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‫בס"ד‬

15th Annual

Shooting Down a Friendly Fighter Plane


BJEC Moot Bet Din, 5784
Rabbi Michael Whitman (rabbi@adath.ca)
Digitized and Annotated by Rabbi David Wallach
September 5, 2023
‫בס"ד‬

I. The Case
II. Introduction to Torah Ethics of Warfare
A. Devarim 23:10-15
B. Devarim 20: 10-20
C. Rambam, Hilchot Melachim 6: 5-7
D. Ramban, commenting on Rambam, Hilchot Melachim 6: 7
E. Tohar HaNeshek Text
F. "Ploughshares into Swords" by Rabbi Yitzchak Blau, Tradition 34:4
G. "I Am the Soldier Who Slept in Your Home" by Yishai Goldflam, National Post,
February 2, 2009
III. Rodef
A. VaYikra 19: 16
B. Rambam, Hilchot Rotze'ach 1: 6-16
C. Sanhedrin 72B
D. The Holocaust and Halachah, by Irving Rosenbaum
E. Mishnah Ohalot 7:6 and 2 interpretations of Sanhedrin 72B
IV. Sheva ben Bichri
A. Shmuel II, Chapter 20
B. Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:12
C. Rambam, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:5
D. Rashi to Sanhedrin 72B,
V. Ba B'Machteret
A. Shemot 22; 1-2,
B. Rambam, Hilchot Geneivah 9:7-12
C. Contemporary Halakhic Problems by Rabbi J. David Bleich
VI. Self Defense
A. Meiri on Sanhedrin 72B
B. Bamidbar 25: 6-15
C. Rabbi Zilberstein vs. Rabbi Eliashev

Ruth & Alex Dworkin BJEC Moot Court Of Jewish Law Beit Din | 5784 1
‫בס"ד‬

I. The Case - Shooting Down a Friendly Fighter Plane

Lieutenant Colonel Shaindy Grunspan is an experienced and decorated pilot in Shaldag,


the elite Israeli Air Force Special Forces. Early this morning, she was sent on a mission to
destroy a terrorist group that had infiltrated Israel from Sinai. Intelligence showed this
group was preparing to fire missiles from within Israel toward Tel Aviv. Once already en route,
the commanders learned the intelligence was mistaken, and the target is actually a troop of IDF
soldiers on a training expedition. However, Grunspan’s plane suffered an inexplicable
communication failure, rendering the pilot unable to receive any message from her base. The
only choices the commanders have is to do nothing and see the mission unfold, killing Israeli
soldiers, or shoot down Captain Grunspan’s fighter plane, sacrificing her life to save the lives
of the IDF soldiers on the ground. Their decision must be made within a very short period of
time.

According to Israeli law, only the Prime Minister of Israel can make such a decision.
Traditionally, the Prime Minister consults with the Air Force Major General in order to reach a
consensus. This is to ensure the decision is based both on what is best for military reasons as
well as political considerations. But, in this case, they are at odds: The Prime Minister wants to
shoot down the plane to protect the IDF soldiers, while the Major General wants to save the life
of Captain Grunspan.

Since they must make a decision very quickly, they both agree to turn to the Israeli Air Force
Bet Din, a panel of three Dayanim. These Dayanim are on constant alert, ready to issue
real-time rulings on operational decisions, as they have expertise in Jewish law,
and specialize in questions of the Ethics of War. You are tasked to write a Brief and argue for
the Prime Minister to shoot down the plane, or the Major General to let the mission unfold,
using sources in classical Jewish Law, for the Bet loin to consider and make an operational
decision. To do so, please relate to the following four groups of sources:

1. Rodef - Does Rodef justify shooting down the plane and killing the pilot?
2. Sheva ben Bichri - Is it permitted to kill one to save many?
3. Ba B'Machteret -Must the danger presented by the pursuer be definite or just probable
to justify killing the pursuer?
4. Self-Defense - Who can take action? Is it only the soldiers on the ground (the potential
victims) defending themselves against the pilot, or can it be a third party (another pilot
in another fighter plane) ordered to do so by the commanders?

I am indebted to Rabbi Chaim Jachter for the idea of this case and some of the sources

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‫בס"ד‬

II. Introduction to Torah Ethics of Warfare

A. Devarim 23:10-15

10 When you go out as a camp against your enemies, ‫ֶיך ְו ִנ ְׁשמַ ְר ָּת‬ ָ ‫איְב‬ ֹ ‫י ִ ּכי־תֵ צֵא מַ חֲ נֶה עַ ל־‬
you must avoid every­thing evil." ‫ִמ ּכֹל ָּדבָר ָרע׃‬
11 Therefore, if a man is unclean because of a nocturnal ‫ש אֲ ֶׁשר לֹא־יִהְ יֶה‬ ָ
ׁ ‫יא ִ ּכי־יִהְ יֶה בְך ִאי‬
emission," he must leave the camp and remain outside. ‫ל־מחו ּץ‬ ִ ֶ‫הור ִמ ְ ּק ֵרה־ ָליְלָה ְו ָיצָא א‬ ֹ ָ‫ט‬
12 Toward evening, he must immerse in a mikvah, and ְ
‫ַמחֲ נֶה לֹא ָיבֹא אֶ ל־תּ ֹוך הַ ַּמחֲ נֶה׃‬ ַּ ‫ל‬
then, when the sun sets, he can enter the camp ‫ַמיִם‬ ָּ ‫ְנות־עֶ ֶרב י ְִרחַ ץ ּב‬ ֹ ‫יב וְהָ יָה לִ פ‬
13 You must designate a place outside the camp to use ‫ש ָיבֹא אֶ ל־תּ ֹוךְ הַ ַּמחֲ נֶה׃‬ ׁ ֶ‫שמ‬ׁ ֶ ּ ַ‫ו ּ ְכבֹא ה‬
as a lavatory. ָ‫ַמחֲ נֶה ְו ָיצָאת‬ ַּ ‫ְך ִמחו ּץ ל‬ ָ ‫יג ְויָד ִ ּתהְ יֶה ל‬
14 You must also keep a spike with your weapons so ‫ש ָּמה חו ּץ׃‬ ׁ ָּ
that then you have to sit down to relieve yourself, you ָ ָ
‫יד ְויָתֵ ד ִ ּתהְ יֶה לְך עַ ל־אֲ ֵזנֶך וְהָ יָה‬
will first dig a hole with it, and then sit down, [and ‫ְת‬ָּ ‫ְת ָך חו ּץ וְחָ פ ְַר ָּתה בָהּ ְו ַׁשב‬ ְּ ‫שב‬ ׁ ִ ‫ְ ּב‬
finally,] cover your excrement ָ‫וְכִ סִּ יתָ אֶ ת־צֵאָ תֶ ך׃‬
15 This is because God, your Lord makes His presence ‫יך ִמתְ הַ ּלֵךְ ּב ְֶק ֶרב‬ ָ ֶ‫הוָה אֱ לֹה‬ ֹ ְ‫טו ִ ּכי י‬
known in your camp, as to deliver you and grant you ָ‫ֶיך ְל ָפנֶיך‬ ָ ‫איְב‬ ֹ ‫מַ חֲ נ ֶָך לְהַ ִצ ּילְך ְולָתֵ ת‬
ָ
victory over your enemy. Your camp must therefore be ָ‫ש ְולֹא־י ְִראֶ ה בְך‬ ׁ ‫דו‬ ֹ ‫ֶיך ָק‬ ָ ‫וְהָ יָה מַ חֲ נ‬
holy. Let Him not see anything lascivious among you, ‫יך׃‬ָ ‫עֶ ְרוַת ָּדבָר ְו ָׁשב מֵ אַ חֲ ֶר‬
and turn away from you.

Ruth & Alex Dworkin BJEC Moot Court Of Jewish Law Beit Din | 5784 3
‫בס"ד‬

B. Devarim 20:10-20
10 When you go out as a camp against your enemies, you must ‫ל־עיר ל ְִה ּלָחֵ ם‬ ִ ֶ‫י־ת ְק ַרב א‬ ִ ‫י ִ ּכ‬
avoid every­thing evil." ‫לום׃‬ ֹ ‫עָ לֶיהָ ו ְָק ָראתָ אֵ לֶיהָ ְל ָׁש‬
11 Therefore, if a man is unclean because of a nocturnal ‫לום ַּתעַ נ ְָך‬ ֹ ‫יא וְהָ יָה ִאם־ ָׁש‬
emission," he must leave the camp and remain outside. ‫וּפָתְ חָ ה לָךְ וְהָ יָה ּכָל־הָ עָ ם‬
12 Toward evening, he must immerse in a mikvah, and then, ‫ְך לָמַ ס‬ ָ ‫הַ נ ִּמְ צָא־בָהּ יִהְ יו ּ ל‬
when the sun sets, he can enter the camp ‫וַעֲ בָדו ָּך׃‬
13 You must designate a place outside the camp to use as a ְ‫יב ו ְִאם־לֹא תַ ְׁשלִ ים ִע ָּמך‬
lavatory. ‫וְעָ ְׂשתָ ה ִע ְּמ ָך ִמלְחָ מָ ה ְוצ ְַר ָּת‬
14 You must also keep a spike with your weapons so that then ‫ֶיה׃‬
ּ ָ ‫עָ ל‬
you have to sit down to relieve yourself, you will first dig a ָ ָ
‫יג וּנְתָ נָהּ יְהוָה אֱ לֹהֶ יך ְ ּביָדֶ ך‬
hole with it, and then sit down, [and finally,] cover your ּ‫ו ְִה ִ ּכיתָ אֶ ת־ ּכָל־זְכו ָּרה‬
excrement ‫לְפִ י־חָ ֶרב׃‬
10 When you near a city to do battle against it, you are to offer ‫שים וְהַ ַּטף‬ ׁ ִ ּ ‫יד ַרק הַ ָנ‬
it peace. ‫וְהַ ּבְהֵ מָ ה ְוכֹל אֲ ֶׁשר יִהְ יֶה‬
11 Should it respond, ‘‘Peace!’’ and open for you, then all the ְ‫ב ִָעיר ּכָל־ ְׁש ָללָהּ ָּתבֹז לָך‬
people found in it will become your payers of tribute, and your ‫ֶיך אֲ ֶׁשר‬ ָ ‫איְב‬ ֹ ‫ְת אֶ ת־ ְׁשלַל‬ ָּ ‫וְאָ ַכל‬
servants. ְ ָ
‫נָתַ ן יְהוָה אֱ לֹהֶ יך לָך׃‬
12 And if it does not settle for peace with you but engages in ‫טו ּכֵן ַּתעֲ ֶׂשה ְלכָל־הֶ עָ ִרים‬
war against you, you shall lay siege to it. ‫חקֹת ִמ ְּמ ָך מְ אֹד אֲ ֶׁשר‬ ֹ ‫הָ ְר‬
13 God, your Lord, will deliver it into your hand, and you will ‫לֹא־מֵ עָ ֵרי הַ ג ֹּויִם־הָ אֵ ּלֶה‬
smite all its males by the sword. ‫הֵ נָּה׃‬
14 However, the women and the children, and the animals, ‫טז ַרק מֵ עָ ֵרי הָ עַ ִ ּמים הָ אֵ ּלֶה‬
and everything that will be in the city—all its booty—are you to ָ ‫יך נֹתֵ ן ל‬
‫ְך‬ ָ ֶ‫אֲ ֶׁשר יְהוָה אֱ לֹה‬
plunder for yourself; you will eat the booty of your enemies ‫נַחֲ לָה לֹא תְ חַ י ֶּה ּכָל־נְ ָׁשמָ ה׃‬
that God, your Lord, gave you. ‫יז ִ ּכי־הַ חֲ ֵרם ַּתחֲ ִרימֵ ם הַ ִח ִ ּתי‬
15 So will you do to all the cities, that are very distant from ‫וְהָ אֱ מ ִֹרי הַ ְּכנַעֲ נִי וְהַ ּפ ְִר ִז ּי‬
you, that are not among the cities of these nations. ‫הַ ִח ִו ּי וְהַ יְבו ִּסי ּכַאֲ ֶׁשר צִ ו ְָּך‬
16 However, from the cities of these peoples that God, your ָ ֶ‫יְהוָה אֱ לֹה‬
‫יך׃‬
Lord, is giving you as inheritance, you are not to leave any ּ ‫ַמדו‬ ְּ ‫יח לְמַ עַ ן אֲ ֶׁשר לֹא־יְל‬
person alive. ‫אֶ תְ כֶם לַעֲ ש ֹׂות ְּככֹל תּ ֹועֲ בֹתָ ם‬
17 Rather annihilate are you to annihilate them: the Chittites ‫שו ּ לֵאלֹהֵ יהֶ ם‬ ׂ ָ‫אֲ ֶׁשר ע‬
and the Emorites, the Canaanites and the Perizites, the ‫וַחֲ טָ אתֶ ם לַיהוָה אֱ לֹהֵ יכֶם׃‬
Chivites and the Yevusites; as Adonoy, your God, commanded )‫(ס‬
you. ‫ל־עיר י ִָמים‬ ִ ֶ‫יט ִ ּכי־תָ צו ּר א‬
18 In order that they do not teach you to do any of their ּ‫ַר ִּבים ל ְִה ּלָחֵ ם עָ לֶיהָ לְתָ ְפ ָׂשה‬
abominations that they did for their gods, and you will sin to ַ‫לֹא־תַ ְׁש ִחית אֶ ת־עֵ צָהּ לִ נְ ּדֹח‬
Adonoy, your God. ‫עָ לָיו ג ּ ְַרזֶן ִ ּכי ִמ ֶּמנּו ּ תֹאכֵל‬
19 If you besiege a city many days to wage war against it, to ‫ֹתו לֹא ִת ְכרֹת ִ ּכי הָ אָ דָ ם עֵ ץ‬ ֹ ‫ְוא‬
capture it, do not harm [any of] its trees by chopping it with an ‫צור׃‬ ֹ ‫ַמ‬ ָ
ָּ ‫שדֶ ה ָלבֹא ִמ ָּפנֶיך ּב‬ ׂ ָ ּ ַ‫ה‬
ax, because you eat from it you are not to cut it down; For, is ‫ר־תדַ ע‬ ֵּ ‫כ ַרק עֵ ץ אֲ ֶׁש‬
the tree in the field a man to join the besieged to escape you? ‫ֹתו‬
ֹ ‫ִ ּכי־לֹא־עֵ ץ מַ אֲ כָל הו ּא א‬
‫צור‬ ֹ ָ‫תַ ְׁש ִחית ְוכ ָָר ָּת ו ּ ָבנִיתָ מ‬

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‫בס"ד‬

20 Only a tree that you know that it is not a fruit tree may you ‫ר־הוא ֹע ָׂשה‬ ִ ‫עַ ל־הָ ִעיר אֲ ֶׁש‬
harm or cut down; and you will build battlements against the ‫ִע ְּמ ָך ִמלְחָ מָ ה עַ ד ִרדְ ָּתהּ ׃‬
city that is waging war against you until it is conquered.

