SHIGENORI KURODA v. ALANDONI, G.R. No.

L-2662, March 26, 1949

FATS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial
Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the
Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the
trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore
he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international.

ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?

RULING
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its
section 3, that –The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of
the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and
significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation
all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or
waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of
humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the
promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution. Petitioner argues that respondent
Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation
of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not
a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that
the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory
to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may
have been or shall be a signatory.
 LA CHEMISE LACOSTE, S. A., vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. L-63796-97 May 2,
1984

FACTS
The petitioner is a foreign corporation, organized and existing under the laws of
France and not doing business in the Philippines. It is undeniable from the records
that it is the actual owner of the trademarks used on clothings and other goods
specifically sporting apparels sold in many parts of the world and which have been
marketed in the Philippines since 1964. The main basis of the private respondent's
case is its claim of alleged prior registration.
In 1975, Hemandas & Co., applied for a duly licensed domestic firm and was issued
Reg. No. SR-2225 for the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & CROCODILE
DEVICE" by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear and other
garment products of the company. Two years later, it applied for the registration of
the same trademark under the Principal Register. On November 21, 1980, the
petitioner filed its application for registration of the trademark "Crocodile Device"
(Application Serial No. 43242) and "Lacoste" (Application Serial No. 43241).
On March 21, 1983, the petitioner filed with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of unfair competition being
committed by Hemandas .The NBI conducted an investigation and subsequently
filed with the respondent court two applications for the issuance of search warrants
which would authorize the search of the premises used and occupied by the Lacoste
Sports Center and Games and Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas.
The respondent court issued Search Warrant Nos. 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. The NBI agents executed the two search
warrants and as a result of the search found and seized various goods and articles
described in the warrants.

Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search warrants. The petitioner filed its
opposition to the motion arguing that the motion to quash was fatally defective as it
cited no valid ground for the quashal of the search warrants and that the grounds
alleged in the motion were absolutely without merit. The State Prosecutor likewise
filed his opposition on the grounds that the goods seized were instrument of a crime.

The respondent court was, however, convinced that there was no probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated March 22, 1983,
the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the NBI agents or officers in
custody of the seized items were ordered to return the same to Hemandas. (Rollo, p.
25)
ISSUES

Whether or not the petitioner has no capacity to sue before Philippine courts

Whether or not the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated April 22, 1983

RULING

Yes, the petitioner has the capacity to sue in the Philippines.

Yes, the respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order dated April 22, 1983. In upholding the right of the petitioner
to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of
trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which
the Philippines and France are parties. Western Equipment and Supply Co. v. Reyes (51 Phil.
115), this Court held that a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the
Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and
favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its
corporate and... tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to
restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing
the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge
of the existence of... such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the
proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign
corporation.

REYES v. BAGATSING G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

FACTS
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti- Bases Coalition
sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy,
which is less than two blocks apart. Then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing has
denied the permit. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City
Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the
US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to
the US embassy from such lawless elements pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as affirmed by our constitutional provision to
“adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.

ISSUE
Whether or not the denial of the permit by the Mayor violates the petitioner's right to
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

RULING
Yes. The Court held that the denial of the permit violated the petitioner's right to
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Free speech and peaceful assembly
are fundamental rights that should be protected and respected.Article 3 Section 4 of
the 1987 constitution states that No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. These rights can
only be limited if there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Therefore, the denial of the permit by the mayor violates
the constitutional rights of the petitioner.

DALE SANDERS v. VERIDIANO G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988

FACTS
Petitioner Sanders was then the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the
Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private respondents were
American citizens with permanent address in the Phil and were both game room
attendants of the NAVSTA.

Herein respondents were then advised that their employment was changed from
permanent full time to permanent part-time. They filed a case of the US Dept. of
Defense then was gave a recommendation for their reinstatement. The controversy
of the case was when Sanders sent a letter to Moreau that he disagrees with the
recommendation. Because of the letters private respondents filed a case with CFI of
Zambales, the plaintiffs claim that the letters contains libelous content and has
caused them the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings.

The lower court ruled that the defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith. Motion
to lift the default order and motion for reconsideration of the denial on the motion to
dismiss which was subsequently denied by the respondent court.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction

2. Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they
did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents.

RULING

1. Yes, the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government
functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him
from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of
state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not
suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled
principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the
person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the
present case. In Baer v. Tizon, we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against
the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was
done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United
States had not given its consent to be sued. The petitioners were, legally speaking,
being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to
the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners
in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal.
This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.

2. Yes, the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. It is abundantly
clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are sued by are acts
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA had supervision of its personnel and matters relating to their
work and employment. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the
Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the
private respondent’s type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had
even commenced.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

FACTS

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos
family to allow the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu,
Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act
arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior

refusal, fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of
former President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. In a statement, she
said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely
and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of
society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our
country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the
succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos'
remains.

2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is
tantamount to dictatorship.

RULING

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the
result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the
people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be
confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under
the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers
to an express grant of power.
 RAQUIZA v. BRADFORD G.R. No. L-44 September 13, 1945

FACTS

In their petition for a writ of habeas corpus dated August 30, 1945, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee
Han Kee, and Emma Link Infante claim they are being unlawfully detained at the Correctional
Institution for Women. They request that Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the
CIC, U.S. Army, or their substitutes, appear in court, present the petitioners, and explain why
they should not be released immediately. They argue that they have been deprived of their liberty
without due process of law.

Respondents Lt. Col. L. J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twidle claim that the petitioners were
detained under the authority of a proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on
December 29, 1944.

The proclamation stated that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort
and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and military necessity requires that such persons be
enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether or not the detention of the petitioners is legal under the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur.

RULING

Yes. The Commander in Chief of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation
cannot be seriously questioned. General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it
to be his purpose, among other things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to, when
apprehended, "for the duration of the war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine
Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." He premised his proclamation upon
two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that evidence was before him "that certain citizens of the
Philippines voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of
allegiance due the Government of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;"
and (2) that "military necessity requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to
threaten the security of our military forces or the success of our military operations."

In the very nature of things, the Commander in Chief of the Army of liberation at the time of
issuing that proclamation had to act upon the evidence then before him. The exigencies of the
mighty military operations that he had then but recently begun for the destruction or defeat of the
powerful enemy who was at that time occupying the Islands, did not permit of any other
procedure. And to deny him the exclusive power and competency to determine the strength and
sufficiency of such evidence would have been destructive of that military efficieny with which, in
the interest of all the citizens of the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners,
the operations for their liberation had to be conducted. And once having apprehended the
persons to whom the proclamation referred, the same exigencies required that the said
Commander in Chief be invested with the exclusive power and authority to decide when he
should deliver them to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.