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The EU between Federal Union and
Flexible Integration: Interdisciplinary

European Studies Antonina Bakardjieva
Engelbrekt
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THE EU BETWEEN FEDERAL UNION
AND FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION
Interdisciplinary European Studies
EDITED BY ANTONINA BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT

PER EKMAN · ANNA MICHALSKI · LARS OXELHEIM
The EU between Federal Union and Flexible
Integration
“Putin’s barbaric war in Ukraine tests our European Union as never before. Since
the invasion on 24 February 2022, we have seen unity among EU member states
and staunch solidarity with Ukraine. It is important that this continues. But what
are the options for the next steps with regard to the future of the EU? Increased
federalism or more flexible integration? This volume offers valuable answers
and insights regarding a wide selection of key issues, ranging from the rule of
law to economic, security and industrial policy, as well as income inequality.
The volume provides a rich source of essential knowledge on the state of the
European Union.”
—Anders Ahnlid, Director General of National Board of Trade Sweden. Formerly
Sweden’s ambassador to Finland, the European Union and the OECD, and
Director General for Trade in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt ·
Per Ekman · Anna Michalski · Lars Oxelheim
Editors
The EU
between Federal
Union and Flexible
Integration
Interdisciplinary European Studies
Editors
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt Per Ekman
Department of Law Department of Government
Stockholm University Uppsala University
Stockholm, Sweden Uppsala, Sweden
Anna Michalski Lars Oxelheim

Department of Government Research Institute of Industrial
Uppsala University Economics (IFN)
Uppsala, Sweden Stockholm, Sweden
ISBN 978-3-031-22396-9 ISBN 978-3-031-22397-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22397-6
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Contents
1 The Road Ahead for the European Union: Between

Federal Union and Flexible Integration 1
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Per Ekman,
Anna Michalski, and Lars Oxelheim
2 Democracy in Europe: Enlarged But Eroding—A Union
in Existential Crisis 25
Daniel Silander
3 Rule of Law Crisis: EU in Limbo Between Federalism
and Flexible Integration 51
Anna Södersten
4 Parliament as an Arena for Opposition in EU Politics:
Wasteland or Conflict Zone? 75
Christer Karlsson, Moa Mårtensson, and Thomas Persson
5 European Stabilisation Policy After the COVID-19
Pandemic: More Flexible Integration or More
Federalism? 103
Fredrik N. G. Andersson and Lars Jonung
6 EU State Aid Policy: Concealed Transfer
of Competences? 133
Jörgen Hettne
v
vi CONTENTS
7 Are Federal Taxation Requirements Moving the EU

Away from Flexible Integration? 159
Krister Andersson
8 A Federal European Prosecution Authority: From
Vision to Reality? 185
Jacob Öberg
9 European Defence Policy: Between Flexible
Integration and a Defence Union 215
Malena Britz
10 A More Equal Europe: A Prerequisite or a Consequence
of Increased Federalism? 239
Jesper Roine
11 The State of European Integration: Where Does
the EU Stand and in What Direction Is It Heading? 263
Index 279
Notes on Contributors
Fredrik N. G. Andersson is Associate Professor of Economics at the

Department of Economics at the Lund University School of Economics
and Management. His research interests include the relationship between
macroeconomic policies and economic crises.
Krister Andersson is a Member of the European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC) and the European Commission’s Platform for Tax
Good Governance. He focuses primarily on the interactions between tax
policy and economic growth.
Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt is Professor of European Law at the
Faculty of Law of Stockholm University. She is chair of the Swedish
Network for European Legal Studies (SNELS) and she has been Torsten
och Ragnar Söderberg Professor of Legal Science (2015-2018). Her
research interests include processes of Europeanisation and globalization
and their influence on national law and institutions.
Malena Britz is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Swedish
Defence University. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stock-
holm University. Her research areas include different aspects of European,
Nordic and transatlantic security policy, including Europeanization of
security and defence, and Nordic co-operation.
Per Ekman is a researcher in Political Science at the Department
of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden and Coordinator for the
vii
viii NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES). His

research interests include foreign policy of countries in the EU’s Eastern
Partnership, state building and historical institutionalism.
Jörgen Hettne is Professor of Business Law at the Department of Busi-
ness Law, Lund University School of Economics and Management. He is
also Director of the Centre for European Studies at Lund University and
Senior Advisor at the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. His
research interests include EU’s internal market and competition policy, in
particular state aid law.
Lars Jonung is Professor Emeritus in Economics at Lund University,
Sweden. His research is focused on monetary and fiscal policy, inflationary
expectations, the euro and European integration. He served as research
advisor at the European Commission 2000–2010.
Christer Karlsson is Professor of Political Science at the Department of
Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. His research has focused on
political opposition, constitutional change and climate change politics.
Moa Mårtensson is a Researcher in Political Science at the Department
of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden, and a former coordinator
of the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science. Her
research focuses on democracy, political equality, European integration
and the welfare state.
Anna Michalski is Associate Professor in Political Science at the Depart-
ment of Government, Uppsala University and Associate Research Fellow
at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. She is Chair for the
Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES). Her
research interests include European foreign policy, EU-China relations,
strategic partnerships and socialization in international organizations.
Jacob Öberg is Associate Professor in law at Örebro University and
currently a visiting fellow at Amsterdam Centre for European Law and
Governance. His research interests lie primarily in EU constitutional
law and EU criminal law, including the federal dimension of EU law,
multidimensional and contextual perspectives on EU law, legitimacy and
justifications for EU legislative action and EU criminal policy.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
Lars Oxelheim is Professor of International Business and Finance at the

University of Agder, professor emeritus at Lund University and affili-
ated with the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden.
He is the founder of the Swedish Network for European Studies in
Economics and Business (SNEE). His research interests include economic
and financial integration, corporate governance and risk management.
Thomas Persson is Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior
Lecturer at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden,
and a former chairperson of the Swedish Network for European Studies in
Political Science. His research interests include European Union politics,
democratic governance and parliamentary democracy.
Jesper Roine is Deputy Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transi-
tion Economics and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the Department
of Economics at Stockholm School of Economics. His main areas of
research are income and wealth distribution and issues of inheritance and
intergenerational economic mobility.
Daniel Silander is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Depart-
ment of Political Science, Linnaeus University, Sweden and Extraordinary
Professor of Political Science at the School of Government Studies,
North-West University Potchefstroom, South Africa.
Anna Södersten is Senior Researcher at the Swedish Institute for
European Policy Studies (SIEPS). Her research interests include EU
institutional and constitutional law.
List of Figures
Fig. 4.1 Percentage of statements in plenary debates that express

opposition, that express support, or that fall in the ‘other’
category; all six parliaments taken together (Note Includes
all statements, n = 4740. Source Political Opposition
Database (POD), 2022) 83
Fig. 4.2 Percentage of statements in plenary debates in each
of the six parliaments that express opposition, that express
support, or that fall in the ‘other’ category (Note Includes
all statements, n = 4740. Source Political Opposition
Fig. 4.3 Percentage of oppositional statements in plenary debates
in each of the six parliaments that propose alternatives
or that express criticism, respectively (Note Includes
only oppositional statements, n = 2417. Source Political
Opposition Database (POD), 2022) 84
Fig. 4.4 Percentage of oppositional statements in plenary
debates in each of the six parliaments that are aimed
at policy or the polity, respectively (Note Includes
only oppositional statements, n = 2417. Source Political
xi
xii LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 4.5 Percentage of statements in plenary debates in the six

parliaments that express opposition, that offer support,
and ‘other’; among Eurosceptic and mainstream parties,
respectively (Note Includes all statements, n = 4591;
of which oppositional, n = 2321; and support/ ‘other’,
n = 2270. Source Political Opposition Database (POD),
2022) 89
Fig. 4.6 Percentage of oppositional statements in the six
parliaments that propose alternatives and express critique;
among Eurosceptic and mainstream parties, respectively
(Note Includes only oppositional statements, n = 2321.
Source Political Opposition Database (POD), 2022) 90
Fig. 4.7 Percentage of oppositional statements in plenary
debates in the six parliaments which are aimed at policy
or at the polity; among Eurosceptic and mainstream
parties, respectively (Note Includes only oppositional
statements, n = 2321. Source Political Opposition
Fig. 4.8 Percentage of statements in plenary debates that express
opposition, that express support, or that fall in the ‘other’
category within each policy area; all six parliaments taken
together (Note Includes all statements, n = 4737. Source
Political Opposition Database (POD), 2022) 93
Fig. 4.9 Percentage of statements in plenary debates in six
parliaments that express opposition, that express support,
or that fall in the ‘other’ category within each policy area
(Note Includes all statements, n = 4737. Source Political
Fig. 5.1 Crises and changes in stabilisation policy. A schematic
illustration 106
Fig. 5.2 Government debt as per cent of GDP in the euro area
1995–2020 (Source Eurostat) 110
Fig. 5.3 Budget deficit as per cent of GDP in the euro area
1998–2020 (Source Eurostat) 111
Fig. 5.4 ECB balance sheet 1999–2020. Billions of euros (Source
ECB) 112
Fig. 10.1 Average annual economic growth 2005–2020 in relation
to the respective country’s GDP per capita level
at the beginning of the period, 2005 (Source Author’s
calculations based on PPP and inflation-adjusted GDP
figures from EUROSTAT) 246
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
Fig. 10.2 Average annual growth of disposable household income

for different decile groups 2005–2019 in relation
to the respective country’s national median level
calculations based on PPP and inflation-adjusted figures
from EUROSTAT) 248
Fig. 10.3 Average annual growth of disposable household income
for different decile groups 2005–2019 in relation
to the income level of the respective decile group
calculations based on PPP and inflation-adjusted figures
from EUROSTAT) 250
Fig. 10.4 Change in the Gini coefficient (number of Gini-points)
of disposable income relative to its level around 2000
(Source Author’s calculations based on World Bank data) 252
Fig. 10.5 Change in the S80/S20 ratio of disposable income
in relation to its level around 2005 (Source Author’s
calculations based on Eurostat data) 253
Fig. 10.6 Change in the poverty rate (AROP) in relation to its
level around 2005 (Source Author’s calculations based
on Eurostat data) 254
Fig. 10.7 Distribution of economic growth in the EU and in the US
across income groups for the period 2000–2019 (Source
Author’s calculations based on WID data) 255
Fig. 10.8 Distribution of economic growth in EU member
states before 2004, EU member states after 2004,
and in the US across income groups for the period
2000–2019 (Source Author’s calculations based on data
from WID) 257
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Freedom house on the EU’s member states 35

Table 2.2 The economist intelligence unit on the EU’s member
states 36
Table 2.3 Nations in transit 2005–2020 38
Table 5.1 Crises and the evolution of stabilisation policies
in the EU during four periods 1999–2021 108
Table 5.2 Public finances in the EU and the USA, 2008–2012 114
xv
CHAPTER 1
The Road Ahead for the European Union:

Between Federal Union and Flexible
Integration

Introduction
The future of the European Union (EU) is again on the agenda. A strong
impetus for reconsidering the EU’s shape and composition has this time
been given by external events. Chief amongst them is Russia’s large-
scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the long-lasting effects
that this terrible deed will have on the European security architecture.
The war Russia is waging in EU’s immediate neighbourhood requires
rethinking the role of the EU in the defence and security of Europe, and
the prospects of EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, as
A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt
Department of Law, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: antonina.bakardjieva@juridicum.su.se
P. Ekman · A. Michalski (B)
Department of Government, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
e-mail: anna.michalski@statsvet.uu.se
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 1

