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Becoming Who We Are
Becoming Who We Are
Politics and Practical Philosophy
in the Work of Stanley Cavell
Andrew Norris
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For my parents
Mary Cecilia Coupe Norris and Barnard Norris
in loving memory
To know
That which before us lies in daily life,
Is the prime wisdom
—Milton
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
CHAPTER 1 Ordinary Language and Philosophical Conversion 15
CHAPTER 2 Skepticism and Transcendence 49
CHAPTER 3 Community and Voice 95
CHAPTER 4 Walden and the Foundations of True Political
Expression 141
CHAPTER 5 Receiving Autonomy 177
Notes 223
Bibliography 287
Index 305
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
M any people have helped me in the long process of writing this book.
I owe a special debt to Stanley Cavell, who took time to read the
bulk of the manuscript, and whose comments on it displayed exemplary
care and generosity. Garrett Baer, Dan Brudney, Fabian Börchers, Tom
Dumm, Richard Eldridge, Jeremy Elkins, Bonnie Honig, Paola Marrati,
Rogers Smith, Barry Stroud, and Eric Wilson also read significant por-
tions of the manuscript and gave me extremely helpful comments. Baer
also helped me in the final preparation of the text, and I truly appreci-
ate his patient and thoughtful work. I should also like to thank William
E. Abraham, Jane Bennett, Kane Bixby, Fred Dolan, Kurt Rudolf Fischer,
Michael Geis, David Hoy, David Macarthur, Christoph Menke, Jan Müller,
Jim Noggle, Dirk Setton, Hans Sluga, Tracy Strong, Jörg Volbers, Stephen
White, my brothers and sisters, and Lucy Randall, my editor at Oxford.
About half of Chapter 4 previously appeared as “Thoreau, Cavell, and
the Foundations of True Political Expression,” in A Political Companion
to Henry David Thoreau, and I thank the University Press of Kentucky
for permission to republish those parts of it. It is a pleasure to acknowl-
edge as well the substantial assistance I have received from the University
of California, the Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte,
and the Forschungskolleg Humanwissenschaften and Exzellenzcluster
“Normative Orders” of Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main. My wife
Yasemin often doubted whether this book would ever really be finished,
and I am deeply grateful to her for years of loving patience and support.
My daughters Stephanie and Cecilia have, like true transcendentalists,
helped me again and again to see the possibility and delight of the new
day, and for that I owe them more than I can say.
Becoming Who We Are
Introduction
2 | Introduction
very good books, and I have learned a great deal from them. But their
discussions of politics are of necessity limited, leaving room—as they
must—for analyses of Cavell’s treatments of film, aesthetics, the philoso-
phy of language, Shakespeare, and the myriad other topics he takes up in
his unique body of work. In contrast, I discuss most of these matters only
in so far as it is necessary to appreciate what Cavell has to offer moral
and especially political philosophy.5 My initial aim here is to draw out
an important feature of Cavell’s work that has not yet been adequately
addressed, and to make explicit some of what Cavell leaves implicit. Doing
so will not only bring Cavell’s thinking about public life into clearer focus,
it will also alter our understanding of his work as a whole, showing it to
have more sides and greater depth than is sometimes thought. It would be
wrong to understand my attempt to do this as one that entails translating
Cavell’s words into an idiom more congenial to political theorists. Cavell’s
style is at once concrete and elusive in a way that delights and frustrates
equal numbers of readers. The twists and flights of his prose, so precise
and measured in his presentation, make any recapitulation and summary
difficult if not impossible. For this, however, there is no ready help. Cavell
emphasizes, as no other philosopher has, the importance of voice in phi-
losophy, and early in his career he has sought his own voice. To really
hear what Cavell is saying, one has to hear him saying it. For this reason
I have quoted extensively from his writings throughout. But there is in the
end no substitute for Cavell’s own books and essays. Instead of trying to
provide one, I have endeavored to open up Cavell’s complex positions and
claims, and to help bring them into conversation with thinkers and with
problems and views that Cavell either has not yet addressed or has not yet
addressed in an explicit and systematic enough fashion to have been heard
by the wider community of political theorists and philosophers. I am not,
however, under the illusion that Cavell can easily or comfortably find a
place in that community as it stands. Indeed, I would want to say of Cavell
what he says of Wittgenstein, that “some of the things he says have lost,
or have yet to find, the human circle in which they can usefully be said.”6
This does not mean that Cavell does not speak to contemporary political
theory and contemporary political life, but rather that he does so in ways
that might help to transform that theory and that life.7 Cavell’s point is that
Wittgenstein’s text calls for a “human circle” or community that does not
yet exist, and thus calls for us to bring it into being—to create “a new pub-
lic,” as Emerson puts it—by transforming the community we now have or
share.8 Cavell seeks a similar transformation—that is indeed why he draws
our attention to this aspect of Wittgenstein.
