Adam Lewis - Jonathan Taylor - Sport - Law and Practice-Bloomsbury Professional (2021)

Sport: Law and Practice
Fourth Edition
Sport: Law and Practice
Fourth Edition
Adam Lewis QC
and
Jonathan Taylor QC
BLOOMSBURY PROFESSIONAL
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Foreword to Fourth Edition
It is with pleasure that I have agreed to write a short foreword for this fourth edition
of Sport: Law & Practice, edited by Adam Lewis QC and Jonathan Taylor QC.
As a former athlete, then politician, and now sports administrator, I am well aware of
the importance of rules and law to sport.
• I was the first athlete invited to address an IOC Congress back in 1981. My task
was to synthesise the views of the 40 Olympians that Juan Antonio Samaranch
had invited to the Congress. Of the four minutes that I was allocated, I spoke
about the dangers to the health of the athletes, the damage to the fabric of sport
and the integrity of competition for about two and three-quarter minutes. This
little group, which included the current IOC President, Thomas Bach, then
formed the membership of the first IOC Athletes Commission.
• I’ve also always had an interest in the governance of sport. In advance of the
Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, I went head-to-head on the BBC with the
Chairman of the British Amateur Athletics Board. I disputed the selection
policy for the Games that year. In response to my position, the Chairman
observed that this was all about who ran the sport. I replied that I welcomed
that approach and when he did find out who ran the sport, would he please let
me and the athletes know as it would be extremely helpful! Sadly, he had the
last laugh and, more importantly, the casting vote that vetoed my selection a
couple of months later for the Seoul Games, denying me the opportunity of
winning a third 1500m title.
• As chair of the London 2012 Bidding Committee and then the Organising
Committee for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, I was
involved in securing the necessary statutory protection of the Olympic symbols
from ambush marketing, in the form of the Olympic Symbol etc (Protection)
Act 1995, subsequently amended by the London Olympic Games and
Paralympic Games Act 2006. With my team at LOCOG, we also worked hard
on developing the strong governance structures that enabled the Organising
Committee, which I chaired, the Olympic Delivery Authority, the British
Olympic Association, the Mayor of London, the UK Government, and the
plethora of regional and national bodies and departments to be instrumental in
delivering an exceptional Olympic and Paralympic Games.
• When I became president of the IAAF (now World Athletics) in 2015,
I spearheaded the reform of the sport’s constitution and the creation of the
Athletics Integrity Unit (a ground-breaker) in response to the Russian doping
crisis, and I have personally been to CAS when the Russian Olympic Committee
challenged our exclusion of Russian athletes from the 2016 Olympic Games
(ROC & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684) and when Caster Semenya
challenged our rules governing the eligibility of athletes with differences in sex
development to compete in the female competition category (Semenya v IAAF,
Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798).
• When it came to rebalancing the powers of the IAAF president in our
governance reforms in 2016, I was slightly taken aback when one key figure in
the sport could not understand why I would want to give away so much power
after having worked so hard to win the election. That was when I knew the full
enormity of the reform process that lay ahead and the need for a much greater
understanding of empowerment in the governance process.
vi Foreword to Fourth Edition
• As a politician in the early to mid-1990s and now a Member of the House of

Lords and Chancellor of Loughborough University, I continue to believe that
sport is fundamental to the fabric of our society and continue to speak out on
sport governance, sport integrity, the power of partnerships and the need for
sport to be available to all.
Given how high the stakes are in modern professional sport, and given the intensity
of the public gaze, sports governing bodies and all others active in the sports sector
clearly need highly competent and expert legal advice. I therefore welcome the latest
edition of this comprehensive practitioners’ guide. No sports organisation should
leave home without one!
Sebastian Coe
World Athletics President
January 2021
Preface to Fourth Edition
This book continues to seek to provide an accessible guide, for both participants in
sport and for legal practitioners, to the interaction of sport with the law, an interaction
that has intensified and developed greatly since the first edition was published in
2003. To that end, this fourth edition retains and updates the core content of the
third edition, while reorganising the structure followed and adding new chapters,
in particular in relation to data protection, best practice in sports governance,
effective sports regulation, misconduct, exploitation of sports data, and eSports.
Where relevant, the effect of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European
Union is addressed, as is the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. The law stated in this
edition is as of 1 June 2020, although where possible later developments have been
incorporated.
Part A (Governance of the Sports Sector) examines how, and the extent to which,
sports governing bodies self-govern (Chapter A1); their forms of organisation
(Chapter A2); government intervention in the sector (Chapter A3); the application of
data protection law to sports organisations (Chapter A4); and lastly best practice in
sports governance (Chapter A5). The last two chapters are new as stand-alone topics,
reflecting their growing importance in law and practice.
Part B (Regulating Sport) addresses the approach to, and the principal areas of,
the regulation of sport by sports governing bodies. The first chapter (Chapter B1)
analyses the basic legal principles relevant to and constraining sports governing
bodies’ regulatory efforts. While some of the content of this chapter has been
addressed elsewhere in previous editions, we have sought to examine these principles
in more detail here in order to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for
what follows in the rest of the section and elsewhere in the book. The remaining
chapters of Part B address a number of specific areas of regulation: selection (Chapter
B2); misconduct (Chapter B3); match-fixing and related corruption (Chapter B4);
financial fair play (Chapter B5); and safeguarding (Chapter B6). Other areas of
regulation are addressed where they arise in the context of disciplinary and other
internal proceedings brought by sports governing bodies (Chapter D1) and in the
context of challenges to the actions of sports governing bodies (Part E).
The major area of doping is deal with separately in Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation
and Enforcement) in the light of the extensive developments in this area, including the
introduction of the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code with effect from 1 January 2021.
Each of the critical elements of anti-doping law and practice is now dealt with in a
separate chapter in the interests of accessibility for readers, even where that results
in chapters of (at times significantly) differing lengths. After an initial introduction
(Chapter C1), the anti-doping regulatory framework is described (Chapter C2), setting
out how the regime is operated and by whom. The next three chapters deal with the
practicalities of anti-doping procedures: the parties to the procedure (Chapter C3);
preliminary considerations in bringing and defending a charge (Chapter C4); and
the burden and standard of proof at a hearing on the merits (Chapter C5). There then
follow ten chapters (Chapters C6 to C15) on the individual anti-doping rule violations
contained in Article 2 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2021, which are carried over
into the anti-doping rules of all Code-compliant sports. The remaining chapters deal
with the consequences of a proven violation: an introductory overview of how periods
of ineligibility are determined (Chapter C16); the starting point of basic periods of
ineligibility determined by application of Code Articles 10.2 and 10.3 (Chapter C17);
reduction of the starting point basic period where the athlete establishes they bear
viii Preface to Fourth Edition
no fault or negligence or no significant fault or negligence for the violation (Chapter

C18); increase of the period in the light of aggravating factors (Chapter C19); the
methodology of fixing the period of ineligibility within an available range (Chapter
C20); reductions in the period for other reasons not connected to the degree of fault
(Chapter C21); the start date for the period of ineligibility (Chapter C22); and the
disqualification of results and financial consequences (Chapter C23).
Part D (Disciplinary and Arbitral Proceedings) explains the role in sports disputes
of proceedings other than in court. Disputes in the sector are resolved increasingly
resolved in such proceedings. Disciplinary and other internal proceedings (Chapter
D1) are the proceedings brought by or against sports governing bodies before internal
decision makers, which range from administrative arms of the sports governing body
to domestic tribunals that are or verge on the arbitral. The next chapter (Chapter D2)
analyses the dual roles of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, on occasion as the last
appeal instance in relation to a decision made by the governing body’s internal panel,
and on occasion as an ordinary arbitration in respect of a range of disputes submitted
to it. Lastly Chapter D3 addresses arbitration in sport more widely and generally.
Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies) analyses the judicial
limits on self-governance by sports governing bodies, ie the bases on which courts
and arbitral panels are prepared to intervene in relation to various actions of sports
governing bodies, and the procedural elements involved. In order to make this area
more accessible both to those contemplating challenging a sports governing body, and
to sports governing bodies defending such a challenge, each of the critical elements
is now dealt with in a separate chapter, as with doping, even where again that results
in chapters of differing lengths. After an initial introduction (Chapter E1), the types
of governing body actions susceptible to challenge are addressed (Chapter E2). Then
the initial steps preparatory to bringing or defending a challenge are examined:
identification of the cause of action and the respondent (Chapter E3); and choice of
forum (Chapter E4). That is followed by analysis of the nature of a sports governing
body’s actions and the consequences: the extent to which the governing body’s
actions are private or quasi-public (Chapter E5); and the varying degree of review as
a result (Chapter E6). There then follow eight chapters (Chapters E7 to E14) on the
principal causes of action relevant to challenge to governing body action: the grounds
for review arising out of control of the sport (or ‘Bradley grounds’); contract; tort;
restraint of trade; competition law; free movement to the extent applicable; human
rights law; and discrimination law. The remaining chapters deal with remedies
(Chapter E15) and procedural aspects of such challenges (Chapter E16).
Part F (Relationships between Clubs and Players) turns to the relationships between
the principal participants in sport other than governing bodies: clubs, players,
training staff, and agents. First, player and manager contracts are dealt with (Chapter
F1); then players’ agents (Chapter F2); and lastly the complex rules and practice in
relation to player transfers (Chapter F3).
Part G (Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport) describes the circumstances

in which one participant in a sporting contest may become liable to another, or to a
member of the public, as a consequence of the way in which the sport is played: first
civil liability (Chapter G1), and then criminal liability (Chapter G2).
Part H (Commercialising Sport Properties) covers the application of the law to the
activities of commercial partners that contract with governing bodies or participants
in order to make a financial gain from the sport: proprietary rights in sports events,
and the corollary ambush marketing (Chapter H1); broadcasting and new media
(Chapter H2); sponsorship (Chapter H3); image rights (Chapter H4); merchandising
and licensing (Chapter H5); hospitality (Chapter H6); and exploiting sports data
Preface to Fourth Edition ix
(Chapter H7). The last chapter is new as a stand-alone topic, again reflecting its
growing importance.
Part I (Tax Issues in the Sports Sector) addresses taxation of sports organisations
(Chapter I1) and taxation of individual athletes (Chapter I2).
Part J (Esports) is new and sets out the application of the law to the most recent
development in the ambit of sport, esports.
We are very grateful to all of those who have made this fourth edition possible,
including each of the author-contributors, who are individually identified in the table
of contents following this preface and whose biographies are then set out, Kiran
Goss, Paul Crick and Jenny Lank for Bloomsbury, Joanna Hawkins and Catherine
Smith at Bird & Bird, and Mat Swallow and the clerks at Blackstone Chambers.
We also thank Lord Coe very much for providing a short foreword that shows how
frequently he has encountered sports law issues during his illustrious career as an
athlete, politician, and sports administrator.
Finally, as in the case of previous editions, Adam again thanks Beate, Magnus and
Marianne, and Jon again thanks Kate, Sophie and Emily for putting up with us (and
our absences) while we have been working on this edition.
Adam Lewis QC Jonathan Taylor QC

Blackstone Chambers Bird & Bird LLP
January 2021
Contents
Foreword v
Preface vii
Author Biographies xxiii
Table of Statutes xli
Table of Statutory Instruments li
Table of Cases lv
PART A GOVERNANCE OF THE SPORTS SECTOR 1

CHAPTER A1 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT,
AND ITS LIMITS (Lauren Pagé and Jonathan Taylor QC) 3
1 INTRODUCTION 3
2 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT 4
3 THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE 17
4 THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF AN SGB 24
5 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS 32
6 ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS 52
CHAPTER A2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SPORTS

GOVERNING BODIES AND COMPETITIONS
(James Maloney,Tom Bruce and Jon Walters) 72
1 INTRODUCTION 72
2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME 73
3 THE NATIONAL SCHEME 76
4 TYPICAL CONSITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK 78
5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNING BODIES AND
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS 91
6 THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY SPORTS GOVERNING
BODIES 92
7 AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS 97
CHAPTER A3 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE SPORTS

SECTOR (Lewis Calder and Jonathan Taylor QC) 104
1 INTRODUCTION 104
2 THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY 105
3 GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY 108
4 IMPLEMENTING MODERN GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY:
A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 122
CHAPTER A4 DATA PROTECTION AND SPORT (Emma Drake) 171

1 INTRODUCTION 171
2 DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE 172
3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT 183
4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS 220
5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS 231
6 DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT 237
7 LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 247
CHAPTER A5 BEST PRACTICE IN SPORTS GOVERNANCE

(Maria Clarke, Edwina Haddon, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 255
1 INTRODUCTION 255
2 BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 260
xii Contents
3 PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE 270

4 MONITORING COMPLIANCE 288
PART B REGULATING SPORT 291

CHAPTER B1 DRAFTING EFFECTIVE REGULATIONS –
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (Jonathan Taylor QC,
Charles Flint QC, and Adam Lewis QC) 293
1 INTRODUCTION 293
2 THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS SPORT 294
3 THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON AN SGB’S EXERCISE OF ITS
REGULATORY POWERS 304
4 RESOLVING DISPUTES AS TO THE PROPER MEANING OF AN
SGB’S REGULATIONS 359
CHAPTER B2 SELECTION (Elizabeth Riley and Christopher Stoner QC) 391

1 INTRODUCTION 391
2 THE SELECTION PROCESS 392
3 ELIGIBILITY 402
4 APPEALS 404
5 THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES 419
6 CONCLUSIONS 421
CHAPTER B3 MISCONDUCT (Kendrah Potts, Stuart Tennant, and

James Eighteen) 423
1 INTRODUCTION 424
2 ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING 424
3 POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD INCIDENTS 429
4 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 433
5 TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES 438
6 REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT 447
7 DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT PROVISIONS 449
8 TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES 454
9 CODES OF ETHICS 469
CHAPTER B4 MATCH-FIXING AND RELATED CORRUPTION IN

SPORT (Iain Higgins, Jonathan Taylor QC,
Adam Lewis QC, and Tom Mountford) 487
1 INTRODUCTION 487
2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM 490
3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN SPORT 508
4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES 530
5 SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES 546
6 PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES 555
7 THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY? 574
CHAPTER B5 REGULATING FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY (Nick Craig,

Jonathan Taylor QC, and Sam Beer) 577
1 INTRODUCTION 577
2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 581
3 CLUB LICENSING 597
4 COST CONTROLS 607
5 WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY 630
CHAPTER B6 SAFEGUARDING (Kate Gallafent QC and Richard Bush) 642

1 INTRODUCTION 642
2 KEY TECHNOLOGY 643
3 THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND 648
4 SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT 652
Contents xiii
PART C ANTI-DOPING REGULATION AND

ENFORCEMENT 673
CHAPTER C1 INTRODUCTION (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 675
CHAPTER C2 THE ANTI-DOPING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

(Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 676
1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION 676
2 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW 681
3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN THE UK 685
CHAPTER C3 PARTIES (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 687

1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? 687
2 WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS? 689
CHAPTER C4 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS IN BRINGING

and DEFENDING A CHARGE (Jonathan Taylor QC
and Adam Lewis QC) 697
1 GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE 697
2 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN ATHLETE OR OTHER
PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING RULE
VIOLATION 702
CHAPTER C5 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF AT THE

HEARING ON THE MERITS (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 739
1 INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION 739
2 STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION
MUST MEET 739
3 THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 743
4 ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 743
5 REBUTTAL EVIDENCE 747
CHAPTER C6 ARTICLE 2.1 ADRV – THE PRESENCE OF A

PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR ITS METABOLITES
OR MARKERS IN AN ATHLETE’S SAMPLE
1 ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE 754
2 ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE
LABORATORY’S ADVERSE ANALYTICAL FINDING 774
3 ESTABLISHING THAT THE SUBSTANCE FOUND IN THE SAMPLE IS
IN FACT PROHIBITED 799
CHAPTER C7 ARTICLE 2.2 ADRV –AN ATHLETE’S USE OR

ATTEMPTED USE OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE
OR A PROHIBITED METHOD (Jonathan Taylor QC
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION 822
2 PROVING ‘USE’ 824
3 PROVING ‘USE’ BY REFERENCE TO ANALYTICAL DATA 825
4 PROVING ‘USE’ BY MEANS OF THE ATHLETE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT 827
5 PROVING ‘USE’ BY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL DATA 846
6 ‘ATTEMPTED USE’ OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR METHOD 850
7 DEFENCES 852
CHAPTER C8 ARTICLE 2.3 CHARGE – REFUSING OR FAILING TO

SUBMIT TO OR OTHERWISE EVADING SAMPLE
COLLECTION (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 854
xiv Contents
CHAPTER C9 ARTICLE 2.4 ADRV – THREE WHEREABOUTS

FAILURES IN TWELVE MONTHS (Jonathan Taylor QC
CHAPTER C10 ARTICLE 2.5 ADRV – TAMPERING OR ATTEMPTED

TAMPERING WITH ANY PART OF DOPING
CONTROL (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 876
CHAPTER C11 ARTICLE 2.6 ADRV – POSSESSION OF A

PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR A PROHIBITED
METHOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 886
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.6 (POSSESSION) VIOLATION 886
2 DEFENCES TO AN ART 2.6 CHARGE 891
CHAPTER C12 ARTICLE 2.7 ADRV – TRAFFICKING OR

ATTEMPTED TRAFFICKING IN ANY PROHIBITED
SUBSTANCE OR PROHIBITED METHOD
CHAPTER C13 ARTICLE 2.8 ADRV – ADMINISTRATION

OR ATTEMPTED ADMINISTRATION OF A
PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE TO AN ATHLETE
CHAPTER C14 ARTICLE 2.9 ADRV – COMPLICITY OR

ATTEMPTED COMPLICITY BY AN ATHLETE
OR OTHER PERSON (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 901
CHAPTER C15 ARTICLE 2.10 ADRV – PROHIBITED ASSOCIATION

– and ARTICLE 2.11 ADRV – RETALIATION
CHAPTER C16 CODE SANCTIONS: OVERVIEW OF APPROACH TO

PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY (Jonathan Taylor QC
CHAPTER C17 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (1): APPLYING

CODE ARTICLES 10.2 AND 10.3 (Jonathan Taylor QC
1 OVERVIEW 915
2 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.1 VIOLATION 916
CHAPTER C18 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (2):

ESTABLISHING NO (OR NO SIGNIFICANT)
FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 946
1 IS A PLEA OF NO (OR NO SIGNIFICANT) FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE
AVAILABLE IN PRINCIPLE? 946
Contents xv
2 THE FIRST THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR BOTH NO FAULT OR

NEGLIGENCE AND NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE:
PROVING HOW THE SUBSTANCE ENTERED THE ATHLETE’S SYSTEM 951
3 THE SECOND THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR NO FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE: PROVING THAT THE ATHLETE USED ‘UTMOST
CAUTION’ TO KEEP THEIR SYSTEM CLEAR OF PROHIBITED
SUBSTANCES 968
4 THE SECOND THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR NO SIGNIFICANT
FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE: PROVING THAT ANY FAULT THAT THE
ATHLETE BEARS FOR THEIR VIOLATION IS ‘NOT SIGNIFICANT’ 984
5 DETERMINING THE REDUCTION FOR NO SIGNIFICANT FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE ONCE THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS ARE MET 1009
CHAPTER C19 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (3):

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1 THE CASES WHERE A PLEA OF AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
WILL BE AVAILABLE 1010
2 ESTABLISHING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 1011
CHAPTER C20 DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF THE

INELIGIBILITY PERIOD WITHIN A PERMITTED
RANGE (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 1021
1 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE THE RANGE IS 0–24 MONTHS OR
12–24 MONTHS 1022
2 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE THE RANGE IS 24 OR 48 MONTHS UP
TO A LIFETIME BAN 1058
3 ASSESSING FAULT WHERE AGGRAVATING FACTORS ARE FOUND
TO EXIST 1063
CHAPTER C21 SUSPENDING OR REDUCING SANCTIONS FOR

REASON UNRELATED TO FAULT
1 SUSPENDING THE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY AND/OR OTHER
CONSEQUENCES DUE TO ‘SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE’ 1064
2 REDUCING THE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY BASED ON AN
ADMISSION MADE BEFORE THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION
WAS AWARE OF THE ADRV 1071
3 REDUCING A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY BASED
ON A PROMPT ADMISSION AFTER BEING CONFRONTED WITH THE
ADRV 1075
CHAPTER C22 DETERMINING THE START DATE OF THE

INELIGIBILITY PERIOD (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 1080
1 GENERAL RULE: BAN STARTS FROM THE DAY IT IS ACCEPTED OR
IMPOSED 1080
2 FIRST EXCEPTION: DELAYS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ATHLETE
OR OTHER PERSON 1080
3 SECOND EXCEPTION: CREDIT FOR PROVISIONAL SUSPENSION 1082
4 THIRD EXCEPTION: NEW BANS RUN CONSECUTIVELY, NOT
CONCURRENTLY 1083
5 NO OTHER EXCEPTIONS UNDER THE 2021 CODE 1084
CHAPTER C23 DISQUALIFICATION OF RESULTS AND FINANCIAL

CONSEQUENCES (Jonathan Taylor QC and
Adam Lewis QC) 1086
1 DISQUALIFICATION OF RESULTS 1086
2 FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES 1098
xvi Contents
PART D DISCIPLINARY AND ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 1101

CHAPTER D1 DISCIPLINARY AND OTHER INTERNAL
PROCEEDINGS (Kate Gallafent QC and
Christopher Quinlan QC) 1103
1 INTRODUCTION 1103
2 JURISDICTION: ESTABLISHING RULES BINDING ON PARTICIPANTS 1107
3 JURISDICTION: ESTABLISHING RULES COVERING DIFFERENT
TYPES OF DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES AND OTHER INTERNAL DISPUTES 1116
4 ENFORCEMENT: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1125
5 CHECKLISTS 1145
6 CONCLUSION 1148
CHAPTER D2 THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR COURT

(Michael Beloff QC, Dr Stephan Netzle and
Prof Dr Ulrich Haas, With Björn Hessert and
Dr Mirjam Koller Trunz) 1150
1 HISTORY 1151
2 ORGANISATION OF CAS 1156
3 JURISDICTION OF CAS 1166
4 HOW TO PROCEED BEFORE CAS 1176
5 GOVERNING LAW ON THE MERITS 1199
6 SPECIFIC SPORTS LAW PRINCIPLES 1206
7 THE AWARD 1215
8 CAS MEDIATION 1227
9 LEGAL OPINIONS 1228
CHAPTER D3 ARBITRATION IN SPORT (Ian Mill QC and

andrew Hunter QC) 1229
1 INTRODUCTION 1229
2 WHEN ARE SPORTS DISPUTES REFERRED TO ARBITRATION? 1232
3 VALIDITY OF SPORTS ARBITRATION CLAUSES 1237
4 THE SCOPE OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 1244
5 OUSTER OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION, STAYS AND ANTI-SUIT
INJUNCTIONS 1250
6 CONDUCT OF DOMESTIC SPORTS ARBITRATIONS; SUPERVISION
AND ASSISTANCE BY THE COURT 1253
7 CHALLENGES TO DECISIONS OF ARBITRAL BODIES 1256
8 ENFORCEMENT OF DOMESTIC ARBITRATION AWARDS 1259
9 IMMUNITY OF DOMESTIC SPORTS ARBITRATORS FROM SUIT 1260
10 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1260
PART E CHALLENGES TO THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS

GOVERNING BODIES 1263
CHAPTER E1 INTRODUCTION TO CHALLENGES
(Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis
QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1265
CHAPTER E2 THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS GOVERNING

BODIES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,
Adam Lewis QC, and Jonathan Taylor QC) 1268
1 ACTIONS AFFECTING A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT 1269
2 ACTIONS AFFECTING A CLASS OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS 1274
3 FAILURE TO TAKE ACTION IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL
PARTICIPANTS 1277
4 ACTIONS AFFECTING SPECIFIC CLUBS 1277
5 ACTIONS AFFECTING ALL CLUBS 1280
6 ACTIONS AFFECTING OTHER SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 1282
Contents xvii
7 ACTIONS AFFECTING COMMERCIAL PARTNERS 1284

8 ACTIONS AFFECTING THE PUBLIC 1289
9 ACTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS AFFECTING OTHER PARTICIPANTS 1289
CHAPTER E3 IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND

RESPONDENT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,
1 CAUSE OF ACTION 1291
2 RESPONDENT 1294
CHAPTER E4 CHOICE OF FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGE

(Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,
1 INTERNAL PROCEEDINGS AND INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1298
2 ATTEMPTS TO OUST THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS 1301
3 EXTERNAL ARBITRATION 1301
4 COURT 1306
5 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOUTION OR MEDIATION 1306
6 ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 1307
CHAPTER E5 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? (Nick De Marco

QC, James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and
Jonathan Taylor QC) 1309
1 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE CHOICE OF
PROCEDURE 1310
2 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 IN THIS
CONTEXT 1312
3 THE EXTENSION TO SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES OF EU FREE
MOVEMENT LAW 1314
CHAPTER E6 THE VARYING DEGREES OF REVIEW

1 JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE 1316
2 THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN APPLIED 1317
3 LIMITATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE 1318
4 DOES THE PRINCIPLE APPLY IN THE CONTEXTOF RESTRAINT OF
TRADE? 1319
5 SHOULD SPECIALIST ARBITRAL BODIES BE SO RELUCTANT? 1319
6 RELUCTANCE TO INTERVENE UNDER COMPETITION LAW AND
EUROPEAN LAW 1320
CHAPTER E7 GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ARISING OUT OF

CONTROL OF THE SPORT (Nick De Marco QC,
James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and
1 THE EXTENT OF AND BASIS FOR THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 1323
2 THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT LAWFULY AND IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SPORTS GOVERNING BODY’S RULES 1348
3 THE REQUIREMENT TO ACT FAIRLY IN A PROCEDURAL SENSE, OR
‘NATURAL JUSTICE’ 1351
4 THE REQUIREMENT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONLY RELEVANT
CONSIDERATIONS 1359
5 THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE BODY INSTRUCT ITSELF PROPERLY
AS TO THE FACTS 1360
6 THE REQUIREMENT NOT TO ACT CONTRARY TO A LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION 1360
7 THE REQUIREMENT NOT TO ACT IRRATIONALLY, ARBITRARILY OR
CAPRICIOUSLY 1360
xviii Contents
CHAPTER E8 CONTRACT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

1 THE SOURCES OF CONTRACTS TO WHICH SPORTS GOVERNING
BODIES ARE PARTY 1364
2 EXPRESS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1371
3 IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1371
4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPRESS AND IMPLIED
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 1372
CHAPTER E9 TORT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

1 ACTIONS IN NEGLIGENCE AGAINST SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES 1373
2 INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE ECONOMIC TORTS 1375
3 ACTIONS AGAINST SPORTS GOVERNING BODIES BASED ON
OTHER TORTS 1376
CHAPTER E10 COMMON LAW RESTRAINT OF TRADE

1 THE BASIS FOR AND EXTENT OF THE DOCTRINE 1378
2 APPLICATION TO THE RULES AND ACTIONS OF SPORTS
GOVERNING BODIES 1381
3 DOES THE DOCTRINE REMAIN A DISTINCT BASIS FOR CHALLENGE? 1390
CHAPTER E11 EU AND UK COMPETITION LAW RULES AND

SPORT (Brian Kennelly QC,Tom Richards, and
Adam Lewis QC) 1392
1 INTRODUCTION 1392
2 THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU AND
UK COMPETITION RULES 1393
3 APPLYING THE COMPETITION RULES IN THE SPORTS SECTOR 1405
4 COMPETITION LAW JURISPRUDENCE IN THE SPORTS SECTOR 1415
CHAPTER E12 EU FREE MOVEMENT RULES and SPORT

(Thomas De La Mare QC and Ravi S Mehta) 1492
1 APPLICATION OF EU FREE MOVEMENT RULES TO SPORT 1492
2 STATUS OF SPORT UNDER THE EU TREATIES 1496
3 FREE MOVEMENT RULES ESTABLISHED BY THE EU TREATIES 1498
4 SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT RULES 1500
5 SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT RULES 1530
6 ENFORCEMENT 1540
CHAPTER E13 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND SPORT

(Lord Pannick QC, Paul Luckhurst, and Celia Rooney) 1542
1 INTRODUCTION 1542
2 THE PROVISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 1545
3 THE CONVENTION ARTICLES RELEVANT TO SPORT 1554
4 THE HRA 1998 IN PRACTICE 1571
CHAPTER E14 DISCRIMINATION IN SPORT (Emily Neill and

Hollie Higgins) 1575
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1575
2 WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION? THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATION 1580
3 WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION UNLAWFUL? THE SCOPE OF THE
LEGISLATION 1593
4 STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS RELEVANT TO SPORT 1598
5 REMEDIES 1608
Contents xix
CHAPTER E15 REMEDIES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

1 INTERIM INJUNCTIONS 1610
2 FINAL INJUNCTIONS 1615
3 INTERIM DECLARATIONS 1617
4 FINAL DECLARATIONS 1618
5 REMISSION FOR A FRESH DECISION 1619
6 DAMAGES 1620
7 REMEDIES UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 1623
8 UNFAIR PREJUDICE PETITIONS UNDER SECTION 994 OF THE
COMPANIES ACT 2006 1623
CHAPTER E16 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS (Nick De Marco QC,

James Segan QC, Adam Lewis QC, and
1 PARTIES 1625
2 OBTAINING A QUICKER RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE 1626
3 SECURITY FOR COSTS 1629
4 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE OR INTERNAL
PROCEEDINGS 1629
5 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1631
6 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PENDING CHALLENGE 1631
7 STAY IN THE LIGHT OF PARALLEL REGULATORY COMPETITION
PROCEEDINGS 1631
8 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 1632
9 JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW 1633
PART F RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLUBS AND

PLAYERS 1637
CHAPTER F1 PLAYING CONTRACTS (Paul Goulding QC,
Jane Mulcahy QC, and Diya Sen Gupta QC) 1639
1 INTRODUCTION 1639
2 WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? 1641
3 FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT 1644
4 PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 1656
5 TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT 1657
6 REMEDIES 1669
7 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1674
8 MINORS’ CONTRACTS 1676
CHAPTER F2 PLAYERS’ AGENTS (Ian Lynam, Jonathan Ellis, and

Nick De Marco QC) 1678
1 THE ROLE OF PLAYERS’ AGENTS IN SPORT 1678
2 THE REGULATION OF PLAYERS’ AGENTS 1681
3 THE CONTENT OF A REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT 1717
4 ISSUES ARISING BETWEEN AGENT AND PRINCIPAL AND THIRD
PARTIES 1724
CHAPTER F3 PLAYER TRANSFERS (Stephen Sampson,

Peter Limbert, and Adam Lewis QC) 1741
1 THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘PLAYER TRANSFER’ 1742
2 CONTRAST WITH POSITION OUTSIDE THE SPORTS SECTOR 1746
3 TRANSFER RULES THAT HAVE BEEN IMPOSED, AND WHY 1747
4 THE LEGALITY OF TRANSFER RULES 1759
5 NEGOTIATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL PLAYER TRANSFER 1787
6 DISPUTES IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUAL PLAYER TRANSFERS 1812
xx Contents
PART G LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF PARTICIPATION

IN SPORT 1847
CHAPTER G1 CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF
PARTICIPATION IN SPORT (Prof Mark James) 1849
1 INTRODUCTION 1849
2 LIABILITY OF CONTESTANTS TO EACH OTHER 1853
3 LIABILITY OF NON-ATHLETES FOR CAUSING INJURY TO SPORTS
PARTICIPANTS 1864
4 LIABILITY OF GOVERNING BODIES 1872
5 LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES CAUSED ON OR NEAR SPORTING
PREMISES 1877
6 DEFENCES 1894
7 FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 1897
CHAPTER G2 CRIMINAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF

PARTICIPATION IN SPORT (Prof Mark James) 1900
1 SPORTS PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1900
2 PARTICIPATOR VIOLENCE 1901
3 COMBAT SPORTS 1922
4 PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES AND RACIST ABUSE 1923
5 INITIATION CEREMONIES AND INFORMAL PUNISHMENTS 1927
6 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 1927
PART H COMMERCIALISING SPORTS PROPERTIES 1929

CHAPTER H1 PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN SPORTS EVENTS
(Clive Lawrence, Phil Sherell, and Tristan Sherliker) 1931
1 INTRODUCTION 1931
2 NO PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN A SPORTS EVENT PER SE 1932
3 FIGHTING AMBUSH MARKETING: THE FOUNDATIONS FOR
A SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIAL PROGRAMME FOR A SPORTS EVENT 1942
4 ACCESS RIGHTS 1945
5 CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTIONS ON PARTICIPANTS AND
COMMERCIAL PARTNERS 1953
6 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1959
7 USING OTHER LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL REMEDIES 1993
CHAPTER H2 MEDIA RIGHTS AND SPORT (Morris Bentata and

Craig Giles) 1996
1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS 1996
2 WHAT ARE SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS? 2002
3 FROM THE PITCH TO THE SCREEN: THE PRODUCTION AND
BROADCAST OF SPORTS EVENTS 2009
4 SPORTS MEDIA RIGHTS CONTRACTS 2016
5 REGULATION OF SPORTS BROADCASTING 2039
CHAPTER H3 SPONSORSHIP (Craig Giles, Robert Turner, and

Georgie Twigg MBE) 2045
1 INTRODUCTION 2045
2 TYPES OF SPONSORSHIP 2050
3 RIGHTS INVENTORY 2056
4 KEY ISSUES ARISING IN SPONSORSHIP DEALS 2061
5 SPONSORS IN REGULATED MARKETS 2069
CHAPTER H4 IMAGE RIGHTS (Stephen Boyd and Felicity Reeve) 2080

1 INTRODUCTION 2080
2 THE USE OF IMAGE RIGHTS IN MODERN MARKETING PRACTICE 2081
3 THE LEGAL STATUS OF AN ATHLETE’S IMAGE RIGHTS 2083
4 IMAGE RIGHTS CONTRACTS 2111
Contents xxi
CHAPTER H5 MERCHANDISING AND LICENSING (Clive Lawrence) 2127

1 INTRODUCTION 2127
2 THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A MERCHANDISING/LICENSING
AGREEMENT 2134
3 SUMMARY 2149
CHAPTER H6 HOSPITALITY (Warren Phelops) 2150

1 INTRODUCTION 2150
2 COMMERCIAL RATIONALE FOR OFFICIAL HOSPITALITY
ARRANGEMENTS 2151
3 HOSPITALITY AGREEMENTS – KEY PROVISIONS 2152
4 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 2167
5 THE RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS OF HOSPITALITY PACKAGES 2174
CHAPTER H7 EXPLOITING SPORTS DATA (andy Danson and

Elizabeth Dunn) 2174
1 INTRODUCTION 2174
2 CREATION, COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION OF SPORTS DATA 2180
3 PROPRIETARY RIGHTS IN SPORTS DATA 2183
4 KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPORTS DATA 2184
PART I TAX ISSUES IN THE SPORTS SECTOR 2197

CHAPTER I1 TAXATION OF SPORTS ORGANISATIONS
(Ben Elliott) 2199
1 WHY TAX IS IMPORTANT 2200
2 THE TYPES OF ENTITY AND THE TAXES THEY FACE 2201
3 CORPORATION TAX 2202
4 VALUE ADDED TAX 2209
5 PAYE AND NIC 2220
6 SPECIAL TYPES OF SPORTS ORGANISATIONS 2226
APPENDIX: VAT TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF INCOME 2230
CHAPTER I2 TAX AND FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR

INDIVIDUAL ATHLETES (Ben Elliott) 2233
1 INTRODUCTION 2234
2 IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 2235
3 LIABILITY FOR INCOME TAX 2238
4 TAXATION OF INCOME FROM EMPLOYMENT 2244
5 TAXATION OF INCOME FROM A TRADE, PROFESSION OR VOCATION 2248
6 SPECIAL TYPES OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 2250
7 INVESTMENT INCOME AND GAINS 2253
8 RETIREMENT PLANNING 2253
9 OTHER TAXES 2255
10 NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTION OBLIGATIONS AND
PLANNING 2256
11 VALUE ADDED TAX 2256
12 ENQUIRIES, INVESTIGATIONS, LITIGATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE 2257
PART J ESPORTS 2265

CHAPTER J1 ESPORTS (William Deller and Richard Bush) 2267
1 INTRODUCTION 2267
2 THE ESPORTS ‘ECOSYSTEM’ 2269
3 COMMERCIAL RIGHTS IN ESPORTS 2273
4 ESPORTS AND GAMBLING 2282
5 ESPORTS REGULATION 2284
6 THE FUTURE OF ESPORTS 2289
INDEX 2291
Author Biographies
Adam Lewis QC
Adam Lewis is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, London. He regularly advises
national and international governing bodies, clubs and players from a wide range
of sports, and commercial partners involved with those sports. He regularly appears
on their behalf before the English courts, the Court of Arbitration for Sport and
other arbitral bodies, and the domestic and European regulatory authorities. He
lectures on the British Association for Sport and the Law and de Montfort University
postgraduate sports law course and regularly speaks at sports law conferences and
is a co-author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional,
2016). His background is as an EU and public law specialist. Between 1991
and 1994 he worked in Brussels in the cabinet of the European Commissioner
responsible for competition and for White & Case (Brussels). His practice covers a
wide range of contentious sports-related issues, including challenges to the actions
and decisions of sports governing bodies, competition and free movement issues,
doping and disciplinary , and disputes between clubs and players. He is a Sport
Resolutions Arbitrator, an FA Rule K Arbitrator, an RFU Appeal Board Chairman,
and a UKA Tribunal Chairman. Chambers UK 2021 puts him in a class of his own
as the only Star Individual at the Bar in the area of sport and states that ‘he is widely
regarded as the leading sports barrister in the UK, whose dedicated focus has led
to him having an unrivalled knowledge and experience in the sector’, that ‘he is a
market leader’ and that ‘he is first rate and his sport knowledge is second to none’.
The Legal 500 2021 describes him as ‘the foremost leader in the field. He is a leading
light in the sports sector. Works extremely hard and gets to grips with the detail. He
is the complete package and a go to silk’.
Jonathan Taylor QC
Jonathan Taylor QC is a partner and co-head of the International Sports Group at
Bird & Bird LLP (twobirds.com). With law degrees from Oxford (BA) and Virginia
(LLM), he initially practised as a commercial litigator in New York (1990–97) before
returning to England in 1997, where he has practised sports law exclusively ever since,
advising blue chip international and national sports governing bodies, public agencies,
broadcasters, sponsors and other commercial partners of sport on the full range of
commercial, regulatory and contentious issues that arise in the sports sector. Jonathan is
an experienced advocate, appearing regularly before the Court of Arbitration for Sport
in Lausanne, Switzerland, as well as a range of other sports tribunals, in particular in
doping and match-fixing cases, and was made Queen’s Counsel in 2017 in recognition
of his advocacy skills. He was the chair of WADA’s independent Compliance Review
Committee from 2016 to 2020, and of the IBU External Review Commission from
2018 to 2021. In 2019 he led reviews of the English Football League’s governance and
of its handling of the Bury FC matter. He is co-author of Challenging Sports Governing
Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016). He has also sat as an arbitrator/expert in
sports cases for Sports Resolutions (UK), the International Baseball Federation, and
the International Chamber of Commerce. He has been ranked as a leading sports
law practitioner for many years by both Chambers UK 2020 (‘Star Individual’; ‘a
massive name and a superb sports lawyer’) and The Legal 500 2021 (‘Hall of Fame’;
‘Jonathan Taylor has an enormous breadth of knowledge and experience on which to
rely, and uses it to great effect. Understands the whole picture – from the minutiae to
the broader context – better than anyone’).
xxiv Author Biographies
Michael Beloff QC
Michael Beloff QC of Blackstone Chambers is former President of the British
Association of Sport and the Law, co-author of Sports Law, 2nd edn (Hart Publishing,
2012), Editor of Sweet & Maxwell’s International Sports Law Review, Halsburys
Laws of England, 5th ed, Vol 96 on Sport, and Atkins Court Forms, Vol 36(2) (Sports
Law). He has been a member of CAS since 1996 and has served on four CAS Summer
Olympic Ad Hoc Panels. His other offices include President of Trinity College
Oxford (1996–2006), Treasurer of Gray’s Inn (2008), Senior Ordinary Appeal Judge
of the Channel Islands (2005–2014), Chairman of the International Cricket Council’s
Code of Conduct Commission (2003–) and Dispute Resolution Committee (2015–),
Chairman of the Emirates Cricket Board Appeal Tribunal (2018–), First Chairman
of the International Association of Athletic Federations Ethics Board (2014–2018)
and Disciplinary Tribunal (2017-2019), Steward of the RAC (1999–2018), Ethics
Commissioner for London 2012, member of the FIA International Appeal Panel
(2010–), Member of the European Tour Golf Appeal Panel (2013), and member of
the Mixed Martial Arts and Ironman Anti-doping Appeal Tribunals (2016–).
Morris Bentata
Morris Bentata is a founding partner of media, entertainment, sports and technology
‘new-law’ firm, Level. His practice comprises a comprehensive range of commercial
work within the sports sector, focusing principally on the acquisition, protection and
exploitation of media and marketing rights for rights-holders, agencies, broadcasters
and sponsors. Morris read law at Cambridge and obtained the Postgraduate
Certificate in Sports Law at Kings College London. Morris is a director of the British
Association for Sport and Law.
Stephen Boyd
Stephen Boyd is a barrister practising from Selborne Chambers, London. Following
a degree in Linguistic and International Studies (Russian, Swedish and law), Stephen
worked for international trading companies in Hong Kong and South Africa. His
practice comprises a broad range of commercial and property litigation. In 2001 he
was awarded the Postgraduate Certificate in Sports Law by King’s College London
(for which his dissertation was on image rights). He is a fellow of the Chartered
Institute of Arbitrators and is on CEDR’s panel of mediators and arbitrators. He has
been a supporter of Tottenham Hotspur FC since going to watch the likes of Greaves
and Mackay as a lad in the sixties.
Tom Bruce
Tom is a Partner at Farrer & Co LLP and Deputy Head of its Sports Group. He is
embedded in the sports sector and works closely with high-profile sports clients on
a wide range of corporate, commercial and governance matters. He advises national
governing bodies and international federations, commercial sports organisations and
clubs and is a ‘go-to’ adviser for his clients on governance matters (including the
Code for Sports Governance), joint ventures and structuring international sporting
events. The Legal 500 2021 describes Tom as ‘the most knowledgeable lawyer in
regards to corporate governance issues in the sports sector. He has advised so many
organisations, and his detailed knowledge of the sector, coupled with his legal skill,
means he is now the go-to person for any governance related issues’. Tom lectures on
the British Association for Sport and the Law and de Montfort University postgraduate
sports law course and provides training sessions for the Sports Governance Academy
(a partnership between the Governance Institute and Sport England).
Author Biographies xxv
Richard Bush
Richard Bush is a senior associate in the Sports Group at international law firm
Bird & Bird LLP. He advises on a range of regulatory and contentious sports-
related issues, including challenges to regulatory decisions, rules and regulations,
disciplinary matters, child protection/safeguarding, and commercial dispute
resolution. He represents clients, and has acted as advocate, before a range of national
and international dispute resolution forums, including CAS, anti-doping tribunals,
anti-corruption tribunals, and various other institutional arbitrations in sport. He is a
member of The FA County Disciplinary (Anti-Discrimination) FA Chairman’s Panel
and was among the first members of the Esports Integrity Coalition Disciplinary
Panel.
Lewis Calder
Lewis is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP in London. Lewis’s focus
is primarily on commercial and corporate matters, such as advising on sponsorship,
media rights, licensing, merchandising, image rights, and gambling-related issues
and agreements. Lewis represents clients across all major sports, including football,
rugby, tennis, motor sport, and cricket, as well as a range of broadcasters, event
organisers and sponsors. Lewis also has experience advising on the drafting and
interpretation of rules and on wider regulatory matters, including financial regulation
and best practice sports governance. In particular, Lewis advised on the drafting
and implementation of the FIA Formula One 2021 Financial Regulations, a ground-
breaking set of regulations that introduced a cap on the amount that each team may
spend each season in order to promote the competitive balance and sporting fairness
of the championship while seeking to ensure the long-term financial stability and
sustainability of the teams. He also has experience client-side through several virtual
secondments including with a global sports and media agency and a national football
governing body. Prior to his career in law, Lewis was a professional rugby player,
having represented Scotland Sevens on the World Rugby Sevens Series.
Nick Craig
Nick Craig is the Governance & Legal Director at the English Football League, the
world’s original league football competition. He is responsible for providing advice
on all aspects of the Football League’s operational and commercial activities and,
since his appointment in 2001, has helped implement a variety of measures aimed
at improving the governance of the League and its member clubs. They include
the introduction of English football’s first ever Fit and Proper Persons’ Test (now
the Owners’ and Directors’ Test), Sporting Sanctions (points deductions for clubs
subject to insolvency proceedings) and wide-ranging financial regulations including
controls on club expenditure. He led the EFL’s successful defence of the so-called
football creditors’ rule and of Queens Park Rangers’ competition law challenge to the
Financial Fair Play regulations.
Andy Danson
Andy is a partner in Bird & Bird’s industry-leading Sports Group and heads up
the firm’s international gambling practice. He has spent the last 15 years advising
clients in the sports and gambling sectors and has a particular interest in the interface
between the two. He has advised on some of the biggest developments in the sports
data rights market over the last few years, including on the establishment of The
Racing Partnership, and his clients include major national and international governing
bodies and rights-holders, teams, broadcasters, agencies, global brands, and major
international betting operators. He has longstanding expertise in sports media rights
exploitation (for both betting and primary broadcast markets) and in sports sponsorship
xxvi Author Biographies
and marketing matters and has been invited by the European Commission and the
Asser Institute to participate in expert workshops on the advertising of gambling,
and the commercial relationship between the sports and gambling industries. He is
also a member of the International Masters of Gaming Law. Andy was seconded to
LOCOG, the organising committee for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games and is a former first-class cricketer and Cambridge Blue.
Tom de la Mare QC
Tom de la Mare QC is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, where he specialises
in sports, EU, competition, media/entertainment, and human rights/ public law. He
has advised and acted for clubs (eg London Welsh, Scarlets), for governing bodies
(eg ECB, RFU, Premier League) and individuals (eg Aljaz Bedene) and companies
(eg Betgenius) in a wide range of sports, with particular emphasis on regulatory
matters raising individual and systemic questions of competition and EU law. Tom
appeared for London Welsh in its successful competition law challenge to the
requirements of the RFU’s minimum stadium criteria, for a variety of football agents
in various disputes over The FA’s version of the FIFA Players Agents Regulations,
for the BDO in their successful campaign to have darts recognised as a sport, for the
UK in the CJEU challenge over the UK’s designation of the World Cup and European
Championships as ‘crown jewels’ to be broadcast free to air, and has regularly
acted for F1 motor racing teams, most recently Racing Point. Brexit, Bosman and
grandfathered free movement rights have been a particular focus of Tom’s practice
since 2018. Tom is a contributing editor to Lester and Pannick’ s Human Rights Law
and Practice and a former Chair of the Bar European Group.
Will Deller
Will Deller is a senior associate based in Bird & Bird’s Sports Group, having
qualified at the firm in 2014. Will’s practice is mainly focused on commercial/
contractual matters, though he also has experience in advising on league structuring,
rule drafting/interpretation, and other sports and esports regulatory issues. On the
commercial side, he routinely advises on sponsorship, media rights, event staging
and other commercial contracts, but he also advises sports and gaming clients on
consumer law and advertising and gambling regulation. Will leads Bird & Bird’s
esports practice, advising stakeholders from across the industry on issues ranging
from sponsorship and player contracts through to rule drafting and brand protection.
His clients are major AAA-game publishers, esports teams, agents, tournament
platform operators and service providers, giving him a rare insight into the spectrum
of issues facing those involved in this idiosyncratic and fast-growing industry. Will
was awarded the ‘Rising Star’ Award at the 2019 Legal Week Innovation Awards
for his role in developing Bird & Bird’s esports practice, and was shortlisted by the
Financial Times in their 2019 Innovative Lawyers awards for his work with esports
platform Intergalactic Gaming.
Nick De Marco QC
Nick is one of only two barristers in England with a practice exclusively in sports-
related disputes. His practice ranges from commercial and contractual claims to
regulatory and disciplinary disputes, dealing with issues relating to sponsorship,
intellectual property and competition law in sport. He is active in disputes across
all sports, but widely recognised for his special expertise in football where he has
been involved in most of the high-profile disputes in England, as well as many
internationally. Chambers UK 2020 described him as ‘an outstanding practitioner
with a widely held reputation at the Bar for being the foremost expert on football
Author Biographies xxvii
regulatory matters,’ adding he ‘has formed a fantastic reputation for successfully

challenging governing bodies’. Nick sits as an arbitrator across a number of sports,
and he is a member of the World Athletics Disciplinary Commission, the Sports
Resolutions’ independent Panel of Arbitrators and Mediators, and the specialist
sports list of arbitrators at the Asian International Arbitration Centre. He is a member
of the Editorial Board of Law In Sport and writes and lectures regularly on sports
law issues. He is co-author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury
Professional, 2016) and is the author and General Editor of Football and the Law
(Bloomsbury Professional, 2018). He is a director of the British Association for
Sport and the Law.
Emma Drake
Emma is a senior associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP. Emma is a
privacy specialist and was described during parliamentary debates as a ‘lead lawyer
for sport on data protection’ for her work alongside governing bodies in securing
sport-related provisions in the Data Protection Act 2018. She advises a large number
of clubs, competitions and national and international sports governing bodies on
privacy matters. This has included specific advice on topics such as safeguarding, anti-
doping, integrity investigations, Covid-19 protocols and engagement with grassroots
athletes and fans. Her work covers all aspects of data protection law, including advice
on privacy notices, policies and procedures, data protection impact assessments, data
subject rights, cookie compliance and data breach reporting. Emma is also the data
protection officer for a major UK governing body and is CIPP/E certified by the
International Association of Privacy Professionals.
Elizabeth Dunn
Elizabeth is a senior associate in Bird & Bird LLP’s Media, Entertainment & Sport
Group, based in London. Her practice focuses on primarily on commercial and
regulatory matters in the sport and gambling sectors. She advises major national
and international governing bodies and rights-holders, teams, broadcasters, agencies
and global sports brands on major international sports media rights tenders and
licensing, sponsorship, licensing, event staging and supply agreements, and has
particular expertise in the production, exploitation and protection of sports data. She
also regularly advises major international gambling operators on commercial and
regulatory issues, often co-ordinating multi-jurisdictional projects, and is a member
of the International Masters of Gaming Law. She was seconded twice to the London
Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), first in the
legal team and then in an operational role during London 2012 itself.
James Eighteen
James is a founding partner of Northridge Law LLP. He is a commercial litigator
who specialises in dispute resolution, governance and regulation, and regularly
acts for sports governing bodies, individuals and teams in all dispute resolution
forums, particularly before disciplinary panels, the High Court, and the Court of
Arbitration for Sport. His recent experience includes acting for Premiership Rugby
in the landmark salary cap investigation and prosecution of Saracens Rugby Club,
and leading on the re-drafting of all of the British Horseracing Authority Rules and
Regulations. James is ranked as a Next Generation Lawyer in The Legal 500 and
recognised in Chambers, who describe him as ‘impressive’, ‘an expert in his field’
and someone who provides ‘quick, reasoned and sensible advice’. He lectures on the
BASL/DMU postgraduate certificate in sports law and is a contributing author to the
textbook Football and the Law.
xxviii Author Biographies
Ben Elliott
Ben Elliott is a barrister at Pump Court Tax Chambers specialising in all areas of tax
law, including corporate, employment, VAT, property, private client and international
tax, as well as tax-related insolvency and public law. He acts for a broad range of
clients and is experienced in handling tax investigations, negotiating settlements
with HMRC, and litigating disputes before the Tax Tribunal and High Court. He
has particular expertise advising on tax issues relating to sporting organisations and
individuals.
Jonathan Ellis
Jonathan is a founding partner of Northridge Law LLP. He is a trusted adviser to
some of the biggest names in sport, with clients describing him as ‘the absolute
go-to person on regulatory matters’ and as being ‘an exceptional litigator, who is
superb when the stakes are at their highest’. Jonathan has acted for The FA for more
than 15 years, undertaking a wide range of work from advising on the regulation of
intermediaries through to representing The FA at the Hillsborough inquests. Other
highlights have included representing leading Premier League and European football
clubs before CAS, successfully defending the WRU in High Court litigation, and
acting as the Solicitor and Secretary to the Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis.
Jonathan is ranked as a leading individual by Chambers (Band 1), The Legal 500, and
in the International Who’s Who of Sports & Entertainment Lawyers.
Charles Flint QC
Charles Flint QC has extensive experience in sports law, both as counsel and
arbitrator. He is President of the UK National Anti-Doping Panel, chairman of the
independent tribunal of the International Tennis Federation and a member of the
adjudicatory chamber of the UEFA Club Financial Control Body. Charles practises
from Blackstone Chambers (blackstonechambers.com) as an arbitrator and mediator
in sports cases.
Kate Gallafent QC
Kate Gallafent QC is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers where she specialises in
sports, professional discipline, public and employment law. She regularly acts for
and advises national governing bodies, clubs and individuals in a wide range of
sports including football, tennis, rugby and horse-racing, with a particular emphasis
on discipline and safeguarding. Examples of recent work include acting for The FA
in relation to disciplinary matters such as FA v Peter Beardsley and FA v Kieran
Trippier, and appearing before CAS in FIFA v The FA in relation to breaches of
transfer regulations by Chelsea FC. She represented the Football Association of
Wales in the challenge by a club to its decision to terminate the 2019/20 season
prematurely due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and acted as prosecutor for the RFU
in disciplinary proceedings brought against members of the Barbarians rugby team
for breaches of the Covid-19 Code of Conduct. At the international level she has
acted as prosecutor for the IAAF Ethics Board including appearing before CAS in
proceedings against Athletics Kenya officials, and regularly sat on the disciplinary
committee of the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique. She is a member of
the UK Anti-Doping Panel and is on the Sport Resolutions’ lists of mediators and
arbitrators. She is recognised as a leading silk in sports law by The Legal 500 and
Chambers UK.
Craig Giles
Craig is a partner in Bird & Bird LLP’s Media, Entertainment and Sport Group,
based in London. He advises on a range of commercial issues connected with sport,
Author Biographies xxix
including media rights, sponsorship, image rights, staging agreements, agency

agreements, merchandising, licensing, funding agreements, brand protection, and
ticketing measures. He acts for a number of major national and international governing
bodies, competition organisers and broadcasters, including The Football Association,
Six Nations Rugby, the RFU, the All England Lawn Tennis Club, the British &
Irish Lions, ATP Media, Celtic Rugby (the organisers of the PRO14), the IPC, and
Perform/DAZN. He has particular expertise in the field of media rights, having
advised numerous national and international sports organisations and broadcasters
on some of the most high profile and cutting-edge media rights deals in the industry,
both in the UK and in other jurisdictions across the world. He also advises clients
on the highly regulated world of marketing, including advertising campaigns across
all digital and non-digital media, prize competitions and sweepstakes, website terms
and conditions, e-commerce, and the ever-changing consumer law landscape. Craig
is ranked as a leading practitioner for sports law in the Chambers UK and The Legal
500 directories. In Chambers UK 2020 clients noted that Craig ‘knows the business
and understands the angle of the advice that we need, and if we need it quickly he is
very good at giving succinct, clear, commercial advice’.
Paul Goulding QC
Paul Goulding QC is a member of Blackstone Chambers. He practises in sport,
employment, and commercial law. He is a Specialist Member of the Football
Association Judicial Panel, and a member of the Chairmen’s Panel of Arbitrators
of Sports Resolutions. He has appeared in many sports cases, including: in football
Sheffield United FC v The Football Association Premier League (the Tevez case);
Fulham FC v Tigana; Jones v Southampton FC; in athletics Modahl v British
Athletics Federation; in snooker Hendry v World Snooker; in tennis Korda v ITF.
He has also represented sports governing bodies, Formula One constructors and
drivers, and individual sportsmen. He is recognised as a leading silk in both sports
law and employment law by The Legal 500 and Chambers UK. He is the Editor
of Employee Competition: Covenants, Confidentiality, and Garden Leave, 3rd edn
(Oxford University Press, 2016) and a contributor to De Marco, Football and the
Law (Bloomsbury Professional, 2018) and Tolley’s Discrimination in Employment
Handbook, 2nd edn (2011).
Ulrich Haas
Ulrich Haas is a professor of private law and civil procedure at the University of
Zurich. He is also of counsel at the law firm TIMES Attorneys. One of his fields
of research is sports law. He has been an arbitrator with the Court of Arbitration
for Sport in Lausanne (CAS) since 2002. He also acts as arbitrator for other sports
arbitral institutions, such as the Deutsche Sportschiedsgericht of the Deutsche
Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit eV in Cologne, the FIBA Arbitral Tribunal
(BAT) in Geneva and Sport Resolution in the UK. Ulrich has acted as a chairman or
party-appointed arbitrator in more than 250 sports-related arbitration proceedings.
He chaired the advisory group on legal issues of the monitoring group of the Council
of Europe Anti-Doping Convention from 2002–04 and the Independent Observer
Group at the Summer Olympic Games in Athens 2004. He has also participated in
various revision processes for the revision of the World Anti-Doping Code (2009,
2015 and 2021). In 2014–15 he was a member of the independent investigation team
that investigated the doping allegations in international cycling. He also chaired the
Governance Working Group tasked with reforming the governance structure of the
World Anti-Doping Agency (2018). Furthermore, he was a member of the CAS Ad
Hoc Panel for the Olympic Winter Games in Vancouver (2010) and for the Olympic
Summer Games in Rio de Janeiro (2016).
xxx Author Biographies
Edwina Haddon
Edwina is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP, helping a range
of international sports clients deal with regulatory issues and disputes. Edwina
specialises in disciplinary matters including anti-doping, challenges to regulatory
decisions, selection disputes, rules and regulations, constitutions and governance
and contractual disputes, as well as investigations. She has advised international and
national governing bodies, clubs, competition organisers, and individual athletes, and
in some cases has represented them before internal sports tribunals. Edwina recently
completed a secondment with the Premier League.
Björn Hessert
Björn Hessert is a research assistant and Ph D candidate at the University of Zurich,
specialising in the field of sports law. He holds a Master’s degree from the University
of Melbourne (LL M) and was admitted to the bar in Germany in 2019.
Hollie Higgins
Hollie Higgins is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. She practices in EU, public,
commercial and employment law. Her sports practice intersects with all of these
areas and has recently included commercial litigation in the High Court regarding
the sale of a club, an internal investigation into misconduct allegations, and an
arbitration between an athlete and their promoter. Hollie has a particular specialism
in discrimination and equality issues and recently appeared in the Supreme Court
equal pay case of Asda Stores Limited v Brierley.
Iain Higgins
Iain is a law graduate of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Iain played professional
rugby league for London Broncos RLFC in the Super League whilst successfully
completing a Postgraduate Certificate in Sports Law at King’s College, London. He
held senior legal, operational and strategic roles with the International Cricket Council
for eleven years, most recently as Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, prior
to which he worked as a senior solicitor within the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP,
advising on a range of legal issues connected with sport. His expertise lies primarily
in respect of matters of discipline, doping, corruption and other regulatory fields, as
well as in commercial disputes and all aspects of sporting governance. Whilst at the
ICC, he advised on many challenging issues faced by international cricket, including
on the management of ethical issues, governance and corruption, most notably in the
successful prosecution of numerous international cricketers for offences committed
under the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code, Anti-Doping Code, and Code of Conduct.
As part of a global strategic initiative, he led a process by which USA Cricket was
established in 2018 as the recognised governing body for the sport in the United
States and he recently moved to California to become USA Cricket’s first-ever CEO.
Andrew Hunter QC
Andrew Hunter QC is a leading commercial advocate with many years of experience
in the sports sector. He has acted in a wide variety of high-profile sports disputes
such as ‘Spygate’ in Formula One, ‘Bloodgate’ in rugby, and Bin Hammam v FIFA
concerning alleged corruption at FIFA.
Professor Mark James

Mark James is Professor of Sports Law and Head of Research at Manchester Law
School, where his research and teaching expertise focuses on sports law, the law
of tort, and criminal law. Mark is the author of Palgrave Macmillan’s Sports Law
Author Biographies xxxi
and has published widely on issues relating to player violence and sports injuries,
football-related disorder, ambush marketing and Olympic law. His current research
focuses on the legal frameworks within which sporting mega-events operate, and in
particular the operation of Rules 40 and 50 of the Olympic Charter, and ticket touting
at sport and entertainment events. Mark is an editor of the Entertainment and Sports
Law Journal and a member of the Editorial Boards of the International Sports Law
Journal, International Journal of Sports Policy and Politics, and LawInSport.
Brian Kennelly QC SC
Brian specialises in competition and EU, commercial, public and regulatory law,
sanctions law and telecommunications law. He is recognised by the legal directories
as a leading barrister in these areas. He is also a Senior Counsel at the Bar of Ireland.
He appears regularly in the Court of Justice of the EU and the General Court, the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and the Commercial Court, the Competition Appeal
Tribunal and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. He has appeared in competition,
regulatory and commercial cases in Ireland, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands, and the
Virgin Islands. Brian has acted in over 70 cases before the CJEU and General Court
in a broad range of competition, regulatory and sanctions matters. He is a leading
advocate in private competition damages actions and has also appeared in many of
the leading regulatory public law cases of recent years in the Admin Court and the
Competition Appeal Tribunal.
Dr Mirjam Koller Trunz

Mirjam Koller Trunz is a Swiss attorney practising law with TIMES Attorneys in
Zurich. Her current work includes the support of clients before sports arbitration
tribunals as well as the advice of clients on commercial, organisational, disciplinary,
doping and compliance issues. Before she joined TIMES Attorneys, Mirjam worked
as an attorney and trainee at Bär & Karrer and as an assistant at the chair of Prof
Ulrich Haas. She wrote her PhD thesis on the topic ‘A global solution to combat
manipulations of sports competitions’, which was awarded the Walther Hug Prize,
and acted as an ad hoc clerk in several CAS proceedings. Since 2015, she has been
a lecturer on various topics related to sports law at the University of Zurich and its
international postgraduate programme.
Clive Lawrence
Clive Lawrence is a partner at Lupton Fawcett LLP where he is head of the Intellectual
Property and Commercial department. A graduate of Downing College, Cambridge,
he qualified as a solicitor in 1993. He has advised clubs, individual participants and
governing bodies in a wide range of sports on intellectual property and rights matters,
as well as a broad sweep of allied issues ranging from constitutional and regulatory
matters to broadcasting, sponsorship, licensing and merchandising. He is the co-
author of Sports Business: Law, Practice and Precedents (Jordans (1st edn), 1999;
(2nd edn) 2005), author of Brands: Law, Practice and Precedents (Jordans, 2008),
and a Visiting Lecturer at Leeds Beckett University.
Peter Limbert
Peter is General Counsel at Fulham Football Club, where he has worked since 2014.
He is in charge of all legal affairs at Fulham and also has management responsibility
for the club’s safeguarding, equality and HR functions. Prior to his career at Fulham,
Peter worked in private practice as part of the Sports Law team at the international
law firm, Squire Patton Boggs. He has a broad range of experience in contentious
and non-contentious matters and has been recognised as one of the UK’s leading
sports law practitioners. He was noted in legal directories as a ‘future star’, a lawyer
xxxii Author Biographies
who ‘knows everything about how football works’ and was named as one of the
‘Hot 100’ in the 2019 Edition of The Lawyer magazine’s list of the most prominent
UK lawyers. Aside from his work for Fulham, Peter has been a member of working
groups at football governing bodies and holds directorships at organisations including
the British Association for Sports Law.
Paul Luckhurst
Paul Luckhurst is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. He specialises in commercial,
public, international, EU, and human rights law. His sports practice includes advising
and representing football players, managers, agents and clubs, particularly in the
context of FA Rule K arbitrations. Paul has also acted for rugby clubs, boxers, and the
organisers of a round-the-world yacht race in a variety of sporting and commercial
disputes.
Ian Lynam
Ian Lynam is a partner at Northridge Law LLP. Ian’s practice spans a wide range
of transactional and regulatory areas of sports law. His expertise includes the
financial regulation of sport (including salary caps and financial fair play), mergers
and acquisitions in sport, financing, governance, integrity, rules and regulations,
sponsorship agreements, transfers, player contracts, and image rights. He is
recognised by the legal directories as a leading ‘commercial dealmaker’ ‘who has
become a clear leader in the UK’ and ‘an excellent lawyer, whose knowledge of the
sports industry is unparalleled’. He has a particular expertise in the use of data in the
sports industry, has spoken widely on the subject, advises a number of companies
in the area and sits on the board of STATSports as a non-executive director. Ian is a
contributing author to a number of other leading textbooks including Football and
the Law, The Sports Law Review, and The Negotiator’s Desk Reference. He regularly
speaks at conferences (including the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference 2017
& 2019) and lectures on a number of undergraduate and postgraduate university
sports law programmes. Ian is ranked as a ‘Leading Individual’ in UK Sport by The
Legal 500 and in Band 1 for UK Sport by Chambers UK. Ian is also recommended in
Who’s Who Legal in the Sports & Entertainment category. He is admitted to practise
in England & Wales, Ireland, and New York.
James Maloney
James Maloney is a partner at Farrer & Co LLP and a member of its Sports Group.
James regularly advises a range of national governing bodies on structuring their
charitable activities, including advice on the formation and registration of new
charities, and compliance with charity law. He also advises other sports-related
charities on charity law matters, including constitutional matters, governance, charity
mergers, fundraising and trading. He is a member of the Charity Law Association
and the Society of Trust and Estate Practitioners (for which he currently acts as
deputy chair of their Philanthropy Advisors Global Special Interest Group) and was
a member of the CLA working party that responded to the Charity Commission’s
consultation on the advancement of amateur sport. He lectures on charity law and
charity tax law at City, University of London’s business school (formerly Cass
Business School). He speaks regularly at conferences on issues affecting the charity
and sport sectors and is also a charity trustee.
Ravi Mehta
Ravi Mehta is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, where he specialises in sports,
public, EU and competition and employment law. He has a busy and varied sports
law practice in domestic and international tribunals, FA K arbitration proceedings,
Author Biographies xxxiii
the High Court and CAS. He regularly advises and acts for players, player
representatives, clubs, commercial intermediaries and governing bodies in relation
to a range of issues including anti-doping, disciplinary procedures, competition law,
broadcasting and sponsorship, eligibility for national and international competitions,
and the organisation of or access to rival competitions.
Ian Mill QC
Ian Mill QC is a member of, and for over seven years (2004–2012) was joint head
of Blackstone Chambers. He practises in commercial, media and entertainment and
sports law. He is highly rated by the independent legal directories as a leading silk
for sports-related disputes. He has specialist knowledge of a wide range of sporting
issues, having acted for numerous individuals, teams, organisers, managers, governing
bodies and sports broadcasters, and has appeared before many international and
domestic sports-related arbitral and regulatory bodies. He has particular knowledge
in the fields of athletics, rugby, tennis, football, cricket, boxing, motor sport, golf, and
horse racing. As well as acting for parties, Ian is a highly experienced decision-maker
in sporting disputes. UK Athletics appointed him as Chairman of its Disciplinary
Committees to hear the so-called ‘nandrolone’ doping cases, and The FA has
appointed him to chair a number of appeals from FA Disciplinary Commissions. He
has also been appointed an FA Premier League Panel Member. Ian is a Chairman of
the Sport Resolutions Panel of Arbitrators and has acted as Chairman of International
Cricket Council and International Tennis Federation Anti-Doping Tribunals. He has
recently been appointed as an Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer for the Tennis Anti-
Corruption Program and Chair of the European Tour’s Disciplinary Panel. He is also
an Appeal Steward of the British Boxing Board of Control. He is a consulting editor
of International Sports Law Review.
Tom Mountford
Tom Mountford is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers. He advises organisations
and individuals in respect of all contentious and non-contentious aspects of sports
law, from commercial sports litigation to regulatory, disciplinary and safeguarding
work across numerous different sports. He regularly appears before the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, arbitral bodies, disciplinary and regulatory tribunals and in the
English courts in sports cases. He also advises upon and undertakes investigations.
He has served as Legal Secretary to the Ethics Board of World Athletics (formerly the
IAAF) since 2015. He acts both for owners, sponsors, clubs and other commercial
actors in the world of sport as well as for national and international governing bodies
and for individual sportspeople. Recent highlights include successfully acting for
HRH Prince Abdullah bin Mosaad bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in his boardroom battle for
control of the English Premier League football club Sheffield United in the English
High Court in 2019.He is ranked as a leading junior in the field of sports law in
both Chambers UK and The Legal 500, where he has been described as ‘technically
excellent … extremely bright and very hard working’ and ‘an expert in sports ethics
and corruption matters, who is accessible, practical and has a good eye for the finer
detail’.
Jane Mulcahy QC
Jane Mulcahy QC acts in the civil courts and in arbitration and sports tribunals,
including the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Areas covered include breach of
contract, employment, disciplinary and regulatory matters, doping, corruption,
player transfers, competition/restraint of trade, agency , and child protection. Jane
sits on the English Cricket Board’s Appeals Panel in child protection cases. She also
sits as an Appeal Steward for the BBBC and as an Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer
xxxiv Author Biographies
for the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program. She advises sport governing bodies on a
range of issues and is on Sport Resolutions’ panel list of mediators and arbitrators. In
respect of the latter roles, she has experience of arbitrating disputes between players,
agents and clubs, both alone and as one of a panel of arbitrators and has mediated
sports cases.
Emily Neill
Emily is a barrister practising at Blackstone Chambers, London, and at the Bars of
Northern Ireland and Ireland. She practises in EU, public and commercial law. Her
sports law practice builds on her particular specialisms in EU and competition law.
Emily worked on the case of FIFA and UEFA v European Commission (with Tom de la
Mare QC and Brian Kennelly), acting for the United Kingdom intervening in actions
brought by FIFA and UEFA in relation to the Commission’s approval of the UK
notification of listed events mandatorily broadcast on free television. She regularly
advises on EU and competition law issues in the sporting context, particularly the
compatibility of the rules of sporting associations with those requirements and on
issues of State aid in the context of support for sport.
Dr Stephan Netzle, LLM

Stephan Netzle is a Swiss attorney practising law with TIMES Attorneys in Zurich.
He holds law degrees from the University of Zurich and the University of Virginia
School of Law. Stephan is a renowned expert on sports law and served as an
arbitrator with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) from 1991 until 2010. At
the Sydney 2000 and Beijing 2008 Olympic Games he was a member of the Ad
Hoc Division of the CAS. He has been an arbitrator with the independent Basketball
Arbitration Tribunal (BAT) since 2006. He advises and represents international sports
federations, National Olympic Committees, event organisers, athletes, teams, agents,
corporate sponsors and host cities on commercial, organisational, disciplinary,
doping and compliance issues. He is a co-editor of the German bi-monthly Sport
und Recht. Since 2009, he has been a lecturer on International Arbitration at the
University of Zurich. Stephan rowed in the Olympic finals 1980 (Moscow) and 1984
(Los Angeles), won the Stewards’ Challenge Cup at Henley twice, and became world
champion in the coxless four in 1982.
Lauren Pagé
Lauren Pagé is a senior associate in the Media, Entertainment, & Sports Group at
Bird & Bird LLP (twobirds.com). She works in the regulatory/contentious sports
team and advises on a variety of issues including (among others) anti-doping and
other disciplinary matters, investigations and governance reviews, integrity issues,
membership disputes, challenges to regulatory decisions, rules and regulations, and
contractual disputes. Over the years she has acted for national and international
federations, event organisers, clubs, rights-holders, and individuals across numerous
sports including (among others) tennis, motor sport, equestrianism, rugby union,
cricket, ice hockey, and field hockey. In the anti-doping field, she regularly acts for
international federations in anti-doping proceedings before first instance panels such
as Sport Resolutions in London, and on appeal before the Court of Arbitration for
Sport in Lausanne. Lauren is an arbitrator for the Euroleague Basketball Dispute
Resolution Chamber, and also sat as a member of a three-person panel appointed ad
hoc to hear a first instance International Handball Federation anti-doping case. She
is also an independent director of the British Orienteering Federation. With a dual
civil and common law degree from McGill University (Montreal, Canada), Lauren is
qualified in three jurisdictions: England & Wales, Quebec, and New York. The Legal
Author Biographies xxxv
500 2020 ranked Lauren as a ‘rising star’, stating that ‘she is developing along the
same lines as Jonathan Taylor; she has the ability to distil complex issues into clearly
understandable advice’.
Lord Pannick QC
Lord Pannick QC specialises in constitutional and administrative law, human rights
law, and sports law. His leading sports law cases include acting for Greg Rusedski
(in refuting unfounded doping allegations), Wimbledon FC (in securing permission
to move to Milton Keynes), Ashley Cole (on tapping-up charges), the RFU (against
Viagogo), and Manchester City FC. He appeared in 100 cases before the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords and has argued over 30 cases in the Supreme Court
since its creation in 2009. He is a crossbench peer in the House of Lords, a Fellow of
All Souls College, Oxford, a member of Blackstone Chambers, and a season ticket
holder at Arsenal FC.
Warren Phelops
Warren has recently joined as a partner at Squire Patton Boggs, to spearhead the
Global Sports & Entertainment Practice with fellow author Stephen Sampson. He
previously led the Global Sports Practice at K&L Gates, having joined there from
Slaughter & May, where he also trained. The majority of his work focuses on rights/
content tendering, ownership, and exploitation, event staging, governing body
regulation, structuring, strategy, and broadcast/ digital media His client list and work
over his 27 years working in the global sports industry reads like a who’s who at the
very top end of the sector and his work has involved some of the biggest global sports
events (including the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup, Rugby World Cups, Cricket
World Cups, Formula 1, Ryder Cups, and America’s Cups). The clients he has
advised include financiers, media/broadcast/ digital technology companies, domestic
and international governing bodies, sponsors, clubs, players, merchandisers/kit
manufacturers, gambling operators, event owners, promoters, hospitality and travel
companies, and insurers. Warren has been described in Sports Business International
as ‘one of the world’s most influential lawyers in the sports industry’. He is a Director
of Sports Resolutions (UK) and sits on the editorial board of the International Sports
Law Review.
Kendrah Potts
Kendrah Potts is a barrister at 4 New Square Chambers specialising in commercial,
civil fraud and sports law. She is recognised as a leading junior in the directories.
Kendrah acts for athletes, clubs, governing bodies and agents across a range of sports.
She is regularly instructed on high profile cases, most recently including acting for
Daniel Sturridge in respect of charges brought under The FA’s betting regulations,
Alex Hales in relation to charges of bringing cricket into disrepute and Birmingham
City FC in financial fair play-related charges. Kendrah represented the Rugby
Football Union in bringing charges against Nathan Hughes and Sale Sharks, and
regularly acts for the governing bodies of tennis in match-fixing cases. She is on the
Sport Resolution panel of arbitrators and mediators, the Union Cycliste Internationale
arbitral and disciplinary board, the World Association of Kickboxing Organizations
arbitration committee, and sits as a panel member for the British Equestrian
Federation. Before moving to the Bar, Kendrah was a solicitor, during which time
she was also Legal Counsel to the Cycling Independent Reform Commission set up
by the UCI to investigate doping in cycling, the lead lawyer for sport integrity and
anti-doping for LOCOG and was appointed to the Challenge Panel that advised the
UK Government on its review of UK Anti-Doping.
xxxvi Author Biographies
Christopher Quinlan QC
Christopher Quinlan QC is a member of Guildhall Chambers, Bristol and Farrar’s
Building, London, Recorder of the Crown Court, and Bencher of Inner Temple. He is
a sports and criminal law silk, with extensive experience in both fields as an advocate,
judge and tribunal chair. Christopher is the Independent Judicial Panel Chairman
for both World Rugby and The Football Association. He is a member of the World
Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal and Deputy Chair of the Appeal Board, Table Tennis
England. He is a member of the Sport Resolutions Panel of Arbitrators, and a legal
member (since its inception) of the UK National Anti-Doping Panel and National
Child Safeguarding in Sport Panel. He is the author of the Quinlan Review of the
structure, composition and operation of the British Horseracing Authority (BHA)
Disciplinary Panel, Appeal Board and Licensing Committee, which was published
in September 2016. In January 2019 his independent review into events at Wrexham
Tennis Centre was published. The Lawn Tennis Association commissioned that
review following the conviction and subsequent imprisonment for sexual offences of
their former Head Coach in July 2017. In 2019 he led a review of the safeguarding
policies and procedures of UK Athletics. As happened with his BHA review, all
of his recommendations will be implemented. He is a contributor to Cowe and
Cavender (Eds), Practical Advocacy in the Crown Court (Bloomsbury Professional,
2018). Described in Chambers UK (Sport) thus: ‘He is extraordinarily thorough,
extraordinarily hard-working and his understanding of the issues is without parallel’.
Felicity Reeve
Felicity Reeve is a partner in Bird & Bird’s Sports Group in London. She is recognised
in the elite band of commercial sports lawyers, having advised clients in the sports
sector for over 20 years. Felicity has worked on a number of high profile and cutting-
edge corporate and commercial projects in football, tennis, rugby, and motor racing.
Her experience includes the sale and purchase of sports-related rights and businesses,
event staging, venue build, finance and hire arrangements, media and marketing
rights work, licensing and supply agreements, and advising on gaming and betting.
Tom Richards
Tom Richards is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, practising in commercial,
competition and public law as well as sports law. He has acted for clients including
Joe Calzaghe, The Football Association, the Welsh Rugby Union, Derby County FC,
and London Welsh RFC and is ranked for his sports law practice in the leading legal
directories.
Elizabeth Riley
Liz Riley is the General Counsel at the International Paralympic Committee. Prior to
that she spent over ten years as a barrister in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP,
where she advised a wide range of sports clients (including international and national
governing bodies and organisations, public bodies, event organisers, sporting venues,
clubs, sponsors, agents and athletes) on a variety of sports-related issues, including
governance and constitutional matters, anti-doping, discipline and corruption, rules
and regulations, Para sport classification, selection, player contracts, commercial
sponsorship and supply agreements, ticketing, and contractual and regulatory
disputes. Liz is an experienced advocate and has appeared frequently before CAS
and other sporting tribunals. She sat as a member of the RFU’s Disciplinary Panel
for several years and has been a non-executive director for the British Wrestling
Association since 2016. Liz was a member of WADA’s 2021 Code Drafting Team
and is also the lead drafter for the 2021 International Standard for Therapeutic
Use Exemptions. Liz played rugby for London Wasps and has also represented
Author Biographies xxxvii
England A and the England touch rugby team. Liz studied at St Catharine’s College,
Cambridge where she gained a first class BA (Hons) degree in law.
Celia Rooney
Celia is a barrister at Blackstone Chambers, practising in commercial law, public law,
and employment law. She has a particular specialism in sport, and acts for governing
bodies, clubs and athletes alike. Her clients to date have included The Football
Association, the FA of Wales, the Premier League, the Lawn Tennis Association,
Arsenal FC, Middlesbrough FC, Racing Point and British Boxing, as well as a
number of individual athletes. Recent cases include South Shields v The FA and The
New Saints v The FA Wales, two of the first challenges arising out of the coronavirus
pandemic, in each of which she successfully represented the relevant governing body
(led by James Segan QC and Kate Gallafent QC, respectively). Celia is also currently
part of a team of lawyers (led by Nick De Marco QC) representing gymnasts who
claim to have suffered abuse at the hands of British Gymnastics.
Stephen Sampson
Stephen is a partner and the Head of the Sports & Entertainment Practice at Squire
Patton Boggs, qualifying in 1998 at its predecessor firm. He has been ranked as a
leading sports law practitioner for over a decade by both UK legal directories and
is noted in the ‘Hall of Fame’ by The Legal 500. He has over 20 years’ experience
of undertaking contentious, regulatory, investigatory, governance, commercial and
transactional work within the sports sector with particular expertise in all aspects of
dispute resolution, including regularly appearing before the CAS. Clients include
national and international governing bodies, broadcasters and rights owners, clubs
and teams, sponsors, agencies and leading players. In this publication, Stephen
writes on player transfers, in which he is considered a specialist due to the volume of
transactions handled and his involvement in many of the transfers and leading cases
that have helped shape the application of the regulations of the football governing
bodies.
James Segan QC
James practises at Blackstone Chambers, specialising in regulatory, commercial and
public law. He is recommended as a leading barrister in the field of sports law by all
of the independent legal directories. He acted for The FA in successfully defending
its decision to void the 2019/20 season in lower leagues on account of Covid-19;
he has acted for the EFL in successful prosecutions of Birmingham City, Sheffield
Wednesday and Queen’s Park Rangers under the ‘financial fair play’ rules; he has
acted for the RFU in many commercial and disciplinary cases over the last 14 years
including in its Supreme Court win against the ticket agent Viagogo; he acted for
the Force India Formula One Team in successfully defending a multi-million pound
Commercial Court claim against it by a sponsorship agent; and he advised the British
Olympic Association in relation to all London 2012 selection disputes. He is a co-
author of Challenging Sports Governing Bodies (Bloomsbury Professional, 2016)
and writes and blogs regularly on sports law issues.
Diya Sen Gupta QC

Diya Sen Gupta QC is a member of Blackstone Chambers. She specialises in
complex and significant employment litigation including in the areas of employee
competition, business protection, whistleblowing and discrimination. Diya is
instructed in cases which typically involve difficult issues of law, and are commercially
and reputationally significant. Her recent sports law experience includes acting for
Premier League football clubs in employment disputes. Diya is a contributor to
xxxviii Author Biographies
Employee Competition: Covenants, Confidentiality, and Garden Leave, and co-wrote

the employment chapter of Football and the Law. Diya is Chair of the Employment
Law Bar Association.
Tristan Sherliker
Tristan Sherliker, solicitor-advocate at Bird & Bird, is a specialist in resolving
intellectual property disputes. With a focus on bringing and defending complex cases
in the High Court, Tristan represents clients in a wide range of IP rights from the
use of trade marks, passing off and confidential data, to technical electronic patent
disputes.
Phil Sherrell
Phil heads Bird & Bird LLP’s international Media, Entertainment and Sport sector,
a 130-strong team of sector-focused lawyers spread across our offices and practice
areas. His day job is as a litigator, handling complex intellectual property and media
law disputes, often with a digital aspect. Phil sits on the Copyright and Technology
Working Group of the British Copyright Council and is the Editor of the International
Comparative Legal Guide to Copyright. The Legal 500 ranks Phil as a Leading
Individual for Media & Entertainment.
Christopher Stoner QC
Christopher Stoner QC is a member of Serle Court in Lincoln’s Inn and Guildhall
Chambers in Bristol. His practice encompasses sports disciplinary and regulatory
work. Chris appears in sports matters before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, the
High Court and international and domestic tribunals and he has been recognised as
a leading specialist for sports law in both The Legal 500 and Chambers for many
years. Chris regularly provides advice for numerous governing bodies as well as for
individuals and often drafts rules and regulations in the disciplinary and regulatory
context. Chris has also acted on numerous occasions and developed a particular
expertise in classification issues in Paralympic sport as well as in selection issues
across a wide range of sports.
Stuart Tennant
Stuart is a sports regulatory and disputes lawyer based in the Legal Services team at
the Premier League. He manages a wide range of regulatory and disciplinary cases
and provides legal advice on issues such as transfers and registrations, intermediaries,
safeguarding, medical matters and financial regulation. He is a Non-Executive
Director (Legal) to the board of Scottish Squash Limited and sits as a Disciplinary
Panel Member for the Lawn Tennis Association.
Robert Turner
Robert Turner is a partner in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP. Robert advises
on a variety of commercial transactions in the sports sector, such as sponsorship,
licensing, wagering rights, broadcasting and media rights and event staging. He is
also head of the firm’s International Consumer Law Group, advising businesses that
sell to (or otherwise interact with) consumers, including advising sports entities on
their ticketing terms, hospitality and membership terms, merchandising programmes
and other fan initiatives.
Georgie Twigg MBE

