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Table of Contents

Session plan ........................................................................................................................ 2

Culture ................................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction to culture ............................................................................................... 3
Aviation Culture .......................................................................................................... 5
National Culture ......................................................................................................... 6
Cultural dimension in aircraft accidents .................................................................. 7
National culture – Basic premise ............................................................................. 8
Professional culture ................................................................................................. 11
Company culture ...................................................................................................... 12
Safety culture and CRM ........................................................................................... 13
Pilots vs Cabin crew – Same culture? .................................................................... 13
Boeing vs Airbus ....................................................................................................... 14
Military vs Commercial Flying Culture..................................................................... 15
Type of Flying Operations ........................................................................................ 16
Managing cultural differences & CRM training ...................................................... 17
Developing the right culture .................................................................................... 18

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Module 21

Culture

Session plan

Module no 21

Module title Culture

Duration 1 hour

Optimal class size 6 to 12

Learning On completion of the module the student will be able to:

Objectives
• Identify the different cultures which are present in our professional aviation
environment

• List ways in which to develop and maintain an appropriate organisational and

positive safety culture

Delivery method Facilitation

Trainer Trainer to have completed 5 day CRM Trainer core course.

qualifications

Student None
prerequisites

Trainer materials PowerPoint

Whiteboard
Flipchart

Participant Handout: N/A

materials

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Culture
Slide – Header slide

Introduction to culture
Slide – Introduction

Slide – Introduction

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Slide – Introduction

Professor Geert Hofstede, a Dutch, social psychologist, who is notable in his research of
cross-cultural groups and organisations defines culture as;
“The collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or
category of people from others.”

Slide – Background

Culture surrounds us and influences the values, beliefs, and behaviours that we share with
other members of groups. Culture serves to bind us together as members of groups and to
provide clues and cues as to how to behave in normal and novel situations.

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Aviation Culture
Slide – Background

When thinking of culture, what typically comes to mind first is national culture, the
attributes that differentiate between natives of one culture and those of another.
For pilots and cabin crew however, there are three cultures operating to shape actions and
attitudes.
▪ National culture (Global Workplace).
▪ Professional culture that is associated with being a member of the pilot
profession.
▪ Company (organisational) culture – which defines the daily activities of
their members.
All three cultures are of importance in an aviation environment because they influence
critical behaviours. These include how junior crew relate to their seniors and how
information is shared. Culture can also shape attitudes about stress (e.g. gung ho/macho
or supportive) and personal capabilities. It also influences adherence to SOPs and how
automation is valued and used.
Each of the three cultures has strengths that enhance safety and weaknesses which can
diminish it.

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National Culture
Slide – National Culture

People who have grown up in different countries will have experienced different general
ways of acting and behaving, particularly in social situations. They will also have developed
different values. A person from one country might act in a way that seems polite, but a
person from a different country might perceive that way of acting as rude.
In an increasing global workplace of multicultural and multilingual working environments a
junior, assertive Western FO, who’s culture values subordinates speaking up, goes against
cultural norms in an Eastern Flight deck were they value subordinates who obey their
superiors unquestioningly, can be damaging to a working dynamic; as the Captain
perceives the FO as being impolite, aggressive or disruptive which will lead to a less
functional (and possibly less safe) environment.
In his study of national culture and CRM, Aviation Psychologist Brent Hayward (1997)
compared the implicit meanings present in language despite the same explicit
communication. For example, the word yes to a Westerner is an acknowledgment and
agreement with another party. However, the same word, to an East Asian can be just an
acknowledgement without any intent to express agreement.
This misunderstanding of implicit information can lead to faulty situation awareness and
decision-making, which can impact aviation safety. In addition, although English is the
universal language for aviation, most cultures have a different accent and use of it. This
slows crew co-ordination and causes further misunderstandings.

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Slide – National Culture

As well as Communication and common language other cultural differences include:

▪ Humour
▪ Religion
▪ Politics
▪ Use of automation
These differences in culture can create friction between individuals slowing teamwork and
decision-making also decreasing one another’s trust.

