Aristotle on Sexual Difference.

Metaphysics, Biology, Politics

Marguerite Deslauriers
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Aristotle on Sexual Difference
Aristotle on Sexual
Difference
Metaphysics, Biology, Politics

M A R G U E R I T E D E SL AU R I E R S

1
 3
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 For Clara Lewis and Théophile Deslauriers

“ . . . Thou that begett’st him that did thee beget”

Shakespeare, Pericles 5.1.197
 Table of Contents

Acknowledgments  xi
Abbreviations  xiii
Translations  xv

Introduction: The Philosophical Problem of Sexual Difference  1

1. Precursors to Aristotle’s Account of Sexual Difference  9
1.1 Why are there two sexes?  9
1.2 The origin of the sexes  11
1.2.1 Introduction to the questions  11
1.2.2 The origins of the two sexes  13
1.2.2.1 Hesiod  13
1.2.2.2 Empedocles  14
1.2.2.3 Plato  17
1.2.2.4 Sexual difference, sexual reproduction,
and matter  21
1.3 The assessment of women as inferior or flawed  24
1.3.1 Introduction  24
1.3.2 Female as even  25
1.3.3 Female as unlimited  26
1.3.4 Female as moist  27
1.3.5 Female as left  29
1.3.6 Moral failings of women  31
1.4 The biology of sexual difference  34
1.4.1 The sexed body as a biological phenomenon  34
1.4.2 The role of male and female in reproduction  37
1.4.3 The determination of sex in the embryo  41
1.5 Sexual difference in the political context  45
1.5.1 The legal status of women in Athens  46
1.5.2 Aristophanes  47
1.5.3 Socrates  49
1.5.4 Comparison of Aristophanes and Socrates  51
1.5.5 Interpreting the Socratic proposals  52
1.5.6 The question of women as a genos  56
1.6 Conclusion  58
2. Sex Is a Difference in the Matter  60
2.1 Introduction  60
viii Table of Contents

2.2 Sexual difference in the Metaphysics  63

2.3 The definitions of male and female  69
2.4 The organs that differentiate the sexes  75
2.4.1 Organs and capacities  75
2.4.2 Sexual organs  76
2.4.3 The heart as a sexual organ  77
2.5 The concoction of sperma in male and female  81
2.5.1 Concoction in the Meteorology  82
2.5.2 Concoction of sperma in the Generation
of Animals  85
2.6 Potentialities and capacities of spermata  89
2.6.1 Introduction  89
2.6.2 Capacities of male semen  90
2.6.3 Capacities of katamênia  92
2.6.4 Capacities of the fetation  95
2.6.5 The value and the inferiority of the katamênia  97
2.7 Conception and generation of an animal  99
2.7.1 Introduction  99
2.7.2 Two analogies with conception and embryonic development  102
2.7.3 The role of movements in conception and embryonic
development  104
2.7.4 Conception and final causation  108
2.8 The determination of sex in the embryo  109
2.8.1 Introduction  109
2.8.2 The formation of organs in the embryo  111
2.8.3 Two questions about the determination of sex  113
2.8.4 The different kinds of movements in the semen  113
2.8.5 How sex is determined in the embryo  116
2.8.6 The formation of sexual organs  118
2.9 The female as natural, necessary, and defective  121
2.9.1 Introduction  121
2.9.2 Material and conditional necessity in biological phenomena  122
2.9.3 Sexual difference is a telos  125
2.9.4 Female animals are necessary  128
2.9.5 The female as a deformity  134
2.9.5.1 Deformity and species form  135
2.9.5.2 Deformity and frequency  141
2.10 The unity of the soul in transmission  143
2.10.1 The unity of animal soul  143
2.10.2 The unity of human soul  146
2.11 Conclusion  149
3. Sexual Difference in Social and Political Life  152
3.1 Introduction  152
 Table of Contents ix