A. B. Engelbrekt et al. (eds.), The EU between Federal Union
and Flexible Integration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22397-6_1
2 A. BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT ET AL.
part of a future Pax Europaea (Balfour, 2022; Snyder, 2022). Beyond the
immediate effects of the war itself and its security implications, the break-
down of the European security architecture will have a long-lasting impact
on a wide range of EU policy and various political initiatives. The dialectic
process of deepening and widening is again set to drive the debate on the
future of the EU, and how a viable form of political integration will be
found between flexible integration and federalism.
In the early 2020s, the EU member states are undergoing a series of
crises caused or exacerbated by Russia’s unprovoked military aggression
towards Ukraine. In the first half of 2022, the EU enacted a number of
sanctions packages as a response to the attack. It became clear that the
increasingly tense stand-off between the EU and Russia would trigger
an unexpectedly rapid revision of the EU member states’ energy poli-
cies. The EU institutions and member states were galvanized into action
in the wake of Russia’s decision to discontinue indefinitely the export
of gas through Nord Stream 1 and 2 as a way to punish them for the
support given to Ukraine. The withdrawal from Russian oil and gas is
having a nefarious impact on the economies of the EU. A cost-of-living
crisis has hit European consumers due to the rise in energy prices, fuelling
an already high rate of inflation and afflicting further economic and social
pain on the populations of all member states. The negative fallout of the
dependence on Russian supply of oil and gas shows that in the short to
medium term the EU’s green conversion is becoming even more crucial
in order to ensure strategic and societal resilience as well as to mitigate
the effects of climate change.
Despite fears to the contrary, the massive influx of Ukrainian refugees
into the EU in the beginning of the war did not develop into a crisis on
par with the refugee crisis of 2015–2016 in the wake of the war in Syria;
P. Ekman
e-mail: per.ekman@statsvet.uu.se
L. Oxelheim
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: lars.oxelheim@ifn.se
University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
Lund University, Lund, Sweden
1 THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: BETWEEN … 3
this is partly due to it being handled very differently by the EU member

states which across the board showed generosity and solidarity. On the
whole, the ability to keep a united front towards Russia and to main-
tain military, diplomatic and financial support to Ukraine has resulted in
a newfound sense of unity among the EU member states. Nonetheless,
the EU will have to find ways to uphold the present solidarity among EU
member states also in a long-term perspective as insecurity and instability
in the eastern European neighbourhood are bound to persist for the fore-
seeable future. The preservation of unity will be no small feat given that
the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine will present a real challenge
to the EU member states in the years to come and the combined effects
of the green conversion, higher energy prices, and inflation will put strain
on social peace. However, throughout history, external events and chal-
lenges have often led to pushes to deepen the EU in order to equip it with
the instruments and capacities necessary to address changes in economic,
social, and political conditions. In the beginning of 2023, the EU stands
at a watershed moment. The way in which the EU will face the mounting
challenges will set the Union on a path towards defining its future.
In view of these ominous changes in the surrounding world, it is our
purpose in this introductory chapter to shed light on some basic princi-
ples of European integration, how these have developed over the years,
and how they help the Union deal with the continuing tension between
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. As the EU once more stands
to enlarge its membership in the decade to come, we also return to
the long-standing dialectic of widening and deepening the EU and the
tensions that arise in the process. Our review of these dimensions high-
lights how European integration has progressed through both pragmatic
and formal solutions that allow flexibility in the commitments of member
states to the Union, and how these coexist with new forms of enhanced
cooperation. Indeed, with the war in Ukraine and the many external and
internal challenges that the EU is facing, its future shape and composition
will again be the outcome of pragmatism as well as principled action. The
ultimate end point of European integration is still unknown and the ques-
tion of where the EU’s external borders should be definitively drawn is far
from being settled given the EU’s pledge to allow Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia to join the EU along with the Balkans countries (Dragneva &
Wolczuk, 2015; European Council, 2022). For these reasons, questions
surrounding what kind of commitment the EU can demand both from
existing and future member states are again raised. Ultimately, a larger
membership may in the future force the EU to exert stricter commit-

ments and loyalty from its members, or else disunity will split the Union
in groups of states forming on the basis of their varying willingness to
comply with the principles of political integration.
In this chapter, we review the process of European integration from
the twin challenge of widening and deepening which has character-
ized the evolution of the EU since its inception about 70 years ago.
We argue that this process had been defined by a pendulum swing
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. This has resulted in
solutions that have required reforms of the original treaties and hence
deeper forms of integration at the same time as cooperation and coor-
dination among the member states in looser more intergovernmental
frameworks have also been present. On the whole integration among
the EU member states have deepened but without necessarily resulting
in federalism and stronger governance from the centre. These reflections
precede a presentation of the individual chapters of this book written by
prominent scholars in the fields of law, economics and political science,
each contributing with an interesting piece of the puzzle of where the
process of European integration is heading in a context of mounting
challenges and dangers.
Integration to Achieve Union:

A Process Fraught with Difficulties
The newfound unity among the EU member states in view of the war in
Ukraine should not mask the fact that cohesion among them is precarious,
and consensus about the future shape of the Union remains uncertain.
This is all the more troubling as the EU stands to become an important
player in the new European security architecture and in the reconstruction
of Ukraine when the war eventually comes to an end. Given the contesta-
tion concerning the EU’s fundamental values and norms on behalf of the
governments of Hungary and Poland as well as the deep societal reform
required by the energy crisis and the green conversion, there is an urgent
need to address issues concerning the future of the EU. The prospect of
treaty reform is again looming large.
That being so, the debacle surrounding the Constitutional Treaty in
the mid-2000s and the lukewarm support of European citizens at the time
put the issue of treaty reform on the back-burner for many years. Since the
early 2020s, however, the issue was carefully put back on the EU’s polit-
ical agenda. In an effort to seek out public support for further reforms,
the Conference on the Future of Europe met in 2021–2022 as a forum
for EU citizens to lay out and debate possible alternatives for the road
ahead. The Conference’s final document called for ambitious reforms in a
wide range of areas, some of which, such as a move to qualified majority
voting in EU’s foreign and security policy regarding sanctions, would
require treaty change, while in the case of others, the existing treaty’s
passerelle clause would be sufficient to permit a deepening of the EU’s
competences (Conference on the Future of Europe, 2022). In 2023, it is
still too early to say whether sufficient political momentum is building in
favour of treaty reform in the coming years, but it is clear that the Euro-
pean Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the European Commission will
be pressing the European Council to convene a convention to consider
this very question (European Commission, 2022; European Parliament,
2022).
Public debates on the future of the EU are nothing new as it has
been strongly felt since the difficult ratification of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992–1993 that the European project needed to be better anchored
with European citizens. The ambiguity concerning the ultimate aim of
European integration has been constant since the inception of the Union.
Opinions have been divided on whether the EU should be considered
a case of regional integration, unique in nature but without a definite
end point, or whether instead it is a politico-federal construction bearing
comparison with previous state formations in history. According to the
first perspective, the Union’s development has been marked by flex-
ible solutions to meet needs which have arisen in its member states or
impinged due to shifts in world politics. According to the second view,
deeper integration forms part of a constituting process in which national
sovereignty gradually dissolves into the Union, up to the point where
a new federal state has emerged. The constant tension found within the
EU’s policies and institutional structure can be interpreted on the basis of
either perspective, depending on the standpoint of the observer, resulting
in quite intransigent positions. A more productive way perhaps than the
binary view of intergovernmental cooperation versus supranational inte-
gration is to approach the question by considering the actual changes in
EU policies and institutions that have taken place over the last decade
in response to the many deep crises that have beset the EU. The EU’s
ability to deal with these crises and challenges to its cohesion is of crucial
importance to evaluate the choice between a federal direction and a prag-

matic approach. In the early 2020s, the way in which the EU has reacted
to crises is through a combination of these two approaches as the focus
has been on solving a problem at hand, not on drawing up a blueprint
for European integration. Generally speaking, the double-edged approach
has been rather successful. Except for Brexit, the EU has thus far managed
to hold its membership together, and contrary to the expectations of the
sceptics, also managed to deepen and widen many of its powers.
It has, therefore, become somewhat of a hallmark of European integra-
tion that the future of the EU is under constant discussion. Its evolution
from the European Coal and Steel Community to political union has been
accompanied throughout by reports, reflection papers, political initiatives,
and scenario exercises. Some of these initiatives and processes stand out
as important stages in the process of preparing the EU for reforms in a
federal direction. One of the earliest initiatives along such lines came from
the Italian MEP, Altiero Spinelli, who presented a draft for a treaty on
European Union, which the European Parliament adopted in February
1984 (Pinder, 2007). This text was later rejected by representatives of
the member states, but it contributed to the first amendment of the
Treaty of Rome: the Single European Act, which entered into force in
1987 (Dinan, 2010). For several years, as the great eastward enlarge-
ment of 2004 approached, there were wide-ranging discussions about
how the EU’s cohesion and effectiveness could be preserved after the
near doubling of member states that enlargement would entail (Schim-
melfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). An ambitious and holistic approach
to the matter was proposed in 2001, as part of the preparations for
enlargement: the establishment of the Convention on the Future of
Europe (Sokolska, 2021), the task of which would be to reflect on what
changes to the Treaties would be necessary in order to strengthen democ-
racy, transparency, and effective decision-making in the enlarged Union.
In 2003, the Convention presented a constitution for the EU, which
contemporaries perceived as very far-reaching. The proposal was voted
down in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, but it still
furnished the framework for the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into
force in 2009. Discussions on the EU’s future have since continued,
even after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In 2017, on
the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, the European Commission
(2017) presented a number of scenarios aimed at stimulating debate on
the Union’s future role and manner of functioning. The same year, in
a widely noted speech at the Sorbonne, President Emmanuel Macron of

France openly endorsed a ‘multi-speed Europe’ and called on the member
states that want deeper integration to take the lead (Briancon, 2017).
Macron clearly expected, furthermore, that a reinforced Franco-German
axis would form the core of this avant-garde.
Coming back to the issue of crisis as a trigger for integration, Jean
Monnet, one of the foremost figures in its history, noted already when
European integration was in its infancy, that Europe would be created
out of crises, taking shape on the basis of solutions crafted to deal with
such crises (Monnet, 1976). Given the long-standing association between
crises and European integration, it can be worthwhile to consider what
research into the matter has uncovered. Mark Rhinard (2019) shows that
historical crises have acted as a catalyst for deeper integration and that new
patterns of cooperation have emerged in the EU. A similar conclusion
is drawn by the authors in Palgrave’s handbook on EU crises (Ridder-
vold et al., 2020) who argue that it is a recurrent pattern in EU history
that a crisis is needed in order to break political stalemates and to make
new solutions possible. However, and in spite of the many ongoing crises
which beset the EU, they are not the only source of change in the EU.
A perhaps equally important force in this regard is the growing realiza-
tion that future challenges require solutions at the European level—not
least seen in connection with enlargement and with integration on the
internal market. The case of enlargement presents a particularly clear
example, where fears of a dilution in the EU’s capacity for action and
for a reduction in cohesion between its member states have resulted, on
several occasions, in reforms of the Treaties that have both deepened and
widened the powers of the Union. However, enlarging the membership
of the Union also results in a new dynamic of integration as the insti-
tutional structures and practices of policymaking need to consolidate in
reaction to new member states’ political culture, strategic outlook, and
socio-economic challenges.
The Constant Tension Between

Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism
When European integration was still in its infancy, the member states
agreed to apply supranationalism of a clearly limited kind. The Amer-
ican political scientist Ernst Haas (1958, 1964) called attention to a
special type of integration in this regard, whereby contentious issues were
depoliticized because responsibility for dealing with them was placed in

the hands of apolitical officials as they were considered less likely to
be influenced by special interests of a national or sectoral kind. This
approach worked well enough in the case of the European Coal and Steel
Community. However, when economic integration and the creation of
the internal market came up on the agenda, the EU’s governance was
changed to include intergovernmentalism as well. Since then, the two
logics—intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism—have permeated
the European project (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). The balance between
them has constantly shifted, and one and the same policy area can exhibit
both intergovernmental and supranational features, making it difficult to
categorize the EU’s governance once and for all. This inherent tension
has become increasingly explicit over time, and it has been fruitfully
cited as the two-pronged driving force behind the EU’s evolution, with
its oscillation between proto-federal integration and intergovernmental
cooperation (Fabbrini, 2020a). This may explain how deeper integration
can coexist with a strengthening of intergovernmental cooperation, both
within and outside the Treaties, and it may account for the emergence of
the many forms of flexible integration found in the EU at the beginning
of the 2020s.
The broadening of the EU’s prerogatives has led to disagreements
between member states. Some members have argued that the expan-
sion of EU competence to additional policy areas should be limited,
that the role of supranational institutions like the European Commission
and the European Parliament should be circumscribed, and that decision-
making by majority vote within the Council of the European Union (the
Council of Ministers) should be minimized. Other member states, often
supported by the European Commission and the European Parliament,
have stressed the need for greater common powers for a more efficient
decision-making process and a clearer role for the EU in external affairs.
Disunity has marked the intergovernmental conferences that have nego-
tiated amendments to the Treaties; and yet, all of the proposed reform
agreements—such as the Single European Act, the treaties of Amsterdam,
Nice, and Lisbon, and the free-standing Maastricht Treaty—have ulti-
mately been approved by all of the member states (except in the one
case of the proposed Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe).
Since 2009, however, the member states have been extremely reluctant to
convene further intergovernmental conferences to consider changes to the
Treaties, mainly on account of the complexity and unpredictability of the
subsequent processes for ratification. Against this background, the Italian