Cultural dimension in aircraft accidents

Whereas accident rates vary among nations (particularly between the developed and
developing world) it is not obvious to what extent, if any, those accident rates are
influenced by cultural differences (e.g. between developed and developing nations).
Nevertheless, some researchers have made convincing arguments attributing cultural
dimensions to accidents.

Slide – Culture in aircraft accidents

1) Asiana Airlines Flight 214, 6th July 2013 (4min 44sec video)

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http://www.voanews.com/content/aviation-experts-question-whether-culture-had-role-in-
asiana-crash/1730757.html
http://www.voanews.com/media/video/1731526.html
2) One example is argued by Helmrich (1994) to be the Avianca (Boeing 707) Flight 52
19th July 1989 that ran out of fuel approaching John F Kennedy Airport (the criticality of
the fuel emergency was not communicated by Spanish pilots).
3) Another, argued by Westrum and Adamski (1999) is the runway overrun of Korean Air
1533 (MD-83) 15th March 1999 in which there was disagreement between the Korean
and Canadian pilots.
4) Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 (Boeing 747-2B5F) 22 December 1999 – from London to
Milan. The crew banked the aircraft into the ground while multiple audible warnings were
sounding. Subsequent investigation revealed that the pilots did not respond appropriately
to warnings during the climb after take-off despite prompts from the flight engineer. The
commanding pilot maintained a left roll control input, rolling the aircraft to approximately
90 of left bank and there was no control input to correct the pitch attitude throughout the
turn. The first officer either did not monitor the aircraft attitude during the climbing turn or,
having done so, did not alert the commander to the extreme unsafe attitude that
developed, and the maintenance activity at London/Stansted was misdirected.
Investigators subsequently suggested, among other things, that Korean Air alter training
materials and safety education to meet the "unique" Korean culture.
5 Helios Airways Flight 522 (737-300) 14th August 2005 - German Captain (history of
abrupt, distant, weak advocacy of teamwork) and Cypriot First Officer (history of not
following checklist and SOPs) all within an organisation which had barriers of personal
conflict, language, cultural traits with a lacklustre CRM training programme.

National culture – Basic premise

Slide – National Culture

Research of Hofstede (1980, 1991) laid the foundation for the considerable body of work
which has since examined the role of national culture in relation to flight crew behaviour

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and safety on the flight deck. In it he identified a number of dimensions were national
culture could be identified:

Power Distance (PD)

One’s perception of (and response to) hierarchy, seniority or rank.
In a high-power distance culture (e.g. India) the social inequality is accepted and leaders
are expected to be decisive and self-sufficient, while the subordinates should know their
place and not question their superiors. In a low power distance culture (e.g. Austria) all
citizens treat and view each other as team mates or colleagues there is no gap between
boss and employee, captain and co-pilot. This will affect the management, teamwork and
communication between the crew.

Individualism and collectivism (IND)

A reference to whether a person’s goals are self-oriented (individualism) or team-oriented
(collectivism).
Individualists cultures (e.g. US, Australia, Great Britain) view their actions in a narrow-
minded frameset of personal costs and benefits and group involvements are seen as costs
or rewards. In this culture independence and self-sufficiency are valued, individuals like to
express their own opinions, communication is direct and personal, feedback is precise and
always verbal. Emphasis is placed on resolving conflicts rather than simply agreeing.
Whereas in Collectivist Cultures (e.g. Iran, and many Asian and South American Countries)
individuals express concern for the implications of their actions towards the group, being a
part of a group is highly valued and you have obligations to your group. They also tend to
have a stronger acceptance of fate, tending to cause low stress levels. It is possible to
commonly link collectivism to a high-power distance in a culture because authority is rarely
challenged in a group orientated society.

