Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the

State 1st ed. Edition Matthieu Cimino

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/syria-borders-boundaries-and-the-state-1st-ed-edition
-matthieu-cimino/
MOBILITY & POLITICS
SERIES EDITORS: MARTIN GEIGER
PARVATI RAGHURAM · WILLIAM WALTERS

Syria: Borders,
Boundaries, and
the State
Edited by
Matthieu Cimino
Mobility & Politics

Series Editors
Martin Geiger
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

Parvati Raghuram
Open University
Milton Keynes, UK

William Walters
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
Mobility & Politics

Series Editors
Martin Geiger, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
Parvati Raghuram, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
William Walters, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Global Advisory Board

Michael Collyer, University of Sussex
Susan B. Coutin, University of California
Raúl Delgado Wise, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas
Nicholas De Genova, King’s College London
Eleonore Kofman, Middlesex University
Rey Koslowski, University at Albany
Loren B. Landau, University of the Witwatersrand
Sandro Mezzadra, Università di Bologna
Alison Mountz, Wilfrid Laurier University
Brett Neilson, University of Western Sydney
Antoine Pécoud, Université Paris 13
Ranabir Samaddar, Mahanirban Research Group Calcutta
Nandita Sharma, University of Hawai’i at Manoa
Tesfaye Tafesse, Addis Ababa University
Thanh-Dam Truong, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Human mobility, whatever its scale, is often controversial. Hence it carries with it
the potential for politics. A core feature of mobility politics is the tension between
the desire to maximise the social and economic benefits of migration and pres-
sures to restrict movement. Transnational communities, global instability, advances in
transportation and communication, and concepts of ‘smart borders’ and ‘migration
management’ are just a few of the phenomena transforming the landscape of migra-
tion today. The tension between openness and restriction raises important questions
about how different types of policy and politics come to life and influence mobility.
Mobility & Politics invites original, theoretically and empirically informed studies
for academic and policy-oriented debates. Authors examine issues such as refugees
and displacement, migration and citizenship, security and cross-border movements,
(post-)colonialism and mobility, and transnational movements and cosmopolitics.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14800
 Matthieu Cimino
Editor

Syria: Borders,
Boundaries,
and the State
Editor
Matthieu Cimino
Oxford, UK

Mobility & Politics

ISBN 978-3-030-44876-9 ISBN 978-3-030-44877-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44877-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Foreword

“One, one, one, ‘Amuda and Kafr Nabl are one, the Syrian people is
one.” This was a slogan signed by the local committee of ‘Amuda, a
Kurdish town in North-East Syria, at the beginning of the Syrian uprising
in 2011. “Muslims, Christians, all one Syrian people” was chanted across
the streets of Damascus in 2011. Even the occupied Golan Heights terri-
tory was part of this all-inclusive rhetoric: “Greetings from the bride of the
north, ‘Amuda, to the bride of the occupied South, Majdal Shams,” with
Majdal Shams answering with “bows to you, how beautiful would it be
to live in the same country.” At this early stage of the revolution, all signs
pointed to a unified country, a strong sense of a Syrian national identity,
and an overwhelming feeling of solidarity among Syrians from various
parts of the country. Not only did the revolution not seek to challenge
the external borders of Syria—with the exception of the Golan Heights,
often claimed as a part of Syria in various slogans, but Syrian protestors
were also adamant in highlighting the unity of their country, sometimes in
very creative ways. Language, and in particular Syrian dialect, was a tool
the protestors used daily on the streets of Syria to showcase the unity of
the Syrian people regardless of ethnic, regional, or religious differences. A
symbolic chain of slogans emerged, where a slogan from a city would be
answered by a town on the other side of the country, a powerful demon-
stration that indeed, “one, one one, the Syrian people is one.” In this
process, the local dialectal differences of one region were used in the
slogans of another, such as in the case of the slogan from Damascus to

v
vi FOREWORD

Daraa, “Oh Daraa, we are with you till death,” where the term “we” used
is henna, common in Daraa, rather than the Damascene nahna. Humor
was present in the creation of new sayings: The protestors created a new
proverb in Arabic, translating as “sectarianism is the product of the regime
so avoid it,” recalling the Qur’anic verse “fitna is the product of the devil
so avoid it.” All these signs pointed to the awareness, by the Syrian people,
of the fragmentation strategies of the uprising by the Syrian regime.
These hopes of a unified country against the regime were short-lived.
In 2014, Daesh raised its flag in the Syrian city of Raqqa, making it its de
facto capital a year later. As early as 2012 onward, the national borders
of Syria did not de facto delineate a coherent state any longer, and Syria’s
territory’s spatial continuity was broken. In this process, it is not only
the physical space that was altered and fragmented, but also the very
cohesion of Syria’s social fabric, which constitutes the most serious chal-
lenge for Syria’s future peace and stability. What the posters of the early
days of the revolution had warned the world about had materialized, in
the most inhumane and unexpected ways possible. The fragmentation of
Syria’s territory was as brutal as it was rapid. A map of Syria in 2016
shows a mosaic of areas under the control of different actors: While the
Syrian regime controlled some areas along the Damascus-Aleppo axis, the
Kurdish PYD took charge of the Federation of North Syria, the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) occupied a large part of East and
Central Syria, the Syrian opposition held various discontinuous areas, and
the Islamic group Jabhat Fatah al-Sham controlled a few areas in the
North Western part of the country. While ISIL began minting its own
gold dinars, the Turkish lira and the US dollar became used currencies in
Syria along with the Syrian pound. The borders of modern Syria, which
had been thought stable and socially internalized, had been challenged,
opening up avenues to new imaginations of space: the possibility of a
Kurdistan, but also an umma unified under an Islamic State.
The Syrian case is a demonstration of the complex nature of borders
and boundaries, as well as their fluctuant and transient character. As very
polyvalent terms, borders and boundaries can denote a dividing line that is
natural, political, institutional, historical, legal, imagined, cultural, social,
hard or soft, visible or invisible. In the field of border studies, borders
(understood as mostly external) and boundaries (mostly internal of imag-
ined) are one of the most ubiquitous features of political geography. A
 FOREWORD vii

burgeoning field of interdisciplinary nature, border studies has gained

renewed prominence in the twenty-first century across the social sciences
and humanities, in line with the current global crises and transforma-
tions of our world. Territorial disputes, resource management, migra-
tions, or globalization are among the key topics of this field: These issues
are deeply anchored in the Syrian case, as this volume skillfully demon-
strates. Central to the Syrian case and to the field of border studies is
the concept of the border as a process: Borders are the outcome of
processes of bordering and othering, and as such, borders are active forces
characterized by variability and contingency across space and time. They
can be used and manipulated by various actors: state, transnational, or
internal players. The Syrian case provides a formidable illustration of these
processes at play. The Syrian-Israeli border, despite being a feature of the
Syrian regime’s resistance rhetoric, has been the most quietest border over
the past decades. As this volume shows, the changing nature of borders in
the Syrian case makes their study even more necessary in the twenty-first
century: Far from vanishing, borders exhibit a changing nature.
As the first volume dedicated to the study of Syria’s borders from
the mandate period till the rise of ISIL, this book could not come at a
more opportune time, both for a better understanding of Syria, but also
at the global level given the recent political, social, and environmental
transformations. First, it is a timely work for a better understanding of
modern Syria and the 2011-present civil war, examined here through the
lens of borders as well as geographical space and imagination. The Syrian
conflict is the foremost example of a local conflict that has become a global
crisis: from international players leading a proxy war, transnational groups
and foreign fighters establishing their battles within its borders, to global
migrations and an unfolding humanitarian crisis that has impacted terri-
tories as far as Europe or the United States and Australia. With the migra-
tions of Syrian refugees and the internationally led attacks of ISIS, Syria’s
porous borders suddenly became a problem for the international commu-
nity, one it could no longer ignore. If it was too late of a wake-up call, the
Syrian scenario is one that reminds us of the global nature of our world,
and the necessity to care and solve crises before they aggravate. Second,
at the global level, it seems that borders have never been so crucial for
academic examination: Their changing nature and their porosity call for a
greater attention to the future of borders. While wars and instability are
viii FOREWORD

driving many outside of their state borders, climate change is becoming an

alarming factor in the influx of population migrations. At the state level,
but also at the local and micro level, many communities are leaving their
areas as food becomes too scarce because, for instance, fishing is not an
option any longer. Other communities are chased outside of their borders
such as the Rohingya in Myanmar. These phenomena will, unfortunately,
only aggravate in the years and decades to come. This is why this book
will be a valuable tool not only for specialists of Syria and border studies
scholars, but also anyone interested in pressing global issues.
Starting with the creation of modern Syria and the Sykes-Picot drawing
of its new borders up until the establishment of a Caliphate encompassing
Syrian and Iraqi territories, this volume is unique by its many tempo-
ralities. The case studies provided go way beyond these timely markers
(1920–2017): Ottoman legacy, but also the long-term history of the
Kurds going back to the sixteenth century, or the references to the early
Islamic empire by Daesh are all examined by the contributors. They have
successfully demonstrated that each actor in the conflict should be studied
through a timeline that is unique to them. When the ancient or Islamic
past is recalled, there is much to satisfy the imagination in the case of Syria
given the rich history of its borders. A cradle of civilization, Damascus is
known as the most continuously inhabited city in the world. Following
a rich prehistory, Syria was a territory under the Persian, Greek, and
Roman empires, and in the latter, several parts of Syria acted as a buffer
zone under the Ghassanid empire. Syria was then integrated within the
Islamic empire after the conquests, becoming the seat of the Umayyad
empire, and later played a key role during the Mamluk empire being
united with Egypt, and finally as a province of the Ottomans up until
the early twentieth century. The legacy of the Ottoman era is swiftly inte-
grated to this volume, enabling the reader to get a grasp of a long-term
border construction and internalization process. Many key questions are
raised by this volume. When do borders become legitimate and internal-
ized, and through what processes? How and why do state and non-state
actors manipulate borders? What was the legacy of the short-lived Arab
Kingdom of Syria under Emir Faisal in 1919? The Kingdom proclaimed
Syria as a territory between “its natural boundaries” from the Taurus
mountains in Turkey to the Sinai desert in Egypt and became a source of
inspiration for many Arab liberation movements. What is the relationship
 FOREWORD ix

between localism or regional identities and nationalism? When and how

do local identities become predominant? In the height of the civil war,
many Syrians spoke of their country as a historical patchwork made up of
different regions that were not one entity, a discourse that was scarcely
heard before that stage. These discourses were the outcome of current
events and the splitting of groups who supported various factions in the
conflict. This raises the question: How do perceptions of self and territory
change depending on present events?
Each one of the chapters in this volume is the work of a scholar who
knows the local languages, has done fieldwork during their career, and has
used a variety of sources ranging from archival documents, to local news-
papers, interviews, geography and history school textbooks, etc. Most
scholars who have contributed to this volume have been working on
Syria or its neighbors for many years and are specialists in their subject
matter, be it Jordi Tejel on Syrian Kurds or Thomas Pierret on Sunni
Islamists in Syria, for instance. The depth and breadth of the chapters
is impressive, ranging from micro-level analyses and ethnographies, such
as Sule Can’s study of Antalya’s ‘borderlanders’ or Kevin Mazur’s exam-
ination of Dayr al-Zur, to more macro-level analyses such as Matthieu
Rey’s work on the legacy of the Tanzimat on Syria’s modern borders,
allowing for a historiography of border construction in modern Syria.
The Turkish, Lebanese, and Iraqi borders with Syria are examined in
detail, only leaving out Jordanian and Israeli case studies. A multiplicity of
disciplines, perspectives, and methods of investigation is presented here:
modern history, but also anthropology, geography, political science, or
sociology. It is the aggregation of these various perspectives and studies
of different actors that allows us to get a clearer picture of Syria’s chal-
lenges and shifting borders and boundaries until the present day. Because
borders are defined by at least two states or groups, each border examined
here looks at various border actors, such as the Turkish and French states
in Seda Altug’s piece, which showcases how the border was at times made
impenetrable and at times unsafe and chaotic to serve state interests. Key
moments in Syria’s modern history are examined in detail: the French
mandate and the popular contestation of its imposed borders on Syria by
Idir Ouahes, but also Pan Arabism under the Baath party, as both a key
moment and ideology in the internalization processes of Syria’s borders
in Souhail Belhadj Klaz and Mongi Abdennabi’s work. Non-state actors
x FOREWORD

and their representation of Syrian territorialities is amply examined: Daniel

Meier’s study on Hizbullah’s borderland strategy, but also Ali Hamdans’s
work on the various territories of the opposition, or Matthieu Cimino’s
chapter on Daesh’s recasting of Syrian territory all offer in-depth investi-
gations of specific actors and their relationship to Syria’s borders.
The editor of this work is both a colleague and a friend of ours. The
genesis of this volume is a conference held at Saint Anthony’s College
in Oxford in November 2017 under the title “Exploring Syria’s Borders
and Boundaries.” Matthieu was then a Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow
at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, working with Professor Eugene Rogan.
We, Nassima and Ziad, were both invited discussants to the papers of the
conference—Ziad was also the keynote speaker of the conference, with
a talk entitled “War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Territorial
Fragmentation: Are Peace and Reconstruction Possible in Syria?” Both of
us have deep links with Syria, both academic and personal. I (Nassima)
lived in Syria for a year studying at the French institute of Arab Studies
(IFEAD) in Damascus. I later wrote a paper on the impact of the Syrian
revolution on Arabic language in Syria, which won an academic award
by the International Sociological Association. I met Matthieu while being
an Early Career Fellow and Lecturer in Islamic History at the Faculty
of Oriental Studies at Oxford University (2015–2017) and a Senior
Member of Saint Anthony’s College. Matthieu and I had shared inter-
ests in modern Syria, but also Iraq, as well as Islamic history. Matthieu’s
work combining political analyses of contemporary Syria with an explo-
ration of the historical sources of Daesh’s rhetoric is a case in point. He
asked me to be a discussant of his work during the Conversation Series
of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, where he presented his early project
on Syria’s borders. Islamic medieval geography textbooks, as Matthieu
demonstrated, played a key role in the rhetoric of Daesh and its concep-
tion of the space, dar al-islam; the analysis of the Islamic past was neces-
sary to shed light on contemporary ideologies and movements. We both
worked with our esteemed colleague Professor Eugene Rogan, Director of
the Middle East Studies Center at Saint Anthony’s College, and author of
groundbreaking work on the topic of Ottoman borders and state restruc-
turing during the last decades of the empire, notably Frontiers of the State
in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan, 1850–1921 (2000).
 FOREWORD xi

Perhaps the most challenging border for the future of Syria is a non-
tangible and symbolic one: It is the border between those who have lost
(their lives, their families, their homes) and those who have the feeling
they have won, i.e., the regime supporters. It will take a lot of work,
time, and a strong will to overcome this deep fissure in the social fabric
of Syria.

