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POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE
Series Editors: Dan Hough · Paul M. Heywood
Corruption in
the MENA Region
Beyond Uprisings
Dina Elsayed
Political Corruption and Governance
Series Editors
Dan Hough
University of Sussex
Brighton, UK
Paul M. Heywood
University of Nottingham
Nottingham, UK
This series aims to analyse the nature and scope of, as well as possible
remedies for, political corruption. The rise to prominence over the last
20 years of corruption-related problems and of the ‘good governance’
agenda as the principal means to tackle them has led to the devel-
opment of a plethora of (national and international) policy proposals,
international agreements and anti-corruption programmes and initiatives.
National governments, international organisations and NGOs all now
claim to take very seriously the need to tackle issues of corruption. It
is thus unsurprising that over couple of decades, a significant body of
work with a wide and varied focus has been published in academic jour-
nals and in international discussion papers. This series seeks to provide a
forum through which to address this growing body of literature. It invites
not just in-depth single country analyses of corruption and attempts to
combat it, but also comparative studies that explore the experiences of
different states (or regions) in dealing with different types of corruption.
We also invite monographs that take an overtly thematic focus, analysing
trends and developments in one type of corruption across either time or
space, as well as theoretically informed analysis of discrete events.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14545
Dina Elsayed
Corruption
in the MENA Region
Beyond Uprisings
Dina Elsayed
Cairo, Egypt
Political Corruption and Governance

ISBN 978-3-030-55313-5 ISBN 978-3-030-55314-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55314-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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To future Arab generations,
May your voices be heard,
May your rights be respected,
May You live in better governed societies,
May you enjoy a better quality of life,
May you witness spring …
Preface
In the context of the growing political and academic attention given to the
MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings, this book seeks to
explore a key dimension of such political upheavals: corruption. There is a
general consensus that grand and petty corruption are widespread among
countries in the region, and corruption has been a key driver behind the
Arab Spring. Against this backdrop, this book seeks to fill the academic
gap in corruption studies in the MENA region by looking at the root
causes of corruption in fifteen Arab countries. The number of studies on
the nature and extent of corruption in MENA countries is limited due to
the lack of reliable data on corruption-related issues within these coun-
tries, as well as widespread restrictions on accessing corruption-related
information.
Contributing to the literature on corruption in MENA countries, this
book addresses the causes of corruption in the region through a system-
atic cross-national comparative analysis. In particular, fifteen countries are
analyzed in detail using the structured focused comparative method and
the Most Similar Systems Design in order to better comprehend the
distinctive causes of corruption in these countries, and also to explain
the causal relationship between corruption and differences in political
and socio-economic dimensions within these countries over a timeframe
of 1999–2010. The countries are divided into three sub-regions (Gulf
region, North Africa, and Mashreq plus Yemen) to enable focused analysis
and comparison within these groups.
vii
viii PREFACE
The book concludes that the main variables that showed robustness in
impacting the intensity of corruption among all the cases are the rule of
law, quality of regulation, and trade openness. Poverty rates and income
inequality have been clear triggers for petty corruption to flourish in many
cases. However, natural resource endowments have shown less impact
on the levels of corruption in the countries analyzed. While women’s
empowerment has not been found to be a strong indicator, discrimi-
nation in general against women, minorities, religious sects, indigenous
groups, immigrants, non-nationals, opposition parties, and other groups
has revealed a clear absence of social equality among those populations
where favoritism and polarization have taken place. The book further
concludes that the relationship between literacy rates and corruption is
negligible, but that there is a negative causal relationship between the
quality of education and corruption. Finally, there is also a negative
correlation between human development and corruption.
Cairo, Egypt Dina Elsayed

Acknowledgments
To the most interesting, extraordinary, yet exhausting years.

To the experience I have encountered with every new step I took,
putting the pieces of knowledge together to help me reach a clear picture
of this puzzle.
To the constant sincere support of Professor Dr. Nicolai Dose, with
whom I managed to book a space in his busy schedule. I acknowledge
that it has been a significant enriching phase in my life because of his
patient guidance and encouragement.
To Professor Dr. Tobias Debiel, who added constructive input and
invaluable feedback to enhance my work.
To the experts from each country in the MENA region, who gave me
so much of their time, knowledge, experience, and objective perspectives
in discussing critical topics. To their willingness to help in all possible
ways, to their openness, humbleness and follow-up.
To that giving caring loving soul who witnessed it all, who gave me her
hand all along the way, who always believed in me and kept pushing me
forward, and without whom I would not have reached many places. I am
so grateful that she happened to be my mother.
To the generous hand who relentlessly supported me. Thank you,
my father, for tolerating all my ups and downs, for being patient and
understanding.
ix
x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To my siblings, Khaled, Mohamed, Nancy, Sherine, and Maha. I could

not be any luckier, having you all. I believe I can conquer anything
knowing I have a family supporting me every step of the way.
To my godparents, Mama Nawal El Degwi and Professor Dr. Abdul-
Monem Al-Mashat, who have been inspiring role models, and who always
pushed me to achieve more and aim higher. Thank you for always
encouraging me whenever my journey gets tough.
To those who made me believe that friends are the family we choose
to belong to. Your support has been irreplaceable throughout this phase.
I am thankful to have you.
This book would not have been accomplished without you all.
For this, I am grateful.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
References 5
2 Definition of Concepts 9
1 What Is Corruption? 9
1.1 Corruption Defined Through Public Interest,
Public Opinion, and Public Office 10
1.2 Corruption Defined Through the Principal–Agent
Framework 12
1.3 Corruption as Abuse of Public Office 14
References 18
3 Literature Review 23
1 Causes of Corruption 27
1.1 Regime Characteristics 27
1.2 Role of Government in the Economy 31
1.3 Development and Society 33
2 The Analytical Framework 36
3 Hypotheses of the Study 37
4 Concluding Remarks 38
References 38
xi
xii CONTENTS
4 Research Design, Methodology, and Data Collection 49

1 Case-Study Method 50
2 Structured Focused Comparison Method 51
3 The Most Similar Systems Design 53
4 Data Collection 54
5 Concluding Remarks 57
References 58
5 The MENA Region: Unique Features and Sustained

Regimes 61
1 Regime Characteristics 64
2 Role of Government in the Economy 66
3 Development and Society 68
References 72
6 Corruption in the Gulf Region: A Black Box 77

1 Qatar 80
1.2 Economic Status 85
1.3 Development Status 89
2 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 93
3 Oman 106
4 Bahrain 117
5 Kuwait 129
6 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) 139
CONTENTS xiii

7 Causes of Corruption in the Gulf Region:
A Cross-National Comparative Analysis 149
References 157
7 Corruption in North Africa: Monopoly of Power

and Widespread Ignorance 165
1 Tunisia 168
2 Morocco 181
3 Egypt 191
4 Algeria 201
5 Libya 211
6 Causes of Corruption in North Africa:
A Cross-National Comparative Analysis 220
References 227
8 Corruption in the Mashreq Region Plus Yemen:

A Region in Turmoil 235
1 Jordan 237
xiv CONTENTS
2 Lebanon 248
3 Syria 258
4 Yemen 269
5 Causes of Corruption in the Mashreq Region Plus
Yemen: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis 280
References 287
9 Corruption in the MENA Region: What are the Roots? 291

1 Comparing Across Each Hypothesis 291
2 Comparing Across the Ten Hypotheses 302
3 What Are the Exclusive Causes of Corruption? 305
References 307
10 Conclusion: Is There a Way Out? 311
Annexes 319
Index 341
Abbreviations
CPI Corruption Perception Index

DCR Democratic Constitutional Rally Party (Tunisia)
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIS Front Islamic du Salut Party (Algeria)
FNL Front de Libération Nationale Party (Algeria)
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
HDI Human Development Index
IAF Islamic Action Front Party (Jordan)
ILO International Labor Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MENA Middle East and North Africa
NA No Available Data
NDP National Democratic Party in Egypt
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
TI Transparency International
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
V-Dem Varieties of Democracy Project
WEF World Economic Forum
WTO World Trade Organization
xv
List of Figures
Chapter 5
Fig. 1 Map of the MENA region 63
Chapter 6
Fig. 1 Map of the Gulf region 78
Fig. 2 Regime characteristics in Qatar 83
Fig. 3 Economic status in Qatar 88
Fig. 4 Regime characteristics in UAE 98
Fig. 5 Economic status in UAE 101
Fig. 6 Regime characteristics in Oman 110
Fig. 7 Economic status in Oman 114
Fig. 8 Regime characteristics in Bahrain 122
Fig. 9 Economic status in Bahrain 125
Fig. 10 Regime characteristics in Kuwait 134
Fig. 11 Economic status in Kuwait 136
Fig. 12 Regime characteristics in KSA 143
Fig. 13 Economic status in KSA 146
Chapter 7
Fig. 1 Map of North Africa 166
Fig. 2 Regime Characteristics in Tunisia 173
Fig. 3 Economic Status in Tunisia 176
Fig. 4 Regime Characteristics in Morocco 184
xvii
xviii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 5 Economic Status in Morocco 187

Fig. 6 Regime Characteristics in Egypt 195
Fig. 7 Economic Status in Egypt 197
Fig. 8 Regime Characteristics in Algeria 205
Fig. 9 Economic Status in Algeria 208
Fig. 10 Regime Characteristics in Libya 214
Fig. 11 Economic Status in Libya 217
Chapter 8
Fig. 1 Map of the Mashreq Region & Yemen 236
Fig. 2 Regime characteristics in Jordan 242
Fig. 3 Economic status in Jordan 244
Fig. 4 Regime characteristics in Lebanon 252
Fig. 5 Economic status in Lebanon 254
Fig. 6 Regime characteristics in Syria 262
Fig. 7 Economic status in Syria 265
Fig. 8 Regime characteristics in Yemen 273
Fig. 9 Economic status in Yemen 276
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon; no country is entirely clean and

immune from it. It penetrates societies at all levels, causing the malfunc-
tioning of their political and economic institutions (Glynn et al. 1997;
Amundsen 1999). It is a complex phenomenon that persists as a global
problem, attracting the attention of policymakers, political scientists, and
economists. Efforts continue on the political as well as the academic level
to address corruption and its intermingled dimensions: causes, effects,
implications, and means of curbing it.
During the last decade, international organizations have placed tack-
ling corruption at the top of their agendas and action plans. In December
2003, the United Nations adopted the UN Convention Against Corrup-
tion. This marked a clear step within the development cooperation realm
towards fighting corruption internationally. Initiatives were adopted on
regional and national levels to restrain corruption through good gover-
nance strategies, the enforcement of laws, establishing national entities to
fight corruption, and raising awareness of its implications. Moreover, it
has become an integral component of donor assistance agendas. Devel-
opment aid is now tied in with accountability and transparency measures,
which falls under the umbrella of advancing good governance practices in
recipient countries.
Consequently, much attention has been paid worldwide to improving
the functioning of institutions and political systems. The World Bank
© The Author(s) 2021 1