political scientist Federico Fabbrini (2020b) points out that the Confer-
ence on the Future of Europe (see above) must be seen as a bold initiative,
the success of which is not guaranteed. This is because in the early 2020s,
there is no obvious political leadership in the EU. Things were different
in that regard in 1955, at the time of the Messina Conference, which
preceded the Treaty of Rome; as well as in 2001–2003, when the Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe was held. In both cases, the foundation for
a number of gradual changes to the Treaties were laid. The present-day
situation, however, is different as in recent years transfers of powers to
the Union have not involved any straightforward movement in a federal
direction. The result has instead been a variable pattern: specific types
of integration have been instituted, suited more to reaching pragmatic
solutions than establishing a well-thought-out federation of states.
The deepening of individual policy areas—as one of two trends towards
federalism—has taken place gradually, through a successive transition to
majority decision-making. This first trend began with the Single Euro-
pean Act of 1987, according to which common legislation for the internal
market could be enacted if a majority of member states assented. The
Lisbon Treaty then applied majority voting to almost all policy areas,
while changing the definition of ‘majority’ from one based on weighted
votes for the member states to one consisting of at least 55% of the
member states representing no less than 65% of the Union’s population.
The deepening of integration in several policy areas has been accompa-
nied, moreover, by a strengthening of the EU’s legislative competence,
mainly through a conferral of greater powers upon the European Parlia-
ment which now wields legislative power within the EU together with the
Council of Ministers.
Nevertheless, there are phenomena in the EU that work against the
trend towards supranationalism. One such phenomenon, as noted by Carl
Fredrik Bergström (2022), is the increasing number of legal acts adopted
by the European Commission and the representatives of the member
states, without the European Parliament being afforded full insight into
the process. A further such phenomenon is the open method of coordina-
tion. This is applied in a number of policy areas—e.g. fiscal matters, social
concerns, and educational policy—where a formal transfer of powers to
the EU is still considered unacceptable. The open method of coordina-
tion is sometimes considered as a precursor to deeper integration through
the way that representatives of the member states, meeting in Council
working groups and committees, form tightly-knitted communities which

come to share the definition, diagnostic, and possible solutions to partic-
ular problems (Heidenreich & Bischoff, 2008). At times, however, it was
unclear at the outset whether a new measure would result in deeper inte-
gration or not before the measure was implemented and its real effects
became clear. A case in point is the principle, enunciated in 1979, of
mutual recognition of goods on the internal market which facilitated the
free movement of goods by doing away with the requirement of full
harmonization through legislation. Such a pragmatic decision sped up the
completion of the internal market in a way that the tortuous negotiations
to legislate specific requirements for goods to circulate freely in the EU
would not have done.
A second trend towards federalism involves the widening of the
Union’s policy areas. This has followed a clear pattern. It first appeared
in areas that formed the original core of the project, and which were
considered less sensitive from the standpoint of sovereignty, e.g. market
integration, agriculture and fisheries, foreign trade and tariffs, and coal
and steel production. From there, the EU’s policy remit extended grad-
ually into areas previously seen as close to the heart of the nation-state—
including fiscal policy, foreign affairs, internal security, educational policy,
and migration and asylum policy. Here, however, powers are distributed
unevenly between the EU and the national level. The member states do
not so much follow a common policy on such matters as coordinate
their national policies. In several areas—especially foreign affairs as well
as internal and external security—the member states keep their national
competence.
Since the turn of the millennium, however, the importance of the
distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism within
the Union has diminished. Contributing factors here include the Euro-
pean Council’s increasingly collective leadership and its growing role as a
crisis manager, which Christopher Bickerton et al. (2015) have called ‘the
new intergovernmentalism’. Recurrent deliberations between the heads of
state or government form part of the EU’s functioning today. On several
occasions since the financial crisis of 2008, the European Council has
devised new forms of cooperation in order to handle crises. Many of the
solutions involved—among them the temporary crisis funds (replaced by
a permanent support fund in 2012) and the European Stability Mech-
anism (ESM)—have required intergovernmental decisions outside the
framework of the Treaties.
Does the establishment of the ESM then point towards increased inter-
governmentalism, or sooner towards a federal development of the EU?
The question remains open. Still, in the beginning of 2023, the overall
trend would seem to be towards federalism, in view of such factors as
dealing with the fallout of the severe energy crisis, the gradual strength-
ening of the banking union, the plans to institute common EU taxes,
such as a carbon tax, and the creation of the Next Generation EU fund
which raises loans on the international financial markets in the name of
the EU.
Enlargement: A Driving Force Towards

Deepening or Towards Fragmentation?
In the same way that crises have affected the Union’s development,
enlargement has acted in a two-pronged manner: both towards deep-
ening and towards fragmentation. It has often raised fears that, under
the pressure of new members, cohesion between member states will be
diluted, the EU’s policy areas and institutional frameworks will be split
apart, and that the distribution of financial support within the EU will
be altered to the detriment of existing members. These fears do not just
reflect the fact that an increase in the number of member states affects
the EU’s functioning; they also register an awareness that new members
may not be fully ready to assume the obligations that membership entails,
whether due to a lack of will, a lack of ability, or a combination thereof.
The British, for example, had to make three attempts to join—in 1963,
1967, and 1973—before the French approved their entry. The reasons
for the resistance had to do with French fears that the British would
not fit in with the ways of the European Community due to their past
as a great power, and that the UK’s liberal notions as a trading nation
would take the EEC’s customs union and its aid policies in a new direc-
tion. Another example can be seen in the protracted negotiations in the
early 1980s on the conditions for Spain’s incorporation into the Common
Agricultural Policy. In this case, the fear was not just that Spain would
be a competitor on the market: it might also, it was thought, drive a
shift towards support for Mediterranean crops, at the expense of wheat,
sugar, and other products from countries like France and Germany among
others. Another example was when, in connection with the accession of
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, opposition was expressed to the inclusion
of neutral and non-aligned countries in the EU. The worry here was that
these countries would slow down the development of a common security

and defence policy.
Undoubtedly, however, it was eastern enlargement in the late 1990s
and early 2000s that led to a serious revival of the debate on the conse-
quences of granting membership to a large number of countries in the
midst of their transformations into democracies and market economies
(O’Brennan, 2006). Enlargement to the east resulted in a wide range
of constitutional changes for strengthening the political, economic, and
institutional structures of the EU. The reunification of Germany in 1989
and the geopolitical shift around 1990 led ultimately to a stronger foreign
and security policy, to the establishment of economic and monetary
union, and to a clearer enunciation of the EU’s values in the Maas-
tricht Treaty of 1993. The office of High Representative of the Union
for Foreign and Security Policy was established by the Amsterdam Treaty,
which entered into force in 1999. The Treaty of Nice (2001) strength-
ened the EU’s institutions and decision-making processes. In the Treaty
of Lisbon (2009), a number of further steps were taken to make the
EU, its institutional framework, and its decision-making processes more
robust, as well as to broaden its policy areas. There were also concerns
about how well the new members from Central and Eastern Europe
could withstand pressures on the internal market, and whether they
were capable of participating effectively in EU decision-making and the
implementation of EU law.
Furthermore, there were fears that incorporating the new member
states would undermine the EU’s social dimension, for instance due to
social dumping in connection with labour migration and to increased
competition for structural funds and other support systems for poorer
member states. In order to handle the adjustment to the internal market
and the EU’s acquis, a proper enlargement policy was established—with
periodic follow-up, oversight mechanisms, and gradual adaptation to the
EU’s administration. In the area of labour migration, for example, long-
term transitional arrangements were made; and financial support from EU
support funds was limited to four percent of a recipient country’s gross
domestic product. Thus, the challenge of enlargement was addressed
through deepening, in order to achieve greater efficiency in decision-
making and by strengthening the political cohesion of the Union. In some
cases, as with monetary union and the euro, the trend was towards feder-
alism. Many of the solutions, however, involved a large measure of flexible
integration, both in the form of transitional solutions and in the form of

differentiated integration.
In the early 2020s, as the EU confronts serious challenges—including
a crisis of values and a need to process the consequences of Brexit
further—it is reasonable to ask what requirements should be placed
on new members, not least at the prospect of a relatively swift acces-
sion of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Do countries preparing for EU
membership need to have reached a level of socio-economic development
and democratic consolidation comparable to that achieved by present
members? Must they have a national elite with a self-image and a notion
of sovereignty which are compatible with the obligations that come with
EU membership?
In this volume, therefore, it is high time to return to the central ques-
tion of what direction the EU is moving in, without delving into the
matter of the Union’s possible dissolution—a prospect which has lost its
topicality ever since Brexit so clearly highlighted the consequences of such
an event. Rather we ask questions regarding the patterns of integration
visible during recent years in the wake of the various crises, and whether
they show that decisive steps towards a federal system have been taken or
rather that the trend towards a multi-speed Europe has grown stronger.
Gauging the Future Direction

of European Integration
In Chapter 2, Daniel Silander puts forward the argument that the EU’s
enlargement in 2004 and 2007 to a number of post-communist states
was seen by many as the triumph of democracy and the beginning of
the unification of Europe. The process of change in Europe took place
in a global context of far-reaching democratization. A couple of decades
later, however, democratization in the new member states has given way
to worsening autocratization. The enlargement of the Union has thus
entailed a de facto erosion of democracy. Silander first highlights how
the liberal democratic order has been the foundation for European inte-
gration and the EU’s identity, whereupon he reflects that, due to the
trend towards autocratization in recent years, the member states are not
all liberal democracies any longer. Instead, substantial elements of both
illiberalism and autocracy are to be found in the Union today. Citing
several indices of democracy, the author points to a significant nega-
tive trend within the new member states, where limitations on political
and civil rights have been increasing. Accordingly, the EU now contains
states characterized by electoral authoritarianism; and several leaders of
an illiberal, populist, and nationalist bent are now prominent within it.
Silander further argues that the trend towards autocratization means that
the fundamental norms and values of the Union are no longer fully
respected, and that the actions of the countries where said trend is most
evident—Hungary and Poland—pose an existential threat to the Union
as a promoter of peace and freedom within its bounds. Furthermore,
the author contends, these countries constitute a threat to the EU as
a normative power internationally, particularly in relation to other coun-
tries seeking to join. Silander contends, then, that the EU is facing an
existential threat in the early 2020s. This threat must be addressed imme-
diately, if democracy’s future in Europe is to be secured. It is true that
the Union’s institutions and its member states have taken action, on the
basis of Article 7, to sanction disobedient members, although for different
reasons no state has as yet seen its rights as member of the EU suspended.
In the view of the author, however, the negative trend of recent years
points to a growing urgency to proceed in restricting EU membership
to states which do not fully respect and promote the fundamental norms
and values of the Union.
In the next chapter, Anna Södersten analyses the ‘rule of law crisis’
which now confronts the EU. From the perspective of the author, this
crisis can be described as the most serious of the Union’s crises. What
distinguishes this crisis in comparison with others is that it bears on the
very core of European integration as it concerns the Union’s values, and
what the EU is to become. It touches on the Union’s identity and the
very foundations of European integration. It is thus virtually an exis-
tential issue. Furthermore, Södersten points out, the rule of law crisis
cannot be said—unlike many other crises which the EU confronts—to
have originated outside Europe’s borders; rather, it comes from within.
Furthermore, it differs from other crises in that it is not even regarded as a
problem by all of the member states. Therefore, the author sees no simple
solution for this quandary, even though the Union now has a battery of
tools to which it can resort against member states that fail to respect the
rule of law. One consequence of the rule of law crisis, Södersten argues, is
that EU now finds itself in a limbo between federalism and flexible inte-
gration. For several reasons, deeper integration cannot be limited through
so-called flexible integration because of member states that do not respect
the rule of law. Apart from the practical difficulties associated with such a
solution, it is not possible as a matter of principle to have a ‘multi-speed