Georgie is an associate in the Sports Group at Bird & Bird LLP in London. She
is experienced in advising on sports-related commercial issues and has acted for
Author Biographies xxxix
governing bodies, event organisers, clubs and commercial sponsors across a range
of sports including football, rugby union, motorsport and athletics. Georgie is
also experienced in consumer law matters, including advertising, marketing, prize
promotions and competitions, and complaints before the Advertising Standards
Authority.
Jon Walters
Jon is a founding partner at Northridge Law LLP, providing commercial and corporate
advice to clients. In the sports sector, he acts for governing bodies, teams, agencies
and brands, specialising in governance, M&A and investment work, and commercial
rights deals. His clients include The FA, the Welsh Rugby Union, the Rugby Football
League, AEG Worldwide and institutional investors active in sport. Highlights
in sports governance include acting for The FA and World Rugby on landmark
governance reforms, the Welsh Rugby Union on its regional rugby structure, and
the Rugby Football League on the reform of its relationship with Super League. Jon
maintains a broad practice outside sport, notably for technology and media clients.
He leads Northridge TRACK, a club supporting and connecting growth businesses
and industry participants with a focus on the application of technology in the sports
and entertainment market. He is recognised as a ‘Next Generation Partner’ by The
Legal 500 and as an ‘Up and Coming Partner’ by Chambers UK.
Table of Statutes
para para
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 Arbitration Act 1996 – contd
s 8.................................................. G2.36 s 46................................................ D3.19
Administration of Justice Act 1985... F2.78 66................................................ D3.109
Arbitration Act 1996.............. C4.20, C4.45; (1)........................................... D3.99
C5.8; D1.5, D1.8, D1.63; (2)........................................... D3.100
D3.1, D3.3, D3.7, D3.75, (4)........................................... D3.101
D3.77, D3.78, D3.81, 67......................... C4.20; D3.26, D3.91,
D3.84, D3.98, D3.110, D3.91, D3.94, D3.97
D3.112; E3.4, E3.12; (1)(a), (b)................................ D3.92
E4.2, E4.7, E4.8, E4.9, 68......................... C4.20; D3.93, D3.94,
E4.11; E7.26; E13.36, D3.97
E13.50; E16.18, E16.20; (2)(g)....................................... E16.27
F2.166; F3.39 (4)........................................... D3.95
s 1.................................................. D3.75 69......................... D3.93, D3.96, D3.97;
2.................................................. C4.20 E4.2
(2)............................................. D3.108 (2)........................................... D3.96
3.................................................. D3.7 (8)........................................... D3.96
5.................................................. D3.8 70(2), (3)..................................... D3.97
6.................................................. D3.8 72...................................... D3.26, D3.97
(1).................................. D3.11, D3.12 (1)........................................... D3.91
7.................................................. D3.23 73....................................... D3.26, D3.92
8(1)(a)......................................... D3.51 74................................................ D3.102
9........................... D3.28, D3.69, D3.70, (3)........................................... D3.102
D3.73; E4.9; E15.43; 77................................................ D3.90
F3.196 79................................................ D3.90
(4)......................... D3.12; F2.37, F2.39 82(2)........................................... D3.61
15, 16.......................................... D3.76 Pt II (ss 85–98).............................. D3.109
18................................................ D3.76 s 101.............................................. D3.109
(3)........................................... D3.76 102.............................................. D3.110
24.......................... D3.81, D3.82, D3.83 103.............................................. D3.110
(2)........................................... D3.82 (3)......................................... D3.110
(3)........................................... D3.82 Betting and Gaming Act 1960........... A3.77
30...................................... D3.26, D3.91 Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act
31................................................ D3.26 1963.......................................... A3.77
(1)........................................... D3.92 Birmingham Commonwealth Games
32................................................ D3.26 Act 2020
33........................... D3.79, D3.83, D3.94 s 10...................................... A3.69; H6.95
34................................................ D3.77 11–25.......................................... A3.69
35................................................ D3.60 Bribery Act 2010................... B3.168; B4.2,
37................................................ D3.77 B4.48, B4.49; F2.22,
38................................................ D3.77 F2.23, F2.26; H3.4,
40................................................ D3.80 H3.76; H6.112, H6.114,
41................................................ D3.80 H6.115, H6.122, H6.124
42...................................... D3.77, D3.85 s 1, 2.............................................. F2.23
43....................... B4.47; D3.86, D3.108; 7.................................................. F2.25
E4.8 Broadcasting Act 1981...................... A3.84
44......................... D3.73, D3.87, D3.88, Broadcasting Act 1990............ A3.84; H4.27
D3.108; E15.13; F3.196 s 3(3)............................................. B5.15
45................................................ D3.89 13................................................ H2.137
xlii Table of Statutes
para para
Broadcasting Act 1996...................... A3.84 Competition Act 1998 – contd
Pt IV (ss 97–105).......................... A3.99 Pt I Ch I (ss 1–16).............. A1.67; D3.34;
Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984..... A3.84 E11.7, E11.8; F3.55,
Care Act 2014........................ B6.16, B6.31 F3.83; H6.60, H6.61,
s 9.................................................. B6.31 H5.65
42......................................... B6.7, B6.31 s 2......................... E11.8; E15.7, E15.25;
(1)........................................... A4.69 F3.86
43................................................ B6.31 (4)............................................. E11.46
Sch 2.............................................. B6.31 4................................................ E11.251
Charities Act 2006................. A2.60, A2.61, 9.................................................. E11.10
A2.62, A2.64, A2.65, 10................................................ E11.12
A2.66 Pt I Ch II (ss 17–24).......... D3.34; E11.15,
Charities Act 2011................... A2.60, A2.64, E11.17; H6.60
A2.66, A2.74; I1.116 s 18..................... E11.14, E11.46; E15.25
Children Act 1989............................. B6.25 25................................... E11.40, E11.41
s 17................................................ B6.26 25A............................................. E11.41
31(9)........................................... B6.10 26, 27.......................................... E11.40
31A, 33....................................... B6.30 28................................... E11.35, E11.40
44................................................ B6.29 29................................................ E11.40
44A............................................. B6.29 31(1), (2)..................................... E11.41
46................................................ B6.29 31A............................................. E11.41
47................................................ B6.27 39, 40.......................................... E11.41
105(1)......................................... B6.5 46, 47.......................................... E11.44
Children Act 2004............................. B6.25 47A............................................. E11.45
s 16E.............................................. B6.28 50(1), (5)..................................... E11.40
Children and Social Work Act 2017.... B6.25, 58................................................ E16.25
B6.28 (1)........................................... E11.43
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 62, 64.......................................... E11.35
1982 Sch 8
s 25................................................ E16.30 para 3......................................... E11.44
Civil Partnership Act 2004................ E14.34 9, 13, 36............................. E11.47
Communications Act 2003...... A3.95; H4.23 Sch 8A........................................... E11.47
s 211.............................................. H2.137 Consumer Rights Act 2015.... A3.69; H1.33;
233(3)......................................... H2.137 H6.101, H6.102, H6.106,
299.............................................. A3.84 H6.107, H6.130, H6.134,
(1B)....................................... A3.86 H6.136, H6.141, H6.143
300.............................................. A3.86 s 2(3)............................................. H6.130
368A........................................... H2.139 49, 50............................. H6.131, H6.142
Companies Act 1985 51, 52.......................................... H6.142
s 459.................................. D3.52; E15.41 54................................................ H6.134
Companies Act 2006............. A2.35, A2.37, (7)........................................... H6.134
A2.39, A2.43, 55................................................ H6.132
A2.59; H3.3 56................................................ H6.133
s 28................................................ A2.37 57................................................ H6.141
33................................................ B5.37 (6)........................................... H6.143
(1)........................................... E8.3 Pt 2 (ss 61–76).............................. H1.36
170.............................................. A2.38 s 62(4)........................................... H6.135
(4)......................................... A2.38 68................................................ H1.36
171.............................................. A2.38 Pt 3 Ch 5 (ss 90–95)...................... H1.33
172............................. A2.38; B5.4; H3.3 s 90(3)(c)....................................... H6.103
173–177...................................... A2.38 91................................................ H6.109
251(1), (2)................................... B5.12 (8)........................................... H6.103
994................................. D3.52; E15.41, 92(3)........................................... H6.103
E15.42, E15.43 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties)
Competition Act 1998.............. E3.6; E5.13; Act 1999.......... H6.146, H6.147; H7.50
E11.4, E11.28, E11.42, Co-operative and Community
E11.45, E11.47, Benefit Societies Act 2014........ A2.48,
E11.205, E11.251; A2.51, A2.57, A2.58;
F3.54 B5.139
Table of Statutes xliii
para para
Copyright Designs and Patents Act Copyright Designs and Patents Act
1988................... E2.50; H1.69, H1.70, 1988 – contd
H1.78, H1.84, H1.85, s 96, 97.......................................... H1.89
H1.89, H1.92; H2.31, 97A............................................. H1.147
H2.88; H3.26; H5.22 98–100........................................ H1.89
s 1.................................................. H1.65 101, 101A................................... H2.110
(1)....................................... J1.8, J1.27 107(1), (2)................................... H1.90
(a)......................................... H4.30 153.............................................. H2.31
2(1).................................... H1.65, H1.85 178.............................................. H2.32
3.................................................. H1.75 180(2)............................... H1.69, H1.70
(1)............................................. H1.69 183.............................................. H1.65
(b)......................................... J1.8 198.............................................. H1.90
(2)................................... H1.65; H2.31 213.............................................. H5.19
3A............................................... H1.77 296, 296ZA–296ZG................... H1.90
4................................. H5.22; J1.8, J1.27 297, 298.................................... E11.234
(1)(a)............................... H1.81; H2.31; Corporation Tax Act 2009
H4.30 s 46................................................ I1.7
(b), (c).................................. H2.31 Pt 8 Ch 7 (ss 754–763).................. I1.36
5A............................................... J1.8 Corporation Tax Act 2010
(1)(a)...................................... H2.31 Pt 5 (ss 97–188)..................... I1.29, I1.37
5B(1)................................. H1.83; H2.31 s 217B........................................... I1.39
6.................................................. H1.83 Pt 13 Ch 9 (ss 658–671)...... A2.63; I1.123
(1)............................................. H2.31 s 996A........................................... I1.32
9........................................ H1.66, H1.84 1121............................................ I1.10
(2)(aa), (ab), (b)........................ H2.31 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990... F2.78
11(1)........................................... H2.31 Crime and Disorder Act 1998
(2)........................................... H2.32 s 28................................................ B3.143
12................................................ H1.67 (1)........................................... G2.87
(2)........................................... H2.31 (4)........................................... G2.88
13A............................................. H1.67 (5)........................................... G2.88
(2)(a)–(c).............................. H2.31 31................................................ G2.87
13B............................................. H2.31 (1)(c)........................... B3.143; G2.91
14................................................ H1.67 (5)............................... B3.143; G2.91
(2)........................................... H2.31 Criminal Justice Act 1967
16...................................... H1.65, H1.88 s 8.................................................. B3.46
(1)........................................... H1.85 Criminal Justice Act 2003................. A3.70
(3)(a)....................................... H1.85 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015
17................................................ H1.65 s 57................................................ G1.156
(3)........................................... H5.22 Criminal Justice and Police Act
18, 19.......................................... H1.65 2001.......................................... E11.40
20.......................... H1.65, H1.83; H2.97 Criminal Justice and Public Order
21................................................ H1.65 Act 1994.................................... H6.94
22–26................................ H1.65, H1.86 s 166................................... A3.69; H1.33;
29................................................ H1.87 H6.91, H6.94
30...................................... H1.87; H2.88 (1)......................................... H1.33
(2)................................. H1.88; H2.89 166A................................. A3.69; H1.33
31...................................... H1.72, H1.87 Criminal Law Act 1977
51................................................ H5.22 s 1.................................................. B4.48
52................................................ H5.22 Data Protection Act 1998...... A4.26, A4.77,
62................................................ H1.81 A4.156, A4.157,
72................................................ H2.97 A4.239, A4.247,
77, 78.......................................... H1.65 A4.250; H4.57, H4.70
80................................................ H1.65 Data Protection Act 2018....... A3.124; A4.2,
84, 85.......................................... H1.65 A4.4, A4.12, A4.15,
87................................................ H1.65 A4.59, A4.65, A4.67,
90(2)........................................... H1.68 A4.68, A4.71, A4.74,
91...................................... H1.84; H2.33 A4.132, A4.154, A4.158,
92................................................ H1.68 A4.163, A4.164, A4.167,
94................................................ H1.65 A4.174, A4.199, A4.205,
xliv Table of Statutes
para para
Data Protection Act 2018 – contd Data Protection Act 2018 – contd
A4.239, A4.241, A4.243, Sch 2 – contd
A4.254, A4.255; B4.45; para 26....................................... A4.91
B6.52; H4.70, H4.71, Sch 3................................ A4.172, A4.174
H4.72, H4.73, H4.76, Sch 4................................ A4.172, A4.174
H4.77, H4.78, H4.80 Sch 15.............................. A4.241, A4.256
s 3(2), (3)....................................... H4.71 para 15....................................... A4.255
(3)............................................. H4.71 Sch 21................. A4.198, A4.200, A4.201
(5)............................................. H4.71 para 4, 5..................................... A4.199
(10)........................................... A4.209 6–8..................................... A4.201
9.................................................. A4.45 Defamation Act 2013........................ H4.20
10...................................... B6.53; H4.76 Digital Economy Act 2017...... A3.69, A3.84;
11(2)........................................... A4.12 A4.132; H6.101, H6.110
13................................................ H4.76 s 106................................ H6.110, H6.111
(2)........................................... H4.76 Disability Discrimination Act 1995.... E14.5,
17A, 17B.................................... A4.199 E14.17
17C............................................. A4.201 s 21F.............................................. E14.60
18................................................ A4.202 Education Act 1944........................... A3.11
21................................................ A4.26 Education Act 2002
115(2)......................................... A4.242 s 84(3)........................................... A3.44
122(5)......................................... A4.205 Education Reform Act 1988
123.............................................. A4.87 Sch 13
127.............................................. A4.151 Pt I.................................... A3.12, A3.47
142–145...................................... A4.241 Employment Agencies Act 1973....... F2.20,
146.............................................. A4.241 F2.21
(9)......................................... A4.241 s 13(2), (3)..................................... F2.20
147.............................................. A4.241 Employment Rights Act 1996........... E14.54;
148.............................................. A4.241 F1.36, F1.38, F1.58
149–153, 155–159...................... A4.243 s 95(1)........................................... F1.59
167–169...................................... A4.249 98................................................ F1.64
170.............................................. A4.255 (1)(b).............................. F1.48, F1.59
171.............................................. A4.255 (2)........................................... F1.59
(3), (4)................................... A4.255 (4)(a)....................................... F1.59
172.............................................. A4.255 114.............................................. F1.86
173................................ A4.158, A4.255 115.............................................. F1.86
184.............................................. A4.255 119.............................................. F1.85
187–189...................................... A4.254 (2)(a)..................................... F1.85
198.............................................. A4.256 (3)......................................... F1.85
199A........................................... A4.201 123(1)......................................... F1.85
205.............................................. A4.167 124(1), (1ZA).................... F1.60, F1.85
Sch 1........................ A4.59, A4.69, A4.72 203.............................................. D3.52
Pt 1 (paras 1–4) 220–229...................................... F1.85
para 18......................... A4.69; B6.53 Enterprise Act 2002........................... E11.4
(4).............................. B6.7 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
27................................... A4.63 Act 2013.................................... E11.21
(1), (2)....................... A4.63 Equality Act 2006.................. E14.5, E14.17
28................................... A4.65 Equality Act 2010..... E7.56; E14.5, E14.10,
(1)(b), (c)................... A4.65 E14.11, E14.16, E14.17,
(2).............................. A4.65 E14.18, E14.21, E14.22,
Pt 3 (paras 29–37)..................... A4.58 E14.23, E14.25, E14.27,
para 36................................... A4.68 E14.28, E14.29, E14.30,
Pt 4 (paras 38–41)..................... A4.72 E14.36, E14.40, E14.47,
para 39–41............................. A4.72 E14.48, E14.50, E14.51,
Sch 2................................ A4.172, A4.174 E14.52, E14.54, E14.58,
para 2, 5..................................... A4.91 E14.61, E14.62, E14.63,
7......................................... A4.92 E14.64, E14.65, E14.66,
16(3).................................. A4.163 E14.67, E14.68, E14.76;
19, 22................................. A4.91 F1.6
23, 24................................. A4.163 Pt 2 Ch 1 (ss 4–12)........................ E14.19
Table of Statutes xlv
para para
Equality Act 2010 – contd 112(1)......................................... E14.51
s 4.................................... E14.31, E14.35 118................................. E14.78, E14.83
5.................................................. E14.32 119, 120......................... E14.78, E14.83
6.................................................. E14.48 123................................. E14.78, E14.83
7(1)............................................. E14.33 127(9)............................ E14.52, E14.83
8.................................................. E14.34 128................................. E14.52, E14.83
9.................................................. E14.36 131.............................................. E14.52
10................................................ E14.37 144(1)......................................... D3.52
11................................................ E14.38 158................................. E14.79, E14.80
12................................................ E14.39 159................................ E14.79, E14.81,
Pt 2 Ch 2 (ss 13–27)...................... E14.19 E14.82
s 13................................................ E14.41 (4)(b)..................................... E14.83
(1)........................................... E14.23 (5)......................................... E14.82
(2)........................................... E14.24 193(7)......................................... E14.76
(5)........................................... E14.23 195.................... E14.58, E14.68, E14.69
(8)........................................... E14.35 (1)......................................... E14.67
15.................................. E14.41, E14.42 (2)............... E14.67, E14.73, E14.74
(1)(b)....................................... E14.49 (3)......................................... E14.67
17................................... E14.23, E14.35 (4)............................ E14.67, E14.68
(6)........................................... E14.35 (5), (6).................... E12.103; E14.75
18.................................... E14.23, E14.35 (7), (8)................................... E14.78
(6)........................................... E14.35 Sch 1.............................................. E14.48
19................................................ E14.25 Pt 1 (paras 1–9)......................... E14.40
(2)(d)....................................... E14.49 para 6, 9................................. E14.48
20................................... E14.40, E14.44 Sch 2
21................................................ E14.40 para 2(2).................................... E14.59
23................................................ E14.23 (7)...................... E14.50, E14.66
26...................... E14.27, E14.28, E14.29 (8).................................... E14.50
(1)–(3)..................................... E14.27 Sch 3
27................................................ E14.30 para 27....................................... E14.77
Pt 3 (ss 28–31)................ E14.20, E14.21, Sch 9
E14.58 Pt 1 (paras 1–6)......................... E14.74
s 28(1)........................................... E14.58 Sch 16
29................................................ E14.58 para 1......................................... E14.62
(3)........................................... E14.27 Equal Pay Act 1970.............. E14.5, E14.10,
(7)........................................... E14.59 E14.17
31(2)........................................... E14.58 European Communities Act 1972..... E11.3,
Pt 4 (ss 32–38).............................. E14.20 E11.28
Pt 5 (ss 39–83)................ E14.20, E14.21 s 1A, 1B........................................ E14.16
s 39................................................ E14.53 2.................................................. E11.2
40(2)–(4)..................................... E14.29 European Union (Withdrawal) Act
41................................................ E14.53 2018.................... A4.4; E14.16, E14.52
53, 54.......................................... E14.55 s 1..................................... E11.3; E14.16
55, 56.......................................... E14.57 1A...................... E11.3, E11.28, E11.45
65................................................ E14.52 2, 3.............................................. E14.16
66................................................ E14.52 4........................... E11.3, E11.5, E11.29;
69................................................ E14.52 E14.16
79................................................ E14.52 5(4)............................................. E14.16
83................................... E14.53, E14.54 6(2)–(7)....................................... E14.16
(2)........................................... E14.52 European Union (Withdrawal
(a)....................................... F1.6 Agreement) Act 2020.... E11.3; E14.16;
Pt 7 (ss 100–107)............ E14.20, E14.21, H5.19
E14.60 Sch 5
s 101.............................................. E14.61 para 1......................................... A4.4
102.............................................. E14.61 Fair Trading Act 1973..................... E11.205
107.............................................. E14.61 Family Law Reform Act 1969
109.............................................. E14.51 s 1.................................................. F2.142
(4)......................................... E14.51 Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003
111.............................................. E14.51 s 5B............................................... B6.22
xlvi Table of Statutes
para para
Finance Act 1998 Gambling Act 2005 – contd
Sch 18............................................ I1.24 s 327.............................................. H3.79
Finance Act 2004 330.................................... H3.79, H3.80
Pt 7 (ss 306–319).......................... I2.108 (2)......................................... H3.79
Finance Act 2010.............................. B5.15 336.............................................. B4.51
s 30................................................ B5.15 Sch 6
Sch 6 Pt 3............................................ B4.47
Pt 1 (paras 1–7) Gaming Act 1845
para 1, 4................................. B5.15 s 18................................................ D3.25
Finance Act 2013.................... A3.43; I2.110 Gaming Act 1968.............................. A3.77
Sch 45............................................ I2.21 Glasgow Commonwealth Games
Finance Act 2014 Act 2008.......... A3.69, A3.101; H1.144
Pt 4 (ss 199–233).......................... I2.111 s 2, 10, 17, 42................................ A3.101
Sch 17............................................ I1.8 Horserace Betting and Olympic
Finance Act 2016 Lottery Act 2004............ A3.78, A3.79,
Sch 2.................................... I1.101; I2.69 A3.80
Finance (No 2) Act 2017................... I2.28 Human Rights Act 1998.......... B1.25, B1.26,
s 5.................................................. I1.95 B1.61; D1.39, D1.100;
22................................................ A2.60 D3.64, D3.67; E3.5, E3.6;
Financial Services and Markets Act E5.2, E5.5, E5.7; E7.10,
2000.......................................... H3.75 E7.59; E11.35; E13.1,
s 21................................................ H3.75 E13.2, E13.3, E13.4,
60A............................................. B5.15 E13.6, E13.7, E13.8,
Fire Safety and Safety at Places of E13.9, E13.15, E13.16,
Sport Act 1987.......................... A3.63 E13.17, E13.20, E13.25,
Football (Disorder) Act 2000............ A3.70, E13.26, E13.28, E13.33,
A3.72 E13.34, E13.50, E13.53,
Sch 1.............................................. A3.70 E13.74, E13.75, E13.80;
Football (Offences) Act 1991............ A3.67 E14.3, E14.6, E14.7,
s 2–4.............................................. A3.67 E14.24; E15.3, E15.29,
Football Spectators Act 1989............ A3.64, E15.40; F1.64; F2.60;
A3.66, A3.72, A3.73 H4.50, H4.53
s 10................................................ A3.64 s 1....................................... E13.9, E13.32
14A................................... A3.70, A3.72 2.................................................. E13.10
14B....................... A3.71, A3.72, A3.73; 3.......................... B1.61; E13.3, E13.11,
E12.69 E13.12
14J.............................................. A3.74 (2)(c)......................................... E13.3
Fraud Act 2006............. B4.48; F2.29, F2.30 4............................ E13.1, E13.3, E13.13
s 1.................................................. F2.29 (5), (6)....................................... E13.13
2.......................................... B4.48; F2.29 6............................... E5.8; E13.1, E13.3,
3, 4.............................................. F2.29 E13.7, E13.14, E13.26,
Freedom of Information Act 2000.... A4.26; E13.28
I2.58 (1)............................................. E13.7
Freedom of Information (Scotland) (3)............................................. E14.7
Act 2002.................................... A4.26 (a)............. E13.14, E13.17, E13.28,
Gambling Act 2005................ A3.77, A3.82; E13.29, E13.30, E13.31
B4.15, B4.51, B4.52; (b)........................... E13.14, E13.29
H3.79, H3.80, H3.81, (5)............................................. E13.29
H3.82; I1.31; J1.58, J1.60 7.................................................. E13.1
s 1.................................................. B4.51 (1)............................................. E13.1
6(2), (5)....................................... J1.60 (a)............................ E13.74, E13.76
9.................................................. J1.62 (b)......................................... E13.74
14................................................ J1.58 (2)............................................. E13.76
30................................................ B4.47 (3)............................................. E13.75
42.......................... B4.47, B4.48, B4.49, (5)............................................. E13.77
B4.52 (a), (b).................................. E13.77
(1)(b)....................................... B4.48 (7)............................................. E13.75
(3A)(a).................................... B4.48 8.......................... E15.40; H4.63, H4.64,
88(1)........................................... B4.47 H4.68
Table of Statutes xlvii
para para
Human Rights Act 1998 – contd Justices of the Peace Act 1361
s 8(1).................................. E13.78; H4.54 s 1.................................................. G2.84
(2)–(4)....................................... E13.78 Law Reform (Contributory
9(3), (5)....................................... E13.80 Negligence) Act 1945
10................................................ E13.13 s 1(1)............................................. G1.140
11................................................ H1.88 Legal Services Act 2007........ E13.52; F2.78
21(1)........................................... E13.28 Local Government (Miscellaneous
Sch 1.................................. E13.8, E13.32 Provisions) Act 1976
Protocol 1 s 19...................................... A3.12, A3.47
Art 1................... H4.66, H4.67, H4.68, Local Government, Planning and
H4.69 Land 1980................................. A3.47
Immigration and Social Security Co- Localism Act 2011............................ A3.47
ordination (EU Withdrawal) London Olympic Games and
Act 2020.................................... F1.12 Paralympic Games Act 2006..... A3.100;
Income Tax Act 2007 H1.143
Pt 13 Ch 2 (ss 714–751)................ I1.104 s 4(1)............................................. A3.39
s 966.............................................. I2.32 31................................................ A3.69
Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Sch 4.............................................. H1.143
Act 2003.................................... I2.52 Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976.. A3.77
s 22–26A....................................... I2.29 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980
44................................................ I2.58 s 44................................................ G2.36
48................................................ I2.57 115.............................................. G2.84
61................................................ I2.57 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
61A............................................. I2.56 s 34–36.......................................... D3.52
Pt 3 Chs 2–11 (ss 63–220)............ I2.72 National Insurance Contributions
s 203(2)......................................... H6.81 (Termination Awards and
204.............................................. H6.81 Sporting Testimonials) Act
265.............................................. H6.81 2019................................ I1.101; I2.69
Pt 7A (ss 554A–554Z21).............. I2.54 National Lottery etc Act 1993........... A3.13,
s 554A........................................... I2.54 A3.77
Income Tax (Trading and Other s 26................................................ A3.13
Income) Act 2005 National Lottery Act 1998................ A3.13
s 13, 14.......................................... I2.32 National Lottery Act 2006................ A3.13
850C–850E................................. I1.8 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957........... G1.81,
Industrial and Provident Societies G1.84, G1.85, G1.88,
Act 1965........................ A2.48; B5.139 G1.89, G1.90, G1.92,
Industrial and Provident Societies G1.94, G1.103, G1.120,
Act 1967.................................... A2.48 G1.123, G1.124,
Industrial and Provident Societies G1.138
Act 1975.................................... A2.48 s 1(2)............................................. G1.84
Industrial and Provident Societies (3)(a)......................................... G1.86
Act 1978.................................... A2.48 2.................................................. G1.69
Industrial and Provident Societies (2).................... G1.89, G1.93, G1.119,
Act 2002.................................... A2.48 G1.123
Insolvency Act 1986............ B5.131, B5.132, (3)............................................. G1.94
B5.133 (4)(a)......................................... G1.98
s 123(1)(e)..................................... B5.131 (6)............................................. G1.84
(2)......................................... B5.132 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984........... G1.81,
127.............................................. B5.133 G1.84, G1.85, G1.88,
129(2)......................................... B5.133 G1.89, G1.90, G1.91,
213, 214...................................... B5.132 G1.103, G1.114,
Sch B1 G1.120, G1.138
para 3(1).................................... B5.133 s 1(3)............................................. G1.115
(4)(b)............................... B5.133 (b)......................................... G1.117
26....................................... B5.139 (4)............................... G1.115, G1.119
40(1)(a), (b)....................... B5.133 Offences Against the Person Act
43(6).................................. B5.153 1861................................ G2.14, G2.16
Sch 6 s 18........................... G2.2, G2.27, G2.29,
para 1–7..................................... B5.135 G2.35, G2.65
xlviii Table of Statutes
para para
Offences Against the Person Act Restrictive Trade Practices Act
1861 – contd 1976.......................... E11.251; E13.26
s 20......................... G2.14, G2.23, G2.24, Road Traffic Act 1988
G2.25, G2.30, G2.46, s 123.............................................. B5.15
G2.54, G2.55, G2.58, 125(3)......................................... B5.15
G2.65, G2.66, G2.69 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act
47......................... G2.14, G2.18, G2.19, 2006
G2.22, G2.23, G2.66, s 9.................................................. B6.65
G2.96 35................................................ B6.65
Offensive Behaviour at Football and Sch 4.............................................. B6.64
Threatening Communications Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975.... A3.63,
(Scotland) Act 2012.................. A3.68 A3.64, A3.65
s 1, 6.............................................. A3.68 s 1.................................................. A3.63
Office of Communications Act 2002.. H2.136 2.................................................. A3.63
Physical Training and Recreation 12................................................ A3.63
Act 1937.................................... A3.11 School Standards and Framework
Police Act 1997 Act 1998
Pt V (ss 112–127).......................... B6.58 s 77................................................ A3.47
s 112.............................................. B6.59 Senior Courts Act 1981
113A(1), (2)................................ B6.60 s 31(2A)........................................ E7.62
113B(4)....................................... B6.61 Sex Discrimination Act 1975............ E14.5,
Police and Criminal Evidence Act E14.10, E14.17,
1984 E14.29, E14.68
s 75................................................ B4.38 s 13................................................ E14.56
Powers of Criminal Courts 44................................................ E14.68
(Sentencing) Act 2000 Sexual Offences Act 2003...... A3.75; B6.91;
s 130.............................................. G2.73 D1.39
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906... F2.23 s 2, 3.............................................. G2.96
s 1.......................................... B4.48, B4.49 16...................................... A3.75; B6.45
2.................................................. B4.48 17–19.......................................... B6.45
Private International Law (Miscella Solicitors Act 1974............................ F2.78
neous Provisions) Act 1995........ E11.29 Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002............. B4.53 etc) Act 1985
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012..... B6.64, s 1, 2.............................................. A3.69
B6.67, B6.72 Sports Grounds Safety Authority Act
s 80................................................ B6.58 2011.......................................... A3.65
Public Order Act 1986 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act
s 4.................................................. G2.58 1992
4A......................... G2.14, G2.85, G2.87 s 139.............................................. A2.56
5........................... B3.143; G2.14, G2.85, 152....................................... I1.20; I2.86
G2.86, G2.87, G2.91, Theft Act 1968.............. F2.29, F2.31; H1.33
G2.95 s 17................................................ F2.31
17–22.......................................... G2.89 Theft Act 1978.................................. F2.29
Race Relations Act 1976....... E14.5, E14.17, Tobacco Advertising and Promotion
E14.36 Act 2002.......................... A3.81; H3.97
s 25................................................ E14.60 s 10................................................ A3.81
Recreational Charities Act 1958....... A2.60 (2)........................................... A3.81
Registered Designs Act 1949............ H5.17 Trade Marks Act 1938....................... H1.102
s 1(2)............................................. H5.17 Trade Marks Act 1994........ H1.102, H1.104,
(3)............................................. H5.18 H1.115, H1.116,
1B............................................... H5.17 H1.126, H1.129
(1)........................................... H5.17 s 1.................................................. H1.102
7.................................................. H5.17 (1)............................................. H4.31
7A(1).......................................... H5.17 2(2)............................................. H1.129
8(1), (2)....................................... H5.17 3(1)(b), (c).................................. H1.104
Regulation of Investigatory Powers 4.................................................. H1.104
Act 2000.................................... B4.53 (5)............................................. H1.142
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 5(3), (4)....................................... H1.107
1974................................ B6.59; D1.50 7(3)............................................. H1.107
Table of Statutes xlix
para para
Trade Marks Act 1994 – contd Code du Sport (10 December 2020)
s 10................................................ H1.113 – contd
(1)............................ H1.113, H1.115, art L222-16, L222-17, L222-18.... F2.90
H1.116, H1.117 L222-19.................................... F2.90
(2)............................. H1.113, H1.116, L222-19-1................................ F2.90
H1.122, H1.123 L222-20, L222-21.................... F2.90
(3)............................. H1.113, H1.124 R222-1..................................... F2.89
(4)............................. H1.114, H1.120 Law No 71-1130 (31 December
14–16............................ H1.125, H1.126 1971)
46(1)(a)–(c)................................ H1.110 art 6............................................... F2.90
Trade Union and Labour Relations Law of 16 July 1984
(Consolidation) Act 1992 art 18-1....................................... E11.244
s 207A(2)...................................... F1.49
Transport Act 1968............................ H1.33 GERMANY
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Competition Act (Gesetzgegen
Act 2007.................................... I2.105 Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen
UEFA European Championship (GWB))
(Scotland) Act 2020........ A3.69; H1.26 s 31.............................................. E11.243
s 2.................................................. H6.95
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977....... F2.9; GREECE
H6.139, H6.140, H6.141 Sports Law 2725/1999
s 3.................................................. H6.139 art 90............................................. F3.222
Sch 2.............................................. H6.140
Value Added Tax Act 1994................ I1.45 GUERNSEY
Sch 1 Image Rights (Bailiwick of
para 1......................................... I1.46 Guernsey) Ordinance 2012....... H4.86,
Sch 4A H4.87
para 9A...................................... H6.83 Pt I (ss 1–64)
Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006... H1.33; s 1.................................................. H4.87
H6.93 2(3)............................................. H4.88
s 52................................................ A3.72 5(1)............................................. H4.87
18................................................ H4.88
AUSTRALIA 27–29.......................................... H4.89
COMMONWEALTH
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
s 40................................................ D2.15 Equal Status Act 2000....................... E14.62
NEW SOUTH WALES Public Health (Alcohol) Act 2018..... H3.86
Homebush Bay Operations Act Sport Ireland Act 2015...................... A4.64
1999.......................................... H2.27
SOUTH AUSTRALIA SOUTH AFRICA
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 Promotion of Administration Justice
s 66................................................ E14.68 Act 2000.................................... E5.5
CANADA SWITZERLAND
Personal Information and Protection Cartel Act 1995
of Electronic Documents 2000... A4.187 art 7(2a)......................................... A1.44
12............................................. A1.44
FRANCE Civil Code (Schweizerisches
Code of Public Health Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB))............ B1.4
art L 3323-2................................... H3.86 art 2............................................... A1.44
Code du Sport (10 December 2020) (2)........................................... A1.44
art L111-1...................................... A1.6 27............................................. D2.127
L132-2...................................... F2.90 (2)......................................... D2.194
L 222-5............................. F2.89, F2.90 28................................. A1.44; D2.127
L222-6...................................... F2.90 60................................. A1.23; D2.127
L 222-7..................................... F2.90 64............................................. A1.29
L222-8 – L222-11.................... F2.90 75..................... D2.64, D2.65, D2.101
L222-12– L222-15................... F2.90 Civil Procedure Code 2008.... D2.45, D2.48,
L222-15-1................................ F2.90 D2.52
l Table of Statutes
para para
Civil Procedure Code 2008 – contd Private International Law Statute
art 353(2)....................................... D2.47 (18 December 1987) – contd
354........................................... D2.46 art 178(1)....................................... D2.52
381........................................... B1.16 (2)............................. D2.53, D2.55
390........................................... D2.46 181........................................... D2.66
393........................................... D2.46 182........................................... D2.68
Code of Obligations (Obligation (1)....................................... D2.49
enrecht)..................................... D2.127 (2)............................. D2.69, D2.70
art 41............................................. D2.127 (3)............................. D2.43, D2.70
75............................................. B1.12 183........................................... D2.107
163........................................... D2.127 (1)......................... D2.103, D2.106
336........................................... D2.127 (2)............................ D2.44, D2.109
337........................................... D2.127 184........................................... D2.113
(c)(1).................................. F3.275 186........................................... D2.57
Code on Private International Law (1)....................................... D2.57
(LDIP) (2)............................. D2.57, D2.66
art 25............................................. D2.67 187................. B1.16; D2.122, D2.124
116(1)....................................... B1.16 (1)....................................... B1.16
190(2)(e).................................. B1.16 (2)....................................... D2.122
Federal Act on Employment Services 190.................. D2.85, D2.86, D2.108,
and the Hiring of Services D2.192
(AVG)........................................ D2.188 (2)........................... D2.46, D2.176
Federal Constitution of the Swiss (a).................................. D2.177
Confederation (b).................... D2.178, D2.180
art 23.................................... A1.9; D2.100 (c).................................. D2.185
Federal Tribunal Act 2005 (d).................................. D2.186
art 40, 72, 74, 77, 90, 92, (e).................... D2.191, D2.193
103, 105................................... D2.174 192............................... D2.74, D2.169
Private International Law Statute (2)....................................... D2.173
(18 December 1987)...... D2.45, D2.47, 194........................................... D2.49
D2.48, D2.49, D2.50,
D2.52, D2.109, UNITED STATES
D2.111, D2.113 Americans with Disabilities Act
Ch 12................................... D2.43, D2.47 1990............................ E14.63, E14.64
art 13............................................. D2.124 Professional and Amateur Sports
16............................................. D2.125 Protection Act 1992........... B4.4; H7.15
(1), (2).................................. D2.125 Sports Agent Responsibility and
17............................................. D2.124 Trust Act (15 USC § 7801-
116........................................... D2.122 7807)......................................... F2.83
176(1), (2)................................ D2.47 Sports Broadcasting Act 2000
177........................................... D2.46 s 1291–1294................................ E11.243
(1)....................................... D2.59 Uniform Athlete Agents Act 2000..... F2.84
Table of Statutory Instruments
para para
Breaching of Limits on Ticket Sales Competition Act 1998 (Competition
Regulations 2018, SI 2018/735. and Markets Authority’s Rules)
H6.101, H6.110 Order 2013, SI 2014/458
reg 3.............................................. H6.111 Sch 1
Business Protection from Mislead para 5......................................... E11.41
ing Marketing (Amendment) Competition (Amendment etc)
Regulations 2013, SI 2013/ EU Exit Regulations 2019, SI 2019/93
2701.......................................... H6.96 reg 3.............................................. E11.12
Business Protection from Misleading 62............................................ E11.3
Marketing Regulations 2008, Conduct of Employment
SI 2008/1276................ H1.145; H4.23, Agencies and Employment
H4.25, H6.137 Businesses Regulations 2003,
reg 3(2).......................................... H5.76 SI 2003/3319............................. F2.21
Child Safeguarding Practice Review reg 13A, 14, 16, 18–22, 25............ F2.20
and Relevant Agency (England) 26............................................ F2.20
Regulations 2018, SI 2018/789 (1)–(3)..................................... F2.20
reg 18............................................ B6.28 27A.......................................... F2.20
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, 29............................................ F2.20
SI 1998/3132............... E13.76; E16.14; 30............................................ F2.20
I2.105 Sch 3.............................................. F2.20
r 3.4............................................... E16.8 Consumer Contracts (Information,
Pt 7.11........................................... E13.76 Cancellation and Additional
Pt 8 (rr 8.1–8.9)........ E5.3; E7.23; E13.15, Charges) Regulations 2013,
E13.21; E16.10, E16.13 SI 2013/3134............................. H1.36
r 19.6............................................. E16.3 reg 14(4)........................................ H1.35
(1)......................................... A4.253 28(h)........................................ H1.35
19.11........................................... A4.253 Consumer Protection from Unfair
Pt 24 (rr 24.1–24.6)....................... E16.8 Trading Regulations 2008,
Pt 25 (rr 25.1–25.15)..................... E16.15 SI 2008/1277.................. H4.23, H4.25;
r 25.1(1)(b).................................... E15.20 H6.137
34.4............................................. B4.47 reg 3.............................................. H4.24
40.20........................................... E7.23 (2).......................................... H4.23
Pt 54 (rr 54.1–54.36).............. E3.4, E3.5, 4, 5.......................................... H4.24
E3.12; E5.2, E5.3, 9, 10, 12.................................. H6.96
E5.8; E7.10, E7.16, 15(2)........................................ H4.24
E7.23, E7.42, E7.45; 18(4), (7)................................. H4.24
E13.7, E13.15, Copyright and Rights in
E13.19, E13.20, Databases Regulations 1997,
E13.21, E13.26, SI 1997/3032.................. H1.77, H1.93
E13.42; E15.2; E16.13 reg 13............................................ H1.93
Claims in respect of Loss of Damage 16(1), (2)................................. H1.93
arising from Competition 17(1)........................................ H1.93
Infringements (Competition Copyright (Free Public Showing
Act 1998 and Other Enactments or Playing) (Amendment)
(Amendment)) Regulations Regulations 2016, SI 2016/
2017, SI 2017/385..................... E11.47 565............................................ H2.97
Community Amateur Sports Club Data Protection (Charges and
Regulations 2015, SI 2015/ Information) Regulations 2018,
725............................................ A2.63 SI 2018/480............................... A4.132
lii Table of Statutory Instruments
para para
Data Protection, Privacy and Major Sporting Events (Income Tax
Electronic Communications Exemption) Regulations 2016,
(Amendments etc) (EU Exit) SI 2016/771............................... A3.43
Regulations 2019, SI 2019/419.. A4.4, Package Travel and Linked Travel
A4.27, A4.184, Arrangements Regulations
A4.198, A4.209, 2018, SI 2018/634.......... H6.97, H6.98
A4.203, A4.244 reg 15(2)........................................ H6.99
reg 8.............................................. A4.209 Payments into the Olympic Lottery
Sch 1 Distribution Fund etc Order
para 62....................................... A4.245 2007 (draft)............................... A3.15
Designs and International Trade Payments into the Olympic Lottery
Marks (Amendment etc) Distribution Fund etc Order
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019, 2008, SI 2008/255..................... A3.15
SI 2019/638............................... H5.19 Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records)
Sch 1.............................................. H5.19 Regulations 2002, SI 2002/233.. B6.58,
Sch 2.............................................. H5.19 B6.61
Employment Equality (Age) Regula reg 2.............................................. B6.77
tions 2006, SI 2006/1031.......... E14.5, Privacy and Electronic Communi
E14.17 cations (EC Directive) Regula
Employment Equality (Religion tions 2003, SI 2003/2426........... A4.203,
or Belief) Regulations 2003, A4.204, A4.205, A4.207,
SI 2003/1660................ E14.5, E14.17 A4.208, A4.209, A4.211,
Employment Equality (Sexual A4.214, A4.216, A4.220,
Orientation) Regulations 2003, A4.224, A4.226, A4.229,
SI 2003/1661................. E14.5, E14.17 A4.240, A4.248, A4.256
Employment Rights (Increase of reg 2(1).......................................... A4.208
Limits) Order 2020, SI 2020/205. F1.60 3A............................................ A4.235
Sch 1 6.............................................. A4.226
para 1......................................... F1.85 (1), (2)................................... A4.226
Equality Act 2010 (Commencement (4).......................................... A4.237
No 9) Order 2012, SI 2012/ 19–21, 21A.............................. A4.214
1569............................ E14.20, E14.58 22(2)........................................ A4.208
Equality Act 2010 (Disability) (3)........................................ A4.212
Regulations 2010, SI 2010/ Sch 1
2128.......................................... E14.48 para 8AA................................... A4.256
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Provision of Services Regulations
Regulations 2007, SI 2007/ 2009, SI 2009/2999................... E12.3
1263................ E14.5, E14.17, E14.60 Registered Designs Regulations
Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention 2001, SI 2001/3949
of Less Favourable Treatment) reg 2.................................... H5.17, H5.18
Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2034 2.1B......................................... H5.17
reg 8.............................................. F1.20 (1).................................... H5.17
Freedom of Establishment and 5.............................................. H5.17
Free Movement of Services Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019, 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975,
SI 2019/1401............................. E12.4 SI 1975/1023................... B6.60, B6.61
Glasgow Commonwealth Games Safety of Places of Sport Regulations
Act 2008 (Games Association 1988, SI 1988/1807................... A3.63
Right) Order 2009, SI 2009/1969 Safety of Sports Grounds
art 4............................................... H6.95 (Accommodation of Spectators)
Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 1996, SI 1996/499........... A3.63
Order 2019 (draft)..................... E13.80 School Premises (England)
Income Tax (Entertainers and Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1943
Sportsmen) Regulations 1987, reg 10............................................ A3.45
SI 1987/530............................... I2.32 Sex Discrimination Act 1975
Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) (Amendment) Regulations
Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2682 2008, SI 2008/656..................... E14.29
reg 72............................................ I1.96 State Aid (EU Exit) Regulations
81............................................ I1.96 2019 (draft)............................... E11.5
Table of Statutory Instruments liii
para para
Television Broadcasting Regulations Tribunal Procedure (First-tier
2000, SI 2000/54....................... A3.95 Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules
Ticket Touting (Designation of 2009, SI 2009/273..................... I2.105
Football Matches) Order 2007, Unfair Terms in Consumer
SI 2007/790 Contracts Regulations 1999,
art 2............................................... H6.92 SI 1999/2083............... E11.223; H1.33
Tobacco and Related Products Value Added Tax (Sport, Sports
Regulations 2016, SI 2016/507.. H3.98 Competitions and Physical
reg 44............................................ H3.98 Education) Order 1999,
(1)(a), (b)............................. H3.98 SI 1999/1994............................. A2.34
Trade Secrets (Enforcement etc)
Regulations 2018, SI 2018/597.. H1.20
AUSTRALIA
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection
Homebush Bay Operations Regulation
of Employment) Regulations
1999
2006, SI 2006/246...... B5.137, B5.148;
reg 3(d).......................................... H2.27
F1.67
reg 8(4).......................................... B5.148
Table of cases
[All references are to paragraph number]
para
1998 Football World Cup, Re (Case IV/36.888) [2000] 4 CMLR 963........................... H6.67
77m Ltd v Ordnance Survey Ltd [2019] EWHC 3007 (Ch)........................................... H1.100
A
A v Association B (SFT Decision, 5A.805/2014)........................................................... C3.7
A v B Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] QB 195, [2002] 3 WLR 542, [2002]
2 All ER 545, [2002] EMLR 21, [2002] 1 FLR 1021, [2002] 2 FCR 158,
[2002] HRLR 25, [2002] UKHRR 457, 12 BHRC 466, [2002] Fam Law 415,
(2002) 99(17) LSG 36, (2002) 152 NLJ 434, (2002) 146 SJLB 77, CA................ E13.31,
E13.59, E13.65
A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2016)............................................................ D2.187
A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 12 September 2018)..................................................... D2.79
A v Club Atletico de Madrid SAD v Real Federacion Espanola de Futbol (RFEF) &
FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3140).............................................................................. B1.4; D2.63
A v FIA (CAS 2014/A/3773).......................................................................................... C20.8
A v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2426)........................................................................................ B1.25
A v FINA (CAS 2005/A/925)......................................................................................... C20.17
A v ITF & B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 29 January 2019)............................................... D2.70
A v Queen’s Park Rangers FC (Faurlin), FA Disciplinary Hearing, February & May
2011............................................................................................................. E2.40; F3.209
A v S (24 October 2011)................................................................................................. F3.176
A v Tayside Fire Board, 2000 SC 232, 2000 SLT 1307, 2000 GWD 5-174, Ct of
Sess.............................................................................................................. B4.40; D1.95
A v UEFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 March 2013)........................................ C4.17; D2.192
A v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 6 November
2009)....................................................................................................................... D2.179
A v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FINA (Federal Tribunal, 28 October
2019)....................................................................................................................... D2.27
A & B v AMA & VTV 4A_428/2011 (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 13 February 2012)...... D2.12
A AG v B NV (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 21 November 2003)......................................... D2.55
AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 2103 (QB), [2013] EMLR 2,
[2012] HRLR 31, QBD........................................................................................... H4.63
AC Milan v UEFA (CAS/2018/A/5808, 1 October 2018)............................... D1.100; E12.39
AC Muthiah v Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr [2011] INSC 436, Supreme
Court of India.......................................................................................................... E5.5
AC Venezia v Club Atlético Mineiro & AS Roma (CAS 2004/A/560)............ F3.179, F3.248
ADO Den Haag v Newcastle United FC (CAS 2006/A/1152)............................. B1.56, B1.59
AEK Athens BC v Malik Hairston (CAS 2018/A/5971)................................................ D2.122
AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA (CAS 98/2000; 20 August 1998)..... A1.20, A1.27,
A1.56; A5.27; B1.4, B1.6, B1.16, B1.21,
B1.27, B1.29, B1.35, B1.36, B1.37,
B1.38, B1.39, B1.45, B1.47; B4.41;
C4.19; D2.107, D2.132, D2.133, D2.134,
D2.148; D3.3, D3.59; E2.30; E4.11;
E11.60, E11.123, E11.124; E12.37,
E12.108; E16.32
AEK PAE & SK Slavia Praha v UEFA (CAS 98/2000)................................................. B5.17
A-G for Jersey v Edmond O’Brien [2006] UKPC 14, [2006] 1 WLR 1485, [2006]
3 WLUK 571.................................................................................................. B4.38; C5.6
lvi Table of Cases
para
A-G v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109, [1988] 3 WLR 776, [1988] 3 All ER 545,
[1989] 2 FSR 181, (1988) 85(42) LSG 45, (1988) 138 NLJ Rep 296, (1988)
132 SJ 1496 HL...................................................................................................... H4.63
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975), Re [1975] QB 773, [1975] 3 WLR 11, [1975] 2 All
ER 684, (1975) 61 Cr App R 118, [1975] RTR 473, [1975] Crim LR 449, (1975)
119 SJ 373, CA....................................................................................................... G2.36
ER 683, (1993) 97 Cr App R 429, (1994) 158 JP 741, [1993] RTR 337, (1994)
158 JPN 552, (1993) 90(27) LSG 36, (1993) 143 NLJ 919, (1993) 137 SJLB 152,
CA........................................................................................................................... G2.63
ER 1057, (1981) 73 Cr App R 63, [1981] Crim LR 553, (1981) 125 SJ 426, CA.... A3.76;
G2.82
AMA v ASBL & Keisse (CAS 2009/A/2014)................................................................ C23.6
AMI Sport & Entertainment Pty Ltd v Rugby Union Players Association Inc
[2005] NSWSC 950 21........................................................................................... F2.71
AMP Advisory & Management Partners AG v Force India Formula One Team Ltd
[2019] EWHC 2426 (Comm), [2019] 9 WLUK 333........................................ E8.1; F1.5
AOC v FIBT (CAS OG 2010/01)............................................... B1.54, B1.55, B1.56, B1.57;
B2.14, B2.16, B2.65, B2.89
AOC v IOC & ICF (OG Athens 2004/006).................................................................... D2.152
AOC & AWU v FILA (CAS 2008/A/1502).......................................................... B1.53, B1.59
AR Cycling AG v UCI (CAS 2004/4/777)..................................................................... D2.149
ARU v Bourke (ASADA press release, 30 May 2012)................................................... C12.4
ARU v Sailor (ARU Judicial Committee Decision, 20 July 2006)............. B1.56; C6.1, C6.39;
C20.18
A SA v B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J & L Association (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 15 July 2015)... D2.187
ASA Adjudication on Fuller Smith & Turner plc (Decision, 1 July 2009)..................... H1.132
ASADA v Allen (Athletics Australia Doping Control Tribunal, 13 October 2008)....... C7.20,
C7.22; C11.2, C11.7
ASADA v Bannister (CAS A1/2013)....................................................................... C9.2, C9.3
ASADA v Marinov (CAS (Oceania/2007/ 9 June 2007)............................ C5.1; C11.2; C12.4
ASADA v O’Neill (CAS 2008/A/1591)................................ C5.11; C18.14, C18.24, C18.26
ASADA v Wyper (CAS A4/2007)................................................ C4.23; C7.20; C11.2; C22.9
ASADA (on behalf of AC & ASC) v Smith (CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2015).......... C18.12
AS Livorno Calcio v Chelsea Football Club Ltd (CAS 2013/A/3366)............. F3.278, F3.279
ATP v Braga (Anti-Doping Tribunal, May 2004)........................................................... C6.6
ATP v Köllerer (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, 31 May 2011)................................. B4.38
ATP v Luzzi (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, ATP press release 28 February 2008). B4.25
ATP v Newport (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 7 December 2005).......................................... C23.6
ATP v Perry (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 30 November 2005)............ B1.15, B1.39; C4.40; C6.2;
C18.19; C20.16
ATP v Rodriguez (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 18 September 2003)................. B1.44; C6.2, C6.41
ATP v Rusedski (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 10 March 2004).............................................. C6.2
ATP v Ulihrach (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 7 July 2003)................................ B1.39; C6.2; E7.68
ATP v Vargas-Aboy (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 12 July 2005)........................................... C22.6
Aanes v FILA (CAS 2001/A/317)............................................... C6.1; C16.2; C18.29; C23.2
Abakumova v IOC (CAS 2016/A/4804)......................................................................... C6.34
Abdelrahman v Egyptian NADO (CAS OG 16/23).............................................. C4.26; C6.23
Abdelrahman v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & EADA (CAS 2017/A/5016 &
CAS 2017/A/5036).................................................... A1.19; B1.53, B1.56; C3.7; C6.14;
C17.4, C17.6; C18.3; C23.6
Abdevali v United World Wrestling (CAS AG 14/04).................................................... B1.56
Aberavon & Port Talbot Rugby Football Club v Welsh Rugby Union Ltd
[2003] EWCA Civ 584, CA.................................................................................... E7.55
Aberdeen Journals Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 4, [2002]
3 WLUK 524, [2002] Comp AR 167...................................................................... E11.16
Abrahams v Performing Right Society Ltd [1995] 5 WLUK 301, [1995] ICR 1028,
[1995] IRLR 486..................................................................................................... F1.78
Table of Cases lvii
para
Abramova v International Biathlon Union (CAS 2016/A/4889).................................... C18.19
Ace Paper Ltd v Fry; Capital Print & Display Ltd, Re [2015] EWHC 1647 (Ch),
[2015] 6 WLUK 606............................................................................................... B1.61
Achilles Paper Group Ltd v OFT [2006] CAT 24........................................................... E11.41
Adam Opel AG v Autec AG (48/05) 25 January 2007.................................................... H1.120
Adams v CCES (CAS 2007/A/1312)............................. C6.1, C6.39; C18.18, C18.19; C20.11
Adams v IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4703).............................................................................. B1.28
Adamson v NSW Rugby League (1991) 100 ALR 479, 27 FCR 535, on appeal,
103 ALR 319.................................................................................. E10.5; E11.168; F3.53
Adamu v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2426)....................................... A1.20; A5.45; B3.175, B3.182,
B3.186; B4.38
Ademi v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4676).............................. C17.4, C17.5; C18.5, C18.26; C20.6
Adidas v The Lawn Tennis Association [2006] EWHC 1318 (Ch), [2006] 6 WLUK 67
[2006] UKCLR 823, [2006] ECC 29, [2006] Eu LR 1057, [2006] ETMR 64....... B1.28
Adidas-Salomon AG v Draper [2006] EWHC 1318 (Ch), [2006] UKCLR 823,
[2006] ECC 29, [2006] Eu LR 1057, [2006] ETMR 64 Ch D..................... E2.47; E7.26;
E11.68, E11.77, E11.293;
E12.58; E15.9; E16.8
Adidas-Salomon AG v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd (C-408/01) [2004] Ch 120, [2004]
2 WLR 1095, [2003] ECR I-12537, [2004] 1 CMLR 14, [2004] CEC 3,
[2004] ETMR 10, [2004] FSR 21, ECJ.................................................................. H1.120
Ad Vitam (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 9 October 2015)........................................... B4.32, B4.38
Aerenson v Arenson [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 179.............................................................. D3.103
Affutu-Nartoy v Clarke (The Times, 9 February 1984).................................................. G1.53
Agar v Canning (1965) 54 WWR 302............................................................................ G1.17
Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41, [2000] 201 CLR 552.................................. E2.28; E9.3; G1.78
Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] UKHL 23, [2006] 1 WLR 1380,
[2006] 3 All ER 97, [2006] STC 1056, 77 TC 686, [2006] BTC 372, 8 ITL Rep
1106, [2006] STI 1542, (2006) 103(22) LSG 27, (2006) 156 NLJ 880, (2006)
150 SJLB 671, HL.................................................................................................. I2.32
Agen v ERC (ERC Appeal Committee, March 2002).................................................... B4.21
Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The Angelic Grace) [1995] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 87, CA................................................................................................ D3.69
Agreement between the FA Premier League & BskyB see Televising Premier League
Football Matches, Re
Agreement between the FA Premier League, Re [2000] EMLR 78, [1999] UKCLR
258.............................................................................................................. E2.51; E11.49
Air Canada v United Kingdom (18465/91) (1995) 20 EHRR 150, ECtHR................... E13.36
Aitken v DPP [2015] EWHC 1079 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 297, [2016] 3 All ER 45,
[2015] 4 WUK 419, [2015] 2 Cr App R 18, (2015) 179 JP 223, [2015] EMLR 23,
[2015] Crim LR 719, [2015] AC 77........................................................................ B1.61
Akyuz (Nectmettin Erbakan) v International Wushu Federation (IWUF)
(CAS 2017/A/5155)................................................................................................ D2.133
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd v Commission of the European Communities (T-
235/03) [2008] All ER (EC) 1, [2008] Bus LR 348, [2007] ECR II-3523, [2008]
4 CMLR 3, [2007] CILL 2513, CFI....................................................................... E11.36
Alabbar v FEI (CAS 2013/A/3124)........................ B1.27, B1.30; C5.4, C5.6; C18.5, C18.12,
C18.16, C18.20, C18.21, C18.32; C20.12, C20.13
Al Eid v FEI (CAS 2012/A/2807).......................................................... B4.41; C18.6; C20.10
Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie (C-67/96)
[1999] ECR I-5751, [2000] 4 CMLR 446, ECJ..................................... E11.144, E11.169
Albert v Belgium (A/58) (1983) 5 EHRR 533, ECtHR...................... E13.39, E13.40, E13.42
Albertville, Barcelona (unreported, 16 July 1992)............................................ E2.53; E11.202
Albion Water Ltd v Ofwat [2006] CAT 23..................................................................... E11.44
Albion Water Ltd v Water Services Regulation Authority (formerly Director General
of Water Services) [2008] EWCA Civ 536, [2009] 2 All ER 279, [2008] Bus
LR 1655, [2008] UKCLR 457, CA......................................................................... E11.19
Albon (t/a NA Carriage Co) v Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2007] EWHC 1879
(Ch), [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 420, [2007] 7 WLUK 895................................ D3.70, D3.72
lviii Table of Cases
para
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310, [1991] 3 WLR 1057,
[1991] 4 All ER 907, [1992] PIQR P1, (1992) 89(3) LSG 34, (1991) 141 NLJ 166,
(1992) 136 SJLB 9, HL........................................................................................... G1.124
Alejandro Valverde Belmonte v Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano, (Swiss
Federal Tribunal, 29 October 2010)........................ D2.32, D2.33, D2.69, D2.70, D2.177
Al Hussein (HRH Prince Ali) v FIFA (CAS 2016A/4459)............................................. A5.34
Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8, [2010] 2 AC 39, [2010] 2 WLR 471,
[2010] 2 All ER 175, [2010] PTSR 524, [2010] HRLR 18, [2010] UKHRR 417,
[2010] HLR 22, [2010] BLGR 401, (2010) 154(7) SJLB 37, SC.......................... E13.50
Ali v Channel 5 Broadcast Ltd [2018] EWHC 298 (Ch), [2018] 2 WLUK 532,
[2018] EMLR 17..................................................................................................... H4.63
Ali v United Kingdom (Application 40378/10) [2015] 10 WLUK 500, (2016)
63 EHRR 20, [2015] HLR 46................................................................................. E13.50
Alisic v Bosnia & Herzegovina (Application 60642/08)................................................ E13.73
Al Jazira FSC v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5900).................................................................... D2.133
Allan (Robert C) v Scottish Auto Cycle Union [1985] Outer House Cases 32.............. E7.55
Allenet de Ribemont v France (A/308) (1995) 20 EHRR 557, ECtHR.......................... E13.55
Allport v Wilbraham [2004] EWCA Civ 1668, CA.............................................. G1.56, G1.57
Alovan v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4927)...................................................................... C4.17; C23.2
Aloyan v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4927)...................................................................... B1.54, B1.60
Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien (Case C-384/93) [1995] ECR I-1141,
[1995] 5 WLUK 142, [1995] 2 BCLC 214, [1995] 2 CMLR 209, [1995] All ER
(EC) 543.................................................................................................................. E12.86
Al Rumaithi (Mohammed) v FEI (CAS 2015/A/4190).................. B1.56, B1.61; C6.2, C6.55;
C21.12; C22.3
Al Shaab FC v Guirie (CAS 2015/A/4122; 26 August 2016)......................................... F1.73
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (55721/07) (2011) 53 EHRR 18, 30 BHRC 561, [2011]
Inquest LR 73, ECtHR............................................................................................ E13.75
Al-Suweidi v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)...................................................... C21.5
Alstom Transport v Tilson [2010] EWCA Civ 1308, [2011] IRLR 169, CA................. F1.8
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co (in liquidation) v Texas Commerce
International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84, [1981] 3 WLR 565, [1981] 3 All ER 577,
[1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 27, [1981] 7 WLUK 280, [1981] Com LR 236, (1981)
125 SJ 623............................................................................................................... B1.57
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No 1) [1975] AC 396, [1975] 2 WLR 316,
[1975] 1 All ER 504, [1975] FSR 101, [1975] RPC 513, (1975) 119 SJ 136, HL.... C4.26
Anderlecht v UEFA (CAS 98/185)........................................................................ E2.29; E7.55
Andersen & Anti-Doping Denmark v IPC (CAS 2015/A/435)...................................... C18.27
Anderson v IOC (CAS 2008/A/1545)....................................................... B1.22, B1.40, B1.60
Anderson v Lyotier (t/a Snowbizz) [2008] EWHC 2790.................................. G1.45, G1.143
Anderson Luis de Souza v CBG & FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3395)...................................... C6.21
Andrade v Cape Verde NOC (CAS Atlanta 96/002 & 005).................... D2.150; E2.13; E7.65
Andreea Raducan v IOC (5P.427/2000).......................................................................... D2.37
Andrianova v ARAF (CAS 2015/A/4304)........................ B1.44, B1.56, B1.61; C4.22; D2.70
Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA (CAS OG 12/06)........................................... B2.14, B2.65
Angelic Grace see Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA (The
Angelic Grace)
Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar Narodni Podnik (C-245/02)
[2004] ECR I-10989, [2005] ETMR 27, ECJ......................................................... H1.120
Annus v IOC (CAS 2004/A/718).................................................................................... C8.2
Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [1998] QB 948, [1998] 2 WLR 826,
[1998] 1 All ER 997, [1997] 7 WLUK 704, (1998) 10 Admin LR 75, [1998]
1 EGLR 9, [1998] 14 EG 133, [1998] COD 178, (1997) 94 (35) LSG 35, (1997)
141 SJLB 198, [1997] NPC 123............................................................................. B1.43
Appleton v Medhat Mohammed El-Safty [2007] EWHC 631, QBD.................. G1.32, G1.60
Appollon Kalamaria v Davidson Oliveria (CAS 2004/A/678).......................... F3.160, F3.222
Araci v Fallon [2011] EWCA Civ 668, (2011) 155(23) SJLB 39, CA........................... F1.80
Arashov v ITF (CAS 2017/A/5112).......................... C6.1, C6.8, C6.10, C6.14, C6.16, C6.18;
C17.4, C17.7; C18.2; C20.19
Table of Cases lix
para
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Offentlich Rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (ARD) v Commission of the European Communities (T-158/00)
[2003] ECR II-3825, [2004] 5 CMLR 14 CFI..................................................... E11.228
Archer v South West Thames Area Health Authority (The Times, 10 August 10
1985) QBD....................................................................................... B4.38, B4.40; D1.95
Arestova v IPC (13 September 2016)............................................................................. A1.59
Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, [2006] UKCLR 1135,
(2006) 103(42) LSG 32, (2006) 150 SJLB 1391, CA............................................. E11.41
Armstrong v World Curling Federation (CAS 2012/A/2756)......................................... C20.6
Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619, [2015] 2 WLR 1593, [2016] 1 All
ER 1, [2015] 6 WLUK 320, [2015] HLR 31, [2015] 2 P & CR 14, [2015] L &
TR 25, [2015] CILL 3689............................... B1.54, B1.56, B1.58, B1.59; B2.16; E8.15
Arnolt v Football Association (2 February 1998)........................................................... E2.56
Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (Application 7050/75) 19 DR 5 (1980)....................... E13.64
Arsenal Football Club Plc v Elite Sports Distribution Ltd (No 1) [2002] EWHC 3057
(Ch), [2003] FSR 26, (2003) 26(3) IPD 26017, (2003) 100(7) LSG 36, Ch D...... H1.39,
H1.45, H1.121
Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (C-206/01) [2003] Ch 454, [2003] 3 WLR 450,
[2003] All ER (EC) 1, [2002] ECR I-10273, [2003] 1 CMLR 12, [2003] CEC 3,
[2003] ETMR 19, [2003] RPC 9, (2002) 152 NLJ 1808, ECJ.. H1.109, H1.116, H1.117,
H1.118, H1.135; H4.37
Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2695 (Ch), [2003] 1 All
ER 137, [2003] 1 CMLR 13, [2002] Eu LR 806, [2003] ETMR 36, (2003)
26(2) IPD 26008, (2003) 100(3) LSG 32, (2002) 152 NLJ 1923, Ch D................ H1.119
Arsenal Football Club Plc v Reed (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 696, [2003] 3 All ER 865,
[2003] 2 CMLR 25, [2003] Eu LR 641, [2003] ETMR 73, [2003] RPC 39, (2003)
26(7) IPD 26045, (2003) 147 SJLB 663, CA......................................................... H1.120
Arzhanova v CMAS (CAS 2010/A/2284)............................................................ B1.23, B1.26
Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962, [2008]
2 WLR 975, [2008] 3 All ER 573, [2008] 4 WLUK 587, [2008] Po LR 203,
(2003) 158 NLJ 632, (2008) 152 (17) SJLB 29...................................................... G1.150
Asian Handball Federation v International Handball Federation (CAS 2008/O/1483).... D2.101,
D2.145
Asif v ICC (CAS 2011/A/2362)...................................... B3.192; B4.21, B4.22, B4.40, B4.41,
B4.45; E7.66, E7.67; E16.22
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authorities [2012] USKC 22, [2012] 2 AC 471, [2012]
2 WLR 1275, [2012] 4 All ER 1249, [2012] 5 WLUK 909, [2013] 1 CMLR 4,
(2012) 109 (24) LSG 22.......................................................................................... B1.56
Associated British Ports v Transport & General Workers Union [1989] 1 WLR 939,
[1989] 3 All ER 822, [1989] 7 WLUK 356, [1989] ICR 557, [1989] IRLR 399,
(1989) 133 SJ 1200................................................................................................. E15.9
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corpn [1948] 1 KB 223.............. D1.69
Association Nouvelle des Boulogne Boys v France (Application 6468/09)................... E13.69
Associazione ‘Giùlemanidallajuve’ v European Commission (T-273/09) (19 March
2012)....................................................................................................................... E11.78
Aston Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2003]
UKHL 37, [2004] 1 AC 546, [2003] 3 WLR 283, [2003] 3 All ER 1213, [2003]
HRLR 28, [2003] UKHRR 919, [2003] 27 EG 137 (CS), (2003) 100(33) LSG 28,
(2003) 153 NLJ 1030, (2003) 147 SJLB 812, [2003] NPC 80, HL.............. E13.16; H4.67
Aston Villa Football Club v B.93 Copenhagen (CAS 2006/A/1177).... F3.157, F3.250, F3.255
Aston Villa v FA (29 January 2016)................................................................................ F1.14
Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary
Tribunal, October 2006)................................................................... C6.42, C6.44, C6.45
Athletic Club v Commission (Case T-678/19)............................................................ E11.316
Athletics Ireland v Colvert (Irish Sports Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 16 July
2015)....................................................................................................................... C6.30
Athletics South Africa v IAAF (CAS 2018/O/5798).......................................... D2.90, D2.133
Attheraces Ltd v British Horseracing Board Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 38, [2007]
UKCLR 309, [2007] ECC 7, [2007] Info TLR 41, [2007] Bus LR D77, CA.... E11.307
lx Table of Cases
para
Auckland Boxing Association v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001] NZLR 847.... A1.56;
E7.51
Ausiello v Italy (1996) 24 EHRR 568, ECtHR............................................................... E13.48
Australian Football League v Carlton Football Club [1998] 2 VR 546, Australia.......... D3.65
Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2000/C/267).................... A1.19, A1.29; B1.16, B1.46,
B1.49, B1.51, B1.53
Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT (CAS OG 10/01)............................................. B2.89
Australian Rugby League v Cross (1996) 135 ALR 33, (1997) 39 IPR 111........ E8.17; F3.53
Australian Rugby League v Law, Leagues (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 23 May 2013)....... C7.20
Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41, [2011] 4 All ER 745, [2011] ICR 1157,
[2011] IRLR 820, (2011) 161 NLJ 1099, (2011) 155(30) SJLB 31, SC................ F1.8
Aylesbury Football Club (1997) Ltd v Watford Association Football Club Ltd
(unreported, 12 June 2000).................................................... F1.40, F1.89, F1.95; F3.253
Azevedo v CBDA (CAS 2003/A/510)..................................... C6.16, C6.18; C8.1, C8.5, C8.6
Azevado v FINA (CAS 2005/A/925).............................................................................. C18.3
Azharuddin v BCCI (CCCA No 408 of 2003), 8 November 2012................................. B4.5
Azzimuri v CNOC (CAS OG 06/03).............................................................................. D2.151
B
B (Children) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11,
[2008] 3 WLR 1, [2008] 4 All ER 1, [2008] 2 FLR 141, [2008] 2 FCR 339,
[2008] Fam Law 619, [2008] Fam Law 837, HL............................ B4.37; D1.103; E7.66
B v FEI (CAS 2007/A/1415)...................................................................... C8.2, C8.5; C17.13
B v FIBA (CAS 92/80)................................................................. B1.4, B1.16, B1.32; D2.157
B v FINA (CAS 2001/A/337)....................................................... C6.23, C6.25, C6.41, C6.52
B v FINA (CAS 2002/A/430)......................................................................................... C6.10
B v FINA (CAS 98/211)................................................................................................. D2.88
B v ITU (CAS 98/222).................................................................................................... D2.133
BAF v Jason Livingston (BAF Appeal Panel, 1993)...................................................... C6.62
BBC v British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd [1992] Ch 141, [1991] 3 WLR 174, [1991]
3 All ER 833, Ch D........................................................................... E2.50; H1.87; H2.88
BBC v Talksport Ltd (No 1) [2001] FSR 6, (2000) 23(10) IPD 23084 (2000)
97(27) LSG 39, Ch D...................................................................... H1.15; H2.18, H2.26
BBC v Talksport [2001] FSR 53............................................................ E2.50; H1.130; H2.35
BBC Worldwide Ltd v Pally Screen Printing Ltd [1998] FSR 665, (1998) 21(5)
IPD 21053, Ch D..................................................................................... H1.122, H1.132
BBSA v Howe (NADP Tribunal, 4 May 2009).............................. B1.44; C4.16; C8.5; C19.9
BCCI v Pandya (Hardik) (19 April 2019)........................................................... B3.94, B3.120
BHA v Ahern (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 22 May 2013)............... B4.32, B4.37, B4.38, B4.43
BHA v Best (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 14 December 2016).......................................... B4.22
BHA v Burke & Rodgers (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 20 July 2009)..................... B4.19, B4.26
BHA v Egan (Darren) & Langford (Philip) (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 23 October
2014)....................................................................................................................... B4.45
BHA v Heffernan (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 23 January 2013).............. B4.19, B4.21, B4.26,
B4.45, B4.47
BHA v O’Mahoney (Gerrard) (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 23 October 2014)................. B4.45
BHA v Sines (Disciplinary Panel, 28 April 2012).......................................................... B4.43
BHA v Sines (BHA Disciplinary Panel, 14 December 2011)...... B4.23, B4.25, B4.26, B4.38,
B4.45, B4.47
BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2011] EWCA Civ
227, [2011] 1 WLR 2524, [2011] 3 All ER 470, [2011] Bus LR 1359,
[2011] BCC 399, [2011] 2 BCLC 1, CA................................................................ B5.131
BPP Holdings Ltd v R & Comrs [2017] UKSC 55, [2017] 1 WLR 2945, [2017] 4 All
ER 756, [2017] STC 1655, [2017] 7 WLUK 609, [2018] RVR 8, [2017] BVC 36,
[2017] STI 1742...................................................................................................... I2.105
BRV v FIA (Case Comp/39732, 4 August 2011)........................................................ E11.182
BTTC v ITTF (CAS 2005/A/996).................................................................................. A5.34
BWF v IPC (CAS 2016/A/4745).................................................................................... B1.22
BWF v IWF (CAS 2015/A/4319)............................................................ A1.55, A1.58, A1.59
Table of Cases lxi
para
BWF v Perssons (BWF Ethics Hearing Panel, 18 March 2019).................................... B4.29
BWLA v T (Disciplinary Panel, 20 August 2007).......................................................... C6.46
Babbs & Cleaschi v BHA (BHA Appeal Board, 3 June 2013)....................................... B4.26
Bacardi & Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United Football Club [2001] Eu LR 45..... E2.47;
E5.14; E12.57; E16.26
Bacardi-Martini SAS & Cellier des Dauphins v Newcastle United FC [2001] Eu
LR 45...................................................................................................................... E15.23
Bacon v White & Chartfield Associates Ltd (21 May 1998).......................................... G1.49
Badrick v British Judo Association [2004] EWHC 1891 (Ch)................ B2.12, B2.13; E7.51
Bagnall v Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd [2001] UKPC 57, [2001] All ER (D) 162
(Dec)....................................................................................................................... F1.5
Bain Budgen Sports Ltd v Hollioake (unreported, 8 December 1997)........................... F1.5
Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA Civ 274, [2002]
1 All ER (Comm) 737, [2001] 2 WLUK 803, [2001] CLC 999............................. E8.10
Baker v British Boxing Board of Control [2015] EWHC 2469 (Ch), [2015]
8 WLUK 235.......................................................... D3.17; E3.12; E4.8; E10.30; E11.102
Baker v Jones (for British Amateur Weightlifters’ Association) [1954] 1 WLR 1005,
[1954] 2 All ER 553, (1954) 98 SJ 473 QBD.......................... D3.66; E2.29; E4.6; E7.56
Balciunaite v LAF & IAAF (CAS 2011/A/2414).................................... C6.6, C6.46; C18.12
Balmoral Tanks Ltd v Competition & Markets Authority [2017] CAT 23, [2017]
10 WLUK 135, [2018] Comp AR 61...................................................................... E11.41
Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700, [2013]
3 WLR 179, [2013] 4 All ER 533, [2013] 6 WLUK 527, [2013] HRLR 30,
[2013] Lloyd’s Rep FC 580............................................................................ E3.9; E7.82
Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408, [2020] 4 WLR 55,
[2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 756, [2020] 3 WLUK 249, [2020] Lloyd’s Rep
FC 211..................................................................................................................... C5.2
Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 13, [2020] AC 973, [2020]
2 WLR 960, [2020] 4 All ER 19, [2020] 3 WLUK 464, [2020] ICR 893,
[2020] IRLR 481, [2020] PIQR P11, [2020] Med LR 155, (2020) 175 BMLR 1,
[2020] PNLR 22, 2020 Rep LR 74................................................... G1.35, G1.36, G1.42
Barcelona v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3793)..........................................................................
B1.16, B1.28, B1.56; E2.21
Barlow v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 6 September 2016)...... C17.16
Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India (Case No 61/2010, 8 February 2013).... E11.103
Barnard v Australian Soccer Federation & FIFA (1988) 81 ALR 51................. E15.12; F3.53
Barnard v Jockey Club of South Africa (1984) 2 SALR 35........................................... E7.71
Barrieau v US Trotting Association (1986) 78 NBR (2d) 128, 198 APR 128........ E5.5; E7.74
Barry Silkman v Colchester United Football Club Ltd (15 June 2001)......................... E2.57
Barry Silkman Soccer Consultancy Ltd v Colchester United Football Club Ltd
[2001] WL 825218.................................................................. E8.9; F2.7; F3.160, F3.202
Bartlett v English Cricket Board Association of Cricket Officials [2015] 8 WLUK 301...... G1.56
Barton v FA (FA Appeal Board, 24 July 2017)..................................................... B4.23, B4.25
Bassani-Antivari v IOC (CAS OG 2002/003)...................................................... B1.57, B1.60
Bassong (Zohran Ludovic); Anderlecht v FIFA (CAS 2015/A/4178)............................ F3.254
Bates v Post Office (No 3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB), [2019] 3 WLUK 260.................. B1.46
Bauer v AOC & ASF (CAS OG 14/001).................................................. B2.11, B2.15, B2.83
Baumann CAS Sydney 00/006 (Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000)......................... E16.29
Baumann v IOC, NOC German & IAAD (CAS OG 2000/006)..................................... D2.58
Baxter v IOC (CAS 2002/376)........................................................................... C6.37; C23.2
Beal v South Devon Railway 159 ER 560, (1864) 3 Hurl & C 337, Ct of Exch............ F2.13
Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation (CAS 2000/A/260)............................. B2.59, B2.69
Beaton & Scholes v Equestrian Federation of Australia (CAS 2003/A/477)................. C6.23
Beaton v Devon County Council (2003) LS Gaz........................................................... H1.94
Bedene (Aljaz) v Lawn Tennis Association & International Tennis Federation
(2 March 2017)................................................ B1.4, B1.6, B1.35, B1.36, B1.40; E12.48
Begaj v IWF (CAS 2015/A/4049).................................................................................. C6.40
Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group v Golden Ocean Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 1063
(Comm), [2013] 2 All ER (Comm) 436, [2013] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 61, QBD.... D3.24, D3.25
lxii Table of Cases
para
Belane Nagy v Hungary (Application 53080/13)........................................................... E13.73
Belarus Canoe Association v International Canoe Federation (CAS 2016/A/4708)...... A1.55,
A1.58; C11.5
Belcher v British Canoe Union (Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012)................ B2.6, B2.9, B2.14,
B2.47, B2.50, B2.51
Belgian Linguistic Case (A/6) (1968) 1 EHRR 252, ECtHR......................................... E13.41
Belgium v Royer (48/75) [1976] ECR 497, [1976] 2 CMLR 619, [1977] ICR 314, ECJ.... E12.85
Belize Basketball Federation v FIBA (CAS 2009/A/1988)................................... B1.4, B1.49
Bellman v Northampton Recuirtment Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2214, [2019] 1 All
ER 1133, [2018] 10 WLUK 202, [2019] ICR 459, [2019] IRLR 66...................... G1.42
Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012]
1 AC 383................................................................................................... B5.131, B5.141
Berchtold v Skiing Australia (CAS 2002/A/361)....................... B2.60, B2.74, B2.88; D2.157
Beresford v Equestrian Australia (CAS 2012/A/2837)......................................... B2.56, B2.89
Berg v Blackburn Rovers Football Club & Athletic Plc [2013] EWHC 1070 (Ch),
[2013] IRLR 537, Ch D.......................................................................................... F1.18
Berger v Mallya (unreported, 19 March 1998)............................................................... F1.5
Berger v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2009/A/1948)...... B1.51, B1.55, B1.56,
B1.57, B1.59, B1.60; C18.27
Berkele Degfa v TAF & IAAF (CAS 2013/A/3080)................................ C10.1; C19.7; C19.8
Berkely Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330 (Ch), [2007]
6 WLUK 93, [2007] 3 EGLR 101, [2007] 24 EG 169 (CS), [2007] NPC 71......... B5.7
Bernhard v ITU (CAS 98/222)............................................................................ C6.42, C6.49
Beşiktaş JK v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2824)...................................................................... B5.66
Besitkas JK v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3258)......................... B1.4, B1.23, B1.54, B1.57, B3.187
Bility v FIFA (CAS 2015/A/4311).................................................................................. A5.45
Billington v FIBT CAS Salt Lake City (2002/005, 18 February 2002)................ B1.56, B1.60;
D2.157
Birkner (Maria Belen Simari) v Comite Olimpico Argentino (COA) & Federacion
Argentina de Ski y Andinismo (FASA) (CAS OG 14/003)........................ B2.15, B2.51,
B2.99; D2.40
Birmingham City Football Club plc v R & C Comrs (2007) UK VAT 20151....... F2.128; I1.65
Bitar v Nuffield Health [2017] UKET 2206631/2016.................................................... F1.7
Blackler v New Zealand Rugby Football League [1968] NZLR 547...... E2.14; E10.4, E10.11;
F3.53
Blackpool FC v Club Topp Osslbid (CAS 2006/A/1027)............................................... F3.255
Blackpool & Fylde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 1 WLR 1195...... E8.2
Blain v Splain [1994] FSR 497....................................................................................... H4.7
Blair v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 30 July 2018)....... C16.2; C17.6;
C18.5, C18.12
Blanco v USADA (CAS 2010/A/2185).......................... C4.16, C4.33, C4.45; C6.21, C6.22,
C6.23, C6.46; C7.3
Bland v Sparkes (for the Amateur Swimming Association) (The Times, 17 December
1999), Cal B1.23; E2.9; E4.5
Blass v Cycling New Zealand (NZST 06/19)................................................................. B2.47
Blatter v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4501)................................ A5.3; B1.40, B1.44; B3.164, B3.174
Bloomsbury International Ltd v Department for Environment, Food & Rural
Affairs [2011] UKSC 25, [2011] 1 WLR 1546, [2011] 4 All ER 721, [2011]
6 WLUK 297, [2011] 3 CMLR 32, (2011) 161 NLJ 883....................................... B1.57
Boevski v IWF (CAS 2004/A/607)......................................... B4.38; C4.34; C5.5; C6.6, C6.7,
C6.18; C7.1; C10.1
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, [1957] 2 All
ER 118, [1955-95] PNLR 7, (1957) 101 SJ 357, QBD............................... G1.26, G1.59
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, [1997] 3 WLR 1151,
[1997] 4 All ER 771, [1997] 11 WLUK 222, [1998] PIQR P10, [1998] Lloyd’s
Rep Med 26, (1998) 39 BMLR 1, [1998] PNLR 1, (1997) 94 (47) LSG 30,
(1997) 141 SJLB 238.................................................................................. G1.26, G1.59
Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, [1994] 2 All ER 486, [1994] COD 295,
CA...................................................................................... A1.68; B4.41; C16.1; C20.10
Table of Cases lxiii
para
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078, [1951] 1 TLR 977, 50 LGR 32,
(1951) 95 SJ 333, HL..................................................... G1.86, G1.121, G1.122, G1.138
Bony v Kacou [2017] EWHC 2146 (Ch), [2017] 9 WLUK 19........ C3.3; D3.8, D3.29, D3.31;
E8.1, E8.9; E16.17; F2.170, F2.171; F3.202
Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Amalgamated Racing Ltd
[2008] EWHC 1978 (Ch), [2009] UKCLR 547, Ch D........................... E11.53, E11.254
Bookmakers Afternoon Greyhound Services Ltd v Wilf Gilbert (Staffordshire) Ltd
[1994] FSR 723 Ch D............................................................................................. H1.76
Bosman case see Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL)
v Bosman (C-415/93)
Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co v Ansell (1888) 39 Ch. D. 339, CA.............. F1.38, F1.57
Botta v Italy (21439/93) (1998) 26 EHRR 241, 4 BHRC 81, (1999) 2 CCL Rep 53,
[1998] HRCD 302, ECtHR..................................................................................... H4.54
Bouras v International Judo Federation (CAS 99/A/230)............. B1.22, B1.56, B1.61; C4.15
Bournemouth & Boscombe AFC v Manchester United Football Club (The Times,
22 May 1980), CA............................................................................ F1.28, F1.42; F3.237
Boxing Australia v AIBA (CAS 2008/O/1455)............................. B1.6, B1.21, B1.27, B1.29,
B1.37, B1.47; B2.80
Boyle v SCA Packaging Ltd [2009] UKHL 37, [2009] 4 All ER 1181, [2009] NI 317,
[2009] 7 WLUK 2, [2009] ICR 1056, [2009] IRLR 746, (2009) 109 BMLR 53,
(2009) 153 (26) SJLB 27........................................................................................ E16.9
Boyo v Lambeth London BC [1994] 3 WLUK 115, [1994] ICR 727, [1995]
IRLR 50.................................................................................................................. F1.77
Bradley v Jockey Club [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, [2005] 7 WLUK 253, [2006] LLR 1;
aff’d [2004] EWHC 2164, [2004] 10 WLUK 1, [2007] LLR 543................. A1.9, A1.68;
B1.4, B1.6, B1.31, B1.36; B2.11; B4.41;
B5.96; D1.8, D1.34; D3.2; E3.4, E3.5, E3.9,
E3.12; E4.2, E4.3; E5.4; E6.1, E6.2, E6.8;
E7.1, E7.6, E7.8, E7.15, E7.16, E7.17, E7.18,
E7.20, E7.21, E7.22, E7.23, E7.24, E7.25,
E7.26, E7.27, E7.28, E7.29, E7.30, E7.31,
E7.32, E7.33, E7.35, E7.36, E7.40, E7.49,
E7.56, E7.57, E7.60, E7.82, E7.83, E7.84;
E8.14, E8.15; E10.2, E10.24, E10.25, E10.27,
E10.32; E11.127; E13.1, E13.42; E15.23,
E15.32, E15.33, E15.34; E16.2
Brady (Kieron) v Sunderland Football Club (unreported, 17 November 1998)............. F1.33
Brady v PKF (UK) LLP [2011] EWHC 3178, QBD...................................................... E15.15
Braganza v BP Shipping Ltd [2015] UKSC 17, [2015] 1 WLR 1661, [2015] 4 All
ER 639, [2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 240, [2015] 3 WLUK 513, [2015] ICR 449,
[2015] IRLR 487, [2015] Pens LR 431.............................................. B1.36; E7.40; E8.2
Bratty v A-G of Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, [1961] 3 WLR 965, [1961] 3 All
ER 523, (1962) 46 Cr App R 1, (1961) 105 SJ 865, HL......................................... G2.63
Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44, HL....................................................................................... F2.14
Bray v New Zealand Sports Drug Agency [2001] 2 NZLR 160, 166, NZCA................ C4.10
Brennan v ERC (ERC Appeal Tribunal, 1 June 2007).................................................... B3.81
Brennan v Health Professions Council [2011] EWHC 41 (Admin), (2011) 119
BMLR 1, QBD................................................................................................ B4.41; E2.7
Brescia Calcio SpA v West Ham United FC Plc (ICAS, 26 June 2012)(2012) 3 Int
SLR 40.............................................................................................. D2.32, D2.85; E7.70
Breuer, Derr, Krabbe case (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 20 November 1993)............. C6.57; C7.1
Brewer v Delo [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 488....................................................................... G1.101
Breyer (Patrick) v Bundesrepublik Deutschland) (Case C-582/14) [2017] 1 WLR 1569,
[2016] 10 WLUK 420, [2017] 2 CMLR 3, [2017] CEC 691, 42 BHRC 700......... A4.10,
A4.50
Bridport & West Dorset Golf Club Ltd (Case C-495/12) [2014] STC 663, [2013]
12 WLUK 671, [2014] BVC 1, [2014] STI 257..................................................... I1.57
Briggs v Professional Combat Sports Commission [2012] WASAT 57, 27 March
2012, [2011] WASAT 30......................................................................................... E2.7
lxiv Table of Cases
para
Brimsmeade & Sons Ltd v Brimsmeade & Waddington & Sons Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 706,
CA........................................................................................................................... H1.131
Bristol Conservatories Ltd v Conservatories Custom Built Ltd [1989] RPC 455 CA... H1.132
British Aircraft Corp v Austin [1978] IRLR 332, EAT................................................... F1.33
British Airline Pilots Association v British Airways Citiflyer Ltd [2018] EWHC 1889
(QB), [2018] 5 WLUK 93....................................................................................... E15.20
British Airways Plc v Commission of the European Communities (T-219/99)
[2004] All ER (EC) 1115, [2003] ECR II-5917, [2004] 4 CMLR 19, CFI............ E11.18
British Airways Plc v Sindicato Espanol de Pilotes de Lineas Areas
[2013] EWHC 1657.............................................................................................. E12.122
British Home Stores Ltd v Burchell [1980] ICR 303, [1978] IRLR 379, (1978)
13 ITR 560, EAT..................................................................................................... F1.59
British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd [2005] EWCA (Civ)
863, [2005] 7 WLUK 318, [2006] ECC 16, [2005] ECDR 28, [2005] RPC 35,
(2005) 155 NLJ 1183.............................................................................................. H1.98
British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1268,
[2002] ECC 24, [2002] ECDR 4, [2002] Masons CLR 1, (2001) 24(9) IPD 24059,
CA........................................................................................................................... H1.96
British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Ltd [2001] RPC 612.............................. H1.95
British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill (C-203/02) [2009] Bus LR 932,
[2004] ECR I-10415, [2004] 11 WLUK 206, [2005] 1 CMLR 15, [2005] CEC 68,
[2005] ECDR 1, [2005] Info TLR 157, [2005] RPC 13............... H1.94, H1.97, H1.100
British Judo Association v Petty [1981] ICR 660, [1981] IRLR 484, EAT.................... E2.14
British Olympic Association v World Anti-Doping Agency (CAS 2011/A/2658)......... B1.11,
B1.35; B2.18; C4.13; E2.2,
E2.14, E2.43; E7.55, E8.8
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, Virgin Media, The Football Association Premier League
Ltd, British Telecommunications Plc v Office of Communications Competition
Appeal Tribunal, 8 August 2012 [2012] CAT 20.................................................... E2.51
British Sky Broadcasting Ltd v Office of Communications Competition Appeal
Tribunal 9 November 2010 [2010] CAT 29, [2011] Comp AR 3........................... E2.51
British Telcommunications plc v Office of Communications [2014] EWCA Civ 133,
[2014] 4 All ER 673, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 973, [2014] Bus LR 713, [2014]
2 WLUK 510........................................................................................... E2.51; E11.224
British Triathlon Association v Tim Don (Tribunal, 29 September 2006).............. C9.1, C9.3
British Westinghouse Eletcric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Rlys
Co of London Ltd (No 2) [1912] AC 673, [1912] 7 WLUK 88.............................. F1.78
Brothers v FINA (CAS 2016/A/4631).............................................. C8.2, C8.5; C18.3; C20.6
Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53, [1971] 3 WLR 334, [1971] 2 All ER 1505, (1971)
22 P & CR 871, (1971) 115 SJ 406 Ch D............................................................... F3.226
Browing v Odyssey Trust Co Ltd, Belfast Giants 2008 Ltd [2014] NIQB 39................ G1.105
Bruin v FINA, (CAS 98/211)............................................................................... C6.25; D2.98
Bruno Heiderscheid v Franck Ribéry (CAS 2007/0/1310)............................................. F2.139
Bruyneel v USADA; Marti v USADA; World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v
Bruyneel (CAS 2014/A/3598).......................................... C3.8; C17.20; C20.22, C20.24
Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353......................................... E10.4, E10.9, E10.11; F3.53
Bulgarian Chess Federation v Fédération Internationale des Echechs (FIDE)
(CAS 2012/A/2943).................................... B1.27, B1.57; D2.59, D2.73, D2.74, D2.130
Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting
Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU) (CAS 2014/A/3863)....... A1.29,
A1.43, A1.56, A1.60
Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd v Williams [2008] NSWSC 822, SC (NSW)........... F1.80
Bunn v FEI (CAS 2000/A/313)...................................................................................... C6.10
Burgess v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Decision SR/062/2020, 29 April 2020).... C17.5;
C18.21
Burghartz v Switzerland (A/280-B) [1994] 2 FCR 235, (1994) 18 EHRR 101, [1995]
Fam Law 71, ECtHR............................................................................................... E13.59
Burke v Cycling Canada & UCI (SDRCC, 2 October 2013).......................................... C18.19
Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2821)........... B5.56, B5.57, B5.59, B5.65
Table of Cases lxv
para
Buscarini v San Marino (Application 24645/94) [1999] 2 WLUK 314, (2000)
30 EHRR 208, 6 BHRC 638................................................................................... E13.62
Butcher (Terry Ian) v Jessop, 1989 JC 55, 1989 SLT 593, 1989 SCCR 119, HC of
Justiciary................................................................................................................ G2.84
Butt v ICC (CAS 2011/A/2364).......................................... A1.9; B1.6; B4.22, B4.26, B4.41,
B4.42; E7.66, E7.67; E16.22
C
C v D [2007] EWHC 1541 (Comm), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 557, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 367, [2007] 6 WLUK 670, [2007] 1 CLC 1038...................................... D3.7, D3.69
C v FINA (CAS 2002/A/430; 6 June 2003).................................................................... C5.9
C v M (FIFA DRC, 6 August 2009)................................................................................ F3.257
CBDG v FIBT (CAS OG 10/02).................................................................................... B2.89
CC v AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), [2007] EMLR 11, [2007] 2 FLR 301, [2008]
2 FCR 505, [2007] Fam Law 591, QBD................................................................. H4.63
CCES v Adams (CAS 2007/A/1312).............................................................................. C18.6
CCES v Adams (SDRCC DT-06-0039).......................................................................... C18.6
CCES v Aubut (SDRCC, 2 March 2009)........................................................................ C20.21
CCES v Bains (SDRCC DT Decision 20-0323)............................................................. C17.8
CCES v Barber (SDRCC, 11 August 2016).................................................................... C18.19
CCES v Boyle (SDRCC DT 07-0058).................................................................... C8.5; C18.3
CCES v Brown (SRDCC Doping Appeal Tribunal, 20 April 2015)............................... C18.5
CCES v Earle (DT 15-0230, 28 July 2015).................................................................... C21.12
CCES v Galle (SDRCC Doping Tribunal, 23 April 2009)............. C3.7; C7.3; C18.24; C20.6;
C22.12
CCES v Garieny (SDRCC Doping Tribunal 19 January 2012)...................................... C20.20
CCES v Gerhart (SDRCC No DT 13-0192)................................................................... C8.5
CCES v Haack (SDRCC Decision, 22 May 2012)............................................. C12.4; C20.20
CCES v Jamnicky (SDRCC Decision, 16 August 2019)...................... C17.5; C18.19; C20.19
CCES v Lee (SDRCC Decision, 21 December 2019).................................................... C17.8
CCES v Lelievre (SDRCC Decision, 7 February 2005)......................... C6.16; C18.6, C18.20
CCES v Moscariello (SDRCC DT 09-0097, 14 December 2009).................................. C20.22
CCES v Novia (DT 15-0234, 16 September 2015)........................................................ C21.12
CCES v Picard (DT 15-0235, 13 October 2015)............................................................ C21.12
CCES v Sheppard (SDRCC Decision12 September 2005)............ C4.38; C6.30; C7.3; C17.2
CCES v Thomassin (SDRCCC Decision 15 April 2018)............................................... C18.19
CCES v Thompson (SDRCC DT Decision 19-0316, 3 October 2019).......................... C4.28
CCES v Valiquette (SDRCC, 9 December 2014)........................................................... C18.6
CCES v Welsh (DT 15-0228, 8 July 2015)..................................................................... C21.12
CCES v Zardo (SDRCC DT-05-0023)........................................................ C8.2, C8.5; C20.10
CCGS v Shulga (SDRCC, 20 September 2013)................................................ C6.60; C18.32
CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307, [1972] 1 All ER 960, (1971)
116 SJ 176, Ch D.................................................................................................... F1.80
CJ Motorsport Consulting v Bird [2019] EWHC 2330 (QB), [2020] 1 All ER (Comm)
279, [2019] 9 WLUK 5, [2019] IRLR 1080................................... E10.1; F1.22; F2.165
CNOSF, BOA, USOC v FEI & NOCG (CAS OG 04/007)............................................ D2.63
CNOSF, BOA, USOC v FEI & NOCG (CAS OG 04/008)............................................ D2.152
COA v FIS (CAS OG 02/002)........................................................................................ B2.51
COC & Scott v IOC (CAS 2002/0/273)......................................................................... D2.133
CONI & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Petacchi (CAS 2007/A/1362)........... B1.44;
C6.32; C22.4
CONI (CAS 2000/C/255)........................................................... A1.29, A1.30; A5.27; B1.10,
B1.12, B1.21
CONI (CAS 2005/C/841)...................................................... A1.9; B1.6, B1.15, B1.22, B1.39
CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch).... B5.7
Caballero (Carlos Javier Acuna) v FIFA & Associacion Paraguaya de Futbol
(CAS 2005/A/956).................................................................................................. F3.147
Cadiz CFSAD v FIFA & Associacion Paraguaya de Futbol (CAS 2005/A/955)........... F3.147,
F3.254
lxvi Table of Cases
para
Calder & Jarvis v FISA (CAS OG 04/005).................................................................... D2.152
Caldwell v Maguire & Fitzerald [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [2001] 3 ISLR 224...... G1.8, G1.9,
G1.14, G1.17, G1.18, G1.20, G1.21, G1.23,
G1.28, G1.29, G1.55, G1.110, G1.111
Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] AC 1228, HL.................. E9.5
Calvin v Carr [1980] AC 574, [1979] 2 WLR 755, [1979] 2 All ER 440, (1979)
123 SJ 112, PC (Aust)....................................................................... D1.121; E6.1; E7.72
Cameron v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (CAS 2019/A/6110)..................... B1.6; C17.8; C18.6
Campagnolo v Benalla & District Football League Inc [2009] VSC 228, 11 June 2009,
SC (Victoria)........................................................................................................... E2.14
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457,
[2004] 2 WLR 1232, [2004] 2 All ER 995, [2004] EMLR 15, [2004] HRLR 24,
[2004] UKHRR 648, 16 BHRC 500, (2004) 101(21) LSG 36, (2004)
154 NLJ 733, (2004) 148 SJLB 572, HL.......................... E13.31, E13.59; H4.63, H4.72
Campbell v United Kingdom (13590/88) (1993) 15 EHRR 137, ECtHR...................... E13.60
Campbell v United Kingdom (A/80) (1985) 7 EHRR 165, ECtHR............................... E13.49
Campbell-Brown v JAAA v IAAF (CAS 2014/A/3487).................. B1.7; C6.5, C6.13, C6.14,
C6.15, C6.22, C6.24
Canadian Olympic Committee & Beckie Scott v IOC (CAS 2002/O/373)......... B1.16, B1.57;
D2.62, D2.148, D2.152
Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch),
[2019] 2 WLUK 275, 183 Con LR 167, [2019] L & TR 14................................... E11.4
Canas v ATP Tour (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2007, ATF 133 III 235)... C4.17; D2.54,
D2.70, D2.74, D2.171, D2.186
Cañas v ATP Tour1 (CAS 2005/A/951).................................. C6.7; C18.16, C18.19; C20.12;
C23.6, D2.187
Cañas v Commission (T-508/09), General Court (Order of 26 March 2012)................. E5.13
Canoe Kayak Canada v Austin Denman (CCES Decision, 7 May 2014)....................... C18.27
Cantanae v Shoshana (1987) 10 IPR 289 (Federal Court).............................................. H4.49
Caparo Industries v Dickman [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256, [2001] PIQR
P16, (2001) 98(12) LSG 44, (2001) 145 SJLB 31, CA................................... G1.5, G1.6
Capital & Counties Plc v Hampshire CC [1997] QB 1004, [1997] 3 WLR 331,
[1997] 2 All ER 865, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 161, (1997) 147 NLJ 599, (1997)
141 SJLB 92, CA.................................................................................................... G1.74
Carabba v Anacorted School District No 103 435 P 2d 936 (1967)............................... G1.57
Cartier International AG v British Telecommunciations plc [2018] UKSC 28,
[2018] 1 WLR 3259, [2018] 4 All ER 373, [2018] 2 All ER (Comm) 1057,
[2018] Bus LR 1417, [2018] 6 WLUK 226, [2018] ECC 29, [2018] ETMR 32,
[2018] ECDR 16, [2018] EMLR 22, [2018] RPC 11............................................. H1.148
Carlton Communications Plc v Football League [2002] EWHC 1650, [2002] All ER
(D) 1, QBD......................................................................................... E2.48, E2.51; H2.63
Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204, [1975] 3 All ER 158, [1975] 7 WLUK 83,
(1975) 61 Cr App R 275, [1975] Crim LR 714, (1975) 119 SJ 560............. B1.57, B1.60
Casas Vaque v FEI (CAS 2019/A/6202)............... B1.22, B1.54; B3.59, B3.59, B3.61, B3.137
Case 32150 Eurovision [2000] OJ L151/18................................... E11.225, E11.232, E11.271
Case 32524 Screensport/EBU [991] OJ L63/32......................................................... E11.224
Case 33384 & 33378 Distribution of package tours during the 1990 World Cup
[1992] OJ L326/31.................................................................................. E11.68, E11.207
Case 36237 TPS+7 [1999] OJOJ 1999 L 90/6............................................................. E11.227
Case 36539 British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, 1999 OJ L312/1......................... E11.224
Case 36888 1998 Football World Cup [2000] OJ L5/55..................... E2.53, E2.56; E11.198,
E11.202, E11.203
Case 37.576 (UEFA’s broadcasting rules) [2000] OJ C121/14.................... E11.279, E11.280
Case 37214 Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga [2005] OJ
L134/46.................................................................................. E11.228, E11.245, E11.263
Case 37398 Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League
[2003] OJ L291/25................................................... E11.68, E11.227, E11.228, E11.230,
E11.231, E11.242, E11.243, E11.244,
E11.245, E11.246, E11.263
Table of Cases lxvii
para
Case 37576 UEFA Broadcasting Regulations [2001] OJ L171/12 [2001]
5 CMLR 654.............................................................................................. E11.59, E11.77
Case 37932 Cupido v UEFA, Euro 2000 & ISL Marketing AG................................... E11.198
Case 38287 Telenor/Canal+/Canal Digital, para 28...................................................... E11.228
Case JV.37 BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV................................................................................. E11.228
Case M.2876 Newscorp/Telepiu, OJ 2004 L 110/73................... E11.227, E11.228, E11.260,
E11.268, E11.270, E11.274
Case M.469 MSG Media Service, [1994] OJ L 364/1.................................................. E11.228
Case M.779 Bertelsmann/CLT [1996] OJ C364/3........................................................ E11.227
Case M.993 Bertelsmnann/Kirch/Premiere, [1999] OJ L53/1....................... E11.228, E11.231
Case M.4066, 19 January 2006 [2006] OJ L134/46...................... E11.224, E11.227, E11.331
Case M.5659 Daimler AG, IPIC, Brawn Grand Prix (13 Hanuary 2010).................... E11.331
Case M.6380 Bridgepont, Infront Sports & Media (19 January 2012)........................ E11.331
Case M.7000 Liberty Global /Ziggo (30 May 2018).................................................... E11.331
Case No COMP/JV.37 BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV Case...................................................... E11.331
Case No COMP/M.2483–Group Canal+/RTL/GJCD/JV............................................. E11.331
Case Nos IV/F-1/33.055 & 35.759 [1996] 4 CMLR 885............................ E11.189, E11.290
Case of Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Campeanu v Romania
(Application 47848/08)........................................................................................... E13.75
Casini v FC Vestel Manisaspor....................................................................................... F2.137
Castle v St Augustine’s Links Ltd (1922) 38 TLR 615.................................................. G1.136
Catholic Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants see Various Claimants v Institute
of the Brothers of the Christian Schools
Catley v St John’s Ambulance Brigade (unreported, 25 November 1988)..................... G1.61
Caucchioli v CONI & UCI (CAS 2010/A/2178)............................ B1.44; C4.16; C7.8, C7.11
Cavanagh v The FA (FA Appeal Board, 23 October 2009)............................................ B4.37
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2016] AC 1172,
[2015] 3 WLR 1373, [2016] 2 All ER 519, [2016] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 55, [2015]
11 WLUK 78, [2015] 2 CLC 686, [2016] BLR 1, 162 Con LR 1, [2016] RTR 8,
[2016] CILL 3769................................................................................................... F1.79
Cellino v Football League (5 April 2014)................................................ B1.51, B1.56, B1.57
Celtic v UEFA (CAS 98/201)...................................................... A1.32; B1.14, B1.53, B1.56,
B1.57; D2.133; F3.239
Centro Europa 7 SrL v Italy (Application 38433/09) [2012] 6 WLUK 105...... E13.43, E13.44
Chagnaud v FINA (CAS 1995/A/141)............................................................................ C23.2
Chalmers Brown [2003] NICA 7.................................................................................... E13.72
Chambers v British Olympic Association [2008] EWHC 2028 QBD........ A1.9; B1.6, B1.34;
E2.2, E2.43; E7.1, E7.6, E7.31, E7.32, E7.56;
E10.4, E10.27; E11.127; E15.4, E15.7, E15.9
Chand v IAAF & AFI (CAS 2014/A/3759)....................... A1.30; B1.4, B1.10, B1.11, B1.13,
B1.28, B1.34, B1.35; B2.38
Chandimal v ICC (25 June 2018)................................................................................... B1.61
Chanpanich v FA of Thailand (FAT (CAS 2013/A/3389).............................................. A5.34
Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786, CA........................................................................... G1.32
Chaplin v Leslie Frewin (Publishers) Ltd [1966] Ch 71, [1966] 2 WLR 40, [1965]
3 All ER 764, (1965) 109 SJ 871, CA..................................................................... F2.144
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101,
[2009] 3 WLR 267, [2009] 4 All ER 677, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 365, [2009]
Bus LR 1200, [2009] BLR 551, 125 Con LR 1, [2010] 1 P & CR 9, [2009]
3 EGLR 119, [2009] CILL 2729, [2009] 27 EG 91 (CS), (2009) 153(26) SJLB 27,
[2009] NPC 87, [2009] NPC 86, HL.................................... B1.54, B1.57, B1.59; B2.16
Chelsea FC v RC Lens & FIFA (re Kakuta) (CAS 2009/A/1976)................................. E16.23
Chelsea v Adrian Mutu (CAS 2006/A/1192).................................................................. B1.49
Chelsea FC v FIFA (CAS 2019/A/6301)....................... B5.24; E2.21; F3.137, F3.147, F3.254
Chelsea v Mutu (CAS 2005/A/876, CAS 2006/A/1192)............ D2.65, D2.167; F1.48, F1.49,
F1.79; F3.261
Cheltenham BC v Laird [2009] EWHC 1253 (QB), [2009] IRLR 621, QBD............... F1.36
Chemidus Wavin v TERI [1978] 3 CMLR 614, CA....................................................... E11.46
Cheney Bros v Doris Silk Corpn (1929) 35 F 2d 279..................................................... H1.13
lxviii Table of Cases
para
Chep & SSAF v SSNOC (CAS OG 16/005)....................................................... B2.53, B2.84
Chepalova v FIS (CAS 2010/A/2041)................................. C6.6, C6.23, C6.30, C6.40; C22.4
Cheruvier (t/a Fleur Estelle Belly Dance School) v R & C Comrs [2014] UKFTT 7
(TC), [2013] 12 WLUK 547................................................................................... I1.128
Chiapas Football Club v Cricuma Esporte Clube & Reinaldo de Souza
(CAS 2006/A/1189, CAS 2007A/1329-1330)........................................................ D2.65
Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation (CAS 2000/A/278)................... B2.15, B2.50,
B2.51, B2.81
Chicago Professional Sports LP v NBA 95 F 3d 593, 598–99 (7th Cir 1996)............... E11.49
Chicherova v IOC (CAS 2016/A/4839).......................................... C3.7; C6.23, C6.25; C23.2
Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire [1999] 1 WLR 1178........................................... B1.36
Chittock v Woodbridge School [2002] EWCA Civ 915, [2002] ELR 735, [2003] PIQR
P6, (2002) 99(32) LSG 33, (2002) 146 SJLB 176, CA............................... G1.31, G1.52
Chiyangwa v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5098)............................................................. A5.34, A5.45
Chorherr v Austria (A/266-B) (1993) 17 EHRR 358, ECtHR........................................ E13.66
Christianuyi Ltd v R & C Comrs [2018] UKUT 10 (TCC), [2018] STC 1863,
[2018] 1 WLUK 258, [2018] BTC 504, aff’d [2019] EWCA Civ 474, [2019]
1 WLR 5272, [2019] 3 All ER 178, [2019] STC 681, [2019] 3 WLUK 310,
[2019] BTC 10, [2019] STI 853............................................................................. I2.56
Chung (Mong Joon) v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5086)............ A5.46; B1.22, B1.23, B1.39, B1.44;
B4.32; C4.16; D2.161, D2.162
Church of X v United Kingdom (Application 3798/68) 12 YB 306 (1969)................... E13.63
Cielo v FINA (CAS 2011/A/2495-2498) see FINA v Cielo
Cilic v ITF (CAS 2013/A/3327).......................................... C17.15; C18.22, C18.24, C18.25,
C18.26, C18.32; C20.2, C20.6,
C20.7, C20.8, C20.9
Cityhook Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 18.............................................................................. E11.41
Clansman Sporting Club Ltd v Robinson (unreported, 5 May 1995)..................... F1.21, F1.39
Clarke v Earl of Dunraven (The Satanita) [1897] AC 59 HL................................... E8.1, E8.9
Clarke v Lloyd [2011] EWHC 4079 (QB)...................................................................... F2.107
Clarke v Price (1819) 2 Wils Ch 157, 37 ER 270, [1819] 7 WLUK 43......................... F1.80
Clark (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Oceanic Contractors Incorporated [1983] 2 AC 130,
[1983] 2 WLR 94, [1983] 1 All ER 133, [1983] STC 35, [1982] 12 WLUK 161,
56 TC 183, (1982) 13 ATR 901, (1983) 133 NLJ 62, (1983) 127 SJ 54........ I1.93; I2.53
Claymore Dairies Ltd & Arla Foods UK plc v OFT [2005] CAT 30.............................. E11.18
Cleghorn v Oldham (1927) 43 TLR 465......................................................................... G1.7
Club A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 2 July 2015).......................................... D2.185, D2.190
Club A v Club B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 28 August 2014)................ D2.65, D2.178, D2.183
Club Atletico de Madrid SAD v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4805; 1 June 2017)......... E2.21; F3.137,
F3.147
Club Atlético de Madrid SAD v Sport Lisboa E Benfica – Futebol SAD & FIFA
(Federal Tribunal, 13 April 2010 (4A_490/2009).......................... D2.65, D2.67, D2.193
Club Atletico Penarol v Carlos Heber Bueno Suarez & Christian Gabriel Rodriquez
Barotti & Paris Saint Germain (CAS 2005/A/983 &984)........................ D2.160; F3.160
Club Atletico Velez Sarsfifeld v Football Association Ltd, Manchester City FC &
FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4903, 16 April 2018).............................................................. E12.84
Club Guarani v G & Club FC St Gallen AG (CAS 2005/A/878)................................... F3.255
Club Samsunspor v Umar & Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(CAS 2015/A/4220; 12 July 2016)......................................................................... F1.73
Club Sekondi Hasaacas FC v Club Borussia Monchengladbach (CAS 2007/A/1219)..... F3.160,
F3.222
Club X v D & FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3765).............................................................. B1.22, B1.57
Club X v Club Y; Club X v FIFA (32/2016)................................................................... F3.276
Clubol Sportiv Municipal Ramnicu Valcea v RFF & RPFL (CAS 2014/A/3855)......... B1.36
Clyde & Co LLP v Bates van Winkelhof [2011] EWHC 668 (QB), [2011] CP Rep 31,
[2012] ICR 928, [2011] IRLR 467, [2011] Arb LR 7, (2011) 155(12) SJLB 30,
QBD........................................................................................................................ D3.52
Coal Authority v HJ Banks & Co Ltd [1997] Eu LR 610 QBD..................................... E16.25
Coditel SA v Cine Vog Films SA (Coditel I) (62/79) [1980] ECR 881.......................... H2.96
Table of Cases lxix
para
Coditel SA v Cine Vog Films SA (Coditel II) (262/81) [1982] ECR 3381, [1983]
1 CMLR 49, (1983) FSR 148, ECJ........................... E11.232, E11.237, E11.266; H2.96
Coetzee v Comitis [2001] 4 BCLR 323.......................................................................... F3.53
Cofemel v G-Star Raw (Judgment, 12 September 2019).................................... H1.65; H5.22
Colgan v the Kennel Club [2010] 10 WLUK 709, QBD........................ D1.14, D1.50; D3.68;
E2.10; E7.18, E7.57, E7.67
Collett v Smith [2009] EWCA Civ 583, (2009) 106(26) LSG 18, (2009) 153(24)
SJLB 34 CA............................................................................................................ G1.153
Collier v Sunday Referee Publishing Co Ltd [1940] 2 KB 647, [1940] 4 All ER 234,
KBD........................................................................................................................ F1.30
Collins v Lane (unreported, 22 June 1999), CA........ E4.5; E7.7, E7.50, E7.64, E7.72; E15.39
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, [1984] 3 All ER 374, [1984] 4 WLUK 145,
(1984) 79 Cr App R 229, (1984) 148 JP 692, [1984] Crim LR 481, (1984)
81 LSG 2140, (1984) 128 SJ 660............................................................................ G1.11
Collins v NBPA & Grantham, United States DC, District of Colorado, 850 F Supp
1468 (1991), affirmed per curiam, 976 F 2d 740 (10th Cir 1992).......................... F2.87
Commission Decision 1990 World Cup, para 47 [1994] 5 CMLR 253........... E11.69, E11.70
Commission of the European Communities v France (167/73) 1974] ECR 359, [1974]
2 CMLR 216, ECJ.............................................................................................. E12.122
Commission of the European Communities v France (C-334/94) [1996] ECR I-1307,
ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.25
Commission of the European Communities v France (C-262/02) [2005] All ER (EC)
157, [2004] ECR I-6569, [2004] 3 CMLR 1, ECJ..................................... E2.47; E12.57
Commission of the European Communities v France (C-200/08).................................. E12.56
Commission v France (Case C-429/02).......................................................................... E12.57
Commission v France (Case C-94/09) [2012] STC 573, [2010] ECR I-4261, [2010]
5 WLUK 79............................................................................................................. I1.51
Commission v France; Bacardi France SAS v Television Francaise 1 SA (TF1)
[2004] ECR I-6569, [2004] 3 CMLR 1, [2005] All ER (EC) 157.......................... E5.14
Commission of the European Communities v Infront WM AG (C-125/06 P)
2008] ECR I-1451, [2008] 2 CMLR 28, ECJ............................................. E2.49; E12.62
Commission of the European Communities v Italy (C-118/85) [1987] ECR 2599,
[1988] 3 CMLR 255, ECJ....................................................................................... E11.65
Commission of the European Communities v Spain (C-153/08) [2009] ECR I-9735,
[2010] 1 CMLR 30, ECJ......................................................................................... E12.68
Commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV (C-12/03 P) [2005] All
ER (EC) 1059, [2005] ECR I-987, [2005] 4 CMLR 8, ECJ................................... E11.18
Comr of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11, [2019] AC 196, [2018]
2 WLR 895, [2018] 3 All ER 469, [2018] 2 WLUK 453, [2018] 1 Cr App R 31,
[2018] HRLR 11..................................................................................................... E13.10
Comr of Police of the Metropolis v Thorpe [2015] EWHC 3339 (Admin), [2016]
4 WLR 7, [2015] 11 WLUK 426, [2016] 1 Cr App R (S) 46, (2016) 180 JP 16,
[2016] ACD 12............................................................................................ A3.72; E13.68
Common Wealth Games / CGC & Triathlon Canada (CAS CG 02/001)....................... B1.56
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission of the European
Communities (C-395/96 P) [2000] All ER (EC) 385, [2000] ECR I-1365, [2000]
4 CMLR 1076, ECJ................................................................................................ E11.17
Company X v Switzerland (Application 7865/77) 16 DR 85 (1981)............................. E13.63
Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866, [1985] 2 All ER 453, (1985) 135 NLJ 485, (1985)
129 SJ 382, CA........................................................................ G1.1, G1.7, G1.15, G1.22
Confederaçao Brasiliera de Desporto no Gelo & Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh
et de Tobogganing v Fabiana Santos (CAS 10/02, 12 February 2010)..................... D2.40
Conrad v Inner London Education Authority (1967) 65 LGR 543................................. G1.53
Conteh v Onslow- Fane (for the British Board of Boxing Control) (The Times, 26 June
1975)....................................................................................................................... G2.70
Conway v Irish Tug of War Association, Tug of War International Federation
[2011] IEHC 245 7 June 2011................................................................................ E2.16
Cook v Thomas Linnell & Sons [1977] ICR 770, [1977] IRLR 132, (1977) 12 ITR 330,
EAT......................................................................................................................... F1.36
lxx Table of Cases
para
Cooke v Football Association [1972] CLY 516.............................................................. E16.29
Cooper & Grant v BWLA (CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418)................ B1.12; C6.4, C6.10, C6.17
Corbett v Cumbria Kart Racing Club [2013] EWHC 1362, QBD....... G1.89, G1.101, G1.143
Cosentino (Pablo Gustavo) v Ezequiel Matias Schelotto (CAS 2016/A/4554).............. D2.182
Costain Ltd v Tarmac Holdings Ltd [2017] EWHC 319 (TCC), [2017] 2 All ER
(Comm) 645, [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 331, [2017] 2 WLUK 725, [2017] 1 CLC 491,
[2017] BLR 239, 171 Con LR 183......................................................................... B1.57
Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (13134/87) [1994] 1 FCR 65, (1995)
19 EHRR 112, ECtHR............................................................................................ E13.23
Couch v British Boxing Board of Control (unreported, 31 March 1988 (2304321/97)
March 31, 1998, EAT............................................................... B2.6, B2.47, B2.57, B2.94
Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee [2012] ISLR 3,
SLR37-39........................................................................................................ D1.56; E6.2
Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v Saluja [2006] EWHC 2784
(Admin), [2007] 1 WLR 3094, [2007] 2 All ER 905, [2007] LS Law Medical
237, (2006) 92 BMLR 153, [2007] ACD 29, (2006) 156 NLJ 1767, QBD............ B4.38
Coulter v Independent Press Standards Organisation CIC [2018] EWHC 919 (QB)..... E7.6,
E7.41
Council of Civil Service Unions v United Kingdom (Application 11603/85) 50 DR 228
(1987)...................................................................................................................... E13.69
Coventry (t/a RDC Promotions) v Lawrence [2012] EWCA Civ 26, [2012]
1 WLR 2127, [2012] 3 All ER 168, [2012] PTSR 1505, 141 Con LR 79, [2012]
Env LR 28, [2012] 1 EGLR 165, [2012] 10 EG 88 (CS), (2012) 109(11) LSG 21,
(2012) 156(9) SJLB 31, CA............................ G1.127, G1.129, G1.130, G1.131, G1.133
Cowley v Heatley (The Times, 24 July 1986), CA...................... B1.15, B1.35, B1.51; E2.13;
E6.1, E6.2; E7.8, E7.52, E7.54,
E7.56; E15.16; E16.29
Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1997] 4 WLUK 370,
[1997] EMLR 444, (1997) 16 Tr LR 544, (1997) 20 (7) IPD 20070, (1997) 94
(21) LSG 32, (1997) 141 SJLB 107........................................................................ H4.63
Cresswell v IRC [1984] 2 All ER 713, [1984] ICR 508, [1984] IRLR 190, (1984)
81 LSG 1843, (1984) 134 NLJ 549, (1984) 128 SJ 431, Ch D.............................. F1.36
Crews v AIBA (CAS 2009/A/1985)............................................................................... C4.23
Cricket South Africa v Kleinveldt (SAIDS Disciplinary Panel, 3 April 2012).... C20.6, C20.10
Criminal proceedings against A Case E-1/07 [2007] EFTA Court Report 246.............. E12.73
Criminal Proceedings against Dickinger (C-347/09) 15 September 2011, ECJ............. E12.68
Criminal Proceedings against Gilli & Andres (C788/79) [1981] ECR 2071,
[1980] ECR 2071, [1981] 1 CMLR 146, ECJ..................................................... E12.104
Criminal proceedings against Ibiyinka Awoyemi (C-230/97) [1998] ECR I-6781,
ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.70
Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association (CAS 2010/A/2275)................ A1.43,
A1.56, A1.60
Cronin v Greyhound Board of Great Britain Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 668, [2013]
6 WLUK 438................................................................................................. E7.37, E7.60
Crown & Cushion (Chipping Norton) Ltd v R & C Comrs [2016] UKFTT 765 (TC),
[2016] 11 WLUK 387............................................................................................. I1.33
Cruzeiro EC v CA Atenas (CAS 2017/A/4994)............................................................. D2.133
Crystal Palace FC (2000) Ltd v Dowie [2007] EWHC 1392 (QB), [2007] IRLR 682,
QBD........................................................................................................................ F1.43
Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd, Re [2004] EWHC 2113............................................ E2.29
Crystal Palace v Steve Bruce [2002] 2 ISLR SLR-81.............................. F1.27, F1.81, F1.83;
F3.16, F3.218
Culley v Whitehawk Football Club [2017] UKET 2300793/2017................................. F1.29
Cullwick v FINA (CAS 96/149)................................................. B1.19, B1.44, B1.57; D2.133
Cunningham v Reading Football Club Ltd (1991) 157 LG Rev 481.............................. G1.99
Curaçao Sport & Olympic Federation v International Olympic Committee
(CAS 2011/A/2576)..................................................................................... D2.40, D2.55
Currie v Barton (The Times, 12 February 1988)............................. E2.9; E7.6, E7.31, E7.65;
E9.6; E10.13, E10.27
Table of Cases lxxi
para
Curry v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Panel, 22 May 2018)........... C17.3, C17.4,
C17.8
Cycling Ireland v Kelly (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 27 July 2015).... C19.8;
C22.8
Czarnikow Ltd v Roth Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478, (1922) 12 Ll L Rep 195, CA... D3.64
Czech Olympic Committee & Czech Cycling Federation v Union Cycliste
Inetrnationale (CAS OG 16/022) ........................................................................... B2.99
Czech Olympic Committee & Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF (CAS OG 98/004-
005)................................................................................................................ B1.28, B1.57
D
D v FINA (CAS 2002/A/432)......................................................................................... C18.26
D, Re (Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intervening) [2008] UKHL 33.............. D1.103
DFB v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5063)...................................... B1.37, B1.53, B1.54, B1.56, B1.57
DFSNZ v Brightwater-Wharf (STNZ, 29 November 2010)................................. C4.16; C20.5
DFSNZ v Gemmell (CAS 2014/A/2)............................................. B1.44, B1.56; C4.16; C9.1,
C9.3; C17.15
DFSNZ v Murray (CAS 2017/A/4937)................................. C5.2, C5.6; C10.1, C10.2; C16.1
DFSNZ v Newman, (STNZ, 31 January 2012)............................ C4.13; C11.2; C16.1; C19.8
DFSNZ v Prestney (New Zealand Sports Tribunal ST 09/11, 15 December 2011)....... C18.24
DFSNZ v Seay (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 28 July 2011)....................................... C18.19
DFNSZ v Stewart (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 6 December 2010)........................... C23.6
DFSNZ v Stewart (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 16 February 2011)................. C7.20; C23.6
DFSNZ v Takerei (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 8 June 2012).................................... C20.13
DH v Czech Republic (57325/00) (2008) 47 EHRR 3, 23 BHRC 526, [2008] ELR 17,
ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.71
DPP v Newbury (Neil) [1977] AC 500, [1976] 2 WLR 918, [1976] 2 All ER 365,
(1976) 62 Cr App R 291, [1977] Crim LR 359, (1976) 120 SJ 402, HL................ G2.30
DSN v Blackpool Football Club Ltd [2020] EWHC 595 (QB), [2020] 3 WLUK 208..... G1.36,
G1.41
Dacas v Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 217, [2004] ICR 1437,
[2004] IRLR 358, CA............................................................................................. F1.8
Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI (CAS OG 06/008)............................. B2.13, B2.15, B2.78, B2.89;
D2.133, D2.151
Daniels v WP Rugby (15468/11) [2011] ZAWCHC 481............................................... E5.5
Danilova v IOC (CAS 2002/A/371)................................................................................ C6.30
Danish Tennis Federation Commission, Re (Case Nos IV/F-1/33.955, 35/759) [1996]
4 CMLR 885...................................................................................... E2.45, E2.46; H6.22
D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1539).......................... B2.64, B2.88
D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1574)............. B1.23; B2.13, B2.48,
B2.49, B2.64, B2.89
Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang & Chino (DRA Disciplinary Committee, 15 June
2018)................................................................................................. B4.22, B4.37, B4.38
Darwin Zamir Andrade Marmolejo Club Deportivo La Equidad Seguros SA & FIFA
(Award 24 November 2016).................................................................................... F3.100
Data Protection Comr v Facebook Ireland Ltd & Schrems (Maximillian) (Schrems II)
(Case C-311/18) [2020] 7 WLUK 245..................................................... A4.187, A4.196
David Wilson Homes Ltd v Survey Services Ltd (In Liquidation) [2001] EWCA Civ
34, [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 449, [2001] BLR 267, (2001) 3 TCLR 13, 80 Con
LR 8, CA................................................................................................................. D3.17
Davies v Barnes Webster & Sons Ltd (29 June 2011).................................................... E16.17
Davies v Nottingham Forest FC [2017] EWHC 2095................................. E8.1, E8.9; F2.170
Davis v Carew Pole [1956] 1 WLR 833, [1956] 2 All ER 524, (1956) 100 SJ 510,
QBD................................................................................................. D1.20; E2.11; E7.53
Davis v Feasey (unreported, 14 May 1998), CA............................................................ G1.107
Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing [2017] EWCA Civ 74, [2017] 1 WLR 3255, [2017]
2 WLUK 461, [2018] WTLR 57.............................................................. A4.157, A4.160
Day v High Performance Sports Ltd [2003] EWHC 197, QBD..................................... G1.50
lxxii Table of Cases
para
Days Medical Aids Ltd v Pihsiang Machinery Manufacturing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 44
(Comm), [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 991, [2004] 2 CLC 489, [2004] UKCLR 384,
[2004] ECC 21, [2004] Eu LR 477, QBD................................... E10.3, E10.31; E11.107
De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Ltd [2019] FCA 688...................... B6.1
De Bonis v CONI & UCI (CAS 2010/A/2174)............................ B1.44; C4.16, C4.31; C6.22;
C7.5, C7.8, C7.9, C7.11
Debreceni Vasitas Sport Club (DVSC) v Nenad Novakovic (CAS 2017/A/5111)......... D2.125
De Cubber v Belgium (A/86) (1985) 7 EHRR 236, ECtHR........................................... E13.52
De Francesco v Barnum (1890) 45 Ch D 430, Ch D...................................................... F1.80
de Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee v IAAF, CAS 2004/A/727........................... D2.140
Del Pino v UIM (CAS 2015/A/3892)..................................................................... C4.31; C6.6
De Moor v Belgium (A/292-A) (1994) 18 EHRR 372, ECtHR..................................... E13.39
Dean Ashton v Wright-Phillips............................................................................... E4.13; E9.2
Deer v University of Oxford; Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Co
Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 121, [2018] QB 256, [2017] 3 WLR 811, [2017]
3 WLUK 119............................................................................................ A4.156, A4.160
Delcourt v Belgium (A/11) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 355, ECtHR......................................... E13.36
Deliege v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL (C-51/96 &
C-191/97) [2000] ECR I-2549, [2002] 2 CMLR 65 ECJ................. B2.41; E5.13; E6.10;
E11.51, E11.66, E11.74, E11.94,
E11.152, E11.154, E11.155, E11.156;
E12.22, E12.29, E12.30, E12.46,
E12.95, E12.98, E12.99, E12.103, E12.119
Demicoli v Malta (A/210) (1992) 14 EHRR 47, ECtHR................................................ E13.52
Demir v Turkey (34503/97) [2009] IRLR 766, (2009) 48 EHRR 54, ECtHR............... E13.68
Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund (12/86) (12/86) 1987] ECR 3719, [1989]
1 CMLR 421, ECJ.................................................................................................. E12.76
Denisov v Ukraine (Application 76639/11)....................................................... E13.38, E13.50
Denmark Productions v Boscobel Productions (1967) 111 SJ 715, HC......................... F2.144
de Ridder (Dirk) v International Sailing Federation (CAS 2014/A/3620)..................... B3.74
Deripaska v Cherney [2012] EWCA 1235..................................................................... B4.38
Derrick v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4579).............................................................................. A5.45
Despres v CCES (CAS 2008/A/1489 & 1510).................................... C6.51; C18.31, C18.32;
C22.9; C23.8
Detroit Lions & Billy Sims v Jerry Argovitz, 580 F Supp 542, United States DC,
Eastern District of Michigan, (1984)...................................................................... F2.88
Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1 WLR 1580, [1995] 4 All
ER 717, [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 113, [1996] 5 Bank LR 109, [1996] BCC 180,
(1995) 145 NLJ 1719, (1996) 140 SJLB 21, HL.................................................... B2.16
Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak (C-438/00) [2003] ECR I-4135, [2004]
2 CMLR 38, ECJ................................................... E5.13; E12.4, E12.7, E12.22, E12.45,
E12.76, E12.77, E12.81, E12.89, E12.112;
E16.26; F3.44, F3.67, F3.70, F3.71, F3.72,
F3.74, F3.75
De Vere Golf & Leisure Ltd (Lond/01/055 & 058)........................................................ I1.58
Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC (CAS 2009/A/1752, CAS 2009/A/1753)....... B1.20, B1.61;
B2.16; C4.45; C6.5, C6.21, C6.22, C6.45
Deweer v Belgium (A/35) [1980] ECC 169, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 439, ECtHR.............. E13.41
Dextra Accessories Ltd v Macdonald (Inspector of Taxes) [2002] 9 WLUK 18,
[2002] STC (SCD) 413, [2003] WTLR 349, [2002] STI 1335............................... I2.54
Diack v IAAF & Ethics Commission of the IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4420)....................... B1.23
Diana Trade Mark, Re [2000] 7 WLUK 939, [2001] ETMR 25.................................... H4.34
Di Mauro v ATP (CAS 2007/A/1427)............................................................................ B4.25
Diethart v IOC (CAS 2007/A/1290)................................................................... C11.2; C20.18
Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain; sub
nom Medicaments & Related Classes of Goods (No 2), Re [2001] 1 WLR 700,
[2001] UKCLR 550, [2001] ICR 564, [2001] HRLR 17, [2001] UKHRR 429,
(2001) 3 LGLR 32, (2001) 98(7) LSG 40, (2001) 151 NLJ 17, (2001)
145 SJLB 29, CA................................................................. B2.71; E7.22, E7.71; E13.53
Table of Cases lxxiii
para
Dobud v FINA (CAS 2015/A/4163)............................................................................... C8.2
Dogru v France (Application 27058/05) [2008] 12 WLUK 119, (2009) 49 EHRR 8,
[2009] ELR 77........................................................................................................ E13.62
Dollingstown Football Club v Irish Football Association [2011] NIQB 66,
[2012] NI 109, [2011] Arb LR 42, QBD................................................................ D3.96
Dominguez v FIA (CAS 2016/A/4772).............................. A1.19; B1.6, B1.16, B1.35, B1.39,
B1.53; C3.7; C4.19, C4.21; C20.6
Don King Productions Inc v Warren (No 1) [1998] 2 All ER 608, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 176, [1998] 3 WLUK 572, [1998] 2 BCLC 132, [1998] RPC 817, (1998) 95
(21) LSG 24, (1998) 142 SJLB 162........................................................................ F1.5
Donà v Mantero (C-13/76) [1976] ECR 1333; [1976] 2 CMLR 578, ECJ......... E5.13; E6.10;
E11.51; E12.22, E12.23, E12.28,
E12.44, E12.88
Donoghue v Folkestone Properties Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 231, [2003] QB 1008,
[2003] 2 WLR 1138, [2003] 3 All ER 1101, [2003] 2 WLUK 914, (2003) 100
(17) LSG 29, (2003) 147 SJLB 265, [2003] NPC 28............................................. G1.117
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 1932 SC (HL) 31, 1932 SLT 317,
[1932] WN 139, HL................................................................................................ G1.4
Doping Authority Netherlands v Zuijkerbuijk (CAS 2009/A/2012)............... C18.14, C18.20,
C18.24; C20.6,
C20.11; C21.7
Doping v Wallader see Wallader v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD)
Dorofeva v ITF (CAS 2016/A/4697)............................................... C3.7, C3.8; C4.23; C12.2,
C13.2; D1.20
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967, [2001] 2 WLR 992, [2001] 2 All ER 289,
[2001] EMLR 9, [2001] 1 FLR 982, [2002] 1 FCR 289, [2001] HRLR 26,
[2001] UKHRR 223, 9 BHRC 543, [2001] FSR 40, CA................. H4.54, H4.55, H4.56,
H4.57, H4.72
Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 6) [2005] EWCA Civ 595, [2006] QB 125, [2005]
3 WLR 881, [2005] 4 All ER 128, [2005] EMLR 28, [2005] 2 FCR 487,
[2005] HRLR 27, (2005) 28(8) IPD 28057, (2005) 155 NLJ 828, CA...... H4.21, H4.59,
H4.60, H4.62
Douglas v Hello!; Mainstream Properties v Young; OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21,
[2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920, [2007] 4 All ER 545, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm)
1, [2007] Bus LR 1600, [2007] 5 WLUK 21, [2007] IRLR 608, [2007] EMLR 12,
[2007] BPIR 746, (2007) 30 (6) IPD 30037, [2007] 19 EG 165 (CS), (2007)
161 SJLB 674, [2007] NPC 54.......................................... F2.151; H2.20, H2.21, H2.22
Doyle v White City Stadium Ltd [1935] 1 KB 110, CA.......................... B1.36, B1.38; D1.26;
E8.4; F1.94
Drug Free Sport New Zealand v Blair Jacobs (ST 24/10, 22 June 2011)....................... C20.13
Drug Free Sport New Zealand v O’Grady (New Zealand Sports Tribunal, 21 March
2011)...................................................................... C18.4, C18.6, C18.14, C18.19; C23.2
Dry v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 25 February 2020)............ C9.1;
C10.1; C17.16
Duckworth v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 10 January 2011)... C18.32;
C20.13
Dudgeon v United Kingdom (A/45) (1982) 4 EHRR 149, ECtHR................................ E13.59
Duncan Ferguson, Re (Ferguson v Scottish Football Association) (unreported,
1 February 1996)............................................................................................ E7.55, E7.68
Dundee United Football Co Ltd v Scottish Football Association, 1998 SLT 1244,
1998 GWD 9-420, Ct of Sess..................................................................... E7.75; F3.199
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, [1914]
7 WLUK 5............................................................................................................... F1.79
Dunlop-Slazenger v European Commission (T-43/92) [1994] ECR II-441, CFI....... E11.296
Du Plessis v ICC (21 December 2016)................................................................. B1.56, B1.61
Durant v Financial Services Authority (Disclosure) [2003] EWCA Civ 1746,
[2004] FSR 28, CA..................................................................................... A4.157; H4.71
Dzhumadzuk (Maria) & Equestrian Federation of Ukraine v FEI (CAS 2016/A/4921
& 4922)................................................................................................................... D2.133
lxxiv Table of Cases
para
E
E v Diyarbakirspor (CAS 2008/A/1447; 29 August 2008)............................................. F1.72
E v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2354)........................................................................................ E2.21
E v FIFA & Al-Ahly Sporting Club (CAS 2009/A/1881).............................................. D2.66
E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] QB 1044,
[2004] 2 WLR 1351, [2004] 2 WLUK 12, [2004] INLR 268, [2004] BLGR 463,
(2004) 101 (7) LSG 35, (2004) 148 SJLB 180....................................................... E7.80
E & A v IBU (CAS 2009/A/1931)............................................... B1.44, B1.59; C4.16; C6.22,
C6.23, C6.30
EFDR Complaint to the European Commission against the Rugby Football Union &
the International Rugby Board, Case No IV/36.994 (March 1998).......... E2.41; E11.101
EFL v Birmingham City Football Club (No 2) (29 June 2020)...................................... E8.17
EFL v Sheffield Wednesday (EFL Disciplinary Commission, 16 July 2020)................. E7.66
EPCR v Chris Ashton (EPCR Independent Judicial, 20 January 2016)......................... B3.57
EPCR v Mourad Boudiellal & RC Toulon (17 July 2018).............................. B3.106, B3.120
ERC v Gavin Henson 10 January 2006.......................................................................... B2.87
ERC v Harlequins (ERC Appeal Tribunal, 17 August 2009).......................................... B3.67
ERC v Williams (Appeal Committee, 1 September 2009)............................................. C3.8
Earl of Ellesmere v Wallace [1929] 2 Ch 1, CA............................................................. E8.9
East Dorset District Council v Eaglebeam Ltd `[2006] EWHC 2378 (QB), [2006]
7 WLUK 764, [2007] LLR 154, [2007] Env LR D9.............................................. G1.137
Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413, [1963] 3 WLR 574, [1963]
3 All ER 139, (1963) 107 SJ 574, Ch D.............................. E2.19; E10.3, E10.9, E10.11,
E10.21; E15.23, E15.35; F1.26; F3.29,
F3.49, F3.50, F3.51, F3.52, F3.53
Eastman Photographic Materials Co Ltd v John Griffiths Cycle Corpn Ltd (1898)
15 RPC 105............................................................................................................. H4.43
Eckle v Germany (A/51) (1983) 5 EHRR 1, ECtHR...................................................... E13.48
Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV (C-126/97) [1999] 2 All ER
(Comm) 44, [1999] ECR I-3055, [1999] UKCLR 183, [2000] 5 CMLR 816,
ECJ.................................................................. D3.3, D3.53, D3.54, D3.59; E4.9; E16.27
eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09); Martinez v MGN Ltd (C-161/10) [2012]
QB 654, [2012] 3 WLR 227, [2012] CEC 837, [2012] ILPr 8, [2012] EMLR 12,
ECtHR..................................................................................................................... H4.82
Eder v IOC (CAS 2007/A/1286).......................................... B1.56, B1.57; C6.7; C7.1; C11.2,
C11.3, C11.5; C13.1; C14.1,
C14.2, C14.4; C16.2
Eder v Ski Austria (CAS 2006/A/1102)................................................... C4.17; C7.22; C20.6
Edwards v British Athletic Federation [1998] 2 CMLR 363, [1997] Eu LR 721, (1997)
94(30) LSG 29, (1997) 141 SJLB 154, Ch D........................ C4.20; E2.3; E5.13; E12.65
Edwards v IAAF (CAS/OG/04/003).................................................. C18.16, C18.26, C18.32;
C20.16, C20.17; D2.99
Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, [1955] 3 WLR 410, [1955]
3 All ER 48, [1955] 7 WLUK 81, 48 R & IT 534, 36 TC 207, (1955) 34 ATC 198,
[1955] TR 209, (1955) 99 SJ 558........................................................................... I2.106
Egon Zehnder Ltd v Tillman [2019] UKSC 32, [2020] AC 154, [2019] 3 WLR 245,
[2020] 1 All ER 477, [2019] 7 WLUK 10, [2019] 2 BCLC 143, [2019] ICR 1223,
[2019] IRLR 838, [2019] FSR 39.................................................................. E10.3; F1.25
Egyptian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation
(CAS 2019/A/6498)................................................................................................ A1.59
Ehrman v Bartholomew [1898] 1 Ch 671, Ch D............................................................ F1.80
Eiffrage SA v Switzerland (Application 1742/5)............................................................ E13.41
Ekaterina Bychkova (Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, 8 January 2010)...................... B4.30
Ekeberg v Norway (Judgment, 31 October 2007).......................................................... E13.52
Elche Club de Futbol v Commission (Case T-901/16)............................................... E11.318
El Nasharty v J Sainsbury Plc [2007] EWHC 2618 (Comm), [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
360, QBD....................................................................................................... D3.6, D3.31
Elias Karigiannis v Football Federation Australia Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1454................ E7.61
Elliot v Lloyds TSB Bank plc (Case OLS51907)........................................................... A4.157
Table of Cases lxxv
para
Elliot v Saunders (unreported, 10 June 1994)....................................................... G1.13, G1.21