D. Elsayed, Corruption in the MENA Region,
Political Corruption and Governance,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55314-2_1
2 D. ELSAYED
views corruption as a significant obstacle to economic and social devel-

opment because it undermines the capacities of systems to function
effectively (World Bank 1997). Transparency International considers
corruption one of the “greatest challenges” of this era, since it “under-
mines good government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to
misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private sector
development and particularly hurts the poor” (Commonwealth Secre-
tariat 2001: 55). Nevertheless, so far, the effectiveness of international
institutions’ efforts in this area remains ambiguous on diverse levels
(McCusker 2006; Richter and Burke 2007; Nadgrodkiewicz et al. 2012;
Pech and Debiel 2011; Sumpf 2015).
An overview of academic research on corruption indicates that studies
have attempted to define the concept, determine its causes and effects,
and analyze its diverse motives and dimensions using several methods,
designs, and frameworks. Empirical studies on corruption have notice-
ably increased in number during the last decade, reflecting the greater
concern caused by the alarming figures. Those empirical efforts have
offered various insights which in turn have triggered further research
and analysis. In addition, much of the research has undertaken cross-
national analysis to offer a wider scope and deeper explanation of the
phenomenon. In spite of extensive research efforts on the subject of
corruption, less widespread consensus has been reached regarding its
different dimensions. This is primarily due to the difficulty of measuring
a complex phenomenon like corruption where adequate data is lacking
(Bardhan 1997; Ades and Di Tella 1997; Tanzi 1998; Lambsdorff 1999;
Jain 2001; Aidt 2003; Serra 2006).
Based on that, the relevance of this book stems from both political
perspectives and academic reasoning. First, the 2011 Arab Uprisings,
which brought down some regimes in the MENA region, indicated the
geostrategic importance of this region, as well as the importance of
analyzing its countries with regard to corruption, which stood out as one
of the main reasons for the Arab Uprisings. Second, while the MENA
region has been a subject of research in literature, it is under-represented
in studies of corruption. The topic is generally studied in relation to
broader issues like enhancing democratic practices, promoting notions
of good governance, and the impact of corruption on human develop-
ment and economic growth in the region. These issues have mainly been
addressed by international organizations (such as the World Bank and the
United Nations) through the lens of enhancing good governance and
1 INTRODUCTION 3
transparency in the region, without an in-depth analysis of the distinct

features of corruption within its countries.1 The lack of political will
within the MENA region countries to tackle such a sensitive topic and
the lack of data on its leading causes present another obstacle to the plan-
ning of appropriate strategies to curb it. This book aims to fill this gap
and contribute to the literature on corruption. More specifically, it seeks
to analyze the causes of corruption in this distinctive region, presenting
another level of knowledge stemming from its culture and history. A study
of the causes of corruption in these countries requires consideration of
the exclusive features—their distinct political and socio-economic condi-
tions, oil richness in some cases, and their cultural uniqueness—which are
variously reflected in how their systems function.
Third, since the countries of focus vary in their levels of corruption,
this book intends to study the causes of corruption through an analyt-
ical comparative perspective, which offers a deeper level of understanding
for each country, as well as to compare them cross-nationally. The ability
to speak the mother language of this region—Arabic—and awareness of
its circumstances and culture offers the author an extraordinary oppor-
tunity to comprehend the different dimensions of the phenomenon in
these countries, to analyze corruption within its proper context, and
to correctly reflect on it based on her academic study, experience, and
cultural knowledge.
This book has been developed in an attempt to answer the question:
• What are the causes of corruption in the MENA region countries?
Sub-questions developed during the course of answering this central

question include, but are not limited to:
• What are the main variables causing corruption in each country?

• Which variables are evident among all the selected countries under
study?
• What are the exclusive causes of corruption among each sub-group
within the MENA region?
1 This is elaborated upon in Chapter 5 which tackles the general features of the MENA
region.
4 D. ELSAYED
• Which variables have less of an impact on the levels of corruption in

the MENA countries?
• Which variables turn out to be irrelevant in the study of the causes
of corruption?
To answer the main question, this book employs the case study
research method, conducting an in-depth analysis of the causes of corrup-
tion in fifteen Arab countries in the MENA region. These countries are
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and Yemen. In order to address the sub-questions, the
book follows the structured, focused comparison method and employs
the Most Similar Systems Design to conduct a cross-national comparative
analysis across all the countries.
Regarding the scope and period of study, this book focuses mainly on
public office corruption in the MENA region countries. Private corrup-
tion is beyond the book’s scope.2 The timeframe of the study is from
1999 until 2010. The year 1999 represents, in most cases, a contin-
uation in power of either the same leader or a successor sharing the
same ideology. Furthermore, the intention is to study the phenomenon
of corruption before the 2011 Arab Uprisings, in order to have a consis-
tent analysis. The Arab Spring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria)
have witnessed drastic changes since 2011 and are still in transition, expe-
riencing unsteady paths towards democracy, which in turn will hinder
coherent analysis of the countries under study.
The book is divided into ten chapters. Following a general outline
of the topic in Chapter 1, chapter 2 defines corruption, highlighting its
various classifications and types, and concluding with a working defini-
tion. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on corruption, focusing on work
addressing its causes, which presents a blueprint for developing the analyt-
ical framework and the hypotheses of the book. Chapter 4 outlines the
methodology, with a specific focus on the structured, focused compar-
ison method, the method of difference, and the Most Similar Systems
Design, as well as the case-study research method. The chapter then
2 Private corruption generally occurs when those in charge misuse their office—an
organizational position in a private firm—for personal benefit.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
explains the data collection process used. Chapter 5 defines the bound-
aries of the MENA region and explains the specific range of countries
under study, highlighting their broad common political, economic, and
societal features. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 focus on the causes of corruption in
the MENA region, initially giving a general overview of each sub-regional
group (Gulf countries, North African countries, and Mashreq countries
plus Yemen). This is followed by an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the
causes of corruption in the fifteen countries across the three sub-regions
during the period of study (1999–2010). Thus, chapter 6 addresses the
causes of corruption in the Gulf countries (Qatar, UAE, Oman, Bahrain,
Kuwait, and KSA) and conducts a cross-country comparison among the
six cases along with some concluding remarks. Chapter 7 looks at the
causes of corruption in North Africa, shedding light on features common
to the countries in the region. It then analyzes the five countries within
the region (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya), compares the
causes of corruption across the five cases, and presents some concluding
observations. Chapter 8 analyzes the causes of corruption in the Mashreq
region (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) plus Yemen, compares the causes
of corruption cross-nationally, and concludes with some remarks on this
group of countries. Chapter 9 conducts a cross-country comparison across
the fifteen countries under study by addressing each hypothesis, then
grouping all the hypotheses, in order to arrive at the causes of corruption
in the MENA region, as well as highlighting exclusive causes of corrup-
tion in some of its countries. Chapter 10 emphasizes the most important
findings of the study, compares the causes of corruption in the three
sub-regions, along with the author’s insights on the issue of corruption
within the MENA region, and suggests future perspectives for research
on corruption.
References
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1997). The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey
and Some New Results. Political Studies, 45(3), 496–515.
Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. The Economic
Journal, 113(491), F632–F652.
Amundsen, I. (1999). Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues
(Working Paper. 99(7)). Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal
of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320–1346.
6 D. ELSAYED
Commonwealth Secretariat. (2001). 1999 Meeting of Commonwealth Law Minis-

ters and Senior Officials: Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 3–7 May 1999:
Memoranda (Vol. 1). Commonwealth Secretariat.
Glynn, P., Kobrin, S. J., & Naím, M. (1997). The Globalization of Corrup-
tion. In K. A. Elliott (Ed.), Corruption and the Global Economy (pp. 7–27).
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Jain, A. K. (2001). Corruption: A Review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1),
71–121.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (1999). The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index 1999: Framework Document. Berlin: Transparency International.
McCusker, R. (2006). Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies. Canberra: Australian
Institute of Criminology.
Nadgrodkiewicz, A, Nakagaki, M., & Tomicic, M. (2012). Improving Public
Governance: Closing the Implementation Gap Between Law and Practice.
Center for International Private Enterprise. Washington, DC: Global Integrity.
Pech, B., & Debiel, T. (2011). Corruption as an Obstacle to Development?
Taking Stock of Research Findings and the Effectiveness of Policy Strategies.
In UNIKATE 40. Social Sciences - Comparative, International, Transnational
(pp. 16–25). Essen: University of Duisburg-Essen.
Richter, W. L., & Burke, F. (Eds). (2007). Combating Corruption, Encouraging
Ethics: A Practical Guide to Management Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Serra, D. (2006). Empirical Determinants of Corruption: A Sensitivity Analysis.
Public Choice, 126, 225–256.
Sumpf, D. (2015). Working Paper on Governance: Envisaging the Future in the
Arab Region. United Nations Working Paper.
Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope,
and Cures. Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund, 559–594.
World Bank. (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the
World Bank. The World Bank. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/ant
icorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf. Accessed April 6, 2020.
Further Reading
Debiel, T., & Gawrich, A. (Eds.). (2013). (Dys-) Functionalities of Corrup-
tion: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism. Comparative
Governance and Politics. Special Issue 3. Springer.
DeLeon, P. (1993). Thinking About Political Corruption. Armonk, NY: ME
Sharpe.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
Seldadyo, H., & Haan, J. (2005). The Determinants of Corruption. Paper

Prepared for the 2006 EPCS Conference. http://conferences.wcfia.harvard.
edu/sites/projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/gov2126/files/seldadyo_determina
nts_corruption.pdf. Accessed April 6, 2020.
CHAPTER 2
Definition of Concepts
1 What Is Corruption?
At first glance, corruption seems to be a simple, easily understandable
phenomenon. However, as a persistent worldwide phenomenon found in
all countries to varying degrees, it is in fact a complex one that needs a
clear understanding of its characteristics, dimensions, and impact. Various
approaches and perspectives have sought to define the concept, leading to
much controversy, especially since it is associated with both societies and
individual actions. Nowadays, corruption is gaining much academic atten-
tion and is subject to increased scrutiny as efforts are made to curb it and
create better systems of government around the world. While many social
science approaches have sought to define corruption, it remains difficult
to reach a common definition of the term and arrive at reliable concrete
measures of the phenomenon. Furthermore, consideration of corruption
is intermingled with other concepts like governance, transparency, and
accountability in today’s vocabulary (Rose-Ackerman 1997b; Lancaster
and Montinola 2001; Kaufmann et al. 2005). This chapter sheds light
on the range of literature defining the concept and concludes with the
definition used in this book.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55314-2_2
10 D. ELSAYED
1.1 Corruption Defined Through Public Interest, Public Opinion,

and Public Office
Among the researchers who have worked on the concept and its historical
roots is Heidenheimer (1989), who views corruption through a broad
lens as depraved and unprincipled behavior. His definition involved the
three concepts of public opinion, public office, and public interest, but
his approach was later heavily criticized.
The public opinion definition stands for what the public views as
corrupt—presenting a subjective approach—which creates confusion even
about what the ‘public’ is (Heidenheimer 1989). Scott (1972: 3–4) is
considered one of the most prominent writers to offer insights on corrup-
tion. He also gave a public opinion definition of corruption, in which the
‘public’ determines its dimensions. Scott’s definition, likewise, is subjec-
tive, and fails to offer any capacity to operationalize it. Still, this approach
of defining corruption finds relevance in certain fields such as public
policy (i.e., when drafting national anti-corruption strategies), offering
a blueprint to curtail the phenomenon. It also assists in looking into the
norms and values within different contexts and cultures to gain a broader
understanding of what corruption means in different societies.
Heidenheimer (1989) based the public interest definition of corrup-
tion on the commonly accepted norms of what comprises a public good.
In other words, if a public official’s act stands against the public interest,
it is considered unethical. Along the same lines, Friedrich (1966: 74)
contended that one can look at an act and classify it as corrupt according
to the public interest—meaning that if a public official is regarded as
acquiring something beyond his capacities and legal assignments, then
this counts as corrupt conduct. Even though the public interest offers a
more objective approach to defining corruption, it fails to be operational.
This also applies to the public opinion definition, due to the difficulty of
reaching a consensus on public ‘opinion’ and public ‘interest’.
The public office definition of corruption describes the phenomenon
more objectively. According to this approach, Heidenheimer (1989)
defines corruption as the violation of the official regulations of a formal
office. Likewise, Nye’s (1967: 419) public office definition of corrup-
tion is acts that violate the rules and regulations of office and are carried
out with the aim of pursuing private gains. Aikin (1964: 142) also views
corruption as an act that disrupts the authorized power of a public office
or is against its moral standards of behavior in order to gain personal
2 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 11
benefits, power, or status. Morris (1991) interprets corruption generally