Europe’ when it comes to values. Nor, according to the author, does
federalism offer a possible way forward. This is because federalism, in the
sense of ‘uniformity’ (whereby all member states strive for the same goal
and at the same speed) necessitates a core of common values. Further-
more, the rule of law is crucial for the EU’s future. Södersten concludes
that, while finding a way out of limbo is not easy, the Union must fully
apply the political, legal, and economic tools to its disposal to enforce the
rule of law conditionality mechanism. Only in this way can it maintain its
credibility.
One recurring issue in the debate on how the EU should be reformed
concerns the democratic deficit. How far has the Union come on the road
to a functioning representative democracy? In the chapter by Christer
Karlsson, Moa Mårtensson, and Thomas Persson, the state of representa-
tive democracy in the EU is discussed. In the chapter, they focus on the
role played by political opposition. To what extent, they ask, do parlia-
ments (national and European) function as arenas for political opposition
in the political life of the Union? The authors identify two opposed views
in previous research. According to one, political opposition is essentially
absent from EU politics. In particular, the EP, considered as an arena
for opposition, is a wasteland. According to the contrary view, however,
lines of conflict between government and opposition are becoming clearer
in the politics of the Union. Rather than being a wasteland, the EP is
becoming a zone of conflict and opposition. In a systematic examina-
tion of plenary debates in five national parliaments and in the EP, the
authors test the viability of the two hypotheses concerning opposition in
EU politics. Their main finding is that vigorous opposition indeed prevails
in the parliaments examined, and that EU politics is marked far more by
conflict than by consensus. The problem, from a democratic perspective,
lies not in any lack of opposition, but rather in the fact that the opposition
conducted in the parliaments only reaches the voters to a limited extent. If
the established parties do not present clear proposals and distinct political
options when they meet the voters, it does not avail that parliamentary
life itself is characterized by vibrant opposition. As long as the parlia-
ments are an isolated political arena in this regard, a democratic problem
remains. In conclusion, the authors argue, parties contending for govern-
ment power must make the dividing lines on EU issues visible to the
voters. They should clearly state the policies on which they are seeking
the electorate’s favour. Further, they must shoulder the responsibilities of
democratic leadership by bringing EU politics out of the isolated zone of

conflict where it presently plays out, and giving it the place it deserves in
public debate and in election campaigns.
In the following chapter, Fredrik N. G. Andersson and Lars Jonung
discuss fiscal and monetary policy in Europe after the corona pandemic.
Since the introduction of the common currency on 1 January 1999, the
regulatory framework for both monetary and fiscal policy has been the
subject of a series of reforms. These have been influenced by the ways in
which previous economic crises have evolved. In 2020–2021, in connec-
tion with the corona pandemic, major steps towards a common federal
fiscal policy within the Union were taken. The member states agreed
on a joint recovery plan: Next Generation EU. This plan involved both
transfers between the member states and new powers for the Commis-
sion to raise taxes and borrow on international markets. Andersson and
Jonung discuss the implications of a common EU fiscal policy. What
are the prospects and difficulties, they ask, that a federal fiscal policy
may face? They begin with a review of how the global financial crisis
of 2008–2009, the European debt crisis of 2010–2015, and the corona
pandemic affected the Union’s framework for stabilization policy. Their
basic thesis is that reforms of this framework have been guided by
short-term crisis considerations rather than by the fundamental prob-
lems facing the EU economies. Increased federalism, in the form of fiscal
union and more Union responsibility for fiscal policy, will not correct the
fundamental economic imbalances among European economies. Indeed,
increased federalism may lead instead to further tensions between member
states as their national interests diverge. Andersson and Jonung hold out
structural and growth-oriented reforms as a constructive alternative to a
federal fiscal policy. The EU has long suffered from weak growth, which
has intensified the economic downturn during crises. By focusing on
such structural reforms, the Union can meet future crises more success-
fully than it has during the first twenty years of the euro. The reforms
should include measures for the full implementation of a well-functioning
internal market. Matters of this kind already fall within the EU’s remit,
and the Union needs no new powers to address them.
Next, Jörgen Hettne examines the role that competition policy—and
in particular the EU’s rules on state aid—has played within the European
integration process. He takes as his starting point the ban on state aid
which is set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
This prohibition is not, however, without exceptions as it leaves room
for certain EU-wide exemptions. Policies on state aid affect a number

of other policy areas, including several where the member states show a
reluctance to transfer powers to the Union. Hettne focuses on three such
areas: tax policy (where competence is shared between the EU and the
member states but unanimity in the Council is required), industrial policy
(where the Union has only ‘supporting competence’), and housing policy
(where the EU has no competence). This, according to Hettne, raises a
question of great importance concerning competence. The member states
have been careful to limit the EU’s powers, but this has not prevented the
Union from guiding national policies through the back door via its stric-
tures on state aid. This has proved in practice to be a (little noticed) way of
transferring competence to the EU. Why has EU competition policy had
such an impact on other policy areas? It is a consequence, Hettne argues,
of a lack of political coordination in other respects. Thus, the overarching
policy perspective ends up being centred on competition policy, and the
power to decide in practice rests at last with the Commission. In Hettne’s
view, then, the reluctance of the member states to relinquish powers can
in fact lead to an even worse situation from a nation-state perspective,
whereby areas such as tax policy, industrial policy, and housing policy end
up being driven indirectly by EU competition policy. By contrast, if the
member states had transferred more competence to the Union in those
areas, they would have had opportunities to engage in political bargaining
over the policies in question. Hettne argues, accordingly, that the member
states should view the EU’s powers in a larger context, and thereby come
to appreciate they have much to gain from transferring more competence
to the Union in the areas in question. Doing so would place the issues in
question higher up on the EU agenda, and make them part of the usual
decision-making process of the Council of Ministers and in the EP. This
legislative process, the author stresses, is much more open and democratic
than are the highly opaque procedures connected with EU policy on state
aid.
In the following chapter, Krister Andersson shows that the forces
pushing the EU towards federalism in the tax area are gaining in strength.
According to the Treaty on European Union, taxes are a national issue.
Agreement among the member states is needed for the adoption of
common rules. The present-day decision-making system for taxes is in
many ways well suited to the EU. Andersson sees flexible integration as
important because the states that take part in the economic and monetary
union cannot conduct a monetary policy tailored to their own partic-

ular needs. They may, therefore, need such flexibility when it comes to
taxes and fiscal policy. In Andersson’s judgement, moreover, the strongest
force driving developments towards federalism in the tax area is probably
the need for common funding of the Union’s social goals. The Recovery
and Resilience Facility adopted in connection with the corona pandemic
meant that significantly larger programmes are now being financed jointly
and on the basis of shared indebtedness. This will affect the Union’s
finances in coming decades. The demands for joint financing and common
taxes have grown stronger. The author notes as well that the Commis-
sion has increasingly pushed the same line on tax questions as the G7
and G20 countries have done. He shows, moreover, that many of the
proposals which suit the largest economies in the EU and in the world
have not always had the highest priority for smaller countries that have
wanted to safeguard their competitiveness. Andersson does not believe a
revolt against increased federalism within the Union is likely to erupt over
taxes; however, smaller countries will fight to retain the requirement of
unanimity in EU decision-making on questions of taxation. In this way,
flexible integration will remain a viable option. As Andersson sees it, both
the question of migration and the implementation of the social pillar may
result in a more federal structure and in more federal decision-making.
Public opinion, however, may call this into question. That is particularly
likely in the case of countries with a relatively efficient tax system and a
high level of ambition in the social and labour market areas.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is the focus of the
chapter by Jacob Öberg. This body, which began operating only recently,
symbolizes the EU’s shift in the field of criminal law from an intergov-
ernmental to a supranational paradigm. But the EPPO is more than just
a symbol, according to Öberg; it is also an outstanding legal and polit-
ical achievement that will likely lead to a fundamental shift in our view of
the Union’s role in the area of criminal law. As a result of the EPPO’s
establishment, a supranational body has in practice assumed executive
criminal powers that have traditionally figured among the basic tasks of
the sovereign state. The overarching question addressed in this chapter
concerns the extent to which the EPPO can serve as a desirable model
for a future European system of ‘federal’ criminal law. The author seeks
to shed light on this question by focusing on the relationship between
the EPPO, state sovereignty, and legitimacy. His analysis is based on a
prominent theory in the criminal justice and political science literature
on supranational integration, according to which institutional and legal

factors condition processes of political and economic integration in large
measure. One of the key ‘criteria for integration’ emphasized in this liter-
ature concerns the formal delegation of powers to the institutions and
agencies of the Union. Formal delegation is thought to be of central
importance for assessing the depth and scope of integration within a
given area. Öberg starts by analysing the scope of the EPPO’s preroga-
tives, including the nature and type of powers it enjoys. He then proceeds
to a detailed discussion of how the powers of this body and their exer-
cise may constitute a threat to state sovereignty. Öberg also considers the
EPPO from the standpoint of legitimacy, with a particular focus on judi-
cial review and oversight of the office’s activities. What requirements, he
asks, should be placed on a central European prosecutor that exercises
power over public criminal law within the territory of a member state?
To strengthen the legitimacy of its activities among the member states
(and their public authorities), the EPPO needs to show that it protects
the fundamental rights of defendants and affords opportunities to review
its activities. Finally, the author considers whether the EPPO serves as a
desirable example for a future ‘federal’ system of European criminal law.
In the following chapter, Malena Britz describes the development of
European defence policy since the Union presented its Global Strategy in
2016: Brexit and the war in Ukraine. Britz believes that the efforts which
have been made to improve the capacities of member states in the defence
area may prove highly significant. These improvements have been the fruit
of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and of the jointly
funded European Defence Fund for research and development. While
these developments display the mixed character typical of EU defence
policy—being both binding and flexible—they may prove important for
the future common capabilities of the member states. One innovation
here is that the capacities in question are not just being developed for the
sake of international efforts. To a degree, their purpose is also to support
the defence of the member states themselves, especially in connection
with cyber warfare and hybrid threats. Britz also discusses whether these
developments make the EU more of a federal union. Despite the inter-
governmental nature of this policy area, and the clear features of flexible
integration that it displays, certain trends within it are plainly of a more
federalist character than the policies pursued earlier were. This particu-
larly applies in the case of the European Defence Fund, which requires
member states to contribute even if they do not actively participate in it
themselves. The push towards federalism is also reflected in a joint devel-

opment of capacities, particularly in projects centred on the protection of
the member states at home rather than on international efforts. At the
same time, Britz points out, it is clear that a European defence union
differs from a federal union as traditionally understood. In the area of
defence policy, ‘common’ is not the same as ‘exclusive’, as it would be
in a more traditional union. The member states support the development
of capacities together, but that does not mean such capacities are exclu-
sive to the Union, or that the member states cannot develop capacities on
their own, or even that the jointly developed capacities can only be used
under the EU flag. In this way, the European Defence Union—even if it
is achieved in 2025, in accordance with the goal set out by the Commis-
sion—will clearly be different from other defence unions or federal unions
in general. Finally, Britz contends, the EU needs to set clear priorities for
which defence undertakings should be done within the framework of the
Union and which should be left to the member states. The Union’s insti-
tutions must clarify common areas for defence policy, while at the same
time ensuring that the member states are on the same page. The latter,
for their part, need to take the development of a European defence and
security policy seriously and take responsibility for it. Otherwise, there
is a risk that defence policy in the future will be left in the hands of a
European bureaucracy.
In the chapter by Jesper Roine, the author analyses the recent trends
within the Union in the area of income inequality. He describes how,
since the end of the 1990s, the member states have set out common
goals for the achievement of greater social cohesion. As for whether the
EU needs to take steps in a federal direction to achieve these goals, he
explains that views on that point are varied. On the one hand, an increased
coordination of taxes and of redistributive policies can be seen as neces-
sary to achieve the goals in question; on the other hand, it can be argued
that differences between the member states are too great for steps in that
direction to be feasible. To be able to discuss issues such as these, Roine
points out, we must first analyse the trends on income inequality and eval-
uate what has actually happened. His chapter is mainly devoted to that
purpose. Roine explores income inequality from several different angles.
The social indicators that form the basis for his analysis, and in which
different measures of income inequality figure centrally, follow the trends
within each member state. They do not, however, provide a complete
picture of trends within the EU as a whole. As Roine points out, income
inequality can fall within countries at the same time that it increases
between them, and vice versa. The level of income inequality that obtains
for the population of the Union as a whole reflects the combination of
these changes. The author reviews developments since the early 2000s
in this regard. His short answer is that income disparities have decreased
between countries, while converging within them (i.e. they have increased
where they had previously been smaller, and decreased where they had
previously been larger). For the EU as a whole, income differences have
narrowed. This trend is wholly driven, however, by developments in the
countries that joined the Union in 2004. If the same analysis is done
for the countries that were members before 2004, the results are the
opposite. Finally, Roine compares the EU and the USA. Where feder-
alism versus flexible integration is concerned, this comparison illustrates
the importance of analysing developments at different levels. It turns out
that, already in its current form, the EU has a more even distribution of
income than the federal USA does. The comparison shows as well that
the EU’s member states are not too unequal in terms of income to take
further steps in a federal direction.
In the concluding chapter of this volume, Antonina Bakardjieva Engel-
brekt, Per Ekman, Anna Michalski, and Lars Oxelheim take stock of the
state of integration seventy years after the founding of the European
Coal and Steel Community. The authors argue that political leadership
is needed in order to stake out the way ahead. The concluding chapter
seeks to bring together different trends of integration and juxtapose them
to sources of disintegration to gauge where the EU stands in view of the
mounting challenges both from internal and external challenges.
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CHAPTER 2
Democracy in Europe: Enlarged