C. Rambam, Hilchot Melachim 6: 5-7


5 Joshua sent three letters to the Canaanites before ‫ְהו ֻׁשעַ עַ ד‬ֹ ‫ה ְׁשלֹ ָׁשה ּכְתָ בִ ים ָׁשלַח י‬
entering the promised land: At first, he sent them: ‫ הָ ִראש ֹׁון ָׁשלַח‬.‫ֶׁש ּלֹא ִנ ְכנַס לָאָ ֶרץ‬
'Whoever desires to flee, should flee.' .‫רוצֶה לִ ְברֹחַ ִיב ְַרח‬ ֹ ‫לָהֶ ם ִמי ֶׁש‬
Afterwards, he sent a second message: 'Whoever desires to ‫רוצֶה לְהַ ְׁשלִ ים‬ ֹ ‫וְחָ זַר ְו ָׁשלַח ִמי ֶׁש‬
accept a peaceful settlement, should make peace.' ‫רוצֶה‬ ֹ ‫ וְחָ זַר ְו ָׁשלַח ִמי ֶׁש‬.‫יַ ְׁשלִ ים‬
Then, he sent again: 'Whoever desires war, should do ‫ ִאם ּכֵן‬.‫לַעֲ ש ֹׂות ִמלְחָ מָ ה יַעֲ ֶׂשה‬
battle.' .‫ְעון‬ ֹ ‫ִמ ּ ְפנֵי מָ ה הֶ עֱ ִרימו ּ ֹיו ְׁשבֵי ִּגב‬
If so, why did the inhabitants of Gibeon employ a ruse? ‫שלַח לָהֶ ם ַ ּב ְּכלָל ְולֹא‬ ָּׁ ‫לְפִ י ֶׁש‬
Because originally, when he sent the message to them as ‫ ְולֹא יָדְ עו ּ ִמ ְׁש ּפַט ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל‬.ּ ‫ִק ּבְלו‬
part of all the Canaanite nations, they did not accept. They ‫שו ּב אֵ ין פ ֹּותְ ִחין לָהֶ ם‬ ּׁ ‫ו ְִדמּ ו ּ ֶׁש‬
were not aware of the laws of Israel and thought that they ‫ָמה ָק ָׁשה הַ ָּדבָר‬ ָּ ‫ ְול‬.‫לום‬ ֹ ‫ְל ָׁש‬
would never be offered a peaceful settlement again. ‫יאים ו ְָראו ּ ֶׁש ָראו ּי לְהַ כ ֹּותָ ם‬ ִ ‫ש‬ ׂ ִ ּ ְ‫ַלנ‬
Why was the matter difficult for the princes of Israel to ‫ ִמ ּ ְפנֵי‬.‫שבו ּעָ ה‬ ְּׁ ַ‫לְפִ י חֶ ֶרב לוּלֵי ה‬
accept to the point that they desired to slay the Gibeonites ‫ֶׁש ּכ ְָרתו ּ לָהֶ ם ּב ְִרית וַהֲ ֵרי הו ּא‬
by the sword were it not for the oath they had taken? ‫ ב) "לֹא ִת ְכרֹת‬,‫אומֵ ר (דברים ז‬ ֹ
Because they made a covenant with them and ‫לָהֶ ם ּב ְִרית" אֶ ּלָא הָ יָה ִ ּדינָם‬
Deuteronomy 7:2 states 'Do not make a covenant with ‫ְהו ִאיל‬ ֹ ‫ ו‬.‫ֶׁשי ִּהְ יו ּ לְמַ ס עֲ ב ִָדים‬
them.' Rather, the laws governing their status would have ‫וּבְטָ עו ּת ִנ ְׁש ּבְעו ּ לָהֶ ן ּב ְִדין הָ יָה‬
prescribed that they be subjugated as servants. ‫ֶׁשי ֵּהָ ְרגו ּ עַ ל ֶׁש ִהטְ עו ּם לוּלֵי ִח ּלו ּל‬
Since the oath was given to them under false pretenses, it :‫שם‬ ֵּׁ ַ‫ה‬
would have been just to slay them for misleading them,
were it not for the dishonor to God's name which would ‫ּמואָ ב אֵ ין ש ֹׁול ְִחין לָהֶ ם‬ ֹ ‫ו עַ מּ ֹון ו‬
have been caused. )‫ ז‬,‫לום ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (דברים כג‬ ֹ ‫ְל ָׁש‬
‫טבָתָ ם ּכָל‬ ֹ ‫ש ְׁשלֹמָ ם ְו‬ ׁ ‫"לֹא ִתדְ ר‬
6 No offer of a peaceful settlement should be made to ‫ אָ מְ רו ּ חֲ כ ִָמים לְפִ י‬."‫יך‬ ָ ֶ‫יָמ‬
Ammon and Moav, as Deuteronomy 23:7 states: 'Do not ָ‫ י) "ו ְָק ָראת‬,‫ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (דברים כ‬
seek their peace and welfare for all your days.' Our Sages ‫ּמואָ ב‬ ֹ ‫ָכול עַ מּ ֹון ו‬ ֹ ‫לום" י‬ ֹ ‫אֵ לֶיהָ ְל ָׁש‬
declared: Although it is written: 'Offer a peaceful ‫ש‬
ׁ ‫לומַ ר לֹא ִתדְ ר‬ ֹ ‫ ַּתלְמו ּד‬.‫ּכֵן‬
settlement,' does this apply to Ammon and Moab? The ‫ לְפִ י ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר‬.‫טבָתָ ם‬ ֹ ‫ְׁשלֹמָ ם ְו‬
Torah states: 'Do not seek their peace and welfare.' ‫"ע ְּמ ָך ֵי ֵׁשב‬ ִ )‫ יז‬,‫(דברים כג‬
Although it is written 'He must be allowed to live alongside ‫ יז) " ּבַטּ ֹוב‬,‫ְך" (דברים כג‬ ָ ‫ּב ְִק ְר ּב‬
you in you midst,' (Deuteronomy 23:17) does this apply to ‫ּמואָ ב‬ ֹ ‫ָכול עַ מּ ֹון ו‬ ֹ ‫ י‬."ּ ‫לו לֹא תּ ֹו ֶננּו‬ ֹ
Ammon and Moav? No, the Torah also forbids 'their ‫ וְאַ ף עַ ל‬.‫טבָתָ ם‬ ֹ ‫לומַ ר ְו‬ ֹ ‫ּכֵן ַּתלְמו ּד‬
welfare.' ‫לומָ ם ִאם‬ ֹ ‫ִ ּפי ֶׁשאֵ ין ש ֹׁואֲ לִ ים ִּב ְׁש‬
Even though we should not offer them a peaceful ‫ִה ְׁשלִ ימו ּ מֵ עַ צְמָ ם ְּת ִח ּלָה מְ קַ ּבְלִ ין‬
settlement, if they sue for peace themselves, we may :‫אותָ ן‬ ֹ
accept their offer.
‫ אֵ ין‬. ּ‫ז ְּכ ֶׁשצ ִָּרין עַ ל ִעיר לְתָ ְפ ָׂשה‬
7 When a siege is placed around a city to conquer it, it ָ‫ּחותֶ יה‬
ֹ ‫אותָ הּ מֵ אַ ְר ּבַע רו‬ֹ ‫מַ קִּ יפִ ין‬
should not be surrounded on all four sides, only on three. ‫ִּיחין‬
ִ ‫ ו ּמַ נ‬. ָ‫ּחותֶ יה‬
ֹ ‫ש רו‬ׁ ֹ‫של‬ָּׁ ‫אֶ ּלָא ִמ‬

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A place should be left for the inhabitants to flee and for all ‫קום ַלב ֹּו ֵרחַ ו ּ ְלכָל ִמי ֶׁשי ְִּרצֶה‬ ֹ ָ‫מ‬
those who desire, to escape with their lives, as it is written ‫ ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר‬.‫ל ְִה ָּמלֵט עַ ל נַ ְפש ֹׁו‬
Numbers 31:7: 'And they besieged Midian as God ‫ ז) " ַו ִּי ְצ ּבְאו ּ עַ ל ִמדְ יָן‬,‫(במדבר לא‬
commanded Moses.' According to tradition, He ‫ ִמ ִ ּפי‬."‫ּכַאֲ ֶׁשר צִ ו ָּה ה' אֶ ת מ ֶׁשה‬
commanded them to array the siege as described. :ּ ‫שמו ּעָ ה לָמְ דו ּ ֶׁש ְ ּבכָךְ צִ ו ָּהו‬ְּׁ ַ‫ה‬

D. Ramban, commenting on Rambam, Hilchot Melachim 6: 7 cited in


The Bounds of Wartime Military Conduct in Jewish Law: An Expansive Conception
Book by Michael Broyde, pg. 28

The obligation to seek peace in the manner outlined above applies to battles between armies
where no civilian population is involved. Jewish law requires an additional series of overtures
for peace and surrender in situations where the military activity involves attacking cities
populated by civilians: Maimonides states:

Joshua, before he entered the land of lsrael sent three letters to its inhabitants. The
first one said that those that wish to flee [the oncoming army] should flee. The second
one said that those that wish to make peace should make peace. The third letter said
that those that want to fight a war should prepare to fight a war
(Hilkhot Melakhim 6:5)

Nor was the general obligation to warn the civilian population enough to fulfill the obligation:
Maimonides codifies a number of specific rules (;)f military ethics, all based on Talmudic
sources:

When one surrounds· a city to lay siege to it, it is prohibited to surround


it from four sides; only three sides are permissible. One must leave a place for
inhabitants to flee for all those who wish to abscond to save their life
(Hilkhot Melakhim 6:1)

Nahmanides elaborates on this obligation in a way which clearly explains the


moral rationale by stating:

God commanded us that when we lay siege to a city that we leave one
of the sides without a siege so as to give them a place to flee to. It is
from this commandment that we learn to deal with compassion even with
our enemies even at time of war, in addition, by giving our enemies a
place to flee to, they will not charge at us with as much force

‫מצוה חמישית שנצטוינו כשנצור על עיר להניח אחת מן הרוחות בלי מצור שאם ירצו לברוח‬
‫יהיה להם דרך לנוס משם כי בזה נלמוד להתנהג בחמלה אפילו עם אויבינו בעת המלחמה ובו‬
‫עוד תקון שנפתח להם פתח שיברחו ולא יתחזקו לקראתינו‬

Nahmanides believes that this obligation is so basic as to require that it be one of the 613
fundamental biblical commandments in Jewish law. However, Nahmanides clearly limits
this ethical obligation to Authorized and not Obligatory

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E. Tohar HaNeshek Text" (IDF Code of Ethics)

The IDF serviceman will use force of arms only for the purpose of subduing the enemy to the
necessary extent and will limit his use of force so as to prevent unnecessary harm to human life
and limb, dignity and property.

The IDF servicemen's purity of arms is their self-control in use of armed force. They will use
their arms only for the purpose of achieving their mission, without inflicting unnecessary
injury to human life or limb; dignity or property, of both soldiers and civilians, with special
consideration for the defenseless, whether in wartime, or during routine security operations,
or in the absence of combat, or times of peace1

F. Ploughshares into Swords" by Rabbi Yitzchak Blau2, Tradition 34:4, p. 10

AUTHOR’S NOTE: When Jewish communities are threatened, we rightfully incline towards
communal unity and are reluctant to engage in internal criticism. In the wake of recent events
in Israel, some of which I have witnessed firsthand, one might question the appropriateness of
publishing this article. Nevertheless, the article remains timely. It attempts to correct a
perceived misrepresentation of yahadut (Judaism), irrespective of political issues, and such a
step is always relevant. Furthermore, the decision to delay our own moral questioning during
difficult times could lead in modern Israel to a de facto decision never to raise such questions.
Finally and most significantly, times of heightened anger, frustration and fear can cause cracks
in the moral order to widen into chasms. I hope the reader will agree that the issues analyzed
in the article remain very much worthy of discussion.
The article does not advocate a particular political approach. While readers of a dovish
inclination will no doubt find the article more congenial, it is the more right wing readers who
truly stand to benefit from the discussion. It is precisely the militant excesses of the dati le’umi
(national religious) world that enable and lead others to ignore their legitimate criticisms. The
ability to combine a more right wing political view with a more moderate expression of
Judaism would be both a kiddush hashem (sanctification of God’s name through morally
correct behaviour) and more successful politically as well.

“In this situation of war for the land of our life and our eternal freedom, the
perfected form of our renewal appears: not just as the People of the Book—the
galuti description given us by the gentiles— but rather as God’s nation, the holy
1
The Spirit of the IDF: The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, 1995 version (emphasis
added). It is worth noting that when the code was rewritten in: concise, bullet-point form in 2001, the
language of the Purity of Arms clause was updated: Purity of Arms: IDF servicemen and women will use
their weapons and force only for the purpose of their mission, only to the necessary extent and will
maintain their humanity even during combat. IDF soldiers will not use their weapons and force to harm
human beings who are not combatants or prisoners of war, and will do all in their power to avoid causing
harm to their lives, bodies, dignity, and property
2
Rabbi Yitzchak Blau is current Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Orayta in Jerusalem

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nation, possessors of the Divine Torah implanted therein, for whom the Book and
the Sword descended intertwined from the heavens ... the men of the Sword
cannot be detached arid exempt from the Book, which is the strength of our lives
and the length of our days, and the People of the Book cannot be detached and
exempt from the Sword, when it [the Sword] is enjoined by this holy source of life
itself.” (R. Zvi Yehuda Kook3)

The words above, delivered in a 1948 speech, herald a paradigm shift in the thinking of
sections of the religious community in the wake of the formation of a Jewish state. The
designation of the Jews as “the People of the Book,” is no longer our primary source of pride
and becomes but an incomplete portrayal of Jewish ideals. The Sword, frequently looked down
upon as the instrument of violence and death, becomes a crucial supplement to the Book. Jews
must take Book and Sword in hand in their quest to achieve renewal.
R. Zvi Yehuda took the image of Sword and Book descending together from Sifrei
(Devarim 11:13) and transformed the image from its original midrashic usage. In the midrash,
God does not give man both as instruments for human use. Rather, God says that if we do not
keep what is written in the Book, we will be punished by the Sword. The need to read the
midrash as advocating humans taking up the Sword stems from the novel reality presented to
Jews in the twentieth century.
The formation of the State of Israel posed fresh challenges to religious Jewry in
both the halakhic and aggadic spheres. The first organized Jewish army in almost two
millennia turned our attention back to the Rambam’s hilkhot Melakhim: long neglected
laws applied to present-day warfare. The existence of a Jewish army also inspired a
search for midrashim about the saints who excel in both the bet midrash and on the
battlefield. As the State’s hostile neighbors made maintaining a strong army a necessity,
it became imperative to show that valor in battle did not contradict the ideal image of the
pious Jew. Tanakh helpfully provided many examples of righteous forefathers who also
successfully took Sword in hand.
The renewal of Jewish autonomy in a geographical area also populated by other
nationalities created its own halakhic and aggadic issues. Halakhot pertaining to a Jewish court
system, a non-Jewish minority in Israel and other thorny problems received extensive
attention. On an aggadic level, the desire to find the appropriate context within which to
thank God for the gift of the State led to a search for midrashim about the significance of Jewish
self-rule and of living in the Holy Land.
Of course, the phenomenon described above reflects the enduring and dynamic nature
of halakha and aggada. The Jewish tradition provides enough material for guidance through all
legal and philosophical problems that arise in the vicissitudes of time. However, the
excitement and enthusiasm generated by a new situation can create dangers as well. Values
that receive renewed emphasis can move beyond legitimate expression to the point where
other necessary balancing values are ignored. An overemphasis on military valor can lead to an
idealization of war and a delegitimization of the striving for peace. A constant focus on Jewish

3
Zvi Yehuda Kook was a prominent ultranationalist Orthodox rabbi. He was the son of Abraham Isaac
Kook, the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi of British Mandatory Palestine. Both father and son are credited with
developing Kookian Zionism, which became the dominant form of Religious Zionism

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sovereignty can erode important moral constraints about ruling over other populations.
Significant segments of the current dati le’ummi community suffer greatly from this lack of
balance.
A number of writers have pointed out some of the extreme and dangerous excesses in
contemporary Religious Zionist circles. We need not list them here because most readers will
not need convincing that rabbinic statements downplaying the severity of killing non-Jews or
praising acts of terrorism committed by Jews are extremely problematic. Indeed, most dati
le’ummi thinkers reject these positions. There is, however, a more subtle danger in the shift to
idealize the Sword. The search to create a midrash, as it were, about the paramount
significance of Jewish autonomy and Jewish army heroics, I fear, has led to a worrying
imbalance in some Religious Zionist circles. In these circles, there is an attempt to quiet all
moral qualms in pursuing the Religious Zionist goal.
The following pages illustrate this spirit. The published writings of some prominent
community rabbis, heads of Yeshivot Hesder and Havrei Knesset4 from the world of Religious
Zionism join together to create a distortion of emphasis regarding the role of war and peace,
the relationship between Jew and gentile and the place of morality in the halakhic system.
While some of the quotes taken in isolation would prove quite harmless, it is in the cumulative
effect of these voices on the community that the danger lies. With a couple of exceptions, I will
limit my citations to fairly well known names in the dati le’ummi world. This will demonstrate
the prominent role these ideas play in the sociological group under discussion.
At the same time, we must be wary of painting an entire community with the same
brush. The term Religious Zionist incorporates a multitude of different views and a perusal of
the literature reveals writers from either side of the political spectrum whose writings are free
of the faults mentioned above. Furthermore, not all of the people criticized in this paper
deserve identical treatment. R. Dov Lior and R. Shlomo Aviner certainly write about peace
with different voices. However, despite the diversity among Religious Zionists, this paper
argues that the problems are widespread enough to cause concern.
We shall look at three problematic aspects in these writers' employment of traditional
sources. First, though different times call for different emphases, there must be some limit on
one-sided portrayal of a given issue. If a writer constantly cites one theme, and totally ignores
a balancing theme prominently featured in Jewish sources, his or her writing approaches
distortion. Second, these writers often cite a source reflecting a theme clearly opposed to their
own viewpoint in order to reread that source as a support for their outlook. This paper argues
that these new interpretations consist of strained attempts to change the obvious meaning of a
text. Finally, even when a specific interpretation is justifiable, we should be concerned about
the moral effect that focusing on certain themes might have on our community. We shall
return to these three problems towards the end of the paper.

WAR

Judaism clearly rejects the extreme pacifism of a Gandhi, as the halakha includes the
categories of both a mandated war and a permissible war. However, the halakha also
insures that no capricious wars are fought by requiring a Jewish government considering
a permissible war to receive first the approval of the Sanhedrin and possibly the Urim
4
Members of Israeli Parliament

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ve-Tumim5 as well. R Moshe Feinstein extends the need for Divine sanction to the
mandated war and thus concludes that the only halakhically legitimate war today is a war
of self-defense. Furthermore, admitting the need for war need not conflict with
maintaining distaste for military endeavor.
A number of classical sources indicate a Jewish revulsion toward war and its
implements. The Sages refused to let people walk outside on Shabbat wearing their
weapons as “they are nothing but a disgrace.” ( Shabbat 63a). Rashi and Ramban explain
that the prohibition of employing hewn stones for the altar reflects our recoil from
associating the house of God with the violent Sword needed to cut the stones." According
to the account in Divrei Ha-Yamim (I 22:8), David could not build the temple due to the
blood he spilled in his many battles.
Furthermore, Hazal tellingly regularly reinterpret military feats of biblical heroes in
spiritual terms. The “Sword and the bow” (Bereshit 48:22) with which Yaakov defeated the
Emorites were prayer and good works (Bereshit Rabba 97:6). Benayahu’s vanquishing of the
strong men of Moav (Shemuel II 23:2) refers to his study of Torah (Berakhot 18b). The sixty
strong ones who surround Shlomo’s bed (Shir ha-Shirim 3:6) are the letters in the priestly
blessing (Shir ha-Shirim Rabba 3:6). Apparently, Hazal want to emphasize that Jewish heroism
occurs primarily in the study hall and the synagogue, not on the battlefield. Indeed, they view
weapons as the implements of Esav, inappropriate in Jewish hands (Bereshit Rabba 98:5).
Many dati le’ummi thinkers, who view the existence of war as a significant part of
religious reality, feel the need to shift the tone of these sources. R. Eliahu Zini, rabbi of the
Technion, argues that David himself offered this reason for his inability to construct the
temple but that no prophet ever said it. However, R. Zini’s attempt to remove any negative
sentiments about war from the biblical text proves unsuccessful for three reasons. 1) Major
rishonim such as the Rambam, Ramban, Ibn Ezra, and others accept David’s explanation for
why he could not build the temple. Ibn Ezra even employs the verse to illustrate that Judaism
takes the lives of gentiles seriously. 2) While it is true that David states the idea in question
and neither God nor prophet ever explicitly confirms it, David prefaces his remarks by saying
“the word of God came upon me.” Why doubt him! 3) Even if we accept the suggestion that it
was David’s idea—and his alone—David himself, as a model for the Jewish warrior, can also
instruct us regarding Jewish values.
Rav Abraham Balas, an author and regular contributor to Me’at Min ha-Or, argues
against the humanistic reading of Divrei ha-Yamim much more forcefully. According to R.
Balas, “the blood that David spilled, [the blood] that was spilled for the defense and revival of
Israel, did not diminish in the slightest the purity of the soul or righteousness of the path of
King David. On the contrary, it raised his value.” R. Balas claims that David could not build the
Temple because then people would think that his wars only had the instrumental value of
enabling the construction of the Temple. In fact, wars have intrinsic value in expressing Jewish
sovereignty. Where R. Zini attempts to neutralize the anti war sentiment in Divrei ha-yamim,
R. Balas turns the message on its head in order to generate a radical endorsement of military
endeavor.