as conduct against political norms. Lessig (2013) views corruption as a
legal systematic influence that undermines the effectiveness of an institu-
tion, leading to public distrust and weakening the institution’s reputation
and credibility.
Khan (1996: 12) defines corruption as an act by persons in public
office positions that departs from the ‘formal rules of conduct’, where
this behavior is motivated by private gains being ‘wealth, power or status’.
Gould (2001) views corruption as an unethical phenomenon, consisting
of deviation from the moral standards in a given society, and leading
to disrespect for and distrust of the authorized and constituted powers.
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) regard corruption as conduct by a public
official that is far from the commonly accepted and prevailing norms in
society. Accordingly, based on the above definitions, corruption consists
of a violation of the power vested in a public official, serving another
person directly or indirectly. It is a two-sided phenomenon, since it takes
both an agent and a client to conduct such acts for personal gain. This
definition is, therefore, operational in the sense of not abiding by the rules
that are established in principle. However, Bayley (1966: 721) and Scott
(1972: 10–11) highlight that defining corruption in public office terms
cannot be generalized as, first, it depends on the cultures of which these
regulations are a part of. Second, it neglects to look at the cases in which
the legislators themselves are corrupt. Third, some regulations are already
unfair, in that they serve the aspirations of those who established them,
so paying a bribe in those cases might not be considered unethical (Rose-
Ackerman 1978: 9). An obvious difficulty of following these approaches,
generally, is their incompatibility with empirical analysis across countries
with diverse cultures (Gibbons 1989; Manzetti and Blake 1996).
Discussions and debates over the definition of corruption according
to these approaches have given rise to other efforts. Johnston (1996:
331) combines the public opinion and public office approaches to give a
definition of corruption under the umbrella of a ‘neo-classical approach’.
He defines corruption as the misuse of ‘public order’ to achieve private
gain, where misuse is determined based on legal standards or societal
norms, in the sense of what the society disapproves or views as unaccept-
able. Hence, societies differ in their definition of corrupt actions, with
standards varying because cultures are dissimilar (Johnston 1996). Simi-
larly, van den Berg and Noorderhaven (2016) argue that the approach
under which corruption is defined decides how the society perceives the
12 D. ELSAYED
concept: it becomes either an insignificant issue that does not require

decisive action or a widespread phenomenon that appears high up on
policymakers’ agendas.
Each of these approaches has its own drawbacks. Though public office
is suitable in many instances, it fails to tackle corruption within specific
contexts, such as the legislative authority. The public opinion approach
lacks clarity and concrete standards, even though most comparisons in
research on the intensity of corruption worldwide rely on public opinion
surveys. The public interest approach falls between the public office and
the public opinion approaches and is ambiguous due to being society
based. In a nutshell, the above set of definitions of corruption (public
opinion, public interest, and public office) have led to much deliberation
on the concept and a lack of consensus on a common meaning, with the
variances leading to abundant research scrutinizing the three approaches.
Research efforts have tried to deal with the non-alignment of the public
office or formal regulations with the public interest that is reflected in
the society’s norms. Studies have sought to understand how and why this
deviation happens, and which norms are associated with corruption within
public office (Gibbons 1989; Morris 1991; Manzetti and Blake 1996;
Kurer 2005). Nevertheless, this controversy began to diminish with the
spread of globalization, notably when international organizations such as
the UN and various transnational actors established general guidelines,
including definitions of illegal and unethical acts.
1.2 Corruption Defined Through the Principal–Agent Framework

A well-known and widely employed definition of corruption is offered
by the principal–agent model. It presents an economic approach to how
corruption occurs, and is based on the rational choice of individuals,
with the underlying assumption that people are driven by self-interest to
act to maximize their own advantage (Olson 1971). This approach to
defining corruption stands principally for those individuals that represent
the process of corruption. It defines corruption as a behavior conducted
through some agents who are delegated to act on behalf of some
principals (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Klitgaard 1988).
Based on this approach, Klitgaard (1988: 24) defines corruption as a
disagreement between the public’s interest and that of the public official.
Hence corruption takes place when the agent fails to act in accordance
with the principal’s interest, seeking private benefit. The two essential
perspectives, according to Klitgaard, are ‘information’ and ‘incentives’.

In line with this, Klitgaard (1988) develops the principal–agent–client
model, which involves three actors playing their part in the corruption
process. The principals are the officials holding power who can deliver
goods or services to the clients. Generally, principals have a compara-
tive advantage as they are acquainted with the administration and are
well aware of the processes, which enables them to exploit their power
to act in their own interests. This takes various forms, including bribery,
fraud, nepotism, extortion, or embezzlement (which are defined in the
following section). Clients are the benefit givers, with these public officials
sometimes employing agents to deliver the activity on their behalf. Agents
might also act in their own interests and begin to abuse power entrusted
to them, sustaining the vicious circle of corruption. Building on this
nexus, Klitgaard’s principal–agent–client model suggests the following
equation to better understand how corruption flourishes:
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. (Klitgaard 1988:

75)
It shows that opportunities for unethical acts are enhanced when agents
impose their monopoly power on clients, accompanied by discretion
and lack of accountability towards the principal. Klitgaard has given a
precise explanation of corruption, viewing the problem as lying in the
concentration of powers, discretion, and weak accountability.
Becker and Stigler (1974) contend that the bureaucrats are sometimes
the agents, and the rulers are the principals, where both have conflicting
self-interests even though the agent is assigned to fulfill the interests of
the principal. In a similar vein, Alam (1989: 442) argues that corruption
is clearly understood within the principal–agent functional relationship.
He defines it as either “the sacrifice of the principal’s interest for the
agent’s” or “the violation of norms defining the agent’s behavior”. In
this scenario, the government is the agent, while citizens are the prin-
cipals. This can also be the case during elections when democracy is in
place. To explain this situation, citizens/voters—who act as principals—
face restrictions in accessing information, whereas public officials—who
act as agents—have a comparative advantage in processing information
that invites corruption opportunities because citizens have bounded ratio-
nality. They vote according to the limited knowledge they gain. This gives
scope for politicians to be unaccountable and act unethically in many
14 D. ELSAYED
instances (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Banfield 1979; Persson and Tabellini

2000; Adsera et al. 2003; Besley 2006).
Therefore, according to the principal–agent perspective, corruption is
an individual unethical act, driven by personal gain to maximize profit
and minimize costs. This approach to explaining corruption focuses on
the individual incentives in which each actor is only seeking his own self-
interest. It ignores other vital dimensions of the phenomenon, such as
cultural aspects, social values, and norms, and how these systems function
(Elster 1989; Green and Shapiro 1994).
1.3 Corruption as Abuse of Public Office

Webster’s Dictionary defines corruption as ‘inducement (as of public offi-
cials) by means of improper considerations (as bribery) to commit a
violation of duty’ (Gove 1961). The Oxford Dictionary (2000) defines
the concept as a dishonest act, or illegal behavior explicitly conducted
by persons in power, and it changes ‘personal behavior’ to ‘immoral
standards’. McMullan (1961: 183–184) defines corruption in the sense
that a public official is corrupt if he accepts money or benefits in kind
for conducting an act under his assigned authority. Kubbe and Varraich
(2020: 3) define corruption as the “absence of impartiality in the exercise
of public power”.
In broad terms, the most common and acknowledged definition of
corruption is “the abuse/misuse of public office for private benefit/gain”
(Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Sandholtz and Gray 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi
2013). Several institutions studying corruption employ this definition.
Among them is Transparency International (TI) which initiated the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995. Similarly, the World Bank’s
definition of corruption is often quoted in the literature as “the abuse of
public office for private gain” (World Bank 1997). Based on this general
definition, it is worth noting that the abuse of entrusted responsibilities
and authority is not limited to the ‘public’ officials and ‘public’ sector
as it also takes place in the private sector. Corruption in that sense is
also viewed as a one-sided process, encompassing one individual as the
sole actor even though the action can sometimes involve two or more
persons. In other words, one is the corrupt official receiving benefits, and
the other is the person offering them to get a service done.
Corruption is thus a complex concept encompassing many features and
dimensions, including more than one actor, different interests, intended
benefits, abused power, and a common consensus within the society that
this behavior is against its norms. However, this last dimension is not
easy to pinpoint, due to diverse interpretations even among individuals
in one society as well as across societies (Gampat 2007). In line with
that, the definition employed in this book is the working definition of
the World Bank, the United Nations, and Transparency International,
which is the “abuse of public office for private benefit”. Relying on
this definition assists in offering a wide perspective and enables flexibility
in analyzing the countries under study. Most of the data used in this
book is derived from those international institutions, which allows more
consistency throughout the research.
Having mentioned earlier that the focus of this book is corruption
in the public sector, it is worth looking at its different practices, which
helps in the later analysis and reflection on the MENA countries within
this book. Corruption manifests in various forms on different levels of
public administration. The most common distinction on the govern-
mental level is between grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption
occurs when both the amount of corrupt activities is large, and those
involved in them are high-level officials. It is at the decision-making
level, and therefore is also called political corruption, since it is associ-
ated with unethical behaviors of those assigned to take decisions for the
general public, legislate, and enforce laws. In this context, these high-
level officials abuse power vested in them to enhance their status, gain
more benefits, and in many instances sustain their political positions.
Such conduct and decisions occur in complete secrecy; therefore, they
are rarely detected. This type of corruption not only leads to misallo-
cation of resources, but it also negatively affects the whole of society.
While grand corruption is strongly linked to the political elite, it is also
apparent in economies that are witnessing rapid growth, in which there
are opportunities for new investments and industries. It can also include
arms deals and natural resource extraction (Heidenheimer et al. 1993;
Moody-Stuart 1997; Andvig et al. 2000; Alan and Theobald 2000; Leen-
ders and Sfakianakis 2001; Rose-Ackerman 2002; Cisar 2003; Khan 2006;
Bray 2007; FATF 2011).
Petty corruption, on the other hand, falls at the other end of the
administrative hierarchy, way below grand corruption. It refers to minor
benefits associated with routine decisions and undertakings assigned to
low-level civil servants, which is why it is also referred to as bureaucratic
corruption. Typically, this type involves activities like issuing licenses, tax
16 D. ELSAYED
and customs authorities, school admissions, hospital access, and many