3.2 The rule of men over women is a form of natural rule  154
3.2.1 What it means to rule  154
3.2.2 Rule over women as an element of the household  155
3.2.3 There are different kinds of rule  157
3.2.4 Rule, household, and polis as natural  158
3.2.4.1 Rule in composites  158
3.2.4.2 Rule is toward a telos  161
3.3 Women are capable of virtue  166
3.3.1 Women and phronêsis  166
3.3.2 The virtue of natural subjects  168
3.4 The political inferiority of women: a deliberative faculty without
authority  172
3.4.1 Three lines of interpretation  173
3.4.2 The rule of men is both aristocratic and constitutional  175
3.4.3 Women’s deliberative faculty is without authority  180
3.5 The political benefit of sexual difference  186
3.5.1 Introduction  186
3.5.2 Aristotle’s criticisms of the Socratic proposals  187
3.5.3 The household as a community  189
3.5.4 Sexual difference promotes unity  191
3.5.5 Sexual difference contributes to the full range of human virtue  195
3.5.6 The virtues of natural rulers and natural subjects  200
3.5.7 Living well requires the household  202
3.6 Conclusion  204
4. The Relation between Biological and Political Sexual Differences  207
4.1 Introduction  207
4.1.1 The question  207
4.1.2 Basic principles governing the question  209
4.1.3 Two hypotheses to explain how the female body might
compromise the deliberative capacity  214
4.1.4 Refining the question: what exactly is the political deficiency of
women?  217
4.2 The first path: cold, sensation, and rational capacity  218
4.2.1 Introduction  218
4.2.2 Heat and purity in blood  220
4.2.3 Pure blood and sensation  223
4.2.4 From sensation to deliberation  225
4.2.5 Imperfect memory and the lack of deliberative authority  230
4.3 The second path: heat, thumos, and rule  231
4.3.1 Introduction  231
4.3.2 Thumos as physical  232
4.3.3 Thumos as psychological  234
4.3.3.1 Thumos is a desire  234
x Table of Contents

4.3.3.2 Thumos is affect  237

4.3.3.3 Thumos and virtue  239
4.3.4 Thumos and rule  243
4.3.5 Thumos as the source of political sexual difference  246
4.4 The better path  248
4.4.1 The argument from precision  249
4.4.2 The argument from rule  250
4.4.3 The argument from the contrast of women with slaves  251
4.4.4 The better path is through thumos  254
4.5 Conclusion  256
Conclusion: The Value of Females and Women  257

Notes  261
References  323
Index Locorum  337
General Index  345
 Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the many colleagues in ancient philosophy from whose work,
conversation, and comments I have benefited over time, including Emanuela
Bianchi, Sara Brill, Andrea Falcon, Michael Ferejohn, William W. Fortenbaugh,
Cynthia Freeland, Jessica Gelber, Jim Hankinson, Devin Henry, Annick Jaulin,
Joseph Karbowski, Melissa Lane, Mariska Leunissen, Thornton Lockwood,
Sara Magrin, Stephen Menn, Karen M. Nielsen, Pierre Pellegrin, C. D. C. Reeve,
Andrés Rosler, Thanassis Samaras, John Thorpe, Denis Vlahovic, Charlotte
Witt, and Marco Zingano. Three former students, now valued colleagues, have
been particularly influential in forming my thinking on sexual difference in
Aristotle: Sophia Elliott, Edwin Z. Filotas, and Rebekah Johnston. Thoughtful
comments from anonymous readers for Oxford University Press helped me to
correct many errors and clarify my argument; I am grateful to them.
Undergraduate and graduate students at McGill University have approached
Aristotle’s work with both insight and a willingness to challenge his views, and
their questions and interventions have kept alive for me the pleasure of philo-
sophical exchange. I am especially grateful to Léa Derome, who persuaded me
to simplify my interpretation of the transmission of soul; to Kosta Gligorijevic,
whose work was helpful to me in thinking about deformity; and to Jeanne Allard,
Moritz Bodner, Hacan Genc, and Andre Martin for hallway conversations that
made a difference. A number of exceptionally talented undergraduate research
assistants provided philological, philosophical, and editorial support to the
project of this book; I would like to thank in particular Vivian Feldblyum, who
improved my understanding of thumos; Alexandra White, who led me to think
more carefully about Plato and Aristophanes; and Norah Woodcock, who kept
me focused on the evidence, and is always right about the text. I look forward to
their future work.
This book draws on research supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. McGill University granted me several sabbatical
leaves that provided time for reflection, research and writing. In 2017 Harvard
University awarded me a Robert J. Lehman Visiting Professorship at Villa
I Tatti, the Harvard Center for Italian Renaissance Studies, during which I bene-
fited from the learning and the collegiality of that community of scholars and
its Director, Alina Payne. I would like to acknowledge the importance of these
opportunities and resources.
xii Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the feminist colleagues who have encouraged my research. In