Dr. Nassima Neggaz

New College
Florida, USA

Dr. Ziad Majed

American University
Paris, France

Dr. Nassima Neggaz is Assistant Professor in Islamic Studies at New College

Florida in Sarasota (US). She was previously an Early Career Fellow and Lecturer
in Islamic History at Oxford University (Oriental Studies & Saint Antony’s)
and Jameel Lecturer in Islamic Studies at Cardiff University. Her research fields
encompass medieval Islamic history as well as contemporary Iraq and Syria.

Dr. Ziad Majed is Associate Professor and coordinator of the Middle Eastern
Studies Program at the American University of Paris. His latest publications are
Syrie, La révolution Orpheline (2014), Iran and Its Four Arab Fronts (2017), and
Dans la tête de Bachar Al-Assad (with Subhi Hadidi and Farouk Mardam-Bey,
2018).
 Acknowledgments

This book and Matthieu Cimino’s article are part of a Marie Skłodowska-
Curie project entitled “The Fate of a Colonial Legacy: A Modern History
of Syrian Borders (1920–2015)” funded by the European Union the EU’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation approval (Grant Agreement No.
701923).
Jordi Tejel’s article is part of a larger research project entitled “Towards
a Decentred History of the Middle East: Transborder Spaces, Circula-
tions, Frontier Effects and State Formation, 1920–1946” funded by the
European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation approval (Grant Agreement No. 725269).
Şule Can would like to thank Wenner-Gren Foundation and Bing-
hamton University for supporting this ethnographic research.
For their helpful comments, Kevin Mazur would like to thank Maryam
Ababsa, Carl Dahlström, Loubna El Amine, Kheder Khaddour, Raphaël
Lefèvre, Daniel Neep, and Isabelle Schierenbeck.

xiii
 About This Book/Conference

This book is the result of a conference hosted in November 2017 enti-

tled “Exploring Syria’s Borders and Boundaries.” Enabled by funding
from the Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions program and
the Maison Française d’Oxford (MFO), the workshop was hosted by the
University of Oxford (Saint Antony’s College and The Oriental Institute)
and the MFO.
It brought together researchers working on Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and
Turkey.

xv
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Matthieu Cimino
The Invention of Syrian Borders and the Affirmation of the
Modern State 6
Spatial and Symbolic Boundaries: Reconfigurations in
Times of War 11
“Syria as We See It”: Territorialities, Contemporary
Imagined Geographies, and the Syrian Conflict 16
References 21

Part I From the Mandate to Assad’s Dynasty:

Constructing, Contesting, and Legitimizing Syrian
Borders (1920–2011)

2 Drawing a Line in the Sand? Another (Hi)Story of

Borders 27
Matthieu Rey
Introduction 27
Studying the Fabric of the Border 29
Tanzimat Reforms, Settlements, and the Euphrates River 35
Transport, Technologies, and Control of the Area 37

xvii
xviii CONTENTS

Completing the Ottoman Reforms, the Action of the French

Authorities in Syria 40
Conclusion 42
References 44

3 The Turkish-Syrian Border and Politics of Difference

in Turkey and Syria (1921–1939) 47
Seda Altuğ
Introduction 47
Retarded Presence and Politics of Border in French-Syria 49
Turkey and the Border Region in 1920s: Ordering Through
Deliberate Destabilization 55
International Border-Making as a Turkish Domestic
Matter 63
Conclusion 68
References 71

4 Syria’s Internal Boundaries During the French

Mandate: Control and Contestation 75
Idir Ouahes
Introduction 75
Historical Outline 76
Internal (Re)Organization 79
Contestation of State Space in the Executive Apparatus 81
Contestation of State Space in the Legislative Apparatus 83
Contestation of State Space in the Press 87
Conclusion 89
References 91

5 “The Country Should Unite First”: Pan-Arabism,

State and Territory in Syria Under the Baath Rules 93
Souhail Belhadj Klaz and Mongi Abdennabi
Introduction 93
The Country or the Countries Should Unite First? The
Pan-Arabism Dilemma 94
Hafez al-Asad Sovereignism: An Alternative to the Failure
of the Arab Unionist Project? 97
 CONTENTS xix

Syria’s External Security Versus Arab National Unity: The

Consolidation of Hafez al-Asad’s Power Through the Help
of the Intelligence Services 99
From Hafez to Bashar al-Asad: The Paradox of
Legitimizing the Sykes-Picot Agreement Through a
Pan-Arab Policy 101
References 104

Part II Struggling for the Borderlands: The Syrian

Revolution (2011) and Its Aftermath

6 Hizbullah’s Borderlands Strategy: From Identity

Shaping to the Nation-State Re-ordering 109
Daniel Meier
Introduction 109
The Territorialisation of Political Ambitions 111
From the South to the Centre 114
2006 and the Syrian War: Redeployment 117
Conclusion 122
References 124

7 Spatialization of Ethno-Religious and Political

Boundaries at the Turkish-Syrian Border 127
Şule Can
Introduction 127
The Syrian Civil War: A Local View from the Borderlands 129
Cityscape and Political Belonging in Antakya 132
The Politics of Urban Space After 2011 137
Shifting Political Landscape at/Across the Border 142
Conclusion 144
References 147

8 Dayr al-Zur from Revolution to ISIS: Local

Networks, Hybrid Identities, and Outside Authorities 151
Kevin Mazur
Introduction 151
Method and Sources 154
xx CONTENTS

Dayr al-Zur Before the Uprising 155

2011: Demonstrations in the City and Disparate Violence
in the Countryside 162
2012: Armed Struggle Against the Regime 165
2013: Struggle Among Armed Groups and the Ascendance
of Jabhat al-Nusra 171
2014: The Ascendance of ISIS 182
Conclusion 189
References 191

Part III Imagining and Manufacturing the Borders:

Non-state Actors and Their Representations of
Syrian Territory (2011–2017)

9 The Opposition’s Three Territories 199

Ali Hamdan
Introduction 199
Geographies of Syria’s Conflict 200
Territoriality and Civil War in Syria 203
Differing Territorial Conceptions 207
Conclusion 215
References 217

10 Sunni Islamists: From Syria to the Umma, and Back 221

Thomas Pierret
Introduction 221
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s Syria-Centric Arab
Nationalism 223
Against Nationalism: Radicals and Traditionalists 226
The 2011 Uprising and the Enshrinement of Syrianhood 231
Conclusion 236
References 238

11 The Complex and Dynamic Relationship of Syria’s

Kurds with Syrian Borders: Continuities and Changes 243
Jordi Tejel
Introduction 243
 CONTENTS xxi

Nationalism, Maps and Education 245

Kurdish Visions of Kurdistan 247
Toward an Alternative Understanding of the Role of Maps
and Textbooks 250
Between Pan-Kurdism and Syrianization, 1920–2011 251
The Syrian Revolution and Its Aftermath: Continuities
and Changes 259
Conclusion 262
References 264

12 The Map and Territory in Political Islam: Spatial

Ideology and the Teaching of Geography by the
Islamic State 269
Matthieu Cimino
Introduction 269
Between Fixity and Flexibility: A Brief Theory of Empires
Boundaries 272
Shaping the World: The Founding Role of Medieval
Geographical Thought (Ninth–Eleventh Centuries) 275
Building and Disseminating a Collective Memory: The
Question of the Dā’ish Schoolbooks 278
An Injunction to Conquer: Definition and Symbolism of
the Islamic World According to Dā’ish 281
Conclusion 285
References 286

Location Index 289

Name Index 293

 Notes on Contributors

Mongi Abdennabi is a journalist, political consultant, and analyst in

Middle East and North Africa Affairs. From 2006 to 2012, he worked
as a consultant in Middle East Affairs with the International Crisis Group
and is currently working as a consultant with Syrian NGOs in Turkey
focusing on local communities.
Dr. Seda Altuğ is a lecturer at the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish
History at Bogazici University, Istanbul. She received her Ph.D. from
Utrecht University, Holland.
Dr. Souhail Belhadj Klaz is a Researcher at the Centre on Conflict,
Development and Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute, Geneva. He
worked on a three-year project named “Tunisia: Security Provision and
Local State Authority in a Time of Transition,” with the support of the
Gerda Henkel Foundation. In parallel, he is conducting a research on
economy of violence and armed conflict in Syria.
Dr. Şule Can received her doctoral degree from Binghamton University
(SUNY) in 2018. She is currently a Research Associate at Binghamton
University, Department of Anthropology.
Dr. Matthieu Cimino is a fellow at the Paris Institute for Advanced
Studies (IAS). Formerly a Marie Curie scholar at the University of Oxford,
he is now working on territorial ideologies of jihadi non-state actors.

xxiii
xxiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Ali Hamdan is a fellow with the Social Science Research Council,
a former fellow of the American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR),
and an associate research fellow at the Institut Français du Proche-Orient
(IFPO) in Amman, Jordan. He is from Shelburne Falls, MA.
Dr. Kevin Mazur is a visiting postdoctoral fellow at the Orient-Institut
Beirut and was previously a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at
Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Dr. Daniel Meier is associate researcher at PACTE-CNRS laboratory
and teaches at Sciences Po Grenoble. He conducted extensive fieldwork
on border issues and is the author of Shaping Lebanon’s Borderlands (I.B.
Tauris, 2016).
Dr. Idir Ouahes has completed a Ph.D. at the University of Exeter and
is working on a project about the internal organization of Syria over the
1916–1966 period.
Dr. Thomas Pierret is a Senior Researcher at Aix Marseille Université,
CNRS, IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence, France, and a former Senior Lecturer
at the University of Edinburgh. He authored Religion and State in Syria
(Cambridge University Press, 2013).
Dr. Matthieu Rey is a Researcher at IREMAM (CNRS-Aix en
Provence) and an Associate Researcher at the IFAS (Johannesburg) and
Wits University, History Workshop. A former fellow at the Collège de
France (Paris), he holds a Ph.D. in history from the EHESS (Paris).
Dr. Jordi Tejel is an Adjunct Professor in the History Department at the
University of Neuchâtel. Currently, he leads a research program funded
by the European Research Council on border-making and state-formation
processes in the Middle East in the interwar period.
 Abbreviations

BANP Bozanti-Adana-Nisibin et Prolongements

BLLC Building Legitimacy for Local Councils in Syria
CSA Civil Services Administration
CVE Countering-Violent Extremism
FSA Free Syrian Army
ICC Idlib City Council
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and the Levan/al-Sham
LAC Local Administrative Council
PBR Permanent Border Commission
SIF Syrian Islamic Front
SILF Syrian Islamic Liberation Front
SR Service de Renseignement (intelligence service)

xxv
 List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Map of the initial French division of Mandate Syria.

Courtesy of Wikipedian “Techpete”. Available online:
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mandate_of_
Syria.svg 80
Fig. 7.1 Map of Turkey and Antakya on the border with Syria
(Drawn by the author) 128
Fig. 7.2 Old Antakya Street, a typical Antiochian door at a
traditional house, 2017 (Photographed by the author) 135
Fig. 8.1 Towns in Dayr al-Zur governorate, by population size
(Source Author) 157
Fig. 8.2 Major oil and gas fields in Dayr al-Zur governorate (and
towns referenced in text) (Source Author) 169

xxvii
xxviii LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 8.3 al-Buchamal sub-tribes (and towns referenced in text)

Notes This chart provides only a partial list of towns in
which members of each sub-tribe reside. In addition,
it sketches potential bases of group identification and
solidarity, rather than the actual group around which
social life and contention are structured. Many tribal
leaders made claims to represent a tribal grouping at
the level of an entire sub-tribe, such as al-Bukayr or
al-Buchamal. In practice, however, splits in patterns
of action below the level of the town were common
from the beginning of the upspring (see main text).
Information on lines of descent comes from Zakariya
(1945). For a more comprehensive accounting, see a map
by Justice for Life Organization (2017), al-Mashhour
(2017: 13–17), and Zakariya (1945: 568–579) (Source
Author) 177
Fig. 11.1 ‘Cîranên me (Our neighbours)’ Zanistên Civakî, 6th
grade, 2015, p. 117 262
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Matthieu Cimino

Since March 2011, Syria has been engaged in a major revolutionary pro-
cess that started in the southern city of Daraa. Located at the Jordanian
border, the city was, until the uprising, one of the advanced outposts of
the Syrian defense system against Israel and, pertinently, home to sev-
eral regiments. Due to this considerable concentration of Syrian soldiers,
mainly of Sunni origin and including many officers, Daraa provided a
significant number of defectors (munshaqı̄n), who then constituted the
“historic” nucleus of the Free Syrian Army (hereafter, FSA), at least for
southern Syria (Winter 2013). In 2013, during a first series of interviews
conducted at the Syro-Jordanian border with members of the opposition
from the coordination committees (tansı̄qiyyāt ) and the FSA,1 one of the
interlocutors told me that, in reaction to the imbalance of the conflict, the
latter was ready to “accept help from everyone, including Israel”; more-
over, he continued in jest, “we might even give them the Golan back;
where do we sign?” With this anecdote, the interviewee demonstrated the
lack of interest shown by the opposition in territory, even for the Golan,2
which was portrayed by the Syrian regime as a key political issue, and