Uncertainty avoidance (UA)

This is the extent to which people feel threatened in unfamiliar situations or conditions
and of one’s need for defined structures and procedures.
High uncertainty avoidance involves a preference for standard operating procedures
(SOPs), direct face-to-face communications and leaving as little as possible to chance. Low
uncertainty avoidance involves acceptance of high stress and higher exposure to risk as
part of the job, with more tolerance and flexibility.
In the flight deck this may affect how each pilot reacts to an emergency situation and how
each crew member embraces protocol. High uncertainty avoidance cultures (e.g. Latin
America, Latin Europe) are very emotional and expressive with loud voices and sweeping
gestures, they will feel more stressed at work with preference to Standard Operating
Procedures and a stable environment leaving as little as possible to chance and often
communication is very direct. The lowest uncertainty avoidance cultures (e.g. Most Anglo,
Nordic and Asian countries) uncertain situations and conditions are viewed as part of the
job or part of life, and individuals seem more tolerant and flexible.

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Slide – National Culture

Masculine and feminine cultures

This division determines the feeling towards traditional male and female values. In the
flight crew this will affect how much value the men and women place in their working
relationship. In a masculine culture (e.g. Switzerland) there is a stronger gender
differentiation in which males are assertive, competitive and value wealth relative to the
female population. In feminine cultures (e.g. Norway) value in placed on the quality of life
and relationships, male and female populations generally value assertiveness,
competitiveness and wealth equally.

Long vs. short term orientation

This describes the individual cultures orientation towards the future and the present. This
does not have a major effect in aviation working culture but can create friction between
individuals. In long term orientated cultures (e.g. China) people are focused on future
goals and actions are taken to achieve these. Value is placed on an individual’s thrift and
perseverance. Where as in short term orientated cultures (e.g. US and NZ) one’s focus is
on fulfilling social obligations of the present, protecting one’s ‘face’ rather than a respect
for tradition.

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Professional culture
Slide – Professional Culture - Positives

Work conducted by aviation psychologists Robert L Helmreich and Ashleigh C. Merrit

(1998) confirmed that pilots have an overwhelming liking for their job (even if they have a
passionate dislike for their organisation). They found pilots are proud of what they do and
retain their love of the work and are strongly motivated to do it well. This very positive
aspect of the culture of pilots is pride in their profession can help organisations work
toward safety and efficiency in operations.

Slide – Professional Culture - Negatives

However, it was found that professional culture of pilots also has a strong negative
component in a near-universal sense of personal invulnerability. In particular, how the
majority of pilots in all cultures feel that their decision-making is as good in emergencies
as normal situations, that their performance is not effected by personal problems, and
that they do not make more errors in situations of high stress. This misplaced sense of
personal invulnerability can result in a failure to utilise CRM practices as countermeasures
against error.

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Slide – Professional Culture – Impact on safety

In their research paper ‘Culture, Error, and Crew Resource Management’, (Robert L.
Helmreich, John A. Wilhelm, James R. Klinect, & Ashleigh C. Merritt) showed graphically
some of the positive and negative influences of pilots’ professional culture on safety. As
the figure illustrates, positive components can lead to the motivation to master all aspects
of the job, to being an approachable team member, and to pride in the profession. On the
negative side, perceived invulnerability may lead to a disregard for safety measures,
operational procedures, and teamwork.

Company culture
Slide – Company culture

While national, vocational and work group cultures have an undeniable influence on
individual and group behaviour at work, organisational culture has the potential to have a
very significant direct impact on the safety performance of organisations. It is
organisational culture which ultimately shapes workers' perceptions of safety, the relative
importance placed on safety, and members' activities regarding safety (Merritt &
Helmreich, 1996a). A number of authors have provided rigorous discussion on the

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importance of an appropriate organisational safety culture and the role that human factors
expertise can play in establishing and maintaining appropriate cultural norms

Safety culture and CRM

Slide – Company culture & CRM

A company’s safety culture is inextricably linked with, but can be distinguished from its
organisational culture. A company culture will depend on factors such as the way in which
the organisation handles the often conflicting goals of safety and profitability, the trade-
offs between the two, and the level of demonstrated commitment to safety. It also
depends heavily on perceptions of the organisational communication styles, for example, if
an employee is concerned about the safety of a certain practice or procedure, are
channels open for that concern to be communicated to management. If so, how will
management respond? Is the flight safety department proactive or reactive?