ELVIS PRESLEY Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543, (1997) 20(5) IPD 20044, Ch D....... H1.21;
H4.17
ELVIS PRESLEY Trade Marks [1999] RPC 567, (1999) 22(5) IPD 22050, CA.......... H4.16,
H4.34, H4.60
Emirates Football Club Co v Hassan Tir Raja Club & FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3707)........ D2.62
Emms v R & C Comrs [2008] STC (SCD) 618, [2008] STI 374, Sp Comm................. I2.73
Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association [1971] Ch 591, [1970]
3 WLR 1021, [1971] 1 All ER 215, (1970) 114 SJ 827, CA.............. D3.65; E2.29; E4.5,
E4.6; E7.7, E7.51, E7.63,
E7.65; E8.11; E15.1
Enfield v Football League (unreported, 1995)................................................................ E10.18
England & Wales Cricket Board v Gale (Andrew) (October 2014)............................... B3.58
England & Wales Cricket Board v Hales (Alex) (7 December 2018)............. B3.118, B3.119,
B3.120, B3.127, B3.146
England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074, QBD...... B4.47; C4.20;
C5.8; D1.5; D3.17,
D3.18, D3.22; E4.9
England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Kaneria & Westfield (Disciplinary Panel,
22 June 2012).................................................... B1.4; B4.1, B4.22, B4.28, B4.37, B4.38,
B4.41, B4.42, B4.43, B4.45; D3.31,
D3.86; E3.12; E4.3, E4.8; E13.41
England & Wales Cricket Board v Stokes (Ben) (7 December 2018).............. B3.120, B3.143,
B3.146
England & Wales Cricket Board v Thakor (Shiv) (16 March 2018)................. B3.106, B3.142
England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd v Tixdaq Ltd [2016] EWHC 575 (Ch), [2016]
Bus LR 641, [2016] 3 WLUK 529, [2017] ECDR 2, [2016] Info TLR 285,
[2016] RPC 21................................................................................. E2.50; H1.88; H2.89
English Bridge Union Ltd v R & C Comrs (Case C-90/16) [2017] STC 2317,
[2017] 10 WLUK 622, [2018] CEC 844, [2017] BVC 53, [2018] LLR 23,
[2017] STI 2241...................................................................................................... I1.59
English Bridge Union v English Sports Council [2017] EWCA Civ 116, [2017]
1 WLUK 649........................................................................................................... E7.10
English Bridge v English Sports Council [2015] EWHC 2875 (Admin), [2016]
1 WLR 957, [2015] 10 WLUK 407, [2016] LLR 127, [2016] ACD 2.......... A3.56; E5.3;
E7.10; E13.21
English Chess Federation & Georgian Chess Federation v FIDE (CAS 2011/A/2360
& 2392)................................................................................................................... E2.57
English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd v E.ON UK Plc [2007] EWHC 599 (Comm),
[2007] UKCLR 1653, [2008] ECC 7, [2007] Eu LR 633, QBD............................ E11.46
Enron Coal Services Ltd (In Liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway
Ltd [2009 CAR 36’ aff’d [2011] EWCA Civ 2, [2011] UKCLR 303, (2011)
108(5) LSG 18, CA................................................................................................. E11.47
Eremenko v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5078)........................................................................ C6.40
Errani (Sara) v International Tennis Federation (CAS 2017/A/530).... C17.6; C18.12, C18.12,
C18.12, C18.16; C20.8
Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd (No 1) [1979] AC 731, [1979]
3 WLR 68, [1979] 2 All ER 927, [1979] FSR 397, [1980] RPC 31, (1979)
123 SJ 47, HL......................................................................................................... H1.130
Essel Sports Pvt Ltd (Indian Cricket League) v Board of Control for Cricket in
India, England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd & International Cricket Council
[2011] INDLHC 1834, 31 March 2011, on appeal [2010] INDLHC 642.............. E16.31
Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v Plowman (Minister of Energy & Minerals) [1995]
128 ALR 391........................................................................................................... E2.30
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, [1967]
2 WLR 871, [1967] 1 All ER 699, (1967) 111 SJ 174, HL............... E10.3, E10.4, E10.5;
F3.228
Ethnikos Asteras FC v Hellenic Football Federation (CAS 2009)................................. E12.77
Et Plus SA v Welter [2005] EWHC 2115 (Comm)........................................................ D3.58
lxxvi Table of Cases
para
Ettl v Austria (A/117) (1988) 10 EHRR 255, ECtHR.................................................... E13.49
European Federation of American Football (EFAF) v International American Football
Association (IFAF) (CAS 2012/A/2873)................................................................ A1.60
European Football League notification [1999] OJ C70/07, Case IV D3/3700............. E11.114
European Professional Club Rugby v Armitage (Delon) (Appeal Committee,
22 January 2015)..................................................................................................... B3.82
European Rugby Cup v Richards, Brennan, Chapman & Harlequins (2010) 1 ISLR
SLR9-43.............................................................................................. E2.7, E2.29; E7.68
European Rugby Cup v Williams (2009) 4 ISLR 122.................................................... E2.7
Evans v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Tribunal, 5 July 2016)................ C17.12, C17.19;
C20.6; C21.11
Evans v Waitermata District Pony Club [1972] NZLR 773............................................ G1.102
Excelsior Mouscron IP/99/965 (9 December 1999)........................................... E2.31; E12.50
Exeter City AFC Ltd v Football Conference Ltd [2004] EWHC 2304 (Ch), [2004]
1 WLR 2910, [2004] 4 All ER 1179, [2004] BCC 498, [2005] 1 BCLC 238,
(2004) 101(9) LSG 31, Ch D........................................................................ D3.52; E2.34
Exxon Corp v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch 119, [1981]
3 WLR 541, [1981] 3 All ER 241, [1982] RPC 69, (1981) 125 SJ 527, CA.......... H1.79;
H4.30
Ezsias v Welsh Ministers [2007] 11 WLUK 611, [2007] All ER (D) 65 (Dec).............. A4.157
F
F da Silva Matuzalem v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
(Swiss Federal Tribunal, 27 March 2012)............................................................... D2.194
F v Switzerland (A/128) (1988) 10 EHRR 411, ECtHR................................................ E13.75
F, Re [1990] 2 AC 1, [1989] 2 WLR 1025, [1989] 2 All ER 545, [1989] 5 WLUK 284,
[1989] 2 FLR 376, (19889) 139 NLJ 789, (1989) 133 SJ 785................................ G1.149
FA v Anelka (Nicolas) (Regulatory Commission, 3 March 2014)................................. B3.33
FA v Armstrong & Kendall (FA Regulatory Commission, 3 October 2017)......... C6.7; C17.6,
C17.8; C18.3
FA v Arsenal (Regulatory Commission, 10 June 2019).................................................. B3.84
FA v Aston Villa (Regulatory Commission, 18 May 2015)............................................ B3.84
FA v Barton (FA Regulatory Commission, 26 April 2017)................................... B4.23, B4.25
FA v Beardsley (Peter) (Regulatory Commission, 18 September 2018)........ B3.185; D1.104;
G2.94, G2.95
FA v Becchetti (Regulatory Commission, 15 January 2015).......................................... B3.59
FA v Benitez (Rafel) (Regulatory Commission, 8 October 2018).................................. B3.140
FA v Birmingham City FC (Regulatory Commission, 16 September 2019).................. B3.84
FA v Blackstock (Dexter) (FA Regulatory Commission, 2 May 2014).......................... B4.45
FA v Bowyer (Lee) (Regulatory Commission, 15 October 2019).................................. B3.137
FA v Bradbury (Kieran) (FA Regulatory Commission, 21 November 2017)................. F2.149
FA v Cellino (Edoardo) (Regulatory Commission, 18 April 2016)................. B3.111, B3.112
FA v Choudhury (Hamza) (Regulatory Commission, 10 May 2019).............. B3.111, B3.119
FA v Codner (Robert) (FA Regulatory Commission, 19 October 2017)........................ F2.149
FA v Dembele (Moussa) (FA Regulatory Commission, 6 May 2016)........................... B3.57
FA v Evra & Chelsea Football Club (2009) 1, SLR1-9.......................................... E2.6, E2.29
FA v Forestieri (FA Regulatory Commission, 24 July 2019).............................. B3.58, B3.143
FA v Ferdinand (Rio) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 August 2012)............... D1.48; G2.93
FA v Fredericks (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 24 March 2017)................ B3.111, B3.112
FA v Gray (Andre) (Regulatory Commission, 22 September 2016)............... B3.106, B3.110,
B3.111, B3.112, B3.118, B3.119
FA v Guardiola (Pep) (Regulatory Commission, 12 March 2018)................................. B3.77
FA v Harris (FA Regulatory Commission, 23 July 2009)............... B4.19, B4.21, B4.23, B4.25
FA v Hennessey (Regulatory Commission, 12 April 2019)................ B3.113, B3.122, B3.124,
B3.128
FA v Henry (Tony) (Regulatory Commission, 9 July 2018)............................. B3.120, B3.125
FA v Jehwo (Daniel) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 July 2019)................................ F2.149
FA v Johnson (FA Regulatory Commission, 20 January 2020)........... C10.1; C21.10, C21.11,
C21.12
Table of Cases lxxvii
para
FA v Johnson (Marvin) (Regulatory Commission, 26 September 2018)....................... B3.111
FA v Jones (Sophie) (Regulatory Commission, 19 March 2019)................................... B3.58
FA v Kenny (FA Regulatory Commission, 9 September 2009)...................................... C20.6
FA v Klopp (Jurgen) (February 2019)............................................................................ B3.137
FA v Livermore (Jake) (8 September 2015)............................................. C20.6, C20.19; E2.3
FA v Lowe (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 21 August 2018)..................................... B3.120
FA v Manasseh (David) (FA Regulatory Commission, 28 September 2018)................. F2.149
FA v Marshall (FA Regulatory Commission, 8 May 2012).................. B1.30; C18.32; C20.13
FA v Mourinho (Jose) (FA Regulatory Commission, 9 June 2014)................ B3.115, B3.129,
B3.137, B3.138, B3.139
FA v Mourinho (Jose) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 December 2018)......... B1.29, B1.39;
B3.99, B3.102, B3.103, B3.121, B3.129,
B3.130, B3.132, B3.133, B3.134,
B3.135, B3.136, B3.141; E7.81
FA v Moyes (Regulatory Commission, 12 June 2017)......................... B1.29; B3.120, B3.128,
B3.131
FA v Niasse (Oumar) (Regulatory Commission, 22 November 2017)................. B3.30, B3.66
FA v Pardew (Alan) (Regulatory Commission, 11 March 2014)................................... B3.59
FA v Pochettino (Mauricio) (Regulatory Commission, 4 March 2019)......................... B3.64
FA v Poyet (Gus) (Regulatory Commission, 3 March 2015)......................................... B3.59
FA v Puncheon (Jason) (Regulatory Commission, 6 March 2014)................................ B3.111
FA v Queens Park Rangers/Gianni Palladini (FA Regulatory Commission, 20 May
2011)................................................................................. B5.27; E12.41; F3.207, F3.208
FA v Queens Park Rangers FC (Faurlin) (FA Disciplinary Hearing, February & May
2011)....................................................................................................................... F3.39
FA v Reading (Regulatory Commission, 5 August 2015).............................................. B3.84
FA v Rodriguez (Jay) (Regulatory Commission, 11 April 2018)................................... B3.60
FA v Sagna (Bacary) (Appeal Board, 1 February 2017).................................. B3.106, B3.138
FA v Sexton (Niel) (FA Regulatory Commission, 18 May 2017).................................. F2.149
FA v Shaw (Regulatory Commission, 6 September 2017)............................................. B4.26
FA v Silva (Bernardo) (FA Regulatory Commission, 11 November 2019)....... B3.112; D1.48
FA v Smith & Wycombe Wanderers (Phillips (FA Regulatory Commission, April 2014)... F3.39
FA v Snodgrass (Robert) (Regulatory Commission, 25 April 2019).............................. B3.120
FA v Stretford (Disciplinary Proceedings) (FA Appeal Board, 22 December 2008)...... E2.10;
E4.5
FA v Stretford (Disciplinary Proceedings Preliminary Issue) (FA Regulatory
Commission, 31 March 2008)......................................... E13.7, E13.15, E13.26, E13.28,
E13.41, E13.52
FA v Sturridge (Appeal Board, 27 February 2020)................................. B4.26, B4.38, B4.41
FA v Sturridge (Regulator Commission, 15 July 2019).................................................. B4.26
FA v Suarez (Luis) (FA Regulatory Commission, 30 December 2011)............. B3.33, B3.60;
G2.92, G2.95
FA v Timms (David) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 July 2019)................................ F2.149
FA v Terry (FA Regulatory Commission, 27 September 2012)............. B3.60, B3.143; D1.50;
E7.67; E16.22
FA v Tunnicliffe (Ryan) (Regulatory Commission, 17 June 2015)................. B3.111, B3.112
FA v Tweneboah (Glen) (FA Regulatory Commission, 21 November 2016)................. F2.149
FA v Vernazza (Paolo) (FA Regulatory Commission, 12 December 2016).................... F2.148
FA v Warnock (Neil) (Regulatory Commission, 20 May 2019)..................................... B3.137
FA v Webber (Danny) (FA Regulatory Commission, 13 December 2016).................... F2.149
FA v Wenger (Arsene) (Regulatory Commission, 10 January 2018)............................. B3.137
FA v West Ham (Regulatory Commission, 18 January 2019)........................................ B3.84
FA v Wilshere (Jack) (Regulatory Commission, 15 June 2015)..................................... B3.120
FA v Wood (FA Regulatory Commission, 18 April 2018)........................ B4.22, B4.37, B4.38,
B4.39, B4.43
FA v Wyness (Keith) (Regulatory Commission, 5 June 2017).......................... B3.116, B3.137
FA of Wales v UEFA (CAS 2004/A/593)................................................. B1.56, B1.57, B1.61
FAPL v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), [2013] 7 WLUK 490,
[2013] ECDR 14....................................................................................... E2.50; H1.147
lxxviii Table of Cases
para
FAPL v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch), [2017] 3 WLUK 305,
[2017] ECC 17, [2017] ECDR 17, [2018] LLR 738............................................... H1.147
FAPL v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2019] EWHC 1828 (Ch), [2019]
5 WLUK 661........................................................................................................... H1.147
FAPL v LCD Publishing Ltd [2008] EWHC 3171, Ch D.............................................. H1.45
FAPL v Luxton [2016] EWCA Civ 1097, [2016] 11 WLUK 263, [2017] ECDR 7,
[2017] FSR 21, [2017] LLR 102............................................................. E11.237; E12.61
FAPL v Panini UK Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 995, [2004] 1 WLR 1147, [2003]
4 All ER 1290, [2004] ECC 17, [2003] ECDR 36, [2004] FSR 1, (2003)
100(35) LSG 35, (2003) 147 SJLB 874, CA................................................ H1.87; H6.35
FAPL v Panini [2002] EWHC 2779 (Ch), [2002] 12 WLUK 415, [2003] ECDR 21,
[2003] FSR 38, (2003) 26 (4) IPD 26022............................................................... E2.52
FAPL v Premier League Tickets Ltd (Case No D-RS 04232)........................................ H1.25
FAPL v QC Leisure & Murphy v Media Protection Services (2012) 34(4) EIPR 277–
279.......................................................................................................................... E16.26
FAPL v QC Leisure [2008] EWHC 44 (Ch), [2008] UKCLR 65, [2008] ECC 16,
[2008] Info TLR 1, [2008] FSR 22, Ch D.............................................................. E12.61
FAPL v QC Leisure; Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (Case C-403/08 &
C-429/08) [2012] Bus LR 1321, [2011] ECR I-9083, [2011] 10 WLUK 38,
[2012] 1 CMLR 29, [2012] All ER (EC) 629, [2012] CEC 242, [2012] ECDR 8,
[2012] FSR 1, (2011) 108 (40) LSG 22, (2011) 161 NLJ 1415................. E2.50, E12.61;
E11.233, E11.234, E11.235, E11.236,
E11.237, E11.267; H1.70, H1.80,
H1.90, H1.91; H2.95, H2.97; J1.27
FAPL v QC Leisure [2012] EWCA Civ 1708, [2013] Bus LR 866, [2013] FSR 20,
CA........................................................................................................................... H2.97
FAPL v QC Leisure; Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) [2012] All
ER (EC) 629, [2012] Bus LR 1321, [2012] 1 CMLR 29, [2012] CEC 242,
[2012] ECDR 8, [2012] FSR 1, (2011) 108(40) LSG 22, (2011) 161 NLJ 1415,
ECJ................................................................................................................. H2.95; J1.27
FAPL v QC Leisure [2012] EWHC 108 (Ch), [2012] 2 WLUK 133, [2012]
2 CMLR 16, [2012] FSR 12, [2012] LLR 375....................................................... E12.61
FA v (1) Queens Park Rangers FC & (2) Gianni Paladini (FA Regulatory Commission,
20th May 2011............................................................................................. F3.39, F3.207
FAPL v Trademark (Case No D-2005-0014).................................................................. H1.25
FAPL v West Ham United (FAPL Disciplinary Panel, 27 April 2007)............... B5.22; E2.40;
E12.40; F3.39, F3.207
FAPL Joint Selling of Media Rights (Case COMP/C-2/38.173, 22 March 2006)........ E11.237
FC A v B (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 18 April 2018)......................................................... D2.59
FC Dinamo Minsk v Obodo (CAS 2015/A/4327).......................................................... F1.73
FC Girondins de Bordeaux v FIFA (CAS 2012/A/2862, 11 January 2013)....... B1.54; E12.84
FC Girondins de Bordeaux (CAS 2011/A/2494)............................................................ E2.21
FC Metalist v FFU (CAS 2010/A/2267).......................................................... B3.187, B3.193
FC Midtjylland A/S v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1485; 6 March 2009).............. B1.4, B1.16, B1.25,
B1.26, B1.29, B1.31, B1.57;
F1.99; F3.139
FC Mretebi v Georgia (Application 38736/04) [2007] 7 WLUK 885, (2010)
50 EHRR 31............................................................................................................ E13.41
FC Nantes v Féderation Internationale de Football Association & Al Nasr Sports Club
(CAS 2013/A/3091)................................................................................................ F1.72
FC Pyunik Terevan v L, AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA (CAS 2007/A/1358)................ B1.57
FC Schalke v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1622-1624)...................................... B1.57, B1.61; E12.53
FC Shakhtar Donetsk v da Silva (CAS 2008/A/1519).................................................... F1.74
FC Sion v Federation Internationale de Football Association (Al Ahly & Al Hadary)
(Swiss Federal Tribunal, 12 January 2011)................................................... D2.76, D2.77
FC Sion v FIFA & AL-Ahly Sporting Club (CAS 2009/A/1880-1881; 1 June 2010)... F1.74
FEI Belgian Competition Authority (Brussels Ct of Appeal, 28 April 2016)................. A1.76
FEI v Camiro (FEI Tribunal, 22 December 2008).......................................................... C18.6
FEI v Filho (FEI Tribunal, 25 April 2019)...................................... C6.2; C17.2, C17.3, C17.6
Table of Cases lxxix
para
FEI v Koyshov (Aleksandr) (FEI Tribunal, 27 November 2012)................................... C18.6
FEI v Millar (FEI Tribunal, 28 March 2013)........................................... C20.6, C20.18; C21.7
FEI v Stroman (CAS 2013/A/3318)............................................... B1.56, B1.57, B1.61; C3.7;
C18.16; C20.6; C20.10, C20.11,
C20.12; C21.1; C21.5
FFG v SOCOG (CAS OG 2000/014)................................................................. B1.56, B1.57
FFSA v FISA (CAS 97/168)........................................................................................... B1.10
FIA Formula One Championship [2001] OJ C-169/5................... A1.71, A1.72; E2.25, E2.53
FIFA v CBF & Lopes (CAS 2017/A/5022)............................................. C17.3, C17.8; C18.3
FIFA v CONMEBOL & Fernandez (CAS 2016/A/4416)....................... B1.57; C18.21; C20.8
FIFA v European Commission (C-204/11 P, C-205/11 P).............................................. A3.97
FIFA v European Commission (T-385/07) (Belgian listing) [2011] ECR II-205........... E2.49;
E12.62
FIFA v European Commission (T-68/08) [2011] ECR II-349................ A3.97; E2.49; E12.62
FIFA v KFA & Kang Soo (CAS 2015/A/4215).......................... C17.8; C18.26; C20.2, C20.6,
C20.11, C20.12; C21.10
FIFA v Nike Inc (Civ Action No 03-2003, Dist Columbia)............................................ H1.106
FIFA v SOAC (CAS 2016/A/4596).......................................................... C4.33; C6.40; C17.8
FIFA v STJD & CBF & Mr Ricarda Lucas Dodo (CAS 2007/A/1370)............... C6.7; C18.6,
C18.12, C18.16
FIFA Ethics Committee v Hammam (Bin) (CAS 2011/A/2625).................................... B3.164
FIFA Ethics Committee v Karim (Keramuudin) (Adj ref no 12/2019)........... B3.154, B3.175
FIFA Ethics Committee v Marin (Jose Maria) (Adj ref no 23/2018)............................. B3.193
FIFA Ethics Committee v Mbaga (Oden Charles) (Adj ref no 13/2018)....................... B3.190
FIFA Ethics Committee v Ngaissona (Patrice-Edouard) (Adj ref no 10/2019).............. B3.175,
B3.193
FIFA Ethics Committee v Nicholas (Tai) (Adj ref no 6/2019)....................................... B3.174
FIFA Ethics Committee v Shprygin (Adj ref no 5/2019)............................................... B3.172
FIFA Ethics Committee v Siasia (Samson) (Adj ref no 3/2019).................................... B3.190
FIG v SOCOG (CAS OG 2004/014).................................................................. B1.29; D2.133
FIN v FINA (CAS 96/157)............................................................................................. B1.16
FINA & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Tagliaferri (CAS 2008/A/1471 &
CAS 2008/A/1486)............................................................. B1.44; C18.5, C18.6; C20.6;
C22.4, C22.6; C23.8
FINA v Aleshin (FINA Doping Panel Decision No. 09/10)............................. C4.13; C17.15
FINA v Cielo (CAS 2011/A/2495-2498)..................................... B1.15, B1.30, B1.58, B1.60;
C18.31; C20.5, C20.13,
C20.18; C22.12
FINA v Cox (Madisyn) (FINA Doping Panel Decision 07/18)...................................... C17.5
FINA v D (FINA Doping Panel 04/01)............................................................. C20.17; E12.73
FINA v Donath ( FINA Doping Panel, October 2012)............................. C9.1, C9.3; C17.15
FINA v G (DINA Doping Panel, 04/17)......................................................................... C9.3
FINA v J (FINA Doping Panel Decision 06/01)............................................................. C5.1
FINA v Kreuzmann & German Swimming Federation (CAS 2005/A/921).......... C6.1, C6.35
FINA v Mellouli & FTN (CAS 2007/A/1252)...................................... C17.2; C18.8, C18.24;
C20.18, C20.19; E7.84
FINA v Molina & CBDA (CAS 2011/A/2515).............................................................. C20.7
FINA v Oliva (FINA Doping Panel, 18 January 2007)......................................... C6.23, C6.25
FINA v Ortiz (FINA Doping Panel, 20 August 2010).................................................... C17.15
FINA v Palmer (FINA Doping Panel Decision 03/15)................................................... C4.23
FINA v Schoeman (FINA Doping Panel Decision 01/20).................................... C4.23; C17.5
FINA v Tagliaferri (CAS 2008/A/1471, CAS 2008/A/1486)......................................... C4.13
FIS v Johaug & Norweigan Olympic & Paralympic Committee & Confederation of
Sports (CAS 2017/A/5015 & 5110).......................................... C18.14, C18.16, C18.26;
C20.8, C20.10, C20.18
FIS v Veerpalu (FIS Doping Panel, 21 August 2011).......................................... C6.10; C19.8
FISA v Gomez (Arriaga) (FISA Anti-Doping Panel, 22 June 2015).............................. C18.19
FISA v Gryhchenko (FISA Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 9 February 2005).................. C13.2
FISA v Olefirenko (FISA Commission, 9 February 2005)............................................. C18.19
lxxx Table of Cases
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FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec & Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA (CAS 2009/A/1290)..... B3.181,
B3.187; B4.20, B4.22, B4.23,
B4.37, B4.38, B4.43, B4.47
FK Siad Most v Clube Esportivo Bento Gonçalves (CAS 2009/A/1781)...................... F3.255
FLCP v IWF (CAS 99/A/252)........................................................................................ C6.51
FWS Joint Sports Claimants v The Copyright Board (1991) 22 IPR 429, 432-3........... H1.72
F91 Diddeleng v Commission (T-341/10), General Court 16 April 2012.......... E5.13; E12.45,
E12.54
Fabiano in Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446.................................... E13.34
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724, [1984] ICR 589, [1984] IRLR 61,
[1985] FSR 105, (1984) 134 NorieLJ 255, Ch D................................................... F1.38
Fagan v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1969] 1 QB 439, [1968] 3 WLR 1120,
[1968] 3 All ER 442, (1968) 52 Cr App R 700, (1969) 133 JP 16, (1968)
112 SJ 800, DC....................................................................................................... G2.16
Fallon v Chesfield Downs Golf Club Ltd [2012] 7 WLUK 910..................................... G1.98
Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 1898 (QB), 28 July 2006,
[2006] All ER (D) 427............................................ B4.39, B4.50; C4.27, C4.29; D1.96,
D1.98; E2.10; E7.1, E7.33, E7.67,
E7.78, E7.82, E7.84; E16.22
Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB), [2006]
7 WLUK 806, [2006] LLR 735, (2006) 103 (37) LSG 33........................... B4.41; E7.33
Faramus v Film Artistes Association [1964] AC 925, [1964] 2 WLR 126, [1964] 1 All
ER 25, (1964) 108 SJ 13, HL.................................................................................. E7.9
Farnan v Sunderland Association Football Club Ltd [2015] EWHC 3759 (QB), [2015]
12 WLUK 693, [2016] IRLR 185........................................................................... F1.35
Farnasova v IAAF & ARAF (CAS 2017/A/5045).......................................................... C7.8
Fashion ID GmbH & Co KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV (Case C-40/17) [2020]
1 WLR 969, [2019] 7 WLUK 445, [2020] 1 CMLR 16......................................... A4.23
Fauconnet v ISU (CAS 2011/A/2615).................................... C18.25; C20.6, C20.10, C20.12,
C20.13; C22.4, C22.12; C23.8
Fazekas v IOC (CAS 2004/A/714)..................................................... C8.2, C8.4, C8.5; C23.2
Fearn v Board of Trustee of the Tate Gallery [2020] EWCA Civ 104, [2020] Ch 621,
[2020] 2 WLR 1081, [2020] 2 WLR 108, [2020] JPL 985..................................... G1.134
Federacio Catalana de Patinage v International Roller Sports Federation
(CAS 2004/A/776)....................................................................................... A1.44, A1.47
Federation Francaise des Echecs v Federation Internationale des Echecs
(CAS 2010/O/2166)............................................................. A1.29; B1.56, B1.57, B1.59
Federation Internationale de Motorcyclisme v Kuwait Motor Sports Club (Swiss
Federal Tribunal, 28 May 2018)................................................................... A1.44, A1.48
Fédération Luxembourgeoise de Boxe v British Board of Boxing Control................... E2.43
Fédération Nationale des Syndicates Sportifs v France (Application 48151/11 &
77769/13)....................................................................... C4.17; D2.133; E13.22, E13.33,
E13.57, E13.62
Federation Suisse de Lutte Amateur v Grossen SFT 121 III 350................................... B2.44
Federation X v Federation A, B, C, D, & E & F Inc (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March
2016)....................................................................................................................... D2.188
Federitalia / Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE) (Decision no 18285, 28 July
2008)....................................................................................................................... A1.80
Fenerbahçe Spor Kulübü v Stephen Appiah (CAS 2009/A/1856-1857; 7 June 2010)... F1.74;
F3.268, F3.269
Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a Topshop) [2013] EWHC 2310, Ch D...... H4.52; H6.33
Fercometal v Mediterranean Shipping Co SA (The Simona) [1989] AC 788, [1988]
3 WLR 200, [198] 2 All ER 742, [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 199, [1988] 6 WLUK 151,
(1988) 138 NLJ Rep 178, (1988) 132 SJ 966......................................................... H6.127
Ferguson (Duncan) v Normand 1995 SCCR 770, [1995] 10 WLUK 105...................... G2.60
Ferreira v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4758).................................................................. C6.14; C20.18
Feyenoord Rotterdam v Clube de Ragatas do Flamengo (CAS 2007/A/1320-1321)..... F3.244
Fiji Association of Sports & National Olympic Committee v Commonwealth Games
Federation (CAS 2010/O/2039).............................................................................. A1.58
Table of Cases lxxxi
para
Financial Services Authority v Sinaloa Gold plc [2013] UKSC 11, [2013] 2 AC 28,
Bus LR 302, [2013] 2 WLUK 718, [2013] 1 BCLC 353, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep
FC 305, (2013) 163 NLJ 267, (2013) 157 (9) SJLB 31.......................................... E15.12
Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (Nos 1, 2 & 3) [1985] 2 NZLR 159... E2.56;
E5.5
Finnish FA v Tampere United in (2011) 9(6) World Sports Law Report........................ B5.21
Finnish Ski Association & A-K. Saarinen v FIS (CAS 2010/A/2090)........... D2.144, D2.146,
D2.147
Finucane’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2019] UKSC 7, [2019] 3 All ER 191,
[2019] NI 292, [2019] 2 WLUK 382, [2019] HRLR 7........................................... E7.81
Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov; sub nom Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili
Shipping Co [2007] UKHL 40, [2007] 4 All ER 951, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm)
1053, [2007] Bus.LR 1719, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254, [2007] 2 CLC 553, 114
Con LR 69, [2007] CILL 2528, (2007) 104(42) LSG 34, (2007) 151 SJLB.
1364 HL.......................................................................................... D3.24, D3.43, D3.44
Fisher v National Greyhound Racing Club (unreported, 31 July 1985) CA........... E7.6, E7.9,
E7.75; E9.6
Fitzgerald v British Disabled Fencing Association Sport Resolutions, 27 April 2012... B2.75
Fixtures Marketing v OPA (9 November 2004).............................................................. H1.97
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB (C-46/02) 2004] ECR I-10365,
[2005] ECDR 2 ECJ................................................................................................ H1.97
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Oy Veikkaus AB, Vantaa District Court & Helsinki Court of
Appeals, 1999 MMR 93.......................................................................................... H1.96
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB (C-338/02) [2004] ECR I-10497,
[2005] ECDR 4, ECJ............................................................................................... H1.98
Fixtures Marketing Ltd v Svenska Spel AB, Gotlands Tingsrätt, Case No T 99-99
(Gotland District Court, 11 April 2000).................................................................. H1.96
Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1117, (2005)
102(37) LSG 31, CA.......................................... A1.55; D1.81; E2.3; E6.1, E6.2; E13.52
Flaherty v National Greyhound Racing Club Ltd [2004] EWHC 2838 (Ch), [2004]
12 WLUK 184, [2005] LLR 70...................................... E6.1, E6.3; E7.1, E7.22, E7.25,
E7.33, E7.72, E7.73
Flannery (Jerry) v Six Nations Ltd (Six Nations Appeal Committee, 3 March 2010)... B3.48,
B3.49
Fleetwood Wanderers Ltd (t/a Fleetwood Town Football Club) v AFC Fylde Ltd [2018]
EWHC 3318 (Comm), [2019] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 247, [2018] 11 WLUK 540...... D3.94; E4.11
Fletcher v Bradford City Association Football Club (1983) Ltd, Health & Safety Executive
& West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council (unreported, 23 February 1987).... G1.123
Focsa Services (UK) Ltd v Birkett [1996] IRLR 325 EAT............................................ F1.77
Foggo v National Rugby League (CAS 2011)............................. B1.30, B1.44, B1.56; C18.32
Foley v Post Office; HSBC Bank plc (formerly Midland Bank plc) v Madden [2001]
1 AlL ER 550, [2000] 7 WLUK 954, [2000] ICR 1283, [2000] IRLR 827............ F1.59
Football Assocation of Serbia v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4602).................. A1.47; B1.36, B1.53,
B1.60; D2.60, D2.130
Football Dataco Ltd v Brittens Pools Ltd; Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd;
Football Dataco Ltd v Stan James (Abingdon) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 1380,
[2011] ECDR 9, [2011] RPC 9, CA.................................. E2.52; E12.63; H1.76, H1.77,
H1.78, H1.99
Football Dataco Ltd v Livescore Ltd [2011] EWHC 2264, Ch D...................... E2.52; E12.53
Football Dataco Ltd v Smoot Enterprises [2011] EWHC 973 (Ch), [2011] 1 WLR 1978,
[2011] FSR 25, Ch D.............................................................................................. E2.52
Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2011] EWCA Civ 330, [2011]
1 WLR 3044............................................................................................................ E12.63
Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH [2013] EWCA Civ 27, [2013] Bus LR 837,
[2013] 2 CMLR 36, [2013] ECC 12, [2013] FSR 30, CA......................... H1.99, H1.100
Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd (Case C-604/10) [2012] Bus LR 1753, [2012]
3 WLUK 1, [2012] 2 CMLR 24, [2013] All ER (EC) 257, [2012] ECDR 10,
[2013] FSR 1................................................................................................ E2.52; H1.78
lxxxii Table of Cases
para
Football Dataco Ltd v Yahoo! UK Ltd see Football Dataco Ltd v Brittens Pools Ltd
Football Federation of Australia v Hearfield (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 4 June 2013)....... C6.19;
C18.6, C18.20, C18.22
Football Federation of Kazakhstan v Pelzer (CAS 2014/A/3527).................................. B1.16
Football League Ltd v Edge Ellison [2006] EWHC 1462, [2006] All ER (D) 263........ E2.48
Football League Ltd v Littlewoods Pools Ltd [1959] Ch 637, [1959] 3 WLR 42,
[1959] 2 All ER 546, (1959) 103 SJ 490, Ch D...................................................... H1.76
Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 242.............................. E5.5
Forestieri (Fernando) v FA (FA Appeal Board, 12 September 2019)............................. B3.185
Foschi v FINA (CAS 96/156)...................................................... B1.15, B1.19, B1.27, B1.56;
C6.22; C10.1; C16.2; D2.161
Foschini v Victoria Football League (unreported, 15 April 1983).................................. F3.53
Fossdal v IPF (CAS 2015/A/3945)................................................................................. C20.10
Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v UEFA (CAS 2011/A/2476)............................................... B5.55
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251.............................. B1.19, B1.51, B1.53, B1.57,
B1.60; C4.19
Fowles v Bedfordshire CC [1996] ELR 51, [1995] PIQR P380 CA.............................. G1.53
Fox v Riverside Health Trust [1994] 1 FLR 614, [1994] 2 FCR 577, (1994) 6 Admin
LR 250, [1995] 6 Med LR 181, [1994] Fam Law 321, CA.................................... E15.20
Foxley v United Kingdom (33274/96) (2001) 31 EHRR 25, 8 BHRC 571,
[2000] BPIR 1009, ECHR...................................................................................... E13.60
France Telecom SA v Commission of the European Communities (T-339/04)
[2007] ECR II-521, [2008] 5 CMLR 6, CFI........................................................... E11.24
Frank Industries Pty Ltd v Nike Retail BV [2018] EWCA Civ 497, [2018]
3 WLUK 287, [2018] FSR 24................................................................................. E15.4
Fraser v Major League Soccer 97 F Supp 3d 130 (D Mass, 2000)................................. A1.26
Fraser v Professional Golfers’ Association Ltd [2008] CSIH 53, 2009 SCLR 324,
2008 GWD 33-492, Court of Session, OH............................................................. E2.12
Freedman v Petty & Greyhound Racing Control Board [1981] VR 1001...................... E7.72
Freeport Plc v Arnoldsson (C-98/06) [2008] QB 634, [2008] 2 WLR 853,
[2007] ECR I-8319, [2008] CEC 21, [2007] ILPr 58, ECJ.................................... E11.26
Freibergs v IOC (CAS 2014/A/3604)...................................................... C6.21, C6.25, C6.34
French v Australian Sports Commission & Cycling Australia (CAS 2004/A/651)........ C5.3;
C7.15; C12.4
Friend v United Kingdom (Application 16072/06) [2009] 11 WLUK 569, (2010)
50 EHRR SE6......................................................................................................... E13.59
Fulham FC v FC Metz (CAS 2006/A/896)..................................................................... B1.57
Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards [2011] EWCA Civ 855, [2012] Ch 333,
Bus LR 606, [2011] BCC 910, [2012] 1 BCLC 335, [2012] 1 CLC 850, [2011]
Arb LR 22, CA........................................................... D3.12, D3.52; E2.34; E4.9; E15.43
Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Tigana [2004] EWHC 2585 (QB), [2004]
11 WLUK 392; aff;d [2005] EWCA Civ 895, [2005] 7 WLUK 564.......... F1.36, F1.48,
F1.52, F1.79
Fulham Football Club v West Ham United Football Club FA Rule Arbitration [2011]
International Sports Law Review 1, SLR1-7.................................... E2.40; E4.11; F3.39
Funke v France (A/256-A) [1993] 1 CMLR 897, (1993) 16 EHRR 297, ECtHR.......... E13.46
Fusimalohi v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2425)......................................................................... B4.41
Fussballclub Zürich v Swiss Football League (Swiss Federal Tribunal, January 1982,
ATF 108 II 15, 18).................................................................................................. D2.65
Fútbol Club Barcelona v Commission (Case T-865/16).............................................. E11.316
Fútbol Club Barcelona v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3793)............... B1.57; F3.137, F3.147, F3.254
Futebol Clube do Porto v Jacobus Adriaanse / Jacobus Adriaanse v Futebol Clube do
Porto (CAS 2008/A/1464, CAS 2008/A/1467........................................................ F3.219
Future Investments SA v Fédération Internationale de Football Association
[2010] EWHC 1019................................................................................................ E2.51
G
G (J) (Guardian & Trustees of) v Strathcona (County) (2004) 38 Alta LR (4th) 261.... G1.52
Table of Cases lxxxiii
para
G v A (FIFA DRC, 1 March 2012)................................................................................. F3.257
G v International Equestrian Federation (CAS 91/53)................................................... E7.64
G v K & E (FIFA DRC, 20 May 2011)........................................................................... F3.257
GB v Stoke City Football Club Ltd [2015] EWHC 2862 (QB), [2015]
10 WLUK 831............................................................................................... G1.39; G2.96
GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association (5 March
2012).............................................................. B1.54, B1.56, B1.57; B2.12, B2.13, B2.14,
B2.15, B2.16, B2.17, B2.57, B2.104
GNK Dinamo v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3324 & 3369)............................. B1.57, B1.61; D2.133
Gaber v UWW (CAS 2015/A/4210)........................................................... C9.2, C9.3; C17.15
Galatasaray SK v Ribbery (CAS 2006/A/1180).................................................. A1.24; B1.16
Galatasaray v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4492; 3 October 2016)........... B1.4, B1.15, B1.16; B5.89;
E2.39; E11.172; E12.39; F3.45
Gallagher v Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1994] Ch 107, [1994] 2 WLR 160,
[1993] STC 537, [1993] 6 WLUK 307, 66 TC 77, (1993) 90 (32) LSG 40, (1993)
137 SJLB 174.......................................................................................................... I1.17
Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League (CAS 2008/A/1452)........ B1.49; C4.13, C4.15;
C7.22; C18.19
Gannon v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council (unreported, 6 February 1991)... G1.1,
G1.51
Garcia v FECNA (CAS 2013/A/3170)........................................................................... C6.6
Garcia (Albert), in the matter of (FIBA Commission, 7 July 2006)............................... C18.19
Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130, [1983]
3 WLR 143, [1983] 2 All ER 770, [1983] Com LR 198, [1983] 3 CMLR 43,
[1984] FSR 23, (1983) 127 SJ 460, HL.................................................................. E11.48
Gargano Corse / ACI (Decision no 19946, 30 June 2009).............................................. A1.80
Garrett v Canadian Weightlifting Federation (Case No. 9003-01227) (unreported,
18 January 1990), Alta QB (Edmonton)................................................................. B2.73
Garycki v Poland (Judgment, 6 May 2007), ECtHR...................................................... E13.55
Gasser & SLV v IAAF (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 18 January 1988).............................. C6.16
Gasser v Stinson (unreported, 15 June 1998), QBD............. C4.2, C4.17, C4.20, C4.33; C6.1,
C6.22; E2.3, E2.4; E6.2; E7.6, E7.31,
E7.53; E8.11; E10.4, E10.5, E10.13,
E10.17, E10.27; E16.11, E16.29, E16.32
Gautrin v France (1999) 28 EHRR 196, [1998] HRCD 555, ECtHR............................. E13.52
Gaygusuz v Austria (17371/90) (1997) 23 EHRR 364, ECtHR..................................... E13.71
Geerings v Netherlands (30810/03) (2008) 46 EHRR 49, 24 BHRC 365, ECtHR........ E13.55
Geldof Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667, [2010]
4 All ER 847, [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 517, [2010] 1 CLC 895, [2010] BLR 401,
[2010] TCLR 6, 130 Con LR 37, [2010] CILL 2880, [2011] Bus LR D61, CA.... B5.37
Gemeente Almelo v Energiebedrijf Ijssellmij NV (C-393/92) [1994] ECR I-1477,
[1994] 2 CEC 281, ECJ.......................................................................................... D3.53
Gemeente Nijmegen v European Commission (Case T-251/13)................................ E11.315
Genoa Cricket & Football Club SpA v NK Lokomotiva Zagreb (CAS 2015/A/4335)..... F3.255
Genzyme v OFT [2004] CAT 4...................................................................................... E11.16
Germany v European Parliament (C-376/98) [2000] All ER (EC) 769, [2000]
ECR I-8419, [2000] 3 CMLR 1175, ECJ..................................................... A3.81; H3.95
Germany v European Parliament (C-380/03) [2007] All ER (EC) 1016,
[2006] ECR I-11573, [2007] 2 CMLR 1, ECJ........................................................ H3.95
Getty v FIS (CAS OG 14/002)........................................................................... B2.86; D2.151
Geys v Société Générale London Branch [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 1 AC 523, [2013]
2 WLR 50, [2013] 1 All ER 1061, [2012] 12 WLUK 668, [2013] ICR 117,
[2013] IRLR 122..................................................................................................... F1.47
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557, [2004] 3 WLR 113,
[2004] 3 All ER 411, [2004] 6 WLUK 427, [2004] 2 FLR 600, [2004] 2 FCR 481,
[2004] HRLR 31, [2004] UKHRR 827, [16 BHRC 671, [2004] HLR 46, [2005]
1 P & CR 18, [2005] L & TR 3, [2004] 2 EGLR 132, [2004] Fam Law 641,
[2004] 27 EG 128 (CS), (2004) 101 (27) LSG 30, (2004) 154 NLJ 1013, (2004)
148 SJLB 792, [2004] NPC 100, [2004] 2 P & CR DG17..................................... E13.12
lxxxiv Table of Cases
para
Gibbs v Leeds United Football Club Ltd [2016] EWHC 960 (QB), [2016]
4 WLUK 627, [2016] IRLR 493............................................................................. F1.55
Gibbs v Barking Corp [1936] 1 All ER 115, CA............................................................ G1.53
Gibilisco v CONI (CAS 2007/A/1426)...................................................... B1.15; C7.20, C7.21
Gibraltar Badminton Association v International Badminton Federation (CAS 2001
2001/A/329)................................................................................................ B1.28; D2.107
Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3776)................... A1.47; B1.36, B1.37,
B1.42, B1.44, B1.45, B1.46; D3.3
Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2002/O/410)........ A1.44; B1.16, B1.36, B1.37,
B1.42, B1.44, B1.45; D3.3
Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2007/O/1237).............................. A1.44, A1.47
Gillingham Football Club v McCammon UKEAT/0626/11/RN EAT, 8 December
2011........................................................................................................................ G1.63
Gillmore v LCC [1938] 4 All ER 331.................................................................... G1.1, G1.94
Ginikanwa v United Kingdom, Application 12502/86, 55 DR 251................................ E13.40
Glacier Bay see West of England Shipowners Mutual Insurance Association
(Luxembourg) v Cristal Ltd (The Glacier Bay)
Glasner v FINA (CAS 2013/A/3274)............................... B1.16, B1.26, B1.57, B1.60, B1.61;
C4.15; C23.3, C23.5, C23.6
Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Ltd’s Application for Revocation [1996] ETMR 56,
TM........................................................................................................................... H1.110
Global Champions League SPRL & Tops Trading Belgium SPRL v L’Autorite Belge
de la Concurrence (Brussels Ct of Appeal, 27 June 2018)..................................... A1.76
Globe Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Variety Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ
396.......................................................................................................................... B1.46
Globespan Airways Ltd (in liquidation), Re [2012] EWCA Civ 1159, [2013]
1 WLR 1122, [2012] 4 All ER 1124, [2012] 8 WLUK 296, [2014] BCC 252,
[2013] 1 BCLC 339, (2012) 109 (33) LSG 18, (2012) 162 NLG 1124........ B1.54, B1.56
Gnidenko v IOC & UCI (CAS 2016/A/4803)..................................................... B1.44; C6.34
Goals Soccer Centres plc v R & C Comrs [2012] UKFTT 576 (TC), [2012]
9 WLUK 131, [2012] STI 2936.................................................................... I1.53, I1.128
Goc v Turkey (36590/97) (2002) 35 EHRR 6, ECtHR................................................... E13.44
Golden Gate Yacht Club v Société Nautique De Genève, New York.............................. E7.55
Gold Group Properties Ltd v BDW Trading Co (formerly Barratt Homes Ltd)
[2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC), [2010] 7 WLUK 5..................................................... B5.7
Golder v United Kingdom (A/18) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, ECtHR.............................. E13.41
Goldman v Hargrave [1967] 1 AC 645, [1966] 3 WLR 513, [1966] 2 All ER 989,
[1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 65, (1966) 110 SJ 527, PC (Aust)........................................ G1.127
Goncalves v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4761)............................................................... C4.17; C20.18
Goode v Owen [2001] EWCA Civ 2101, (2002) 99(2) LSG 29, CA............................. G1.133
Goodwood Racecourse Ltd v Satellite Information Services Ltd [2004] EWHC 2364,
[2004] All ER (D) 112, Ch D....................................................................... H1.30, H1.33
Google Inc v Vidal-Hall [2015] EWCA Civ 311, [2016] QB 1003, [2015] 3 WLR 409,
[2016] 2 All ER 337, [2015] 3 WLUK 852, [2015] CP Rep 28, [2015] 1 CLC 526,
[2015] 3 CMLR 2, [2015] EMLR 15, [2015] Info TLR 373, [2015] FSR 25........ A4.250
Google Spain SL, Google Inc v AEPD, Mario Costela González (Case C-131/12)
[2014] QB 1022, [2014] 3 WLR 659, [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 301, [2014]
5 WLUK 394, [2014] 3 CMLR 50, [2014] All ER (EC) 717, [2014] ECDR 16,
[2014] EMLR 27, 36 BHRC 589, (2014) 164 (7607) NLJ 20................................ A4.28
Gorel v Ozalan (10 February 2003)................................................................................ F2.138
Gorgodze v IPC (CAS 2015/A/3915)................................. C6.8, C6.14, C6.16; C19.8; C23.9
Gorraiz Lizarraga v Spain (2004) 45 EHRR 1031.......................................................... E13.75
Gosiewski v British Judo Association, (unreported, 2012)...................... B2.13, B2.56, B2.87
Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landsbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA (C-
250/92) [1994] ECR I-5641, [1996] 4 CMLR 191, ECJ...................... E11.101, E11.253
Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351, [2002] QB 1213,
[2002] 3 WLR 289, [2002] 2 All ER 985, [2002] 2 CMLR 11, [2002] Eu LR 359,
[2002] HRLR 29, [2002] Po LR 68, [2002] ACD 75, (2002) 99(18) LSG 36,
(2002) 152 NLJ 552, (2002) 146 SJLB 94, CA.......................................... A3.73; E12.69
Table of Cases lxxxv
para
Gough v United Kingdom (Application 49327/11) 2015 SCCR 1, [2014]
10 WLUK 813, (2015) 61 EHRR 8, 38 BHRC 281............................................... E13.59
Gouldbourn v Balkan Holidays Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 372, (2010) 154(11) SJLB 30,
CA........................................................................................................................... G1.26
Graham v Equestrian Australia (CAS 2012/A/2828)..................... B2.13, B2.26, B2.51, B2.89
Graham v Horse Racing Ireland (29 October 2019)....................................................... E8.9
Grasshopper v Alianza Lima (CAS 2008/A/1705)..................... B1.10, B1.16; F3.179, F3.247
Gravil v Carroll [2008] EWCA Civ 689, [2008] ICR 1222, [2008] IRLR 829, (2008)
105(26) LSG 26, (2008) 158 NLJ 933, CA.......................... E9.2; G1.12, G1.38, G1.149
Great Britain Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association,
Sport Resolutions, [2012] ISLR 2, SLR 23-30................................. D1.33, D1.56; E2.43
Greek Swimming Federation v Xynadas (Board of Hellenic Swimming Federation,
5 June 2009)............................................................................................................ C8.5
Green v Perry (1955) 94 CLR 606.................................................................................. G1.102
Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302, [1978] 3 All ER 449, (1978) 122 SJ 162, Ch D...... A1.20,
A1.28, A1.62, A1.68, A1.70, A1.73;
E2.25; E9.6; E10.3, E10.9, E10.12,
E10.19; E11.108; E15.23
Gresham Life Assurance Society ex p Penney (1872) LR Ch A 446.............................. B5.145
Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 33, [2001] 2 All
ER 437, [2001] EMLR 18, (2001) 151 NLJ 102, CA................................... B4.21, B4.49
Grondin (Christophe) v Al-Faisaly Football Club (CAS 2014/A/3706)......................... F3.100
Group Lotus Plc v 1Malaysia Racing Team Sdn Bhd [2011] EWHC 1366 (Ch),
[2011] ETMR 62, Ch D.......................................................................................... H1.123
Guerrero v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5546)......................... C17.6; C18.12, C18.16; C20.8, C20.18
Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation & Triathlon Canada (CAS CG02/001)...... B4.39;
C4.26, C4.28; D2.38, D2.149
Guincho v Portugal (A/81) (1985) 7 EHRR 223, ECtHR.............................................. E13.48
Guinez v UCI (CAS 2016/A/4828).......................................................... C6.23; C17.2, C17.4
Guirao v Besiktas Jimnastik Kilubu (CAS 2007/A/1407)............. B1.54, B1.56, B1.59, B1.61
Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch), [2015] 5 WLUK 637............................. A4.251
Gulf Oil (Great Britain) Ltd v Page [1987] Ch 327, [1987] 3 WLR 166, [1987] 3 All
ER 14, (1987) 84 LSG 1968, (1987) 137 NLJ 408, (1987) 131 SJ 695 CA........... H1.49
Gunawan v FINA (CAS 2014/A/3549)........................................................................... C17.8
Gundel v FEI (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 15 March 1993, ATF 119 11 271)........... C4.20; D2.8,
D2.9, D2.12, D2.25,
D2.32, D2.175, D2.177
Gundel v FEI; G v FEI (CAS 92/63)............................................... D2.8, D2.9, D2.12, D2.25
Gunter Harz Sports v USTA (1981) 511 F Supp 1103......................................... A5.27; B1.21
Gusev v Olympus SARL (CAS 2008/O/1643)............................................................... C7.8
Gustafsson v Sweden (1996) 22 EHRR 409, ECtHR..................................................... H4.66
Guzzardi v Italy (A/39) (1981) 3 EHRR 333, ECtHR.................................................... E13.79
Győri ETO v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2702).............................................................. B5.65, B5.66
Gyrre (Andreas) v Norweigan Government [2020] OJ C90/2........................................ E12.23
H
H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [1996] AC 563, [1996] 2 WLR 8,
[1996] 1 All ER 1, [1996] 1 FLR 80, [1996] 1 FCR 509, [1996] Fam Law 74,
(1995) 145 NLJ 1887, (1996) 140 SJLB 24, HL.................................................... B4.37
H v Belgium (A/127) (1988) 10 EHRR 339, ECtHR.......................... E13.24, E13.39, E13.40
H v FINA (CAS 98/128)................................................................................................. B1.56
HMV Ltd v Propinvest Friar LP [2011] EWCA Civ 1708, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 416,
[2013] Bus LR, CA................................................................................................. D3.96
HRA v Fallon (HRA Appeal Board, July 2006)............................................................. B4.39
HRA v Kelly (HRA Disciplinary Panel, 19 April 2007)...................................... B4.8, B4.19
HRA v Winston (Disciplinary Panel, 16 February 2007)..................................... B4.26, B4.38
Hachette Filipacchi Presse Automobile & Dupuy v France (Application 71111/01)
[2007] 7 WLUK 323, (2009) 49 EHRR 23............................................................. E13.66
Haga v FIM (CAS 2000/A/281)..................................................................................... E4.11
lxxxvi Table of Cases
para
Halford v United Kingdom (20605/92) [1997] IRLR 471, (1997) 24 EHRR 523,
3 BHRC 31, [1998] Crim LR 753, (1997) 94(27) LSG 24, ECtHR....................... E13.79
Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205, CA.......................................... G1.103
Hall v Holker Estate Co Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1422, [2008] 12 WLUK 490,
[2008] NPC 143............................................................................................ G1.87, G1.90
Hall v Thomas, Hardwick & The Everton Football Club Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 1625
(QB), [2014] 5 WLUK 683..................................................................................... G1.64
Hall v Victoria Football League [1982] VicRp 6, [1982] VR 64, 58 FLR 180............... E2.14;
F3.44, F3.53
Hall v Victorian Amateur Football Association [1999] VCAT AD 30, [1999] 7(2)
SATLJ 66................................................................................................................ E2.12
Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 333, [2013]
3 WLUK 427, [2013] 3 WMLR 4, [2013] Info TLR 351....................................... A4.250
Halliwell v Panini (unreported, 6 June 1997)...................................................... H4.36, H4.49
Hallman Holding Ltd v Webster [2016] UKPC 3, [2016] 1 WLUK 435....................... F1.28
Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576, [2004]
1 WLR 3002, [2004] 4 All ER 920, [2004] CP Rep 34, [2004] 3 Costs LR 393,
(2005) 81 BMLR 108, (2004) 101(22) LSG 31, (2004) 154 NLJ 769, (2004)
148 SJLB 629, CA.................................................................................................. D3.72
Halsted v British Fencing Association Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012............ B2.31, B2.47,
B2.66
Hamburger Sport-Verein cV v Odense Boldklub (CAS/2003/O/527)............. F3.176, F3.246,
F3.247
Hamed v Mills & Tottenham Hotspur Football Club & Athletic Ltd [2015] EWHC 298
(QB), [2015] 2 WLUK 530......................................................................... E15.37; G1.62
Hamilton v USADA & UCI (CAS 2005/A/884).................... C4.33; C5.2, C5.5; C6.31; C7.2
Hammersley-Gonsalves v Redcar & Cleveland BC [2012] EWCA Civ 1135,
[2012] ELR 431, CA............................................................................................... G1.53
Hammerton v United Kingdom (Application 6287/10) [2016] 3 WLUK 514, [2017]
1 FLR 835, (2016) 63 EHRR 23............................................................................. E13.80
Hamr Sportas v European Commission (Case T-693/14)........................................... E11.325
Handsworth FC v FA, FA Rule K arbitration, 6 & 11 July 2012.................................... E10.28
Handyside v United Kingdom (A/24) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, ECtHR........... E13.61, E13.65
Hansen v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI) (CAS 2009/A/1768)............ B1.6, B1.56,
B1.61; C6.1, C6.10, C6.17,
C6.55; C23.2; D2.40
Hapoel Beer Sheva FC v Ravak (CAS 2015/A/4206).......................................... F1.72, F1.73
Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd
[1993] QB 701, [1993] 3 WLR 42, [1993] 3 All ER 897, [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
455, CA........................................................................................... D3.24, D3.25, D3.49
Harding (Tonya) v United States Figure Skating Association [1994] 851 F Supp
1476........................................................................................................................ C4.28
Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808, [2010]
7 WLUK 439, [2011] RTR 1.................................................................................. B5.15
Harrison v West of Scotland Kart Club & RAC Motor Sport Association Ltd
[2008] CSOH 33 (OH)............................................................................................ E3.14
Harrods Ltd v Harrodian School [1996] RPC 697, (1996) 19(10) IPD 19090, CA....... H1.132;
H4.43
Hasan v General Medical Council [2003] PC 52............................................................ B4.38
Hauschildt v Denmark (A/154) (1990) 12 EHRR 266, ECtHR...................................... E13.52
Hawkes Hill Publishing, Re [2007] BCC 172................................................................ B5.132
Headcorn Parachute Club v Pond (unreported, 11 January 1995).................................. G1.107
Health & Case Management Ltd v Physiotherapy Network Ltd [2018] EWHC 869
(QB)........................................................................................................................ B5.7
Hearn v Rugby Football Union [2003] EWHC 2690 (Ch), (2003) 100(40) LSG 31, Ch D.. D1.69
Heart of Midlothian plc v Andrew Webster & Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd
(CAS 2007/A/1298).................................................... B1.28; F3.76, F3.77, F3.80, F3.81,
F3.99, F3.257, F3.263, F3.264,
F3.266, F3.267, F3.268, F3.271
Table of Cases lxxxvii
para
Hedley v Cuthbertson (unreported, 20 June 1997)......................................................... G1.50
Hellenic NOC & Kaklamanakis v ISAF (CAS OG/04/009)................. B1.45, B1.47; D2.133
Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804, [1995] 4 All ER 473,
(1995) 92(7) LSG 35, (1995) 139 SJLB 49, QBD.................................................. H4.60
Henderson v Radio Corp Pty [1969] RPC 218............................................................... H4.43
Hendry v World Professional Billiards & Snooker Association Ltd [2001] All ER (D)
71, [2002] UKCLR 5, [2002] ECC 8, [2001] Eu LR 770, Ch D................ A1.68, A1.72,
A1.73, A1.74, A1.75; E2.26,
E2.36; E10.20, E10.23, E10.30;
E11.102, E11.110; E15.23,
E15.25, E15.38; F1.9; F3.92
Henneberry v Law Society (unreported, 2000)............................................................... B1.23
Henning v SAIDS (CAS 2016/A/4716)....................................... C17.2, C17.3, C17.8, C17.9
Henriques v IOC & IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6225).................................................. B1.53, B1.54
Herbert Clayton & Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209, [1930] All ER Rep 414,
HL........................................................................................................................... F1.30
Hercules Club v Futbol v Commission (Case T-766/16) (22 March 2018)................ E11.318
Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 All ER 65, [1992] PIQR P433,
HL........................................................................................................................... G1.124
Hill v Cycling Australia & ASADA (CAS 2013/A/3388).............................................. C18.32
Hill v NCAA 1994 7 Cal 4th 1 (SC California)............................................................... C3.7
Hilton (Elliot) v National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd
[2009] ISLR 75..................................................................... B2.13, B2.15, B2.62; E2.15
Hilton v United Kingdom (1988) 57 DR 108................................................................. E13.60
Hinchcliffe v British Schoolboys Motorcycle Association (unreported, April 2000)..... G1.107
Hipperdinger v ATP (CAS 2004/A/690)............................. B1.15, B1.60; C4.19; C6.1; C18.8,
C18.12, C18.14, C18.16, C18.24;
C20.16, C20.17, C20.18; C22.6
Hivac Ltd v Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch 169, [1946] 1 All
ER 350, CA............................................................................................................. F1.38
Hoch v FIS & IOC (CAS 2008/A/1513)...................... C7.22; C14.2, C14.4; C20.21, C20.22
Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All ER 176, [1952] 1 TLR 1360, CA..................................... B5.40
Hoffmann La Roche & Co AG v Commission of the European Communities (85/76)
[1979] ECR 461, [1979] 3 CMLR 211, [1980] FSR 13, ECJ................................. E11.17
Hofner v Macrotron GmbH (C-41/90) [1991] ECR I-1979, [1993] 4 CMLR 306,
(1991) 135 SJLB 54, ECJ....................................................................................... E11.65
Hogan (Niall) v London Irish Rugby Football Club Trading Ltd (unreported,
20 December 1999)................................................................................................. F1.56
Homawoo v GMF Assurances SA (C-412/10) 2012] ILPr 2, ECJ................................. E11.29
Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, [1970] 2 WLfzR 1140, [1970]
2 All ER 294, [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 453, (1970) 114 SJ 375, HL......................... G1.99
Hondo v UCI, Swiss Olympic & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
(CAS 2005/A/922, 923, 926).................................................................... C20.16, C20.18
Hondo v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), UCI (Swiss Federal Tribunal of
10 January 2007, 4P.148/2006)............................................................................... D2.192
Hønefoss Baliklubb v Mora Mora & Bélen FC (CAS 2015/A/4082)............................ F1.72
Honey v Australian Airlines (1990)18 IPR 185.............................................................. H4.49
Hong Kong Rifle Association v Hong Kong Shooting Association [2012] HKCU 1504,
CFI.................................................................................................................. D1.8; E5.5
Horne & Marlow v RAC Motor Sports Association (unreported, 24 May 1989), CA... E9.2;
G1.103
Horse Sport Ireland (HSI) & Cian O’Connor v Federation Equestre Internationale
(FEI) (CAS 2015/A/4208)........................................................... B3.35; D2.138, D2.143
Hospitality Group v Australian Rugby Union [1999] FCA 1136, [2001] FCS 1040..... E2.54;
E11.206, E11.219
Hospitality Group v Football Association (unreported, 24 January 1996)....... E2.54; E11.206
Hosseinpoor v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Tribunal, 13 January 2017)............. C16.1
Howells v Dominion Insurance Co Ltd [2005] EWHC 552, QBD................................ A2.30
Howey v British Judo Association.................................................................................. B2.93
lxxxviii Table of Cases
para
Hubert Watson v Irish Football Association see Dollingstown Football Club v Irish
Football Association
Hudson v Gambling Commission [2010] EWHC 1229................................................. B5.153
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association Inc (1986) 19 FCR 10, (1986)
69 ALR 660, Federal Ct of Australia...................................................................... F3.53
Hull City FC v Football Association (FA Rule K Arbitration Panel, 23 February
2015)....................................................................................................................... E2.32
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] AC 655, [1997] 2 WLR 684, [1998] 1 WLR 434,
[1997] 2 All ER 426, [1997] CLC 1045, 84 BLR 1, 54 Con LR 12, [1997] Env
LR 488, [1997] 2 FLR 342, (1998) 30 HLR 409, [1997] Fam Law 601, [1997]
EGCS 59, (1997) 94 (19) LSG 25, (1997) 147 NLJ 634, (1997) 141 SJLB 108,
[1997] NPC 64........................................................................................ G1.127, G1.128
Hunter-Galvan (Liza) v Athletics New Zealand Incorporated (NZST 07/08, 20 June
2008)....................................................................................................................... B2.51
Hutchison v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012....... B2.13, B2.30,
B2.47, B2.50, B2.53, B2.71, B2.73
Hyland v Dundalk Racing Ltd [2017] 6 WLUK 15, [2017] LLR 481........................... E8.9
I
I v FIA (CAS 2010/A/2268)................................................ B1.4; C3.7; C18.5, C18.6; C20.6,
C20.19; E7.84
IAAF v ADAK & Ndegwa (CAS 2017/A/5175)................................................. C17.6; C22.8
IAAF v AFI & Asisini (CAS 2012/A/2763)................................................................... C18.16
IAAF v AFS & Javornik (CAS 2008/A/1608)................................ C5.4; C6.16, C6.21, C6.30
IAAF v ANI, Aswini el al (CAS 2012/A/2763)................................... C18.5, C18.29, C18.32
IAAF v ARAF & Chernova (CAS 2016/A/4469)........................................................... C23.6
IAAF v ARAF & Dyldin (CAS 2016/O/4702)........................................ C8.2; C17.13; C22.8
IAAF v ARAF & Kazarin (CAS 2016/A/4480)................................................... C5.7; C20.20
IAAF v ARAF & Kirdyapkin (Sergey) & RUSADA (CAS 2015/A/4005).................... B1.44
IAAF v ARAF & Mokhney (CAS 2016/O/4504).................................... C5.7; C10.1; C17.20;
C20.20; C22.8
IAAF v ARAF & Rutto (Disciplinary Tribunal, 7 November 2019).............................. C7.8
IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina (CAS 2016/O/4464)....................... B1.12, B1.40, B1.61; C4.13,
C4.16; C7.6, C7.7, C7.8, C7.9;
C17.12; C19.8; C23.7
IAAF v ARAF & Yegorova (CAS 2008/A/1718-24).................... B1.40; C4.15; C10.1; C23.6
IAAF v ARAF, Zaripova & RUSADA (CAS 2015/A/4006)............................... C16.3; C23.6
IAAF v Adekoya (Disciplinary Tribunal, 18 July 2019)...................................... C17.2, C17.6
IAAF v Ahye (Disciplinary Tribunal, 7 January 2020).................................................. C9.3
IAAF v Bett (Disciplinary Panel, 19 November 2018)..................... C8.2, C8.5; C17.6; C23.6
IAAF v Balakhnichev, Melinikov, Dolle & Diack (IAAF Ethics Commission, February
2016)....................................................................................................................... A5.3
IAAF v Boulami (CAS 2002/A/452)................................................................... C6.30, C6.31
IAAF v Bulgarian Athletics Federation & Slambolova & Veneva
(CAS 2007/A/1348)...................................................................................... C6.45, C6.46
IAAF v CBA & Dos Santos (CAS 2002/A/383)............................................................ C4.33
IAAF v Cakir-Alpetkin (CAS/2014/A/3498)................................................................. C7.12
IAAF v CBat v Da Silva (CAS 2012/A/2779)..................... C6.6, C6.8, C6.16, C6.17; C20.18
IAAF v Chepchirchir (Disciplinary Tribunal, 28 November 2019).......... C7.8; C17.12; C23.6
IAAF v Czech Athletic Federation & Z, CAS 2002/A/362............................................ C6.53
IAAF v FFA & Fadil Bellaabouss (CAS 2011/A/2340)................................................. D2.130
IAAF v Griggs (Virjilio) (SR/278/2019)........................................................................ B3.154
IAAF v HAA & Kovago (CAS 2012/A/2843)......................................................... C6.7; C8.2
IAAF v Hellebuyck (CAS 2005/A/831)........................................ B1.12; C4.13, C4.22; C6.30
IAAF v Jeptoo (NADP Tribunal, 22 February 2016)............................... C10.1; C19.4, C19.8
IAAF v Jeptoo (CAS 2015/O/4128)......................................................... B1.40, B1.60, B1.61
IAAF v Kendagor (Disciplinary Tribunal, 22 October 2019)......................................... C8.2
IAAF v Kintum (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/94/2019)..................................................... C7.6
Table of Cases lxxxix
para
IAAF v Kokkariniou (CAS 2012/A/2773)................................. C7.5, C7.7, C7.8, C7.9, C7.12;
C19.7, C19.8
IAAF v Nathaniel (Disciplinary Tribunal, 5 May 2019)................................................ C17.6
IAAF v Ottey (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 3 July 2000).......................................... B1.59; C6.51
IAAF v QAF & Balla (CAS 2018/A/5989).......................................................... B1.44; C11.2
IAAF v RFEA & Fernandez-Palaez (CAS 2011/A/2678).......... C16.3; C21.2, C21.2, C21.5
IAAF v RFEA & Onyia (CAS 2009/A/1805)....................................................... C6.40, C6.60
IAAF v RusAF & Bespalova (CAS 2018/O.5676)........................................ C5.2, C5.5; C7.19
IAAF v RusAF & Firova (CAS 2018/O/5666)............................ C6.34; C7.19; C19.8; C22.4;
C23.6, C23.7
IAAF v RUSAF & Ganeeva (CAS 2018/O/5704).......................................................... D2.133
IAAF v RusAF & Guschina (CAS 2019/O/6153).................................... C19.8; C23.6, C23.7
IAAF v RusAF & Khanafeeva (CAS 2018/O/5673)........................ C5.2; C7.2, C7.19; C17.6;
C23.7
IAAF v RusAF & Kirdyapkina (CAS 2017/O/5398)............................................. C7.8; C19.8
IAAF v RusAF & Pyatykh (CAS 2017/O/5039)......................... B1.44; C4.22; C7.19; C19.8;
C23.2, C23.6, C23.7
IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva (CAS 2018/O/5822)................................. C7.6, C7.8; C17.12;
C23.6, C23.7
IAAF v RusAF & Shkolina (CAS 2018/O/5667)................................ C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C7.2,
C7.19; C19.8; C23.6, C23.7
IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov (CAS 2018/A/5675)............................ B1.44; C4.22; C5.2; C7.19;
C19.8; C23.7
IAAF v Ryzhova (Disciplinary Tribunal, 29 August 2019).................................. C7.8; C17.12
IAAF v SAAF & Alhamdah (CAS 2014/A/3469).......................................................... C19.8
IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkarinou (CAS 2012/A/2773) see IAAF v Kokkariniriou
IAAF v Savinova-Farnosova (CAS 2016/O/4481)......................................................... C23.7
IAAF v Shobukhova....................................................................................................... C7.12
IAAF v Sumgong (Disciplinary Tribunal, 17 January 2019).......................................... C10.1
IAAF v TAF & Yanit (CAS 2013/A/3373).................................... C7.8, C7.12, C7.13; C19.8
IAAF v USATF (CAS 2002/O/401)............................................ A1.29; B1.10, B1.11, B1.39,
B1.47, B1.56, B1.57, B1.61; C4.23
IAAF v UKA & Walker [2001] 4 ISLR 264..................... E2.42; E4.2, E4.3, E4.7; E6.9; E8.6
IAAF v Ugarova (CAS 2016/O/4463)....................................................... C7.8; C19.9; C23.6
IAAF v Vasilyeva (CAS 2017/O/4980).......................................................................... C23.7
IAAF & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v RFEA & Dominguez Azpeleta
(CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3651)........................................... B1.4; C6.15, C6.22; C7.5, C7.8,
C7.12; C23.7
IAAF v Walker (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 20 August 2000).......... B1.24, B1.56; C6.60, C6.63
IAAF Ethics Board v Spinola (Vanessa) (05/2016).......................................... B3.171, B3.173
IBAF v Lopez (IBAF Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 12 February 2010).......................... C18.6
IBAF v Luque (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 December 2010).......... C6.21; C16.2; C18.6,
C18.14, C18.19, C18.20,
C18.25, C18.28; C23.5;
IBAF v Maestales (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 15 June 201)...................................... C19.8
IBAF v Ponson (IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal, 8 June 2009)............... C18.26; C20.12; C21.7;
C23.6
IBU v Glazyrina (IBU Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, 24 April 2018).............................. C7.19
IBU v Loginov (ADHP, 30 June 2015)........................................................................... C23.7
IBU v Sleptsova (ADHP, 11 February 2020)..................................... C5.2, C5.8; C6.21; C7.1,
C7.2, C7.19; C19.9
IBU v Ussanova (ADHP, 9 September 2019).......................................... B1.44; C11.4; C14.3
IBU v Ustyugov (ADHP, 11 February 2020).................................................................. C7.19
IBU v Yaroshenko (IBU Doping Hearing Panel, 11 August 2009)..................... C4.13; C6.22,
C6.25; C19.9
ICC v Anderson & Jadeja (3 August 2014).......................................................... B3.44, B3.60
ICC v Ansari (Disciplinary Panel, 19 February 2019).................................................... B4.32
ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir (10 November 2010).......................................... B4.39, B4.41; C5.5;
D1.95, D1.98
xc Table of Cases
para
ICC v Butt (23 December 2010)......................................................................... B3.193; B4.40
ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir (Anti-Corruption Tribunal, 5 February 2011)............... B4.4, B4.21,
B4.22, B4.30, B4.37, B4.38,
B4.41, B4.42, B4.45, B4.47;
E7.66, E7.67
ICC v Ikope (Disciplinary Panel, 5 March 2019)........................................................... B4.32
ICC v Salman Butt, Mohammad Amir, & Mohammad Asif ICC Disciplinary Tribunal
(Michael Beloff QC), 5 February 2011................................................................... E16.22
ICC v Smartt (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 14 December 2011)............................................ C20.5
ICC v Tharanga (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 15 July 2011).................................................. C20.10
ICC v USACA (ICC Dispute Resolution, 16 June 2017)............... A1.9, A1.44, A1.45, A1.53,
A1.54, A1.55, A1.56, A1.57;
B1.6, B1.56
IFFB v IWGA (CAS 2010/A/2119)......................................................... A1.52, A1.55, A1.59;
B1.22, B1.23, B1.33
IOC v Lysenko (IOC Disciplinary Commission, 6 October 2016)................................. C17.2
IOC & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Pinter & FIS (CAS 2007/A/1434)....... C11.2,
C11.3; C14.2; C22.6
IOC & World Curling Federation v Aleksandr Krushelnitckii (CAS ADD 18/03)........ D2.167
IOC Ethics Commission v Diack (Lamine) (D/01/2011)............................................... B3.157
IOC Ethics Commission v Drut (Guy) (D/06/05)........................................................... B3.194
IOC Ethics Commission v Kim (Un Yong) (D/01/05).................................................... B3.194
IOC Ethics Commission v Moon (Dae-sung) (01-2016)................................................ B3.175
IPC v Brockman & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2004/A/717)............. C18.27
IPC v Issa (IPC Anti-Doping Committee, 13 August 2018)........................................... C20.6
IPC v Polukhih (IPC Hearing panel, 20 June 2016)....................................................... C18.19
IRB v Evile Telea (Board Judicial Committee, 18 August 2010).............. C12.1; C21.5, C21.7
IRB v Gould (Board Judicial Committee, 27 October 2013)......................................... C19.9
IRB v Gurusinghe (IRB Judicial Committee, 16 September 2011)................................ C20.6
IRB v Hitch (Board Judicial Committee, 10 August 2012)............................................ C6.7
IRB v Keyter (CAS 2006/A/1067).............................................. C5.4; C18.6, C18.7, C18.19,
C18.24; C20.10
IRB v Kulakivisky (Board Judicial Committee, 21 June 2013).......................... C19.8; C21.10
IRB v Lytvynenko (Board Judicial Committee, 29 May 2013).......................... C10.1; C19.8
IRB v Murray (IRB Post-Hearing Review Body, 27 January 2012)................... C20.6, C20.12
IRB v Nelo Liu (Board Judicial Committee, 24 April 2007)...................... B1.56; C8.2, C8.5;
C18.3
IRB v Slimani (Board Judicial Committee, 14 October 2008)....................................... C18.26
IRB v Thompson (Board Judicial Committee, 7 June 2007)................ C18.26; C20.6, C20.18
IRB v Troy (CAS 2008/S/1664)......................................................... A1.19; C3.6; C5.1, C5.2;
C7.20, C7.22; C11.2, C11.3; C12.3
IRB v Van Standen (Post-Hearing Review Body, 11 February 2011)................. C16.3; C21.5
IRB v Viklani (16 January 2013).................................................................................... C18.5
IRB v Zhivatov et a ( Board Judicial Committee, 21 January 2013).............................. C18.6
IRC v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217, HL................................... H4.39, H4.68
IRC v Willoughby [1997] STC 995, [1997] 7 WLUK 218, 70 TC 57, [1997] BTC 393,
(1997) 94 (29) LSG 28, (1997) 147 NLJ 1062, (1997) 141 SJLB 176................... I2.108
IRC v Wimbledon FC Ltd [2004] EWHC 1020 (Ch), [2004] 5 WLUK 216...... B5.147; E2.34
IRIFF v FIFA (CAS 2008/A/1708)...................................................................... A1.30; B1.10
ISI v International Rugby Board.......................................................................... E2.55; E3.14
ISL Marketing & FIFA v JY Chung (Case D-200-0034) (unreported, 3 April 2000).... E2.52
ISU v Commission (Case C-93/18) [2018] OJ C142/72................................................ A1.80
ISU v Malkova RSU & RUSADA (CAS 2016/A/4840).................................... B1.30; C20.13
ISU v Park (ISU Disciplinary Commission, 20 March 2017)........................................ C18.19
ISU v Sin (ISU Disciplinary Commission, 28 April 2018)............................................ C17.15
ITF & Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP & OÜ Viking Line Eesti (C-
438/05) [2007] ECR 1-10779............................................................................. E12.122
ITF v Abel (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 29 April 2008)........................................................ C18.6
ITF v Aleshchev (Independent Tribunal, 1 August 2019)................................ C20.18; C21.11
Table of Cases xci
para
ITF v Antoniychuk (ITF, 12 May 2010)......................................................................... C22.12
ITF v Beck (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 February 2006)........................... B1.16; C4.19; C18.6
ITF v Belluci (4 January 2018)....................................................................................... C17.8
ITF v Bogomolov (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 26 September 2005)............ C18.16; C20.5; C23.6
ITF v Burdekin (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 4 April 2005)............................... C4.3, C4.23; C18.6,
C18.24; C20.16; E7.68
ITF v Dorofeyeya (Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal, 9 June 2016)................ C4.23; C12.2;
C13.2; C20.21
ITF v Farah (ITF Decision, 10 February 2020).............................................................. C18.19
ITF v Fridman (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 2 March 2006)...................................... C18.27; C20.6
ITF v Gasquet (CAS 2009/A/1296)............................................... B1.56; C4.42; C5.4; C6.38;
C18.6, C18.7, C18.8, C18.12,
C18.19; C20.5, C20.19
ITF v Hingis (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 3 January 2008)............. C4.45; C5.8; C6.6, C6.7, C6.8,
C6.10, C6.17; C16.1; C18.6
ITF v Hood (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 8 February 2006)................................................... C18.26
ITF v Karatantcheva (CAS/2006/A/1032)................................... C4.23; C6.10, C6.17, C6.52;
C18.6, C18.16; C20.6
ITF v Karic (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 21 December 2006)............................................... C18.26
ITF v Korda (CAS 99/223/A)..................................................... B1.59; C6.48; D2.56, D2.133
ITF v Kozlova (ITF, 27 May 2015)................................................................................. C20.8
ITF v Koubek (CAS 2005/A/823)...................................................... C18.14, C18.16, C18.26;
C20.5, C20.15; C23.2, C23.6
ITF v Kramperova (4 January 2018).................................................................... C17.8; C22.9
ITF v Kratzer (Independent Tribunal, SR/085/2020)..................................................... C17.8
ITF v Lepchenko (ITF Decision, 20 September 2016)................................................... C18.19
ITF v Mak (Independent Tribunal, 7 November 2017)................... C6.2; C8.2, C8.5; C17.13;
C18.3
ITF v Nastase (SR/913/2017).............................................................. B3.59, B3.120, B3.121,
B3.125, B3.128
ITF v Neilsen (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 5 June 2006).......................... C18.20, C18.25, C18.27
ITF v Sharapova (Independent Tribunal, 6 June 2016)............................. B1.39; C4.45; C6.2;
C17.7, C17.8; C18.16,
C18.21, C18.24; C20.18
ITF v Valle (Zacarias) (ITF Decision, 8 February 2019)................................................ C18.19
ITF v X (ITF Decision, December 2019)....................................................................... C18.19
IWBF v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) & Gibbs (CAS 2010/A/2230)......... B1.30, B1.32, B1.57,
B1.61; C4.17; C17.6;
C18.5, C18.6, C18.9
Iannone v FIM (CAS 2020/A/6978).................................................................... C17.5; C18.6
Iao Hui v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2612)............................................ A1.30; B1.12, B1.16, B1.19;
C4.13, C4.15; C6.6
Ibrahim v United Kingdom (Applications 50541/08, 50573/08 & 40351/09)............... E13.46
Ide v ATB Sales Ltd / Lexus Financial Services v Russell [2008] EWCA Civ 424, [2008]
4 WLUK 710, [2009] RTR 8, [2008] PIQR P13, (2008) 152 (18) SJLB 32.......... C18.12
Iles v Shooting Australia (CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2016)........................................ B2.61
Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009] EWCA Civ 63, [2009] 2 All ER 666,
[2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 921, [2009] Bus LR 1034, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 436,
[2009] 1 BCLC 724, CA......................................................... F1.4, F1.38; F2.15, F2.18,
F2.41, F2.166
Imberechts v Belgium (Application 15561/89) 69 DR 312 (1991)................................ E13.47
Ime Akpan (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 10 April 1995)..................................................... C6.62
Iñaki Urquijo v Liedson Da Silva Muñiz (CAS 2007/A/1371)...................................... F2.140
Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [1999] 1 WLR 270, [1999] 1 All
ER 820, [1999] CLC 165, (1999) 1 TCLR 169, (1998) 95(41) LSG 45, (1998)
142 SJLB 269, CA....................................................................................... D3.70, D3.91
Independent Schools Council v The Charity Commission for England & Wales . See
R (on the application of Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission
for England & Wales
xcii Table of Cases
para
Indian Hockey Federation v International Hockey Federation, FIH Judicial
Commission (CAS/2014/A/3828).............................. A1.9, A1.43, A1.44, A1.45, A1.48;
B1.6, B1.8, B1.44, B1.56
Infront WM v European Commission (T-33/01) [2005] ECR II-5897........................... A3.96
Interfish Ltd v R & C Comrs [2014] EWCA Civ 876, [2015] STC 55, [2014]
6 WLUK 859, [2014] BTC 34, [2014] STI 2286.................................................... I1.33
International Canoe Federation v ICF (CAS 2015/A/4222)........................................... B1.58
International Canoe Federation v Sterba (CAS OG 12/07)................... C6.55, C6.58; C18.24;
C20.12
International Cycling Union & Italian National Olympic Committee, Re (CAS 94/128)... D2.133
International Federation of American Football (IFAF) v Wiking (CAS 2017/O/5025). A1.29
International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) v SCB Eishockey AG (Swiss Federal
Tribunal of 8 March 2012, 4A_627/2011).............................................................. D2.181
International News Service v Associated Press, 248 US 215, 63 L Ed 211, 39 S Ct 68
(1918).................................................................................... H1.10, H1.11, H1.13, H1.14
Inverclyde Property Renovation LLP v R & C Comrs [2019] UKFT 408 (TC)............ I1.8
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society (No 1),
[1998] 1 WLR 896, [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 BCLC 531, [1997] CLC 1243,
[1997] PNLR 541, (1997) 147 NLJ 989, HL........................ B1.54, B1.57, B1.59; B2.16
Ionikos FC v Juan Pajuelo Chavez (CAS 2008/A/1517)................................................ D2.65
Irish Football Association v Football Association of Ireland (CAS 2010/A/2071)........ B1.54,
B1.57; D2.107, D2.130
Irish Football Association v Football Association of Ireland CAS, 27 September 2010,
(2011) ISLR 2, SLR151–162.................................................................................. E2.43
Irish Hockey Association / Lithuanian Hockey / International Hockey Federation
(CAS 2001/A/354).................................................................................................. B1.57
Irish Sugar Plc v Commission of the European Communities (T-228/97) [2000] All
ER (EC) 198, [1999] ECR II-2969, [1999] 5 CMLR 1300, CFI............................ E11.18
Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] EWHC 367 (Ch), [2002] 1 WLR 2355, [2002] 2 All
ER 414, [2002] EMLR 32, [2002] FSR 60, (2002) 25(6) IPD 25039, (2002)
99(18) LSG 38, (2002) 152 NLJ 553, (2002) 146 SJLB 85, Ch D.......... H1.138; H4.14,
H4.39, H4.42, H4.44, H4.46,
H4.47, H4.48, H4.49, H4.52,
H4.60, H4.68, H4.84; H6.32
Italia 90 (Distribution of Package Tours) [1992] OJ L 326/31................. E2.53, E2.54, E2.56;
E11.38, E11.202, E11.203,
E11.208, E11.209, E11.210
Italian Canoe Federation v ICF (CAS 2015/A/4222).............................. B1.48, B1.57; B2.16
Italy v Sacchi (155/73) [1974] ECR 409, [1974] 2 CMLR 177, ECJ......................... E11.225
J
J Bollinger SA v Costa Brava Wine Co Ltd (No 4) [1961] 1 WLR 277, [1961] 1 All
ER 561, [1961] RPC 116, (1961) 105 SJ 180, Ch D.............................................. H1.134
JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade & Industry [1990] 2 AC 418,
[1989] 3 WLR 969, [1989] 3 All ER 523, (1989) 5 BCC 872, [1990] BCLC 102,
(1990) 87(4) LSG 68, (1989) 139 NLJ 1559, (1989) 133 SJ 1485, HL................. E13.6
JJ Burgess & Sons v OFT [2005] CAT 25...................................................................... E11.44
JJB Sports Plc v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, [2005] Comp AR 29, CAT... E11.297
Jack v Swimming Australia & ASADA (CAS A1/2020).................................... C17.5; C18.6
Jacob v Irish Amateur Rowing Union [2008] IEHC 196, 10 June 2008, [2008]
4 IR 731............................................................................................... D1.33; E2.15; E6.2
Jaguar v McLaren [2001] 9(2) SATLJ 88....................................................................... F3.16
Jalloh v Germany (Application 54810/00) [2006] 7 WLUK 277, (2007) 44 EHRR 32,
20 BHRC 575, [2007] Crim LR 717....................................................................... E13.59
James v United Kingdom (A/98) 1986) 8 EHRR 123, [1986] RVR 139, ECtHR.......... H4.66
James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] AC 141,
[1977] 3 WLR 907, [1977] 3 All ER 1048, [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 119, [1977]
11 WLUK 64, [1978] RTR 59, [1978] 1 CMLR 156, (1977) 121 SJ 811.............. B1.51
Table of Cases xciii
para
James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd
[1970] AC 583, [1970] 2 WLR 728, [1970] 1 All ER 796, [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
269, [1970] 3 WLUK 6, (1970) 114 SJ 225............................................................ B1.57
Japan Paralympic Committee (JPC) v International Paralympic Committee (IPC) &
International Blind Sport Federation (IBSA) (CAS 2012/A/2831)........................ B2.4
Jarrold v Boustead [1964] 1 WLR 1357, [1964] 3 All ER 76, 41 TC 701, (1964)
43 ATC 209, [1964] TR 217, (1964) 108 SJ 500, CA............................................ I2.66
Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 1 WLR 898, [1979] 2 All ER 1108, (1979) 123 SJ 389,
CA..................................................................................................... D1.95; B4.38, B4.40
Jersey Football Association v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4787)...................... A1.33, A1.43, A1.44;
B1.36, B1.53, B1.54, B1.56,
B1.57, B1.59, B1.60
Jobcentre Krefeld Widerspruchsteel v JD (Case C-181/19)........................................... E12.25
Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4184).................................. B1.4
Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes (1993) 1 SA 649................................................ E5.5
Jockey Club v Bradley (Appeal Board [2003] ISLR-SLR 71)............. E5.10; E13.24, E13.31,
E13.33
Jockey Club v Bradley (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 13 December 2002).............. B4.34
Jockey Club v Bradley see Bradley v Jockey Club (Application for New Ground of
Appeal)
Jockey Club v Buffham [2002] EWHC 1866 (QB), [2003] QB 462, [2003] 2 WLR 178,
[2003] CP Rep 22, [2003] EMLR 5, (2002) 99(40) LSG 32, QBD....................... E13.65
Jockey Club v Carphone Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151............................................. B4.47
Jockey Club v Carter (Gary) (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 28 September 2005).... B4.8,
B4.19, B4.47
Jockey Club v Coleman (Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel, 22 January 2003)................ B4.11
Johnson v Athletic Canada & IAAF [1997] OJ 3201, (1997) 41 OTC 95.............. B1.6; E10.5;
F3.53
Johnson v Cliftonville Football & Athletic Club [1984] 1 NI 9, 21, Ch D................ E11.168
Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13, [2003] 1 AC 518, [2001] 2 WLR 1076, [2001]
2 All ER 801, [2001] ICR 480, [2001] IRLR 279, [2001] Emp LR 469, HL... F1.34, F1.77
Jones v Northampton Borough Council (The Times, 2 May 1990)................................ G1.98
Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC 270, [2006] 2 WLR 1424, [2007]
1 All ER 113, [2006] HRLR 32, [2007] UKHRR 24, 20 BHRC 621, (2006)
156 NLJ 1025, (2006) 150 SJLB 811, HL.............................................................. E13.10
Jones v Sherwood Computer Services plc 1992] 1 WLR 277, [1992] 2 All ER 170,
[1989] EG 172 (CS), CA............................................................................. D3.48, D3.66
Jones v USADA (CAS 2019/A/6376)............................................................................ C17.6
Jones v USADA (UFC Arbitration Tribunal, 6 November 2016)........ C18.6, C18.16, C18.22;
C20.2; C22.12
Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (The Times, 6 March 1997)....................................... C4.28; E6.6
Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (27 February 1997).......................... E7.11; E7.58, E7.62, E7.65,
E7.76; E15.5, E15.14
Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (NADP Tribunal, 9 June 2010)......................................... C8.5
Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee (CAS 2008/A/1605).................... B1.23; B2.51
Jonsson v IPF (CAS 2007/A/1332)................................................................................ C6.16
Joseph Barton of Queens Park Rangers FC before the Football Association Regulatory
Commission, 23 May 2012..................................................................................... G2.70
Jovanovic v USADA (CAS 2002/A/360)................................................ C6.51; C7.1; C18.29
Jules Rimet Cup Ltd v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWHC 2376 (Ch),
[2008] ECDR 4, [2008] FSR 10, (2008) 31(1) IPD 31002, Ch D............. H1.81, H1.85,
H1.139
Juliano v FEI (CAS 2017/A/5114).............................................................. B1.6, B1.35, B1.57
Justice v South Australian Trotting Control Board (1989) 50 FAR 613......................... E5.5
Juventus Football Club SpA v Chelsea Football Club Ltd (CAS 2013/A/3365).... B1.4, B1.53,
B1.61; F3.278, F3.279
K
K v E (FIFA DRC, 26 April 2012).................................................................................. F3.257
xciv Table of Cases
para
Kambala & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIBA, (FIBA Appeals Tribunal,
23 August 2007)............................................................... B1.44; C4.16; C18.21, C18.22,
C18.26; C20.2, C20.6, C20.18
Kaneria v ECB (Appeal Panel, May 2013)............................................... B4.37, B4.38, B4.45
Karabil Kaiya Hai (FEI Tribunal, 21 March 2012)......................................................... C18.6
Karatantcheva v ITF (CAS 2006/A/1032).......................... C3.7; C6.51, C6.52; C18.5, C18.6
Karatancheva v ITF (CAS 2007/A/1399)....................................................................... C18.7
Karwalski v Squash Australia (CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014).......... B2.49, B2.87, B2.88
Kason Kek-Gardner Ltd v Process Components Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 2132, [2018]
2 All ER (Comm) 381, [2017] 12 WLUK 373....................................................... B2.16
Katusha Management SA v Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI)
(CAS 2012/A/3031)............................................................... B1.7, B1.26; D2.73, D2.74
Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62, CA................................................................ H4.21, H4.60
Keefe v McInnes [1991] 2 VR 235................................................................................. E2.12
Keegan v Newcastle United Football Co Ltd [2010] IRLR 94, (2010) International
Sports Law Review 1, SLR1-8....................................................................... F1.18, F1.54
Kemp v New Zealand Rugby Football League [1989] 3 NZLR 463..................... F3.44, F3.53
Kendrick v ITF (CAS 2011/A/2518)......................................... B1.30, B1.56, B1.60; C18.14,
C18.24, C18.26, C18.32; C20.5,
C20.6, C20.13; D2.100
Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88, [1980] 3 WLR 361, [1980] 3 All ER 329,
[1980] JPL 515, (1980) 124 SJ 378, CA................................................................. G1.132
Kennedy v Charity Commission; Kennedy v Information Comr [2014] UKSC 20,
[2015] AC 455, [2014] 2 WLR 808, [2014] 2 All ER 847, [2014] 3 WLUK 755,
[2014] EMLR 19, [2014] HRLR 14, (2014) 158 (13) SJLB 37................. E7.82; E10.17
Kennedy v United Kingdom (26839/05) (2011) 52 EHRR 4, 29 BHRC 341, [2010]
Crim LR 868, ECtHR............................................................................................. E13.60
Kennemer Golf & Country Club v Staatssecretaris van Financien (Case C-174/00)
[2002] QB 1252, [2002] 3 WLR 829, [2002] STC 502, [2002] ECR I-3293, [2002]
3 WLUK 629, [2002] 2 CMLR 12, [2002] All ER (EC) 480, [2002] CEC 330,
[2002] BTC 5205, [2002] BVC 395, [2002] STI 354............................................. I1.58
Kenny v Football Association (FA Appeal Board, 20 October 2009)............... C20.10, C20.13
Kenya Football Federation v FIFA (CAS 2008/O/1808)................................................ A1.17
Kenya v Kenya Cricket Association (unreported, 2006) (HC Kenya)..................... D1.8; E5.5
Keramuddin v FIFA (CAS 2019/A/6388)....................................................................... B4.38
Kerr v Willis [2009] EWCA Civ 1248, (2009) 106(44) LSG 20, CA............................ G1.29
Kerry v Ice Skating Australia (CAS 2013/A/3415)........................................................ B2.56
Kervanici v France (Application 31645/04)................................................................... E13.62
Key2Law (Surrey) LLP v De’Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567, [2012] BCC 375,
[2012] 2 BCLC 195, [2012] 2 CMLR 8, [2012] ICR 881, [2012] IRLR 212, CA. B5.148
Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2015] UKSC 59,
[2016] AC 155, [2015] 3 WLR 1665, [2016] 4 All ER 794, [2015] 11 WLUK 613,
[2016] HRLR 2, 40 BHRC 228...................................................... E7.82, E7.83; E10.24
Kibunde v IOC (CAS Sydney 2000/004)......................................................... B1.16; D2.131
Kieron Brady v Sunderland Football Club see Brady (Kieron) v Sunderland Football
Club
Kim v FILA (CAS 2013/A/3272)................................................................................... A1.33
Kindle v Federation Motorcycliste Suisse (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 25 March 1992)... D2.101
King v AIBA (CAS 2011/A/2452).............................................. B1.26, B1.58, B1.61; D2.133
Klass v Germany (A/28) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 214, ECtHR............................................. E13.60
Klein v ASADA & Athletics Australia (CAS A/4/2016)..................................... C8.4; C20.19
Klemenic v UCI (CAS 2016/A/4648).......................................... B1.44, B1.56; C4.16; C6.24,
C6.30; C22.5; C23.7, C23.9
Kline v OID Association Inc 609 NE 2d 564 (1992)...................................................... G1.57
Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2016/A/4650)................................... B4.38; D2.167
Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA (CAS 2018/A/5734)............................................... D2.167
Knauss v FIS (CAS 2005/A/847)............................... B1.56; C16.3; C18.12, C18.14, C18.20,
C18.21, C18.31, C18.32; C20.2, C20.5,
C20.11, C20.18; C21.2, C21.5; D2.101
Table of Cases xcv
para
Koji Murofushi & Japanese Olympic Committee v International Olympic Committee
(CAS 2012/A/2912)................................................................................................ D2.100
Kokkinakis v Greece (A/260-A) (1994) 17 EHRR 397, ECtHR..................... E13.62, E13.63,
E13.64
Kolasa v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 22 May 2014)....... C5.5; C8.2;
C21.6, C21.7
Köllerer v ATP (CAS 2011/A/2490).................................................... B3.181, B3.186; B4.22,
B4.37, B4.43
Kolobnev (CAS 2011/A/2645)............................................................... C18.6, C18.14; C20.6
Konig v Germany (No.1) (A/27) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 170, ECtHR................................ E13.39
Koninklijke Racing Culb Genk v Manchester United Football Club
(CAS 2018/A/5733)................................................................................................ F3.250
Kontakt-Information-Therapie & Hagen v Austria (Application 11921/86) 57 DR 81
(1988)...................................................................................................................... E13.63
Kop v IAAF & TAF (CAS 2008/A/1586)....................................................................... C4.16
Korda v ITF (CAS 99/A/223)............................................................................... B1.53, B1.54
Korda v ITF [1999] All ER (D) 337............................................ D2.56; D3.13, D3.45, D3.49,
D3.50; E4.2, E4.7
Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation) [1999] All ER (D) 84....... B1.56; C3.7;
C4.10; D1.16; D3.29; E2.4; E7.53, E7.55
Korean Olympic Committee v International Skating Union OWG (Salt Lake City
02/007, 23 February 2002)............................................................ B3.36; D2.140, D2.145
Korneev & Gouliev v IOC, CAS (Atlanta) No 003-4L............... B3.187; C5.2; C6.56, C6.57;
E7.66
Koubek v ITF, CAS 2005/A/823 see ITF v Koubek (CAS 2005/A/823)
Kowalczyk v FIS (CAS 2005/A/918)............................................................................. C18.27
Krabbe v IAAF (High Regional Court of Munich, 28 March 1996).............................. B1.15
Kreuziger v Czech Cycling Federation (COC Arbitration Committee, 22 September
2014)................................................................................................................ C7.6, C7.8
Kristoffersen v Norweigan Ski Federation (E-8/17) [2018] 11 WLUK 814, [2019]
2 CMLR 6..................................................................................... E12.23, E12.29, E12.42
Krunic (Branislav) v Bosnia & Herzegovina Football Federation (BIHFF)
(CAS 2014/A/3850)................................................................................................ D2.65
Kulesza v Canadian Amateur Synchronized Swimming Association Inc (Case
No 27763-0001) (unreported, 27 June 1996), Ont Ct Gen Div (Ottawa)............... B2.71
Kulubu (Sivasspoor) v UEFA (CAS 2014/A/3625)............................... B3.187; B4.12, B4.37
Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen [1955] AC 197, [1955] 2 WLR 223, [1955] 1 All
ER 236, (1955) 119 JP 157, [1955] Crim LR 339, (1955) 99 SJ 73, PC........ B4.38; C5.7
Kutrovsky v ITF (CAS 2012/A/2804)................................... C18.8, C18.20, C18.24, C18.32;
C20.2, C20.6; D2.100
Kuwait Motor Sports Club (KMSC) v Federation Internationale de Motorcyclisme
(FIM) (CAS 2015/O/4316)..................................................................................... A1.48
Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation
(CAS 2016/A/4727)............................................................... A1.55, A1.56, A1.57; B1.22
Kuwait Sporting Club v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association CAS 2015/A/4241....... A1.4,
A1.17, A1.44, A1.53, A1.58
Kyprianou v Cyprus (73797/01) (2007) 44 EHRR 27, ECtHR.......................... E7.73; E13.52
L
L v IOC (CAS 2000/A/310)............................................................................................ C6.61
La Barbera v IWAS (CAS 2010/A/2277).......................... C6.7, C6.10, C6.16; C18.6, C18.7
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 273, [1964]
1 All ER 465, (1964) 108 SJ 135, HL......................................................... H1.65, H1.85
Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd v Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator (C-258/08)
[2013] All ER (EC) 62, [2010] 3 CMLR 40, [2011] CEC 212, ECJ...................... E12.68
Lagat v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & IAAF (13 September 2006)............... C3.7
Lamond v Glasgow Corp, 1968 SLT 291, Ct of Sess..................................................... G1.122
Lamptey v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5173)........................................... B4.33, B4.38, B4.43, B4.47
xcvi Table of Cases
para
Landis v USADA (CAS 2007/A/1394)................................. C4.34, C4.45; C6.1, C6.5, C6.7,
C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.25,
C6.42, C6.45, C6.46
Langborger v Sweden (A/155) (1990) 12 EHRR 416, ECtHR...................................... E13.52
Langston v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (No 1) [1974] 1 WLR 185,
[1974] 1 All ER 980, [1974] ICR 180, [1974] IRLR 15, (1973) 16 KIR 139,
(1973) 118 SJ 97, CA.............................................................................................. F1.31
Lapikov v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2677).................................................... C13.2; C18.32; C20.12
Lassana Diarra v FC Lokomotiv Moscow (CAS 2014/A/4094)..................................... F3.279
Latsutina v IOC & FIS (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 27 May 2003)........... D2.25, D2.34, D2.177
Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402, [1892] 6 WLUK 12..................................................... B1.40
Lauritzencool AB v Lady Navigation Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 579, [2005] 1 WLR 3686,
[2006] 1 All ER 866, [2005] 2 All ER (Comm) 183, [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 63,
[2005] 5 WLUK 363, [2005] 1 CLC 758................................................................ E7.50
Lau Tak Wah Andy v Hang Seng Bank Ltd [2000] 1 HKC 280..................................... H4.49
Law Society of Ireland v Competition Authority [2005] IEHC 455.............................. E11.36
Law v National Greyhound Racing Club [1983] 3 All ER 300, [1983] 1 WLR 1302,
CA.......................................................................................................... E5.2, E5.6; E7.22
Lawal v Northern Spirit Ltd [2003] UKHL 35, [2004] 1 All ER 187, [2003] ICR 856,
[2003] IRLR 538, [2003] HRLR 29, [2003] UKHRR 1024, (2003)
100(28) LSG 30, (2003) 153 NLJ 1005, (2003) 147 SJLB 783, HL...................... B2.71
Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 26, [2012] 1 WLR 2127, [2012] 3 All
ER 168, CA............................................................................................................. E9.7
Laws v London Chronicle (Indicator Newspapers) Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 698, [1959]
2 All ER 285, 93 ILT 213, (1959) 103 SJ 470, (1959) 103 SJ 462, CA....... F1.37, F1.50
Lawson v IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6313)................................................................. C17.5; C18.19
Lazar & Brazeur & FN Belgium & Hungary v Freun & FEI (CAS 2006/A/1046)........ D2.185
Lazutina v IOC (CAS 2002/A/370).................................................. C4.17; C5.9; C6.7, C6.30,
C6.47, C6.51; D2.12
Lea v USADA (CAS 2016/A/4371)........................................... C6.60; C18.24; C20.5, C20.7,
C20.8, C20.9
Lebara Mobile Ltd v Lycamobile UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 3318 (Ch), [2015]
11 WLUK 393......................................................................................................... E15.9
Levedeva v IOC & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2017/A/4983)............ C6.34
Le Compte v Belgium (A/43), Van Leuven v Belgium (A/43), De Meyere v Belgium
(A/43) [1982] ECC 240, (1982) 4 EHRR 1, ECtHR...... E13.24, E13.39, E13.40, E13.68
Le Roux v New Zealand Rugby Football Union (unreported, 14 March 1995),
NZHC...................................................................................................................... E7.78
Leatherland v Edwards (28 October 1998)..................................................................... G1.25
Lee v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329, [1952] 1 All ER 1175,
[1952] 1 TLR 1115, (1952) 96 SJ 296, CA........................ B1.49; B5.144; D3.66; E7.7,
E7.9; E15.19; F1.28
Leeds Rugby Ltd v Harris [2005] EWHC 1591, QBD......................................... F1.22; F3.224
Leeds United 2007 Ltd v Football League Ltd [2008] BCC 701................................... E2.34
Leeds United Football Club & Rotherham FC v Football League, award of FA Arbitral
Panel (1 May 2008)................................................................................................. E2.30
Leeds United Football Club v The Football League (unreported, 2007)........................ B5.144
Leeper v IAAF (CAS 2020/A/6807)............................................... B1.4, B1.6, B1.25, B1.32;
B2.39; C17.9; C20.10
Legkov v FIS (CAS 2017/A/4968)..................................... A1.58; C4.26, C4.28, C4.29; C5.1,
C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C7.1, C7.2;
C10.1; C13.1; C14.1, C14.3
Lehtinen v FINA (CAS 95/A/142).................................................................................. C6.7
Lehtonen v Federation Royale Belge des Societes de Basket-Ball ASBL (FRBSB)
(C-176/96) [2001] All ER (EC) 97, [2000] ECR I-2681, [2000] 3 CMLR 409,
[2000] CEC 498, ECJ................................................. B1.4; B5.31; E2.19; E5.13; E6.10;
E11.51, E11.148, E11.149, E11.150; E12.22,
E12.36, E12.98, E12.106; F3.34, F3.57, F3.62,
F3.63, F3.88, F3.151
Table of Cases xcvii
para
Lei Cao v IOC (CAS 2017/A/4974)................................. C4.23; C6.21, C6.22, C6.55; C23.2
Les Authentiks & Supras Auteuil 91 v France (Application 4696/11)........................... E13.69
Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232, [1964] 3 WLR 573, [1964] 2 All ER 929, [1964]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 339, (1964) 108 SJ 519, CA............................................................ G1.11
Lewis v Brookshaw (1970) NLJ 413.............................................................................. G1.12
Lewis v Buckpool Golf Club 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 43........................................................ G1.16
Lewis (Lennox) v World Boxing Council & Frank Bruno (unreported, 3 November
1995)................................................................................................... E8.2, E8.9; E16.30
Lewis v Heffer [1978] 1 WLR 1061, [1978] 3 All ER 354, (1978) 122 SJ 112, CA...... C4.28
Leyton Orient v FAPL (FA Rule K arbitration, still pending).............................. E2.32; E4.11
Liao Hui v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2612)............................................. B1.8, B1.10, B1.61; C4.34;
C6.3, C6.4, C6.6, C6.22, C6.53;
C19.4, C19.9
Licensed Players’ Agent Vincent Cusumano, Belgium v Player David Mounard,
France, 15 February 2006....................................................................................... F2.20
Lichtenstein v Clube Atletico Mineiro [2005] EWHC 1300, QBD......... F2.7, F2.134; F3.240
Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional v Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa
da Misericordia de Lisboa (C-42/07) [2009] ECR I-7633, [2010] 1 CMLR 1,
[2010] CEC 399, ECJ............................................................................... E12.68; E13.41
Lilia Malaja v Fédération Française de Basketball (Case No VC 99 NC 00282)........... E12.78;
F3.66
Lim (Jo-Ann) v Synchronised Swimming Australia Inc (CAS (Oceania Registry)
A2/2016)....................................................................................................... B2.48, B2.87
Lincolnshire CC v Hopper [2002] 5 WLUK 705, [2002] ICR 1301.............................. F1.10
Lindemann v American Horse Shows Association, 851 F Supp 1476 (1994)................ C4.28
Lindon v France (21279/02) (2008) 46 EHRR 35, ECtHR............................................ E13.52
Lindqvist (Bodil), criminal proceedings against (Case C-101/01) [2004] QB 1014,
[2004] 2 WLR 1385, [2003] ECR I-12971, [2003] 11 WLUK 159, [2004]
1 CMLR 20, [2004] All ER (EC) 561, [2004] CEC 117........................................ A4.160
Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v Union of European Football Associations & FC Porto
Futebol SAD (CAS 2008/A/1583)............................ B1.25, B1.26, B1.28, B1.54, B1.57
Lissarague v FEI (CAS 2005/A/895).............................................................................. D2.63
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 AC 215, [2001] 2 WLR 1311,
[2001] 2 All ER 769, [2001] ICR 665, [2001] IRLR 472, [2001] Emp LR 819,
[2001] 2 FLR 307, [2001] 2 FCR 97, (2001) 3 LGLR 49, [2001] ELR 422,
[2001] Fam Law 595, (2001) 98(24) LSG 45, (2001) 151 NLJ 728, (2001)
145 SJLB 126, [2001] NPC 89, HL........................................................................ G1.35
Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555, [1957] 2 WLR 158,
[1957] 1 All ER 125, [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 505, (1957) 121 JP 98, (1957)
101 SJ 106, HL....................................................................................................... F1.36
Lithuanian Hockey / International Hockey Federation (CAS 2001/A/355)................... B1.57
Lloyd (Richard) v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599, [2020] QB 747, [2020]
2 WLR 484, [2020] 2 All ER 676, [2020] 2 All ER (Comm) 128, [2019]
10 WLUK 6, [2020] 1 CMLR 34, [2020 EMLR 2.................................. A4.251, A4.253
Lloyd v McMahon [1987] AC 625, [1987] 2 WLR 821, [1987] 1 All ER 1118, HL..... E7.14
Lobello v ISU (CAS 2007/A/1318)................................................................................ C9.1
Lobo Machado v Portugal (1997) 23 EHRR 79, ECtHR................................................ E13.52
Lombard North Central plc v GATX Corpn [2012] EWHC 1067 (Comm), [2012]
2 All ER (Comm) 1119, [2013] Bus LR 68, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 662, [2012]
4 WLUK 531, [2012] 1 CLC 884................................................................. D3.70, D3.71
London Borough of Ealing v R & C Comrs (Case C-633/15) [2017] 4 WLR 174,
[2017] STC 1598, [2017] 7 WLUK 256, [2017] BVC 35, [2017] STI 1721......... I1.60
London Welsh v RFU, Newcastle Falcons intervening (RFU Arbitration 29 June
2012)........................................................................ B5.42; D1.57; E2.27, E2.33; E6.11;
E7.56; E11.68, E11.72, E11.77, E11.117,
E11.119; E15.7; E16.12
Longridge on Thames v R & C Comrs [2016] EWCA Civ 930, [2017] 1 WLR 1497,
[2016] STC 2362, [2016] 9 WLUK 9, [2016] BVC 33, [2016] STI 2541............. I1.118
Lopez Ostra v Spain (A/303-C) (1995) 20 EHRR 277, ECtHR..................................... E13.23
xcviii Table of Cases
para
L’Oréal SA v Bellure NV (C-487/07) [2010] All ER (EC) 28, [2010] Bus LR 303,
[2009] ECR I-5185, [2010] CEC 453, [2009] ETMR 55, [2010] RPC 1, ECJ...... H1.124
Louisvale Pirates v South African Football Association [2012] ZAGPJHC 78.............. E5.5
Lovchev v IWF (CAS 2016/A/4632).............................................................................. C6.34
Lovell v Pembroke County Cricket Club [2003] ISLR 2 SLR 38................ E7.6, E7.7, E7.64,
E7.65
Lowe v British Judo Association.................................................................................... B2.93
Lozovye v Russia (Application 4587/09)....................................................................... E13.58
Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2011] UKSC 39, [2012] 1 AC 208, [2011] 3 WLR 487,
[2011] 4 All ER 817, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1011, [2011] Bus LR 1211,
[2011] ECDR 21, [2012] EMLR 3, [2011] FSR 41, 7 ALR Int’l 711, (2011)
161 NLJ 1098, SC................................................................................................... H5.22
L’Union Nationale des Footballeurs Professionnels (Conseil d’Etat, 24 February
2011)....................................................................................................................... C4.17
Lumley v Wagner, 42 ER 687, (1852) 1 De GM & G 604............................................. F1.80
Lungowe v Vedanta Resources plc [2019] UKSC 20, [2020] AC 1045, [2019]
2 WLR 1051, [2019] 3 All ER 1013, [2019] 2 All ER (Comm) 559, [2019] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 399, [2019] 4 WLUK 148, [2019] BCC 520, [2019] 1 CLC 619,
[2019] BLR 327, [2019] Env LR 32....................................................................... E11.26
Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish v Romania (Application 76943/11)................................ E13.48
Lustig-Prean v United Kingdom (31417/96) (2000) 29 EHRR 548, 7 BHRC 65,
ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.79
Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland (CAS OG 12/03).................................................... B2.13, B2.15
Lyngstad v Anabas Products Ltd [1977] FSR 62 Ch D......................... H1.137; H4.49, H4.52
Lyon v Maidment [2002] EWHC 1227 (QB), [2002] 6 WLUK 471................... G1.26, G1.28
M
M v AIBA (CAS OG 96/006)......................................................................................... D2.145
MA (children) (care: thresholds), Re [2009] EWCA Civ 853, [2009] 7 WLUK 849,
[2010] 1 FLR 431, [2010] 1 FCR 456, [2009] Fam Law 1026............................... B6.11
MFK Dubnica v FC Parma (CAS 2014/A/3486)............................................................ D2.99
MONOC v IOC (CAS OG 08/006)................................................................................ D2.159
MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789,
[2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 483, [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 494, [2016] 7 WLUK 720,
[2016] 2 CLC 272................................................................................................... B1.46
MTK Budapest v FC Internazionale Milano SpA (CAS 2009/A/1757)............ F3.176, F3.186
MTV v Formula One Management (unreported, 6 March 1998)................................... E2.51
McBride v Falkirk Football & Athletic Club (UKEATS/0058/10/BI)................. F1.16, F1.18,
F1.34, F1.61, F1.64
McCaig v Canadian Yachting Association, (Case No CI96-01-96624) (unreported,
24 April 1996), Man QB (Winnipeg)...................................................................... B2.47
McCarrick v Park Resorts Ltd & Chiltern Health & Safety Service & Johnson [2012]
10 WLUK 851........................................................................................... G1.98, G1.100
McComiskey v McDermott [1974] IR 75....................................................................... G1.18
McCracken v Melbourne Storm RLFC [2005] NSWSC 107......................................... G1.16
McCulloch v Lewis A May (Produce Distributors) Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 845, (1948)
65 RPC 58, [1947] WN 318, (1948) 92 SJ 54 Ch D..................... H1.136; H4.16, H4.40,
H4.43, H4.44
McCutcheon v David MacBrayne [1964] 1 WLR 125, [1964] 1 All ER 430, [1964] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 16, 1964 SC (HL) 28, 1964 SLT 66, (1964) 108 SJ 93, HL.............. H1.34
McDaid v Walsall MBC [2018] 5 WLUK 171............................................................... G1.156
McDermid v Nash Dredging & Reclamation Co Ltd [1986] QB 965, [1986]
3 WLR 45, [1986] 2 All ER 676, [1986] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 24, [1986] ICR 525,
[1986] IRLR 308, (1986) 83 LSG 1559, (1986) 130 SJ 372, CA........................... F1.33
MacDonald v FIFA & SFA [1999] SCLR 59, [1999] 7(1) SATLJ 33............................ E2.56
McGill (Anthony) v Sports & Entertainment Media Group (SEM) [2016] EWCA Civ
1063, [2017] 1 WLR 989........................................................................................ F2.152
McGinley v United Kingdom (21825/93) (1999) 27 EHRR 1, 4 BHRC 421, (1998)
42 BMLR 123, [1998] HRCD 624, ECtHR............................................................ E13.59
Table of Cases xcix
para
McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (No 13) [2012] FCA 1441................. E2.46; E11.175,
E11.178
McInnes v Onslow Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520, [1978] 3 All ER 211, (1978) 122 SJ 844,
Ch D........................................................................ E2.12; E6.1, E6.2; E7.8, E7.9, E7.11,
E7.35, E7.45, E7.58, E7.65, E7.75,
E7.81; E10.13, E10.19; E15.8, E15.19
McKennitt v Ash [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73, [2007] 3 WLR 194,
[2007] EMLR 4, (2007) 151 SJLB 27, CA............................................................. H4.63
McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508, QBD.............. B4.21, B4.26,
B4.38, B4.45, B4.47; D1.8, D1.91,
D1.123; E2.7; E3.4, E3.13; E6.1;
E7.1, E7.33, E7.65, E7.80; E15.27
McKeown, Decision on Penalty Reconsideration, 25 May 2010, ISLR 2010
3/4 SLR 157–158............................................................................ D1.123; E7.34, E7.35
McKerr v UK (Application 28883/95) [2001] 5 WLUK 157, (2002) 34 EHRR 20,
[2001] Inquest LR 170............................................................................................ E13.75
McLaren Racing Ltd v R & C Comrs [2012] UKFTT 601 (TC), [2013] SFTD 18,
TC........................................................................................................................... E8.9
McMahon v Dear [2014] CSOH 100, 2014 SLT 823, 2014 SCLR 616, [2014]
6 WLUK 431, 2014 Rep LR 71, 2014 GWD 22-421............................................. G1.113
McNamara v Duncan (1971) 26 ALR 584...................................................................... G1.12
McTier v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWHC 212 (Admin)....................... B1.43
McVety v Mahoney (1980) 25 AR 173........................................................................... G1.27
Maatschaap Toeters & MC Verberk v Productschap Vee en Vlees (Case C-171/03)..... A4.154
Macari v Celtic Football & Athletic Co Ltd, 1999 SC 628, 2000 SLT 80,
2000 SCLR 209, [1999] IRLR 787, 1999 GWD 25-1208, Ct of Sess.......... F1.19, F1.34,
F1.37, F1.50
Makuda v FIFA (CAS 2018/A/5769)............................................................................. B3.195
Málaga Club de Futbol SAD v UEFA (CAS 4 June 2013)............................................. B5.66
Malboum v Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa
(CAS 2017/A/5163)................................................................................................ B3.167
Malhous v Czech Republic (Application 33071/96) (12 July 2001).............................. E13.47
Malik v Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA (In Liquidation) [1998] AC 20,
[1997] 3 WLR 95, [1997] 3 All ER 1, [1997] ICR 606, [1997] IRLR 462, (1997)
94(25) LSG 33, (1997) 147 NLJ 917, HL.............................................................. F1.34
Malik v United Kingdom (23780/08) [2012] Med LR 270, ECtHR.............................. E13.72
Malisse (Flemish Doping Tribunal Case 2009-03, 5 November 2009)............... C9.1; C17.15
Malone v United Kingdom (A/82) (1985) 7 EHRR 14, ECtHR..................................... E13.60
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2011] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104, [2010]
3 WLR 1441, [2011] 1 All ER 285, [2011] PTSR 61, [2010] 11 WLUK 96,
[2011] HRLR 3, [2010] UKHRR 1213, 31 BHRC 670, [2011] HLR 7,
[2010] BLGR 909, [2011] L & TR 2, [2010] 3 EGLR 113, [2010] 45 EG 93 (CS),
(2010) 107 (44) LSG 16, (2011) 108 (8) LSG 20, (2010) 154 (42) SJLB 30......... E13.10
Manchester City Football Club Plc v Royle [2005] EWCA Civ 195, CA...................... F1.48
Manchester City v UEFA (CAS 2019/A/6298).............................................................. B5.75
Manchester City Football Club v UEFA (CAS 2020/A/6785)......... B1.4; B5.3, B5.73; E7.60,
E7.66, B5.76
Manchester United v Gabriel Heinze (unreported, 21 August 2007)............................. F3.44
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] WLR 749....... B1.56,
B1.57
Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG v Commission of the European Communities
(T112/98) [2001] ECR II-729, [2001] 5 CMLR 1, CFI.......................................... E11.36
Marbe v George Edwardes (Daly’s Theatre) Ltd [1928] 1 K.B. 269; 56 A.L.R. 888,
CA........................................................................................................................... F1.30
Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG (C-425/98) [2000] All ER (EC) 694, [2000] ECR I-4861,
[2000] 2 CMLR 1061, [2000] CEC 395, [2000] ETMR 723 ECJ.......................... H1.122
Marcello Costa (Case C-72/10) (16 February 2012)...................................................... E12.68
Marckx v Belgium (A/31) (1979) 2 EHRR 330, ECtHR.................................. E13.72, E13.75;
H4.68
c Table of Cases
para
Marcus Webb Golf Professional v R & C Comrs [2012] UKUT 378 (TCC),
[2013] STC 574, [2012] 10 WLUK 710, [2012] BVC 1944, [2012] STI 3232..... I1.128
Marks & Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd
[2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742, [2015] 3 WLR 1843, [2016] 4 All ER 441,
[2015] 12 WLUK 67, 163 Con LR 1, [2016] 1 P & CR 13, [2016] L & TR 8,
[2016] CILL 3779................................................................................................... F1.28
Marlon v Durban Turf Club 1942 AD 112...................................................................... E5.5
Martin v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd, 13 April 2010, EAT......................... E2.14
Martinez & Martinez v MGN Ltd (Case C-161/10) [2012] QB 654, [2012] 3 WLR 227,
[2011] ECR I-10269, [2011] 10 WLUK 688, [2012] CEC 837, [2012] IL Pr 8,
[2012] EMLR 12..................................................................................................... H4.82
Martinez v Ellesse International SpA [1999] CLY 861, CA................................... E8.15; F1.5
MasterCard International Incorporated v FIFA 239 Fed Appx. 625, 2007 US App
LEXIS 12309 (2nd Cir, 25 May 2007)................................................................... H3.65
Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream (C-344/98) [2000] ECR I-11369......... E11.30; E16.24, E16.25
Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, [1998] 3 WLR 18, (1998) 142 SJLB 100, PC
(Mauritius).................................................................................................... B1.29; E7.82
Matchroom Boxing v BT [2018] EWHC 2443 (Ch), [2018] 9 WLUK 247................... H1.147
Matt Lindland v US Wrestling Association & USOC.................................................... B2.93
Mayer v IOC (CAS 2002/A/389-393).................................................................. B1.44; C7.22
Maylin v Dacorum Sports Trust (t/a XC Sportspace) [2017] EWHC 378 (QB), [2017]
3 WLUK 226........................................................................................................... G1.148
Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, [2007] QB 462, [2007]
2 WLR 286, [2007] 1 All ER 1, [2007] ICR 701, [2007] 1 FLR 1398, [2006]
3 FCR 447, [2007] LS Law Medical 1, (2006) 92 BMLR 51, [2007] Fam Law 214,
[2006] 44 EG 196 (CS), (2006) 103(43) LSG 28, (2006) 156 NLJ 1686, CA.......... F2.61
Meca-Medina & Majcan v FINA (CAS 99/A/234 & CAS 99/A/235)............... B1.44; C4.34;
C6.1, C6.10, C6.41, C6.48,
C6.51, C6.52; C17.6; C18.6
Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (C-519/04 P) [2006] All
ER (EC) 1057, [2006] ECR I-6991, [2006] 5 CMLR 18, ECJ................... A1.44, A1.79;
B1.4; B5.31; C4.17, C4.20; D3.34, D3.35,
D3.39; E7.31; E11.1, E11.50, E11.51,
E11.52, E11.64, E11.71, E11.74, E11.75,
E11.76, E11.77, E11.80, E11.87, E11.89,
E11.93, E11.94, E11.101, E11.102,
E11.105, E11.107, E11.115, E11.126,
E11.127, E11.151, E11.168, E11.182,
E11.198; E12.107, E12.64, E12.99,
E12.116, E12.121; E15.8; F3.84, F3.88
Meca-Medina v Commission of the European Communities (T313/02) [2004] ECR
II-3291, [2004] 3 CMLR 60, [2005] CEC 176, CtFI.............. E2.4; E6.10, E6.11; E7.84
Mechaai v IAAF & Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de la Salud-en el Deporte
(AEPSAD) (CAS 2017/A/4967)............................................................................. C9.3
Media Protection Services Ltd v Crawford [2012] EWHC 2373 (Admin) [2013]
1 WLR 1068, [2012] CP Rep 48, (2013) 177 JP 54, [2012] CTLC 82, [2013]
Crim LR 155, DC.................................................................................................... E12.61
Media Protection Services Ltd v Gowland [2010] Eu LR 283....................................... E12.61
Medicaments & Related Classes of Goods (No 2), Re see Director of Fair Trading v
Proprietary Association of Great Britain
Meier v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345...................................................................... C6.30
Melinte v IAAF (CAS OG 00/015).............................................. C4.28, C4.28; C6.47, C6.61
Melnikov (Balakhnichev) v IAAD (CAS 2016/A/4417).................... B3.154, B3.157, B3.188
Mendy v Association Internationale de Boxe (AIBA) (CAS Atlanta 96/006)................ B3.36;
E2.16; E6.2
Mercato Sports (UK) Ltd & McKay v Everton FC [2018] EWHC 1567 (Ch), [2018]
7 WLUK 274....................................................... C3.3; D3.8, D3.29, D3.31; E8.1, E8.9;
E16.17; F2.171, F2.173; F3.202
Merchandising Corp of America Inc v Harpbond [1983] FSR 32, CA.......................... H4.30
Table of Cases ci
para
Mercury Bay Boating Club Inc v San Diego Yacht Club & Royal Perth Yacht Club of
Western Australia 76 NY 2d 256............................................................................ E2.57
Mersan Idman Yurdu SK v Milan Stepanov & Federation Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) (CAS 2017/A/5274)................................................................ D2.100
Messenger Leisure Developments Ltd v R & C Comrs [2005] EWCA Civ 648,
[2005] STC 1078, [2006] 5 WLUK 633, [2005] BTC 5332, [2005] BVC 363,
[2005] STI 1022...................................................................................................... I1.58
Messi Cuccitini v EUIPO; JM-EV e hijos (MESSI) (Case T-554/13) (26 April 2016).. H4.32
Metropole Television SA (M6) v Commission of the European Communities
(T185/00) [2002] ECR II-3805, [2003] 4 CMLR 14, [2003] ECDR 25, CFI..... E11.271
Metropole Television SA v Commission of the European Communities (T528/93)
[1996] ECR II-649, [1996] 5 CMLR 386, [1996] CEC 794, [1998] EMLR 99,
CFI......................................................................................... E11.115, E11.271, E11.275
Mewing v Swimming Australia (CAS 2008/A/1540).................... B2.2, B2.30, B2.47, B2.50,
B2.54, B2.68
Mexes & AS Roma v AJ Auxerre (TAS 2005/A/902)............. F3.260, F3.263, F3.264, F3.271
Mexès v AS Roma (CAS 2004/A/708)........................................................................... D2.107
Mica v PFC Naftex AC Bourgas (CAS, 24 December 2008)
Micallef v Malta (Application 17056/06) [2009] 10 WLUK 386, (2010) 50 EHRR 37,
29 BHRC 31............................................................................................................ E13.51
Michael v Australian Canoeing (CAS 2008/A/1549).................... B2.51, B2.74, B2.88, B2.89
Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports (NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011)............. B2.34, B2.47,
B2.50, B2.63, B2.69, B2.88, B2.89
Michelin NV v Commission of the European Communities (322/81) [1983] ECR 3461,
[1985] 1 CMLR 282, [1985] FSR 250, ECJ........................................................... E11.18
Middlesbrough Football & Athletic Co (1986) Ltd v Liverpool Football & Athletic
Grounds plc (FA Arbitration) [2002] All ER (D) 311 (May, [2002] All ER (D)
353 (Nov), [2002] EWCA 1929.................................................................. F1.89; F3.215
Milanese v Leyton Orient Football Club Ltd [2016] EWHC 1161, [2016] 5 WLUK 580,
[2016] IRLR 601..................................................................................................... F1.35
Millar v BCF (CAS 2004/A/707)......................................................................... B1.44; C4.16
Millar v FEI (CAS 2013/A/3151)................................................................................... C21.7
Miller v Australian Cycling Federation Inc [2012] WASC 74, SC Western Australia.... E8.3
Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966, [1977] 3 WLR 20, [1977] 3 All ER 338 CA............. E15.18;
G1.127, G1.128, G1.133
Minelli v Switzerland (A/62) (1983) 5 EHRR 554, ECtHR........................................... E13.55
Mirage Studios v Counter-Feat Clothing Co Ltd [1991] FSR 145 Ch D......... H1.132, H1.138;
H4.52
Miranda CAS Sydney 00/008, Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000............................ B1.35
Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd (No 1) (The Times, 23 July 1999), HL......... C6.21
Modal v BAF [1997] 7 WLUK 561............................................... B1.11, B1.49, B1.51, B1.56
Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1447, [2002]
1 WLR 1192, (2001) 98(43) LSG 34, (2001) 145 SJLB 238, CA................. B1.53; C3.7;
C4.1, C4.20, C4.26; C5.3; C6.46; D1.12, D1.13,
D1.16, D1.17, D1.34;D3.8, D3.29; E2.2; E3.12;
E4.5; E5.4; E7.13, E7.14, E7.17, E7.18, E7.22,
E7.38, E7.44, E7.51, E7.52, E7.54, E7.57,
E7.72, E7.83; E8.3, E8.9, E8.11, E8.13, E8.18;
E9.5; E10.17, E10.24; E13.52; E15.1, E15.31,
E15.32, E15.39; E16.21; F1.3, F1.19, F1.28
Modahl v British Athletic Federation [1999] All ER (D) 848........................................ B4.39
Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd 1997 QL 1105493......................................... B1.57
Mohamed Bin Hammam v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2625)........................................ A5.3; D1.104
Mohammed v Football Association [2002] EWHC 287, QBD.............................. E9.6; F2.64
Mohammed v Rougier & FA & FIFA [2002] EWHC 287............................................. E9.6
Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11, [2016] AC 677,
[2016] 2 WLR 821, [2017] 1 All ER 15, [2016] 3 WLUK 90, [2016] ICR 485,
[2016] IRLR 362, [2016] PIQR P11....................................................................... G1.35
Moloughney v Wellington Racing Club [1935] NZLR 800........................................... G1.102
cii Table of Cases
para
Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd (In Liquidation) v London Stock
Exchange Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1150, [2001] 4 All ER 223, [2001] 2 All ER
(Comm) 344, [2001] 2 BCLC 347, [2001] BPIR 1044, Ch D................................ B5.141
Montcourt v ATP (CAS 2008/A/1630)........................................... B1.4; B4.24, B4.25, B4.41
Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 318, [2001] ICR 819,
[2001] IRLR 269, [2001] Emp LR 405, (2001) 98(20) LSG 40 CA...................... F1.8
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2015] AC 1430, [2015]
2 WLR 768, [2015] 2 All ER 1031, 2015 SC (UKSC) 63, 2015 SLT 189,
2015 SCLR 315, [2015] 3 WLUK 306, [2015] PIQR P13, [2015] Med LR 149,
(2015) 143 BMLR 47, 2015 GWD 10-179............................................................. G1.59
Moore v Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 1 WLR 1024, [1972] 3 All ER 399,
48 TC 338, [1972] TR 61, (1972) 116 SJ 276 Ch D............................................... I2.67
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [1985] RPC 219................................... H1.13
Morales v Guatemalan National Anti-Doping Association (CAS 2016/A/4694)........... C6.15
Moreira de Azevedo v Portugal (A/189) (1991) 13 EHRR 721, ECtHR........................ E13.36
Morgan v Jamaican Athletic Administration Association (CAS OG 16/008)................ B2.99
Moriarty v Brooks, 172 ER 1419, (1834) 6 Car & P 684, Assizes................................. G2.23
Morocanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Stores Ltd [2014] EWHC 1686 (IPEC), [2014]
5 WLUK 957, [2015] ECC 6, [2014] ETMR 55, [2015] FSR 4............................. H1.134
Morrell v Owen (The Times, 14 December 1993).................................................. E9.2; G1.95
Morris (Herbert) v Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688...................................................... E10.3, E10.4
Morrow v Safeway Stores plc [2001] 9 WLUK 313, [2002] IRLR 9, [2001] Emp
LR 1303.......................................................................................................... F1.34, F1.35
Mortimer v Becket [1920] 1 Ch 571, Ch D.................................................................... F1.80
Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20,
(2008) 158 NLJ 1112, QBD.................................................................................... H4.63
Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER
(D) 02 (Jul), (2009) 46(4) CMLR 1327–1341.................. A1.24, A1.76; E11.61, E11.69,
E11.102, E11.103
Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Greece (C-49/07) [2009] All
ER (EC) 150, [2008] ECR I-4863, [2008] 5 CMLR 11, [2008] CEC 1068, ECJ... E11.101
Mountford v Newlands School [2007] EWCA Civ 21, [2007] ELR 256, (2007)
151 SJLB 164, CA....................................................................................... G1.26, G1.49
Mountstar v Chairty Commission (CA/2013/0001)....................................................... I1.122
Mouscron (Commission Press Release, 9 December 1999, IP/99/965)........... E11.86, E11.87
Mubic (Elmir) v FIFA (CAS 2011/A/2354)................................................................... F3.254
Muehlegg v FIS (CAS 2002/A/400).................................................................... C6.30; C17.2
Muehlegg v IOC (CAS 2002/A/374).............................................................................. C6.31
Muller v Switzerland (A/133) (1991) 13 EHRR 212, ECtHR........................................ E13.66
Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2005) 80 AJLR 43.......................... G1.100, G1.148
Mullins v Jockey Club see R (on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal
Board (No 1)
Mullins v McFarlane [2006] EWHC 986, QBD..................... D1.23; E3.4, E3.13; E5.3; E6.2,
E6.3; E7.1, E7.6, E7.23; E10.26; E13.1,
E13.7, E13.15, E13.20, E13.21
Mulvaine v Joseph, 118 NLJ 1078, (1968) 112 SJ 927.................................................. G1.32
Muralidharan v NADA (CAS 2014/A/3639).............................. C4.23; C6.10, C6.13, C6.14,
C6.15, C6.17, C6.25
Murdoch v Yachting New Zealand.................................................................................. B2.47
Murgatroyd (Inspector of Taxes) v Evans-Jackson [1967] 1 WLR 423, [1967] 1 All
ER 881, [1966] 11 WLUK 130, 43 TC 581, (1966) 45 ATC 419, [1966] TR 341,
(1966) 110 SJ 926................................................................................................... I2.73
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2007] EWHC 3091 (Admin), [2008]
1 WLR 1869, [2008] Bus LR 1454, [2008] ECD 9, [2008] FSR 15, [2008] ACD 30
& [2008] EWHC 1666 (Admin); [2008] UKCLR 427; [2008] FSR 33, DC......... E12.61;
E16.26
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd [2012] EWHC 466 (Admin), [2012]
2 WLUK 696, [2012] 3 CMLR 2, [2012] ECC 16, [2012] LLR 672....... E2.50; E11.235;
E12.61
Table of Cases ciii
para
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd v QC Leisure (C-403/08) [2012] All ER
(EC) 629, [2012] Bus LR 1321, [2012] 1 CMLR 29, ECJ..................................... H2.97
Murphy v Southend United Football Club Ltd (unreported, 18 March 1999)................ F1.45,
F1.79
Murray v Express Newspapers Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481, [2008]
3 WLR 1360, [2008] ECDR 12, [2008] EMLR 12, [2008] 2 FLR 599, [2008]
3 FCR 661, [2008] HRLR 33, [2008] UKHRR 736, [2008] Fam Law 732, (2008)
105(20) LSG 23, (2008) 158 NLJ 706, (2008) 152(19) SJLB 31, CA................... H4.63
Murray v Harringay Arena 1951] 2 KB 529, [1951] 2 All ER 320n, (1951) 95 SJ 529,
CA............................................................................................................ G1.104, G1.105
Mutko v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5498)................................................................................. B1.22
Mutu v Chelsea (CAS 2008/A/1644)..................................................... D2.167; F1.48; F3.257
Mutu v Chelsea Football Club Ltd ( Swiss Federal Tribunal 10 June 2010).................. D2.32,
D2.177
Mutu & Pechstein v Switzerland (Application 40575/10 & 67474/10)............. D1.63; D2.10,
D2.16, D2.25, D2.54, D2.88, D2.133, D2.167,
D2.177; D3.6, D3.10, D3.15, D3.21, D3.32,
D3.33, D3.37, D3.38, D3.67; E2.4; E4.6, E4.8,
E4.10; E5.10, E5.11; E13.22, E13.26, E13.33,
E13.36, E13.39, E13.41, E13.44, E13.47,
E13.50, E13.51, E13.52, E13.54; E16.17
Muyldermans v Belgium (A/214B) (1993) 15 EHRR 204, ECtHR............................... E13.44
N
N v FEI (CAS 92/63)...................................................................................................... C6.25
N v FINA (CAS 98/202)................................................................................................. C7.1
N, J, Y, W v FINA (CAS 98/208)........................................................................... C5.2; D2.98
N, J, Y, W v FINA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 31 March 1999)........................... B1.18; D2.192
NAAAT v Baptiste (Disciplinary Committee, 10 August 2014).... C21.1, C21.2, C21.4, C21.5
NADA v Sinkewitz (CAS 2012/A/2857)..................................... C6.22, C6.34; C21.5; C23.9
NISA v ISU (CAS 2003/O/466)....................................................... A1.29; B1.6, B1.8, B1.16
NRL v Wicks (23 May 2011)............................................................................... C12.1, C12.4
NZ Rugby League v Erihe (New Zealand Sport Tribunal, 4 April 2005)....................... C18.16
NZO & CGA Inc v Telecom New Zealand Ltd [1996] 7 TCLR 167............................. H1.132
NZRL v Tawera (SDTNZ, 5 May 2005)................................................................ C8.1; C18.3
Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v
International Ice Hockey Federation (CAS 2001/A/357).................. B1.28, B1.29, B1.57
Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department see R (on the application of
Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
Nagle v Fielden [1966] 2 QB 633, [1966] 2 WLR 1027, [1966] 1 All ER 689, (1966)
110 SJ 286, CA........................................................ B5.145; D1.51; E2.12; E3.12; E7.6,
E7.7, E7.8, E7.9, E7.16, E7.50, E7.82;
E8.11; E10.3, E10.13, E10.19, E10.25;
E15.11, E15.23, E15.30
Naraki v Shelbourne [2011] EWHC 3298 (QB), [2011] 12 WLUK 526....................... G1.63
Nasri v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5061)................................................................................ C18.27
National Basketball Association v Motorola Inc 105 F 3d 841 (1997) (2d Cir (US)..... H1.13,
H1.73
National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd v Olint Corpn Ltd [2009] UKPC 16, [2009]
1 WLR 1405, [2009] Bus LR 1110, [2009] 4 WLUK 476, [2009] 1 CLC 637...... E15.4
National Crime Agency v N & Royal Bank of Scotland [2017] EWCA Civ 253, [2017]
1 WLR 3938, [2017] 4 WLUK 201, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 232.......................... E15.20
National Cycling Federation v Wilson (NADP Tribunal, 8 July 2008).......................... C23.6
National Football League/Adidas, Court of Appeal of Paris, 29 February 2000, [2000]
10 ECLR, p N.118/9............................................................................. E11.288, E11.290
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injurity Litigation (No 2), Re (12-md-
02323 (ED Pa)......................................................................................................... E2.28
National Grid Plc v Gas & Electricity Markets Authority 2010] EWCA Civ 114,
[2010] UKCLR 386, CA......................................................................................... E11.18
civ Table of Cases
para
National Horse Racing Authority of Southern Africa v Naidoo (AR254/08)
[2009] ZAKZHC 6; 2010 (3) SA 182 (N).............................................................. E5.5
National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (1975) 1 EHRR 578................................ E13.68
National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd
[1972] AC 785, [1972] 2 WLR 455, [1972] 1 All ER 641, [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
101, (1972) 116 SJ 138, HL.................................................................................... B5.37
National Wheelchair Basketball Federation v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) & Gibbs
(CAS 2010/A/2230).................................................................................... C16.2; E13.21
Nemec v CITA & IAAF (CAS 2016/A/4458)........................................................ C6.8, C6.17
Netball New Zealand v IFNA (CAS 2010/A/2315)........................................................ B2.13
Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v International Association of
Athletics Federations (IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee (USOC)
(CAS 2008/A/1641) B3.36;.................................................................................... D2.40
Neumeister v Austria (A/8) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 91, ECtHR.......................................... E13.48
New Balance Athletics Inc v Liverpool Football Club & Athletic Grounds Ltd
[2019] EWHC 2837 (Comm), [2019] 10 WLUK 385...................... F1.5; F3.230; H3.67
New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee (CAS
OG 02/006)..................................................................................... B1.37; B2.85; D2.152
New Zealand Trotting Conference v Ryan [1990] 1 NZLR 143.................................... E5.5
Newcastle United Plc v R & C Comrs [2006] UKVAT 19718....................................... F2.124
Newcastle United Plc v R & C Comrs [2007] EWHC 612 (Ch), [2007] STC 1330,
[2007] BTC 5481, [2007] BVC 449, [2007] STI 1050, Ch D..................... F2.125; I1.65
Newport Association Football Club Ltd v Football Association of Wales Ltd [1995]
2 All ER 87, (1994) 144 NLJ 1351, Ch D................................ E2.31; E7.6; E8.6, E8.17;
E10.1, E10.4, E10.7, E10.10, E10.15, E10.16,
E10.17, E10.18, E10.19, E10.21, E10.24;
E12.49; E15.5, E15.7, E15.11, E15.20,
E15.21, E15.35; F3.50
New Saints v Football Association for Wales Ltd [2020] EWHC 1838 (Ch), [2020]
7 WLUK 165................................................................ A1.30; B5.152; E2.38; E6.1; E7.1,
E7.41, E7.51; E8.3, E8.15
News Ltd v Australian Rugby League (1996) 135 ALR 33.......................... E8.5, E8.17; E9.6
News Ltd v Australian Rugby League (No 2) (1997) 139 ALR 193...................... E8.17; E9.6
News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd [2003] HCA 45.. B5.42
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV [2011] EWCA Civ 890,
[2012] Bus LR 53, [2012] RPC 1, CA......................................................... H1.65, H1.79
Newsweek Inc v BBC [1979] RPC 441 CA................................................................... H1.134
Newton-John v Scholl-Plough (1986) 11 FCR 233........................................................ H4.49
NeXovation Inc v European Commission (Case T-353/15) (16 October 2017).......... E11.323
NeXovation Inc v European Commission (Case C-665/19P)...................................... E11.323
Neykova v FISA & IOC (CAS Sydney 00/012)............................................................. B3.37
Nicholas v Borg [1987] AIPC 90 (SC Australia)............................................................ H1.133
Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems v De Angelis (unreported , 21 December 1979).... F1.2,
F1.9, F1.66, F1.81, F1.82; F3.16
Nigerian Football Federation v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3744 & 3766)............................... A1.17
Nike European Operations Netherlands BV v Rosicky [2007] EWHC 1967, Ch D...... F1.84
Nintentdo Co Ltd v Sky UK Ltd [2019] EWHC 2376 (Ch), [2020] 3 All ER 83, [2020]
2 All ER (Comm) 238, [2019] Bus LR 2773, [2019] 9 WLUK 74, [2020] ECC 7,
[2019] ETMR 60..................................................................................................... H1.148
No 1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd v East Tower Apartments Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ
250, [2018] 1 WLR 5682, [2018] 2 WLUK 457, [2018] HLR 20, [2018] L &
TR 18............................................................................................................ B1.36; E7.40
Nobes v Australian Cricket Board (unreported, 16 December 1991)............................. F3.53
Nolan v Aldwinians RUFC (unreported, 10 July 2001).................................................. F1.28
Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535, HL...... E10.4,
E10.5, E10.6, E10.7, E10.11, E10.12,
E10.16, E10.18, E10.19, E10.21, E10.23,
E10.29; F1.22; F3.50, F3.53, F3.228
Norman v Golder (1942-45) 26 TC 203......................................................................... I2.73
Table of Cases cv
para
Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] ECDR 205, [2000] EMLR 67, [2000] FSR 363,
(2000) 23(3) IPD 23026, (1999) 96(45) LSG 31, (1999) 143 SJLB 279, CA........ H1.38,
H1.69
North Range Shipping Ltd v Seatrans Shipping Corp (The Western Triumph)
[2002] EWCA Civ 405, [2002] 1 WLR 2397, [2002] 4 All ER 390, [2002]
2 All ER (Comm) 193, [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [2002] CLC 992, (2002)
99(20) LSG 31, CA................................................................................................. D3.95
Norwegian Olympic Committee, Alsgaard v IOC (CAS 2002/O/372).......................... D2.62
Norwich Pharmacal v R & C Comrs [1974] AC 133, [1973] 3 WLR 164, [1973]
2 All ER 943, [1973] 6 WLUK 112, [1973] FSR 365, [1974] RPC 101, (1973)
117 SJ 567.................................................................................... B4.47; E15.15; H1.148
Nose v Slovenian Cycling Federation (CAS 2007/A/1356)................... C4.40; C6.45; C7.16;
C18.19; C20.12
Nova Productions Ltd v Mazooma Games Ltd [2006] EWHC 24 (Ch), [2006] EMLR 14,
[2006] RPC 14, (2006) 29(3) IPD 29023, (2006) 103(8) LSG 24 Ch D....... H1.70; J1.27
Nowak (Peter) v Data Protection Comr (Case C-434/16) [2018] 1 WLR 3505, [2017]
12 WLUK 540, [2018] 2 CMLR 21, [2018] CEC 1001......................................... A4.7
N’Sima v FIBA (Appeal Commission, 16 January 2006).............................................. C6.16
O
O v RFEC (CAS 2002/A/358)........................................................................................ C6.30
OBG Ltd v Allan; Mainstream Properties Ltd v Young; Douglas v Hello!Ltd; sub nom
OBG Ltd v Allen [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, [2007] 2 WLR 920, [2007]
4 All ER 545, [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2007] Bus LR 1600, [2007] IRLR 608,
[2007] EMLR 12, [2007] BPIR 746, (2007) 30(6) IPD 30037, [2007] 19 EG 165
(CS), (2007) 151 SJLB 674, [2007] NPC 54, HL............... E9.6; F1.88; F2.151; G1.155;
H1.16, H1.17, H1.18, H1.19, H1.39
OGC Nice Cote d’Azur & Yannick dos Santos Dialo v FIFA (TAS 2011/A/2578)....... F3.280
Oberschlick v Austria (A/204) (1991) (1995) 19 EHRR 389, ECtHR........................... E13.54
Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) (1998) 25 EHRR 357, ECtHR......................................... E13.66
O’Brien v Associated Fire Alarms [1968] 1 WLR 1916, [1969] 1 All ER 93, 3 KIR 223,
(1968) 112 SJ 232, CA............................................................................................ F1.37
O’Callaghan v Coral Racing Ltd (unreported, 19 November 1998), CA.......... D3.17, D3.19,
D3.25, D3.103
O’Connell (Edward) & Lambe (James) v Turf Club & A-G [2017] IESC 57, [2017]
2 IR 43..................................................................................................................... E7.41
Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25, [2009]
1 WLR 1230, [2009] 3 All ER 1061, [2009] 5 WLUK 466, [2010] Imm AR 59,
[2009] INLR 401..................................................................................................... B1.36
Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1971] 1 WLR 442,
[1971] 2 All ER 407, [1970] 11 WLUK 63, (1970) 49 ATC 315, [1970] TR 299,
(1971) 115 SJ 224................................................................................................... I1.17
O’Dwyer v Council of Ministers of the European Communities (T466/93) [1995] ECR
II-2071, [1996] 2 CMLR 148, CFI.................................................................... E12.110
Office of Fair Trading v X [2003] EWHC 1042 (Comm), [2003] 2 All ER (Comm)
183, [2003] UKCLR 765, [2004] ICR 105, QBD................................................... E11.35
O’Hara v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UEFA (CAS 2008/A/1511)........... C4.21;
C18.27
Ohlsson v WRU (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 6 January 2009)............ C3.7; C4.3, C4.23, C4.26;
C6.6, C6.7, C6.16, C6.22
Ohuruogu v UK Athletics (CAS 2006/A/1165)............................ A1.19; B1.53, B1.56, B1.59;
C3.6, C3.7; C4.17; C9.1;
C17.15; F1.3, F1.19
Olafsson v Iceland (2013) 56 EHRR 633....................................................................... E13.68
Olasu de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit (CAS 2014/A/3467)................. B4.21, B4.35, B4.38
Oliveira v USADA (CAS 2010/A/2107)............................................................. C18.33; C20.6
Olubi v British Bobsleigh (Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014)........................ B2.47, B2.57
Olympique des Alpes SA v Genoa Cricket & Football Club (CAS 2017/A/5090)........ D2.99
cvi Table of Cases
para
Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Bernard [2010] ECR I-2177................. F1.26; F3.156, F3.181,
F3.183, F3.247
Olympique Lyonnais SASP v Bernard (Case C-325/08) [2010] 3 WLUK 457,
[2010] All ER (EC) 615, [2010] 3 CMLR 14, [2011] CEC 60.................. B5.31; E12.22,
E12.28, E12.34, E12.42, E12.100, E12.101,
E12.102, E12.103, E12.105, E12.115, E12.121
Olympique des Alpes SA (FC Sion) v Genoa Cricket & Football Club
(CAS 2017/A/5090)................................................................................................ F3.252
Olympiques des Alpes v Schweizerisher Fussball-Verband (Higher Court, Canton of
Bern (Obergericht des Kantons Bern), 19 April 2012)........................................... D2.104
Olympiques Lyonnais v UEFA (CAS 2017/A/5299)...................................................... B3.85
Omeragik (Masar) v Macedonian Football Federation (FFM) (CAS 2011/A/2670)..... B1.22,
B1.61; D2.133
Omonigho Temile v FC Krylia Sovetov Samara (CAS 2007/A/1369)............... F1.69, F1.70;
F3.100, F3.256
Opel Austria GmbH v Council of Ministers of the European Communities (T-115/94)
[1997] All ER (EC) 97, [1997] ECR II-39, [1997] 1 CMLR 733, CFI.................. E12.73
Oriekhov v UEFA (CAS 2010/A/2172)................................... B3.181, B3.187; B4.11, B4.30,
B4.35, B4.37, B4.38, B4.41, B4.43
Orkem SA (formerly CdF Chimie SA) v Commission of the European Communities
(374/87) [1989] ECR 3283, [1991] 4 CMLR 502 ECJ........................................... E11.36
Ortega (Ariel) v Fenerbahce & FIFA (CAS 2003/O/482)................................ F3.259, F3.268
Osmanoglu v Turkey (Application 48804/99) [2008] 1 WLUK 371, (2011)
53 EHRR 17............................................................................................................ E13.62
Osborne v Parole Board; Reilly’s Application for Judicial Review, Re [2013] UKSC 61,
[2014] AC 1115, [2013] 3 WLR 1020, [2014] 1 All ER 369, [2014] NI 154,
[2013] 10 WLUK 277, [2014] HRLR 1, (2013) 157 (39) SJLB 37............. E7.57, E7.64
O’Sullivan McCarthy Mussel Development Ltd v Ireland (Application 44460/16)
[2018] 6 WLUK 712, (2019) 68 EHRR 6............................................................... E13.72
Otakuku Rovers Rugby League Club v Auckland Rugby League (unreported,
12 November 1993)............................................................................................ E11.289
Overlook v Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17............................................................................ B5.7
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound
No 1) [1961] AC 388, [1961] 2 WLR 126, [1961] 1 All ER 404, [1961] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 1, [1961] 1 WLUK 865, 100 ALR 2d 928, 1961 AMC 962, (1961)
105 SJ 85................................................................................................................. G1.31
Overvliet v IWF (CAS 2011/A/2675)............................................. A1.19; B1.53; C3.7; C4.13,
C4.17; C20.15
Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Siskina v Distos Compania Naviera
SA [1979] AC 210, [1977] 3 WLR 818, [1977] 3 All ER 803, [1978] 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 1, [1978] 1 CMLR 190 HL.............................................................................. E15.11
Oxley (Graham) Tool Steels v Firth [1980] IRLR 135, EAT.......................................... F1.33
Oyston v Reed [2016] EWHC 1067 (QB), [2016] 5 WLUK 147................................... E9.7
P
P (A Barrister) v General Council of the Bar [2005] 1 WLR 3019, [2005] PNLR 32... E13.52
P v FINA (CAS 97/180).................................................................................................. C18.6
P v International Federation (13 April 2016).................................................................. B5.31
PGA Ltd v Evans (unreported, 25 January 1989)...................... E2.44, E2.54; H1.33, H1.130;
H6.8, H6.24, H6.57
PRABF v USAB (CAS 94/132)...................................................................................... D2.157
PSV Eindhoven (Case SA/41613; 4 July 2016)........................................................... E11.315
PSV NV v FIFA & Federacao Portuguesa de Futebol (CAS 2005/A/835&942)........... D2.65;
F3.100
PTIOS v Gaviri (Hearing Officer, 30 April 2018)........................................................... B4.32
PTIOS v Guzman (Anti-corruption Hearing, 14 March 2019)....................................... B4.22
PTIOS v Klec (Anti-corruption Hearing, 21 August 2015)............................................ B4.32
PTIOS v Kryvonos (AHO, 18 May 2017)...................................................................... B4.41
PTIOS v Liindahl (CAS 2017/A/4956).......................................................................... B4.41
Table of Cases cvii
para
PTIOS v Navarrete (Ribeiro) (Anti-corruption Hearing, 3 October 2017)..................... B4.25
Page One Records, Ltd v Britton [1968] 1 WLR 157, [1967] 3 All ER 822, (1967)
111 SJ 944, Ch D.................................................................................................... F1.80
Pakistan Cricket Board v BCCI (ICC Dispute Resolution Committee, 20 November
2018)....................................................................................................................... B1.57
Palmer (Sigismund) v R [1971] AC 814, [1971] 2 WLR 831, [1971] 1 All ER 1077,
(1971) 55 Cr App R 223, (1971) 115 SJ 264, PC................................................... B3.52
Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation (CAS 2009/A/1823,
11 December 2009)....................................... A1.30, A1.54, A1.55, A1.56, A1.60; B1.22
Panathanaikos v Kyrgiakos (CAS 2005/A/973).............................................................. F3.223
Panathanaikos v UEFA & Olynpiakos (CAS 2015/A/4151).......................................... B5.7
Pantano & Pantano v Super Nova Racing [2003] EWHC 255, QBD.................. F1.81; F3.16
Papathanasiou (Emilios) v International Sailing Federation (ISAF) (CAS 2006/A/1142)... B3.35
Paragon Finance plc (formerly National Home Loans Corpn) v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ
1466 [2002] 1 WLR 685, [2002] 2 All ER 248, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 1025,
[2001] 10 WLUK 408, [2002] 2 P & CR 20, (2001) 98 (44) LSG 36, (2001)
145 SJLB 244, [2002] 1 P & CR DG13........................................................ B1.36; E7.40
Parish v World Series Cricket Pty Ltd (1977) 6 ALR 172.............................................. E2.52
Paris St Germain Football SASP v UEFA (CAS 2018/A/5937, 19 March 2019).......... B5.83;
E12.39
Paris St Germain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v Union des Associations
Europeenes de Football (UEFA) (CAS 2019/A/6367)............................. B3.137, B3.138
Park Promotion Ltd (t/a Pontypool Rugby Football Club) v Welsh Rugby Union Ltd
[2012] EWHC 1919, QBD....................................... B5.42; D1.57; E2.27, E2.29; E2.33;
E6.2; E7.1, E7.36, E7.50, E7.55;
E8.3; E10.27; E16.12, E16.16
Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233....................................................................................... D2.124
Parma FC v Portsmouth City FC (CAS 2012/A/2943)................................................... D2.71
Parma FC SpA v Federazione Italiana Giuco Calcio & Torino FC SpA
(CAS 2014/A/3629)................................................................................................ B1.12
Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow v Wallbank see Aston
Cantlow & Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank
Parsons v R & C Comrs [2010] UKFTT 110 (TC), [2010] 3 WLUK 256,
[2010] STI 2124...................................................................................................... I2.73
Patrugan v Romanian Anti-Doping Agency (CAS 2017/A/5209)....................... C3.8; C13.2
Pavicic (Karen) v Federation Equestre Internationale (OG 16/014, 2016).......... B2.99; D1.31
Pawlak v Doucette & Reinks (1985) 2 WWR 588.............................................. G1.22, G1.44
Pechstein, DESG v ISU (CAS 2009/A/1912-1913)....................... B1.44; C3.7; C4.16; C5.2;
C6.6, C6.10, C6.16; C7.3, C7.5,
C7.8, C7.9, C7.10; D2.13; E16.17
Pechstein v ISU (4A_612/2009)........................................................................... C7.10; D2.13
Pechstein v ISU (15 January 2015)............................................ C7.10; D2.13; E4.8; E11.102,
E11.103
Pechstein v ISU (German Federal Ct of Justice, 7 June 2016)............... A1.24; B1.15; C4.17;
C7.10; D2.13
Pechstein v ISU, (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 10 February 2010)............... C4.17, C4.45; D2.192
Pellizotti v UCI (CAS 2010/A/2308 & CAS 2011/A/2335)................................... C7.8, C7.11
Penarol v Beuno Rodriguez & Paris Saint Germain (CAS 2005/A/983/4)........ B1.15; F3.222,
F3.257
Perez v IOC (CAS OG Sydney 2000/005)............................ B1.57; D2.133, D2.156, D2.157
Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255.................................................................... G1.70
Peternell v SASCOC & SAEF (CAS 2012/A/2845).......... B2.33, B2.48, B2.49, B2.77, B2.89
Peters v Netherlands, 77-A DR 75 (1994)...................................................................... E13.59
Pett v Greyhound Racing Association (No 1) [1969] 1 QB 125, [1968] 2 WLR 1471,
[1968] 2 All ER 545, (1968) 112 SJ 463, CA......................................................... E7.6
Pfeifer v Austria (A/227) (1992) 14 EHRR 692, ECtHR............................................... E13.54
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015]
1 WLR 1591, [2015] 3 All ER 1015, [2015] 3 WLUK 744, [2015] 2 CMLR 49,
[2015] Imm AR 950, [2015] INLR 593........................................................ E7.82, E7.84
cviii Table of Cases
para
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Dickson [1970] AC 403, [1968] 3 WLR 286,
[1968] 2 All ER 686, (1968) 112 SJ 601, HL......................................................... E10.9
Phee v Gordon [2014] CSIH 50, 2015 SCLR 343, [2014] 6 WLUK 40, 2014 GWD 20-
383.............................................................................................................. G1.98, G1.142
Philis v Greece (No 2) (1998) 25 EHRR 417, ECtHR...................................... E13.24, E13.39
Phillip v Panam Sports Organisation (CAS 2019/A/6637)............ C6.14; C23.2, C23.5, C23.6
Phillip Darrell Jones v Commonwealth Games Federation (CAS CG 2010/01)............ B2.42
Phoenix Finance Ltd v Federation International de l’Automobile [2002] EWHC 1028,
Ch D................................................................ D3.10, D3.61, D3.88; E2.12; E4.9, E4.11;
E7.55; E15.5, E15.7, E15.8, E15.10; E16.19
Photo Productions v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, [1980] 2 WLR 283,
[1980] 1 All ER 556, [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 545, [1980] 2 WLUK 146, (1980)
124 SJ 147............................................................................................................... H6.127
Piau (Laurent) v Commission of the European Communities (T-193/02) [2005] ECR
II-209, [2005] 5 CMLR 2, CFI.......................... E2.27; E11.67, E11.68, E11.70, E11.71,
E11.72, E11.79, E11.80, E11.102, E11.162,
E11.163; E12.66; F2.1, F2.59, F2.69, F3.92
Piau v Commission of the European Communities (C-171/05) [2006] ECR I-37......... D3.34;
F2.59
Piersack v Belgium (1982) 5 EHRR 169........................................................................ E13.52
Pighini v Atletico de Madrid........................................................................................... F2.137
Pilkadaris v Asian Tour (Tournament Division) Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 236, HC Sing...... E2.26;
E10.5, E10.29; E11.108
Pillay v Hockey India (Case 73/2011 Competition Commission, India, 31 May 2013).... A1.77
Pinchbeck v Craggy Island Ltd [2012] EWHC 2745 (QB), [2012] 3 WLUK 447......... G1.88
Pine Valley Developments v Ireland (A/246-B) (1993) 16 EHRR 379, ECtHR............ E13.79
Pistorius v IAAF (CAS, 16 May 2008).......................................................................... E2.14
Pistorius v IAAF (CAS 2008/A/1480)............................................................................ B2.39
Pitcher v Huddersfield Town Football Club [2001] All ER (D) 223.................. G1.21, G1.37
Pittsburgh Athletic Co v KQV Broadcasting Co, 24 F Supp 490 (WD Pa 1938)........... H1.11,
H1.12
Platini v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 29 June 2017)....................................... B1.53; D2.47
Platini v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4474)................................................................................ A5.3
Player H v Club O & Club D (23 March 2006); Player P v Club L (21 February
2006)........................................................................................................... F3.160, F3.221
Plotniy v ITF (CAS 2010/A/2245)................................................................................. C16.1
Pobyedonostsev v IIHF (CAS/2005/A/990)........................................... C7.1; C18.19, C18.28
Polkey v AE Dayton Services Ltd [1988] AC 344, [1987] 3 WLR 1153, [1987] 3 All
ER 974, [1988] ICR 142, [1987] IRLR 503, (1987) 137 NLJ 1109, (1988)
138 NLJ Rep 33, (1987) 131 SJ 1624, HL............................................................. F1.85
Poll v FINA (CAS 2002/A/399)..................................................................................... C6.41
Poppleton v Trustees of the Portsmouth Youth Activities Committee
[2007] EWHC 1567, QBD.................................................... G1.6, G1.88, G1.92, G1.148
Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, [2002] 2 AC 357, [2002] 2 WLR 37, [2002]
1 All ER 465, [2002] HRLR 16, [2002] HLR 16, [2002] BLGR 51, (2001)
151 NLJ 1886, [2001] NPC 184, HL.................................. B2.71; D1.76; E7.22, E7.73
Porter v National Union of Journalists [1980] 1 WLUK 274, [1980] IRLR 404........... B1.54
Portuguese Athletic Federation v Ornelas, Case 4/2011 (Disciplinary Council of
Portuguese Athletic Federation, 13 January 2012)...................................... C7.12; C19.8
Post Office v Liddiard [2001] EWCA Civ 940, [2001] Emp LR 784, CA..................... F1.64
Pous Tio v ITF, CAS 2008/A/1488....................................................... C16.2; C18.26, C18.27
Powell v JADCO (CAS 2014/A/3571)........................................................................... C20.10
Premier Family Martial Arts LLP v R & C Comrs [2020] UKFTT 1 (TC), [2020]
1 WLUK 13, [2020] STI 231.................................................................................. I1.128
Premier Rugby v RFU [2006] EWHC 2068................................................ E2.37; E7.55; E8.5
Premier Rugby Ltd v Saracens (5 November 2019)................... B1.4; B5.114, B5.115; D3.34;
E2.24, E2.39; E6.1, E6.2, E6.11; E7.1, E7.39,
E7.51, E7.84; E8.4; E11.53, E11.73, E11.165,
E11.167, E11.172, E11.173; F3.22, F3.25, F3.45
Table of Cases cix
para
Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fiji Shipping Company Ltd see Fiona Trust & Holding
Corp v Privalov
Prestatyn Urban DC v Prestatyn Raceway Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 33, [1969] 3 All
ER 1573, 68 LGR 609, (1969) 113 SJ 899, Ch D.................................................. G1.132
Print v Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1999] All ER (D) 1197, QBD.................... D3.66
Proactive Sports Management Ltd v Rooney [2011] EWCA Civ 1444, [2012] 2 All
ER (Comm) 815, [2012] IRLR 241, [2012] FSR 16, CA................ E10.3; F1.19, F1.25;
F2.142, F2.161, F2.162,
F2.163, F2.166; H4.91
Proceedings Brought by Wahlergruppe Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative
und Grune GewerkschafterInnen/UG (C-171/01) [2003] ECR I-4301, [2003]
2 CMLR 29, ECJ.................................................................................................... E12.76
Procola v Luxembourg (A/326) (1996) 22 EHRR 193, ECtHR..................................... E13.52
Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia Oil & Cake Co Ltd (Reasonableness of Trade
Custom) [1917] 1 KB 320, CA............................................................................... B2.17
Proform Sports Management Ltd v Proactive Sports Management Ltd
[2006] EWHC 2903 (Ch), [2007] 1 All ER 542, [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 356,
[2007] Bus LR 93, (2006) 156 NLJ 1723, Ch D.................. F1.89, F1.96; F2.7, F2.142,
F2.147, F2.150; F3.251
Provident Financial Group v Hayward [1989] 3 All ER 298, [1989] ICR 160,
[1989] IRLR 84, CA............................................................................................... F1.30
Provimi Ltd v Aventis Animal Nutrition SA [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm), [2003]
2 All ER (Comm) 683, [2003] UKCLR 493, [2003] ECC 29, [2003] Eu LR 517,
QBD........................................................................................................................ E11.26
Puerta v ITF (CAS 2006/A/1025)..................................... B1.15, B1.32, B1.33, B1.43, B1.61;
C4.42; C16.3; C18.5, C18.6, C18.7,
C18.8, C18.17; C20.10, C20.17,
C20.18, C20.19; C23.2; E7.84
Pulis v Cystal Palace Football Club Ltd [2016] EWHC 2999 (Comm), [2016]
11 WLUK 529............................................................................................... D3.94; F1.42
Purevdori v United World Wrestling (CAS 2019/A/6190)........... C4.17; C6.40; C17.5, C17.6
Q
QPR v EFL (EFL Arbitration, 19 October 2017)............. B1.4; B5.96, B5.114; D3.34; E7.56
Qatar FA v FIFA (CAS 2012/A/2742).................................................................. B1.55, B1.56
Qerimaj v International Weightlifting Federation (CAS 2012/A/2822).............. C13.2; C17.8;
C18.20, C18.32; C20.6, C20.12,
C20.13, C20.15; C21.11
Queens Club Ltd v R & C Comrs [2017] UKFTT 700 (TC), [2017] 9 WLUK 362,
[2017] STI 2074...................................................................................................... I1.68
Queen’s Park Rangers v Football League (FDC Arbitral Panel, 2017)................ E6.11; E7.84
R
R v A (Complainant’s Sexual History) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45, [2001]
2 WLR 1546, [2001] 3 All ER 1, [2001] 2 Cr App R 21, (2001) 165 JP 609,
[2001] HRLR 48, [2001] UKHRR 825, 11 BHRC 225, [2001] Crim LR 908,
(2001) 165 JPN 750, HL......................................................................................... E13.12
R v Abu Hamza [2006] EWCA Crim 2918, [2007] QB 659, [2007] 2 WLR 226,
[2007] 3 All ER 451, [2007] 11 WLUK 637, [2007] 1 Cr App R 27, [2007] Crim
LR 320.................................................................................................................... B1.39
R v Adomako (John Asare) [1995] 1 AC 171, [1994] 3 WLR 288, [1994] 3 All ER 79,
(1994) 99 Cr App R 362, (1994) 158 JP 653, [1994] 5 Med LR 277, [1994] Crim
LR 757, (1994) 158 JPN 507, (1994) 144 NLJ 936, HL........................................ G2.34
R v Amir (Mohammad); R v Butt (Salman) [2011] EWCA Crim 2914, [2012] 2 Cr
App R (S) 17, CA....................................................................................................
B4.41, B4.49; E7.67; E16.22
R v Anderson (William Ronald) [1986] AC 27, [1985] 3 WLR 268, [1985] 2 All
ER 961, (1985) 81 Cr App R 253, [1985] Crim LR 651, HL................................. B4.48
cx Table of Cases
para
R v BBC, ex p Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23, [1983] 1 All ER 241, [1983] ICR 99,
[1982] IRLR 404, (1983) 133 NLJ 133, (1982) 126 SJLB 836, QBD....... B4.38, B4.40;
D1.95
R v BM [2018] EWCA Crim 560, [2019] QB 1, [2018] 3 WLR 883, [2018] 3 WLUK 554,
[2018] 2 Cr App R 1, [2018] LLR 514, [2018] Crim LR 847....................... G2.42, G2.78
R v Barnes (Mark) [2004] EWCA Crim 3246, [2005] 1 WLR 910, [2005] 2 All
ER 113, [2005] 1 Cr App R 30, [2005] Crim LR 381, (2005) 102(4) LSG 30,
CA...................................................................... D1.7, D1.95; G2.8, G2.9, G2.26, G2.33,
G2.46, G2.47, G2.48, G2.55, G2.60
R v Barnsley MBC, ex p Hook [1976] 1 WLR 1052, [1976] 3 All ER 452, 74 LGR 493,
(1976) 120 SJ 182, CA............................................................................................ E7.84
R v Billinghurst [1978] Crim LR 553, CC.............................................. G2.24, G2.54, G2.55
R v Birkin (Paul Abbey) (1988) 10 Cr App R (S) 303, [1988] Crim LR 854, CA......... G2.65
R v Blissett (The Independent, 4 December 1992).............................................. G2.29, G2.55
R v Boateng (Michael); R v Ganeshan (Krishna Sanjay); R v Sankaran (Chann) (Case
Nos T20139135, T20139053 & T20139135) (unreported, Birmingham Crown
Court)...................................................................................................................... B4.49
R v Boggild (Phillip) [2011] EWCA Crim 1928, [2012] 1 WLR 1298, [2011] 4 All
ER 1285, [2011] 5 Costs LR 879, [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 81, (2012) 176 JP 85,
[2012] Crim LR 48, CA............................................................................... A3.70, A3.72
R v Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83......................................................... G2.1, G2.26, G2.31
R v British Basketball Association, ex p Mickan (unreported, 17 March 1981), CA..... B1.57;
E7.6, E7.52; F3.44
R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, [1993] 2 WLR 556, [1993] 2 All ER 75, (1993) 97 Cr
App.R 44, (1993) 157 JP 337, (1993) 157 JPN 233, (1993) 143 NLJ 399, HL..... G2.8,
G2.13, G2.40, G2.42, G2.43, G2.78
R v Brownbill (unreported).................................................................................. G2.13, G2.18
R v CC 2009 ONCJ 249...................................................................................... G2.33, G2.51
R v Calton [1999] 2 Cr App R (S) 64, CA.............................................................. G2.2, G2.28
R v Cantona (The Times, 25 March 1995).......................................................... B3.80; G2.59
R v Cey (1989) 48 CCC 3d 480 (Sask CA)......................................................... G2.33, G2.48
R v Chance, ex p Smith [1995] BCC 1095, (1995) 7 Admin LR 821, DC..................... B4.40
R v Chapman (unreported 3 March 2010) CC (Warwick).............................................. G2.55
R v Church (Cyril David) [1966] 1 QB 59, [1965] 2 WLR 1220, [1965] 2 All ER 72,
(1965) 49 Cr App R 206, (1965) 129 JP 366, (1965) 109 SJ 371,Ct of CA........... G2.30
R v Ciccarelli (1989) 54 CCC (3d) 121.......................................................................... G2.48
R v Commission for Racial Equality, ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council
[1982] AC 779, [1982] 3 WLR 159, [1982] 6 WLUK 104, [1982] IRLR 424,
80 LGR 737, (1982) 126 SJ 449............................................................................. B1.47
R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, QBD.......................................... A3.76; G2.13, G2.37, G2.43,
G2.78, G2.81, G2.82
R v Cotterill [2007] EWCA Crim 526, [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 64, CA................. G2.5, G2.66
R v Davies (Robert Paul) (1990-91) 12 Cr App R (S) 308, [1991] Crim LR 70, CA.... G2.21,
G2.22
R v Derby Magistrates Court, ex p B [1996] AC 487, [1995] 3 WLR 681, [1995] 4 All
ER 526, [1996] 1 Cr App R 385, (1995) 159 JP 785, [1996] 1 FLR 513, [1996]
Fam Law 210, (1995) 159 JPN 778, (1995) 145 NLJ 1575, (1995) 139 SJLB 219,
HL........................................................................................................................... E11.36
R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909,
[1993] 2 All ER 853, [1993] COD 234, (1993) 143 NLJ 163, CA........ E2.4; E5.3, E5.5;
E7.7; E13.15; E15.11
R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex p Massingberd-Mundy [1993]
2 All ER 207, (1990) 2 Admin LR 609, [1990] COD 260, DC.............................. E5.3
R v Donovan (John George) [1934] 2 KB 498, (1936) 25 Cr App R 1, CA................... G2.43
R v DPP, ex p Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326, [1999] 3 WLR 972, [1999] 4 All ER 801, [2000]
1 Cr App R 275, [2000] HRLR 93, [2000] UKHRR 176, (2000) 2 LGLR 697,
(1999) 11 Admin LR 1026, [2000] Crim LR 486, (1999) 96(43) LSG 32, HL...... E13.55
R v Eastern Counties Rugby Union, ex p Basildon Rugby Club (unreported,
10 September 1987)................................................................................................ E2.33
Table of Cases cxi
para
R v Evans (unreported, 14 June 2006) (Newcastle Crown Court).................................. G2.17
R v Executive Council for the Joint Disciplinary Scheme, ex p Hipps [1996] CLY 5,
QBD........................................................................................................................ B4.40
R v Football Association Ltd, ex p Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833,
[1992] COD 52...................................................................................... E2.43; E5.3, E5.4
R v Football Association of Wales, ex p Flint Town United Football Club
[1991] COD 44, DC...................................................................................... E5.3; E12.49
R v G [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034, [2003] 3 WLR 1060, [2003] 4 All
ER 765, [2004] 1 Cr App R 21, (2003) 167 JP 621, [2004] Crim LR 369, (2003)
167 JPN 955, (2003) 100(43) LSG 31, HL............................................................. B3.47
R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, [1981] 2 All ER 1060, (1981) 73 Cr App R 124,
[1981] Crim LR 648, (1981) 125 SJ 442, CA......................................................... C4.1
R v Garfield (unreported, 15 November 2007), Crown Court (Swansea)...................... G2.24
R v Goodwin (Reginald Barry) (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 885, CA...................... G2.69, G2.70
R v Gough (Robert) [1993] AC 646, [1993] 2 WLR 883, [1993] 2 All ER 724, (1993)
97 Cr App R 188, (1993) 157 JP 612, [1993] Crim LR 886, (1993) 157 JPN 394,
(1993) 143 NLJ 775, (1993) 137 SJLB 168, HL.................................................... E13.53
R v Hardy (The Guardian, 27 July 1994)....................................................................... G2.61
R v Hertfordshire County Council, ex p Cheung (The Times, 4 April 1986)................. B1.27
R v Howell [1982] QB 416, [1981] 3 WLR 501, [1981] 3 All ER 383, [1981]
4 WLUK 132, (1981) 73 Cr App Rep 31, [1981] Crim LR 697, (1981)
125 SJ 462............................................................................................................... G2.84
R v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, ex p Brindle
[1994] BCC 297, CA.............................................................................................. B4.40
R v Institute of Chartered Accountants, ex p Nawaz [1997] 16 PNLR 43, CA.............. B4.38
R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225, (1991) 5 Admin
LR 265, [1990] COD 346, QBD............................................. E2.55; E5.4, E5.5; E7.81;
E10.14; E13.21
R v Johnson (1986) 8 Cr App Rep (S) 343..................................................................... G2.28
R v Johnstone (Robert Alexander) [2003] UKHL 28, [2003] 1 WLR 1736, [2003]
3 All ER 884, [2003] 2 Cr App R 33, (2003) 167 JP.281, [2004] ETMR 2,
[2003] HRLR 25, [2003] UKHRR 1239, [2003] FSR 42, [2004] Crim LR 244,
(2003) 167 JPN 453, (2003) 100(26) LSG 36, (2003) 147 SJLB 625, HL............ H1.120
R v Kamara (The Times, 15 April 1988)........................................................................ G2.58
R v Keogh (David) [2007] EWCA Crim 528, [2007] 1 WLR 1500, [2007] 3 All
ER 789, [2007] 2 Cr App R 9, [2007] HRLR 21, (2007) 104(12) LSG 35, (2007)
151 SJLB 397, CA.................................................................................................. E13.55
R v Life Assurance Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation, ex p Ross [1993] QB 17,
[1992] 3 WLR 549, [1993] 1 All ER 545, [1993] BCLC 509, (1993) 5 Admin
LR 573 [1992] COD 455, CA................................................................................. B2.94
R v Lincoln (1990) 12 Cr App Rep (S) 250......................................................... G2.65, G2.69
R v Lloyd (1989) 11 Cr App Rep (S) 36.............................................................. G2.3, G2.65
R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Hibbit & Saunders (The Times, 12 March 1993)................. E6.5
R v Luttrell (Gerrard Francis) [2004] EWCA Crim 1344, [2004] 2 Cr App R 31,
(2004) 148 SJLB 698, CA...................................................................................... B3.60
R v Majeed, Butt, Amir & Asif (3 November 2011).......................... B4.1, B4.4, B4.35, B4.40
R v Majeed (Mazhar); Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, [2013] 1 WLR 1041,
[2012] 3 All ER 737, [2012] 2 Cr App R 18, [2012] Lloyd’s Rep FC 593, [2012]
Crim LR 965, CA............................................................................. B4.41, B4.48, B4.49
R v Marshall (Adrian John) [1998] 2 Cr App R 282, (1998) 162 JP 489, [1999] Crim
LR 317, (1998) 162 JPN 504, (1998) 95(16) LSG 24, (1998) 142 SJLB 111,
CA........................................................................................................................... H1.33
R v Miller (Peter) [1954] 2 QB 282, [1954] 2 WLR 138, [1954] 2 All ER 529, (1954)
38 Cr App R 1, (1954) 118 JP 340, (1954) 98 SJ 62, Assizes................................ G2.23
R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex p Federation Europeene de la Sante
Animale (FEDESA) (C-331/88) [1990] ECR I-4023, [1991] 1 CMLR 507,
ECJ........................................................................................................................ E12.110
R v Moloney (Alistair Baden) [1985] AC 905, [1985] 2 WLR 648, [1985] 1 All ER 1025,
(1985) 81 Cr App R 93, (1985) 149 JP 369, [1985] Crim LR 378, HL.................... G2.35
cxii Table of Cases
para
R v Moore (1898) 15 TLR 229....................................................................................... G2.31
R v Noble (Kalem Connor) [2015] EWCA Crim 1454, [2015] 7 WLUK 1008............. G2.66,
G2.69
R v Olliver (Richard George) (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 10, (1989) 153 JP 369, [1989]
Crim LR 387; (1989) 153 J.P.N. 390, CA............................................................... G2.73
R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Al-Fayed [1992] BCC 524, [1992] BCLC 938,
(1993) 5 Admin LR 337, CA.................................................................................. B4.40
R v Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] QB 815........................ E5.4; E13.21
R v Piff (Jason Mark); su nom A-G’s Reference (No.27 of 1993), Re (1994) 15 Cr App
Rep (S) 737, CA........................................................................................... G2.28, G2.65
R v Rodgers..................................................................................................................... B4.49
R v Sang (Leonard Anthony) [1980] AC 402, [1979] 3 WLR 263, [1979] 2 All
ER 1222, (1979) 69 Cr App R 282, [1979] Crim LR 655, HL............................... B4.38
R v Savage (Susan); R v Parmenter (Philip Mark) (No.1), sub nom DPP v Parmenter
(Philip Mark) [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 3 WLR 914, [1991] 4 All ER 698, (1992)
94 Cr App R 193, (1991) 155 JP 935, [1992] Crim LR 288, (1991) 155 JPN 770,
(1991) 141 NLJ 1553, HL........................................................................... G2.20, G2.23
R v Scottish Football Association, ex p Rangers Football Club Plc [2012] CSOH 95,
2012 SLT 1156, 2012 GWD 20-402................................................... B5.144; D1.8; E4.9;
E5.5; E16.17
R v Secretary of State for Education & Employment, ex p Portsmouth Football Club
[1998] COD 142..................................................................................................... F1.13
R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p Eastside Cheese Co [1999] 3 CMLR 123,
[1999] Eu LR 968, [2000] EHLR 52, (2000) 2 LGLR 41, (2000) 55 BMLR 38,
[1999] COD 321, CA.......................................................................................... E12.110
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696, [1991]
2 WLR 588, [1991] 1 All ER 720, (1991) 3 Admin LR 486, (1991) 141 NLJ 199,
(1991) 135 SJ 250, HL............................................................................................ E13.2
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Naughton [1997] 1 WLR 118
(QB)........................................................................................................................ B1.57
R v Shervill (David Anthony) (1989) 11 Cr App Rep (S) 284, CA................................ G2.65
R v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, ex p Gallagher, CA............................................... B4.40
R v Soneji (Kamlesh Kumar) [2005] UKHL 49, [2006] 1 AC 340, [2005] 3 WLR 303,
[2005] 4 All ER 321, [2005] 7 WLUK 669, [2006] 2 Cr App R 20, [2006] 1 Cr App
R (S) 79, [2006] Crim LR 167, (2005) 102 (31) LSG 26, (2005) 155 NLJ 1315,
(2005) 149 SJLB 924.............................................................................................. C4.23
R v Stapylton (Ben) [2012] EWCA Crim 728, [2013] 1 Cr App R (S) 12, [2012] Crim
LR 631, CA............................................................................................................. G2.73
R v T [1990] Crim LR 256, CC...................................................................................... G2.63
R v Terry (John) (unreported, 13 July 2012)................................. B3.143; E2.6; E7.67; G2.91
R v Thomas (unreported, 13 February 2006), Bexley Magistrates’ Court...................... G2.86
R v Venna (Henson George) [1976] QB 421, [1975] 3 WLR 737, [1975] 3 All ER 788,
(1975) 61 Cr App R 310, [1975] Crim LR 701, (1975) 119 SJ 679, CA................ G2.20
R v Westfield, 17 February 2012........................................................................ B4.41, B4.49
R v Weston (unreported, 5 March 2012), Bristol Crown Court...................................... G2.66
R v Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411, (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, [1984] Crim
LR 163, (1984) 81 LSG 278, CA............................................................................ G2.61
R (Robert) v Ski Llandudno Ltd [2000] 7 WLUK 921, [2001] PIQR P5.......... G1.90, G1.144
R (on the application of Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the
Environment, Transport & the Regions see R (on the application of Holding &
Barnes Plc) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport & the Regions
R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for
Culture, Media & Sport [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312, [2008] 2 WLR 781,
[2008] 3 All ER 193, [2008] EMLR 8, [2008] HRLR 25, [2008] UKHRR 477,
24 BHRC 217, (2008) 152(12) SJLB 30, HL......................................................... E13.66
R (on the application of RBNB) v Crown Court at Warrington [2002] UKHL 24, [2002]
1 WLR 1954, [2002] 4 All ER 131, [2002] 6 WLUK 333, [2002] BCC 697,
(2003) 167 JP 6, [2002] LLR 515, (2003) 167 JPN 31, (2002) 99 (30) LSG 39,
(2002) 152 NLJ 999, (2002) 146 SJLB 174, [2002] NPC 85................................. B5.15
Table of Cases cxiii
para
R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth
Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [2009] 1 AC 453, [2008] 3 WLR 955, [2008] 4 All
ER 1055, [2008] 10 WLUK 552, (2008) 105 (42) LSG 20, (2008) 158 NLJ 1530,
(2008) 152 (41) SJLB 29........................................................................................ B3.134
R (on the application of Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15,
[2007] 1 AC 100, [2006] 2 WLR 719, [2006] 2 All ER 487, [2006] 1 FCR 613,
[2006] HRLR 21, [2006] UKHRR 708, 23 BHRC 276, [2006] ELR 273, (2006)
103(14) LSG 29, (2006) 156 NLJ 552, HL............................................................ E13.62
R (on the application of Bulger) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2001] EWHC Admin 119, [2001] 3 All ER 449, DC............................................ E13.75
R (on the application of Bus & Coach Association Ltd) v Secretary of State for
Transport [2019] EWHC 3319 (Admin), [2019] 12 WLUK 71............................. E15.24
R (on the application of Carson) v Secretary of State for Work & Pensions
[2005] UKHL 37, [2006] 1 AC 173, [2005] 2 WLR 1369, [2005] 4 All ER 545,
[2005] HRLR 23, [2005] UKHRR 1185, 18 BHRC 677, HL................................ E13.71
R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63,
[2014] AC 271, [2013] 3 WLR 1076, [2014] 1 All ER 683, 2014 SC (UKSC)
25, 2014 SLT 143, [2013] 10 WLUK 509, [2014] 1 CMLR 45, [2014] HRLR 3,
2013 GWD 34-676.................................................................................................. E13.10
R (on the application of Countryside Alliance) v A-G [2007] UKHL 52, [2008]
1 AC 719, [2007] 3 WLR 922, [2008] 2 All ER 95, [2008] Eu LR 359,
[2008] HRLR 10, [2008] UKHRR 1, (2007) 104(48) LSG 23, (2007)
157 NLJ 1730, (2007) 151 SJLB 1564, [2007] NPC 127, HL................. E13.68, E13.70
R (on the application of DSD) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin),
[2019] QB 285, [2018] 3 WLR 829, [2018] 3 All ER 417, [2018] 3 WLUK 689,
[2018] HRLR 12, [2018] ACD 57.......................................................................... E7.78
R (on the application of Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2002] EWCA Civ 606, [2002] QB 1391, [2002] 3 WLR 481, [2002]
4 All ER 289, [2002] UKHRR 734, 12 BHRC 497, [2002] Imm AR 447,
[2002] INLR 257, [2002] ACD 76, (2002) 99(22) LSG 33, (2002) 152 NLJ 708,
(2002) 146 SJLB 124, CA...................................................................................... E13.75
R (on the application of Gallaher Group Ltd) v Competition & Markets Authority
[2018] UKSC 25, [2019] AC 96, [2018] 2 WLR 1583, [2018] 4 All ER 183,
[2018] Bus LR 1313, [2018] 5 WLUK 293, [2018] 5 CMLR 2............................. E7.82
R (on the application of Gloszczuk) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(C-63/99) [2002] All ER (EC) 353, [2001] ECR I-6369, [2001] 3 CMLR 46,
[2001] CEC 358, [2002] INLR 357, ECJ............................................................... E12.76
R (on the application of Greenpeace Ltd) v Secretary of State for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 55 (Admin), [2016] PTSR 851, [2016]
1 WLUK 230, [2016] 2 CMLR 19, [2016] ACD 73............................................... E7.78
R (on the application of Haworth) v R & C Comrs [2019] EWCA Civ 74, [2019]
2 WLUK 1, [2019] 1 FLR 1175, [2019] 2 FCR 153.............................................. I2.111
R (on the application of Holub) v Secretary of State for the Home [2001] 1 WLR 1359,
[2001] HRLR 24, [2001] Imm AR 282, [2001] INLR 219, [2001] ELR 401,
[2001] ACD 31, CA................................................................................................ E13.75
R (on the application of Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd) v Teleconica UK Ltd
[2017] EWHC 3376 (Admin), [2017] 12 WLUK 572............................................ B1.21
R (on the application of Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for
England & Wales; A-G v Charity Commission for England & Wales, sub nom
Independent Schools Council v Charity Commission for England & Wales
[2011] UKUT 421 (TCC), [2012] Ch 214, [2012] 2 WLR 100, [2012] 1 All
ER 127, [2012] PTSR 99, [2011] ELR 529, [2012] WTLR 41, 14 ITELR 396,
TC........................................................................................................................... A2.71
R (on the application of Jayes) v Flintshire County Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1089,
[2018] 5 WLUK 246, [2018] ELR 416................................................................... E7.80
R (on the application of Kaur) v Institute of Legal Executives Appeal Tribunal
[2011] EWCA Civ 1168, [2012] 1 All ER 1435, [2012] 1 Costs LO 23,
[2011] ELR 614, (2011) 108(45) LSG 20, (2011) 155(40) SJLB 31,
[2011] NPC 106, [2012] PTSR, CA...................... D1.52, D1.78, D1.121; E7.72; E13.52
cxiv Table of Cases
para
R (on the application of Khatun) v London Borough of Newham [2004] EWCA Civ
55, [2005] QB 37, [2004] 3 WLR 417, [2004] 2 WLUK 611, [2004] Eu LR 628,
[2004] HLR 29, [2004] BLGR 696, [2004] L & TR 18, (2004) 148 SJLB 268,
[2004] NPC 28........................................................................................................ E7.78
R (on the application of King) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54,
[2016] AC 384, [2015] 3 WLR 457, [2016] 1 All ER 1033, [2015]
7 WLUK 909................................................................................................. E7.60, E7.72
R (on the application of Locke) v R & C Comrs [2019] EWCA Civ 1909, [2020]
1 All ER 459, [2019] STC 2543, [2019] 11 WLUK 52, [2019] BTC 30,
[2019] STI 1805...................................................................................................... I2.111
R (on the application of Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2003] EWHC 2073 (Admin), [2003] 9 WLUK 7, [2004] Prison LR 65............... A4.162
R (on the application of Lumsdon) v Legal Services Board [2015] UKSC 41,
[2016] AC 697, [2015] 3 WLR 121, [2016] 1 All ER 391, [2015] 6 WLUK 762,
[2015] 3 CMLR 42, [2015] HRLR 12, [2015] Crim LR 894................................. E3.9
R (on the application of McCann) v Manchester Crown Court [2002] UKHL 39,
[2003] 1 AC 787, [2002] 3 WLR 1313, [2002] 4 All ER 593, [2003] 1 Cr App
R 27, (2002) 166 JP 657, [2002] UKHRR 1286, 13 BHRC 482, [2003] HLR 17,
[2003] BLGR 57, [2003] Crim LR 269, (2002) 166 JPN 850, (2002)
146 SJLB 239, HL.................................................................................................. B4.37
R (on the application of McMorn) v Natural England [2015] EWHC 3297 (Admin),
[2016] PTSR 750, [2015] 11 WLUK 312, [2016] Env LR 14, [2016] LLR 151... B1.27
R (on the application of McVey) v Secretary of State for [2010] EWHC 437 (Admin);
[2010] Med LR 204, QBD...................................................................................... E7.32
R (on the application of Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Comrs of Income
Tax [2002] UKHL 21, [2003] 1 AC 563, [2002] 2 WLR 1299, [2002] 3 All
ER 1, [2002] STC 786, [2002] 5 WLUK 481, [2002] HRLR 42, 74 TC 511,
[2002] BTC 223, 4 ITL Rep 809, [2002] STI 806, (2002) 99 (25) LSG 35, (2002)
146 SJLB 126, [2002] NPC 70............................................................................... B1.61
R (on the application of Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56,
[2014] 1 WLR 3947, [2015] 1 All ER 495, [2014] PTSR 1317, [2014]
10 WLUK 872, [2014] BLGR 823, [2015] RVR 93............................................... B1.21
R (on the application of Mullins) v Jockey Club Appeal Board (No 1) [2005] EWHC 2197
(Admin), [2005] 10 WLUK 434, [2006] LLR 151, [2006] ACD 2............. D1.8; E3.13;
E5.3, E5.5, E5.8; E7.1, E7.6,
E7.10, E7.23; E13.21, E13.26
R (on the application of N) v Mental Health Review Tribunal (Northern Region)
[2005] EWCA Civ 1605, [2006] QB 468, [2006] 2 WLR 850, [2006] 4 All
ER 194, [2005] 12 WLUK 723, (2006) 88 BMLR 59, [2007] MHLR 59.............. B3.185
R (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363, [2005] 11 WLUK 580.................................................... B1.39
R (on the application of Newcastle United Football Club Ltd) v R & C Comrs
[2017] EWHC 2402 (Admin), [2017] 4 WLR 187, [2018] STC 103, [2017]
10 WLUK 63, [2017] Lloyd’s Rep FC 604, [2017] BVC 44, [2017] ACD 129,
[2017] STI 2181.................................................................................................. F2.7; I1.1
R (on the application of Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127,
[2019] 7 WLUK 20, [2019] ELR 443..................................................................... B3.115
R (on the application of Niazi) v Secretary fo State for the Home Department
[2008] EWCA Civ 755, [2008] 7 WLUK 256, (2008) 152 (29) SJLB 29.............. B3.132
R (on the application of Oliver) v DPP [2016] EWHC 1771 (Admin), [2016]
7 WLUK 371........................................................................................................... G2.34
R (on the application of Reprotech) (Pebsham) Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8,
[2003] 1 WLR 348, [2002] 4 All ER 58, [2002] 2 WLUK 761, [2003] 1 P & CR 5,
[2002] 2 PLR 60, [2002] JPL 821, [2002] 10 EG 158 (CS), [2002] NPC 32.... B1.36, B1.39
R (on the application of S) v Swindon BC [2001] EWHC Admin 334, [2001] 2 FLR 776,
[2001] 3 FCR 702, [2001] BLGR 318, [2001] Fam Law 659, QBD........................ B6.87
R (on the application of ST (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2012] UKSC 12, [2012] 2 AC 135, [2012] 2 WLR 735, [2012] 3 All ER 1037,
[2012] 3 WLUK 674, 34 BHRC 23, [2012] Imm AR 734, [2012] INLR 440........ B1.46
Table of Cases cxv
para
R (on the application of Save Britain’s Heritage) v Secretary of State for Commnunities
& Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 2137, [2019] 1 WLR 929, [2019] 1 All
ER 1117, [2018] 10 WLUK 88, [2019] JPL 237.................................................... E7.75
R (on the application of Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000]
2 AC 115, [1999] 3 WLR 328, [1999] 3 All ER 400, [1999] 7 WLUK 189,
[1999] EMLR 689, 7 BHRC 411, (1999) 11 Admin LR 961, [1999] Prison
LR 82, [1999] COD 520, (1999) 96 (30) LSG 28, (1999) 149 NLJ 1073, (1999)
143 SJLB 212.......................................................................................................... B1.61
R (on the application of Sky Blue Sports & Leisure Ltd) v Coventry City Council
(No 2) [2018] EWCA Civ 2252, [2018] 10 WLUK 220.................................... E11.322
R (on the application of Stott) v Justice Secretary [2018] UKSC 59, [2020] AC 51,
[2018] 3 WLR 1831, [2019] 2 All ER 351, [2018] 11 WLUK 455, [2019] 1 Cr
App R (S) 47, [2019] Crim LR 251........................................................................ E13.71
R (on the application of TVDanmark 1 Ltd) v Independent Television Commission
[2001] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 WLR 1604, [2001] 3 CMLR 26, [2001] Eu LR 741,
[2001] EMLR 42, (2001) 98(34) LSG 43, HL................................. A3.98, A3.99; E15.22
R (on the application of Turkish Businesspeople Ltd) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2019] EWHC 603 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR 4273, [2019]
3 WLUK 276, [2019] ACD 51................................................................................ E7.81
R (on the application of United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd) v Westminster
Magistrates’ Court [2019] EWHC 409 (Admin), [2019] 2 WLUK 359, [2019]
LLR 374....................................................................................................... B2.71; E7.72
R (Westech College) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 1484
(Admin), [2011] 6 WLUK 205............................................................................... E7.32
R (on the application of Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support
Service [2002] UKHL 38........................................................................................ B1.57
R (on the application of White) v Blackfriars Crown Court [[2008] EWHC 510
(Admin), [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 97, (2008) 172 JP 321, [2008] Crim LR 575,
DC........................................................................................................................... E12.69
R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education & Employment
[2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246, [2005] 2 WLR 590, [2005] 2 All ER 1,
[2005] 2 FLR 374, [2005] 1 FCR 498, [2005] HRLR 14, [2005] UKHRR 339,
19 BHRC 99, [2005] ELR 291, [2005] Fam Law 456, (2005) 102(16) LSG 27,
(2005) 155 NLJ 324, (2005) 149 SJLB. 266, HL................................................... E13.62
R & C Comrs v Bridport & West Dorset Golf Club Ltd (Case C-495/12)
[2014] STC 663, [2013] 12 WLUK 671, [2014] BVC 1, [2014] STI 257............. I1.128
R & C Comrs v Football League Ltd v The Football League & FA Premier League
[2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR 1539, [2013] BCC 60, [2013]
1 BCLC 285, [2012] BPIR 686, (2012) 109(24) LSG 20, Ch D................ B5.39, B5.134,
B5.140, B5.141, B5.144, B5.146,
B5.153; E2.34; E12.38
R & C Comrs v Rochdale Drinks [2011] EWCA Civ 1116, [2012] STC 186, [2011]
10 WLUK 298, [2013] BCC 419, [2012] 1 BCLC 748, [2011] BPIR 1604,
[2011] STI 2776...................................................................................................... E15.4
R & C Comrs v McLaren Racing Ltd [2014] UKUT 269 (TCC), [2014] STC 2417,
[2014] 6 WLUK 462, 82TC 345, [2014] BTC 518, [2014] STI 2288.................... I1.32
R & C Comrs v Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd [2010] EWHC 2013 (Ch),
[2011] BCC 149, [2010] BPIR 1123, (2010) 107(33) LSG 14, Ch D..... B5.133, B5.146;
E2.34
R & C Comrs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd [2020] UKUT 147 (TCC),
[2020] 5 WLUK 118............................................................................................... I2.51
R & C Comrs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd UT/2018/0161....................... F1.10
R & C Comrs v Tottenham Hotspur Ltd [2017] UKUT 453 (TCC), [2018] 4 WLR 17,
[2018] STC 81, [2017] 11 WLUK 602, [2017] BTC 535, [2018] STI 90...... I1.95; I2.68
RC v UK, Application 37664/94....................................................................... E13.33, E13.72
RCA Corpn v Pollard [1983] Ch 135, [1982] 3 WLR 1007, [1982] 3 All ER 771,
[1983] FSR 9, CA................................................................................................... H1.18
RCD Espanyol De Barcelona Sad v Club Athletico Velez Sarsfield
(CAS 2004/A/635).................................................................................................. B5.18
cxvi Table of Cases
para
RCD Mallorca v Club Atletico Lanus (CAS 2004/A/781)............................................. B5.18
RCD Mallorca v FA & Newcastle United (CAS 2008/A/1639)............. D2.65, D2.66, D2.116
RFC 2012 plc (in liquidation) (formerly The Rangers Football Club) plc v A-G for
Scotland [2017] UKSC 45, [2017] 1 WLR 2767, [2017] 4 All ER 654,
[2017] STC 1556, 2018 SC (UKSC) 15, 2017 SLT 799, 2017 SCLR 517,
[2017] 7 WLUK 77, [2017] BTC 22, [2017] WTLR 1093, [2017] STI 1610,
2017 GWD 21-357.......................................................................................... I1.95; I2.54
RFC Seraing v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4490).......................... B1.4, B1.14; B5.25, B5.31, B5.34;
D3.23, D3.38; E2.40; E12.40,
E12.41; F3.42, F3.209
RFEC v Alberdi (Spanish National Competition & Sporting Discipline Committee,
13 April 2009)......................................................................................................... C18.19
RFL v Leaf (RFL Disciplinary Panel, 11 August 2011).......................... B4.23, B4.25, B4.26,
B4.34, B4.38
RFL v Long & Gleeson (RFL Advisory Panel, 17 June 2004)....................................... B4.25
RFL v Price (RFL Anti-Doping Tribunal, 25 October 2008)......................................... C18.26
RFL v Tomkins (Joel) (Independent Operational Rules Tribunal, 5 March 2019)......... B3.61
RFU v Armitage (RFU Disciplinary Tribunal, 20 January 2011)................................... C10.1
RFU v Ashton (Chris) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 22 September 2016).......................... B3.57
RFU v Blake (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 24 May 2015)........................................ B4.23, B4.25
RFU v Cipriani (RFU Disciplinary Tribunal, 28 August 2018)................. B1.29; B3.3, B3.93,
B3.98, B3.107, B3.131,
B3.142, B3.145
RFU v Comben (RFU Tribunal, 9 April 2013)................................................ C18.24; C20.15
RFU v Cotton Traders Ltd [2002] EWHC 467 (Ch), [2002] ETMR 76, Ch D.............. H1.105,
H1.121, H1.135; H5.32
RFU v Diamond (Steve) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 19 November 2017)............. B3.3, B3.91,
B3.136, B3.137
RFU v Goodfellow (NADP Hearing Panel SR/NADP/112/2019, 11 February 2020)... C17.8
RFU v Hadfield (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 25 October 2019)........................................... C20.6
RFU v Hart (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 12 April 2018).............................. B4.25, B4.32, B4.41
RFU v Hughes (Nathan) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 23 October 2018)................ B3.3, B3.107,
B3.111
RFU v Johnson (Martin) (Internal Appeal, Disciplinary Panel, 5 March 2002)............. D1.42
RFU v Jose (Independent Panel, 23 September 2014)................................................... C21.7
RFU v Kvecic (Matt) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 28 January 2020)................................ B3.44
RFU v Lockwood (Barry) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 29 September 2014).................... B3.62
RFU v Lovobalavu (Gaby) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 21 February 2018)..................... B3.44
RFU v McCarthy (28 February 2017)............................................................................ B3.137
RFU v McIntosh (NADP, 13 April 2017)....................................................................... C10.1
RFU v Parker (RFU Tribunal, 8 May 2012)................................................................... C21.9
RFU v Peters (Disciplinary Tribunal, 3 March 2014)........................................... C11.3; C12.4
RFU v Price (Independent Panel, 10 March 2016)............................................... C6.16; C8.5
RFU v Ridler (Chance) (2 October 2012)............................................................. D1.48; D2.13
RFU v Scowby (John) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, February 2017)................................. B3.51
RFU v Solomona (Denny) (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 5 April 2018).............................. B3.60
RFU v Southend & Colchester (RFU Disciplinary Panel, 11 January 2017)................. B3.87
RFU v Spellman (RFU Tribunal, 3 April 2012)................................................... C21.7, C21.8
RFU v Steenkamp (RFU Judicial Committee, 22 March 2011)..................................... C18.32
RFU Stokes (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 3 November 2017)................................................ C21.11
RFU v Van Rensburg (Rohan Janse) (RFU Appeal Panel, 7 February 2020)................. B3.40
RFU v Viagogo Ltd [2012] UKSC 55, [2012] 1 WLR 3333, [2013] 1 All ER 928,
[2013] 1 CMLR 56, [2013] HRLR 8, [2013] FSR 23, (2012) 162 NLJ 1504,
(2012) 156(45) SJLB 31, SC.......................................................... E15.15; H1.33; H6.58
RFU v Willmott (Anti-Doping Panel, 13 April 2015 & 2 June 2015)................. C12.1, C12.3;
C20.20; C21.7
RPC v IPC (CAS 2016/A/4745)................................................... A1.52, A1.55, A1.58, A1.59
RS Components v Irwin [1974] 1 All ER 41, [1973] ICR 535, [1973] IRLR 239,
(1973) 15 KIR 191, [1973] ITR 569....................................................................... F1.48
Table of Cases cxvii
para
RWF v IWF (CAS OG 16/009)...................................................................................... A1.59
RYA v Johnston (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 30 May 2007)........................... C7.20; C8.5; C20.18
Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2, [2012] 2 AC 72,
[2012] 2 WLR 381, [2012] 2 All ER 381, [2012] PTSR 497, [2012] HRLR 10,
33 BHRC 208, (2012) 15 CCL Rep 13, [2012] Med LR 221, (2012)
124 BMLR 148, [2012] MHLR 66, (2012) 162 NLJ 261, (2012) 156(6) SJLB 31,
SC............................................................................................................................ E13.75
Race Tires America Inc v Hoosier Racing Tire Corp , No 09-3989 (Court of Appeal,
3rd Circuit, 23 July 2010)................................................................................... E11.193
Racecourse Association v OFT; BHB v OFT [2005] CAT 29........................... E2.51; E11.253
Racing Partnership Ltd & Arena Leisure Ltd v Done Bros (Cash Betting) Ltd
[2019] EWHC 1156 (Ch), [2020] Ch 289, [2019] 3 WLR 779, [2019]
5 WLUK 112, [2019] ECDR 17, [2019] FSR 33; aff’d in part [2020] EWCA Civ
1300, [2020] 10 WLUK 86, [2021] FSR 2..................................... H1.19, H1.30, H1.37,
H1.41, H1.43, H1.100; H2.21
Radford v Campbell [1809] 6 TLR 488.......................................................................... F3.2
Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262; [1978] 1 All ER 33, 7 BLR 35, (1978)
35 P & CR 316, (1977) 121 SJ 319, Ch D.............................................................. F1.77
Radien v FINA (CAS 2015/A/4200)................................................................... C17.3; C20.6
Radio Telefis Eireann v Commission of the European Communities (C-
241/91 P) [1995] All ER (EC) 416, [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718,
[1995] EMLR 337, [1995] FSR 530, [1998] Masons CLR Rep 58, ECJ........... E11.304,
E11.305
Raducan (Andrea) v IOC (5P.427/2000)......................................................................... D2.192
Raducan v IOC (CAS OG 00/011)................................................................................. C23.2
Raducan v IOC (Swiss Federal Tribunal 4 December 2000, 5P427/2000).................... C23.2
Raguz (Angela) v Rebecca Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 290.................................. D2.15, D2.37
Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, [2012] 1 All
ER 1137, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2012] Bus LR 313, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
34, [2011] 2 CLC 923., [2012] BLR 132, 138 Con LR 1, [2011] CILL 3105,
SC................................................................................................................. B1.57; B2.16
Ralepelle v World Rugby..................................................................................... C6.14, C6.24
Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sa v Portugal (Applications 55391/13, 57728/13 &
74041/13)........................................................ E13.42, E13.47, E13.49, E13.50, E13.51
Rangers Football Club Plc, Petitioner [2012] CSOH 95; 2012 SLT 1156;
2012 GWD 20-402, Ct of Sess, OH........................................................................ E7.55
Ratcliffe v Evans 1892] 2 QB 524, CA........................................................................... H4.21
Ratcliff v McConnell [1999] 1 WLR 670, [1998] 11 WLUK 535, (1999) 1 LGLR 276,
[1999] Ed CR 523, [1999] PIQR P170, (1999) 96 (3) LSG 32, (1999)
143 SJLB 53............................................................................................................ G1.118
Raula v RADA (CAS 2014/A/3668)........................................................... C6.6; C8.2; C19.8
Ready Mixed Concrete (Pistorius East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions & National
Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497, [1968] 2 WLR 775, [1968] 1 All ER 433, 4 KIR 132,
[2010] BTC 49, (1967) 112 SJ 14, QBD................................................................ F1.8
Real Federación Española du Fútbol v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3813)........... A1.24; B1.4, B1.16,
B1.40, B1.56, B1.58; E2.21;
F3.137, F3.147, F3.254
Real Madrid v Commission (Case T-791/16) (22 May 2019)..................................... E11.317
Real Madrid v FIFA (CAS 2016/A/4785).......................................................... E2.21; F3.137
Real Sociedad de Fútbol SAD & Nihat Kahveci v Consejo Superior de Deportes &
Real Federación Española de Fútbol (C-152/08) [2008] ECR I-6291........ E12.89; F3.72
Rebagliati v IOC (CAS OG/98/001)................................................................... B1.22; D2.154
Rebagliati v IOC (CAS OG/98/002)............................................................................... C4.15
Reebok France v Adidas & Uhlsport [1998] ECLR 5................................................ E11.288
Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226, [1981] 3 All ER 321, (1981) 125 SJ 585, CA (Civ
Div)........................................................................ A1.47, A1.55; B1.36, B1.56; D2.133;
E2.42; E8.6; E16.29
Regner v Czech Republic (Application 35289/11) [2017] 9 WLUK 277, (2018)
66 EHRR 9.............................................................................................................. E13.45
cxviii Table of Cases
para
Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 361, [2009] 1 All ER
(Comm) 586, CA.................................................................................................... H6.128
Reinholds v FISA (CAS 2001/A/330)................................................................. B1.33, B1.34
Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012.............. B2.5, B2.13, B2.14,
B2.30, B2.47, B2.88, B2.91
Resch’s Will Trusts, Re [1969] 1 AC 514, [1968] 3 WLR 1153, [1967] 3 All ER 915,
41 ALJR 213, PC (Aust)......................................................................................... A2.70
Response Clothing Ltd v Edinburgh Woollen Mill Ltd [2020] EWHC 148 (IPEC),
[2020] 1 WLUK 291, [2020] ECC 16, [2020] ECDR 11, [2020] FSR 25............. H5.22
Ressiot v France (Application 15054/07) (28 June 2012).............................................. E13.65
Revie v Football Association (The Times, 14 December 1979)..................................... E7.72
Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (120/78) [1979]
[1979] ECR 649, [1979] 3 CMLR 494, ECJ....................................................... E12.104
Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 1 WLR 948, [1985] 2 All
ER 712, [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1, (1985) 82 LSG 2995, (1985) 129 SJ 503, HL... C18.6,
C18.12
Rhind v Astbury Water Park [2004] EWCA Civ 756, [2004] 6 WLUK 266, (2004)
148 SJLB 759, [2004] NPC 95............................................................................... G1.116
Ribeiro v UEFA (CAS 2005/A/958).................................................................... C4.26; C6.40
Ricco v CONI (CAS 2008/A/1698)................................................................................ C21.5
Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482, [1880] 2 WLUK 53............................................ F3.9
Riis Cycling A/S v the Licence Commission of the UCI (UCI) (CAS 2012/A/3055).... B1.11,
B1.12, B1.26, B1.40, B1.41; D2.82
Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446, QBD...................... B5.25; E2.40; F3.39
Roach v Football Association [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 26............................................ D1.20; E2.11
Roberge v Judo Canada (Arbitration, 21 June 1996)...................................................... B2.14
Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012.............. B2.12, B2.16, B2.31,
B2.33, B2.34, B2.47,
B2.50, B2.67, B2.88
Roberts v FIBA (SFT Decision 4P 230/2000)................................................................ C3.7
Roberts v Gray [1913] 1 KB 520, CA................................................................ F1.94; F2.144
Robertson v Australian Professional Cycling Council (unreported, 10 December
1992)....................................................................................................................... F3.53
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736,
[2018] 2 WLR 595, [2018] 2 All ER 1041, [2018] 2 WLUK 189, [2018] PIQR
P9..................................................................................................................... G1.5, G1.6
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850, 154 ER 363, [1848] 1 WLUK 171..................... F1.77
Robyn Rihanna Fenty v Arcadia Group Brands Ltd (t/a TopShop) [2013] EWHC 2310
(Ch), [2013] 7 WLUK 1050, [2014] ECDR 3, [2014] FSR 5.................... H1.138; H4.16
Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch), [2013]
1 WLUK 209........................................................................................................... H4.63
Rodgers v Bugden & Canterbury Bankstown (1993) ATR 81–246................................ G2.38
Rodriguez v ITF (CAS 2019/A/6245)................................................... C17.6; C18.3; C21.12
Rodriguez v RFEA (CAS OG 12/06)................................................................. B2.92; D2.151
Rofa Sport Management v DHL Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 902............................................... E2.55
Rogers v Bugden & Canterbury-Bankstown (1993) ATR 81-246.................................. G1.12
Romania & Spain v World Rugby (World Rugby Appeal Committee, 6 June 2018)..... B3.36
Romanova v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5435)............................................... C5.2, C5.5, C5.6; C10.1
Romero v IAAF (CAS 2019/A/6319).................................................................. C6.10; C18.6
Root 2 Tax Ltd v R & C Comrs [2019] UKFTT 744 (TC), [2019] 12 WLUK 477,
[2020] STI 169........................................................................................................ I2.54
Rootes v Sheldon [1968] ALR 33................................................................................... G1.22
Roquette Freres SA v Directeur General de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de
la Repression des Fraudes (C94/00) [2003] All ER (EC) 920, [2002] ECR I-9011,
[2003] 4 CMLR 1, [2004] ICR 66, ECJ.................................................................. E11.35
Rotherham & English Second Division Rugby Ltd v English First Division Rugby
Ltd, English Rugby Partnership Ltd & the RFU [2000] 1 ISLR 33.............. E2.33; E7.55
Rubython v FIA [2003] EWHC 1355 (QB) [2003] All ER (D) 182........ E2.15, E2.56; E13.7,
E13.15, E13.26, E13.33, E13.65
Table of Cases cxix
para
Ruffoni v UCI (CAS 2018/A/5518)...................................................................... C17.5, C17.6
Rugby Australia v Folau (Israel) (2019)......................................................................... B3.111
Rugby Australia v Latu (Tolu) (2019)............................................................................. B3.142
Rugby Union Players’ Association Inc v Commerce Commission (No 2) [1997]
3 NZLR 301............................................................................................................ F3.53
Rugby World Cup Ltd v Scottish Rugby Union (The Times, 17 December 1999)........ E2.9
Ruiz-Mateos v United Kingdom Application 13021/87................................................. H4.66
Russell v CCES (SDRCC DT 12-0177)............................................................. C16.1; C20.20
Russian Badminton Federation v International Badminton Federation
(CAS 2005/A/971).................................................................................................. A1.43
Russian Olympic Committee & Ekimov v IOC (CAS 2004/A/748).............................. D2.62
Russian Olympic Committee v FEI (CAS OG 04/001)............................ B1.49, B1.57; B2.65,
B2.89; D2.153
Russian Olympic Committee v IAAF (CAS 2016/O/4684).......... A1.9, A1.24, A1.53, A1.58;
B1.4, B1.6, B1.8, B1.28, B1.32,
B1.35, B1.36, B1.38, B1.40, B1.58
Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting Federation
(IWF) (CAS OG 16/09).................................................................... B1.23, B1.29, B1.39
Rybka v UEFA (CAS 2012/A/2759)......................................... C18.5, C18.6, C18.12, C18.16
S
S (Children) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan), Re 2002] UKHL 10, [2002]
2 AC 291, [2002] 2 WLR 720, [2002] 2 All ER 192, [2002] 1 FLR 815, [2002]
1 FCR 577, [2002] HRLR 26, [2002] UKHRR 652, [2002] BLGR 251, [2002]
Fam Law 413, (2002) 99(17) LSG 34, (2002) 146 SJLB 85, HL........................... E13.11
S v FIG (CAS 2001/A/340)............................................................................................ B1.44
S v FINA (CAS 2000/A/274)................................................................................ B1.44, B1.46
S v International Equestrian Federation (CAS 91/A/56)...................................... C4.34; C6.16
S v UCI & FCI (CAS 2002/A/378)................................................................................ C4.26
SA Sporting du Pays de Charleroi v FIFA (C-243/06) [2006] OJ C212/11......... E4.9; E11.96;
E12.51, E12.126
SARL Liberation v France (Judgment, 14 May 2008)................................................... E13.66
SARU v Ralepelle & Basson (SARU Judicial Committee, 25 January 2011)..... B1.44; C4.16
SASP Le Havre Athletic Club & the Association Le Havre Athletic Club v FIFA,
Newcastle United FC & N’Zogbia (CAS 2004/A/791).......................................... F3.262
SC Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v FIFA & Romanian Football Federation (RFF)
(CAS 2008/A/1658)................................................................................................ D2.63
SC Steaua Bucuresti SA v Christiano Bergodi & FIFA (CAS 2013/A/3364)................ D2.66
SCB Eishockey AG v International Hockey Federation (IIHF) (CAS 2012/A/2250).... D2.181
SCS Fotbal Club CFR 1907 Cluh SA & Manuel Fereira de Sousa Ricardo & Mario
Jorge Quintas Felgueiras v FRF (CAS 2012/A/2852, 28 June 2013)..................... E12.54
SDI Retail Services Ltd v Rangers Football Club Ltd [2018] EWHC 2772 (Comm),
[2018] 10 WLUK 383............................................................................................. H3.66
SETCA – FCTB/FIFA (Case IV/36.583) (28 May 2012)............................................... B1.4
SLV & Gasser v IAAF (IAAF Arbitration Panel, 18 January 1988)................... C6.22, C6.25
SNBC Holding v UBS AG [2012] EWHC 2044 (Comm), [2012] 7 WLUK 685.......... F3.230
SPI v National Football Museum & FIFA (unreported, 9 January 1998)....................... E16.30
SRU v MacLeod (Judicial Committee, 22 February 2008)................................ C6.45; C18.19
SRU v MacLeod (24 November 2008)........................................................................... C4.33
SV Willhelmshaven v Altletico Excursionistas & River Plate (CAS 2009/A/1810)...... B1.56;
F3.179, F3.247, F3.250
SV Willhelmshaven v Norddeutscher Fußall-Verband (German Federal Tribunal,
20 September 2016)................................................................................................ D2.173
St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping [1865] 11 ER 642..................................................... G1.128
St Johnstone Football Club v Scottish Football Association Ltd,1965 SLT 171, Ct of
Sess..................................................................................................... D3.65; E2.29; E6.4
Sachenbacher-Stehle v IBU (CAS 2014/A/3685)................................................ C20.8; C21.5
Safronov v IPC (20 O 323/16)........................................................................................ A1.59
Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497, KBD................................................................................ H1.30
cxx Table of Cases
para
Salabiaku v France (A/141-A) (1988) 13 EHRR 379, ECtHR....................................... E13.55
Salford Red Devils & Dr Marwen Koukash v Rugby Football League Ltd (Off Field
Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal, 14 July 2016)................................................. B5.107
Salmond v IIHF (CAS 2018/A/5885)..................................... B1.56, B1.59; C5.2; C6.2, C6.8;
C8.2, C8.6; C10.1; C14.3,
C14.4; C18.3; C20.18
Salomon SA v EC Commission [1999] ECR II-2925, ECJ......................................... E11.311
Samoa NOC v IWF (CAS OG 00/002)........................................................................... B2.65
Sammut v UEFA (CAS 2013/A/3062)................................................................. B4.38, B4.43
Sanchez v Barnet Football Club Ltd, Case No 3302270/2012, Watford Employment
Tribunal (unreported, November 2012)........................................................... F1.8, F1.61
SanDisk Corp v Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch), [2007]
Bus LR 705, [2007] UKCLR 1539, [2007] ILPr 22, [2007] FSR 22, (2007)
30(5) IPD 30033, Ch D........................................................................................... E11.26
Sanghi Polyesters Ltd (India) v International Investor (KCFC) (Kuwait) [2000] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 480, [2001] CLC 748, QBD............................................................... D3.96
Sankofa v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWHC 78, QBD...................... D3.88; E2.1, E2.6;
E4.2, E4.11; E7.26,
E7.58, E7.75; E16.19
Santos v FINA (CAS 2019/A/6482).................................................................. C4.17; C18.19
Saunders v United Kingdom (19187/91) [1997] BCC 872, [1998] 1 BCLC 362,
(1997) 23 EHRR 313, 2 BHRC 358, ECtHR........................................... E13.46, E13.79
Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, (CAS 2011/A/2621)....... B4.22, B4.37, B4.38,
B4.43, B4.45
Schafflützel & Zöllig v Fédération Suisse de courses de chevaux (Swiss Fereal
Tribunal, 23 August 2007).......................................................................... C4.17; D2.192
Schelotto (Ezequiel Matias) v Pablo Gustavo Cosentino (Swiss Federal Tribunal,
22 January 2018)..................................................................................................... D2.182
Schlittler v IJF & BJC (CAS 2011/A/2784)............................................. C17.2; C18.5, C18.6
Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay (formerly Instone) [1974]
1 WLR 1308, [1974] 3 All ER 616, (1974) 118 SJ 734, HL.................................. F1.24
Schuettler v ITF (CAS OG 08/003)..................................................................... B2.65, B2.89
Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association (CAS OG 06/002)....................... B2.13, B2.51, B2.94;
D1.31; D2.40, D2.151
Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland (A/263) [1994] 1 FCR 453, (1993) 16 EHRR 405,
[1995] Pens LR 159, ECtHR.................................................................................. E13.47
Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
(CAS 2016/A/4707)................................................................ C6.6, C6.8, C6.14, C6.16,
C6.45; C17.2; C18.5; C23.6
Score Draw Ltd v Finch [2007] EWHC 462 (Ch), [2007] Bus LR 864, [2007] ETMR 54,
[2007] FSR 20, (2007) 30(7) IPD 30045, Ch D........................... E2.52; H1.105, H1.121
Scott v Avery, 10 ER 1121, (1856) 5 HL Cas 811, HL................................................... D3.64
Scott v ITF (CAS 2018/A/5768)............................................ B1.24; C4.3; C5.8; C6.59,C6.60,
C6.62; C17.2, C17.5, C17.6
Scott v Ricketts [1967] 1 WLR 828, [1967] 2 All ER 1009, [1967] 4 WLUK 9,
44 TC 303, (1967) 46 ATC 133, [1967] TR 123, (1967) 111 SJ 297..................... I2.64
Scottish Football League v Smith, 1998 SLT 608.......................................................... E8.5
Scottish Premier League Ltd v Lisini Pub Management Co Ltd [2013] CSOH 48........ E11.53
Sea Trade Maritime Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd
(The Athena) [2006] EWHC 2530 (Comm), [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 183,
[2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 280, [2006] 2 CLC 710, [2007] Bus LR, QBD................... D3.8
Secretary of State for Defence v Spencer [2003] EWCA Civ 784, [2003] 1 WLR 2701,
[2003] 5 WLUK 678, (2003) 100 (28) LSG 31...................................................... B1.56
Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions Ltd [2015] EWHC 1150
(TCC), [2015] 4 WLUK 645, [2015] BLR 448, 161 Con LR 138......................... B1.56
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon [2014] EWHC 4375,
[2015] EWHC 311.................................................................................................. D3.94
Segura v IOC (CAS OG 00/013)............................................................ B1.45, B1.57, B1.59;
D2.140, D2.145
Table of Cases cxxi
para
Semenya v IAAF (CAS 2018/O/5794).................................. B1.4, B1.6, B1.13, B1.28, B1.31,
B1.34; B2.38; D2.90, D2.133
Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v IRC [2007] UKHL 34,
[2008] 1 AC 561, [2007] 3 WLR 354, [2007] 4 All ER 657, [2008] Bus LR 49,
[2007] STC 1559, [2008] Eu LR 1, [2007] BTC 509, [2007] STI 1865, (2007)
104(31) LSG 25, (2007) 157 NLJ 1082, (2007) 151 SJLB 985, HL...................... I2.54
Sepia Logistics Ltd v OFT [2007] CAT 13..................................................................... E11.41
Sepoong Engineering Construction Co v Formula One Management (formerly
Formula One Administration Ltd) [2000] 1 Lloyds Rep 602, [2000] All ER (D)
345.......................................................................................................................... E2.55
Seraing v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 20 February 2018)......................................... D2.14
Sevilla FC v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5463).......................................................................... F3.42
Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (C-192/89) [1990] ECR I-3461, [1992]
2 CMLR 57, ECJ...................................................................................... E12.80, E12.81
Shakhtar Donetsk v Matuzalem (CAS 2008/A/1519-1520)................... B4.43; F3.81, F3.264,
F3.265, F3.266, F3.267,
F3.272, F3.273
Sharapova v ITF (CAS 2016/A/4643).............................. B1.39, B1.60; C6.2; C17.7, C17.8;
C18.16, C18.21, C18.24;
C20.6, C20.7, C20.18
Shears v Mendeloff (1914) 30 TLR 342......................................................................... F2.144
Sheffield United Football Club Ltd v West Ham United Football Club Plc
[2008] EWHC 2855 (Comm), [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 167, [2008] 2 CLC 741,
QBD........................................................................... D3.74, D3.88; E4.9, E4.11; E16.18
Sheffield United v FAPL [2007] ISLR, SLR-77................. B5.22; D3.63, D3.98; E2.1, E2.29,
E2.33; E6.9; E7.27, E7.79, E7.82; E8.3
Sheffield United v FAPL, 13 July 2007............................. B1.34; B5.22; D1.8, D1.57, D1.69;
D3.96; E2.40; E3.13; E4.2, E4.11;
E7.30; F3.39
Sheffield United v West Ham [2011] ISLR SLR1–7.............................................. E6.1; E7.53
Sheffield United v West Ham FA Rule K arbitration.......................... E2.57; E3.6; E8.1; F3.39
Sheik Al Nahyan v FEI (CAS 2014/A/3591)...................................... B1.4, B1.6, B1.7, B1.25;
C5.4; C18.14, C18.16
Sheldon v Daybrook House Promotions Ltd [2013] EWPCC 26, PCC......................... H4.45
Shelley Films Ltd v Rex Features Ltd [1994] EMLR 134 Ch D.................................... H4.60
Sheppard v CCES, SDRCC DT-05-0028 (12 September 2005)..................................... C4.2
Shone v British Bobsleigh Ltd [2018] 5 WLUK 226............................................. E9.2; G1.47
Shooting Federation of Canada v Canadian Olympic Committee, ADRsportRED
04-0029, 3 May 2004.............................................................................................. B2.14
Sidiropoulos v Greece (1999) 27 EHRR 633, 4 BHRC 500, [1998] HRCD 707,
ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.68
Sigma Finance Corpn, Re [2009] UKSC 2..................................................................... B1.54
Sigurjonsson v Iceland (A/264) (1993) 16 EHRR 462, ECtHR..................................... E13.68
Silvey v Pendragon Plc [2001] EWCA Civ 784, [2001] IRLR 685, [2001] Emp
LR 882, [2002] Pens LR 277, CA........................................................................... F1.77
Sim v Heinz [1959] 1 WLR 313, [1959] 1 All ER 547, [1959] 2 WLUK 25,
[1959] RPC 75, (1959) 103 SJ 238......................................................................... H4.52
Simms v FINA (CAS OG 08/002)...................................................................... B2.85; D2.159
Simms v Leigh Rugby Football Club Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 923......................... G1.69, G1.94
Simpson (East Berkshire Sports Foundation Trustee) v R & C Comrs [2009] STC
(SCD) 226, [2009] WTLR 499, [2009] STI 514, Sp Comm.................................. I1.117
Simunic v Croatia (Application 20373/17) (22 January 2019)....................................... E13.67
Simutenkov (Igor) v Spanish Football Federation, 12 April 2005 (C-265/03)
[2005] ECR I-2579; [2006] All ER (EC) 42, [2005] All ER (D) 98........ E12.22, E12.45,
E12.77, E12.81, E12.89, E12.112;
E16.26; F3.44, F3.68, F3.71,
F3.72, F3.74, F3.75
Sines v BHA (BHA Appeal Board, 10 April 2012).................................. B4.37, B4.38, B4.41
Singer v Jockey Club (unreported, 28 June 1990).......................................................... E7.18
cxxii Table of Cases
para
Singh v Football Association (2001) ET Case No 5203593/99...................................... F1.6
Singh v Football Association, Football League [2002] 1 SLJ........................................ E2.14
Sinkewitz v UCI (CAS 2011/A/2479)...................................................... C4.28, C4.33; C6.40
Six Nations v Hartley (Dylan) (Six Nations Disciplinary Committee, 27 March
2012)....................................................................................................................... B3.52
Six Nations v Marler (Joe) (England) (Six Nations Disciplinary Committee, 12 March
2020)....................................................................................................................... B3.57
Sky Italia srl v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (C-234/12)..................... E12.59
Sky Osterreich GmbH v Osterreichischer Rundfunk (C-283/11) [2013] All ER (EC)
633, [2013] 2 CMLR 25, [2013] ECDR 6, ECJ...................................... E12.60; H2.135
Slack v Glennie (unreported, 19 April 2000), CA.......................................................... G1.107
Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 580, 593 (7th Cir 2001)................................................ C4.17; C6.45
Slaney (IAFF Arbitration Panel, 25 April 1999)............................................................. C6.45
Slovenia v Commission (Case T-507/12)..................................................................... E11.312
Smikle v JADC (CAS 2015/A/3925)................................................................... C6.14, C6.15
Smith (Linsay) v Nairn Golf Club [2007] CSOH 136, 2007 SLT 909, 2007 GWD 25-
420................................................................................................................ D1.105; E2.7
Smith De Bruin v FINA (CAS 1998/A/211)........................... B4.38; C5.5; C6.6; C7.1; C10.1
Smith v British Boxing Board of Control [2015] 4 WLUK 112......................... D3.21, D3.83
Smith v United Kingdom (33985/96) [1999] IRLR 734, (2000) 29 EHRR 493, (1999)
11 Admin LR 879, ECtHR...................................................................................... E13.59
Smoldon v Whitworth [1997] ELR 249, [1997] PIQR P133, CA........ G1.26, G1.54, G1.146,
G1.147
Smouha SC v Ismaily SC & Aziz Abdul & Club Asante Kotoko FC & FIFA
(CAS 2017/A/4977).................................................................................. F3.277, F3.279
Soares v Beazer Investments Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 482, [2004] 3 WLUK 718.......... F1.47
Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (56/65) [1966] ECR 235,
[1966] CMLR 357, ECJ...................................................................................... E11.265
Soderman v Sweden (Application 5786/08) (12 November 2013)................................. E13.59
Sodie v Macclesfield Town Football Club Ltd [2017] UKET 2401718/2016................ F1.61
Softball New Zealand v Potae (Sports Tribunal New Zealand, 27 February 2008)........ C18.19
Solicitor, Re [1993] QB 69, [1992] 2 WLR 552, [1992] 2 All ER 335, (1991)
141 NLJ 1447, QBD............................................................................................... B3.53
Sonatrach Petroleum Corp (BVI) v Ferrell International Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm)
627, QBD................................................................................................................ D3.7
Sonatrach v Statoil [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm), [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 857, [2014]
2 Lloyd’s Rep 252, [2014] 4 WLUK 108, [2014] 1 CLC 473................................ D3.94
South African Institue for Drug-Free Sport v Leballo (Independent Doping Hearing
Panel, 19 July 2017)...................................................................... C10.1; C17.6, C17.18
South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953,
[2004] 4 All ER 775, [2005] 1 P & CR 6, [2004] 4 PLR 50, [2004] 28 EG 177
(CS), (2004) 101(31) LSG 25, (2004) 148 SJLB 825, [2004] NPC 108 HL.......... B2.34
South Shields v Football Association (9 June 2020).............................. B1.21, B1.36, B1.38;
E2.38; E6.1; E7.1, E7.40,
E7.51, E7.52, E7.55,
E7.58; E8.3, E8.4
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club v News Ltd [2000] FCA 1541,
[2001] FCA 862, [2001] 2 ISLR N-20.................................................................... E10.5
Southport Corpn v Esso [1954] 2 QB 182, [1954] 3 WLR 200, [1954] 2 All ER 561,
[1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 446, [1954[ 6 WLUK 20, (1954) 118 JP 411, 52 LGR 404,
(1954) 98 SJ 472..................................................................................................... G1.127
Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine (48553/99) (2004) 38 EHRR 44, ECtHR....... E13.73; H4.69
Spanish Bowling Federation v International Bowling Federation & Catalan Bowling
Federation (CAS 2007/A/1424).............................................................................. A1.44
Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 239, QBD.................................... E2.4; H4.63
Sport in International Wheelchair Basketball Federation v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD)
& Gibbs (CAS 2010/A/2230, Court of Arbitration)............................................... B1.4
Sport Ireland v Miele (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 13 December
2019)...................................................................................................... C8.2, C8.4, C8.5
Table of Cases cxxiii
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Sport Ireland v O’Reilly (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel, 26 February
2018)............................................................................................ C17.8; C21.11, C22.12
Sportive / French Football Deferation (French Competition Authority, 30 September
2009)....................................................................................................................... E11.39
Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA,& FC Porto Futebol SAD
(CAS 2009/A/1583 & 1584)..................................... B1.54; B5.7; D2.60, D2.64, D2.97
Sporting Clube de Portugal SAD v SASP OGC Nice Cote d’Azur
(CAS 2014/A/3647)................................................................................... F3.235, F3.280
Sporting Club Olbanense v Gonzaio Mathias Bordes Mastriani & Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) (CAS 2016/A/4675)...................... D2.71
Sporting Exchange Ltd (t/a Betfair) v Minister van Justitie (C-203/08) [2013] All ER
(EC) 62, [2010] 3 CMLR 41, [2011] CEC 313, ECJ.............................................. E12.68
Sports & General Press Agency Ltd v Our Dogs Publishing Co Ltd [1917] 2 KB 125,
CA....................................................................... H1.7, H1.8, H1.8, H1.30; H2.19, H2.20
Sports Club v Inspector of Taxes [2000] STC (SCD) 443, [2000] STI 1364, Sp
Comm.............................................................................................. F3.194; I1.104; I2.76
Sports Club, Evelyn & Jocelyn v Inspector of Taxes [2000] STC (SCD) 443,
[2000] STI 1364, Sp Comm................................................................. F3.160; H4.4, H4.5
Sports Network Ltd v Calzaghe [2009] EWHC 480, QBD............................................ F1.4
Sports Network, Frank Warren v Ricky Hatton (January 2006)..................................... F1.80
Spycatcher see A-G v Observer Ltd
Squizzato v FINA (CAS 2005/A/830)............................. B1.32, B1.34; C3.6; C17.2; C18.21,
C18.26; C20.12, C20.15, C20.16,
C20.18; E7.84
Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of GB & Northern Ireland (Sport
Resolutions, 5 December 2013)...................................................... B2.57, B2.62, B2.88
Starlight Shipping Co v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (Hubei Branch) [2007] EWHC 1893
(Comm), [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 593, [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 230, [2007]
2 CLC 440, QBD.................................................................................................... D3.69
State v Forbes (unreported, 12 September 1975) (Case 63280) Minn Dist Ct............... G2.62
Stec v United Kingdom (Application 65731/01) [2006] 4 WLUK 341, (2006)
43 EHRR 47, 20 BHRC 348................................................................................... E13.71
Steel v United Kingdom (Application 24838/94) [1998] 9 WLUK 214, (1998)
28 EHRR 603, 5 BHRC 339, [1998] Crim LR 893, [1998] HRCD 872................ B1.19
Sterjna v Finland (1994) 24 EHRR 195, ECtHR............................................................ E13.59
Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v Football League Ltd (The Times, 1 August
1996)....................................................................... B1.34; B5.144; E7.11, E7.36, E7.51;
E10.5, E10.7, E10.13, E10.17,
E10.18, E10.23, E10.24, E10.25
Stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v Football League Ltd (1997) 9 Admin LR 109,
CA....................................................................................... E4.5; E5.5, E5.6; E6.8; E7.6;
E15.1, E15.5, E15.7, E15.17,
E15.18, E15.19; F3.50
Stevens v United Kingdom (Application 11674/85) 46 DR 245 (1986)........................ E13.65
Stewart v FIM (CAS 2015/A/3876)......................................... C4.21; C18.27; C20.8, C20.20
Stewart v Judicial Committee of the Auckland Racing Club [1992] 3 NZLR 693........ E7.76
Stinnato v Auckland Boxing Association [1978] 1 NZLR 1........... E6.3; E7.6; E10.10; F3.53
Stitchting Anti-Doping Autoriteir Nederland (NADO0 & the Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Scaatsenrijders Bond (KNSB) v W (CAS 2010/A/2311, 2312).... E13.40
Stillitano v USSF & FIFA (CAS 2006/A/1192).................................................. A1.24; B1.49
Strabya v FINA (CAS 2003/A).................................................... B1.44; C4.16; C6.29, C6.54
Stran Greek Refineries v Greece (A/301-B) (1995) 19 EHRR 293, ECtHR.................. E13.24
Stransky v Bristol Rugby Ltd 2002] All ER (D) 144, QBD.................................. F1.16, F1.44
Stratton v Hughes, Cumberland Sporting Car Club Ltd & RAC Motor Sports
Association Ltd (unreported, 17 March 1998), CA........................ E9.2; G1.31, G1.107
Streetmap.EU Ltd v Google Inc [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch), [2016] 2 WLUK 347,
[2016] Info TLR 146............................................................................................... E11.19
Stretch v Romford Football Club (1971) 115 SJ 741..................................................... G1.132
Stretford v Football Association (FA Rule K Arbitration)........................................ E4.5; E7.1
cxxiv Table of Cases
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Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2006] EWHC 479, Ch D............... C4.20; D2.54; D3.6,
D3.28, D3.31, D3.33, D3.40, D3.67;
E7.1; E8.9; E13.1, E13.31; F1.21;
F2.34, F2.61, F2.142
Stretford v Football Association Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 238, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm)
1, [2007] Bus LR 1052, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 31, [2007] 1 CLC 256, (2007)
151 SJLB 437, CA.......................................................... A1.41; D3.21; E4.5, E4.6, E4.9,
E4.11; E5.1, E5.10, E5.11; E7.26,
E7.56; E13.24, E13.26, E13.36, E13.39,
E13.41, E13.50; E16.17; F2.34
Striani v UEFA (11 April 2019)........................................................................... B5.88; E2.39
Striani v UEFA (Case C-299/15) (16 July 2015)................................. B5.87; E11.171; E12.39
Suarez (Luis), FC Barcelona & AUF v FIFA (CAS 2014/A/3665, 3666 & 3667)......... B3.57;
D2.127
Subaru Tecnica International Inc v Burns [2001] 12 WLUK 265, [2001] All ER (D)
195 (Dec)....................................................................... F1.9, F1.24, F1.66, F1.81; F3.16
Subirats v FINA (CAS 2011/A/2499)...................................................................... C9.2, C9.4
Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia (CAS 2000/A/284).......... B2.15, B2.61, B2.79, B2.89
Sumukan Ltd v Commonwealth Secretariat 2007] EWCA Civ 243, [2007] 3 All
ER 342, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 23, [2007] Bus LR 1075, [2007] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep 87, [2007] 1 CLC 282, (2007) 157 NLJ 482, (2007) 151 SJLB 430, CA....... D3.31,
D3.33, D3.96; E13.41
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (A/30) (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, (1979) 76 LSG 328,
ECtHR..................................................................................................................... E13.61
Sunderland Association Football Club v Uruguay Montevideo FC [2001] 2 All ER
(Comm) 828, QBD........................................................................... B5.18; F1.43; F3.196
Sunrise Brokers LLP v Rodgers [2014] EWCA Civ 1373, [2014] 10 WLUK 681,
[2015] ICR 272, [2015] IRLR 57........................................................................... E15.19
Supporters Juventus Turin v FIGC-CONI-UEFA-FIFA (12 May 2009)........................ E11.78
Surikov v Ukraine (Application 42788/06) [2017] 1 WLUK 497, [2017] IRLR 377.... E13.60
Susin v FINA (CAS 2000/A/274)........................................................................ C6.45, C6.46
Sutton v Syston Rugby Football Club Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1182, CA......... G1.97, G1.101
Svenska Blisportforbundet v Konjurrensverket (Swedish Market Court, Decision no
2012:16).................................................................................................................. A1.80
Swedish NOC & Swedish Triathlon Federation v ITU (CAS OG 12/10)...................... D2.142
Swiss Ski v FIS (CAS 2006/A/1053)............................................................................. D2.63
Synstar Computer Services (UK) Ltd v ICL (Sorbus) Ltd [2001] CP Rep 98,
[2001] UKCLR 585, [2002] ICR 112, (2001) 98(23) LSG 40, (2001)
145 SJLB 119, Ch D............................................................................................... E16.24
T
TLT v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217..................... A4.250
TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU (CAS 2007/A/1363)..................... B1.56, B1.57, B1.61
TV10 SA v Commissariaat voor de Media (Case C-23/93) [1994] ECR I-4795........... E12.60
TWR v RAC (unreported, 9 October 1985).................................................................... E7.55
Tabbane v Switzerland (Application 41079/12) (1 March 2016)........ E13.41, E13.44, E13.51
Taflan-Met v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank (C-277/94) [1996] ECR I-4085,
[1997] 3 CMLR 40, ECJ......................................................................................... E12.76
Talacre Beach Caravan Sales Ltd (Case C-251/05) [2006] STC 1671,
[2006] ECR I-6269, [2006] 7 WLUK 154, [2006] 3 CMLR 31, [2006] CEC 1000,
[2007] BTC 5455, [2007] BVC 366, [2006] STI 1855, [2006] NPC 80................ I1.52
Tavener Rutledge Ltd v Trexapalm Ltd [1975] FSR 479, [1977] RPC 275, (1975)
119 SJ 792, Ch D....................................................................................... H1.132; H4.52
Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 90, [2003] QB 528, [2002] 3 WLR 640, [2002]
2 All ER 353, [2002] 2 WLUK 67, [2002] CP Rep 29, (2002) 99 (12) LSG 35,
(2002) 152 NLJ 221, (2002) 146 SJLB 50............................................................. E7.72
Taylor v World Rugby (CAS 2018/A/5583)................................ C6.2; C18.6, C18.12; C20.6;
C21.11; C22.6
Tchachina v FIG (CAS 2002/A/385).......................................... C4.31; C5.10; C6.22, C6.23
Table of Cases cxxv
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Televising Premier League Football Matches, Re [1999] UKCLR 258,
[2000] EMLR 78, (1999) 96(32) LSG 33, Ch D....................... E2.36; E11.109, E11.251
Terna Bahrain Holding Co WLL v Al Shamsi [2012] EWHC 3283 (Comm), [2013]
1 All ER (Comm) 580, [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 86, 145 Con LR 114, QBD............ D3.94
Tetley v Chitty [1986] 1 All ER 663, [1985] 7 WLUK 305, (1985) 135 NLJ 1009....... G1.127
Tevez v Mancini’ by (2011) 9(11) World Sports Law Report 15–16);........................... F3.208
Thai Airways International Public Co Ltd v KI Holdings Co Ltd [2015] EWHC 1250
(Comm), [2015] 1 CLC 765.................................................................................... F1.78
Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB), [2002] EMLR 22, QBD................... E13.31,
E13.59; H4.60
Thellusson v Viscount Valentia....................................................................................... B1.36
Thomas v St Jonhstone Football Club (unreported, 30 August 2003)............................ F1.62
Thompson v Charnock, 101 ER 1310, (1799) 8 Term Rep 139..................................... D3.64
Thornton v School District No 57, Board of School Trustees (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 35..... G1.52,
G1.53
Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163, [1971] 2 WLR 585, [1971] 1 All
ER 686, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 289, [1971] RTR 79, (1970) 115 SJ 75, CA.......... H1.34
Tibor Balog v Royal Charleroi (C–264/98).................................... E11.135, E12.33; E16.26;
F3.89, F3.93
Tierce Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities (C-353/95 P)
[1997] ECR I-7007, [1998] CEC 338, ECJ......................................................... E11.305
Tietosuojavaltuutettu, proceedings brought by (Case C-25/17) [2019] 4 WLR 1,
[2018] 7 WUK 169, [2019] 1 CMLR 5, [2019] CEC 1061.......................... A4.23, A4.26
Tifu Raiders Rugby Club v South African Rugby Union [2006] (2) ALLSA 549......... E5.5
Tilling v Whiteman [1980] AC 1, [1979] 2 WLR 401, [1979] 1 All ER 737, [1979]
3 WLUK 61, (1979) 38 P & CR 341, (1979) 250 EG 51, [1979] JPL 834, (1979)
123 SJ 202............................................................................................................... E16.9
Tilpekapora Herunga v Namibian National Olympic Committee (NNOC) (CAS
OG 16/015).................................................................................................. B2.99; D2.40
Tiscali UK Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc [2008] EWHC 3129, QBD............. H1.145
Tod v Swim Wales [2018] EWHC 665 (QB), [2018] 3 WLUK 745.......... E5.4; E7.14, E7.38;
E8.3, E8.9, E8.10; F1.3
Tolley v JS Fry & Sons Ltd [1930] 1 KB 467, CA............................................. H4.15, H4.19
Tomjanovich v California Sports Inc, No H-78-243 (SD Tx 1979)................................ G2.63
Tomlinson v Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46, [2003] 3 WLR 705,
[2003] 3 All ER 1122, [2004] PIQR P8, [2003] 32 EG 68 (CS), (2003)
100(34) LSG 33, (2003) 153 NLJ 1238, (2003) 147 SJLB 937, [2003] NPC 102,
HL........................................................ G1.19, G1.91, G1.100, G1.101, G1.118, G1.148
Tonga National Rugby League v Rugby League International Federation
[2008] NSWSC 1173, 27 October 2008.................................. B1.4, B1.35; E2.42; E10.4
Topfit eV & Biffi v Deutscher Leictathletikverband eV (Case C-22/18) [2019]
6 WLUK 171, [2020] 1 CMLR 3, [2020] CEC 264.................. E12.10, E12.14, E12.22,
E12.24, E12.26, E12.27, E12.31,
E12.50, E12.101, E12.121
Topps Europe Ltd v European Commission (Case C-699/14) [2017] 1 WLUK 65,
[2017] 4 CMLR 13............................................................................................... E11.295
Towcester Racecourse v Racecourse Association Ltd 2002] EWHC 2141 (Ch), [2003]
1 BCLC 260, (2002) 99(45) LSG 34, Ch D...................................................... E7.2, E7.7
Townsend v Google Inc & Google Ltd [2017] NIQB 81............................................... A4.77
Transado-Transportes Fluvais do Sado v Portugal (Application 35943/03)................... E13.41
Tre Traktorer AB v Sweden (A/159) (1991) 13 EHRR 309, ECtHR............................. H4.68
Trebor Bassett Ltd v Football Association Ltd [1997] FSR 211, (1996) 19(12)
IPD 19116, Ch D............................................................................. E2.52; H1.115; H6.35
Treganowan v Robert Knee & Co Ltd [1975] ICR 405, [1975] IRLR 247,
[1975] ITR 121, (1975) 119 SJ 490, DC................................................................ F1.48
Treherne (Alwyn) (for the Welsh Amateur Boxing Federation) v Amateur
Boxing Association of England [2001] 3 ISLR 231, [2001] Al ER (D) 342,
[2002] EWCA Civ 381, [2002] All ER (D) 144 (Mar)....................... E2.43; E7.50; E8.6
Tretorn Commission (Decision 94/987/EEC [1994] OJ L378/45)............................. E11.296
cxxvi Table of Cases
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Troicki v ITF (CAS 2013/A/3279)........................................ C8.2, C8.5, C8.6; C18.3, C18.20
Tsagaev v IWF (OG Sydney 2000/010, 25 September 2000)................ A1.55; B1.22, B1.23;
D2.152, D2.155
Tsfayo v United Kingdom (60860/00) (2009) 48 EHRR 18, [2007] HLR 19,
[2007] BLGR 1, ECtHR............................................................................. E7.72; E13.50
Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA (CAS 2009/A/1827)........................ A1.29; B1.10, B1.57
Turner v BEF (NADP Tribunal, 1 August 2014)............................................................ C8.2
Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974(3) SA 633 (A)........................................... E5.5
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpn v British Telecommunciations plc
[2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2012] 1 All ER 806, [2012] Bus LR 1461, [2011]
7 WLUK 872, [2011] RPC 28, (2011) 155 (31) SJLB 31...................................... H1.147
Tyrrell Racing Organisation v RAC Motor Sports Association & the Fédération
Internationale de l’Automobile (unreported, 20 July 1984)............ E7.51, E7.55, E7.64;
E15.8
Tyrrell v FA (unreported, 28 April 1997)........................................................................ E2.56
Tysall v Snowdome Ltd [2007] CLY 4196..................................................................... G1.148
Tysse v Norwegian Athletics Federation & IAAF (CAS 2011/A/2353)........................ C6.30
U
UBS AG & DB Services UK Ltd v R & C Comrs [2016] UKSC 13, [2016] 1 WLR 1005,
[2016] 3 All ER 1, [2016] STC 934, [2016] 3 WLUK 249, [2016] BTC 11,
[2016] STI 513........................................................................................................ I2.54
UCI & Coni (CAS 94/128)................................................................................. B1.44; D2.133
UCI v A (CAS 97/175, 15 April 1998)........................................................................... E4.5
UCI v Bascio & USADA (CAS 2012/A/2924).............................................................. C20.7
UCI v Burke & CCA (CAS 2013/A/3370)..................................................................... C18.19
UCI v Contador & RFEC; World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Contador & RFEC
(CAS 2011/A/2384, 2386)........................................... B4.38, B4.46; C4.24; C5.2; C7.8;
C17.4, C17.5; C18.6, C18.10, C18.11,
C18.12, C18.13; C23.8; D1.102; D2.70
UCI v Diniz (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 13 September 2017).............. C6.15, C6.16, C6.21;
C7.8, C7.9; C23.7
UCI v Fernandes (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 20 December 2019).............................. C10.1
UCI v Forde (CAS 2006/A/1057)................................................................................... C6.22
UCI v Gonzalez (CAS 2009/A/1797)............................................................................. C21.7
UCI v Hamberger (CAS 2001/A/343).................................................................. C4.33; C6.30
UCI v Israel & FCC (CAS 2004/A/613)......................................................................... C18.26
UCI v Kocjan (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 28 June 2017)...................... C6.22, C6.24; C10.1;
C22.5; C23.7, C23.9
UCI v Kolobnev (CAS 2011/A/2645).............................................................. C18.26; C20.13
UCI v Landaluce & RFBC (CAS 2006/A/119)............................. B1.6, B1.15; C6.23, C6.25,
C6.46; C16.3
UCI v M & FCI (CAS 2007/A/1368)............................................................................. C21.3
UCI v Mason (CAS 98/212)........................................................................................... C6.49
UCI v Munoz Fernandez (CAS 2005/A/872)................................................................. C18.26
UCI v Negri (UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal, 28 January 2020).......................................... C6.52
UCI v Paolini (UCI Anti-Doping Trubunal, 13 April 2016)........................................... C18.21
UCI v Rasmussen & DIF (CAS 2011/A/2671)........................................ C9.4; C17.15; C22.4;
C23.6, C23.8
UCI v Sohrabi (UCI Anti-Doping Panel, 17 January 2020)........................................... C6.10
UCI v Ullrich (CAS 2010/A/2083)............................................................ C4.3, C4.13, C4.23;
C7.17; C16.4; E7.68
UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia (CAS 2010/A/2235)........... C4.17; C6.22,
C6.33; C7.4, C7.6, C7.7, C7.8,
C7.11; C19.9; C23.4, C23.6, C23.7
UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v BAC Travel Management (Order of Richards J, 8 June
2004)....................................................................................................................... E2.53
UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v Domino’s Pizza (Order of Lewison J, 8 April 2004)......... E2.53
Table of Cases cxxvii
para
UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v eBay International AG (Order of Buckley J, 19 May
2004)....................................................................................................................... E2.53
UEFA & EURO 2004 SA v Select Promotions (Order of Patten J, 25 February 2004). E2.53
UEFA v Alliance International Media 25 April 2000, Case D2000-0153...................... E2.52
UEFA v European Commission (T-55/08) [2011] ECR II-271.............. A3.97; E2.49; E12.62
UEFA v European Commission (C-201/11 P).................................................... A3.97; E12.52
UEFA v European Commission (9C-204/11 P)..............................................................
................................................................................................................................ E12.52
UEFA v European Commission (C-205/11 P)........................................ A3.97; E2.49; E12.52
UEFA v Sakho (UEFA Control, Ethics & Disciplinary Body, 7 July 2016)......... B1.24; C6.60
UEFA v Z Association (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 December 2008)...... B1.53, B1.54, B1.57
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Anderson (NADP Tribunal, 15 May 2013)............. C18.5, C18.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Awad (NADP Tribunal, 11 May 2015)................. C18.6, C18.24
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bailey (NADP Tribunal, 8 December 2017).......... C6.10, C6.14;
C8.2, C8.5; C20.18
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barlow (NADP Tribunal, 27 June 2016)..... C10.1, C10.2; C17.16
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barlow (NADP Tribunal, 6 September 2016)........... C6.7; C10.1,
C10.2
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Barrett (NADP Tribunal, 9 October 2012)....................... C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Belarus Athletic Federation (CAS 2015/A/3977)............. C6.23
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bevan (16 December 2016).............................................. C21.12
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bird (NADP Tribunal, 9 January 2019)...................... C8.2, C8.4
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Blair (NADP Tribunal, 23 February 2018)....................... C18.5
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Bridge (26 September 2016)............................................. C12.4
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Burns (NADP Tribunal, 10 December 2012)......... C11.2; C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Burrell (NADP Tribunal, 7 February 2018)...................... C8.2
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Buttifant (NADP Tribunal, 14 December 2015)............... C21.11
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Buttifant (NADP Appeal Panel, 7 March 2016).... C17.4; C21.11
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v C (NADP Tribunal, 15 May 2018)............................ C9.1, C9.3
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Canaveral (NADP Tribunal, 7 October 2019).......... C4.13; C8.2,
C8.5
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Catana (NADP Tribunal, 14 December 2010).................. C18.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Clabby (NADP Tribunal, 20 December 2016)........ C8.2; C18.3
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Cleary (NADP Tribunal, 5 January 2016)........................ C18.24
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Colclough (NADP Tribunal, 30 January 2014)................ C4.13;
C12.4; C20.20
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Cooper (NADP Tribunal, 22 November 2011)................. C10.1
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Croall (NADP Tribunal, 24 April 2014)........................... C20.7
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Danso & UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Offiah
(NADP Tribunal, 20 July 2012)....................................................... C10.1; C19.9; C21.7
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Davies (NADP Tribunal, 16 September 2014)................. C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Dry (NADP Appeal Panel, 25 February 2020)...... C10.1, C10.2;
C17.16; C20.15,
C20.18
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Edwards (NADP, 7 June 2011)...................... C4.13; C6.6, C6.7,
C6.10, C6.16; C7.3;
C19.7, C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Edwards (NADP Tribunal, 10 June 2014)........................ C22.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Evans (NADP Tribunal, 29 January 2015).......... C18.32; C20.5,
C20.7
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Fletcher (29 November 2011)............................... C2.23; C12.4
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Gibbs (NADP Tribunal, 4 June 2010).............................. C18.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Gleeson (NADP Consent Order, December 2011)........... C18.16,
C18.21; C19.8; C20.5
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Graham (NADP Tribunal, 27 August 2015)......... C17.2, C17.4,
C17.12
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Grant (NADP Tribunal, 29 October 2015)............. C17.8; C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Hardaker (NADP Tribunal, 6 April 2018)........................ C18.21
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Hastings (NADP Tribunal, 18 November 2015)............... C17.8
cxxviii Table of Cases
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UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Insall (NADP Tribunal, 3 October 2017)............. C17.12; C18.6,
C18.24
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Kendall (NADP Tribunal, 9 January 2015)............ C7.20; C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Kruk (11 July 2012).......................................................... C7.3
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Lancaster (RFU Appeal Panel, 9 February 2016)............. C21.11
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Llewellyn (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 14 February 2013).... B1.56;
C3.7; C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v McMillan (NADP Tribunal, 21 April 2015)......... C18.6, C18.24
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Normandale (NADP Tribunal, 27 June 2019)....... C17.3, C17.7,
C17.8; C18.24
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Olubamiwo (NADP Consent Order, 13 June 2012)......... C2.23;
C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Patton (NADP Hearing SR/004/2020, 11 June 2020)...... C17.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Phelps (NADP Tribunal, 19 October 2015)...................... C17.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Priestley (NADP Tribunal, 16 June 2010).............. C18.5, C18.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Rule (Consent Order, December 2011)............................ C10.1
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Six (NADP Tribunal, 26 September 2012)............... C8.5; C18.3
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Skafidas (NADP Tribunal, 22 February 2016)........ C3.8; C10.1;
C13.1; C20.21, C20.23; C21.7
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Staite (NADP Tribunal, 6 July 2010)................................ C19.9
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Slowey (NADP Tribunal, 9 September 2016)...... C17.12; C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Tiernan-Locke (NADP Tribunal, 15 July 2014)........ C7.5, C7.6,
C7.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Tinklin (Philip) (NADP Trubunal, 28 May 2014).... C3.8; C11.2,
C12.1, C12.2; C20.20
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Townsend (NADP Tribunal, 22 December 2015)............. C17.4,
C17.6; C18.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Turley (NADP Tribunal, 29 January 2018).......... C17.8; C18.21;
C20.6
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Walsh (NADP Tribunal, 18 May 2010)............... C18.6, C18.32;
C22.12
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Warburton (Gareth) & Williams (Rhys) (NADP Tribunal,
12 January 2015)............................................................... C4.16; C18.5; C18.22, C18.31;
C20.5, C20.7
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Watt (NADP Tribunal, 6 November 2014).............. B1.44, B1.56
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Webster (7 November 2017)............................................. C22.12
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Wilson (National Anti-Doping Panel, 28 September
2011)......................................................................................... C6.6, C6.7, C6.16; C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v Windsor (NADP Tribunal, 30 April 2013)............. C7.16; C19.8
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (CAS 2016/O/4712)...................................................... C9.3
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (NADP Panel, 8 October 2019).................................... C4.28
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X (NADP Tribunal, 3 August 2017)........................ C6.2, C6.14
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) v X & Y (NADP Trubunal, 3 August 2016)............... C4.28; C20.6
UK Athletics v Chambers (Disciplinary Committee, 24 February 2004)............ B1.16, B1.24,
B1.51; C4.19, C4.20; C6.57, C6.60
UK Athletics v Ohuruogu (UKA Disciplinary Committee, 15 September 2006).......... C9.3;
C17.15; C20.15, C20.18
UKA v Walker (unreported, 25 January 2000).................................................... C6.56, C6.57
US Swimming v FINA (CAS OG 1996/001).......................................... D2.158; E2.13; E7.69
USA Shooting & Quigley v International Shooting Union (CAS 94/A/129)....... B1.19, B1.20,
B1.21, B1.22, B1.61;
B3.99; C4.15; C6.1,
C6.5; D2.130, D2.133
USA Triathlon v Smith (CAS 99/A/241)........................................................................ C6.25
USADA v Arias (AAA Panel, 27 March 2012).............................................................. C9.2
USADA v Asfaw (AAA Tribunal, 9 March 2015)................................ C18.25, C18.26; C20.9
USADA v Armstrong (Decision of USADA on disqualification & ineligibility,
10 October 2012)........................................................ B1.15; C3.3; C4.22; C7.18, C7.17;
C12.4; C15.2; C20.20; C21.5
Table of Cases cxxix
para
USADA v Barnwell (AAA Panel, 26 February 2010).................................................... C19.9
USADA v Bergman (CAS 2004/A/679)......................................................................... C6.30
USADA v Block (AAA Panel, 17 March 2011)............................. C4.23; C5.2; C12.1; C14.1;
C20.21, C20.22
USADA v Brown (AAA Panel, 30 September 2019).................... C3.8; C10.1; C12.1; C14.2,
C14.3, C14.4; C18.3
USADA v Brunemann (AAA Panel, 26 January 2009)............................ B1.44; C4.16; C20.6
USADA v Bruyneel (AAA Panel, 7 June 2013)...................................................... C3.3, C3.8
USADA v Cabada (USADA, 2 February 2017)............................................................. C18.19
USADA v Collins (AAA Panel, 9 December 2004)................................. C6.44; C7.14; C21.5
USADA v Cosby (AAA Panel, 5 May 2010)................................................................. C20.6
USADA v Crawford (USADA Press Release, 18 April 2013)....................................... C17.15
USADA v Davis (AAA Panel, 15 April 2014)............................................................... C4.13
USADA v Dooler (NADP Tribunal, 24 November 2010).............................................. C18.32
USADA v Drummond (AAA Panel, 17 December 2014)..................... C11.3; C14.2; C20.22
USADA v Duckworth (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 10 January 2011)............................... C4.16
USADA v Downing (USADA press release, 31 May 2013).......................................... C18.3
USADA v Dwyer (AAA, 11 October 2019)........................................... C17.8; C18.16; C20.8
USADA v Gaines (CAS 2004/O/649)......................................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.5;
C7.2, C7.14
USADA v Gatlin (AAA Panel, 1 January 2008, appeal rejected CAS 2008/A/1461)...... C4.13,
C4.15; C16.2; C18.5,
C18.6; C21.5
USADA v Gicquel (AAA, 11 August 2020)................................................................... C23.6
USADA v Gilbert (USADA press release, 17 July 2012).............................................. C19.8
USADA v Grammer (NADP Tribunal, 4 January 2012)...................... C18.26; C20.6, C20.18
USADA v Grove (USADA, 4 January 2019)................................................................. C18.19
USADA v Hainline (AAA Panel, 29 December 2005)................................................... C18.3
USADA v Hardy (CAS 2009/A/1870).................................................. B1.30; C18.32; C20.2,
C20.10, C20.16, C20.18
USADA v Hellebuyck (AAA Panel, 30 January 2012).......................................... C4.2; C5.10
USADA v ICC (ICC Dispute Committee, 16 June 2017)....................... A1.30, A1.52; B1.10,
B1.22, B1.53, B1.57
USADA v Jelks (AAA Panel, 23 May 2012).......................................... C9.1; C17.15; C20.6
USADA v Jenkins (AAA Case No 30 190 00199 07)............................... C4.2, C4.45; C6.22,
C6.23, C6.25
USADA v Klineman (AAA Panel, 12 December 2013).................................. C18.21; C20.13
USADA v Korchemny (AAA Panel, 12 March 2007).................................................... C20.22
USADA v Landis (AAA Panel, 20 September 2007)..................... C4.2, C4.34, C4.45; C6.1,
C6.5, C6.7, C6.21, C6.22, C6.23,
C6.25, C6.42, C6.45, C6.46
USADA v Leeper (AAA Panel, 6 November 2015)....................................................... C17.5
USADA v Leinders......................................................................................................... C20.22
USADA v Leogrande (AAA Panel, 1 December 2008).............. C4.33; C6.30; C7.16; C10.1
USADA v Lock (USADA press release, 20 April 2012)................................................ C17.15
USADA v McCall (9 June 2017).................................................................................... C4.21
USADA v Meeker (AAA Panel, 18 November 2013)............................ C18.12; C19.4, C19.9
USADA v Merritt (AAA No 77 190 00293).................................................................. B2.18
USADA v Montgomery (CAS 2004/O/645)...................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.5; C7.2,
C7.14; C22.4
USADA v Mortenson (AAA Panel, 25 September 2006)..................................... C4.13; C9.1
USADA v O’Bee (AAA Panel, 1 October 2010)........................... C4.7, C4.38; C7.16; C19.8
USADA v O’Neill (AAA Panel, 9 December 2009).......................... C18.20, C18.24; C20.10,
C20.18; C22.12
USADA v Page (AAA Panel, 4 February 2009)....................................................... C8.2, C8.5
USADA v Piasecki (AAA Panel, 24 September 2007).................................... C18.32; C20.10
USADA v Reed (CAS 2008/A/1577)......................................... C3.7; C6.39; C18.24; C20.11
USADA v Rollins (AAA, 14 April 2017)............................................... B1.51; C9.3; C17.15;
C20.8; C22.5
cxxx Table of Cases
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USADA v Sahin (AAA Panel, 23 March 2005)................................. C18.19, C18.21, C18.26
USADA v Salazar (30 September 2019)............................. C3.8; C4.3; C10.1; C11.1; C12.1,
C12.2; C13.1, C13.2, C13.3;
C14.1, C14.3, C14.4; C17.20
USADA v Sbeih, (AAA Panel, March 2004)................................................................. C6.30
USADA v Stewart (AAA Panel, 24 June 2010)................................................. C12.4; C20.22
USADA v Trafeh (AAA Panel, 2 December 2014)................................... C7.14; C8.2; C19.8
USADA v Wade (AAA Panel, 9 November 2005)..................................... C4.34; C6.6, C6.7,
C6.22, C6.52
USADA v Williams (USADA, 5 August 2010).............................................................. C16.1
USADA v Youngquist (AAA Panel, 28 February 2005).......................... C4.38; C17.2; C22.4;
C23.6
USADA v Zalicek (USADA Press Release, 10 June 2011)........................................... C10.1
USOC v IOC (CAS OG 2000/001)..................................................................... B1.26, B1.48
USOC v IOC & IAAF (CAS 2004/A/725)......................................................... B1.22; C4.15
USOC v IOC (CAS 2011/O/2422)........................................ A1.9, A1.19, A1.44; B1.6, B1.8,
B1.10, B1.11, B1.12; B2.18,
B2.22, B2.23; C4.13; D2.197
Udinese Calcio SpA v De Sanctis & Sevilla FC SAD (CAS/A/2145, 2146&2147)...... F3.81,
F3.271, F3.273
Ugo Cifone (C-77/10)..................................................................................................... E12.68
Unabhangiges Landeszentrum fur Datenschutz Schlewsig-Holstein v
Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbG (Case C-210/16) [2019]
1 WLR 119, [2018] 6 WLUK 11, [2018] 3 CMLR 32, [2019] CEC 799............... A4.23
Union des Associations Europeennes de Football (UEFA) v Briscomb (Application for
Summary Judgment) Chancery [2006] EWHC 1268 (Ch), (2006) 150 SJLB 670,
Ch D........................................................................................................... H1.91; H2.110
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) v Euroview Sport Ltd
[2010] EWHC 1066 (Ch), [2010] Eu LR 583, Ch D.............................................. E12.61
Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association (ASBL) v Bosman (C-
415/93) [1996] All ER (EC) 97, [1995] ECR I-4921, [1996] 1 CMLR 645,
[1996] CEC 38, ECJ....................................... B1.4, B1.32; B5.31; E2.19, E2.22; E5.13;
E6.10; E11.49, E11.51, E11.66, E11.72,
E11.90, E11.91, E11.93, E11.130, E11.131,
E11.132, E11.133, E11.134, E11.138,
E11.142, E11.240, E11.276, E11.326;
E12.2, E12.3, E12.21, E12.22, E12.23,
E12.28, E12.33, E12.34, E12.45, E12.88,
E12.92, E12.93, E12.97, E12.100, E12.101,
E12.105, E12.112, E12.115, E12.118,
E12.119, E12.120, E12.124; F1.26; F2.1;
F3.25, F3.29, F3.44, F3.50, F3.54, F3.55,
F3.56, F3.58, F3.60, F3.61, F3.76, F3.82,
F3.84, F3.87, F3.88, F3.89, F3.91, F3.93,
F3.94, F3.95, F3.102, F3.103, F3.116,
F3.117, F3.128, F3.239
United Brands Co v Commission of the European Communities (27/76)
[1978] ECR 207, [1978] 1 CMLR 429, ECJ............................ E11.16, E11.19, E11.223
United Policyholders Group v A-G of Trinidad & Tobago [2016] UKPC 17, [2016]
1 WLR 3383, [2016] 6 WLUK 683.................................................. B1.36, B1.38, B1.39
United States v International Olympic Committee (CAS, 4 October 2011)................... E8.8
United States v National Football League 116 F Supp 319, 323–24 (ED Pa 1953)....... E11.49
United States v Panhandle Eastern Corp , 118 FRD 346 (D Del 1988)......................... D2.30
United States Cricket Association v International Cricket Council (16 June 2017)....... E15.42
University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 601,
Ch D........................................................................................................................ H4.83
Unnamed tennis player & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), ATP & ICAS
(European Commission Decision, 12 October 2009)................................. C4.17; C20.15
Upjohn Co v US 499 US 383 (1981).............................................................................. E11.36
Table of Cases cxxxi
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V
V v FINA (CAS 2003/A/459)..................................................................... C8.5; C16.3; C20.6
V v FINA (CAS 2003/A/493)............................................ B1.44; C4.16; C6.6, C6.10; C18.29
V v Swiss Cycling, (CAS 2001/A/318).......................................................................... B1.44
VB Football Assets v Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd (formerly Segesta
Ltd) [2017] EWHC 2767 (Ch), [2017] 11 WLUK 88............................................ E15.43
VfB Admira Wacker Modling v AC Pistoiese spA (CAS 2008/A/1521)............ F3.176, F3.250
Vairy v Wyang Shire Council (2005) 80 ALJR 1............................................. G1.100, G1.148
Valcke v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 7 May 2019)....................................... D2.47, D2.135
Valcke v FIFA (CAS 2017/A/5003)................................................. A5.3; B1.4, B1.15, B1.16,
B1.22, B1.57; B4.32; D2.161
Valencia Club de Futbol v Commission (Case T-732/16) (18 November 2016)......... E11.318
Valsts policihas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalda v Rigas
pašvaldibas SIA (Case C-13/16)........................................... A4.47, A4.48, A4.49, A4.50
Vanakorn v Federation Internationale de Ski (FIS) (CAS 2014/A/3832)....................... B1.23
Van de Hurk v Netherlands (A/288) (1994) 18 EHRR 481, ECJ................................... E13.49
Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) v International Association
of Athletics Federations (IAAF) (CAS 2005/A/727).............................................. B3.36
Van der Mussele v Belgium (A/101) (8919/80) (1984) 6 EHRR 163, ECtHR............... E13.35
Van Hannover v Germany [2004] 6 WLUK 538, [2004] EMLR 21, (2005) 40 EHRR 1,
16 NHRC 545......................................................................................................... H4.54
Van Huyssteen v International Rugby Board (CAS 2014/A/3772)................................ C18.24
Van Marle v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 483, ECtHR................................................. H4.68
Van Oppen v Bedford Charity Trustees [1990] 1 WLR 235, [1989] 3 All ER 389,
(1989) 139 NLJ 900, CA........................................................................................ G1.51
Van Snick v Federation Internationale de Judo (CAS 2014/A/3475).......... C5.4; C6.1; C16.2;
C18.19; C23.2
Various Claimants v Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools; sub nom Catholic
Child Welfare Society v Various Claimants [2012] UKSC 56, [2013] 2 AC 1,
[2012] 3 WLR 1319, [2013] 1 All ER 670, [2013] IRLR 219, [2013] ELR 1,
[2013] PIQR P6, (2012) 162 NLJ 1505, (2012) 156(45) SJLB 31, SC........ G1.35, G1.36
Varis v IBU, (CAS 2008/A/1607)................................................................................... C6.23
Varnish v British Cycling Federation (t/a British Cycling) [2018] UKET
2404219/2017......................................................................................................... F1.8
Varnish v British Cycling Federation (t/a British Cycling) [2020] 5 WLUK 539,
[2020] IRLR 822..................................................................................................... F1.8
Vassilev v FIBT & BBTF (CAS 2006/A/1041)............................................... C18.19, C18.28
Veerpalu v FIS (CAS 2011/A/2566)............................................. C6.21, C6.22, C6.34; C7.11
Veerpalu v FIS (CAS 2020/A/6781)............................................................................... C4.26
Vencill v USADA (CAS 2003/A/484)................................... C18.14, C18.15, C18.20, C18.32
Vereniging Rechtswinkels Utrecht v Netherlands (Application 11308/84) 46 DR 200
(1986)........................................................................................................ E13.63, E13.65
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479, HC
(Australia).................................................................. E2.51; G1.134; H1.8, H1.9, H1.10,
H1.12, H1.15, H1.18, H1.30, H1.39;
H2.18, H2.19, H2.22; H3.26
Villanueva v FINA (CAS 2016/A/4534)............................. B1.56, B1.61; B4.4; C4.17;C17.4,
C17.5, C17.6; C20.18; C21.10, C21.11
Vincenzo Morabito v Ittihad Club (CAS 2007/A/1274)................................................. F2.138
Vinus v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784, [2000] 6 WLUK 152, [2001] CP Rep
12, [2000] CPLR 570.............................................................................................. B1.61
Virgin Islands Olympic Committee v IOC (CAS OG 10/003)....................................... B1.55
Virgin Net Ltd v Harper [2004] EWCA Civ 271, [2005] ICR 921, [2004] IRLR 390,
(2004) 101(14) LSG 25, (2004) 148 SJLB 353, CA............................................... F1.77
Vistins & Perepolkins v Latvia (Application 71243/01) [2012] 10 WLUK 793, (2014)
58 EHRR 4.............................................................................................................. E13.73
Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (The Santa Clara) [1996] AC 800, [1996] 3 WLR 105, [1996]
3 All ER 193, [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 225, [1996] CLC 1159, (1996) 15 Tr LR 347,
(1996) 93(26) LSG 19, (1996) 146 NLJ 957, (1996) 140 SJLB 147, HL.............. B5.139
cxxxii Table of Cases
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Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v Union of European Football Associations &
FC Porto Futebol SAD (CAS 2008/A/1584)........................ B1.25, B1.26, B1.28, B1.57
Vivendi/BskyB (April 2000; DTI Press release P/2000/277)...................................... E11.229
Vlasov v ATP (Anti-Doping Tribunal, 24 March 2005)..................................... C18.26; C20.6
Volandri v ITF (CAS 2008/A/1782)............................................ B1.26, B1.44; C4.23; D2.74
Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 379................................................................ H4.61
Von Hannover v Germany (40660/08 & 60641/08) [2012] EMLR 16, (2012)
55 EHRR 15, 32 BHRC 527, ECtHR..................................................................... E13.59
Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318, [2003] 1 WLR 1607, [2003] ECC 24,
[2003] PIQR P29, (2003) 100(20) LSG 28, CA..................... E9.2; G1.26, G1.54, G1.56
Vroeman v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autoreit Nederland
(CAS 2010/A/2296)................................................... B1.56; C4.33; C6.8, C6.10, C6.16,
C6.21, C6.22, C6.23, C6.28
W
W v B (22 July 2010)...................................................................................................... F3.176
W v UK Athletics (CAS 2002/A/455)............................... B1.16, B1.28, B1.30, B1.45, B1.61
W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931, [1977] 3 WLR 214, [1977] 3 All
ER 40, 8 BLR 57, [1977] ICR 662, [1977] IRLR 314, (1978) 13 ITR 71, (1977)
121 SJ 512, HL....................................................................................................... F1.57
WBPSA v Lee (Disciplinary Panel, 16 September 2013).......................... B4.4, B4.21, B4.37,
B4.38, B4.41, B4.42
WCM-GP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612.............................................. B1.56, B1.61; D2.147
WCVB-TV v Boston Athletic Association, 926 F 2d 42 (1st Cir 1991).............. H1.13; H2.26
WICB v Samuels (Disciplinary Committee, 16 May 2008).......... B4.26, B4.28, B4.38, B4.41
WPBSA v Higgins & Mooney (WPBSA statement, 8 September 2010).............. B4.30, B4.45
WPBSA v Jogia (WPBSA statement, 25 July 2012)...................................................... B4.34
WRU v Laing (NADP Tribunal, 28 June 2011).............................................................. C18.32
WTC v Moats (AAA Panel, 10 October 2012)................... B1.20, B1.22; C4.4, C4.15; C20.6
Waddington v Miah [1974] 1 WLR 683, HL...................................................... B1.43; D2.133
Wagon Mound, The see Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd
(The Wagon Mound)
Walker v Australian Biathlon Association (CAS 2011/A/2590)..................................... B2.51
Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd [1910] 1 KB 87, CA................................... F1.8
Walker v UKA & IAFF (unreported, 3 July 2000).................... B1.40; C4.20, C4.26; D2.133;
D3.112; E2.42; E4.11; E8.6,
E8.7, E8.12; E9.6; E16.29
Walkinshaw v Diniz [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 237, [1999] 5 WLUK 257........ D3.17, D3.18,
D3.19, D3.22, D3.50;
E3.12; E4.8; E13.41
Walkinshaw v Diniz [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 632, QBD............................................ F1.2, F1.66
Wall v British Canoe Union [2015] 7 WLUK 983......................................................... G1.73
Wallader v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 29 October 2010)...... C18.31,
C18.32
Walrave v Association Union Cycliste Internationale (36/74) [1974] ECR 1405,
[1975] 1 CMLR 320, ECJ........................................ A1.32; B1.14; B2.41; E5.13; E6.10;
E11.51, E11.93; E12.21, E12.22,
E12.23, E12.43, E12.90, E12.122
Walter v Ashton [1902] 2 Ch 282, Ch D......................................................................... H4.43
Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102... B1.60
Waltons & Morse v Dorrington [1997] IRLR 488, EAT................................................ F1.29
Wang Lu Na v FINA (CAS 98/A/208............................................................................. C6.23
Ward v (1) International Olympic Committee (2) International Boxing Association (3)
Association of National Olympic Committees [2012] CAS OG 12/02.................. B1.53,
B1.57; D1.31
Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, [1936] 3 All ER 160, KBD........ F1.80
Warnock v Scarborough Football Club [1989] ICR 489, EAT....................................... F1.79
Warren v Burns [2014] EWHC 3671 (QB), [2014] 11 WLUK 351........................ F1.5, F1.65
Table of Cases cxxxiii
para
Warren v Mendy [1989] 1 WLR 853, [1989] 3 All ER 103, [1989] ICR 525,
[1989] IRLR 210, (1989) 133 SJ 1261, CA.......................... E7.50; E15.19; F1.9, F1.80,
F1.81, F1.82, F1.90; F3.16
Warren v USADA (CAS 2008/A/1473).................................................. C18.6; C20.6, C20.18
Watson & Bradford AFC v Gray & Huddersfield Town AFC (The Times, 26 November
1998)..................................................................................... G1.2, G1.12, G1.21, G1.37,
G1.154, G1.155
Watson (Michael) v British Board of Boxing Control (1999) 143 Sol Jo LB 235,
[2000] EWCA Civ 2116, CA; [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256, [2000] All
ER (D) 2352, [2001] PIQR P213.................................. E2.28; E3.8; E6.5; E9.4; E15.37;
F1.33; G1.61, G1.68, G1.69,
G1.71, G1.73, G1.78, G1.79
Watson v British Boxing Board of Control Ltd [2001] QB 1134, [2001] 2 WLR 1256,
[2001] PIQR P16, (2001) 98(12) LSG 44, (2001) 145 SJLB 31, CA..................... G1.31
Watson v Gray (The Times, 26 November 1998)........................................................... F1.91
Watson v Prager [1991] 1 WLR 726, [1991] 3 All ER 487, [1991] ICR 603,
[1993] EMLR 275, Ch D............................................... E2.57; E7.6; E10.13; F1.9, F1.24
Watson’s Application for Leave to Appeal for Judicial Review [2011] NIQB 66.......... E5.5
Watt v Australian Cycling Federation (CAS 96/153)................... B2.47, B2.50, B2.82, B2.89,
B2.94; D1.56; D2.133; E6.9
Watt v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal, 10 March 2015).................... C3.7; C4.13;
C6.1, C6.39; C20.18
Wattleworth v Goodwood Road Racing Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 140 (QB), [2004] PIQR
P25, QBD........................................................... E9.2; G1.3, G1.68, G1.75, G1.78, G1.79
Watts v Australian Cycling Federation (CAS 96/153).................................................... E7.69
Wayde v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1985) 61 ALR 225.............................. E15.42
Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541,
[2016] 3 All ER 357, [2015] 11 WLUK 554, [2016] EMLR 7............................... H4.63
Wells v Full Moon Events Ltd (t/a Dave Thorpe Honda Off-Road Centre)
[2020] EWHC 1265 (QB), [2020] 5 WLUK 255................................................... G1.101
Welsh Rugby Union Ltd v Cardiff Blues [2008] EWHC 3399, QBD.................. E2.41; E7.55;
E11.95; E12.53
Weltimmo sro v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és információszabadság Hatóság (Case
C-230/14) [2016] 1 WLR 863, [2015] 10 WLUK 12............................................. A4.28
Wemhoff v Germany (A/7) (1979-80) 1 EHRR 55, ECtHR........................................... E13.48
Wen Tong v IJF (CAS 2010/A/2161)........................................................ C4.31, C4.33; C6.23
West Bromwich Albion Football Club Ltd v El-Safty [2006] EWCA Civ 1299,
[2007] PIQR P7, [2007] LS Law Medical 50, (2006) 92 BMLR 179, (2006)
103(41) LSG 34, (2006) 150 SJLB 1428. CA..................................... G1.6, G1.60, G1.65
West Ham v FA (Rule K Arbitration Tribunal, 7 Feburary 2014).................................. E2.16
West Indies Cricket Board of Control & the West Indies Players’ Association, in the
matter of (unreported, 16 December 2004)............................................................. H4.94
Westfield v ECB (ECB Appeal Panel, July 2013).......................................................... B4.45
Westland Helicopters Ltd v Arab British Helicopter Co (ABH) (Swiss Federal
Tribunal, 19 April 1994)......................................................................................... D2.185
Westminster Property Management Ltd (No 1), Re; sub nom Official Receiver v Stern
(No 1) [2000] 1 WLR 2230, [2001] 1 All ER 633, [2001] BCC 121, [2000]
2 BCLC 396, [2000] UKHRR 332, CA..................................................... E13.40, E13.46
West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA (formelry Ruinione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA) (Case
C-185/07) [2009] 1 AC 1138, [2009] 3 WLR 696, [2009] 1 All ER (Comm)
435, [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 413, [2009] ECR I-663, [2009] 2 WLUK 197,
[2009] 1 CLC 96, [2009] All ER (EC) 491, [2009] CEC 619, [2009] IL Pr 20,
2009 AMC 2847...................................................................................................... E11.26
Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker (Case 57/72)
[1973] ECR 321, [1973] 3 WLUK 69..................................................................... B1.40
Wheat v E Lacon & Co Ltd [1966] AC 552, [1966] 2 WLR 581, [1966] 1 All ER 582,
[1966] RA 193, [1966] RVR 223, (1966) 110 SJ 149, HL.......................... G1.84, G1.89
Whitbread Plc (t/a Whitbread Medway Inns) v Hall [2001] EWCA Civ 268, [2001]
ICR 699, [2001] IRLR 275, [2001] Emp LR 394, (2001) 145 SJLB 77, CA......... F1.59
cxxxiv Table of Cases
para
White v Bristol Rugby Ltd [2002] IRLR 204, QBD...................... F1.16, F1.44, F1.49, F1.68
White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455, [1998] 3 WLR 1509,
[1999] 1 All ER 1, [1999] ICR 216, [1999] IRLR 110, (1999) 45 BMLR 1,
(1999) 96(2) LSG 28, (1998) 148 NLJ 1844, (1999) 143 SJLB 51, HL................ G1.124
Whiteside v United Kingdom (20357/92) (1994) 18 EHRR.......................................... H4.66
Whitmore v International Skating Union (CAS 2016/A/4558)...................................... B3.146
Whyte v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 27 March 2013)............ C18.20,
C18.21, C18.32
Wickmayer (Flemish Doping Tribunal Case 2009-04, 5 November 2009)............ C9.1, C9.2;
C17.15
Widnes RFC v Rugby Football League (unreported, 26 May 1995).............................. E7.55
Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police see Chief
Constable of Greater Manchester v Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd
Wigan Athletic FC v EFL (League Arbitration Panel, 4 August 2020).............. B5.72, B5.150
Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd v Heart of Midlothian Plc (Webster) ( CAS 2007/A/1298;
30 January 2008)................................................................................ B1.15, B1.22; F1.74
Wigan RLFC v Rugby Football League (Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal,
March 2019)............................................................................................................ B5.106
Wilander & Novacek v Tobin & Jude [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 293, [1997] 2 CMLR 346,
[1997] Eu LR.265, CA.................................................... B1.4; C4.17; C5.3; C6.1, C6.6;
E2.3, E2.4; E5.13, E5.14; E7.12,
E7.78, E7.80, E7.83; E10.13,
E10.17, E10.18, E10.24; E12.65; F3.54
Wilcox v Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464, [1951] 1 TLR 706, (1951) 115 JP 151,
49 LGR 363, [1951] WN 77, (1951) 95 SJ 157, DC.............................................. G2.37
Wiles v Bothwell Castle Golf Club, 2005 SLT 785, 2006 SCLR 108, 2005 GWD 25-
460, Ct of Session......................................................................................... E5.5; E13.19
Wilks v Cheltenham Homeguard Motor Cycle & Light Car Club [1971] 1 WLR 668,
[1971] 2 All ER 369, (1971) 115 SJ 309, CA......................................................... G1.82
Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43, [2018] AC 779, [2016] 3 WLUK 477, [2017] 2 All
ER 327, [2016] 7 WLUK 510................................................................................. E9.5
Willes v IBSF (CAS 2016/A/4776)............................................. C6.10, C6.16, C6.35; C18.32
William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker [1999] ICR 291, [1998] IRLR 313, (1998)
95(20) LSG 33, (1998) 142 SJLB 140, CA................................................... F1.27, F1.31
Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189, [2014]
2 WLR 355, [2014] 2 All ER 489, [2014] 2 WLUK 621, [2014] WTLR 873,
16 ITELR 740, (2014) 164 (7596) NLJ 16............................................................. B1.59
Williams v Eady (1893) 10 TLR 41, CA........................................................................ G1.52
Williams v Leeds United Football Club [2015] EWHC 376 (QB), [2015] 2 WLUK 644,
[2015] IRLR 383................................................................................. F1.34, F1.35, F1.57
Williams v Welsh Rugby Union [1999] Eu LR 195, QBD see Williams & Cardiff
RFC v Pugh (IRB intervening)
Williams & Cardiff RFC v Pugh (IRB intervening) (unreported, 23 July 1997), CA.... E2.36,
E2.37, E2.41; E3.11; E5.14; E6.4;
E8.5, E8.7; E10.5, E10.20, E10.22;
E12.54; E15.5
Williams (Calle) v IOC (CAS 2005/A/726).................................... C5.2; C6.34, C6.55, C6.56,
C6.58, C6.59, C6.61
Willmott v RFU (Appeal Panel, 11 January 2016).................................. C7.20, C7.22; C12.3
Wilson v British Darts Organisation Ltd 95/NJ/1687..................................................... E2.25
Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 633, [2002] QB 74, [2001]
3 WLR 42, [2001] 3 All ER 229, [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 134, [2001] ECC 37,
[2001] HRLR 44, [2001] UKHRR 1175, (2001) 98(24) LSG 44, (2001)
145 SJLB 125; aff’d [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, [2003] 3 WLR 568,
[2003] 4 All ER 97, [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 491, [2003] 7 WLUK 303,
[2003] HRLR 33, [2003] UKHRR 1085, (2003) 100 (35) LSG 39, (2003)
147 SJLB 872................................................. B1.36, B1.38, B1.40, B1.43, B1.57; H4.66
Wilson v Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Primary School, Carlton, Governors [1998]
1 FLR 663, [1998] ELR 637, [1998] PIQR P145, [1998] Fam Law 249, CA........ G1.107
Table of Cases cxxxv
para
Wilson v UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) (NADP Appeal Tribunal, 19 January 2012)......... C6.7,
C6.10, C6.10, C6.16; C19.8
Wilson v United Counties Bank Ltd [1920] AC 102, [1919] 6 WLUK 1....................... F1.78
Wilson (Ajee) (USADA Press Release, 19 June 2017).................................................. C18.19
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57, [1937] 3 All ER 628, 1937 SC
(HL) 46, 1937 SLT 523, HL................................................................................... F1.33
Wimbledon case (OFT press release no 20/93, 23 March 1993)......... E2.54; E11.60, E11.205,
E11.219
Wimbledon Football Club v Football League (FA Arbitration, 29 January 2002)......... D1.33;
E7.69; E10.5, E10.20, E10.24
Wingrove v United Kingdom (17419/90) (1997) 24 EHRR 1, 1 BHRC 509, ECtHR... E13.66
Wise (Dennis) v Filbert Realisations (formerly Leicester City Football Club) (in
administration) (unreported, 9 February 2004)................................... F1.48, F1.58, F1.62
Wiszniewski v Central Manchester HA [1998] PIQR P324, [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med
223, CA................................................................................................................... B4.38
Withers v Flackwell Heath Football Supporters’ Club [1981] IRLR 307 EAT.............. F1.9
Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee (Decision, 7 October 2005)............... C6.10; C8.5
Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants [2020] UKSC 12, [2020] AC 989,
[2020] 2 WLR 941, [2020] 4 All ER 1, [2020] 3 WLUK 454, [2020] ICR 874,
[2020] IRLR 472, [2020] EMLR 19, 2020 Rep LR 80.................... G1.35, G1.36, G1.40
Wombles Ltd v Wombles Skips Ltd [1975] FSR 488, [1977] RPC 99 Ch D................. H4.52
Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24, [2017] AC 1173, [2017]
2 WLR 1095, [2017] 4 All ER 615, [2018] 1 All ER (Comm) 51, [2017]
3 WLUK 724, 171 Con LR 1, [2017] CILL 3971................. B1.54; B2.16; E8.15; F1.21
Wood v Mussleburgh Joint Racing Committee [2016] 10 WLUK 343, [2017] LLR 216,
2016 GWD 34-621.................................................................................................. E8.9
Wood Group Engineering v Robertson (unreported, 6 July 2007)................................. F1.8
Woods v Multi-Sports Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 76 ALJR 483............ G1.80, G1.100, G1.148
Woods v WM Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1982] Com LR 208, [1982] ICR 693,
[1982] IRLR 413, CA............................................................................................. F1.34
Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43, [1962] 3 WLR 616, [1962] 2 All ER 978,
(1962) 106 SJ 489 CA............................................................ G1.1, G1.7, G1.30, G1.108,
G1.109, G1.110, G1.112
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ADAK & Athletics Kenya & Kipyego
(CAS 2017/A/5295)................................................................................................ C17.4
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ADAK & Jepchoge Marn
(CAS 2019/A/6157)................................................................................................ C17.8
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ASADA (CAS 2007/A/1383)................. C6.60; C7.3;
C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ASSIS & FPC (CAS 2006/A/1153)..... C4.17; C6.16,
C6.17, C6.52
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Arman-Marshall Silla (CAS 2017/A/4954).... B4.46
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Ayiro (CAS 2017/A/5248).............................. C17.5
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Batan & IPF (CAS 2013/A/3316)........ B1.57; C4.15,
B1.61
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Bellchambers (CAS 2015/A/4059)....... B1.36, B1.61;
C5.2, C5.6, C5.8; C7.1;
C18.26; C20.8; C22.3, C22.4
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Bhupender Singh & NASA
(CAS 2014/A/3868)......................................................................... C8.3; C18.16; C20.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Buitrago & GCD (CAS 2013/A/3077)............ C8.5
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CADO & Greaves (CAS 2016/A/4662).......... C17.4,
C17.6; C18.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CBC & Denise Consuelo Oliveira
(CAS 2014/A/3786)................................................................................................ C20.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CBJ & Penalbar (CAS 2009/A/1954)............. C4.16
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CFA, Eranosian (CAS 2009/A/1817 &
CAS 2009/A/1844....................................................................................... B1.39; C21.2
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI & Fiorio (CAS 2013/A/3241)............... C18.3
cxxxvi Table of Cases
para
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI (FIGC & Cherubin
(CAS 2008/A/1551)......................................................................................... C8.2, C8.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini
(CAS 2008/A/1557)...................................................... B1.56, B1.57; C8.2, C8.3, C8.5;
C20.6; C22.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FITET & Piacentini
(CAS 2008/A/1516)................................................................................................ C20.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, FPI & Comastri (CAS 2008/A/1479)... C18.6,
C18.20, C18.24
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v CONI, Slay & Diaz (CAS 2009/A/1892)........ C8.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Chernova & RUSADA (CAS 2013/A/3112)... C6.8,
C6.15, C6.21, C6.22;
C7.8; C19.8
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Comitato Permanente Antidoping San Marino
NADO & Karim Gharbi (CAS 2017/A/4962)........................................................ C4.17
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Contreras & COC (CAS 2013/A/3341).......... C8.5;
C10.1, C10.2
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Covert & FEI (CAS 2012/A/2960)..... B1.57, B1.58;
C4.23; C18.6; C23.8
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Daiders, Daiders & FIM (CAS 2014/A/3615)... C16.2;
C17.2; C18.5, C18.6,
C18.9, C18.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v EADA & Abd Elsalam (CAS 2016/A/4563)... C6.55;
C18.5, C18.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FAW & James (CAS 2007/A/1364)................ C20.6,
C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FCF & Garcia (CAS 2017/A/5315)...... C6.8, C6.16,
C6.22, C6.23, C6.53; C20.18
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FCL & Villareal (CAS 2011/A/2376)...... C6.10, C6.16;
C18.5; C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FECNA & Lina Maria Prieto (CAS 2007/A/1284
& 1308)............................................................................................. C3.7; C18.6, C18.32
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIBA & Morgan (FIBA AC 2005-1, 22 June
2005)................................................................................................... B4.38; C5.5; C16.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIG & Melnychenko (CAS 2011/A/2403)...... C20.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIG & Vysotskaya (CAS 2007/A/1413)......... C6.1;
C18.6; C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FILA & Abdelfattah (CAS 2008/A/1470)....... C3.3;
C5.5; C6.7; C8.2
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Abdelrahman (CAS 2017/A/5036)...... C17.6; C18.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FILA & Stadnyik (CAS 2007/A/1399)........... C18.6;
C22.4
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIM & Iannone (CAS 2020/A/7068).............. C17.5;
C18.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FIVB & Berrios (CAS 2010/A/2229)............. B1.30;
C5.4; C18.32; C20.10,
C20.12, C20.13
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FMF & Cermona (CAS 2006/A/1149)........... C4.31;
C6.21, C6.22
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FPC & Cabreira (CAS 2009/A/1873)............. C10.1
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v FPF & Costa Fernandes (CAS 2012/A/2922)... C4.23;
C6.21
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Fedrovia (CAS 2016/A/4700)................. C6.7; C10.1
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Galuilina & FIG (CAS 2012/A/3037)............. C20.6,
C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Goltsova & IWF (CAS 2014/A/3485)............ C18.24
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Hardy & USADA (CAS 2009/A/1870).......... B1.30,
B1.40, B1.44; C4.16; C18.29;
C20.10, C20.13; D2.100
Table of Cases cxxxvii
para
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IIHF & Busch (CAS 2008/A/1564)......... C8.2, C8.3;
C18.3; D2.179
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IWF & Calcedo (CAS 2016/A/4377)..... C5.4; C17.4,
C17.6; C18.3, C18.6, C18.12, C18.16; C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v IWWF & Rathy (CAS 2012/A/2701)............. C18.32;
C20.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Indian NADA & Pereira (CAS 2016/A/4609)... C17.3,
C17.8; C18.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v International Hockey Federation (IIHF) &
Lestan (CAS 2017/A/5282)......................................................... C17.8; C21.11, C21.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v JBN, de Goede & Dopingautoreit
(CAS 2012/A/2747).......................................................................... B1.61; C17.8; C22.9
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Jamaludin (CAS 2012/A/2791)................ C8.2, C8.5;
C14.1; C19.8;
C20.22; C21.5
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Jobson (CAS 2010/A/2307)................ B1.15, B1.34,
B1.60; C4.17, C4.19;
C6.1; C20.6, C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Karpinska & PWF (CAS 2014/A/3472)......... C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Kurtoglu v FIBA (FIBA AC 2005-6).............. B1.31;
C4.17; C18.20, C18.21, C18.22,
C18.24; C20.2, C20.16
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Lallukka (CAS 2014/A/3488)............ B1.44; C4.16;
C6.34; C19.9; C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Lund & USADA (CAS OG 06/001)...... C6.7; C17.2,
C18.4, C18.24; C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v McHale (Irish Sport Anti-Doping Panel,
29 July 2010)............................................................................................... C18.3; C20.18
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Nilforushan & FEI (CAS 2012/A/2959)......... C18.24,
C18.26, C18.27; C20.6,
C20.10, C20.12; C22.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v NADA & Meghali (CAS 2016/A/4626).......... C17.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v NSAM & Cheah (CAS 2007/A/1395)............ C16.2;
C18.12, C18.16, C18.24
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v ONADE & Illescas (CAS 2016/A/4834)........ B1.16
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Pakistan Cricket Board (CAS 2006/A/1190).. B1.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Portuguese Football Federation & Nuno Asis
Lopes de Almeida (CAS 2006/A/1153)...................................................... C4.34; C6.51
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Qatar FA & Alanezi (CAS 2007/A/1446)....... C4.21;
C18.26
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Qatar FA & Ali Juma Al-Mohadanni
(CAS 2007/A/1445)..................................................................................... C18.5; C22.9
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v RADO & ADAK & AK & Ndinda Muli
(CAS 2017/A/5157)................................................................................................ C21.11
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Roberts (CAS 2017/A/5296)............... C18.6, C18.19
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Robinson & JADCO (CAS 2014/A/3820)...... C17.6;
C18.6, C18.16; C21.5;
C22.8; C23.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v SANEF & Gertenbach (CAS 2008/A/1558)... C6.10;
C8.2; C16.3; C20.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Salmon & FIVB (CAS 2012/A/296)............... C18.20;
C20.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stanic & Swiss Olympic Association
(CAS 2006/A/1140)................................................................................................ C18.7
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stanic & Swiss Olympic Association
(CAS 2006/A/1130)..................................................................................... C18.5, C18.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Stauber & Swiss Olympic Committee
(CAS 2006/A/1133)..................................................................... C16.2; C18.14, C18.19,
C18.25, C18.26, C18.27
cxxxviii Table of Cases
para
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Sundby & FIS (CAS 2015/A/4233)...... B1.56, B1.57,
B1.61; C18.27; C20.8; C23.2
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Sun Yang & FINA (CAS 2019/A/6148).......... B1.27;
C6.8; C8.2, C8.5, C8.6; C10.1,
C10.2; C18.3; C23.6; D2.10
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Swiss Olympic & Daubney
(CAS 2008/A/1515)...................................................... C18.6, C18.19, C18.20, C18.24
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v TFF & Kuru (CAS 2016/A/4512)................... C17.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Troy & IRB (CAS 2008/A/1652).......... B1.54, B1.57
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Turkish Football Federation & Ahmet Kuru
(CAS 2016/A/4512)................................................................................................ C17.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Turrini & CISM (CAS 2008/A/1565)............. C18.25,
C18.26
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Ryan (CAS 2019/A/6180)............ C6.39
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Scherf (CAS 2007/A/1416).......... C18.3
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v USADA & Thompson (CAS 2008/A/1490)...... C18.20;
C20.6, C20.12
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Wium (CAS 2005/A/908)........... C6.6, C6.17, C6.18,
C6.25, C6.46
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v WSF & Iqbal (CAS 2016/A/4919)....... C17.4, C17.6;
C21.11
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v WTC & Marr (CAS 2011/A/2398)................. C18.24
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v West (Anthony) & FIM (CAS 2012/A/3029).... C6.60;
C20.6, C20.7
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v Yadav & NADA (CAS OG 16/25).................. C17.6
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian (CAS 2009/A/1817,
CAS 2009/A/1844)................................................... B1.40, B1.44; C4.13, C4.16; C5.4;
C7.15, C7.16; C13.2; C18.24; C21.5
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & FIFA (CAS 2005/C/976 & 986).......... A1.50, A1.58;
B1.6, B1.8, B1.16, B1.22, B1.27,
B1.30, B1.32, B1.34; C2.9; C18.14,
C18.15, C18.18, C18.20, C18.26;
C20.6, C20.13; D2.100, D2.198
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UCI v Alberto Contador Velasco & RFEC
(CAS 2011/A/2384)................................................................................................ E7.66
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) & UCI v Valverde (CAS 2007/A/1396 &
1402)................................................................... B4.38; C5.2, C5.7; C6.6; C7.17; C23.6
World Archery v Ticas (Anti-Doping Panel, 5 July 2016)................................... C17.8; C20.2
World Athletics v Chani (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/078/2020)............................... C7.8, C7.9
World Athletics v Kibarus (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/069/2020)................................... C6.10
World Athletics v Kipkemoi (Disciplinary Trubunal SR/051/2020)................. C18.25, C18.26
World Athletics v Marimuthu (Disciplinary Tribunal, SR/287/2019)........ C4.23; C6.22, C6.51
World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich (Disciplinary Tribunal SR/009/2020,
24 June 2020).............................................................................. C9.2, C9.4, C9.5; C10.1
World Cup 1990 Package Tours: Pauwels Travel Bvba v FIFA Local Organising
Committee Italia ‘90¸ [1994] 5 CMLR 253......................................................... E11.202
World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry v FIFA & ISL (Case No IV/F-
1/35.266).................................................................................... E2.45; E11.186, E11.187
World Motor Sport Council v Renault, Briatore & Symonds (21 September 2009)...... E2.7,
E2.29
World Rugby v Hettiarachchi (Board Judicial Committee, 20 February 2017)............. C17.9
World Rugby v Marler (Joe) (Independent Judicial Committee, 5 April 2016)............. B3.56,
B3.58
World Rugby v Mikhaltsov (Board Judicial Committee, 2 June 2016).............. C17.3, C17.8;
C18.19
World Rugby v Perinchief (Board Judicial Committee, 29 June 2015)............... C4.24; C18.5,
C18.12, C18.19, C18.31
World Rugby v Ricco (World Rugby Independent Judicial Committee, 30 March
2017)............................................................................................................ C17.8; C18.6
Table of Cases cxxxix
para
World Rugby v Taylor (Judicial Committee, 16 July 2017)................. C18.12; C21.11; C22.6
World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc
[2001] All ER (D) 50; on appeal [2002] EWCA Civ 196, [2002] All ER (D) 370;
resumed [2006] EWHC 184, [2006] All ER (D) 212, [2007] All ER (D) 13......... E2.52
Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (C-309/99)
[2002] All ER (EC) 193, [2002] ECR I-1577, [2002] 4 CMLR 27, [2002] CEC 250,
ECJ................................................................................ A1.67; E11.50, E11.51, E11.102,
E11.126, E11.253
Wright v Cheshire CC [1952] 2 All ER 789, [1952] 2 TLR 641, (1952) 116 JP 555,
51 LGR 14, [1952] WN 466, (1952) 96 SJ 747, CA.................................. G1.25, G1.53
Wright v Jockey Club (The Times, 16 June 1995)............... E2.12; E7.64, E7.69, E7.80; E9.5
Wycherley v Queens Park Rangers Football & Athletic Club Ltd
[2017] UKET 3347602/2016.................................................................................. F1.48
X
X AG v Y ( Federal Tribunal, 20 December 2005, ATF 132 III 389)..... B1.16, B1.53; D2.128,
D2.191, D2.192
X & Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235, ECtHR........................................................ H4.54
X v ATP (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 22 March 2007)........................................................ D2.171
X v Austria 18 DR 155 (1980)........................................................................................ E13.57
X v FIFA (Swiss Federal Tribunal 20 February 2018)....................................... B5.32; D2.192
X v Germany (Application 4653/70) 17 Yearbook 148 (1974)....................................... E13.34
X v IWF (SFT Judgment, 28 February 2018)................................................................. C6.16
X v Netherlands (Application 9322/81) 32 DR 180 (1983)............................................ E13.34
X v Netherlands 16 DR 184 (1979)................................................................................ E13.57
X v Netherlands 32 DR 180 (1983)................................................................................ E13.21
X v World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (CAS 2014/A/3751).................................... C18.27
X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 4 August 2006)............................................. D2.177, D2.192
X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 3 May 2010, 4A_456/2009)......................... D2.178, D2.180
X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 9 February 2009, 4A_400/2008).................................. D2.188
X v Y (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 13 April 2010).............................................................. D2.108
X & Church of Scientology v Sweden (Application 7805/77) 16 DR 68 (1979)........... E13.63
X Co v Z Ltd (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 18 February 2016)............................................ D2.52
X SpA v Y Srl (Swiss Federal Tribunal, 8 March 2006)................................................ D2.191
Xuen v OCA (CAS AG/14/03......................................................................................... C6.10
Y
YL v Birmingham City Council; L v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27,
[2008] 1 AC 95, [2007] 3 WLR 112, [2007] 3 All ER 957, [2007] HRLR 32,
[2008] UKHRR 346, [2007] HLR 44, [2008] BLGR 273, (2007) 10 CCL Rep
505, [2007] LS Law Medical 472, (2007) 96 BMLR 1, (2007) 104(27) LSG 29,
(2007) 157 NLJ 938, (2007) 151 SJLB 860, [2007] NPC 75, HL.......................... E13.26
YS v Minister voor Immigratie (Case C-141/12)............................................ A4.156, A4.162
YS v Minister voor Immigratie (Case C-371/12)............................................ A4.156, A4.162
Yang v Hamm (CAS 2004/A/704).................................................... D2.139, D2.140, D2.142
Yarrow v United Kingdom (Application 9266/81) 30 DR 155 (1983)........................... E13.73
Yashin v NHL [2000] OTC 681...................................................................................... F3.53
Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation (CAS 2014/A/3516)........ B1.22, B1.23, B1.45, B1.61
Ynysybwl RFC v WRU................................................................................................... D1.44
Young & Woods v West [1980] IRLR 201, CA.............................................................. F1.10
Young (Yang Tae) & Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) v International Gymnastics
Federation (CAS 2004/A/704)................................................................................ B3.35
Youssef v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 3,
[2016] AC 1457, [2016] 2 WLR 509, [2016] 3 All ER 261, [2016]
1 WLUK 488........................................................................................................... E7.82
Z
Zakharov v Russia (Application 4743/06) [2015] 12 WLUK 174, (2016) 63 EHRR 17,
39 BHRC 435.......................................................................................................... E13.60
cxl Table of Cases
para
Zahavi v FC Besiktas...................................................................................................... F2.138
Zaripov v IIHF (CAS 2017/A/5280)..................................................................... B1.33; C17.8
Zemliak v Ukranian Athletic Federation & World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
(CAS 2018/A/5654)..................................................................................... C6.34; C7.13
Zeturf Ltd v Premier Ministre (C-212/08) [2012] Bus LR 1715, [2011] 3 CMLR 30,
ECJ.......................................................................................................................... E12.68
Zielinksi v IWF (CAS 2017/A/5178)............................... C4.17; C17.4, C17.6, C17.8; C20.2
Zina v LOC (CAS OG 18/06)............................................................................... B2.84, B2.96
Zubac v Croatia (Application 40160/12) [2018] 4 WLUK 36, (2018) 67 EHRR 28..... E13.41
Zubkov v Federation Internationale de Natation (CAS 2007/A/1291)........................... B3.98
Zubkov v IOC (CAS 2017/A/5422)................................... B1.12, B1.23, B1.56; C4.13; C5.1,
C5.2, C5.5; C7.1, C7.2; C10.1;
C13.1; C14.1, C14.2, C14.3
Zulkiffi v BWF; Seang v BWF (CAS 2018/A/5846)............................... B4.22, B4.37, B4.38,
B4.41, B4.43, B4.45
PART A
Governance of the Sports Sector