M. Cimino (B)
Oxford, UK
e-mail: matthieu.cimino@sciencespo.fr

© The Author(s) 2020 1

M. Cimino (ed.), Syria: Borders, Boundaries,
and the State, Mobility & Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44877-6_1
2 M. CIMINO

had since the early 1970s constituted the very foundation of its arsenal of
legitimization (Hinnebusch 2006).
Although the Golan Heights had for decades been the subject of a sys-
tematic propaganda campaign in the major cities of Syria,3 in 2013 this
issue seemed negligible in comparison with the opposition’s desire to put
an end to the authoritarian regime of the Assad family. Thus, from the
start of the uprising, it was clear to most observers of the Syrian conflict
that territorial motives were not at the heart of the mobilizations. On a
daily basis, the so-called local nationalist actors of the opposition were not
territorializing their demands. Besides, not only were the current borders
of Syria not a mobilizing factor in the conflict, it even seems that they
had largely been internalized. As Vignal (2017) puts it, “Syria’s national
construction, which had taken place within borders originally imposed by
external actors, was not only acknowledged as a practical reality but con-
stituted the framework within which Syrians had come to define them-
selves” (Vignal 2017: 809). In the weekly demonstrations, the opposi-
tion’s claims were directed against the Assad family, calling for the end of
authoritarianism, and regime change (Ismail 2011).
Nevertheless, the wide-ranging civil war, largely depicted by the regime
as a “sectarian plot” (Cimino 2014), also attracted foreign fighters. Mer-
cenaries and militia came to lend a hand to both the opposition and the
regime, while local Syrian factions were stuck in internal conflicts around
the definition of the identity of the revolution. In that context, two non-
state actors, namely the Islamic State and the PYD,4 which had each
taken control of various territories, quickly engaged in contradictory state-
building processes for the creation of, respectively, a Sunni caliphate and
an autonomous Kurdistan. Although the Islamic State’s caliphate project
was defeated by the war launched by the US-led Coalition,5 and Syrian
Kurdish political actors have always been very cautious about the cre-
ation of an autonomous state—be it transnational or territorially limited
to Syria—preferring a form of “decentralized” (lā markaziyyah) confed-
eralism, the fact remains that these different and contradictory projects
revealed that a contestation of Syrian territory and its colonial bound-
aries was a factor for some actors, both exogenous and endogenous to
Syria. This situation was made possible by a series of factors, namely the
Syrian regime’s “self-fulfilling prophecy” policy and the early backing of
Islamist militants (Mohand 2011); the internal fragmentation of Syria
(Heydemann 2013); the porosity of its external borders (Harling and
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Simon 2015); the involvement of external actors (Wimmen and Asseburg

2012); and more.
However, although a considerable number of books, scientific arti-
cles, and other think-tank notes on the subject have been published
since 2011,6 few works have approached the Syrian conflict through the
prism of the country’s borders. Indeed, Syrian boundaries have never
been fully investigated by the academic community, unlike those of the
Ottoman Empire (Ben-Bassat and Ben-Artzi 2015; Rogan 2002), Pales-
tine (Sfeir-Khayat 2009; Ball 2012; Paul 2020); or Lebanon (Meier
2013). While some works deeply address particular aspects, such as ter-
ritorial disputes (Jörum 2014), there is still a lack of major research on
Syrian borders. Until 2011, this could easily be explained by the authori-
tarian nature of the regime and the subsequent difficulties for researchers
to work there and to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. Now,
as this research has become possible, this book aims to open the door to
the field of border studies, which remains largely under-explored in favor
of more conventional approaches in sociology or political science.
Indeed, border studies is a relatively fragmented area of research. “Ob-
scure” (Paasi 2003) and, above all, polysemic, the notion of the border is
observed from multiple angles, regularly offering new perspectives in his-
tory, political science, anthropology, philosophy (Balibar 2009), and also
cultural studies in the definition of “otherness” (Rovisco 2010). From a
theoretical aspect, this book is based on three postulates:

(1) Investigating a border implies asking the question: where? (Prescott

1999; Minghi 2017). Where is the border? What is its history, and
what processes explain its location? If this aspect is today often
marginalized in favor of purely processual logics, it is nonetheless
fundamental, as preeminent as in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Borders materialize the sedimentation of states in our
world of Westphalian sovereignty (1648): They constitute markers
of division between two areas of authority. Sometimes invisible to
the eye, often drawn on the ground, these lines are first of all con-
crete and tangible symbols, especially for the people who encounter
them on a daily basis. The where therefore is crucial. In the case of
Syria, exploring the borders consequently requires an examination
of colonial and diplomatic history.
First imposed by the territorial conquest, borders then material-
ize the process of state formation (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999).
4 M. CIMINO

Once the situation is frozen on the ground, it then has to be

cartographically translated; at the “age of Empires” (Hobsbawm
2010), this translation was carried out in the anteroom of the Euro-
pean diplomatic salons. Then, as the state accumulates power and
becomes centralized, its authority spreads to the peripheries. As
such, once created, the border must be maintained and stabilized
(Barth 1998). As a “privileged place of assertion of political pow-
er” (Montenach 2016), it is part of an operational process aimed
at maintaining its physical and symbolic integrity; it must therefore
have a meaning both for the state but also for the local population.
In the first case, the central government will strive to “rational-
ize” the border by installing customs officials and the military. The
border then becomes a tool for defining the envelope of the state
through visible markers, such as railways or surveillance posts. The
state gives itself authority to manage the incoming and outgoing
flows and, if necessary, to modify the demographic balance in order
to secure the space and make it more compatible with its own inter-
ests. In the second case, local actors—those of the borderlands—
will appropriate the border, adapt to it, or try to reconfigure its
meaning and role by subverting it, notably through smuggling or
revolts. After the conquest of territory, therefore, both state and
local practices give an empirical sense to the border.
(2) The other aspect is the how. Once the location is known and fixed,
the line becomes a process. On a daily basis, the border plays a
major role in building the collective imagination of a society, as a
marker of otherness (the other is on the other side) and therefore as
the envelope of a cultural sanctuary. Cartography plays here a key
role as it provides a visual representation; as “powerful social and
ideological tools” (Culcasi 2006), maps reflect previous conquests
and the territorialization of the state. They constitute the unifying
tools of a nation by ensuring “prestige and pride in social groups”
(Monmonier 1991; Crampton and Krygier 2006). By producing
maps, the state reminds us that it is first of all a “power container”
which must preserve its integrity and stability, as well as a “wealth
container” eager to conquer larger territories (Taylor 1994). Above
all, however, the state produces maps to formalize and legitimize
the process of territorialization.
Yet, in the words of Van Houtum and Naerssen (2002), the
where and the how constitute two distinct fields of research, “with
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

their own centers of expertise, their own journals, their own

tutelary figures, and (therefore) very few connections between
them”. However, the exploration and understanding of borders—
be they territorial or symbolic—implies the need for a multifaceted
approach: What is the colonial history behind it? How was it ide-
ologically constructed and then legitimized? And, above all, how
is the border viewed and represented by the local populations and
actors?
(3) As a result, over the years, the study of borders as simple political
lines has been largely sidelined, in favor of a focus on considering
boundaries as processes. This led to a multiplicity of approaches
and, as Paasi (2005) pointed out, to the “bursting of the dis-
cipline”. While some major theoreticians called for uniformity of
concepts and models (Newman 2003; Liikanen 2010), others pos-
tulated the “impossibility of a single model, a large border theory”
(Paasi 2009). In this book, although we wanted to avoid the pitfalls
of dispersion as much as possible, the differing approaches of his-
tory, political science, sociology, and sometimes even anthropology
are all represented. The aim is to present, through three different
axes, the most recent research on the Syrian conflict, while follow-
ing a chronological framework.
Thus, this book is the result of a conference hosted in Novem-
ber 2017 entitled “Exploring Syria’s Borders and Boundaries”.
Enabled by funding from the Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska-
Curie Actions program and the Maison Françaised’Oxford (MFO),
the latter and the University of Oxford (Saint Antony’s College
and The Oriental Institute) brought together researchers working
directly or indirectly on Syria, whose work had led them to investi-
gate the significance of its borders. Over two days, these researchers
shared their reflections, the substance of which is gathered in this
collective work. Before presenting the spirit of the book, I extend
my warm thanks to all the participants, and in particular to Dr.
Ziad Majed and Dr. Nassima Neggaz whose, respectively, keynote
speech and discussions considerably contributed to the reflections.
From these three axes, Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State,
is therefore divided into three parts. First, the objective is to retrace
the colonial history (be it Ottoman or French) of the Syrian bor-
ders, by insisting on the local but also discursive dimensions of
6 M. CIMINO

its creational process. In a second axis, we will study the territo-

rial and urban reconfigurations resulting from the 2011 revolu-
tion, also largely polarizing on its local manifestations. Taking note
of the revitalization of borderlands as an object of study in the
Syrian case (Vignal 2017), this part will show how external actors
(Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq) integrate into their political decision the
changes induced by the conflict; and how do those transformations
reconfigure the very representation of Syria and Syrians by either
external or local actors. Finally, the third axis will study the produc-
tions and developments of national imaginaries and territorialities:
How do the different actors (the secular and Islamist factions of
the opposition, the PYD, and the Islamic State) of the conflict rep-
resent or imagine Syrian territory today? What are their strategies
and conceptions of territoriality?

The Invention of Syrian Borders

and the Affirmation of the Modern State
The first part of this book, entitled From the Mandate to Assad’s dynasty:
Constructing, contesting, and legitimizing Syrian borders (1920–2011),
aims to contribute to the studies on the construction and significance
of early Syrian borders.
After the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot agreements7 and the fall of the
Ottoman Empire (1920), France and the United Kingdom territorially
divided the Middle East and, by relying on political minorities, encour-
aged and galvanized nationalist claims and tendencies, as a result of a
long-term process that originally started in 1798, after Napoleon’s cam-
paign to Egypt (Filiu 2018). As such, the creation of Syria was a pivotal
moment in the history of the Near East, since it is particularly in this
newly created territory that the mandate system was challenged until the
withdrawal of the last French troops in 1946. Many authors have pro-
posed an analogy between the 1925–1927 revolts and those of 2011,
mostly with success (Zénobie 2011). However, although the recent upris-
ings borrowed from the past a comparable discursive register of mobiliza-
tion, it seems that the territorial dimension, very present in 1925, is now
absent. Nevertheless, revisiting the period of mandate, and then that of
independence, using a territorial approach, seemed relevant for this book.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

How were those new borders built and viewed by the local population?
By what processes did Syrian political actors legitimize them or, on the
contrary, contest them, during the mandate period, or after?
This first axis aims to contribute to the historiography of the border,
by insisting on the fact that the border is not an “artificial” construct.
Although the making of borders and territory is certainly a product of
colonial history, this construction is nevertheless very clearly part of a set
of precedencies and continuities, and how they prevailed during colonial
times. We affirm that the architecture of the Syrian borders preexists the
French mandate. The shaping of Syria’s territorial envelope began under
the Ottoman Empire, materialized during the Tanzimat reform (1839–
1876), and was finally institutionalized and internalized during the French
mandate. Thus, in the case of the Turkish-Syrian border, the line separat-
ing the two states is firstly the result of the modernizing policies of the
Ottomans, then of its appropriation by the local communities. In fact,
these “borderlanders”, long marginalized as an object of study, remain at
the heart of this axis; how do the peripheries contribute to the construc-
tion of borders? And how do these abnormalities (Agnew 2007) make it
possible to understand the practices of states’ territorialities? This is the
subject of the articles by Matthieu Rey and Seda Altuğ.
In Drawing a line in the sand? Another (hi)story of borders (Chapter 2),
Matthieu Rey presents an archeology of the Syrian-Turkish border,
through the example of the city of Jarabulus. Grounding his reflections in
history back to the nineteenth century, the author—whose work is in line
with that of Sahlins (1989)—has explored intelligence services’ archives
and conducted semi-structured interviews. He identifies three processes
by which a border is created: the formal division on the ground (allo-
cation); the establishment of places, devices, and technologies to control
the environment or space, in particular the railways and the development
of villages, castles, and other nodal points; and finally, the appropriation
by local actors of these new borders. In an unprecedented case study,
Rey reminds us that borders—Syrian or others—are not only the product
of diplomatic arrangements between major powers, even in the “era of
Empires”, but the result of a long process of sedimentation, administra-
tion of the territory and affirmation of central power. “Borders engineer-
ing”, i.e., the process by which a state familiarizes with its own border,
requires considerable time (Dullin 2014).
8 M. CIMINO