the philosophy department at McGill, Alia Al-​Saji, Hasana Sharp, and Natalie
Stoljar have enriched my perspectives on philosophy and kept me company. In
the wider world, Lisa Shapiro, as the lead researcher of the project “Extending
New Narratives in the History of Philosophy,” and Christia Mercer, as the ed-
itor of Oxford New Histories of Philosophy and Director of the Center for New
Narratives in Philosophy, have created a network of scholars and students in-
terested in re-​thinking the history of philosophy. I am very grateful to them
for establishing a context—​both structures and a culture—​in which feminist
approaches to the history of philosophy might flourish. They and other members
of that network have been supportive and inspiring, making the salt mines of
philosophy less lonely. My thanks in particular to Sandrine Bergès, Jacqueline
Broad, Karen Detlefsen, Andrew Janiak, Marie-​Frédérique Pellegrin, Martina
Reuter, and Anne-​Lise Rey.
I would like to acknowledge some personal debts of gratitude. Thanks to
Enrico Palandri and Jenny Condie for the loan of Ca’ Sottana, where I first started
thinking about Aristotle on sexual difference; to Kim Turner and John Connolly
for giving me time at Sydenham and at Métis-​sur-​Mer to work, and feeding me
so well; and to Ajay Heble and Sheila O’Reilly for the house at Coin du Banc,
with its view of L’Île Bonaventure, where this work was completed. Thanks to
Eric Lewis, as always, for professional advice, personal support, and especially all
those dinners.
This book is dedicated to my children, Théo and Clara, both of whom have
been sources of great joy to me as I worked. One of those joys is seeing how dif-
ferent they are as they become themselves; sex is the least interesting of those
differences.
 Abbreviations

English titles are followed by Latin titles (when in common use) in square
brackets.

Works of Aristotle
A.Po. Posterior Analytics [Analytica posteriora]
Cat. Categories [Categoriae]
Const. Ath. Constitution of Athens [Atheniensium respublica]
DA On the Soul [De anima]
DC On the Heavens [De caelo]
Div. On Divination in Sleep [De divinatione per somnum]
EE Eudemian Ethics [Ethica Eudemia]
EN Nicomachean Ethics [Ethica Nicomachea]
GC Generation and Corruption [De generatione et corruptione]
GA Generation of Animals [De generatione animalium]
HA History of Animals [Historia animalium]
IA Progression of Animals [De incessu animalium]
Juv. On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death [De juventute et senectute, De vita
et morte]
MA Movement of Animals [De motu animalium]
Mem. On Memory and Recollection [De memoria et reminiscentia]
Met. Metaphysics [Metaphysica]
Meteor. Meteorology [Meteorologica]
PA On the Parts of Animals [De partibus animalium]
Phys. Physics [Physica]
Physiog. Physiognomics [Physiognomica]
Pol. Politics [Politica]
Prob. Problems [Problemata]
Rhet. Rhetoric [Rhetorica]
Sens. On Sense and Sensibilia [De sensu et sensibilibus]
Somn. On Sleep and Waking [De somno et vigilia]
Top. Topics [Topica]
Vir. Virtues and Vices [De virtutibus et vitiis libellus]

Works of Plato
Criti. Critias
Polit. Statesman [Politicus]
Rep. Republic [Respublica]
xiv Abbreviations

Smp. Symposium
Tht. Theaetetus
Ti. Timaeus

Hippocratic works
Aph. Aphorisms [Aphorismata]
Epid. Epidemics [Epidemiae]
Genit. Generation [De semine/​De genitura]
Gland. Glands [De glandulis]
Mul. Diseases of Women [De morbis mulierum]
Nat. Mul. Nature of Women [De natura muliebri]
Nat. Puer. Nature of the Child [De natura pueri]
Prorrh. Prorrhetic [Prorrhetica]
Steril. Sterility/​Barrenness [De sterilibus]
Superf. Superfetation [De superfetatione]
Vict. Regimen [De diaeta/​De victu]

Other works
Ag. Aeschylus, Agamemnon
Ch. Aeschylus, The Libation Bearers [Choephoroi]
De die nat. Censorinus, The Natal Day [De die natali]
De E Plutarch, On the E at Delphi [De E apud Delphos]
DK Diels-​Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker
D. L. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers
Ekkl. Aristophanes, Assemblywomen [Ecclesiazousae]
Eq. Aristophanes, The Knights [Hippeis]
Hippocr. Epid. Galen, Commentary on Hippocrates’ ‘Epidemics’ [In Hippocratis
Epidemiarum]
II. Homer, Iliad
Is. et Os. Plutarch, Isis and Osiris [De Iside et Osiride]
Lys. Aristophanes, Lysistrata
Od. Homer, Odyssey
Oec. Xenophon, Economics [Oeconomicus]
Pyth. Pindar, Pythian
Ref. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies [Refutatio omnium haeresium]
Symp. Xenophon, Symposium
Thesm. Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae
 Translations

Unless otherwise noted, quotations in English from Aristotle’s works are drawn
from the following translations, sometimes modified.