CHAPTER A1
The Autonomy of the Sports

Movement, and its Limits
Lauren Pagé and Jonathan Taylor QC (both Bird & Bird LLP)
Contents
para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A1.1
2 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT........................................ A1.2
A The sports movement’s assertion of independence and autonomy.............. A1.2
B Governmental attitudes to self-regulation by the sports movement............. A1.5
C When does government intervention become improper?............................ A1.11
3 THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE................................. A1.19
A Deriving governance authority from consent............................................... A1.19
B The ‘European model of sport’.................................................................... A1.22
C The North American model of sport............................................................ A1.26
4 THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF
AN SGB............................................................................................................... A1.27
A The legislative branch.................................................................................. A1.28
B The executive branch................................................................................... A1.33
C The judicial branch...................................................................................... A1.36
5 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS.............................................. A1.42
A Admission as a member of an international federation............................... A1.43
B Defining the rights and obligations of members.......................................... A1.49
C Enforcing membership obligations.............................................................. A1.52
6 ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS.................................................... A1.61
1 INTRODUCTION
A1.1 An understanding of the sports sector begins with an understanding of who

governs that sector. As the rest of this book will explain, it is a very heavily regulated
sector, and therefore it is vital for anyone working in that sector to understand where
the power to govern and regulate a sport lies, where that power comes from, how
it is maintained and exercised, and what are the main constraints on that power. In
this opening chapter, therefore, we first explain how national governments generally
recognise and support the autonomy of the sports sector, leaving it to private
associations (not public agencies) to govern and regulate each sport, subject only to
compliance with the general law (Section 2); we then describe the pyramid model
of sports governance and regulation, with one international governing body at the
top of the pyramid for each sport, responsible for the sport worldwide, and with one
national governing body in each country where that sport is played, responsible for
the sport in that country (Section 3); we provide a brief overview of how such sports
governing bodies (SGBs) exercise legislative, executive, and judicial authority over
the sport and its internal affairs (Section 4); we explain how international federations
depend on their member national federations to apply and enforce their rules and
regulations throughout the sport, which requires discussion of the legal principles
governing admission of new members, the enforcement of membership obligations,
and the suspension or even expulsion of members who do not comply with those
4 Governance of the Sports Sector
obligations (Section 5); and finally we survey the growing number of cases dealing
with efforts by SGBs to address the issues arising from unsanctioned events that fall
beyond their regulatory remit (Section 6).
2 THE AUTONOMY OF THE SPORTS MOVEMENT
A The sports movement’s assertion of independence and

autonomy
A1.2 The sports movement has always maintained as an article of faith that it
best understands the unique characteristics (or ‘specificities’) of sport,1 and therefore
knows best how to govern and regulate sport for the benefit of all its stakeholders
and the public good, so that it should be allowed to get on with that job without
interference from external bodies (in particular governments), and where disputes
arise among its stakeholders, they should be left to be resolved internally, by the sport
itself.2 For example, when speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations
in New York in 2013, the IOC president stated:
‘Regardless of where in the world we practise sport, the rules are the same. They
are recognised worldwide. They are based on a common “global ethic” of fair play,
tolerance and friendship. But to apply this “universal law” worldwide and spread our
values globally, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this
sporting autonomy. For only then can sport organisations implement these universal
values amidst all the differing laws, customs and traditions. Responsible autonomy
does not mean that sport should operate in a law-free environment. It does mean that
we respect national laws which are not targeted against sport and its organisations
alone, sometimes for chiefly political reasons’.3
1 See European Commission White Paper on Sport, COM (2007) 391 final, 11 July 2007. The Commission
recognised that ‘sport has certain specific characteristics, which are often referred to as the ‘specificity
of sport.’ According to the Commission, the specificity of European sport can be approached through
two prisms: (1) the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules, such as separate competitions
for men and women, limitations on the number of participants in competitions, or the need to ensure
uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part in
the same competitions; and (2) the specificity of the sport structure, including notably the autonomy
and diversity of sport organisations, a pyramid structure of competitions from grassroots to elite level
and organised solidarity mechanisms between the different levels and operators, the organisation of
sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per sport. Similarly, in 2011 the
Commission told the European Parliament: ‘The specificity of sport includes ‘all the characteristics
that make sport special, such as for instance the interdependence between competing adversaries or
the pyramid structure of open competitions’. Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’, Brussels, 18 January 2011, COM (2011) 12
final, pp 10–11.
2 This tenet is set out as one of the ‘Fundamental Principles of Olympism’ at the beginning of the
Olympic Charter: ‘Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports organisations
within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the rights and obligations
of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, determining the
structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free from any outside
influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied’. See also
IOC Press Release, ‘Historic Milestone: United Nations Recognises Autonomy of Sport’ (3 November
2014).
3 Quoted in Transparency International, ‘Autonomy and governance: necessary bedfellows in the fight
against corruption in sport’ (undated).
A1.3 Accordingly, the Olympic Charter proclaims the IOC’s mission ‘to protect
[the Olympic Movement’s] independence, to maintain and promote its political
neutrality and to preserve the autonomy of sport’.1 The Charter emphasises the
‘independence and autonomy [of each international federation] in the governance of
its sport’,2 and requires National Olympic Committees to ‘preserve their autonomy
The Autonomy of the Sports Movement, and its Limits 5
and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal,
religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the
Olympic Charter’.3
1 Rule 2.5 of the Olympic Charter.
2 Ibid, Rule 25.
3 Ibid, Rule 27.6.
A1.4 Following this lead, international federations usually include broad

statements in their constitutions that assert their independence and autonomy, and
mandate that they and their members must manage their affairs independently,
without improper influence by third parties, in particular in relation to the election
of its officeholders.1 And the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has accepted the
importance and legitimacy of that principle.2
1 See eg International Biathlon Union (IBU) Constitution (October 2019) Art 2.1.10 (one of the
fundamental purposes of the IBU is to ‘protect the right of the IBU (internationally) and its NF Members
(nationally) to govern, regulate and administer the sport independently and autonomously, including
by conducting democratic elections that are free from any outside influence to elect office-holders’)
and Art 7.1.7 (requiring each member national federation ‘to manage its affairs autonomously and
without interference from bodies outside the Olympic Movement’); International Cricket Council
(ICC) Memorandum of Association (June 2017), Art 5(D) (one of the ICC’s objectives is ‘to protect
the independence and autonomy of the ICC and its Members to govern and regulate Cricket’), and
ICC Articles of Association (June 2017), Art 2.4(D) (requiring each member federation to ‘manage
its affairs autonomously and ensure that there is no government (or other public or quasi-public body)
interference in its governance, regulation and/or administration of Cricket in its Cricket Playing Country
(including in operational matters, in the selection and management of teams, and in the appointment of
coaches or support personnel)’); FIFA Statutes (June 2019), Arts 14.1(i) (requiring member federations
‘to manage their affairs independently and ensure that their own affairs are not influenced by any
third parties in accordance with art 19 of these Statutes’) and Art 19 (‘1. Each member association
shall manage its affairs independently and without undue influence from third parties. 2. A member
association’s bodies shall be either elected or appointed in that association. A member association’s
statutes shall provide for a democratic procedure that guarantees the complete independence of the
election or appointment. 3. Any member association’s bodies that have not been elected or appointed
in compliance with the provisions of par. 2, even on an interim basis, shall not be recognised by FIFA.
4. Decisions passed by bodies that have not been elected or appointed in compliance with par. 2 shall
not be recognised by FIFA’); and Union Cycliste International (UCI) Constitution (July 2019), Art
7.6 (‘The national federations must manage their internal affairs with total independence and ensure
that no third party interferes in their operations. They must remain autonomous and resist all political,
religious and financial pressure which may infringe their commitment to abide by the Constitution of
the UCI. Any external form of interference or attempt to interfere must be reported to the UCI’).
2 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.60 (‘the
undue interference by governments into the governance of national federations is a serious concern
which contravenes a fundamental FIFA principle. The protection of independence and autonomy is
a cornerstone of FIFA’s Statutes and values as an organisation which aims to promote the sport of
football without political influences’).
B Governmental attitudes to self-regulation by the sports

movement
A1.5 The governments of some countries (for example, many southern and eastern
European states) adopt an interventionist approach to the regulation of the sports
sector, based on the premise that sporting activity is a public good and therefore a
public service responsibility of the state, with sports organisations being licensed and
funded by the government in order to fulfil that responsibility as agents of the state:
‘The state has a central role [in sport] in such countries. It endows sports federations
with their right to exercise regulatory and disciplinary functions. These are thus
public powers which are only delegated to federations as long as they comply with
criteria of independence, legality and democracy. The powers can be withdrawn if
these criteria are not met or the powers are abused. It is argued that interventionist
sports policies produce uniform regulation, better governance, greater public

accountability and prevent alternative governing bodies proliferating’.1
1 Foster, ‘Can Sport Be Regulated By Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models’ in Caigner &
Gardiner (Eds), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-Regulation (TMC Asser Press, 2000)
at p 62.
A1.6 In France, for example, in accordance with the Code du Sport, the French
Ministry of Sport recognises one national governing body for each sport, and confers
on that body the exclusive right to organise events, license participants in its sport
in France, and set the technical rules of the relevant sport, under delegated authority
from the Ministry.1 In other words, the recognised SGB effectively functions by
licence from (and as an organ of) the state, and is accountable to the Ministry of
Sport.
1 See Art L111-1. The Ministry is also responsible for (among other things) the promotion of sport to all
age groups, and for the management and supervision of government grants to sports.
A1.7 This has significant ‘constitutional’ consequences for those active in the
sports sector. For example, as a quasi-public body exercising delegated sovereign
powers, a French SGB may not recognise and give effect in France to disciplinary
sanctions handed down by the international federation of that sport if the disciplinary
procedures followed by the sanctioning body are deemed to fall short of the standards
required of French sports bodies under the Code du Sport. Any French body that
proposes to recognise such sanction can be challenged for acting ultra vires, ie beyond
the scope of its delegated public powers, and ultimately risks being ‘de-recognised’,
ie stripped of its constitutional authority to govern its sport in France. This can lead to
very difficult practical issues, as the rulebooks of most international federations will
require automatic recognition and enforcement by all of its members of disciplinary
sanctions imposed by any other members or authority.1 It also means the government
has very significant influence over the sports sector, as the SGB depends on it not
only for funding but also for its very authority to govern its sport.2
1 See paras D2.12–D2.16 and D3.6. For example, in 2010 French rugby union player David Attoub
was banned by a European Rugby Cup Disciplinary Committee for 70 weeks for eye-gouging an
opponent in a Heineken Cup match, but challenged that sanction before the French authorities, arguing
that it did not comply with French law, and saw his domestic ban reduced to 52 weeks. See, ‘David
Attoub’s reduced ban leaves him free to play in December’, Guardian 11 June 2010 (theguardian.com/
sport/2010/jun/11/david-attoub-reduced-ban [accessed 23 September 2020]).
2 Foster, ‘Can Sport Be Regulated By Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models’ in Caigner &
Gardiner (Eds), Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-Regulation (TMC Asser Press, 2000)
at p 62 (‘Where state intervention is reinforced with state funding, the threat of de-recognition is a
powerful tool for the state’).
A1.8 In most countries, however, including the UK and many other northern and
western European states, governments have traditionally taken a non-interventionist
approach to sport, regarding the provision of sport not as a public service responsibility
of the government, but rather a matter for the private, voluntary sector to address, with
general encouragement from government.1 As a result, in such countries typically no
general ‘law of sport’ is enacted to regulate activity in the sector. Rather, the sport
sector has historically been left entirely alone not only to organise and manage itself,
but also to regulate the entire conduct and administration of the sport, including
in areas of important public interest such as safeguarding,2 anti-corruption,3 and
anti-doping.4 Legislation or other intervention is generally countenanced only as a
measure of last resort, in response to a pressing public interest requirement that a
sport cannot or will not meet by its own regulatory measures.5
1 See generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector) and Foster, ‘How Can Sport
Be Regulated?’ in Greenfield & Osborn (Eds) Law & Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass,
2000), pp 267–282.
For example, the historical attitude of respective UK governments has been that sport ‘generally
presented a complex of problems out of which government was not wholly free to opt’: Lord Hailsham,
The Door Wherein I Went, p 207. In his foreword to the Labour administration’s 2001 sports strategy
paper, ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’ (DCMS PP374, March 2001),
Prime Minister Tony Blair was emphatic: ‘The Government does not and should not run sport’. One
member of the Parliamentary Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, when faced with the suggestion
that the Minister for Sport should exercise more executive authority, said: ‘I think the only thing which
would be worse than hordes of old buffers [running sport] would be government ministers’: Minutes
of Evidence before the Committee for Culture, Media and Sport, 1998. Additionally, in a speech
in May 2007, David Cameron (then opposition leader) said: ‘I believe that football shouldn’t need
government intervention. National governing bodies should be empowered to deliver in their areas
with the government there to help and advise with intervention only required in extreme situations.
You shouldn’t nationalise the running of sport through government. You provide funding and trust
it to run itself. Government is about devolving power and responsibility, not controlling everything
from its centre’. Sport Industry Lecture, 23 May 2007. See further para A3.37 et seq. See eg Joint
UK Government/Sports Councils’ Response to Commission Consultation Paper, The European Model
of Sport (DCMS May 1999) (‘In the UK at least the governing bodies are autonomous bodies set up
and run by their members and it is not for the Government, or [European] community institutions, to
decide whether they should be retained, combined with others, or abolished’); and the ‘Declaration
on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account should
be taken in implementing common policies’ annexed (as Annex IV) to the Nice European Council
Presidency Conclusions (December 2000), at paras 7-9 (Role of sports federations), available on the
Commission’s website: europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm [accessed 23 September 2020]
(‘The European Council stresses its support for the independence of sports organisations and their right
to organise themselves through appropriate associative structures. It recognises that, with due regard
for national and Community legislation and on the basis of a democratic and transparent method of
operation, it is the task of sporting organisations to organise and promote their particular sports […]. It
notes that sports federations have a central role in ensuring the essential solidarity between the various
levels of sporting practice, from recreational to top-level sport, which co-exist there; they provide
the possibility of access to sports for the public at large, human and financial support for amateur
sports, promotion of equal access to every level of sporting activity for men and women alike, youth
training, health protection and measures to combat doping, acts of violence and racist or xenophobic
occurrences. These social functions entail special responsibilities for federations and provide the basis
for the recognition of their competence in organising competitions’).
2 See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding)
3 See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption).
4 See Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).
5 See further para A3.62 et seq.
A1.9 This laissez-faire approach is reflected in the national laws of such countries.
While SGBs have to respect the law, just like everybody else, courts are generally
loathe to interfere and second-guess an SGB’s actions, and therefore afford the
SGB a ‘wide margin of appreciation’ in governing its affairs,1 including in making
rules for the sport,2 resolving membership issues,3 and determining to what extent
it is necessary and proportionate for its rules to restrict the rights and freedoms that
participants in the sport otherwise enjoy under national law.4
1 See generally Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations: The Legal Framework), Section 2 (‘The
Autonomy Afforded to an SGB to Regulate Its Sport’).
2 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 73 (‘The starting
point is that sports governing bodies know what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore
is consciously restrained’); Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591,
para 149 (‘[…] the FEI as a sporting association is afforded a wide margin of appreciation in making
rules to regulate the conduct of its members. While this principle does not prevent a judicial or arbitral
tribunal charged with examining the rules to determine whether they constitute an infringement of
fundamental rights, it serves to emphasise that a sporting association will generally be in the best
position to assess the rules which are required to address issues arising in the sport which it runs’);
Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘this Panel’s duty is not that
of rewriting a federation’s rules. The rule-making power, and the balance to be struck in its exercise
between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent bodies of the sport entity,
which shall exercise it taking into account also the overall legislative framework. The duty of this Panel
is to ensure that such an exercise does not conflict with the rules that govern it and not to alter the content
(whether by way of interpretation or other form of ‘manipulation’) of existing rules transforming them
into something different’); Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828,
para 143 (‘One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue
their own rules relating to their governance, their membership and their own competitions’); USOC v
IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the
Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a
very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own
affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One
of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their
own governance, their membership and their own competitions’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17
(‘Like any other human or social activity, there cannot be any sports activity outside the framework
of State law. Depending on the various political and legal systems in the world, States grant to sports
organizations and governing bodies a certain degree of autonomy and allow them to establish, within
the framework of State law, their own sports laws and rules’).
3 For example, Art 23 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation states: ‘Freedom of
association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and
to participate in the activities of an association. No person may be compelled to join or to belong to
an association’. According to the CAS panel in Indian Hockey Federation v FIH & Hockey India,
CAS 2014/A/3828, para 139, ‘[t]he contents of this constitutional right are designed to protect the
association – within certain boundaries – from all kinds of state interference (including interference by
state courts with the association life (CAS 2010/A/2083, at 61; CAS 2010/A/386, at 5.3.4)’. The broad
autonomy of SGBs when it comes to admitting new members is discussed further at para A1.44.
4 Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 55 (‘[…] significant deference should be afforded to a sporting
body’s expertise and authority to determine the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its
strategic imperatives’); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an
association a wide discretion to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to
its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para 125 (‘In
a different context, this wide discretion is referred to as ‘the margin of appreciation’’); Bradley v Jockey
Club [2004] EWHC 216, Richards J, para 43 (‘The test of proportionality requires the striking of a
balance between competing considerations. The application of the test in the context of penalty will
not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single “correct” decision. Different decision-
makers may come up with different answers, all of them reached in an entirely proper application
of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that, in
determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether
it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion.
The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment.
Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of
reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests.
The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the
primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate.
The court’s role, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision
reached falls within the limits of the decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the
penalty is lawful; if it does not, the penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in
the shoes of the primary decision-maker, strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis
what it considers the right penalty to be’), affirmed on appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; Chambers v
BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB) (‘[…] though the court must not shrink from exercising a supervisory
power which it has if it affects the claimant’s right to work […], the BOA, if acting honestly and not
capriciously and within its powers, is and must be a body better fitted to judge what was needed than
me, or any court’).
A1.10 In recent years, however, this traditional non-interventionist model has

come under more and more pressure. This is partly because:
(a) sport has such enormous social, cultural, and economic importance in modern
society;1
(b) politicians have come to understand the power of sport as an instrument for
achieving public policy imperatives;2 and
(c) SGBs have had to turn to government for assistance in addressing issues that
are beyond their jurisdiction and/or competence to control (from public order
issues like hooliganism and ticket touting, to integrity issues such as doping
and match-fixing).3
These factors have led to increasing levels of cooperation and partnership between the
UK government and SGBs and increasing levels of public funding and other support
for the SGBs’ activities. But that in turn has led to a demand that if SGBs are to be
publicly funded partners in the delivery of public policy goals, they must stand up to
scrutiny in their standards of governance, transparency, and accountability, a demand
that has only been heightened in the wake of the string of high profile scandals that
have exposed incompetence and corruption in many (mainly international) SGBs.4
This demand is satisfied by placing strict conditions on the receipt of public funding
and other benefits. For example, to be eligible for recognition and public funding,
SGBs in the UK have to comply with the Code of Sports Governance issued by
UK Sport and the home country Sports Councils (which are government-funded
agencies),5 and they also have to comply with the National Anti-Doping Policy.6
1 See para A3.5. For example, like many other countries, the UK has ‘listed events’ legislation that
operates to protect free-to-view access to the coverage of sports events that have ‘a special national
resonance […]; […] an event which serves to unite the nation; a shared point on the national calendar’
(see para A3.83 et seq).
2 See para A3.16.
3 In relation to public order issues, see para A3.66 et seq. In relation to ticket touting, see para A3.69. In
relation to doping, see para A3.117.
4 Examples include IOC members selling their votes for the hosting of the 2002 Olympic Games in Salt
Lake City (nytimes.com/2000/07/21/sports/olympics-leaders-of-salt-lake-olympic-bid-are-indicted-
in-bribery-scandal.html, 21 July 2000 [accessed 23 September 2020]); FIFA Executive Committee
members and CONMEBOL executives selling their votes for hosting of events and acceptance of
commercial contracts (justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-
conspiracy-and-corruption, 3 December 2015 [accessed 23 September 2020]); the IAAF President
accepting bribes to bury Russian doping cases before the 2012 Olympic Games (wada-ama.org/en/
resources/world-anti-doping-program/independent-commission-report-2, 14 January 2016 [accessed
23 September 2020]); and the IWF President running the sport of weight-lifting corruptly for several
decades (mclarenweightliftingenquiry.com/wp-content/themes/mclarenweightlifitingenquiry/assets/
CORRECTED-300720-FULL-REPORT-MASTER-FINAL-FOR-PUBLICATION-v2.pdf, 4 June
2020 [accessed 23 September 2020]). See also para A5.3.
5 See para A3.37.
6 See para A3.121.
C When does government intervention become improper?
A1.11 Against this background, it is not an easy task to determine what should be
accepted as appropriate intervention by a government in the practice of sport within
its territory, and what is ‘improper’ interference or ‘undue’ influence. Where is the
line to be drawn?
A1.12 The sports movement recognises that it needs government support in certain
areas, because there are certain threats that it cannot protect sport from on its own.
For example, in 2006 the IOC acknowledged that ‘Governments are needed to fight
doping issues (WADA), corruption, illegal betting, money laundering, trafficking of
young athletes, racism and other forms of discrimination’.1 And SGBs are always
willing recipients of public funding. But once the help of governments is requested
in this way, it becomes very hard to resist governmental demands that as a quid
pro quo SGBs observe minimum standards of governance and integrity themselves.
For example, no one has ever seriously run an argument that the UK Government’s
conditioning of public funding and support on SGB compliance with the government-
sponsored Code of Sports Governance, equality standards, or the National Anti-Doping
Policy, constitutes improper government interference in the autonomy of the sports
movement. On the contrary, the IOC itself has recognised that ‘governments invest
in sport and have a natural and justified position wanting to control their investments
and the use of funds from the national lottery, for which in turn they are accountable
to electors and parliaments’.2 And while Article 7.6 of the UCI Constitution states
emphatically that ‘the national federations must manage their internal affairs with
total independence and ensure that no third party interferes in their operations’, the
comment to that Article states: ‘This provision does not prevent, for instance, the
government from controlling the appropriate use of allowances granted to a national
federation […]’.3
1 Resolutions of the First Seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic and Sports Movement, IOC, 2006.
2 Ibid.
3 UCI Constitution (July 2019) Art 7.6. The comment continues: ‘but under no circumstances should the
government interfere with the strategy or the operations of the national federation’.
A1.13 It is telling, in this respect, that principle number 7 of the IOC’s Basic
Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement1 asserts that the
sports movement and governments have ‘complementary missions’, and therefore
emphasises the importance of ‘cooperation, coordination, and consultation’:
7.1 Cooperation, coordination and consultation (‘Sporting organisations should
coordinate their actions with governments; Cooperation with governments
is an essential element in the framework of sporting activities; Cooperation,
coordination and consultation are the best way for sporting organisations to
preserve their autonomy’);
7.2 Complementary missions (‘Governments, constituents of the Olympic
Movement, other sports organisations and stakeholders have a complementary
mission and should work together towards the same goals’);
7.3 Maintain and preserve the autonomy of sport (‘The right balance between
governments, the Olympic Movement and sporting organisations should be
ensured’).
1 Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, Seminar on
Autonomy of Olympic and Sport Movement, February 2008.
A1.14 In fact, external authorities have made clear,1 and the sports movement well
understands that there will be further encroachment on the autonomy of sport if it fails
to improve governance standards. As the IOC noted during the Olympic Congress in
October 2009, ‘the legitimacy and autonomy of the Olympic Movement depends
on upholding the highest standards of ethical behaviour and good governance. All
members of the Olympic Movement should adopt, as their minimum standard,
the Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic Movement,
as proposed by the IOC[…]’.2 The issue of good sports governance has therefore
assumed great importance, and as a result this edition of the book includes a whole
chapter of this book is dedicated to the subject.3
1 See eg European Commission, White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 final (11 July 2007), p.13 (‘The
Commission acknowledges the autonomy of sporting organisations and representative structures (such
as leagues). Furthermore, it recognises that governance is mainly the responsibility of sports governing
bodies and, to some extent, the Member States and social partners. Nonetheless, dialogue with sports
organisations has brought a number of areas to the Commission’s attention. […] The Commission
considers that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation respectful of good governance
principles, provided that EU law is respected, and is ready to play a facilitating role or take action if
necessary’). It followed this up in September 2013, stating: ‘The autonomy of sports bodies is now
more susceptible than ever before. Interventions from the courts, national governments or regulators,
commercial interests or European institutions are more likely. Indeed, in its 2011 Communication
“Developing the European Dimension in Sport” the European Commission developed its position
beyond that of previous comments confirming good governance is a condition for the autonomy and
self-regulation of sport organisations’ (ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/xg-gg-
201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf [accessed 17 November 2020]).
Similarly, in its September 2013 report the expert group on good governance established by the
European Council as part of its European Union Work Plan for Sport for 2014–2017 said that ‘sports
bodies that do not have in place good governance procedures and practices can expect their autonomy
and self-regulatory practice to be curtailed’. However, it later added that ‘autonomous self-regulation
by the sport movement remains the best option and is consistent with the structure of the international
sport movement’ (European Commission, Expert Group “Good Governance” Deliverable 2 report
(September 2013), pp. 3. 15).
2 Recommendation 41, Olympic Congress, Copenhagen, 2009.
3 Chapter A5 (Best Practice in Sports Governance).
A1.15 Where the sports movement appears to draw the line is when the government
inserts its officials into the leadership of a national federation,1 or interferes with the
federation’s strategy or operations. The IOC has noted the following examples with
disapproval:2
‘Interventions have been witnessed through national legislation processes or in
electoral proceedings, appointment of officials, appointment of referees, recognition
of sporting results, (selective) financing mechanisms, splitting of National
Federations or the creation of parallel structures aimed at positioning friendly
voices and/or influencing voting in National Olympic Committees, the creation of
separate (controlled) appeal bodies, (forced) bankruptcies, denigration campaigns,
imprisonment and visa refusals for athletes or officials’.
1 There is obvious cause for concern on this front. A 2017 survey of National Olympic Committees
(NOCs) showed that at least one in seven NOCs have leaders with formal ties to their governments.
See Play the Game survey ‘Autonomy in National Olympic Committees 2017 – an autonomy
index’, by Mads A Wickstrom and Sine Alvad (June 2017) (‘Of the 205 NOCs surveyed, 30 are led
by a president and/or secretary general (26 presidents and 8 secretary generals) with formal ties to
government institutions. […] Of the five regional confederations, the Asian OCA [Olympic Council
of Asia] holds the largest relative proportion (36.4%) of government-connected NOC leaders followed
by Oceania (11.8%) and Europe (10%). A great number of NOC leaders hold a position as minister of
either tourism and/or sport. Furthermore, especially in Asia, a considerable number of NOC leaders
belong to the ruling or highly politically influential royal family’).
2 Resolutions of the First Seminar on the Autonomy of the Olympic and Sports Movement, IOC, 2006.
A1.16 Rule 27.9 of the Olympic Charter provides that:
‘the IOC Executive Board may take any appropriate decisions for the protection
of the Olympic Movement in the country of an NOC, including suspension of
or withdrawal of recognition from such NOC if the constitution, law or other
regulations in force in the country concerned, or any act by any governmental or
other body causes the activity of the NOC or the making or expression of its will to
be hampered.’
The cases where the IOC has exercised that power reflect what it considers to be
improper interference with the autonomy of the sport movement:
(a) In January 2010, the IOC suspended the Kuwait Olympic Committee (KOC)
after the Kuwaiti legislature adopted a law that permitted the state to interfere
in the elections of officers of sport federations. The KOC was barred from
receiving IOC funding and its athletes and officials were banned from
participating in Olympic Games and Olympic meetings until the interference
was removed. The IOC lifted the suspension in December 2012 after guarantees
were received from the Kuwaiti government that the KOC and its national
federations would be permitted to operate in full compliance with the Olympic
Charter and the rules of the international federations.1
(b) In 2011 the IOC objected to the Indian Sports Ministry’s attempts to require
national sports federations in India to incorporate specific age and tenure
requirements for officials into their constitutions, stating:
‘The [Indian] government authorities may make suggestions and recommendations
to assist sports organizations in their internal matters and internal governance, if
need be, however, [they] cannot force them (by law) to adopt standard mandatory
provisions. […] All internal operations and procedures in force within the NOC
(and the NSFs) including in particular the membership, eligibility conditions for
members, decision-making mechanisms, election procedures, eligibility conditions
for officers and office-bearers, etc. must be determined exclusively by these sports
organisations’.
When the Indian Sports Ministry pressed ahead with its demands, in December
2012 the IOC Executive Board suspended the Indian Olympic Association’s
membership of the Olympic Movement, meaning that it was barred from
receiving IOC funding and its athletes and officials were banned from
participating in Olympic Games and Olympic meetings. The IOC lifted the
suspension on 7 February 2014 following confirmation by an IOC representative

that the elections for a new board of the Indian Olympic Association had been
held properly and without government interference.2
(c) In 2015, legislation was passed in Kuwait that gave the Kuwaiti Sports Ministry
the power to take control of national sporting bodies and the ability to control
financial matters. Using that power, the Kuwaiti Sports Ministry disbanded the
Kuwait NOC and nine national sporting bodies based on supposed financial
irregularities, and set up interim committees to run those sports. In response
in October 2015 the IOC again suspended the Kuwait Olympic Committee. It
provisionally lifted the suspension only in August 2018, based on revisions to
the law and an agreement to establish a process for free elections of the officers
of all sports organisations in Kuwait, and lifted the suspension completely in
July 2019 after the successful implementation of a roadmap established under
the supervision of an IOC supervisory committee.3
(d) In 2019, the IOC issued a warning to the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) after
the Italian Parliament approved a law that would set up a separate government-
controlled organisation (Sport e Salute) to distribute funds to the country’s
national federations, reducing CONI’s role to only handling preparation for
the Olympic Games (reducing its budget by around £353 million). In its
warning letter, the IOC emphasised CONI’s autonomous responsibility in the
determination and control of the rules of sport, the definition of the structure of
and the governance of their organisations.4
1 See IOC press releases dated 4 January 2010 (olympic.org/news/the-ioc-suspends-the-noc-of-kuwait
[accessed 23 September 2020]) and 4 December 2012 (olympic.org/news/final-executive-board-
meeting-of-2012-gets-under-way-in-lausanne).
2 See ‘Govt can’t infringe IOA autonomy through legislation: IOC’, Times of India, 11 June 2011
(timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/more-sports/others/Govt-cant-infringe-IOA-autonomy-through-
legislation-IOC/articleshow/8814994.cms [accessed 23 September 2020]); and IOC press releases
dated 4 December 2012 (olympic.org/news/final-executive-board-meeting-of-2012-gets-under-way-
in-lausanne/184870 [accessed 23 September 2020] and 11 February 2014 (olympic.org/news/ioc-
executive-board-lifts-suspension-of-noc-of-india [accessed 23 September 2020]).
3 See IOC press releases dated 27 October 2015 (olympic.org/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-olympic-
committee [accessed 23 September 2020]), 2 June 2016 (olympic.org/news/executive-board-wraps-
up-day-2-of-meetings-with-reports-from-organising-committees [accessed 23 September 2020]),
and 5 July 2019 (olympic.org/news/ioc-lifts-suspension-of-kuwait-olympic-committee [accessed
23 September 2020]). The IOC Executive Board did permit certain athletes from Kuwait to take
part in the 2016 Olympic Games as independent Olympic athletes under the IOC flag. However, the
Kuwaiti athletes did not have any right to participate; rather, this was an act of mercy by the IOC.
See also ‘Governmental interference in global sport – Why Kuwait is still in the Olympic wilderness’
LawInSport (15 June 2018) (lawinsport.com/topics/item/governmental-interference-in-global-sport-
why-kuwait-is-still-in-the-olympic-wilderness#sdfootnote6sym [accessed 23 September 2020]).
4 See Inside the Games article dated 7 August 2019,’IOC issues stern warning to CONI over potential
Olympic Charter breaches’ (insidethegames.biz/articles/1083142/ioc-warning-for-coni [accessed
23 September 2020]).
A1.17 The Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA), the international

governing body for football, has also not hesitated to suspend its member national
federations when it considers that their independence has been compromised by
government interference. Since that suspension means that neither the national
federation’s clubs nor its national representative teams may play in international
competitions, compliance with FIFA’s demands tends to be swift. For example:
(a) In July 2006, FIFA suspended the Greek Football Federation when (despite of
repeated warnings from both FIFA and UEFA) the Greek government failed
to amend a national law on sport to recognise that football matters could be
decided only by the Greek Football Federation and its subordinated football
structures (a requirement for the federation to comply with the FIFA Statutes
and relevant UEFA regulations). The suspension was lifted a week later, after
the legislation was amended to recognise the independence of the federation.1
(b) In October 2006, FIFA suspended the Kenyan Football Federation (KFF)
for ‘repeated government interference in local football affairs’, after the
Kenyan government intervened to address alleged malfeasance within the
KFF by appointing a committee to take over the running of the game. The
suspension was lifted in March 2007 after the KFF resolved in general
meeting to dissolve itself and transfer its powers to a new governing body,
Football Kenya Limited, which had the support (but not the involvement) of
the Kenyan Government.2
(c) In May 2008, FIFA suspended the Iraqi Football Association (IFA) after the
Iraqi government dissolved the Iraqi Olympic Committee and all national
sports federations. FIFA lifted the ban after the Iraqi government excluded the
IFA from dissolution. However, less than a year later, in November 2009, the
IFA was suspended again after the Iraqi Olympic Committee moved to disband
it. FIFA lifted the suspension a few months later on the basis that the ‘National
Olympic Committee of Iraq had withdrawn the dissolution of the IFA and that
the latter had its full authority restored’.3
(d) In November 2008, FIFA suspended the Peruvian FA following the Peruvian
Government’s refusal to recognise its national election results. Peru had earlier
been stripped of the right to host the South American U20 championship due
to the dispute.4
(e) In June 2011, FIFA suspended the Belize Football Federation following the
announcement by the Ministry of Sports that the federation was not authorised
to represent Belize as it had failed to meet the requirements for registration with
the national sports council. FIFA provisionally lifted the suspension less than a
month later based on ‘some positive developments’ in the matter, but said that
the suspension would be reinstated in August that year if the federation was not
able to ‘definitively settle the issues at stake with the authorities’. It appears the
issues were resolved, as the suspension was not reinstated.5
(f) In July 2013, FIFA suspended the Cameroonian Football Association
(FECAFOOT), following government interference with the elections of its
officers, and set up a FIFA normalisation committee to oversee new elections.
FIFA lifted the suspension less than three weeks later, after the Cameroonian
authorities allowed the new committee to enter the FECAFOOT headquarters
and to carry out its activities unhindered.6
(g) In July 2014, FIFA suspended the Nigeria Football Association in response to a
court order preventing its officers from running Nigerian football and requiring
the Minister of Sports to appoint a member of the civil service to manage the
association pending a hearing. FIFA lifted the suspension just over a week later
after the court proceedings and order were withdrawn.7
(h) In June 2015, FIFA suspended the Indonesian Football Association and
disqualified it from the 2018 World Cup and 2019 Asian Cup qualifiers
following the takeover of its activities by the Indonesian Sports and Youth
Ministry, which had attempted to prevent certain teams from participating in
the domestic league, and had set up another body to replace it. FIFA lifted the
suspension almost a year later after the Indonesian Government agreed to lift
the decree in question.8
(i) In October 2015, FIFA suspended the Kuwait Football Association (KFA)
after the Kuwait Government failed to withdraw new legislation that gave the
Kuwaiti Sports Ministry the power to interfere with the independence national
sporting bodies, including the KFA. The suspension meant that the Kuwait
team could no longer compete in the FIFA World Cup qualifying tournament.
In a detailed and instructive award, CAS rejected a challenge to that suspension,
finding that the Kuwaiti law did interfere with the independence of the KFA,
in breach of the requirements of the FIFA Statutes, and that the suspension
of the KFA was a necessary and proportionate sanction for that breach.9 The
suspension was lifted in December 2017 after the Kuwait Parliament adopted a
law that excluded government interference in the sport.10
(j) In March 2017, FIFA suspended the Malian Football Association (FEMAFOOT)
after the Mali Sports Minister dissolved the executive committee of
FEMAFOOT and appointed a provisional committee to run the federation
and to set up elections within 12 months. FIFA lifted the suspension the next
month after FEMAFOOT provided a copy of the decision of the Malian Sports
Minister annulling the initial decision to dissolve the executive committee.11
(k) In July 2017, FIFA suspended the Sudan Football Federation (SFF) when the
SFF President and board of directors were removed from post by decree of
the Sudanese Government. FIFA lifted the suspension a week later following
confirmation that the Prime Minister of Sudan had issued a resolution
suspending the offending decree.12
(l) In October 2017, FIFA suspended the Pakistan Football Federation (PFF) when
the PFF’s offices in Karachi were put under the control of a court-appointed
administrator. FIFA lifted the suspension in March 2018 after the PFF regained
control of its offices and accounts.13
(m) In October 2018, FIFA suspended the Sierra Leone Football Association
(SLFA) after the SLFA President and General Secretary were removed from
post during a criminal investigation into corruption charges. FIFA demanded
that the SLFA and its recognised leadership confirm to FIFA that the SLFA
administration, premises, accounts and communication channels were under
their control once again. FIFA lifted the suspension in June 2019 after the
SLFA President and General Secretary returned to their posts after being
acquitted of all corruption charges.14
FIFA has also issued a number of warnings to member federations in relation to
government interference.15
1 See FIFA press releases dated 3 July 2006 (fifa.com/news/fifa-suspends-the-hellenic-football-
federation-104401 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 12 July 2006 (fifa.com/news/fifa-lifts-
suspension-hellenic-football-federation-104439 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
2 See FIFA press releases dated 25 October 2006 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-the-kenya-
football-federation-106935 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 9 March 2007 (fifa.com/who-we-
are/news/fifa-lifts-suspension-kenya-football-federation-112991 [accessed 23 September 2020]). In
Kenya Football Federation v FIFA, CAS 2008/O/1808, dissident officials of the KFF appealed to the
CAS, seeking an order that FIFA had not validly expelled the KFF, and that there had been no legal
succession from FFF to FKL. The CAS ruled that FIFA had been right not to apply the expulsion
provisions in its statutes, as it had not been necessary for it to do so. It was sufficient for FIFA to accept
the binding decisions taken by the bodies governing football in Kenya to change the legal vehicle of
the national federation, particularly since the dissidents now before the CAS had not challenged the
decision of the KFF General Assembly to form a new governing body.
3 See CNN, ‘Iraq banned from international football’, 21 November 2009 (edition.cnn.com/2009/
SPORT/football/11/21/iraq.fifa/index.html [accessed 23 September 2020]) and FIFA press release
dated 19 March 2010 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-executive-committee-approves-special-
funding-for-chile-and-haiti-1183198 [accessed 23 September 2020])
4 See FIFA press release dated 25 November 2008 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-the-
peruvian-959151 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
5 See FIFA press releases dated 17 June 2011 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/suspension-the-football-
federation-belize-1454212 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 7 July 2011 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/
suspension-the-football-federation-belize-provisionally-lifted-1470955 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
6 See FIFA press releases dated 4 July 2013 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-the-cameroonian-
football-association-2132047 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 22 July 2013 (fifa.com/who-we-are/
news/cameroonian-football-association-suspension-lifted-2139105 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
7 See FIFA press releases dated 9 July 2014 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/keep-pending-fifa-emergency-
committee-suspends-nigeria-football-federa-2402265 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 18 July 2014
(fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-nigeria-football-federation-lifted-2406572 [accessed
23 September 2020]). See also Nigerian Football Federation v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3744 & 3766, where
the CAS panel held that FIFA legitimately declined to recognise the results of the elections of officers of
the Nigeria FA.
8 See FIFA press release dated 3 June 2015 (fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=2015/m=6/news=indonesia-
disqualified-from-2018-fifa-world-cup-russia-and-afc-asian-c-2617809.html [accessed 23 September
2020]) and BBC article ‘Fifa ends Indonesia’s suspension from football after almost a year’ dated
14 May 2016 (bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36292992 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
9 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241. The CAS panel
found that ‘FIFA, as an association under Swiss law, enjoys substantial autonomy under Article 63(1)
of the SCC [Swiss Civil Code]. It is empowered to require its members to manage their affairs
independently and without third party interference’ (para 8.13); and that ‘the FIFA Statutes provide
clear requirements which its members must comply with. Such requirements include respecting the
principles of independence and autonomy […]. Certain legal provisions found in the new Kuwaiti
sports laws 117/2014 and 25/2015 contravene the FIFA Statutes. Specifically, the KFA, which is
obliged to implement the laws of Kuwait, finds itself in breach of its obligations as a member of
FIFA. This is sufficient to justify the suspension of KFA’ (paras 8.48–8.50). The legal provisions
that were held to cross the line included provisions that the Public Authority for Youth and Sport
(PAYS) could form a neutral committee to attend the meetings of the general assembly of the sports
body ‘to investigate the validity of its meeting and voting measures’ (because this compromised the
independence of the sports body and could lead to interference with the actions of those participating
in the meeting) (para 8.17); that the PAYS could require the sports body to call a general meeting or
face interruption of government support (para 8.32); and that a member of the sports body that paid its
membership fee had a right to attend the general assembly (para 8.46: ‘This subsection substantively
alters the rights which a member of a sporting body enjoys nor was such a condition imposed
previously. Undue interference occurs when a third party can influence or interfere in the internal
affairs of a sporting organisation. As previously explained, such interference does not occur when
laying out a timeframe for when an election should occur. However, interference does occur when a
government can set out the rights which a member does or does not have within a sporting body. The
rights of members must remain within the ambit of the sporting body itself in order to preserve its
autonomy and independence’). On the other hand, other provisions were held not to cross the line,
including a provision mandating a four-year term limit for directors of the sports body, because such
provision ‘does not interfere with the substance of the election, nor does it provide a third party with
the ability to influence the outcome of the board’s election’ (para 8.39).
10 See FIFA press releases dated 16 October 2015 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-
football-association-2717726 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 6 December 2017 (fifa.com/who-
we-are/news/suspension-of-the-kuwait-football-association-lifted-2922929 [accessed 23 September
2020]).
11 See FIFA press releases dated 17 March 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-malian-
football-association-femafoot-2876348 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 2 May 2017 (fifa.com/
who-we-are/news/suspension-of-the-malian-fa-lifted-2881964 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
12 See FIFA press releases dated 7 July 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-sudan-football-
association-2900598 [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 13 July 2017 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/
fifa-lifts-suspension-of-sudan-football-association-sfa-2901219 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
13 See FIFA press releases dated 11 October 2017 (fr.fifa.com/who-we-are/news/la-fifa-suspend-la-
federation-pakistanaise-de-football-2913302# [accessed 23 September 2020]) (available in French
only) and 14 March 2018 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-lifts-suspension-of-pakistan-football-
federation [accessed 23 September 2020]).
14 See FIFA press releases dated 5 October 2018 (fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-suspends-the-sierra-
leone-football-association [accessed 23 September 2020]) and 3 June 2019 (fifa.com/who-we-are/
news/fifa-council-appoints-qatar-as-host-of-the-fifa-club-world-cup-in-2019-and-2020 [accessed
For further examples of FIFA suspensions, see Henk Erik Meier and Borja Garcia, ‘Protecting
private transnational authority against public intervention: FIFA’s power over national governments’,
(2015) Public Administration 93(4) 890–906, doi: 10.1111/padm.12208, pp 896 et seq.
15 For example, in March 2012, when the Gambian Government dissolved the Gambian Football
Association and replaced it with a government-appointed interim committee, FIFA threatened ‘severe
sanctions’, stating: ‘no governmental instituted “interim committee” would be recognised and/or
dealt with by FIFA. FIFA underlines that any action taken against the GFA’s executive committee
would constitute a clear governmental interference and therefore infringe the FIFA Statutes’: see BBC
article ‘Fifa warns The Gambia that it faces ‘severe sanctions’ dated 6 March 2012 (bbc.co.uk/sport/
football/17273349, [accessed 23 September 2020]). Further, in 2018, FIFA threatened to suspend the
Nigeria Football Federation (NFF) due to undue government interference after a faction (supported
by the Nigerian Sports Minister), led by a person who was serving a five-year ban from the game,
took over the NFF headquarters after winning a court ruling following a protest of the elections that
kept the incumbent in power. Nigeria narrowly escaped the international ban as FIFA received prompt
confirmation that the legitimate leadership had been given back effective control of the federation (see
fifa.com/who-we-are/news/nigeria-and-ghana-given-final-deadline-or-face-suspension and in.reuters.
com/article/soccer-africa-nigeria/soccer-nigeria-escape-fifa-ban-as-officials-return-to-power-
idUKL3N0RA3A620140909 [accessed 23 September 2020]). See also, eg ‘FIFA warns Venezuela
against controversial sports law’, insideworldfootball.biz (2 August 2011) (insideworldfootball.
com/2011/08/02/fifa-warns-venezuela-against-controversial-sports-law/ [accessed 23 September
2020]); and ‘FIFA warn S Africa government against interference’, Thomson Reuters (31 March
2013) (uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-africa-safrica/fifa-warn-south-africa-government-against-
interference-idUKBRE92U01F20130331 [accessed 23 September 2020]).
As a further example, also in 2018, US President Donald Trump wrote on Twitter (‘The US has
put together a STRONG bid w/ Canada & Mexico for the 2026 World Cup. It would be a shame if
countries that we always support were to lobby against the US bid. Why should we be supporting
these countries when they don’t support us (including at the United Nations)?’), suggesting that he
was willing to withdraw political and financial support to nations that did not back the three-way
North American bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. In response, FIFA brought the FIFA ethics
guidelines to the President’s attention and noted the rules prohibiting undue influence by government.
Reuters article ‘FIFA points to ethics rules after Trump tweets threat to World Cup bid opponents’
dated 27 April 2018 (reuters.com/article/us-soccer-worldcup-trump/fifa-points-to-ethics-rules-after-
trump-tweets-threat-to-world-cup-bid-opponents-idUSKBN1HY03C [accessed 23 September 2020]).
A1.18 One particular area where the sports movement draws the line is where
a government mandates discrimination either against some of its own citizens or
against athletes from other countries:
(a) The IOC did not permit the South African Olympic Committee to enter a team
in the Olympic Games from 1964 until 1988 because of the South African
government’s policy of apartheid, which prevented South African SGBs from
allowing participation in sport without discrimination on racial grounds.1
(b) The European Weightlifting Federation (EWF) withdrew Spain’s right to host
the 2018 Junior and Under-23 Championships because of its political stance
over Kosovo. Kosovo is a member of the EWF, but Spain does not recognise
Kosovo (which declared its independence in 2008) as a sovereign state because
it thought this might provide arguments for the recognition of the Catalan
independence movement. The EWF rules provide that the hosts of EWF events
must allow all member nations to participate. The EWF Executive Board
sought guarantees from Spain that Kosovo’s team would be given visas, but
Spain refused them, prompting the withdrawal of the hosting rights.2
(c) In January 2019, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) stripped
Malaysia of the right to host the 2019 World Para Swimming Championships
after the Malaysian government banned Israeli athletes from taking part in
events in its country, and the Home Ministry of Malaysia failed to provide the
necessary guarantees that Israeli para swimmers would be able to participate
safely and free from discrimination in the championships.3
(d) In October 2019, the International Judo Federation (IJF) suspended the Iran
Judo Federation ‘from all competitions, administrative and social activities
organised or authorised by the IJF and its Unions, until the Iran Judo Federation
gives strong guarantees and prove that they will respect the IJF Statutes and
accept that their athletes fight against Israeli athletes’, following an incident
at the 2019 World Championships where Iranian authorities and the Iran Judo
Federation instructed an athlete to withdraw from a potential contest against an
Israeli athlete, in contravention of the IJF Statutes, the Olympic Charter, and
the IOC Code of Ethics.4
1 See BBC article ‘1964: South Africa banned from Olympics’ (news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/3547872.stm [accessed 23 September 2020]); NY Times article
‘Olympics Committee Ends Its Ban On Participation by South Africa’ dated 10 July 1991 (nytimes.
com/1991/07/10/sports/olympics-olympics-committee-ends-its-ban-on-participation-by-south-africa.
html [accessed 23 September 2020]); and Capobianco, ‘Voices of Discontent: Avery Brundage and the
IOC’s Dilemma of South Africa’s Olympic Participation, 1956–1968’, (PhD thesis, June 2015). See
further para A1.59(c).
2 See Inside the Games article dated 23 April 2018, ‘Exclusive: Spain loses weightlifting championships
because of political stance over Kosovo’ (insidethegames.biz/articles/1064262/spain-loses-
weightlifting-championships-because-of-political-stance-over-kosovo [accessed 23 September
2020]).
3 See IPC press release dated 27 January 2019 (paralympic.org/news/ipc-strip-malaysia-2019-world-
para-swimming-championships [accessed 23 September 2020]).
4 See International Judo Federation Disciplinary Commission decision no 2019-3 dated 22 October 2019.
3 THE PYRAMID MODEL OF SPORTS GOVERNANCE AND

REGULATION
A Deriving governance authority from consent
A1.19 As noted above,1 in most countries SGBs are not state agencies, licensed by
the state to implement its policy objectives; instead they are wholly private bodies.
As a result, the authority of SGBs is not derived from statute or other government
mandate. Instead, an SGB’s legitimacy and authority as the governing body of its
sport is entirely consensual, derived from the agreement of its members to be bound
by its rules and regulations.2
1 See para A1.8.
2 Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established
by contract and FINA derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming
has promulgated rules and regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a
contract between the body and its members’); Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016
& CAS 2017/A/5036 (‘92. The Panel agrees that the authority of international or national federations
and/or national anti-doping organizations to impose sanctions on athletes is normally based on a
contractual relationship. Such relationship may be grounded on the athlete obtaining a licence to
participate in competitions organized under the rules of a federation, or on an agreement – either
explicit or implicit – on participation in a specific sport event. 93. The terms of this contractual
relationship consist inter alia of the relevant anti-doping rules. While obtaining a licence to compete
from a federation or when participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts that the anti-doping rules
of that federation or event organizer bind him/her’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, paras 86,
88 (same); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 8.21 (‘[…] the WADA Code is neither a law nor
an international treaty. It is rather a contract instrument binding its signatories in accordance with
private international law’); Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.16 (‘It
is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship between UKA and Ohuruogu is contractual
in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s new regime when she signed the form that
contained those procedures on 25 July 2005 […]’); International Rugby Board v Troy & ARU,
CAS 2008/A/1664, para 38 (‘[…] the [ARU Anti-Doping] By-Law is only enforceable by reason
of contract. Thus there must be some evidence that the Respondent undertook contractually to be
bound by the By-Law’); Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.26 (‘[…] the Appellant, when she
entered the IWF European Championships, accepted the IWF Regulations and the sanctions provided
in the IWF ADP. As Respondent correctly submitted, by participating in an IWF competition, the
Appellant entered into a contractual relationship with the Respondent, and, consequently, subjected
herself to the IWF ADP with respect to doping matters’).
A1.20 This has important ‘constitutional’ consequences. For example, because

this regulatory structure is a private arrangement between the SGB and its members,
under English law at least those aggrieved by the actions and decisions of an SGB
may not invoke the judicial review mechanisms that are used to challenge the
actions and decisions of public bodies. Rather, a private law cause of action must
be identified, and private law remedies apply.1 On the other hand, as a result of the
social, cultural and economic importance attributed to sport, and the enormous
public interest in its conduct,2 SGBs are often seen as custodians of public assets.3
Combined with their monopoly authority and control over access to the sport, which
carries with it enormous power over people’s livelihoods, hopes, and expectations,
this creates a tension between an SGB’s ‘private’ status and its public interest role
that is reflected in (for example) the application to SGBs of EU free movement rules
that are supposedly confined in application to ‘state’ measures,4 in the debate as to
whether SGBs are considered ‘public authorities’ within the scope of human rights
legislation,5 and in the public law standards that have crept into courts’ ‘private law’
analysis of the actions of governing bodies.6
1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies), and in particular Chapter
E5 (Public or Private?). See eg Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/1/2426, para 65 (‘With specific regard to
the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), which was invoked by the Appellant, the Panel
remarks that international treaties on human rights are meant to protect the individuals’ fundamental
rights vis-à-vis governmental authorities and, in principle, they are inapplicable per se in disciplinary
matters carried out by sports governing bodies, which are legally characterized as purely private
entities’).
2 See para A3.5 et seq.
3 See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347–48 (‘The two bodies were in a sense
custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should
be properly organised and administered’); Sport and the European Union (Federation Internationale
de l’Automobile, May 1999) (‘Sports authorities fulfil functions which are manifestly public interest
responsibilities. They maintain rules to ensure integrity of competition. They establish rules to
protect the safety of participants and spectators. […] If sporting authorities did not carry out these
responsibilities, public authorities would be forced either to ban all dangerous sport or to step in and
run it at significant cost to the taxpayer’).
4 See para E12.21.
5 See para E13.14.
6 See Chapter E5 (Public or Private?) and Chapter E7 (Grounds for Review Arising Out of Control of the
Sport). See also AEK Athens v UEFA, CAS 98/200, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer,
2002) p 38, para 58 (‘there is an evident analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental
bodies with respect to their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities,
and similar principles should govern their actions’).
A1.21 Another important consequence of the fact that an SGB’s authority is derived
from the consent of its members is that it makes a ‘pyramid’ model of governance and
regulation inevitable and essential, because it is impossible for one SGB to contract
with all of the millions of bodies and individuals who participate in the sport around
the world, let alone to police and enforce those contracts. Instead, it has to contract
with a few members, and require them to contract with and enforce its rules against
the participants in the sport in their respective jurisdictions.
B The ‘European model of sport’
A1.22 In its November 1998 consultation paper,1 the European Commission

adopted the term ‘The European Model of Sport’ to describe the pyramid system of
governance and regulation typically seen in the sports sector:2
‘In the Member States sport is traditionally organised in a system of national
federations. Only the top federations (usually one per country) are linked together in
European and international federations. Basically the structure resembles a pyramid
with a hierarchy …
The clubs form the foundation of this pyramid. They offer everyone the possibility
of engaging in sport locally, thereby promoting the idea of “sport for all”. They
also foster the development of new generations of sportsmen/women. At this level
unpaid participation is particularly important and beneficial to the development of
European sport […]
Regional federations form the next level; the clubs are usually members of these
organisations. Their area of interest is limited to a region in which they are responsible
for organising regional championships or co-ordinating sport on a regional level […]
The national federations, one for each discipline, represent the next level. Usually
all the regional federations are members of the respective national federation. These
federations regulate all general matters within their discipline and at the same
time represent their branch in the European or International federations. They also
organise national championships and act as regulatory bodies.
The top of the pyramid is formed by the European Federations, which are organised
along the same lines as the national federations. Every European federation allows
only one national federation from each country to be a member. By means of rules,
usually involving sanctions for those taking part in championships which have not
been recognised or authorised by the international federation, these organisations try
to maintain their position’.
However, the continental federations are not at the apex of the pyramid. Instead, each
of them will be a member of an international federation that has ultimate authority for
the governance of their sport. Thus, the Olympic Charter recognises one international
federation for each sport, with exclusive authority and responsibility to govern that
sport,3 and buttresses that authority by requiring National Olympic Committees to
recognise only one national federation for each sport, which must be the national
federation that is affiliated to the international federation recognised by the IOC.4
1 ‘The European Model of Sport’, Consultation Document of DG X, November 1998. See also para
E11.81.
2 Typically, but not uniformly. The European Commission has noted that ‘[t]here are differences in the
scope and importance of the sporting pyramid depending on the sport. In particular, the system of open
competitions is generally limited to team sports, and even in that case “the system of open competitions
is somewhat mitigated by a licensing system that introduces financial criteria for participation in
competitions”. In other disciplines, such as motor sports and cycling, professional competitions are
totally or partially closed, and in disciplines such as golf and tennis “the organisation of competitions
also largely diverges from the pyramid structure”’. European Commission, Case AT.40208,
International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 29, citing ‘Commission staff
working document – The EU and Sport: Background and context’, SEC (2007) 935, p 41. See also
Commission staff working paper at para 4 ( ‘in view of the diversity and complexities of European
sport structures […] it is unrealistic to try to define a unified model of organisation of sport in Europe.
[…] ‘[t]he emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside the organised disciplines, professional
sports clubs, etc) is posing new questions as regards governance, democracy and representation of
interests within the sport movement’).
3 See Rules 25 and 26 of the Olympic Charter.
4 See para 1.2 of the Bye-Law to Olympic Charter Rules 27 and 28 (‘An NOC shall not recognise more
than one national federation for each sport governed by an IF’) and Rule 29 (‘To be recognised by an
NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national federation must exercise a specific, real and
on-going sports activity, be affiliated to an IF recognised by the IOC and be governed by and comply
in all aspects with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF’). See also para 2.1 of the Bye-
Law to Rules 27 and 28 (NOC must select athletes for Games from those proposed by recognised
national federation) and Rule 44.4 (‘An NOC shall only enter competitors upon the recommendations
for entries given by national federations’).
A1.23 International federations come in various guises. Many have followed the
IOC in basing their headquarters in Switzerland,1 and they are usually organised as
non-governmental not-for-profit associations founded under and governed by Art 60
et seq of the Swiss Civil Code. However, this is not a requirement of the Olympic
Charter. For example, the International Tennis Federation, World Sailing, and the
International Netball Federation are all based in the UK, while the International
Cricket Council is based in Dubai, and each of them is organised as a private limited
company, under the laws of either the UK or another common law jurisdiction.2
1 For a discussion of some of the perceived benefits of doing so, see Dudognon, ‘The Standard
International Sports Federation: An Association under Swiss Law, with its Headquarters in Lausanne’
[2014] ISLR 50.
2 See generally Chapter A2 (Forms of Organisation of Sports Governing Bodies).
A1.24 Wherever the international federation is based, however, it must have

international reach and authority, because sport ‘is a global phenomenon which
demands globally uniform standards. Only if the same terms and conditions apply to
everyone who participates in organised sport, are the integrity and equal opportunity
of sporting competition guaranteed’.1 The international federation establishes those
terms and conditions in its rules and regulations, and then ensures their uniform
application throughout the world by adopting the aforementioned pyramid structure
of governance and regulation.2 More specifically:
(a) The international federation’s constitution will recognise the exclusive
authority of its member national federations to govern the sport in their
respective national territories.3
(b) Each national federation will in turn be required as a condition of membership
(i) to recognise the exclusive authority of the international federation to regulate
the sport,4 and (ii) to adopt the rules of the international federation within its
territory, and enforce them against its members, including athletes under its
jurisdiction.5
(c) The international federation’s rules will make it clear that no athlete may
participate in international competitions unless they are a member of or
otherwise affiliated to a member national federation and have agreed to be
bound by and to comply with its rules.6
(d) The international federation’s rules will usually require the reciprocal
recognition throughout the sport of disciplinary decisions and sanctions handed
down by the international federation or by its member federations.7
(e) The international federation and its member federations will require participants
to commit to compete only in competitions that have been sanctioned by the
international federation or one of its member federations, and so are organised
subject to their rules (and not to participate in any competition to which those
rules do not apply and to which their authority does not extend).8
1 Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 12. The courts have recognised the importance
of the uniform application of the rules of sport by upholding provisions requiring the submission
of all disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in order to avoid inconsistent application and
enforcement of those rules by national courts. See eg Pechstein v International Skating Union,
German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), decision of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15. In addition, the Court of
Arbitration for Sport has developed different ways of ensuring that an international federation’s rules
may be applied uniformly throughout the sport, notwithstanding differences in national laws. See para
B1.16.
2 See Rule 26.1 of the Olympic Charter (‘The mission and role of the IFs within the Olympic Movement
are: (1) to establish and enforce, in accordance with the Olympic spirit, the rules concerning the
practice of their respective sports and to ensure their application’); opinion of Advocate-General
Kokott dated 6 March 2008 in C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v
Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER (D) 02 (Jul) (‘The pyramid structure that has developed in most sports
helps to ensure that the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable
for competitions, are taken into account’).
3 See eg Art 4.2 of the Statutes of the Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) (‘The FIA shall
recognise in each country and for all branches of motoring only one holder of the Sporting Power
which under all circumstances shall remain responsible to the FIA pursuant to the FIA Statutes and
regulations. The holder of the Sporting Power is the direct motor sport representative and exclusive
authority for its country within the FIA. It is the sole entity entitled to govern motor sport and enforce
in its country the International Sporting Code of the FIA and all other FIA and ASN/ACN regulations
required for the development and organisation of motor sport competitions and for the implementation
of the applicable judicial and disciplinary proceedings’); FIH Constitution at Art 2.2(a)(i) (‘full
Members shall enjoy all of the rights and benefits conferred on Members by the Statutes and
Regulations, including (without limitation) recognition as the sole governing body for Hockey in that
Member’s Country’). See also Stillitano v USSF & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2241, para 10.21 (‘the Panel
finds persuasive FIFA’s assertion that “one of the basic tenets of FIFA and its member organizations is
that its national association members control association football within their respective territory”’).
4 See eg FIA Statutes Art 6 (‘6.1 The Clubs, Associations or Federations which are members of the
FIA shall, by the very fact of their admission into the FIA, agree to abide without reservation by the
Statutes. They shall undertake to do this when they file their application for membership. 6.2 Likewise,
they shall undertake to enforce in their respective countries the general regulations established by
the FIA and the appendices thereto. 6.3 They shall also undertake to accept, observe, and enforce
all decisions taken by the bodies of the FIA, including the International Tribunal, the Cost Cap
Adjudication Panel, the International Court of Appeal, the Senate, the World Council for Automobile
Mobility and Tourism, the World Motor Sport Council and the General Assembly’); FIH Constitution,
Art 4.1(a) (‘All Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that (a) the FIH
has sole ultimate authority over the governance, regulation and playing of Hockey; (b) they shall not
become a member of or recognise or otherwise support any organisation with similar objects to the
FIH unless that organisation is recognised by the FIH’) and Art 4.1(c) (‘All Continental Federations
and Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that: […] they are bound by
and must comply with the Statutes and Regulations, and with the decisions taken by the FIH and its
constituent bodies (including Congress, the Executive Board, and other duly appointed officials and
bodies of the FIH) pursuant to and in application and enforcement of the Statutes and Regulations
[…]’).
5 For example, in Real Federacion Espanola de Futbol (RFEF) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, the CAS
panel noted that ‘the structure has it that the national football associations are the primary guardians of
FIFA’s regulations on the protection of minors with power to take action on any member who breaches
the said regulations’ (para 204). See further para 259 (‘The RFEF had an ancillary duty to play in
ensuring full compliance of Article 5.1 of the FIFA RSTP [FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer
of Players]. This role entailed undertaking both preventive and curative measures in monitoring clubs’
compliance thereof’), and para 291 (‘The national federations play an important role in the protection
of minors. They must assume an oversight and supervisory role in respect of the relevant FIFA rules,
a duty stipulated in general and abstract terms in the FIFA regulations. Therefore, a violation of these
FIFA rules on the protection of minors should be taken (particularly) seriously’). The CAS panel held
that the RFEF had failed to enforce the relevant regulations properly by overseeing the international
transfer of foreign under-aged players to Spanish football. The CAS upheld the sanction imposed by
the FIFA Appeal Committee, but reduced the fine amount. The RFEF was fined CHF 280,000 (reduced
from CHF 500,000), reprimanded, and given a period of one year to rectify its regulatory system to
comply with the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (paras 15, 32, 297, and CAS
conclusions on final page).
Similarly, Art 20.3 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code requires international federations not only
to adopt Code-compliant anti-doping rules, but also ‘[t]o require as a condition of membership that
the policies, rules and programs of their National Federations and other members are in compliance
with the Code’, and ‘[t]o withhold some or all funding to its member National Federations that are
not in compliance with the Code’. The 2021 World Anti-Doping Code will significantly strengthen Art
20.3, in particular by obliging international federations who sign the Code ‘to require, as a condition
of membership, that the policies, rules and programs of their National Federations and other members
are in compliance with the Code and the International Standards, and to take appropriate action to
enforce such compliance; areas of compliance shall include but not be limited to: (i) requiring that
their National Federations conduct Testing only under the documented authority of their International
Federation and use their National Anti-Doping Organization or other Sample collection authority
to collect Samples in compliance with the International Standard for Testing and Investigations;
(ii) requiring that their National Federations recognize the authority of the National Anti-Doping
Organization in their country in accordance with Article 5.2.1 and assist as appropriate with the
National Anti-Doping Organization’s implementation of the national Testing program for their sport;
(iii) requiring that their National Federations analyze all Samples collected using a WADA-accredited
or WADA-approved laboratory in accordance with Article 6.1; and (iv) requiring that any national
level anti-doping rule violation cases discovered by their National Federations are adjudicated by an
operationally independent hearing panel in accordance with Article 8.1 and the International Standard
for Results Management’.
6 See eg Art 1 of World Athletics’ rules on ‘Requirements to compete in International Competitions’:
‘No athlete may take part in an International Competition unless they: 1.1.1 are a member of a Club
affiliated to a Member; or 1.1.2 are themselves affiliated to a Member; or 1.1.3 have otherwise agreed
to abide by the rules of a Member; […]’.
Where a national federation is suspended from membership of the international federation for
failure to comply with its membership obligations, such as the duty to run an effective anti-doping
programme, the default position is that its athletes may not participate in official competitions until
the national federation is reinstated. See eg International Volleyball Association (FIVB) Disciplinary
Regulations (May 2019) Art 25.1.2 (‘Unless the FIVB Board of Administration or Executive Committee
decides otherwise (eg authorising participation in competitions under the FIVB flag), a suspended NF
loses the rights as member of FIVB (except for Art. 2.3.1.4 of the FIVB Constitution [may attend
Congress as observers]) so long as it remains suspended and its teams and officials may not organise
and/or participate in official competitions or activities’); UCI Discipline and Procedure Regulations
(February 2020) Art 12.3.017 (‘In the event of the suspension of a team, association or any other
organisation, all licence holders who are members or otherwise linked shall also be suspended, unless
authorised by the UCI Management Committee to exercise their activities in an individual capacity
under appropriate conditions to be set by the Management Committee’); and FEI General Regulations
(January 2020) Art 117.5 (‘Athletes whose NF has been suspended or expelled may not be accepted as
entries for any International Event, or national Event outside the country of their NF, during the period
of the Suspension or expulsion, unless otherwise approved by the Board’). The rationale is that the
athletes were admitted to international competition based on their federation’s firm legal commitment,
as a condition of membership, to institute effective anti-doping measures. The athletes’ exclusion
from international competition is then an inevitable result of their federation’s failure to meet that
commitment. The exclusion is not a punishment for the athletes’ own doping conduct; it is a necessary
consequence of the fact that their federation has failed to subject them to an anti-doping system that
meets the mandatory requirements of the Code. The pyramid system of governance and regulation
of sport requires that they share the fate of their federation, and bear the consequences of the actions
and omissions, achievements and failures of that federation’s management. So, for example, when the
IAAF (now World Athletics) suspended the Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF) from membership
in November 2015 on the basis that it had failed to comply with its obligation to operate an adequate
anti-doping system, by operation of the IAAF’s Competition Rule 22.1(a) all Russian track athletes
were automatically ineligible to compete in any international competitions (including the Olympic
Games) pending RusAF’s reinstatement. The Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) and a number of
Russian athletes challenged the validity of that rule in ROC & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684,
but the CAS rejected the challenge and upheld the validity of the rule, stating: ‘It is a rule which
affects the eligibility of athletes to enter into International Competitions and is a consequence of
the organizational structure of international sport; national federations are members of international
federations, and have the duty to respect the obligations deriving from such membership; athletes
participate in organized sport, as controlled by an international federation, only on the basis of their
registration with a national federation, which is a member of the international federation in question.
[…] [T]he consequence contemplated by Rule 22.1(a) is in fact suitable to apply irrespective of the
reason triggering the suspension of the national federation. In other words, Rule 22.1(a) is a rule of
general application, not specific to doping cases, and would apply equally to athletes who are members
of federations that fail to pay their membership dues as to athletes who are members of federations
that engage in other breaches of federation obligations to the IAAF as a member thereof’ (para 119).
7 For example, if one national federation were to ban a player for a period for misconduct (eg on-field
violence, or doping), it would undermine the integrity of the sport if that player could circumvent the
ban by simply going to play elsewhere. To avoid this, the international federation’s rules may provide
that disciplinary sanctions imposed by a national federation apply automatically throughout the sport.
See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 7.1.8 (requiring member federations to ‘recognise and
enforce within its Country: all decisions of the IBU’s constituent bodies, officials, the Biathlon Integrity
Unit, Disciplinary Tribunals, and the CAS; periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions
imposed under the [IBU] Rules, including the IBU Integrity Code; and periods of ineligibility and other
disciplinary sanctions imposed by other NF Members’); FIH Statutes (November 2018) Art 2.2(b)(vii)
(‘Each full Member and provisional Member […] must recognise and enforce within its Country: (A)
all decisions of the FIH’s constituent bodies and/or officials made under the Statutes and Regulations;
(B) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed by the FIH, the Disciplinary
Commissioner or the Judicial Commission; and (C) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary
sanctions imposed by CFs or by other Members …’); and, similarly, ICC Anti-Corruption Code for
Participants Art 9.2 (‘Decisions made and Provisional Suspensions and sanctions imposed under the
anti-corruption rules of National Cricket Federations shall be recognised, enforced, extended and
given effect to within their respective jurisdictions by the ICC and other National Cricket Federations
(including in respect of any Matches, tournaments or other events sanctioned by such National Cricket
Federations), automatically upon receipt of notice of the same, without the need for further formality’.
Similarly, Article 15 of the World Anti-Doping Code provides for the automatic recognition and
enforcement by all Code signatories of doping bans issued pursuant to rules complying with the Code.
Alternatively, the international federation’s rules may give the international federation the right, in
‘serious’ cases, to extend the sanction so that it applies worldwide. See eg FIFA Disciplinary Code
(2019 edition) Art 136.1 (‘If the infringement is serious, in particular but not limited to discrimination,
the manipulation of football matches and competitions, misconduct against match officials or forgery
and falsification, the associations, confederations, and other organising sports bodies shall request the
Disciplinary Committee to extend the sanctions they have imposed so as to have worldwide effect’)
(which is further discussed at para B3.55).
This principle may lead to difficulties where the sanctions handed down by one governing body
are deemed to fall short of the requirements of national law binding another governing body: see para
A1.7, n 1.
8 See further Section 6.
A1.25 For example, FIFA governs association football at the global level. It is
responsible for maintaining the ‘Laws of the Game’ (ie the ‘rules of football’), and
also issues regulations on issues of global application and importance, such as the
scheduling of international matches, the registration and transfer of players, and
player release for international matches. On the other hand, issues relevant only to
one continent or nation are addressed by (respectively) the continental federation
or the national federation in question. For example, UEFA governs football in
Europe, regulating issues specific to European football associations, and organising
pan-European competitions at national representative level (eg the quadrennial
UEFA European Championships) and at club level (the annual UEFA Champions
League and Europa League).1 And The Football Association is the governing body
for football in England, issuing regulations on matters such as the use of agents2 and
the maintenance of proper discipline and conduct on and off the field,3 as well as
organising or sanctioning the organisation of national-level competitions.4 The FA
may in turn delegate certain functions to regional federations (or county associations)
to administer at a lower level.
1 There are six continental associations in football sitting under FIFA, namely UEFA in Europe, the
Asian Football Confederation (AFC), the Confederation of African Football (CAF), the Confederation
of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), the Oceania Football
Confederation (OFC), and the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL).
2 See Chapter F2 (Players’ Agents).