Introduction | 3
This is not to say that his work addresses all or even most of the major
political issues of our time. Cavell expresses almost no interest in political
institutions such as the state, particularly in the Weberian sense, as the sole
legitimate source of (the threat of) violence. Accordingly, he has written
nothing on, say, international law, and has nothing very striking or origi-
nal to say about constitutional questions, distributive justice, campaign
finance, or similarly pressing issues of the day. And in his few explicit
engagements with political theory, he is quick to say that he writes for
a society in which “good enough” justice prevails.9 This has given some
the impression that his concern with politics is either superficial or sim-
ply too intermittent to be of any real importance. Indeed, a prominent
political theorist who works on a number of Cavell’s favorite texts once
assured me, “Cavell has no real interest in politics.” Cavell, however,
insists throughout his work that he does, and his writing is filled with
political terms, such as alienation, America, authority, autonomy, com-
munity, conformity, consent, contract, crisis, decision, democracy, dissent,
education, equality, freedom, identity, interest, judgment, obligation, own-
ing, the political, privacy, publicity, repression, responsibility, utility, and
voice.10 These terms, however, are not deployed in the service of the sorts
of arguments made by most political theorists and philosophers. Cavell
does not defend theses concerning canonical topics such as freedom or
justice in the manner of Arendt or Rawls, to take representatives of the two
major modes of political theorizing in our time. He does not argue in the
fashion of Arendt that, seen rightly, certain experiences or epochs reveal
themselves as standards by which one might evaluate political phenomena
in general. Nor does he attempt, in the style of Rawls, to first discover
an indubitable or at least widely held starting point and then to develop
a series of valid inferences from that point that will guide future politi-
cal practice. Instead, what Cavell offers are a series of readings. Cavell
has famously sought “to understand philosophy not as a set of problems
but as a set of texts,”11 and the more political texts he takes up include
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics; Emerson’s Essays; Hume’s
“Of the Original Contract”; Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals; Locke’s second Treatise; Marx’s “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right”; Mill’s On Liberty and The Subjection of Women;
Nietzsche’s “Schopenhauer as Educator,” Beyond Good and Evil, and Thus
Spoke Zarathustra; Plato’s Euthyphro and Republic; Rawls’s Theory of
Justice; Rousseau’s Social Contract; Shakespeare’s tragedies; Thoreau’s
Walden and “Civil Disobedience”; and the Bible. He has also sought to
bring out the political import of texts—like Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
4 | Introduction
Investigations, Kant’s Critiques, or Hollywood “Weepies”—that are not
usually thought of as being very political at all. His reading of all of these
is extremely idiosyncratic, emphasizing etymological play and personal,
sometimes even extravagant, chains of association that make plain his
embrace of Emerson’s view that “there is … creative reading as well as
creative writing”: “One must be an inventor to read well.”12 The result is
a series of texts that themselves ask to be read, rather than a set of argu-
ments that demand our assent. And, if Cavell’s own practice is any guide,
the reading they call for amounts to a personal response from the reader—
hardly a familiar gesture in the canon of political theory. Arnold Davidson
describes this aspect of Cavell’s work as well as anyone has:
Far from being apolitical in nature, Cavell’s efforts to help us “undo our
self-mystifications” place him squarely within two of the most important
streams of political thought in the Western tradition: first, the Rousseauian
conception of authentic action as autonomous action, and second, the
Socratic conception of individual self-knowledge as the key to the shared
pursuit of the good life that is politics. In the former, freedom is under-
stood as the giving of law to oneself. For this not to be either a meaning-
less redundancy or a form of slavery, the self that gives law must be a
better self, at once identified with and superior to the self that receives
law. To understand oneself as split in this way requires, in Cavell’s words,
“questioning what or who the self is that commands and obeys itself and
what an obedience consists in that is inseparable from mastery.”14 Freedom
requires a complicated knowledge of the self as divided; and it requires
an understanding of the desire of the current self to “obey” and hence
become the superior self. It is precisely this that Cavell seeks to provide
in his account of Emersonian perfectionism. Such self-knowledge is, for
Cavell, following Socrates, at once a personal and a political matter. Like
Introduction | 5
Socrates, Cavell traverses the public and the private distinction without
simply denying it; and he does so in an attempt to criticize his political cul-
ture from within, showing it to be lacking on its own terms, terms it uses
without understanding. If Cavell is seen by some as apolitical in nature,
this is in part a reflection of the fact that he, like Socrates, elliptically
contests our understanding of what politics really is. In Plato’s Gorgias,
Socrates, who eschewed public office, is presented as claiming that he
nonetheless was “one of the very few among the Athenians, not to say
the only one, engaged in the true political art.”15 To say this in the city
that prided itself as being the most political in the world is to deny that its
citizens knew what politics is or where it could be found. A similar claim
is lodged by Cavell.16 For both Socrates and Cavell, politics, devoted as it
is to the good life of the individuals who make up the polis, is found first
and foremost in individual lives, lives that are all too often characterized
by the “silent melancholy” and “quiet desperation” Emerson and Thoreau
discern in their fellow citizens. “The endlessly repeated idea that Emerson
was only interested in finding the individual should,” Cavell writes, “give
way to or make way for the idea that this quest was his way of founding a
nation, writing its constitution, constituting its citizens.”17
This is not to say, however, that individuals might free themselves of
such “political depression” alone.18 One of Cavell’s central political claims
is the roughly Hegelian one that our individual autonomy and our mem-
bership in a community with others are constitutive of one another. His
own texts enact this in the way they call out for response from the reader.
In politics as Cavell understands it, “the idea is of the expression of a
conviction whose grounding remains subjective—say myself—but which
expects or claims justification from the (universal) concurrence of other
subjectivities, on reflection; call this the acknowledgment of matching.”19
If more familiar ways of thinking about politics and political philosophy
aspire to chains of reasoning that compel one toward a conclusion, they
will easily take the form of monologues that one might deliver to oneself.