5
Part of the breastplate of the Cohen Gadol (High Priest) that would be consulted on matters of Jewish
law

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Rav Yaakov Medan, Ram (teacher) in Har Etzion, offers a novel explanation for why
Hazal keep converting military feats into prayer and study. R. Medan writes “in places where
the Sword appears, according to the simple reading of the text, the midrash comes and drags
after it [the Sword], and intertwines within it, the Torah; and thus, wherever we find the
Sword of the Divine wars, Torah is there.” He ignores the more obvious possibility that Hazal
want us to think of the biblical great men we must emulate as scholars and saints rather than as
warriors.

EFFECTS OF WAR

Many Jewish sources express concern about the moral erosion that war and violence
bring to a society. Rambam views the many mitsvot addressed to the soldier as the
Torah’s attempt to deal with the moral decay associated with wartime. Ramban suggests
that the mitzvah of “ve-nishmarta me-kol davar ra6” specifically demands extra
diligence, so that our soldiers not fall prey to the violent tendencies unleashed in battle.
Neither of them assumes that Jews can easily escape these moral difficulties.
In his Shemoneh Perakim7 Rambam employs the example of David to prove that a
prophet need not possess all moral attributes. God communicated with David despite David’s
trait of akhzariyyut8, the trait that disqualified him from building the Bet Hamikdash. Rambam
clearly accepts the conventional reading of the verses in Divrei Ha-Yamim, unlike R. Balas and
R. Zini. More significantly, Rambam highlights the negative effects of war on the moral
personality.
R. Naftali Tsvi Yehuda Berlin famously comments that the “brit shalom” given to
Pinhas after killing Zimri9, and the promise of mercy adjacent to the mitsva of completely
destroying an ir ha -niddahat10, reflect God’s promise that these acts of aggression will not
corrupt the personality of Pinhas nor the court that executes the ir ha -niddahat. He
emphasizes that it was Pinhas’ acting “Ie-shem shamayim” out of the noblest motivations,
that enabled him to receive this “berit shalom” and maintain his peaceful personality. Clearly,
even if we extend this idea of the Net5iV to every Jew engaged in a moral war, the “Ie-shem
shamayim” component needed to remain uncorrupted will not be achieved by every Jewish
soldier.
Nevertheless, R. Dov Lior, Rosh Yeshiva in Kiryat Arba, dismisses the notion that army
maneuvers that harm civilians might have negative moral consequences for the soldiers
involved. R. Lior turns the Netsiv’s idea into a Divine guarantee of Jewish incorruptibility.
R. Lior writes that “the attribute of compassion is a hereditary trait of Am Yisrael…one
inherits this characteristic without ever having to learn it”. According to R. Lior, Jews proceed

6
Devarim 23:10 - When you go out as a troop against your enemies, be on your guard against anything
untoward.
7
“Eight Chapters” - Rambam's introduction to Pirkei Avot
8
Cruelty
9
Bamidbar 25:12
10
The Ir nidachat is a biblical commandment (Devarim 13:13-19) that states that if the inhabitants of an
Israelite city become idol worshippers, they and their livestock must be slaughtered and the city be burnt
to the ground, never to be rebuilt.

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through life without any need to work on their moral selves, having been biologically assured
of their moral superiority.

PEACE

A multitude of talmudic and midrashic sources extolling the virtues of peace with a
hyperbole beyond the rabbinic norm. The gemara views the promotion of peace as the
purpose of the entire Torah (Gittin 59b). According to one midrash, God commended
Moshe for sending peace overtures in defiance of a Divine command to wage war
(Bemidbar Rabba 19:29). According to a different midrash (Bereshit Rabba 38:6) , the
peace formed between idol worshipers saves them from Divine punishment.
Some Religious Zionists, however, present a different picture. R. Balas attempts to
radically redefine peace. In response to a question about peace with Egypt, R. Balas says
“True, we achieved a peace of a few months. Whoever was privileged to be in Yamit in its last
months before the evacuation saw what peace is. Peace is a vision, a joy, a boundless love for
the people and the land and a life full of Torah, joy and pioneering spirit. The Jewish goal of
peace refers to the settling of Yamit.
Another approach limits the celebration of peace to the complete peace achieved in the
messianic era and rejects any partial peace as worthless. R. Yaakov Ariel, Rav of Ramat Gan,
writes “Peace that is not founded on the shared belief in, and concept of, one God is not an
authentic and lasting peace ... a Jew who believes in the true worth of peace is not willing to
exchange it for a phony peace of trips to the pyramids, eating and dancing or even the loftier
concept of easing the security burden which is also an issue of material comfort.” 26 R. Ariel
ignores the possibility that an ethical desire to prevent killing may not be founded on shared
theological assumptions.
A striking irony emerges from R. Ariel’s argument. He identifies with a religious group
that proclaims the arrival of the messianic era despite the incomplete nature of our current
redemption. This group demands that we celebrate our current achievement even as we wait
patiently for the rest of the messianic process to unfold. However, when it comes to peace, it
adopts an all-or-nothing approach in which any pale substitute for the messianic utopia must
be rejected.

G. "I Am the Soldier Who Slept in Your Home" by Yishai Goldflam, National Post,
February 2, 2009

From an Israeli Soldier, An Open Letter to A citizen Of Gaza

Hello,

While the world watches the ruins in Gaza, you return to your home, which remains standing.
However, I am sure that it is clear to you that someone was in your home while you were away.

I am that someone.

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I spent long hours imagining how you would react when you walked into your home. How you
would feel when you understood that IDF soldiers had slept on your mattresses and used your
blankets to keep warm.

I knew that it would make you angry and sad and that you would feel this violation of the most
intimate areas of your life by those defined as your enemies, with stinging humiliation. I am
convinced that you hate me with unbridled hatred, and you do not have even the tiniest desire
to hear what I have to say. At the same time, it is important for me to say the following in the
hope that there is even the minutest chance that you will hear me.

I spent many days in your home. You and your family’s presence was felt in every corner. I saw
your family portraits on the wall, and I thought of my family. I saw your wife’s perfume bottles
on the bureau, and I thought of my wife. I saw your children’s toys and their English language
schoolbooks. I saw your personal computer and how you set up the modem and wireless phone
next to the screen, just as I do.

I wanted you to know that despite the immense disorder you found in your house that was
created during a search for explosives and tunnels (which were indeed found in other homes),
we did our best to treat your possessions with respect. When I moved the computer table, I
disconnected the cables and lay them down neatly on the floor, as I would do with my own
computer. I even covered the computer from dust with a piece of cloth. I tried to put back the
clothes that fell when we moved the closet although not the same as you would have done, but
at least in such a way that nothing would get lost.

I know that the devastation, the bullet holes in your walls and the destruction of those homes
near you place my descriptions in a ridiculous light. Still, I need you to understand me, us, and
hope that you will channel your anger and criticism to the right places.

I decided to write you this letter specifically because I stayed in your home.

I can surmise that you are intelligent and educated and there are those in your household that
are university students. Your children learn English, and you are connected to the Internet.
You are not ignorant; you know what is going on around you.

Therefore, I am sure you know that Qassam rockets were launched from your neighborhood
into Israeli towns and cities.

How could you see these weekly launches and not think that one day we would say "enough"?!
Did you ever consider that it is perhaps wrong to launch rockets at innocent civilians trying to
lead a normal life, much like you? How long did you think we would sit back without reacting?

I can hear you saying "it’s not me, it’s Hamas". My intuition tells me you are not their most
avid supporter. If you look closely at the sad reality in which your people live, and you do not
try to deceive yourself or make excuses about "occupation", you must certainly reach the
conclusion that the Hamas is your real enemy.

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The reality is so simple, even a seven year old can understand: Israel withdrew from the Gaza
strip, removing military bases and its citizens from Gush Katif. Nonetheless, we continued to
provide you with electricity, water, and goods (and this I know very well as during my reserve
duty I guarded the border crossings more than once, and witnessed hundreds of trucks full of
goods entering a blockade-­‐free Gaza every day).

Despite all this, for reasons that cannot be understood and with a lack of any rational logic,
Hamas launched missiles on Israeli towns. For three years we clenched our teeth and
restrained ourselves. In the end, we could not take it anymore and entered the Gaza strip, into
your neighborhood, in order to remove those who want to kill us. A reality that is painful but
very easy to explain.

As soon as you agree with me that Hamas is your enemy and because of them, your people are
miserable, you will also understand that the change must come from within. I am acutely
aware of the fact that what I say is easier to write than to do, but I do not see any other way.
You, who are connected to the world and concerned about your children’s education, must
lead, together with your friends, a civil uprising against Hamas.

I swear to you, that if the citizens of Gaza were busy paving roads, building schools, opening
factories and cultural institutions instead of dwelling in self pity, arms smuggling and
nurturing a hatred to your Israeli neighbors, your homes would not be in ruins right now. If
your leaders were not corrupt and motivated by hatred, your home would not have been
harmed. If someone would have stood up and shouted that there is no point in launching
missiles on innocent civilians, I would not have to stand in your kitchen as a soldier.

You don’t have money, you tell me? You have more than you can imagine.

Even before Hamas took control of Gaza, during the time of Yasser Arafat, millions if not
billions of dollars donated by the world community to the Palestinians was used for purchasing
arms or taken directly to your leaders bank accounts. Gulf States, the emirates -­‐ your
brothers, your flesh and blood, are some of the richest nations in the world. If there was even a
small feeling of solidarity between Arab nations, if these nations had but the smallest interest
in reconstructing the Palestinian people – your situation would be very different.

You must be familiar with Singapore. The land mass there is not much larger than the Gaza
strip and it is considered to be the second most populated country in the world. Yet, Singapore
is a successful, prospering, and well managed country. Why not the same for you?

My friend, I would like to call you by name, but I will not do so publicly. I want you to know
that I am 100% at peace with what my country did, what my army did, and what I did.
However, I feel your pain. I am sorry for the destruction you are finding in your neighborhood
at this moment. On a personal level, I did what I could to minimize the damage to your home
as much as possible.

In my opinion, we have a lot more in common than you might imagine. I am a civilian, not a
soldier, and in my private life I have nothing to do with the military. However, I have an
obligation to leave my home, put on a uniform, and protect my family every time we are
attacked. I have no desire to be in your home wearing a uniform again and I would be more

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than happy to sit with you as a guest on your beautiful balcony, drinking sweet tea seasoned
with the sage growing in your garden.

The only person who could make that dream a reality is you. Take responsibility for yourself,
your family, your people, and start to take control of your destiny. How? I do not know. Maybe
there is something to be learned from the Jewish people who rose up from the most destructive
human tragedy of the 20th century, and instead of sinking into self-­‐pity, built a flourishing
and prospering country. It is possible, and it is in your hands. I am ready to be there to provide
a shoulder of support and help to you.

But only you can move the wheels of history.

Regards, Yishai

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III - Rodef

A. VaYikra 19: 16
Do not go around as a gossiper among your people.Do not ‫מ֖ד‬ ָ ‫לֹא־תֵ ֵל֤ךְ ָרכִ יל֙ ּבְעַ ֶּמ‬
ֹ ֲ‫֔יך לֹ֥א תַ ע‬
stand idly by when your neighbor’s life is in danger. I am ֹ ְ‫עַ ל־ ַּד֣ם ֵרעֶ ָ֑ך אֲ ִנ֖י י‬
‫ה ָוֽה׃‬
God

B. Rambam, Hilchot Rotze'ach 1: 6-16


6 When does the above apply? When the person has already ‫ַמה ְּדב ִָרים אֲ מו ִּרים ְ ּב ֶׁשעָ בַר‬ ֶּ ‫ו ּב‬
transgressed and performed the transgression for which he is ‫וְעָ ָׂשה הֶ עָ ֹון ֶׁשחַ י ָּב עָ לָיו ִמיתַ ת‬
liable to be executed by the court. When, however, a person ‫ֵרו‬
ֹ ‫רודֵ ף אַ חַ ר חֲ ב‬ ֹ ָ‫ אֲ בָל ה‬.‫ּבֵית ִ ּדין‬
is pursuing a colleague with the intention of killing him - ‫רודֵ ף ָקטָ ן‬ ֹ ָ‫לְהָ ְר ֹגו אֲ פִ ּלו ּ הָ יָה ה‬
even if the pursuer is a minor - every Jewish person is ‫הֲ ֵרי ּכָל ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל מְ ֻצ ִו ּין לְהַ ִצ ּיל‬
commanded to attempt to save the person being pursued, ֹ ָ‫הַ נ ְִּר ָּדף ִמיַּד ה‬
‫רודֵ ף וַאֲ פִ ּלו ּ ְ ּבנַ ְפש ֹׁו‬
even if it is necessary to kill the pursuer. :‫רודֵ ף‬ ֹ ‫ֶׁשל‬

7 What is implied? If the rodef was warned and continues to ‫ ִאם ִהז ְִהירו ּהו ּ וַהֲ ֵרי‬.‫ז ּכֵיצַד‬
pursue his intended victim, even though he did not ‫רודֵ ף אַ חֲ ָריו אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁש ּלֹא‬ ֹ ‫הו ּא‬
acknowledge the warning, since he continues his pursuit he ‫ִק ּבֵל עָ לָיו הַ תְ ָראָ ה ּכֵיוָן ֶׁשעֲ דַ יִן‬
should be killed. ‫ ו ְִאם‬.‫רודֵ ף הֲ ֵרי זֶה נֶהֱ ָרג‬ ֹ ‫הו ּא‬
If it is possible to save the pursued by damaging one of the ‫ילו ּבְאֵ יבָר מֵ אֵ יב ְֵרי‬ ֹ ּ ‫ְכולִ ים לְהַ ִצ‬ ֹ ‫י‬
limbs of the rodef, one should. Thus, if one can strike him ‫או‬ֹ ‫תו ּבְחֵ ץ‬ ֹ ‫או‬ֹ ּ ‫ְגון ֶׁשיַ ּ ּכו‬ ֹ ‫רודֵ ף ּכ‬ ֹ ָ‫ה‬
with an arrow, a stone or a sword, and cut off his hand, ‫ָדו‬
ֹ ‫ִקטְ עו ּ אֶ ת י‬ ְ ‫או ּבְסַ יִף ְוי‬ ֹ ‫ּבְאֶ בֶן‬
break his leg, blind him or in another way prevent him from ‫או יְסַ מּ ו ּ אֶ ת‬ ֹ ‫ְלו‬ ֹ ‫או ִי ְׁש ּבְרו ּ אֶ ת ַרג‬ ֹ
achieving his objective, one should do so. ‫ְכולִ ין‬ֹ ‫ ו ְִאם [אֵ ינָן] י‬.‫שין‬ ׂ ִ ‫עו‬ ֹ ‫ינו‬
ֹ ֵ‫ע‬
If there is no way to be precise in one's aim and save the ‫ילו אֶ ּלָא ִאם ּכֵן‬ ֹ ּ ‫ְל ַכו ֵּן וּלְהַ ִצ‬
person being pursued without killing the rodef, one should ‫הו ְרגִ ין‬ ֹ ּ ‫ַרודֵ ף הֲ ֵרי אֵ ּלו‬ ֹ ‫הֲ ָרגו ּהו ּ ל‬
kill him, even though he has not yet killed his victim. This is ‫תו אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁשעֲ דַ יִן לֹא הָ ַרג‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ
implied by Deuteronomy 25:11-12, which states: "If a man is ‫ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (דברים כה יב) "וְקַ צ ֹּתָ ה‬
fighting with his brother, and the wife of one... grabs the :"‫חוס עֵ ינ ֶָך‬ ֹ ָ‫אֶ ת ַּכ ּפָהּ לֹא ת‬
attacker by his private parts, you must cut off her hand; you
may not show pity." ‫ח אֶ חָ ד ִּבמְ בו ּ ָׁשיו וְאֶ חָ ד ּכָל ָּדבָר‬
‫ אֶ חָ ד‬.‫ש ב ֹּו סַ ָּכנַת נְ ָפש ֹׁות‬ ׁ ‫ֶׁש ֵּי‬
8 There is no difference whether she grabs "his private ‫ ִענְיַן הַ ּכָתו ּב‬.‫שה‬ ָּׁ ‫או הָ ִא‬ ֹ ‫ש‬ ׁ ‫הָ ִאי‬
parts" or any other organ that imperils his life. Similarly, the ‫ֵרו‬
ֹ ‫חו ֵׁשב לְהַ כ ֹּות חֲ ב‬ ֹ ַ‫ֶׁש ּכָל ה‬
rodef may be a man or a woman. The intent of the verse is ‫תו מַ ִצ ּילִ ין‬ֹ ‫או‬
ֹ ‫הַ ּכָאָ ה הַ ְּמ ִמיתָ ה‬
that whenever a person intends to strike a colleague with a ‫ ו ְִאם‬.‫רודֵ ף‬ ֹ ‫אֶ ת הַ נ ְִּר ָּדף ְ ּב ַכפ ֹּו ֶׁשל‬
blow that could kill him, the pursued should be saved by ‫תו אַ ף‬ ֹ ‫או‬
ֹ ‫ְכולִ ין מַ ִצ ּילִ ין‬ ֹ ‫אֵ ינָן י‬
"cutting off the hand" of the rodef. If this cannot be done, )‫ְ ּבנַ ְפש ֹׁו ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (דברים כה יב‬
the victim should be saved by taking the rodef's life, as the

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‫בס"ד‬

verse continues: "you may not show pity." :"‫חוס עֵ ינ ֶָך‬


ֹ ָ‫"לֹא ת‬

9 This, indeed, is one of the negative mitzvot - not to take ‫ט אַ ף ֹזו ִמ ְצוַת לֹא ַּתעֲ ֶׂשה ֶׁש ּלֹא‬
pity on the life of a rodef. ְ‫ לְפִ יכָך‬.‫רודֵ ף‬ ֹ ָ‫ש ה‬ ׁ ‫לָחו ּס עַ ל ֶנ ֶפ‬
On this basis, our Sages ruled that when complications arise ‫הורו ּ חֲ כ ִָמים ֶׁשהָ עֻ ּב ָָרה ֶׁש ִהיא‬ ֹ
and a pregnant woman cannot give birth, it is permitted to ‫מַ ְק ָׁשה לֵילֵד מֻ ָּתר לַחְ תּ ֹךְ הָ עֵ ּבָר‬
abort the fetus in her womb, whether with a knife or with ‫ּבְמֵ עֶ יהָ ּבֵין ּבְסַ ם ּבֵין ְ ּביָד ִמ ּ ְפנֵי‬
drugs. For the fetus is considered a rodef of its mother. . ּ‫ְרודֵ ף אַ חֲ ֶריהָ לְהָ ְרגָה‬ ֹ ‫ֶׁשהו ּא ּכ‬
If the head of the fetus emerges, it should not be touched, ‫הוצִ יא רֹאש ֹׁו אֵ ין ֹנוג ְִעין‬ ֹ ‫ש‬ ֶּׁ ‫ו ְִאם ִמ‬
because one life should not be sacrificed for another. ‫ש‬ ׁ ‫ש ִמ ּ ְפנֵי ֶנ ֶפ‬
ׁ ‫ב ֹּו ֶׁשאֵ ין ד ֹּו ִחין ֶנ ֶפ‬
Although the mother may die, this is the nature of the world. :‫עולָם‬ ֹ ‫ְעו ֶׁשל‬ ֹ ‫ְוזֶהו ּ ִטב‬