If this process is already well known in contemporary historiography,

Rey’s contribution is to focus on the key role of infrastructures and tech-
nologies (border posts, railways, etc.) in the “fabric” of these borders, as
tools for the states to control territory—Mann’s “infrastructural power”
(1984)—and as nodal points for meeting, mediation, and confrontation
between the central state, the local communities, and the tribes. Con-
trary to popular and sometimes academic belief, the Turkish-Syrian border
materialized well before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and is primarily
the product of the Tanzimat reform (1839–1876), i.e., the economic
development policies and demographic changes first undertaken by the
Ottoman Empire. Before the War, the Ottomans attempted to subdue the
Syrian provinces. New villages were created; tribes were pushed back or
subdued, in general, “control over the Euphrates River improved”. When
the Treaty of Ankara was finally signed (1921), the border “naturally” fol-
lowed the train line then created, the Bagdadbahn. Finally, despite minor
adjustments, the French confirmed and resumed the development policies
and effectively consolidated the preexisting border.
Seda Altuğ’s chapter complements that of Rey, by tackling the post-
1920 construction of the border, on the Turkish side, and emphasizes on
the key role of the borderlands in the materialization of the state’s author-
ity. In The Turkish-Syrian border and politics of difference in Turkey and
Syria (1921–1939) (Chapter 3), Altuğ explains that borders are above all
places of instability, to which undesirable people are relegated, kept away
from society. In fact, if borders are places of coexistence and confronta-
tion between states, as well as places of interaction between states and
populations located on the other side of the border, they are also mark-
ers of the relationship between a state and its own population. In this
study of the Turkish-Syrian border, the author shows that the very loca-
tion of a border depends first on the politics of differentiation on the
part of a state toward its own population. The case of the Jazira region is
illustrative in this respect: During the French mandate, as it was allegedly
empty, the region was considered the ideal place to settle refugees, who
would ensure a buffer zone with Turkey and thus function as a limès, i.e.,
the Empire’s march with its neighboring states. This policy of settling
refugees, and later security reinforcements, in this area triggered often
sharp reactions from Syrian nationalists and the local population, who
likened the refugees to “parasites” (t.ufaylı̄).
On the Turkish side, the demarcation and then the administration of
the border constituted a real challenge for the nation-building objective
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

of the newly created state whose primary concern was the control of the
Armenian and Kurdish populations. In fact, not only did the Turkish state
establish mechanisms to control and secure the border influx, but it also
relied on the boundary to define the spectrum of otherness: the we and the
them, i.e., the enemy. Thus, as Altuğ explains, the Turkish authorities “at-
tempted to rectify the border zone from the ‘improper’ populations who
were considered to form a domestic and a cross-border threat to the secu-
rity of the Turkish nation”. The border was then described as a dangerous
place; those who crossed it illegally were either labeled as “gangs” (in the
case of the Syrians), or as infiltrating it in a “political” threat, in the case of
Armenians or Kurds. More specifically, the mandate’s archives show that
the Turkish state supported criminal activities at the border, where neces-
sary, in order to justify its coercive policies against social groups identified
as “impure”. Altuğ also demonstrates that the Turkish discourse had an
ethno-racial basis and contributed to the essentialization of these same
populations. Ultimately, it was on the grounds of this “instability” that
the Turkish state pushed France to demarcate the Turkish-Syrian border,
making it a national security imperative.
Although the border is indeed built via the borderlands, they are also
the product of one or multiple representations of space, and of the capac-
ity of the state to impose them, as shown by the work of Idir Ouahes,
Souhail Belhadj Klaz, and Mongi Abdennabi. In Syria’s internal bound-
aries during the French Mandate: Control and contestation (Chapter 4),
Idir Ouahes focuses on the French policies of the mandate period.
Although the preliminary configuration of the border dates back to the
mid-nineteenth century, the French had clearly contributed to shaping
it to their own territorial representation. However, the geographic con-
tours of post-Ottoman Syria were also represented in different ways, by
different local actors. This is the crux of Ouahes’ work, which explores
the colonial and local imaginations and interpretations of Syrian territory.
How did France imagine Syria in geographical and political terms, and
what were the control policies put in place to implement this construc-
tion? What were the reactions of the local actors? As early as 1920, Paris
started to devote the first decade of its mandate to “border and order”
(Van Houtum and Naerssen 2002) the country along sectarian lines, in
order to gain political control while reducing the nationalist aspirations
of other groups.
10 M. CIMINO

The French policy had two notable consequences. On one side, the
country’s external envelope left Syria “cut off” from Lebanon, accord-
ing to Syrian nationalists. Regarded by them as a province, Lebanon will
never, despite various mobilizations, be “reintegrated” into the “mother-
land”. On the other hand, Syria was divided internally into “administra-
ble blocks” (Damascus, Aleppo, the Druze, and Alawites). Several sectar-
ian statelets thus coexisted within Syria, which was fragmented according
to European anachronistic or orientalist representations, in which a cer-
tain minority dominated or was supposed to dominate over this or that
region. In this chapter, Ouahes explores the centrifugal tendencies and
the resistance strategies of Syrian nationalists opposing the French desire
to impose an exogenous conception of their territory while implement-
ing an “ethnic makeup”. This confrontation primarily polarized on many
issues: first, as the new territorial organization of the state disrupted trade
routes, the confrontation was largely based on economic and commercial
discontent (as, for example, Ihsan al-Jabiri’s mobilization).
The author also shows how this new reality was disputed on the exec-
utive level (opposition to the creation of a Syrian Federation), legislative
(by boycotting the organization of elections), but also through the press,
where debates flourished on the nature and significance of Syrian terri-
tory, as well as the need to struggle for the reunification of the various
statelets and the independence of the country. Thus, during the French
mandate, the question of the nature of the territory was widely and hotly
debated, giving rise to a multiplicity of interpretations as to its form, its
structure, and, more generally, its political organization. Idir Ouahes also
proves that “those debates did not show a unified dissatisfaction with
French policies; instead they represented the various conceptions of the
Syrian state space along ethnic, geographic and political lines”.
As for the French mandate period, very few works have questioned the
spatial ideology of the major protagonists who conquered and then confis-
cated power from independence (1946) onward. During the Baathist rule
and the “authoritarian stabilization” of the Assad dynasty, research was
even nonexistent. In “The Country should unite first”: Pan-Arabism, State
and Territory in Syria under the Baath rules (Chapter 5), Souhail Belhadj
Klaz and Mongi Abdennabi fill this vacuum. After the departure of the
French troops, the debates around Syrian territorial identity, and its func-
tion and role within the regional architecture of the Arab nations, con-
tinued within the Ba’ath Party. The desire for “unionism”, popularized
by the mobilizing and charismatic figure of Gamal Abd al-Nasser up to
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

1958, was concretely expressed in that year by the Egyptian-Syrian union

within the United Arab Republic (UAR). This attempt at building a pan-
Arab union failed and, in 1961, was dissolved (Jankowski 2002). Despite
this failure, pan-Arabism remains a unifying reality in Egypt and Syria;
however, it was the Assad dynasty that definitively buried the project.
By relying on unpublished documents, Belhadj Klaz and Abdennabi
demonstrate that during the rules of Hafez al-Assad (1966–2000) and
his son Bashar (2000–today), Syria initiated and then endorsed a transi-
tional process from unionism to what Billig (1995) describes as the most
“banal” nationalism. Under the leadership of the neo-Baath, Hafez al-
Assad developed and strengthened the concept of “regionalism” (qutr),
that Syria must exist as an independent and sovereign state, but alongside
other regional states. This “sovereignism”, consecrated by Hafez al-Assad,
marked the defeat of the pan-Arabists of the Ba’ath Party and of their
desire to merge the different Arab national territories. Beyond the party’s
ideological approach, Belhadj Klaz and Abdennabi also present the prac-
tical consequences of this paradigm shift for Syrian foreign policy. If, on
the domestic level, Hafez and then Bashar al-Assad endeavored to neu-
tralize all organizations capable or willing to maintain this project, exter-
nally, Syria also became an “expansionist” state. Formerly “subordinate”
to Egypt, Syria became a predatory state, notably by annexing Lebanon
(1976–2005). At the same time, the intelligence services—which were
fundamentally reconfigured—metamorphosed into the armed wing of this
predatory policy. Before the 2011 revolution, it was finally Bashar al-Assad
who, in a three-hour speech, definitively buried unionist policies, empha-
sizing the unshakable character of the independence and sovereignty of
the Syrian nation. Thus, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the tran-
sition to “banal” nationalism took place.

Spatial and Symbolic Boundaries:

Reconfigurations in Times of War
Buried by the authoritarianism of the Ba’ath Party, the territorial ques-
tion only really re-emerged in favor of the 2011 Syrian revolution. On 11
February, young children from Daraa wrote on the walls of their institu-
tion, “Your turn has come, doctor!”. The mobilization that was initially
peaceful spread to most of the country’s major cities, from Aleppo to Dayr
az-Zur. In response to the Syrian regime’s policy of systematic repression,
12 M. CIMINO

the opposition militarized itself (Filiu 2013) and progressively adopted an

Islamic rhetoric of mobilization.
In this second part, entitled Struggling for the Borderlands: the Syrian
Revolution (2011) and its Aftermath, the objective is to question, through
three case studies, the new collective representations of space and iden-
tities in post-2011 Syria. From that date, political violence, centralized
and organized by the Syrian regime, involved a double reconfiguration,
firstly of representations of Syrian territory, by external or local actors,
and secondly, of the symbolic, social but also concrete borders between
the different sectarian groups, notably in ethno-national heterogeneous
cities.
These two aspects brought about profound modifications in the imag-
inative geographies, that is, in the way in which the social groups rep-
resent each other. According to Hewitt (2019: 258), cited by Graham
(2006: 256), “war mobilizes the highly charged and dangerous dialectic
of place attachment: the perceived antithesis of ‘our’ places or homeland
and ‘theirs’”. War contributes to an alteration in the representation of
space and leads political actors or peoples to modify the cursor of the
line separating their own social group from others, generally by polariz-
ing it. How do a state, a city, or social groups define the framework of
their identity? How do political realities influence our perception of the
other and how, therefore, are spatial or urban boundaries recomposed? In
this second axis, the authors explore different internal and external bor-
ders and boundaries reconfigurations, in Lebanon (Daniel Meier), Turkey
(Şule Can), and also in Syria, on the Iraqi border (Kevin Mazur). As in the
first part, their work is largely dedicated to the borderlands, as major lab-
oratories of reconfigurations. Due to the unavailability of authors working
on Jordan and Israel, and editorial constraints, these two cases could not
be included but could and should be the subject of further research.
In Hizbullah’s borderlands strategy: from identity shaping to re-ordering
the nation state (Chapter 6), Daniel Meier explores the Syrian-Lebanese
borderlands through research on Hizbullah. Supported by dense histor-
ical reflection over an extended period of time (1982–2016), the author
interrogates the mechanisms and the strategies by which the Shiite party
has, since its creation, territorialized its political ambitions in Lebanon,
and how the latter shifted its territorial center of gravity, by factoring Syria
into its rhetoric of nationalist mobilization. In fact, Meier asks himself the
following questions: How do we territorialize power and how, by study-
ing the borderland strategy of the party, can we understand its current
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

domestic strategy? By relying on Van Houtum’s triptych (2002) defining

territorialization as a sequential process of bordering (shaping the region),
ordering (legitimizing power), and othering (defining the other), Meier
describes the process by which Hizbullah built its legitimacy in Lebanon.
First, the party appropriated a territory (South Lebanon) by mounting
an effective resistance to the Israeli presence, until its actual withdrawal
in May 2000. Meier emphasizes on the importance of the borderland
regions (particularly the Qalamoun region), which then served as key
main points of its political and symbolic influence. During this period of
time, Hizbullah “re-bordered the Southern limits of the Lebanese state
according to a nationalistic posture” and inserted itself into Lebanese poli-
tics, with “a clear territorial occupied zone, a designated enemy and there-
fore a strategic goal”. After the end of Israeli occupation, by pretexts for
mobilization and engaging in territorial disputes (the Shebaa Farms in
particular), the Shiite party continued to monopolize the imperative of
resistance to the Israeli “presence”, while at the same time developing a
considerable security apparatus, and maintaining political control over its
territory.
Then, in 2011, the beginning of the Syrian revolution constituted a
strategic dilemma for the Shiite party, although one quickly resolved.
To ensure the preservation of the “resistance” (muqāwamah) and “re-
fusal” (mumāna ah) dichotomy—that was very largely discredited by the
movement’s commitment alongside the repression of the Syrian regime
(Dot-Pouillard 2012), Hizbullah spatially shifted the area of its terri-
tory to include geographical parts of Syria. By sending forces across the
border, for example in Qoussayr in 2013, and then establishing itself in
the Qalamoun Mountains, Hizbullah absorbed part of the Syrian bor-
derlands within its strategic area. At the same time, the party’s engage-
ment in the war alongside the regime was carried out in the name of the
anti-imperialist struggle. As it took place outside its own territory, this
anti-jihadist mobilization of the party was then legitimized in the name
of Lebanese sovereignty and the defense of the country’s borders. Pro-
gressively, the movement then started to “border this area on the model
developed in South Lebanon”.
While Meier’s work offers a macro reflection on the construction of
the territorial identity of a non-state actor, the seventh and eighth chap-
ters propose a micro perspective, aiming to extract the local dynamics
from the reconfiguration of social groups’ symbolic borders. In spatial-
ization of ethno-religious and political boundaries at the Turkish-Syrian
14 M. CIMINO

border (Chapter 7), Şule Can explores the city of Antakya, at the Turkish-
Syrian border. Multicultural and multiethnic, formerly Syrian but annexed
by Turkey in 1939, Antakya is regularly praised by the Turkish authori-
ties. Like many places in the borderlands, the city provides a laboratory
to observe the social and political practices of different sectarian groups
and their representations of their own collective identities. Antakya, a
plural place of intermingling of Sunni Turks and Arab Alawites, allows
us to understand the processes by which the ethno-religious, urban and
local political boundaries are socially constructed, maintained, or recon-
figured; more importantly, the mechanisms by which social boundaries are
being translated into a spatial reality. As Can mentions, “the valorization
of national territory and the contestation of national, ethnic, and religious
identities are often most visible in the borderlands”, which is why study-
ing the geography of difference in border towns remains fundamental
academic endeavor.
In this well-documented chapter, informed by field studies carried out
in the city, Can not only offers a general and innovative ethnography of
Antakya, but also questions the way in which “coexistence” between dif-
ferent communities has been affected by the war since 2011. Cultural
boundaries and “sectarian imaginary” (Ali 2010) of Antakya’s communi-
ties were drastically reconfigured in response to the Syrian conflict with
the massive influx of refugees this caused; demographic changes in the
city; and political initiatives of the Turkish government, through modifica-
tions of the administrative and electoral map of ethnically heterogeneous
neighborhoods, such as Defne or Arsuz. For the author, the first conse-
quence of the conflict is found in the identitarian polarization between
Alawites and Sunnites, a shift publicly visible in commercial strategies
(souvenir shops selling posters of Bashar al-Assad and Imam Ali), individ-
ual initiatives (selection of tenants by ethnic category), circulatory prac-
tices (fear of being attacked by the other), behavior toward refugees, or
even contestation of touristic sites. On a daily basis, cultural identification
is systematic and testifies to ethnocultural tension. In another significant
shift, while the urban and social boundaries of Antakya were essentially
“intuitive” at the start of the conflict, they now seem very marked and
almost openly present in everyday life. Finally, material borders and social
boundaries clearly overlap, particularly in the identification of Alawites
with the Syrian regime; in 2015, some demonstrators therefore openly
shouted their support for Bashar al-Assad.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

