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Beyond Speech
ii

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iii

Beyond Speech
Pornography and Analytic
Feminist Philosophy

Edited by Mari Mikkola

1
iv

1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Mikkola, Mari, editor.

Title: Beyond speech : pornography and analytic feminist philosophy /
edited by Mari Mikkola.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2017]
Identifiers: LCCN 2016031908 (print) | LCCN 2017001145 (ebook) |
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Subjects: LCSH: Pornography. | Feminism.
Classification: LCC HQ471 .B49 2017 (print) | LCC HQ471 (ebook) |
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v

CONTENTS

List of Contributors vii

CHAPTER 1 Feminist Philosophy and Pornography: The Past,

The Present, and The Future 1
Hilkje Charlotte Hänel and Mari Mikkola

PART I | Speech Act Approaches to Pornography

CHAPTER 2 Is Pornography Like The Law? 23
Rae Langton
CHAPTER 3 On Multiple Types of Silencing 39
Mary Kate McGowan
CHAPTER 4 Be What I Say: Authority Versus Power
in Pornography 59
Louise Antony

PART II | Pornography and Social Ontology

CHAPTER 5 What Women are For: Pornography and Social
Ontology 91
Katharine Jenkins
CHAPTER 6 Pornographic Artifacts: Maker’s Intentions Model 113
Mari Mikkola
vi

PART III | Objectification as Harm of Pornography

CHAPTER 7 Treating Pornography as a Woman and Women’s
Objectification 137
Lina Papadaki
CHAPTER 8 Getting “Naked” in the Colonial/​Modern Gender
System: A Preliminary Trans Feminist Analysis
of Pornography 157
Talia Mae Bettcher
CHAPTER 9 Race and Pornography: The Dilemma of the
(Un)Desirable 177
Robin Zheng

PART IV | Feminist Pornography: An Oxymoron?

CHAPTER 10 Falling in Lust: Sexiness, Feminism, and
Pornography 199
Hans Maes
CHAPTER 11 In/​Egalitarian Pornography: A Simplistic View
of Pornography 221
Petra van Brabandt
CHAPTER 12 Feminist Pornography 243
A. W. Eaton

Index 259

vi | Contents
vii

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Louise Antony (B.A. Syracuse University, Ph.D. Harvard University) is

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. She
has published many articles in the areas of philosophy of mind, philosophy
of language, feminist theory, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion.
She has edited or co-​edited three volumes, most recently Philosophers
Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. She has served
as president of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and as presi-
dent of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.
Talia Mae Bettcher is a professor of philosophy at California State
University, Los Angeles and she serves as the department head. Some of
her articles include “Evil Deceivers and Make-​Believers: Transphobic
Violence and the Politics of Illusion” (Hypatia, 2007), “Trapped in
the Wrong Theory: Re-​ thinking Trans Oppression and Resistance
(Signs, 2014), and “When Selves Have Sex: What the Phenomenology
of Trans Sexuality Can Teach about Sexual Orientation” (Journal of
Homosexuality, 2014). With Ann Garry, she co-​edited the Hypatia special
issue “Transgender Studies and Feminism: Theory, Politics, and Gender
Realities” (2009). With Susan Stryker, she co-​edited the Transgender
Studies Quarterly special issue “Trans/​Feminisms” (2016). She is cur-
rently at work on a monograph entitled Personhood as Intimacy: A Trans
Feminist Philosophy. Talia has also been involved in Los Angeles trans
community organizing for over fifteen years and now serves on the newly
established Transgender Advisory Council for the City of Los Angeles.
A. W. Eaton is an Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department
at the University of Illinois-​Chicago. She received her Ph.D. from the
viii

University of Chicago in both philosophy and art history and works on

topics in feminism, aesthetics and philosophy of art, value theory, ethics,
and Italian Renaissance painting. Eaton was a Laurance Rockefeller
Fellow at Princeton’s Center for Human Values in 2005–​06, and is cur-
rently a Trustee of the American Society of Aesthetics and the editor of the
Aesthetics & Philosophy of Art section of Philosophy Compass.
Hilkje Charlotte Hänel is finishing her Ph.D. at the Humboldt-​University
of Berlin, Germany. She held a fellowship at the Carl and Max Schneider
Stiftung and was a scholar at the Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung for two years.
Her research is in feminist analytic philosophy and social philosophy.
Her thesis is on the concept of rape and how we should methodologi-
cally understand it. Further research concerns Wittgenstein’s theories of
language and family resemblance, the relation between friendship and
romantic relationships, methodological problems and Haslanger’s ame-
liorative analyses, Critical Theory and questions of ideology, and the
situation of women in philosophy. She is an executive board member of
SWIP Germany.
Katharine Jenkins is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University
of Nottingham. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Sheffield in
2016, before which she studied philosophy at the University of Cambridge.
Her research spans the fields of social ontology, feminist philosophy, and
the critical philosophy of race. She is particularly interested in using ana-
lytic social ontology to illuminate the nature of race and gender categories
and the dynamics of racial and gender-​based oppression. Her publications
include “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept
of Woman” (Ethics) and “Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as
Hermeneutical Injustices” (Journal of Applied Philosophy).
Rae Langton is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and
Fellow of Newnham College. She is the author of Kantian Humility: Our
Ignorance of Things in Themselves, and Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical
Essays on Pornography and Objectification. She was elected to the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2013, and the British
Academy in 2014. Some themes of her contribution to this volume are
further developed in her John Locke Lectures (Oxford 2015), forthcoming
as Accommodating Injustice (Oxford University Press 2017).
Hans Maes is Senior Lecturer in History and Philosophy of Art and
Director of the Aesthetics Research Centre at the University of Kent at
Canterbury. He has authored papers on a variety of topics in ethics and