In contrast, Cavell’s texts, many of which revolve around and end with
questions, consistently seek to enact and elicit a conversation. Although
they are full of precise and nuanced argumentation, these are always situ-
ated within texts that, in line with Cavell’s emphasis upon identity and
desire, open themselves out to the reader, rather than hemming her in.
As Cavell puts it when characterizing his style as in part the expression
of a reluctance to accept the governing standard of philosophical form,
in particular the governing standard for how philosophical ideas should
be derived, “I mean to leave everything I will say, or have, I guess, ever
6 | Introduction
said, as in a sense provisional, the sense that it is to be gone on from.”20 In
accepting that invitation in writing this book, I make no claim to its being
exhaustive: the conversations Cavell’s work calls for will reveal the char-
acter of their participants as much as their subject matter, and that is true
of me and of this book. Other people will find other things in Cavell, and
will develop their ideas about those in their own ways; remaining open to
that is one of the lessons I take him to be teaching us.21 One might say that
for Cavell our political and philosophical culture is profoundly hermeneu-
tic: “Philosophy’s first virtue,” for Cavell, “is responsiveness,” and it is in
reading and responding to the works of those who have come before us,
and doing so together, that we learn who we are and how to become who
we are.22
Cavell is under no illusion that this is an easy task, or that his own work
is always easy to read. While this latter difficulty is widely attributed to the
mannerisms of his writing, which some find off-putting, there is a deeper
reason for this that needs to be acknowledged at the start of any serious
engagement with that work. More than anything else, Cavell’s thought is
influenced by his embrace of Wittgenstein’s vision of language, one that
Cavell has described as “terrifying” in its conception of human finitude
and its exposure to what we might roughly name “contingency”:
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected,
and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing
ensures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of
universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as nothing insures that
we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we
do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humor
and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is simi-
lar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an
assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism
Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and
community, rest on nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as
simple as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying.23
Introduction | 7
products of the same divine workman, to which we can appeal for assur-
ance that we shall continue to go on with one another. The other side of
our openness to one another is a profound exposure on the part of each of
us to the judgments and reactions of others. As Cavell explicitly makes
this vision of language and finitude his own, he thus announces here that
he expects us, his readers, to find his own work not just difficult or irritat-
ing, but deeply disturbing. This is an anticipation of a resistance on the
part of his interlocutor fully on a par with anything found in Nietzsche or
Freud, and it is a necessary resistance, one internal to Cavell’s most basic
claims.24 One might say that if the reader does not regularly experience
this resistance, she is not fully grasping those claims. This is, at the very
least, an unusual state of affairs for work making a significant contribution
to political thought.
I wrote that this book would differ from previous books on Cavell in its
focus on questions of politics and political philosophy. Given the kind of
philosopher Cavell is, however, that focus may still be looser than many
readers would expect or desire. Cavell approaches almost everything he
discusses from the perspective of one trained in ordinary language phi-
losophy. Similarly, his master topic of skepticism provides the terms in
which he discusses almost everything, including, if not especially, political
matters. However, Cavell’s understanding of both ordinary language phi-
losophy and skepticism is far from commonplace, or straightforward, and
I have accordingly devoted the first two of my five chapters to the exposition
and analysis of their meaning for Cavell and to the wider implications they
have for his understanding of human subjectivity, and hence of ethical and
political subjectivity. While many dismiss ordinary language philosophy
as a passé form of armchair sociology and a reactionary defense of “com-
mon sense,” Cavell argues that, properly understood, it is a legitimate and
powerful mode of self-examination that, like Freudian analysis, uncovers
the uncanny extent to which the self is ordinarily oblivious of its ordinary
life and language. For Cavell the ordinary is precisely not what is obvious,
but rather that which, like Poe’s purloined letter, passes in the normal run
of things unnoticed and untouched, though it sits in plain view before us.
As Wittgenstein puts it, “the aspects of things that are most important for
us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
notice something—because it is always before one’s eyes.)”25 Cavell can
describe the goal of his work as “discover[ing] the specific plight of mind
and circumstance within which a human being gives voice to his condi-
tion” only because most of us, most of the time, are unaware of that plight,
and of those circumstances.26 To the extent that we become aware of those
8 | Introduction
circumstances of our lives, we make our lives our own, and transform the
ordinary into what Cavell terms the “eventual ordinary,” the ordinary that
will come out of the shell of our lives as we now live them. This eventual
ordinary will differ from the ordinary as it stands first and foremost in the
recognition that we incline not to be here, in our lives, with one another,
that being here is not native to us.
Cavell’s distinction between two modes of the ordinary is not a wholly
novel one. Mill, for instance, makes a similar distinction in his essay on
the subjection of women when, after noting that existing moralities “are
mainly fitted to a relation of command and obedience” because the histo-
ries that give rise to them are those of inequality and domination, he goes
on to assert that “command and obedience are but unfortunate necessities
of human life: society in equality is its normal state.”27 Here, as in Cavell,
what is normal or ordinary is precisely what is not yet the norm. In Cavell,
however, the eventual ordinary, the ordinary that has become or been seen,
however fleetingly, to be what it is, is one that requires more than his-
torical social progress; it requires a society of individuals committed to
perpetual education and conversion. Hence it requires that those people
initially and repeatedly experience their lives as sites of self-estrangement.
