BULAN, JULIE FAITH, A.

SEPTEMBER 16, 2022

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSIGNMENT 3: Case Digest

G.R. No. L-2662             March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,
vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA,
Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville Hussey for
respondents.

I. FACTS

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes
Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a
signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is
charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. 

II. ISSUE/S

a. WON the Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations laid down on The Hague and
Geneva Conventions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it can
create a Military Commission to try violations of the Hague Convention?

III. RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]

YES, E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in section 3, that – The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who has been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
 consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines
is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that  the rules and
regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of, and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two conventions. Such rules
and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

REFERENCES:

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949. (2012). Philippine Constitutional Law Digests.
http://philippineconstitutionallawdigests.blogspot.com/2012/07/kuroda-v-jalandoni-gr-no-l-2662-
march.html
G.R. No. 63796-97, 21 May 1984
La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez

I. FACTS
La Chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the trademarks “Lacoste,”
“Chemise Lacoste,” “Crocodile Device” and a composite mark consisting of the word “Lacoste” and
a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothing and other goods sold in many parts of the
world and which has been marketed in the Philippines since 1964.
In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. No.
SR-2225 (SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE &
CROCODILE DEVICE" by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts, sportswear, and other
garment products of the company. Two years later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark
under Principal Register.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to respondent Gobindram Hemandas all rights, title, and
interest in the trademark "CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE".
In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste filed for the registration of the “Crocodile device” and “Lacoste”.
Games and Garments opposed the registration of “Lacoste.” In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the
NBI letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and requesting the
agency’s assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods and articles were
seized upon the execution of the warrants. Hemandas filed a motion to quash the warrants, which the
court granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods were ordered to be returned. La Chemise
Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.

II. ISSUE/S

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair
competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation

III. HELD

Yes. The petitioner has the right to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition
or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation. As early as 1927, this Court was, and it still is, of
the view that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue before
Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair competition. Thus, in Western Equipment and
Supply Co. v. Reyes (51 Phil. 115), this Court held that a foreign corporation that has never done any
business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here but is widely and
favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing it’s corporate and
tradename has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and
inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign
corporation when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign
corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade
in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.
Moreover, we are recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. Pursuant to this
 obligation, the Ministry of Trade issued a memorandum addressed to the Director of the Patents Office
directing the latter to reject all pending applications for Philippine registration of signature and other
world-famous trademarks by applicants other than its original owners or use.

REFERENCES:

La Chemise Lacoste vs Fernandez Digest. (2018). SCRIBD. https://www.scribd.com/document/384925882/2-La-

Chemise-Lacoste-vs-Fernandez-Digest
 Sanders vs. Veridiano II
No. L-46930 | 1988, June 10
Petitioner:        Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, jr.
Respondent:    Hon. Regino, Veridiano II (presiding Judge, CFI Zambales, Olongapo)
Anthony M. Rossi and Ralph L. Wyers
CRUZ, J.

I. FACTS
Private respondents Rossi and Wyers were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They protested this action which in effect led to several
grievance proceedings. Even the grievances were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, it was
placed in public places where others not involved in the case could hear. Private respondents sued the
herein petitions for invasion of their personal and propriety rights.

II. ISSUE/S
Whether the petitions were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they
have been sued for damages.

III. RULING
Yes; and therefore, they are being sued as officers of the United States Government. Such a
complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable and has given its
consent to be sued.

 It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders as director of the special
services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel including the
private respondents and had a hand in their employment, work, assignments, discipline, dismissal,
and other related matters. The act of Moreau is deadly official in nature, performed by him as the
immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the
special department of NAVSTA.

REFERENCES:

CASE DIGEST: Sanders vs. Veridiano II. (n.d.). WORD PRESS. Retrieved July 31, 2018, from Reyes vs.
Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
 Reyes vs. Bagatsing,
G.R. No. L-65366
November 9, 1983

I. FACTS
Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on
October 26, 1983, from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the
United States Embassy. Once there, a short program would be held. The march would be attended
by the local and foreign participants of such conference. There was an assurance in the petition
that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps
would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However, the request was denied.
Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal
elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where many people is expected to
attend. The respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants may be ensured. An oral
argument was heard, and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no
showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the
denial of a permit. However, Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila.

II. ISSUE/S
WON the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated.

III. HELD
Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." There is no limitation on the exercise of this right,
except in the presence of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest. There was no justification to deny the right to freedom of peaceable
assembly and the right to free speech, as there was the absence of clear and present danger of a
substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. It is settled law that in public places, especially so
as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use depending on who is the
applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. From time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Regarding the ordinance, there was no showing that
there was a violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not
follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit
sought could still be challenged.

REFERENCES:
Reyes vs. Bagatsing,  G.R. No. L-65366 . (2011). PDF COFFEE. https://pdfcoffee.com/qdownload/reyes-vs-
bagatsing-5-pdf-free.html

Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668

Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners

Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., respondents

I. FACTS
Only about three years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the latter, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences of his return to the nation at a time when the stability of government is threatened from
various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on
the decision to bar his and his family’s return. The Marcoses now seek to enjoin the implementation
of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their constitutionally guaranteed liberty of abode and right to
travel.