viii | List of Contributors

ix

aesthetics, including the relation between modesty and hypocrisy, the role
of intention in the interpretation of art, the notion of free beauty, the art
of portraiture, and the difference between erotic art and pornography. He
is editor of the essay collections Art and Pornography (Oxford University
Press, 2012) and Pornographic Art and The Aesthetics of Pornography
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
Mary Kate McGowan is the Luella LaMer Professor of Women’s Studies
and Professor of Philosophy at Wellesley College. She works at the inter-
section of the philosophy of language, philosophy of law, and feminism,
and she has written several other articles on silencing. She can be reached
at: mmcgowan@wellesley.edu
Mari Mikkola is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Humboldt-​
Universität zu Berlin. Her work is mainly on feminist philosophy and,
in particular, on feminist metaphysics and feminist engagements with
pornography. Additionally, she has research interests in social ontology,
broadly conceived. Mikkola has published papers on these topics in vari-
ous journals and edited collections (for instance, in Analysis, Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, Inquiry, and Hypatia). Her latest work includes a
monograph on feminist philosophy and social injustice titled The Wrong
of Injustice: Dehumanization and Its Role in Feminist Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 2016) and various papers on feminist and “mainstream”
metaphysics. She is also an editor of the open-​access philosophy journal,
Journal of Social Ontology.
Lina Papadaki has been an assistant professor in philosophy at the
Department of Philosophy and Social Studies, University of Crete
(Greece), since 2009. She completed her Ph.D. thesis at Sheffield in 2006
and worked as a lecturer in the School of Philosophy, Birkbeck College,
University of London, between 2007 and 2009. Papadaki’s research in-
terests are in moral philosophy, bioethics, and feminist philosophy. Her
research currently focuses on the phenomenon of women’s sexual objec-
tification and on the application of Kant’s moral philosophy to bioethical
issues like abortion, euthanasia, and organ donation. Some of her recent
and forthcoming publications include “Abortion and Kant’s Formula of
Humanity,” Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies (2012),
“Treating Others Merely as Means: A Reply to Kerstein,” Utilitas (2015),
“What is Wrong About Objectification?,” Current Controversies in
Political Philosophy, ed. Thom Brooks, London: Routledge (2015), and
“Sexual Objectification,” The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings

List of Contributors | ix
x

(7th edition), eds. Alan Soble, Raja Halwani, and Sarah Hoffman, Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. (forthcoming).
Petra van Brabandt teaches aesthetics, semiotics, art theory, and cultural
criticism at St. Lucas School of Arts, Antwerp, Belgium. She is member
of the research group Art & Narrativity. Her research focuses on sociopo-
litical dimensions of art. She writes and lectures about art and feminism,
queer art, art and pornography, art and postcolonialism, and art and labor.
Her current research concerns wet aesthetics in art and pornography.
Robin Zheng is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Yale-​NUS College,
Singapore. She received her Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University
of Michigan and was a Visiting Junior Research Fellow in 2015–​16 at
Newnham College, Cambridge. She specializes in ethics, moral psychol-
ogy, and feminist and social philosophy.

x | List of Contributors
xi

Beyond Speech
xii
1

CHAPTER 1 Feminist Philosophy

and Pornography
The Past, The Present, and The Future
Hilkje Charlotte Hänel and Mari Mikkola

1.1. The Past

The heir of Playboy, Cooper Hefner, stated in a recent newspaper arti-

cle that the magazine is not pornography—​rather, Playboy is art and it
empowers women.1 This claim is in stark contrast with most prominent
conceptions of pornography. In 1964, Justice Potter Stewart famously
claimed that, although he cannot provide a clear definition of pornogra-
phy, he knows pornography when he sees it. During the 1960s and 1970s,
pornography in the United States and the United Kingdom was understood
on the model of obscenity: a work is obscene if an average, reasonable
person applying community standards would find the work as a whole
to lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and the
work describes or depicts in an obvious way offensive sexual conduct
(Dwyer 1995, 242, 245; Itzin 1992b). In short, the work is sexually ex-
plicit, primarily intended to produce sexual arousal in viewers, and (in
some sense) bad—​it has a morally corrupting influence, and it is indecent
or causes indecency. Conservative opponents of pornography echo such
an understanding: pornography is morally corrupting in promoting sexual
promiscuity and sexual practices that are outside of “the norm” (cf. Berger
1977). To prevent such damaging effects, the state is permitted to prohibit
pornography even for consenting adults (cf. Baird and Rosenbaum 1991).

http://​www.independent.co.uk/​news/​people/​news/​playboy-​is-​art-​not-​porn-​says-​hefner-​heir-​
1.

8439849.html. Accessed October 15, 2015.

2

However, even those who wish to distance themselves from conservative

views probably disagree with Cooper Hefner. Furthermore, feminists typi-
cally reject Hefner’s claim, along with that of Justice Stewart. They com-
monly renounce the obscenity standard, regardless of whether they oppose
pornography or not. Many feminist theorists and activists welcome ruptures
to community standards and have found the talk of “reasonable persons” to be
about “reasonable men” in disguise. Further, feminists do not oppose pornog-
raphy because of its sexual content or putative offensiveness. Championing
the antipornography stance, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
advanced a well-​known view of pornography as the violation of women’s
civil rights (A. Dworkin 1981; MacKinnon 1987, 1989, 1993). Specifically,
pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through
pictures and words that also includes women, for example, dehumanized as
sexual objects, enjoying humiliation or pain, physically hurt, presented in
positions of sexual submission or degradation, or reduced to body parts. On
such feminist views, pornography is about sexually explicit materials that
harm women insofar as they play a crucial role in the exploitation and op-
pression of women (e.g., Itzin 1992b; Lederer 1980; Saul 2003, Chapter 3).
Sexually explicit materials count as pornography when they depict the abuse
and degradation of women in endorsing, condoning, or encouraging ways
(Longino 1995; Russell 1993). If men, transpeople, or children are used in
the place of and treated as if they were women, the work also counts as por-
nography. Materials that are premised on equality count as erotica, which is
about passionate love and involves a positive, free choice (MacKinnon 1987;
see also Steinem 1995). And since MacKinnon and Dworkin hold that por-
nography should be understood as the subordination of women (and not only
to cause subordination), there cannot be putatively egalitarian pornography.
Some liberal philosophers (R. Dworkin 1985; Feinberg 1984, 1985) have
found the MacKinnon–​Dworkin elucidation wanting and have defended
pornography, even while denying that pornography is somehow valuable.
To begin with, pornography should not be censored, as this would restrict
some person’s choices on the basis that others find those choices offensive.
The state should not be allowed to restrict someone’s freedom on the basis
of others’ moral convictions, if this does not harm others. Furthermore,
even if we accept that pornography might cause some harms, the objection
goes, to claim that pornography is by definition women’s subordination
is philosophically confused, unwarranted, and “dangerous” (R. Dworkin
1991, 1993; Parent 1990).2