Categories. Translated by J. L. Ackrill. In The Complete Works of Aristotle,

edited by Jonathan Barnes, 3–​24. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1984.
Constitution of Athens. Translated by F. G. Kenyon. In The Complete Works
of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 2341–​83. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
De Anima. Translated by Christopher Shields. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016.
De Generatione et Corruptione. Translated by C. J. F. Williams.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
De Motu Animalium. Translated by Martha C. Nussbaum. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Eudemian Ethics. Translated by Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Generation of Animals. Translated by A. L. Peck. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1942.
History of Animals: Books I–​ III. Translated by A. L. Peck. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
History of Animals: Books IV–​VI. Translated by A. L. Peck. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.
History of Animals: Books VII–​IX. Translated by D. M. Balme. Cambridge:,
MA Harvard University Press, 1991.
Metaphysics Translated by W. D. Ross. Revised ed. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1966.
Meteorologica. Translated by H. D. P. Lee. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1952.
Nicomachean Ethics. Edited by Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe.
Translated by Christopher Rowe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
On the Heavens. Translated by J. L. Stocks. In The Complete Works of
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 447–​
511. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
On the Parts of Animals I–​IV. Translated by James G. Lennox. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2001.
xvi Translations

Parva Naturalia. Translated by W. S. Hett. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1957.
Physics. Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. In The Complete Works
of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 315–​446. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. 2nd ed. University of Chicago Press, 2013.
Posterior Analytics. Translated by Jonathan Barnes. In The Complete Works
of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 114–​66. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
Problemata. Translation by Robert Mayhew. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2011.
Rhetoric. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts. In The Complete Works of Aristotle,
edited by Jonathan Barnes, 2152–​ 2269. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
Topics. Translated by W. A. Pickard-​Cambridge. In The Complete Works of
Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 167–​277. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984.

Unless otherwise noted, quotations in English from Plato’s works are drawn
from The Complete Works of Plato, edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett, 1997), sometimes modified.
Aristotle on Sexual Difference
 Introduction
The Philosophical Problem of Sexual Difference

Aristotle makes two remarks about the differences between the sexes that have
become infamous. The first occurs in the Generation of Animals, where he
says that “we must accept that the female nature (τὴν θηλύτητα φυσικήν) is,
as it were, a deformity (ἀναπηρίαν)” (GA 6.4 775a15–​16). In this context he is
speaking of ways in which offspring may be produced perfectly or imperfectly,
claiming that females in utero develop more slowly because they are colder and
treating that coldness as a kind of defect. The second is a remark in the Politics
about women in their relation to men in the household. In discussing the differ-
ence between natural rulers and natural subjects, he treats women as one kind
of natural subject and justifies their subjection to the rule of men by saying that
“the woman has [a deliberative faculty], but it is without authority (ἄκυρον)”
(Pol. 1.13 1260a14).
Each of these remarks requires analysis and interpretation. What is striking at
the outset, however, is that they bear no obvious relation to each other. Aristotle
does not suggest in the Generation of Animals that the defect in the female caused
by the colder temperature of her body has cognitive or moral manifestations; it
seems to be evident only in a slower pace toward achieving physical maturity.
The discussion of women as natural subjects in the Politics makes no mention
of the coldness of the female or any other bodily feature distinctive of women. It
treats the lack of authority of the deliberative faculty of women as a natural fact,
without specifying any physical cause. Although it is common to suppose that the
defect Aristotle attributes to women as political beings must somehow emerge
from the biological defect he identifies in females, no clear picture has emerged
of a causal connection between these defects, or of the conception Aristotle has
of the differences between men and women. The project of this book is to con-
struct such a picture.
This book approaches that project through a number of questions:

(1) What were the contexts in which Aristotle came to explain the role and
the origin of female animals in his biology, and the role of women in po-
litical life in the Politics? How did he see the philosophical significance of
these discussions?

Aristotle on Sexual Difference. Marguerite Deslauriers, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197606186.003.0001
2 Introduction

(2) How did he understand sexual difference in biological terms as a differ-

ence in the matter of males and females? Which questions did the biolog-
ical account help him to resolve? Which resources, from his predecessors
and from his own prior philosophical commitments, did he draw on in
formulating that account?
(3) How did Aristotle understand sexual difference in political terms? If
women are females, they are also, on his account, persons. How does
sexual difference express itself in human beings and in particular in the
social structures—​household and polis—​that Aristotle thinks are nat-
ural to people? How does Aristotle argue that a distinction in the roles of
the sexes in the political realm is both required by nature and justified by
pragmatic considerations of the collective good?
(4) If the rule of men over women is based on psychological differences, in
particular differences in the deliberative capacities of the sexes, are those
derived from physiological differences or independent of them? Are
the political roles of men and women ultimately based on their material
differences? Can we trace a causal connection between those features that
Aristotle identifies in his biological works as characterizing the bodies of
male and female and the features that he takes to distinguish men and
women? That is, did Aristotle believe that women’s bodies somehow
caused them to have intellectual or moral deficiencies that rendered them
less fit than men for the activities of political life?
(5) Finally, how are we to interpret the ambivalence Aristotle expresses about
the worth of the female and of women? Can we reconcile his claims that
they are inferior with his arguments for their value ?