Here the early Heidegger is the more important predecessor for Cavell,
particularly in his insistence that Eigentlichkeit or authenticity is an “exis-
tentiell modification” of inauthenticity, and not our initial and natural way
of being.28 On Heidegger’s account, “average everydayness” is character-
ized by an “evasive turning away” in which we evade ourselves, and hence
fail to make our own (eigen) what is most properly ours, our lives as we
find them.29 To counter this Abkehr, we must turn back to ourselves, avert
ourselves from life as we live it, or rather fail to live it. This conversion is
not a turning away from the inauthentic everyday toward a transcendent
realm lying beyond the everyday (the sun of Socrates’s Good, Plotinus’s
and Augustine’s unchangeable good) so much as it is a turning within that
everyday, and toward it. Cavell shares this vision, and names Being and
Time along with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as the two
philosophical works of the twentieth century that have meant the most to
him and that helped shape his sense that “some moral claim upon us is
leveled by the act of philosophizing itself, a claim that no separate subject
of ethics would serve to study—as if what is wrong with us, what needs
attention from philosophy, is our life as a whole.”30
In embracing this Heideggerian understanding of the ordinary as at
once requiring and suppressing our conversion to it, Cavell breaks from
his teacher Austin, a break I emphasize as previous work on Cavell has
Introduction | 9
not. For Cavell, Austin’s “terms of criticism,” unlike those of Wittgenstein,
are inadequate to the uncanny nature of the difficulties Austin’s work
uncovers in philosophy that is inattentive to “what we say when.” Put oth-
erwise, Austin’s terms do not allow for the articulation of Cavell’s distinc-
tion between the actual and the eventual ordinary, and hence do not allow
us to understand moral and political life as, among other things, a struggle
to become who we are. That said, Cavell no more apes Heidegger than
he does Austin, and his emphasis upon skepticism as the counter to the
ordinary is, as I demonstrate, not a Heideggerian one. Here the decisive
influence is that of Wittgenstein, whom Cavell credits with revealing “the
drift towards skepticism [to be] the discovery of the everyday, a discovery
of what it is that skepticism would deny.”31 It is only in a confrontation
with skepticism that the eventual everyday comes into view, because it is
skepticism that resists it, that resists the event of the ordinary. On Cavell’s
account, skepticism is far from being what Rorty and others claim it is:
a peculiar hang-up picked up by over-eager undergraduates who have
read too much Descartes and Hume and not enough Dewey.32 Instead, it
is an expression of our deep discomfort with our finitude, our resistance
to accepting the world and acknowledging those with whom we share it.33
And it is a particularly pure example of a more general attempt to speak
without accepting responsibility for the conditions that make speech intel-
ligible—an attempt to disown the criteria of our language, to speak with-
out speaking to someone, to speak without being someone who needs or
wants to speak, and who wants and needs to be addressed. This avoid-
ance is most prominent in skepticism concerning other minds, the mode
of skepticism upon which Cavell places special emphasis in his practical
thought. Such skepticism asks, with Mill in An Examination of Sir William
Hamilton’s Philosophy, “By what evidence do I know … that the walking
and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts,
or in other words, possess Minds?”34 It is plain enough that posing this
question requires that one bracket the sentience and humanity of the other,
the walking and speaking figure I see and hear. But Cavell argues that this
gesture has not been properly appreciated, and that the skeptical investi-
gation, whatever its result, responds to a need to so bracket the other, to
hold her off, and make her feelings—typically, in the Investigations and
the standard mid-twentieth-century discussions of the topic, feelings of
pain—objects of cognition, and not something that demands my acknowl-
edgment and my concern. In the skeptical investigation, knowledge of
the other is sought in some mark or sign from or in the other. Cavell’s
response is to argue that no such mark—not even a mark that fits all of the
10 | Introduction
skeptic’s criteria—could in principle satisfy the skeptic, as the search for
it is a deflection from a knowledge that the skeptic denies—that is, fails to
acknowledge. The mark or sign is one that the skeptic himself must give;
the test is one he himself must pass.
It is on the basis of these first two chapters that I take up the more
obviously political aspects of Cavell’s work. In the third chapter, I con-
sider Cavell’s attempt to develop the political implications of ordinary
language philosophy in his account of the political claim. Just as the ordi-
nary language philosopher speaks for a community of speakers who have
lost sight of what they say when, so on Cavell’s account, political actors
lodge “claims to community” that strive to recall a community of citizens
that has lost sight of who they are and what they share. Cavell empha-
sizes the influence of Rousseau’s conception of political autonomy on his
understanding of the political claim. For some, the appeal to Rousseau
is problematic, as he has been taken by readers like Isaiah Berlin as a
proto-totalitarian precisely on the grounds that he encourages a “mon-
strous impersonation” in which one person purports to say not just what
is good for the other but what the other himself wills, and on this basis, in
Rousseau’s infamous phrase, “force him to be free.”35 I review this argu-
ment and the aspect of Rousseau’s thought that inspires it, and demonstrate
that the objection rests upon a misunderstanding of both Rousseau’s texts
and the nature of the political claim under consideration. In particular,
such criticisms miss the manner in which political claims are provocative
contributions to situations in which there is conflict over the nature of the
community, over who we are and what we will. Such provocation is not
meant to inspire obedience, but rather debate and reflection. As in ordinary
language philosophy, the use of the first person plural registers a claim that
is at once authoritative and disputable: if, on due consideration, the other
rejects my claim, the claim falls short, but it does not, for all that, lose its
authority. Rather, the other indicates that he is not in community with me,
not a member of the community for whom I speak. I review a number of
examples of political claims in Cavell’s sense of the term so as to bring
out his distinctive understanding of citizenship and of the relation between
“ethical” questions of integrity and self-knowledge and “political” ques-
tions of community identity and intention. As I show, Cavell’s understand-
ing of the politics of public speech allows for a rich account of the nature
of the political reproach as well as that of the political claim.