2.
For more on these critiques, see West (2013).

2 | Beyond Speech
3

The former objection, however, seems to rest on a misunderstand-

ing. At the request of the Minneapolis Council in 1983, MacKinnon and
A. Dworkin drafted antipornography ordinances that were premised on
civil rights, using the definition of pornography above. In so doing, they
aimed to challenge the prevalent obscenity-​based antipornography legisla-
tion. The ordinances did not advocate censorship or criminalizing the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of pornographic materials. Rather,
they aimed to give those trafficked into or coerced to perform in pornog-
raphy, those who have had pornography forced on them, and those who
are survivors of assaults caused by pornography consumption the oppor-
tunity to seek legal recourse for the harms done to them (cf. A. Dworkin
2000; Itzin 1992b; MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997). Contra conservatives,
feminist opponents of pornography reject the moralist stance. And contra
R. Dworkin, they argue precisely that pornography does harm others,
rather than being a harmless private pursuit.
The latter liberal objection has also been challenged, and Rae Langton
(1993) defends the philosophical cogency of MacKinnon’s position in her
classic article “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts.” Because U.S. leg-
islation seemingly takes pornography to be a form of speech (insofar as
free speech legislation protects its manufacture and distribution), Langton
uses J.L. Austin’s (1962) speech act theory to argue that pornographic
speech subordinates and silences women. Austin argued that our state-
ments can (and do) do more than simply make true or false claims about
the world—​sometimes we perform actions other than just speaking with
our utterances. With this in mind, Austin divides speech acts into (a) lo-
cutions, (b) perlocutions, and (c) illocutions: the speaker’s locution (the
words uttered) can perform some illocutionary action (in uttering some-
thing the speaker’s locution can count as øing), and the locution can have
some perlocutionary effects (by uttering something the speaker’s locution
can cause further extralinguistic effects). Langton famously argued that
pornographic expressions (broadly conceived) have the authority illocu-
tionarily to subordinate and silence women. In saying something about
women, pornographic speech does something: it performs harmful ac-
tions. Specifically, it subordinates women in ranking them as inferior,
in legitimating discrimination against them, and in depriving women of
important rights to do with free speech (Langton 1993, 305–​313). This
last point connects to illocutionary silencing. Pornographic speech does
not prevent women from making utterances, but it may create communi-
cative conditions that otherwise disable women’s speech: for instance, if
pornographic speech in particular instances prevents a woman’s “No!”

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 3

4

from being taken to be a refusal and sex is forced on her, she has not suc-
cessfully performed the illocutionary act of refusing the unwanted sex. In
so doing, pornography is the (illocutionary) subordination and silencing
of women.

1.2. The Present

Langton’s speech act theoretic analysis has dominated Anglo-​American

feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography over the past 20 years,
and most subsequent philosophical discussions draw on her approach.
Numerous philosophers from various feminist and nonfeminist back-
grounds have either critiqued or defended Langton’s position, and this has
generated considerable disagreements about the topic. These disagree-
ments are the starting point for this collection of previously unpublished
papers. The included contributions have different aims and perspectives,
and they offer various ways to understand pornography and its relation to
gendered oppression. Nevertheless, the subsequent papers are united by
feminist political commitments and by taking pornography as a central
feminist philosophical topic. But first, let us briefly outline some central
controversies in order to understand the debate better.

1.2.a. Does the Subordination Claim Stand Up to Scrutiny?

One might accept that some pornography harms some individual women.3
But Langton’s antipornography position makes a stronger claim: that por-
nographic materials harm women as a group. The idea is that pornography
creates and reproduces views about women and their sexual behavior that
are false (see also Longino 1995). Such “sexual lies” then play a role in
how men view women and they teach men (as well as women) falsehoods
about sex (cf. Baker 1992; Cameron and Frazer 1992; Sweet 1992). Such
views about women and sex extend to gender oppression in general inso-
far as pornography is a tool in reproducing a culture of systematic sexual
violence against women (MacKinnon 1987, 1989, 1995).

As part of civil rights hearings, MacKinnon and Dworkin (1997) collected a catalog of first-​
3.

hand stories of how the production of pornography has harmed individual performers: some were
sexually abused and/​or threatened to take part; others had no other economic choices. Furthermore,
nonperformers have being attacked by perpetrators trying to reenact pornographic scenes or have
been abused by men who were taught by pornography that a woman’s “No” means “Yes.” This,
of course, does not imply that there are no positive stories from performers who have entered the
pornography industry despite other meaningful choices.

4 | Beyond Speech
5

Whether this more controversial claim stands up to scrutiny has gener-

ated heated debate. Some object to such an antipornography position be-
cause it singles out pornography as the central patriarchal tool of women’s
oppression. This supposedly ignores other ways in which (e.g.) labor and
family relations and discriminatory forces more broadly enact gender op-
pression (Valverde 1995; Willis 1995). Others have claimed that antipor-
nography positions ignore oppression that is due to intersections of race,
class, nationality, ability, ethnicity, and religion. In defining pornography
as they do, the argument goes, white U.S. antipornography feminists fail to
see the world outside of North America and fail to see how racism (and not
just sexism) is an integral part of the harms of pornography (Collins 1993;
Loots 2000; Mercer 2000). Still others argue that in failing to theorize and
recognize queer pornography, antipornography feminism is blinkered in
focus and actually represses already-​repressed queer sexualities (Green
2000). In line with this, Jennifer Saul (2006) and Mari Mikkola (2008)
have expressed worries about the scope of Langton’s ideas. Saul argues that
Langton’s position is too broad and that a narrower one is warranted: fol-
lowing Langton, Saul claims, we should say that “pornographic viewings
are sometimes the subordination of women” (2006, 79; see Bianchi 2008
for an opposing view and De Gaynesford 2009 for a reply). This opens
up the possibility, for example, for contexts of feminist critical viewings.
Furthermore, establishing a reliable systematic causal connection be-
tween pornography and sexualized violence is hard, and there is signifi-
cant disagreement among social scientists and philosophers about this.
Some countries (like Japan) that appear to have low sexual assault figures
have high pornography consumption figures (e.g., Segal 1993; Strossen
1995). Furthermore, it is far from easy to tell whether pornography is re-
sponsible for the fact that some men sexually attack women: perhaps these
men have a predisposition to sexualized violence, which simply correlates
with their consumption of pornography. And although child abusers tend
to use pornography to “educate” their victims about sex, this does not
demonstrate that pornography is the cause of such abuse. Liberal defend-
ers of pornography consider the idea that some “decent chaps” will be
turned into rapists after they have watched pornography to be highly im-
plausible and laughable (Feinberg 1985), and critics often take the lack of
reliable empirical evidence that proves a systematic causal connection to
undermine antipornography positions (e.g., R. Dworkin 1993).4 Finally, it

Some have stressed the vast amount of research that supports the causal connection (cf.
4.

