After study this unit, you will understand: Corporate Finance – An Overview Principles of Corporate Finance Tools of Corporate Finance The Objective in Corporate Finance Agency Problem Corporate Finance – An Overview Imagine that you were to start your own business. No matter what type you started, you would have to answer the following three questions in some form or another: What long-term investments should you take on? That is, what lines of business will you be in and what sorts of buildings, machinery, and equipment will you need? Where will you get the long-term financing to pay for your investment? Will you bring in other owners or will you borrow the money? How will you manage your everyday financial activities such as collecting from customers and paying suppliers? These are not the only questions by any means, but they are among the most important. Corporate finance, broadly speaking, is the study of ways to answer these three questions. Therefore, corporate finance could then be defined as any decisions made by a business that affect its finances. These decisions can be categorized into investment decisions, financing decisions and dividend decisions. Corporate finance is the area of finance dealing with the sources of funding, the capital structure of corporations and the actions that managers take to increase the value of the firm to the shareholders, as well as the tools and analysis used to allocate financial resources. Corporate Finance is about decisions made by corporations. Not all businesses are organized as corporations. Corporations have three distinct characteristics: Corporations are legal entities, i.e. legally distinct from Corporations it owners and pay their own taxes, Corporations have limited liability, which means that shareholders can only loose their initial investment in case of bankruptcy, Corporations have separated ownership and control as owners are rarely managing the firm. The objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder value by increasing the value of the company's stock. Although other potential objectives (survive, maximize market share, maximize profits, etc.) exist these are consistent with maximizing shareholder value. The Financial Manager and Corporation A striking feature of large corporations is that the owners (the stockholders) are usually not directly involved in making business decisions, particularly on a day-to-day basis. Instead, the corporation employs managers to represent the owners’ interests and make decisions on their behalf. In a large corporation, the financial manager would be in charge of answering the three questions as we raised in the above. The financial management function is usually associated with a top officer of the firm, such as a vice president of finance or some other chief financial officer (CFO). The chief financial officer of finance coordinates the activities of the treasurer and the controller. The controller’s office handles cost and financial accounting, tax payments, and management information systems. The treasurer’s office is responsible for managing the firm’s cash and credit, its financial planning, and its capital expenditures. (see Figure-1) These treasury activities are all related to the three general questions raised earlier. Principles of Corporate Finance All of corporate finance is build on three such principles, which we term the investment principle, the financing principle, and the dividend principle. The Investment Principle: This principle states simply that firms should invest in assets only when they are expected to earn a return greater than a minimum acceptable return. This minimum return, which we term a hurdle rate, should reflect whether the money is raised from debt or equity, and what returns those investing the money could have made elsewhere on similar investment. The Financing Principle: It posits that the mix of debt and equity chosen to finance investments should maximize the value of the investments made. In the context of the hurdle rate specified in the investment principle, choosing a mix of debt and equity that minimize this hurdle rate allows the firm to take more new investments and increase the value of existing investments. The dividend principle: Firms some times cannot find investments that earn their minimum required return or hurdle rate. If this shortfall persists, firms have to return any cash they generate to the owners. Tools of Corporate Finance In the process of developing the models that can be used to make sensible investment, financing and dividend decisions, we will draw on a number of tools that apply across all these decisions. The first of these tools is the time value of the money, which allows us to compare cash received or paid at different points in time and to weight them based on when they occur. The second tool is an understanding of financial statements, since much of the information that we get and provide in finance comes from these statements. The third tool is an understanding of how to value an asset. Not only the above tools but also using the following tools can help your corporation control its finances, which will lead to greater efficiencies. Risk and return, Futures, Forwards, and Options. The Objective in Corporate Finance An objective specifies what a decision maker is trying to accomplish, and by so doing, it provides measures that can be used to choose between alternatives. In most firms, it is the managers of the firm, rather than the owners, who make the decisions about where to invest or how to raise funds for an investment. Thus, if stock price maximization is the objective, a manager