3 See para B3.56 et seq.
4 The FA organises the FA Cup and enters national representative teams in international tournaments
organised by UEFA and FIFA and in ‘friendly’ matches that it organises directly with other FIFA
member national associations. In addition, The FA sanctions the Premier League to organise its
own annual league competition, it sanctions the Football League to organise its own annual league
competitions as well as the annual League Cup, and it sanctions the National League to organise
annual league competitions below the Football League. See further the discussion at para A2.78 .
C The North American model of sport
A1.26 In contrast to the so-called ‘European model of sport’, North American

sports are mainly split into:
(a) amateur sport, mainly high school and university athletes, with all inter-
collegiate sports governed by the NCAA;1 and
(b) professional leagues, with the ‘big four’ Major League sports being Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National
Basketball Association (NBA), and National Hockey League (NHL) (although
some call for Major Soccer League (MLS) to make it the ‘big five’).2
Notably:
(a) In contrast to the pyramid structure of the European model of sport (which
involves interdependence between the organisations at different levels of the
pyramid), the North American model is more ‘horizontal’.3 In particular, the
professional leagues are generally not linked to (or responsible for developing)
the lower levels of the sport.
(b) A single league dominates the competition and organisation of each professional
sport, and it operates independently of the international sporting system.4
Teams in the leagues are privately owned ‘franchises’, and the owners of those
franchises are also the owners of the league,5 which has a private ownership
structure.6 The owners appoint a ‘commissioner’ who runs the league on their
behalf (effectively as a CEO).
(c) In contrast to the ‘open system’ seen in most European league sports, the
North American professional leagues are ‘closed leagues’, which do not have a
system of promotion and relegation. Changes in teams in the league therefore
come only from adding, removing, or relocating franchises (with the owners of
the league having the exclusive right to decide on market entry).7
(d) To maintain competitive balance in the absence of promotion and relegation,
the professional leagues typically recruit new talent through a reverse-order
draft system (in its simplest form, the lowest ranked team in a season will get
the first choice of high school or college graduates that are eligible to play in
the league the next season) and also impose salary caps to limit the amount of
money that clubs can spend on wages.8
(e) A further significant differentiating characteristic of the North American model
is that collective bargaining agreements govern the relationship between the
league/owners and the unions (which represent all of the players in the league
and negotiate collectively on their behalf). Disputes in the bargaining process
have led to numerous strikes and lockouts.9
1 See NCAA website (ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [accessed
24 September 2020]); and Van Bottenburg, ‘Why are the European and American sports worlds so
different? Path-dependence in the European and American sports history’, Utrecht University (March
2019), p 14.
2 See eg Cassidy, ‘How far can soccer go in the U.S.A?’, The New Yorker (2 July 2014) (newyorker.com/
news/john-cassidy/how-far-can-soccer-go-in-the-u-s-a [accessed 24 September 2020]).
3 Nafziger, ‘A comparison of the European and North American models of sports organisation’, The
International Sports Law Journal (1 July 2008), p 8.
4 For example, the NHL is not a member of the International Ice Hockey Federation (which is the IOC-
recognised international federation for ice hockey), and refused to release its players to participate in
the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympic Games. See NHL press release dated 4 April 2017 (nhl.com/news/
nhl-will-not-participate-in-2018-winter-olympics/c-288385598 [accessed 24 September 2020]).
5 See eg Mitten, ‘Baseball: An Illustration Of How Professional Sports Are Structured, Internally
Governed, And Legally Regulated In The USA’, Marquette University Law School (January 2009),
p 3.
6 The MLS is an exception. See Fraser v Major League Soccer, 97 F Supp 2d 130 (D Mass 2000),
p 132 (‘The structure and mode of operation of MLS is governed by its Limited Liability Company
Agreement (“MLS Agreement” or “Agreement”). The MLS Agreement establishes a Management
Committee consisting of representatives of each of the investors. The Management Committee has
authority to manage the business and affairs of MLS. Several of the investors have signed Operating
Agreements with MLS which, subject to certain conditions and obligations, give them the right to
operate specific MLS teams. There are also passive investors in MLS who do not operate teams’).
7 See eg Buzzacchi et al, ‘Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Open Leagues, Closed
Leagues and Competitive Balance’, Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade (2003), p 170.
8 Salary caps in various guises are slowly being introduced into European sports. See para B5.100
et seq.
9 See eg CNN Editorial Research article, ‘Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts’ dated 17 March
2020 (edition.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/index.html [accessed
4 THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF

AN SGB
A1.27 The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has noted that ‘there is an evident
analogy between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with respect to
their role and functions as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities, and
similar principles should govern their actions’.1 In particular, like governments,
SGBs have legislative, executive, and judicial functions. For example, the Fédération
Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the world governing body for four-wheel
motor sport, has noted:
‘The FIA is structured in line with the principles of good governance and its
organisation follows a classic governmental style similar to that of a nation
state. Specifically in relation to sport, there is a clear separation between: making
and amending of sporting rules as the primary legislative function; making and
reviewing executive decisions regarding the management of financial resources and
organisation of sporting competitions; and resolving disputes between members,
sporting participants and other relevant parties’.2
1 AEK Athens v UEFA, CAS 98/200, p 38, para 58. See also Max Mosley, Former President of the
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, speech at The Rules of the Game, conference on the
Governance of Sport (Brussels, February 2001) (‘the whole structure of a sports federation is that of a
small government which, within the limits of what it is trying to do, mainly makes rules and becomes,
for that particular area of activity, almost like a sovereign country’).
2 See fia.com/governance [accessed 24 September 2020].
A The legislative branch
A1.28 The SGB has a clear legislative function, issuing rules to regulate an activity
of broad interest and importance, in the public interest.1 Not only is it the guardian of
the ‘laws of the game’. It is also called upon to issue regulations addressing a host of
issues of obvious public interest,2 such as the integrity of the sport (including doping,3
match-fixing,4 and financial fair play5) and the safety of its participants (including
on-field discipline6 and safeguarding7). It also has to maintain the constitution of the
SGB, determining how and by whom the powers of the SGB are to be exercised, and
regulating the relationship between the SGB and other SGBs at other levels of the
pyramid in the sport in question.
1 See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48 (‘[T]he two bodies were in a sense
custodians of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game should
be properly organised and administered’).
2 See generally Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations: The Legal Framework).
3 See Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).
4 See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption).
5 See Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play).
6 See Chapter B3 (Misconduct).
7 See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).
A1.29 The legislative authority of the SGB – its power to amend its constitution
and/or to issue rules and regulations setting out the playing conditions of the sport
– is ultimately vested in the members of the SGB, meeting together as a ‘Congress’
or ‘General Assembly’.1 For example, the supreme legislative body of the FIA is the
General Assembly, which is composed of representatives of the national automobile
associations or clubs representing the different countries in membership of the FIA.2
However, such bodies generally meet only every two or four years, or (at most)
annually. Many SGB constitutions therefore confirm that only the members in
general meeting may change the constitution, but delegate the power to issue sporting
regulations (which may need to be changed more urgently and/or more frequently)
to the Executive Committee or other organ of the SGB.3 Where rule-making power
is dispersed between different bodies in this way, disputes may arise as to whether a
particular body did actually have the requisite power to issue particular regulations.4
1 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 12.2 (‘Congress holds ultimate and supreme authority
in relation to the affairs of the IBU’); and World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Art 24.1
(‘Congress is the highest authority of World Athletics and the sport of Athletics worldwide’). See
also, eg Art 64 of the Swiss Civil Code (‘The general meeting of members is the supreme governing
body of the association’); Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting
Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 84 (‘Under German
law, the meeting of the members is the highest organ of an association’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255,
para 12 (‘Chapter IV of the Constitution is entitled “Congress”. By Article 27 the Congress is the
general meeting of members and the highest authority of UCI’); International Federation of American
Football (IFAF) et al v Wiking, CAS 2017/O/5025, para 205 (‘The Congress is the supreme authority
of IFAF (Article 1 of the IFAF Statutes) […]’).
2 Further to Article 4.1 of the FIA Statutes, the FIA General Assembly has the exclusive right to take
all decisions concerning the organisation, direction, and management of international motor sport,
including the right to amend the FIA Statutes and the International Sporting Code.
3 NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/0/466, para 7.8 (‘The Panel observes, in general, that in any international
federation the legislative power is hierarchically apportioned between the general assembly and
the executive body, whatever their names. General assemblies of international federations are
convened only once or twice every four-year Olympic period. It would be highly impractical for the
administration of a sport if the executive body, whose meetings are frequent, could not enact rules at
all in order to implement or supplement the resolutions adopted by the general assembly, provided
that it does not violate them’); Federation Française des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des
Echecs, CAS 2010/O/2166, para 9.6.5 (‘It is customary in practically all sports federations to transfer
the powers of the general assembly to a body which manages the affairs of the federation between the
sessions of the general assembly (which sits every two or four years’); Australian Olympic Committee,
CAS 2000/C/267, para 34, discussing the governance structure of FINA (‘the General Congress and
the Technical Congress have the power to issue rules. The Bureau interprets and applies them. In
between congresses, the Bureau has further wide authority over all matters to be decided by FINA and,
in particular, may issue decisions which will have authority in between congresses. Bureau decisions
once made are effective until they are either confirmed or the Congress acts in a different fashion. The
effect of the Bureau decision is binding and determinative of the issue until changed by the Congress’).
For example, the FIA General Assembly delegates the right to identify potential changes to
the Statutes and the International Sporting Code, and to approve the regulations for different FIA
competitions, to a body called the World Motor Sports Council, but retains the right to approve or reject
changes to the Statutes and/or the International Sporting Code at its next meeting. See FIA Statutes
Art 9.10-9.13 and Art 16.
4 See eg IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 13 (‘[…] insofar as the promulgation, interpretation,
or amendment of the IAAF Rules are concerned, such powers are reserved exclusively to the
appropriate organs of the IAAF’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (finding that a new UCI rule
did not, as contended, create a new category of membership, and therefore it was not ultra vires the
UCI management committee to issue that rule); FFSA et al v FISA, CAS 97/168 (rejecting claim by
member federations that the FISA Council did not have authority, under the FISA Statutes, to adopt
bye-laws limiting the placing of advertising on athletes’ uniforms); Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA,
CAS 2009/A/1827, paras 7.1.6 and 7.19 (Executive Committee bye-laws that would have had the
effect of amending the Statutes declared invalid, because AIBA’s Statutes provided that they could only
be amended by Congress).
A1.30 The SGB’s different legal instruments and rules form a ‘hierarchy of norms’
that must be respected.1 The SGB’s constitution (which may be referred to by
different names, eg Statutes, or Charter, or Memorandum and Articles of Association)
is the supreme document that governs the affairs of the SGB. Any regulations issued
by any duly authorised body of the SGB must fall within the object clause of the
constitution,2 and must not contradict the constitution.3 In particular, they must
respect any fundamental rights and principles set out in the constitution.4
1 See para B1.10.
2 New Saints v Football Association of Wales [2020] EWHC 1838 (Ch), para 76(3) (‘the objectives
of FA Wales, as set out in the FA Wales Rules, constitute a hard limit on the powers that FA Wales
has’); ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 50 (‘It is
axiomatic that ICC cannot act outwith its objects. […]’) (discussed further at para A1.44, n 1).
3 IRIFF v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1708, para 24 (‘In principle, FIFA has the freedom to establish its own
provisions, but there are limits to this autonomy. When creating new rules and regulations, the relevant
organs are bound by the limits imposed on them by the higher ranking provisions, in particular the
association’s statutes. This follows from the principle of legality which means that a lower level
provision may complement and concretize a higher ranking provision, but not amend, override,
contradict or change the higher one. This principle is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence’);
Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 102 (‘It follows from this principle [of hierarchy of norms]
that – subject to well-defined exceptions – rules and regulations enacted by an association must be
in compliance with the highest regulatory framework, ie the statutes of the associations. In case of
contradiction between lower ranking norms and the statutes it is the latter – subject to well-defined
exceptions – that take precedence’); and USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, paras 57-58 (‘By Rule
44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC has incorporated the WADA Code into the IOC’s own
Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of the OC that a competitor must respect and comply
with all aspects with the WADA Code. Accordingly, the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in
particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that
the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been
incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC,
and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’).
4 For example, in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449, ‘[t]he Athlete contended, and
the IAAF did not submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of
Monaco all provide that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking
rules that prevail. Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable
and proportionate, they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution
and the laws of Monaco’. See also CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (finding that new UCI rule ‘does
not interfere in the internal affairs of national federations, and so does not infringe UCI’s Constitution
in that regard’).
A1.31 There may even be sporting norms or rules that are hierarchically superior
even to the SGB’s own constitution.1 For example, if the SGB is a national federation,
its rules will have to comply with the statutes and rules of the international federation
of which it is a member;2 whereas if the SGB is the international federation of a sport
that is part of the Olympic Movement, Rule 25 of the Olympic Charter states that its
‘statutes, practices and activities must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter’.
So, for example, the international federation is required to implement the World Anti-
Doping Code (including adopting anti-doping rules that incorporate the mandatory
requirements of that Code and make them applicable to all athletes and athlete
support personnel under its jurisdiction) and also the Olympic Movement Code on
the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions.3 However, rules that are adopted
in defiance of these obligations are still enforceable against the participants in the
sport, even if they put the international federation in breach of its obligations under
the Olympic Charter.4 And beyond enforcing these obligations under the Olympic
Charter, the IOC may not constrain the autonomy of the international federation.5
1 See para B1.11.

2 See para A1.24 and A1.45.
3 See Olympic Charter, Fundamental Principles of Olympism, no 7 (‘Belonging to the Olympic
Movement requires compliance with the Olympic Charter and recognition by the IOC’), Rule 1.4
(‘Any person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to the Olympic Movement is
bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the decisions of the IOC’); and
Rule 43 (‘Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and the Olympic Movement Code on the
Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions is mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement’). See
also para B1.11, n 3.
4 Unless those obligations have been validly incorporated into the international federation’s own
constitution: see para B1.12.
5 Prusis & Latvian Olympic Committee, CAS Ad Hoc Division, OG 02/001, para 10 (‘unless the IOC
proves that an International Federation has violated the Olympic Charter (in which case the IOC
may impose sanctions on the International Federation), the IOC cannot take any action with regard
to a specific sport which could be regarded as prejudicial to the independence and autonomy of the
International Federation administering that sport’).
A1.32 In addition, the legislative authority and powers of the SGB’s members in
general meeting may be supreme within the sport, but they are constrained by the
obligation that every SGB has to comply with applicable national and transnational
laws.1 The SGB’s constitution is likely to specify a governing law, usually the law of
the country where the SGB is headquartered or incorporated. If the SGB is a national
federation, and its regulations only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of that
nation, the legality of its regulations can generally be assessed solely by reference to
the applicable national law.2 If the SGB is an international federation, however, the
position will be more complicated, because its rules apply globally, and therefore they
will potentially be subject not only to any national law specified in the constitution
as the governing law, but also to the mandatory requirements of the laws of every
country in which the rules will apply, and (if the rules apply within the territorial
jurisdiction of the EU) the laws of the EU.3 This poses obviously challenges to the
creation of a global level playing-field,4 which CAS panels have worked hard to
overcome by various different methods.5
1 The sports sector has stopped short of claiming that the autonomy of sport requires exemption
from national or European laws: McCutcheon, ‘The Rule of Law in Sport’ (2002) 9(3) Sports Law
Administration & Practice 1; Foster, ‘Is There a Global Sports Law?’, (2003) Entertainment Law
1–18. Rather, it has acknowledged that ‘[s]port is part of society and cannot establish its own political
and legal framework’: The Rules of the Game, conference on the Governance of Sport (Brussels,
February 2001), Advance Conference Paper, p 5. The sports movement always hopes that the law will
be flexible enough to accommodate the ‘specificities’ of the sports sector, but it accepts that ultimately
sport must defer to the law, and not the other way around.
2 See further para B1.51, n.1.
3 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, para 28 (‘By reason of the fact
that it is imperative, the [EU] rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in
so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or of the place
where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201,
para 4 (EU provisions on free movement and on free competition fall within the special category of
mandatory rules that must be applied irrespective of the national law applicable to the merits of the
case). See also Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary,
Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 547–49 (discussing the need for sports rules to
comply with an ‘ordre public “international and universal”’, including EU rules).
4 See para B1.14-B1.15.
B The executive branch
A1.33 In the periods between the annual or biennial or quadrennial general

meetings of the SGB’s member federations in Congress or General Assembly, the
powers of the SGB are exercised by an ‘Executive Committee’ or ‘Executive Board’
or ‘Council’ made up of individuals elected by the member federations at a previous
general meeting.1 Equivalent to a board of directors in a public or private limited
company,2 the Executive Board or Council is responsible for overseeing a staff of

employees headed by a CEO (or, in sport movement speak, a ‘Director General’
or ‘Secretary General’) who administer the rules and regulations of the SGB. The
Executive Board or Council is also responsible for making decisions and exercising
powers entrusted to it under the constitution and/or those rules and regulations, which
may include promulgating further rules and regulations setting out the conditions for
the playing of the sport,3 and/or ruling on requests arising under those rules and
regulations on a range of diverse matters, such as:
(a) whether or not a particular event should be sanctioned by the SGB for inclusion
in the official calendar;
(b) whether or not a particular performance should be ratified as a world record;
(c) which country or city should be awarded the right to host one of the SGB’s
events; or
(d) whether or not to permit a particular athlete to transfer allegiance from one
member federation to another.
Some of these tasks may be delegated to other committees, or to individual officers
such as the CEO.4
1 Once again, care must be taken only to exercise powers that have been delegated, and not to purport to
exercise powers that have been reserved to Congress (see eg Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA,
CAS 2016/A/4787 (CAS panel set aside the UEFA Executive Committee decision to reject JFA’s
application for membership because only the UEFA Congress had that power)) or to assert powers that
have not been delegated to it under the rules, properly construed. For example, in Panamerican Judo
Union v International Judo Federation (IJF), CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.8, the CAS panel rejected the
IJF’s attempt to rely on a provision in its statutes that purported to grant the IJF’s Executive Council
a wide-ranging power to decide any issues that had not been placed under the authority of another
IJF body. The CAS panel held: ‘Such residual-powers clauses are common in statutes and by-laws.
Officials of the relevant entities are on occasion tempted to make sweeping claims of authority by
reference to them. But such claims are absolutely constrained by the overall powers of the body as
a whole. They do not give the vast power of arbitrary exclusion; if such a thing were possible, there
would be no reason at all to define lesser powers and to allocate them carefully among internal organs
along with a requirement of compliance with procedural safeguards. Otherwise residual-power clauses
could degenerate into the proposition that “for matters not expressly defined herein, the President may
do whatever he wants whenever he wants”. The proper purpose of a residual-powers clause is to make
clear that when a general authority has been explicitly granted, incidental and subsidiary decisions
may be made by the authorised organ, even if they are not specifically defined’.
Care must also be taken to exercise the power in accordance with the requirements in the applicable
rules, eg voting in person and not by correspondence where required by the rules. Kim v FILA,
CAS 2013/A/3272, para 84 (‘The Panel finds that the Decision is illegal because it was voted on by
correspondence’).
2 Where the SGB is a public or private limited company, the ‘Executive Board’ or ‘Council’ will actually
be the board of directors of the company.
3 As to which, see generally Chapter B1 (Effective Sports Regulation; The Basic Principles).
4 For example, the ITF constitution gives the Rules of Tennis Committee the power to recommend
changes to the Rules of Tennis to the ITF board of directors; while World Athletics’ Competition Rule
31.9 gives the President and CEO power to determine requests for ratification of performances as
world records (with reference to be made to the Council only in cases of doubt).
A1.34 The powers of the Executive Board or Council may also include deciding
whether to bring action against a member federation or an individual official or athlete
for breach of the SGB’s rules and regulations, although a trend has started to put that
important power in the hands of an operationally independent ‘integrity unit’ of the
SGB that reports to a separate board made up of individuals who are independent of
the SGB.1
1 See para A5.48.
A1.35 Election to the Executive Board/Council can be a sought-after role, because

its substantial powers and/or authority give office-holders a special status in the
sport, and/or because it is often a gateway to appointment to higher office (including
membership of the IOC). However, the members of the Executive Board/Council

are subject to extensive legal1 and ethical duties2 in the exercise of their powers,
breach of which may lead to significant sanctions3 or even individual legal liability.
In addition, the stakes are generally high, and therefore their collective decisions
are often subject to legal challenge, most often on the grounds that they followed an
unfair procedure, or that they failed to comply with their own rules or with applicable
law, or that they exercised their discretion irrationally.4
1 See eg para A5.27 et seq.
2 See para A5.46.
3 See eg para B3.104 et seq.
4 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies).
C The judicial branch
A1.36 It is vital that challenges to the actions of the SGB are heard by one tribunal,
applying the same laws and standards to each case. If instead such challenges could
be heard by any national court anywhere, applying its own laws, the uniformity
of approach that is required to ensure a level playing-field wherever the sport is
played would be destroyed.1 Furthermore the judges of a national court may be less
likely to appreciate and therefore take account of the ‘specificities’ of the sport than
a more specialised tribunal. Therefore, most SGBs’ constitutions provide that all
disputes between the SGB and its members, including any challenges to the actions
or decisions of the SGB, must be referred exclusively to a specialist tribunal for
hearing and determination. To limit the possibility of challenges in the courts to
the decisions of that tribunal, it should have the features necessary to qualify as an
independent arbitral tribunal.2 The usual choice (at least in the case of international
federations) is the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland,3 although
national federations may choose a domestic counterpart, such as (in the UK) Sport
Resolutions.4
1 See further para B1.15 et seq.
2 See generally Chapter D3 (Arbitration in Sport).
3 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport). One exception is the FIA, which has
its own International Court of Appeal: see fia.com/international-court-appeal#:~:text=Established%20
under%20the%20FIA%20Statutes,organizations%20affiliated%20to%20the%20FIA [accessed
24 September 2020].
4 See sportresolutions.co.uk/ [accessed 24 September 2020].
A1.37 Disputes may also arise under an SGB’s constitution and/or rules and
regulations on a wide range of other matters. For example, the SGB may have a
claim against one of its members for breach of its duties under the constitution or
the rules,1 or against an official or individual athlete for breach of disciplinary rules;
member federations may protest against decisions taken by competition officials;
or one member federation may assert a claim against another member federation.
Again, to achieve efficient and consistent resolution of such disputes, and to avoid
the sport being dragged constantly before national courts, the SGB’s constitution
needs to create internal bodies and/or identify appropriate external tribunals to hear
and determine each kind of dispute. Depending on the circumstances, these may not
need to be independent arbitral tribunals. For example, protests about breaches of
competition rules are usually heard by a competition referee and/or a jury of appeal
(made up of officials of the sport) sitting in situ at the competition venue. Alleged
rule breaches by member federations may be decided by the Executive Board and/or
Congress, and alleged breaches by individual officials or athletes generally go to an
internal or external disciplinary tribunal, in each case with a right to appeal that first
decision to an independent appeal body;2 while claims between members are often
assigned to an internal tribunal or arbitral panel.

2 For example, the International Equestrian Federation (FEI) sends such cases to its own FEI Tribunal,
with a right of appeal to the CAS: FEI Statutes Arts 38.1 and 39.1.
A1.38 For example, part nine of the International Biathlon Union’s constitution
(‘Dispute Resolution’) states:
30. Alleged violations of the Rules
30A Protests
30.1 Mechanisms will be established in the IBU Event and Competition Rules to
resolve any protest concerning the fair and proper conduct of a competition,
including protests about alleged infringements by an Athlete or Athlete Support
Personnel of the IBU Event and Competition Rules, protests about alleged
errors by officials, protests about competition conditions, and protests about
announced results.
30B Alleged violations of the IBU Integrity Code
30.2 Alleged violations of the IBU Integrity Code will be prosecuted by the BIU
before a Disciplinary Tribunal, as follows:
30.2.1 where the alleged violation is of the anti-doping chapter of the
IBU Integrity Code, the matter will be referred to the CAS Anti-
Doping Division, which will appoint one or more CAS arbitrators to
sit as the Disciplinary Tribunal that will hear and determine the case in
accordance with the anti-doping chapter of the IBU Integrity Code, the
CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration, and the Arbitration Rules for
the CAS Anti-Doping Division; and
30.2.2 where the alleged violation is of a different part of the IBU Integrity
Code, the matter will be referred to the CAS Ordinary Division, which
will appoint one or more CAS arbitrators to sit as the Disciplinary
Tribunal that will hear and determine the case in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the IBU Integrity Code and the CAS Code of
Sports–related Arbitration, provided always that the BIU may choose
instead to refer to the Secretary General any alleged violations of the
IBU Integrity Code that it considers to be minor or otherwise suitable
for referral. The Secretary General will follow a process for hearing and
determining such cases that is efficient and effective while respecting
the due process rights of the party that is the subject of the allegations.
31. Appeals against IBU decisions
31.1 All ‘field of play’ decisions, including decisions resolving protests in
accordance with the IBU Event and Competition Rules, will be final and
binding on all parties concerned, and may not be appealed or otherwise
challenged in any forum, save where the aggrieved party claims to have
direct evidence that such decision is tainted by fraud or corruption or
other bad faith/prejudice. Any such claim will be resolved exclusively
by one or more arbitrators appointed by the CAS Ordinary Division, in
accordance with the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration and the
‘field of play’ doctrine set out in CAS jurisprudence.
31.2 To the extent that this Constitution or the Rules (including the
IBU Integrity Code) give a party a right of appeal against any decision,
that appeal is to be made (unless otherwise specified in this Constitution
or in those Rules) exclusively to the CAS Appeals Division, which will
appoint one or three CAS arbitrators to resolve the appeal definitively in
accordance with the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration. Pending
resolution of the appeal, the decision being appealed will remain in full
force and effect unless the CAS orders otherwise. The decision of the
CAS resolving the appeal may not be challenged in any forum or on
any ground except as set out in Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Code
on Private International Law.
32. Other claims and disputes
32.1 Subject to Article 32.3, any claim or dispute of any kind whatsoever:
32.2.1 between the IBU and one or more IBU Members and/or
IBU Officials;
32.2.2 between two or more IBU Members and/or IBU Officials; or

32.2.3 between the IBU and any other Person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the IBU or of an IBU Member;
that arises out of or is related in any way to the activities of the IBU
as an association or their activities as members or officials of or
stakeholders in the IBU, and whether such claim or dispute arises under
this Constitution or the Rules, or pursuant to a decision of the IBU, or
in connection with a contract between the parties, or otherwise, will
be referred to the CAS Ordinary Division, which will have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim or dispute definitively in
accordance with the CAS Code of Sports–related Arbitration.
32.3 The decision of the CAS Ordinary Division determining such claim
or dispute may not be challenged in any forum or on any ground
except as set out in Chapter 12 of the Swiss Federal Code on Private
International Law.
32.4 This Article 32 does not apply to the following claims and disputes: protests
(which are governed exclusively by Article 30.1), alleged violations of
the IBU Integrity Code or other Rules (which are governed exclusively by
Article 30.2), appeals against decisions (which are governed exclusively
by Article 31), and claims or disputes involving IBU Staff or BIU Staff in
relation to their terms of employment or engagement by the IBU (which
are governed by the dispute resolution terms agreed in their contracts of
employment or engagement by the IBU).
A1.39 Decisions of an SGB’s internal dispute resolution bodies may be challenged

before the courts on the same grounds as decisions of its executive bodies.1 Bodies
exercising disciplinary jurisdiction and with the power to impose significant sanctions
on participants must therefore be particularly careful to exercise their powers with
due regard for the legal rights of those participants.2
1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies).
2 See generally Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Arbitral Proceedings), as well as paras B1.28-B1.30
(requirement of equal treatment) and para B1.33 (requirement that any punishment be proportionate to
the offence).
A1.40 For such sports-specific dispute resolution mechanisms to work, all of the
sport’s participants must be obliged to respect them. As a result, many international
federations require their members not only to agree to submit disputes to bespoke
judicial organs, but also to require their own members at national level to do the
same. For example, Art 59 of the FIFA Statutes (June 2019) provides:
1. The confederations, member associations and leagues shall agree to recognise
CAS as an independent judicial authority and to ensure that their members,
affiliated players and officials comply with the decisions passed by CAS. The
same obligation shall apply to intermediaries and licensed match agents.
2. Recourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided
for in the FIFA regulations. Recourse to ordinary courts of law for all types of
provisional measures is also prohibited.
3. The associations shall insert a clause in their statutes or regulations, stipulating
that it is prohibited to take disputes in the association or disputes affecting
leagues, members of leagues, clubs, members of clubs, players, officials and
other association officials to ordinary courts of law, unless the FIFA regulations
or binding legal provisions specifically provide for or stipulate recourse to
ordinary courts of law. Instead of recourse to ordinary courts of law, provision
shall be made for arbitration. Such disputes shall be taken to an independent
and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognised under the rules of the
association or confederation or to CAS.
The associations shall also ensure that this stipulation is implemented in the
association, if necessary by imposing a binding obligation on its members. The
associations shall impose sanctions on any party that fails to respect this obligation
and ensure that any appeal against such sanctions shall likewise be strictly submitted
to arbitration, and not to ordinary courts of law.
A1.41 In 2007, the European Parliament expressed its disquiet at these provisions,
which it considered to be an attempt to deny citizens the right of recourse to national
courts.1 Similarly, the European Commission has on occasion suggested that denying
participants an ability to have their competition law claims heard by a national court
might itself be anti-competitive.2 However, in 2012, the European Parliament passed
another resolution stating that it:
‘[…] recognises the legitimacy of sports courts for resolving disputes in sport, as
long as they respect people’s fundamental rights to a fair trial; [and] calls for the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to take into account EU law provisions when it
comes to settlement of sport disputes within the EU disputes arising within the EU’.3
This accords with the position under English law: the English courts have robustly
defended the right of sports bodies to require their stakeholders to submit sports
disputes to arbitration by bespoke sporting tribunals.4
1 Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 29 March 2007 on the future of professional
football in Europe, paras 13-16 (The European Parliament ‘13. Believes that improved governance
leading to more concerted self-regulation at national and European level will reduce the tendency to
have recourse to the Commission and the Court of Justice; 14. Recognises the expertise and legitimacy
of sporting tribunals insofar as they address the citizens’ right to a fair hearing, as laid down in
Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 15. Takes the view that
applying to the civil courts, even when not justified in sports terms, cannot be penalised by disciplinary
regulations; and condemns the arbitrary decisions by the FIFA in this respect; 16. Asks UEFA and
FIFA to accept in their statutes the right of recourse to ordinary courts, but recognises however that
the principle of self-regulation implies and justifies the structures of the European sports model and
the fundamental principles governing the organisation of sporting competitions, including anti-doping
regulations and disciplinary sanctions’.)
2 See para D3.39. See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s
Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 269 (the rules requiring participants to submit all disputes to
arbitration before the CAS ‘reinforce the restrictions of competition that are caused by the Eligibility
rules’).
3 See European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the European dimension in sport, at
para 89.
4 See eg Stretford v The Football Association, [2007] EWCA Civ 238, discussed at para D3.28 et seq and
para 13.31.
5 EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER MEMBERS

A1.42 Under the pyramid model of sports governance, an international federation
relies heavily on its member continental and national federations to help it govern
the sport wherever it is played, giving them the right and the responsibility to govern,
regulate, promote, and develop the sport in their respective continental or national
jurisdictions, and often providing them with significant financial and other support
to help them in those efforts. The quid pro quo is that the member federations must
exercise their powers and discharge their responsibilities effectively. In this section,
we examine how international federations manage this vital relationship with their
members, covering the process of accepting applications for membership, identifying
the rights and responsibilities of members, and when action has to be taken to enforce
members’ obligations, including (in extreme cases) suspending or even expelling a
federation from membership.
A Admission as a member of an international federation

A1.43 The international federation alone has the right to decide who to admit as
a member to represent a particular country (or territory1), not the government2 or
National Olympic Committee3 of the country or territory in question. And within the
international federation it is generally the members in general meeting who have the
exclusive right to decide who may join their ranks.4
1 See paras A1.46-A1.47.
2 For a government to insist that it has the right to determine which body should be recognised as the
national governing body for a sport would be considered by the sports movement to be improper
government interference. See para A1.11 et seq; International Hockey Federation v FIH & Hockey
India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 159 (‘it would be contrary to the FIH’s right to autonomy to oblige it
to wait until the Indian government had decided which body was to be the National Sports Federation,
before making any decision’).
3 See eg Russian Badminton Federation v International Badminton Federation, CAS 2005/A/971,
para 7.2.5. The International Badminton Federation sought to justify its decision to recognise one Russian
national body instead of another on the basis that the Russian Olympic Committee had recommended
that action. The CAS panel rejected that argument, stating: ‘The ROC has no right to ‘pick and choose’
the national associations which […] compose its membership. The recognition of the national federations
lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the international federation. This principle conforms with and
remains consistent with the Rule 26 of the Olympic Charter which states that each international federation
“maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of its sport”’. See also Croatian Golf
Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 27 (‘With respect to the Appellant’s
expulsion from the COC, it is doubtful whether this fact could in itself justify the Resolution. It has
been held by CAS in the case CAS 2005/A/971 that “Unless relating to the participation of the national
association’s athletes in the Olympic Games, the provisions of [Rules 26 and 28 of the Olympic Charter]
do not vest any authority whatsoever in the NOCs which permit them to determine or co-determine
the […] expulsion of a national association by its IF. This does not prohibit the NOC from making a
recommendation to the IF […], but the IF is not required to follow such recommendation”’).
This does not stop the international federation taking into account the views of the country’s
National Olympic Committee as to which body should be admitted to membership as the national
federation of the sport in that country. In fact, some international federations make recognition by the
NOC a condition of membership. See eg Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International
Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, paras 80-
81 and 87 (‘it is in the interest of the sport of shooting and the athletes practicing this sport that
the national federations are “recognized and affiliated with their National Olympic Committees”, as
article 1.3.1 of the ISSF Constitution explicitly states. […] The Panel concludes that the recognition of
the national shooting and rifle organization by and its affiliation to the National Olympic Committee
and to the Olympic Movement is a sine qua non-condition for membership with the ISSF. […]
According to the ISSF Constitution and German law, a national shooting and rifle organization which
has lost its recognition by and its affiliation with the National Olympic Committee may be expelled
for valid reasons, provided that the proceedings leading to the expulsion meet the requirements of due
process’). However, given that the Olympic Charter requires the NOC to recognise only a national
federation that is admitted to membership of the international federation (see para A1.22, n 3), making
NOC recognition a condition of membership creates a circularity that is unhelpful at best and at worst
can contribute to intractable membership disputes (as happened, for example, in International Hockey
Federation v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828).
4 See eg FIH Constitution (November 2018) Art 2.4(a) (‘Only Congress may admit an NA as a full
Member’); Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787 (CAS panel set aside the
UEFA Executive Committee decision to reject JFA’s application for membership, because only the
UEFA Congress had that power).
A1.44 As a general principle, SGBs (or, more specifically, their members in

general meeting) have a very broad discretion as to who to admit (or not admit)
as a member.1 Any court or arbitral panel exercising supervisory jurisdiction will
generally be assiduous not to second-guess such decisions on the merits.2 However,
the SGB’s discretion is not absolute.3 In particular:
(a) The SGB must not make a membership decision that is contrary to the
legitimate expectations that the applicant derived from the SGB’s rules and/or
conduct.4
(b) The SGB must not make an arbitrary decision5 or one that treats the applicant
differently from other federations.6
(c) The SGB must not act anti-competitively.7 The CAS has held that the impact
of competition law is that an SGB that has exclusive control over access to
the sport might ‘have in fact a duty to accept new members if they fulfil all
statutory conditions to that effect’.8
If an SGB’s denial of a membership application crosses one of these lines, the

reviewing court or arbitral panel may order it to admit the applicant to membership.9
1 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 57 (under English
law, ‘sports governing bodies are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in governing their affairs,
in particular in respect of membership matters’). This is also the clear position under Swiss law. See
eg IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 142 (‘The autonomy of Swiss associations is
particularly evident with regard to determining the composition of their membership. With respect to
the exclusion of members, for example, the Swiss Civil Code has granted associations “a freedom that
almost reaches arbitrariness”’); Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 29
(‘Generally, freedom of association includes the freedom of an association to accept or to refuse any
applicant for membership, even if the applicant fulfils all statutory conditions’); Gibraltar Football
Association v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 103 (‘the principle of the autonomy of the association
[…] means, inter alia, that the association is free to accept or refuse members. The association thus
has a discretionary right in this respect. This right is usually exercised by an association by setting
forth in its articles of association criteria and conditions for the admission of members’). See also
Spanish Bowling Federation v International Bowling Federation & Catalan Bowling federation,
CAS 2007/A/1424, para 29, where the CAS upheld the decision by the International Bowling
Federation (now World Bowling) to admit the Catalan federation as a new member, despite objections
by the Spanish federation (‘The Panel wishes to add that it intends to give priority in the political
debate to the principle of the independence and autonomy of international federations, particularly in
organisational matters. In this respect, the Panel refers to the case law of the CAS, which has repeatedly
affirmed the importance of safeguarding the independence and autonomy of international federations
in relation to the administration of their sport (see in particular CAS OG 02/001, paragraph 29). In
particular, the CAS case law recognises that the general assemblies of the international federations have
“final jurisdiction over any question relating to the affiliation of a new member”, which is described
in that case law as “(…) a discretionary power which leaves a very wide margin of appreciation”
(CAS 2004/A/776, paragraph 71)’) (unofficial English translation of French original).
2 See eg Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme v Kuwait Motor Sports Club, Swiss Federal
Tribunal decision number 4A_314/2017 dated 28 May 2018, para 3.2.2 (English translation available
at: swissarbitrationdecisions.com) (‘According to the case law, in view of the autonomy of sports
federations, it is not for the CAS to substitute itself for the competent organ of an international
federation to decide on the merits of a federation’s application for membership’, citing Federacio
Catalana de Patinatge v International Roller Sports Federation, CAS 2004/A/776, para 49);
Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS 2009/A/1823, paras 9.1-9.2 (‘The CAS
has neither the authority nor the ambition to make policy for sports federations. In particular, it is
not for the CAS to say whether one entity or another is a more suitable member of a federation. […]
The CAS’s authority is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective of their wisdom
or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of the federations
[…]’); Jersey Football Association (JFA) v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 137 (CAS panel declined
the JFA’s request to order the UEFA Congress to ‘take all necessary measures to admit the JFA as a
full member of UEFA without delay’, because the UEFA Congress has discretion as to whether to
admit new members, and it was the panel’s understanding that some of the membership requirements
were not met: ‘The Panel is therefore bound to respect such power of discretion. It is not the role of
the CAS to replace the due discretion of a body of a sports association by the discretionary views of
the respective Panel. In order to reach the conclusion that the UEFA Congress should be ordered to
admit the JFA as a UEFA member, the Panel holds that it would have to reach the conclusion that, even
after the consideration of all due discretion, such order would be the only legitimate outcome of the
evaluation of the Appellant’s application’).
3 IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 143, citing USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para
at 55 (same). See also Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 29-31 (‘However,
this principle [of an SGB’s freedom to decide who to accept as a member] is now generally considered to
be limited, such limits being derived in particular from: (i) the contractual nature of the membership to an
association and the related obligation to act in good faith in the context of contractual or pre-contractual
discussions (Article 2 Swiss Civil Code [other references omitted]); (ii) the general prohibition of
arbitrary decisions and the need of a control of the association’s decision to refuse a new member
(Article 2 paragraph 2 Swiss Civil Code); (iii) in professional matters, the provisions of competition law
and the related need to protect personality rights (see, JdT 1957 I 202-212; Article 7 of the Swiss Federal
Law on Cartels)’); Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 105.
4 Where an SGB through its conduct creates a legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant member
federation that it will be granted membership if it meets the relevant membership conditions, the SGB
will be precluded from denying it such membership if the conditions are met: Gibraltar Football
Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 118 (‘When reviewing the application of the GFA
and recommending accepting the GFA as a member of UEFA, the Expert Panel created “legitimate
expectation” for the GFA to achieve its goal to become affiliated with UEFA. Although this does not
by itself create a claim to membership, it lifts the threshold for UEFA to reject GFA’s application. In
other words, after having created legitimate expectations, there must be material reasons (and not only
the exercise of an uncontrolled voting power) to reject the membership application of the GFA. This
Panel finds the reasons given by UEFA why it rejected the GFA’s application not convincing enough to
outweigh the legitimate expectations created by its own Expert Panel’). For further discussion of the
doctrine of legitimate expectations, see para B1.36 et seq.
5 See eg Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 32-33 (‘The Panel holds, in
that respect, that the exclusion of athletes, or of a sports association to which athletes are affiliated,
from an international sports organisation which occupies a dominant or monopolistic position in the
organisation of the sports competitions at issue may have the effect of a boycott. It is the Panel’s
opinion that such an exclusion should therefore be held invalid, at least to the extent that it is not
grounded on objective and justified reasons. The Respondent itself admitted that a refusal by UEFA to
grant the GFA provisional membership could be considered as illegal if it were arbitrary or based on
“unjustified reasons”’); Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para 115
(‘The discretion which UEFA is entitled to exercise when accepting members, cannot be exercised
arbitrarily. It must be exercised in good faith which means that there must be justified and objective
reasons for denying membership to an applicant who fulfils all the requirements for membership’)
and para 117 (‘In the view of this Panel there are no objective and justified reasons to reject the GFA’s
application, nor has UEFA been able to identify any such reasons. Consequently, this Panel finds that
a bona fide exercise of UEFA’s discretionary right should have lead [sic] to acceptance of the GFA’s
application for membership’).
6 Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, para107 (‘The rejection of
an application for membership for discriminatory reasons may constitute an unlawful breach of
personality rights. This is recognised not only for professional and trade associations but also for
sports associations with monopolistic powers’) and para 109 (‘A violation of Art. 28 CC [Swiss
Civil Code], especially if this consists of discriminatory behaviour, may lead to an obligation of the
discriminatory to enter into a contract with the discriminated person’. On the facts of the case, the CAS
found (at para 110) that ‘[i]n the past, UEFA has repeatedly accepted as members the governing bodies
of football of certain territories which are comparable to Gibraltar, at least with respect to their degree
of independence and the fact that they are not independent members of the United Nations, such as the
Faroe Islands, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. This Panel finds it difficult to draw a distinction
between those members and Gibraltar, and concludes that non-admission of the GFA as a member
of UEFA would constitute a discrimination which violates Art. 28 CC [Swiss Civil Code, protecting
personality rights]’.
7 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 30; Gibraltar Football Association
(GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, paras 122-127 (‘this Panel regards UEFA as an association of
the kind that it is intended to be covered by the Cartel Act and also by EU law provisions relating to
restrictions on competition […] . By refusing membership to the GFA, UEFA has denied the GFA
access to all of these programmes which have not only a sporting, but also an economic impact on
the participating federations. Such refusal must be regarded as a refusal to do business which violates
Article 7 para. 2a of the Cartel Act and may lead to the sanctions addressed by Article 12 of the
Cartel Act. […] [T]he unlawful restraint of competition may be cured by elimination of the barrier to
becoming a member of UEFA […] . Based on Article 13(b) of the Cartel Act, a person may therefore
be obliged to contract with another person or, more specifically, to accept a person as a member in
an association […] . It is for these reasons that this Panel will declare in the operative part of this
award that the GFA is entitled to full membership in UEFA, and that it will order the UEFA to take
all the necessary measures to achieve this’). In contrast, in Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA &
Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.74, the CAS panel rejected the argument that
suspending the membership of the KFA was in breach of competition law, because ‘in accordance
with well-established principles of EU competition law, which the Swiss competition authorities
apply readily in Switzerland, restrictions that are proportionate to achieve a legitimate objective do not
violate competition law’, citing case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:492.
For more information on competition law and its application to the sport sector, see generally Chapter
E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport).
8 Gibraltar Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 31 (‘Furthermore, in the context
of sports associations, it is now often considered that associations in a monopolistic position […]
have in fact a duty to accept new members if they fulfil all statutory conditions to that effect. This
opinion is derived both from the legislation on cartels and from the provisions on the protection of the
personality’).
9 See Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237, where the CAS held that UEFA
‘shall take all necessary measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association to full membership of
the Union des Associations Européenes de Football without delay’; and Gibraltar Football Association
(GFA) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3776, where the CAS ordered the FIFA Executive Committee to send
the GFA’s application for FIFA membership to the FIFA Congress, which ‘shall take all necessary
measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association as a full member of FIFA without delay’.
A1.45 In order to be admitted to membership of an international federation, a

national federation must satisfy the criteria for admission to membership set out in
the international federation’s constitution, and continue to satisfy them thereafter.

Those criteria will vary from sport to sport, but the key requirements typically
include1 that the national federation must:
(a) be a legal entity properly constituted in accordance with the law of its country;
(b) be solvent;
(c) be concerned with the administration, organisation, and practising of the sport
in issue (either that sport solely and exclusively, or else in conjunction with
other sports2);
(d) claim the exclusive right to govern its sport (both the men’s and women’s
game3) in its country;4
(e) have a constitution that:
(i) complies with the Olympic Charter, the World Anti-Doping Code, and
the international federation’s constitution and rules;
(ii) declares the federation’s opposition to any unlawful discrimination on
the grounds of race, skin colour, national or social origin, gender, sex,
sexual orientation, language, political or other opinion, religion or other
beliefs, circumstances of birth, or other improper grounds; and
(iii) includes a formal undertaking to be bound by the membership obligations
applicable to national federations; and
(f) stage competitions and carry out developmental and other activities in its
country at least to the minimum level prescribed by the international federation.
1 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 5.1; World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Art 7;
FIH Statutes (November 2018) Art 2.3; and ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Arts 2.4 and 2.7
and definition of ‘Eligibility Criteria’.
2 For example, many national associations govern both skiing and biathlon, and Article 5.1.2 of the
IBU Constitution specifically permits this.
3 This was introduced by the IOC as a means of addressing inequalities between men’s and women’s
sport.
4 See eg IHF v FIH & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, paras 5–6, in which the International Hockey
Federation (FIH) changed its membership requirements to say that there could no longer be two
members from one country, one representing men’s hockey and the other representing women’s
hockey; instead there could only be one member for each country, representing both men’s and
women’s hockey. The India Hockey Federation (IHF), which governed men’s field hockey, and the
Indian Women’s Hockey Federation (IWHF), which governed women’s field hockey, created a new
entity called the Indian Hockey Confederation (IHC), which purported to govern men’s and women’s
field hockey. However, in 2008, the FIH discovered ‘that the IHC did not govern either men’s or
women’s hockey, but was merely a facade behind which the IHF continued to govern men’s hockey
and the IWHF continued to govern women’s hockey’. While the IWHF was merged into the IHF, and
the IHF claimed to be the FIH member as a successor to the IHC, the FIH recognised a new body,
Hockey India, set up in 2009 with the support of the Indian Olympic Association. After several years
of legal challenge, in 2014 the FIH Congress unanimously approved Hockey India as the FIH member
for India, which decision was upheld by the CAS.
As a further example, the ICC suspended the USA Cricket Association (USACA) in 2015 because
(inter alia) it no longer seemed to be the de facto governing body of cricket in the US, since the
majority of the US cricket community were not members of USACA. Following USACA’s failure to
comply with reinstatement conditions geared at uniting the US cricket community behind USACA,
the ICC expelled USACA from membership, and USACA’s challenge to its right to do so was rejected
in ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017. See para 77 (‘The
Reinstatement Conditions, certainly the first three [ie obtaining ICC approval of a new Constitution,
adoption of that new Constitution, and election of a new Board under the new Constitution], were
designed to ensure that that USACA satisfied an indispensable element of membership, set out both
in the membership criteria (see para 3.1) and in Article 2.7(D), that USACA was a national body in
control of cricket within its country (a position which, at the time of the suspension, ICC considered
USACA did not enjoy)’); para 81 (‘I consider that it was Reinstatement Conditions 1-3 which were key;
and their satisfaction the most important precondition of USACA’s reinstatement from suspension. My
reasons are these. First they enjoyed pride of place at the head of the list of reinstatement conditions.
Second the form of any legal person’s constitution is critical to its governance; it is the source from
which all else flows. Third on several occasions […] ICC indicated that USACA’s adoption of the ICC-
approved constitution might cause the ICC to overlook USACA’s failure to satisfy other Reinstatement
Conditions (which were therefore necessarily perceived by the ICC to be of lesser significance).
Fourth, the record shows that ICC spent much time and effort in identifying what provisions in any
USACA constitution to replace the 2008 version (which both parties agreed before me was no longer
fit for purpose) were necessary in its view to achieve what each party asserted to be a key objective of
unifying the USA cricketing community (that the parties disagreed on which provisions would achieve
that objective is irrelevant to this particular point). Fifth, in so far as ICC’s concern was that USACA
under its present regime bore responsibility for the division in that community, the disputed provisions
[…] were designed to ensure that the dominant figures in that regime could not simply continue
seamlessly in post’); and para 100 (‘This therefore inexcusable (as I find) failure to comply with this
mandatory constitutional reinstatement condition would in my view per se justify ICC conference’s
consideration of whether or not to expel USACA’).
A1.46 It is obviously important for an international federation to define clearly

the meaning of ‘country’ under its rules. It is not bound by international norms on
this point, and so may recognise for sporting purposes a member federation that
represents a ‘country’ that is not recognised as a sovereign state in international law.1
For example, many sports have different members for England, Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland; while the IOC only allows Team GB to enter the Olympic Games.
1 For example, World Athletics defines a ‘Member Federation’ as ‘the national governing body for
the sport of Athletics in a Country or Territory which has been admitted to membership to World
Athletics’, where ‘Country’ is defined as ‘a self-governing geographical area of the world recognised
as an independent state by international law and international governmental bodies’, and ‘Territory’
is defined as ‘a geographical area of the world which is not a Country, but which has aspects of
self-government, at least to the extent of being autonomous in the control of its sport, and which is
recognised as such by the World Athletics’. See World Athletics’ Generally Applicable Definitions.
See also FIFA Statutes (June 2019) Art 11.6 (‘An association in a region which has not yet gained
independence may, with the authorisation of the member association in the country on which it is
dependent, also apply for admission to FIFA’).
A1.47 Sometimes an SGB may find itself dragged into political disputes about
the sovereignty of particular ‘countries’. For example, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF),1
the English Court of Appeal found that an IAAF resolution to make its member
federation from China the sole representative within the IAAF for both mainland
China and Taiwan amounted to a decision to expel the Taiwanese federation
(which had been a member since 1956), which was beyond any power conferred
in the IAAF’s rules. The Court of Appeal noted that the word ‘country’ in the rules
delineated the area over which one governing amateur athletic association exercised
authority; that membership of the federation was thus not confined to associations
representing sovereign or national states.2 It ruled:3
‘Those who formed the federation [IAAF] were not concerned with international
politics; they were concerned to set standards for athletics throughout the world.
They were concerned to collect together people who would be in a position to
exercise control over athletics in various parts of the world. Unless a governing body
of some kind applies for membership, the federation is not concerned to determine
if a given place or area is a country. It is only in connection with an application
for membership by an applicant who puts himself forward as a governing body
for a particular place, district or region that it becomes necessary to consider the
meaning of “country” in the rules. One thing that is clear is that there may only be
one member for each country. Therefore, in entertaining an application, it has to be
seen whether or not there is an existing member who has control, or a measure of
control, over the same area as that for which the applicant contends. There must be
no doubt who is to speak with authority as the governing body for a particular group
of athletes. The word “country” has been used in the rules in order to delineate the
area of authority. They do not use the word in the sense of sovereign state’.4
1 [1979] 1 WLR 1252, aff’d [1981] 1 WLR 1226 [CA].
2 Ibid at p 1226.
3 Ibid at p 1232.
4 For examples of similar disputes, see Football Association of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602,
paras 126–130 (The Serbian federation sought to have UEFA’s decision to admit the Football
Federation of Kosovo to membership set aside on the basis that the Kosovo federation was not ‘based
in a country which is recognised by the United Nations as an independent state’, as required under
then Art 5(1) of the FIFA Statutes. The CAS panel noted that the UN does not ‘recognise’ countries,
and so it was required to interpret Art 5(1) to determine the meaning of ‘country’. It referred to the
definition of ‘country’ in another provision of the FIFA Statutes (‘an independent state recognised by
the international community’), which accorded with the Olympic Charter definition. The CAS panel
also noted that Kosovo had already been recognised by the IOC and a number of other international
federations (FIBA, FINA, UCI, IAAF, FIS, etc). The CAS panel stated that ‘if the UEFA Statutes are
interpreted in line with the common understanding in the sporting community, it becomes evident
that FFK fulfils the membership criteria’. On that basis, the CAS held that Kosovo’s admission to
membership was valid); Federació Catalana de Patinatge v International Roller Sports Federation,
CAS 2004/A/776 (CAS panel ordered the International Roller Sports Federation to have its Congress
reconsider the membership application of the Catalan Roller Skating Federation); and the cases of
Gibraltar Football Association (GFA) v UEFA, CAS 2007/O/1237 and Gibraltar Football Association
(GFA) v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3776 (CAS panels ordered each of UEFA and FIFA to ‘take all necessary
measures to admit the Gibraltar Football Association to full membership’).
A1.48 The rules of an international federation should also set out a clear procedure
for resolving competing claims for membership by bodies from the same country,
based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria.1 Simply failing to deal with the
issue is not acceptable.2
1 For example, Art 2.4(d) of the FIH Constitution provides: ‘If membership for a particular Country
is vacant, and more than one body applies to be admitted as a Member for that Country, or in other
circumstances where there are competing claims to be entitled to membership for a particular
Country and the Executive Board deems it appropriate to apply this clause, the competing claims
shall be resolved as follows: (i) The Executive Board will specify the criteria by which the competing
claims are to be assessed. (ii) The Executive Board will appoint appropriate persons to a committee
to consider the respective claims of the competing bodies, in accordance with a fair and impartial
process, and then to make a written recommendation as to which of those bodies, in the committee’s
view, best meets the criteria and so should be the FIH’s Member for that Country. (iii) The Executive
Board will submit that recommendation to the next meeting of Congress for decision. However, if it
sees fit the Executive Board may admit/treat the recommended body as a provisional Member pending
that meeting, strictly without prejudice to the powers of Congress pursuant to sub-clause (iv), below.
(iv) At its next meeting, Congress will consider the competing claims, together with the committee’s
recommendation, and will give each claimant an equal opportunity to be heard by Congress, before
deciding which claim to accept. (v) The decision of Congress shall be final. The rejected claimant may
challenge that decision exclusively by appeal to the CAS in accordance with Article 14.3(b)(i) of these
Statutes’. This process was scrutinised and passed muster in Indian Hockey Federation v International
Hockey Federation & Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828.
2 Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979] 1 WLR 1252, aff’d [1981] 1 WLR 1226 CA, p 1232 (‘One thing
that is clear is that there may only be one member for each country. Therefore, in entertaining an
application, it has to be seen whether or not there is an existing member who has control, or a measure
of control, over the same area as that for which the applicant contends. There must be no doubt who is to
speak with authority as the governing body for a particular group of athletes’). In Kuwait Motor Sports
Club (KMSC) v Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (FIM), CAS 2015/O/4316, the Kuwait
International Automobile Club (KIAC) was recognised by FIM as an Affiliate Member for Kuwait.
However KMSC was recognised by the Kuwait Public Authority for Youth and Sports. In September
2009, the KMSC informed FIM of its wish to become a member of FIM. KIAC opposed it, and when
FIM failed to act on the KMSC’s application for more than two and a half years, the KCMS filed an
appeal at CAS. The CAS panel found the delay by FIM amounted to a formal denial of justice, and
ordered FIM to rule on KMSC’s application for membership within nine months. FIM challenged the
CAS award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, on the basis of lack of jurisdiction (PILA Art 190(2)(b))
and for ruling ultra petita, ie rendering a decision that goes beyond the claims submitted to the tribunal
(PILA Art 190(2)(c)), but the challenge was dismissed (Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme v
Kuwait Motor Sports Club, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision number 4A_314/2017 dated 28 May 2018).
B Defining the rights and obligations of members
A1.49 The rights of members of SGBs will depend on the type of membership
held (full or associate/provisional), and will vary across sports. However, national
federations that are full members in good standing of an international federation will
typically have the right to:
(a) recognition by the international federation and its members as the body with
the ‘sole and exclusive right’ to govern the sport in its country;
(b) appoint delegates to attend and speak on its behalf at meetings of the
international federation’s Congress;
(c) submit proposed motions to the Executive Board and Congress, eg on changes
to the rules and regulations for participation in the sport;
(d) vote on motions put before Congress;
(e) nominate individuals who meet the eligibility criteria for election or
appointment to the Executive Board or committees;
(f) receive copies of reports required to be made to Congress, and other official
information distributed about the federation;
(g) enter athletes in international competitions (in accordance with the relevant
eligibility and qualification rules);
(h) participate in development programmes and activities organised by the
international federation; and
(i) bid to host international competitions sanctioned by the international
federation.1
1 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 6; FIH Constitution (November 2018) Art 2.2(a);
ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Art 2.3.
A1.50 The obligations imposed on members of international federations will also

vary across sports.1 However, there are certain obligations that are common to most
sports because they embody the vital role that the national federation plays in the
pyramid system of governance and control of the sport.2 In addition to requiring
continued satisfaction of the criteria for admission as a member in the first place,3
and also requiring payment of an annual membership fee,4 typically an international
federation’s constitution will require a member national federation to:
(a) respect, support, and promote the purposes of the international federation;
(b) administer, promote, and develop the sport in the national federation’s country;
(c) develop, stage, and sanction competitions in its country;
(d) participate in other competitions only if they been duly sanctioned by the international
federation (for international competitions) or by other national federations that are
members of the international federation (for other competitions);5
(e) determine its officeholders by democratic elections;
(f) manage its affairs autonomously and without interference from bodies outside
the Olympic Movement;6
(g) comply in all respects with the international federation’s constitution and rules,
and the decisions of its Congress, Executive Board, disciplinary tribunals, and
the CAS;
(h) adopt, implement, and enforce within its country a constitution and regulations
that comply with, and are not inconsistent with, the constitution and other
rules and regulations of the international federation, including anti-doping
regulations that are compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code;
(i) recognise and enforce within its country:
(i) all decisions of the international federation’s constituent bodies, officials,
disciplinary tribunals, and the CAS;
(ii) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed under
the rules and regulations of the international federation; and
(iii) periods of ineligibility and other disciplinary sanctions imposed on
participants in the sport by other national federations that are members
of the international federation;
(j) require any participants in its competitions and activities to submit to its rules
and regulations, and the rules and regulations of the international federation, as
a condition of such participation;
(k) adopt and enforce rules prohibiting persons under its jurisdiction from
participating in competitions in its sport that have not been properly sanctioned
by the international federation (in the case of international competitions) or the

national federation (in the case of other competitions);7
(l) not do anything (by act or omission) that risks bringing the sport or the
international federation into disrepute or that is contrary to the integrity and
best interests of the sport or the international federation;8
(m) agree to the resolution of disputes through the disputes resolution procedure
provided for by the international federation (usually by way of arbitration,
including before CAS);9 and
(n) provide reports on its activities to the international federation upon request.10
1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion
to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such
sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’).
2 See para A1.42.
3 See para A1.45.
4 For example, Article 10.2 of World Athletics’ Constitution (November 2019) provides that ‘[a]
Member may be suspended or expelled from Membership in accordance with this Constitution if any
Membership Fees or other fees or payments to World Athletics are due and outstanding for more than
thirty (30) days after the Due Date, or any later date, approved by Council upon application by the
Member Federation’.
5 See para A1.61.
6 See para A1.2. See also paras A1.11 et seq.
7 See para A1.61.
8 See para B1.23.
9 See para A1.36.
10 For a typical list of such membership obligations, see eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 7;
FIH Constitution (November 2018) Arts 2.2(b) and 2.3; ICC Articles of Association (June 2017) Arts
2.4 and 2.7(A).
A1.51 To comply with the principle of legal certainty,1 the international federation
should clearly identify in its constitution what consequences may apply in the
event that a member federation breaches its membership obligations. It will not be
permitted to impose any consequences not provided for in the constitution, however
much the member federation may deserve them.2 The range of sanctions should
include (for serious cases) the right to suspend the member for a set period or until
the member has satisfied certain conditions (during which suspension the member
federation may not exercise any membership rights, including in particular the right
to enter its athletes in international events), as well as (for the most serious cases) the
right to expel the member. In addition, there will generally be a range of less severe
sanctions for less serious cases, which might be imposed alone or in combination
with other sanctions, such as a warning or reprimand, a fine, withholding of grants
or subsidies, suspension of particular membership rights, together with a catch-all
power to impose ‘such other reasonable sanctions’ as the appropriate body within the
SGB may consider appropriate.3
1 For a discussion of which, see para B1.19 et seq.
2 See para A1.55 and para B1.22.
3 See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 10.1 and Appendix 4; FIH Constitution (November 2018)
Arts 2.6 and 2.7; World Athletics Constitution (November 2019) Arts 13 and 14; ICC Articles of
Association (June 2017) Arts 2.10 and 2.11.
C Enforcing membership obligations
A1.52 To maintain the integrity of the pyramid structure of governance and

regulation of the sport, the international federation has to be ready, willing, and able
to enforce the obligations that its national federations have assumed as members,
including (if necessary) by suspending or even withdrawing membership from a
national federation that fails to comply with its obligations. This is particularly true
of the obligation on member federations to adopt and enforce effectively in their
respective national jurisdictions the rules and regulations issued by the international
federation to set the playing conditions for the sport, in particular the rules that
protect the integrity of competition, such as the anti-doping rules. If the international
federation fails to enforce this obligation strictly, the standards it has set will not
be applied uniformly throughout the sport across the world. Instead, the defaulting
national federation, and its athletes, will be playing by a different set of rules, and the
playing field will not be level.1
1 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 82 (the IPC is ‘dependent on its (national) members to implement
its policies on a national level […]. [As the IPC pointed out] this federal system with complementary
international and national obligations is the core back-bone of the fight against doping’); IFBB v
IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, headnotes and paras 27-34 (‘the decision to suspend the IFBB from
participation in the World Games was based on the IFBB’s failure to take serious measures to address
doping within its system and not on vicarious imputation to the IFBB of the actions of its athletes. In
other words, the IFBB was held responsible for its own omissions, and not for the acts of third parties.
[…] An international federation which wishes to take part in the World Games must respect the rules
of the IWGA and apply proper anti-doping policies. If it is not in a position to ensure the fair conduct
of its sport – for whatever reason – such federation cannot claim to have its sport, tainted by doping,
included in the World Games programme – so involving indirectly the IWGA in its failures’).
In ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, paras 50-56,
USACA argued that Art 3(A) of the 2016 ICC Memorandum of Association (which provided that
‘The objects for which the Council is established are: (A) To administer, develop, co-ordinate, regulate
and promote the game of cricket worldwide in co-operation with its Members […]’) meant that it was
beyond the competence of the ICC to require amendments to USACA’s constitution as a condition
of reinstatement from suspension due to breach of its membership obligations. The sole arbitrator
(Michael Beloff QC) rejected that argument as follows: ‘It is axiomatic that ICC cannot act outwith
its objects. … In my view the natural and ordinary meaning of paragraph 3(A) of the MOA is that
ICC’s object is to work together with its members where such cooperation is necessary in order to
achieve the effective administration, development, co-ordination, regulation and promotion of the
sport worldwide in accordance with the characteristic pyramid system of governance and regulation
of international sports. […] it would be destructive of the harmonisation of global standards, eg in the
fields of anti-doping or sex discrimination, if a member could simply pick and choose what principles
or rules to adopt in defiance of ICC (cf IFBB v IWGA CAS 2010/A/2119 at paras 27-28). In my view,
on the contrary, its duty to collaborate involves necessary subordination to the requirements of ICC
(as long as they are in the broad sense intra vires) as the quid pro quo of its membership. The words
“in cooperation with its Members” cannot sensibly be construed as giving a member a right of veto
over a valid proposal of ICC. I conclude that […] [the] submission that it is beyond the constitutional
competence of the ICC to require of USACA amendments to the latter’s constitution is wrong. The
power to do anything conducive to achieving ICC’s developmental, regulatory and other objectives
in cooperation with its members clearly includes the power to require a member to do that which is
necessary for the achievement of those objectives and to sanction a member for its refusal (or failure)
to do so’.
A1.53 Membership obligations are enforceable in the same way as any other
contractual obligations, including (in extreme cases) by termination of the
membership contract. As the CAS has stated:
‘it is a fundamental principle of the law of associations in all applicable jurisdictions
that members of associations have an obligation to satisfy the requirements for
membership in the association and if they fail to do so those members may have
their association membership adversely affected. In many ways, this is the contract
for being part of an association and the rules upon which all association members
are expected to conduct themselves’.1
1 Russian Olympic Committee & Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 124. In ICC v USACA,
ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 39, sole arbitrator Michael Beloff
QC cited that passage with approval, and noted that it also reflects the position under English law. See
also Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.14
(‘The broad discretion and autonomy which FIFA enjoys under Swiss law means that it can require its
members to abide by its Statutes. A failure to do so may result in sanctions’).
A1.54 Similar to the limited review conducted of an international federation’s

decision not to admit an applicant as a member,1 if an international federation’s
suspension or expulsion or other sanctioning of a member national federation is
challenged, the supervising court or arbitral panel will not second-guess the merits
of that decision, but rather should simply ensure that it respects the following legal
constraints on SGB decisions and actions.2
1 See para A1.44.
2 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017 (Michael Beloff QC,
sole arbitrator), para 73 (‘whether the issue of the propriety of the proposed expulsion is approached
through the lens of company law, the law of associations, or the principles of public law which have
migrated into the private sector, especially where powerful sports governing bodies are concerned,
[…] the approach will be essentially the same. The starting point is that sports governing bodies know
what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore is consciously restrained’) and para 40
(‘the role of an arbitral panel reviewing a decision to expel a member of an international federation
is not to “make policy for sports federations’’, ie by evaluating whether it thinks that the entity is a
suitable member, but ‘is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective of their wisdom
or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of the federations,
including persons or entities who at a particular moment may find themselves in the minority’’),
quoting Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, paras 9.1-
9.2 (‘The CAS has neither the authority nor the ambition to make policy for sports federations. In
particular, it is not for the CAS to say whether one entity or another is a more suitable member of a
federation. […] The CAS’s authority is rather to verify the legal bases of federal actions, irrespective
of their wisdom or otherwise, in the interest of parties who have a stake in the proper functioning of
the federations, including persons or entities who at a particular moment may find themselves in the
minority’).
A1.55 First, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, the international
federation must be able to show that the obligation that the member federation is said
to have breached, and the sanction that has been imposed for that breach, are set out
clearly in the applicable rules.1 For example, in Tsagaev v International Weightlifting
Federation (IWF), the IWF purported to suspend a member national federation due
to repeated doping infractions by some of its athletes, with the consequence that all
of the member’s athletes were excluded from the 2000 Olympic Games. On appeal,
a CAS panel overturned the federation’s suspension on the basis that the specific
provision in the IWF statutes that the IWF invoked to justify the suspension stated
that the sanction for repeated doping infractions by a member’s athletes was a fine,
and that the federation would only be suspended if it did not pay the fine. The IWF’s
alternative argument was that it had ‘an inherent power to take appropriate action,
including the suspension of a member federation, if the behaviour of a member
federation is harmful to that particular sport’. That was also rejected by the CAS
panel:
‘Although an international federation may have certain general discretionary powers

to govern its sport even in the absence of specific provisions in the statutes or
regulations, the Panel is of the clear view that a suspension of an entire federation
from participation in the Olympic Games, including innocent athletes who have not
committed a doping offence or any other violation of the applicable rules, at least
requires an explicit, and unambiguous legal basis’.2
The CAS panel applauded the IWF for its desire to signal its commitment to stamp
out doping in its sport, but noted: ‘Laudable policy objectives, and alacrity in pursuing
them, do not, however, obviate the fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of
having a legal basis for disciplinary action’.3
2 Tsagaev v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 22 (emphasis in original).
3 Ibid, para 25. See also Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS 2009/1823, para 9.4
(‘Whether one is talking of a nation-State or an international sports federation, the exclusion of a
constituent entity cannot be the result of an arbitrary executive action or by the extra-constitutional
vote of a majority of the community – no matter how large the majority, no matter how unpopular
the excluded member’) and para 9.6 (‘PJU’s eviction as Continental Union was no small matter; it
entailed the extinction of its raison d’être. It naturally cannot be legitimised in the absence of a clear
legal foundation. For reasons to be explained immediately below, the Panel has no doubt in concluding
that the decision lacked legal basis’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport
Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 208 (‘Finally, the Panel notes the arguments of the ISSF that
Article 1.13.5.1 [of the ISSF Constitution] gives it a wide discretion to suspend its members, citing
CAS 2011/A/2525. The Panel maintains that there has to be a clear purpose to better serve and some
evidence of behaviour by the Member that is putting this purpose in danger. A disciplinary sanction
such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’) and para 213 (‘The Panel does not
seek to condone the actions of the Kuwaiti Government in any way at all, however, the suspension
or expulsion of a member by an International Federation is a serious matter and must be done in
accordance with its own constitution and in accordance with the applicable law. Without calling into
question the right of the General Assembly of an IF to take disciplinary measures against its national
members, it appears in the present case that the reasons retained by the ISSF to suspend the KSF are
not justified by any applicable rule’); Belarus Canoe Association & Belarusian Senior Men’s Canoe
and Kayak team members v ICF, CAS 2016/A/4708, paras 72-80 (‘In the Panel’s view, issuing a
decision first and thereafter searching for a possible legal basis does not confirm to the principle of
legality. […] Article 12.3 read together with Sub-Article 12.3.1 provides that in case of four or more
anti-doping rule violations within a twelve month period, the ICF (Executive Committee) has two
options: a) to ban all officials from the BCA for participation in any ICF activities for a period of up
to two years and/or to fine the BCA in an amount up to 15.000 Euros. The Appealed Decision deviates
from the above legal basis in three ways: it includes athletes, it does not ban all officials of the BCA
and it does not ban all officials for participation in any ICF activities, but from participation at “all
international competitions”. […] The Panel, thus, holds that by applying Article 12.3 read together
with Sub-Article 12.3.1 ICF ADR on other persons than officials on the one hand, and by not addressing
all BCA officials on the other hand, and finally by banning them, but not from any ICF activities, the
Appealed Decision violated its legal basis’); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 12(A) (the first
question to ask when reviewing the legality of the IWGA’s decision to suspend the IFBB from the
World Games is whether it has a ‘proper legal basis in the IWGA rules and regulations’) and paras
14-41 (analysis concluding that there was a proper legal basis in the IWGA rules for suspension);
BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319, para 57 (finding that the IWF rules clearly provided for the sanction
imposed, namely banning the BWF from entering athletes in the next edition of the Olympic Games);
RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 83 (IPC Constitution provided the IPC with the explicit and
unambiguous right to suspend the rights of a member National Paralympic Committee that fails to
comply with its membership obligations)
The position is the same under English law: ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber
decision dated 16 June 2017, para 44 (The ICC’s ‘relationship with its members is governed by
contract, ie its Memorandum (‘MOA’) and Articles of Association (‘Articles’), and the source of any
power on the part of the ICC to expel or suspend a member must be found in those instruments by
which both parties are bound’) and paras 57-58 (‘These principles articulated in CAS cases [citing
RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745 and IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119] are not discrepant, but rather
dovetail with domestic jurisprudence. See generally Flaherty v NGRC [2005] EWCA Civ 1117 CA
(‘it is the courts’ function to control illegality and make sure that a body does not act outside its
powers. But it is not in the interest of sport or anybody else for the courts to seek to double guess
regulating bodies in charge of domestic arrangements. Sports regulating bodies ordinarily have
unrivalled and practical knowledge of the particular sport that they are required to regulate. They
cannot be expected to act in every detail as if they are a court of law. Provided they act lawfully
and within the ambit of their powers, the courts should allow them to get on with the job they are
required to do’ (para 20ff)). Similarly, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979] 1 WLR 1252, aff’d [1981]
1 WLR 1226 CA, p.1231, the English Court of Appeal found that the IAAF (now World Athletics)
had no power under its rules to expel a member, and therefore the IAAF’s expulsion of the Taiwanese
athletic federation was invalid.
A1.56 Secondly, the process by which it is determined whether the alleged

breach(es) of the member’s obligations have taken place and (if so) what consequences
should be imposed must be fair, ie it must respect the member’s right to natural
justice (in civil law terms, the ‘right to be heard’).1 This generally means that, at a
minimum:
(a) The member must be given fair and proper notice of the provisions in the
rulebook that it is alleged to have breached, and the facts on which those
allegations are based.2
(b) The member must be told what consequences will be sought and may be
imposed if the alleged breach(es) are found to have been established.3
(c) The member must be given a full and fair opportunity to answer the case
against it, both on the facts and on the law.4 This may include the right to be
heard orally, or (depending on the circumstances) the right to make written
submissions may be sufficient.
(d) The decision-maker must act impartially, ie it must not have pre-judged
the matter and it must decide the case on the facts alone, and not based on
any extraneous matters.5 If the decision-maker is not independent of the
international federation, the member should have the right to appeal an adverse
decision on a de novo basis to an independent body.6
1 Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 30 (‘There is no doubt
that the right to be heard is a legal principle which has to be respected by federations when making
their decisions and within their internal proceedings […] such as the Appellant’s expulsion from
the EGA’); Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.9
(‘Expulsion from the IJF is permitted only on the grounds of ‘serious breach or gross negligence […]
. A finding to that effect requires the opportunity to be heard. This is a matter of international public
policy which should be apparent to an international body like the IJF’).
2 Auckland Boxing Association Inc v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001] NZLR 847
[2001] NZHC 445, 8 May 2001, paras 53–54 (‘The most fundamental natural justice ground advanced
by ABA is that the Council, in deciding that it would suspend the Applicant, failed to allow a proper
hearing. The duty to hear all sides before deciding is a fundamental aspect of natural justice. Basic to
that duty is the requirement of notice. This may, in the circumstances, include notice of the potential
outcomes of the decision-making process’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting
Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 200 (‘The use of this provision in the ISSF Constitution to
suspend the KSF should invoke a disciplinary process. The Panel would have expected some form of
investigation by the ISSF into whether there was some actual conduct by the KSF that was affecting
the purposes of the ISSF. The Panel would have expected the ISSF to have put the findings of such
investigation to the KSF and to have given it the opportunity to comment, before any decision was
taken, as in a normal disciplinary process’); Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association,
CAS 2010/A/2275, paras 31–37 (waiting until the eve of an AGM to inform a member federation
that a resolution proposing its expulsion would be put to a vote the following day, even though the
information had been available weeks before, and refusing to provide the member with relevant
documents, constituted a severe violation of the right to be heard).
3 See Auckland Boxing Association Inc v New Zealand Boxing Association [2001] NZLR 847
[2001] NZHC 445, 8 May 2001, para 64 (‘The ABA was not properly notified of the scope of the [New
Zealand Boxing Association) Council’s concerns, or of the potential consequences of the decision. In
the absence of such notice, they were unable fully to put their own case to the Council. This is a serious
breach of natural justice’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation,
CAS 2016/A/4727, para 197 (‘[…] the starting point is the ISSF Constitution. Each Member should
be able to identify with certainty what disciplinary sanctions it could face which could threaten its
membership of the ISSF […]. If a temporary sanction is handed out, such as suspension, then the
conditions to remedy the behaviour should be clear in the Constitution too, so the Member can regain
membership’).
4 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017 (Michael Beloff QC,
sole arbitrator), para 74 (‘USACA does not allege any procedural unfairness. ICC has followed the
procedure set out in its constitution to the letter, and at all times has given USACA clear notice of
the reasons for its actions and the requirements for USACA’s reinstatement. In the 30 April letter it
was also expressly stated that USACA will be given a full and fair opportunity to be heard before
the membership votes on the resolution to expel’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA,
CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘With regard to the right to be heard, the Panel wishes to stress that the CAS has
always protected the principle audiatur et altera pars in connection with any proceedings, measures
or disciplinary actions taken by an international federation vis-à-vis a national federation, a club or
an athlete. However, there is a very important difference between the adoption by a federation of
an ad hoc administrative or disciplinary decision directly and individually addressed to designated
associations, teams or athletes and the adoption of a general regulation directed at laying down rules of
conduct generally applicable to all current or future situations of the kind described in the regulation.
[…] Only in the event of administrative measures or penalties adopted by a sports-governing body
with regard to a limited and identified number of designees could there be a right to a legal hearing’);
Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, paras 31-37 (one day’s
notice of an AGM vote on potential expulsion was clearly insufficient, and refusing to provide the
member with relevant documents was also a breach of the member’s right to be heard).
5 See para D1.52.
6 Such a de novo appeal may be held to cure any procedural defects in the first instance proceedings.
See eg RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 69 (‘possible deficiencies – such as denial of justice, or
procedural irregularities – are unfortunate but without any effect in light of the de novo decision of the
CAS’); Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF)
& Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 92 (‘Even if the Appellant’s rights had
been violated by the General Assembly of the ISSF, the proceedings at the CAS would have a curing
effect’) and para 101 (‘Even if one would assume that procedural rules have been violated in rendering
the appealed decisions, quod non, such defects could have been cured by the Panel pursuant to article
R57 of the Code’). But cf Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275,
paras 38 and 40, where the CAS panel set aside the European Golf Association’s decision to expel the
Croatian Golf Federation because the procedure leading to the resolution adopted at its AGM violated
the Croatian Golf Federation’s fundamental right to be heard. The CAS panel held that the de novo
proceedings before it could not cure that violation because the vote on the AGM resolution ‘is not a
decision which was largely determined by legal standards and which the Panel could therefore take in
lieu of the delegates’ because ‘it is still very much a “political” decision within the discretion of the
delegates whether or not to expel a member’.
A1.57 Thirdly, the decision reached must not be arbitrary or irrational; it must be
grounded in objective facts.1
1 ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, paras 57 and 58 (‘it is
elementary that sports governing bodies are afforded a wide margin of appreciation in governing their
affairs, in particular in respect of membership matters. A court or arbitral body seized of a complaint
of abuse or misuse of power would not ordinarily intervene unless the complainant (here USACA)
was able to show that the actions of the governing body (here ICC), to which objection was taken,
were irrational, perverse, or evidently or grossly disproportionate’); Kuwait Shooting Federation
v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 208 (‘the Panel notes the
arguments of the ISSF that Article 1.13.5.1 gives it a wide discretion to suspend its Members, citing
such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’).
A1.58 Fourthly, if the member federation is found to have breached its obligations,
the sanction imposed must be proportionate to the member’s offence, ie it must serve
a legitimate purpose, it must be effective to achieve that purpose, and it must go no
further than is necessary to achieve that purpose.1 The international federation will
be given a margin of appreciation in determining what is a proportionate sanction in
a particular case,2 but if challenged it will need to be able to show that it considered
and gave appropriate weight to all relevant factors, including the degree of fault of
the member (ie did it act deliberately, recklessly, or negligently);3 the importance
of the obligation breached4 and the damage caused by the member’s breach of that
obligation;5 the impact of the sanction on the member;6 and whether there were
any alternative sanctions that would have been just as effective in achieving the
international federation’s purposes.7
1 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, paras 73-74 (‘The more difficult question for consideration is
whether the decision to suspend the RPC […] was proportionate […] The question is whether the
Decision served a legitimate purpose and was suitable, necessary and appropriate for the objective
which it aims to achieve’) and paras 88–89 (‘The IPC took the view, which was not unreasonable
in the circumstances of the scale and the nature of the doping and cover-up, that the purpose of a
suspension of membership was threefold. On the one hand, the measure was designed to provoke
behavioural change (for the future) within the sphere of responsibility of the RPC. On the other hand,
the suspension took into account that the failures in the past had resulted in a distorted playing field
on an international level, because the IPC anti-doping policy was not being adequately enacted and
enforced vis-à-vis para-athletes affiliated to RPC. Finally, the IPC submitted that in view of the fact
that Paralympic sports had been specifically mentioned in the IP Report, a strong message had to be
issued to restore public confidence, since the Paralympic movement depends – much more than other
sports – on the identification with moral values. The Panel notes that all three goals pursued by the
IPC are legitimate and that the measure taken is suited to achieve the goals pursued’). ROC et al v
IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras 130–131 (‘The principle of proportionality implies that there must be
a reasonable balance between the nature of the misconduct and the sanction. In order to be respected,
the principle of proportionality requires that (i) the measure taken by the governing body is capable
of achieving the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach
the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints which the affected person will suffer as a consequence of
the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal. In other words, to be
proportionate a measure must not exceed what is reasonably required in the search of the justifiable
aim [references omitted]. […] In the Panel’s opinion, eradication of doping in sport, protection and
promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are undeniably legitimate objectives of extreme
importance for the viability of sport at any level, and i. the measure taken by IAAF, and the effect
it produces, is capable of achieving those objectives, as it prevents athletes under the jurisdiction
of the suspended national federation (for having failed to promote a doping-free environment) from
competing with athletes registered with federations that have not been the subject of an exclusion;
ii. the measure taken by IAAF is necessary to reach the envisaged goal: if the IAAF could not take a
step having the mentioned effect, the suspension of the Russian federation would have no meaningful
impact; and iii. the constraints which the affected athletes, including the Claimant Athletes, will suffer
as a consequence of the measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal,
which outweighs them, and do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it’). On the requirement of
proportionality more generally, see para B1.31 et seq.
2 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion
to determine the obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such
sanctions it deems necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para 125 (‘In a different context, this
wide discretion is referred to as ‘the margin of appreciation’’); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119,
para 36 (IWGA had a wide margin of appreciation in determining whether to lift its suspension of
the IFBB for governance failings); RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 83 (‘The decision of the
IPC to suspend the RPC was within its power, has a proper legislative basis and was not irrational,
or perverse, or outside the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not evidently or grossly
disproportionate’).
3 Kuwait Sporting Club et al. v FIFA & Kuwait Football Association (KFA), CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.65
(‘in principle, FIFA’s decision to suspend the KFA with immediate effect without a reasonable time
limit to address FIFA’s concerns would be a violation of the principle of proportionality. However, as
stated concerning the principle of equal treatment, FIFA’s measures have not been taken in a contextual
vacuum. FIFA has had to intervene on numerous occasions in Kuwait over the past several years, each
of which has related to interference by the Kuwaiti government in the affairs of sports organisations.
The regular and repeated attempts by a national government to unduly interfere with the independence
of FIFA’s members would justify the manner in which the Decision was imposed’).
4 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 82 (in finding that the IPC’s decision to suspend the RPC was
not disproportionate, the CAS panel took into account that the IPC is ‘dependent on its (national)
members to implement its policies on a national level … . [As the IPC pointed out] this federal system
with complementary international and national obligations is the core back-bone of the fight against
doping’) and para 84 (‘The concern that clean athletes, inside and outside of Russia, have confidence in
the ability to compete on a level playing field, and the integrity and credibility of the sporting contest,
represent powerful countervailing factors to the collateral or reflexive effect on Russian athletes as a
result of the suspension. This represents an overriding public interest that the IPC was entitled to take
into account in coming to the Decision’).
5 Ibid, para 86 (‘The testing of Russian Paralympic athletes had not complied with the WADA Code.
The damage caused by the systemic non-compliance is substantial. […] This was not a case of a single
or simple failure by an anti-doping authority. It was not a case of failing temporarily or occasionally to
fulfil an obligation, or of inconsequential inadvertence on the part of the RPC’) and para 81 (suspension
not disproportionate given the magnitude of the RPC’s failure, leading to what the IPC described as the
‘biggest doping scandal in sports history’).
6 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & KFA, CAS 2015/A/4241, para 8.69 (‘Importantly, the Decision
under appeal does not impose a permanent exclusion of the KFA. Rather, it is a temporary suspension,
which may be lifted immediately. Under such circumstances, whereby the sanction of an association
may not only be removed entirely in a very short amount of time, but is also not permanent in nature,
the Panel finds that it would be disproportionate to consider that it violates Swiss social, moral and
economic values. Moreover, the KFA, as a member of FIFA and the addressee of the Decision, has
accepted to be bound by its statutes which include the possibility of sanctions’).
Importantly, the fact that the athletes affiliated to the suspended member federation will not be able to
participate in international competitions is simply a natural consequence of the member’s suspension,
and does not change the proportionality analysis. ROC and Lyukman et al, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras
119, 121, and 130; RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 79 (‘The fact that the suspension of the RPC
reflexively affects the Russian para-athletes insofar as they derive a legal position from the RPC is a
logical and natural consequence of the simple fact that the IPC Constitution allows for legal persons
(representing the sport in a specific geographical area) to obtain membership. This by itself cannot
change the accountability of such a (collective) member to comply with the obligations imposed by
the IPC Constitution. In particular, the collective member cannot hide behind those individuals that
it represents’) and para 91 (‘The RPC points to the consequences for the athletes but considering the
matter in dispute in, and the parties to, this arbitration, such consequences follow from the suspension,
as has happened in the case of other suspensions of NFs’); BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319, paras
73–74 (‘no additional sanction is imposed on BWF athletes as the ban is not a direct consequence
of the fact that they individually committed anti-doping rule violations. […] The BWF athletes are
prevented from taking part in the Olympics because they are affiliated to a national federation that
has been banned from entering athletes for the Olympic Games because it has not been able to fight
doping within its organisation effectively. […] The fact that individual BWF athletes are prevented
from participating in the Olympic Games as a mere ”collateral damage” that is justified by the
overarching objectives to protect the values of sport and to ensure that general education is provided
by national federations to its affiliated members. […] [P]art C.1 of the Qualification System determines
that a national federation is only not allowed to enter athletes if 9 or more violations of the IWF
ADP are committed within a calendar year period “in testing conducted by the IWF or Anti-Doping
Organizations other than the National [sic] or its National Anti-Doping Organization”. As such, anti-
doping rule violations committed based on tests conducted by the national federation itself and the
national anti-doping organisation are not counted. […] It derives from such rule that the intention is
for the national federations to actively combat doping within their organisations. The reason for the
ban on the national federation is not so much that its affiliated members have been sanctioned for
anti-doping rule violations, but rather that the national federation has been unsuccessful in finding
anti-doping rule violations among its affiliated members while others could […]’); Fiji Association
of Sports and National Olympic Committee v Commonwealth Games Federation, CAS 2010/O/2039,
paras 7.1-7.2 (‘The Panel accepts the Claimant’s submission that the athletes of Fiji are being punished
for no fault of their own. But […] we are clearly of the view that the effect of Fiji’s full suspension
is to deprive it of the rights and privileges of membership of a Commonwealth Country. […] While
it is a principle of CAS jurisprudence that where possible rules of sports governing bodies should be
construed so as to enable athletes to compete, the Panel does not consider that the CGF rules allow
a benevolent construction. […] A suspension means, absent any particular qualification, denial of
rights pro tem’); Legkov et al v International Olympic Committee, CAS OG 18/03, para 7.18 (where
Russian athletes and coaches appealed the IOC’s decision not to invite them to participate at the 2018
Pyeongchang Olympic Games, the CAS panel ruled that ‘it may be that non-sanctioned individual
athletes, including the Applicants, are prevented from participating in the Olympic Games simply
because they are citizens of a country that has been found to have engaged in a systemic manipulation
of the anti-doping rules. However, in light of the IOC’s overall objective to balance the interests of
clean athletes and the fight against doping against the interests of individual Russian athletes, the Panel
concludes that any unfairness was a consequential effect of the suspension of the ROC and that the
process was neither discriminatory nor unfair (see also [BWF v IWF], CAS 2015/A/4319)’). See also
Ahn et al v IOC, CAS OG 18/02 (same); BCA & Belarusian Senior Men’s Canoe and Kayak team
members v ICF, CAS 2016/A/4708, para 79.
7 Kuwait Sporting Club et al v FIFA & KFA, CAS 2015/A/4241, paras 8.61 et seq (‘FIFA cannot take
any direct measures against the State of Kuwait [for government interference in Kuwait football], and
as a result, is only left with the choice of imposing sanctions on its members’).
A1.59 Examples of cases where a member federation has been suspended from
membership on account of a failure to comply with its membership obligations
include the following:
(a) Failure to comply with rules for the protection of the welfare of
participants in the sport: In March 2015 the FEI suspended the UAE national
federation from membership for failure to protect horse welfare issues and
non-compliance with FEI rules and regulations in the discipline of endurance.
Under the terms of the suspension, the UAE national federation was precluded
from attending or being represented at any session or meeting of any body of
the FEI and from organising any international events, and its members were
precluded from participating in any international events (although UAE athletes
in disciplines other than endurance were allowed to compete in international
competitions under the FEI flag), unless and until the UAE federation took
the actions deemed necessary by the FEI to provide assurance that moving
forward it would protect horse welfare and comply fully with the FEI rules and
regulations.1
(b) Failure to comply with anti-doping obligations: The International
Paralympic Committee (IPC) suspended the Russian Paralympic Committee
(RPC) from membership in August 2016 (just before the Rio Paralympic
Games) on the basis that the cheating at the 2014 Sochi Paralympic Games
that had been exposed in Richard McLaren’s report2 was caused by its failure
to take the necessary steps (including insisting on appropriate support from the
Russian Ministry of Sport and the Russian national anti-doping organization,
RUSADA) to run an effective anti-doping programme in Russian Paralympic
sport. The RPC’s appeal was rejected by the CAS, which ruled that:
(i) The IPC had established that the RPC had failed to comply with its
obligations as a member of the IPC. It had failed to rebut Professor
McLaren’s evidence of a state-sponsored doping scheme, and while
there was no evidence that the RPC was complicit in that scheme, it
had a positive obligation to vigorously pursue all potential anti-doping
rule violations within its jurisdiction and to investigate cases of doping.