10 The laws of a rodef apply whether a person is pursuing a ‫ֵרו לְהָ ְר ֹגו‬ֹ ‫רודֵ ף אַ חַ ר חֲ ב‬ ֹ ָ‫י אֶ חָ ד ה‬
colleague with the intent of killing him, or a maiden that had ‫רודֵ ף אַ חַ ר נַעֲ ָרה מְ א ָֹרסָ ה‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ
been consecrated with the intent of raping her, as reflected )‫ ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (דברים כב כו‬. ּ‫לְאָ נְסָ ה‬
by Deuteronomy 22:26, which establishes an equation ּ ‫ש עַ ל ֵרעֵ הו‬ ׁ ‫" ִ ּכי ּכַאֲ ֶׁשר יָקו ּם ִאי‬
between murder and rape, stating: "Just as when a man ."‫ש ּכֵן הַ ָּדבָר הַ זֶּה‬ ׁ ‫ָחו ֶנ ֶפ‬
ֹ ‫ו ְּרצ‬
arises against his colleague and kills him, so too, is this )‫אומֵ ר (דברים כב כז‬ ֹ ‫וַהֲ ֵרי הו ּא‬
matter i.e., the rape of a consecrated maiden." ‫"צָעֲ ָקה הַ נַּעֲ ָרה הַ מְ א ָֹרסָ ה וְאֵ ין‬
The same principle is reflected by another verse within the ַ‫שיע‬
ׁ ִ ‫מו‬
ֹ ּ‫ש לָה‬ ׁ ‫ הָ א ֵי‬." ּ‫שיעַ לָה‬ ׁ ִ ‫מו‬ ֹ
passage, which states (Ibid.:27): "The consecrated maiden ‫ָּכול‬
ֹ ‫שיעָ הּ ְ ּבכָל ָּדבָר ֶׁשי‬ ׁ ִ ‫מו‬ ֹ
cried out, but there was no one to save her." Implied is that :‫רודֵ ף‬ ֹ ָ‫שיעַ וַאֲ פִ ּלו ּ ּבַהֲ ִריגַת ה‬ ׁ ִ ‫ְהו‬ ֹ ‫ל‬
if there is someone who can save her, he must do so, using all
means including taking the life of the pursuer. ‫יא וְהו ּא הַ ִ ּדין לִ ְׁשאָ ר ּכָל‬
‫ אֲ בָל‬.‫הָ עֲ ָר ֹיות חו ּץ ִמן הַ ּבְהֵ מָ ה‬
11 The same laws apply with regard to any woman forbidden ‫ש‬
ׁ ‫תו ְ ּב ֶנ ֶפ‬
ֹ ‫או‬ֹ ‫הַ זָּכו ּר מַ ִצ ּילִ ין‬
as an ervah, but not to relations with an animal. With regard ‫ אֲ בָל‬.‫רודֵ ף ִ ּכ ְׁשאָ ר ּכָל הָ עֲ ָר ֹיות‬ ֹ ָ‫ה‬
to homosexual rape, by contrast, one may save a man from . ּ‫רודֵ ף אַ חַ ר הַ ּבְהֵ מָ ה ל ְָרבְעָ ה‬ ֹ ָ‫ה‬
being raped by killing the intended rapist. ‫או ֶׁש ָרדַ ף לַעֲ ש ֹׂות מְ לָאכָה ְ ּב ַׁש ּבָת‬ ֹ
If one pursues an animal with the intent of sodomizing it, or ‫ אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי‬.‫בודָ ה ז ָָרה‬ ֹ ֲ‫או לַעֲ בֹד ע‬ ֹ
one seeks to perform a forbidden labor on the Sabbath or to ‫בודָ ה ז ָָרה ִע ְ ּק ֵרי הַ ָּדת‬ ֹ ֲ‫ש ּבָת וַע‬ַּׁ ַ‫ֶׁשה‬
worship idols - although the Sabbath and the prohibition ‫תו עַ ד ֶׁשיַּעֲ ֶׂשה‬ ֹ ‫או‬ֹ ‫יתין‬ ִ ‫אֵ ין מְ ִמ‬
against idol worship are fundamental elements of our faith - ּ ‫ידינו ּהו‬ ִ ִ‫וִ יבִ יאו ּהו ּ ְלבֵית ִ ּדין ו‬
the person should not be killed until he commits the :‫ְויָמו ּת‬
transgression and is brought to court, convicted and
executed. ‫יב ָרדַ ף אַ חַ ר עֶ ְרוָה ו ּתְ ָפ ָׂשהּ ְו ָׁשכַב‬
‫ אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁש ּלֹא‬.‫ִע ָּמהּ וְהֶ עֱ ָרה‬
12 If a person pursued a woman forbidden as an ervah, took ‫תו‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫יתין‬ ִ ‫תו אֵ ין מְ ִמ‬ ֹ ָ‫גָּמַ ר ִּביא‬
hold of her and inserted the head of his organ within her, he ‫ ָרדַ ף אַ חַ ר עֶ ְרוָה‬.‫דו ַ ּב ִ ּדין‬ ֹ ְ‫עַ ד עָ מ‬
may not be slain, even though he has not concluded sexual ‫רודְ פִ ין אַ חֲ ָריו‬ ֹ ּ ‫וַאֲ חֵ ִרים הָ יו‬
relations. He must be brought to court. ּ ‫ וְאָ מְ ָרה לָהֶ ם הֲ נִיחו ּהו‬. ּ‫לְהַ ִצ ּילָה‬
If a man was pursuing a woman forbidden as an ervah, and ‫ אֵ ין ש ֹׁומְ ִעין‬.‫ּכְדֵ י ֶׁש ּלֹא יַהַ ְר ֵגנִי‬
other men were pursuing him to save her, and she tells ‫ּמונ ְִעין‬
ֹ ‫תו ו‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫לָהּ אֶ ּלָא מַ ב ְִהילִ ין‬
them, "Let him be, so that he does not kill me," they should ‫ ו ְִאם‬.‫תו ִמ ִּלבְעל ּבְאֵ יב ָָריו‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ
not listen to her. Instead, he should be intimidated and ‫ְעו ּבְאֵ יב ָָריו‬ ֹ ‫ְכולִ ים לְמָ נ‬ ֹ ‫אֵ ינָן י‬
prevented from raping her, by maiming his limbs. If he :ּ ‫ְמו ֶׁש ּבֵאַ ְרנו‬
ֹ ‫אֲ פִ ּלו ּ ְ ּבנַ ְפש ֹׁו ּכ‬

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‫בס"ד‬

cannot be prevented by maiming his limbs, his life may be


taken, as explained above. ‫ָּכול לְהַ ִצ ּיל ּבְאֵ יבָר‬
ֹ ‫יג ּכָל הַ י‬
‫מֵ אֵ יב ָָריו ְולֹא טָ ַרח ְ ּבכָךְ אֶ ּלָא‬
13 When a person could prevent a murder or a rape by ‫רודֵ ף וַהֲ ָר ֹגו הֲ ֵרי‬
ֹ ‫ִה ִצ ּיל ְ ּבנַ ְפש ֹׁו ֶׁשל‬
maiming the rodef's limbs, but did not take the trouble and ‫זֶה ש ֹׁופֵךְ ָּד ִמים וְחַ י ָּב ִמיתָ ה אֲ בָל‬
instead saved the victim by killing the rodef, he is regarded :‫תו‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫יתין‬ ִ ‫אֵ ין ּבֵית ִ ּדין מְ ִמ‬
as one who shed blood and is liable for death. Nevertheless,
he should not be executed by the court. ‫ָּכול לְהַ ִצ ּיל ְולֹא ִה ִצ ּיל‬ ֹ ‫יד ּכָל הַ י‬
‫עובֵר עַ ל (ויקרא יט טז) "לֹא‬ ֹ
14 Whenever a person can save another person's life, but he ‫רואֶ ה‬ ֹ ָ‫ ְוכֵן ה‬."‫תַ עֲ מֹד עַ ל ַּדם ֵרעֶ ָך‬
fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as ‫או לִ סְ ִטים‬ ֹ .‫טובֵעַ ַ ּבי ָּם‬ ֹ ‫ֵרו‬ ֹ ‫אֶ ת חֲ ב‬
Leviticus 19:16 states: "Do not stand idly by while your ‫או חַ י ָּה ָרעָ ה ּבָאָ ה‬ ֹ .‫ּב ִָאים עָ לָיו‬
brother's blood is at stake." ‫ילו הו ּא‬ֹ ּ ‫ָכול לְהַ ִצ‬ ֹ ‫ ְוי‬.‫עָ לָיו‬
Similarly, this commandment applies when a person sees a ‫או ֶׁש ִּי ְׂש ּכֹר אֲ חֵ ִרים‬ ֹ .‫ְמו‬ ֹ ‫ּבְעַ צ‬
colleague drowning at sea or being attacked by robbers or a ‫שמַ ע‬ָּׁ ‫או ֶׁש‬ ֹ .‫ילו ְולֹא ִה ִצ ּיל‬ ֹ ּ ‫לְהַ ִצ‬
wild animal, and he can save him himself or can hire others ‫מוסְ ִרים‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫עובְדֵ י כ ֹּוכָבִ ים‬ ֹ
to save him. Similarly, it applies when he hears gentiles or ‫טומְ נִין‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫שבִ ים עָ לָיו ָרעָ ה‬ ְּׁ ַ‫מְ ח‬
mosrim conspiring to harm a colleague or planning a snare ‫ֵרו‬
ֹ ‫אזֶן חֲ ב‬ ֹ ‫לו ּפַח ְולֹא ִּג ּלָה‬ ֹ
for him, and he does not inform him and notify him of the ‫או‬ֹ ‫או ֶׁשי ָּדַ ע ּבְעַ ּכו ּ''ם‬ ֹ .‫יעו‬ ֹ ‫ְהו ִד‬ ֹ ‫ו‬
danger. ‫ָכול‬
ֹ ‫ֵרו ְוי‬ ֹ ‫ְאונֵס ֶׁשהו ּא ּבָא עַ ל חֲ ב‬ ֹ ‫ּב‬
And it applies when a person knows of a gentile or a man of ‫ֵרו לְהָ ִסיר מַ ה‬ ֹ ‫ְסו ִּב ְגלַל חֲ ב‬ ֹ ּ ‫ְל ַפי‬
force who has a complaint against a colleague, and he can ‫ ְוכָל ַּכי ֹּוצֵא‬.‫ְסו‬ ֹ ּ ‫ש ּבְלִ ב ֹּו ְולֹא ִ ּפי‬ ֶּׁ
appease the aggressor on behalf of his colleague, but he fails ‫אותָ ם‬ ֹ ‫עו ֶׂשה‬ֹ ָ‫ ה‬.ּ ‫ִּבדְ ב ִָרים אֵ ּלו‬
to do so. And similarly, in all analogous instances, a person :‫עובֵר עַ ל לֹא תַ עֲ מֹד עַ ל ַּדם ֵרעֶ ָך‬ ֹ
who fails to act transgresses the commandment: "Do not
stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake." ‫ֵרו‬
ֹ ‫רודֵ ף אַ חַ ר חֲ ב‬ֹ ‫רואֶ ה‬ ֹ ָ‫טו ה‬
ּ‫או אַ חַ ר עֶ ְרוָה ְלבָעֳ לָה‬ ֹ ‫לְהָ ְר ֹגו‬
15 When a person sees a rodef pursuing a colleague to kill ‫ הֲ ֵרי זֶה‬.‫ָכול לְהַ ִצ ּיל ְולֹא ִה ִצ ּיל‬ ֹ ‫ְוי‬
him, or a woman forbidden as an ervah to rape her, and he ‫ִּב ֵּטל ִמ ְצוַת עֲ ֵׂשה ֶׁש ִהיא (דברים‬
has the potential to save the victim and yet fails to do so, he ." ּ‫כה יב) "וְקַ צ ֹּתָ ה אֶ ת ַּכ ּפָה‬
has negated the observance of the positive commandment: ‫וְעָ בַר עַ ל ְׁשנֵי לָאוִ ין עַ ל (דברים‬
"You must cut off her hand," and has transgressed two ‫חוס עֵ ינ ֶָך" וְעַ ל‬ ֹ ָ‫כה יב) "לֹא ת‬
negative commandments: "You may not show pity," and "Do ‫(ויקרא יט טז) "לֹא תַ עֲ מֹד עַ ל‬
not stand idly by while your brother's blood is at stake." :"‫ַּדם ֵרעֶ ָך‬

16 Even though lashes are not given as punishment for the ‫לו ִקין עַ ל‬ ֹ ‫טז אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁשאֵ ין‬
transgression of these prohibitions - because they do not ‫לָאוִ ין אֵ ּלו ּ ִמ ּ ְפנֵי ֶׁשאֵ ין מַ עֲ ֶׂשה‬
involve committing a forbidden deed - they are nevertheless ‫ ֶׁש ּכָל הַ מְ אַ ּבֵד‬.‫ּבָהֶ ן חֲ מו ִּרים הֵ ם‬
very severe. For whoever causes the loss of a Jewish soul is ‫ש אַ חַ ת ִמ ִּי ְׂש ָראֵ ל ּכ ְִא ּלו ּ ִא ּבֵד‬ׁ ‫ֶנ ֶפ‬
considered as if he destroyed the entire world, and whoever ‫ ְוכָל הַ מְ קַ י ֵּם‬.‫עולָם ֻּכל ֹּו‬ ֹ ָ‫ּכָל ה‬
saves a Jewish soul is considered as if he saved the entire ‫ש אַ חַ ת ִמ ִּי ְׂש ָראֵ ל ּכ ְִא ּלו ּ ִקי ֵּם‬ ׁ ‫ֶנ ֶפ‬
world. :‫עולָם ֻּכל ֹּו‬ ֹ ָ‫ּכָל ה‬

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C. Sanhedrin 72B
§ Rav Huna says: If a minor was pursuing another person in order to ‫אמר רב הונא קטן‬
kill him, the pursued party may be saved with the pursuer’s life. ‫הרודף ניתן להצילו‬
That is to say, one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the ‫בנפשו קסבר רודף‬
minor who is pursuing him, and one does not say that since the minor ‫אינו צריך התראה‬
lacks halakhic competence, he is not subject to punishment. ‫לא שנא גדול ולא‬
The Gemara explains: Rav Huna maintains that a pursuer, in ‫שנא קטן איתיביה‬
general, does not require forewarning, and there is no difference ‫רב חסדא לרב הונא‬
with regard to this matter between an adult and a minor. The ‫יצא ראשו אין‬
essence of the matter is rescuing the pursued party from death, and ‫נוגעין בו לפי שאין‬
therefore the pursuer’s liability to receive the death penalty is ‫דוחין נפש מפני נפש‬
irrelevant. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna from a ‫ואמאי רודף הוא‬
baraita: If a woman was giving birth and her life was being ‫שאני התם דמשמיא‬
endangered by the fetus, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in ‫קא רדפי לה‬
order to save the mother. But once his head has emerged during
the birthing process, he may not be harmed in order to save the ‫נימא מסייעא ליה‬
mother, because one life may not be pushed aside to save another ‫רודף שהיה רודף‬
life. If one is permitted to save the pursued party by killing the ‫אחר חבירו להורגו‬
minor who is pursuing him, why is this so? The fetus is a pursuer ‫אומר לו ראה‬
who is endangering his mother’s life. The Gemara answers: This is ‫שישראל הוא ובן‬
not difficult, as it is different there, with regard to the woman ‫ברית הוא והתורה‬
giving birth, since she is being pursued by Heaven. Since the fetus is ,‫אמרה (בראשית ט‬
not acting of his own volition and endangering his mother of his own ‫ו) שופך דם האדם‬
will, his life may not be taken in order to save his mother. ‫באדם דמו ישפך‬
The Gemara suggests: Let us say that a baraita supports the ruling of ‫אמרה תורה הצל‬
Rav Huna, who said that a pursuer does not require a forewarning: ‫דמו של זה בדמו של‬
If a pursuer was pursuing another person in order to kill him, a ‫זה ההיא רבי יוסי‬
third party says to the pursuer: See that he whom you are pursuing ‫ברבי יהודה היא‬
to kill is a Jew, and a loyal member of the covenant, and the Torah '‫דתניא רבי יוסי בר‬
stated: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be ‫יהודה אומר חבר‬
shed” (Genesis 9:6). The Torah stated: Save the blood of this person ‫אין צריך התראה‬
who is being pursued with the blood of that person who is pursuing ‫לפי שלא ניתנה‬
him. The fact that there is no indication here that the pursuer must say ‫התראה אלא‬
that he heard the forewarning suggests that forewarning is not ‫להבחין בין שוגג‬
required, as stated by Rav Huna. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: ‫למזיד‬
Perhaps this baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of
Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda. As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi
Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: A ḥaver, who is thoroughly
knowledgeable in halakha, does not need to be issued a
forewarning by witnesses in order to become liable to be punished,
because forewarning is given only to distinguish between
unintentional sin and intentional sin, and a ḥaver is certainly
aware of the halakha. The same may be said about a pursuer: Since
his malice is clear, he does not require a forewarning; his sin is
obviously intentional.

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‫בס"ד‬

D. The Holocaust and Halachah, by Irving Rosenbaum


“...has a pitcher, if both drink they will both die, but if one only drinks, he can reach
civilization. Ben Peturah taught: "It is better that both should drink and die, rather
than that one should behold his companion’s death.” Until Rabbi Akiva came and
taught “That thy brother may live with thee (Lev. 25:36), thy life takes precedence
over his life.”