Pilots vs Cabin crew – Same culture?

Slide – Company culture – Pilots v Cabin crew

Brent Hayward, in his research paper Culture, CRM and aviation safety, recognised that
within the aviation industry, there exist a range of sub-cultures which can be labelled as
occupational or work group cultures. Examples include the occupations of pilot, flight

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attendant, maintenance engineer, ramp, air traffic control, etc. While these aviation
professions commonly share various vocational norms, there are also significant
differences between their sub-cultures. For instance, pilots and flight attendants work
together as members of the same flight crew, but there are many differences between
them in terms of stereotypical characteristics and management styles for each group
within the organisation.
The cockpit/cabin crew interface research conducted by Chute and her co-workers at
NASA Ames (Chute, Wiener, Dunbar, & Hoang, 1996) analysed the nature of the jobs to
reveal some generalised differences in the demographics and roles of the two work
groups, and their origins, as depicted in Table below.

Boeing vs Airbus
Slide – Company culture – Boeing v Airbus

Within the two biggest aircraft manufacturers there is a culture that distinguishes one from
the other due to the significant differences between the two, in their operating
philosophies and basic systems architecture.

“If it’s not Boeing, I ain’t going” vs “If it’s not Airbus, just take a bus”

Boeing uses traditional controls, where the position of control column corresponds to
position of control surfaces and force on the control column corresponds to force on the
control surfaces. This means that the pilot has to adjust the trim manually when not using
autopilot.
Boeing aircraft leave ultimate control mostly to the pilot.
In flight, the Airbus side-stick input does not indicate desired position of control surfaces,
but desired wing loading and roll rate. The flight computer takes care of trimming the
aircraft for straight flight at current speed and balance, even when autopilot is not
engaged.
Airbus aircraft limit pilots' capabilities in situations that require extreme action to be taken;
the computer may prevent the pilot from pushing the plane past its safe ranges, which
could be necessary in case of an emergency.

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Contrary to what a lot of people think, there aren’t two “camps” of pilot out there, with one
that swears by the Boeing camp and another loyal to Airbus. Although it is recognised that
a pilot might prefer one over the other, it is usually the case of whatever aircraft make they
have been used to. In addition, other factors such Airlines, seniority, bidding preferences,
pay and conditions, commuting options, quality of life/work balance companies etc,
usually determine which aircraft they fly. Whether it’s a Boeing or an Airbus is really
secondary.

Which is safer?
It may be argued that Airbus relies too heavily on automation and flight envelope
protection — under certain conditions, Airbus flight control software precludes manual
inputs from the crew entirely resulting in a statistical stalemate.
However, in determining the better design culture the pros and cons of both sides will
remain, however both plane-makers have endured scandals and controversies, from the
air data sensor malfunction that may have played a role in the 2009 Air France disaster
(Airbus), to the rudder design problems that caused at least two fatal 737 crashes
(Boeing).
As author and researcher Malcom Gladwell (2008) points out, Boeing and Airbus design
modern, complex airplanes to be flown by two equals. That works beautifully in low-power-
distance cultures [like the U.S., where hierarchies aren't as relevant]. But in cultures that
have high power distance, it’s very difficult.
"You are obliged to be deferential toward your elders and superiors in a way that would be
unimaginable in the U.S." he added. That's dangerous when it comes to modern airplanes,
said Gladwell, because such sophisticated machines are designed to be piloted by a crew
that works together as a team of equals, remaining unafraid to point out mistakes or
disagree with a captain.