But Eroding—A Union in Existential Crisis
Daniel Silander
About 25 years ago, Europe was engaged in a dynamic process of

democratization and integration (Huntington, 1993; Whitehead, 2001).
Negotiations were being held between members of the European Union
(eu) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and former
Eastern bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe’ on future enlarge-
ments. Soon, the process of democratization subsequently merged with
that of eu enlargement, as the candidate countries of Central and
Eastern Europe moved successively to meet the Union’s democratic
criteria, thereby qualifying for membership. The great eastward enlarge-
ment served to consolidate the eu’s normative power in the international
arena. The EU became a significant symbol of a democratic, peaceful and
expanding Union (Linden, 2002; Manners, 2002; Pridham & Vanhanen,
1994; Whitehead, 2001).
D. Silander (B)
Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden
e-mail: daniel.silander@lnu.se
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 25

A. B. Engelbrekt et al. (eds.), The EU between Federal Union
and Flexible Integration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22397-6_2
26 D. SILANDER
Today, the situation in Europe is fundamentally different. Liberal

democracy is being called strongly into question, both in Europe
and globally, and the Union is facing an existential crisis (Ágh 2016;
Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). Moreover, authoritarian military aggres-
sion by Russia in Georgia and war in Ukraine highlights the current chal-
lenges to democracy in Europe. In this chapter, I emphasize that the eu
has in fact faced crises of various kinds for decades which have ultimately
resulted in deeper integration. Common crises, in economics, migration,
terrorism, climate change and the pandemic, etc., have contributed in
many cases to the Union’s development, by driving forth change and
promoting improvement (Mai’a, 2017). However, the crisis the Union
faces today is in many respects deeper and more challenging, because
democracy itself is being called into question. The deep-seated iden-
tity of the eu is thereby under threat. A crisis in which democracy is
being challenged poses a more fundamental threat than previous crises
did (Diamond, 2021; Silander, 2021).
The focus of this chapter is on how and to what extent democracy is
under challenge within the eu. I describe the emergence of the Union’s
fundamental norms and values and I consider what eu enlargement and
the spread of democracy in Europe have meant for the European order of
democracies. Most member states of the EU continue to observe demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law; however, enlargement may have
contributed to the erosion of democracy within the Union. Ongoing
crises, rooted in both economic difficulties and the COVID-19 pandemic,
have partly overshadowed the fact that the eu no longer consists solely of
liberal democratic states.
In the next section, I examine the eu as an emerging normative
community, and I discuss the key role that democracy has played in this
process. It is followed by a discussion on the Union’s expansion to the
east and explores the state of democracy within EU member states and
the threat from ongoing autocratization. Finally, I conclude the chapter
with a discussion of the crossroads at which the Union stands and what
it can and should do to save its existence.
The EU, Democratic Institutions,

and Peaceful Relations
Social scientists have been interested in the eu as an international actor
for decades (Bosse 2009; Duchêne 1972; Freedom House, 2020; Kagan,
2 DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: ENLARGED … 27
2004). One issue on which scholars have focused is whether the EU

member states are capable of acting cohesively (Mogherini, 2016). Some
researchers, such as Robert Kagan (2004), have questioned the unity
of European countries and their ability to speak with one voice; but
others—François Duchêne (1972) among them, as well as Ian Manners
(2002)—have stressed the uniqueness of European integration, which has
created a collective actor in the form of the eu, with its shared economic
and political capabilities. While the dominant tendency among scholars
of international politics has been to stress the importance of countries’
power for the shaping of world politics, some researchers—such as John
Ikenberry (2000; see also Keohane & Nye, 1977)—have argued that the
nations of the world have become ever more intertwined through shared
norms and values and that common rules, laws, and institutions have
gained greatly in importance. Political scientists who study European inte-
gration have particularly emphasized how the eu has become a symbol of
a constitutional order—with common institutions and legal obligations—
beyond the traditional power structures of the Cold War (Linden, 2002;
Pace, 2007; Silander, 2005).
It has been said that the eu, as a normative community, is based on
certain fundamental norms: peace, liberty, democracy, human rights, and
the rule of law (Manners, 2002; Pace, 2007). European integration has
developed in accordance with the peace standard set out in the treaties
that established the European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc) and
the European Economic Community (eec), in 1951 and 1957, respec-
tively; and on the basis of the principles of liberty, democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
Further elements of integration include a common development policy,
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the so-called Copenhagen
criteria adopted in 1993 for prospective member states. Article 6(1) of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that: ‘The Union is founded
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common to the
Member States’ (TEU, 2007). In 2009, through the Lisbon Treaty, the
eu Charter of Fundamental Rights that was enacted in 2000 was made
legally binding on the Union. The Charter proclaims that the Union is
based on universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity
and the principles of democracy and the rule of law (2000).
The eu’s democratic community has drawn a great deal of attention
from researchers in political science (see, for instance, Russett, 1993;
28 D. SILANDER
Russett & Oneal, 2001). The idea that liberal democracies can coop-
erate peacefully dates back to the late eighteenth century as developed
in Immanuel Kant’s concept of democratic peace (1991). It was not until
the 1960s, however, that rigorous studies were first conducted on this
issue (Russett, 1993). The basic idea of the democratic peace is that
peace is promoted if countries have free and fair elections, with power
resting in the hands of the people. So, if more countries adopt demo-
cratic rules of the game, peace will prevail more broadly as well. Bruce
Russett (1993) contends that the democratic requirement of popular
support makes it difficult for leaders to wage war, due to the checks and
balances embodied in democratic institutions. Furthermore, the political
culture of democracies rests on debate, negotiation, and peaceful political
competition—features that facilitate compromise with other democratic
countries. The transparency of a democratic system, moreover, minimizes
the risk of surprise and misunderstanding vis-à-vis other countries; while
its openness encourages cooperation and integration. Trade, investment,
culture, and communication generate interdependency and further bonds
of friendship between democracies. Human beings, in this perspective, are
basically rational and good. When representing their citizens, therefore,
political leaders in democracies will tend to safeguard peace, to defend
freedom, and to promote the common good (Kant, 1991; Russett, 1993).
Needless to say, the idea of the democratic peace has come in for
criticism (see Dafoe et al., 2013). First and foremost, how are democ-
racy and war to be defined? Furthermore, some critics have also claimed
that democracies can act aggressively towards non-democracies. Notwith-
standing these criticisms, however, research on the idea of the democratic
peace has been of great importance for our understanding of European
integration and the development of the eu. Political and economic coop-
eration between elected European governments, deepening over time, has
resulted in the establishment of common rules, laws, and institutions.
In 2012, the achievements of the Union’s democratic peace drew the
attention of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, which awarded the Peace
Prize to the EU (2012). The Committee acknowledged how the Union
historically had promoted European peace and reconciliation as well as
democracy and human rights and how an increasing number of countries
had become bound together in friendship (2012).
Research on international socialization and democratization, further-
more, has called attention to how European integration has worked to
promote norms in other countries. The regional context can have an
important impact on countries’ democratic development. In a European

context, the role of the eu in promoting democracy can be seen in its
influence on the political development of non-member states in the prox-
imity to the Union’s democratic community. The promotion of norms has
operated through conditional political and economic cooperation with
the countries in question, with an eye to furthering their democratic
development. Lawrence Whitehead (2001) and Geoffrey Pridham et al.
(1994) have shown how the eu has demanded democratic consolida-
tion in exchange for political, economic and technological help to secure
future membership. The democratization process seen in large parts of
Europe should be understood, in the view of these scholars, as in large
part resulting from how the eu has acted as an international agent of
socialization, promoting democratic norms and values in non-member
states (Florini, 1996; Linden, 2002; Silander, 2005).
The Enlargement of the Union

and the Expansion of Democracy
Researchers such as Ann Florini (1996) have analysed the international
promotion of norms. Scholarly interest has been particularly strong in
the eu’s efforts to promote democracy in Southern Europe in the 1970s
and in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. These dramatic events
surprised a majority of scholars. During the 1980s, many prominent
researchers—Samuel Huntington, for instance—considered democratiza-
tion in Central and Eastern Europe to be impossible (1984), due to the
great anti-democratic influence of the Soviet Union. In the course of just
a few years, however, the picture changed drastically. In 1989, there were
23 communist countries in the world; five years later, only five were left—
and none in Europe as communist rule continued in China, Cuba, Laos,
North Korea, and Vietnam (Silander, 2005).
In the great eastern enlargement of 2004, ten countries—Cyprus,
Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia—joined the eu at the same time. This was a huge success
for the Union. During the decades of the Cold War, Europe had been
divided between East and West, between communism and democracy.
The eu emerged over time as a symbol of cooperation among like-minded
countries on the basis of democracy and market economy—with peace,
liberty, and fraternity as the result. The great enlargement to the east—
the so-called big bang —became a symbol of the West’s victory in the Cold
30 D. SILANDER
War. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been kidnapped
by authoritarian forces, but freedom and independence were now theirs
for the taking. The Union offered membership on the basis of national
reforms and adoption of its norms and values. The so-called Copenhagen
criteria from 1993, adopted at a meeting of the European Council in the
same city, served as a guide for countries seeking full eu membership. The
political criterion demanded that new member states must have a stable
democratic system, rule of law, respect human rights, and protect minori-
ties. The economic criterion comprised a functioning market economy
and the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces on
the EU’s internal market. The legal criterion, finally, stipulated that they
must be able meet the obligations of membership by adhering to the goals
of the political, economic, and monetary union (EUR-Lex, Accession
Criteria; Janse, 2019).
It was the task of the European Commission to oversee the member-
ship negotiations and monitor the candidate states’ national progress.
The final decision on a candidate state’s membership, however, lay in
the hands of the member states. The Commission provided the Council
of Ministers and the European Parliament with strategic reports on the
progress accomplished by each candidate country, on the reforms it
had introduced, and what remained to be done. On the basis of the
Commission’s annual evaluations, the Union set out targets and provided
diplomatic and financial support to the candidate countries. The role of
the Commission in the membership negotiations was thus very important.
The task fell upon it to serve as the catalyst of the Union to promote
European interests and to represent the Union in its external relations
and internally towards member states defend the Treaties and monitor
compliance with eu legislation (Janse, 2019).
The Enlargement of the Union

and the Erosion of Democracy
A quarter of a century ago in Europe, euphoria prevailed in both academic
and the political circles over the ongoing process of integration and
democratization. Some researchers, however, warned of possible prob-
lems in connection with democratization, enlargement and integration
(Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Freedom House, 2020; Linz & Stepan, 1996;
Nations in Transit, 2020; Nodia, 1996; O’Donnell et al., 1986; Rose,
1999; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Zhelyu, 1996). There was a debate on
the importance of enlargement, but also how it implied the establishment