Another microscale case study, Kevin Mazur’s colossal chapter focuses

on the city of Dayr az-Zur, a hub in northeastern Syria and an interface
with Iraq. In Dayr al-Zur from revolution to Isis: Local networks, hybrid
identities, and outside authorities (Chapter 8), Mazur offers a compre-
hensive study of the changing political, tribal, and urban compositions
of the city of Dayr az-Zur, from the end of the Ottoman Empire to the
present day. Basing his methodology on interviews and secondary sources,
notably from social networks, the author shows how the different local
actors—from the Syrian regime to Salafi-jihadist groups—compose and
articulate their policies to control the political, social, and economic struc-
tures of the city, in a very fragmented tribal environment. Initially, until
2011, the central state—and in particular the Syrian Baathist regime—has
always worked to diminish the traditional role of the tribes by bringing
out alternative mediation figures, from within or outside tribal groups
(such as within the Baggarah or ‘Ageidat). By ensuring control over a
panel of tribal leaders and dismissing tribes or individuals with too much
local power, the regime ensured the balance of tribal structures while
securing access to the economic resources of the city. Certain “histori-
cal” figures of the regime, such as Jami’ Jami’, played a major role in the
implementation of these policies. Nevertheless, tribal leaders retained a
symbolic role; they were not commanding everyone’s loyalty, but essen-
tially functioned as “defense systems”.
When the war started, in 2011, some of those rank-and-file members
of tribes largely contributed to the creation of the opposition’s military
formations. Indeed, popular mobilization deeply reconfigured the tribal
environment; for Mazur, revolutionary groups were essentially the prod-
uct on extended familial and/or subtribal groupings, “while broader tribal
affiliations were used only in transactional, often ephemeral ways”. After
the initial uprising by the FSA, Jabhat al-Nusra and later on the IS quickly
gained a foothold in Dayr al-Zur, essentially as a result of “pre-existing
social links forged” with local residents, notably for al-Shuhayl neighbor-
hood who fought in Iraq after 2003, “and were predisposed to [Salafi]
ideology, having developed Salafi leanings while working in Saudi”. Most
of this chapter is devoted to the tribalist policies these non-state actors
which demonstrated a real knowledge of the local social and tribal mech-
anisms. Mazur demonstrates that the non-state actors’ tribalist policies
were substantially identical to the regime’s and were made of economic
16 M. CIMINO

incentives, exploitation of tribal rivalries and grievances, and, when neces-

sary, utilization of violence against local populations to gain access to nat-
ural resources (e.g., control of the oil fields, such as ‘Omar’). In general,
the post-2011 dynamics brought considerably overturned social bound-
aries in Dayr az-Zur: On the one hand, because new leaders emerged; on
the other hand, the civil war also highlighted the inability of the tribes to
clearly guide the actions of their members, although the bonds of solidar-
ity within tribal groups and subgroups were largely maintained.

“Syria as We See It”: Territorialities,

Contemporary Imagined Geographies,
and the Syrian Conflict
Borders are not only “hard” (Eder 2006) realities but are also part of the
collective imagination of a people. Boundaries are therefore also “cog-
nitive projects” which, although first implemented by the elites (Giesen
1998), must also ultimately resonate among the people. This “social pro-
duction” of borders can be of two kinds: (1) as the “naturalization” of
already existing hard borders, that is to say the transformation into speech
and collective acceptance of an accomplished fact. It is indeed in the his-
tory of hard borders that the necessary inspirations for the construction
of the collective imagination are drawn; or (2) as the imagined, fantasized
“construction” of a territory that takes shape through speech, actions,
and more particularly through the production of “persuasive cartogra-
phy” (Tyner 1982). Since 2011, the revolution and then the Syrian civil
war have essentially taken place within national territory and have only
very marginally reconfigured the “external” borders of Syria. With the
exception of certain non-state actors (PYD, ISIS), the envelope consti-
tuting Syria has been little disputed at the margin and seems very largely
internalized by all the actors—whether they belong to the Syrian regime
or to the “opposition”. However, the conflict has considerably energized
and altered the different collective imaginations of social groups. In this
third axis, entitled Imagining& Manufacturing the borders: Non-state
actors and their representations of Syrian territory (2011–2017), we will
try to extract contemporary representations and constructions of Syrian
territory, through four case studies.
In The opposition’s three territories (Chapter 9), Ali Hamdan explores
the political and territorial “experiments” led by the Syrian opposition in
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

their enclaves, since 2011. Through a detailed theoretical explanation of

how political transformations are above all the result of territorial mod-
ifications, the author explores the evolution of representations of space
in wartime. How does the Syrian opposition represent and administer
the territories conquered from the Syrian regime? By focusing on the
borderlands, “territories of high strategic value to the war, especially for
the opposition”, Hamdan shows how these spaces constituted the nodal
points of war, not only for the regime (which deprived them of basic ser-
vices, and besieged them) and the opposition (seeking to gain control
of them), but also for external actors (which—like NGOs, international
organizations, non-Syrian journalists, diplomats, intelligence operatives,
and foreign fighters, among others—externally entangle them). For the
author, from the very beginning of the conflict, Syria’s territoriality has
then undergone lasting change as a result of these two wartime processes,
i.e., “external entanglement and siege warfare”.
Although it is “difficult to speak of coherent strategies of ‘rebel rule’ in
territories controlled by the opposition (mu āridah)”, Hamdan shows in
his chapter that the newly controlled enclaves, ¯such as Idlib, experiment
and implement various conceptions of territoriality. By presenting a typol-
ogy of the administration of areas and the territorialization process in the
opposition’s territories, conquered, built, and shaped by numerous actors,
aid workers, religious figures, and journalists, the author provides a very
innovative approach, which contributes to a better understanding of the
imagined territories in circulation within the Syrian opposition. He also
demonstrates how, in practice, the opposition works to justify its polit-
ical project and, therefore, ensures it builds political relationships with
external actors, as a key element of its process of legitimization. Three
classifications are presented: the “liberated territories” (al-manāt.iq al-
muh.arrarah), “laboratories”, and “safe zones” (al-manāt.iq al-āmı̄nah).
The first category defines a fully liberated territory, “integrally and invio-
lably whole” from regime and foreign presences or influences, and allows
the opposition to set itself up as a credible alternative in the eyes of the
people (essentially as a competent administrator), i.e., as a shared counter-
model. The second group essentially encompasses Islamist factions and is
part of a “more calculating” representation of the territory. The labo-
ratories are certainly experiments of governance but also and above all
narratives aiming to deeply and durably modify the political, institutional,
administrative and economic structures of the country. Finally, the last
18 M. CIMINO

category “views territory in Syria as an unfortunate but necessary out-

come of Syrians’ inability to resolve their differences on their own terms
and redefines it in accordance with the military-strategic logic of those
conducting armed intervention”. To put it differently, it a playground
for external organizations—particularly NGOs and international organi-
zations—wishing to operate in Syria.
While Hamdan essentially addresses the so-called historical and for-
merly secularized opposition, Thomas Pierret, in Sunni Islamists: From
Syria to the Umma, and back (Chapter 10), questions the representa-
tion of space and territory by the so-called Islamist “nationalist” move-
ments and their theoretical and practical conception of Westphalian
sovereignty. In theory, the ideology of “Islamist” movements—which
allegedly calls for a community transcending ethnic or territorial bound-
aries, the umma—seems antagonistic and impossible to reconcile with a
“modern” conception of territory, but Pierret refutes this argument by
demonstrating how, notably for the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (here-
after, SMB), the nation state and the geographical community of believers
are complementary. After independence (1946), the leader of the SMB,
Mustafa al-Siba’, strongly opposed King Abdallah and his project for a
great Arab kingdom. In response, “historical” Syria, or Greater Syria, then
became the frame of reference for the Brotherhood’s political project,
also because Siba’ himself was largely favorable to nationalism. Pierret
even mentions the “remarkable durability” of this nationalist orientation.
Thus, not only did the SMB put forward the Arab and Syrian identities as
preceding Islamist territorial unity, but they even went so far as to openly
welcome the creation of the United Arab Republic with Egypt in 1958, in
line with the prevailing political and popular thought of the moment. The
Muslim Brothers, by adopting the dominant political discourse around a
Syro-centered Arab nationalism, then validated the notion of compatibil-
ity between Islam and Arab nationalism, in effect rejecting the concept of
the caliphate, while advocating for a “regionalist” conception of the state
(duwāl al-qut.riyyah).
In the 1990s, the emergence of transnational jihad and the creation of
Hizb Tahrir al-Islam (HTI) led to a revitalization of the claims to Islamic
unity. This mobilization took place in particular through the figure of
Ramadan al-Buti, a disciple of Abu al-Hassan Ali al-Nadwi and Abu al-
A’la al-Mawdudi, both theoricians and sponsors of pan-Islamism doc-
trines. Buti, deeply and personally opposed to the nation state, called
for the transnationalization of the struggle and the revitalization of the
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

caliphate. However, this movement was short-lived; even among local

Islamist groups, the 2011 revolution was accompanied by an enhance-
ment of the national territory and the promotion of the Syrian people as
a factor of unity. According to Pierret, “pan-Islamist hysteria” therefore
very quickly receded in favor of a nationalist interpretation of the struggle.
However, in Syria, the issue of transnational mobilization remains,
whether through the Kurds or the project carried out by the Islamic State.
In The complex and dynamic relationship of Syria’s Kurds with Syrian bor-
ders: Continuities and changes (Chapter 11), Jordi Tejel questions the
discourses and spatial representations of “Greater Kurdistan”: How was
this notion created? What is the spatial ideology carried by the PYD in
Syria? Are the Syrian Kurds working to restore “historical” Kurdish ter-
ritory and, more specifically, do they envisage secession from Syria? By
relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth
century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial
imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions,
is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, “Rojava” (Syrian
Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not
constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather
a “cultural abstract”. For the author, “like Arab nationalists in Syria, the
Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-
Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial
claims”.
Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very
well documented: from the Sharafnama map of 1596 (which displays
“extreme expansionist tendencies, in particular to the south”) to the Paris
conference in 1919, where the Kurdish representative submitted Kurdish
territorial claims, the representation of “Greater Kurdistan” is diverse and
heterogeneous and is altered according to political contexts and the audi-
ences for which it is intended. After the mandate period, a series of books
and maps were produced—for example, by Mehmet Emin Zaki Bey or
Kamuran Bedir Khan, sometimes revealing the difficulty of defining the
geographical scope of Kurdish identity, and even the term “Kurd”, for
which “linguistic affinities should not necessarily be the sole guide”. For
Tejel, who then studies contemporary textbooks, it is important not to
approach those productions as “official knowledge”, but rather as “per-
suasive cartography as suggested by Tyner, i.e. a cartography that seeks
to change or influence the reader’s opinion”. Thus, the “Kurdish project”
appears above all as a cultural allegory, created in response to the failure of
20 M. CIMINO

successive political attempts in the twentieth century to create a coherent

nation-state, as well as a mobilizing factor and a unifying myth acting as a
political response to Turkish nationalism. As such, Kurdish unity was pri-
marily thought of as a “renaissance” which needed geographical, concrete
bases.
Finally, in The map and territory in political Islam. Spatial ideology
and the teaching of geography by the Islamic State (Chapter 12), Matthieu
Cimino offers a reflection on the ideological construction, by the Islamic
State, of its political and geographical imaginaries. Between 2014 and
2016, the jihadist group engaged in a considerable enterprise of narrative
construction in devising the contours of the caliphate after the territo-
rial conquests of 2014 and afterward. Echoing Tejel’s work on the PYD’s
spatial ideology, and basing his research on history and geography text-
books, Cimino’s chapter explores the group’s territorial ethos. In its pro-
ductions, the IS projects a Foucauldian, semi-fixed representation of the
territory,8 an imaginative creation which borrows very heavily from the
medieval construction of the borders and the “territory” of Islam (dār
al-ı̄slām). ISIS’s frameworks of mobilization are, first and foremost, part
of the cartographic traditions of the Umayyad (662–750) and Abbasid
(750–1258) Empires. In fact, understanding the current imagination of
the Salafi-jihadist group first requires an exploration of the mechanisms of
space construction in medieval Islam, particularly from the various trea-
tises on geography (Muhammad al-Muqadissi, Abu Zayd al-Balkhi) whose
substance remains one of the main sources of inspiration for the group.
When the movement rapidly established itself in Syria and Iraq, in
2014, it became urgent to create a structured ideological apparatus that
was breaking with the international order, and in a certain coherence
with the Syrian and Iraqi local histories. In that perspective, alongside
the creation of schools and an official curriculum, school books played a
very important role, as they provided a new geographical framework in
the conquered territories. However, those books, quickly implemented,
were not elaborated from scratch: In Manbij (Syria), the locally pro-
duced textbooks showed a clear continuity with those produced under
the Syrian regime. Some pages are sometimes identical rigorously identi-
cal to the Baathist-era books; in that perspective, maps were sometimes
only marginally review. While the Ba’ath Party situates Syria in a uni-
tary regional environment (which Parvin and Sommers call “secularized
dār al-ı̄slām”), the IS only had to re-Islamize this unitary conception of
the territory, limiting it however to Sunni areas and those territories that
 1 INTRODUCTION 21

the group effectively controls. Thus, this final article explores, in its lit-
eralist conception, the spatial ideology of the Islamic State and seeks to
demonstrate how, at the local level, it had to accommodate to preexisting
ideological and practical realities.