In the final two chapters, I turn to Cavell’s most substantial and sustained
contribution to political thought, his understanding of Emersonian perfec-
tionism. Cavell does not advance a definition of Emersonian perfectionism.
Introduction | 11
Instead, he develops his account of it through his engagement with a series
of exemplars, first and foremost the American Romantics Emerson and
Thoreau. These are at once widely cherished and widely dismissed authors,
writers with whom American philosophy begins, and whom that very phi-
losophy chronically disavows. Why this is so and what it means is a central
puzzle in Cavell’s later work, one that he argues is decisive for our politi-
cal culture. If the Emersonians in general have faced standing neglect from
contemporary philosophers, Thoreau has faced a particular neglect at the
hands of most of Cavell’s commentators. Though it was Thoreau’s prose
that initially inspired Cavell’s attempt to use American transcendentalism
to “underwrite” ordinary language philosophy, Cavell’s later, more pro-
grammatic embrace of Emerson has led many to disregard his early book,
The Senses of Walden, and treat it as a dry run for later, more important
work.36 This tendency is understandable, given that the book is dedicated
in part to the idea that there is a philosophical way other than argument
of “accepting full responsibility for one’s discourse.”37 Such a book defies
translation into the analytic, argumentative terms familiar to philosophy.
Accordingly, in my fourth and most impressionistic chapter I try to show
that and how Cavell’s study of Thoreau’s Socratic effort to wake us to our
own lives remains important for our understanding of the political sig-
nificance of the Cavellian engagement with skepticism and skepticism’s
aversion to ordinary life.38 Cavell’s reading of Thoreau both brings out and
draws upon hitherto unnoticed resemblances between Walden and Being
and Time, and I conclude the chapter by considering the manner in which
a proper understanding of these works throws into high relief the profound
differences between their authors’ respective understandings of politics
and of the place of philosophy in public life.
In the fifth and final chapter of the book, I turn to the details of Cavell’s
late, more systematic conception of Emersonian perfectionism, a concep-
tion in which the various themes of the book come together. My interpre-
tation of that perfectionism focuses on an aspect of it that Cavell scholars
have not yet sufficiently explored: its relation to Kant. The importance of
this relation is of course plain, given Emerson’s acknowledgment that the
term transcendentalism comes from Kant’s use of the term transcenden-
tal.39 But what the precise relation between the two might be is not wholly
clear, particularly when transcendentalism is understood in Cavell’s sense.
I demonstrate that, for Cavell, receptivity is the key to Emerson’s inheri-
tance of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, as partiality is the key to his inheri-
tance of Kant’s practical philosophy. Both receptivity and partiality are
characterized by a refusal to categorically distinguish between passivity
12 | Introduction
and activity. In my discussion I emphasize the question of partiality, argu-
ing that this should be understood as a paradoxical but deeply significant
rethinking of Kantian autonomy. Cavell hints as much when he writes that
Emerson “composed ‘Self-Reliance’ with [Kant’s] Groundwork as if open
at his elbow,” but such hints have not yet been taken as seriously as I take
them.40 Partiality for Emerson names both the individual agent’s inherent
lack and its want for change and growth. Such desire is directed not at
objects but at other subjects with whom the self as partial is necessarily
in relation. The shameful experience of lack is, on Cavell’s account, the
necessary precondition for growth and for the transformative encounter
with an exemplary other who enables the self’s conversion of the nihilistic
conformity of everyday life as it is now lived. Emerson’s and Cavell’s
almost Hegelian emphases upon this necessary moment of negativity are
easily overlooked, but are, as I demonstrate, absolutely central to their
“rethinking” of the Kantian conception of autonomy, in which the role
played by law in Kant is taken by the agent’s attraction to the other and
what she exemplifies. I conclude the chapter by clarifying Cavell’s related
insistence that Emersonian perfectionism “specifically sets itself against
any idea of ultimate perfection,” arguing, first, that this does not condemn
Cavell’s agents to an endless and hence nihilistic pursuit of an unrealizable
telos, as it might seem; and, second, that the grounds of this refusal must
be understood if we would appreciate Cavell’s important conception of
democratic hope.41 For Cavell, the political problem of hope is not a matter
of what will or is likely to happen, but that of becoming who we are. In our
dark times, characterized as they are by political and environmental prob-
lems that seem to dwarf our apparent collective capacities, this problem is
a very real one for democrats.
For some, the thought of a book on Cavell and public life might seem
mildly absurd, given his insistence upon the first person, on the one hand,
and the kind of person he is or is perceived to be, on the other. How could
someone as brilliant, self-involved, educated, eccentric, and cloistered
make a contribution to our understanding of democratic or ordinary life
by examining himself and his reading of texts such as Emerson’s Essays?