other services. In many cases, petty corruption is initiated by the service
seeker (the person offering a bribe or equivalent in kind) in order to
bypass bureaucratic regulations, i.e., obtain a privilege, gain access, or
lessen the time needed to get the service done. Unlike grand corruption,
which abuses rules and regulations to serve the private interest of those in
power, petty corruption may not necessarily have strong political conse-
quences, as it takes place at the administrative end of the political system.
Petty corruption occurs regularly when civil servants are underpaid and
may be tempted to increase their income through dishonest activities
(Heidenheimer et al. 1993; Andvig et al. 2000; Leenders and Sfakianakis
2001; Rose-Ackerman 2002; Cisar 2003; Khan 2006; Bray 2007; FATF
2011). Even though the distinction between grand and petty corruption
remains unclear in many instances, it is relevant in analytical terms, and in
the case of this book, to the study of the countries of the MENA region.
Corruption takes many forms, with some practices involving threats
or coercion, and some happening on a day-to-day basis, such as bribery,
while others are unusual, complex, and involve huge resources. Never-
theless, they all tend to take place in secret and may be recognized in
certain circumstances. The most common forms relevant to this book are
described below (Gupta 1995; Rose-Ackerman 1997a; Amundsen 1999;
Andvig et al. 2000; Myint 2000; UNODC 2004; Richter and Burke
2007; Lambsdorff 2007; Goldstraw-White and Gill 2012).
The most well-known and common form of corruption is bribery, the
payment of money or a benefit in kind to a public official in exchange for
a service. Corruption is a two-sided process, and in the case of bribery,
the initiative can come from either the benefit taker or the benefit giver.
The benefit is often money but can also be valuables or favors of personal
interest to the bribe taker, such as incentives or access to information. The
term has different connotations in different cultures. For example, with
petty corruption in the MENA region, a ‘sweetener’, commonly known as
baksheeh, is offered to civil servants to make a bureaucratic process faster
or easier, or to bypass it.
Extortion is a kind of blackmail, as it mainly relies on coercion, power,
and the threat of violence to oblige a person to act in a certain manner.
Extortion can be initiated by a person seeking favors and benefits, and
in this case, officials are the victims. Sometimes public officials misuse
their authority to gain personal advantage, and this is generally associated
with bureaucratic regulations of which few have oversight, so they are less
accountable for their decision making. Extortion is similar to bribery but

differs in two aspects. The first is that it is a corrupt behavior that uses
coercion, violence or the threat of violence to extract money or other
benefits. The second is that, unlike the exchange of benefits associated
with bribery, one party can obtain a substantial benefit while the other
gets nothing, except being let go and not intimidated again.
Embezzlement is often associated with grand corruption. It is the
ability of a public official to exploit their position and power to access and
make use of valuables, money, or property entrusted to their authority.
The actions of embezzlement are often referred to as theft, which is
not always classified as corruption. This type is obvious in some of the
MENA region countries as it is a more common occurrence in authori-
tarian regimes. Within those regimes, there is less chance of being caught,
and sanctions are rarely applied, mainly due to the absence of a strong
legal system.
Fraud is the illegal and unethical extraction of money. It involves
deception and providing false data in order to manipulate the person in
charge of the data to take certain actions based on it. It is considered fraud
when state institutions and officials are part of informal black markets, and
when illegal goods are traded. Since it generally involves huge amounts
of money or falsifying very critical information, it mostly falls under the
heading of grand corruption.
Other abuses of power can happen through preferential treatment,
which occurs in three interrelated forms of corruption: favoritism, nepo-
tism, and clientelism. Preferential treatment involves a person in power
granting certain benefits, based on the powers invested in their position,
and favoring someone who is affiliated to them in some way. The affil-
iation and link can be family, friendship, political party, religion, sect,
tribal ties, or any other group identity that links the persons together.
Such actions create conflicts of interest, as when someone is seeking a
personal advantage, it might damage the interests of another or even of
the public generally. Another aspect of the conflict is that manipulative
behavior in order to gain some benefit is against the code of conduct of
public office. However, rationalizing and defining an ambiguous situation
where circumstances intermingle, can be challenging. Examples include
donations to certain parties, appointment of individuals from the ruling
family or friends to political positions, or granting a license for business
operations to specific individuals. In this connection, Varraich (2014)
developed an umbrella model for corruption and other concepts that
18 D. ELSAYED
are often associated with it (clientelism, state capture, patrimonialism,

particularism, and patronage), showing how the concepts overlap.
In conclusion, the distinction between a corrupt and a non-corrupt
act is not always crystal clear. Even though corruption, whether grand or
petty, and taking any of the forms mentioned, may be evident, grey areas
exist when it comes to distinguishing between appropriate and inappro-
priate behaviors. This can include gift giving, lobbying, and state capture
of certain services or goods like natural resources. For example, in some
societies, an exchange of gifts is a very common and accepted behavior
when a service is done by a person in a public office, but in other societies
this is considered a corrupt activity and is strictly forbidden. Therefore, in
each and every culture, corruption is perceived differently. Legal systems
also differ with regard to penal codes, and the clarity and efficacy of rules
and regulations. In a nutshell, this book relies on the broad definition of
corruption as the abuse of public office for private interest, since it focuses
on public-sector corruption and primarily relies on data and reports avail-
able from international organizations that employ this definition (UN,
World Bank, Transparency International). This in turn allows coherent
and consistent analysis of the phenomenon throughout the study.
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CHAPTER 3
Literature Review
There is a great deal of literature on the topic of corruption. However, the

wide range of empirical studies of corruption reveals different approaches
and findings. It is generally agreed that corruption hinders development
and weakens bureaucracy (Sequeira 2012). This chapter examines some
of the prominent research outcomes, with a particular focus on the causes
of corruption.
Corruption has gained much attention among economics scholars.
Leff (1964) was the first to analyze the relationship between corrup-
tion and economic growth, followed by Huntington (1968) and Hines
(1995), who argued that corruption could affect growth positively. Mixed
outcomes were recorded by studies of this relationship in countries as
different as the US (Akai et al. 2005), Nigeria (Ajie and Wokekoro
2012), and China (Donga and Torgler 2013). Mutaşcu and Danuletiu
(2010), using the Human Development Index to examine the correlation
between corruption and political, administrative, and economic factors,
concluded that corruption negatively affects individual welfare. Mauro
(1997) argued that those in charge of public resource allocation have
better opportunities for corrupt activities, and that consequently, corrup-
tion may assist in increasing public investment. In another study, Mauro
(1998) contended that corruption lowers allocation of expenditure on
education.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55314-2_3
24 D. ELSAYED
Several studies have concluded that there is a strong relationship

between GDP and corruption. Husted (1999) and Paldam (2002) argued
that even though corruption negatively impacts GDP, less developed
and developing countries are not able to fight it effectively. Lambsdorff
(1999) and Paldam (2002) argued that the absence of corruption impacts
GDP, contending that the growth of GDP can be explained through
changes and variations in the levels of corruption in given countries, but
not in absolute levels. Researchers like Akçay (2001), on the other hand,
analyzed the level of corruption to FDI flows in some developing coun-
tries, finding that corruption does not act as a barrier to growth. Similarly,
Evrensel (2010) reached the conclusion that corruption is associated
more with governance variables than with growth. There is, therefore,
some ambiguity regarding the impact of corruption on GDP growth
(Knack and Keefer 1995; Brunetti et al. 1997).
Mauro (1995) studied the impact of corruption on investment through
a cross-sectional study of 67 countries. He found that corruption impacts
investment negatively, reducing the ratio of investment to GDP. In a later
study, Mauro (1997) reiterated his results, relying on a larger sample of
countries. Knack and Keefer (1995) and Brunetti et al. (1997) reached
similar findings, supporting Mauro’s argument. Offering another explana-
tion, Wedeman (1996) argued that the effect of corruption on investment
depends on the ‘level’ of corruption in a given country, countries with
lower levels of corruption being strongly affected, while those with high
levels of corruption will not notice such a strong impact on their invest-
ments. Campos et al. (1999) argued similarly, relying on data from the
World Bank to analyze this aspect. They concluded that corruption is
sometimes important for economic gains, with both predictability and
level of corruption impacting on investment.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) looked at the impact of corruption on
investment. They argued that corruption affects the quality of a coun-
try’s infrastructure in many dimensions, including negatively impacting
investments and, consequently, GDP. Although their findings were not
robust, they found that corruption strongly increased public investment.
Presenting an alternative view, Lambsdorff (1999) contended that the
‘nature’ of corruption determines its impact and risks to investment.
Furthermore, many studies have tackled the relation between corrup-
tion and capital inflows, and it is widely acknowledged that corruption
undermines a country’s capacity to attract foreign capital. Wheeler and
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 25
Mody (1992) did not reach a robust conclusion about the relation-
ship between FDI and a given country’s level of risk—which includes
corruption, among other indicators. However, Wei (1997) found a strong
negative impact of corruption on FDI by studying capital inflows between
countries having bilateral relations. Alesina and Weder (1999) generally
concluded that corruption does not particularly influence FDI. Never-
theless, Lambsdorff (1999) argued that corruption has a negative effect
on capital inflows in the host country, indicating a strong relationship
between corruption levels and credit risks, with poor governance having
a bad impact on capital inflows in a corrupt country. Castro and Nunes
(2013) tested the effect of corruption on FDI inflows. Their results
showed a negative correlation, indicating that countries witnessing lower
levels of corruption have higher FDI inflows. Delgado et al. (2014)
studied the effect of FDI on economic growth, associating it with the
level of corruption. They concluded that corruption indirectly affects
FDI, weakening its share in achieving growth rates in several developing
countries. Different outcomes are recorded by studies of the impact of
corruption on FDI inflows in specific regions. Quazi (2014) analyzed
East and South Asia, arriving at the conclusion that there is a clear nega-
tive effect of corruption on FDI inflows. Nevertheless, another study by
Quazi et al. (2014) on African countries found that corruption acts as a
facilitator for FDI inflows in these countries.
Regarding trade, Lambsdorff (1998, 1999) analyzed data for the eigh-
teen largest exporting and 87 largest importing countries, the later study
relying on a wider range of countries and data. He concluded that coun-
tries vary in their willingness to export to corrupt countries, and hence
their readiness to become involved in corrupt practices like bribery. He
also found that these exporting countries are responsible for corruption
occurring in international trade.
As for foreign assistance, Alesina and Weder (1999) examined whether
corrupt countries encourage donor countries1 to offer development aid
or deter them from doing so. They did not find clear-cut evidence that
corrupt countries are less prone to receive aid from OECD countries.
However, while some countries, including Australia and the Scandina-
vian countries, have a greater tendency to discourage aid contributions to
corrupt countries, this is not the case for countries like the US.
1 Donor countries in the cited study are the OECD countries.