Donnerstein et al. 1987; Einsiedel 1992; Hald et al. 2010; Itzin 1992b; Mappes and Zembaty

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 5

6

might be said that because pornography is fantasy, it cannot have subordi-

nating effects in the real world.
These views have not gone unchallenged. Langton and West (1999)
have argued that even fictional works can say derogatory things and that
pornography may well say derogatory things about women, even when
it does not do so explicitly and even when pornography is mere fantasy.
After all, pornography can say things about women implicitly and even
fictional works can appear to tell harmful truths about the world—​just
think of historical fiction, which makes use of actual events and persons,
and thereby muddies the distinction between fact and fiction.5
Anne Eaton (2007), then again, has provided an account of pornogra-
phy’s putative harms on the model of probabilistic harm in order to vindi-
cate the causal connection: if pornography is likely to increase the prob-
ability of sexual violence against women, the causal connection holds and
there may still be a case for legally restricting it. Take smoking: many non-
smokers develop lung cancer and many smokers do not. Nevertheless, we
accept that smoking causes cancer because it increases the likelihood of
cancer, which is enough to justify legal interventions (e.g., prevent smok-
ing in public places). The same could be true of pornography. (For a simi-
lar argument, see also Russell [2000].) Eaton is careful to stress that there
is no conclusive proof that makes good this proposal. Still, she holds, the
subordination claim per se is not absurd.

1.2.b. How Plausible Is the Silencing Claim?

Since writing her seminal paper, Langton has developed the claim that
pornography causes and is the silencing of women in more detail with
Jennifer Hornsby (1998). (Hornsby [1995] also develops this view inde-
pendently of Langton.) The Hornsby–​Langton approach to silencing has,
nonetheless, also been critiqued as philosophically untenable. Alexander

1997; Russell 2000; Weaver 1992; Wyre 1992). Also note that a 1985 report by the U.S. Attorney
General’s Commission on Pornography found a unanimous causal link between pornography and
sexual violence. A powerful attack orchestrated by a Washington D.C. public relations company
ensued to discredit its findings (or as the company put it in a leaked letter: to deal with the
“problems” the report raised [cf. Itzin 1992a]). This campaign was successful in misrepresenting
and discrediting the commission’s findings. Furthermore, it managed to distribute misinformation
rather effectively because the report was initially published in an obscure Tennessee-​based press and
was at the time largely unavailable to the wider public (Itzin 1992a, 11; see also Russell 1993a).
For more on the fictional character of pornography, see Cooke (2012), Eaton (2007), and Liao and
5.

Protasi (2013).

6 | Beyond Speech
7

Bird (2002) has attacked it on the very grounds that justify it: on the
grounds of speech act theory. Bird does not take issue with any empirical
claims about the effects of pornographic speech. Instead, he argues that
the Hornsby–​Langton approach is philosophically indefensible because it
takes uptake as one of the success conditions for the illocution of refusals.
For Hornsby and Langton, if and when pornography prevents women’s lo-
cution “No!” from securing the required uptake (being taken as a refusal),
the locution will fail to count as a refusal, which amounts to an illocution-
ary disablement of the refusal. Bird rejects this, though, because (for him)
uptake is not part of the success conditions for illocutions in general or
for illocutionary refusals in particular (Jacobson [1995] makes a similar
claim). In response, others have defended the philosophical cogency of the
Hornsby–​Langton approach (Maitra and McGowan 2009; Mikkola 2011).
Even though uptake may not be necessary for all illocutionary speech acts,
contra Bird and Jacobson, it is necessary for refusals because refusing is
a communicative act. And uptake for communicative acts like refusals is
part of their success conditions: if I intend to refuse your invitation, but
you interpret me to be accepting, I have not refused—​I have merely at-
tempted to do so.
However, those critical of the silencing claim hold that we should reject
it on practical grounds too: it allegedly diminishes rapists’ responsibility.
Bird holds that if women’s refusals are silenced, rapists won’t be culpable
because they would not have committed rape. Bird’s view is akin to that of
Jacobson (1995), who takes the phenomenon of illocutionary disablement
to have the purportedly odd and problematic consequence that if women
fail to illocute refusals and sex is forced on them, we cannot call this
“rape.” And this is said to render the Hornsby–​Langton view practically
indefensible. (For another variant of this argument, see Wieland [2007].)
Independently of one another, Mikkola (2011), Maitra and McGowan
(2009), and McGowan et al. (2011) have argued that the Hornsby–​Langton
model does not diminish rapists’ culpability. The Hornsby–​Langton view
is in trouble only if the lack of refusal entails consent. But this is false, and
we should not confuse consent with nonrefusal. Just think of cases where
someone has been drugged and is thus unable to refuse sex or show any
signs of resistance. Contra views critical of the silencing claim, Maitra
(2009) argues that there are different ways to understand the claim by
drawing on Paul Grice’s work rather than Austin. And there may be still
other ways in which pornography silences women even on the Austinian
model (McGowan 2009).

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 7

8

Nancy Bauer puts forward a more thoroughgoing challenge by ques-

tioning the focus and attention on speakers’ illocutionary acts. Instead, she
asks: why is it that pornography seemingly makes people see the world in
a certain way and, thus, has significant perlocutionary effects in the world?
Why is it that consumers “acquiesce to the pornographer’s point of view”
(Bauer 2015, 80)? A more fruitful feminist analysis of pornography (for
Bauer) requires that we refocus our attention to pornography’s consumers,
rather than speakers’ illocutionary intentions, bearing in mind the “bigger
picture” in which pornographic expressions take place.6

1.2.c. Does Pornography Objectify?