As Rabbi Oshry11 explains Ben Patura’s point of view, it is the drinking by the one man that
causes the death of the other. The saving of his own life is, thus, the direct cause of his fellow’s
death. Ben Patura does not believe that the injunction of “and live by them” (Lev. 18:5) - not
die by them - applies if one gains his own life by not attempting to save his comrade’s. And
though Rabbi Akiba disagrees with Ben Patura, it is only in this case of the two travelers, where
the one takes no direct physical action to injure his fellow, but simply refrains from giving him
water, that Rabbi Akiba would sanction his behaviour. However, in our case, where as a result
of the direct action of seizing the card, a fellow workman will be delivered over to the
murderers, it is quite possible that Rabbi Akiba would agree with Ben Patura and forbid the
action.
Rabbi Oshry considers the possibility that since the cards were assigned to all the
workmen in the ghetto, each is therefore a partner in the ownership of them; and accordingly,
no one could be censured for seizing what is partially his property. However, he points out
that this very argument works against any leniency in the matter. At the time of the
publication of his teshuva, it was called to his attention that the Maharsha, in Baba Metzia 62a,
asserts that if the pitcher of water were the property of both men, Rabbi Akiba would certainly
agree with Ben Patura that one had no right to drink at the expense of the life of the other,
who had equal claim to the water.
At the end of the teshuva, Rabbi Oshry returns to his original consideration of whether
the Aeltestenrat had the right to distribute the cards altogether. Perhaps, he says, it was
incorrect to say that this case was analogous to the one in the Tosefta, where the threat was
made that if one of the company was not delivered up, the rest would die. In that case the
intent of the attackers was to spare the lives of all except the one they sought. The others were
thus buying their own lives at the cost of one of their number. In the case of Kovno, however,
there was certainly no intent on the part of the Germans to spare the lives of anyone, even
those who distributed the cards. They too would soon be put to death. If so, then the
distribution of the cards was actually a means of saving a portion of the community
-mandatory according to the Halakhah. Afterwards, Rabbi Oshry writes, he heard from Rabbi
Abraham Shapira, the chief rabbi of Kovno, that when the Germans decreed that all the Jews
should assemble in the Demokratia-Plate for a selection on October 26, 1941, they directed the
Aeltestenrat to post notices to this effect. Its members, in turn, came to Rabbi Shapira to ask
him whether this was permissible according to the Torah, since they knew that many of those
who assembled would be taken out to their deaths. After serious consideration he replied, "If
the decree to destroy an entire Jewish community has been determined by the enemy, and

11
Rabbi Ephraim Oshry (1914–September 28, 2003), Rabbi in the Kovno Ghetto and concentration
camp. Author of Sheilot U’Teshuvot MiMaamakim (Questions from the Depths), a book of halakhic
questions that he received while in the Kovno Ghetto.

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through some means or other it is possible to save part of the community, its leaders are
obliged to summon up their spiritual strength and take upon themselves the responsibility of
doing whatever needs to be done to save a part of the community." And so too in our case, it
appears that the accepting and the distribution of the "white cards" was also a method of
saving part of the community. If so, not only were the members of the Aeltestenrat permitted
to do so, but they were obligated to accept and distribute them.
Rabbi Oshry's teshuvah concluded that those who had allocated the "white cards" and
thereby indirectly condemned others to die had acted contrary to the Halakhah. His ruling was
based on the Tosefta, Terumot 7:23, in which it is held that a group of threatened individuals
may not deliver one of their number unto death unless he has been specifically named and is
guilty of a capital offense.
Rabbi Efrati12, on the other hand, using the same text, comes to the opposite conclusion
in a case of direct homicide.
Here is the she’elah (halakhic question) which came to him: During the Holocaust
period, a group of Jews were hiding in a bunker from the Nazis, who were conducting a
"search and destroy" operation. It was certain that they would all be killed if the Germans
discovered their hiding place. Suddenly, an infant, who was among those concealed in
the bunker, began to cry. It was impossible to quiet him. If the Nazis heard his cries, they
would be discovered and all would be lost. While they were wondering whether it would
be all right to stifle the cries with a pillow, since the child might suffocate, one of the men
in the bunker seized one and covered the child's face. After the Germans had left and they
were safe, they removed the pillow and found, to their dismay, that the infant had
suffocated. Rabbi Efrati was asked: Was this man's action permissible, since it was done
to save the lives of others? And if it was not permissible according to the Halakhah, even
though the death was caused unintentionally, must he accept upon himself some type of
penance through which he might atone for his sin?
While Rabbi Oshry was content to accept the decision of the Rambam (Yesodei ha-Torah
5:5) that it is forbidden to deliver up anyone to those who will murder him unless he is
deserving of death, as was Sheva ben Bikhri, Rabbi Efrati goes back to the original text of the
Tosefta (Terumot 7:23) on which it is based. He suggests a most ingenious interpretation of the
Tosefta, which leads not only to a significant practical halakhic ruling, but also resolves many
of the difficulties raised by the commentators on the Rambam.
The Tosefta, unlike the parallel passage in the Palestinian Talmud, contains the
following material:
Rabbi Judah says, "When does this apply [that they may not deliver up a specified
victim]? if the murderers are outside the city, and the victims inside. But if the
murderers and the threatened group are both inside the city land, therefore, there is
no possibility that any of them will escape, cf. Minhat Bikkurim], since both the named
individual and the entire group will certainly be killed, they may give him up." And
thus Scripture says, "Then the woman went unto all the people in her wisdom.. " (2
Sam. 20:22). She said to them, Since he will be killed and you will be killed [if you do
not give him up], give him up and do not be killed." Rabbi Simeon said, What she said

12
Rabbi Shimon Efrati (1908-1988), rabbi in Galicia. After the Holocaust, he served as Rabbi of She'erit
Hapleita in the city of Warsaw. He collected the halachic questions that arose during that time into two
books, M'Gai HaHarega and Emek HaBacha.

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‫בס"ד‬

to them was, 'He who rebels against the rule of the House of David is guilty of Death."

Rabbi Efrati perceives a meaning in the statement of Rabbi Judah which he believes was
also understood by the Rambam. Rabbi Judah is emphasizing that in the case of Sheva ben
Bikhri there were two factors which made it permissible for him to be killed. The one, that he
was deserving of death. The other, that it was certain he would be killed by the forces of Joab
even if he were not given up by the residents of the city where he had taken refuge. As Rabbi
Efrati understands it, Rabbi Judah is saying that if either of these conditions exist, it is
permitted to deliver up the specific individual. The recurring use by the Tosefta of the
expression "like Sheva ben Bikhri' can be construed to mean that whether the person is
deserving of death like Sheva ben Bikhri, or is certain to be killed in any event, again like
Sheva ben Bikhri, his life may be sacrificed to save the others.
One section of Rashi's commentary on a passage in Sanhedrin 72 appears to bear out
this point of view. In connection with the principle there enunciated of
“en dohin nefesh mipenei nefesh ("one life is not set aside in favor of another"), Rashi says:
And if you will ask about the case of Sheva ben Bikhri where his head was tossed over
the city wall to Job, that was because, even if they had not handed him over, he would
have been killed in the city when Joab seized him; and they would have been killed with
him. But if in that case he would have been saved even though they would have been
killed, they would not have been permitted to save themselves by sacrificing him.
So, Rabbi Efrati points out, in the matter which came before Raba (Sanhedrin 74a), where he
forbade the killing of one man by the other ("who can say whose blood is redder?"), there was
a reasonable possibility that the intended victim might escape if he did not carry out the
governor's order. That is why he was not allowed to kill him to save his own life. If it had been
certain that the designated victim would have been killed in any event, Raba would have ruled
differently.
Rabbi Efrati seeks to demonstrate that the Rambam, in spite of the fact that it is difficult
to read this meaning into his words, is, in fact, deciding the Halakhah according to Rabbi
Judah. Since this is the accepted practice when Rabbi Judah disagrees with Rabbi Simeon,
many of the questions raised by commentators are thus resolved. He finds further evidence for
his point of view in the Sefer Hahinukh 296, and the commentary of the Ran.
In our case, therefore, since the crying child would certainly have been killed together
with the others if his voice had been heard, it is comparable to that of Sheva ben Bikhri (who
would also certainly have been put to death). All Jews were under sentence of death by the
Nazis and no one would have escaped. Therefore, it was permissible for them to attempt to
quiet the child even though there was a possibility that he would die as a result.
Rabbi Efrati adds that there is still another halakhic principle which is relevant in
this case. A rodef, one who pursues an iInnocent victim with intent to kill him, may be
killed by anyone in order to save the life of the pursued (Rambam, Hilkhot Rotzeah 1:7).
Since the crying child was endangering the lives of the others, he might be considered a
rodef. While there is a distinction between a rodef who is intent upon killing of his own
free will, and one who is an ones -a rodef by compulsion, Rabbi Efrati maintains that
here, too, if both the rodef and his intended victim will certainly die unless the rodef is
killed, the rodef may be killed. The principle of en dohin nefesh mipnei nefesh ("one life
may not be set aside for another") applies in the case of a rodef by compulsion only if one
life will be saved--even if it be that of the rodef. But in our case, unless the child--rodef- is

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‫בס"ד‬

silenced, no life, not even his, will be spared. Therefore the full provisions of an ordinary
rodef apply to him, and it is permissible to kill him to save the others.
Accordingly, both on the grounds of Rabbi Efrati's interpretation of the Tosefta,
and of the laws of rodef, the person who silenced the child was justified in his action.
There is a practical difference, Rabbi Efrati says, arising from which of the two grounds
are used. In the case of the Tosefta, the Rambam rules that while the person may be
delivered up, we do not ab initio adivse those concerned that this is the law. In the case of
rodef, it is a mitzvah to slay him. While Rabbi Efrati concedes that probably is true only in
the case of a rodef who is acting of his own free will, and not in the situation of a rodef
acting under compulsion, he maintains that it is certainly permissible, if not mandatory,
to slay him. And we would so rule, even ab initio.
However, if a victim does not wish to exercise the right to slay a rodef under the
circumstances in our case, he is performing a special act of piety and may be considered a
kadosh- -a martyr. Thus, those who did not wish to silence the child and save their lives in this
fashion were fulfilling the commandment of the sanctification of God's name. There were,
Rabbi Efrati writes, those in his own family who gave up their lives rather than suffocate a
Jewish child. However, the man who did so need have no pangs of conscience, for what he did
was in accordance with the law, since his act was intended to save Jewish lives. He concludes
with the The great commentator who explained the verse in Obadiah 1:10,
"For the violence done to thy brother Jacob, shame shall cover thee" properly
explained it to mean, "Esau thou needs be ashamed for that thou brought thy brother
Jacob to perform deeds of violence." For it is only because of Esau that Jacob was
compelled to do such deeds as are described in this teshuvah. May the Almighty
revenge the blood of His servants which has been spilt.

Justifiable Suicide

The Halakhah, it would appear at first glance, has a clear and unequivocal position on
suicide--it is forbidden. The passage in Genesis 9:5, "For your life-blood, too, I will require a
reckoning," was interpreted by the Talmud (Baba Kamma 91b) as a prohibition not only of
suicide, but also of any self-inflicted injury. The Midrash (Genesis Rabbah 34:13) recognized
that there were exceptions to the general prohibition against suicide, and cited as an example
the suicide of King Saul, described in I Samuel 31:3-5,1 which Scripture records without
condemnation.
But while later Rabbinic literature debated in some detail the Midrash's justifications
for considering Saul's suicide permissible, these discussions concerned only the question of
whether full burial honors and mourning rites might be allowed in a specific case of suicide
which had already taken place. Under normal circumstances it was highly unlikely that a
would-be suicide would approach a rabbi in advance with a she'elah as to whether his
contemplated act of self-destruction was permissible. But during the Holocaust this did
become an actual halakhic issue.
Perhaps there were many such she'elot from believing Jews, asking whether the
Halakhah would permit, or at least condone, self-destruction. Certainly there were numerous
suicides in Germany and Austria even before the Nazi plans for the "final solution" were put
into effect. But the only recorded teshuvah we have on this subject is that of Rabbi Oshry, who
writes that on the sixth of Heshvan, 5702 (October 27, 1941), two days before the great

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‫בס"ד‬

slaughter of the Jews of the Kovno ghetto, he was approached by the head of one of the
distinguished Jewish families of the city with a she'elah. Ten thousand men, women, and
children of the ghetto had already been taken away in preparation for the slaughter. Those
who were left were simply waiting until the cruel hand of the Nazis would reach out for them.
The householder declared to Rabbi Oshry that he was convinced from what he had heard that
the sadistic SS troopers would not simply kill him when he was taken, but would first torture
and slay his wife, children, and grandchildren before his eyes. He did not believe he would be
able to withstand such torture; his heart would certainly fail him and he would surely die. His
she'elah, then, was: "Is it permissible to hasten his end, to set his own hand against himself,
even though it not be lawful? This, so that his own eyes not see the destruction of his family.

E. Mishnah Ohalot 7:6 and 2 interpretations of Sanhedrin 72B

A woman whose life is endangered in hard labor is ,‫שה ֶׁש ִהיא מַ ְק ָׁשה לֵילֵד‬ ָּׁ ‫הָ ִא‬
permitted to have the pregnancy terminated. However, ‫יאין‬ִ ִ‫ּמוצ‬ ֹ ‫מְ חַ ְּתכִ ין אֶ ת הַ ָּולָד ּבְמֵ עֶ יהָ ו‬
once the head of the ba;by has emerged, one cannot ָ‫ ִמ ּ ְפנֵי ֶׁשחַ י ֶּיה‬,‫תו אֵ ב ִָרים אֵ ב ִָרים‬ ֹ ‫או‬ֹ
touch it as we are forbidden to kill one individual to save ‫ אֵ ין ֹנוג ְִעין‬,‫ ָיצָא ֻרב ֹּו‬.‫קודְ ִמין לְחַ י ָּיו‬ ֹ
another" (Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipnei Nefesh) :ׁ‫ש ִמ ּ ְפנֵי ָנ ֶפש‬
ׁ ‫ ֶׁשאֵ ין ד ֹּו ִחין ֶנ ֶפ‬,‫ב ֹּו‬

Sanhedrin 72b
This passage in the Gemara regards a Katan (minor) as a Rodeif despite having no Da'at.
The fact that a Katan is regarded as a Rodeif despite his lack of Da'at demonstrates that
one could be classified as a Rodeif even if he is a Rodef B'Oness! (with no intention to
harm others).

Or

This passage explains that the Mishnah does not justify killing the baby after the head
has emerged as a Rodeif since "Mishmaya Ka Radfei Lei" (a literal translation of this
phrase is that the mother is being pursued by heavenly intervention). One could
understand the Gemara as teaching that a Rodef B'Oness is not,a defined as a Rodeif - if
one does not intend to harm others, there is no justification to kill the innocent pursuer.
The pilot in our case most certainly is a Rodeif B'Oness.
But Rambam (Hilchot Rotze'ach 1: 9) classifies a fetus as a Rodeif, showing that even a
Rodeif B'Oness is regarded as a Rodeif. The Rambam (Hilchot Choveil U'Mazzik 8: 15)
even compares heavy baggage on a ship that is danger of sinking to a Rodeif.

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‫בס"ד‬

IV. Sheva ben Bichri

D. Shmuel II, Chapter 20


1 A scoundrel named Sheba son of Bichri, a ‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִר֖י‬ ֥ ֶׁ ‫ש ּבְלִ יַ ּ֗עַ ל ו ּ ְׁשמ ֹ֛ו‬ ׁ ‫ִק ָר֜א ִא֣י‬ ְ ‫א ְו ָׁש֨ם נ‬
Benjaminite, happened to be there. He sounded ּ ‫ש ָפ֗ר ַ ֠ו ֹי ּ֠אמֶ ר אֵ ֽין־ ָל֨נו‬ ֹ ּׁ ‫ש י ְִמי ִנ֑י ַוי ִּתְ קַ ֣ע ַ ּב‬
ׁ ‫ִא֣י‬
the horn and proclaimed: ‫ש‬
ׁ ‫חֵ ֜לֶק ּבְדָ וִ ֗ד ְולֹ֤א נַחֲ לָה־ ָל֙נ ֙ו ּ ְ ּבבֶן־ ִי ַׁש֔י ִא֥י‬
“We have no portion in David, ‫ְלאֹהָ ָל֖יו ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ֽל׃‬
No share in Jesse’s son!
Every man to his tent, O Israel!”
‫ש ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל֙ מֵ אַ חֲ ֵר֣י דָ וִ ֔ד אַ חֲ ֵר֖י‬ ִ ‫ב ַויַ ּ֜עַ ל ּכ‬
ׁ ‫ׇל־א֤י‬
2 All the men of Israel left David and followed ‫ש יְהו ּדָ ה֙ ָּד ְבק֣ו ּ בְמַ ְל ָּכ֔ם‬ ׁ ‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִר֑י ו ְִא֤י‬ ֣ ֶׁ
Sheba son of Bichri; but the men of Judah ‫ִמן־הַ י ּ ְַר ֵּד֖ן וְעַ ד־יְרו ּ ָׁש ָ͏ֽלִם׃‬
accompanied their king from the Jordan to
Jerusalem. ְ‫מלֶך‬ ֡ ֶּ ַ‫ֵיתו יְרו ּ ָׁש ַ ֒ל͏ִם֒ ַוי ַ ִּּק֣ח ה‬
֮ ֹ ‫ג ַו ָּי ֹב֨א דָ וִ ֣ד אֶ ל־ ּב‬
3 David went to his palace in Jerusalem, and the ‫מ֨ר‬
ֹ ‫ש֡ים אֲ ֶׁש֣ר ִה ִנ ּ֩יחַ ֩ לִ ְׁש‬ ׁ ִ ‫ש֣ים ׀ ִ ּפ ַל ְג‬ׁ ִ ‫אֵ ֣ת עֶ ֶׂשר־ ָנ‬
king took the ten concubines he had left to mind ‫ֵית־מ ְׁשמֶ ֶ֙רת֙ ַ ֽויְ ַכ ְל ְּכ ֵל֔ם‬
ִ ‫הַ ַ ּ֜ביִת ַ ֽוי ְִּּת ֵנ֤ם ד ּב‬
the palace and put them in a guarded place; he ‫ַתהְ ֶי֧ינָה צ ְֻרר ֹ֛ות עַ ד־י ֹ֥ום‬ ּ ִ ‫וַאֲ לֵיהֶ ֖ם לֹא־ ָב֑א ו‬
provided for them, but he did not cohabit with }‫מֻ תָ ֖ן אַ לְמְ נ֥ו ּת חַ יֽ ּו ּת׃ {ס‬
them. They remained in seclusion until the day
they died, in living widowhood. ‫ֶךְ אֶ ל־עֲ מָ ָׂש֔א הַ זְעֶ ק־לִ ֥י‬
֙ ‫מל‬ ֙ ֶּ ַ‫ד ַו ֹי ּ֤אמֶ ר ה‬
‫ת־אישׁ־יְהו ּדָ ֖ה ְׁשלֹ֣ ֶׁשת י ִָמ֑ים וְאַ ָּת֖ה ֹּפ֥ה‬ ִ ֶ‫א‬
4 The king said to Amasa, “Call up the men of
Judah to my standard, and report here three days ‫מֽד׃‬ ֹ ֲ‫ע‬
from now.”
)‫ה ַו ֵ֥י ּלֶךְ עֲ מָ ָׂש֖א לְהַ ז ְִע֣יק אֶ ת־יְהו ּדָ ֑ה (וייחר‬
5 Amasa went to call up Judah, but he took longer ‫[ ַוי ּ ֹ֕וחֶ ר] ִמן־הַ מּ ֹועֵ ֖ד אֲ ֶׁש֥ר יְעָ ד ֹֽו׃‬
than the time set for him.
‫שבַע‬ ֥ ֶׁ ּ ‫ו ַו ֹי ּ֤אמֶ ר ָּדוִ ד֙ אֶ ל־אֲ בִ י ַׁש֔י עַ ָּת֗ה ֵי ַ֧רֽע ָל֛נו‬
6 And David said to Abishai, “Now Sheba son of ‫ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִר֖י ִמן־אַ ְב ָׁשל ֹ֑ום אַ ָּ֠ת֠ה קַ ֞ח אֶ ת־עַ בְדֵ ֤י‬
Bichri will cause us more trouble than Absalom.
So take your lord’s servants and pursue him, ‫֙יך ו ְּר ֹד֣ף אַ חֲ ָר֔יו ּפֶן־מָ ֥צָא ל ֹ֛ו עָ ִר֥ים ְ ּב ֻצר ֹ֖ות‬ ֙ ָ ‫אֲ ֹד ֶנ‬
before he finds fortified towns and eludes us.”-a ‫ו ְִה ִצ ּ֥יל עֵ י ֵנֽנו ּ׃‬