choosing between two alternatives will choose the one that increases stock price more. In most cases, the objective is stated in terms of maximizing some function or variable (profits, size, value, social welfare) or minimizing some function or variable (risk, costs). This part of the unit will take you through the models developed in corporate finance to maximize stakeholders’ wealth. The need for an objective Overtime, there had been this controversy over the ‘right’ objective to use in corporate finance, though this may seem somehow difficult to develop. Sometimes, questions could arise, why do one objective, why not have multiple objectives that try to satisfy all sides. In the midst of all these competing objectives, an option came which try to explain the differences using the following reasons: If an objective is not chosen, it will be difficult to have alternative to decision rules. In corporate finance, the net present value (NPV) is the best approach to selecting projects. In this wise, NPV is the objective of maximizing stakeholders’ wealth. Without an objective, there would be several approaches for selecting projects ranging from reasonable ones to absurd ones. If multiple objectives are chosen, we would be faced with numerous problems. A theory developed around multiple objectives of equal weight will create quandaries when it comes to making decisions. To illustrate, assume that a firm chooses as its objectives maximizing market share and maximizing current earnings. If a project increases both market share and current earnings, the firm will encounter no problems, but what if the project being analyzed increases market share while reducing current earnings? The firm should not invest in the project if the current earnings objective is considered, but it should invest in it based on the market share objective. If objectives are prioritized, we are faced with the same stark choices as in the choice of single objective. Should the top priority be maximizing current earnings, or should it be maximizing market share? Because there is no gain from having multiple objectives, and developing theory becomes much more difficult with multiple objectives, we should argue that there should be only one objective. The characteristics of the ‘Right’ objective When it comes to decision making, a firm can choose between a number of different objectives. How can it know whether the objective it has chosen is the “right” objective? A good objective should have the following characteristics. It must be clear and unambiguous: An ambiguous objective will lead to decision rules that vary from case to case and from decision maker to decision maker. Consider, for instance, a firm whose objective is to increase growth in the long-term. This is an ambiguous objective since it does not answer at least two questions. The first is growth in what variable? Is it in revenue, operating earnings, net income, or earnings per share? The second is in the definition of the long-term: is it three years, five years, or a longer period? It must come with a clear and timely measure: That can be used to evaluate the success or failure of decisions. Objectives that sound good but do not come with a measurement mechanism are likely to fail. For instance, consider a retail firm that defines its objective as maximizing customer satisfaction. Exactly how is customer satisfaction defined, and how is it to be measure? If no good mechanism exists for measuring customers’ satisfaction with their purchases, not only will managers be unable to make decisions based on this objective, but the firm will also have no way of holding them accountable for any decisions they do make. It does not create costs for other entities or groups: That erase firm-specific benefits and leave society worse off overall. As an example, assume that a tobacco company defines its objective to be revenue growth. Managers of this firm will then be inclined to Managers increase advertising to teenagers, since it will increase sales. Doing so, however, may create significant costs for society that will overwhelm any benefits arising from the objective. Why corporate finance focuses on stock price maximization Even though stock price maximization as an objective is the narrowest of the value maximization objectives, it is the most prevalent one. There are three reasons for the focus on stock price maximization in traditional corporate finance. The first is that stock prices are the most observable of all measures that can be used to judge the performance of a firm. Unlike earnings or sales, which are updated once every quarter or year, stock prices are updated constantly to reflect new information coming out about the firm. Thus, managers receive instantaneous feedback on every action they take from investors in markets. The second reason is that stock prices, in a market with rational investors, reflect the long-term effect of the firm’s decisions. Unlike accounting measures such as earnings or sales measures such as market share, which examine the effects of the firm’s decisions on current operations, the stock price reflects the long-term effects of this decisions on value. In a rational market, the stock price represents the investors’ attempt to measure this value. Finally, the stock price is a real measure of stockholder wealth, since stockholders can sell their stock and receive the price now. Thus, when firms maximize stock prices, stockholders can cash in on the gain immediately, if they so desire. When is stock price maximization the only objective a firm needs? In classical corporate finance, the managers of firms need to