In addressing these questions, this book has several aims. The first is to pro-
vide a comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s conception of sexual difference in
animal bodies and in political life. The second is to demonstrate that Aristotle
takes sexual difference to be valuable to an animal species, and to the city-​state;
this is true even though he maintains both that females are physiologically de-
ficient relative to males and that women should naturally be ruled by men. The
third is to establish the link between the explanation Aristotle offers for the defi-
ciencies of the female body and his justification of distinct roles for the sexes in
the household and the city.
I maintain two theses. The first is that Aristotle, in his discussions of sexual
difference, is primarily concerned to defend the idea that sexual difference is
valuable, and as a corollary that females and women are valuable (even as he
claims that they are inferior to males and men). Although female bodies are de-
fective relative to male bodies, and the deliberative capacities of women are lim-
ited relative to those of men, Aristotle makes the case that, viewed from a larger
 Introduction 3

perspective, these defects and limitations are good in two senses. First, and pri-
marily, they are good for the structures in which sexual difference occurs: the
reproductive couple, the household, and ultimately the genus of animals and the
polis; and second, they are good for females and women, in allowing them to
carry out the tasks nature assigns to them. The second thesis is that Aristotle did
believe the bodies of women were responsible for their status as natural subjects
under the rule of men, but that the defect that bestowed that status on them was
not so much an intellectual as a moral incapacity. This account of sexual differ-
ence in Aristotle makes two points that may be controversial. First, it challenges
the idea that Aristotle’s assessment of females and women was wholly negative,
without disputing that he maintained a hierarchy of sex in which the female is
inferior to the male. Second, it reconceives the inferiority that Aristotle believes
distinguishes women from men as a limited failure of moral authority rather
than a case of akrasia or a comprehensive intellectual failing.
I argue that for Aristotle the philosophical problem of sexual difference
emerges from the tension between his view that the female is imperfect relative
to the male and that men by nature should rule over women, and his commit-
ment to two other claims: (1) that sex is a division in the matter and not in the
form of the genus animal—​so there is no difference in essential form between the
male and female members of a sexually differentiated species, and (2) that sexual
difference, and by implication the existence of sexed individuals, is good, both
for generation and for the political life characteristic of human beings; and as a
corollary, that females and women are valuable. I begin by identifying just how
Aristotle would describe both the physiological and the psychological defects of
women; I then ask how those defects might also in his view be benefits, and how
they might be causally connected.
Aristotle does not argue for the inferiority of women, either in the biology or in
the political writings. He did believe in their inferiority, but he largely represents
that view as self-​evident. What he took to be less obvious was their value and use-
fulness, or, more precisely, the value and usefulness of sexual difference, both in
the generation of offspring and in political life, and so his discussions of females,
women, and sexual difference focus on their contributions to different aspects
of the lives of animals, both non-​human and human. In this he is opposing his
viewpoint to that of his predecessors, many of whom associated sexual differ-
ence with affliction and represented women as an evil, if a necessary one. Prior
to Aristotle, most discussions of the sexes suggest that it would be better if there
were no sexual generation, no females, and no women. Against that background,
Aristotle is arguing for the value of sexual difference and of females and women.
One way in which Aristotle articulates the value of sexual difference and of
females is by offering teleological explanations for the generation of females, for
the concoction of the female’s fertile residue, for the social role played by women,
4 Introduction