II. ISSUE/S
Is the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?

III. HELD

Yes. Contrary to the petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power, and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers
of the President are not limited to what is expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos,
for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the
duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect
and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty.

REFERENCE:

Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211). (2018, October). Law School Noob.
http://lawschoolnoob.blogspot.com/2018/10/case-digest-marcos-v-manglapus-gr-no.html
 G.R. No. L-44            
September 13, 1945
LILY RAQUIZA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
LT. COL. L.J. BRADFORD, ET AL., respondents.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for petitioners.
J.A. Wolfson for respondents.

I. FACTS

Petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante were arrested for charges
of “Espionage activity for Japanese” and “Active collaboration with the enemy” by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944.
Petitioners pray that the Officers, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of the CIC,
U.S. Army, be directed to appear before the court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show
cause why they should not forthwith be set at liberty.

II. ISSUE/S

Whether or not the foreign military has the legal power to detain the petitioners.

III. HELD

Yes. The Commonwealth Government asked, and the United States Government agreed, that the
United States Army come and be stationed in the Philippines, for the very realization of the
overruling and vehement desire and dream of the Filipinos to be freed from the shackles of Japanese
tyranny. The grant of a free passage, therefore, implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops
during their passage and permits the foreign general to use that discipline and to inflict those
punishments that the government of this army may require.

REFERENCE:

G.R. No. L-44 . (2010). PDF COFFEE. https://pdfcoffee.com/qdownload/digest-raquizavs-bradford-pdf-free.html

GR. No. L-1352            
April 30, 1947
ALFONSO MONTEBON, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, ET AL., respondents.
Petitioner Montebon in his own behalf.
Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Gianzon and Solicitor Alejandro for respondents.

I. FACTS
This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso Montebon on behalf oF Elpidio S. Cruz, a prisoner at
the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar petition was filed with this Court by Felicisima Santiago in the name
of the same prisoner (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 927), a petition which was denied by us in
a decision promulgated on January 30, 1947. The ground of the first petition was the alleged illegality of
one of the prisoner's three convictions for estafa. The present application contests the validity of the
prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine Executive
Commission under date of June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his (prisoner's) maximum aggregate
sentences in three cases in which had been paroled by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26,
1941, when he still had over five years to serve. The commissioner of Justice's recommitment order was
made by virtue of Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of
the Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the Board of Pardons
having been abolished, the powers, duties, and functions thereof shall henceforth be assumed and
exercised by the Commissioner of Justice.

II. ISSUE/S
Won the recommitment order valid during the Japanese Occupation?
III. HELD
The petition is denied without costs.

Ruling:
Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid and binding; it is
imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague convention and the theory of jus post limitation
the International Law. That the legal truism in political and international law is that all acts and
proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good
and valid.
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society or do away
with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages
celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time
of peace.
 REFERENCE:

ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. (2018). Course Hero: Compilation-of-case-digests-

constitutional-law. https://www.coursehero.com/file/25271422/compilation-of-case-digests-
constitutional-law-docxdocx/

Asaali vs Commissioner of Customs

GR No. L-24170 December 16, 1968

I. FACTS
On Sept. 10, 1950, at about noon time, a Philippine customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-
23 intercepted fi ve (5) sailing vessels on the high seas between British North Borneo and Sulu, while
they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu. The vessels were all of the Philippine registry, owned
and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu. The cargo consisted of cigarettes without the required
import license, hence, smuggled.
Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No. 426,
otherwise known as the Import Control Law. Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the
outset, affirmed the decision rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for
forfeiture under the law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. was, as also already made
known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals.

II. ISSUE/S
Whether or not the forfeiture and seizure made by the collector at the high seas is proper.

HELD: 

Yes. It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of the Philippine registry. The Revised Penal
Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its
interior waters, and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction against those commit offense
sense while on a Philippine ship. The principle of law that sustains the validity of such a provision
equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure of the five sailing vessels found thereafter to have
violated the applicable provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Church v. Hubbart, an 1804 decision, that a state has the right to protect itself
and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. In the language
of Chief Justice Marshall: “The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and
exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of
that territory and is a hostile act that it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury
may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.”

REFERENCE:
CASE DIGEST: ASAALI V. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (G.R. NO. L-24170). (2012). PROJECT
JURISPRUDENCE. https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2020/10/case-digest-asaali-v-commissioner-
of-customs-gr-no-l-24170.html

G.R. No. 162230

Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al.
GR NO. 162230
I. FACTS
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners narrate that during
the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the
women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were
looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese
soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly
raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese
tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries,
pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they
have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting
assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

II. ISSUE/S

Did respondents commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed against them?

HELD

Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases
often have been found to present political questions. One such category involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative the political'--
departments of the government and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
 Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question of whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is in the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of
1951. The wisdom of such a decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners
herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for
certiorari.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be
inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the
Executive Departments’ determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinated political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed. DISMISSED.

REFERENCE:

VINUYA V. ROMULO (G.R. NO. 162230; APRIL 28, 2010). (2017). PROJECT JURISPRUDENCE.

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/05/vinuya-v-romulo-gr-no-162230-april-28.html