of new borders might affect the eu. In addition, there were discus-
sions about Europe’s geography and the Union’s future borders. Some
observers worried that new neighbours with diverse political, economic,
and security-related weaknesses might undermine the peace and freedom
that had been achieved within the Union (Silander & Nilsson, 2014,
2016). Could a new division between ‘us’ and ‘them’—between an
enlarged Union and its new neighbours—emerge? In the early 2000s,
accordingly, discussions were held about a new neighbourhood policy for
the east (all countries of the former Soviet Union) and the south (across
the Mediterranean Sea). Then, in May 2004, the European Neighbour-
hood Policy was officially adopted. Its overarching aim was to encourage
cooperation and to promote partnership for peace, by socializing the
eu’s future neighbours into sharing the common norms and values of its
members. The Union made no promises of future membership, but it put
strong priority on aiding the development of the countries in question,
with an eye to harmonizing their political and economic structures with
those of its members. The countries included in the European Neighbour-
hood Policy were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine in the east; and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia in the south (Silander & Nilsson,
2014, 2016).
Concerns were also expressed, however, regarding the ability of the
Union to absorb a growing number of member states, both politically
and economically. There were growing scepticism of enlargement among
the populations of the existing member states. Some of the institutional
changes resulting from enlargement provoked political resistance within
the Union. This debate highlighted the danger that an increasing number
of member states might pose to the eu’s unity and its capacity to take
decisions. The great enlargement of 2004, followed by the adherence
of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and that of Croatia in 2013, led to
institutional changes in the structure of the Union, leading to worries
about political overload. Moreover, due to economic unrest during the
European and global financial crisis, from 2008 onwards, unemployment
emerged as an issue of general concern within the Union. Several member
states were threatened with economic collapse. Many citizens and leaders
saw the crisis as partly connected with enlargement, which they believed
had worsened the competition for jobs, reduced levels of employment
32 D. SILANDER
domestically, undermined national social security systems, and redirected

eu funds from the south to the east.
A third concern that was expressed (and which is of particular interest
to this chapter) concerned the capacity of the new member states to
absorb the fundamental norms and values of the Union (Linz & Stepan,
1996; Rupnik, 2000). Could the new members withstand the competitive
pressure on the internal market? Could they meet the far-reaching polit-
ical and legal demands of membership? As enlargement proceeded, signs
started to appear to the effect that several countries were facing transi-
tional difficulties in their efforts to establish democratic institutions and
procedures. Other problems included social inequalities, ethnic/religious
tensions, and lack of economic development. Corruption, bureaucratic
overload, and inefficient political decision-making were also discussed.
Studies showed that, in many cases, democratization was a more complex
affair in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s than it
had been in Southern Europe in the 1970s, much due to the central-
ization of political and social power under communism over a long
period. Decades of authoritarian rule had left an anti-democratic legacy,
with economic and social inequality, a weak and limited civil society,
and a lack of functioning legal and bureaucratic principles. This legacy
also prompted concern that governments in the fragile new democracies
would concentrate power in their own hands, restrict or even exclude
political opposition, and generally fail to represent the political aspirations
of their citizens (Huntington, 1984; Pridham, 1991, 1997).
Over the last years, there have been discussions on the consequences
of eastward enlargement. Did it represent the triumph of the Union,
or rather bear the seeds of its downfall? At the end of the 1990s,
there were signs that illiberal democracies were starting to emerge in
Europe. In 1997, Fareed Zakaria had argued that certain democrati-
cally elected governments were undermining constitutional frameworks,
reducing checks and balances, and attacking the fundamental rights and
freedoms of citizens. By illiberal democracies, Zakaria meant countries
that hold free and fair elections, but which also restrict the rights and
freedoms of citizens, show serious deficiencies in the practice of rule of
law, and make inadequate provision in their constitutional arrangements
for checks and balances (1997). In regimes of this kind, it is often demo-
cratically elected leaders who take liberties—outside of the constitutional
order and the rule of law—to accumulate power at the expense of other
important democratic institutions (Ágn, 2016; Lewitsky & Way, 2002;

Noury & Roland, 2020).
Autocratization Within the EU

The V-Dem Institute at Gothenburg University, Sweden, has the largest
database on democracy in the world, with data on 202 countries, covering
the period between 1978 and 2021 (V-Dem Institute, 2020, 2021). It
is clear from this material that autocratization is proceeding apace, both
in Europe and in the world at large. Anna Lührmann and Staffan I.
Lindberg (2019) show how autocratization takes place gradually, as the
ruling elite employs democratic institutions in such a way as to succes-
sively erode their democratic functions. In many cases, autocratization has
resulted in ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’. Regimes of this kind use elec-
tions to legitimize their power, but they make sure beforehand—through
various anti-democratic means—that the outcome is the one they prefer.
These methods include censoring the media, imposing restrictions on civil
society, harassing opposition leaders and activists, and undermining inde-
pendent electoral mechanisms and election observers (Diamond et al.,
2016; Rutzen, 2016; Schedler, 2002). A gradual decline of democracy
is often difficult to detect, because it rarely involves violent attacks on
democratic institutions, which might otherwise provoke national and
international criticism. The mechanisms employed are subtler and more
sophisticated, and they operate within the framework of a continuing
multi-party system with regular elections (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019).
Autocratization—the opposite of democratization—can take place in
both democratic and undemocratic systems (V-Dem Institute, 2021).
Earlier researchers often used the term ‘democratic breakdown’, but that
concept rather refers to a specific stage when democracy collapses and
gives way to autocracy. It referred, that is, to the end of democracy.
Another term used in the debate is ‘democratic backsliding’, which points
the challenges that democracy faces. Unfortunately, however, this concept
is a bit misleading, due to its suggestion of a pendular motion—whereby
a regime always returns to its earlier position, rather than taking a new
form. The term ‘autocratization’, by contrast, refers to a process whereby
democratic features within a regime are gradually curtailed and autocratic
elements consolidated (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
An extremely tough paper made from silk, a recent invention
of T. Oishi, a Japanese manufacturer, would be specially
useful for such a purpose....
It will be noticed that the texture is very compact and free
from pores, as might, indeed, be expected on account of the
fineness of the silk fibres of which it is composed. It must not
be forgotten that cotton fibres are tubes, and gas may pass
through them even when they are embedded in an
impermeable film. Silk fibres, on the other hand, are solid, as
well as stronger than cotton.
Another way in which a tough, flexible cement may be
utilised is to cement a metal foil to a textile fabric. Aluminium
foil, for instance, cemented to cotton by means of flexile
collodion, gives a completely impermeable fabric of much
greater suppleness than the sheet aluminium hitherto used for
balloons.
Fine aluminium flakes dusted upon the freshly varnished
surface adds greatly to the impermeability of the fabric, and
the same may be said of coarsely powdered mica.
It may be noted in this connection that an impermeable varnish

does not only apply to balloon and airship construction, but will also
have its use for impregnating the planes of the heavier-than-air
machines.
6. Great cost of airships.

The cost of airships compared with that of aëroplanes certainly
favours the extended use of the latter in war. It is easy to spend
£50,000 on a very large airship. Supposing the cost of an aëroplane
seating two persons is £1,000, it is a question from an economic
point of view whether the possession of fifty aëroplanes is not far
better military value for the money expended on the solitary airship.
But in the case of the latter it is not only initial expense that has to be
considered, but cost of housing, maintenance, and hydrogen gas.
These items are very considerable. The upkeep of one large airship
very much exceeds that incurred with fifty aëroplanes.
7. The great amount of personnel needed for the manipulation of

large airships.
It is no exaggeration to say that the ground manipulation of large
airships necessitates the attendance of quite an army. In the case of
a Zeppelin the exigencies of wind may call for the assistance of 300
trained sappers on landing. This is the reason why it is so advisable
to have the resting-places of large airships on water. In the case of
rigid airships a slight bump on the earth may do considerable
damage. Colonel Moedebeck has laid especial stress on the
advisability of water landing.
In practice it is never possible, even by working the motor

against the wind, to avoid a certain amount of bumping, since
the aërostatical equilibrium is not easily judged and allowed
for, especially in strong winds. On this account the safer water
landing is always preferable.
An airship can be anchored more easily with the point
against the wind on water. It is quite impossible to anchor on
land when assistance is not forthcoming to hold down the
airship. On water, also, the airship will give a little to side
winds and to alterations in the direction of the wind, without
overturning. On land this danger is not excluded, even with
rigid airships. Of course, a watertight and seaworthy car is a
necessary condition for landing on water.
The landing requires great attention, and rapid, decisive
handling and management on the part of the aëronaut.
In the opinion of the same expert airship travelling on a large

scale would not be possible without the publication of special charts,
which would furnish information concerning natural airship harbours,
and their relation to various winds, and also of the various airship
sheds which may be erected. He states it would be highly dangerous
to undertake airship voyages without the existence of suitable
stations against storms, and where gas supplies, driving material,
and ballast could be renewed.
8. Great liability of being destroyed by aëroplanes in war.

This is no doubt one of the greatest dangers the airship has to
face in war. The aëroplane is the airship’s deadliest enemy. So
terrible to the airship is this hornet of the air that the former has no
chance of making an attack. It must ever remain on the defensive.
The speed and quickly rising power of modern aëroplanes settles
this question. When the aëroplane is advancing the airship cannot
escape. Nor can it now any longer rise to safe altitude, for the
nimbler heavier-than-air machines can easily outdo it.
The only salvation of the attacked airship is its mitrailleuse gun
fixed on the platform at its topmost part, but the chance of hitting the
swiftly advancing aëroplane is fairly remote.
There are more ways than one in which the fatal attack of
aëroplane v. airship can be made. The airman can, indeed, ram the
gas-bags by hurling himself and machine against it. Then destruction
would be swift and sure, with the probable loss of the airman’s own
life. Better tactics would be to fly above, and drop suitable weapons
on the fragile gas-bag; a few sharp and jagged stones would
probably suffice. Sharp darts of steel would be all-effective. So easy,
indeed, would it be for one aëroplane skilfully handled to end the
existence of the largest airship that one cannot refrain from asking
the question whether on this account alone it can survive as the
instrument of war?
9. Insufficient power of quickly rising.

This is a point which wants the attention of the aëronautical
engineer. The old-fashioned spherical balloons were made to rise
and fall by the alternate sacrifice of gas and ballast. Thus the very
life-blood of the balloon became quickly exhausted. It was obvious
that when airships supplanted balloons the former must be supplied
with a less exhausting process of vertical movement.
As has already been mentioned, when treating of the Zeppelin
airship, for the purpose of rising horizontal planes are now fitted to
airships. Some engineers have thought these should be
supplemented by a mechanical device, so that the speed of rising
might be augmented. The late Baron de Bradsky provided his airship
with a horizontal screw placed beneath the car. But one horizontal
screw beneath an airship tends to twist it round—to convert it into an
aërial top. To avoid this effect it would be necessary to have two
horizontal screws rotating in opposite directions. This precaution was
absent in de Bradsky’s construction, and it kept on twisting round,
with the disastrous effect that the steel wires which held the car to
the balloon snapped, with tragic results. But the idea of the
horizontal screw is worth reviving. It has been a cherished plan of M.
Julliot to include the principle in his designs, but on account of extra
weight he has, I believe, hitherto not tried the interesting experiment.
The colour of most of the airships is a disadvantage, though this
is a matter so easy of alteration that it has not been included in the
list of disadvantages.
In military airships, and, it may be added, aëroplanes also, the
colour should be a neutral tint that is as invisible as possible against
the sky. Most of the airships have been made a glaring yellow, so
that the india-rubber in the envelopes may be better preserved from
the action of light. This protection may have to be sacrificed to the
overpowering advantages of invisibility in the case of naval and
military airships.
CHAPTER VI
THE ADVENT OF THE AËROPLANE
The year of 1908 will be memorable in aëronautical science for its