and for sexual difference both as a biological and as a political phenomenon. The
framework for those explanations is Aristotle’s account of natural teleology, that
is, of the operation of final causes in the generation and the existence of natural
phenomena.1 A final cause is defined by Aristotle at Physics 2.3 194b33 as “that
for the sake of which” (το οὗ ἕνεκα), and is often described as a goal (telos). In
natural philosophy “that for the sake of which” usually falls into one of three cat-
egories: (1) a natural substance as the goal of a process of generation in which
a potential for form is realized, (2) a function performed by a natural being, or
(3) an object of desire for an animal or a person.2 So a teleological explanation is
generally one that appeals to a natural substance as a goal, to the function of an
entity, or to a desire in order to account, respectively, for (1) the process of for-
mation of the substance, (2) the parts or features of the natural being and their
constitutive materials insofar as these support the functions, and (3) the actions
of a person or animal. In discussions of sexual difference it is final causes as nat-
ural substances and as functions that concern us. To claim that the female is a
final cause of animal generation is to say that the nature of an animal kind has
the female animal as a goal in the generation of the kind. And to claim that sexual
difference is valuable is to say that there is some function for the sake of which
that difference exists. These are not self-​evident claims, but I argue that they are
justified by Aristotle’s discussions of sexual difference.
Three features of that discussion deserve highlighting insofar as they bear on
teleological explanation. The first is that while Aristotle generally opposes final
causation with material necessity (that things “are thus in respect of their char-
acter and nature,” as he says at PA 1.1.642a35), so that something produced by
final causation is not produced by material necessity, he claims that the female
fertile residue, the menses, is produced both by conditional necessity and by ma-
terial necessity—​that is, both as a condition necessary for the realization of a telos
and as a result of the coldness of the female body. In c­ hapter 2, section 2.9, I dis-
cuss this claim and argue that the female animal similarly is a result not only of
material necessity operating in the course of the generation of an animal, but also
as a result of the final causes that govern generation.
The second feature of the discussion of sexual difference as teleological that
should be emphasized is that the notion of “function” is not restricted to the
functions that an individual animal or person might perform. The functions of
an animal are generally those that are carried out by the individual animal; sen-
sation, digestion, and the concoction of a fertile residue are all functions that
any well-​formed animal performs as an individual. But there are other functions
that are equally natural to the animal but require collaboration: for example, the
generation of another animal like itself, or, in the case of political animals, col-
laborative activities such as dam building among beavers. This means that some
of the functions that are final causes for an animal kind are not achievable by
 Introduction 5

the individual. In sexually differentiated species these collaborative functions

include not only the generation of another animal like themselves, but also the
separation of efficient and material causes of generation, and the management
of households and political communities. My discussion of the value of female
animals and women, and of sexual difference as a biological phenomenon,
emphasizes the importance of these collaborative functions (see chaps. 2 and 3,
sections 2.9 and 3.2).
A third point about teleology in discussions of sexual difference is that
Aristotle extends the notion of the natural to political functions and institutions,
describing, for example, the polis as a telos or goal that is natural to human asso-
ciations (Pol. 1.2 1252b30–​32). This makes clear that natural teleology is not
restricted to biological phenomena, but it raises a question about how to under-
stand the notion of a natural telos in the case of social entities like households
and city-​states, which do not themselves have natures. I address that question in
­chapter 3 (section 3.2.4) and argue that there are social functions that Aristotle
treats as final causes, and that are the teloi that help to explain his view that it is
good that there should be women in the household and in the polis.
A word about Aristotle’s motivations, and mine, in exploring the concep-
tion of sexual difference. Some commentators have attributed vicious motives
to Aristotle in his discussion of females and women.3 Others have defended
Aristotle by minimizing the evidence of misogyny in his works as a mere re-
flection of his time, or attempting to show that he adopted a pro-​woman
stance.4 But most assume that Aristotle was motivated, at least in part, by an
unexamined prejudice rather than an active animus against women.5 The ev-
idence seems to me to suggest a somewhat different attitude: Aristotle asserts
without argument that females and women are inferior—​a prejudice, although
hardly an unthinking one, as I will argue. He acknowledges and rejects the idea
that women might be suited for political authority, and he rejects contempo-
rary theories of generation according to which the contributions of male and
female are equally formative. But in all these cases his primary motivation is
to explain and justify the phenomenon of sexual difference as a benefit, either
to an animal species or to political community. His views on sexual difference
are neither to be explained nor excused, then, simply by dismissing them as
those of a man of his time; there were other men at the same time who did
not hold them.6 Rather, while provoked undoubtedly by a prejudice against
the female, they emerged from certain philosophical positions to which
he was committed—​for example, that the better should rule the worse, that
form should, when possible, be kept separate from matter, and that composite
wholes should be made up of parts that differ in value. All these commitments
have a normative aspect, and the discussions of sexual difference are as a result
thoroughly imbued with questions of value.
6 Introduction