Whatever he might find in any such an examination surely has nothing to
do with the rest of us. Cavell addresses this suspicion late in The Claim of
Reason: “Human beings,” he writes,
Introduction | 13
reveals the wish to be ordinary, everyday. (One does not, after all, wish to
become a monster, even though the realization of one’s wish for unique-
ness would make one a monster.) So both the wish for the exceptional and
for the everyday are foci of romanticism. One can think of romanticism as
the discovery that the everyday is an exceptional achievement. Call it the
achievement of the human.42
14 | Introduction
CHAPTER 1 Ordinary Language and
Philosophical Conversion
A curious, indeed uncanny thing, that we must first leap onto the soil
on which we really stand.
—Heidegger
Here again, but for these faithful souls, the Aneityumese Teacher
and his wife, I must have been baffled, and would have died in the
effort. The planks of the wreck, and all other articles required they
fetched and carried, and it taxed my utmost strength to get them in
some way planted together. But life depended on it. It was at length
accomplished; and after that time I suffered comparatively little from
anything like continuous attacks of fever and ague. That noble old
soul, Abraham, stood by me as an angel of God in sickness and in
danger; he went at my side wherever I had to go; he helped me
willingly to the last inch of strength in all that I had to do; and it was
perfectly manifest that he was doing all this not from mere human
love, but for the sake of Jesus. That man had been a Cannibal in his
heathen days, but by the grace of God there he stood verily a new
creature in Christ Jesus. Any trust, however sacred or valuable, could
be absolutely reposed in him; and in trial or danger, I was often
refreshed by that old Teacher’s prayers, as I used to be by the prayers
of my saintly father in my childhood’s home. No white man could
have been a more valuable helper to me in my perilous
circumstances, and no person, white or black, could have shown
more fearless and chivalrous devotion.
When I have read or heard the shallow objections of irreligious
scribblers and talkers, hinting that there was no reality in
conversions, and that Mission effort was but waste, oh, how my heart
has yearned to plant them just one week on Tanna, with the “natural”
man all around in the person of Cannibal and Heathen, and only the
one “spiritual” man in the person of the converted Abraham, nursing
them, feeding them, saving them “for the love of Jesus,”—that I
might just learn how many hours it took to convince them that Christ
in man was a reality after all! All the scepticism of Europe would hide
its head in foolish shame; and all its doubts would dissolve under one
glance of the new light that Jesus, and Jesus alone, pours from the
converted Cannibal’s eye.
Perhaps it may surprise some unsophisticated reader to learn,
though others who know more will be quite prepared for it, that this
removal of our house, as also Mr. Mathieson’s for a similar reason,
was severely criticised by the people who try to evangelize the world
while sitting in easy chairs at home. Precious nonsense appeared, for
instance, in the Nova Scotian Church Magazine, about my house
being planted on the fighting ground of the Natives, and thereby
courting and provoking hostilities. As matter of fact, the hill-top was
too narrow to accommodate both the Church and my house, and had
to be levelled out for that purpose, and it was besides surrounded by
a deep valley on three sides; but the arm-chair critics, unwilling to
believe in the heathen hatred of the Gospel, had to invent some
reason out of their own brains to account for my being so persecuted
and plundered. In truth, we were learning by suffering for the benefit
of those who should follow us to these Islands,—that health could be
found only on the higher levels, swept by the breath of the trade
winds, and that fever and ague lay in wait near the shore, and
especially on the leeward side. Even Mr. Inglis had his house on
Aneityum removed also to the higher ground; and no Missionary
since has been located in the fever-beds by the swamp or shore. Life
is God’s great gift, to be preserved for Him, not thrown away.
CHAPTER VIII.
MORE MISSION LEAVES FROM TANNA.
Grasping hold of their leader, I held him fast till he promised never
to kill any one on my account, for Jesus taught us to love our
enemies and always to return good for evil! During this scene, many
of the armed men slunk away into the bush, and those who remained
entered into a bond to be friendly and to protect us. But again their
Public Assembly resolved that we should be killed, because, as they
said, they hated Jehovah and the Worship; for it made them afraid to
do as they had always done. If I would give up visiting the villages,
and praying and talking with them about Jehovah, they intimated
that they would like me to stay and trade with them, as they liked the
Traders but hated the Missionaries! I told them that the hope of
being able to teach them the Worship of Jehovah alone kept me
living amongst them; that I was there, not for gain or pleasure, but
because I loved them, and pitied their estate, and sought their good
continually by leading them to know and serve the only true God.
One of the Chiefs, who had lived in Sydney and spoke English,
replied for all the rest,—
“Missi, our fathers loved and worshipped whom you call the Devil,
the Evil Spirit; and we are determined to do the same, for we love the
conduct of our fathers. Missi Turner came here and tried to break
down our worship, but our fathers fought him and he left us. They
fought also Peta, the Samoan Teacher, and he fled. They fought and
killed some of the Samoan Teachers placed on the other side of the
Harbour, and their companions left. We killed the last foreigner that
lived in Tanna before you came here. We murdered the Aneityumese
Teachers, and burned down their houses. After each of these acts,
Tanna was good; we all lived like our fathers, and sickness and death
left us. Now, our people are determined to kill you, if you do not
leave this island; for you are changing our customs and destroying
our worship, and we hate the Jehovah Worship.”