Military vs Commercial Flying Culture

Slide – Company culture – Military v Commercial

Acceptable risk?
A typical commercial flight is a largely predictive environment. As there will always be a
known sequence of events and significant variations from the plan are rare. If unusual,

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unplanned events or emergencies occur the clear majority can be modelled in advance, or
already experienced in the past. Hence, detailed checklists and procedures are in place
with loss of additional resources available beyond the flight deck, (e.g. ATC, Operations,
Maintrol etc) which can assist crews in a successful outcome.
Within military flying, pilots deliberately place themselves in a high-risk environment, with
the peacetime or training ‘acceptable’ loss rate being zero. And whilst commercial pilots
also have to deal with the unexpected, the reality is that the airlines have been
enormously successful at largely ‘systemising’ the risk out of their operations.
It is recognised that within military pilots there is a ‘higher’ risk culture (compared to
Commercial aviation), which is managed by equipping their pilots with tools and
techniques to be able to still make decisions to deal with the unique situations they end
up facing. It is recognised, unlike commercial flying, that it is not possible to provide all the
solutions they are ever likely to face. So the aim is to equip military pilots with the ability to
reach safe solutions themselves.
As military pilots, safety or risk management is not simply a compliance exercise, or
something that is outsourced to a separate department; it’s owned by the operators.
However, if it can’t be done safely, or at least within agreed acceptable boundaries of risk,
then it can’t be done at all.

Conversion from Military to Civilian Commercial Flying

What are the challenges?
As an example, Korea’s authoritarian culture had previously reflected Korean Air’s hiring
and promotion policy that favoured former military fliers over civilians. Too often, the effect
had been friction (hierarchical cockpits, poor stunted communication) which hampered the
pilot teamwork needed to fly Western-built jets.

Type of Flying Operations

Slide – Company culture – Type of operation

Within aviation there are a number of varying types of Aircraft operations, For example,
Commercial and Public, Business (Corporate) and specialised operations (air taxi, medical,
police, security etc). Within each of these organisations, the culture adopted to satisfy the
demands and expectations of the differing types of operation will be different.

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These cultural differences will need to be recognised by the organizations and appropriate
management SOPs, and countermeasures be incorporated to ensure the risks identified
are acceptable and managed accordingly, whilst still meeting company financial
performance and profitability.

Managing cultural differences & CRM training

Whilst CRM has succeeded in developing better flight crews, due to expansion of aviation
with multicultural and multilingual cockpits there is a need to ensure how CRM techniques
and principles (which are based upon the cultural values of western European society) are
adapted to bridge the gap that separate pilots and crew in language, professional
expectations and cultural interaction.
Answers how to tackle – Basic premises of advocacy, communication and inquiry,

Move from personalities to culture CRM training

Slide – Managing cultural differences

CRM training in the past, had used training from corporate management disciplines and
applied it to aviation to focus upon pilot’s personalities. The idea was that by recognising
your own and your work colleague’s personality traits you will be able to adapt your
behaviour to ensure you still work together as an effective team in maintaining a safe
flight.
However, over recent years it has become recognised that within CRM sessions pilots and
crews are reluctant and uncomfortable to openly discuss their perceived negative
personality traits with their peers.
Aviation psychologist, Robert L. Helmreich refers to additional studies that indicate no
reliable and consistent evidence that personality relates to accidents. However, what is
agreed is that pilots’ personalities should be emotionally stable, non-impulsive, agreeable
but assertive, and that cultural differences should be appreciated by all crew-members,
and where possible substituted for a professional culture. In particular, Crew Resource
Management training of an organization needs to be tailored to the culture of the specific
individuals receiving the training.
Trainers should encourage flight crewmembers to communicate clearly with each other.
Just as pilots have no problem asking ATC to “say again” or “please clarify” instructions,