concentrate only on maximizing stock prices and can set aside all other concerns they might have for other claim holders. Although this single-mindedness sounds extreme and may actually be damaging to other claim holders in the firm (lenders, employees, and society), it is appropriate if the following assumptions hold. 1. The managers of the firm put aside their own objectives and focus on maximizing stockholder wealth as measured by the stock prices. This might occur either because they are terrified of the power stockholders have to replace them or because they own enough stock in the firm that maximizing stockholder wealth becomes their primary objective as well. 2. The lenders to the firm feel secure that their interests will be protected and that the firm will live up to its contractual obligations. This might occur for one of two reasons. The first is that stockholders might be concerned about the damage to the firm’s reputation if they take actions that hurt lenders and about the consequence of that damage for future borrowing. The second is that lenders might be able to protect themselves fully when they lend by writing in the restrictions (covenants) that proscribe the firm’s taking any actions that hurt the lenders. 3. The managers of the firm do not attempt to mislead or lie to financial markets about their future prospects, and there is sufficient information for markets to make judgments about the effects the firm’s actions on its value. Markets are assumed to be reasoned and rational in their assessment of these actions and the consequent effects on stock price. 4. There are no burdens that are created for society, in the form of health, pollution, or infrastructure costs, in the process of stockholders wealth maximization. All costs created by firm in its pursuit of stockholder wealth maximization can be traced and charged to the firm. With these assumptions, no other group is hurt as stockholders maximize wealth, and stock prices reflect stockholders wealth. Consequently, managers can concentrate on one objective-maximizing stock prices. Agency Problem The relationship between stockholders and management is called an agency relationship. Such a relationship exists whenever someone (the principal) hires another (the agent) to represent his/her interests. For example, you might hire someone (an agent) to sell a car that you own while you are away at the place. In all such relationships, there is a possibility of conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. Such a conflict is called an agency problem. Suppose that you hire someone to sell your car and that you agree to pay that person a flat fee when he/she sells the car. The agent’s incentive in this case is to make the sale, not necessarily to get you the best price. If you offer a commission of, say, 10 percent of the sales price instead of a flat fee, then this problem might not exist. In a large corporation, for example, the managers may enjoy many fringe benefits, such as golf club memberships, access to private jets, and company cars. These benefits (also called perquisites, or “perks”) may be useful in conducting business and may help attract or retain management personnel, but there is room for abuse. What if the managers start spending more time at the golf course than at their desks? What if they use the company jets for personal travel? What if they buy company cars for their teenagers to drive? The abuse of perquisites imposes costs on the firm—and ultimately on the owners of the firm. There is also a possibility that managers who feel secure in their positions may not bother to expend their best efforts toward the business. This is referred to as shirking, and it too imposes a cost to the firm. Another possibility that managers will act in their own self-interest, rather than in the interest of the shareholders when those interests clash. Finally, to see how management and stockholder interests might differ, imagine that the firm is considering a new investment. The new investment is expected to favorably impact the share value, but it is also a relatively risky venture. The owners of the firm will wish to take the investment (because the stock value will rise), but management may not because there is the possibility that things will turn out badly. If management does not take the investment, then the stockholders may lose a valuable opportunity. This is one example of an agency cost. To mitigate the agency problem, the following agency costs may incur: 1. Monitoring costs are costs incurred by the principal to monitor or limit the actions of the agent. In a corporation, shareholders may require managers to periodically report on their activities via audited accounting statements, which are sent to shareholders. The accountants’ fees and the management time lost in preparing such statements are monitoring costs. 2. Bonding costs are incurred by agents to assure principals that they will act in the principal’s best interest. The name comes from the agent’s promise or bond to take certain actions. A manager may enter into a contract that requires him or her to stay on with the firm even though another company acquires it. 3. Executive Compensation. Incentives may be offered in the form of cash bonus and perks that are linked to certain performance targets. Stock options that grant managers the right purchase equity shares at a certain price thereby giving them a stake in ownership when certain goals are achieved, and so on.
Corporate Finance Is The Area of Finance Dealing With Monetary Decisions That Business Enterprises Make and The Tools and Analysis Used To Make These Decisions