This book examines the ambivalence Aristotle expresses about females, his
sense that they are inferior and yet valuable. The point is not to exculpate him
from charges of misogyny, but to treat his views about sexual difference, females,
and women as serious philosophical discussions—​to investigate the structure of
the problem of sexual difference as Aristotle understood it, to examine his con-
ceptualization of sexual difference in both physiological and political terms, and
to consider how he might have traced the political inferiority of women to causes
in the constitution of their bodies.7
Achieving clarity on Aristotle’s claims about females and women, their con-
text, and the contentious history of their interpretation is important on its own
terms. It is also important because the question of the relation between sexed
bodies and social and political roles is of abiding interest, and in many respects
Aristotle’s discussion of sexual difference has set the terms of a historical de-
bate that is ongoing. This is evident in the sorts of arguments produced to ex-
plain sexual difference: those who continue to think that women are peculiarly
emotional or irrational are appealing to a tradition that began with Aristotle of
suggesting that women’s deliberative capacities are somehow compromised (al-
though, on my interpretation, Aristotle did not think women were less rationally
competent than men). But it is also evident in the structure of such debates: when
we assume that something about the sexed body might be responsible for the
psychological differences that are supposed to track gender, we are drawing on
a tradition according to which limitations on women’s political participation
might be justified by pointing to defective features of their bodies. Almost all
arguments that aim to exclude women from citizenship, political participation,
or governance have asserted that women have imperfect reasoning capacities,
and they trace that imperfection to women’s bodies. In understanding Aristotle
on sexual difference, we understand the structure, and the sources, of these
arguments.
This book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 begins with accounts of the
origins of the sexes, as the background to Aristotle’s interest in the purpose and
value of sexual difference. These origin stories typically imply that sexual dif-
ference is a misfortune, and that women in particular are bad, and the chapter
analyzes the metaphysical, physiological, and moral failings that were supposed
to characterize women. I consider early accounts of the biology of sexual dif-
ference, from which Aristotle drew certain elements for his own more system-
atic account. The chapter concludes with a section on proposals in works by
Aristophanes and Plato to grant women a role in political governance, which
provide the context for Aristotle’s account of political sexual difference. He
rejects the idea that sexual difference is a misfortune and disputes the notion that
the female is unqualifiedly bad, but he also objects to the suggestion that there
might be no difference in the roles of men and women in political governance.
 Introduction 7

In subsequent chapters Aristotle’s positive views on the nature of sex as a distinc-

tion that manifests itself both in the bodies and in the souls of men and women
are explored.
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of sex as a distinction in the matter of the
genus animal, as Aristotle formulates it in the Metaphysics, and then explores sex
as a phenomenon that is manifested in the bodies of individual animals—​in their
matter. The rest of the chapter pursues two themes. The first is the character of
the sexes, and so it examines Aristotle’s definitions of the sexes, the organs that
differentiate them, and their generative capacities. The second is the origin of
the sexes—​both how sex is determined in the embryo, and whether the female
as well as the male in a species should be understood to be a natural telos. The
conclusion of the chapter is that Aristotle has the resources to argue both that
females are inferior to males and that they serve a natural purpose.
Chapter 3 turns to sexual difference in the political life of human beings.
Aristotle treats the rule of men over women as natural, and in the first two
sections I analyze this notion of natural rule and its implications for our under-
standing of the differences that distinguish men and women, arguing that the
defect Aristotle attributes to women that determines them as natural subjects
does not make them incapable of virtue. The core of the chapter is an examina-
tion of that defect; I argue that Aristotle’s claim that women’s deliberative fac-
ulty is without authority should be interpreted as a limited incapacity that allows
women to participate in deliberation but makes them unsuited to decision-​
making and hence to political rule. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
Aristotle’s arguments for the benefit of sexual difference and the inclusion of
women in the household and the polis, despite their inferiority relative to men.
Chapter 4 considers the relation between sexual difference, as manifest in
male and female bodies, and sexual difference in the political context, as man-
ifest in the differing deliberative capacities of men and women. I explore two
paths one might pursue to establish a causal connection between the physiology
of the sexes and the different political roles that should, on Aristotle’s account,
be assigned to men and women. The first moves from the colder temperature of
the female body to compromised sensory capacities to a defective deliberative
capacity. The second moves from the colder temperature of the female to a lower
degree of spiritedness to an incapacity for rule. I argue that the second is how
Aristotle is likely to have understood the link between the physiology of sex and
its psychology. It has greater explanatory power, for two reasons: first, it better
explains the particular defect that Aristotle attributes to women, and second, it
allows us to distinguish the imperfection of women from the imperfection of
natural slaves, a point on which Aristotle insists.
The conclusion addresses the coherence of Aristotle’s account of sexual dif-
ference. It is an account that captures his sense that it is worse to be female than
8 Introduction

male—​because the condition of the female prevents her from engaging fully in
the best possible activity either of the nutritive or of the rational soul—​but also
his insistence that it would be worse if there were no females, and worse because
the existence of sexually differentiated individuals makes better not only the gen-
eration of animals but also the political life characteristic of human beings.
 1
Precursors to Aristotle’s Account
of Sexual Difference