The above debates mainly focus on physical harms against women (like
sexualized violence). There might, however, be other senses in which por-
nography harms women as a group. MacKinnon and Dworkin claim that
pornography creates and reproduces the objectification of women by men
(MacKinnon 1987; see Haslanger [1993] for a discussion of MacKinnon’s
view). Most basically, objectification is about seeing and/​or treating a
person as a thing or an object (Nussbaum [1995] offers a comprehensive
account of objectification). Several feminist scholars have argued that
pornography causes men to view and treat women as objects to be used,
which makes pornography particularly problematic from a feminist per-
spective (cf. Assiter 1988; Langton 1995; Russell 1993; Vadas 2005; for
an overview, see Papadaki [2015]). Moreover, Langton has more recently
argued that pornography produces a distinctive kind of maker’s knowl-
edge about women (2009, Chapter 13). What is distinctive about such
knowledge is that it “not only aims at truth, but makes its truth” (Langton
2009, 292). Further, pornographic knowledge is in itself a kind of harm.
Pornography functions like a blueprint that benefits those with social
power—​namely, men. It involves a certain kind of self-​fulfilling projection
with objectification of women as its mechanism. This makes pornogra-
phy a source of certain kinds of harmful knowledge about women, which

There are many further questions about what legally follows from the silencing claim. Some hold
6.

that even if pornography illocutionarily silences women, this is not the sort of harm that justifies
legally restricting pornography (R. Dworkin 1993; Jacobson 1995). Free speech does not extend
to our freedom to make illocutionary speech acts. Since pornographic speech does not literally
render women’s speech inaudible, there is no free speech case against pornography. In response,
some argue that free speech considerations may still demand restrictions on pornographic speech,
although they may not justify full censorship (Hornsby and Langton 1998; Langton 2009;
West 2003).

8 | Beyond Speech
9

destroys women’s sexual autonomy (for similar claims, see Dyzenhaus

[1992] and Easton [1994]).
Whether pornography objectifies and whether objectification is harmful
are live issues, though. For instance, Cameron and Frazer (1992) disagree
with the view that men are incapable of critically interpreting pornogra-
phy. Moreover, some argue that not all objectification is bad (cf. Green
2000; Soble 2002). Following Nussbaum (1995), the moral status of ob-
jectification is context-​dependent. If the context is one of equality and re-
spect, objectification is morally benign. This is in line with some BDSM
practitioners’ claims. BDSM practices, although apparently objectifying,
have strict rules that render the contexts of such practices premised on
equality and respect (cf. Califia 1994; Rubin 1993). Unsurprisingly, some
disagree (Raymond 1992). If objectification can be morally benign, argu-
ably so can pornographic makers’ knowledge.

1.2.d. Pornography as Subordinating Speech?

Langton’s entire approach hinges on a particular presupposition: that
pornography is speech (broadly conceived). But there are live questions
about what it means for pornography or instances of pornography con-
sumption to count as speech acts in the relevant sense (Antony 2011;
Saul 2006). Furthermore, if some pornography fails to be speech in the
appropriate sense, the speech act theoretic approach does not get off the
ground. Finally, in order for the speech act approach to succeed, pornog-
raphy and pornographers must have the required sort of authority to enact
illocutionary silencing and subordination. But some have questioned this
move (e.g., Bauer 2015; Butler 1997; Green 1998). Whether pornogra-
phers are authoritative or not hinges on many empirical issues. There is
nevertheless evidence that younger consumers see pornography as an
educational tool and do consider pornographers to be “experts” about sex
(cf. Paul 2005). Langton has responded to this point (2009, Chapters 4
and 5), along with McGowan (2003), in arguing that the sort of porno-
graphic authority required to defend the speech act approach is actually
of a fairly modest kind.
Moreover, although the feminist move away from the obscenity
standard of public morality has been welcomed, whether it is help-
ful to understand pornography as a moralized notion is controversial.
Some (maybe many) ordinary speakers find the MacKinnon–​Dworkin/​
Langton accounts counterintuitive, and it seemingly stipulates what
pornography is in a prescriptive manner. Michael Rea, thus, argues for

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 9

10

a nonstipulative, “real” definition that “respects commonly held views

and widely shared intuitions and attempts to capture these in a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions” in a nonevaluative manner (2001,
119). Now, if we define pornography as MacKinnon and Langton do,
there simply cannot be egalitarian pornography. Antipornography femi-
nists are often skeptical of the idea that women choose to perform in
pornographic films. A number of performers and ex-​performers report
having been sexually abused as children or groomed for sex work (cf.
MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997; Russell 1993). Performers from un-
derprivileged socioeconomic backgrounds have fewer occupational al-
ternatives, which raises doubts about the genuineness of their choices.
Still, other performers claim that they genuinely chose a career in the
industry, that they would have other meaningful economic choices open
to them, and that they are proud of their occupation (see Arrowsmith
2013; Gruen and Panichas 1997; McElroy 1995, Chapter 7; Royalle
2000; Strossen 1995, Chapter 9).
Be that as it may, a staunch antipornography stance holds that certain
representations of women just are degrading and that they assault women’s
right to equality: even if performers chose to participate in pornography, in
endorsing women’s subordination, the depicted images are morally prob-
lematic. However, many feminists opposing restrictions on pornography
also agree (cf. Rubin 1993). In fact, self-​proclaimed feminist pornogra-
phers typically hold that much of mainstream industrial pornography is
sexist (cf. Arrowsmith 2013). But (they contend) we should not therefore
oppose pornography per se; rather, we should oppose ethically bad and ex-
ploitative pornography and aim to undermine the force of such mainstream
industrial porn. With this in mind, feminist pornography has been described
as a genre that “uses sexually explicit imagery to contest and complicate
dominant representations of gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, ability,
age, body type, and other identity markers” (Taormino et al. 2013, 9).
So, a simple divide between harmful pornographic speech and harm-
less erotica is insufficient. Self-​proclaimed feminist pornographers take
themselves explicitly to be producing egalitarian pornography (not erot-
ica) and to be creating alternatives to mainstream pornography’s vision
of female sexuality. (A number of concrete examples will be discussed
in the pages to come.) This pushes us towards a nonevaluative definition
of pornography that is applied to all sexually explicit materials, some of
which endorse the abuse and degradation of women. In this way, we could
distinguish nonegalitarian and egalitarian pornography as well as erotica.