26 D. ELSAYED
Some scholars have looked at the political implications of corruption.

Many have argued that corruption erodes legitimacy, leading to a lack
of trust by citizens in the political system (Seligson 2002; Anderson
and Tverdova 2003). Through testing specific dimensions of legitimacy
in six Latin American countries, Booth and Seligson (2009) concluded
that corruption—particularly obvious in petty corruption—undermines
the population’s trust in the system. Chang and Chu (2006) studied
some Asian countries, finding a strong relationship between trust and
state legitimacy. They contended that when citizens perceive higher levels
of political corruption, this leads to reduced trust in the legitimacy of
the state. Rose-Ackerman (2001) analyzed post-socialist state transitions,
highlighting the interaction between trust and democracy and stressing
the importance of distinguishing between trust among individuals and
trust in the bureaucracy, and their impact on corruption. However, other
studies have argued that patronage can assist in strengthening legitimacy
in unstable situations. These arguments are based on the fact that corrupt
behaviors related to offering political support and receiving rewards in
return can enhance legitimacy, with benefits exchanged in a patron–
client system (Huntington 1968; Reno 1995; Papagianni 2008; OECD
2008; Bellina et al. 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi 2011). Making a similar argu-
ment, Arriola (2009) analyzed some African countries, contending that
patronage networks enable leaders to stay in office longer, which indicates
political stability. Beissinger and Young (2002) argued that patronage
can act as a legitimizing factor for the country as long as the political
elite’s interests do not surpass the state’s interest, but that if this does
happen, state legitimacy is eroded. Galtung and Tisné (2009) argued that
patronage networks can hinder state building in post-conflict countries,
illustrating this by reference to several states in Africa. Another contrasting
perspective is offered by Lindemann (2008), who finds that the effect
of corruption on stability depends on the political elites’ relations with
society.
Furthermore, many researchers have focused on the question of how
to fight corruption. De Asis (2000), basing his insights on the World
Bank’s perspectives on governance, argued that there are three main
pillars of corruption. First, incentives prevailing in low wages, patronage
and excessive bureaucracy; second, absence of transparency and access
to information; and third, lack of accountability. His broadly accept-
able list of solutions to corruption, based on these three interlinked
issues, included ‘domestic’ efforts, primarily through raising awareness,
political will, and following a participatory analysis of the issue. Tanzi’s

(2000b) alternative viewpoint was based on the IMF’s experiences with
fiscal decentralization. Tanzi stressed the importance of better-functioning
public institutions in charge of tax policies, administration, expenditures,
and budgets. He also emphasized the importance of effective resource
transfer from the center to the subdivisions, in order to ensure effective
and specific task execution. In the absence of efficient decentralization
policies and procedures, corruption becomes more profoundly rooted in
the lower levels of administration (Tanzi 2000b).
1 Causes of Corruption
Although scholars have worked extensively on the causes of corruption,
there is no consensus in the literature (Bardhan 1997; Ades and Di Tella
1997; Tanzi 1998; Lambsdorff 1999; Jain 2001; Aidt 2003; Serra 2006).
This section reviews the relevant literature, highlighting the most signif-
icant causes of corruption and those most widely agreed upon among
researchers. It is divided into three sub-sections that are the basis for the
hypotheses and analytical framework of this book.
The first addresses the regime characteristics, and the features of the
political system and its bureaucratic structures that can positively or
negatively impact corruption levels. The second looks at the different
economic features within a given country. The third tackles develop-
mental, societal, and cultural features affecting corruption levels in a given
country.
1.1 Regime Characteristics

Democracy is a complex term; it is important to understand what democ-
racy is in order to determine its indicators. It is a political system
characterized by mass participation, competitive elections, the rule of law,
and respect for civil rights. Many criteria need to be fulfilled for a country
to be categorized as democratic. Among the most important characteris-
tics of democracy are: first, accountability of the regime; second, political
competition so that no specific political party or person can get a grip
on power; third, political equality both for the electorate and for those
running for public office, given that everyone has the right to access
public office; and fourth, freedom of the media and especially a free
press that monitors government activities and decisions, spreads awareness
28 D. ELSAYED
and keeps the public informed (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1987;
Diamond et al. 1995; Roskin and Robert 2013).
Paldam (1999a), Goldsmith (1999), and Sandholtz and Koetzle
(2000) found no clear impact of democracy on corruption. However,
Suphacahlasai (2005), Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005), and
Lederman et al. (2005) found that democracy and corruption are nega-
tively correlated. Treisman (1999a) relied on Gastil’s democracy index
and found little evidence of the effect of democracy on corruption levels,
although in a later study (Treisman 2000), he argued that older democ-
racies witness less corruption. Paldam (1999a), and Gerring and Thacker
(2004, 2005) reached findings supporting those of Treisman (2000). In
addition, Montinola and Jackman (2002) and Sung (2004) concluded
that well-established democracies are negatively correlated with corrup-
tion; however, semi-democratic or autocratic regimes witness higher levels
of corruption. De Mesquita et al. (2002) argued along the same lines,
contending that political figures in non-democratic regimes hold onto
power for longer. They succeed in sustaining power and misusing the
country’s resources for their personal benefit; hence, these countries
witness higher levels of corruption.
Politicians in democratic countries, on the other hand, stay in office
for a shorter time and seek to maintain their popularity in order to be
re-elected; they therefore make more effort to offer public goods. In a
World Bank study, Rose-Ackerman (1997: 40) argues for the importance
of democracy to deter corruption, stating that “democracy gives citizens
a role in choosing their political leaders. Thus, corrupt elected officials
can be voted out of office”. In contrast, she later states that “democracy
is not necessarily a cure for corruption. Some democracies harbor corrupt
politicians even though citizens are aware of their malfeasance. Moreover,
bribes are often used to fund political parties and election campaigns.” In
relation to this, Lederman et al. (2001), Sung (2002), and Brunetti and
Weder (2003) argue that a free press is negatively associated with corrup-
tion, as it reveals corrupt behaviors and abuses of public office to the
masses. Linked to this is the importance of respecting political rights and
civil liberties. Treisman (2007), using World Bank data, found that polit-
ical rights are negatively associated with levels of corruption, but these
findings were not robust. Another dimension of democracy is the quality
of the judiciary, with an independent judiciary distinctly reducing corrup-
tion levels (World Bank 1997). Ades and Di Tella (1996), as well as Sung
(2002), also found a negative relationship between the independence of