Then, surrounded by a number of men, who had spent some years
in the Colonies, he continued in a bitter strain to this effect,—
“The people of Sydney belong to your Britain; they know what is
right and wrong as well as you; and we have ourselves seen them
fishing, feasting, cooking, working, and seeking pleasure on the
Sabbath as on any other day. You say, we do not here need to cook
any food on Sabbaths or to toil at our ovens, but you yourself cook,
for you boil your kettle on that day! We have seen the people do all
the conduct at Sydney which you call bad, but which we love. You are
but one, they are many; they are right, and you must be wrong; you
are teaching lies for Worship.”
After many such speeches, I answered all the questions of the
people fully, and besides I cross-questioned my assailants on several
subjects, regarding which they grossly contradicted each other, till
the majority of voices cried out,—
“They are lying! Their words are crooked! Missi knows all the truth
about the people of Sydney!”
Alas, I had to admit that what they reported was too true regarding
the godless multitudes at home who made the Sabbath a day of
pleasure, but not regarding Jehovah’s servants. By this time, they
were willing to remain quiet, and allowed me to talk of spiritual
things and of the blessings that the Sabbath and the Bible brought to
all other lands, and to conduct in their presence and hearing the
Worship of Jehovah.
But my enemies seldom slackened their hateful designs against my
life, however calmed or baffled for the moment. Within a few days of
the above events, when Natives in large numbers were assembled at
my house, a man furiously rushed on me with his axe; but a
Kaserumini Chief snatched a spade with which I had been working,
and dexterously defended me from instant death. Life in such
circumstances led me to cling very near to the Lord Jesus; I knew
not, for one brief hour, when or how attack might be made; and yet,
with my trembling hand clasped in the hand once nailed on Calvary,
and now swaying the sceptre of the Universe, calmness and peace
and resignation abode in my soul.
Next day, a wild Chief followed me about for four hours with his
loaded musket, and, though often directed towards me, God
restrained his hand. I spoke kindly to him, and attended to my work
as if he had not been there, fully persuaded that my God had placed
me there, and would protect me till my allotted task was finished.
Looking up in unceasing prayer to our dear Lord Jesus, I left all in
His hands, and felt immortal till my work was done. Trials and
hairbreadth escapes strengthened my faith, and seemed only to
nerve me for more to follow; and they did tread swiftly upon each
other’s heels. Without that abiding consciousness of the presence
and power of my dear Lord and Saviour, nothing else in all the world
could have preserved me from losing my reason and perishing
miserably. His words, “Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of
the world,” became to me so real that it would not have startled me
to behold Him, as Stephen did, gazing down upon the scene. I felt
His supporting power, as did St. Paul, when he cried, “I can do all
things through Christ which strengtheneth me.” It is the sober truth,
and it comes back to me sweetly after twenty years, that I had my
nearest and dearest glimpses of the face and smile of my blessed
Lord in those dread moments when musket, club, or spear was being
levelled at my life. Oh the bliss of living and enduring, as seeing
“Him who is invisible!”
One evening, I awoke three times to hear a Chief and his men
trying to force the door of my house. Though armed with muskets,
they had some sense of doing wrong, and were wholesomely afraid of
a little retriever dog which had often stood betwixt me and death.
God restrained them again; and next morning the report went all
round the Harbour, that those who tried to shoot me were “smitten
weak with fear,” and that shooting would not do. A plan was
therefore deliberately set on foot to fire the premises, and club us if
we attempted to escape. But our Aneityumese Teacher heard of it,
and God helped us to frustrate their designs. When they knew that
their plots were revealed to us, they seemed to lose faith in
themselves, and cast about to circumvent us in some more secret
way. Their evil was overruled for good.
Namuri, one of my Aneityumese Teachers, was placed at our
nearest village. There he had built a house for himself and his wife,
and there he led amongst the Heathen a pure and humble Christian
life. Almost every morning, he came and reported on the state of
affairs to me. Without books or a school, he yet instructed the
Natives in Divine things, conducted the Worship, and taught them
much by his good example. His influence was increasing, when one
morning a Sacred Man threw at him the kawas, or killing stone, a
deadly weapon, like a scythe stone in shape and thickness, usually
round but sometimes angular, and from eighteen to twenty inches
long. They throw it from a great distance and with fatal precision.
The Teacher, with great agility, warded his head and received the
deep cut from it in his left hand, reserving his right hand to guard
against the club that was certain to follow swiftly. The Priest sprang
upon him with his club and with savage yells. He evaded, yet also
received, many blows; and, rushing out of their hands, actually
reached the Mission House, bleeding, fainting, and pursued by
howling murderers. I had been anxiously expecting him, and hearing
the noise I ran out with all possible speed.
On seeing me, he sank down by a tree, and cried,—
“Missi, Missi, quick! and escape for your life! They are coming to
kill you; they say, they must kill us all to-day, and they have begun
with me; for they hate Jehovah and the Worship!”
I hastened to the good Teacher where he lay; I bound up, washed,
and dressed his wounds; and God, by the mystery of His own
working, kept the infuriated Tannese watching at bay. Gradually they
began to disappear into the bush, and we conveyed the dear Teacher
to the Mission House. In three or four weeks, he so far recovered by
careful nursing that he was able to walk about again. Some
petitioned for him to return to the village; but I insisted, as a
preliminary, that the Harbour Chiefs should unitedly punish him
who had abused the Teacher; and this to test them, for he had only
carried out their own wishes,—Nowar excepted, and perhaps one or
two others. They made a pretence of atoning by presenting the
Teacher with a pig and some yams as a peace-offering; but I said,—
“No! such bad conduct must be punished, or we would leave their
island by the first opportunity.”