10 | Beyond Speech
11

1.3. The Future

Since Langton’s seminal paper, a rich literature on feminist philosophy

and pornography has emerged. Nevertheless, as the above attests, little
agreement exists on many key issues: What is pornography? Does pornog-
raphy in fact subordinate and silence women? Does pornography objec-
tify women in harmful ways? Is pornography authoritative in the requisite
sense to make good the speech act approach? How (if at all) is pornogra-
phy speech? Given the deep disagreements over these questions, the first
goal of this collection is to take stock of extant debates in order to clarify
feminist conceptual and political terrains. Feminist philosophers often op-
erate with diverged conceptual and political frameworks, which compli-
cates meaningful dialog and debate. Interlocutors may end up talking past
one another, and this hinders real progress in the debate. The collection
thus seeks to clarify some key feminist conceptual commitments when
discussing pornography. However, in so doing, it aims to go beyond the
prevalent speech act approach to pornography.
This brings us to the collection’s second goal: to highlight some novel
issues in feminist pornography debates. We will examine some newer lines
of inquiry and investigate what they can tell us about still-​unsettled con-
ceptual and political questions. In so doing, the collection opens a space
for themes and debates that have to date received surprisingly little atten-
tion. We will also ask how these more recent debates interact with one
other and with more established discussions. How can newer lines of in-
quiry help with some of the older problems? And how can we make prog-
ress philosophically analyzing pornography without simply rehashing old
debates, but still acknowledging the value of earlier feminist work? Thus,
the leading idea of the anthology is to go “beyond speech,” but without
changing the terms of the debate wholesale.
The papers in this collection are divided into four parts, and they cluster
around certain themes and methodological frameworks that are to do with
harm, epistemology, and aesthetics.

1.3.a. Harm
Although much has already been written about harm, many open questions
remain. This is particularly so when we take seriously the aforementioned
putatively feminist pornography. Furthermore, very little has been written
in recent analytic feminism about racism and the racialization of sexuality

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 11

12

in pornography. With these in mind, a feminist analysis of pornography

must still ask the following:

1. Which definitions of harm and pornography would be most fitting

when we go beyond simple mainstream examples (like Playboy or
Hustler)?
2. Is feminist pornography ever possible, or might putatively “female-​
friendly” pornography still involve harmful objectification
of women?
3. Is objectification really one of pornography’s harms?
4. Are queer pornography and trans-​pornography structurally similar to
heteronormative pornography, and do they have parallel harms?
5. How are racialized genres of pornography harmful? Do such genres
involve objectification in the same sense that some feminists have
claimed women are objectified in and by pornography?

1.3.b. Epistemology
As outlined above, Langton argues in her recent work that pornography
produces a distinctive kind of harmful maker’s knowledge. She further
holds that objectification is one mechanism that projects such pornographic
knowledge and that undermines women’s sexual autonomy. It is still an
open question, though, whether pornography involves this kind of mak-
er’s knowledge, some other kind of knowledge, or any knowledge at all.
Moreover, do pornographers have the authority to create maker’s knowl-
edge or enact some other norm-​governed activities? This relates back to
harm: if pornography involves maker’s knowledge, is it of a harmful kind?
And does its harmfulness consist in women’s objectification? Might dif-
ferent kinds of pornography produce different kinds of knowledge—​some
harmful, but others not?

1.3.c. Aesthetics
Although philosophers of art and cultural theorists have extensively de-
bated the relationship between art and pornography (cf. Maes and Levinson
2012), very few of these discussions intersect with those in analytic femi-
nist philosophy. This being the case, the collection aims to bring debates
about pornography and art together with those in feminist philosophy.
Subsequently, we should ask:

12 | Beyond Speech
13

1. What kind(s) of representation does pornography involve?

2. Is the representation of gender, sexuality, and/​or race in pornography
harmful; if so, in what sense?
3. If pornography involves a kind of fantasy, can it generate knowledge
claims about women?
4. Does feminist pornography (as its self-​ proclaimed champions
hold) embody emancipatory potential partly due to its aesthetic and
artistic value?
5. Do queer pornography and trans-​ pornography escape putatively
harmful objectification?

With these themes and questions in mind, the collection starts by

considering the much-​discussed speech act theoretic approach (Part I,
“Speech Act Approaches to Pornography”). Rae Langton’s chapter (“Is
Pornography like the Law?”) draws an analogy between pornography
and the law when thinking about the subordination claim. The chapter
examines the seemingly outrageous radical feminist view that pornogra-
phy subordinates in the same sense that the law could subordinate: for
instance, in that they both may authoritatively say someone is inferior.
Langton defends the analogy as well as the authoritativeness of pornogra-
phy to subordinate. Mary Kate McGowan’s chapter (“On Multiple Types
of Silencing”) is also concerned with the more traditional approach to por-
nography via speech act theory. It investigates different forms of silencing
and argues that there are many ways in which speech acts can go wrong
(and thus be silenced). This becomes especially relevant when focusing
on systematic interferences with speaker authority. In the section’s final
chapter, “Be What I Say: Authority Versus Power in Pornography,” Louise
Antony argues that there is an internal tension in Langton’s speech act
analysis. Langton claims that pornography is both a verdictive/​exercitive
speech act and a statement that purports to describe the world—​it “tells
lies about women.” But on Austin’s theory, this is impossible: verdictive
and exercitive speech acts do not describe the state of affairs they bring
about. If pornography says that women are inferior, it cannot at the same
time make it the case that women are inferior.
Part II, “Pornography and Social Ontology,” is concerned with ways
in which feminist philosophers can go beyond the speech act approach to
pornography. The section starts with Katharine Jenkins’ chapter (“What
Women Are For: Pornography and Social Ontology”), which argues
that John Searle’s account of institutional reality offers fruitful ways to