judicial authority and levels of corruption.
Decentralization is another aspect studied in association with corrup-
tion. It affects the intensity of corruption either positively by supporting
better regulation with effective checks—hence lower corruption is
observed—or negatively by creating more regulation with less moni-
toring, resulting in higher corruption levels. The concentration of power
in capital cities and growing dissatisfaction with central government plan-
ning has introduced a broader perspective on administration (Smoke
1994; Olowu 2000). Decentralization has risen to the top of the devel-
opment agenda and donor strategies. The World Bank (2000) considers
decentralization an essential component of anti-corruption aid that is
focused on governance and accountability in developing countries (Crook
and Manor 1998; World Bank 1999). According to Khan (2002), decen-
tralization is the process of changing government administration in order
to be more responsive to the people’s needs by delegating some of the
central government’s powers to the lower levels of administration. Even
though the definition and process seem clear, the results of decentraliza-
tion on the ground have differed widely among countries (Smoke and
Lewis 1996), so there are no definitive findings regarding the impact
of decentralization on corruption. Weingast (1995) and Breton (1996)
argued that less corruption is evident in decentralized governments
due to subdivisions competing to provide public services. Gurgur and
Shah (2005) supported the argument that decentralization contributes
to better governance; hence corruption decreases. They contended that
corruption levels are higher in unitary systems, so corruption is more
negatively correlated with unitary countries than with federal ones.
A different perspective was offered by Banfield (1979), who argued
that decentralization increases corruption, with fragmentation in the
political system providing opportunities for corrupt practices to expand
due to the smaller number of entities monitoring and ensuring trans-
parency. Prud’homme (1995) argued that corruption is more evident in
the lower levels of administration since more opportunities are present
due to the relative freedom of action of local bureaucrats in decision
making, as well as the proximity of those local officials to the public and
their needs. Manor (1999) contended that decentralization is associated
with a greater number of people involved in corrupt activities. Brueckner
30 D. ELSAYED
(2000), Tanzi (2000a, b), and Carbonera (2000) arrived at similar gener-
alizations, concluding that in local subdivisions, corruption is more likely
to take place.
On another level of analysis, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argued
that corruption is more apparent in countries that are in the middle
of the decentralization spectrum, meaning that the country is still in
a mid-level of governmental centralization. However, countries that
are either extremely centralized or extremely decentralized witness less
corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Treisman (1999b) concluded
that federal systems witness higher levels of corruption than centralized
systems. Furthermore, Treisman (2000) used the Transparency Interna-
tional Index (CPI) to look at the relationship between corruption and
decentralization in a cross-country analysis. He reached the same conclu-
sion that federal states witness higher levels of corruption than unitary
states. He explained that unitary states are ‘cleaner’ than federal ones,
given the existence of clear and effective hierarchies of control that allow
central government officials to limit subnational bureaucrats’ actions.
Goldsmith (1999) had similar results, highlighting that decentralization
does not offer a better system of administration since it is easier in such
systems to be unseen and to get away with corrupt activities. Goel and
Nelson (2010) employed two measures to look at decentralization—the
number of government subdivisions in relation to the population and
to the area. They obtained mixed outcomes regarding decentralization
and corruption, but if better regulation is enacted and enforced, less
corruption is observed.
Looking at fiscal decentralization, Huther and Shah (1998) and Fisman
and Gatti (1999) studied subdivisions’ expenditures as an indicator of
decentralization, concluding that with decentralized public spending,
lower corruption levels occur. Arikan (2000) as well as Fisman and
Gatti (2002) similarly concluded that more subnational government
spending—with fiscal decentralization—is associated with fewer corrupt
activities. De Mello (2000) argued that fiscal decentralization generally
connects the public’s needs more closely to government. Estache and
Sinha (1995) worked on a cross-country analysis of 20 countries over
20 years. They found that deliverables to the public are positively affected
when expenditure is decentralized; however, this is less efficient when
funds are held by central government.
Concerning history and its relationship with corruption, Treisman
(1999a) and Swamy et al. (2001) looked at the impact of colonial history
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
might have gone farther back and mentioned the Negro contingent in
the army of Xerxes the Great (when Britons were savages) and
about which Herodotus so glowingly writes.
But even if Mr. Wells likes to take a popular crack at history, he is
none the less a first-rate novelist in the tradition of Charles Dickens
and I don't think he imagines himself a historian any more than I do,
so one must be tolerant if his Outline has the earmarks of a glorified
Research Magnificent.
Also, I did not like Mr. Wells's inspired articles on the Naval
Conference. Paradoxically, I found myself sympathizing with the
Daily Mail, which rebuked him for his offensive against Japan. Mr.
Wells injected much violent prejudice into what should have been
unbiased reporting. While Mr. Wells was outlining history, he might
have reserved a little of his English sentimentality for Japan, from the
knowledge that Japan might not have been a "yellow peril" today if
the white powers hadn't broken open her door and forced their
civilization upon her.
Wells's little Liberator reception was a question-time picnic for the
Liberator collaborators—especially for the ladies, to whom Wells is
exceptionally attractive. They asked him many questions about the
war and the peace and the aftermath, about Russia and Europe,
Japan and America and universal peace. Mr. Wells smilingly and
slickly disposed of all problems to the satisfaction of all.
William Gropper, the artist, and I had concocted a plan to ask some
impish questions. But everybody was very pleasant. It was a nice
party. So we said nothing. I was standing, leaning against the
mantelpiece, and Mr. Wells approached me in a sly way as if he
desired a close-up scrutiny of me without my knowing it. I seized the
opportunity to take a good quick look at Mr. Wells's eyes. Journalists
always write about the jolly twinkle in Mr. Wells's eyes. I didn't like
them. They made me think of a fox.
Some years later, after my trip to Russia and returning to France, I
met Frank Harris in Nice. I was in the company of a brilliant
American writer who was meeting Frank Harris for the first time. We
went to the Taverne Alsacienne for our drinks. Mr. Wells had recently
published his William Clissold, which we had all read and were
discussing.
Frank Harris said that what amazed him about H.G. Wells was the
fact that the more he tried consciously to expand his writings on a
world scale, the more provincial they became. I said, "The higher a
monkey climbs, the more he shows his tail." Frank Harris roared.
Then he said that perhaps Wells himself was not aware that his early
novels of fantasy and sentiment were his most universal things.
The American writer, said that an English gentleman had remarked
to him in London that Wells as a writer was a cockney. I didn't like
the reference to class, especially as I had at least two very dear
cockney friends. Harris said that Wells wasn't a cockney as a writer;
that he was a fifth-form public school boy, the same as Kipling. I said
I always thought of Kipling as the bugler of the British Empire, and
that perhaps Wells was the sub-officer.
It was interesting, after another little lot of years had passed along, to
read what Wells had to say about Harris in his Experiment in
Autobiography. Wells's first encounter with Frank Harris interested
me, especially because of the fact that my own meeting with Harris
was one of the high spots of my life. But it appears as if Wells could
not forgive Harris for once being a big and successful editor and
discovering him a poor and unknown writer. He writes of Harris's roar
receding with the years until it sounded something like a bark. But a
lion may lose its voice through age and worry. Wells mentions one
interesting fact, which must be one of the reasons why Harris was
such a great editor. The first story he sent to Harris was excellent;
the second, Wells admits, was bad. And Harris summoned and gave
him a loud talking to over the bad one. Yet when Harris became
editor of another magazine, he remembered only the good story and
wrote to Wells asking him to become one of his special contributors.
And that gave Wells his real start. The point is that many editors
wouldn't remember at all, or if they did, they would remember only
that the second contribution was bad.
The American writer left us for Cannes, and Harris invited me to
drink champagne with him. We went to the terrace of a café on the
Promenade. Harris was not a steady free drinker as he was when I
had known him seven years before in New York. His skilful hands
trembled under the weight and accumulated cares of three-score
years. His hair was dyed, and from the heat of the Midi and of
alcohol some of the color had dissolved and mixed with the
perspiration oozing from the deep lines of his face, which resembled
an antique many-grooved panel with some of the paint peeled off.
Again Frank Harris talked reminiscently and interestingly as always
of his acumen in perceiving greatness in Bernard Shaw and H.G.
Wells and getting them to write for him when they were unknown.
"But I am prouder of Shaw," he said. "Shaw is really a great genius. I
don't always agree with what he says, and he went wrong about the
War, but his 'Common Sense' was a great piece of polemic. Shaw
has intellectual integrity. But I don't think Wells understands what
intellectual integrity means. He is too full of vanity to be a serious
intellect. He is a modernistic fiction writer who is discontented with
his talent and wants to be a social philosopher. But he is impossible
because he has never learned to think."
I said I thought it was a marvelous thing, something like second-
sight, for a man to pick a genius by his first inadequate efforts. Harris
said that it took a genius like himself to discover geniuses, and that
as an editor, he never played favorites. When he found good stuff he
accepted it. But he didn't go back-slapping and printing bad verses
by pretty women. He had had great temptations, but he never let his
desires interfere with his intellectual judgment.
His manner was boastful but not offensively so, for I think Frank
Harris had something to boast about. After all, he was Gaelic, and I
preferred his manner to the hypocritical English way of boasting by
studied understatement. And when he spoke of the enormous
financial as well as artistic success of Shaw and Wells, there was no
envy, but I could detect a shade of personal defeat and frustration in
his voice.
Frank Harris's phrase, "intellectual integrity," kept agitating my
thoughts like a large blue-bottle against a window pane. For a long
long time I had carried something on my mind which I had hesitated
to get off. But now, with the champagne working in my head and a
warm and mellow feeling suffusing me, and with Frank Harris's
features softening a little, I was emboldened to let go.
During my second year as assistant editor on The Liberator a
woman called to see me one day bringing a little book of poems. She
offered me ten dollars if I would review it in The Liberator. I said that
The Liberator did not accept money for printing reviews, but if her
poems seemed worth while, we would review them. She said that
she had paid Frank Harris a thousand dollars to get the book printed,
yet he hadn't even reviewed it in Pearson's. And afterward, she said,
she had seen a literary agent who informed her that the cost of
printing was about two hundred dollars. She thought that Frank
Harris had swindled her. I did not review the verses, because to my
mind, they were not worth while.
Also, I had heard stories of Frank Harris posing as an art
connoisseur and palming off fake pictures as old masters, and of his
getting material for his magazine from writers who thought they
would be paid and then not paying them—tales of petty racketeering
that were more funny than vicious. And so, being champagne drunk
with Harris on a café terrace looking out on the calm blue
Mediterranean, and feeling elastic and free, I, who admired the
extraordinary ways of Frank Harris more than any other intellectual
of my acquaintance, was interested to hear from himself the truth. I
told him the story of that woman who had visited The Liberator and
complained about him.
Frank Harris was wonderful to look at under the influence of the
champagne, his lion-roaring, his face like a pirate's, yet with a
sublime gleam of genuine kindliness in his eyes! What I said he did
not affirm or deny. He just exploded with a mighty sermon about the
artist and intellectual integrity. He said that the way of the artist was
hard, for if he had a talent that appealed to popular imagination,
everybody desired to use him—women and men, politicians,
philanthropists, reformers, revolutionists, organizations,
governments. Many artists won success by sacrificing their
intellectual integrity. He himself had had large success. But
whenever he felt the urge and the bounden duty to declare his
opinion, he could not restrain himself, and so he had not remained
successful. He had not been a puritan about life. Perhaps he had
done things that Jesus would not have done. But he had not given
his soul entirely to Mammon. Perhaps he had taken gifts from
persons who thought they had been swindled and who were better
off perhaps, if they were. But whatever he did he had reserved intact
his intellectual integrity.
It was a great sermon and I felt that Frank Harris was greater
because of it. He was no hypocrite. He had no social pretensions,
although he delighted in the company of smart and fashionable
people. He was aware, that there was plenty of dross inseparable
from the gold of life, and he embraced the whole. Nobody could deny
that he was indeed a follower of the Jesus who dominated his mind,
that he sincerely believed in sin and redemption.
XII
"He Who Gets Slapped"
MY radical days on The Liberator were sometimes rosy with
romance. Friends vied with friends in giving me invitations to their
homes for parties and car rides and in offering tickets for plays and
concerts. And even more. I remember I had a pressing debt of honor
to settle. And one day a staunch friend of The Liberator, Elizabeth
Sage Hare, handed me a check for five hundred dollars. She also
invited me to tea at her house in Park Avenue or Fifth, I don't quite
remember, but it was somewhere in the exclusive Faubourg
Bourgeoisie.
Liberator friends introduced me to a few of those Greenwich Village
tearooms and gin mills which were not crazy with colorphobia. And I
reciprocated by inviting some of them up to the cabarets and cozy
flats of Harlem. I did not invite my friends to the nice homes of the
Negro élite, simply because I did not have an entrée.
Once Sanina condescended to entertain I think four friends—all
men. When we arrived we found Sanina set in a circle of dark-brown
girls, all cunningly arranged to heighten her quadroon queenliness. It
was an exciting tableau, with a couple of sweetmen decorating the
background.
But Sanina knew that I held a genteel position, sitting in an editor's
chair among the whites downtown. (She was a faithful reader of True
Stories.) So more than ever that night Sanina invested her unique
position in Harlem with majesty. She was the antithesis of the Little
Brown Jug of Charlie Chaplin's party. She brought out a bottle of rum
for the glory of Jamaica, and holding it like a scepter, she poured
royally. I believe my friends were thinking that they also would have
to pay royally. But the evening was Sanina's affair. She provided
everything free and formally and with the air of a colored queen of
respectability and virtue. Meanwhile her shrewd brown eyes seemed
to be saying: "I'll show you white folks!" She was a different Sanina
to me. Indeed, she was a creature of two races that night, with the
blood of both warring in her veins.
Our editor-in-chief possessed none of the vulgar taste for cellar
cabarets. Yet one evening Max Eastman said he would like to go on
a cabaret party to Harlem. He was accompanied by another friend.
We were welcomed at Barron's, where white people were always
welcome and profitable business. Barron was a big man in Tammany
politics. But I wanted particularly to go with my white friends to Ned's
Place on Fifth Avenue. Ned and I had been friends when I had run a
restaurant in Brooklyn some years previously. He was living in
Brooklyn and often dropped in at my place to eat. Then my business
went bankrupt and we lost sight of each other. A few years later,
when I was waitering on the railroad, I discovered Ned operating a
cabaret on Fifth Avenue in Harlem. I introduced all of my railroad
friends to the place. Our crew used to rendezvous there and unload
ourselves of our tips.
Ned's Place was a precious beehive of rare native talent and
customers. A big black girl from Brooklyn with a mellow flutelike
voice was the high feature. And there was an equivocal tantalizing
boy-and-girl dancing team that I celebrated in Home to Harlem.
When that boy and girl started to shake together they gave
everybody the sweet shivers. The place was small and Ned was his
own master of ceremonies. With a few snappy flashes he could start
everybody swaying together in a merry mood, like a revival leader
warming up his crowd.
Ned's was one place of amusement in Harlem in which white people
were not allowed. It was a fixed rule with him, and often he turned
away white slummers. This wasn't entirely from pride-of-race feeling,
but because of the white unwritten law which prohibits free social
intercourse between colored and white. The big shots of the
amusement business in Harlem, such as Barron, got by the law, for
they were Tammany men. But even they were surprised and messed
up sometimes by the vice squads. Ned said he preferred to run a
"small and clean business" rather than to start treading in the
quicksands of bribes.
However, I had become so familiar with Max Eastman, and his ideas
and ways were so radically opposed to the general social set-up of
white-without-black, that it was impossible to feel about him as a
black does about a white alien. And I was such a good and regular
customer of Ned's that I thought he would waive his rule for me. But I
thought wrong that time.
We arrived at the door of the cabaret, from where Max Eastman
could get a glimpse inside. He was highly excited by the scene, and
eager to enter. But the doorman blocked the way. I beckoned to Ned,
but his jovial black face turned ugly as an aard-vark's and he acted
as if I was his worst enemy. He waved his fist in my face and roared:
"Ride back! Ride back, or I'll sick mah bouncers on you-all!"
Max Eastman and his friend and I made a quick retreat. Eastman
didn't mind. He said he was happy that there was one place in
Harlem that had the guts to keep white people out. There are no
such places left today. Harlem is an all-white picnic ground and with
no apparent gain to the blacks. The competition of white-owned
cabarets has driven the colored out of business, and blacks are
barred from the best of them in Harlem now.
Always I was inflamed by the vision of New York as an eye-dazzling
picture. Fascinated, I explored all points in my leisure moments, by
day and by night. I rode all the ferries. I took long trips, from the
Battery to the Bowery, from Broadway through Harlem to the Bronx. I
liked to walk under the elevated tracks with the trains clashing and
clanging overhead. There was excitement when the sudden roaring
of the train abruptly blotted out conversation. Even the clothes
suspended in the canyon tenements appeared endowed with a
strange life of their own. In the stampeding hours of morning, noon,
and evening, when the crowds assumed epic proportions, I was so
exalted by their monster movement that I forgot that they were white.
I particularly remember some nocturnal wanderings with Adolf Dehn,
the artist, spanning blocks upon blocks along the East River, and the
vast space-filling feeling of the gigantic gas tanks. One loves in New
York its baroque difference from the classic cities, the blind chaotic
surging of bigness of expression. I remember how, when I worked in
the West Eighties and spent my rest time loitering along Riverside
Drive, the black giants of the New York Central, belching flame and
smoke and dust along the façades of the fine palaces, created a
picture like a caravan of modern pirates coming home in a rolling
cloud of glory. The grim pioneer urge of the great pragmatic
metropolis was a ferment in my feeling.
Often I was possessed with the desire to see New York as when I
first saw it from the boat—one solid massive mammoth mass of
spiring steel and stone. And I remember one week-end when Eugen
Boissevain offered a ride over to Jersey, whence one could see New
York in that way. Max Eastman was with us. We drove up to a
summit commanding a grand view of the city. We stood there a long
time drinking in the glory of the pyramids. Afterward we drove
aimlessly around the country. Finally we became hungry. We
stopped at several hotels and restaurants, but none would serve the
three of us together. At last one place offered to serve us in the
kitchen. So, being hungry, all three of us went into the kitchen. The
cooks were frying and roasting at the stove. Kitchen help were
peeling potatoes, washing dishes, cleaning up garbage. We sat
down at the servants' table, where a waiter served us.
It was one of the most miserable meals I ever ate. I felt not only my
own humiliation, but more keenly the humiliation that my presence
had forced upon my friends. The discomfort of the hot bustling
kitchen, the uncongenial surroundings—their splendid gesture, but
God! it was too much. I did not want friends to make such sacrifices
for me. If I had to suffer in hell, I did not want to make others suffer
there too. The physical and sensual pleasures of life are precious,
rare, elusive. I have never desired to restrict the enjoyment of others.
I am a pagan; I am not a Christian. I am not white steel and stone.
On many occasions when I was invited out by white friends I
refused. Sometimes they resented my attitude. For I did not always
choose to give the reason. I did not always like to intrude the fact of
my being a black problem among whites. For, being born and reared
in the atmosphere of white privilege, my friends were for the most
part unconscious of black barriers. In their happy ignorance they
would lead one into the traps of insult. I think the persons who
invented discrimination in public places to ostracize people of a
different race or nation or color or religion are the direct descendants
of medieval torturers. It is the most powerful instrument in the world
that may be employed to prevent rapproachement and
understanding between different groups of people. It is a cancer in
the universal human body and poison to the individual soul. It saps
the sentiment upon which friendliness and love are built. Ultimately it
can destroy even the most devoted friendship. Only super-souls
among the whites can maintain intimate association with colored
people against the insults and insinuations of the general white
public and even the colored public. Yet no white person, however
sympathetic, can feel fully the corroding bitterness of color
discrimination. Only the black victim can.
It was at this time that I wrote a series of sonnets expressing my
bitterness, hate and love. Some of them were quoted out of their
context to prove that I hate America. Mr. Lothrop Stoddard was the
chief offender in his The Rising Tide of Color.
Here are the sonnets:
BAPTISM
Into the furnace let me go alone;
Stay you without in terror of the heat.
I will go naked in—for thus 'tis sweet—
Into the weird depths of the hottest zone.
I will not quiver in the frailest bone,
You will not note a flicker of defeat;
My heart shall tremble not its fate to meet,
My mouth give utterance to any moan.
The yawning oven spits forth fiery spears;
Red aspish tongues shout wordlessly my name.
Desire destroys, consumes my mortal fears,
Transforming me into a shape of flame.
I will come out, back to your world of tears,
A stronger soul within a finer frame.
THE WHITE CITY
I will not toy with it nor bend an inch.
Deep in the secret chambers of my heart
I brood upon my hate, and without flinch
I bear it nobly as I live my part.
My being would be a skeleton a shell,
If this dark Passion that fills my every mood,
And makes my heaven in the white world's hell,
Did not forever feed me vital blood.
I see the mighty city through a mist—
The strident trains that speed the goaded mass,
The fortressed port through which the great ships pass,
The tides, the wharves, the dens I contemplate,
Are sweet like wanton loves because I hate.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Your door is shut against my tightened face,
And I am sharp as steel with discontent;
But I possess the courage and the grace
To bear my anger proudly and unbent.
The pavement slabs burn loose beneath my feet,
And passion rends my vitals as I pass,
A chafing savage down the decent street,
Where boldly shines your shuttered door of glass.
Oh I must search for wisdom every hour,
Deep in my wrathful bosom sore and raw,
And find in it the superhuman power
To hold me to the letter of your law!
Oh I must keep my heart inviolate,
Against the poison of your deadly hate!
AMERICA
Although she feeds me bread of bitterness,
And sinks into my throat her tiger's tooth,
Stealing my breath of life, I will confess
I love this cultured hell that tests my youth!
Her vigor flows like tides into my blood,
Giving me strength erect against her hate.
Her bigness sweeps my being like a flood.
Yet as a rebel fronts a king in state,
I stand within her walls with not a shred
Of terror, malice, not a word of jeer.
Darkly I gaze into the days ahead,
And see her might and granite wonders there,
Beneath the touch of Time's unerring hand,
Like priceless treasures sinking in the sand.
The Liberator was gaining strength in its stride. We were always