Notes
1. Founded in July 2011, the Free Syrian Army (al-jaysh as-sūrı̄ al-h.urr) was
the first prominent military faction of the opposition to the Syrian regime.
2. The Golan Heights is a Syrian territory captured by Israel during the Six-
Day War (1967). It was later annexed in 1981.
3. In 2010, in Damascus, a vast advertising campaign called for the recovery
of the Golan: “it is ours” (al-jawlānlanā).
4. For Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, the Democratic Union Party is the main
Kurdish Syrian political party, and the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK).
5. ISIS’s last territorial stronghold, Baghouz, fell in November 2019.
6. Ajami (2012), Lister (2017), and Phillips (2016) comprehensively explore
the different aspects of the conflict. On another level, the prison memories
of Yassin al-Hajj Saleh (2015), a narrative constructed as a personal testi-
mony and not an academic analysis, allow us to understand in great detail
the mechanisms of imprisonment in an authoritarian system.
7. In May 1916, during the First World War, France (François Georges-Picot)
and the United Kingdom (Mark Sykes) concluded a secret agreement—
which would be disclosed in 1917 by Russia—to divide the Middle East
into two spheres of influence. The agreement would be known as the Sykes-
Picot Agreement.
8. For Foucault, the mobilization of a “people” for a territory in the name of
their “natural right” to dispose of it is accompanied by a process of subjec-
tivation of space (Cutolo and Geschiere 2008). However, although social
groups constantly reconfigure around the “common regulator” (Giraut
2008), i.e. the state, they need a stable—even “fixed” or “semi-fixed”—rep-
resentation of the territory to maintain their position of power and access to
resources. Informal discussion with Ali Hamdan, Oxford, November 2017.

References
Agnew, John. 2007. Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics.
International Political Sociology 1 (1): 138–148.
Ajami, Fouad. 2012. The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously.
Foreign Affairs 91 (2): 56–65.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
commencement de l'année suivante. Quelques
auteurs prétendent que Salia alors consul avec Idat. chron.
Philippe, est le même que ce Salianus[153]. Mais la
dignité consulaire ne paraît guère s'accorder avec Till. art. 11.
cette députation. Philippe, l'autre consul, était
d'une famille très-obscure. Un génie souple et
intrigant l'avait élevé jusqu'à la charge de préfet An 348.
d'Orient, qu'il posséda pendant plusieurs années. Il
était vendu aux Ariens, et nous le verrons bientôt signaler son zèle
en leur faveur par des crimes dont il fut mal récompensé.
Constance, naturellement timide, ne reçut pas sans inquiétude les
lettres menaçantes de son frère. Mais les Perses lui donnaient alors
de plus vives alarmes.
[152] Constance était dans cette ville le 8 mars 347.—S.-M.
[153] Cette opinion est celle de Henri Valois dans une note sur Théodoret, l. 2, c.
8.—S.-M.
Après le siége de Nisibe, ils étaient convenus
d'une trève avec les Romains. Cependant Sapor, xlix. Guerre de
dont l'humeur guerrière n'était gênée par aucun Perse.
scrupule, employait ce temps à faire de nouveaux
efforts. Il enrôle tout ce qu'il a de sujets propres à Liban. Basil, t.
porter les armes; les plus jeunes, pour peu qu'ils 2, p. 123 et 128-
paraissent vigoureux, n'en sont pas dispensés. Les 133.
villes restent presque désertes. Il n'épargne pas
même les femmes, qu'il oblige de suivre l'armée, Amm. l. 18, c. 9.
et de porter le bagage. Il épuise de soldats les
nations voisines, qu'il engage par prières, par argent, par force. Tout
l'Orient s'ébranle et marche vers le Tigre. Constance de son côté
rassemble les forces romaines, se met à leur tête et s'avance pour
arrêter ce torrent. Il campe à six lieues[154] du fleuve, et porte des
corps de troupes jusque sur les rives. Bientôt la poussière qui
s'élève au-delà annonce l'approche des Perses; on entend le bruit
des armes et le hennissement des chevaux. Constance, averti par
ses coureurs, va lui-même reconnaître l'ennemi; il ordonne aux
postes avancés de se replier, et de laisser le passage libre:
N'empêchez pas même les Perses, leur dit-il, de prendre un terrain
avantageux et de s'y retrancher: tout ce que je souhaite, c'est de les
attirer au combat; et tout ce que je crains, c'est qu'ils ne prennent la
fuite avant que d'en venir aux mains. Les Perses profitent de cette
confiance; ils jettent trois ponts; ils mettent plusieurs jours et
plusieurs nuits à passer le fleuve sans aucune inquiétude; et se
retranchent près de Singara[155]. Dans cette ville se trouvait alors un
officier de la garde nommé Elien; il n'avait avec lui qu'une troupe de
nouvelles milices. Mais il sut leur inspirer tant de courage, qu'étant
sortis pendant la nuit ils osèrent sous sa conduite pénétrer jusque
dans le camp des Perses; ils les surprirent endormis sous leurs
tentes, en égorgèrent un grand nombre, et se retirèrent sans perte
avant que d'être reconnus. Cette action rendit ces soldats célèbres;
on en composa deux cohortes sous les noms de Superventores et
de Prœventores, qui rappelaient leur hardiesse. Elien fut honoré du
titre de comte.
[154] A 150 stades selon Libanius, or. 3, t. 2, p. 131. ed. Morel.—S.-M.
[155] Ville au milieu de la Mésopotamie sur les bords du Chaboras, actuellement
le Khabour. On la nomme à présent Sindjar.—S.-M.
Les deux armées se rangèrent en bataille: celle
des Perses paraissait innombrable. Elle était l. Bataille de
composée de soldats de toute espèce; archers à Singara.
pied et à cheval, frondeurs, fantassins et cavaliers
armés de toutes pièces. Les rives, la plaine, la Liban. Basil. t.
pente des montagnes n'offraient aux yeux qu'une 2, p. 130-134.
forêt de lances et de javelots. Les gens de trait
couvraient les coteaux et bordaient le
Jul. or. 1, p. 23
retranchement: au-devant était rangée la cavalerie; et 24. ed.
l'infanterie formait l'avant-garde; elle se mit en Spanch.
marche et fit halte hors de la portée du trait; les
deux armées restèrent long-temps en présence.
Eutr. l. 10.
On était déja à l'heure de midi, dans les plus
grandes chaleurs du mois d'août; et les Romains,
sous les armes dès le point du jour, n'étaient pas Rufus.
accoutumés comme les Perses au soleil brûlant de
ces climats. Enfin Sapor, s'étant fait élever sur un Hier. Chron.
bouclier pour considérer l'armée ennemie, fut
frappé du bel ordre de leur bataille; elle lui parut
invincible. C'était un reste de cette ancienne Amm. l. 25, c. 9.
tactique, qui jointe à la sévérité de la discipline
avait rendu les Romains maîtres du monde. Sapor Oros. l. 7, c. 29.
savait assez la guerre pour admirer leur
ordonnance; mais non pas pour la rompre de vive
force, ni pour la rendre inutile par la disposition de [Socr. l. 2, c.
ses troupes. Soit crainte, soit stratagème, il fait 25.]
sonner la retraite, et fuyant lui-même à toute bride
avec un gros de cavalerie, il repasse le Tigre et laisse la conduite de
l'armée à son fils Narsès, et au plus habile de ses généraux. Les
Perses prennent la fuite vers leur camp, pour attirer l'ennemi à la
portée des traits prêts à partir de dessus la muraille et les coteaux.
Les Romains, au désespoir de les voir échapper, demandent à
grands cris le signal du combat. En vain Constance veut les arrêter;
ils n'estimaient ni sa capacité ni sa valeur; et malgré ses ordres, ils
courent de toutes leurs forces, et arrivent au camp sur le soir,
lorsque les Perses y rentraient en désordre. Constance voyant les
siens fatigués d'une course de quatre lieues, épuisés par la chaleur
et par la soif, fait de nouveaux efforts pour les retenir. La nuit
approchait; les archers sur les éminences d'alentour, les cavaliers au
pied de la muraille faisaient bonne contenance. Rien n'arrête la
fougue du soldat romain; il fond sur cette cavalerie, renverse
hommes et chevaux, les assomme à coups de masses d'armes. En
un moment le fossé est comblé, les palissades sont arrachées. Ils
s'attachent ensuite à la muraille; elle s'écroule jusqu'aux
fondements. Les uns pillent les tentes et massacrent tous ceux qui
ne peuvent fuir; Narsès est fait prisonnier: les autres courent vers les
hauteurs; mais à découvert de toutes parts, ils sont accablés d'une
grêle de traits; l'obscurité fait égarer leurs coups; leurs épées déja
rompues dans les corps des ennemis refusent de les servir: après
avoir perdu leurs meilleurs soldats ils se rejettent dans le camp; là se
croyant victorieux, ils allument des feux; et accablés de fatigue,
brûlants de soif, ils cherchent de l'eau et ne songent qu'à se
désaltérer. Les vaincus, profitant du désordre et favorisés des
ténèbres de la nuit, fondent sur eux; ils les percent de traits à la
lueur de leurs feux, et les chassent de leur camp. Dans cette
affreuse confusion, quelques soldats furieux se jettent sur Narsès; il
est fouetté, percé d'aiguillons, et coupé en pièces. Constance, fuyant
avec quelques cavaliers, arriva à une méchante bourgade nommée
Hibite ou Thébite, à six lieues de Nisibe, où mourant de faim il fut
trop heureux de se rassasier d'un morceau de pain qu'il reçut d'une
pauvre femme. Le lendemain les Perses, ne sentant que leur perte,
repassent le fleuve et rompent les ponts. Sapor, saisi de douleur et
de rage, quitta les bords du Tigre, s'arrachant les cheveux, se
frappant la tête et pleurant amèrement son fils. Dans l'excès de son
désespoir, il fit trancher la tête à plusieurs seigneurs qui lui avaient
conseillé la guerre. Telle fut la bataille de Singara, où les rives du
Tigre furent tour à tour abreuvées du sang des Perses et des
Romains, et où la mauvaise discipline fit perdre aux vainqueurs tout
l'avantage que leur avait procuré une bravoure téméraire.
En Occident, les Francs étaient tranquilles; et
Constant profitait du calme de ses états, pour li. Nouveaux
travailler à rendre la paix à l'église. Étant allé de troubles des
Milan[156] à Aquilée, il y manda Athanase, et Donatistes
apaisés en
l'engagea ensuite à passer à Trèves. Gratus Afrique.
évêque de Carthage, en allant au concile de
Sardique, avait représenté à l'empereur les
violences que les Circoncellions ne cessaient de Optat. l. 3. de
commettre en Afrique. Le prince y envoya deux schis. 3-9.
Donat. c.
personnages considérables, nommés Paul et
Macarius. Ils étaient chargés de distribuer des
aumônes, et de donner leurs soins à ramener les [Athan. apol. ad
esprits. Donat, faux évêque de Carthage, les Const. t. i, p.
rebuta avec insolence, et défendit à ceux de sa 297.]
communion de recevoir leurs aumônes. Un autre
Donat, évêque de Bagaï en Numidie, assembla les Baronius.
Circoncellions; les envoyés de l'empereur, pour se
mettre à couvert de leurs insultes, furent obligés Till. Hist. des
de se faire escorter par des soldats que leur donna Donat. art. 46 et
le comte Silvestre. Quelques-uns de ces soldats suiv.
ayant été maltraités, leurs camarades malgré les
commandants en tirèrent vengeance: ils tuèrent plusieurs
Donatistes, entre autres Donat de Bagaï. On employa contre ces
sectaires des rigueurs qui furent blâmées des évêques catholiques.
Cette conduite trop dure de Paul et de Macarius donna occasion à la
secte de les rendre odieux comme persécuteurs, et d'honorer
comme martyrs ceux qui perdirent la vie. Mais les commissaires
n'excédèrent pas les bornes d'une sévérité légitime en chassant de
Carthage le faux évêque Donat, et en traitant de même plusieurs
autres évêques obstinés. Une grande partie du peuple rentra dans la
communion catholique. Gratus cimenta cette heureuse union par un