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they should be unwilling to accept an instruction from an aircraft captain or a reply from a
first officer that is imprecise or unclear.
For example, in cultures of high power distance (e.g. India), a First Officer should receive
training that correcting or questioning the Captain is not so much concerned with
disrespecting the Captain, but more about preventing events down the line that (for
example) might lead to the Captain ‘losing face.’ A well designed training program should
be able to overcome many cultural barriers (Helmreich, 1999).
An organisation needs to support the CRMT in ensuring their employees recognise the
basic premises of national culture identified by Professor Geert Hofstede they must be
applied at the individual pilot level through a three-step developmental mode:
▪ Awareness — Be mindful that you cannot accurately profile another
crewmember simply because of assumptions about his or her national
culture or language.
▪ Knowledge — Incorporate the skills learned from your company’s formal
CRM courses and recognise key phrases and terms that will better
enable communication success and understanding of another’s
perceived strengths and weaknesses.
▪ Skill — Apply the lessons learned to your daily flying activities, and
recognise what works (and, more importantly, what does not) with your
colleagues.
Returning to the basics of early CRM will require trainers to incorporate explicit phrases —
the new idiom — for crewmembers of different primary languages and cultures to employ
when a message is ambiguous.
“Please confirm you would like me to perform the following procedure …” and “Your
instructions are not clear — please clarify …” are examples of procedural, word-specific
SOPs planned for the latest iteration of CRM.

Developing the right culture

Slide – Developing the right culture

What is the right culture – it is one that empowers subordinates by training them the
cognitive (SA and Decision Making) and interpersonal skills (Communication, team work,

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advocacy and inquiry which will enable them to take on additional responsibility when
circumstances call for it.

Behavioural Markers (Notechs)

Via the use of Behavioural Markers organisations are able to develop CRM knowledge,
skills and attitudes appropriate to the culture, which influence flight safety.
Specific Behavioural Markers need to be developed which are sensitive to the individual,
organisation and profession.
Specific behavioural techniques intended to enhance situation awareness and flight
safety, such as cross-checking and verification of communication, preparation, planning,
and vigilance, speaking up to express concerns, and sharing a mental model of the
situation are all means of reducing the likelihood of an error occurring or trapping an error
before it has an operational impact.
These behavioural markers then need to be continually evaluated and reinforced
throughout sim and line orientated training, line checks and company assessments.

Human error and TEM

Also important to the establishment of an appropriate safety culture is the recognition that
human error is unavoidable and that it is the responsibility of a mature organisation to
effectively manage that error. Ensuring non-punitive policies regarding everyday error.
Threat Error Management has been identified as a method of universal agreement across
ALL cultures, which along with behavioural markers a set of error countermeasures that
when applied reduces the likelihood of error, trapping errors before they have an
operational effect, and mitigating the consequences of errors when they do occur.

To summarise

Slide – Summary

Recognition of various cultures within the aviation industry will go a long way toward
mitigating the undesirable effects of some of those cultures, and breaking down barriers
between sub-cultures.
Development and maintenance of an appropriate organisational culture and a positive
safety culture is essential.

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Crew Resource Management training needs to be tailored to the culture of the specific
individuals receiving the training.
A well-designed training program should be able to overcome many cultural barriers.

References
Flight Safety Foundation David M. Bjellos – Multicultural CRM
http://flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/august-2012/multicultural-CRM
University of Texas, Robert L. Helmreich, John A. Wilhelm, James R. Klinect, & Ashleigh C.
Merritt, 1 Culture, Error, and Crew Resource Management
University of Texas, Robert L. Helmreich, Building Safety on the Three Cultures of Aviation
Human Factors in complex sociotechnical systems, Liza Tam and Jacqueline Duley, Ph.D.
Booz Allen Hamilton McLean, VA BEYOND THE WEST: CULTURAL GAPS IN AVIATION
HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH
Aviation Knowledge – National Culture in Aviation
http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:national-culture-in-aviation
The Australian Aviation Psychology Association, Brent Hayward, Culture, CRM and aviation
safety
CAA, CAP 737 – Flight-crew human factors handbook, October 2014

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