receiving praiseful letters and faithful promises of support. And we
were preparing to celebrate our struggling through to a happy New
Year. But suddenly the magazine was knocked off its feet. Our
bookkeeper, Mylius, disappeared, and with him went the four
thousand dollars left from The Liberator's government bonds.
Unfortunately Mylius had been intrusted with the key to the bank's
vault in which they were kept. I always felt that I could have trusted
my friend, Michael, the gangster, with my life, while I wouldn't have
trusted Mylius with my shadow.
Max Eastman was discouraged. Always worried about the raising of
money to run the magazine, he had never had the necessary leisure
for his own creative writing. Most of the money he raised came from
liberal rentiers. And now that the magazine editorially had taken a
stand for Lenin and Trotsky and the Bolshevik revolution, it was less
easy to obtain money from these rentiers, whose class had been
ruthlessly expropriated in Russia.
Max Eastman wanted to relinquish the editorship and go abroad to
live and write as he desired. We called a meeting of Liberator artists
and writers and sympathizers. All of us wanted to carry on with the
magazine. But money mocked at us. None of us had Eastman's
combination of talents for the money-raising job. That had been no
picnic for him, either, in spite of his fine platform personality and
attractive presence.
The only person at that meeting who felt that The Liberator could
carry on without Max Eastman was Michael Gold. Gold was always
critical about the way in which the magazine was run. He thought
that Eastman was too much of an esthete, too Baudelaire-like in his
poetic expression. He maintained that The Liberator should express
more of the punch and the raw stuff of life and labor. Max Eastman
had made up his mind to get out from under. We decided that all the
collaborators should endeavor to keep the magazine going as a
collective enterprise. And upon Eastman's suggestion, Michael Gold
and myself were appointed executive editors. There could have been
no worse combination, because personally and intellectually and
from the first time we met, Michael Gold and I were opposed to each
other.
Michael Gold's idea of The Liberator was that it should become a
popular proletarian magazine, printing doggerels from lumberjacks
and stevedores and true revelations from chambermaids. I
contended that while it was most excellent to get material out of the
forgotten members of the working class, it should be good stuff that
could compare with any other writing.
I knew that it was much easier to talk about real proletarians writing
masterpieces than to find such masterpieces. As a peasant and
proletarian aspirant to literary writing I had come in contact with
reams of stuff, pathetic attempts of working people toward adequate
literary expression. My sympathy was with them, but my attitude was
not mawkish. Because I was also an ordinary worker, without benefit
of a classic education. And I had had the experience of the hard
struggle and intellectual discipline and purposefulness that were
necessary to make a fine stanza of verse or a paragraph of prose.
And Michael Gold also knew. He was still intellectually battling up
from the depths of proletarian starvation and misery. And like myself
he was getting hard criticism and kind encouragement from Max
Eastman. But Michael Gold preferred sentimentality above
intellectuality in estimating proletarian writing and writers.
I preferred to think that there were bad and mediocre, and good and
great, literature and art, and that the class labels were incidental. I
cannot be convinced of a proletarian, or a bourgeois, or any special
literature or art. I thought and still think that it is possible to have a
proletarian period of literature, with labor coming into its heritage as
the dominating social factor, exactly as we have had a Christian
period, a Renaissance period, and the various pagan periods. But I
believe that whenever literature and art are good and great they leap
over narrow group barriers and periods to make a universal appeal.
The intelligentsia of our southern states may boycott a Negro's book
or a Negro's painting. Hitler may burn the creative work of Jews,
liberals and radicals, Mussolini may proscribe literature and art that
he considers anti-Fascist, the Pope may index works that he
interprets as anti-Catholic, and the Communists may damn works of
literature and art that appear to them unfavorable to international
Communism. I don't minimize the danger of the obstruction of talent
and the destruction of art. But if the works are authentic they will
eventually survive the noise and racket of the times, I think.
Michael Gold and I on The Liberator endeavored to team along. But
that was impossible. Gold's social revolutionary passion was
electrified with personal feeling that was sometimes as acid as lime-
juice. When he attacked it was with rabbinical zeal, and often his
attacks were spiteful and petty. One day I was informed that he had
entered the Civic Club (a rendezvous of liberals and radicals) in his
shirt sleeves and with an insulting attitude. I remarked that I didn't
see any point in doing that to the pacifist Civic Club; that he might
have gone instead to the Union League Club.
Someone repeated my comment, and one evening when I was
dining with Marguerite Tucker at John's Italian restaurant in Twelfth
Street, Gold came in and challenged me to box. He had been a
champion of some note on the East Side. I shrugged and said the
difference between us was intellectual and not physical, but that I
was willing to box, if he thought that would settle it. So we laughed
the matter off and drank a bottle of dago red together. However, I
saw clearly that our association could not continue. Shortly after that
we called a meeting of Liberator editors and I resigned.
Meanwhile I had been devoting most of my time to dramatic
criticism. Happy Harlem had come down to Broadway in a titillating
musical piece called Shuffle Along. The metropolitan critics
dismissed it casually at first. There were faults. Technically the piece
was a little too rhythmically lazy and loose-jointed. But there were
some luscious songs and singing: "Shuffle Along," "Love Will Find a
Way," and "Bandanna Land." And there was Florence Mills. Florence
Mills was so effortless in her perfect mimicry and elfin brown voice
that the Negro impressarios were not even aware that they
possessed in her a priceless gold star. For they had given her a
secondary rôle in the revue.
Never had I seen a colored actress whose artistry was as fetching as
Florence Mills's. After the show I went backstage to see her. I said:
"You're the star of the show." No, she said, the stars were Lottie Gee
and someone else whose name I don't remember. I said, "You're the
star for me, and I'm going to say so in my review." She laughed
deliciously.
I thought I'd feature Shuffle Along in The Liberator. I wanted
especially to do this because the Negro radicals of those days were
always hard on Negro comedy. They were against the trifling,
ridiculous and common side of Negro life presented in artistic form.
Radical Negroes take this attitude because Negroes have
traditionally been represented on the stage as a clowning race. But I
felt that if Negroes can lift clowning to artistry, they can thumb their
noses at superior people who rate them as a clowning race.
I asked William Gropper, the cartoonist, to go along with me to see
Shuffle Along and make some drawings. Gropper made some
excellent things, but they were too savagely realistic for the airy fairy
fascination of Negro comedy. Gropper realized this, and didn't mind
my asking Hugo Gellert to take a stroke at them, because I thought
Gellert's style more suitable to the kind of thing I wanted. I did not
rate Gellert's talent anywhere near Gropper's. But Gellert possessed
a more receptive mind and cunning hand for illustrative work. Gellert
made some clever drawings with a modernistic accent. We printed
them with my article, and that issue of The Liberator was a sensation
among the theatrical set of Harlem.
Florence Mills ran away with the show, mimicking and kicking her
marvelous way right over the heads of all the cast and sheer up to
the dizzying heights until she was transformed into a glorious star.
Shuffle Along was conceived, composed and directed by Negroes.
There had been nothing comparable to it since the Williams and
Walker Negro shows. It definitely showed the Negro groping,
fumbling and emerging in artistic group expression. When its best
artists were bought out by white producers and it was superseded by
such elaborate super-productions as Blackbirds, which was
projected and directed by a white impresario, there was no artistic
gain for the Negro group. But the Negro artistes made more money,
and thoughtless Negroes, like all good Americans, think that the
commercially successful standard is the only standard by which
Negro artistic achievement may be judged.
I have no prejudice against white persons leading and directing
Negroes artistically and otherwise, if they can do it with more than
merely technical competence. Negroes using the technique of the
white peoples to express themselves must necessarily have to go to
school to the whites. But it is no easy achievement for any outsider
to get on the inside of a segregated group of people and express
their hidden soul. Many white people see Negroes from a white point
of view and imagine that they know all about the Negro soul and can
express it even better than the blacks themselves. When I saw the
white man's Blackbirds in Paris and remembered Shuffle Along I was
very sad. The Blackbirds flashed like a whip from beginning to end,
rushing the actors through their parts like frightened animals. There
was not a suggestion in it of the inimitably lazy tropical drawl that
characterizes Negro life even in the coldest climate. And that was
the secret of the success of the charming Shuffle Along.
In the midst of my career as a dramatic critic I bumped into one of
those acute snags which remain in the memory even as the scar of a
bad wound that has been healed remains in the body. It wasn't
because I was thin-skinned. When I went to work on The Liberator I
knew that I would have to face social problems even greater than
before, but I was determined to face them out. But what happened to
me hurt more because it came from an unexpected source.
I think that instead of rewriting it, I will let the article I wrote at the
time (for The Liberator of May, 1922) tell the story for me:
"Wouldn't your dramatic critic like to see He Who Gets Slapped?"
So, very graciously, wrote the Theater Guild's publicity agent to The
Liberator. Our sometime dramatic critic, Charles W. Wood, having
deserted us for the season, I elected myself dramatic critic by
acclamation. It would be pleasant to sit in a free front-row parquet
seat along with "The Press," instead of buying a ticket for the second
balcony. And as for the other seat—free seats come in pairs—I
decided to take along William Gropper, Liberator artist of the
powerful punch and vindictive line, and master of the grotesque.
So on the appointed night we presented ourselves at the box office
of the Fulton. It was with keen pleasure that I anticipated seeing this
fantastic play of Leonid Andreyev's, He, the One Who Gets Slapped.
A curious and amusing theme!
The stubs were handed to Gropper and we started toward the
orchestra. But the usher, with a look of quizzical amazement on his
face, stopped us. Snatching the stubs from Gropper and muttering
something about seeing the manager, he left us wondering and
bewildered. In a moment he returned, with the manager. "The—the
wrong date," the manager stammered and, taking the stubs marked
"orchestra," he hurried off to the box office, returning with others
marked "balcony." Suddenly the realization came to me. I had come
here as a dramatic critic, a lover of the theater, and a free soul. But—
I was abruptly reminded—those things did not matter. The important
fact, with which I was suddenly slapped in the face, was my color. I
am a Negro—He, the One Who Gets Slapped....
Gropper and I were shunted upstairs. I was for refusing to go, but
Gropper, quite properly, urged compromise. So, brooding darkly,
madly, burnt, seared and pierced, and over-burdened with hellish
thoughts, I, with Gropper beside me half-averting his delicate pale
face, his fingers, run through his unkempt mop of black hair, shading
his strangely child-like blue eyes, sat through Leonid Andreyev's
play.
Andreyev's masterpiece, they call it. A masterpiece? A cleverly
melodramatic stringing together of buffoonery, serio-comic
philosophy, sensational love-hungriness and doll-baby impossibilism,
staged to tickle the mawkish emotions of the bourgeois mob! So I
thought. I sat there, apart, alone, black and shrouded in blackness,
quivering in every fiber, my heart denying itself and hiding from every
gesture of human kindliness, hard in its belief that kindliness is to be
found in no nation or race. I sat inwardly groaning through what
seemed a childish caricature of tragedy. Ah! if the accident of birth
had made Andreyev a Negro, if he had been slapped, kicked,
buffeted, pounded, niggered, ridiculed, sneered at, exquisitely
tortured, near-lynched and trampled underfoot by the merry white
horde, and if he still preserved through the terrible agony a sound
body and a mind sensitive and sharp to perceive the qualities of life,
he might have written a real play about being slapped. I had come to
see a tragic farce—and I found myself unwillingly the hero of one. He
who got slapped was I. As always in the world-embracing Anglo-
Saxon circus, the intelligence, the sensibilities of the black clown
were slapped without mercy.
Poor, painful black face, intruding into the holy places of the whites.
How like a specter you haunt the pale devils! Always at their elbow,
always darkly peering through the window, giving them no rest, no
peace. How they burn up their energies trying to keep you out! How
apologetic and uneasy they are—yes, even the best of them, poor
devils—when you force an entrance, Blackface, facetiously,
incorrigibly, smiling or disturbingly composed. Shock them out of
their complacency, Blackface; make them uncomfortable; make them
unhappy! Give them no peace, no rest. How can they bear your
presence, Blackface, great, unappeasable ghost of Western
civilization!
Damn it all! Goodnight, plays and players. The prison is vast, there is
plenty of space and a little time to sing and dance and laugh and
love. There is a little time to dream of the jungle, revel in rare scents
and riotous colors, croon a plantation melody, and be a real original
Negro in spite of all the crackers. Many a white wretch, baffled and
lost in his civilized jungles, is envious of the toiling, easy-living
Negro.
XIII
"Harlem Shadows"
MEANWHILE I was full and overflowing with singing and I sang in all
moods, wild, sweet and bitter. I was steadfastly pursuing one object:
the publication of an American book of verse. I desired to see "If We
Must Die," the sonnet I had omitted in the London volume, inside of
a book.
I gathered together my sheaf of songs and sent them to Professor
Spingarn. He was connected with a new publishing firm. Many years
before I had read with relish his little book, entitled Creative
Criticism. I wrote to him then. He introduced me to James
Oppenheim and Waldo Frank of The Seven Arts, and they published
a couple of my poems under a nom de plume. That was way back in
1917. Now, five years later, I asked Professor Spingarn to find me a
publisher.
I had traveled over many other ways besides the railroad since those
days. Professor Spingarn was appreciative of me as a Negro poet,
but he did not appreciate my radicalism, such as it was!
Paradoxically, Professor Spingarn supported and advocated Negro
racial radicalism and abhorred social radicalism. Professor Spingarn
preferred my racial jeremiads to my other poems. Well, I was blunt
enough to tell Professor Spingarn that he was a bourgeois. He didn't
like it. Nevertheless he found me a publisher.
When I told a Yankee radical about myself and Professor Spingarn,
this radical said that it was impossible for any man to be pro-Negro
and anti-radical. He said, he believed that Professor Spingarn was
pro-Negro not from broad social and humanitarian motives, but
because he was a Jew, baffled and bitter. I said, "But Oswald
Garrison Villard is also pro-Negro, and he is not a radical nor a Jew."
The radical said, "Oh, Villard is an abolitionist by tradition." And I
said, "Isn't it possible that Professor Spingarn is also an abolitionist,
and by even a greater tradition?"
If only individual motives were as easy to categorize and analyze as
they appear to be! Anyway, Professor Spingarn got Harcourt Brace
and Company to accept my poems. Max Eastman wrote a splendid
preface, and the book was published in the spring of 1922.
Harlem Shadows was a succès d'estime. The reviews were
appreciative, some flattering, flattering enough to make a fellow feel
conceited about being a poet. But I was too broke and hungry and
anxious about the future to cultivate conceit. However, I was not
discouraged. The publication of my first American book uplifted me
with the greatest joy of my life experience. When my first book was
published in Jamaica, I had the happy, giddy feeling of a young goat
frolicking over the tropical hills. The English edition of my poems had
merely been a stimulant to get out an American book. For to me
America was the great, difficult, hard world. I had gone a long,
apparently roundabout way, but at least I had achieved my main
purpose.
The last Liberator affair in which I actively participated was an
international dance. The winter had been cold on our spirits and our
feelings warmed currently to celebrate the spring. We trumpeted
abroad our international frolic and the response was exhilarating. All
shades of radicals responded, pink and black and red; Left liberals,
Socialists, Anarchists, Communists, Mayflower Americans and
hyphenated Americans, Hindus, Chinese, Negroes. The spirit of The
Liberator magnetized that motley throng. There was a large freedom
and tolerance about The Liberator which made such a mixing
possible. (How regrettable that nothing like the old Liberator exists
today! Social thinking is still elastic, even chaotic, in America. Class
lines and ideas here are not crystallized to such an extent as to
make impossible friendly contact between the different radical
groups.)
Our spring frolic brought that international-minded multitude into
Forty-second Street. But the metropolitan police resented the
invasion. They were aghast at the spectacle of colored persons
mixed with white in a free fraternal revel. So they plunged in and
broke it up, hushed the saxophones, turned the crowd out of the hall,
and threw protesting persons downstairs, lamming them with their
billies.
After leaving The Liberator I took a holiday from work. I had not had
one for over a year. I was in a small circle of friends and we convived
together, consuming synthetic gin. Meanwhile I was thinking about a