concile tenu à Carthage; et la tranquillité rétablie dans l'église
d'Afrique subsista jusqu'à la mort de Constance.
[156] Il était en cette ville le 17 juin 348.—S.-M.
Il était temps que les menaces de Constant
arrêtassent en Orient la persécution qui avait lii. Violences
redoublé de violence après le concile de Sardique. des Ariens.
Les Ariens de Philippopolis, irrités contre les
habitants d'Andrinople qui rejetaient leur Ath. ad monach.
communion, s'en étaient plaints à Constance; et t. i, p. 354.
par les ordres de ce prince le comte Philagrius
avait fait trancher la tête à dix laïcs des plus considérables de la
ville. L'évêque Lucius fut de nouveau chargé de chaînes, et envoyé
en exil, où il mourut. Des diacres, des prêtres, des évêques avaient
été les uns proscrits, les autres rélégués dans les montagnes de
l'Arménie, ou dans les déserts de la Libye. On gardait les portes des
villes, pour en interdire l'entrée aux prélats rétablis par le vrai
concile. On envoya de la part de l'empereur aux magistrats
d'Alexandrie un ordre de faire mourir Athanase, s'il osait se
présenter pour rentrer en possession de son siége. On redoublait les
fouets, les chaînes, les tortures. Les catholiques fuyaient au désert;
quelques-uns feignaient d'apostasier. Ce fut au milieu de ce
désordre, que les lettres de Constant vinrent suspendre les coups
que son frère portait à l'église.
Constance ne se rendit pas d'abord. Son
incertitude lui attira une seconde lettre plus forte liii. Lettre de
que la précédente. Il connaissait le caractère vif et Constance à S.
bouillant de son frère; il ne doutait pas que ces Athanase.
menaces réitérées ne fussent bientôt suivies de
l'exécution. Dans cet embarras, il assemble Socr. l. 2, c. 23.
plusieurs évêques du parti, et leur demande
conseil. Ils sont d'avis de céder, plutôt que de Soz. l. 3, c. 20.
courir les risques d'une guerre civile. L'empereur
feint de s'adoucir. Il permet à Paul de retourner à
Constantinople. Il invite par lettre Athanase à le Philost. l. 3, c.
venir trouver, lui promettant non-seulement une 12.
sûreté entière et le rétablissement dans son église,
mais encore les effets les plus réels de sa bienveillance. Il lui
témoigne beaucoup de compassion sur ses malheurs, et lui fait des
reproches de ce qu'il n'a pas préféré de recourir à lui pour obtenir
justice. Cette feinte douceur n'était capable que d'inspirer de
nouveaux soupçons. Aussi Athanase ne se pressa pas d'y répondre.
Dans ces circonstances on découvrit un horrible complot qui
déshonora les Ariens, et qui fit pour quelques moments ouvrir les
yeux à leur aveugle protecteur.
Les deux évêques envoyés avec Salianus à
Constance, étaient Vincent de Capoue et liv. Insigne
Euphratas de Cologne. Étienne évêque d'Antioche fourberie
résolut de leur ôter tout crédit auprès de d'Étienne,
l'empereur, et de les perdre d'honneur à la face de évêque
d'Antioche.
toute la terre. Dans ce dessein il trama l'intrigue la
plus noire et la plus honteuse. Il avait à ses ordres
un jeune homme de la ville, dont il se servait pour Ath. ad monach.
maltraiter les catholiques. C'était un scélérat sans t. i, p. 355 et
pitié et sans pudeur. On lui avait donné le surnom 356.
d'Onagre, mot qui signifie âne sauvage, à cause
de sa pétulante férocité. L'évêque lui fait part de Theod. l. 2, c. 9-
son dessein, et n'a pas besoin de l'exciter à le 10.
remplir. Onagre va trouver une femme publique; il
lui dit qu'il est arrivé deux étrangers qui veulent passer la nuit avec
elle. Il convient avec quinze brigands semblables à lui, qu'ils se
placeront en embuscade autour de la maison où logeaient les deux
évêques. La nuit suivante Onagre conduit la courtisane: un
domestique qu'il avait corrompu par argent, tenait la porte ouverte.
Cette femme se glisse dans la chambre d'Euphratas: c'était un
vieillard vénérable; il s'éveille au bruit; et ayant demandé qui c'était,
comme il entend la voix d'une femme, il ne doute pas que ce ne soit
une illusion du diable, et se recommande à J.-C. Aussitôt Onagre
entre avec des flambeaux à la tête de sa troupe. La courtisane,
frappée de la vue d'un homme si respectable, et qu'elle reconnaît
pour un évêque, s'écrie qu'elle est trompée: on veut lui imposer
silence; elle crie plus fort: tous les valets accourent; Vincent qui
couchait dans une chambre voisine vient au secours de son
collègue: on ferme les portes; on arrête sept de ces misérables:
Onagre s'échappe avec les autres. Dès le point du jour les évêques
instruisent Salianus de cet attentat; ils vont ensemble au palais; les
prélats requièrent un jugement ecclésiastique: Salianus soutient
qu'un fait de cette nature est du ressort des tribunaux séculiers; il
demande une information juridique: il offre les domestiques des deux
évêques pour être appliqués à la question; et comme tout le
soupçon tombait sur Étienne dont Onagre était le ministre ordinaire,
il exige qu'Étienne représente aussi les siens. Celui-ci le refuse,
sous prétexte que ses domestiques étant clercs ne peuvent être mis
à la question. L'empereur est d'avis que l'information se fasse dans
l'intérieur du palais. On interroge d'abord la courtisane, qui déclare la
vérité: on s'adresse ensuite au plus jeune de ceux qui avaient été
arrêtés, il découvre tout le complot: Onagre est amené, et proteste
qu'il n'a rien fait que par les ordres d'Étienne: cet indigne prélat est
aussitôt déposé par les évêques qui se trouvent à Antioche.
L'empereur, irrité d'une si affreuse imposture,
rappelle d'exil les prêtres et les diacres lv. Constance
d'Alexandrie; il défend d'inquiéter ni les clercs ni invite de
les laïcs attachés à l'évêque Athanase. La guerre nouveau
Athanase.
des Perses qui commença alors à l'occuper tout
entier, ne lui fit pas perdre de vue le retour du
prélat. Dans sa marche même, étant à Edesse, il [Athan. apol.
lui écrivit une seconde lettre[157], dont il chargea cont. Arian. t. i,
p. 170.]
un prêtre d'Alexandrie: c'était apparemment un des
exilés qui revenait d'Arménie, et qui s'était
présenté à l'empereur. Constance pressait de Socr. l. 2, c. 23.
nouveau le saint évêque; il lui permettait de
prendre des voitures publiques pour se faire
conduire à la cour. Mais il était de retour à Theod. l. 2, c.
Antioche avant qu'Athanase se fût déterminé à le 10, 11.
venir trouver.
[157] Selon Socrate (l. 2, c. 23), Athanase était alors à Soz. l. 3, c. 19.
Aquilée.—S.-M.
Grégoire était mort à Alexandrie, et l'empereur
n'avait pas permis aux Ariens de lui nommer un An 349.
successeur. Enfin l'année suivante, sous le
consulat de Liménius et de Catulinus, Athanase, lvi. Athanase à
pressé par une troisième lettre de Constance, et Antioche.
par celles de plusieurs comtes, dont la bonne foi
lui était moins suspecte, se rend à tant de
sollicitations. Il va d'abord à Rome trouver le pape Idat. Chron.
Jules qui, transporté d'une sainte joie, écrit à
l'église d'Alexandrie pour la féliciter du retour de Ath. ad.
son évêque. De là il prend la route d'Antioche, où monach. t. i, p.
l'empereur affecta de réparer ses injustices 356 et 357. et
passées par l'accueil le plus honorable. La seule apol. contr.
Arian. t. i, p.
grace qui lui fut refusée, ce fut celle de confondre 171-174.
en face ses calomniateurs qui étaient à la cour.
Mais le prince lui promit avec serment de ne les
plus écouter en son absence. Constance écrit aux Socr. l. 2, c. 23.
Alexandrins, pour les exhorter à la concorde; il leur
recommande l'obéissance à leur évêque; il Theod. l. 2, c.
ordonne aux magistrats de punir les réfractaires; il 12.
déclare que l'union avec Athanase sera à ses yeux
le caractère du bon parti; il enjoint, par un ordre Soz. l. 3, c. 20
exprès, aux commandants de la ville et de la et 21.
province, d'annuler et d'effacer des registres
publics tous les actes et toutes les procédures
faites contre l'évêque et contre ceux de sa Phot. vit. Ath.
communion, et de rétablir le clergé d'Athanase cod. 257.
dans tous ses priviléges. On ne peut concevoir comment Constance
a pu sans rougir donner à la doctrine et aux mœurs du saint prélat
les éloges dont ces lettres sont remplies. Il entrait dans cette
conduite plus de crainte de Constant, que de sincérité et de véritable
repentir. Aussi voit-on ici ce prince se démentir lui-même. Il était
alors, autant que jamais, le jouet des Ariens, qui l'avaient tant de fois
trompé. Ce fut à leurs instances qu'ayant un jour fait appeler
Athanase: Vous voyez, lui dit-il, tout ce que je fais pour vous; faites à
votre tour quelque chose pour moi; je l'attends de votre
reconnaissance: de toutes les églises d'Alexandrie, je vous en
demande une pour ceux qui ne sont pas de votre communion.
Prince, lui répond Athanase sans se déconcerter, vous avez le
pouvoir d'exécuter ce que vous désirez; mais accordez-moi aussi
une grace. Je vous l'accorde, lui dit aussitôt Constance. Il y a ici à
Antioche, répliqua Athanase, beaucoup d'habitants séparés de la
communion de l'évêque; il est de votre justice que tout soit égal:
donnez-leur une église, comme vous en demandez une pour ceux
d'Alexandrie. Depuis la déposition d'Étienne, l'église d'Antioche était
gouvernée par Léonce, qui n'était pas moins livré à l'arianisme; et
les catholiques, appelés Eustathiens, étaient en grand nombre.
Constance, frappé de la présence d'esprit d'Athanase, ne put lui
répondre sans avoir consulté ses oracles ordinaires. Ceux-ci
jugèrent que par cette concession mutuelle leur parti perdrait
beaucoup plus à Antioche, qu'il ne gagnerait à Alexandrie, tant que
leur doctrine y trouverait un si puissant adversaire; et l'empereur se
désista de sa demande.
Dans le voyage d'Antioche à Alexandrie, Athanase
fut partout reçu avec honneur. Les évêques, lvii. Retour
excepté quelques Ariens, s'empressaient à lui d'Athanase à
témoigner leur respect. La plupart même de ceux Alexandrie.
qui l'avaient auparavant condamné ou abandonné,
revenaient à sa communion. Les prélats de Ath. apol. contr.
Palestine s'assemblèrent à Jérusalem; ils écrivirent Arian. t. i, p.
une lettre aux églises d'Égypte, de Libye, 175-177. ad
d'Alexandrie, pour les assurer qu'ils partageaient monach. p. 357-
359.
leur joie. A son arrivée ce fut une fête par toute
l'Égypte, mais une fête vraiment chrétienne. C'était
par l'imitation d'Athanase qu'on solennisait son Socr. l. 2, c. 24.
retour. On versait des aumônes abondantes dans
le sein des pauvres; les ennemis se réconciliaient; chaque maison
semblait une église; Alexandrie tout entière était
devenue un temple consacré aux actions de Soz. l. 3, c. 20
graces, et à la pratique des vertus. Tous les et seq.
évêques catholiques envoyaient à Athanase et
recevaient de lui des lettres de paix. Ursacius et Phot. vit. Ath.
Valens eux-mêmes lui écrivirent d'Aquilée, et lui cod. 257.
demandèrent sa communion. Ils venaient de
confirmer à Rome, en présence de Jules et de
plusieurs évêques, par une nouvelle protestation Pagi, ad Baron.
signée de leur main, l'anathème qu'ils avaient prononcé à Milan
contre la doctrine d'Arius; ils avaient de plus, par ce même acte,
déclaré fausses et calomnieuses toutes les accusations formées
contre Athanase: c'était confesser leur propre crime. L'Église
respirait après un orage de plus de sept années. Les évêques exilés
étaient rétablis; les Ariens quittaient en tumulte les siéges usurpés;
Macédonius, obligé de céder à Paul, ne conserva dans
Constantinople qu'une seule église. Cette paix qui était l'ouvrage de
Constant, fut bientôt troublée. Elle ne survécut pas à ce prince, dont
la mort fut l'effet d'une révolution soudaine, et la cause des plus
violentes agitations.