1.1 Why are there two sexes?

Before Aristotle, most of those who had something to say about sexual differ-
ence did not make a systematic attempt to describe the sexes or determine their
distinguishing features. They may have thought—​as perhaps many people do
now—​that the facts of sexual difference are obvious, and that it is not difficult
in practice to distinguish females from males or women from men. If we be-
lieve that sexual difference is an obvious phenomenon, then we may think that
there is no need to describe male and female or to articulate with precision the
differences between them. This may explain why most discussions of the sexes in
ancient Greek mythology, literature, history, and medicine assume not only that
there is a difference between male and female, but also that we have an intuitive
grasp of that difference that allows us to distinguish them with ease.
In these early discussions the question was not so much what constituted
sexual difference, but rather how to explain the emergence of sexual difference
and understand its purpose. What was not obvious was why there should be two
sexes. The question was posed in a range of contexts, and in different forms. In
mythological writing it is often presented as a question about the origins of the
sexes, or of sexual reproduction, and is usually accompanied by a creation myth.
This chapter begins, then, in section 1.2, with a discussion of accounts of the
origins of the sexes, since such accounts offer the best understanding of how
sexual difference was conceptualized prior to Aristotle. To describe the creation
of women, either from men or independently of the creation of men, was to ex-
plain, however speculatively, the purpose of sexual difference, and in so doing to
indicate the content of sexual difference. These descriptions manifest the neg-
ative assessment of females and women that pervades many ancient accounts.
Women are generally described as inferior to men in a myriad of ways; this is true
although women are sometimes depicted as necessary in a number of ways—​not
only for reproduction, but also for certain forms of social and political life. In
section 1.3 I collect the representations of women as bad, pernicious, or defec-
tive together with the evidence that women were also depicted as good, useful,
or necessary for some purpose. Most authors make no attempt to reconcile these

Aristotle on Sexual Difference. Marguerite Deslauriers, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197606186.003.0002
10 Aristotle on Sexual Difference

apparently conflicting assessments, appearing to accept the ambivalence that

their work displays toward women.
Aristotle is remarkable precisely for his attempt to address, systematically, this
ambivalence. As is his usual practice, he aims to respect received opinion so far
as possible, at the same time advancing a comprehensive and coherent account
of sexual difference, which he thought required an analysis of the physiological,
anatomical and psychological traits of animals. While detailing the way in which
females and women are, in his view, inferior, he also insists that the female is not
only necessary, but also good, although not as good as the male. Aristotle, I will
argue, adopts this position in two contexts: in the discussion of the nature of the
sexes, the physiology of sexual generation, and the determination of sex in his
biological works, especially the Generation of Animals, and in his discussion of
the role of women in the household and their exclusion from the public life of the
polis in his Politics. To provide the background to Aristotle’s views in these two
domains, I consider the precedents to his biological account of sexual difference
in section 1.4, and the precedents to his political views in section 1.5.
There is a great deal of evidence available in various genres to help in
constructing a picture of commonly held views about the purpose or function
of sexual difference prior to Aristotle. There are plays, both tragic and comic,
the poetry of Hesiod, Homer, and Semonides of Amorgos, the medical writing
of the Hippocratic authors, the speeches of Thucydides, fragments from the pre-​
Socratic philosophers (most importantly, for my purposes, from Democritus and
Empedocles), and the dialogues of Plato, to whom Aristotle is often responding.
But the status and reliability of many of these sources as evidence for contem-
porary states of affairs or contemporary thinking is very much in question. It is
difficult to draw out the implications of our sources in many cases. For example,
if a poet (Aristophanes) takes political corruption as his theme and constructs a
comedy on the premise that women might take over political rule in a city-​state,
what should we deduce about the status of women in the political community to
which that author belongs? Should we suppose that women are utterly excluded
from political life, even its informal practices, by a deeply rooted belief among
men that women are incapable, so that the suggestion that they might rule would
be received as ridiculous and entertaining by the audience for whom it was in-
tended? Or should we suppose, rather, that there is enough contemporary dis-
cussion of the frailty of men and the strengths of women that the premise by
itself counts as witty and provocative? Consider another example: if a natural
philosopher (Empedocles) attempts to explain human reproduction in terms of
a commingling of female and male seed, does that suggest that he believes in the
equality of the sexes in some more general way? Or should we be cautious in our
interpretation and assume only that he is trying to account for the resemblance
of offspring to their mothers in the simplest possible way?
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