7 Joab’s men, the Cherethites and Pelethites, and ‫ז ַו ֵּי ְצא֤ו ּ אַ חֲ ָריו֙ אַ נְ ֵׁש֣י ֹיואָ ֔ב וְהַ ּכ ְֵר ִת֥י‬
all the warriors, marched out behind him.-b They ‫וְהַ ּ ְפל ִֵת֖י ְוכׇל־הַ ִּג ּב ִֹר֑ים ַו ֵֽי ּצְא ֙ו ּ ִמיר֣ו ּ ָׁש ַ ֔ל͏ִם לִ ְר ֹ ּד֕ף‬
left Jerusalem in pursuit of Sheba son of Bichri. ‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִרֽי׃‬ ֥ ֶׁ ‫אַ חֲ ֵר֖י‬
8 They were near the great stone in Gibeon when
Amasa appeared before them. Joab was wearing ‫ְדו ָלה֙ אֲ ֶׁש֣ר ּבְגִ ְבע ֹ֔ון‬
ֹ ּ ‫ח הֵ ֗ם ִעם־הָ אֶ ֤בֶן הַ ג‬
his military dress, with his sword girded over it ‫ש ֹ֗ו‬
ׁ ‫ְיואָ ֞ב חָ ג֣ו ּר ׀ ִמ ּד ֹ֣ו ְל ֻב‬ֹ ‫וַעֲ מָ ָׂש֖א ָ ּב֣א לִ ְפנֵיהֶ ֑ם ו‬
and fastened around his waist in its sheath; and, ּ‫ל־מתְ נָיו֙ ּבְתַ עְ ָר֔ה‬
‫ֻמ֤דֶ ת עַ ׇ‬ ֶּ ‫וְעָ ָל֞ו חֲ ג ֹ֥ור חֶ ֶ֙רב֙ מְ צ‬
as he stepped forward, it fell out.-a }‫ַת ֹּפֽל׃ {ס‬ ּ ִ ‫ְוה֥ו ּא ָי ָצ֖א ו‬

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‫בס"ד‬

9 Joab said to Amasa, “How are you, brother?”


and with his right hand Joab took hold of Amasa’s ‫ט ַו ֹי ּ֤אמֶ ר ֹיואָ ב֙ לַעֲ מָ ָׂש֔א הֲ ָׁשל ֹ֥ום אַ ָּת֖ה אָ ִח֑י‬
beard as if to kiss him. ‫וַתּ ֹ ֜חֶ ז יַד־י ְִמ֥ין ֹיואָ ֛ב ִּבזְקַ ֥ן עֲ מָ ָׂש֖א לִ נְ ׇׁשק־ל ֹֽו׃‬
10 Amasa was not on his guard against the sword
in Joab’s [left] hand, and [Joab] drove it into his ‫ַד־יואָ ֗ב‬
ֹ ‫י וַעֲ מָ ָׂש֨א לֹא־ ִנ ְׁשמַ ֜ר ּבַחֶ ֶ֣רב ׀ אֲ ֶׁש֣ר ְ ּבי‬
belly so that his entrails poured out on the ‫ש ַו ִּי ְׁש ֹּפ֨ךְ מֵ עָ ֥יו אַ ְ֛רצָה‬ׁ ֶ‫ח֜מ‬ ֹ ַ‫ַויַ ּ ֵּכ֩ה ֩ו ּ ָב֨הּ אֶ ל־ה‬
ground and he died; he did not need to strike him ‫ְיואָ ב֙ וַאֲ בִ י ַׁש֣י אָ ִח֔יו ָרדַ ֕ף‬ ֹ ‫מ֑ת ו‬ ֹ ‫שנָה ל ֹ֖ו ַו ָּי‬ ֥ ָׁ ‫ְולֹא־‬
a second time. ‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִרֽי׃‬ ֥ ֶׁ ‫אַ חֲ ֵר֖י‬
Joab and his brother Abishai then set off in
pursuit of Sheba son of Bichri, ‫מנַּעֲ ֵר֖י ֹיואָ ֑ב ַו ֹי ּ֗אמֶ ר ִמ ֩י‬
ֽ ִ ‫ש עָ מַ ֣ד עָ ָל֔יו‬
ׁ֙ ‫יא ו ְִאי‬
11 while one of Joab’s henchmen stood by the ‫ְיואָ ֛ב ו ִּמ֥י אֲ ֶׁשר־לְדָ וִ ֖ד אַ חֲ ֵר֥י ֹיואָ ֽב׃‬ ֹ ‫אֲ ֶׁש֨ר חָ ֵפ֧ץ ּב‬
corpse-c and called out, “Whoever favors Joab,
and whoever is on David’s side, follow Joab!” ‫יב וַעֲ מָ ָׂש֛א ִמתְ ֹּג ֵל֥ל ַ ּב ָּד֖ם ְ ּבת ֹ֣וךְ הַ ֽמְ ִס ָ ּל֑ה ַויַ ּ ְ֨רא‬
‫ש ִ ּכֽי־עָ מַ ֣ד ּכׇל־הָ עָ ֗ם ַוי ּ ֵַּסב֩ אֶ ת־עֲ מָ ָׂש֨א‬ ׁ ‫הָ ִא֜י‬
12 Amasa lay in the middle of the road, drenched ‫שדֶ ה֙ ַויַ ּ ְׁש ֵל֤ךְ עָ לָיו֙ ֶ ּ֔בגֶד ּכַאֲ ֶׁש֣ר‬ ׂ ָ ּ ַ‫ִמן־הַ ֽמְ ִס ָ ּל֤ה ה‬
in his blood; and the man saw that everyone ‫ָראָ ֔ה ּכׇל־הַ ָ ּב֥א עָ ָל֖יו וְעָ מָ ֽד׃‬
stopped. And when he saw that all the people
were stopping, he dragged Amasa from the road
into the field and covered him with a garment. ֙‫ש‬
ׁ ‫ׇל־אי‬
ִ ‫ה ָג֖ה ִמן־הַ ֽמְ ִס ָ ּל֑ה עָ ַב֤ר ּכ‬ ֹ ‫יג ּכַאֲ ֶׁש֥ר‬
‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִרֽי׃‬
֥ ֶׁ ‫אַ חֲ ֵר֣י ֹיואָ ֔ב לִ ְר ֹ ּד֕ף אַ חֲ ֵר֖י‬
13 Once he was removed from the road,
everybody continued to follow Joab in pursuit of ׁ ִ ‫יד ַ ֽויַּעֲ ֹב֞ר ְ ּבכׇל־‬
‫שבְטֵ ֣י ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ֗ל אָ ֵ ֛בלָה ו ּ ֵב֥ית‬
Sheba son of Bichri. )‫(ויקלהו‬ }‫מַ עֲ ָכ֖ה ְוכׇל־הַ ּב ִֵר֑ים {ס‬
‫[ ַוי ָ ִּּק֣הֲ ל֔ו ּ] ַו ָּי ֹב֖או ּ אַ ף־אַ חֲ ָרֽיו׃‬
14 [Sheba] had passed through all the tribes of
Israel up to Abel of Beth-maacah; and all the
Beerites assembled and followed him inside. ‫טו ַו ָּי ֹב֜או ּ ַו ָּי ֻצ֣רו ּ עָ ָל֗יו ּבְאָ ֵ ֙ב ָלה֙ ֵ ּב֣ית הַ ַּֽמעֲ ָכ֔ה‬
‫מ֖ד ּבַחֵ ֑ל‬
ֹ ֲ‫ס ְל ָלה֙ אֶ ל־הָ ִע֔יר ַו ַּֽתע‬ ֽ ֹ ּ ‫ַו ִּי ְׁש ּ ְפכ֤ו‬
15 [Joab’s men] came and besieged him in Abel of ‫ית֖ם לְהַ ִ ּפ֥יל‬ ִ ‫ת־יואָ ֔ב מַ ְׁש ִח‬
ֹ ֶ‫ְוכׇל־הָ עָ ם֙ אֲ ֶׁש֣ר א‬
Beth-maacah; they threw up a siegemound ‫חומָ ֽה׃‬ ֹ ַ‫ה‬
against the city and it stood against the
rampart.-f ּ ‫שמְ ע֤ו‬ ׁ ִ ‫ש֥ה חֲ כָמָ ֖ה ִמן־הָ ִע֑יר‬ׁ ָ ּ ‫ַת ְק ָר֛א ִא‬ּ ִ ‫טז ו‬
All the troops with Joab were engaged in ‫ל־יואָ ֔ב ְק ַר֣ב עַ ד־הֵ ֔נָּה‬
ֹ ֶ‫שמְ ע ֙ו ּ ִאמְ רו ּ־ ָנ֣א א‬ ִׁ
battering the wall,-g ָ ‫וַאֲ דַ ּב ְָר֖ה אֵ ֶל‬
‫ֽיך׃‬
16 when a clever woman shouted from the city,
“Listen! Listen! Tell Joab to come over here so I ‫ש֛ה הַ אַ ָּת֥ה ֹיואָ ֖ב‬ ׁ ָ ּ ‫יז ַוי ְִּק ַר֣ב אֵ ֶל֔יהָ וַתּ ֹ ֧אמֶ ר הָ ִא‬
can talk to him.” ‫ַו ֹי ּ֣אמֶ ר אָ ֑נִי וַתּ ֹ ֣אמֶ ר ל ֹ֗ו ְׁשמַ ע֙ ִ ּדב ְֵר֣י אֲ מָ תֶ ָ֔ך‬
ׁ ‫ַו ֹי ּ֖אמֶ ר‬
‫שֹמֵ ֥עַ אָ ֹנֽכִ י׃‬
17 He approached her, and the woman asked,
“Are you Joab?” “Yes,” he answered; and she
said to him, “Listen to what your handmaid has ‫מ֔ר‬
ֹ ‫ש ָנה֙ לֵא‬
ֹׁ ‫מ֑ר ַּד ֵ ּב֨ר יְדַ ְ ּבר֤ו ּ ב ִָרֽא‬
ֹ ‫יח וַתּ ֹ ֖אמֶ ר לֵא‬
to say.” “I’m listening,” he replied. ‫ָׁשא ֹ֧ול יְ ָׁשאֲ ל֛ו ּ ּבְאָ ֵב֖ל ְו ֵכ֥ן הֵ תַ ֽמּ ו ּ׃‬

18 And she continued, “In olden times people ‫ש‬ׁ ֗‫ַק‬


ּ ֵ ‫יט אָ נֹכִ ֕י ְׁשלֻמֵ ֖י אֱ מו ּ ֵנ֣י ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ֑ל אַ ָּת֣ה מְ ב‬
used to say, ‘Let them inquire of Abel,’-a and that ‫לְהָ ִמ֨ית ִע֤יר וְאֵ ם֙ ְ ּב ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ֔ל ָל ָּ֥מה תְ ַב ַּל֖ע נַחֲ ַל֥ת‬
was the end of the matter. }‫ה ָוֽה׃ {פ‬ ֹ ְ‫י‬
19 I am one of those who seek the welfare of the
faithful in Israel. But you seek to bring death
upon a mother city in Israel! Why should you

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‫בס"ד‬

destroy the LORD’s possession?” ‫כ ַויַ ּ֥עַ ן ֹיואָ ֖ב ַוי ֹּאמַ ֑ר חָ לִ ֤ילָה חָ לִ ֙י ָלה֙ לִ ֔י‬
‫ִאם־אֲ ַב ַּל֖ע ו ְִאם־אַ ְׁש ִחֽית׃‬
20 Joab replied, “Far be it, far be it from me to
destroy or to ruin! ‫שבַע‬֧ ֶׁ ‫ְריִם‬ ֜ ַ ‫ש מֵ הַ ֨ר אֶ פ‬ ׁ֩ ‫כא לֹא־ ֵכ֣ן הַ ָּד ָב֗ר ִ ּכ֡י ִאי‬
21 Not at all! But a certain man from the hill ‫את ֹ֣ו‬ֹ ‫ַמלֶךְ ּבְדָ וִ ֔ד ְּתנו ּ־‬ ֣ ֶּ ‫ָדו ּב‬
֙ ֹ ‫ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִר֣י ְׁשמ ֹ֗ו ָנ ָׂש֤א י‬
country of Ephraim, named Sheba son of Bichri, ֙‫שה‬
ׁ ָ ּ ‫ְל ַב ּד ֹ֔ו וְאֵ ְל ָכ֖ה מֵ עַ ֣ל הָ ִע֑יר וַתּ ֹ ֤אמֶ ר הָ ִא‬
has rebelled against King David. Just hand him ‫֖יך ּבְעַ ֥ד‬ָ ‫ש ֹ֛ו מֻ ְׁש ָל֥ךְ אֵ ֶל‬
ׁ ‫ל־יואָ ֔ב ִה ֵנ ּ֥ה רֹא‬ ֹ ֶ‫א‬
alone over to us, and I will withdraw from the ‫חומָ ֽה׃‬ֹ ַ‫ה‬
city.” The woman assured Joab, “His head shall
be thrown over the wall to you.” ּ‫ש֨ה אֶ ל־ ּכׇל־הָ עָ ֜ם ּב ְׇחכְמָ תָ ֗ה‬ ׁ ָ ּ ‫בוא֩ הָ ִא‬
ֹ ‫ַת‬ ָּ ‫כב ו‬
22 The woman came to all the people with her
clever plan; and they cut off the head of Sheba ּ ‫שבַע ּבֶן־ ִּבכ ְִרי֙ ַויַ ּ ְׁשלִ ֣כו‬ ֤ ֶׁ ‫ש‬ׁ ‫ַ ֽו ִּיכ ְְרת֞ו ּ אֶ ת־ ֹר֨א‬
son of Bichri and threw it down to Joab. He then ‫ש‬
ׁ ‫ש ָפ֔ר ַו ָּי ֻפ֥צו ּ מֵ עַ ל־הָ ִע֖יר ִא֣י‬ ֹ ּׁ ‫ל־יואָ ֔ב ַוי ִּתְ קַ ע֙ ַ ּב‬ֹ ֶ‫א‬
sounded the horn; all the men dispersed to their }‫מלֶך׃ {ס‬ ְ ֽ ֶּ ַ‫ְיואָ ֛ב ָׁש֥ב יְרו ּ ָׁש ַ ֖ל͏ִם אֶ ל־ה‬ ֹ ‫ְלאֹהָ ָל֑יו ו‬
homes, and Joab returned to the king in
Jerusalem. ֙ ‫ְיואָ ֕ב אֶ ֥ל ּכׇל־הַ ָּצ ָב֖א ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ֑ל ו ּ ְב ָנ ָי‬
‫ה‬ ֹ ‫כג ו‬
‫ּבֶן־יְה ֹ֣ויָדָ ֔ע עַ ל־(הכרי) [הַ ּכ ְֵר ִת֖י] וְעַ ל־הַ ּ ְפל ִֵתֽי׃‬
23 Joab was commander of the whole army [of]
Israel; Benaiah son of Jehoiada was commander
of the Cherethites and the Pelethites; ‫יהו ָׁש ָפ֥ט ּבֶן־אֲ ִחיל֖ו ּד‬
ֹ ִ‫כד וַאֲ ד ָֹר֖ם עַ ל־הַ ַּמ֑ס ו‬
‫הַ ַּמ ְז ִ ּכֽיר׃‬
24 Adoram was in charge of forced labor;
Jehoshaphat son of Ahilud was recorder; ‫ס ֵפ֑ר ְו ָצד ֹ֥וק וְאֶ ְביָתָ ֖ר‬
ֹ ]‫כה (ושיא) [ו ּ ְׁש ָו֖א‬
‫ּכֹהֲ ִנֽים׃‬
25 Sheva was scribe; and Zadok and Abiathar
were priests. ‫ירא֙ הַ ָי ּ ִ֣א ִר֔י הָ ָי֥ה כֹהֵ ֖ן לְדָ וִ ֽד׃‬
ָ ‫כו ְו ַג֗ם ִע‬
26 Ira the Jairite also served David as priest.

E. Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:12


It was stated: “A group of people on the road were ‫שהָ יו ּ מְ הַ ְּלכִ ין‬ ֶׁ ‫יעות ְּבנֵי אָ דָ ם‬ ֹ ‫ַּתנֵּי ִס‬
met by Gentiles who said to them, give us one of you ּ ‫ וְאָ ֽמְ רו ּ תְּ נו ּ לָנו‬.‫פגְעו ּ לָהֶ ן ג ֹּויִם‬ ֽ ָ ּ ‫ַּב ֶּד ֶרךְ ו‬
that we may kill him, otherwise we shall kill all of ‫תו ו ְִאם לָאו הֲ ֵרי‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ‫רוג‬ ֹ ֲ‫אֶ חָ ד ִמ ֶּכם ְונַה‬
you; even if all of them are killed they should not ‫ אֲ פִ ילו ּ ּכו ּ ָּלן‬.‫הו ְרגִ ין אֶ ת ּכו ּ ְּלכֶם‬ ֹ ּ ‫אָ נו‬
hand over a Jewish person. If they designated one, .‫ש ָראֵ ל‬ ְׂ ִּ‫ש אַ חַ ת ִמי‬ ׁ ‫נֶהֱ ָרגִ ים אַ ל יִמְ סְ רו ּ ֶנ ֶפ‬
like Sheba ben Bikhri, they should hand him over so ‫שבַע ֶּבן ִּבכ ְִרי‬ ֶׁ ‫ְּגון‬ֹ ‫יִיחֲ דו ּ לָהֶ ן אֶ חָ ד כ‬
as not to be killed.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, on ‫ אָ מַ ר ִר ִּבי‬.ּ ‫תו וְאַ ל ייֵהָ ֵרגו‬ ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ּ ‫יִמְ סְ רו‬
condition that he be guilty of a capital crime like ‫שיְּהֵ א חַ ייָב‬ ֶׁ ‫ש וְהו ּא‬ ׁ ‫עון ֶּבן ל ִָקי‬ ֹ ְ‫שמ‬ ִׁ
Sheba ben Bikhri; but Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he is ‫ ו ְִר ִּבי ֹיוחָ נָן אָ מַ ר‬.‫שבַע ֶּבן ִּבכ ְִרי‬ ֶׁ ‫ִמיתָ ה ְכ‬
not guilty of a capital crime like Sheba ben Bikhri. Ulla ‫שבַע ֶּבן‬ ֶׁ ‫ינו חַ ייָב ִמיתָ ה ְכ‬ ֹ ֵ‫שא‬ ֶׁ ‫אַ ף עַ ל פִּ י‬
bar Qoshav was proscribed by the government. He ּ‫שב תְּ בַעְ תֵּ יה‬ ַׁ ‫קו‬
ֹ ‫ עו ּ ָּלא ַּבר‬.‫ִּבכ ְִרי‬
fled and went to Lydda to Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They ‫ְלוד גַּ ֵּבי ִר ִּבי‬ ֹ ‫ עָ ַרק וְאָ זַל לֵיהּ ל‬.‫מַ לְכו ּתָ א‬
came and surrounded the city. They said to them, if .‫ אָ תו ּן וְאַ ְק ּפו ּן מְ ִדינְתָ א‬.‫שו ּעַ ֶּבן לֵוִ י‬ ׁ ‫ֹיו‬
you do not hand him over to us, we shall destroy the ‫בון לֵיהּ לָן‬ ֹ ָ‫אָ ֽמְ רו ּ לָהֶ ן ִאין לֵית אַ תּ ו ּן יְה‬
city. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi went to him and talked ‫ סְ לַק גַּ ֵּביהּ ִר ִּבי‬.‫אֲ נָן מַ חֲ ִרבִ ין מְ ִדינְתָ א‬
him into being handed over to them. Elijah, may be be .‫לון‬ ֹ ּ‫שעַ ֶּבן לֵוִ י וּפַייְסֵ יהּ וִ יהָ בֵיה‬ ֻׁ ‫ְהו‬
ֹ ‫י‬

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‫בס"ד‬

remembered for good things, used to appear to him; ‫וַהֲ וָה אֵ לִ יָּהו ּ זָכו ּר לַטּ ֹוב יְלִ יף ִמיתְ גְּלֵי‬
he stopped appearing. He fasted may fasts; he ‫צו ִמין‬ ֹ ‫ ְוצָם כַּמָּ ה‬.‫לוי ְולָא ִאיתְ גְּלֵי‬ ֹ ֲ‫ע‬
appeared to him and said, do I appear to informers? ‫רות אֲ נִי‬ ֹ ‫סו‬ ֹ ְ‫ אָ מַ ר לֵיהּ וְלִ מ‬.‫לוי‬ ֹ ֲ‫ו ְִאיתְ גְּלֵי ע‬
He said to him, did I not act according to a baraita? He .‫יתי‬ ִ ‫ש‬ִׂ ָ‫שנָה ע‬ְׁ ‫ אָ מַ ר לֵיהּ ְולֹא ִמ‬.‫ִנ ְגלָה‬
said to him, is that a statement for the pious? .‫ידים‬ ִ ‫ְזו ִמ ְׁשנַת הַ חֲ ִס‬
ֹ ‫אָ מַ ר לֵיהּ ו‬

On the basis of the verse, "Sheba the son of Bichri has lifted up his hand against the king,
against David" (II Samuel 20:21), Resh Lakish infers that acquiescence with a demand of such
nature can be sanctioned only in instances in which the victim's life is lawfully forfeit, as was
the case with regard to Sheba the son of Bichri who is described as being guilty of Lèse majesté.
However, for instances in which the designated victim is guiltless, all must suffer death rather
than become accomplices to murder. R. Yohanan maintains that the question of guilt
iSirrelevant; rather, the crucial factor is singling out a specific individual by the oppressor.
Members of a group have no right to select one of their number and deliver him to death in
order to save their own lives. Since the life of each individual is of inestimable value there is no
basis for preferring one life over another. However, once a specific person has been marked for
death in any event, either alone if surrendered by his companions or together with the entire
group if they refuse to comply, those who deliver him are not to be regarded as accessories.

F. Rambam, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 5:5


If gentiles tell [a group of] women: "Give us one of ּ ‫עובְדֵ י כ ֹּוכָבִ ים ְּתנו‬ ֹ ‫שים ֶׁשאָ מְ רו ּ לָהֶ ם‬ ׁ ִ ‫ָנ‬
you to defile. If not, we will defile all of you," they ‫אותָ הּ ו ְִאם לָאו‬ ֹ ‫לָנו ּ אַ חַ ת ִמ ּכֶן וּנְטַ ֵּמא‬
should allow themselves all to be defiled rather than ּ ‫ִטמְ או ּ ֻּכ ּלָן וְאַ ל יִמְ סְ רו‬ ָּ ‫נְטַ ֵּמא אֶ ת ֻּכ ְּלכֶן י‬
give over a single Jewish soul to [the gentiles]. ּ ‫ ְוכֵן ִאם אָ מְ רו‬.‫ש אַ חַ ת ִמ ִּי ְׂש ָראֵ ל‬ ׁ ‫לָהֶ ם ֶנ ֶפ‬
Similarly, if gentiles told [a group of Jews]: "Give us ‫עובְדֵ י כ ֹּוכָבִ ים ְּתנו ּ לָנו ּ אֶ חָ ד ִמ ּכֶם‬ ֹ ‫לָהֶ ם‬
one of you to kill. If not, we will kill all of you," they ּ ‫ יֵהָ ְרגו‬.‫ְונַהַ ְר ֶג ּנּו ּ ו ְִאם לָאו נַהֲ רֹג ֻּכ ְּלכֶם‬
should allow themselves all to be killed rather than ‫ש אַ חַ ת‬ ׁ ‫ֻּכ ּלָם וְאַ ל יִמְ סְ רו ּ לָהֶ ם ֶנ ֶפ‬
give over a single soul to [the gentiles]. ּ ‫ ו ְִאם יִחֲ דו ּהו ּ לָהֶ ם וְאָ מְ רו ּ ְּתנו‬.‫ִמ ִּי ְׂש ָראֵ ל‬
However, if [the gentiles] single out [a specific ‫ ִאם הָ יָה‬.‫או נַהֲ רֹג אֶ ת ֻּכ ְּלכֶם‬ ֹ ‫ְלונִי‬ֹ ‫לָנו ּ ּפ‬
individual] and say: "Give us so and so or we will kill ‫תו‬ֹ ‫או‬ ֹ ּ ‫ִתנו‬ ְּ ‫מְ חֻ י ָּב ִמיתָ ה ְּכ ֶׁשבַע ּבֶן ִּבכ ְִרי י‬
all of you," [different rules apply]: If the person is .‫מו ִרין לָהֶ ם ּכֵן ְלכ ְַּת ִח ּלָה‬ ֹ ‫ וְאֵ ין‬.‫לָהֶ ם‬
obligated to die like Sheva ben Bichri, they may give ‫ינו חַ י ָּב ִמיתָ ה יֵהָ ְרגו ּ ֻּכ ּלָן וְאַ ל‬ ֹ ֵ‫ו ְִאם א‬
him over to them. Initially, however, this instruction :‫ש אַ חַ ת ִמ ִּי ְׂש ָראֵ ל‬ ׁ ‫יִמְ סְ רו ּ לָהֶ ם ֶנ ֶפ‬
is not conveyed to them. If he is not obligated to die,
they should allow themselves all to be killed rather
than give over a single soul to [the gentiles].

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‫בס"ד‬

G. Rashi to Sanhedrin 72B


its head came out: With a woman that is experiencing ‫ באשה המקשה לילד‬- ‫יצא ראשו‬
difficulty giving birth and is in [mortal] danger. And it is ‫ומסוכנת וקתני רישא החיה‬
taught in the first section [of this teaching], "the midwife ‫פושטת ידה וחותכתו ומוציאתו‬
extends her hand and cuts it up and extracts [the pieces];" ‫לאברים דכל זמן שלא יצא לאויר‬
as the entire time that that it has not gone out into the air ‫העולם לאו נפש הוא וניתן‬
of the world, it is not [considered] a soul, and [so] it is ‫להורגו ולהציל את אמו אבל יצא‬
possible to kill it and to save its mother. But when its head ‫ראשו אין נוגעים בו להורגו‬
came out, we cannot touch it to kill it, as it is like a born ‫דהוה ליה כילוד ואין דוחין נפש‬
[baby]; and we do not push off one soul for the sake of ‫מפני נפש ואם תאמר מעשה‬
another. And if you will ask [from] the story of Sheva ben )‫כ״א‬:‫דשבע בן בכרי (שמואל ב כ׳‬
Bichri - [wherein it is written] (II Samuel 20:21), "behold, ‫הנה ראשו מושלך אליך דדחו‬
his head is sent to you" - they pushed off one life for the ‫נפש מפני נפש התם משום‬
sake of another; there, it was because even if they had not ‫דאפילו לא מסרוהו לו היה נהרג‬
delivered him, he would have been killed in the city when ‫בעיר כשיתפשנה יואב והן נהרגין‬
Yoav would have seized it, and they would have been killed ‫עמו אבל אם היה הוא ניצול‬
with him. But if he would have [otherwise] been saved - ‫אע"פ שהן נהרגין לא היו רשאין‬
even though they would have been killed - they would not ‫למסרו כדי להציל עצמן אי נמי‬
have been allowed to deliver him [to Yoav] in order to save ‫משום דמורד במלכות הוה והכי‬
themselves. And also (another answer) is that it is because :)‫מפרש לה בתוספתא (דתמורה‬
he was a rebel to the kingdom, and so is it explained in the
Tosefta (of Terumah).

Rashi notes that the episode of the wise woman advising the killing of Sheva ben Bichri to save
her town seems to contradict the principle of Ein Dochin Nefesh Mipnei Nefesh. Shmuel II
Chapter 20 records the story of a "wise woman of the town of Avel Beit Ma'achah" who hands
over the rebel Sheva ben Bichri to King David's general Yoav ben Tzeruyah. She did so in order
to spare the entire town from being destroyed by Yoav ben Tzeruyah for harboring Sheva ben
Bichri. The Navi apparently condones the actions of this woman as it refers to her with the
complimentary title "wise woman".

Rashi offers two defenses of the Ishah Chachamah killing Sheva Ben Bichri in
order to save the town of Aveil:

1. Sheva ben Bichri was guilty of Capital Punishment for rebelling against King David, so his
life could be forfeited.
2. Had she done nothing, Sheva ben Bichri would still have been killed along with everyone
else in the town. So killing him to save the rest of the town was permitted.

According to both of these answers, there is no application to our case, as the pilot was not
already a guilty party, nor would he have died in his attack on the soldiers.

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‫בס"ד‬

V. Ba B'Machteret

H. Shemot 22; 1-2


If the thief is seized while tunneling and beaten ‫לו‬
ֹ ‫ִמצֵא הַ ַג ּנָּב וְהֻ ּכָה וָמֵ ת אֵ ין‬
ָּ ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת י‬
ַּ ‫ִאם־ ּב‬
to death, there is no bloodguilt in that case. ‫ָּד ִמים׃‬
If the sun had already risen, there is bloodguilt ‫לו ַׁש ּלֵם יְ ַׁש ּלֵם‬
ֹ ‫ש עָ לָיו ָּד ִמים‬ׁ ֶ‫שמ‬ ׁ ֶ ּ ַ‫ִאם־ז ְָרחָ ה ה‬
in that case.—[The thief] must make restitution, ‫ָתו׃‬
ֹ ‫לו ְונִמְ ּכַר ִּב ְג ֵנב‬ ֹ ‫ִאם־אֵ ין‬
and if lacking the means, shall be sold for the
theft.

I. Rambam, Hilchot Geneivah 9:7-12

7 When a person breaks into a home - whether at night or ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת ּבֵין ַ ּבי ֹּום ּבֵין‬ ַּ ‫ז הַ ּבָא ּב‬
during the day - license is granted to kill him. If either the ‫לו ָּד ִמים אֶ ּלָא ִאם‬ ֹ ‫ַ ּב ַּליְלָה אֵ ין‬
homeowner or another person kills him, they are not ‫או ְׁשאָ ר הָ אָ דָ ם‬ֹ ‫הֲ ָר ֹגו ּבַעַ ל הַ ַ ּביִת‬
liable. ‫ש ַלכּל לְהָ ְר ֹגו ּבֵין‬ׁ ‫שו ּת ֵי‬ ׁ ‫ ו ְּר‬.‫ּפְטו ִּרין‬
‫ּבְחל ּבֵין ְ ּב ַׁש ּבָת ְ ּבכָל ִמיתָ ה‬
The license to kill him applies both on the Sabbath and ‫יתו ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (שמות‬ ֹ ‫ְכולִ ין לַהֲ ִמ‬ ֹ ּ ‫ֶׁשי‬
during the week; one may kill in any possible manner. This :"‫לו ָּד ִמים‬ ֹ ‫כב א) "אֵ ין‬
is all implied by Exodus 22:1, which literally reads: "He has
no blood." ‫או ַג ּנָּב‬ ֹ ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת‬ ַּ ‫ח וְאֶ חָ ד הַ ּבָא ּב‬
ֹ ‫ְתוךְ ַג ּג ֹּו ֶׁשל אָ דָ ם‬
‫או‬ ֹ ‫ֶׁשנ ִּמְ צָא ּב‬
8 The license mentioned above applies to a thief caught ‫יפו ּבֵין‬ ֹ ‫ְתוךְ קַ ְר ִ ּפ‬
ֹ ‫או ּב‬ ֹ ‫ֵרו‬ ֹ ‫ְתוךְ חֲ צ‬
ֹ ‫ּב‬
breaking in or one caught on a person's roof, courtyard or ‫ָמה נֶאֱ מַ ר‬ ָּ ‫ ְול‬.‫ַ ּבי ֹּום ּבֵין ַ ּב ַּליְלָה‬
enclosed area, whether during the day or during the night. ‫(שמות כב א) "מַ חְ ֶּת ֶרת" לְפִ י‬
Why does the Torah mention "breaking in," because it is ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת‬ ַּ ‫ָבוא ּב‬ ֹ ‫ֶׁש ֶּד ֶרךְ רֹב הַ ַג ּנָּבִ ים ל‬
the general practice for thieves to break in at night. :‫ַ ּב ַּליְלָה‬

9 Why did the Torah permit the blood of such a thief to be ‫מו‬ ֹ ‫ירה תּ ֹו ָרה ָּד‬ ָ ‫ט ו ִּמ ּ ְפנֵי מָ ה ִה ִ ּת‬
shed, although he is only attempting to steal money? ‫ֶׁשל ַג ּנָב אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁש ּבָא עַ ל ִעסְ ֵקי‬
Because it is an accepted presumption that if the ‫תו ֶׁש ִאם עָ מַ ד‬ ֹ ‫ לְפִ י ֶׁשחֶ ז ְָק‬.‫מון‬ ֹ ָ‫מ‬
house-owner arises and attempts to prevent the thief from ּ ‫ָעו יַהַ ְרגֵנו‬
ֹ ‫ּבַעַ ל הַ ַ ּביִת ְל ָפנָיו ו ּמְ נ‬
stealing, the thief will slay him. And thus the thief entering ‫ֵרו לִ ְגנֹב‬ֹ ‫ְונִמְ צָא זֶה הַ ִּנ ְכנָס ְלבֵית חֲ ב‬
his colleague's house to steal is in effect a pursuer seeking ְ‫ וּלְפִ יכָך‬.‫ֵרו לְהָ ְר ֹגו‬ ֹ ‫ְרודֵ ף אַ חַ ר חֲ ב‬ ֹ ‫ּכ‬
to kill his colleague. Therefore, he should be killed, ‫ָדול ּבֵין ֶׁשהָ יָה‬ ֹ ּ ‫יַהֲ רֹג ּבֵין ֶׁשהָ יָה ג‬
whether he is an adult or a minor, or a man or a woman. :‫ָקטָ ן ּבֵין ָזכָר ּבֵין נ ְֵקבָה‬