FIN DU LIVRE SIXIÈME ET DU TOME PREMIER.

 TABLE DES MATIÈRES CONTENUES
DANS LE TOME PREMIER DE
L'HISTOIRE DU BAS-EMPIRE.
Introduction Page 1.
LIVRE PREMIER.
1. Date de la naissance de Constantin. 2. Sa patrie. 3. Son origine.
4. Qualité de sa mère. 5. Noms de Constantin. 6. Ses premières
années. 7. Portrait de ce prince. 8. Sa chasteté. 9. Son savoir. 10.
Galérius est jaloux de Constantin. 11. Il cherche à le perdre. 12.
Constantin s'échappe des mains de Galérius. 13. Il joint son père.
14. Il lui succède. 15. Proclamation de Constantin. 16. Sépulture de
Constance. 17. Projets de Galérius. 18. Ses cruautés, 19; contre les
chrétiens, 20; contre les païens mêmes. 21. Rigueur des
impositions. 22. Les crimes de ses officiers doivent lui être imputés.
23. Il refuse à Constantin le titre d'Auguste et le donne à Sévère. 24.
Maxence élevé à l'empire. 25. Maximien reprend le titre d'Auguste.
26. Maximin ne prend point de part à ces mouvements. 27.
Occupations de Constantin. 28. Sa victoire sur les Francs. 29. Il
achève de les dompter. 30. Il met à couvert les terres de la Gaule.
31. Sévère trahi. 32. Sa mort. 33. Mariage de Constantin. 34.
Galérius vient assiéger Rome. 35. Il est contraint de se retirer. 36. Il
ruine tout sur son passage. 37. Maximien revient à Rome, d'où il est
chassé. 38. Maxence lui ôte le consulat. 39. Maximien va trouver
Constantin et ensuite Galérius. 40. Portrait de Licinius. 41. Dioclétien
refuse l'empire. 42. Licinius Auguste. 43. Maximin continue à
persécuter les chrétiens. 44. Punition d'Urbanus et de Firmilianus.
45. Maximin prend le titre d'Auguste. 46. Maximien consul. 47.
Alexandre est nommé empereur à Carthage. 48. Maximien quitte la
pourpre pour la seconde fois. 49. Il la reprend. 50. Constantin
marche contre lui. 51. Il s'assure de sa personne. 52. Mort de
Maximien. 53. Ambition et vanité de Maximien. 54. Consulats. 55.
Constantin fait des offrandes à Apollon. 56. Il embellit la ville de
Trèves. 57. Guerre contre les Barbares. 58. Nouvelles exactions de
Galérius. 59. Sa maladie. 60. Édit de Galérius en faveur des
chrétiens. 61. Mort de Galérius. 62. Différence de sentiments au
sujet de Galérius. 63. Consulats de cette année. 64. Partage de
Maximin et de Licinius. 65. Débauches de Maximin. 66. Maximin fait
cesser la persécution. 67. Délivrance des chrétiens. 68. Artifices
contre les chrétiens. 69. Édit de Maximin. 70. La persécution
recommence. 71. Passion de Maximin pour les sacrifices. 72.
Calomnies contre les chrétiens. 73. Divers martyrs. 74. Famine et
peste en Orient. 75. Guerre contre les Arméniens. 76. État du
christianisme en Italie. 77. Guerre contre Alexandre. 78. Défaite
d'Alexandre. 79. Désolation de l'Afrique. 80. Massacre dans Rome.
81. Avarice de Maxence. 82. Ses rapines. 83. Ses débauches. 84.
Mort de Sophronie. 85. Superstition de Maxence. 86. Constantin se
prépare à la guerre. 87. Il soulage la ville d'Autun. 88. Il retourne à
Trèves. 89. Outrages qu'il reçoit de Maxence. 90. Ils s'appuient tous
deux par des alliances. 91. Préparatifs de Maxence. 92. Forces de
Constantin. 93. Inquiétudes de ce prince. 94. Réflexions qui le
portent au christianisme. 95. Apparition de la croix. 96. Constantin
fait faire le labarum. 97. Culte de cette enseigne. 98. Protection
divine attachée au labarum. 99. Sur le lieu où parut ce prodige. 100.
Discussion sur la vérité de ce miracle. 101. Raisons pour le
combattre. 102. Raisons pour l'appuyer. 103. Constantin se fait
instruire. 104. Conversion de sa famille. 105. Fable de Zosime
réfutée. Page 23.
LIVRE DEUXIÈME.
1. Triomphe de la religion chrétienne. 2. Prise de Suze. 3. Bataille de
Turin. 4. Suites de la victoire. 5. Siége de Vérone. 6. Bataille de
Vérone. 7. Prise de Vérone. 8. Constantin devant Rome. 9. Maxence
se tient enfermé dans Rome. 10. Pont de bateaux. 11. Songe de
Constantin. 12. Sentiment de Lactance. 13. Bataille contre Maxence.
14. Fuite de Maxence. 15. Suites de la victoire. 16. Entrée de
Constantin dans Rome. 17. Fêtes, réjouissances, honneurs rendus à
Constantin. 18. Dispositions de Maximin. 19. Précautions de
Constantin. 20. Conduite sage et modérée après la victoire. 21. Lois
contre les délateurs. 22. Il répare les maux qu'avait fait Maxence. 23.
Libéralités de Constantin. 24. Embellissements et réparations des
villes. 25. Établissement des indictions. 26. Raisons de cet
établissement. 27. Conduite de Constantin par rapport au
christianisme. 28. Progrès du christianisme. 29. Honneurs que
Constantin rend à la religion. 30. Églises bâties et ornées. 31.
Constantin arrête la persécution de Maximin. 32. Consulats de cette
année. 33. Mariage de Licinius. 34. Mort de Dioclétien. 35. Édit de
Milan. 36. Guerre contre les Francs. 37. Constantin comble de
bienfaits l'église d'Afrique. 38. Exemption des fonctions municipales,
accordée aux clercs. 39. Abus occasionés par ces exemptions, et
corrigés par Constantin. 40. Lois sur le gouvernement civil. 41. Lois
pour la perception des tributs. 42. Lois pour l'administration de la
justice. 43. Maximin commence la guerre contre Licinius. 44. Licinius
vient à sa rencontre. 45. Bataille entre Licinius et Maximin. 46.
Licinius à Nicomédie. 47. Mort de Maximin. 48. Suites de cette mort.
49. Aventures de Valéria, de Prisca et de Candidianus. 50. Valéria
fuit Licinius, et est persécutée par Maximin. 51. Supplice de trois
dames innocentes. 52. Dioclétien redemande Valéria. 53. Mort de
Candidianus, de Prisca et de Valéria. 54. Jeux séculaires. 55. Paix
universelle de l'église. 56. Origine du schisme des Donatistes. 57.
Conciliabule de Carthage, où Cécilien est condamné. 58. Ordination
de Majorinus. 59. Constantin prend connaissance de cette querelle.
60. Concile de Rome. 61. Suites de ce concile. 62. Plaintes des
Donatistes. 63. Convocation du concile d'Arles. 64. Concile d'Arles.
65. Les Donatistes appellent du concile à l'empereur. Page 98.
LIVRE TROISIÈME.
1. Consuls de cette année. 2. Première guerre entre Constantin et
Licinius. 3. Bataille de Cibales. 4. Suites de cette bataille. 5. Bataille
de Mardie. 6. Traité de paix et de partage. 7. Loi en faveur des
officiers du palais. 8. Décennales de Constantin. 9. Révolte des Juifs
réprimée. 10. Lois en l'honneur de la croix. 11. Constantin en Gaule.
12. Il se détermine à juger de nouveau les Donatistes. 13. Nouveaux
troubles en Afrique. 14. Jugement rendu à Milan. 15.
Mécontentement des Donatistes. 16. Violences des Donatistes. 17.
Silvanus exilé et rappelé. 18. Le schisme dégénère en hérésie. 19.
Donatistes à Rome, 20. Circoncellions. 21. Constantin en Illyrie. 22.
Nomination des trois Césars. 23. Lactance chargé de l'instruction de
Crispus. 24. Naissance de Constance. 25. Éducation du jeune
Constantin, consul avec son père. 26. Persécution de Licinius. 27.
Victoire de Crispus sur les Francs. 28. Quinquennales des Césars.
29. Consuls. 30. Les Sarmates vaincus. 31. Pardon accordé aux
criminels. 32. Lois de Constantin. 33. Loi pour la célébration du
dimanche. 35. Loi en faveur du célibat. 35. Loi de tolérance. 36. Loi
en faveur des ministres de l'église. 37. Lois qui regardent les
mœurs. 38. Lois concernant les officiers du prince et ceux des villes.
39. Lois sur la police générale et sur le gouvernement civil. 40. Lois
sur l'administration de la justice. 41. Lois sur la perception des
impôts. 42. Lois pour l'ordre militaire. 43. Causes de la guerre entre
Constantin et Licinius. 44. Préparatifs de guerre. 45. Piété de
Constantin et superstition de Licinius. 46. Approches des deux
armées. 47. Harangue de Licinius. 48. Bataille d'Andrinople. 49.
Guerre sur mer. 50. Licinius passe à Chalcédoine. 51. Bataille de
Chrysopolis. 52. Suites de la bataille. 53. Mort de Licinius. Page 159.
LIVRE QUATRIÈME.
1. Aventures d'Hormisdas. 2. Il se réfugie auprès de Constantin. 3.
Récit de Zonare. 4. Constantin seul maître de tout l'empire. 5. Il
profite de sa victoire pour étendre le christianisme. 6. Lettre de
Constantin aux peuples d'Orient. 7. Il défend les sacrifices. 8. Édit de
Constantin pour tout l'Orient. 9. Tolérance de Constantin. 10. Piété
de Constantin, 11. Corruption de sa cour. 12. Discours de
Constantin. 13. Troubles de l'arianisme. 14. Commencements
d'Arius. 15. Son portrait. 16. Progrès de l'arianisme. 17. Premier
concile d'Alexandrie contre Arius. 18. Eusèbe de Nicomédie. 19.
Eusèbe de Césarée. 20. Mouvements de l'arianisme. 21. Concile en
faveur d'Arius. 22. Lettre de Constantin à Alexandre et à Arius. 23.
Second concile d'Alexandrie. 24. Généreuse réponse de Constantin.
25. Convocation du concile de Nicée. 26. Occupation de Constantin
jusqu'à l'ouverture du concile. 27. Les évêques se rendent à Nicée.
28. Évêques orthodoxes. 29. Évêques ariens. 30. Philosophes
païens confondus. 31. Trait de sagesse de Constantin. 32.
Conférences préliminaires. 33. Séances du concile. 34. Constantin
au concile. 35. Discours de Constantin. 36. Liberté du concile. 37.
Consubstantialité du Verbe. 38. Jugement du concile. 39. Question
de la Pâque terminée. 40. Réglement au sujet des Mélétiens et des
Novatiens. 41. Canons et symbole de Nicée. 42. Lettres du concile
et de Constantin. 43. Vicennales de Constantin. 44. Conclusion du
concile. 45. Exil d'Eusèbe et de Théognis. 46. Saint Athanase,
évêque d'Alexandrie 47. Lois de Constantin. 48. Mort de Crispus. 49.
Mort de Fausta. 50. Insultes que Constantin reçoit à Rome. 51.
Constantin quitte Rome pour n'y plus revenir. 52. Consuls. 53.
Découverte de la croix. 54. Église du saint Sépulcre. 55. Piété
d'Hélène. 56. Retour d'Hélène. 57. Sa mort. 58. Guerres contre les
Barbares. 59. Destruction des idoles. 60. Temple d'Aphaca. 61.
Autres débauches et superstitions abolies. 62. Chêne de Mambré.
63. Églises bâties. 64. Arad et Maïuma deviennent chrétiennes. 65.
Conversions des Éthiopiens et des Ibériens. 66. Établissement des
monastères. 67. Restes de l'idolâtrie. 68. Date de la fondation de
Constantinople. 69. Motifs de Constantin pour bâtir une nouvelle
ville. 70. Il veut bâtir à Troie. 71. Situation de Byzance. 72. Abrégé
de l'histoire de Byzance jusqu'à Constantin. 73. État du christianisme
à Byzance. 74. Nouvelle enceinte de C. P. 75. Bâtiments faits à
Constantinople. 76. Places publiques. 77. Palais. 78. Autres
ouvrages. 79. Statues. 80. Églises bâties. 81. Égouts de
Constantinople. 82. Prompte exécution de ces ouvrages. 83.
Maisons bâties à Constantinople. 84. Nom et division de
Constantinople. Page 222.
LIVRE CINQUIÈME.
1. Changement dans le gouvernement. 2. Dédicace de C. P. 3.
Précautions de Constantin pour la subsistance de C. P. 4.
Chrysargyre. 5. Priviléges de C. P. 6. Autres établissements. 7.
Nouvel ordre politique. 8. Nouvelle division de l'empire. 9. Quatre
préfets du prétoire établis. 10. Des maîtres de la milice. 11. Patrices.
12. Des ducs et des comtes. 13. Multiplication des titres. 14. Luxe de
Constantin. 15. Suite de l'histoire de Constantin. 16. Guerre contre
les Goths. 17. Sarmates vaincus. 18. Delmatius consul. 19. Peste et
famine en Orient. 20. Mort de Sopater. 21. Ambassades envoyées à
Constantin. 22. Lettre de Constantin à Sapor. 23. Préparatifs de
guerre faits par les Perses. 24. Constantin écrit à saint Antoine. 25.
Constant César. 26. Consuls. 27. Les Sarmates chassés par leurs
esclaves. 28. Consuls. 29. Tricennales de Constantin. 30. Delmatius
César. 31. Partage des états de Constantin. 32. Comète. 33.
Consuls. 34. Mariage de Constance. 35. Ambassade des Indiens.
36. Rappel d'Arius. 37. Retour d'Eusèbe et de Théognis. 38.
Déposition d'Eustathius. 39. Troubles d'Antioche. 40. Eusèbe de
Césarée refuse l'évêché d'Antioche. 41. Athanase refuse de recevoir
Arius. 42. Calomnies contre Athanase. 43. Accusation au sujet
d'Arsénius. 44. Eusèbe s'empare de l'esprit de l'empereur. 45.
Concile de Tyr. 46. Accusateurs confondus. 47. Conclusion du
Concile de Tyr. 48. Dédicace de l'église du Saint-Sépulcre. 49.
Concile de Jérusalem. 50. Athanase s'adresse à l'empereur. 51. Exil
d'Athanase. 52. Concile de C. P. 53. Efforts d'Eusèbe pour faire
recevoir Arius par Alexandre. 54. Mort d'Arius. 55. Constantin refuse
de rappeler Athanase. 56. Lois contre les hérétiques. 57. Loi sur la
juridiction épiscopale. 58. Lois sur les mariages. 59. Autres lois sur
l'administration civile. 60. Les Perses rompent la paix. 61. Maladie
de Constantin. 62. Son baptême. 63. Vérité de cette histoire. 64.
Mort de Constantin. 65. Deuil de sa mort. 66. Ses funérailles. 67.
Fidélité des légions. 68. Inhumation de Constantin. 69. Deuil à
Rome. 70. Honneurs rendus à sa mémoire par l'église. 71.
Caractère de Constantin. 72. Reproches mal fondés de la part des
païens. 73. Ses filles. Page 309.
LIVRE SIXIÈME.
1. Caractère des fils de Constantin. 2. Massacre des frères et des
neveux de Constantin. 3. Autres Massacres. 4. Crédit de l'eunuque
Eusèbe. 5. Suites de la mort de Delmatius et d'Hanniballianus. 6.
Nouveau partage. 7. Rétablissement de saint Athanase. 8. Rappel
de saint Paul de Constantinople. 9. Constance retourne en Orient.
10. Antiquités de Nisibe. 11. Sapor lève le siége de Nisibe. 12.
Préparatifs pour la guerre de Perse. 13. Première expédition de
Constance. [14. Révolutions arrivées en Arménie.] 15. Troubles de
l'arianisme. 16. Mort d'Eusèbe de Césarée. 17. Consulat
d'Acyndinus et de Proculus. 18. Mort du jeune Constantin. 19. Lois
des trois princes. 20. Nouvelles calomnies contre saint Athanase.
21. Concile d'Antioche. 22. Grégoire intrus sur le siége d'Alexandrie.
23. Violences à l'arrivée de Grégoire. 24. Précaution pour cacher ces
excès à l'empereur. 25. Les catholiques maltraités par toute l'Égypte.
26. Violences exercées ailleurs. 27. Athanase va à Rome. 28. Paul
rétabli et chassé de nouveau. 29. Athanase va trouver Constant. 30.
Synode de Rome. 31. Amid fortifiée. 32. Terrible tremblement de
terre. 33. Courses des Francs. 34. Ils sont réprimés par Constant.
35. Constant dans la Grande-Bretagne. 36. Tremblements de terre.
37. Conversion des Homérites. 38. Inquiétudes des Ariens. 39.
Marche de Constance vers la Perse. 40. Port de Séleucie. 41.
Sédition à Constantinople. 42. Concile de Milan. 43. Concile de
Sardique. 44. Les Ariens se séparent. 45. Jugement du concile. 46.
Faux concile de Sardique. 47. Concile de Milan. 48. Députés
envoyés à Constance. 49. Guerre des Perses. 50. Bataille de
Singara. 51. Nouveaux troubles des Donatistes apaisés en Afrique.
52. Violences des Ariens. 53. Lettres de Constance à saint
Athanase. 54. Insigne fourberie d'Étienne, évêque d'Antioche. 55.
Constance rappelle de nouveau saint Athanase. 56. Athanase à
Antioche. 57. Retour d'Athanase à Alexandrie. Page 392.

FIN DE LA TABLE DU TOME PREMIER.

*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTOIRE DU
BAS-EMPIRE. TOME 01 ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright
in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and without
paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General
Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and
distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if
you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the
trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the
Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such
as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and
printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in
the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright
law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially
commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
 PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this
work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase
“Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of
the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or
online at www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand,
agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual
property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to
abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using
and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for
obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms
of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by
people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.
There are a few things that you can do with most Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the
full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There
are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™
electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and
help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.