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 13

14

understand the harms of pornography. Instead of relying on speech act

theory, she puts forward social ontological interpretations of MacKinnon’s
claims that pornography subordinates women (the subordination claim)
and that it constructs women’s natures in a way that is somehow defective
(the constructionist claim). Mari Mikkola then tackles the question of what
makes something a pornographic artifact in her chapter, “Pornographic
Artifacts: Maker’s Intentions Model.” Like Jenkins, Mikkola argues that
social ontological models offer more promising ways to conceptualize and
understand pornography than the prevalent speech act approach. For one
thing, the proposed maker’s intentions model helps to create much-​needed
conceptual common ground for interlocutors in the debate and provides a
way to understand the plurality of pornographic makers and subsequent
pornographic knowledges.
The previous part provided alternative ways of conceiving what por-
nography is and what it does more generally. Part III, “Objectification
as Harm of Pornography,” examines one specific way in which pornog-
raphy is thought to be harmful: in that it is objectifying. Lina Papadaki
starts the section by examining the alleged causal relationship between
the objectification of women and the personification of pornography
and argues against the existence of such a causal relationship (“Treating
Pornography as a Woman and Women’s Objectification”). Papadaki also
considers what role pornographic knowledge plays in this causal story, if
any at all. Next, in her chapter “Getting ‘Naked’ in the Colonial/​Modern
Gender System: A Preliminary Trans Feminist Analysis of Pornography,”
Talia Mae Bettcher explores the idea of nakedness relative to (what she
calls) a “sex-​representational system of interpersonal spatiality.” In this
system, racist, sexist, and transphobic oppressions converge, and they
construct differentially racialized and gendered forms of nakedness.
This (Bettcher holds) provides tools with which we can begin to cri-
tique pornography from a trans/​feminist perspective. The part closes
with Robin Zheng’s discussion of objectification and racialization in
pornography. In her chapter “Race and Pornography: The Dilemma of
the (Un)Desirable,” Zheng discusses an apparent dilemma: pornography
produced by members of marginalized groups can work in a positive
fashion to extend our conceptions of sexiness and desirability. At the
same time, racialization in and of pornography also harms people of
color—​thus the dilemma.
Some earlier chapters in this collection discussed pornography criti-
cally from an explicitly antipornographic stance. However, a number of
the contributions also consider the possibility that some pornography

14 | Beyond Speech
15

may not be harmful (see, e.g., Mikkola, Zheng). Moreover, self-​

proclaimed feminist pornographers take their work not to be harmful
in that it involves representations of women and sexuality that embody
emancipatory potential. This is said to be (in part) due to the aesthetic
and artistic values that feminist pornography allegedly involves. Part
IV, “Feminist Pornography: An Oxymoron?”, discusses more explic-
itly the vexing issue of feminist pornography. The chapters in this
final part do so with a special focus on the aesthetics of pornography,
which connects pornography debates in aesthetics to those in feminist
philosophy. The final section, then, affords still further alternatives to
the speech act approach with which the collection started. Hans Maes’
chapter, “Falling in Lust: Sexiness, Feminism, and Pornography,” pro-
vides a bridge to discussions about objectification. Maes considers the
putatively harmful role that “sexiness” plays in women’s objectifica-
tion and in pornography. He goes on to consider whether some radically
egalitarian pornography might undermine that harmful role by promot-
ing an alternative aesthetics of sexiness. Petra van Brabandt continues
discussing the aesthetics of contemporary pornographies in her chapter,
“In/​Egalitarian Pornography: A Simplistic View of Pornography.” Van
Brabandt discusses whether apparently feminist egalitarian pornogra-
phy truly offers an alternative to “mainstream” pornography’s inegali-
tarian depictions of women. She argues that a proper assessment of
this requires taking issue with the aesthetics of the images represented
and that this yields a more complicated picture about which depictions
are acceptable. Finally, she suggests that queer pornography in fact
offers a better emancipatory alternative to purportedly egalitarian por-
nography in going beyond what is truly harmful in much of pornogra-
phy: its highly gendered depictions of sexuality. A.W. Eaton’s chapter,
“Feminist Pornography,” rounds up the final part (and the collection)
by considering more generally whether feminist pornography is pos-
sible at all and, if so, what it would look like. Eaton further considers
the role that pornography (both feminist and inegalitarian) can play in
shaping our erotic tastes: explicitly feminist pornography may direct
our erotic tastes in gender-​just directions, Eaton suggests.
The chapters in this collection are unlikely to discuss definitively the
themes and questions we raised above. Rather, our hope and expectation
is that the discussions to follow create new lines of inquiry that push the
older, more established debates further. In so doing, the collection dem-
onstrates that there is still much to say about pornography from a feminist
philosophical perspective.

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND PORNOGRAPHY | 15

16

References
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Jurisprudence 2: 387–​401.
Arrowsmith, Anna. 2013. “My Pornographic Development.” In Pornographic Art and the
Aesthetics of Pornography, edited by Hans Maes, 287–​297. Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Assiter, Alison. 1988. “Autonomy and Pornography.” In Feminist Perspectives in
Philosophy, edited by Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford, 58–​ 71.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Austin, J.L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon.
Baird, Robert, and Stuart Rosenbaum, eds. 1991. Pornography: Private Right or Public
Menace? Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
Baker, Peter. 1992. “Maintaining Male Power: Why Heterosexual Men Use Pornography.”
In Pornography: Women, Violence and Civil Liberties, edited by Catherine Itzin,
124–​144. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bauer, Nancy. 2015. How to Do Things With Pornography. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Berger, Fred. 1977. “Pornography, Sex, and Censorship.” Social Theory and Practice
4: 183–​209.
Bianchi, Claudia. 2008. “Indexicals, Speech Acts and Pornography.” Analysis
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Bird, Alexander. 2002. “Illocutionary Silencing.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
83: 1–​15.
Butler, Judith. 1997. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York and
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Califia, Pat. 1994. Public Sex. Pittsburgh, PA: Cleis.
Cameron, Deborah, and Elizabeth Frazer. 1992. “On the Question of Pornography and
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Collins, Patricia H. 1993. “Pornography and Black Women’s Bodies.” In Making
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Oxford: Oxford University Press.

16 | Beyond Speech
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
"Go?" Johnson shrugged, then stretched and yawned widely. "I
guess it went all right. I haven't seen Danny or Flip for forty years.
Wonder what ever happened to them?"
"Ended up in jail, most likely. But what about the crisis? Did you
succeed in avoiding it?"
"Crisis?" Johnson peered at him through narrowed lids. "Are you
daft, man? What crisis could there possible be in a bunch of kids
getting together in a corner sweet shop?"
"But...." Cavendish shook his head. "Things did change!"
"What changed? Name me one concrete thing that's different than it
used to be."
"I...." He shook his head. "I can't."
"Of course you can't. And for the very simple reason that nothing did
change. I'm still the same man I always was. And you'd better start
coming up with some concrete benefits from this gadget of yours.
You know I put myself into hock to raise the money you needed—I
told my wife I was adding another franchise to my line. If she finds
out her jewels were hocked for me to play around with a time
machine, instead of a new line of cars, she'll flip. So how about it,
Cavendish? Some concrete results next time."
Cavendish went to the bar and returned with a generous slug of
whisky.
"What's this?" said Johnson.
"Why, your drink."
"Drink?" He snorted. "You know I don't drink, man. Have you gone
completely daft? I haven't touched alcohol since I was a youngster."
Cavendish seemed near tears. He drank the whisky himself, then
turned back to the machine.
"What are you up to now?"
"I'm looking for a suitable crisis point." The screen wavered, then
filled with a group of men in uniform—heavy winter garb. They were
clustered around a small fire in a cave; one seemed to be heating
coffee in a tin can. Johnson sucked in his breath.
"You know what is going to happen?"
"Yes, dammit! You're a devil!"
"Perhaps." He sighed. "I sometimes wonder.... But no matter." He
adjusted the picture, and events flowed forward a few hours. The
soldiers were now at the base of a snow-covered hill. Above them,
gaunt and bare, the timber-line beckoned with obscenely stretching
limbs.
Suddenly a flare shot up from someplace to the right of the little
band. Its eerie glare picked out unexpected shadows among the
trees above. One of the soldiers, facing the prospect of near and
immediate personal death for the first time in his life, panicked and
began spraying the tree-line with his grease gun. Branches and
splinters of wood kicked out, until the Sergeant reached out and
slapped the gun from the boy's arms.