Now that Sacred Man, a Chief too, had gone on fighting with other
tribes, till his followers had all died or been slain; and, after three
weeks’ palaver, the other Chiefs seized him, tied him with a rope, and
sent me word to come and see him punished, as they did not want us
after all to leave the island. I had to go, for fear of more bloody work,
and after talk with them, followed by many fair promises, he was
loosed.
All appearing friendly for some time, and willing to listen and
learn, the Teacher earnestly desired to return to his post. I pled with
him to remain at the Mission House till we felt more assured, but he
replied,—
“Missi, when I see them thirsting for my blood, I just see myself
when the Missionary first came to my island. I desired to murder
him, as they now desire to kill me. Had he stayed away for such
danger, I would have remained Heathen; but he came, and continued
coming to teach us, till, by the grace of God, I was changed to what I
am. Now the same God that changed me to this, can change these
poor Tannese to love and serve Him. I cannot stay away from them;
but I will sleep at the Mission House, and do all I can by day to bring
them to Jesus.”
It was not in me to keep such a man, under such motives, from
what he felt to be his post of duty. He returned to his village work,
and for several weeks things appeared most encouraging. The
inhabitants showed growing interest in us and our work, and less
fear of the pretensions of their heathen Priest, which, alas! fed his
jealousy and anger. One morning during worship, when the good
Teacher knelt in prayer, the same savage Priest sprang upon him
with his great club and left him for dead, wounded and bleeding and
unconscious. The people fled and left him in his blood, afraid of
being mixed up with the murder. The Teacher, recovering a little,
crawled to the Mission House, and reached it about mid-day in a
dying condition. On seeing him, I ran to meet him, but he fell near
the Teacher’s house, saying,—
“Missi, I am dying. They will kill you also. Escape for your life.”
Trying to console him, I sat down beside him, dressing his wounds
and nursing him. He was quite resigned; he was looking up to Jesus,
and rejoicing that he would soon be with Him in Glory. His pain and
suffering were great, but he bore all very quietly, as he said and kept
saying, “For the sake of Jesus! For Jesu’s sake!” He was constantly
praying for his persecutors,—
“O Lord Jesus, forgive them, for they know not what they are
doing. Oh, take not away all Thy servants from Tanna! Take not away
Thy Worship from this dark island! O God, bring all the Tannese to
love and follow Jesus!”
To him, Jesus was all and in all; and there were no bands in his
death. He passed from us, in the assured hope of entering into the
Glory of his Lord. Humble though he may appear in the world’s
esteem, I knew that a great man had fallen there in the service of
Christ, and that he would take rank in the glorious Army of the
Martyrs. I made for him a coffin, and dug his grave near the Mission
House. With prayers, and many tears, we consigned his remains to
the dust in the certainty of a happy resurrection. Even one such
convert was surely a triumphant reward for Dr. and Mrs. Geddie,
whom God had honoured in bringing him to Jesus. May they have
many like him for their crown of joy and rejoicing in the great day!
Immediately after this, a number of Chiefs and followers called on
me at the Mission House, professing great friendliness, and said,—
“Mr. Turner gave our fathers great quantities of calico, axes, and
knives, and they became his friends. If you would give the people
some just now they would be pleased. They would stop fighting
against the Worship.”
I retorted, “How was it then, if they were pleased, that they
persecuted Messrs. Turner and Nisbet till they had to leave the
island? Your conduct is deceitful and bad. I never will reward you for
bad actions and for murder! No present will be given by me.”
They withdrew sullenly, and seemed deeply disappointed and
offended.
On one occasion, when a Chief had died, the Harbour people were
all being assembled to strangle his widow. One of my Aneityumese
Teachers, hearing of it, hastened to tell me. I ran to the village, and
with much persuasion, saved her life. A few weeks thereafter she
gave birth to a young chieftain, who prospered well. If our Harbour
people told the truth, the widows of all who fell in war were saved by
our pleading. Immediately after the foregoing incident, a Sacred Man
was dying, and a crowd of people were assembled awaiting the event
in order to strangle his three wives. I spoke to them of the horrid
wickedness of such conduct. I further reasoned with them, that God
had made us male and female, the sexes so balanced, that for every
man that had three or a dozen wives, as many men generally had
none, and that this caused great jealousy and quarrelling. I showed
them further, that these widows being spared would make happy and
useful wives for other kind and loving husbands. After the Worship, I
appealed to the Chief and he replied,—
“Missi, it was a practice introduced to Tanna from the island of
Aneityum. It was not the custom of our fathers here to strangle
widows. And, as the Aneityumese have given it up since they became
worshippers of Jehovah, it is good that we now should give it up on
Tanna too.”
Thus these three widows were saved; and we had great hope in
Christ that the ghastly practice would soon disappear from Tanna.
An incident of this time created great wonder amongst the Natives;
namely, the Sinking of a Well. We had, heretofore, a boiling spring to
drink from, the water of which literally required in that climate days
to cool down; we had also a stagnant pool at the lower end of a
swamp in which the Natives habitually bathed, the only available
fresh water bath! Beyond that, no drinking water could be had for six
or seven miles. I managed to sink a well, near the Mission House,
and got about twelve feet deep a good supply of excellent fresh water,
though, strange to say, the surface of the well rose and fell regularly