demonstration of the possibility of mechanical flight. Day after day in
France and America was then seen the spectacle of men flying in
the air, with a grace equal to that of the soaring bird. This was done
with a machine not raised by the buoyancy of a gas, but with one
that was heavier than the medium in which it travels, and whose
sustentation and direction was accomplished by dexterity and skill.
The experiments of the brothers Wright were new triumphs of man,
new examples of the old truths that a difficulty is a thing to be
overcome, and that the impossibility of to-day may be the
achievement of to-morrow. This progress in human flight was not the
result of any new discovery; it was the sequence of a long series of
experiments; nor was it one nation only that forged the links that
connected past researches to the successful issues of the present
century.
It is, however, not without honour to the British nation that one of
the fundamental principles of the biplane was proposed and
elucidated by a Briton in 1866. I refer to the important principle of
superposed surfaces advanced in that year by the late F. H.
Wenham. He pointed out that the lifting power of such a surface can
be most economically obtained by placing a number of small
surfaces above each other. Wenham built flying machines on this
principle with appliances for the use of his own muscular power. He
obtained valuable results as to the driving power of his superposed
surfaces, but he did not accomplish flight.
In 1872, H. von Helmholtz emphasised the improbability that
man would ever be able to drive a flying machine by his own
muscular exertion. After his statements there came a period of
stagnation in the attempts to navigate the air by bodies heavier than
air.
It is difficult to say how much aëronautical science owes to two
illustrious names—Sir Hiram Maxim and the late Professor Langley.
The two eminent men took up the subject of flight about the same
time in the last decade of the last century, and applied to it all the
scientific knowledge of the time. The flying machine had come to be
associated in the public mind with foolhardiness and failure. In the
discussion following Sir Hiram Maxim’s paper, “Experiments in
Aëronautics,” read before the Society of Arts on November 28th,
1894, he said, “At the time I took up this subject it was almost
considered a disgrace for anyone to think of it; it was quite out of the
question practically.” But these two scientific men stepped into the
breach, rescued aëronautics from a fallen position, and fired in its
cause the enthusiasm of men of light and leading.
Sir Hiram Maxim built the largest flying machine that had been
constructed. It spread 4,000 square feet of supporting surface, and
weighed 8,000 lb. The screw propellers were no less than 17 feet 11
inches in diameter, the width of the blade at the tip being 5 feet. The
boiler was of 363 h.p. The machine ran on wheels on a railway line,
and was restrained from premature flight by two wooden rails placed
on each side above the wheels. On one occasion, however, the
machine burst through the wooden rails and flew for 300 feet.
In 1896 Langley’s tandem-surfaced model aërodrome had luck
with the aërial currents, and flew for more than three-quarters of a
mile over the Potomac River. This machine had 70 square feet
supporting surface, weighed 72 lb., and had an engine of 1 h.p.,
weighing 7 lb. It is well known how, in later years, Langley
exaggerated his model into a machine which carried a man, and how
twice, when it was put to the test over water, at the very moment of
being launched, it caught in the launching ways and was pulled into
the water. It is interesting to note that the American aviator, Mr.
Curtiss, has lately unearthed the Langley flying machine, and flown
on it. Thus to Langley has come a posthumous aëronautical honour.
Lilienthal, in Germany, in considering equilibrium, experimented
with what are called gliding machines—aëroplanes which are
launched from some hillside against the wind, and depend upon
gravity for their motive power. In this way the art of balancing could
be practised on motorless gliders. With Lilienthal commenced the
age of systematic experimental flight; he made the discovery of the
driving forward of arched surfaces against the wind; he made some
2,000 glides, and sometimes from a height of 30 metres he glided
300 metres. The underlying principle of maintaining equilibrium in the
air has been recognised to be that the centre of pressure should at
all times be on the same vertical line as the centre of gravity due to
the weight of the apparatus. Lilienthal sought to keep his balance by
altering the position of his centre of gravity by movements of his
body. One day he was upset by a side gust and was killed. Pilcher, in
England, took up his work. With his soaring machines he made
some hundred glides, but he also made one too many. One day, in
1899, in attempting to soar from level ground by being towed by
horses, his machine broke, and he fell to the ground. He died shortly
afterwards, a British martyr of the air.
Mr. Octave Chanute’s experiments in 1896–1902 formed
important links in flight development. He first introduced the vital
principle of making the surfaces movable instead of the aviator, and
he made use of superposed surfaces. Though his work was a stage
in the development of the flying machine, it was reserved to two
other geniuses, the brothers Wright, to bring flight to a point of
progress where prejudiced critics would be for ever silenced.
The brothers Wright first carried out laboratory experiments; they
then, in 1900, first began to experiment with gliding machines at Kitty
Hawk, North Carolina. With the comparatively small surfaces (15.3
square metres) they used in that year, they endeavoured to raise the
machine by the wind like a kite; but finding that it often blew too
strongly for such a system to be practical, in 1901 they abandoned
the idea and resorted to gliding flight.
These machines of 1901 had two superposed surfaces, 1.73
metres apart, each being 6.7 metres from tip to tip, 2.13 metres
wide, and arched 1-19th. The total supporting surface was 27 square
metres. They dispensed with the tail which previous experimenters
had considered necessary. Instead, they introduced into their
machine two vital principles, upon which not only the success of their
preliminary gliding experiments depended, but also their later ones
with their motor-driven aëroplanes—(1) the hinged horizontal rudder
in front for controlling the vertical movements of the machine; (2) the
warping or flexing of one wing or the other for steering to right or left.
Later, a vertical rudder was also added for horizontal steering.
The combined movements of these devices maintained equilibrium.
The importance of the system of torsion of the main carrying
surfaces cannot be overestimated. We have only to look to nature for
its raison d’être, and observe a flight of seagulls over the sea: how
varied are the flexings of nature’s aëroplanes in their wondrous
manœuvrings to maintain and recover equilibrium! Since the
appearance of the Wright motor-driven aëroplane, the principle of
moving either the main surface or attachments to the main surface
has been very generally adopted in other types of flying machines. A
feature of these early experiments was the placing of the operator
prone upon the gliding machine, instead of in an upright position, to
secure greater safety in alighting, and to diminish the resistance.
This, however, was only a temporary expedient while the Wrights
were feeling their way. In the motor-driven aëroplanes the navigator
and his companion were comfortably seated. After the experiments
of 1901, the Wrights carried on laboratory researches to determine
the amount and direction of the pressures produced by the wind
upon planes and arched surfaces exposed at various angles of
incidence. They discovered that the tables of the air pressures which
had been in use were incorrect. Upon the results of these
experiments they produced, in 1902, a new and larger machine. This
had 28.44 square metres of sustaining surfaces—about twice the
area that previous experimenters had dared to handle. The machine
was first flown as a kite, so that it might be ascertained whether it
would soar in a wind having an upward trend of a trifle over seven
degrees; and this trend was found on the slope of a hill over which
the current was flowing. Experiment showed that the machine
soared under these circumstances whenever the wind was of
sufficient force to keep the angle of incidence between four and eight
degrees. Hundreds of successful glides were made along the full
length of this slope, the longest being 22½ feet, and the time 26
seconds. A motor and screw propellers were then applied in place of
gravity, in 1903, and four flights made, the first lasting 12 seconds,
and the last 59 seconds, when 260 metres were covered at a height
of two metres.
In 1904, several hundred flights were made, some being circular.
All this work was carried on in a secluded spot and unpublished. In
December, 1905, the world was startled by the news that the
brothers Wright had flown for 24¼ miles in half an hour, at a speed
of 38 miles an hour. More than this at the time the brothers would not
say, and for three years the world thirsted for the fuller knowledge
only revealed in 1908. In the interval some went so far as to distrust
the statements of the brothers Wright; but those who, like myself,
had had the privilege of correspondence with them from their first
experiments felt the fullest confidence that every statement they had
made was fact.
I have somewhat dwelt on the preliminary experiments of the
brothers Wright with their gliding structures as indicating the rapidity
of progress attained when sound scientific method is combined with
practical experiment. Too often in the past there has been a
tendency amongst the workers in science to keep theory and
practice apart. They are, however, interdependent. Each has a
corrective influence on the other.
To the labours of the Wright brothers we certainly owe the advent
of the mobile and truly efficient military air scout. It is their efforts that
have revolutionised warfare. In the present war we see only the
beginnings of what will one day be; but they are none the less truly
prophetic.
It was the enthusiastic Captain Ferber, who later became a
victim to his ardour for aërial achievement, who realised what the
brothers Wright had accomplished for military aëronautics. The latter
having entered into communications with the French Government
respecting the sale of their machines, Captain Ferber was deputed
by the French Government to go to America and report on their
claims. As the brothers Wright at that time so carefully guarded the
secrecy of their details, he was not allowed to see the machine when
he arrived, and had to be content with the mere hearsay of certain
persons at Ohio, who had witnessed their flights. But he had
sufficient faith in the brothers Wright to recommend the French
Government to buy their invention.
The negotiations, however, fell through at the time, but in 1908
Wilbur Wright came to France to carry on experiments at Le Mans,
while his brother, Mr. Orville Wright, went to Fort Myers in America.
In Wilbur Wright’s machine at Le Mans, the two superposed
slightly concave surfaces were about 12.50 metres long and 2
metres wide. They were separated by a distance of 1.80 metres. At a
distance of 3 metres from the main supporting surfaces was the
horizontal rudder for controlling the vertical motions; this was
composed of two oval superposed planes. At 2.50 metres in front of
the main supporting surfaces was the vertical rudder, composed of
two vertical planes.
The 25 h.p. motor was placed on the lower aëro-surface; this
weighed ninety kilogrammes. At the left of the motor were the two
seats, side by side, for the aëronaut and his companion. The two
wooden propellers at the back of the machine were 2.50 metres in
diameter. They revolved at the rate of 450 revolutions per minute.
The area of the sustaining surfaces was fifty square metres. The
weight of the whole machine (with aviator) was about 450
kilogrammes. Levers under the control of the aviator regulated the
various functions of the machine, the flexing of the carrying surfaces,
the movements of the horizontal rudders, the vertical rudder, etc.
Soon after the experiments at Le Mans had commenced there
came the news of the accident to Mr. Orville Wright’s machine in
America, in which the latter’s leg was broken and Lieutenant
Selfridge was killed. This was a critical moment for aëronautical
science. I can myself bear witness to its depressing effect on an
illustrious aëronautical assemblage, for I was myself present at
Wilbur Wright’s aëroplane shed when the telegram came bearing the
sad news. The sacrifice of one life at that moment seemed to
counterbalance the advantages gained by the triumph of the
brothers Wright. Even Wilbur Wright himself seemed to half repent
he had conquered the air! He exclaimed, “It seems all my fault.” It
was, indeed, then little thought what the future toll of the air would
have to be.
Fortunately for aëronautical progress, two days afterwards
Wilbur Wright recovered his nerve, and made the convincing flight of
1 hour 31 minutes 25 4-5th seconds.
From that day onwards there has been an increasing flow of
progress in the mastery of the air.
CHAPTER VII
TYPES OF AËROPLANES
France has indeed been the breeding-place for types of aëroplanes.

From France have the nations of late been largely gathering them—
save Germany. She has preferred to evolve her own distinctive
types. Even before Wilbur Wright appeared with his machine at Le
Mans and the details were known, hearsay of his doings had fired
the French imagination to do what he had done. In ignorance of the
vital principle of movable surfaces that the Wrights had evolved,
there came into existence the unbending, rigid type that was not
destined to survive.
The first of these was the bird of prey of M. Santos Dumont.
Rudely simple was it in its construction. Two box kites formed the
supporting surface. In the centre was the motor, with the screw
behind. To attain flight the machine was run upon wheels along the
ground until a certain speed was reached, when the machine rose
into the air. With this the inventor did not do much more than make
aërial jumps; but rude as it was it contained one feature which has
since been retained in all aëroplanes. In this one respect it was an
advance—and a very necessary one—upon the Wright machine.
That feature was the attachment of wheels to the machine that has
been mentioned above. This was, indeed, an important step in the
evolution of the aërial scout. Had it been necessary to continue using
the external starting catapults that were a feature of the early
experiments of the Wrights, the application of the aëroplane to
warfare would have been somewhat limited.
The well-known Voisin machine was another outcome of this
period, but, imperfect as it was, it brought Mr. Henry Farman into
fame, for on it he was the first man in Europe to fly any distance
worthy of mention.
The Farman Biplane.