The men waited until an unheard signal sounded; then the Sergeant
waved them on up the hill. Slowly, cautiously at first, they made
progress through the protecting trees. But then they reached the
timber-line and froze. Cursing, the Sergeant moved from man to
man, shoving them out of the false protection. At last he came to the
boy who had fired earlier. Just as the older man placed his hand on
the boy's shoulder, the boy twisted and broke away, running madly
down the hill....
"That's enough, damn you!"
Cavendish turned off the picture and came back to Johnson's side.
"They court-martialed you, didn't they?"
"You know they did," he said, dully.
"You were unlucky, that's all. Many a soldier spooks his first time
under fire. A lot of them run away."
"How many of them run right into the arms of their Commanding
General?"
"Unlucky," said Cavendish.
"They kicked me out," said Johnson, bitterly. "A dishonorable
discharge—'cowardice in the face of enemy action'. Said I was lucky
I didn't face the firing squad."
"Officers are human, too," said Cavendish. "In times of stress, they
tend to panic."
"They were 'making an example of me'," said Johnson. He laughed,
a humorless sound that grated on the ears. "Some example. It took
me twenty years to live it down."
"But people do forget, eventually."
"Not all of them."
"Shall we get on with it?"
"Of course, man. This is what I have been waiting for!" His words
were sharp and impatient.

"Hey, Art! Got a butt?"

"Yeah, sure." Art Johnson scrabbled around inside his jacket and
came out with a crumpled pack of cigarettes. He passed them over.
"Thanks, buddy. God, but it's cold here!" He stripped off one glove
and warmed the palm of his hand over the glowing coal of the
cigarette. "Now I know what they mean when they call a place
Godforsaken."
"Ease off there, you two!" Sergeant Stebbins glowered their way.
"You want every chink in Korea to hear you?"
"Sorry, Sarge," muttered the cigarette-bummer. He dropped his voice
to a whisper. "Hey, Artie! I hear some of the guys in Fox company
are making book on how many of us live through the day."
"Yeah?" Johnson shook his head. "Some characters'll bet on their
own mother's funeral."
"Or their own." The boy giggled. "Wouldn't it be funny if the winners
couldn't collect because they were all dead?"
"A real scream," said Johnson, sourly. "Look, let's change the
subject, huh?"
The boy shrugged. "Sure, Art. Anything you say."
They lapsed into silence, and Art Johnson considered the
improbable amount of circumstances that had brought him to the
base of this numbered but nameless hill half across the world from
home. There was nothing of home here, and he felt the lack mightily.
There was a very good chance that before another few hours had
passed, he would be dead. And then he would never see home
again.
He shivered. The thought frightened him. He didn't want to die. Not
that he supposed any of the other men wanted to die either. But they
were remote, other beings, alien in Art Johnson's world. What they
felt he could not guess; what he felt he knew.
And he did not want to die!
"Hey, Art!"
"Uh, what is it, Tooey?"
"Chinks, I think. Up there in the trees. God, they're sneaking down!"
"Where? Dammit, where?" He thumbed the safety of his grease gun,
and brought it up to bear on the trees. His fingers tightened around
the stock; the trigger started to depress—
Then—
Something clicked.
"Jesus, Artie, they're coming!"
Art Johnson's eyes took on a faraway look. His fingers loosened
their death grip on the gun. He shook his head.
"Artie!"
"Shut up, Tooey!" Reaching out, he slapped the boy's face. "You're
imagining things."
"But they're up there, Artie!" whimpered the boy.
"Sure they're up there. But not where you think they are. They're dug
in, in the caves. And it's going to be up to us to dig them out. Now
snap out of it!"

Suddenly a flare shot up from somewhere to their right. It whistled,

then popped, the white light hurting their night-adjusted eyes. A
moment later, Stebbins whistled and the men started moving up the
hill.
They paused at the timber-line, and Stebbins cursed, moving from
man to man and urging him out of the false protection of the trees
and onto the broad expanse of boulder-pocked snow. Above them,
another two hundred yards, black dots against the snow showed
where the caves were waiting for them. Johnson could visualize the
little slant-eyed men within. He flopped to his belly and wriggled
forward. Suddenly he stood up and dashed twenty yards, then
flopped again as bullets whined through the space occupied by his
body bare instants earlier.
He lay there, face pressed into the snow, until the muscles of his
legs started tensing of their own accord. Then he was up again, and
running for dear life.
Gun fire was bursting all around now, a seemingly solid screen of
lead pouring down from the caves. But the men were getting through
the barrier; one slammed into the rock wall beside a cave mouth and
started unlimbering grenades, tossing them in as quickly as he could
pull the pins. Seconds later a vast tongue of fire roared out, melting
the snow and scorching the barren earth beneath.
The fire probed down the hill as the side around the cave shook and
roared. The fire reached and passed over Art Johnson, lying in the
snow, fingers digging at the rock beneath.
By its orange light, the spreading circle of red around the soldier
blended into the artificial coloring of the snow.

"Just think of it!" Cavendish pounded his hand on the desk. "The
chance to go back and correct our mistakes, live our lives over
again. The opportunities missed, the chances passed up, the
decisions made wrong—all can be changed."
The man in the chair swirled the dregs of the whisky in the bottom of
the glass. "Go on, Cavendish," he said. "You're keeping my interest."
Cavendish flushed. "Thank you, Mr. Blackwell. I knew a man of your
position would not pass up an opportunity like this. Why, this is
another chance to make the world! A second chance!"
THE END
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SECOND
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