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Corruption in the MENA Region:

Beyond Uprisings 1st ed. Edition Dina

More information about this series at

Political Corruption and Governance

Cover illustration: Parkpoom Yeesoontes/EyeEm/Getty Images

Cairo, Egypt Dina Elsayed

To the most interesting, extraordinary, yet exhausting years.

To my siblings, Khaled, Mohamed, Nancy, Sherine, and Maha. I could

4 Research Design, Methodology, and Data Collection 49

5 The MENA Region: Unique Features and Sustained

6 Corruption in the Gulf Region: A Black Box 77

6.2 Economic Status 144

7 Corruption in North Africa: Monopoly of Power

8 Corruption in the Mashreq Region Plus Yemen:

9 Corruption in the MENA Region: What are the Roots? 291

10 Conclusion: Is There a Way Out? 311

CPI Corruption Perception Index

Fig. 5 Economic Status in Morocco 187

Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon; no country is entirely clean and

© The Author(s) 2021 1

views corruption as a significant obstacle to economic and social devel-

transparency in the region, without an in-depth analysis of the distinct

• What are the causes of corruption in the MENA region countries?

Sub-questions developed during the course of answering this central

• What are the main variables causing corruption in each country?

• Which variables have less of an impact on the levels of corruption in

Commonwealth Secretariat. (2001). 1999 Meeting of Commonwealth Law Minis-

Seldadyo, H., & Haan, J. (2005). The Determinants of Corruption. Paper

© The Author(s) 2021 9

1.1 Corruption Defined Through Public Interest, Public Opinion,

benefits, power, or status. Morris (1991) interprets corruption generally

concept: it becomes either an insignificant issue that does not require

1.2 Corruption Defined Through the Principal–Agent Framework

perspectives, according to Klitgaard, are ‘information’ and ‘incentives’.

Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability. (Klitgaard 1988:

instances (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Banfield 1979; Persson and Tabellini

1.3 Corruption as Abuse of Public Office

and customs authorities, school admissions, hospital access, and many

accountable for their decision making. Extortion is similar to bribery but

are often associated with it (clientelism, state capture, patrimonialism,

Heidenheimer, A. J. (1989). Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption. In A.

Morris, S. D. (1991). Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico.

There is a great deal of literature on the topic of corruption. However, the

© The Author(s) 2021 23

Several studies have concluded that there is a strong relationship

1 Donor countries in the cited study are the OECD countries.

Some scholars have looked at the political implications of corruption.

political will, and following a participatory analysis of the issue. Tanzi’s

1.1 Regime Characteristics

(2002), also found a negative relationship between the independence of

The Liberator was gaining strength in its stride. We were always

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