Discontented with the Voisin machine, Mr. Henry Farman
constructed one of his own design. Though it appeared at an early
stage of aëroplane development, it still remains one of the most
efficient types of biplanes. It has been used enormously in France,
and armoured Farmans play an important part in the great war that is
proceeding.
Mr. Farman quickly realised that for maintaining lateral stability
the vertical planes fitted between the main planes of the Voisin type
were a very poor substitute for the wing-warping method of the
brothers Wright. He, however, produced the movement of the main
surfaces in an original manner. He hinged small flaps to the rear
extremities of the main planes. These he called “ailerons.” They
produce much the same effect as the wing-warping method of the
brothers Wright. When the biplane tilted sideways, the flaps were
drawn down on the side that was depressed. The pressure of the air
on the flaps forced the aëroplane back on an even keel. In the
normal condition the flaps flew out straight in the wind on a level with
the main planes. Another noticeable feature of Mr. Farman’s
machine was the production of the first light and efficient landing
chassis. This was a combination of wooden skids and bicycle
wheels. Below the biplane, on wooden uprights, he fitted two long
wooden skids. On either side of each skid he placed two little
pneumatic tyred bicycle wheels, connected by a short axle. These
were held in position on the skid by stout rubber bands passing over
the axle.
In a general way the wheels raised the skids from the ground,
but if the ascent was abrupt the wheels were forced against the
rubber bands and the skids came in contact with the ground. With
the abatement of the force of the shock the wheels came again into
play.
Simplification of the chassis is becoming evident in the latest
forms of all military aëroplanes, the reduction of weight in this portion
of the apparatus being important.
To Mr. Farman belongs the credit of having first applied to his
aëroplane the now famous Gnome motor, in which seven or more
cylinders revolve. It can truly be said that the influence of this motor
on facilitating flight generally, and very particularly military aviation,
has been nothing short of prodigious. The aëroplane, like the airship,
had to wait for the light petroleum motor. Its advent made flight
possible, but achievement in flight would have been comparatively
small had it not been for the welcome appearance of a motor
specially adapted to the purpose.
The early forms of aëroplane engines in which the cylinders
were fixed had proved to be quite unreliable owing to the high
speeds at which the engines had to work. Overheating, loss of
power, and stopping were frequent occurrences. The water-cooling
and air-cooling systems introduced were equally inefficient. The very
fact that the cylinders of the Gnome motor revolved effected the
desideratum of automatic cooling, and also gave a smooth, even
thrust to the propeller.
If the aëroplanes in the present war were flying over the enemy’s
lines with old-fashioned engines, they would be dropping down into
hostile hands as quickly as dying flies from the ceiling on the first
winter days.
After the introduction of the Gnome motor, it was quickly realised
that the speeds secured by its use gave the aëroplane a stability that
was absent in the more slowly moving machines. Winds that were
the bugbear of the aëroplanists could then be combated, and the
aëroplane ceased to be the fine-weather machine. Heights could
then be climbed that a little while before were undreamt of. It is said
that there are some disadvantages in the case of revolving cylinders
—that they have been known to produce a gyroscopic effect that has
upset the machine. This, however, is a somewhat doubtful point. It
may be urged that the greater silence of motors with fixed cylinders
is an advantage in war. This may sometimes be so, and it is quite
possible that for offensive aëroplanes a special type of motor may be
in the future evolved.
To return to the other features of the Farman machine. The plan
he adopted in his racing machines of making the upper plane larger
than the lower one was a valuable step in speed-producing
machines.
The records won by Mr. Farman with his machines alone testify
to its efficiency. Often he has held the world’s records of distance,
duration, and height, wrestling, indeed, for these with the Blériot
monoplane.
In 1911 Mr. Farman began to make types of biplanes specially
designed for military use, and in which he studied how he could best
give the observing officer an unobstructed view of the ground
beneath him. He placed both pilot and observer in seats projecting in
front of the main planes. He also made a new departure in placing
his upper plane in advance of the lower one. He claimed that this
facilitates climbing and descent. He has, however, quite lately
evolved a newer type of scouting machine.
In this the lower plane is only one-third the span of the upper
one. The nacelle is not mounted on the lower plane, as in the
ordinary types of his machine, but, instead, strung from the main
spars of the top one. The usual chassis is absent. There is a single
running wheel mounted at each end of the lower plane, which is
brought very close to the ground. The upper and lower planes are
separated by four pairs of struts. The tail is similar to that used on
the ordinary type.
The following are the dimensions of one of the latest 1914 types
of one-seated Farman machines:—
Length 3.75 metres
Span 11.50 metres
Area 26 sq. metres
Weight (total) 290 kgs.
„ (useful) 175 kgs.
Motor 80 h.p. Gnome
Speed 110 km. per hour
The following are the details of one of his high-power

hydroplanes (1914):—
Length 8.80 metres

Span 18.08 metres
Area 50 sq. metres
Weight (total) 605 kgs.
„ (useful) 275 kgs.
Maximum speed 105 km. per hour
[Topical Press.
A BLÉRIOT MONOPLANE IN FLIGHT,
showing one of the two wings attached to the tubular body of machine, chassis,
stabilising plane, and rudder at rear.
The Blériot Monoplane.

At the same time that Mr. Henry Farman was making his first
flights on his biplanes, M. Blériot was experimenting with
monoplanes. His first attempts were disastrous. Time after time he
was dashed to the ground. But he persevered, and produced a
machine which by its performance staggered the aëronautical world.
When he was first experimenting most people thought that it was
in superposed surfaces that success alone lay. They forgot the
researches of Langley. These had showed that support depended on
two factors—speed and surface; that when speed is increased a less
supporting surface will suffice. The success of Blériot took the world
by surprise. If I were asked to name the men who have done most to
further practical aëronautical development, I should unhesitatingly
say: 1, the brothers Wright; 2, Blériot; 3, Pégoud.
The first have been already dealt with. I will speak of the two
latter together.
Of the work of both there has been one underlying characteristic
—simplicity. The former has produced a machine stripped indeed of
encumbering complexities, in which the restriction of accessories to
what is absolutely necessary is carried to a fine art; the latter with
that very machine has performed experiments in the air that the most
sanguine enthusiast of a few years back would have deemed far
beyond the region of the possible. In his graceful air diving, looping
the loop, and flying upside down, he gave the world a great object-
lesson of the materiality of air. He showed the air can give the aviator
as much support as the water can to a fancy swimmer. He showed
that if the aëroplane is an unstable thing, the human brain can
supply the stability; that in human flight, like the bird and its wings,
the machine and individual can be in closest touch. No one has
stripped the air of its terrors as has M. Pégoud. In the yielding air
there is indeed safety! It is the ground the aviator has to fear!
I have spoken of the simplicity of the Blériot monoplane. In the
machine with which M. Blériot flew over the Channel in 1909,
stretched like the wings of a bird on either side of a tubular wooden
frame partly covered with canvas and tapering to the rear, are placed
the two supporting planes, rounded at the ends. At the front end is
placed the motor (in the original type a three-cylindered engine, now
replaced by the Gnome motor), geared direct to a 6 feet 6 inches
wooden propeller, and on a level with the rear end of the planes.
Immediately behind the engine is the petrol tank, and behind that the
aviator’s seat. Near the rear end of the frame and underneath it is
the fixed tail, with two movable elevating tips. How simple is the
working of this monoplane! Moving a lever backwards and forwards
actuates the tips of the fixed tail at the back of the machine, and
causes it to rise or fall. Moving the same lever from side to side
warps the rear surfaces of the supporting planes. The act of pushing
from side to side a bar on which the aviator’s feet rest puts the
rudder into action and steers the machine.
The triumphs of the Blériot monoplane would fill many pages. It
was the first machine to fly over an expanse of water—the Channel.
Later, it carried M. Prior from London to Paris without a stop,
traversing 250 miles in three hours 56 minutes, beating the
performances of the fleetest express trains by three hours. If it no
longer for the moment holds the record of height, which it has so
often done, it carried M. Garros up to a height of 5,000 metres.
When his engine broke down at that prodigious height, by its superb
gliding powers it brought him safely to earth!
It has flown over the Alpine peaks! It carried the first aëroplane
post—1,750 letters and cards—from Hendon to Windsor in
seventeen minutes!
In 1911 Blériot No. XI. flew with ten persons on board.
Its past records have indeed fitted it to be a military machine. It is
doubtlessly destined to play an important rôle in the present war in
the hands of the French aviators. Especially suitable is this type for
the one-seated military machine. Often it may be desirable to employ
a two-seated machine to carry pilot and observer; but there is often,
too, a use for the single-seated type of machine flying at a rate of
some eighty miles an hour. The work of these observers is to make
swift dashes over the enemy’s lines, make a speedy reconnaissance
of the enemy’s position, and return at once to headquarters with
what information has been obtained.
The following are the dimensions, etc., of the 1914 type of
armoured Blériot monoplanes:—
Length 6.15 metres

Span 10.10 metres
Area 19 sq. metres
Motor 80 h.p. Gnome
Speed 100 km. per hour
The Antoinette Monoplane.

There is another monoplane that will figure in the history of
aëronautics—the Antoinette monoplane. This was the first flying
machine to fly in a wind. Up to the time that Mr. Latham went to the
flying meeting at Blackpool, which took place almost immediately
after the famous Rheims meeting, aviators had only dared to fly in
calm weather. On the flying grounds there used to be tiny flags on
posts. When the flags hung down limply that was the time for flying.
When they moved about, even languidly, that was the time to put the
aëroplane to rest in its shed. Aviators then underestimated the
capabilities of their own machines.
When the aviators came to England the island breezes kept the
little flags vigorously moving about. The aviators were consternated.
The public was disappointed. It began to regard flight as a calm-
weather business. Aëroplanes could not face one breath of wind! Of
what practical use would they ever be!
Latham at that time had his Antoinette monoplane at Blackpool.
It consisted of large and strongly built wings, giving a surface of
about 575 square feet, set at a dihedral angle. The motor was some
60 h.p. At the back of the body of the machine were fixed horizontal
and vertical fins. There were hinged horizontal planes at the end of
the tail for elevating or lowering the machine. “Ailerons” were used
on the main surface for controlling lateral stability. One day, at
Blackpool, Latham went up in a very high wind, and remained in the
air for a considerable time. How much of the stability of his machine
was due to his dexterity, or how much to the machine, it is difficult to
say. Probably the fact that the wings were set at a dihedral angle had
much to do with it. He also had a much larger horse power than his
contemporaries, which no doubt contributed to his success. Anyhow,
by the Antoinette monoplane flight was redeemed from the reproach
that it was merely a pastime for ideal weather conditions. From that
time aviators have sought the winds as well as the calms. Now
aircraft can fly in winds of forty-eight or even fifty miles an hour! This
step of Latham gave a great impetus towards the military adoption of
the aëroplane. The military and naval mind tends to despise what is
only of use in the most favourable conditions. It had put aside the

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The EU between Federal Union and

Flexible Integration: Interdisciplinary

EDITED BY ANTONINA BAKARDJIEVA ENGELBREKT

Anna Michalski Lars Oxelheim

ISBN 978-3-031-22396-9 ISBN 978-3-031-22397-6 (eBook)

Cover credit: Image by Markus Pfaff

1 The Road Ahead for the European Union: Between

7 Are Federal Taxation Requirements Moving the EU

Fredrik N. G. Andersson is Associate Professor of Economics at the

Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science (SNES). His

Lars Oxelheim is Professor of International Business and Finance at the

Fig. 4.1 Percentage of statements in plenary debates that express

Fig. 4.5 Percentage of statements in plenary debates in the six

Fig. 10.2 Average annual growth of disposable household income

Table 2.1 Freedom house on the EU’s member states 35

The Road Ahead for the European Union:

Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Per Ekman,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 1

this is partly due to it being handled very differently by the EU member

membership may in the future force the EU to exert stricter commit-

Integration to Achieve Union:

importance to evaluate the choice between a federal direction and a prag-

a widely noted speech at the Sorbonne, President Emmanuel Macron of

The Constant Tension Between

depoliticized because responsibility for dealing with them was placed in

subsequent processes for ratification. Against this background, the Italian

working groups and committees, form tightly-knitted communities which

Enlargement: A Driving Force Towards

these countries would slow down the development of a common security

integration, both in the form of transitional solutions and in the form of

Gauging the Future Direction

solution, it is not possible as a matter of principle to have a ‘multi-speed

democratic leadership by bringing EU politics out of the isolated zone of

for certain EU-wide exemptions. Policies on state aid affect a number

union cannot conduct a monetary policy tailored to their own partic-

on supranational integration, according to which institutional and legal

themselves. The push towards federalism is also reflected in a joint devel-

Briancon, P. (2017, September 26). 5 Takeaways from Macron’s Big Speech on

Rhinard, M. (2019). The Crisisification of Policy-making in the European Union.

Democracy in Europe: Enlarged

About 25 years ago, Europe was engaged in a dynamic process of

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer 25

Today, the situation in Europe is fundamentally different. Liberal

The EU, Democratic Institutions,

2004). One issue on which scholars have focused is whether the EU

important impact on countries’ democratic development. In a European

The Enlargement of the Union

The Enlargement of the Union

the importance of enlargement, but also how it implied the establishment

domestically, undermined national social security systems, and redirected

important democratic institutions (Ágn, 2016; Lewitsky & Way, 2002;

Autocratization Within the EU

It may be noted in this connection that an impermeable varnish

6. Great cost of airships.

7. The great amount of personnel needed for the manipulation of

In practice it is never possible, even by working the motor

In the opinion of the same expert airship travelling on a large

8. Great liability of being destroyed by aëroplanes in war.

9. Insufficient power of quickly rising.

The year of 1908 will be memorable in aëronautical science for its

France has indeed been the breeding-place for types of aëroplanes.

The Farman Biplane.

The following are the details of one of his high-power