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‫בס"ד‬

10 If it is clear to the house-owner that the thief who breaks ‫י הָ יָה הַ ָּדבָר ּבָרו ּר ְלבַעַ ל הַ ַ ּביִת‬
in will not kill him and instead is only seeking financial ‫הו ְר ֹגו‬
ֹ ‫ינו‬ ֹ ֵ‫ֶׁשזֶּה הַ ַג ּנָּב הַ ּבָא עָ לָיו א‬
gain, it is forbidden to kill the thief. If the house-owner ‫מון‬ ֹ ָ‫ְולֹא ּבָא אֶ ּלָא עַ ל ִעסְ ֵקי מ‬
kills him, the house-owner is considered to be a murderer. ‫אָ סו ּר לְהָ ְר ֹגו ו ְִאם הֲ ָר ֹגו הֲ ֵרי זֶה‬
)‫ ֶׁשנֶּאֱ מַ ר (שמות כב ב‬.ׁ‫הו ֵרג ֶנ ֶפש‬ ֹ
This is alluded to by Exodus 22:2, which states: "If the sun ‫ש עָ לָיו" ִאם‬ ׁ ֶ‫שמ‬ ֶּׁ ַ‫"אם ז ְָרחָ ה ה‬ ִ
shines upon him..." - i.e., if it is as clear to you as the sun ‫לו‬
ֹ ‫ש‬ ׁ ‫ש ֶׁש ֵּי‬ׁ ֶ‫ְך הַ ָּדבָר ַּכ ֶׁשמ‬ָ ‫ּבָרו ּר ל‬
that he is at peace with you, do not kill him. Therefore, a ְ‫ לְפִ יכָך‬.ּ ‫לום ִע ְּמ ָך אֶ ל ַּתהַ ְרגֵהו‬ ֹ ‫ָׁש‬
father who breaks into his son's home should not be killed. ‫ינו‬
ֹ ֵ‫ְנו א‬ ֹ ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת עַ ל ּב‬ ַּ ‫אָ ב הַ ּבָא ּב‬
But a son who breaks into his father's home may be killed. ‫ אֲ בָל‬.‫הו ְר ֹגו‬ ֹ ‫ינו‬ֹ ֵ‫נֶהֱ ָרג ֶׁש ַּו ַּדאי ֶׁשא‬
:‫הַ ּבֵן הַ ּבָא עַ ל אָ בִ יו נֶהֱ ָרג‬
11 Different rules apply with regard to a thief who stole and
departed, or one who did not steal, but was caught leaving ‫או ֶׁש ּלֹא‬ ֹ .‫יא ְוכֵן הַ ַג ּנָּב ֶׁש ָג ּנַב ְו ָיצָא‬
the tunnel through which he entered the home. Since he ‫ָאו ֹיוצֵא ִמן הַ ַּמחְ ֶּת ֶרת‬ ֹ ‫ָג ּנַב ו ּמְ צ‬
turned his back on the house and is no longer intent on ‫ש‬
ׁ ‫רודֵ ף ֵי‬ ֹ ‫ינו‬ֹ ֵ‫הו ִאיל ו ּ ָפנָה ע ֶֹרף וְא‬ ֹ
killing its owner, he may not be slain. ‫ ְוכֵן ִאם ִהקִּ יפו ּהו ּ ְ ּבנֵי‬.‫לו ָּד ִמים‬ ֹ
‫או עֵ ִדים אַ ף עַ ל ִ ּפי ֶׁשעֲ דַ יִן‬ ֹ ‫אָ דָ ם‬
Similarly, if he is surrounded by other people, or by ‫ינו‬
ֹ ֵ‫שו ּת זֶה ֶׁש ּבָא עָ לָיו א‬ ׁ ‫הו ּא ִּב ְר‬
witnesses, he may not be killed, even if he is still located ‫לומַ ר ִאם ּבָא‬ ֹ ְ‫ וְאֵ ין צ ִָריך‬.‫נֶהֱ ָרג‬
within the domain which he broke into. Needless to say, if :‫ינו נֶהֱ ָרג‬
ֹ ֵ‫ְלבֵית ִ ּדין ֶׁשא‬
he is brought to the court he may not be killed.
ֹ ּ ‫ְתוךְ ִּגנ‬
‫ָתו‬ ֹ ‫ַמחְ ֶּת ֶרת ל‬
ַּ ‫יב ְוכֵן הַ ּבָא ּב‬
12 Similarly, a person who breaks into a garden, a field, a ‫ְתוךְ הַ ִ ּדיר‬
ֹ ‫או ל‬ ֹ ּ ‫ְתוךְ ָׂשדֵ הו‬ֹ ‫או ל‬ ֹ
pen or a corral may not be killed, for the prevailing ‫תו‬
ֹ ‫ ֶׁשחֶ ז ְָק‬.‫לו ָּד ִמים‬ ֹ ‫ש‬ׁ ‫וְהַ ַּסהַ ר ֵי‬
presumption is that he came merely to steal money, for ‫מון ִּב ְלבַד לְפִ י ֶׁשאֵ ין‬ֹ ‫ֶׁש ּבָא עַ ל הַ ָּמ‬
generally the owners are not found in such places. ‫מות‬ ֹ ‫קו‬
ֹ ְ‫רֹב הַ ּבְעָ לִ ים מְ צוּיִים ִּבמ‬
:ּ ‫אֵ ּלו‬

J. Contemporary Halakhic Problems by Rabbi J. David Bleich13

If this analysis of the position of Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon is correct, Rabbi Joshua ben
Karḥah's response, "Let the owner of the vineyard come and destroy his thorns," becomes
problematic. The retort does not seem to involve a denial of the facts of the case. If the facts
were as described, Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon's halakhic analysis is beyond cavil.
The controversy between Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon and Rabbi Joshua ben Karḥah may well
reflect disagreement regarding the level of certainty of impending loss of life that is required to
trigger the law of pursuit. Even if Rabbi Joshua ben Karḥah did not himself appreciate the fact
that the thieves were in actuality "pursuers" as well, once he heard Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon
declare "I am destroying thorns in the vineyard" Rabbi Joshua ben Karḥah's retort "Let the
Master of the vineyard come and eradicate his thorns" is entirely inappropriate. Rabbi Joshua
ben Karḥah acquiesces in the assignment of the appellation "thorns" to the evildoers. If so, to
13
Rabbi J. David Bleich (born August 24, 1936) is an authority on Jewish law and ethics,
including Jewish medical ethics. He is a Rosh Yeshiva at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological
Seminary of Yeshiva University, as well as head of its postgraduate institute for the study of
Talmudic jurisprudence and family law. At Yeshiva University, he holds the Herbert and
Florence Tenzer Chair in Jewish Law and Ethics.

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‫בס"ד‬

refrain from taking action against them would constitute a violation of the biblical command
"And you shall cut off her hand, your eye shall not have pity" (Deuteronomy 25:12).
The Gemara, Sanhedrin 72a, employing biblical exegesis, develops the principle that a
burglar must also be presumed to be intent upon taking the life of the householder whose
home he enters. It is to be presumed that if the householder discovers the intruder he will
instinctively resist with all means at his disposal in order to preserve hearth and home. The
burglar, in turn, recognizes the likelihood that lethal force will be used against him and hence
it must be presumed that, if discovered by the householder in the course of breaking into his
home, the burglar, fearing for his own life, will endeavor to strike first. Since the burglar is
not only engaged in felonious activity but is also responsible for creating the danger to the
householder, he is adjudged a "pursuer." The Gemara declares that an exception to this rule
occurs in the case of a father engaged in burglarizing his son's home. In that case, the talmudic
presumption is that a father will not attempt to kill his own son and, since this is known to the
son as well, the son, if he should kill his burglarizing father, cannot seek exoneration by
pleading that he was entitled to invoke the law of pursuit. In other cases, however, there
exists a legal presumption that the burglar is a "pursuer." In their commentaries upon that
discussion both Rashi and Tosafot indicate that, in the absence of a presumption of law, the
"pursuer" may not be killed unless murderous intent on his part is known with certainty; the
"law of the pursuer" cannot be invoked on the basis of mere suspicion or in a case of doubt.
A contemporary authority, the late Rabbi Moses Feinstein14, Iggerot Mosheh, Hoshen
Mishpat, II, no. 69, sec. 2, declares that the law of pursuit applies only in situations in which
the murderous intent of the aggressor is known on the basis of an assessment "approaching
certainty." However, a leading authority of the previous generation, Rabbi Chaim Ozer
Grodzinski15, Teshuvot Aḥi'ezer, I, no. 123, sec. 2, adopts a somewhat looser standard. In
discussing the propriety of a therapeutic abortion which, according to some, may be
performed only when the life of the mother is threatened by the fetus as "pursuer," Aḥi'ezer is
prepared to rely upon the "assessment" of medical practitioners but does not indicate that
their prognosis must be couched in terms indicating that, absent intervention, the likelihood
that the mother will die "approaches certainty." The most elastic standard is apparently that
of Rabbi Elijah of Vilna16, Bi'ur ha-Gra, Hoshen Mishpat 388:74, who understands Rema as
permitting summary execution of counterfeiters even when the danger to the community is
not known with certainty but is only "feared" (ḥeshasha). In support of this view, Bi'ur ha-Gra
comments that the principle is derived from the biblical provisions concerning a burglar and
indicates that he regards the danger to the life of the householder in such a situation to be less
than certain.

14
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (March 3, 1895 – March 23, 1986), was the preeminent posek (authority on
Jewish law) for American Orthodox Jewry in the 20th century. Feinstein served as president of the Union
of Orthodox Rabbis, Chairman of the Council of the Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah of the Agudath Israel of
America, and head of Mesivtha Tifereth Jerusalem in New York.
15
Rabbi Chaim Ozer Grodzinski (August 24, 1863 – August 9, 1940) was a Av beis din (rabbinical chief
justice), posek (halakhic authority), and Talmudic scholar Ashkenazi in Vilnius, Lithuania in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries for over 55 years.
16
Elijah ben Solomon Zalman (the Vilna Gaon) (April 23, 1720 – October 9, 1797), was a Lithuanian
Jewish Talmudist, halakhist, kabbalist, and the foremost leader of misnagdic (non-hasidic) Jewry of the
past few centuries.

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‫בס"ד‬

It may be the case that Ritva, in explaining the conduct of Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon as
based upon implementation of "the King's justice," declined to explain the matter on the basis
of the "law of the pursuer" because he did not regard it as being clear that the king would
continue to apprehend and execute the innocent together with the guilty. Particularly with
the king's appointment of Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon as the official charged with bringing
evildoers to justice pursuant to his becoming impressed with that scholar's wisdom and
sagacity, there may well have been reason to assume that the king's wrath was assuaged and
that he would no longer pursue the matter so assiduously or that Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon
would be in a position to dissuade the king from imposing punishment indiscriminately upon
the innocent as well as upon the guilty.

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‫בס"ד‬

VI. Self Defense

A. Meiri on Sanhedrin 72B

‫בית הבחירה למאירי מסכת סנהדרין דף עב עמוד ב‬


‫ובתלמוד המערב של עבודה זרה ראיתי ששאלו בפרק שני מהו לדחות נפש קטן מפני גדול וכשהשיבו‬
‫להם מיצא ראשו אין נוגעין בו שאין דוחין נפש מפני נפש הם תירצו שניא היא שאין אנו יודעין מי‬
‫הורג את מי ולא נתבררה שם ונראה שאף שאלתם במי שאמרו לו הרוג קטן זה ואם לאו נהרוג אותך‬
‫אם מותר להציל עצמו בנפשו ומ"מ מסוגיא שבכאן יראה שהקטן דינו כגדול לענינים אלו שאם לא כן‬
‫תהא האשה עצמה הורגתו אף ביצא ראשו אלא שחכמי הדורות שלפנינו כתבוה כן ר"ל שהאשה עצמה‬
‫יכולה לחתכו שנרדף היא ונרדף מיהא במקום שאין אחרים מחזיקין את הרודפו ברודף הוא עצמו‬
‫רשאי ומ"מ מסוגית קטן הרודף אנו למדים שדינו כגדול אלא שיש לו ראיה ממנה על הטרפה וחברתה‬
:‫שמצילין עצמן באלו‬

Me'iri, Sanhedrin 72b, expresses the novel view that, in the case of a woman in "hard travail,"
although a third party is barred from destroying the infant in order to save the mother because
of inapplicability of the law of pursuit, nevertheless the mother herself may exercise the right
of self-defense to save her own life. A similar view is held by R. Joseph Saul Nathanson,
Teshuvot Sho 'el u-Meshiv, I, no. 22. 13

B. Bamidbar 25: 6-15


Just then one of the Israelites came and brought a ‫ש ִמ ְ ּבנֵי ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל ּבָא ַוי ּ ְַק ֵרב‬ ׁ ‫ו ְִהנֵּה ִאי‬
Midianite woman over to his companions, in the ‫מ ֶׁשה‬ ֹ ‫אֶ ל־אֶ חָ יו אֶ ת־הַ ִ ּמדְ ָינִית לְעֵ ינֵי‬
sight of Moses and of the whole Israelite community ‫וּלְעֵ ינֵי ּכׇל־עֲ דַ ת ְ ּבנֵי־ ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל וְהֵ ָּמה בֹכִ ים‬
who were weeping at the entrance of the Tent of ‫מועֵ ד׃‬ ֹ ‫ּפֶתַ ח אֹהֶ ל‬
Meeting. ‫ַוי ּ ְַרא ִ ּפינְחָ ס ּבֶן־אֶ לְעָ זָר ּבֶן־אַ הֲ רֹן הַ ּכֹהֵ ן‬
When Phinehas, son of Eleazar son of Aaron the ֹ ‫ַוי ׇָּקם ִמתּ ֹוךְ הָ עֵ דָ ה ַוי ַ ִּּקח רֹמַ ח ְ ּבי‬
‫ָדו׃‬
priest, saw this, he left the assembly and, taking a ‫ַו ָּיבֹא אַ חַ ר ִאישׁ־ ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל אֶ ל־הַ ֻ ּק ּבָה ַוי ִּדְ קֹר‬
spear in his hand, ‫שה‬ ׁ ָ ּ ‫ש ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל וְאֶ ת־הָ ִא‬ ׁ ‫אֶ ת־ ְׁשנֵיהֶ ם אֵ ת ִאי‬
he followed the Israelite into the chamber and ‫ַתעָ צַר הַ ַּמ ֵג ּפָה מֵ עַ ל ְ ּבנֵי‬ ֵּ ‫ל־קבָתָ הּ ו‬ ֳ ֶ‫א‬
stabbed both of them, the Israelite and the woman, ‫ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל׃‬
through the belly. Then the plague against the ‫ַמ ֵג ּפָה אַ ְר ּבָעָ ה וְעֶ ְׂש ִרים‬ ַּ ‫ַוי ִּהְ יו ּ הַ ֵּמ ִתים ּב‬
Israelites was checked. }‫אָ לֶף׃ {פ‬
Those who died of the plague numbered twenty-four ‫פנחס‬
thousand. ‫מ ֶׁשה ּלֵאמֹר׃‬ ֹ ‫הוָה אֶ ל־‬ ֹ ְ‫ַויְדַ ּבֵר י‬
The LORD spoke to Moses, saying, ‫שיב‬ ׁ ִ ֵ‫ִ ּפינְחָ ס ּבֶן־אֶ לְעָ זָר ּבֶן־אַ הֲ רֹן הַ ּכֹהֵ ן ה‬
“Phinehas, son of Eleazar son of Aaron the priest, ‫ְאו‬
ֹ ‫אֶ ת־חֲ מָ ִתי מֵ עַ ל ְ ּבנֵי־ ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל ּבְקַ נ‬
has turned back My wrath from the Israelites by ‫יתי‬
ִ ‫ְתוכָם ְולֹא־כִ ִּל‬ ֹ ‫ת־קנְאָ ִתי ּב‬ ִ ֶ‫א‬
‫אֶ ת־ ְ ּבנֵי־ ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל ּב ְִקנְאָ ִתי׃‬

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‫בס"ד‬

displaying among them his passion for Me, so that I ‫לום׃‬ ֹ ‫יתי ָׁש‬ ִ ‫לו אֶ ת־ ּב ְִר‬ ֹ ‫ָלכֵן אֱ מֹר ִהנְנִי נֹתֵ ן‬
did not wipe out the Israelite people in My passion. ‫עו אַ חֲ ָריו ּב ְִרית ּכְהֻ נַּת‬ ֹ ‫וְהָ יְתָ ה ל ֹּו ו ּ ְלז ְַר‬
Say, therefore, ‘I grant him My pact of friendship. ‫עולָם ַּתחַ ת אֲ ֶׁשר ִקנֵּא לֵאלֹהָ יו ַויְ ַכ ּפֵר‬ ֹ
It shall be for him and his descendants after him a ‫עַ ל־ ְ ּבנֵי ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל׃‬
pact of priesthood for all time, because he took ‫ש ִי ְׂש ָראֵ ל הַ ֻּמ ּכֶה אֲ ֶׁשר הֻ ּכָה‬ ׁ ‫ְו ֵׁשם ִאי‬
impassioned action for his God, thus making ‫שיא‬ ׂ ִ ְ‫אֶ ת־הַ ִ ּמדְ ָינִית זִ מְ ִרי ּבֶן־סָ לו ּא נ‬
expiation for the Israelites.’” ‫שמְ ֹענִי׃‬ ׁ ִּ ‫בֵית־אָ ב ַל‬
The name of the Israelite who was killed, the one ‫שה הַ ֻּמ ּכָה הַ ִ ּמדְ ָינִית ׇ ּכ ְז ִּבי‬ ׁ ָ ּ ‫ְו ֵׁשם הָ ִא‬
who was killed with the Midianite woman, was Zimri ‫ש אֻ מּ ֹות ּבֵית־אָ ב ּב ְִמדְ יָן הו ּא׃‬ ׁ ‫בַת־צו ּר רֹא‬
son of Salu, chieftain of a Simeonite ancestral house.
The name of the Midianite woman who was killed
was Cozbi daughter of Zur; he was the tribal head of
an ancestral house in Midian.

C. Rabbi Zilberstein vs. Rabbi Eliashev (Cited by Rabbi Chaim Jachter, Kol Torah
Volume 26, 2017)

Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv17, cited by his son-in-law Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein (Sheilot
UTeshuvot VaHa'arev Na 3:331) forbids shooting the pilot since one engaged in Maaseh
Hatzalah (act of rescue) and risking his life in doing so, cannot be defined as a Rodeif.
Rav Eliashiv writes that even in the tragic case addressed by the Chatam Sofer (Teshuvot
Orach Chaim 177) where a mistress mistakenly poured kerosene down the mouth of her
maid to save her would not and could not be seen as a Rodeif (and be killed by
someone who realized her grievous error).

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein18 (ad. loc.) argues that even according to Rav Eliashiv, it is
permissible for the soldiers themselves to shoot down the plane based on the Meiri to
Sanhedrin 728. This opinion permits those in danger (as opposed to a third party) to kill
someone who is attacking him even if the attacker is not categorized as a Rodeif. Rav
Zilberstein cites as a possible proof the Gemara (Sanhedrin 82A) which states that Zimri
(but not a third party) would have been permitted to kill Pinchas since Pinchas was
attempting to kill Zimri.

17
Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (1910 - 2012, Jerusalem) was a Rabbi and posek who was a
leader in Israel and the Diaspora Lithuanian-Haredi community. He was considered as many by
the Posek Ha’dor (halachic decidor of the generation).
18
Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein (1934 -) is an Orthodox rabbi, posek and expert in medical ethics.
He is sought out by people from all over the world to answer their halakhic questions. He is
known for writing teshuvot (halakhic responsa) on a wide range of topics, and unique cases.

Ruth & Alex Dworkin BJEC Moot Court Of Jewish Law Beit Din | 5784 35

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