Furthermore:
‘the RPC had a non-delegable responsibility with respect to implementing
an anti-doping policy in conformity with the WADA Code in Russia.
As an athlete cannot escape the consequences of an anti-doping rule
violation by delegating his or her responsibility in relation to the personal
duty to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her system (Art.
2.1.1 WADA Code), the RPC cannot delegate the consequences where other
bodies within Russia acting as its agent implement a systemic system of
doping and cover-up’.
As a result:
‘the existence of the system as described in the IP [McLaren] Report and
in the McLaren affidavit means that the RPC breached its obligations and
conditions of membership of the IPC’.
(ii) The IPC had a clear legal basis under its constitution to suspend the RPC
on account of such breaches. Art 9.2.2 of the IPC Constitution provided
that ‘a member may be suspended for not fulfilling the conditions for
membership and not complying with the obligations of members, as
defined in the bylaws’.
(iii) The RPC had failed to establish that the IPC had not respected due
process in imposing the suspension. The RPC complained that it was
not given due warning of the suspension, as required under the IPC’s
suspension policy. However, the CAS found that the IPC did not dictate
the timeline (it had no control over when the McLaren report was issued,
and it sent the RPC notice of the opening of suspension proceedings four
days after receiving the McLaren report, so it ‘could not have reacted
more quickly’). It was also ‘obvious that the RPC could not correct a
situation of the magnitude described in the IP [McLaren] Report in time
for the Rio Paralympic Games’, through no fault of the IPC. In any event,
the RPC had a de novo appeal before CAS, which cured any procedural
defects raised by the RPC.
(iv) Taking into account the magnitude of the RPC’s failure, the serious
damage caused (given that the IPC is dependent on its national members
to implement its policies on a national level), and the fact that there
were no obvious alternatives to complete suspension, the decision of
the IPC to suspend the RPC ‘without reservation, or alleviation of the
consequences to Russian Paralympic athletes’ was ‘within its power, has
a proper legislative basis and was not irrational, or perverse, or outside
the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not evidently or
grossly disproportionate’. The consequences to Russian athletes did not
change the proportionality analysis, because those ‘consequences follow
from the suspension, as has happened in the case of other suspensions of
NFs’.
(v) Finally, the fact that the IOC had taken a different decision (not suspending
the Russian Olympic Committee but instead requiring all Russian athletes
seeking to compete in Rio to prove they were innocent of doping) did
not render the IPC’s decision disproportionate or unlawful. The IPC is
not bound by decisions of the IOC, in particular as they operate under
different charters and rules and have different structures. Further, in any
event, properly analysed the decisions of the IOC and IPC were not in
contradiction.3
(c) Government interference: As noted above, a number of national federations
have been suspended from membership of the international federation as a
result of governance interference in their affairs.4 In addition, in 1963 the IOC
passed a resolution requiring the South African National Olympic Committee

(SANOC):
‘to make a firm declaration of its acceptance of the spirit of the Olympic Code and in
particular of Principle 1 and Rule 24 read together, and [to] get from its Government
by December 31st 1963 a change in policy regarding racial discrimination in sports
and competitions in its country, failing which the South African National Olympic
Committee will be debarred from entering its teams in the Olympic Games’.
The IOC subsequently withdrew SANOC’s invitation to the 1964 Tokyo
Olympic Games, and refused subsequent pleas from SANOC to be reinstated
while its government’s apartheid policy endured, notwithstanding that this
meant its (blameless) athletes were prevented from taking part in the Olympic
Games from 1964 to 1988.5
(d) Failure to follow proper election procedure: World Archery suspended the
Archery Association of India (AAI) in August 2019 after two groups conducted
parallel elections resulting in the election of two different presidents of the
AAI. Due to concerns that Indian archers might not be able to participate in
the Tokyo Olympic Games, the dispute was referred to the Delhi High Court,
which ordered new elections to be held in January 2019. Following those
elections, World Archery conditionally lifted the suspension.6
(e) Poor governance of the sport: In May 2019, the IOC suspended the
International Boxing Association (AIBA) due to issues with its finances,
refereeing standards, and governance issues (including the fact that the
AIBA President was on a US Treasury Department sanctions list as ‘one
of Uzbekistan’s leading criminals’). The IOC set up a special taskforce to
oversee the delivery of the boxing competition at the Tokyo Olympics in place
of AIBA.7 Similarly, FIBA suspended the Brazil Basketball Confederation
(CCB) in November 2016 on the basis that it was ‘not fully complying with
its obligations’, in particular in relation to its ‘overall financial situation’,
‘lack of full control of basketball in the country’ and failure to organise the
national youth championships and a 3x3 World Tour event. That suspension
was conditionally lifted eight months after the ban was imposed, subject to
CCB delivering on a number of actions.8
1 See FEI press release dated 12 March 2015, at fei.org/news/fei-suspends-uae-national-federation
[accessed 25 September 2020]; and FEI press release dated 27 July 2015, at inside.fei.org/news/
uae-national-federation-suspension-lifted-fei-bureau-following-signature-agreement [accessed
25 September 2020].
2 McLaren independent investigation report, part 1, 18 July 2016 (wada-ama.org/en/resources/doping-
control-process/mclaren-independent-investigation-report-part-i [accessed 25 September 2020]).
3 RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, paras 56-60, 61-72, 81, 83, 91, 98, and 99. See RPC v IPC, Swiss
Federal Tribunal decision number 4 A_470/2016 dated 30 August 2016 (RPC appealed CAS award
and sought provisional measures to have the CAS award stayed and to allow Russian para athletes to
participate at the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games. The Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the request for
provisional measures, finding in particular that (i) to succeed in obtaining a stay, the RPC would have
to establish that it did (and will) fulfil its obligation to comply with the IPC Anti-Doping Code and
World Anti-Doping Code, and that its interest in the immediate stay of its suspension outweighs the
interest of the IPC in its fight against doping to protect the integrity of the sport, which it was unable
to do, and (ii) the request to admit individual Russian athletes to the Paralympic Games was beyond
the scope of the subject matter in dispute, because the individual athletes were not party to the CAS
or Swiss Federal Tribunal proceedings). Separately, a number of Russian athletes also tried to obtain
provisional measures from the German courts (as the IPC’s headquarters are in Bonn, Germany) to
participate in the 2016 Rio Paralympic Games. They started at the Landgericht Bonn (first instance
court), appealed to the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court), and even
ended up in front of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Germany’s constitutional court). In essence,
the athletes alleged a violation of personal rights, freedom of action, and equal treatment. All of the
arguments were rejected, and the courts made it clear that the balancing of interests favoured the IPC.
See Safronov et al v IPC, 20 O 323/16, Landgericht Bonn decision dated 5 September 2016, and
Arestova et al v IPC, 20 O 325/16, Landgericht Bonn decision dated 6 September 2016; Arestova et
al v IPC, Safronov et al v IPC, Oberlandesgericht Dusseldorf decisions dated 13 September 2016; and
Bundesverfassungsgericht decision 1 BvQ 38/16 dated 15 September 2016.
See also RWF v IWF, CAS OG 16/009 (upholding the IWF’s exclusion of the Russian weightlifting
federation and its athletes from the Rio Olympic Games based on Art 12.4 of the IWF anti-doping
rules, which provided that ‘if any Member federation or members or officials thereof, by reason of
conduct connected with or associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations, brings the sport
of weightlifting into disrepute, the IWF Executive Board may, in its discretion, take such action
as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport’; this provided a sufficient legal
basis to exclude the Russian federation (and its athletes), the IWF’s decision was based on reliable
information (ie the McLaren report), and the RWF failed to show that the IWF’s conclusion that
weightlifting had been brought into disrepute was unreasonable); BWF v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4319
(rejecting BWF’s challenge of IWF’s decision to ban the Bulgaria national federation from entering
any athletes (or nominating any of its athletes for entry by its NOC) into the 2016 Rio Olympics due
to its failure to put adequate anti-doping systems into place, ruling that it was entirely consistent with
the World Anti-Doping Code, and clearly necessary and proportionate to the defence of clean sport,
and so was justified notwithstanding the consequence that Bulgarian weight-lifters were denied
participation in the Rio Games through no fault of their own); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119,
headnotes and paras 27-34 (‘the Panel underlines that the failure of the IFBB to implement proper
anti-doping policies, as indicated by the anti-doping tests showing positive results during the past
editions of the World Games, as well as by the anti-doping tests performed by IFBB in 2009, affects
in itself the image of the World Games, as it establishes that the member federation is not in a
position to ensure compliance of its athletes with the relevant anti-doping regulations. Proof of
damage to the IWGA image, arising out of such circumstances, in fact, does not need, in the Panel’s
view, confirmation by specific evidence, as it is inherent in the exposure to the public of the “bad
doping record” of one of its member federations at the World Games – organized by the IWGA.
In any case, the Panel notes that the existence of such damage can be inferred, on the basis of a
general presumption that the conduct of illicit practices (such as doping) adversely affects the image
of those appearing to be involved. […] the Panel observes that the decision to suspend the IFBB
from participation in the World Games was based on the IFBB’s failure to take serious measures
to address doping within its system and not on vicarious imputation to the IFBB of the actions of
its athletes. In other words, the IFBB was held responsible for its own omissions, and not for the
acts of third parties. […] An international federation which wishes to take part in the World Games
must respect the rules of the IWGA and apply proper anti-doping policies. If it is not in a position
to ensure the fair conduct of its sport – for whatever reason – such federation cannot claim to have
its sport, tainted by doping, included in the World Games programme – so involving indirectly the
IWGA in its failures’).
In October 2017 the International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) suspended nine of its members
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine) for 12
months as a result of anti-doping rule violations discovered upon the re-testing of samples collected at
the 2008 and 2012 Olympic Games. (See BarBend article ‘Suspension Starts for Nine IWF Member
Federations’ dated 23 October 2017 (barbend.com/iwf-member-federations-suspension/ [accessed
24 September 2020]). The IWF set a number of conditions that each federation had to meet to ensure
a shift in culture regarding anti-doping. The suspensions were lifted in June 2018 for three countries
(Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), but the rest served the full suspension. Further, in September
2019, the IWF suspended the Egyptian Weightlifting Federation after seven Egyptian weightlifters,
including five minors, were sanctioned with four-year periods of ineligibility for positive out-of-
competition tests for methandienone at a training camp in the lead-up to the African Junior and
Youth Championships in Cairo. The Egyptian federation appealed to CAS: Egyptian Weightlifting
Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS 2019/A/6498, which upheld the decision
of the IWF to suspend any current EWF ‘team official’ who was an EWF team official at the Junior
Championships or training camp from participation in any IWF activities for a period of two years,
suspend the EWF from participation in any IWF activities for a period of two years, and impose a
fine of USD 200,000.
5 See BBC article ‘1964: South Africa banned from Olympics’ (news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/
stories/august/18/newsid_3547000/3547872.stm [accessed 25 September 2020]) and NY Times article
‘Olympics Committee Ends Its Ban On Participation by South Africa’ dated 10 July 1991 (nytimes.
com/1991/07/10/sports/olympics-olympics-committee-ends-its-ban-on-participation-by-south-africa.
html [accessed 25 September 2020]); Capobianco, Voices of Discontent: Avery Brundage and the
IOC’s Dilemma of South Africa’s Olympic Participation, 1956–1968 (PhD thesis, 2015), pp 153–154.
6 See World Archery press release dated 23 January 2020 (worldarchery.org/news/177315/world-
archery-conditionally-lifts-suspension-indian-federation [accessed 24 September 2020]); and Sport
Business article ‘World Archery lifts India suspension’ dated 24 January 2020 (sportbusiness.com/
news/world-archery-lifts-india-suspension/ [accessed 24 September 2020]).
7 See Inside the Games article ‘IOC taskforce to oversee organisation of boxing at Tokyo 2020 after
AIBA suspended’ dated 22 May 2019 (insidethegames.biz/articles/1079552/ioc-taskforce-to-oversee-
organisation-of-boxing-at-tokyo-2020-after-aiba-suspended [accessed 24 September 2020]).
8 See FIBA press release dated 14 November 2016 at fiba.basketball/news/fiba-suspends-brazilian-
federation [accessed 24 September 2020].
A1.60 There have also been cases, though fewer in number, where the ultimate
sanction of expulsion from membership has been imposed:
(a) In Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, the CAS upheld
an appeal against the decision of the International Judo Federation (IJF) to
disaffiliate one of its regional associations, the Panamerican Judo Union (PJU)
in favour of a new body, the Panamerican Judo Confederation. The CAS was
very clear that the IJF had to demonstrate a clear basis in its statutes for such
action.1 The IJF’s statutes allowed it to admit both continental unions and
national federations as members, but only granted it an explicit right to expel
national federations from membership. The IJF argued that as both continental
unions and national federations were defined as members, by analogy the
expulsion right should also apply to the continental unions. The CAS panel
ruled that the analogy did not work because as federative constitutive bodies of
the IJF the continental unions had a distinct status from the national federations.
The CAS also rejected the IJF’s attempt to rely on Art 11.4 of the IJF Statutes,
which purported to grant the Executive Council of the IJF wide-ranging power
to decide any issues that had not been placed under the authority of another IJF
body.2
(b) In Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, the CAS set aside
the European Golf Association’s decision to expel the Croatian Golf Federation
because the procedure leading to the resolution adopted at its AGM clearly
violated the Croatian Golf Federation’s fundamental right to be heard.3 The de
novo proceedings before the CAS could not cure the violation of the right to
be heard because the vote on the AGM resolution ‘is not a decision which was
largely determined by legal standards and which the Panel could therefore take
in lieu of the delegates’, because ‘it is still very much a “political” decision
within the discretion of the delegates whether or not to expel a member’.4
(c) In Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting
Federation (ISSF) & Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, the
ISSF expelled the BSSF (its Bulgarian member federation) and accepted the
BSU in its place, based on the fact that the Bulgarian Olympic Committee
had expelled the BSSF from its membership, because the ISSF Constitution
required member federations to be ‘recognised and affiliated’ with its National
Olympic Committee. The ISSF relied on a provision in its constitution providing
that a member could be expelled ‘for an action contrary to the Constitution
or the General Regulations’. The CAS held that this was not a suitable legal
basis, because ‘the absence of the conditions for membership according to
article 1.3.1 of the ISSF Constitution cannot be considered ‘an action contrary
to the Constitution or the Regulations’’. However, the CAS panel noted that
‘[a]ccording to German law, a member of an association can be expelled for
valid reasons, even if the statutes of the association do not provide so, subject
to judicial review’.5 On that basis, the CAS panel found that NOC-recognition
of a member federation was ‘a sine qua non-condition for membership with
the ISSF’, and that a member federation could be expelled for valid reasons on
that basis, provided that the expulsion procedure respected due process.6 While
the BSSF argued that its right to be heard had been violated, the CAS found
that any procedural defects were cured by the de novo appeal before CAS.
The CAS therefore upheld BSSF’s expulsion of the BSSF (and also separately
confirmed the BSU’s admission to membership).7
(d) In ICC v USACA, the ICC initially suspended the USA Cricket Association
(USACA) because it was in fundamental breach of key membership
requirements. In particular, it no longer seemed to be the de facto governing
body of cricket in the US, since the majority of the US cricket community were
not members of USACA, and various of its actions were contrary to the interests
of the ICC and the sport. As one of a number of reinstatement conditions,

the ICC required that USACA adopt a new constitution approved by the ICC,
incorporating and implementing the new governance framework that would
unite that community behind it. When USACA adopted an amended version of
the constitution that did not include certain requirements that the ICC regarded
as key to the unification process, the ICC board put a motion to the members
in general meeting to expel USACA from membership. USACA challenged
the motion as contrary to the ICC’s own rules and/or applicable law. The sole
arbitrator (Michael Beloff QC) found in favour of the ICC, ruling that ‘as long
as the grounds advanced by ICC for USACA’s expulsion are vouched for by
the ICC’s objects and are rational, they can be relied on’, and that ‘[a] member
who does not accept the changes reasonably required of it by ICC to rectify the
[…] defects relied on for its suspension must […] be liable to expulsion. If the
ICC could not expel such member when it continued to resist those changes,
the member would have to remain in a state of perpetual suspension, which
would be counter-intuitive’.8
1 Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.4. Cf European
Federation of American Football (EFAF) et al v International American Football Association (IFAF),
CAS 2012/A/2873, where the continental governing body of American football in Europe, EFAF,
sought to nullify a resolution adopted by the IFAF Congress, amending the IFAF statutes to replace
continental federations with continental executive committees (effectively removing EFAF as an
‘affiliate member’ of IFAF). The CAS panel ruled (see paras 6.18-6.30) that the de facto exclusion
did not violate the IFAF Statutes, because under the IFAF statutes only a national federation could be
a ‘Member’, and so EFAF could not claim the same rights as were afforded to members. Federations
are free to distinguish between different types of members, and even though the amendment in issue
was ‘tantamount to a de facto revocation’ of EFAF’s membership, it was the result of an organisational
change that affected all of the continental federations as affiliated members.
2 Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Federation, CAS 2009/A/1823, para 9.8 (‘Such
residual-powers clauses are common in statutes and by-laws. Officials of the relevant entities are on
occasion tempted to make sweeping claims of authority by reference to them. But such claims are
absolutely constrained by the overall powers of the body as a whole. They do not give the vast power
of arbitrary exclusion; if such a thing were possible, there would be no reason at all to define lesser
powers and to allocate them carefully among internal organs along with a requirement of compliance
with procedural safeguards. Otherwise residual-power clauses could degenerate into the proposition
that ‘for matters not expressly defined herein, the President may do whatever he wants whenever he
wants’. The proper purpose of a residual-powers clause is to make clear that when a general authority
has been explicitly granted, incidental and subsidiary decisions may be made by the authorised organ,
even if they are not specifically defined’).
3 Croatian Golf Federation v European Golf Association, CAS 2010/A/2275, para 30.
4 Ibid, paras 38 and 40.
5 Bulgarian Sport Shooting Federation (BSSF) v International Sport Shooting Federation (ISSF) &
Bulgarian Shooting Union (BSU), CAS 2014/A/3863, para 85.
6 Ibid, paras 81, 87, and 95.
8 ICC Dispute Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 59.
6 ADDRESSING UNSANCTIONED EVENTS
A1.61 As explained above, the integrity of the pyramid model of sports governance
and regulation depends on there being only one international governing body for
each sport and one national governing body in each country for that sport. The
function of governing and administering a sport is a natural monopoly; there can
be only one ultimate source of the rules and regulations that determine the playing
conditions of the sport, one set of administrators issuing decisions, and one unitary
judicial system resolving disputes, or else confusion will reign, and the important
sporting imperatives that the rules and regulations are designed to advance1 will be
undermined. But that also means that the participants in the sport must only compete
in events that are sanctioned by the international federation and its members and to
which the rules (and enforcement mechanisms) of the international federation and
its members therefore apply. As a result, it is a central feature of the pyramid model
of sports governance that international federations require their member national
federations only to participate in sanctioned events,2 and their member national
federations require the same of their member clubs and the athletes affiliated to
them.3
1 See para B1.4.
2 See eg ICC Regulations on the Sanctioning of Events (May 2018) Art 2.8 (‘Participation in
Disapproved Cricket is prohibited for all persons under the jurisdiction of the ICC or any of its
National Cricket Federations. It is the responsibility of each such person to establish that a particular
match or event constitutes Approved Cricket and not Disapproved Cricket before participating in it’);
World Rugby Regulation 16.2.1 (‘A Rugby Body or Club shall not play a Match or Matches against
any Rugby Body or Club or other team(s) that are not affiliated (temporarily or otherwise) to a Union
or against teams that contain Players that are not members of a Union without the prior written consent
of the CEO […]’) and 16.2.8 (‘Any Match, Series of Matches, tour or tournament which does not
fully comply with the requirements of the Bye-Laws, Regulations and Laws of the Game shall be
deemed unofficial. The Union within whose territory such an unofficial event takes place (and the
visiting Union or Unions) and/or the Union or Unions of participating Provincial, County, District,
Clubs or Rugby Bodies will be held responsible and will be liable to sanction in accordance with the
Regulations and/or Bye-Laws’); FIFA Statutes (June 2019) Art 70 (‘The Council shall compile an
international match calendar that shall be binding upon the confederations, member associations and
leagues, after conferring with the confederations’) and Art 71 (‘No such match or competition shall
take place without the prior permission of FIFA, the confederations and/or the member associations in
accordance with the Regulations Governing International Matches’).
International federations will require their national members to include such provisions in
their rulebooks. See eg IBU Constitution (October 2019) Art 7.1.9.2, which requires its members
(ie NF Members) to ‘adopt and implement rules […] prohibiting Persons under its jurisdiction from
participating in Biathlon events that have not been properly sanctioned by the IBU (in the case of
International Competitions) or an NF Member (in the case of other competitions)’.
3 Examples of such rules in the national federation’s rulebook include Rule b.1 of the Football
Association Rules (2019/20) (‘Associations, Competitions or other combinations of Clubs, Players
or Officials, shall not be formed without the written consent of The Association, or of the Affiliated
Association or Affiliated Associations concerned. […] All Affiliated Associations, Competitions or
other combinations of Clubs, Players or Club Officials, Officials or Match Officials shall observe the
Rules. Associations or Clubs in membership of or affiliated to The Association and/or an Affiliated
Association shall not play against any association or club belonging to any association, competition or
combination of clubs to which such consent has not been given’); and Supplement to the UK Athletics
Rules for Competition 2020, Rule G3 (23) S 1 (‘The following are ineligible to take part in Competition
under UKA Rules: Any person who: […] (iii) takes part in any athletics meeting which requires to be
sanctioned but has not been permitted / licensed by UKA or other appropriate Association’).
A1.62 Apart from simply avoiding fixture clashes, and ensuring uniform
application of the sports rules and regulations, control over the calendar also enables
the SGB to give scheduling priority to one form of competition over others, where
it considers it necessary to do so to achieve broader regulatory imperatives for the
good of the sport as a whole. For example, an Olympic international federation
may want its member associations to prioritise the forms of competition that it has
chosen to feature at the Olympic Games, so that the programme at the Games is
of the highest possible quality, thereby contributing to the success of the Games
(and so guaranteeing the sport’s continued inclusion in the Olympic programme,
and therefore its all-important share of Olympic revenues), and also providing an
excellent advertisement for the sport to the watching millions. As another example,
the football clubs playing in certain domestic leagues (especially in Europe) earn
significant income from broadcasting and other revenues, and can afford to sign
players from other continents on wages that dwarf what the players get from playing
for their nations. At the salaries the clubs pay, they could require the player to commit
to play for them alone and never leave to play for his or her country in international
competition. But FIFA’s objective is to develop the game in every country around
the world, which is best done by having a competitive national representative team
whose achievements on the international stage inspire young players to emulate them
(while at the same time making the international competitions a better and therefore
more attractive product for broadcasters and sponsors). FIFA therefore identifies
dates in the calendar that will be taken up with international matches, including the
qualifying matches for the FIFA World Cup and the continental championships, as
well as the dates of non-competitive (‘friendly’) matches, and then requires member
associations not to schedule domestic fixtures on those dates, and requires clubs to
release their players for international duty on those dates (and forbids players who
do not report for international duty playing in any other matches on those dates).1
Without control over the calendar, SGBs would simply not be able to protect and
advance their regulatory imperatives in this way.
1 See Art 70 of the FIFA Statutes, June 2019 (‘The Council shall compile an international match calendar
that shall be binding upon the confederations, member associations and leagues, after conferring with
the confederations’) and Annexe 1 of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (June
2020 Edn) (‘Release of players to association teams’). As to the legal issues arising from such ‘player
release’ rules, see paras E11.95 to E11.99.
There are similar rules in other sports, including cricket (see ICC Regulations on Sanctioning of
Events (May 2018), where domestic leagues generate limited income (except for the Indian Premier
League), and instead it is the revenues from international cricket that underwrite the sport. See Greig v
Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302, 309 (‘there is no very substantial spectator attendance except at Test Matches
and correspondingly that these are generally the only matches likely to produce any substantial profit.
In all the Test-playing countries, the county sides or state associations or the equivalent necessarily
constitute the breeding ground in which players are trained and the source on which Test selectors
largely, if not exclusively, rely in choosing their Test teams. In the situation just described, however,
country clubs and state associations are themselves very dependent for their solvency on subventions
from Test Match receipts. The structure and finances of cricket in the Test-playing countries are thus
vulnerable, in the sense that they are dependent to a considerable degree on the continued popular
attraction and profitability of Test Matches. Anything which is likely to prejudice such attraction or
profitability must be of concern to those organising cricket in those countries’).
A1.63 However, another consequence of the fact that the authority of SGBs
derives not from sovereign power but from the consent of their members1 is that those
members can always choose to walk away if they are not happy with the way the
sport is being run. The rash of breakaway threats over recent decades is a testament
to the difficulty that an SGB faces in trying to reconcile the long-term interests of all
of its constituents, from the mass amateur ranks of the sport to the professional elite
at the top of the pile. But the pressure has increased in the modern entertainment
world, where content is king and therefore the commercial rights to sports event
can be of such enormous value, leading to a string of entrepreneurs being ready to
pay large sums to the stars of the sport to join their new sports events. In particular,
the enormous success of Twenty20 cricket, in particular in the form of the Indian
Premier League, has inspired many imitators in other sports.
1 See para A1.19.
A1.64 There is therefore an enormous tension between the regulatory imperative

to retain control over the organisation and sanctioning of competitions as part of the
official sporting calendar, and the commercial imperative of the stars of the sport to
maximise their career earnings, and of third party investors to bring new products to
the market. To SGBs, restrictions on participation in unsanctioned events are essential
to protect the integrity of the pyramid model of sports governance and regulation, on
which the long-term health and well-being of their sports depend. To the sports stars
and the entrepreneurs, however, they are blatantly anti-competitive, frustrating their
own legitimate commercial desires and thwarting consumer demand for new and
innovative products.
A1.65 Conflicts in this area tend to follow a certain natural cycle. First, the sport
starts to gain in popularity and so in commercial appeal. More broadcasters and
sponsors start bidding for the commercial rights to the elite events. The SGB rights-
holder is happy, but the losing bidders are not, and the elite professional players or
clubs may not be either, if they feel they are not getting a big enough share of the
value they consider they have helped to create. Frequently the SGB is not willing or
able to meet all of their demands, because of the competing need to use some of the
revenues to support the sport at its grass roots (from where the professional elite once
came). Private entrepreneurs (often disappointed bidders for the commercial rights
to the official events) see an opportunity to grab value by creating their own content,
luring over the elite participants with promises of a bigger share of the pot (which
is easier for the private promoter to do, as it will have no wider responsibilities to
the sport as a whole). The SGB therefore invokes the rule against participating in
‘unsanctioned’ events. The elite participants cry foul, alleging restraint of trade/breach
of competition law, on the basis that their right to ‘ply their trade’ is being infringed.
The private promoters also cry foul, also alleging unlawful anti-competitive conduct,
on the basis that the SGB is simply trying to prevent the emergence of a rival that
would compete with it for the services of the players/clubs and for the rights fees on
offer from broadcasters and sponsors.
A1.66 The competition law arguments for those challenging the status quo1
generally run as follows:
(a) There is a market for the organisation of sports events, with connected markets
for the acquisition of the essential ingredients for such events – the clubs, the
players, the venues – and for the sale of the commercial rights to the events to
broadcasters and sponsors.2
(b) The prohibitions on participating in unsanctioned events that are issued by an
international federation and its member federations, and imposed on all clubs/
players participating in the sport, constitute an agreement or arrangement
that restricts competition on those markets and/or gives the SGBs a dominant
position on that market.3
(c) Where SGBs not only regulate the sport but also organise and sell commercial
rights to events, their regulatory authority, as well as their ‘first mover’
advantage, and their control over elements such as national representative
competition, give them an enormous share of and a dominant position in the
market for the organisation of sports events.
(d) Under UK and EU competition law,4 they have a ‘special responsibility’ not to
abuse that dominant position in a way that prevents or restricts competition on
that market.5 In particular, they must not leverage their regulatory powers to
their own commercial and financial advantage.
(e) They are also required in any event not to enter into arrangements that have
an anti-competitive effect, and (because they are generally associations of
undertakings) they are required not to make any decisions that have such an
effect.6
(f) It is an abuse of that dominant position for an SGB to use its regulatory control
to require clubs/players to participate exclusively in ‘sanctioned’ events, and
not to participate in ‘unsanctioned’ events
(g) At least, it is an abuse where the SGB is using that rule to prevent the
emergence of competitors in the market for rights fees from broadcasters and
sponsors. The rule against playing in unsanctioned events is an insuperable
barrier to entry for new competition organisers, because it means there are
no clubs/players (‘essential inputs’) for it to sign. The players they want to
sign would be exiling themselves from ‘official’ competitions, including (in the
case of players) national representative competition. It is also an unreasonable
restriction on the players/clubs’ freedom to ‘ply their trade’ as they see fit.
(h) Finally (say the players/clubs), this is all completely out of proportion to
any legitimate aim pursued, and therefore incapable of justification under
the competition rules. Declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief should be
granted to prevent this unlawful conduct and to compensate for the losses it has
caused.
1 As to which, see generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport). There may
be attempts to use other causes of action as well, such as EU free movement law (see Chapter E12), or
the guarantee of a right to property under Art 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR (see para E13.72),
but ultimately they add little to the competition law claims.
2 See para E11.49.
3 See para E11.100.
4 On 31 January 2020, the UK ceased to be a member of the European Union (aka ‘Brexit’). However,
EU law continues to apply in the UK during the Brexit transition period (scheduled to end on
31 December 2020). The impact of Brexit on UK competition law following the transition period is
not yet clear, and will depend on the terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU.
5 See para E11.13.
6 See para E11.7.
A1.67 In response, the SGB is likely to point out that competition law does not
prohibit sporting rules that are necessary for the ‘organisation and proper conduct
of competitive sport’, and are proportionate to the achievement of that objective.1 It
will argue that the rules against participating in unsanctioned events are necessary to
create fair sporting competition in the first place, are therefore in the interests of the
sport and so in the public interest, and are proportionate to the achievement of that
objective and so justified.2
1 ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’, accompanying paper to the EC’s White Paper on Sport,
SEC (2007) 935, Annex I, para 2.1.5. See further paras B1.4 and E11.75.
2 In competition law terms, there are two stages at which arguments broadly based on justification for a
measure or rule may arise. First, a measure or rule may not fall to be regarded as anti-competitive at all
under TFEU, Arts 101(1) or 102 where, although it may have some anti-competitive elements, those
restrictions are necessary in order to create the very activity/product itself. See especially C-309/99
Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Order van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577. Secondly,
some restrictions that do not meet the above standard and so involve a prima facie infringement of
TFEU, Art 101(1) may still be justifiable, and so may be exempted under TFEU Art 101(3), and do
not fall to be regarded as an abuse under TFEU Art 102, where they are justified. See EC Competition
Policy Newsletter (June 1998) at 26: analysis of criteria for exemption under Article 85(3) EC
(now Article 101(3) TFEU) ‘should not be based on purely commercial considerations. The special
characteristics of sport have to be taken into account. These could include, for example, the need to
ensure ‘solidarity’ between weaker and stronger participants or the training of young players, which
could only be achieved through redistribution of revenue from the sale of broadcasting rights’).
Chapter I of the UK Competition Act 1998 (Competition Act) provides for a similar prohibition on
anti-competitive agreements that have an actual or potential effect on trade within the UK (or any part
of it) and similar exemption criteria. See further para E11.8.
The distinction between the two lines of argument is often unclear. (The Commission has suggested
that justification under Art 101(3) is most likely to apply where a rule or conduct is not inherent in the
organisation or proper conduct of sport but its pro-competitive benefits outweigh its restrictive effects.
See ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’, accompanying paper to the EC’s White Paper on
Sport, SEC (2007) 935, Annex I, para 2.1.6). Broadly, however, in each context, the central question is
whether the rule or measure in question pursues a legitimate objective whose effects are inherent and
proportionate to that objective.
A1.68 How so? The SGB may argue as follows:

(a) Sports governing bodies are not standard private trading companies, maximising
profit in order to generate a healthy return on their shareholders’ investment.
Rather, they are the custodians of the sport, dedicated solely to growing
participation in the sport, and maximising its health, social, cultural, and other
benefits, all of which is in the public interest.1 In all of their efforts, whether
regulatory (issuing rules and regulations to govern the playing of the sport)
or commercial (organising and promoting events that will improve playing
standards and generate commercial revenues that can be invested in projects for
the further development of the sport), they are acting only for the common good.
(b) Requiring participants to play only in sanctioned competitions is the only way
to be sure that rules and regulations of the sport will be applied and observed
consistently, transparently, and with accountability,2 and therefore it is the only

way to maintain public confidence in the ability of the SGB to protect and
preserve the integrity of the sport.3 The public is unable to distinguish between
sanctioned and unsanctioned sport, and therefore if a lack of integrity controls
in the latter leads to scandal, the public will lose confidence in the integrity of
the whole of the sport, not just unsanctioned sport.
(c) Similarly, requiring participants to play solely in sanctioned competitions is
the only way to retain control over the competition calendar, and so to ensure
that competitions are developed in a structured and coherent way that properly
balances the competing interests of the various stakeholders, for the benefit of
participants and spectators alike.4
(d) More broadly, it means that to the extent the sport is lucky enough to attract
significant commercial interest, that demand must be exploited for the benefit
of the whole of the game, and not for the benefit of the few. Innovation
must be encouraged, entrepreneurial risk-taking must be rewarded, and high
playing standards must be incentivised, but in addition the grass roots must be
nourished in order to continue growing the playing base, both as an end in itself
and also to ensure that new talent emerges and contributes to the spectacle at
the elite end of the sport, thereby generating further revenues and permitting
further investment.
(e) In contrast, ‘breakaways’ undermine all of the above and therefore are not in
the public interest. Over the long term, they do not promote competition but
instead harm the ability of the sport to create the ‘product’ that the consumer
wants to see. First and foremost, the creation of competing products means
the consumer is denied what he or she wants to see most, which is who is
the best in the sport.5 Secondly, as noted above the integrity risks raised by
unsanctioned competitions threaten public confidence in the whole of the
sport. Thirdly, existing competitions can be badly distorted.6
(f) More fundamentally, however, the entrepreneur is free-riding on the
development efforts of the SGB. It is able to pay more prize money to the
professional elite because the revenues it generates by staging its events do
not need to be shared with the grass roots. Similarly, the professional elite
have benefited from the SGB’s previous efforts, having been identified and
developed by the performance pathways that the SGB has created and financed.
They therefore owe at least a limited duty of solidarity to the sport.
(g) In other words, the need to control the official event calendar, and to prevent
the emergence of unsanctioned competitions, is not just to ensure regulatory
integrity and a proper balance between different types of event. It is also about
ensuring that the commercial revenues that the sport generates are applied to
benefit the sport as a whole, and not just the elite at the top of the pyramid,
because without such solidarity the competitive playing base of the pyramid
will shrink, and so too will the long-term prospects of all levels of the sport.7
(h) At the very least, the collective should surely at least be able to require those
who benefit from it to support the collective and not to harm it. In other words,
while there is no God-given exclusive right to run a sport,8 while competition
by private promoters is obviously lawful, and while clubs/players cannot
be stopped (subject to honouring any contractual commitments to ‘official’
events) from going off to play in ‘unofficial’ events (even if this is blatant free-
riding), surely they cannot have it both ways? In other words, they cannot insist
in playing in both, they have to choose one or the other.
1 See eg Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48 (‘[T]he two bodies [the international
and national cricket federations] were in a sense custodians of the public interest. The public interest
in my judgment […] requires that the game should be properly organised and administered’).
2 See paras A1.61 et seq. See also Commissioner van Miert, [1996] OJ C217/87, 12 April 1996 (‘It
is generally acknowledged that the most effective institutional structure for promoting sport is the
creation of a single federation in each Member State and a single international federation for each
sport’).
3 The courts have consistently recognised how important it is for a professional regulatory body such
as an SGB to maintain that public confidence in the profession that is regulated, and have therefore
considered rules that impose serious restrictions on the freedom of participants in the sport to be
justifiable where they are necessary to achieve that objective. See eg Bolton v Law Society, [1994]
2 All ER 486 [CA]; Bradley v Jockey Club, [2005] EWCA 1056, para 24.
4 See paras A1.61 et seq.
5 ‘Only a single league can produce that most useful of joint products, the World Champion’. Neale,
‘The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports’ (1994) 1(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 9;
Hendry v WPBSA [2001] All ER (D) 71, at para 95 (a ‘split sport’ is not in the public interest).
6 For example, if Premier League football clubs were not required to compete only in ‘official’
competitions, but could pick and choose when to play in ‘official’ competitions and when to play in
‘unofficial’ competitions, clubs would no longer be competing with the same incentives and so the
playing-field would no longer be level. For example, a club that was out of the running for the Premier
League title might decide to play a series of midseason friendlies in the Middle East, so sapping its
resources for its Premier League fixtures (and so giving an advantage to those who play it now over
those who played it earlier in the season, when it was still in the race). Or a club might not fight so hard
to qualify for the UEFA Champions League if it knew it was guaranteed a place in a rival super-league.
7 See European Commission, draft Preliminary Guidelines on the Application of the Competition
Rules to Sport, 15 February 1999 (‘The IRB [now World Rugby] clearly sees such control [over the
official event calendar] as necessary for the good of the game, highlighting the importance of ensuring
solidarity between clubs and the continued development of the sport at grass roots level (matters which
individual clubs, if allowed to act in their own self interest, are unlikely to take into account)’).
8 See para A1.63.
A1.69 The courts and the competition regulators have now had to grapple with
these arguments on several occasions, and they have struggled to develop a coherent
doctrine that addresses adequately both sides of the argument.
A1.70 A key early case was Greig v Insole in the High Court in England in 1978.
Kerry Packer’s Nine Network had bid unsuccessfully for the broadcasting rights to
Australia’s home Test matches. It therefore set up its own ‘World Series Cricket’
and signed 34 leading players to play in it. The ICC responded by introducing a
rule that anyone who played in a match that was not approved by the ICC was
ineligible to play Test cricket indefinitely, and declaring that World Series Cricket
was disapproved cricket for purposes of this rule. It asked its member federations to
introduce the same rule at the domestic level, and the Test and County Cricket Board
(TCCB) proposed to do so by banning anyone who played World Series Cricket from
approved events for a period of two years. The players and Packer alleged these rules
were an unlawful restraint of trade and asked the High Court to restrain the ICC and
TCCB from applying them.
The High Court held that:
‘both the ICC and the TCCB have legitimate interests, which are entitled to be
protected by appropriate restraints. […] The two bodies were in a sense custodians
of the public interest. The public interest in my judgment […] requires that the game
should be properly organised and administered. [.].. It is now necessary to consider
whether, on the facts, their changes or rule are no more than is reasonably necessary
for the organisation and administration of the game’.1
The High Court accepted that steps had to be taken to protect Test match cricket,
because it financed the rest of the game, including the grass roots from which the
next generation of Test match players would come.2 It also accepted the defendants’
complaints of free-riding by Packer:
‘Under present circumstances, there is much force in Mr Kempster’s description
of the World Series Cricket organisation as being “parasitic”. For it is creaming off
from conventional first class cricket the star players whom it has itself incurred no
expense in training and preparing for stardom, with a view to exploiting their talents
for commercial profit.’3
However, the High Court decided that the threat to Test match finances from the
original (limited) plans for World Series Cricket was a limited one, and that a
retrospective ban was not a reasonable response to that threat. The players who
signed for Packer before the rules came into effect had broken no rules then in effect,
and so did not deserve punishment. Meanwhile the effect of the ban would be to deny
the public the pleasure of seeing those players in future Test matches (and so would
also hurt Test match revenues).4
On the other hand, the longer-term threat to the game was greater, as Packer might
expand his plans, and/or other promoters might join the market. But this:
‘[…] could have been adequately met by merely imposing prospective

disqualification from Test cricket on all players who should thereafter contract with
or play for World Series Cricket or other unapproved private promoters. I do not
say that a merely prospective ban of this nature would necessarily have been valid.
However, being narrower than the ban, both prospective and retrospective, which
was in fact imposed, it would clearly have been more easy to justify. In general
terms I see the force of the proposition that official Test-players should not for the
future be permitted to make themselves available to official Test cricket and to
privately promoted international cricket in turn and from time to time, as and when
they please. There would, I think, have been much to be said for the reasonableness
and thus for the validity of a resolution […] of which the effect had been merely to
inform cricketers in clear terms that any of them who thereafter contracted with and
elected to play cricket for a private promoter, such as World Series Cricket, could
not subsequently expect to be engaged to play in official Test Matches by any of the
cricketing authorities of the Test-playing countries’.5
This judgment helps to identify the objectives that are legitimate for an SGB
to pursue, and it seeks to explain why some actions are proportionate, and so
a justifiable means of achieving those objectives, while others are not. It thereby
establishes a framework for analysis that allows those active in the sports sector to
come to informed judgments about what can and cannot be done moving forward.
Unfortunately, the same compliment cannot be paid to some of the subsequent
jurisprudence in this area.
1 Greig v Insole, [1978] 1 WLR 302 (Ch D 1977) at 347-48.
2 Ibid, at 309.
3 Ibid, at 349.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, at 352. See also ibid at p 464 (‘If cricketing authorities employ a player to go on a tour or
indeed perhaps even if they employ him to play in one or more test matches at home, it may be open
to them, as a matter of fair negotiation, to demand from him, as a price for the privileges which he
himself will derive from participating in the match, a limited covenant precluding him from playing
for competitors. If such covenant represents no more than is reasonably required for the authorities’
protection, in terms of duration, place and otherwise and is reasonable in the interest of the public, it
may perhaps be enforceable according to its terms’).
A1.71 In the FIA Formula One World Championship case,1 a complaint was made
to the European Commission that the FIA had refused to sanction a promoter’s
event simply in order to avoid competition for sanctioned Formula One events.
In June 1999 the Commission issued a Statement of Objections, expressing the
preliminary conclusion that rules and contractual provisions requiring drivers and
circuits to participate only in events sanctioned by the FIA, and penalising licensed
broadcasters who also broadcast unsanctioned events, gave the FIA the power to
prevent competition emerging, in breach of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (now
Arts 101 and 102 of the TFEU). The Commission ended its investigation when the
FIA announced that it was transferring all of its interest in the commercial rights to
the Formula One Championship for 100 years to ‘a commercial rights holder’. In the
eyes of the Commission, this addressed the potential conflict between the FIA’s role
in regulating the sport and its role in staging events, taking away the risk that it might
misuse its regulatory powers to gain an improper commercial benefit/advantage

over competing events. The Commission said that the FIA ‘will have neither the
commercial incentive nor the regulatory power to limit the type and number of
events it authorises, other than on the basis of objective criteria relating to the secure,
equitable and orderly conduct of the sport’.2
1 Commission press release IP/99/434 of 30 June 1999; Article 19(3) Notice, OJ C169/5, 13 June 2001;
2001 Report on Competition Policy, para 221; Commission press releases IP/01/1523 of 30 October
2001, and IP/03/1491 of 31 October 2003.
2 See Art 19(3) Notice, OJ C169/5, 13 June 2001.
A1.72 Does the Formula One case mean that it is unlawful per se for the body that
regulates a sport also to be involved in the commercial exploitation of the sport? The
then-European Commissioner for Competition suggested otherwise, expressing the
point as a starting point for enquiry rather than an end point:
‘Where regulation and organisation being vested in a single body leads to significant
commercial conflicts of interest, the Commission will look carefully at whether
another scenario should be required’.1
And the courts and regulators have subsequently rejected any suggestion of a per se
rule, starting with the English High Court in the Hendry case.2
1 Commissioner Monti, DN Speech/01/84, 26 February 2001.
2 In Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71, Mr Justice Lloyd did not accept that the Formula One case
established a per se rule, noting: ‘it seems to me to be of more value as an illustration of the points
that can arise under these Articles [then 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, now 101 and 102 of the TFEU]
than it is as a direct analogy. This is because of notable differences in the circumstances of the two
sports [Formula One and snooker] and therefore of the facts of the two cases, and also because the
statement of objections, though of course fully considered and issued after years of investigation, is not
a decision on the case but rather a statement of the Commission’s position, to which the parties had and
exercised the right to respond, and which, if the process had not been cut short by the new proposals,
would have been followed by further steps before any decision was reached’ (para 31). He therefore
did not accept that the WPBSA had to choose between being a regulator and being a promoter of
snooker events (par 163). The ECJ’s subsequent decision in MOTOE confirms that he was right, and
there is no such absolute rule prohibiting one body having both a regulatory role and a commercial
one (see para A1.76). See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s
Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 173 (reproduced at para A1.79(e)).
A1.73 The Hendry case followed a very similar fact pattern to Greig v Insole before
it. TSN sought to acquire certain commercial rights to the WPBSA’s ‘Main Tour’
events. When negotiations broke down, TSN announced it was setting up ‘a new and
truly global World Snooker Tour’ for the top 64 players on the tour, with three events
(the Grand Prix, UK Championship, and World Championship) scheduled for the
same dates as the WPBSA events of the same name. TSN argued that the WPBSA
was legally obliged to stop being a promoter, confine itself to being a regulator, and
it would be paid five per cent of the TSN prize money to sanction the TSN tour. The
WPBSA responded by saying it would sanction TSN events as a supplement to the
Main Tour provided that they met the usual conditions for sanction, ie if they did not
clash with Main Tour events (so that players continued to give priority to Main Tour
events), and if television coverage of them was not broadcast at a time that clashed
with the BBC’s live coverage of the Main Tour events (to protect WPBSA’s television
revenues). If not, WPBSA Rule A5 would apply, which provided that players could
not play in events not organised or sanctioned by WPBSA without WPBSA’s consent.
TSN sued on the basis that the object and/or effect of this and other WPBSA rules
was to prevent a competitor to WPBSA entering the market for the organisation
of snooker events, in breach of UK and EU competition law, in breach of the EU
guarantee of free movement of services, and in unreasonable restraint of trade. The
WPBSA defended its rules on the basis that they were required in order to ensure that
the sport developed in a manner that benefited all, and that they were therefore pro-
competitive, and/or their pro-competitive benefits outweighed their anti-competitive

effects, and were a proportionate way of achieving clearly legitimate interests.
Mr Justice Lloyd held that the relevant market was the market for the provision of
playing services by snooker players to the organisers/promoters of snooker event1
and that the WPBSA, as promoter of the largest and most commercially developed
events, had a substantial share of and so was dominant on that market.2 He found that
the imposition of Rule A5 was an abuse of that dominant position, since the effect
of the rule (if not its object) was to prevent competition ‘by limiting the sources to
which players can have recourse in order to earn their livelihood […]’.3 This ruling
was not explained further, but appeared to have been based on the fact that the Main
Tour events occupied all of the dates in the calendar that would be of interest to
broadcasters, and so for the WPBSA to reserve those dates to itself was a significant
barrier to entry for promoters of rival competitions. Mr Justice Lloyd did not address,
in this context, the justifications offered by the WPBSA for its sanctioning stance.
Instead he simply ruled Rule A5 void and unenforceable for breach of the EU and
UK competition rules without further discussion.4
In contrast, in the context of the restraint of trade claim, Mr Justice Lloyd gave
apparently favourable consideration to the justifications proffered by the WPBSA for
the restrictions in its rules:
‘The analogy with Greig v Insole shows that WPBSA has a legitimate interest, as
the governing body of the sport of snooker, which it is entitled to protect, so the
question would then be whether the provision is no more than is reasonably required
to protect that interest. […] WPBSA does not have a major investment in the training
of players to protect, such as did the cricket authorities. It does have its broadcasting
contracts to protect, and with them also its sponsorship contracts. Those exist for
the collective benefit of the sport of snooker and its players, and they have over the
years been of immense value to snooker, in making it a much better-known and
more popular sport, and one which has attracted much better funding. It also has a
legitimate interest in supporting a wider group of players than those in whom 110
Sport is interested. As a general proposition, WBSA must be concerned about the
sport as a whole, including its future players, which might well lead to a course of
conduct inconsistent with the view taken by some current players of what would be
in their best interest. […] Of course the particular distribution of the funds available
for prizes in a given season is something on which different views can always be
taken, but it seems to me that WPBSA does have a legitimate interest, on behalf of
its members, in spreading the prize money more widely than it would be in TSN’s
interest to do, which is motivated solely by commercial profit’.5
1 Hendry v WPBSA [2001] All ER (D) 71 (Lloyd J), para 89.
2 Ibid, at para 84.
3 Ibid, at para 98.
4 Ibid, at para 112.
5 Ibid, at para 114 et seq.
A1.74 This seems to be clear authority for the proposition that it is legitimate for an
SGB to impose (reasonable) restraints on players and others plying their trade in the
sport where necessary to protect an investment in the training of players, to protect
broadcast and sponsorship revenues that are needed for re-investment in the sport,
and/or to ensure that commercial revenues of the sport are applied not just to the
benefit of the elite but also to the development of a broader playing base. However,
Mr Justice Lloyd then abruptly decided that refusing to sanction events that clashed
(or whose broadcast coverage clashed) with Main Tour events went further than was
necessary to protect these legitimate objectives. The only explanation he offered
was that:
‘I am not convinced that this interest can only sensibly be protected by a rule such
as A5. I can readily accept that in earlier years such a rule may have been justifiable.
But at present, it seems to me that, even absent the constraints of competition law
as such, WPBSA cannot justify this restriction as being no more than is reasonably
required for the protection of its own legitimate interests’.1
1 Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71 at para 115 et seq.
A1.75 This raises a number of questions. In particular:

(a) Why would such a policy have been justifiable in earlier times, but not now? It
appears that Mr Justice Lloyd was swayed by evidence that the BBC remained
loyal to the WPBSA even after the WPBSA suspended application of Rule A5
in light of TSN’s legal challenge (which suggested to him that Rule A5 was not
required). But by that point the rule had done its job (most players had signed
for the Main Tour), and that is why the BBC remained loyal.
(b) On the other hand, Mr Justice Lloyd rejected a challenge to the WPBSA rule
limiting the amount of patches that players could wear at televised events,
because of evidence that the BBC would have walked away if that condition
had not been accepted. So if the SGB’s broadcast revenues are conditional on
the top players playing in the event, and there is evidence that the broadcaster
would walk away if that condition were not met, presumably that would mean a
ban on playing in events that clashed with the SGB’s events would be justified?
(c) More fundamentally, if it is legitimate for an SGB to take steps (i) to protect
the commercial revenues that its events generate, in order to re-invest those
revenues in all levels of the sport, and (ii) to prevent outside organisers free-
riding on its developmental efforts, how is it supposed to do that other than
by requiring players to commit themselves only to participate in sanctioned
events?
(d) Mr Justice Lloyd noted that TSN had met with the BBC because:
‘they suspected that the BBC’s contract with WPBSA contained some sort of clause
under which the BBC could escape from the contract if not enough of the top players
took part in WPBSA’s tournaments, and they hoped that they could persuade the
BBC to broadcast their own tour if they were able to attract enough players for the
clause to apply. If the BBC had withdrawn from the contract with WPBSA, as TSN
knew, the WPBSA tour would not have been viable, since sponsorship would also
have been withdrawn’.1
But if this sort of behaviour is allowed on the part of the third-party promoter,
why is the SGB not allowed to defend itself against such behaviour by requiring
players to commit to events so as to secure the revenues that pay their prize
money?
(e) Interestingly, Mr Justice Lloyd rejected TSN’s claim that the WPBSA had
abused its regulatory powers by refusing to sanction an event if the broadcasting
rights to that event were granted to TSN. He reasoned that the WPBSA ‘had
a legitimate reason for objecting, in that WPBSA was supporting the event
in material respects [providing cloths, balls, a scoring kit, and officials],
and would not have agreed to do so if it had been known to be an event also
supported (through the webcast) by TSN. On a different scale, one would not
normally expect Shell to support an event which is also supported by BP’.2
But if this is correct, why would the same reasoning not apply equally to any
event where the promoter wants to use players who have been identified and
developed through performance pathways financed by the SGN?
1 Hendry v WPBSA, [2001] All ER (D) 71 (Lloyd J), para 35.
2 Ibid, at para 65.
A1.76 The next key case on this issue was Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados
NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio,1 in which the ECJ held that a non-profit-
making body that sanctions the staging of sporting events but also organises its
own events and sells the commercial rights thereto is acting as an undertaking for
purposes of the competition rules, and as a result its sanctioning power has to be
subject to ‘restrictions, obligations and review’ to ensure that it is not used ‘to distort
competition by favouring events which it organises’. While this makes it clear that
such dual functionality is not illegal per se, the judgment provides no indication of
what ‘restrictions, obligations and review’ of the sanctioning power are required. The
opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in the case (dated 6 March 2008) is a little more
enlightening (although it was not incorporated into the ECJ’s judgment and therefore
its status is limited):
‘89. Certainly, not every exercise of the right of co-decision conferred on ELPA by
Article 49 of the Road Traffic Code can automatically be regarded as abuse. If the
behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position can be objectively justified,
it is not abuse. In fact, in a case such as this, there may be objective reasons why
an association such as ELPA refuses to give its consent to the authorisation of a
motorcycling event.
90. The existence of such an objective reason is particularly evident where, at a
planned motorcycling event, the safety of the racers and spectators would not be
guaranteed because the organiser did not take the appropriate precautions.
91. However, in addition to the purely technical safety requirements, there may
be other objective reasons for refusing consent which relate to the particular
characteristics of the sport. In a case such as this, it is worth bearing in mind the
following considerations.
92. Firstly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons concerned, but also of the
spectators and the public in general, that, for each sport, rules that are as uniform as
possible apply and are observed so as to ensure that competitions are conducted in
a regulated and fair manner. This applies not only to the frequently discussed anti-
doping rules, but also to the ordinary rules of sport. If rules varied greatly from one
organiser to another, it would be more difficult for sportspersons to participate in
competitions and to compare their respective performances; the public’s interest in
and recognition of the sport in question might also suffer.
93. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of
its consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to compliance with
certain internationally recognised rules cannot automatically be regarded as abuse.
This is without prejudice, of course, to the substantive examination of each of those
rules from the point of view of their compatibility with Community law, in particular
its rules on competition.
94. Secondly, it is in the interests of the sportspersons participating in the event, but
also of the spectators and the public in general, that the individual competitions in a
particular sport are incorporated into an overarching framework so that, for example,
a specific timetable can be followed. It may make sense to prevent clashes between
competitions so that both sportspersons and spectators can participate in as many
such events as possible.
95. Consequently, the fact that an organisation such as ELPA makes the grant of
consent to the authorisation of a motorcycling event subject to the requirement
that the event must not clash with other events that have already been planned and
authorised cannot automatically be regarded as an abuse. However, it goes without
saying in this regard that, when establishing a national Greek annual programme for
motorcycling events, ELPA must not give preference to the events (co-)organised or
marketed by it over those of other, independent organisers.
96. The pyramid structure that has developed in most sports helps to ensure that
the special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for
competitions, are taken into account. An organisation such as ELPA, which is the
official representative of the FIM in Greece, is part of that pyramid structure. Under
its right of co-decision in the authorisation by a public body of motorcycling events,
it may legitimately assert the interests of sport and, if necessary, refuse to give its
consent. However, a refusal to grant consent becomes an abuse where it has no

objective justification in the interests of sport, but is used arbitrarily to promote the
organisation’s own economic interests, to the detriment of other service providers
that would like to organise, and above all market, motorcycling events on their own
responsibility.
The Advocate-General’s opinion therefore accepts the public interest in having

events being played subject to the regulatory oversight and control of the SGB and
its members, and in the SGB also having control of the calendar, to ensure that
competitions are organised and staged in an orderly way that ensures a timetable
that works for participants and spectators alike. What is not clear is what else an
SGB may use its control over the calendar and sanctioning of events to achieve.
In particular, if the SGB exercises its sanctioning power to protect the commercial
value of its events, not so that it can pay out dividends to shareholders but rather
so that it can reinvest the proceeds in the sport, so protecting the ‘virtuous circle’
of investment, development, profit, investment, etc that is so vital to the long-term
future of the sport, is that ‘arbitrary use to promote the organisation’s own economic
interests’? Or is it ‘objectively justified in the interests of the sport’? Neither the
ECJ’s judgment nor the Advocate-General’s opinion helps to answer that question.2
1 C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] All ER (D)
02 (Jul).
2 The Belgian Competition Authority thought that the FEI had crossed the line when it declined to
sanction the ‘Global Champions League’ series, meaning that those who competed in that series faced
a six month ban from the FEI’s sanctioned events under Article 113 of the FEI General Regulations.
It issued an interim injunction restraining the FEI from applying Article 113 in respect of the Global
Champions League (FEI/Global Champions League, Belgian Competition Authority decision number
ABC-2015-V/M-23 dated 27 July 2015 (case number CONC-V/M-15/0016)), and the Belgian Court of
Appeal rejected the FEI’s appeal against the injunction, citing MOTOE for the proposition that ‘when
drawing up the annual calendar, it shall not be permissible for the regulatory authority which also
organises competitions to give preference to the competitions that it co-organises and commercialises
over those of other independent organisers’. FEI v Belgian Competition Authority, Brussels Court
of Appeal decision dated 28 April 2016, case number 2015/MR/1, para 56. The Belgian Court of
Appeal also held that ‘the pyramid structure that has emerged in most disciplines ensures that the
special requirements of sport, such as uniform rules and a single competition calendar, are taken into
account. The College does not dispute this analysis but it criticises the FEI for having broadened its
objectives to the point of not pursuing “clearly defined” objectives’. Ibid, paras 57–58. The complaint
was withdrawn when the parties entered into an MOU pursuant to which the FEI approved the Global
Champions League rules and confirmed it as an FEI-approved series. See FEI press release dated
26 January 2017 (inside.fei.org/news/fei-and-global-champions-league-reach-agreement [accessed
There was however a postscript. A Belgian rider and stable challenged the MOU on the basis that it
reserved most of the places for riders who were members of a team that paid to compete and limited
the number of invitations issued to riders based solely on their ranking and not on payment of a fee.
The Belgian Competition Authority ‘considered prima facie that it is not unreasonable to think that
this decrease might constitute an infringement on competition law’ and so imposed interim measures
requiring the parties to the MOU to ensure that ‘at least 60% of the invitations for GCT events are
sent to riders on the basis of their ranking in the official ranking of the FEI, and should not depend
on the question whether riders are members of a paying team of the GCL’ (see Belgian Competition
Authority press release no. 22/2017 dated 21 December 2017). In April 2018, the Belgian Competition
Authority followed up by imposing daily penalty payments on each of the parties to the MOU ‘for lack
of implementation of the provisional measures imposed by the College in its decision of 20 December
2017’. (See Belgian Competition Authority press release no 6/2018 dated 16 April 2018). However, in
June 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal set aside the Belgium Competition Authority’s decision on
interim measures due to contradictory and insufficient reasons (the Competition College had decided
in its decision to disregard the MOU, which decision was confirmed by the fact that the MOU was not
included in the case file. However, the College nevertheless referred to the MOU in its decision on a
number of occasions and made an order to suspend part of the MOU. The Court of Appeal found that
there was a contradiction in the reasons and decisions of the College, and that as a result it could not
be considered a reasoned decision as required by Art IV.64 para 6 of Book IV of the Belgian Code of
Economic Law, ie The Competition Act).
Following that decision, the applicants (Global Champions League and Tops Trading) requested
the recusal of the members on the Competition College that rendered the annulled decision. The
Belgian Court of Appeal granted that request in August 2018. See Global Champions League SPRL
and Tops Trading Belgium SPRL v L’Autorité Belge de la Concurrence, Brussels Court of Appeal
decision dated 27 June 2018, case number 2018/MR/1 and decision dated 7 August 2018, case number
2018/AR/1293 (originals in French) with summary (in French) at: belgiancompetition.be/sites/
default/files/content/download/files/2018_rapport_annuel_abc.pdf [accessed 25 September 2020]
and English article at: mondaq.com/antitrust-eu-competition-/797176/belgian-competition-authority-
closes-investigation-into-international-horse-jumping-governance-body [accessed 25 September
2020]. After the newly constituted Competition College reconsidered the matter, in October 2018, the
Belgium Competition Authority said that there was insufficient evidence to impose interim measures,
and closed the case in December 2018 on the basis that the FEI had agreed to make ‘procedural and
substantive changes’ to address its concerns. (See Belgian Competition Authority press releases no
35/2018 dated 5 October 2018 and no 44/2018 dated 20 December 2018).
A1.77 Some insight comes from a decision of the Competition Commission of

India relating to field hockey, which is a very popular and therefore commercially
valuable sport in India. In December 2010, the Indian Hockey Federation (IHF),
which was not a member of the International Hockey Federation (FIH), announced
that it had signed a 15-year agreement with Indian pay TV broadcaster Nimbus to
stage a new annual hockey event in India, called ‘World Series Hockey’, featuring
international players from different hockey countries. This caused great concern
to the FIH and its member national associations, because the event cut across the
existing calendar of official events, and was not subject to the regulatory oversight
of the FIH and its members. The FIH therefore introduced new regulations making
participation in an event not sanctioned by it or its members a disciplinary offence
that could lead to a ban from participation in sanctioned events. The regulations were
said to be aimed at protecting and furthering ‘fundamental sporting imperatives’
within the sport, namely, the avoidance of unsanctioned events compromising
the regulatory integrity of the sport, the proper organisation and conduct of the
sporting calendar, and the primacy of international competition in that calendar. Six
individuals connected to the IHF and World Series Hockey filed a complaint with
the Competition Commission of India, alleging that the regulations had been applied
anti-competitively in an attempt to stamp out World Series Hockey. The Competition
Commission of India rejected that complaint in May 2013,1 ruling that:
(a) ‘The Commission took note of the most important merits of the pyramid
structure, which are (i) It helps to ensure that the special requirements of sports,
such as uniform rules and a uniform timetable for competitions, are taken
into account. (ii) Pyramid structure is essential for organization of national
championships and the selection of national athletes and national teams
for international competition. (iii) Enforcement of rules that ensure proper
organization and prioritisation of international competition as the international
competition is recognized to be an essential and valuable feature of sport.
(iv) Enforcement of rules that protect the integrity of the sport and maintain
public confidence’ (decision, para 10.5.2). As such, ‘there are strong efficiency
arguments in favour of a pyramid structure, as also there are tendencies and
scope for potential anti-competitive practices’ (ibid, para 10.6.2).
(b) ‘Sanctioning an event is a regulatory function of sports bodies and cannot be
found foul, per se, for violation of competition laws. It is necessary to prove that
the application of the system was not in accordance with sporting objectives’
(ibid, para 10.13.5(a)).
(b) ‘the intent/rationale behind introduction of the guidelines as submitted by
FIH relating to sanctioned and unsanctioned events needs to be appreciated
before arriving at any conclusions. Factors such as ensuring primacy of
national representative competition, deter[ring] free riding on the investments
by national associations, maintaining the calendar of activities in a cohesive
manner not cutting across the interests of participating members, preserving
the integrity of the sport, etc. are inherent to the orderly development of the
sport, which is the prime objective of the sports association’ (para 10.12.1);
(c) the regulations are inherent in and proportionate to those objectives, and
cannot be ruled illegal unless and until ‘there is any instance where they are
applied in a disproportionate manner, for which there is no evidence at present’
(para 10.13.6);
(d) the evidence adduced by the complainants did not support their claim that the
regulations were introduced specifically to deter players from participating
in World Series Hockey. To the contrary, the regulations were not applied
retrospectively (‘FIH was not advocating disciplinary action on those players/
officials who entered into binding agreements with [World Series Hockey]
before the regulations of FIH were notified’), and the IHF and Nimbus were
given a window to sign additional players to World Series Hockey before the
regulations came into force (paras 10.12.1–10.12.7).
1 Pillay v Hockey India, Competition Commission of India decision dated 31 May 2013, Case No 73
of 2011. See also Barmi v Board of Control for Cricket in India (Case No 61/2010, 8 February 2013),
paras 8.55, 8.58 and 8.59, where the Competition Commission found that the BCCI, by binding itself
in a commercial agreement with the Indian Premier League (IPL) not to sanction any competing
league, had thereby ‘used its regulatory powers in arriving at a commercial agreement’ in a manner
contrary to the prohibition on abuse of dominance (paras 8.55, 8.58, and 8.59). The Competition
Commission also suggested that the intent behind section 32 of the ICC’s regulations, which required
ICC members ‘not to put themselves or the ICC in breach of their respective commitments to those
commercial partners, as this would threaten the generation of commercial income for distribution
throughout the sport’, was ‘not so much in preserving the specificities of sport, rather of assuring
revenue for Cricket Sports Federations under the guise of pyramid structure’ (para 8.57).
A1.78 The next case comes from the sport of basketball. In 2000, unimpressed
with the competitions organised for them by the international federation (FIBA)
and its affiliate company FIBA Europe, some leading European basketball clubs
launched their own competitions, the Euroleague and Eurocup, organised by
Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA), owned by 11 of the 16 competing clubs. In
2016, FIBA Europe launched the Basketball Champions League, to be contested by
the winners of its member federations’ respective domestic leagues, and told those
members that if they did not discipline the clubs in their countries that continued
to participate in the Euroleague and Eurocup, they would not be permitted to enter
national representative teams in international competitions, including the 2016
Olympic Games. ECA promptly filed a complaint with the European Commission,
alleging this constituted an abuse of FIBA’s dominant position, in breach of EU
competition law.1 In response, FIBA filed its own complaint with the Commission,
alleging that ‘in essence, ECA wishes to reap the benefits of the basketball ecosystem
developed by national federations (players, coaches, referees, thousands of other
clubs) without contributing to the foundations of the sport’s pyramid and holding
the national teams hostage to serve the interests of six commercially powerful
clubs’.2 In June 2016, the Munich Regional Court granted an ex parte application
by Euroleague Basketball, some Euroleague and Eurocup clubs and some domestic
leagues for interim measures prohibiting FIBA and FIBA Europe from sanctioning
or threatening to sanction its member federations (by excluding them from the 2016
Olympic Games) for deciding to cooperate with ECA and its subsidiaries, stating:
‘Excluding or threatening to exclude the national teams by reference to the exclusivity

clause under Article 9.1 of the Statutes, constitutes the abuse of a dominant position.
It is “asymmetric” warfare. The National Federations with their national teams are
prevented from taking part in the Olympic Games or European Championships
– which is elementary for them – in order to pressurise them into persuading the
clubs and players organised in the National Federations to forgo taking part in the
competition of a competing event, irrespective of the binding clarification of the
legal issue of whether the ECA, for its part, abuses its market power by organising
the club championships Eurocup and Euroleague. Even if the exclusivity clauses
under Articles 9.1 and 12 of the Statutes and the associated sanctions mechanism
do not in themselves constitute an anticompetitive measure within the meaning of

Article 101 TFEU, in this specific case there would be no justification for excluding
a National Federation from Olympic Games or European championships in
order to eliminate de facto one competitor (the only one) for club championships
(Eurocup versus FIBA Europe Cup), where such competitor is unable to organise
an economically viable competition on account of clubs compelled to refuse. No
compulsory need of FIBA is in evidence as to why it should not await the outcome
of the complaint proceedings before the European Commission that have just been
initiated, where the question will be reviewed as to whether the ECA/Euroleague
are abusing their market power pursuant to Article 102 TFEU. The entitlement to
take part in Olympic Games should be decided for sports reasons. The decision of
certain clubs to take part in a certain club competition has, in terms of sport, nothing
whatsoever to do with a national team’s participation in international competitions.
Such association, namely the imposing of sanctions on third parties to enforce own
interests in a different area, is a classic case of antitrust abuse within the meaning of
Article 102 TFEU’.2
However, the court lifted the injunction shortly afterwards on the grounds that the
applicants had waited too long before applying for relief, after FIBA Europe pointed
out that the applicants had known about its stance for longer than they had let on in
their ex parte application. The court also ruled that the applicants were bound by an
agreement in the FIBA rules to submit their claims to arbitration before the CAS.3
In 2017, FIBA supplemented its complaint to the Commission after ECA organised
its competitions to clash with qualifying matches for the 2019 Basketball World Cup
and clubs participating in ECA competitions refused to release their players to play
in those qualifying matches.4 In November 2017, Commissioner Margrethe Vestager
answered a parliamentary question on the topic by underlining the importance of
national teams and the athletes’ right to decide whether or not they want to play with
their national team, and suggesting that FIBA and ECA should find a solution for the
good of the athletes and the entire sport.5 However, peace did not break out. Instead,
in January 2020 the Union of Leagues of European Basketball announced that it had
joined FIBA Europe’s complaint to the Commission against ECA.6 As of August
2020, however, there had been no public indication that the European Commission
had issued any statement of objections or taken any other step on either complaint,
instead apparently still hoping by its inaction to force the two sides to settle their
differences consensually.
1 See Euroleague press release ‘Euroleague Basketball presents a complaint before the European
Commission against FIBA and FIBA Europe’ dated 22 February 2016.
2 FIBA press release, fiba.basketball/news/fiba-files-complaint-against-euroleague [accessed
25 September 2020], 5 April 2016.
3 Landgericht München I Az.: 1 HK 0 8126/16. English translation available at: euroleague.net/
rs/6xk9sj4v9aybwosi/84bd1f8d-134d-42a0-a8ee-cd688d29aaa2/dbc/filename/munich-court-
decision-english.pdf [accessed 25 September 2020]. See also FIBA press release ‘FIBA Europe
welcomes Munich court decision to cancel temporary injunction’ dated 23 June 2016.
4 See FIBA statement: The worldwide calendar will not change for 2 Euroleague game-days’, fiba.
basketball, 22 September 2017.
5 europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2017-005288&language=EN [accessed 25 September
2020].
6 sportbusiness.com/news/uleb-joins-fibas-european-commission-complaint-over-eca/ [accessed 25 September
2020], 22 January 2020.
A1.79 In the meantime, however, on 8 December 2017 the European Commission

issued an important decision that drew together the key strands of the previous case-
law and set out clear guidance on what is and is not acceptable conduct on the part
of SGBs in relation to unsanctioned events. Two professional speed-skaters had filed
a complaint with the Commission in June 2014, alleging that the eligibility rules of
the International Skating Union (ISU) that made a skater ineligible for a period up
to a lifetime to participate in in ISU events, the Olympic Winter Games, the Winter
Youth Olympic Games and all international competitions, exhibitions and tours
authorised by the ISU if they participated in any speed skating events not authorised
by the ISU or one of its member federations infringed Articles 101 and 102 of the
TFEU, because they stopped the skaters from participating in an event organised by
a private promoter that offered them much better prize money and other revenues.
The Commission opened proceedings in October 2015. In 2016, the ISU adopted
amended rules that restated the objectives behind its eligibility rules and introduced
a new sanctions regime, ranging from a warning to periods of ineligibility from
an unspecified minimum to a maximum of a lifetime ban. In September 2016 the
Commission issued a statement of objections, and in December 2017 the Commission
issued a decision finding that the ISU rules did indeed breach Article 101 TFEU,1 on
the following basis:
(a) The relevant market for competition law purposes2 is the worldwide market for
the organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed-skating
events (as opposed to national speed-skating events or events in other sports
disciplines) (Commission decision dated 8 December 2017, para 115).
(b) As the international governing body of the sport, controlling the calendar and
the rules of the sport, the ISU has a strong position on that market because
athletes have to submit to its jurisdiction if they want to participate in the
important international competitions, and that means they cannot compete in
other competitions without the ISU’s agreement (ibid, para 130).
(c) The ISU conducts not only regulatory activities but also commercial activities,
including marketing the commercial rights to events that it organizes, and so
is an ‘undertaking’ for purposes of the competition rules,3 it and its members
are an association of undertakings for purposes of those rules (ibid, paras 147–
48), and the ISU’s rules amount to a decision of undertakings for purposes of
Article 81 of the TFEU (ibid, para 153).
(d) The ISU’s eligibility rules have an anti-competitive object: ‘By imposing severe
sanctions, including a lifetime ban, on athletes who participate in unauthorised
speed skating events, the Eligibility rules inherently aim at preventing athletes
from participating in events not authorised by the ISU, resulting in the
foreclosure of competing event organisers. As set out in Rule 102(1) a) (ii), one
of the explicit objectives of the Eligibility rules is the protection of the ISU’s
economic interest. This confirms that the objectives of the Eligibility rules are
not – or at least not purely – of a sports nature, but rather of an economic one.
The rules aim to exclude competing event organisers which could potentially
harm the economic interests of the ISU’ (ibid, paras 168-69). Therefore ‘the
Eligibility rules restrict competition by object in the worldwide market for the
organisation and commercial exploitation of international speed skating events
within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Treaty, even though the Eligibility
rules may at the same time also pursue other objectives such as protecting the
integrity of the sport’ (ibid, para 188).
(e) ‘The Commission takes into consideration the fact that international sports
federations have regulatory functions and are entitled to conduct economic
activities besides their regulatory functions. However, where an association
of undertakings is active in the organisation and commercial exploitation of
speed skating events, but at the same time, through its regulatory function, has
the power to authorise sports events organised and commercially exploited by
other, independent service providers, this may lead to a conflict of interest.
The exercise of the ISU’s regulatory power should therefore be subject to
restrictions, obligations and review to avoid a distortion of competition by
favouring its own events and/or those of its Members above those of third party
organisers’ (ibid, para 173).
(f) The ISU eligibility rules also have an appreciable restrictive effect on
competition: ‘in the absence of the Eligibility rules, athletes would be able
to offer their services freely to speed skating event organisers other than the
ISU or its Members or organisers whose events were specifically authorised
by the ISU. Moreover, there would have been real concrete possibilities for a
potential competitor to enter the market for the organisation and commercial
exploitation of international speed skating events without the need for the
ISU’s authorisation’ (ibid, para 202).
(g) Such rules may nevertheless be justified if they are necessary and proportionate
to the achievement of legitimate objectives, and ‘the Commission considers
that the protection of the integrity of sport, the protection of the health and
safety of skaters and the organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport
can be regarded as legitimate objectives in the general interest’ (ibid, para 212,
citing Meca-Medina4), but ‘the ISU Eligibility rules are not inherent in the
pursuit of the objective of protecting the integrity of skating from betting-
related match-fixing nor proportionate to that objective because the betting
policy applied by the ISU does not protect skating against the risks associated
to betting-related match-fixing but was rather used to prevent Icederby from
organising its planned Dubai Grand Prix’ (ibid, para 235), and nor is it clear
how health and safety and anti-doping standards are applied to third party
events (ibid, paras 239–240).
(h) ‘[T]he organization and proper conduct of competitive sport and in particular
to protect the good functioning of the calendar and the rules of the games’ are
also legitimate objectives (ibid, para 242), but the ISU rules do not say the
ISU will only ban an athlete if the third party event interferes with the athlete’s
responsibilities under the ISU’s calendar (ibid, para 243), and ‘the ISU also does
not apply any pre-established objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate
criteria in order to protect the good functioning of the calendar. Sanctioning
athletes merely for participating in unauthorized events, without applying an
authorization system that is based on such criteria, is not inherent in the pursuit
of the organisation and proper conduct of the sport and proportionate to that
objective’ (ibid, para 244). Furthermore, ‘in the absence of clear authorisation
criteria that do not go beyond what is necessary to protect legitimate aims,
the Eligibility rules impede the creation of any new, potentially innovative
competitive events without bringing any improvement to the production or
distribution of goods’ (ibid, para 294).
(i) ‘[T]he Commission recognises that some forms of horizontal solidarity (for
instance, equal distribution of revenues to all the clubs participating in the same
competition) or vertical solidarity (for instance, redistribution of revenues from
the elite/professional level of a sport to the low/grassroots level) may justify
limited restrictions to the economic freedom of undertakings involved in sport,
in particular within a sport pyramid’ (ibid, para 222). But ‘the protection of
economic and/or financial interests does not, however, constitute a legitimate
objective that can justify a restriction of competition. Such interests have also
not been recognised by the Court of Justice as a legitimate objective capable
of restricting the economic freedoms granted to undertakings operating in
the EEA under Internal Market or competition rules. In particular, the Court
has held that imperative requirements that can be invoked to justify limited
restrictions to such rules can only be of a non-economic nature. Concerning
the ISU’s argument that it uses part of the revenues it generates through
commercial activities for the development of the sport, the Commission notes
that these funds are, however, also redistributed to the ISU’s own Members
for the organisation of international competitions […], thus putting third party
event organisers at competitive disadvantage’ (ibid, para 220). ‘The ISU does
not convincingly substantiate how preventing skaters from participating in
speed skating events organised by third party organisers would be necessary to
preserve the ISU’s solidarity model. If the purpose is to foster and develop the
sport of speed skating, a solidarity contribution to be requested from third party

organisers of skating events may under certain circumstances be accepted but
such a contribution should be fair and reasonable, be used to finance grassroots
sports activities and not have exclusionary effects (a solidarity contribution
should for instance not be used to cross-subsidise the events organised by the
governing body collecting the contribution – or its Members – to the detriment
of events organised by third party organisers)’ (ibid, para 247); and it must
be set by objective criteria, not left to the wide discretion of the ISU (ibid,
para 248).
(j) ‘As to the protection of the ISU’s jurisdiction, the Commission notes that,
without prejudice to the question whether the principle of having one regulator
per sport can be considered as legitimate objective capable of justifying
restrictions of competition law, the measures established by the ISU (that is,
the pre-authorisation system embodied by the ISU’s Eligibility rules and by
Communication No 1974 on Open International Competitions) are neither
inherent in the pursuit of those objectives nor proportionate to them’ (ibid,
para 221). They are not inherent because other international federations do not
have a pre-authorisation system and seem to function well enough without it
(ibid, paras 252–53), and they are disproportionate because they require the
third party organiser to disclose financial information and business plans, they
give the ISU broad discretion to ask for more information and to accept or
reject applications for authorisation, and they do not set clear deadlines for
decisions on such applications (ibid, paras 254–258).
(k) The ISU’s complaint that the third party organisers were free-riding on the
investment of the ISU and its members was addressed by the fact that the ISU’s
rules permitted it to require a solidarity contribution to be made as a condition
of receipt of authorization to hold an event (ibid, para 224).
(l) Finally, the sanctions prescribed for participating in unauthorized events ‘are
manifestly disproportionate’, extending up to a lifetime ban, and ‘there are no
pre-established, clear and transparent criteria as to how the sanctions are to be
applied’, instead conferring a broad discretion on the ISU Council, ‘resulting
in an unpredictable, unclear and non-transparent sanctioning system’ (ibid,
paras 260–65).
1 European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017.
2 For an explanation of this concept and its relevance to the competition law analysis, see para E11.54
et seq.
3 For an explanation of this concept and its relevance to the competition law analysis, see para E11.65
et seq.
4 Discussed at para E11.50–E11.52.
A1.80 The Commission ordered the following relief:
‘338 The ISU is required to bring the infringement established in this Decision
effectively to an end and henceforth refrain from any measure that has the same or
an equivalent object or effect.
339. As there is more than one way of bringing that infringement effectively to an
end in conformity with the Treaty, it is for the ISU to choose between these various
ways, including for instance the abolishment of its pre-authorisation system and of
the sanctions imposed on athletes for participation in unauthorised events. If the
ISU were to choose to maintain a pre-authorisation system, it would appear that the
ISU can only effectively bring the infringement to an end by substantially changing
its Eligibility rules, the Appeals Arbitration rules and the authorisation criteria as
currently laid down in Communication No 1974, in the following way.
340. First, the ISU should only provide for sanctions and authorisation criteria that
are inherent in the pursuit of legitimate objectives. The ISU’s financial and economic
interests are not considered as legitimate objectives.
341. Second, the ISU should provide for objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory sanctions and authorisation criteria that do not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve legitimate objectives.
342. Third, the ISU should provide for an objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory procedure for the adoption and effective review of decisions regarding
the ineligibility of skaters and for the authorisation of speed skating events’.
The ISU filed an application to the EU Court of Justice (General Court) on
19 February 2018 to have the Commission’s decision set aside, but no decision had
been issued at the time of writing.1 Subject to whatever the CJEU may say, however,
the Commission has given clear warning of the minefield that faces SGBs who wish
to restrain participation in unsanctioned events, but has also given them a roadmap
by which they may safely traverse that minefield, if they tread very, very carefully.
1 T-93/18 ISU v Commission [2018] OJ C142/72. Updates are available at: curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.js
f?lgrec=fr&td=%3BALL&language=en&num=T-93/18&jur=T [accessed 25 September 2020].
See also: (1) The Italian Competition Authority investigated the unsanctioned event rules of
the national motor sports federation (ACI) and equestrian sports federation (FISE) in 2008. Those
investigations were closed after the ACI and FISE committed to allow its respective members
to participate in events not organised by the federation. See Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e
del Mercato, Federitalia/Federazione Italiana Sport Equestri (FISE), Decision n°18285 of 28 July
2008, Bolletino n° 19/2008; Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Gargano Corse/ACI,
Decision n° 19946 of 30 June 2009, Bolletino n° 23/2009. (2) The Swedish Market Court (upholding
the decision of the Swedish Competition Authority of 13 May 2011 Case 709/2009) found that sections
7.1 and 7.2 of the Swedish Automobile Sports Federation (SBF) Common Rules, which prohibited its
members from participating as drivers and event staff in races not sanctioned by the SBF and provided
that they could be fined or lose their licence in the event of breach, were anti-competitive and ordered
the SBF to amend its rules. While the Swedish Market Court accepted the social, educational, and
cultural objectives of sport and the need to ensure fair and safe competition, it considered that the
restrictions under the SBF rules were a disproportionate means of attaining those objectives. See
Svenska Bilsportförbundet v Konkurrensverket, Swedish Market Court, decision number 2012:16 in
case A 5/11, 20 December 2012 (SBF v KKV). (3) In another Swedish case, BMR Sport Nutrition AB
relied on SBF v KKV when bringing a complaint before the Swedish Competition Authority against
the Swedish Bodybuilding Association (SKKF) regarding the ‘loyalty clause’ in its by-laws which
provided for fines and suspensions against members for participating in competitions not sanctioned
by SKKF. The Competition Authority closed the investigation after SKFF committed no longer to
suspend or fine its members for participating in unsanctioned events. Konkurrensverket (Swedish
Competition Authority), case 590/2013, SKKF, 28 May 2014. (4) Following a 2011 investigation,
the Competition Authority in Ireland determined that Article 299N of the Show Jumping Ireland
(SJI) Rulebook, which prevented its members from competing at unaffiliated show jumping events
where the prize fund exceeded €50/£50, amounted to a decision of an association of undertakings
which was likely to restrict the participation of SJI members at unaffiliated show jumping events and
the organisation of such unaffiliated events in Ireland. The Competition Authority was of the view
that the SJI rule was disproportionate to the stated purpose and likely to infringe Irish and European
law. The case was closed in May 2012, as SJI agreed to amend the alleged anti-competitive rule
as follows: ‘Members of SJI who enter unaffiliated shows with a prize fund above €50/£50 will be
penalised if the show: (i) has not signed up to the specified Health and Safety Standards, and (ii) has
not provided SJI with evidence of adequate insurance’. See ‘Show Jumping Ireland amend allegedly
restrictive rule’ dated 1 May 2012 (ccpc.ie/business/enforcement/civil-competition-enforcement/
closed-investigations/show-jumping-ireland-restrictive-rule/ [accessed 25 September 2020]).
CHAPTER A2
Organisational Structures for Sports

Governing Bodies and Competitions
James Maloney and Tom Bruce (Farrer & Co) and Jon Walters (Northridge)
Contents
para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A2.1
2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME.................................................................... A2.5
3 THE NATIONAL SCHEME................................................................................ A2.14
A Regulation of sport....................................................................................... A2.15
B Competitions – professional sport and amateur sport.................................. A2.21
C The role of representative bodies................................................................. A2.25
4 TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS
IN THE UK.......................................................................................................... A2.27
A Unincorporated associations........................................................................ A2.29
B Companies or other corporate bodies.......................................................... A2.35
C Changing legal structure.............................................................................. A2.53
D Charitable status........................................................................................... A2.60
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS................................................... A2.76
6 THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY SPORTS GOVERNING
BODIES............................................................................................................... A2.81
A International competitions for national teams.............................................. A2.81
B Individual sports competitions..................................................................... A2.85
C Club competitions........................................................................................ A2.88
D Structures adopted for governing body owned competitions....................... A2.92
7 AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS...................... A2.95
A Common features......................................................................................... A2.95
B Disputed relationships between governing body and competitions............. A2.99
C Models of governing body and sports competition relationship.................. A2.101
1 INTRODUCTION
A2.1 Sports governing bodies are essentially private undertakings, even

though they may undertake many public or quasi-public functions.1 Under the so-
called ‘European Model of Sport’,2 they operate within a pyramid structure. The
international federations sit at the top. The national federations are members of the
international federations. There may be continental or area associations that are also
members of the international federations and that also have the national federations
in their respective continents or areas as members. Beneath the national federations
are regional associations, and beneath those are district associations or counties. Then
come clubs or community associations, and beneath them the individual participants
in the sport.
1 See para A1.11.
2 See para A1.22.
Organisational Structures for Sports Governing Bodies and Competitions 73
A2.2 At a national level, there can be a plethora of organisations involved in

any sport, ranging from those regulating the sport (the national governing bodies),
those organising competitions, those participating in the sport, and representative
organisations for the different interest groups. For example in English football, The
Football Association is the governing body that imposes the Laws of the Game (as
mandated by the international federation, FIFA) and sanctions competitions; the
Premier League, the Football League and the National League are competition
organisers that run the professional leagues; The FA itself runs the FA Cup and the
Community Shield; the Professional Footballers’ Association represents players’
interests; the county football associations administer the game at county level; and
the Football Foundation is a football charity promoting grassroots participation.
A2.3 There is no common form of organisation for these different bodies. Some
may be unincorporated associations, and so not even legal entities in their own right;
whereas others will be private companies, public companies, or perhaps registered
societies1 or Royal Charter bodies. A small number now have charitable status.2
1 See para A2.48.
2 See para A2.60.
A2.4 This chapter explains the pyramid structure and the interrelationship
between sports bodies at an international and national level. It sets out the
constitutional structures that are typically used for UK sports organisations operating
within the different elements of the pyramid framework. It describes how these
traditional structures are having to change to reflect the increasing need for efficiency
in administrative operation as well as the move to greater professionalism in sport
and observance of the principles of corporate governance.1 It deals with the potential
for charitable status for sports bodies. It also discusses how different models have
emerged in different sports for the development and commercial exploitation of new
competitions owned not by the governing body but rather by a separate entity in
which the governing body may have a stake but ownership or control is either given
to or shared with the participants in the competition and even potentially third party
investors.
1 See Chapter A5 (Best Practice in Sports Governance).
2 THE INTERNATIONAL SCHEME
A2.5 There is no one standard organisational structure for sport in the UK; rather,
each sport is organised according to its own characteristics and idiosyncrasies.
However, there are some common features. In particular, each sport usually has an
international (or worldwide) federation. These international federations – for example,
FIFA (football), World Athletics (athletics), FIBA (basketball), FINA (swimming),
ICC (cricket), and World Rugby (rugby union) – are responsible for promoting the
sport, establishing the ‘laws of the game’, regulating the sport at an international
level, and imposing certain requirements to be fulfilled by their member associations
at national level. International federations will make rules regulating the staging of
international competitions. They will be responsible for, and make rules governing
the relationship between, the international federation and the national federations,
as well as the relationship between national and other affiliated federations. To some
degree, they will regulate the relationship between a national federation and its own
constituent members (for example, by requiring the national federation to impose
certain anti-doping obligations on athletes and athlete support personnel under its
jurisdiction at national level).1
1 See para A1.50(h) et seq.
A2.6 It can sometimes be difficult to see exactly how all the elements of the
pyramid work together. The relationships can be fairly loose. There will be a series
of rights and obligations on different sides. Although the relationship between the
different elements will usually be contractual,1 the exact contours of the relationship
will all depend on the facts of the individual case.
1 See para A1.52 and the discussion of the Modahl case at para E8.11 et seq.
A2.7 The international federation is the association of all the national federations.
It exists to provide a set of uniform rules for the sport and to ensure these are
enforced.1 It provides the means of regulation of international competition, and may
use the revenues generated by such competition to underwrite distribution schemes
to help grow the game in new areas, in order to broaden the playing base for the sport.
1 The rules of the game for golf and cricket are set not by the relevant international federation but rather
by the Royal & Ancient Club and the Marylebone Cricket Club respectively.
A2.8 International federations come in a variety of guises. Some will be legal

entities in their own right, recognised in the country where they were established.
Others will not be legal entities, and they will be governed by the laws of the country
where their headquarters are based from time to time. It will be necessary to examine
the laws of the country having jurisdiction over the international federation to see
how it is recognised.1
1 Many international federations have followed the International Olympic Committee in making
Lausanne, Switzerland their home. They are usually organised as non-governmental not-for-profit
associations founded under and governed by Art 60 et seq of the Swiss Civil Code. See eg Art 1.1 of
the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (November 2018). However, the position in each
case must be checked carefully. A comprehensive survey of the different forms of organisation of an
international sports federation is beyond the scope of this chapter.
A2.9 The national governing body is usually a member of the international

federation, and is bound by virtue of that membership to abide by the constitution
and rules and regulations of the international federation.1 In certain cases the national
governing body will not be a member of the international federation but will be
‘recognised’ by it, in which case a condition of recognition will be that the national
governing body must abide by the international body’s rules. Whether the relationship
is one of membership or recognition, there is normally a contractual relationship
between the two bodies. World Athletics, for example, is a membership organisation
and each national governing body for athletics is a member of World Athletics and
thereby bound by its rules. By contrast, the members of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) are individuals from each country, as opposed to the National
Olympic Committees (NOCs) and international federations, which are ‘recognised
by the IOC’. The NOCs and international federations are however bound by the
Olympic Charter.
1 See eg Art 4.1 of the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation: ‘All Continental Federations
and Members […] shall be deemed to have agreed and acknowledged that: […] they are bound by
and must comply with the Statutes and Regulations, and with the decisions taken by the FIH and its
constituent bodies (including Congress, the Executive Board, and other duly appointed officials and
bodies of the FIH) pursuant to and in application and enforcement of the Statutes and Regulations
[…]’. See further para A1.43 et seq.
A2.10 In well-developed sports, there will be a layer of continental or area

associations sitting under the international federation.1 The national federations
within a particular geographic area will also be members of the continental/area
association for that particular continent/area. The continental/area associations will
be responsible for representing their member national federations and for organising
competitions within a particular geographic area for their sport.2 There are often one
or two area associations within a particular sport that are more powerful than the
other area associations, often because the most important commercial markets for the
sport are located within their areas.
1 For example, there are six continental associations in football, sitting under FIFA, namely the Asian
Football Confederation, the Confederation of African Football, the Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA), the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association
Football, the Oceania Football Confederation, and the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol/
Confederação Sul-americana de Futebol (South American Football Confederation).
2 For example, UEFA and the European Athletics Association are continental governing bodies
for football and athletics respectively at a European level and are responsible for pan-European
competitions in those sports.
A2.11 Throughout the different sports, therefore, there will be a chain of

interlocking associations/organisations responsible for the sport’s governance at each
level. This can lead to tensions between national, continental/area and international
federations, particularly where the international federation’s rules are in conflict with
regional or national laws. For example, the European Commission has several times
taken the position that football’s rules on the transfer of players from club to club
breach EC guarantees of free movement and/or fair competition.1 In response, for
some time the sports movement sought to argue that it should be exempt from EC
law,2 but that argument has been soundly rejected by the European Court of Justice.3
Meanwhile the German courts ruled that the four-year doping ban imposed on athlete
Katrine Krabbe under the anti-doping rules of the IAAF (as World Athletics was then
named) was an unreasonable restraint of trade under German law, forcing the IAAF
to reinstate Krabbe’s eligibility for competition and to reduce the ban it imposed for
serious doping offences from four to two years.4
1 See further para E11.127 et seq.
2 See eg ‘Sports unite to lobby EU’, Sport Business, No 21 (May 1998).
3 Meca-Medina and Macjen v Commission (519/04 P) [2006] ECR I-6991. See paras E11.50 to E11.52.
4 See para C6.57.
A2.12 Within different sports, there may be players’ associations, which are usually
outside the pyramid structure but nevertheless can play an important role within the
sport. The negotiations between the European Commission, FIFA, UEFA and FIFpro
in respect of FIFA’s transfer rules1 demonstrated the importance of international
players’ organisations and the increased voice that such organisations may have.
1 See para E11.136 et seq.
A2.13 As well as the international federations for each sport, there are various other
sporting bodies of an international nature. The International Olympic Committee
is the ultimate governing body for the sports that participate in the Olympic
Games, requiring as a condition of membership of the Olympic Movement that the
constitutions, rules and regulations of such sports comply with the requirements
of the Olympic Charter.1 The Commonwealth Games Federation is responsible
for the Commonwealth Games, and each Commonwealth country has its own
Commonwealth Games Council. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) (a Swiss foundation under the Swiss Civil
Code) are other important international sporting organisations; they are dealt with
elsewhere in this book.2
1 See Art 25 of the Olympic Charter (Lausanne, 26 June 2019): ‘In order to develop and promote the
Olympic Movement, the IOC may recognise as IFs international non-governmental organisations
governing one or several sports at world level, which extends by reference to those organisations
recognised by the IFs as governing such sports at the national level. The statutes, practice and activities
of the IFs within the Olympic Movement must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter, including
the adoption and implementation of the World Anti-Doping Code as well as the Olympic Movement
Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions. Subject to the foregoing, each IF maintains
its independence and autonomy in the governance of its sport’.
2 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport) and Chapter C2 (The Anti-doping
Regulatory Framework).
3 THE NATIONAL SCHEME
A2.14 This section describes the legal structures commonly used by sports
organisations in the UK. In order to understand why different structures are used, it
is necessary to understand the different roles that the various types of organisation
play within the UK and how the national governing body sits within the modern-day
sporting framework.
A Regulation of sport
A2.15 Within the UK, each sport generally has its own national governing
body responsible for governance and regulation of the sport at the national level
(ie England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). This includes rulemaking,1
rule enforcement,2 regulating relations between clubs and between competitors, and
regulating competitions. Some sports also have joint governing bodies across the
various ‘home nations’, such as UK Athletics, GB Snowsport, and British Swimming.
Some governing bodies may govern a number of sports, such as the Royal Yachting
Association (which governs all forms of boating, including dinghy and yacht racing,
motor and sail cruising, RBIs and sport boats, powerboat racing, windsurfing, inland
cruising and narrowboats, and personal watercraft), and the British Equestrian
Federation (which governs equestrian sports, including jumping, eventing, dressage,
vaulting and endurance).
1 See Chapter B1 (Drafting Effective Regulations – The Legal Framework).
2 See generally Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings).
A2.16 Typically, the national governing body will have responsibility for all
regulatory matters at national level,1 with functions delegated to area or county
associations to administer at a lower level (such as management of the sport generally
and discipline, other than for doping offences2). Many governing bodies will be
responsible for organising national championships and other national competitions,
although these responsibilities may be delegated to organising committees.
2 As a condition of receipt of public funding, UK national governing bodies of sport are required to
delegate the enforcement of their anti-doping rules to UK Anti-Doping, the UK’s national anti-doping
organization. See para C2.21 et seq.
A2.17 Each sport will have its own competition structure. Team sports are likely to
have a very different competition structure to individual sports. Individual sports are
more likely to have global tours with a centralised ranking system (eg tennis, golf),
whereas team sports will usually compete on a league basis. The national governing
body will usually want to ensure that competitions where a GB or England team is
competing have precedence in the calendar over domestic competitions or international
competitions where the competitor or team competes as an individual. This can lead
to tensions between individual and country and between club and country. Some of
the different models of ownership and control of different competitions are discussed
below, at Section 5 et seq.
A2.18 The national federation will not necessarily be responsible for all
competitions in the sport within the UK. Indeed there is no rule of English law that
prevents individuals setting up a competition outside the auspices of the national
federation,1 and any attempt by a national federation to limit or forbid participation
in unsanctioned events is likely to be closely scrutinised on competition law grounds

to guard against the use of regulatory powers for improper reasons.2
1 See para A1.63.
2 See further paras A1.17 et seq and E11.97 et seq.
A2.19 The national federation is part of the international pyramid, but it is also
the top of the national pyramid for the sport. It is important to ensure that each
level of the pyramid is bound by, and operating according to, the same rules and
procedures (which ultimately emanate from the international federation). Some
national governing bodies (such as the Lawn Tennis Association) have the county
and other affiliated associations as their members, which in turn have the clubs as
their members, which in turn have the individual athletes as their members. Other
governing bodies (such as British Cycling) have the individual athletes as members.
A2.20 It is important to remember that the national governing body governs both
amateur and professional sport within the country and there may be conflicts between
those two arms of the sport. In some sports, particularly football, the professional
sports clubs may have greater commercial appeal than the national team run by
the governing body. The result is that many of the individual clubs have far greater
resources than the governing body. However, for many other sports, and in particular
rugby and cricket, where the national team is the most valuable commercial asset
of the sport, the national governing body is more likely to be on a firmer financial
footing than the clubs.
B Competitions – professional sport and amateur sport
A2.21 The tension between the amateur and the professional (elite) game is an
increasingly difficult issue for sports. The governing bodies are required to invest in
the ‘grass roots’ development of the sport and yet the success of the sport is judged by
the success of the elite competitors and clubs. Lottery funding under the World Class
Programme has done little to ease this tension, as governing bodies enjoy greatly
increased funds, but they must be spent on specific elite activities.1
1 See further para A3.60.
A2.22 Rugby union became ‘open’ to professional players in 1995. It is fair to say
that it has taken some time for the sport to adapt to the change. The latest agreement
between the RFU (governing body) and Premier Rugby Limited (a private company
existing to promote the Premiership and represent the clubs in the Premiership) was
signed in 2016 and governs the professional game in England until 2024. It covers
all aspects of professional rugby in England, including the season structure, the
creation of elite playing squads and a player management programme, academies, a
compensation scheme for clubs releasing players to play for England, player welfare,
a standard player agreement, governance and commercial matters, and the terms of
participation in the European Rugby Champions Cup. A Professional Game Board
(made up of representatives from the RFU, PRL, and the Rugby Players’ Association)
has been created to oversee the operation of the agreement. The provisions around
player release are crucial to the resolution of the club versus country debate, which
has been a recurring theme in rugby since the game turned professional.1
1 See further para E11.95.
A2.23 In football, the professional competitions are managed by companies set up

for that purpose. The creation of the FA Premier League Limited and the Football
League Limited as separate companies demonstrated the need for the professional
football leagues to be administered separately from the amateur game. As discussed
in further detail below, The Football Association, as the national governing body, has
been able to retain particular rights in relation to the Premier League by means of a
preference share (with voting rights only in relation to particular matters).
A2.24 Some of the member clubs within the Premier League have floated on the
stock exchange and became public companies (such as Manchester United, which
listed on the New York Stock Exchange on 10 August 2012). However, Tottenham
Hotspur de-listed from AIM on 13 January 2012 and re-registered as a private
company to enable it to raise funds for a new stadium.
C The role of representative bodies

A2.25 The different interests in a particular sport may well be served by a
collective voice. During the late 1990s the popularity of supporters’ organisations
was demonstrated in football. The purposes of these organisations (which are usually
registered societies1) are to forge closer links between the supporters and the club, to
acquire shares in the particular club (which are then held by the registered society for
the benefit of its members) and to involve supporters in the club’s administration by
securing election of supporters to the board of directors of the club.
1 See paras A2.48 to A2.52.
A2.26 There are representative bodies not only for supporters but also for sportsmen
and women. In the UK the Professional Footballers’ Association is well known.
Other organisations representing the interests of players include the British Athletes
Commission, the UK Athletics Athletes’ Commission, the Professional Golfers’
Association, and the Rugby Players’ Association. Most of these organisations are
private companies limited by guarantee.1
4 TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR NATIONAL

GOVERNING BODIES AND OTHER SPORTS ORGANISATIONS IN
THE UK
A2.27 This section sets out various general principles relating to the types of legal
structure that are used by national governing bodies and other sports bodies in the
UK. It is not intended to be exhaustive, and when dealing with any particular type of
legal structure the reader should refer to a specialist work on that type of organisation
(for example, Gore-Brown on Companies, or Palmer’s Company Law).
A2.28 It appears that the form of structure taken by a national governing body
often has a great deal more to do with the history of the sport’s development than
with what is necessarily the most sensible option from a corporate governance and
administration point of view. However, the increased commercialisation of sport,
and the recognition of the advancement of amateur sport as charitable, means that
sports bodies at all levels are well advised to review, from time to time, whether their
constitutional structure adequately protects them from liability and affords them all
the available tax benefits.
A Unincorporated associations
A2.29 Traditionally, an unincorporated association was the most common form

of structure for sports bodies, as it is the simplest way to establish a membership
organisation. Increasingly, as governing bodies become professional entities handling

large sums of money, employing people, and owning or leasing their own premises,
the problems associated with this type of organisation outweigh the benefits, and
most governing bodies have changed their legal status to become limited companies.1
In fact, the government agencies involved in sport in the UK2 are keen to ensure that
governing bodies are corporate entities, largely to protect the individuals running
them from personal liability.
1 World Rugby, based in Dublin, is an unincorporated association.
A2.30 Unincorporated associations are essentially groups of individuals or

entities coming together to carry out a mutual purpose other than to distribute profit.
They are members’ organisations and have no legal personality distinct from the
individuals/entities that comprise their membership.1 This structure can therefore
be suitable for grassroots clubs, county associations or other sports bodies that
do not hold property or employ staff, and whose liabilities can be easily covered
by having in place appropriate insurance policies. However, it is less suitable for
governing bodies with significant staff, commercial assets, and turnover. The lack
of separate legal identity means that the association cannot hold assets or contract
in its own name, which can cause difficulties when it tries to enter into commercial
contracts exploiting the commercial value of its events.2 Furthermore, it means that
the members of the association are not shielded from liability for the debts and other
liabilities of the association. The power to run and the responsibility for running
the association will usually be delegated to a committee. However, the committee
members will be personally liable for any liability of the club beyond its assets, and
the other individual members may also be liable, depending on the particular facts of
the case at hand.3
1 See generally Warburton, Unincorporated Associations: Law and Practice, 2nd Edn (Sweet &
Maxwell, 1992). This can raise some complicated procedural issues when court proceedings are
brought, challenging the actions of a sports governing body that is an unincorporated association of its
members: see para E3.14.
2 This was one of the main reasons why the Six Nations Committee formed Six Nations Rugby Limited
and why the Four Home Unions Tours Committee formed British Lions Limited.
3 In Howells v Dominion Insurance (2005) EWHC 552 (QB), two individual members of an
unincorporated football club (the chairman and secretary) sued the defendant insurance company as
representatives of all of the members of the club, seeking a declaration that the company was liable to
pay a claim made under an insurance policy issued by the company for the benefit of the members of
the club. The insurance company counterclaimed for return of money paid under the policy, which it
alleged was void for non-disclosure, and the counterclaim was upheld and a money judgment issued
against the claimants. The High Court held that as a matter of law the judgment could be enforced
against those individuals who were members of the club when the proceedings were brought and
when judgment was issued, subject only to any of them establishing special reasons (eg fraud) why
the judgment should not be enforced against him or her personally. Ibid, para 29. It also found that the
contract of insurance was made (through the agency of the club secretary) for the benefit of all of the
members of the club for the time being and therefore the claim was against all of the members of the
club for their personal liability under that contract, and so the rule that members of an unincorporated
association cannot be individually liable for the club’s debts did not apply. Ibid, para 31.
A2.31 One of the last remaining sports governing bodies that was organised as an
unincorporated association was the Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC). However, in
2012 it applied for and was granted a Royal Charter, coming into effect on 1 July
2013, which changes the MCC’s status from a private, unincorporated members’ club
to a body incorporated by Royal Charter. The MCC sought this change to enable it
to hold assets (such as Lord’s Cricket Ground) in its own name, rather than through a
custodian trustee, and to remove any potential liability of individual MCC members
for debts and other liabilities incurred by the club.1
1 ‘MCC granted Royal Charter’, 12 December 2012, lords.org/news/2012/december/mcc-granted-
royal-charter/.
A2.32 The relationship between the members of an unincorporated association is

a contractual one, regulated by the rules of the association. Those rules must be
carefully drafted to ensure that the practicalities of how the association is run are
set out, as there is little general law to be relied upon where the rules are silent. The
relative informality of the rules may not be adequate to cover what the organisation is
doing. The more sophisticated the organisation, the more sophisticated the rules will
need to be concerning the members’ liabilities as between themselves.
A2.33 The rules must deal with the following matters: name, objects, membership,
fees and subscriptions, resignation and expulsion, composition of management
committee and management committee responsibilities, appointment of trustees
(or other mechanism for the holding of property), general meetings, alteration of
rules, power to make and alter regulations, bye-laws and standing orders, finance
and accounting, borrowing, property, indemnity, application of surplus funds, and
dissolution. Usually the rules of the unincorporated association can only be amended
by a specified majority of the members of the association at a general meeting.
Therefore, to provide flexibility, the rules may also give a committee of the association
the power to make bye-laws that deal with the technical and practical aspects of the
sport, and to avoid cluttering the constitution with administrative matters such as
expenses policies and the rules for the club cup competition.
A2.34 The rules will need to take account of any particular requirements of the
association. For example, the VAT exemption on sports supplies can only be claimed
if an organisation’s constitution is compliant with the Value Added Tax (Sport, Sports
Competitions and Physical Education) Order 1999, meaning (broadly) that any
profits cannot be distributed to members but instead must be spent on club facilities.1
The association’s status in respect of corporation tax will also need to be considered.
If it is trading and wants to claim mutual trading status, the association’s rules must
provide that any surplus on a winding-up reverts to the members.2
1 SI 1999/1994. See para I1.58.
2 See para I1.13.
B Companies and other corporate bodies
A2.35 Increased commercialisation and the onus on sport to become more

accountable has led many sports bodies to incorporate as limited companies. There
are various types of company that can be used, and the most appropriate for different
types of sports bodies are set out below. Again, the reader should refer to a specialist
publication in relation to the detail of company law, particularly in light of the
enactment of the Companies Act 2006.
A2.36 The main benefit of incorporation as a limited company is that the liability
of the members is limited either to the price paid for the share in the company (in
the case of a company limited by shares) or to a nominal figure in the event of the
company being dissolved (in the case of a company limited by guarantee). However,
there are also other benefits, such as the ability to hold property in the company’s
own right, and the ability to sue and be sued in its own name rather than in the name
of certain individuals as representatives.
A2.37 A company’s constitutional documents used to consist of its memorandum

of association (Memorandum) and its articles of association (Articles). Since
October 2009, however, when the relevant provisions of the Companies Act
2006 came into force, new companies have simply filed a Memorandum in the
prescribed form (containing a list of the company’s subscribers and a statement
that the subscribers wish to form a company under the Companies Act 2006 and
have agreed to become members) at Companies House. The Articles are now the
primary constitutional document setting out the rights and duties of the company
and its members. The objects of the company (historically set out in a company’s
Memorandum) and any other provisions in the existing Memorandum that are not
within the new style Memorandum are now automatically incorporated within the
Articles.1 The Memorandum and Articles are public documents on file at Companies
House and can be viewed by anyone by obtaining them from Companies House.
There are annual filing requirements in respect of the annual return and the directors’
report and accounts, which means increased administration costs compared to an
unincorporated association (whose rules and accounts are private documents).
1 Companies Act 2006, s 28.
A2.38 The directors of the company have to abide by company law and must have
regard to their responsibilities to the company. The general duties upon directors
have been partially codified in the Companies Act 2006,1 although the codification is
explicitly stated to be non-exhaustive, and existing common law on directors’ duties
remains applicable.2 The general duties of directors are as follows:
(a) to act within their powers;
(b) to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole and having regard to (amongst other matters) the long-term effect of
their decisions, the interests of employees, and the impact on the community
and environment;
(c) to exercise independent judgment;
(d) to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence;
(e) to avoid conflicts of interest;
(f) not to accept benefits from third parties; and
(g) to declare interests in proposed transactions or arrangements.
The second of these duties can be considered new, as it replaces the duty to act in
the best interests of the company. The new duty is wider and reflects enlightened
shareholder values, i.e., that companies should act responsibly in the interests of their
stakeholders. For the directors of sports governing bodies, who have in any event had
to consider the effect of their decisions on a wider audience (the participants within
the sport at large), this new duty should not be unduly problematic. However, the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest can cause issues for directors of a governing body
who have been nominated to the board by particular stakeholders in the sport, to act
as their ‘representatives’ on the board.3
1 Companies Act 2006, ss 170–177.
2 Companies Act 2006, s 170(4).
3 See eg the discussion in the EFL Governance Review (Feb 2020) (copy available at efl.com/siteassets/
image/201920/governance-reviews/governance-review.pdf) of the difficulties arising from the EFL
rules providing for directors of member clubs to be appointed as directors of the EFL to represent the
interests of all of the clubs in their division.
(a) Private companies limited by guarantee
A2.39 A company limited by guarantee can only be a private company, as opposed

to a publicly-held company, ie a company whose shares are publicly traded.1
However, a sports governing body will have a defined membership, so that trading
of shares will not be necessary or appropriate. And otherwise a company limited by
guarantee is very flexible. Its Articles of Association2 can be tailored to the purposes
and practicalities of operation of the particular sports organisation. It is likely to be
non-profit-distributing, and the guarantee that the members are liable to pay in the
event of the company being wound up is limited to a nominal sum (usually £1 or
£10). Furthermore, only guarantee companies can benefit from mutual trading status
for the purposes of corporation tax and the VAT exemption,3 which makes them
particularly suitable for sports bodies with members to whom they supply services.
1 See para A2.41.
2 Sports bodies constituted as companies limited by guarantee are likely to retain bespoke objects
clauses rather than adopting the Companies Act 2006 template for companies limited by guarantee,
because it will remain important to distinguish the purposes of the different governing bodies within
the pyramid structure of sports governance.
3 See paras I1.13 and I1.57.
A2.40 Guarantee companies are usually used for non-profit-distributing

organisations, membership organisations,1 and smaller clubs and governing bodies.
Non-profit-distributing does not mean non-profit-generating. Sports organisations
should aim to make a profit but they will want to re-invest it in the sport rather than
distribute it to their members. Examples of sporting organisations incorporated as
companies limited by guarantee include the British Olympic Association, the British
Paralympic Association, UK Athletics Limited, the British Canoe Union, the English
Golf Union Limited, the All England Netball Association Limited, the Ski Club of
Great Britain Limited, the Amateur Boxing Association of England Limited, and the
Amateur Rowing Association Limited.
1 For an interesting discussion of the organisation of golf’s Asian Tour, as arranged between the owner
of the tour, Asian Tour Limited, a company limited by guarantee whose members are the individual
golfers competing on the tour, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Asian Tour (Tournament Players
Division) Pte Ltd, a company limited by shares, that organises and administers aspects of the tour, see
Pilkadaris v Asian Tour (Tournament Division) Pte Ltd, [2012] SGHC 236.
(b) Private or public companies limited by shares

A2.41 Many sports governing bodies and other sports bodies are constituted not
as companies limited by guarantee but rather as public or private limited companies
limited by shares.1 In the normal commercial context, such a structure would be used
to enable investment in the company, including (in the case of a public company,
such as Manchester United plc) by the listing and trading of its shares on a public
exchange. However, sports governing bodies that are organised as companies limited
by shares will include tight restrictions in the articles of association on the transfer
of shares, since ownership of a share carries with it the right to participate in the
governance of the sport (in the case of, for example, a county association that is a
shareholder in The Football Association) or in a particular competition (as in the
case of a football club that is a shareholder in the FA Premier League Limited or the
Football League Limited).2
1 The Scottish Rugby Union used (until 2017) to be a public limited company, due (the authors
understand) to the way in which it financed the building of its stadium at Murrayfield. Other national
governing bodies are private limited companies, ie companies limited by shares rather than by
guarantee, such as The Football Association Limited, which was incorporated on 23 June 1903, and
the English Football League.
2 For example, the English Football League rules requiring the consent of the English Football League
board to the transfer of a share from one company to another are the mechanism used to impose sports
sanctions on clubs that file for and then seek to emerge from bankruptcy: see paras B5.140 and B5.141.
A2.42 There may also be other specific articles that will need to be inserted.
For example, the articles of the FA Premier League Limited contain provision for
one preference share held by The Football Association that entitles The Football
Association to vote on certain matters and to repayment of capital on a winding up
in preference to the other classes of share. The other shareholders in the FA Premier
League Limited are the football clubs in the Premier League from time to time.
A club that is relegated from the Premier League is required to give up its share and
receives instead a share in the Football League Limited.
A2.43 Since October 2009, new limited companies (and companies amending
their articles to reflect the updated provisions of the Companies Act 2006) have to set
out their objects in their articles of association. If a newly established company does
not do so, it will have entirely unrestricted objects. And if it does not register bespoke
articles of association, then the Companies Act 2006 model articles for companies
limited by shares will apply by default. Those model articles are intended for use
by small businesses, however, and do not lend themselves easily to use by sports
governing bodies. In particular, they do not anticipate the sometimes complicated
provisions that can be required for the appointment or election of the office holders
of a governing body, and/or of the additional committees or councils that may exist
within such a body.
A2.44 Matters that might be expected to be seen in articles of association of sports

bodies organised as limited companies after October 2009 include the following:
(a) definitions and interpretation;
(b) objects;
(c) decision-making powers of directors, including the power to make rules and
regulations binding on all members;
(d) members and general meetings;
(e) additional structures/committees within the organisation;
(f) administrative arrangements;
(g) directors’ indemnity and insurance; and
(h) application of surplus funds on winding up of the company.
A2.45 Where the members (shareholders) have particular agreements amongst

themselves (perhaps as to voting or profit share) that extend beyond the matters
dealt with in the articles of association, they may set them out in a shareholders’
agreement, which is private and so does not have to be filed at Companies House.
And matters such as rules of the game, disciplinary procedures for enforcement of
the rules, and the like, should not be set out in the Articles of Association, because
that restricts the ability to amend them easily, and also means they have to be filed
each time with Companies House. Instead, such topics should be dealt with in bye-
laws or regulations issued pursuant to powers conferred in the Articles.
(c) Royal charter body
A2.46 Royal charter bodies are corporations for legal purposes. They are created
either by grant of royal charter of incorporation from the Crown or by a statute making
provision for the creation of a corporation by grant of royal charter. Generally, a
royal charter is granted for an organisation that works in the public interest and that
can demonstrate pre-eminence in its field, stability (including financial stability)
and permanence, and that has the support of a government organisation to petition
the Privy Council. Examples of sports bodies existing by Royal Charter include the
Sports Councils,1 the MCC,2 the National Rifle Association, and the Jockey Club.
2 See para A2.31.
A2.47 When a practitioner is advising in relation to a charter body, it will

be important to check the terms of the charter carefully to make sure that all of
the powers that the organisation is likely to need are included within the charter
(particularly the ability to make subordinate rules). The charter is the ‘governing
document’ or constitution for the particular organisation, and seeking amendments to
the charter is not as easy as amending a company’s articles.
(d) Registered societies
A2.48 A registered society is an organisation conducting an industry, business

or trade either as a co-operative (a ‘co-operative society’) or for the benefit of
the community (‘a community benefit society’). The term also covers societies
incorporated under the old Industrial and Provident Society Acts,1 which formerly
fulfilled the same roles. Co-operative societies are mutual organisations in which
profits are only distributed to members in line with the rules of the society. For
community benefit societies, any profits are ploughed back into the organisation
for the benefit of the community the society is designed to benefit. Democracy is
paramount and different classes of member are not permitted. For this reason, many
trade unions are established as registered societies.
1 There were several Industrial and Provident Society Acts, namely 1965, 1967, 1975, 1978 and 2002.
Registered societies are now governed by the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014
(CCBA 2014).
A2.49 Establishment of a sports organisation as a registered society is usually on

the basis that it is a co-operative organisation. The Rugby Football Union is organised
as a registered society, as are certain rugby, cricket and golf clubs and many of the
football club supporters’ organisations.
A2.50 Like a company, a registered society is a legal entity in its own right and
can therefore hold property and sue and be sued in its own name. The structure also
affords limited liability to its members.
A2.51 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is responsible for the maintenance
of the public registers for registered societies. An application to register an
organisation as a registered society needs to be made to the FCA,1 which will
scrutinise the proposed rules (and also any changes subsequently proposed to the
rules) to ensure compliance with the requirements of the CCBA 2014. Annual returns
and annual accounts are also required to be lodged with the FCA.
1 Mutual Societies, Financial Conduct Authority, 12 Endeavour Square, London E20 1JN (email:
mutual.societies@fca.org.uk).
A2.52 Most sports organisations will choose to incorporate as companies rather

than registered societies, because companies are cheaper1 and simpler to administer,
and (perhaps more importantly) because most practitioners are more familiar
with companies than registered societies. However, if a sports organisation owns
substantial real property, the transfer of which to a new incorporated body would
attract a substantial tax liability,2 then incorporation as a registered society may be
preferable, because (in simple terms) the association ‘becomes’ the registered society
rather than having to transfer its assets to a new entity. Specialist advice should be
sought.
1 The fees currently payable in respect of registration, rule changes and annual returns are significantly
greater in respect of registered societies compared to limited companies.
2 See para A2.56.
C Changing legal structure
A2.53 From time to time and for a variety of reasons, sports organisations may
want to change their legal structure. For example, an unincorporated association may
wish to incorporate as a company limited by guarantee or by shares or as a registered
society; while a registered society may wish to convert into a company; and a private
company may wish to become a public company and float on the stock market. In
such cases, professional advice should be obtained to ensure compliance with the
organisation’s existing constitution and with all applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements and procedures.
A2.54 The incorporation of an unincorporated association as a company is

complicated. Below is set out a brief summary of the steps that will need to be
taken:
(a) It will be necessary to ensure that the unincorporated association has power to
dissolve and is also able to pass its assets by way of a scheme of reconstruction
to a separate entity before a resolution to transfer the assets and undertaking to
that entity is proposed. This may necessitate a change in the existing rules at
the same time.
(b) A company will need to be established with an appropriate constitution to which
the unincorporated association’s assets and undertakings can be transferred.
The constitutional documents are likely to need a considerable amount of
work before they reflect the association’s current structure and to include
any changes to its structure for the future. In particular, incorporation can
provide the opportunity to streamline the way the unincorporated association
is governed and administered.
(c) The company will need to be incorporated and all the necessary Companies
House forms completed in readiness.
(d) The transfer resolution will need to be prepared. This must identify all the
assets to be transferred and set out the date on which the transfer will take place
(which should be some time after the date of the meeting at which the transfer
resolution is proposed, to allow for administrative matters to be dealt with). It
will usually also provide that the unincorporated association will be dissolved
after the transfer.
(e) The relevant tax clearances will need to be obtained from Her Majesty’s
Revenue & Customs. Re-registration for PAYE may be required.
(f) The transfer resolution will need to be put to a general meeting of the members
and passed by the appropriate majority.
(g) All the pre-completion matters will need to be addressed. The members of
the unincorporated association will have to apply to be members of the new
company before the effective date of the transfer. The various Companies House
forms will need to be filed. The employees (having been consulted beforehand
about the change) will need to be informed of their new employer, as the TUPE
regulations will apply. All the unincorporated association’s contracts will
need to be novated in favour of the new company. The documents to transfer
any property, or assign any lease, or transfer any investments, will need to
be completed. The association’s bank will need to be informed and a new
mandate completed. The association will need to re-register at the Information
Commission. New stationery and other documents for the new company will
have to be ordered.
A2.55 After completion, the unincorporated association will usually be dissolved.

However, that should be avoided if legacies are expected. In addition, there may be
certain assets of the unincorporated association that are particularly valuable and
that will need protecting either by being retained in the unincorporated association
(eg an historic insurance policy left for the benefit of the unincorporated association’s
officers relating to a liability that arose before incorporation) or by being kept in
a separate company to the newly incorporated company (eg property assets or a
portfolio of stocks and shares ring-fenced from the newly incorporated operating
company in order to protect those assets from a future claim brought by a member of
the operating company).
A2.56 Incorporation as a company limited by guarantee can be structured so that it

is tax neutral for capital gains tax if it is a ‘scheme of reconstruction’ under s 139 of
the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. Any mutual status of the association for
corporation tax purposes should be preserved if a guarantee company is used. If the
association owns property, the transfer of that property to the new company will fall
within the scope of stamp duty land tax, but (depending upon the circumstances of
the particular unincorporated association) there may be an applicable exception such
that there is no tax to pay. Specialist advice should be sought on such a transfer.
A2.57 Where an unincorporated sports organisation wants to become a registered

society rather than a company (eg to avoid stamp duty land tax: see para A2.52), it
will be necessary to ensure that new rules are adopted or the existing rules changed
by a resolution of the members so that they comply with the requirements of the
Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. This should enable the
organisation to be registered with the FCA. Before putting the resolution to the
members, it is advisable to consult with the FCA to ensure that it will register the
organisation if the new rules are adopted.
A2.58 If a registered society wishes to convert into a company, it will be necessary

to follow the procedure set out in the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies
Act 2014. There will need to be liaison with both the FCA and Companies House
relating to the logistics of conversion because, unlike an incorporation of an
unincorporated association, the company will not be established in advance of the
conversion.
A2.59 Where a private company limited by shares converts to a public company,

there will need to be compliance with the Companies Act 2006 requirements and any
applicable Stock Exchange regulations. A summary of that process is beyond the
scope of this book and reference should be made to a specialist work.
D Charitable status
A2.60 There can be substantial financial benefits from being registered as a charity,
including both tax and business rates relief, as well as eligibility to receive grants.1
Prior to implementation of the Charities Act 2006, the promotion of sport was not in
itself a charitable purpose, meaning that an organisation set up to promote sport would
not generally be considered a charity.2 Under the 2006 Act (later consolidated in the
Charities Act 2011), however, the ‘advancement of amateur sport’ is a charitable
purpose in its own right. This means that:
(a) established sports charities may be able to extend their remit (if their objects
allow pursuit of other charitable activities);
(b) not-for-profit organisations that already advance amateur sport (but were
previously not charities) may now be charities and obliged to register with the
Charity Commission; and
(c) funders of charities may be able to fund a body that ‘advances amateur sport’
even if that body is not a charity, which means that a national governing body
may be able to seek funds for grassroots activities from grant-making charities.
At the time of the 2006 Act it had been thought that this could lead to a major
expansion in the use of charities to run grassroots sports activities. While this has
happened, at least to some extent, two countervailing factors have been a lack of
clarity as to the full legal impact of the change in the law, and the scope (since 1 April
2017) for governing bodies to claim a corporate tax deduction for funding grassroots
sport.3
1 See para I1.116 et seq.

2 That said, sport could be a means of achieving another charitable purpose, for example, where it was
part of the education of young people or people with a disability. Organisations providing certain multi-
sports facilities could also be charities under the Recreational Charities Act 1958 (now consolidated
with other charity legislation in the Charities Act 2011).
3 Introduced by s 22 of the Finance (No 2) Act 2017.
A2.61 Notwithstanding the passage of time since the 2006 Act received Royal
Assent, the Charity Commission has not yet issued guidance on what it considers the
‘advancement of amateur sport’ to mean. A consultation document posing a number
of questions was published on 28 February 2011,1 but this did not result in draft
guidance and no further information from the Commission has yet been forthcoming.
Consequently, a number of unanswered questions remain in relation to the scope
and meaning of the ‘advancement of amateur sport’. That said, decisions made by
the Commission in the intervening period provide an idea of the Commission’s
thinking on at least some of these points. A small number of governing bodies have
successfully registered as charities during this period,2 although this is still unusual
for non-para sport governing bodies.
1 Charity Commission, ‘Consultation on the Advancement of Amateur Sport’ (February 2011),
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140506132343/http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/
media/94901/pbaas.pdf [accessed 29 June 2020].
2 By way of example, British Dressage was registered as a charity in 2014 and The Amateur Swimming
Association (Swim England) Limited was registered in 2017.
A2.62 The first issue is that where a charitable purpose had a particular meaning
under charity law as at the date the 2006 Act came into force, it is prescribed to
continue to bear that meaning. There is therefore an argument that the purpose
‘advancement of amateur sport’ has the meaning set out in the 2003 Charity
Commission Guidance document, ‘RR11 – Charitable Status and Sport’,1 which
recognised as charitable the promotion of community participation in healthy
recreation by providing facilities for playing particular sports. The authors’ view,
however, is that RR11 represents guidance on the previous decision to recognise
as charitable ‘community participation in healthy recreation’, rather than existing
charity law on ‘the advancement of amateur sport’, which is different from and
potentially much wider than community participation in healthy recreation. Until
RR11 is revisited in the long-awaited guidance on ‘the advancement of amateur
sport’, however, this question will unfortunately remain open.2
1 gov.uk/government/publications/charitable-status-and-sport-rr11 [accessed 29 June 2020].
2 It is very much to be hoped that the Charity Commission will amalgamate RR11 with any new
guidance it issues. With the law having been broadened in this area, leaving RR11 as it is would be
confusing and potentially misleading for sports organisations.
A2.63 The second issue is again a question of interpretation: there is no definition

of either ‘amateur’ or ‘amateur sport’. The Commission’s 2011 consultation asked
what criteria it ought to use when deciding whether what is being advanced is an
‘amateur’ sport. Until it issues guidance, however, the position remains unclear. It
had previously been suggested that the definition of ‘amateur’ used for community
amateur sports clubs in Chapter 9 of Part 13 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 (as
amended by the Community Amateur Sports Club Regulations 2015) should be used
in this context – which would mean that the organisation would have to be non-
profit-making, could not provide benefits other than those prescribed by HMRC as
suitable for an amateur sports club, could not exceed prescribed limits on the number
of paid players (and on the amount paid to such players), and would have to pass its
assets to another charity on dissolution.1 However, while there would certainly be
merit in such consistency, unless there is a specific provision (either by enactment or
in Charity Commission guidance) for ‘amateur’ to bear that meaning, as a matter of

legal interpretation it will bear its ordinary meaning, ie ‘non-professional’.
1 See para I1.126.
A2.64 The 2006 Act (now 2011 Act) defines ‘sport’ as ‘sports or games which
promote health by involving physical or mental skill or exertion’. The health
promoted does not have to be physical health, however, meaning that ‘mind sports’
such as chess or bridge can fall within the ambit of the new law, on the basis that they
promote mental well-being.1 Not every activity that involves some level of physical
or mental activity will be admissible. The physical or mental activity must involve
more than ‘effort’; it must amount to ‘skill or exertion’ and that skill or exertion
must be shown to promote health. Moreover, a decision of the First-tier Tribunal
(Charity) (which is empowered to consider appeals against decisions of the Charity
Commission) found that neither the Charity Commission nor the Tribunal ‘should
lightly reach findings, which result in the advantages of charitable status being
conferred in respect of activities for which the science base is less than robust’.2
1 By way of example, in February 2011 the Charity Commission registered Hitchin Bridge Club as a
charity: see gov.uk/government/publications/hitchin-bridge-club [accessed 29 June 2020].
2 Cambridgeshire Target Shooting Association v The Charity Commission for England and Wales
(CA\2015\0002), para 61.
A2.65 The Charity Commission’s February 2011 consultation document suggested

that the effect of the 2006 Act is that organisations concerned with advancing sports or
games may apply to register as a charity if they satisfy the following characteristics:
(a) the organisation advances a sport or game;
(b) that sport or game promotes health;
(c) that sport or game involves physical or mental skill or exertion;
(d) that sport or game is an ‘amateur’ sport or game;
(e) the organisation has aims that are exclusively charitable; and
(f) the sport or game is advanced ‘for the public benefit’.
A2.66 In order to obtain charitable status, therefore, as well as having a ‘charitable

purpose’ an organisation must demonstrate that it is established for the ‘public
benefit’. In September 2013, the Charity Commission published final guidance
on the public benefit requirement under the 2006 Act (by then consolidated in the
2011 Act). This followed earlier guidance which was published in January 2008 and
subsequently withdrawn following a decision of the Upper Tribunal in October 2011
about the Commission’s guidance on public benefit and fee-charging in relation to
educational charities. It is clear from the guidance that the position of the Charity
Commission is that the 2006 and 2011 Acts did not substantively change the existing
law on public benefit, and therefore the following aspects must be considered:
(a) The ‘benefit’ aspect – to satisfy this aspect:
(i) the purpose must be beneficial; and
(ii) any detriment or harm that results from the purpose must not outweigh
the benefit.
(b) The ‘public’ aspect – to satisfy this aspect:
(i) the purpose must benefit the public in general, or a sufficient section of
the public; and
(ii) the purpose not give rise to more than incidental personal benefit.
A2.67 Questions remain as to the application of these aspects of public benefit to

the new charitable purpose of ‘advancement of amateur sport’. It is to be hoped that
the long-awaited guidance from the Charity Commission provides clarity on this
point.
A2.68 The first principle is likely to be satisfied by an organisation (typically a club

or county association) enabling people to engage in a particular sport. However, the
second aspect raises difficult questions when considered in the context of the sports
sector. The majority of clubs, county leagues and county associations are operating
(at one level or another) within a competition structure and not in isolation. The
competitive nature of most sports requires there to be a number of participant clubs,
and as a result the aim of each club is likely to be to improve its standing within that
competition as well as enabling their members to participate in sport. The authors do
not consider that such an aim conflicts with charitable status. On the contrary, it is
needed to promote success of the sport and make it attractive to participants.
A2.69 The authors’ view is that the second aspect needs to be set within the
context of providing access to the sport. This may be on a defined geographical
basis. A county association that exists to advance a particular sport in a particular
county should be capable of satisfying the public benefit requirement even though it
runs county competitions in which only the best players from the county compete.
Correspondingly at club level, there needs to be some recognition that as a club
develops it may promote higher standards (excellence), which will mean that a new
member may not be able to play in the first team. However, provided that membership
is open to all (subject to restrictions for safety reasons), the authors consider that such
an arrangement ought not to fall foul of the public benefit requirement.
A2.70 The second aspect has been hotly debated in the context of fee-charging
charities (particularly independent schools). It is likely that many sports clubs will
fall within this category, since many of them charge membership fees. The reality is
that the majority of grassroots sports clubs are run on a shoestring and seek only to
break even. In these circumstances, and as long as people on low incomes are not
entirely excluded,1 payment of a fee to join should not be a bar to charitable status.
1 Re Resch’s Will Trusts (1969) 1 AC 514.
A2.71 The Charity Commission’s general public benefit guidance was followed
by sector guidance on fee-charging charities (of particular relevance to sports clubs
that charge membership fees) and assessments of the public benefit provided by four
sports and leisure charities.1 While three of the charities assessed by the Commission
were adjudged to have met the public benefit criteria, Radlett Lawn Tennis and
Squash Club was not. The Commission determined that its membership fees were set
at a level that many people could not afford, and that there were limited opportunities
for those who could not afford membership fees to benefit from the club’s activities.
The Commission confirmed that Radlett Lawn Tennis and Squash Club was a charity,
but asserted that it did not, at the time of the assessment, deliver sufficient public
benefit. The authors understand that the club then began a dialogue with a view to
aligning its activities more closely with the Commission’s expectations on public
benefit. The Commission’s approach appeared to have implications for other sports
clubs or bodies that are or that wish to be registered as charities. However, following
a decision of the Upper Tribunal in October 2011 about the Commission’s guidance
on public benefit and fee-charging in relation to educational charities,2 parts of the
guidance were withdrawn and eventually replaced by new guidance on the ways that
trustees of fee-charging educational charities can ensure they run their charities for
the public benefit.3
1 Tintagel Memorial Playing Fields Association, Wigan Leisure and Culture Trust, Birmingham City
Football Club Community Trust, and The Radlett Lawn Tennis and Squash Club.
2 The Independent Schools Council v The Charity Commission for England and Wales and others
[2011] UKUT 421 (TCC).
3 gov.uk/government/publications/charging-for-services/charging-for-services-illustrative-examples-
of-benefits-for-the-poor [accessed 29 June 2020].
A2.72 The fee-charging point aside, the second aspect does raise an important
issue relating to the affordability of participation in certain sports. Ocean yachting,
polo, motor racing and equestrianism, for instance, are generally perceived as
expensive sports. An organisation established to advance amateur sport through these
sports may have difficulty satisfying this public benefit aspect where the costs of
participation require the participant to purchase the necessary equipment (yachts,
horses, motor cars). This will therefore need to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
A2.73 In relation to the requirement that any personal benefit should not exceed
what is incidental, the frequent practice of a sport is likely to lead to individuals or
teams improving their sporting prowess. At some point an individual or team may
excel so that they are able to earn a living by practising their sport and thereby gain
personally as a result. The question then arises as to whether the organisation of
which that individual or team is a member is no longer established for the public
benefit. It seems to the authors that the answer is likely to vary from sport to sport.
In football, for example, it may be fair for charitable status to be lost when a club
with a single team is promoted to a professional league. But what about the club
with a professional team and ten other amateur/junior teams? In an individual sport
(such as athletics), the penalty of private benefit may seem more acute. If an athlete
who is a role model for other club members turns professional, should he/she be
forced to leave the club because his/her professionalism jeopardises the club’s
status? These questions show that it is difficult to impose hard and fast rules about
the incidental nature of personal benefit, and it is to be hoped that at some stage the
Charity Commission issues guidance on ‘the advancement of amateur sport’ that
addresses this issue too. It should also be noted that some of these concerns can be
addressed simply through the structuring of a group that includes both charitable and
non-charitable entities.
A2.74 Even if they might advance amateur sport and so qualify for charitable status,
many clubs may well not want to go through the constitutional change required to
become a charity and adhere to the increased reporting standards required. Annual
reports and accounts have to be provided to the Charity Commission. Those persons
running the club may not want to become charity trustees and therefore bound by the
standards imposed on charity trustees by the Charities Act 2011 and the general law.
Any sports club with a social element (such as the running of a bar) would need to
establish a trading company subsidiary to run that activity, as it will not normally be
charitable. Any property owned by the sports club would become charitable property.
These ‘burdens’ of charitable status will have to be weighed against the financial
advantages of charitable status. The benefits from the charity tax regime would need
to be substantial to justify the burdens. Certain clubs, which have significant legacies
in sight, may be justified in making the change, but others may decide otherwise,
particularly since clubs that are not charitable are often still afforded favourable
tax status as a result of either not trading or (where they do trade) being mutual
organisations and getting some rate relief.1
1 See para I1.13. If an association has exclusively charitable objects, it will be a charity and must (if it
has an income over £5,000 a year) register with the Charity Commission. If the association does not
want the burden of being a charity, it must ensure that its objects are not exclusively charitable or that
it does not operate for the public benefit.
A2.75 Charities are usually constituted as charitable incorporated organisations

(CIOs), companies limited by guarantee, trusts or unincorporated associations
(although other structures, such as bodies incorporated by royal charter, may be
available in some cases).1 The CIO is a bespoke legal structure specifically designed
for (and solely for) use by charities. It provides an alternative to the company limited
by guarantee (which was not created with charitable status in mind). CIOs are
registered with and regulated by the Charity Commission but not Companies House,
thereby avoiding the dual regulation imposed on charitable companies. CIOs need
only file information (such as the annual return) with the Charity Commission. CIOs
are subject to the accounting and reporting requirements set out in the Charities Act
2011, which are less onerous than the Companies Acts accounting regime. Unlike
Companies House, the Charity Commission does not currently charge for registration
or the filing of information; nor does it levy late filing fees. The legal framework for
CIOs is still relatively new. As such, it has taken a little time for clubs and other
parties (such as funders and lenders) to understand the various requirements. There
are no plans to maintain a searchable register of charges over CIO assets comparable
to that maintained for companies by Companies House. This may discourage some
lenders from lending to CIOs where there is no land that can be offered as security for
the borrowing. The Charity Commission has produced model constitutions for CIOs,
and any organisation wishing to register as a CIO must adopt a constitution as close
as possible in form to one of the models. The Charity Commission has also produced
basic template constitutions for charitable trusts, unincorporated associations and
companies limited by guarantee that may be appropriate for use by sports charities
that do not require complex structures.2
1 See further paras A2.29 to A2.47.
2 gov.uk/government/publications/setting-up-a-charity-model-governing-documents [accessed 29 June
2020].

PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS
A2.76 The pyramidical structure of sports governance consisting of international

federation, regional federation and national federation is a helpful way of
understanding the traditional approach to sports governance in European and
(largely) international sport.1 Indeed, the ‘principle of a single federation per sport’2
is recognised by the European Commission. It undeniably remains a straightforward
and accurate prism through which to explain and understand the prevailing mode of
top-down regulation of sport. Yet it remains a blunt tool for capturing the systems of
organisation, ownership and control that have evolved in sports with multi-faceted
stakeholder relationships, particularly those with strong, autonomous professional
club competitions or individual athlete participants.
1 See paras A2.1 to A2.13. Of course, this structure does not have universal application. In particular, US
sports have their own structures and history, which require separate consideration (outside the scope of
this chapter).
2 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’, COM (2007) 391 final, 11 July 2007 at para 4.1.
A2.77 The economic development of sport, in particular the emergence of

professional sports leagues, has created an uneven, and at times complicated, rights
ownership system. Whereas amateur sport can typically be said to have allowed for a
singularly controlled elite competition structure, the increased commercial power of
club-owned or privately-owned competitions in professional sport has placed stresses
on the authority of governing bodies accustomed to control over the regulation and
organisation of the entire sport.
A2.78 English football is a case in point. While a club-controlled competition

(The Football League) has existed since the nineteenth century due to the early
professionalisation of the sport, the hegemony of The Football Association (The
FA) as domestic governing body can arguably be said to have been relatively
unthreatened, notwithstanding an at times uneasy relationship with The Football
League, until the formation of the Premier League in 1992.1 That The FA continues to
enjoy its consensual status as national governing body with authority over domestic
professional football competition is due to the clubs and The FA and the Premier
League having been able to agree a means of co-existence, enshrined through The
FA’s ‘golden share’ in the Premier League.2
1 In turn, The FA sits within the classical pyramid structure for football headed by FIFA. First formed
in 1904 of seven members, by the first FIFA World Cup (in 1930) there were 41 members, and today
FIFA oversees six confederations, who themselves direct the 211 affiliated associations. Each has
its own geographical or functional sphere of competence for the regulation of the sport but remains
beholden to the organisations above them.
2 See paras A2.96 and A2.108.
A2.79 Other sports have fared less well in finding an accommodation between the
interests of governing bodies and professional sports competitions. Individual sports,
in particular, have suffered from the fragmentation of governance and control.1 It is
obvious that for the accommodation of interests to operate successfully, there needs
to be either a commercial or legal imperative for such accommodation. Where neither
exist, instability will invariably follow.2
1 Boxing is the classic example of this fragmentation. See further para A2.90.
2 Darts has suffered more than most sports from schism, most notably in the 1990s during the legal
battle between the incumbent British Darts Organisation and a breakaway player-led organisation, the
World Darts Council (now the Professional Darts Corporation).
A2.80 The following sections of this chapter consider how the legal basis for the
relationship between governing bodies, professional sports competitions and their
participants is commonly structured, both in the case of governing body-controlled
competitions and in the case of autonomous events run by teams or private entities.
The focus is on the systemic framework in which these relationships exist, thrive
and wither, with particular emphasis on ownership of rights. For a more detailed
explanation of the governance and regulatory framework applying between governing
bodies and competitions, readers are urged also to consider Chapter A1.1
6 THE DEGREE OF RETENTION OF RIGHTS BY GOVERNING

BODIES IN NATIONAL TEAM, INDIVIDUAL, AND CLUB
COMPETITION
A International competitions for national teams
A2.81 The development of professional sports competitions has not led in

every case to governing bodies losing rights holding and organisational control to
those competitions. Indeed, at the level of international sport involving national
representative teams, it remains typical that competition is organised and managed
under the auspices of the sport’s international governing body.
A2.82 The quadrennial World Cups in rugby union and football are examples of
this. The Rugby World Cup is rugby union’s most recognised and profitable event,
the rights in which are vested in Rugby World Cup Limited, a ‘subsidiary’ of World
Rugby.1 In turn, the host nation for each tournament, selected by a vote of the World
Rugby Council (consisting of national member unions), will set up a local organising
entity to deliver on the operational aspects of the tournament pursuant to a host nation
agreement between the local entity and Rugby World Cup Limited. All commercial
rights in the competition, save for ticketing and agreed local rights, remain vested
in Rugby World Cup Limited, and the devolution of operational control to the host
union is strictly by reference to the agreed parameters of the host union agreement.
Accordingly, there is a clear reservation of ultimate authority and commercial benefit

by the international governing body. Teams participate in the competition on a
contractual basis under a participation agreement and subject to a universal set of
competition rules. Similarly, the 32 nations who qualify for the FIFA World Cup2 will
compete in an event which has been run by FIFA since the event’s inauguration in
1930.3
1 World Rugby (formerly the International Rugby Board) is the recognised international governing body
for rugby union. As already noted, constitutionally it exists as an association of its member unions,
rather than as a corporate entity. For this reason, Rugby World Cup Limited is not a ‘subsidiary’, in its
strict legal sense, of World Rugby.
2 The number of qualifying nations will increase to 48 for 2026.
3 This structure continues to be followed as the favoured model by governing bodies for new international
competitions. For example, the International Hockey Federation (the FIH) launched the FIH Pro-
League, a round-robin style international field hockey tournament, as a centrally owned and controlled
competition to which competing national federations were enjoined by a participation agreement.
A2.83 This structure carries with it substantial benefits for a governing body, such
as a coherent set of entry and participation rules; central retention of commercial
rights (and the revenues derived therefrom); the ability to delegate local matters
of organisation and planning; and the transfer of commercial risk for hosting the
event and ticket sales to the host federation (often in return for a minimum revenue
guarantee).
A2.84 Another tangible benefit is that it allows, in theory, for the direct flow of
event revenue to all levels of the sport. The Olympic Charter, for example, stipulates
this as a fundamental principle of the Olympic Movement to be strictly adhered to by
the IOC.1 The so-called 2013–16 Games2 generated revenue of $ 5.7 billion. Whilst
10% is earmarked for the operational and administrative costs of governing the
Olympic Movement, the remaining 90% is used for the holding of the Games and for
the development of athletes.3 Other competitions may provide for more substantial
distributions to member federations according to sporting performance, historical
status, and financial need. However, a common feature of competitions controlled by
international governing bodies is that their members can ultimately control how, and
in what proportions, distributions of revenue are made.
1 Olympic Charter (2019), Rule 5 and Rule 24.2.
2 Being comprised of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics.
3 See the Olympic Games website: olympic.org/funding.
B Club competition
A2.85 If international competitions featuring national teams tend towards a model

of ownership and control by the governing body, club competitions might generally be
said to be owned and controlled by their participants. This is largely a consequence of
commercially powerful and well organised participating teams having prised control
from a governing body that may previously have controlled competitions while the
sport was amateur or less commercially attractive. For obvious reasons, a model of
club ownership delivers economic opportunity to clubs, usually at the price of the
governing body, and has been considered desirable by participating teams. Further
consideration of the operation of autonomous club leagues and competitions is found
in paragraphs A2.95 to A2.113.
A2.86 Nonetheless, there are significant club competitions that continue to

fall under governing body ownership and control. In football, these include The
FA Cup, the FIFA Club World Cup, and the UEFA Champions League. Indeed,
UEFA have confirmed their intention to introduce a third club competition
alongside the Champions League and Europa League. However, it is notable that
notwithstanding UEFA’s control of the Champions League, economic ownership
is heavily concentrated in the participating teams. The gross commercial revenue
from the 2018/19 UEFA Champions League (combined with the Europa League
and UEFA Super Cup) was estimated at around €3.25bn, of which €522.5m was
set aside to cover solidarity payments and organisational costs, leaving a resulting
net revenue of €2.73bn, 6.5% to remain with UEFA, and 93.5% to be distributed
amongst participating clubs.1 Were UEFA not willing to distribute this proportion
to teams, its ownership and control of the Champions League would come under
challenge.2
1 As an indication of the economic importance of the revenue share from the Champions League, Celtic
FC received six times as much from participating in the Champions League group stage as they did
from Scotland’s domestic TV deal.
2 The periodical traction that the notion of a European Super League for top teams garners indicates the
potential challenge.
A2.87 Less commercially developed sports properties may also feature a model of
central governing body control. Where possible, governing bodies will typically seek
to retain ownership of club competitions, if commercial and political realties allow,
in order to receive the benefits identified above. The FA, for instance, relaunched
The FA Women’s Super League (the top-flight women’s club football competition
in England) for the 2018/19 season as a centrally owned and controlled competition
to which teams adhere under the terms of the Women’s Super League licence. It
is informative to contrast this with the model adopted for the men’s equivalent in
England, where commercial power has dictated a club-owned competition, the
Premier League.1
1 Another example of a governing body-owned club competition in European sport is PRO14 rugby.
In contrast to its English counterpart, the Premiership, which is owned by the participating clubs, the
PRO14 (the domestic rugby competition for Welsh, Scottish, Irish, Italian and certain South African
teams) is owned by the three Celtic Unions, each of which holds a share in the private company
operating the competition (while the Italian and the South African Rugby Unions, participate by
contract).
C Individual sports competitions
A2.88 Individual sports are less consistently associated with singular governing
body control. The four major tournaments representing the apex of professional
tennis and golf, for example, are outside the direct ownership and control of any
overarching international governing body. The tennis Grand Slams are owned by
the relevant national association (or in the case of Wimbledon, by the All England
Lawn Tennis Club) and operate with the sanction of the International Tennis
Federation (ITF). Those four owners work together collectively as the Grand Slam
Board, which coordinates the general management, direction, financial control and
governance of the majors. Below Grand Slam level, men’s tennis is overseen by
the ATP, which sanctions 64 tournaments, and women’s tennis by the WTA, with
individual tournaments typically owned and run by independent organisations
receiving funding through private sponsorship, broadcasting deals and ticketing. The
ITF runs professional circuits below the ATP and WTA circuits, as well as the Davis
Cup and Fed Cup.
A2.89 In a similar fashion, golf’s most noteworthy individual contests (the

US Open, US Masters, Open Championship, and PGA Championship) are owned
and controlled by national governing bodies rather than an international entity with
overarching responsibility.1 If we also count the Ryder Cup, the top level US golf
tour (the PGA Tour), and the top level European golf tour (the European Tour) as
the pinnacles of elite competition in the sport, the number of competing ownership
and governance groups include the PGA Tour (US), the PGA European Tour, the
Professional Golf Association (UK), the Professional Golf Associations of Europe,
and the R&A. It is no wonder that golf is seen by potential new entrants to the market
as a sport ripe for disruption.2
1 The USPGA owns and controls the US Open, US Masters, and the PGA Championship. The Royal
and Ancient Golf Club of St Andrews (R&A) plays this role for the British Open.
2 At the time of writing, the latest entrant circling is the proposed Premier Golf League, a multi-
tournament series for the top 48 players in the world that both the PGA Tour and the European Tour have
been vocal in rejecting as a competition in which its players can participate: ‘Tiger Woods considering
approach from PGA rival Premier Golf League’, Guardian, 11 February 2020 (theguardian.com/
sport/2020/feb/11/tiger-woods-premier-golf-league-approach-pga [accessed 17 November 2020]).
A2.90 At the extreme is boxing, where the highest level of professional

competition operates almost entirely outwith the jurisdiction of the IOC’s recognised
international governing body, the Association Internationale de Boxe Amateur. Four
major sanctioning bodies vie for position: the World Boxing Council, the World
Boxing Association, the International Boxing Federation, and the World Boxing
Organization. Each of them sanctions matches, ranks fighters and holds its own
world championship, leading to the often confusing situation whereby four different
fighters could each call themselves world champions within their weight category.1
Commercial rights to bouts and the responsibility for organising them are privately
held, either directly or indirectly by the fighters, their promoters, the broadcasters, or
other private individuals or entities. While the licence from the relevant sanctioning
body provides a contractual route to impose certain minimum standards, these can
be widely divergent and do not deliver a clear governance system. Recent doping
scandals in the sport have illustrated the issues presented by this lack of convergence.2
1 Rafael Tenorio, ‘On the competitive structure in professional boxing, or why the best boxers very
seldom fight each other’, in Wladimir Andreff & Stefan Szymanski (ed), Handbook on the Economics
of Sport (2006, Edward Elgar Publishing).
2 The case of British heavyweight Dillian Whyte is salient. As with many boxing fights, Whyte and
his opponent, Oscar Rivas, had agreed to voluntary testing under the auspices of the Voluntary Anti-
Doping Association (VADA) ahead of their match, with each fighter passing all tests. In addition,
UK Anti-Doping (UKAD) conducted tests, one of which produced a positive sample for Whyte.
This led to a conflict between the contractual position between the fighters, which dictated the bout
should continue in the absence of any failed VADA test, and the sanctioning regulator, the British
Boxing Board of Control, which is bound by the National Anti-Doping Policy (see para C2.22).
An independent panel on the day of the bout cleared the fight to proceed without Rivas having any
awareness of the failed test. Similar controversies have arisen with other prominent fighters, not least
Saul ‘Canelo’ Alvarez, widely considered one of the pre-eminent pound-for-pound fighters in world
boxing, who tested positive for the banned drug, clenbuterol, during voluntary testing ahead of his
rematch with Gennady Golovkin in 2018. With the Nevada Athletic Commission in charge of sanction,
few were surprised at the eventual outcome of a reduced ban, allowing one of boxing’s most valuable
bouts to take place on Mexican Independence Day to a lucrative pay-tv audience of Mexican and
Mexican origin Canelo fans.
A2.91 While the lack of central ownership and governance in a sport can create
confusion, it must also be conceded that the model of athlete- or promoter-owned
competition, in theory, allows for the participating athletes to maximise their
commercial potential. Whereas, to revert to the example of tennis, the Grand Slam
tournament owners benefit significantly from a share of the revenues generated
before delivering prize monies to athletes, boxing is the ultimate example of an
individualistic approach to competition ownership where the purse is, in principle,
split between fighters in agreed proportions. In practice, this may not deliver a greater
proportion of revenues to boxers over other athletes once the large commissions
taken by managers and promoters are taken into account, but it does effectively
remove governing bodies from having any meaningful economic participation,
perpetuating the fragmented regulatory market in the sport. Contrast this position
with another combat sport, mixed martial arts, where a dominant organising body
exists in the form of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC), which operates as
owner and regulator of its sport. The UFC retains the substantial majority of revenues
it generates, leaving an average fighter wage share of 20% of event revenue.1
1 For an excellent analysis of the finances of UFC, see ‘What we now know about the UFC finances’,
Bloody Elbow, 9 September 2019 (.bloodyelbow.com/2019/9/9/20851990/what-we-now-know-about-
the-ufc-finances [accessed 17 November 2020]).
D Structures adopted by governing bodies for owned and

controlled competitions
A2.92 How then do governing bodies structure the ownership and control of their
own competitions? A common option is to set up a quasi-autonomous competition
board or subsidiary, either to make decisions on, or to own and exercise rights in, the
competition. Depending on the extent of legal distinction between the competition
body and the federation as a whole, this may allow for liability to be contained in
the competition entity. It should also afford the competition body greater flexibility
and efficiency in decision making, whilst also ensuring that the competition is run
according to the core rules and values of its parent company under delegated or
devolved authority.
A2.93 The organisational structure of the UEFA Champions League is a good

illustration of this.1 UEFA is comprised of 19 standing committees and six expert
panels, sitting under the control of the UEFA Executive Committee. One of these
committees is the Club Competitions Committee (the CCC), which oversees the
UEFA Champions League and other UEFA-run club competitions. The CCC is itself
formed of a chairman and deputy chairman selected from the Executive Committee,
as well as vice-chairmen and ordinary members (as considered necessary for the
proper functioning of the CCC).
1 See UEFA website: uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/committees-panels/ [accessed 17 November
2020].
A2.94 Another example is the Rugby World Cup. Rugby World Cup Limited
(RWCL) is a private limited company established as a ‘subsidiary’1 of World Rugby
and responsible for the management of the Rugby World Cup, Women’s Rugby
World Cup, and Rugby World Cup Sevens. The RWCL Board is comprised of
seven directors who are accountable to and report to the World Rugby Executive
Committee, but the Executive Committee has no power to overrule a decision of the
RWCL Board.2 RWCL will (amongst other things) audit the host nation’s accounts
and oversee their arrangements, consider match venues, hold the commercial rights
to the events, and select event sponsors and broadcasting partners to whom rights will
be granted.3
1 See para A2.82, n 1.
2 This autonomy is enshrined in World Rugby bye-law 10.4(e). See also bye-law 10.4(l)(iv), which
excludes RWCL from the procedures and protocols of World Rugby.
3 The model for the organisation of the Six Nations Championship is similar. In this case, the Unions
of each of the six participating nations (England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland and Wales) pool the
broadcasting and title sponsorship rights over their home international ties under the auspices of the
Six Nations Committee, while retaining ticketing rights and advertising and lesser sponsorship rights
to their respective home matches for individual exploitation, The Championship itself is organised
under the auspices of the Six Nations Committee, which is comprised of the individual Unions but
functions according to its elected 12-member Council, its own constitution, and the bye-laws of World
Rugby. The Six Nations Committee then further divests the everyday running of the competition to
its registered services company, Six Nations Rugby Limited, which carries out certain designated
services and organises the central exploitation of the broadcasting rights and title sponsorship rights to
the Championship.
7 AUTONOMOUS PROFESSIONAL SPORTS COMPETITIONS
A Common features
A2.95 A feature of sports competitions that exist outside the ownership and control
of a governing body is the formation of a new entity, distinct from the governing
body in terms of legal identity, ownership and management, to own and operate the
competition.1
1 For different types of constitutional structure deployed by those entities, see paras A2.27 to A2.52.
A2.96 Returning to the example of English football, within the established

hierarchy of The FA (at national level), UEFA (at regional level), and FIFA (at global
level), there has been a long-standing separation of the professional game from
amateur football – first, through the establishment of a private company owned by
the clubs, the Football League (now the English Football League), and secondly,
through the formation of the Premier League to protect the interests of the most
commercially attractive clubs in the top flight league.1 These private companies retain
control over the economic rights and administrative running of the competitions in
which their respective member clubs participate, while submitting to the overall
jurisdiction and regulation of The FA in respect of on-field discipline, anti-doping
and anti-corruption regulation.2 Another notable feature of the Premier League is the
‘special share’ held by The FA in the Premier League, giving it a right to veto any
proposed changes to certain fundamental aspects, such as promotion and relegation.3
1 The Premier League’s 2016–19 broadcasting deals demonstrate the commercial weight of the league.
Domestic rights elicited £5.136 billion and the overseas market brought in a further £3 billion.
2 See para A2.108 regarding The FA’s retention of some of these rights.
3 See para A2.108.
A2.97 Club rugby, both league and union, further illustrates the preponderance of
participant-owned club competitions. The Premiership, the top tier of domestic rugby
union in England, takes the legal form of a private company owned by the clubs,
although this structure has recently been adjusted to allow for external investment
by the private equity firm, CVC Capital Partners. The Rugby Football Union as
governing body is not one of the shareholders. Instead, its relationship with the
Premiership is dictated by contract.1 Rugby league’s equivalent, the Super League,
is similarly owned by the clubs, with the rights vested in a private company formed
for the purpose. In that case, the Rugby Football League holds a ‘special share’ akin
to The FA’s in the Premier League, and also enjoys a contractual relationship with
the Super League governing areas of operational cooperation and control and the
distribution of revenues.2
1 See para A2.22.
2 See A2.109.
A2.98 In each of the examples above, the devolution of ownership and control to an
autonomous entity can be described as consensual. That is to say that the governing
body has acceded to the emergence of a club-controlled competition, not necessarily
without a significant degree of negotiation or, at times, tension in the relationship, but
at least without recourse to the courts.
B Disputed relationships between governing body and

competition owner
A2.99 In other cases, the path towards autonomy has been less smooth. In rugby
union, European club rugby competition remains in the hands of the national unions
whose teams participate in the tournament, but only after threats of litigation and
ultimately mediation to ensure a change to the revenue distribution and format of the
competition to suit the participating clubs.1
1 The European Rugby Cup Limited (ERC) set up the European Cup with a Board responsible for
the implementation of ERC’s strategy for European club rugby. The ERC Board was made up of
representatives of the six shareholder unions (who take part in the Six Nations), as well as league
bodies and club representatives. However, owing to concerns over the running of the competition
and distribution of the revenue generated, PRL and its French counterpart, the LNR, served notice on
the ERC Board in June 2012, citing an intention to establish an independent club competition. This
disunity sparked mediation meetings between ERC Board members and led to a change to revenue
distribution and the reformatting of the competition as the European Rugby Champions Cup.
A2.100 Where it is not possible to reach an accommodation between the governing

body and the operator of a sports competition, a governing body may seek to exert its
authority by enforcing restrictions under its rules. In general, those restrictions can
be said to manifest themselves in two ways: (i) the imposition of rules against new
entrants, and/or (ii) the sanction of athletes who participate in unapproved events.
Cricket, swimming, and speed skating have all been subject to high profile disputes
between competitions and governing body related to the exercise of sanctioning
control by the governing body, considered elsewhere in this book.1
1 See paras A1.70 et seq.
C Models of governing body and professional sports competition

relationship
A2.101 Where an autonomous professional league or competition has emerged

that operates with the tacit or explicit sanction of the governing body, the level of
formality and choice of structure for the relationship between governing body and
competition organiser can vary dramatically. There is no such thing as a common
approach, but some or all of the following features are likely to exist:
(a) consensual co-existence by adherence to regulations and overall sporting
governance of the governing body;
(b) a contractual model pursuant to which the governing body and competition
organiser agree the terms of their cooperation and co-existence in a stand-alone
contract; and
(c) a shareholder model in which the governing body holds a ‘special share’ in the
entity operating the competition.
(a) Consensual co-existence
A2.102 Consensual co-existence underpins all autonomous sports competitions that

operate with governing body sanction. In its simplest form, this requires the tacit
acceptance by the federation of the event taking place, and the tacit acceptance by the
event owner of the rules and regulations of the federation applying to its competition.
The rulebook of the governing body will invariably give it the power to regulate
any competition in its sport taking place within its area of geographical authority.1
It is also likely that the rulebook will submit teams or athletes participating in the
competition to its jurisdiction. Assuming the event owner accepts that authority,
consensual co-existence can therefore occur without further formality.2
1 See para A1.46.
2 For the reasons set out in para A2.103, it is likely that the governing body will wish to formalise the
relationship with a negotiated agreement. However, whether this is achievable will depend on the
respective bargaining power of the parties involved. In some cases, as much as a federation may wish
to agree further terms with the event owner, it may be forced into a position of begrudging acceptance
of undocumented, consensual co-existence. The Indian Premier League (IPL) is a case in point. The
T20 tournament is one of the most valuable brands in cricket, with a 2018 brand value of $6.3 billion.
The competition was introduced in 2008 by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), which
owns and runs the IPL. Therefore, on a national level, the BCCI as the Indian governing body enjoys a
strong position. The IPL is set up as a sub-committee of the BCCI. It is governed by a General Council
comprised of BCCI representatives and ‘directly accountable’ to the BCCI under its Memorandum of
Association and Rules and Regulations. The eight teams participating in the IPL have no ownership
or involvement in the running of the competition; instead, they are the successful bidders for an IPL
franchise and bound by a Franchise Agreement with the BCCI-IPL. These Agreements grant the
BCCI-IPL a right to a minimum percentage share of the central licensing income of the franchisees
and an exclusive right to the exploitation of the competition’s central rights. Cricket players are also
tied to the BCCI-IPL through centralised contracts and an implied acceptance of the Players’ Code of
Conduct submits them to the rules and regulations of the BCCI rather than the International Cricket
Council (ICC). Indeed, despite the BCCI having been a full member of the ICC since 1926, the
separation of the IPL from the ICC has been staunchly reiterated since establishment. So, whilst the
ICC recognises the IPL and assures no international matches are scheduled during its fixture window,
it remains without locus standi over the tournament and receives no revenue or rights from it.
A2.103 In practice, this is an over-simplification. It is usual that the governing body

would have reserved power in its rulebook to give express sanction to the competition;
and also to approve the calendar for the competition.1 Depending on the constitution
of the governing body, this may require a Board, Council or shareholder vote to
grant the necessary consent.2 It also creates a precarious position for the parties,
particularly the federation, in the absence of a binding legal relationship. All of the
matters that would be covered by a long-form agreement are undocumented, creating
a perpetual pressure for the parties to maintain an alignment of interests and vision
for the competition and its place within the sport as a whole.
1 See para A1.62.
2 For example, World Rugby Regulations require the regulation, co-ordination and approval of the
Council for any international match or competition (Reg 16). Regulation 9 also provides a specific
window for player release.
(b) Contractual agreement
A2.104 For this reason, governing bodies and competition owners will commonly
enter into a negotiated agreement documenting their relationship and terms of co-
existence. What areas might this cover?
(a) The respective areas of responsibility for governance and regulation of the
competition. An acknowledgement of acceptance of the federation’s rulebook
is a given, but it will be necessary to agree any devolved areas of responsibility
(for example, the implementation of competition-specific integrity rules). It
can be expected that areas of regulation on commercial matters will sit with
the competition owner, whereas matters of sport-wide regulatory concern will
continue to be the preserve of the governing body.1
(b) The process for setting the calendar and scheduling of the competition.
This may be supplemented by provisions of the governing body’s rulebook
requiring approval over these matters.2 A particular pressure will be agreeing
sufficient flexibility for the event owner to maximise its commercial appeal,
while affording sufficient protection to international competitions and other
domestic cup competitions.
(c) Provisions as to the required player release for participation in international
competition. There may be a basic position provided for under a global
federation’s rulebook, which a national governing body may seek to enhance by
agreement with the event owner, often in return for a compensatory payment.3
(d) Player management and welfare generally, including data sharing on the
medical condition and training load of players.
(e) The share (if any) of the commercial revenues generated by the competition
that will be delivered to the governing body.
(f) The creation of a governance structure affording the federation direct

representation on a competition board or specific competition sub-committee.
Depending on the balance of power between federation and event owner, this
representation may be limited to a regulatory committee, rather than the full
competition board.
(g) The ownership of intellectual property rights in the competition. An event
organiser may own all intellectual property rights in a competition; or the rights
may ultimately be owned by the governing body with an exclusive licence
granted to the event organiser to exploit them. In the latter example, provisions
on the share of commercial revenues will need to account for the governing
body’s ultimate ownership.
(h) The period of time over which the negotiated agreement will apply; and
termination rights.
1 An example of this would be The FA’s continuing authority to regulate and prosecute disciplinary
issues relating to participants in the Premier League. Rule B1(b) of The FA Rules provides for
competitions (such as the Premier League) to put in place any regulations they deem necessary. As
such, the Premier League has its own set of rules that govern the conduct of the competition and the
clubs within it. However, these regulations are expressly subject to The FA’s own rules, and where
matters impact on the sport as a whole (for example in cases of betting or racial abuse), The FA will
take its own disciplinary action and issue its own sanctions, independent of the Premier League. In
contrast are the commercial regulations, for example the requirements as to the display of commercial
partner advertising in stadia, control over enforcement of which resides with the Premier League as the
rights owner in the competition.
2 See para A1.62 and para A2.103.
3 Rugby union is a good example of a sport where governing bodies have sought to negotiate enhanced
player release provisions over and above those provided for under World Rugby rules to allow the
national team the greatest possible access to players. Both the RFU (see para A2.22) and the Welsh
Rugby Union through its professional rugby agreement with the four professional regional rugby
teams in Wales have negotiated enhanced player release.
A2.105 The Concorde Agreement (Concorde) in Formula One is one of the most
well-known and complicated negotiated agreements between an international
federation and a sports rights owner. Concorde has existed in various iterations since
1981 as the commercial agreement between the sport’s global governing body (the
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile), the commercial rights holder in Formula
One (the Formula One Group), and the participating teams. Its negotiation has been
made significantly more complicated by the fact that teams are individual signatories
to the agreement and by the private ownership of the Formula One Group. It covers all
of the aspects described in para A2.104 above, save for player release for international
duty, which is not applicable in the sport.1 Consistent areas of dispute between
signatories are the share of distributions from the sport and the overall programme and
technical direction of the sport. This has led to significant periods of disagreement and
brinkmanship around the time of Concorde renewal. A comparison could be drawn
with the collective bargaining process in US sports between the major leagues and
player associations concerning the terms of the players’ participation in those leagues,
which has frequently led to extended disputes and lock-outs where agreement cannot
be reached.2 Therein lies the fundamental weakness with a process of contractual
agreement between event owner and federation and teams, being the contract renewal
risk arising around the expiry of the agreed term of the negotiated agreement.
1 For a brief background of the Concorde Agreement and the protracted negotiations over its renewal,
see Norman Howell, ‘F1 owner and teams race to rewrite revenue split’, Financial Times, 25 May 2019
(ft.com/content/42c14d54-6a87-11e9-9ff9-8c855179f1c4 [accessed 17 November 2020])
2 Both the MLB and NHL have suffered from failed negotiations over collective bargaining agreements
(CBA). Over the course of its history, the MLB has experienced eight work stoppages (five strikes
and three lockouts), with the most recent causing the cancellation of the entire 1994/95 post-season,
including the World Series. Similarly, CBA disputes saw the cancellation of the 2004/05 NHL season.
The 2013 lockout led to a new CBA being signed between the NHL and NHLPA, and their mutual
refusal to trigger the opt-out provisions and re-open the CBA (2019) is surely a relief for hockey fans,
at least until its expiry after the 2021/22 season.
(c) Shareholder model
A2.106 A possible answer to this renewal risk is to adopt a shareholder model

that gives the governing body a share or membership interest in the entity owning
and operating the competition, typically as a separate class of share to ordinary
shareholders (the participants in the competition), with distinct rights attached.
A2.107 The rights attached to the governing body share are likely to be non-
economic.1 General voting rights may also be limited. The principal rights attaching
to the share are instead typically specific weighted voting or veto rights over non-
commercial matters of a sporting and regulatory nature relating to the competition.2
In order to protect the integrity of regulation of a sport as a whole and the place of
an autonomous competition in that framework, these rights may allow the governing
body through its own class of share an effective veto over certain decisions, while
leaving the other shareholders free to determine the commercialisation of the sport.
The veto will likely fall short of positive control, save over a handful of specific
regulatory matters that may be preserved as exclusive matters for the governing body
to determine. The share may also carry the right to appoint a director to the board.
The type of rights that may be enjoyed through governing body shareholding are best
illustrated by example.
1 It is more common for any revenue share between competition owner and governing body to be
addressed in a separate contract concerning areas of cooperation, although this is not always the case
and a special share may provide for economic rights.
2 These shares are often described as ‘golden shares’ in the same fashion as weighted voting right shares
held by governments in previously nationalised businesses that have since been privatised.
A2.108 Shares in The Football Association Premier League Limited (FAPL) are
held by the competition’s constituent member clubs through ordinary shares. In
addition to this and by virtue of its role as the sport’s national governing body, The
FA is afforded a ‘special share’ (also known as the ‘golden share’) in the FAPL.
This special shareholder status does not give The FA any involvement in the day-
to-day running of the FAPL or to full economic participation. For example, The
FA does not have a right to vote at general meetings and (other than in the very
limited circumstance of the FAPL’s dissolution) it does not have any right to receive
the capital or income of the FAPL. However, the special share does grant The FA
rights held only by it as the special shareholder. These rights are set out in full at
Articles 7.2 to 7.4 of the FAPL Articles of Association and include the right to:
(a) veto the appointment of the FAPL Chairman or Chief Executive;
(b) effect or prevent change of certain FAPL Articles through giving or withholding
written consent. This includes changes to the Articles governing the issue of
ordinary shares, adherence to The FA Rules, the conditions over winding up of
the FAPL, change of name, and the rules against multiple club ownership;
(c) be notified of, attend and participate in FAPL General Meetings; and
(d) priority of payment in the event of the FAPL winding up.
A2.109 The share held by the Rugby Football League (the RFL) in Super League
(Europe) Limited (the owner of the Super League rugby league competition) (SLE)
is another good example of this model. In the RFL’s case, its share enjoys economic
rights alongside the other club member shareholders. It also gives the RFL the right
to appoint a non-executive director to the SLE board. Its share ranks as a separate
class of share and provides the RFL with veto rights or, in some cases, exclusive
voting rights over certain non-commercial matters, including:
(a) changes to core provisions of the Articles, such as to share capital and class
rights or which otherwise materially adversely affect the RFL;
(b) changes to the name of the Super League;

(c) changes to the number of competing teams beyond agreed parameters;
(d) changes to promotion and relegation mechanisms outside agreed parameters;
(e) the commitment by the member clubs of SLE to abide by the RFL’s fixture list;
and
(f) the adoption or amendment of certain key rules or regulations, such as Salary
Cap Regulations, Operational Rules, and rules on common ownership.
(d) The involvement of private investors
A2.110 An increasingly prevalent feature of professional sports competitions is the

involvement of a third party private investor. Formula One has a long history of
private ownership, first through CVC Capital Partners and latterly through Liberty.1
Newer competitions will also frequently be backed by third party monies – UFC
being a prime example.2 Established sports have also demonstrated a recent appetite
for private investment, notably tennis and rugby union.3
1 Liberty purchased Formula One’s parent company, Delta Topco, from CVC in a two-stage acquisition
from 2016 to 2017 for a total enterprise and equity value of $12.4 bilion. Whilst the consortium of
sellers led by CVC retains shares and board representation in Formula One, the voting rights passed to
Liberty.
2 UFC’s parent company is owned 50.1% by sports and entertainment company Endeavor (itself private
equity backed) and 22.9% apiece by investment groups Silver Lake Partners and KKR: Chris Smith,
‘The Endeavor IPO is actually a risky bet on the future growth of UFC’, 19 September 2019 (forbes.
com/sites/chrissmith/2019/09/19/endeavor-ipo-ufc/#3fb00fa75839 [accessed 17 November 2020]).
3 Each of the UK’s top-level club rugby competitions, PRO14 and the Premiership has sold a minority
stake to CVC Capital Partners.
A2.111 Third party investment in sports commonly comes in the form of asset or
equity sales, but an alternative option is the contractual relationship of a partnership.
The Davis Cup has been reformatted for 2019 on the basis of such a partnership
between tennis’s governing body, the ITF, and the sport investment group, Kosmos.
Whilst this partnership has faced mixed reactions, with concerns over a congested
competition calendar and the required change in the competition format, the sale
to Kosmos of a 25-year licence to operate the Davis Cup will provide $3 billion to
the ITF for the worldwide development of tennis. For Kosmos, the partnership has
the potential to return high revenues through increasingly lucrative sponsorship and
broadcasting deals attracted by the funder’s running of the new one-week World Cup
style tournament as a marquee event. In the meantime, the sport will see around $125
million per annum entering all stages of the game, with $80 million being earmarked
for the Davis Cup and the remainder being used to fund future collaborative events,
tennis development programmes and grassroots projects throughout the member
nations.
A2.112 The balance to be struck between the interests of the investor and the
sporting participants or governing body will be a core area of negotiation. The same
issues that apply to the relationship between autonomous sports competitions and
governing bodies will apply in relation to any private investment or disposal of
commercial assets. While there has been a longstanding history of rights holders
selling or licensing exclusively commercial rights in sports properties to agencies
for onward exploitation, the emergence of private equity suitors has driven more
complicated structures requiring the grant of an equity interest in the sports
competition (or the commercial rights to it) to the investor, frequently combined with
a significant element of debt. This has created more difficult questions of governance,
given the inevitable tension between the economic interests of the investor and the
overall well-being, history and integrity of the sporting competition.
A2.113 One approach is to divest the commercial rights in the competition into a new
entity in which the investor holds shares, while leaving the governance and regulation
of the competition in club / governing body hands via a separate entity in which the
investor holds no equity interest. Nonetheless, there will remain considerable areas
of cross-governance to determine. Plainly, the commercial success of a competition
cannot operate in a vacuum from its governance and regulation. Therein lies the
challenge of distinguishing between matters that are purely commercial in nature,
matters that are purely questions of governance, and matters that are a hybrid
category, each of which may require their own decision-making framework. It may
be easy to identify the choice of title sponsor as a commercial matter, and anti-doping
and anti-corruption as governance issues, but what of matters such as setting the
calendar for the competition, which affects its appeal to broadcasters as much as it
affects player welfare and responsibilities to fans? With private investment in sport
only set to continue to gather pace, these issues will be rehearsed with increasing
frequency.
CHAPTER A3
Government Intervention in the Sports

Sector
Lewis Calder and Jonathan Taylor QC (both Bird & Bird LLP)*
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A3.1
2 THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY................................ A3.5
3 GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY................................................................... A3.9
A Early government sports policy................................................................... A3.11
B The National Lottery.................................................................................... A3.13
C A Sporting Future for All............................................................................. A3.16
D The Cunningham Review............................................................................. A3.18
E Game Plan.................................................................................................... A3.20
F The Carter Report........................................................................................ A3.22
G London 2012 and the Olympic Legacy........................................................ A3.23
G Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation............................... A3.32
I School Sport and Activity Action Plan........................................................ A3.35
A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP............................................................... A3.36
A Government departments and agencies that impact on the sports sector..... A3.37
B The three main methods of government intervention in sport..................... A3.60
*
The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Tim Payton of Park Street Partners to an earlier
edition of this chapter.
1 INTRODUCTION
A3.1 The aim of this chapter of the book is to consider the extent to which the
UK Government intervenes in the governance and regulation of the UK sport sector,
and the extent to which it leaves that task to the private, voluntary sector, ie the
national governing bodies of sport (SGBs). It explains how the approach has shifted
from a strictly non-interventionist stance to a more nuanced approach involving a
(sometimes uneasy) partnership with the SGBs to achieve public policy goals.
A3.2 The discussion starts with a brief narrative of the development of government
sports policy from the late 19th century through to the Labour administration in
power from 1996 to 2010, which recognised more than most of its predecessors
that the enormous public interest in sport makes it not just a populist tool, but also
a potent instrument to be harnessed in support of public policy goals,1 a recognition
undoubtedly encouraged by the successful bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games in
London.2 The story then looks at the approach taken by successive UK Governments,
firstly the Coalition Government in power between 2010 and 2015, which vowed to
deliver a ‘genuine and lasting legacy’ following London 2012,3 and then the recent
Conservative Governments, which have championed ‘Sporting Future: A New
Strategy for an Active Nation’ – the UK Government’s first new sporting strategy for
over a decade.4
Government Intervention in the Sports Sector 105
2 See para A3.23.

4 See para A3.32.
A3.3 The chapter then continues with a description of the various central
government departments and non-departmental public bodies that are responsible
for implementation of the UK Government’s sports policy and/or whose activities
otherwise impact upon the sports sector.1 That description then leads into a discussion
of the three different methods the government uses to pursue its public policy goals
in this area. At one extreme, there is direct legislative intervention in areas of
clear and pressing public interest.2 At the other extreme, there is mere exhortation/
persuasion of SGBs to comply with government wishes.3 And in between there is the
development of a formal public-private partnership, with the government regulating
the sector indirectly by conditioning SGBs’ access to public funding on compliance
with public policy objectives.4 That public-private partnership, fuelled by the flow
of significant Exchequer and Lottery funds to sporting causes, has prompted the
government to seek reform and modernisation of some of the practices of the private
sports movement, amounting to a degree of intervention in the administration of
sport, as well as in its regulatory imperatives, that at times departs significantly from
the traditional non-interventionist model.
A3.4 While the reaction of SGBs to each type of government intervention is often
to fall back to a jealous defence of its autonomous role (interpreting intervention as
interference), the sports movement increasingly realises that it requires government
support to respond effectively to its greatest regulatory challenges. The changes to
the regulatory landscape in the field of anti-doping illustrate the point.1
2 THE POWER OF SPORT, AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY
A3.5 Sport forms an integral part of popular culture in the UK, capturing the
hearts and minds of millions of people from every section of UK society.1 Indeed,
certain of the elite sports events are said to ‘unite the nation; [to be] a shared point
on the national calendar’, part of our common heritage and an expression of our
national identity.2 Millions of people are involved in amateur sport as a healthy and
sociable pastime, some as participants,3 others as volunteers4 and/or employees,
while millions more ‘consume’ elite sport as an entertainment ‘product’.5
1 When he became Prime Minister in July 2007, Gordon Brown noted: ‘Watching sport is a national
pastime. Talking about sport is a national obsession’: Department for Children, Schools and Family
(2007), ‘Five hours a week of sport for every child’. Research conducted by sportsthinktank.com in
2006 indicated that national newspapers devote four times as much coverage to sports stories as to
political stories.
2 Quote taken from appendix to a letter sent by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in November
1997 to various sports bodies, identifying the criteria for designating events to which public access
should be protected under the UK’s ‘listed events’ legislation: see para A3.83 et seq.
3 The Active Lives Adult Survey published by Sport England in October 2018 indicated that 63.2 per
cent of adults (28.6 million) had taken part in 150 minutes or more per week of sporting activity
from May 2018 to May 2019 (sportengland.org/media/14239/active-lives-adult-may-18-19-report.pdf
[accessed 25 September 2020]).
4 Ibid. The Active Lives Adult Survey indicated that 14 per cent of adults (6.2 million) have taken part
in a volunteering role to support sport.
5 According to a 2013 report published by Sport England, sport contributed over £20bn to the British
economy in 2010 (1.9 per cent of the total UK ‘gross value added’); consumer spending on sport in
England stood at £8.5bn, with nearly half of that amount coming from television/satellite broadcasting
revenues (£4.4bn); and sport-related employment in England stood at over 440,000 jobs in 2010,
representing 2.3 per cent of England’s total employment that year: ‘The Economic Value of Sport in
England’ (Sport England (2013) (available at sportengland.org/media/3174/economic-value-of-sport-
summary.pdf [accessed 25 September 2020]).
A3.6 The United Kingdom became the epicentre of world sport in the summer of
2012, when for four weeks the nation was consumed by the twin sporting spectacles
of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. London welcomed 16,500
sportsmen and women, 4,000 technical officials, 4,000 officials from the Olympic
and Paralympic movements, and 21,000 members of the media. Over 240,000
individuals applied to volunteer as ‘Games Makers’, with 70,000 making the final
cut. Television audiences on the BBC reached 27.3 million during the opening
ceremony. Nearly eleven million tickets were sold to attend events at the Games.1 In
July 2013, UK Trade & Investment and the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills announced that the 2012 Games had already given the UK economy a boost
worth £9.9 billion, including:
(a) £5.9bn of additional sales from Olympic-related activity;
(b) £2.5bn of additional inward investment into the UK since the Games,
generating more than 31,000 new jobs, with 58 per cent of the value invested
outside London; and
(c) £1.5bn of Olympic-related high value opportunities won overseas, including
£120m of contracts already won by UK companies for the Brazil 2014 World
Cup and Rio 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games, plus more than 60 contracts
won by UK companies for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics and 2018 Russia
World Cup.
They cited projections made in an independent report that the total benefit to the
UK from hosting the London 2012 Olympics could reach up to £41 billion by
2020.2 In addition, since successfully staging the 2012 Olympics and Paralympic
Games, London has staged more than 25 major sporting events using Olympic
venues, further boosting the UK economy. For example, the 2017 IAAF World
Athletics Championship and 2017 World Para Athletics Championships, both held
in the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park, generated over £79 million and £28 million
respectively.3 UK Sport Head of Major Events Esther Britten noted that ‘the significant
economic impact comes on top of the benefits athletes receive when competing on
home soil, in addition to the phenomenal opportunities spectators and volunteers
enjoy when experiencing live sport’.4
1 London 2012 Report and Accounts.
2 See UKTI press release P/036-2013, ‘Turning the Games into Gold: Government announces almost
£10 billion economic boost from London 2012’, 19 July 2013. At the time of writing, no quantitative
study has been published to assess whether this prediction was accurate.
3 ‘London 2012 legacy continues to provide a positive economic impact six years on’ UK Sport press
release, 27 July 2018.
4 Ibid.
A3.7 This enormous public interest in sport gives it ‘vast potential […] as a
policy tool to achieve wider social and political objectives’.1 As Nelson Mandela
once famously said:2
‘Sport has the power to change the world, the power to inspire, the power to
unite people in a way that little else can. It speaks to people in a language they
can understand. Sport can create hope where there was once only despair. It is an
instrument for peace, even more powerful than governments. It breaks down racial
barriers. It laughs in the face of all kinds of discrimination. The heroes sport creates
are examples of this power. They are valiant, not only on the playing field but also in
the community, spreading hope and inspiration to the world’.
1 Godfrey and Holtham, Sporting Lives: A Vision for Sport in the UK (IPPR, 1999), pp 5, 8. See also
(2002) the Guardian, 18 March: ‘The case for taking sport more seriously rests on its vast untapped
possibilities as a source of social cohesion and improved public health’.
2 Quoted by then-Sports Minister Richard Caborn in a speech given on 5 February 2007. See also
‘Sport as a Tool for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (Report from the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and
Peace) (United Nations, 2005) (available at unicef.org/sports/reportE.pdf [accessed 25 September
2020]): ‘By its very nature sport is about participation. It is about inclusion and citizenship. Sport
brings individuals and communities together, highlighting commonalities and bridging cultural and
ethnic divides. Sport provides a forum to learn skills such as discipline, confidence and leadership and
it teaches core principles such as tolerance co-operation and respect. Sport teaches the value of effort
and how to manage victory, as well as defeat’.
A3.8 The European Commission has identified that sport fulfils an education
function, a public health function, a social inclusion function, a cultural function and
a recreational function, making it ‘a particularly effective weapon in the fight against
intolerance, racism, violence, alcohol and narcotics abuse’.1 Similarly, in a 2001
paper, the Central Council for Physical Recreation (now the Sport and Recreation
Alliance) asserted:2
‘Sport and recreation makes a real contribution to Government policies: improving
education both at schools and through lifelong learning; encouraging a healthy
lifestyle for all; promoting social inclusion by providing links to employment,
reducing crime and promoting social integration; and bringing everyone together to
celebrate national success’.
In 2000, then Prime Minister Tony Blair put it most succinctly, asserting that his
government’s sports policy ‘is not just a sports policy, it is a health policy and
education policy, an anti-crime policy and an anti-drugs policy’.3 The notion of sport
as a tool for social change has held strong over the ensuing years, with successive
governments recognising its value. For example, following its 2019 inquiry into the
social impact of participation in culture and sport, the Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport Committee stated:4
‘Government should see sports and culture as a mainstream way of delivering their
social policy goals’.
1 European Commission, ‘The Development and Prospects for Community Action in the Field of Sport’
(Brussels 1998). See also European Commission, ‘Developing the European Dimension in Sport’
(Brussels 2011): ‘Sport has a strong potential to contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth
and new jobs through its positive effects on social inclusion, education and training, and public health.
It helps limit the rise in social security and health expenditure by improving the health and productivity
of the population and ensuring a higher quality of life through old age. It contributes to social cohesion
by breaking down social barriers and it improves the employability of the population through its
impact on education and training. Voluntary activity in sport can contribute to employability, social
inclusion as well as higher civic participation, especially among young people’.
In his sports keynote speech at the City of London Academy, Southwark, on 28 June 2010, Jeremy
Hunt, then Secretary of State for Culture, Media, Olympics and Sport, stated: ‘The cost [of non-
participation in sport] is enormous. Not just in terms of health, where 1 in 4 adults in this country
are now classed as obese – the highest level in Europe. Not just in terms of social breakdown, where
there is clear evidence that participation in sport reduces the propensity for at-risk teenagers to commit
crime. But also in terms of educational attainment, where teachers know that physical activity boosts
concentration and feeds through directly into improved academic performance. The schools showing
fastest improvement in GCSE results over the past three years were schools with a sport speciality. So
the question is not whether to focus on sport or on academic achievement. The question is whether we
can afford to go on ignoring the fact that sport can help power academic performance’: Hunt, Sports
Keynote Speech, Southwark, 28 June 2010 (available at gov.uk/government/speeches/sports-keynote-
speech [accessed 25 September 2020]).
2 ‘Active Britain: A Manifesto for Sport and Recreation’ (CCPR, May 2001). On its website, the
Sport and Recreation Alliance states: ‘The myriad benefits of physical activity for health are well
documented. Greater levels of activity lead to significant benefits in tackling a wide range of common
diseases, for people of all ages. Sport and physical recreation have a broad appeal and are inexpensive
to deliver, and can bring about lasting improvement for individuals of every age and background. It
is clear that there can be no effective strategy for public health which does not promote and facilitate
sport and physical recreation’.
3 Taken from Tony Blair’s speech at the Labour Party’s 2000 Conference in Brighton, quoted in ‘The
Road to 2012: The Impact of 2012 and Our New Responsibilities for High Performance Sport’
(UK Sport).
4 See ‘Changing Lives: the social impact of participation in culture and sport’, Digital, Culture, Media
and Sport Committee, published 14 May 2019 HC 734. Similarly, as part of its 2019 Action Plan (see
further A3.34), the Department for Education hailed the value of sport as a vital tool for social change:
‘sport has been identified by the Department for Education as one of the five foundations for building
character, helping young people develop resilience, determination and self-belief, and instilling values
and virtues such as friendship and fair play. It can help children and young people to connect with their
peers, tackling loneliness and social isolation and building stronger communities’.
3 GOVERNMENT SPORTS POLICY
A3.9 Because there are ‘valid and legitimate reasons to justify government
involvement in and funding of sport’,1 some countries take a centralised approach
to the regulation of the sports sector, based on the premise that sport is a public
function that the state has the right and the responsibility to deliver.2 Historically UK
governments, in common with many other northern and western European states,
have taken a different view, considering the provision of sport to be not a public
service responsibility of the government, but rather a matter for the private, voluntary
sector to run, with general encouragement from government.3
1 Mr Justice Charles Dubin, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned
Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (Ottawa 1990) at pp 517, 525. It is always
important to remember, however, that ‘sport matters in itself […] Too often sport is justified on the
basis of its spill-over benefits. There is, of course, a good argument that sport is important because it
enhances analytical ability, leadership and teamwork; or that literacy and numeracy can all be taught
with examples drawn from sport. The justification for sport is the Education Department. There is a
good argument that sport is important because it helps us deal with crime by diverting young people at
risk away from trouble. The justification for sport is with the Ministry of Justice. We hear too that sport
keeps the voluntary sector buoyant. Nearly 2 million people give at least an hour a week to sport. They
sustain over 100,000 affiliated clubs in England, serving over 8 million members. The justification
for sport is in the Communities Department. And yes, sport does have all these other benefits and I’m
delighted about that. But they are not the reason we love it. They are not the reason government is
committed to it. Sport is a joy and a passion, not because we can learn about Newton’s laws through
the movement of a snooker ball, but because of the beauty of sport itself […] It does improve our
health, it does help us to learn, it does help to bind a community. But its greatest virtue is none of
these things. Its greatest virtue is to be found in the joy of playing’: DCMS Secretary of State James
Purnell, ‘World Class Community Sport’, 28 November 2007. This theme was continued by Purnell’s
Conservative colleague, Jeremy Hunt, then Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport,
in a speech in June 2010: ‘I want to be clear that, for this government, competitive sport really matters.
Not just because it’s great entertainment, not just because we have the Olympics in two years. But in
its own right. As something that should be a vital part of growing up for every child in the country’.
Hunt, Sports Keynote Speech, Southwark, 28 June 2010 (available at gov.uk/government/speeches/
sports-keynote-speech [accessed 25 September 2020]).
2 See para A1.5.
3 See para A1.8.
A3.10 In recent years, however, this orthodox understanding that ‘the government
does not and should not run sport’ has come under more and more pressure, partly
because of the social, cultural and economic importance attributed to sport in modern
society,1 partly because politicians have come to understand the power of sport as
an instrument for achieving public policy imperatives,2 partly because SGBs have
had to turn to government for assistance in addressing issues that are beyond their
jurisdiction and/or competence to control (from public order issues like hooliganism
and ticket touting, to integrity issues such as doping and match-fixing),3 and partly
because the public and the media expect the government to stay on top of a sector
that is of such enormous public interest.4 On the back of such reasons, during the
first two decades of the 21st century, taxpayer and Lottery funding of sport reached
unprecedented levels,5 bringing with it calls for government to have a greater say
in how that money is spent. The result has been the emergence of more of a public-
private partnership in the governance and regulation of sport.
1 See para A3.16.
2 See para A3.16.
3 In relation to public order issues, see para A3.66 et seq. In relation to ticket touting, see para A3.69.
In relation to doping, see para A3.117 et seq and generally Chapter C2 (The Anti-Doping Regulatory
Framework). In relation to match-fixing, see para B4.50, n.2 (discussion of need for state intervention
to protect integrity of sport in face of match-fixing scandals, because otherwise its use as a tool for
social good will be undermined).See generally Rogge, ‘Governments should protect and promote
sports’ (2001) Sportcal.com, 18 October.
4 Football, for example, is seen as ‘the national game’. Furthermore, the ‘listed events’ legislation (see
para A3.88 et seq.) recognises that certain core events in the UK sports calendar – the ‘sporting crown
jewels’ – are ‘public’ assets, free access to which must be protected from the vagaries of the sports
rights market-place.
In response to questioning by the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, during its 2011 inquiry
into the governance of football in the UK (see para A3.106), then Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson
said: ‘I think as the Minister, you should probably have two reasonable areas of responsibility. The
first is that any Minister for Sport should have at the centre of his brief the performance of the national
team. So I think if our national team is under-performing, then it is perfectly reasonable for the
Minister to ask the question why. I think secondly, we invest quite a considerable amount of public
money in football, and so I think it is my responsibility as the Minister to make sure that the corporate
governance arrangements surrounding the spending of that money are as they ought to be. Thirdly, of
course football is the national game. It is way ahead of any other game in this country in terms of the
number of people who play it and follow it, so it would have to be a concern for the Minister for Sport
if he didn’t feel that the game was correctly governed’.
A Early government sports policy
A3.11 Government sports policy and direction covers not only immediate
sporting issues such as participation, competition, and facilities, but also the wider
applications of sport in society, including health, education and social exclusion.1
Emerging sports policy in the nineteenth century pursued ‘the maintenance of social
stability, the defense [sic] of privilege, and paternalism’,2 followed by a desire to
create a healthy workforce for the industrial revolution and a fit male population for
military service.3 The Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937 was followed by
the Education Act 1944, requiring local authorities to provide facilities for recreation
and physical training.
1 See generally Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura Eds), National
Sports Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996).
2 Ibid, at p 379.
3 Chaker, Study on national sports legislation in Europe (Council of Europe Publishing, 1999), p 11.
A3.12 The Wolfenden Report produced by the Central Council of Physical

Recreation in 1960 recommended (among other things) the creation of a GB Sports
Council to assist in the achievement of governmental policy goals via sport.1 That
recommendation was eventually implemented in 1965,2 but subsequent governments
continued to view sport as a ‘minor matter’,3 notwithstanding the 1975 White Paper
‘Sport and Recreation’, which has been identified as ‘one of the few attempts by
government to provide a comprehensive philosophy of sport and recreation’,
portraying sport as part of the welfare state, contributing to the ‘physical and mental
well-being of the population and to the reduction of hooliganism and delinquency
among young people’, but also identifying benefits from international sporting success
and therefore supporting the funding of elite athletes.4 Consistent with that view,
legislation was passed in the 1970s to promote sport and recreation by encouraging
local authorities to provide sports facilities.5 During the 1980s, however, politicians
left the world of sport ‘principally untouched by legislation’, having acknowledged
that sport and politics were ‘uncomfortable bedfellows’.6
1 willparry.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Wolfenden-report-1960.pdf [accessed 2 November 2020].

2 In July 1995, the incumbent Conservative administration published a sports policy paper, ‘Sport,
Raising the Game’ (Department of National Heritage, July 1995), which led to the reorganisation of
the GB Sports Council into UK Sport and Sport England, and UK Sport’s eventual designation as a
Lottery fund distributor in its own right. Today, UK Sport and the four Home Country Sports Councils,
with the Youth Sport Trust and UK Anti-Doping, are today the primary agents for implementation of
government policy on sport in the UK. See para A3.55 et seq. and para A3.116 et seq.
3 See Grayson, Sport and the Law, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 2000), p 319, quoting Lord Hailsham.
4 Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura (eds), National Sports
Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996).at p 380.
5 See in particular s 19 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, as amended by
Pt I of Sch 13 to the Educational Reform Act 1988, which authorised a local authority to ‘provide […]
such recreational facilities as it thinks fit’.
6 See Lord Moynihan’s comments during the House of Lords debate on his Sports Governance Bill [HL]
2014–15 on 4 December 2014 (see publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/141204-
0002.htm#14120454000495 [accessed 28 September 2020]).
B The National Lottery
A3.13 The National Lottery, introduced in November 1994 pursuant to the National
Lottery Act 1993, triggered a sea-change in the amount of public investment going
to sport, heralding a new era in sports policy as distribution systems through the
Home Country Sports Councils and UK Sport1 were established and the government
took a far greater interest in how the additional revenues were spent.2 The 1993
Act stipulated that the National Lottery Distribution Fund would divide its funding
equally between five ‘good causes’: the arts, sport, the national heritage, charitable
expenditure, and projects associated with the start of the third millennium in 2000.
The National Lottery Act 1998 created a sixth ‘good cause’, of health, education and
the environment. The millennium cause was removed and the distribution of funding
altered, with sport’s share dropping from 20 per cent to 16.66 per cent. The National
Lottery Act 2006 laid down a new system of distribution and apportionment, with half
of the National Lottery Distribution fund to be distributed (via the newly established
Big Lottery Fund) to charitable causes or to projects connected with health, education
or the environment, and the other half divided equally between sport, the arts, and
heritage.
2 Further to s 26 of the National Lottery Act 1993, as amended by the National Lottery Act 1998, the
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport issues financial directions that set broad parameters
for the permissible application of Lottery funds by the Lottery funding agencies such as UK Sport and
the Home Country Sports Councils.
A3.14 This change was severely criticised by former Prime Minister John Major in
2004.1 The original 1992 White Paper that led to the setting up of the National Lottery
had stated that the Lottery would fund only projects additional to those that would
otherwise be funded by the public through general taxation. Major accused the Labour
administration of ‘grand larceny’ and ‘muddying the waters between Exchequer and
Lottery revenues’ by diverting Lottery funding to support health, education, and the
environment. He said when he established the Lottery he wanted the money to go to
art, sport and heritage because they would never compete with education, defence
and pensions for funding.2 In January 2008, Lord Glentoran argued in the House of
Lords that ministers were continuing to use the Lottery as a ‘slush fund’ to finance
public projects.3 In the May 2010 Coalition Agreement, the administration specifically
committed to ‘examine the case for moving to a ‘gross profits tax4 system for the
National Lottery, and reform of the National Lottery so that more money goes into
sport, the arts and heritage’.5 In November 2010, following a public consultation, the
Lottery Shares Order 2010 was passed, amending the percentage share of money held
in the National Lottery Distribution Fund in two stages: first, from April 2011, the
shares for arts, heritage and sport were increased from the previous 16.66 per cent
each to 18 per cent each, with the Big Lottery Fund (responsibility for which moved
from DCMS to the Cabinet Office) reducing from 50 per cent to 46 per cent; then, on
1 April 2012, the shares for arts, heritage and sport each increased to 20 per cent, with
the Big Lottery Fund’s share reducing to 40 per cent.6 While the percentage allocation
to sport is a statutory requirement, the amount of Lottery money distributed to sport
depends on numbers buying Lottery tickets, and therefore has fluctuated over time.
The figure peaked in 1998 at £322 million, dropped to £258 million by 2010,7 and then
by 2019 climbed back up to £321 million.8
1 This point was made explicitly by the Culture, Media and Sport House of Commons Select Committee
in its 2004 report on Reform of the National Lottery (publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/
cmselect/cmcumeds/196/19602.htm [accessed 28 September 2020]).
2 ‘Major charges Labour with “lottery larceny’’, Sunday Times, 24 October 2004 (thesundaytimes.
co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article126581.ece [accessed 28 September 2020]).
3 See the House of Lords debate on the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2007.
4 Under the ‘gross profits tax’ proposal, the operator of the National Lottery would be taxed after it had
distributed prizes for winning tickets, rather than before. In the event, no such change was made.
5 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (May 2010, Cabinet Office), p 14.
6 See culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/national_lottery/3397.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020].
7 See National Lottery Distribution Fund Account 2010-11 (culture.gov.uk/images/publications/NLDF-
Accounts-2010-11-HC1650.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
8 See National Lottery Distribution Fund Account 2018-19 (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/815717/HC_2338_National_Lottery_Distribution_Fund_
Report_and_Accounts_2018-19__Web_Accessible.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
A3.15 The London 2012 Olympics also became a major beneficiary of the
National Lottery Distribution Fund. In 2007, Parliament established the independent
Olympic Lottery Distributor, a body tasked with using National Lottery proceeds to
fund the delivery of the infrastructure for London 2012 and its legacy, and agreed
to the transfer of £1,085bn to the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund.1 Although
£410m of this amount had already been agreed, an extra £675mn was required to
meet the growing cost of the Games, and it was taken from money that had been
due to be distributed to sport via the Home Country Sports Councils and UK Sport,
to be repaid from profits arising from the sale of land in the Olympic Park after the
Games. Introducing the order that sanctioned the transfer, then-Secretary of State
James Purnell MP provided a guarantee to Parliament that no further diversions
from Lottery funds to the Olympics would take place.2 By 2013, when the Olympic
Lottery Distributor was dissolved by statutory instrument,3 it had distributed over
£1.8bn in funds, the vast majority of which had been granted to the Olympic Delivery
Authority to finance construction of Olympic venues (over £1.7bn, the single biggest
Lottery grant ever made in the UK).4 Other grants included a £15m sum to LOCOG
to fund its ‘Cultural Olympiad’ projects, and various grants to the East London
Business Alliance to support community projects.5
1 See the House of Commons debate on the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2007.
2 See the Payments into the Olympic Lottery Distribution Fund etc Order 2008.
3 The Olympic Lottery Distributor (Dissolution) Order 2013.
4 Olympic Lottery Distributor, Annual Report and Accounts 2011/12 (official-documents.gov.uk/
document/hc1213/hc02/0222/0222.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
5 See Olympic Lottery Distributor report on grants to the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games and their legacy (nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121204113822/http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_
we_do/national_lottery/6715.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020]).
C A Sporting Future for All
A3.16 In April 2000, the Labour Government published its strategy for the
development of sport over the next decade, A Sporting Future for All.1 In his foreword,
Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote:
‘The Government does not and should not run sport. Sport is for individuals, striving
to succeed – either on their own, or in teams. However those individuals, together
or alone, need the help of others – to provide the facilities, the equipment, the
opportunities. So there is a key role to play for those who organise and manage
sport – local authorities, sports clubs, governing bodies, the Sports Councils and the
Government.’
This paper identified more clearly than ever before that the twin goals of government
sports policy were mass participation (‘more people of all ages and all social
groups taking part in sport’) and success at elite level (‘more success for our top
competitors and teams in international competition’). The perceived obstacles were
insufficient opportunities for children and young people, loss of interest after school
age, too many obstacles to the attainment of peak performance, and fragmented and
unprofessional organisation and management of sport. The document set out both
a ‘Vision’ and an ‘Action Plan’ to surmount those obstacles. It made it clear (as the
quote above illustrates) that it saw the delivery of government sports policy as a joint
effort between the public and the private sector.
1 DCMS, ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (HMSO, 2000).
A3.17 The Sports Strategy (A Sporting Future for All) Implementation Group,
drawn from leading figures in sport education, local authorities, and SGBs, produced
an initial action plan in December 2000.1 Then in March 2001 the Department of
Culture, Media and Sport published the government’s action plan, ‘A Sporting Future
for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, adopting many of the recommendations
of that group.2 The first annual report, issued in May 2002, noted that some parts
of the plan had been delivered and others had not, but concluded that ‘what is clear
is that sport in education, and sport as a vehicle for delivering social policy, have a
higher profile across Government than they did last year’.3
1 ‘A Sporting Future for All: Action Plan, Report of the Implementation Group to the DCMS and DfEE’
(December 2000), described in the subsequent DCMS publication adopting the plan (‘A Sporting
Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, DCMS PP374, March 2001, DCMS) as ‘the most
significant sporting manifesto ever seen in the United Kingdom’.
2 DCMS PP374 (March 2001, DCMS).
3 ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2001/02’. See also
‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2002/03’.
D The Cunningham Review

A3.18 A review panel chaired by Jack Cunningham MP was commissioned by the
government in October 2000 to consider the future of elite sport in the UK. It issued
a report in September 2001 that concluded: ‘all is not well with sport in the UK’.1
While certain concerns were raised about sport at an amateur level,2 at the elite level
it was found that:
‘there are some overriding issues which the government must urgently resolve if this
report is to herald a new dawn for UK sport:
• The quality of leadership and management in sport at national level must be
improved;
• The opportunity must now be taken to change the style of leadership in Sport
England to one which is much more open, inclusive, responsive and sport
centred;
• The complex structure of sport in the UK must be simplified and better
understood;
• Bureaucracy and territorial concerns must take second place to the development
of sport itself;
• There must be clearer responsibility and accountability for decision-making in
sport, with proper incentives for delivery;
• The national governing bodies must be supported to modernise their

management systems and performance structures;
• New investment in high quality club and talent development structures and
systems will be required to achieve consistent success at World Class level;
• There is a need for a radical step change in the way we license, train and employ
sports coaches as they are the cornerstone to the development of talented
performers;
• Well co-ordinated, well managed UK wide funding and quality support services
and facilities for our top sportsmen and women must be ensured and delivered
quickly […]
Decisive leadership and a strong commitment from UK Government and the devolved
administrations will also be essential if we are to deliver the outcomes and sporting
success that everyone wants to see. It will also be crucial for the organisations
they support and fund to be given firm direction and responsibility for delivery of
the required results and to be held regularly accountable for the progress made.
This will be best achieved if there is one lead body – UK Sport – which is given
key responsibility for overseeing all the “World Class” Programmes for Olympic/
Paralympic Sports and GB/UK [national governing bodies]. The Sports Cabinet (the
collective meeting of Ministers with responsibility for sport in England, Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for
Culture, Media and Sport) will also have an essential role to play. This group of
Ministers will provide the ideal medium for the collective direction, monitoring,
reporting and accountability required to ensure delivery of a sustained programme
of support for UK elite athletes’.3
1 For example, it was concluded that club sport was ‘less well-structured [than school sport] and indeed
in some sports barely surviving […] We need to ensure that the National Governing Bodies of sport
are encouraged to develop clear club and volunteer development strategies and that investment in club
sport becomes a greater priority for funding agencies’: Elite Sports Funding Review, Report of the
Review Group chaired by Dr Jack Cunningham MP (August 2001).
2 Elite Sports Funding Review, Report of the Review Group chaired by Dr Jack Cunningham MP
(August 2001).
3 Ibid. See also Goodbody, ‘Report calls for cash to boost elite grants’, The Times, 12 September 2001.
A3.19 At the Sports Cabinet meeting on 31 October 2001, most of the review
group’s recommendations were accepted (including a ‘one stop shop’ for national
governing bodies seeking talent development funding), and the DCMS stated that it
would consider the remaining recommendations (which required additional funding)
in the context of the then-pending Comprehensive Spending Review.1 In December
2002, an additional £9.4 million in Exchequer funding for UK Sport was announced,
to cover the costs of implementing those recommendations.
1 ‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport, Annual Report 2001/02’.
E Game Plan
A3.20 On 1 February 2002, the Prime Minister announced ‘the most wide-ranging
review of British sport since the White Paper of 1975’,1 a collaboration between the
DCMS and the Performance and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office, charged with
‘sorting out a new organisation chart for British sport’.2 The fruit of this collaboration
was the joint publication by DCMS and the Strategy Unit in December 2002 of
‘Game Plan’, which sought to refine the government’s sports policy objectives and to
identify ways of improving the delivery of government support for sport by making a
number of proposals for the reform and simplification of the sporting infrastructure.3
In particular, Game Plan echoed the Cunningham Review in calling for rationalisation
and simplification of funding streams from UK Sport and the Home Country Sports
Councils to the national governing bodies of sport. It also called for the appointment
of a new Director of Sport to lead within DCMS on sports-related issues and to
coordinate with other government departments, a recommendation that DCMS

swiftly adopted.
1 Trelford, ‘Watching Brief’ Daily Telegraph, 27 May 2002; Guardian leader column, 18 March 2002;
‘A Sporting Future for All – The Government’s Plan for Sport’, Annual Report 2001/02’, at 1 (noting
that the Performance and Innovation Unit review and the Quinquennial Review of Sport England ‘are
likely to make recommendations about how the role of sport in delivering the Government’s wider
agenda should best be organised’).
2 Goodbody, ‘Sporting bodies face top-level review’ The Times, 1 February 2002. The article contained
the following quote from Tessa Jowell, Culture Secretary: ‘Our review is intended to achieve a clear
strategy that will deliver sports policy and will take into account the range of different bodies, such as
central government and local government, and will address the disparity between regions’.
3 ‘Game Plan’ (DCMS/Strategy Unit, December 2002).
A3.21 The first ‘Game Plan’ delivery report, issued in April 2004, noted rapid
progress in raising participation levels, ‘both in the provision of opportunities
for schools and community participation through new and existing funding
programmes’. On elite competition, the progress report was also positive; noting
improvements across high performance funding, talent identification, reform of the
government’s funding organisations, and the modernisation of governing bodies. On
the formulation of sports policy, the report applauded the appointment of a dedicated
Director of Sport within the DCMS and reforms of governing bodies as well as Sport
England and UK Sport.
F The Carter Report
A3.22 In July 2004, Lord Carter was asked to examine how to ‘ensure far better
co-ordination of effort and resources in sport’ and to explore the ‘proposal to involve
private and public sectors together in a new National Sports Foundation’ with a view
to the possible extension of funding for sport. The Carter Report, issued in March
2005,1 valued public spending in sport at £1.8bn per annum, although England’s
public investment per capita in sporting infrastructure was less than most other
nations (for example, three times less than France, but slightly more than Germany).
Carter made five key recommendations to be used to inform the priorities of the
sports sector:
(1) To introduce robust measurement and monitoring systems to inform government
investment at local level and ensure clear lines of accountability.
(2) To promote the personal benefits of sport and physical activity and to help
people identify their local delivery points.
(3) To improve the local delivery of sport. The government was asked to consider
how it could support the coordination of public, private and voluntary sector
investment, as well as local authorities and regional bodies, in order to improve
local sporting facilities.
(4) To create, under strong government leadership, a single access point and brand
for sport in England and to streamline duplicative ‘back office’ functions in
order to release more money for front line activity.
(5) To provide targeted incentives and commercial assistance – via a new National
Sports Foundation – to encourage individual and corporate support and to
‘help sport help itself’.
The Carter Report was welcomed by then-Chancellor Gordon Brown and
DCMS Secretary of State Tessa Jowell, who noted that they had already issued
plans to put in place the National Sports Foundation and promised to consult with
stakeholders in considering the report’s recommendations for the future funding of
sport.2
1 Lord Carter, ‘Review of national sport effort and resources’ (March 2005) (webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/http:/www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/Carter_report.pdf, [accessed 28 September
2020). The Carter Report found that England’s public investment in sporting infrastructure stood at
£36 per capita, with France and Finland leading the international comparisons (with £110 and £84
respectively) and Germany slightly behind with £30. England’s funding broke down into £24 (67
per cent) from local government, £8 (22 per cent) from the Lottery and £4 (11 per cent) from central
government.
2 DCMS press notice 059/95.
G London 2012 and the Olympic Legacy
A3.23 In July 2005, however, the Carter Report and all other initiatives as drivers
of government sports policy were supplanted when the International Olympic
Committee announced that the 2012 Olympic Games would be staged in London.
When the government had announced in May 2003 that it would support London’s
bid to host the Games, it did so on the basis that it wanted:
‘[…] to harness the power of sport to help address some of the key issues our nation
faces – health, social inclusion, educational motivation and fighting crime. We want
the Olympics to be the catalyst that inspires people of all ages and all talents to lead
more active lives’.1
The government and its bidding partners therefore accepted a commitment to create
a sporting system that would not only lead to success at the 2012 Games but would
also leave a lasting legacy of sporting success into the future.2 More specifically, the
government’s Olympic promise ‘to create a world-class sporting nation’ meant ‘three
things: a world class school sport system, a world class community sports system,
and a world class elite sport system’.3
1 See statement of Tessa Jowell, DCMS Secretary of State, to the House of Commons, 12 May 2003. The
Institute of Government’s post-Games publication, ‘Making the Games, What Government can Learn
from London 2012’ (Norris, Rutter and Medland, IOG, 2013) summarised the scale of the government’s
ambition: ‘The scale of the Olympics was like no other project undertaken by governments. It meant
organising the world’s biggest sporting event followed three weeks later by the world’s second biggest
sporting event. But in the UK’s case it mean much more: converting derelict land in East London into
an Olympic Park with new permanent and temporary venues and accommodation for athletes and the
media – but an Olympic Park that was designed to lie at the heart of the future regeneration of the
most deprived boroughs of the city. It meant mobilizing the biggest peacetime force of volunteers from
around the country. It meant transporting hundreds of thousands of spectators around London and the
South East, where transport systems were notoriously crowded and prone to breakdown’.
2 See eg speech of Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, ‘A Lasting Legacy: the
View from Government’, 27 April 2006: ‘in addition to our ambition to deliver the best games ever,
we are determined to create and leave a sustainable legacy for Britain […] a legacy that delivers an
enduring boost for British sport and young people’s physical activity and thousands and thousands of
volunteers for sports clubs across the United Kingdom and beyond’.
3 Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport James Purnell, in a speech on ‘World Class Community
Sport’ made on 28 November 2007.
A3.24 On 16 September 2005, the government took the first step down that path,
announcing a streamlining of responsibility for sports policy designed to simplify
the structure and remove the bureaucracy identified in ‘Game Plan’ and the Carter
Report.1 UK Sport was made fully responsible for elite sport performance in England
and the UK, with Sport England and the other Home Country Sports Councils taking
responsibility for increasing and sustaining participation in community sport, and the
Youth Sport Trust taking responsibility for physical education and sport in schools.2
In the March 2006 Budget, the Chancellor announced that £200m of additional
Exchequer funding would be provided between 2006 and 2012, to be matched by
£100m of private funding, to finance the high performance system designed to
achieve medal success at the 2012 Games and a legacy of further success beyond the
Games.3
1 DCMS press release, 16 November 2005 DCMS.
2 See further para A3.52, n 1.
3 See 2006 Budget, p149. This was on top of the £80 million per year already being spent on Olympic
success. However, it was announced in March 2007 that £675m of Lottery funding earmarked for sport
would instead be applied to the costs of the 2012 Olympic Games in London, so taking sport’s share
of Lottery funding below 16 per cent: see para A3.15.
A3.25 Notwithstanding this restructuring, Sport England continued to come in for

criticism for its alleged bureaucracy and for failing to achieve an increase in the
number of people participating in sport in England1. On 28 November 2007, then-
DCMS Secretary of State James Purnell announced the refocusing of Sport England
on sports development and sports participation, ie ‘community sport’. To support this
objective, the Government established a new Cabinet Committee focusing on health
and well-being, with responsibility for delivering on the Government’s target to have
two million more people active by 2012. The Secretary of State’s intention was that
the physical activity work previously undertaken by Sport England would transfer to
the Department of Health and Social Care, leaving Sport England to concentrate on
mainstream sports activity.2 He explained:
‘[…] we need to create a world-class community sports system. And that can be
one of the biggest legacies of that great day in Singapore: to create an Olympic
generation, to make sure that when people of all ages get inspired to take up sport,
there are clubs, facilities and coaches there to welcome them. […] We will start
this process with a review of Sport England’s strategy to focus the delivery of
an excellent sporting infrastructure form the grass roots up. That means creating
excellent national governing bodies, clubs, coaches and volunteers, supported
by the investment we’ve already made in facilities. And the sporting bodies will
be critical. My offer to you is clear. We want to create whole sports plans, with a
single funding pot. We will free you up from the bureaucracy and bidding that you
complain about today. But, in return, you will need to commit to clear goals to
improve participation, coaching and the club structure. And in particular, you will
need to show how you will reach groups who do less sport today, whether women,
poorer groups or some ethnic minorities. […] But sport can only play its full role in
tackling social problems, if we invest more in community sport, not less. […] We are
at the dawn of an incredible decade of sport. And we would not forgive ourselves if
we failed to create a community sports infrastructure to capitalize on that decade: to
take the enthusiasm of those who watch our sports stars and turn it into a lifetime’s
commitment to sport. […] Our sports policy has a simple and powerful idea at its
core: that if you have a talent we will pull down every barrier in your way to help
you succeed. It is the idea that runs through all the government’s work. Competitive
sport is a perfect meritocracy. The cream rises to the top. But everyone has the
chance to do their best. We want everyone, at all levels of ability, to be as good as
they can be’.
1 See eg Syed, The Times, 11 July 2007: ‘sporting participation has not budged since 1994 despite an
extra £3 billion of investment through the lottery and millions more from the taxpayer. […] It is now
clear that the great sporting experiment of recent years has failed to deliver the change in attitudes
that was promised and has simply provided cheaper access to sport for those already familiar with
the concept of exercise. The net result has been a super-size redistribution of wealth from the fat to
the fit. […] The core problem at the heart of policy is that successive sports ministers have abrogated
their primary responsibility and allowed most of the big funding decisions to be taken by unelected
quangos staffed by bureaucrats who don’t know the difference between a googly and a grubber. How
is the Government to be held to account for sports policy when it has very little to do with it? […] Why
not abolish Sport England – and Sport Scotland, Sports Council Wales, Sport Northern Ireland – and
give the cash straight to the governing bodies and other end users?’
2 See speech by then-DCMS Secretary of State James Purnell, ‘World Class Community Sport’,
28 November 2007. He added: ‘Of course sport has a role to play in tackling wider social problems.
The rise of obesity is a big problem, which the government is taking very seriously indeed. The DCMS
is playing its part in raising participating in PE and school sport. That is why I have agreed with the
department for health and the chief secretary to the Treasury that we will work closely over the next few
months to ensure that all relevant government departments are working together to deliver a physical
activity strategy for all. This work will provide absolute clarity of the roles and responsibilities for all
the different organizations to meet our aim of 2 million more people being more active by 2012’.
A3.26 In 2008, DCMS published ‘Playing to win: A New Era for Sport’, a plan
intended to set out ‘a vision for sport to 2012 and beyond’, encompassing a ‘world
leading system for PE and sport’ in schools (the responsibility of the Youth Sport
Trust), with all 5–16 year olds being offered five hours of PE and sport each week,
a ‘world leading community sports system’ (the responsibility of Sport England),
continuing to increased participation year on year, and ‘a legacy of world leading
elite sport infrastructure including high quality coaching’ (the responsibility of
UK Sport).1
1 ‘Playing to win: A New Era for Sport’, DCMS, 2008.
A3.27 In 2009, in its build-up to the 2010 general election, the Conservative party
published ‘Extending Opportunities: A Conservative Policy Paper on Sport’,1 in
which it promised to:
‘• Return the National Lottery to its four original pillars and consider moving to a
gross profits tax system releasing more money for sport.
• Create a new Cabinet Office cross departmental sports body to reduce
bureaucracy and act as a champion for sport in government.
• Draw up a cross departmental compact to attract world class sports events to
the UK and support World Cup bids such as 2018.
• Examine options to bring together UK Sport, Sport England and the Youth
Sport Trust under one roof to create a world-leading ‘one stop shop’ for sport.
• Deliver the 2012 Olympics on time and within budget – with a proper legacy
for community sport.
• Support the creation of an independent anti-doping agency and put sport
dispute resolution on a statutory basis.
• Drive increases in mass participation through the reformed Sport England and
national governing bodies using the extra money released by the reform of the
National Lottery.
• Prioritise school sport provision and competition, links between schools and
clubs and opening up school sports facilities after hours’.
1 ‘Extending Opportunities: A Conservative Policy Paper on Sport’, Conservative Party, 2009. See also
the 2010 Conservative Party Manifesto, ‘Invitation to Join the Government of Britain’.
A3.28 Meanwhile, the Labour Party published its own sports policy document,
‘A sporting Britain for all’,1 in which it promised to:
‘• Deliver a Golden Decade of major sporting events in Britain, driving record
investment into the economy and inspiring more people to take up sport than
ever before.
• Stage a successful Olympics and Paralympic Games, on time and within
budget, helping to secure more medals for Team GB than in Beijing, and to
ensure that we come at least fourth in the 2012 Olympics Medal Table.
• Transform school sport and guarantee the availability of five hours of
competitive sporting opportunity every week for all under-19s in full time
education, underpinned in law by a Pupil Guarantee.
• Open up more school facilities to the community and establish a network of
3,000 Olympic after-school Sports Clubs for teenagers by 2011.
• Work to get one million more adults playing sport by 2012 – making sure that
amateurs of all ages and abilities can join one of the tens of thousands of sports
clubs run by National Governing Bodies – and a further one million adults
doing more physical activity.
• Help to create 10,000 new Volunteer coaches by 2012.
• Provide the strongest protection for playing fields.
• Ensure women’s, girls’ and disability sport will not be an optional extra, but a
vital part of future investment to create new opportunities in sport.
• Use the power of sport to engage young people in our most deprived
communities through outreach programmes such as Streetgames and Sport
Action Zones.
• Increase the number of sessions of free swimming for children and the over 60s.
• Examine the case for the introduction of a new “fair return” to sports from the
proceeds of betting on sport.
• Work with national governing bodies to improve the financial governance of
professional sport and to ensure greater supporter involvement in professional
clubs, making it easier for Supporters Trusts to buy stakes in their clubs’.
1 ‘A sporting Britain for all’, Labour Party 2010. The Liberal Democrats’ 2010 manifesto was far less
detailed in respect of the policy promises it made concerning sport, but noted: ‘We are proud that
Britain is hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012, and we support bids for other high-
profile events such as the 2018 World Cup – but we believe that grassroots sport is just as important.
We will give people from all backgrounds and generations the opportunity to participate in sports’.
A3.29 Following the May 2010 election, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat
Coalition Government stated in its coalition agreement:
‘The Government believes that a vibrant cultural, media and sporting sector is
crucial for our well-being and quality of life. We need to promote excellence in these
fields, with government funding used where appropriate to encourage philanthropic
and corporate investment’.
It set out its commitment to support bids for major sporting events to be hosted in
Britain, to ensure a ‘safe and successful Olympic and Paralympic Games in London
in 2012, and [to] urgently form plans to deliver a genuine and lasting legacy’, to
‘encourage the reform of football governance rules’, to ‘support the creation
of an annual Olympic-style schools sport event’, and to ‘protect school playing
fields’.1 A few weeks into his new job as Minister for Sport and Olympics, in June
2010, Hugh Robertson MP outlined his plans:2
‘Delivering a mass participation legacy for sport from London 2012 is one of my
three top priorities. I want to see a marked, and sustained, cultural shift toward greater
participation in sport. So I have today informed Sport England that, going forward, it
will have two clear priorities; supporting sports governing bodies through the Whole
Sport Plans and delivering a mass participation sports legacy from London 2012. To
deliver this Sport England will focus on improving facility provision and developing
sport at a community level. […] Lottery reform – Plans to increase sports’ share of
Lottery returns from 16% to 20% are progressing quickly, with an Order expected
to be put before Parliament after the summer recess. It is estimated this will lead
to a funding increase of £50 million a year to sport by 2012; Structural reform –
Proposals are being developed for the bringing together of UK Sport, Sport England
and Youth Sport Trust under one roof while maintaining their separate roles and
responsibilities; School sport – The Secretary of State has made it his top priority to
deliver a renewed emphasis on competition both within and between schools. Work
is underway to develop an Olympic and Paralympic style school sport competition.
More details to follow in the next few weeks; Elite/world class sport – Consultation
is underway with those sports bidding or planning to bid for major events with a
view to bringing forward, at the appropriate time, a specific Major Sports Events
Bill designed to make it easier to win and host major events. These changes will
boost school and community sport, increase the flow of lottery money and further
improve the way our key sports bodies work together. They will also help put the UK
at the top of the world league when it comes to hosting major sports events, which is
critical at a time when we are bidding to win the 2018 World Cup’.
That same month, Jeremy Hunt formally launched the government’s planned
‘Olympic-style competition open to schools’.3 Led by the Youth Sport Trust, in
conjunction with Sport England, the ‘School Games’ project was initially financed
by National Lottery funding of £10m per annum, with a further contribution from
the Department for Health.4 And in January 2012, the government announced a new
£10m investment from Sainsburys to support the project.5 In November 2010, Hugh
Robertson launched the ‘Places People Play’ initiative, a £135m project, funded by
National Lottery cash and overseen by Sport England, to encourage community sports
participation by upgrading a thousand local sports clubs and facilities, protecting
and improving playing fields, and recruiting 40,000 ‘Sport Leaders’ to organise
and lead grassroots sporting activities.6 In January 2012, DCMS issued ‘Creating
a sporting habit for life – A new youth sport strategy’, committing the investment
of £1bn of Lottery and Exchequer funding between 2012 and 2017 to ‘create a
meaningful and lasting community sports legacy by growing sports participation at
all levels’ (including plans for every one of England’s 4,000 secondary schools to
be offered a community sports club on its site, with links to a national governing
body; all secondary schools to be given support to keep their facilities open for local
community use; and establishment of a £40m local sport fund to help local authorities
improve sport provision).7
1 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (May 2010, Cabinet Office).
2 ‘Sport and Olympics Minister sets out Olympic sports legacy plans’, 10 June 2010, culture.gov.uk/
news/media_releases/7152.aspx [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 Sports keynote speech, City of London Academy, Southwark, 28 June 2010.
4 ‘Plans for the Legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games’ (DCMS, December 2010).
5 ‘£10 million Sainsbury’s investment to inspire a new sporting generation’, 10 January 2012, gov.
uk/government/speeches/10-million-sainsbury-s-investment-to-inspire-a-new-sporting-generation
[accessed 28 September 2020.
6 ‘Plans for the legacy from the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games’ (DCMS, December 2010).
7 ‘Creating a sporting habit for life – A new youth sports strategy’ (DCMS, January 2012).
A3.30 On 18 September 2012, following the conclusion of the London Olympic and
Paralympic Games, Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson set out the government’s 10
point ‘sports legacy plan’:1
(a) Elite funding – the government confirmed that, through UK Sport, it had
confirmed Lottery and Exchequer funding of £125m per year through to the
Rio Olympics in 2016.
(b) World class facilities – the government repeated its plans to re-locate and/or
re-configure many of the Olympic venues and to turn certain of the warm-up
facilities used during the Games as community sports venues.
(c) Major sporting events – the government confirmed its successful bids to host
20 major sporting events between 2013 and 2019 and its pending bids for
three more.
(d) Places People Play.
(e) Youth Sport Strategy.
(f) Join In – a new initiative to ‘use the volunteering spirit which did so much to
enhance of the [sic] Games’ and encourage people to give to the community.
(g) School Games.
(h) PE – the government committed to ‘ensure all our children have the chance
to enjoy sport in school, to compete against their peers and to promote and
celebrate sporting excellence at young age’.
(i) Disability sport – Sport England awarded £1.5m to the English Federation of
Disability Sport ‘to work with National Governing Bodies to increase sports
participation by disabled people and make grassroots sport more inclusive’.
(j) International development – continued funding of the International Inspiration
programme, the London 2012 international legacy initiative.2
And in March 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron announced details of a new
primary school sports strategy ‘capitalising on the inspiration young people took from
what they saw during those summer months’ in 2012.3 The strategy promised a new
£150m per year package, funded jointly by the Department for Education (£80m),
the Department for Health (£60m) and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport
(£10m), to be spent on school sport, a greater role for national governing bodies in
providing specialist coaching at primary school level, and tougher assessment of

school sport provision by the government inspectorate, Ofsted.4
1 gov.uk/government/publications/beyond-2012-the-london-2012-legacy-story [accessed 2 November
2020].
2 On 24 January 2013, Robertson provided an update on the progress of the 10-point plan in a written
ministerial statement (gov.uk/government/speeches/written-ministerial-statement-sporting-legacy
[accessed 28 September 2020]). He confirmed that £347m had been committed by UK Sport to fund
Olympic and Paralympic athletes prepare for the Rio 2016 Olympics, an increase of 11 per cent on
the funding available for London 2012 athletes. In addition, he announced that the funding for Places
People Play had increased by £15m to £150m, that the UK had successfully bid to host a further six
major sporting events, and that Sport England had committed £493 million in its ‘whole sport plan
funding package for national governing bodies’ to drive participation.
3 ‘Olympic legacy boost – £150 million for primary school sport in England’ (DCMS, 16 March 2013).
4 For further details of the Coalition Government’s school sports policy, see paras A3.29 to A3.32.
A3.31 Nevertheless, whether the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition

Government delivered on its legacy promise remains controversial.1 For example, a
survey conducted by the Sport and Recreation Alliance in October 2012 revealed that
‘two thirds of [sports] clubs do not feel that they have benefited [from the UK hosting
the Games] and […] the majority of clubs (73 per cent) do not believe the Government
has done enough to help community sport create a legacy of participation’.2 Moreover,
from 2005 – when London won the bid to host the 2012 Olympics – to 2016 there
was virtually no change in adult participation rates. For instance, in October 2005 the
proportion of over 16s in England that played sport for at least 30 minutes each week
was 34.6 per cent; by October 2016 this was 36.1 per cent.3
1 See eg Edwin Heathcote, ‘Legacy or Lunacy?’, Financial Times, 20 January 2012: ‘This was a
Games sold on its legacy and the critical question is exactly what legacy it will leave. Football clubs
bickered over the unneeded stadium but it now looks like it will remain in sorely underused athletics
mode at huge public expense. The aquatics centre will be the most expensive-to-maintain municipal
pool in this – or perhaps any other – city. The argument for London’s taxpayers was that this was a
desired development made possible by, or at least accelerated by the Olympics: such resources would
never have been marshalled otherwise. But, actually, what London has got is a huge park strewn
with enormous chunks of blankly impenetrable structure. It seems odd for an architecture critic to
complain of too much architecture but at a moment when buildings and facilities of real community
engagement – from libraries to sport fields – are being closed, the question needs to be asked whether
this huge expenditure can be justified for a few brief moments of national pride’. See also Toby Helm,
the Observer, 26 January 2013: ‘It is now six months since the start of the Olympics. London won the
Games very largely off the back of its promise to deliver a legacy, not just by ‘inspiring a generation’
for a few weeks or months, but by putting in place actual policies to boost participation for all age
groups and in all communities. So has any progress been made? On the plus side, the government has
massively increased funding for elite sports to try to ensure Team GB does at least as well in 2016
in Rio as it did in London in 2012. In December it announced a record funding package of £347m
for the next four years for elite sport – an 11% increase on the previous four-year cycle. UK Sport,
which distributes lottery and government funding to elite athletes, rewarded those sports that hit or
exceeded their medal targets. Funding for boxing rose by 40% to £13.8m, while cycling, rowing,
sailing and equestrian sport also did well. To boost community sport, £493m is being spent on a range
of projects over coming years. But while those involved in grassroots sport welcome both allocations,
most say one gaping hole remains at the heart of policy. One senior figure close to government said:
“We welcome the money for elite sport and community projects but we ask where is the strategic
vision here? To be honest, policy is a hotchpotch. What we still completely lack is a policy for linking
schools to clubs in the communities – that is what has gone and nothing has been put in its place.”
To gauge opinions among experts, the Observer invited responses via guardian.co.uk from people
involved in community and school sport, and emailed scores of headteachers. While all agreed that the
Olympics had been worth every penny of its £9bn price tag, most respondents said sporting provision
was no better or, in most cases, worse than in 2010. Some leaders of local clubs said there had been a
pick-up in interest since the Olympics but as time wore on numbers had returned to levels more like
those before the Games. The vast majority said they did not believe this government was committed to
delivering a lasting legacy.’
2 ‘Olympic and Paralympic Games, Legacy Survey’, Sport and Recreation Alliance (January 2013),
sportandrecreation.org.uk/sites/sportandrecreation.org.uk/files/web/images/Olympic%20and%20
Paralympic%20legacy%20survey_1.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 See Sport England Active People Survey analysis from 2005-2016 (activepeople.sportengland.org/
H Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation

A3.32 The Conservative Party positioned sport as a key item in its manifesto
for the 2015 general election, highlighting the importance of both building on the
success of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and boosting funding in
school sport.1 Shortly after its victory in the election, the Conservative Government
published its strategy for the development of sport in the UK, ‘Sporting Future:
A New Strategy for an Active Nation’.2 In his foreword, then-Prime Minister David
Cameron wrote:3
‘By harnessing the power of sport for the good of our whole society, by investing
in developing the talent of future stars in every sport and by standing up for the
integrity of the sports we love, we can secure our sporting future and in doing so
make our country stronger for generations to come’.
‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ marked the government’s
first new sporting strategy for over a decade, and set out to redefine the sporting
landscape in the United Kingdom by focusing on five key outcomes: physical
well-being, mental well-being, individual development, social and community
development, and economic development. The policy targeted inactivity generally
(with a particular focus on getting those from under-represented groups more
engaged), which marked a shift in focus from historic policies that measured activity
by reference to the number of people playing one sport or another at a particular
moment. In conjunction with this, the Active People Survey4 was replaced with the
new Active Lives Survey,5 in order to provide the government with a better indicator
for measuring physical activity generally, rather than just participation in sport. In
addition, the strategy paper committed to introduce a new governance code designed
to protect the integrity of UK sport. The Code for Sports Governance was published
on 31 October 2016 and set out the governance requirements that national sports
governing bodies must comply with in order to receive public funds.6
1 Conservative Party Election Manifesto (2015) (ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2015/localpdf/
Conservatives.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
2 ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ (DCMS, 2015).
3 Ibid, see foreword.
4 See Sport England Active People Survey analysis from 2005-2016 (activepeople.sportengland.org/
5 See Sport England Active Lives Survey (sportengland.org/know-your-audience/data/active-lives
[accessed 28 September 2020]). The Active Lives Survey measures the nation’s activity levels through
two surveys: Active Lives Adult, which is published twice a year, and Active Lives Children and Young
People, which is published annually.
6 For discussion of the substance of the new Code, see para A5.12.
A3.33 In June 2018, the Conservative Government published its second annual
progress report on Sporting Future: ‘A New Strategy for an Active Nation’, measured
against the five key outcomes. Then-Minister for Sport Tracey Crouch remarked
that ‘a huge amount has been achieved’1 at both an elite and community level. This
is backed up by the data: the Active Lives Adult survey published in April 2019
reflected that during the period from November 2017–November 2018 the number of
adults who were regularly ‘active’ increased by almost 500,000 whilst the number of
‘inactive’ fell by 185,000.2
1 ‘Sporting Future: Second Annual Report’, published January 2018.
2 See Adult Lives Survey, published April 2019. The survey captures data by reference to three levels of
activity: ‘inactive’ (less than 30 minutes a week), ‘fairly active’ (between 30 – 149 minutes a week),
and ‘active’ (at least 150 minutes a week).
I School Sport and Activity Action Plan

A3.34 In December 2018, however, when the government published the results
of the first year of Sport England’s new Active Lives Children and Young People’s
Survey,1 the data showed that only 17.5 per cent of children had met the Chief
Medical Officer’s guidance for how much activity children should be doing (at least
60 minutes per day). This prompted a substantial new focus across government on
improving sport and physical activity for young people. In July 2019 the Department
for Education, in collaboration with DCMS and the Department for Health and Social
Care, published a new strategy designed to provide all children with the opportunity
to take part in at least 60 minutes of physical activity each day, the ‘School Sport
and Physical Activity Action Plan’.2 The Action Plan focuses on making sport and
physical activity an integral part of both school and after-school activities. From
September 2020, the government plans to launch a series of ‘innovative’ regional
pilots where schools will work with sport providers and other local organisations to
provide a coordinated offering of physical activity and sport in and out of school.3
1 Active Lives Children and Young People Survey: Academic Year 2017/18, published December 2018.
2 ‘School Sport and Physical Activity Action Plan’ (Department for Education, 2019).
3 Ibid.
J Summary
A3.35 Current government sports policy reflects the belief in sport as a potent
instrument of public policy, along with an appreciation of the ‘feel-good’ benefits of
sporting success at the level of elite international competition. However, it took the
massive impetus generated by the successful bid for London 2012 to trigger a sharp
refocusing of the government sport infrastructure onto the triple-track pathways
of school sport (via the Youth Sport Trust), community sport (via Sport England
and the other Home Country Sports Councils) and elite and international sport (via
UK Sport).

A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
A3.36 This section describes the central government departments involved in

developing the government’s sports policy, and the non-departmental public bodies
involved in delivering it on an ‘arm’s length’ basis. It also describes the three main
methods by which the government intervenes in the sports sector, in pursuit of its
sports policy as well as broader public policy objectives.
A Government departments and agencies that impact on the

sport sector
A3.37 With governance of the sports sector traditionally left to the private sports
movement, historically there has not been a need for a large sports expertise or
presence within government. It was only in 2002 that sport was given dedicated policy
recognition within Whitehall by being made a key policy objective of the Department
for Culture, Media and Sport. However, various government departments have got
involved from time to time in the sphere of government sports policy, with varying
and sometimes overlapping and conflicting responsibilities, and without any obvious
clear over-arching framework of reporting and responsibility. The CCPR (now
the Sport and Recreation Alliance) claimed in 2001 that 17 different government
departments affected sport and recreation.1 In May 2007, David Cameron, then
leader of the opposition, stated:2
‘It sometimes seems that every government department wants to run UK sport.
We’ve got the DCMS, the DfES, the DoH, the DCLG and the Home Office all
claiming a role. Sometimes even the MOD, the FCO and DFID get involved. I’m
a politician and even I’m confused. I think it’s time to consider setting up a British
equivalent of the Australian Sports Commission to co-ordinate sports policy across
different departments and act as a champion for sport in government’.
However, the August 2012 comments of Sir Keith Mills, Deputy Chairman of
LOCOG,3 suggest that little changed once David Cameron became Prime Minister
under the 2010 Coalition Government:
‘The issue we have had historically is that sport has been tackled in a fragmented way.
There isn’t a national sport strategy. That is something that is missing. We have got
the opportunity to accomplish that off the back of a very successful [Olympic] Games.
There are some great organisations that do some great work, but they are not connected.
And government is not connected […] Let’s pull together the main departments in
government that are responsible for it – health, education, Home Office, communities
and DCMS – and agree a national strategy, And agree on how we deliver on it’.
The need for joined up, cross-department collaboration has become increasingly
important. This was identified by then-minister for Sport Tracey Crouch when
launching ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’: ‘if this new
strategy is to work effectively, all parts of government must work more closely
together towards clear, shared outcomes’.4 This has been reinforced in recent years
too. As noted by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee following its
recent inquiry into the social impact of participation in culture and sport:
‘sport […] must be better integrated within the work and policy objectives of the
Department for Education, the Department for Health and Social Care, and the
Ministry of Justice to ensure that everyone can benefit’.5
1 CCPR, ‘Active Britain: A Manifesto for Sport and Recreation (May 2001), p 4. Grayson counted 14:
see Grayson, Sport and the Law, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 2000), p 97.
2 Sport Industry Lecture, 23 May 2007. See also Hugh Robertson MP, then Shadow Sports and
Olympic spokesman, Letters, Observer, 17 October 2007: ‘Currently, DCMS, DfES, DoH and the
Home Office all have a say [in how sport is delivered across government], often with vastly differing
objectives. A body like the Australian Sports Commission would have a dramatic effect both in terms
of coordinating the delivery of sports across government and by acting as a champion for sport within
government’.
3 ‘London 2012 Olympics ‘should prompt wholesale rethink of UK sport policy’’, the Guardian,
6 August 2012.
4 ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’ (DCMS, 2015), see foreword.
5 See ‘Changing Lives: the social impact of participation in culture and sport’, Digital, Culture, Media
and Sport Committee, report published 14 May 2019 HC 734.
(a) The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
A3.38 The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) has
primary responsibility for sport in central government,1 including a coordinating
role with other central government departments active in the sports sector. DCMS is
responsible within the government for National Lottery policy, setting the policy and
financial framework within which the bodies distributing Lottery funding operate.2
It also receives the bulk of the direct funding for sport allocated by the government
in its annual budget of Exchequer funds. DCMS is also responsible for identifying
those sports events that are so much part of the national heritage that public access to
them via free television coverage is protected under ‘listed events’ legislation.3 And
as the sponsoring department for gambling, DCMS takes direct oversight of horse
racing matters.4
1 See generally the DCMS website at gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-culture-media-
sport [accessed 28 September 2020]. Originally it was the Department for Culture, Media and Sport,
using the same ‘DCMS’ acronym.
2 See para A3.51 to A3.57.
4 See para A3.77.
A3.39 Perhaps DCMS’s most high-profile responsibility in recent years was

managing the delivery of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,1 a task
it managed principally through two bodies, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)
and the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG). The
ODA, a statutory executive non-departmental public body, was given broad powers
by the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006, including the right to
‘take any action that it thinks necessary or expedient for the purposes of preparing
for the London Olympics’.2 The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport
had responsibility for appointing the ODA board, whose principal role throughout
the delivery phase was to manage the construction of the Olympic Park and the
various Olympic venues. LOCOG was a separate entity, a private limited company
whose structure had been agreed during the bid phase to meet IOC requirements.
It was accountable to three stakeholders: the Secretary of State for Culture, Media
and Sport, the Mayor of London, and the British Olympic Association, who were
collectively responsible for appointing its board under a joint venture arrangement.
After the Games were concluded, DCMS’s policy portfolio included ensuring the
Olympic legacy.3 And in recent years, DCMS has played an active role in exploring
modern day integrity issues facing the sports sector. In addition to the Code of Sports
Governance published in December 2016,4 in October 2017 DCMS published its
‘Review of Criminalisation of Doping in Sport’,5 a wide-ranging review into whether
additional legislative measures were required to criminalise the act of sports doping
in the UK. Ultimately, the review concluded that there was no need to criminalise
doping, but it did set out a number of recommendations for the government to
consider to strengthen the fight against doping in sport, including through better use
of existing powers.6
1 Interestingly, despite DCMS’s success as the lead government department during the bid phase, once
the bid was won there was no guarantee that the portfolio for delivering the Games would fall within
the Department. ‘Understandably, DCMS were keen for the Games to stay with them after the win.
But that was not a fait accompli; DCMS was the smallest government department with little delivery
experience and a small budget unable to absorb the inevitably higher budget the Games would entail.
Some voices within Government whispered that this was beyond the department’s comfort zone.
[…] There were rumours that the Department for Communities and Local Government wanted the
Olympics to sit with them as a major regeneration programme and suggestions that the Games might
be best located in a specialist unit in the Cabinet Office […]. There was even a brief suggestion of a
dedicated Olympics department. After negotiation, and after lobbying from Tessa Jowell, it agreed
that the Olympics would stay at DCMS’. Norris, Rutter and Metland, ‘Making the Games, What
government can learn from London 2012’ (Institute of Government, January 2013).
2 Section 4(1) of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006.
3 See para A3.29 et seq. The Prime Minister also established a Cabinet Committee on Olympic and
Paralympic Legacy, a ‘policy advisory group’ chaired by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and
Sport and attended by Lord Sebastian Coe and the Mayor of London, to provide oversight of legacy
delivery. See gov.uk/government/policy-advisory-groups/olympic-and-paralympic-legacy-cabinet-
committee [accessed 28 September 2020].
4 See para A3.32.
5 See ‘Review of Criminalisation in Sport’, DCMS policy paper (DCMS, October 2017)
6 Ibid.
A3.40 DCMS generally takes an ‘arm’s length’ approach to sports delivery,

establishing the government’s financial, administrative, legal, and overall policy
framework for sport, but delegating implementation of that policy, as well as the
all-important function of distributing Exchequer and Lottery funding for sport, to
separate non-departmental public bodies, principally UK Sport and the four Home
Country Sport Councils.1 It is those bodies (along with UK Anti-Doping) that then
make operational decisions in implementation of government sports policy, albeit that
they are accountable to DCMS under the terms of their formal funding agreements,
and to Parliament through the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the Select Committee
for Culture, Media & Sport. This arm’s length approach, combined with the fact that
DCMS itself by no means has exclusive responsibility for sport among the different
Departments of State, has led different Ministers for Sport to bemoan their limited
power and authority,2 which is perceived by commentators as a serious limitation
on the ability to ensure sport is sufficiently prioritised in the political agenda.3 Calls
therefore periodically surface to give the Minister for Sport direct executive power
and responsibility, by creating a Department of State for Sport with a place for its
Minister in the Cabinet, in order to increase their influence and to achieve access to
the wider funding opportunities that exist in other government departments.4
1 In its response to the report of the Committee that heard the evidence of the then Minister for Sport,
bemoaning his lack of powers, that is quoted at n 2, below, the government stated: ‘Ministers do not
intend abolishing the arm’s length principle, but they do intend that [DCMS] should give strategic
leadership, and should set a clear policy framework within which its bodies can operate’, using in
particular the policy directions issued by the Secretary of State for the DCMS to Lottery-funded grant
bodies under the National Lottery Act 1998 (Objectives and Performance of the DCMS: Government
Response to the Fifth Report from the Culture, Media & Sport Committee, Session 1997/98). See also
the comments of Hugh Robertson MP, Minister for Sport, HC Deb, 28 January 2013, 756, January
2013: ‘I can set the overall strategy for UK Sport, and indeed I do, but it is not up to me to make
individual funding decisions within that, because about two thirds of the money that goes to any of
these funding awards is lottery money. As anyone who has been in this House for any length of time
will know, that is not for Ministers to direct’.
2 In 1998, in evidence given to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, then Minister
for Sport Tony Banks said ‘it is an interesting fact that the budget of my Department for sport is
small at about £50 million, and that would not be that bad of course if the £50 million was totally
at my disposal, but of course about £49 million of that £50 million goes straight out to other bodies
like the English Sports Council and the UK Sports Council, so in terms of money that is available,
as it were, to me as a Minister and to our Department directly, it is a very, very small amount and
that is why the constant stream of Members who come to me and put great projects to me and ask
how we can possibly fund them should realise that, I am afraid, as a Minister, I tend to have to try
to influence rather than to take executive action in terms of sports decisions. Lastly, I asked for a list
because someone said, “What does the Sports Minister do?” and it is an exceedingly good question
and I think really I would see my function more as an advocate for sport within government because
I have been contacting my colleague Ministers who appear to have some element of responsibility for
sport within their Departments and so far I have been talking to Education Ministers, Employment,
Home Affairs, Defence, the Foreign Office and International Development as all of them have a sport
element somewhere within their Department […] Influence rather than executive decision-making is
the role of any Sports Minister’. Minutes of Evidence to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport, 1997. Mr Banks stated that the suggestion that the job of the Sports Minister is in
some ways, to a large degree, a sham, that it is an enormously publicised post and you get a lot of
attention, but actually your effect on British sport is not very great’ was ‘quite unkind, but probably
reasonably accurate’. Similarly, Mr Bank’s successor, Kate Hoey, is reported to have said: ‘I can try
and influence, I can try and persuade, but I have got no real power’: Independent, 15 May 2001.
In contrast, in February 2007, after six-and-a-half years in office, making him the longest-serving
Sports Minister in history, Richard Caborn took a more positive view of the extent to which the Sports
Minister can influence the sporting agenda: ‘A sports minister can have an impact in many ways, not
just through providing direction and sufficient funding, but also on how sport is perceived within
Government. Supporting sport for sport’s sake is a worthy end in itself – and one we sometimes
forget – but sport can also be a powerful medium for delivering on a whole range of issues facing
the country – from public health to crime prevention […]. It is sometimes said that sport should have
a voice in Cabinet. It does: her name is Tessa Jowell [then Secretary of State for the DCMS]. But
I do not subscribe to the view that sport needs a voice all to itself. In fact I believe sport’s bargaining
hand in Cabinet is strengthened by the fact that the Secretary of State representing sport has a wider
portfolio of interests behind them. Nevertheless I believe it was encouraging sign of Tony Blair’s
commitment to sport that when I was given the job it was as a Minister of State and Privy Councillor,
not a Parliamentary Under Secretary as most previous Ministers had been. This helps give the post
holder what you need; a Minister that has authority, commands respect and has a clear vision of what
can be achieved. My personal belief is that the Sports Minister’s position could be strengthened if they
were to chair a Cabinet committee for Sport. This would mean ministerial colleagues were constantly
engaged in ensuring sport was actually delivering on their agendas’ (speech given on 5 February 2007
at sportsthinktank.com.event).
3 See eg Houlihan, ‘Sport in the United Kingdom’ in Chalip, Johnson and Stachura (eds) National Sports
Policies: An International Handbook (Greenwood Press, 1996), at p 401: ‘The fortuitous combination
of a group of senior government members with a clear agenda for sport can evaporate just as rapidly
as it emerged, leaving sport at the whim of the next incumbent of number 10 Downing Street’.
4 See eg CCPR, ‘Active Britain: A Manifesto for Sport and Recreation’ (May 2001) (‘We propose
a dedicated British Sports Department with a Cabinet Minister to drive policy across Whitehall
Departments in partnership with the devolved administrations’). See also Goodbody, ‘A Journalist’s
View’ [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 5 (suggesting that the Secretary of State and Minister for Sport should also
chair UK Sport and Sport England respectively, thereby assuming executive power and responsibility).
See also the comments of former Director of Communications and Strategy for Tony Blair, Alistair
Campbell, ‘Dear Mr Cameron, Please create a new Department for Sport and Olympic Legacy in
reshuffle’, 3 September 2012: ‘My idea […] is the creation of a new Department for Sport, with a
seat at the Cabinet table, a proper budget, and ministerial representation on all key economic, health,
education, crime and community policy committees, not to mention Olympics Legacy. The Secretary
of State should have the same role in overseeing legacy projects that ministers had as the 2012 project
came together. Obviously over time the Legacy part of the brief will start to fade. But by then hopefully
the Department for Sport will be as much an accepted part of the political and cultural landscape as
health, education or the economy. And meanwhile sport will be more deeply embedded in our lives’.
(b) The Home Office
A3.41 The Home Office is responsible for legislation relating to public order at
sports events, including specific measures to address football disorder, racist chanting,
and ticket touting at football matches.1 Along with the Association of Chief Police
Officers, it funds and oversees the UK Football Policing Unit, which is responsible
for preventing and tackling English and Welsh football disorder domestically and
abroad. In March 2011, the Home Office launched the ‘Sports Charter’, calling ‘for
anyone and everyone with a sporting interest or involvement to unite and tackle
homophobia and transphobia in sport’.2 The Home Office also sets immigration
policy (through the UK Border Agency), influencing the terms upon which foreign
sportsmen and women can enter the UK to participate in sport.3 The Home Office
is also not above using sport to advance its own policy goals. In 2019, for example,
it announced the launch of a partnership with Sport England to help tackle serious
violence and knife crime.4 Sport England introduced a series of projects designed
to provide young people with a positive activity to take part in at times when such
individuals are statistically at risk of being drawn into violence, with beneficiaries of
these projects receiving a copy of the Home Office’s #knifefree campaign ‘Partner
Pack’.5
2 ‘Tackling Transphobia and Homophobia in Sport: A Charter for Action’ (Home Office, March 2011)
(available at gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/85484/sports-charter.
pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]). The FA, RFU, RFL and ECB are founding signatories of the
charter.
3 See paras F1.12 to F1.15.
4 ‘Sport used to tackle knife crime’ Sport England, press release (23 July 2019) (sportengland.org/
media/14183/20190723-sport-used-to-tackle-knife-crime.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020])
5 Ibid. The Home Office’s #knifefree campaign was announced on 23 March 2018 and aims to increase
awareness about ‘positive alternatives’ to knife crime. The Home Office’s #knifefree partner pack
includes information on the campaign, along with links to where individuals can download the
campaign resources (gov.uk/government/news/home-office-launches-anti-knife-crime-campaign
(c) The Department of Health and Social Care
A3.42 The Department of Health and Social Care has long recognised the role that
sport can play in improving the nation’s health and well-being. Under the 2010–15
Coalition Government, the Department for Health made a financial commitment to
the government’s School Games programme, and in December 2011 it launched
the Public Health Responsibility Deal, a scheme in which organisations can make a
pledge to improve the public health of the nation. Sporting organisations that have
signed up include Sport England and the Youth Sport Trust.1 In August 2013 and
in direct response to the Coalition Government’s push for a more active population
following the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games,2 the Department of Health
and Social Care pledged to invest over £5 million across three initiatives in order to
encourage children and families to exercise more.3
1 See webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130104155639/http://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/ [accessed

28 September 2020].
2 See para A3.29.
3 ‘Get active to get healthy’, Department of Health and Social Care, press release (14 August 2013).
(d) The Treasury
A3.43 The Treasury is responsible for all taxation policies that affect sport,
including the application of corporation tax to governing bodies and VAT rates paid
by sports bodies and athletes,1 and also allocates Exchequer funding to sport as part
of its periodic Comprehensive Spending Review.2 The Treasury has responded to
concerns that overseas sports stars will avoid coming to the UK for fear of having
to pay UK income tax on their worldwide income3 by granting exemption from
income tax to overseas sportsmen, albeit only on an event-by-event basis, first in
relation to the London 2012 Olympics and the 2011 and 2013 UEFA Champions
League Finals staged at Wembley, and then (as provided for in Finance Act 2013)
in relation to the London Anniversary Games in July 2013 and the Commonwealth
Games in 2014. The Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations
2016 extended this protection to participants in the 2016 London Anniversary Games
and the 2017 IAAF World Athletics Championships in London.4 In April 2018, the
Treasury announced the introduction of a levy on soft drinks containing added sugar
with all proceeds used to ‘fund new sports facilities in schools as well as healthy
breakfast clubs, ensuring children lead healthier lives’.5 The tax, commonly referred
to as the ‘sugar tax’, generated £240 million from April 2018 to April 2019, and a
further £251m from April 2019 to October 2019.6
1 See generally Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations) and Chapter I2 (Taxation of Individual
Athletes).
2 The Sport and Recreation Alliance estimated in 2011 that in 2008 the government made a net surplus
of £5.7bn from sport, with £5 taken in tax for every £1 it spent on sport. ‘Red Card to Red Tape’
(2011, Sport and Recreation Alliance). In November 2001, the Rugby Football Union announced that
it had estimated it would pay the government £50m in tax over the eight years from March 2001.
It pointed out that such a sum could be better used to fund grassroots development of the sport and
noted suggestions that governing bodies committed to the grassroots development of their sports
should be tax exempt: ‘Profits up but RFU condemns government’, sportbusiness.com (16 November
2001). In 1999, UK Sport stated: ‘If the UK wants to be successful in the highly competitive events
marketplace, it will need to address the issue of VAT and Corporation Tax levied on sporting bodies.
A number of countries including Australia, the Republic of Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands
have illustrated the benefits of reducing the tax burden on certain defined major international events’:
see ‘A UK Strategy for Sport: Major Events, A “Blueprint” for Success’ (1999, UK Sport). In June
2011, with the support of the Minister for Sport, the Sport and Recreation Alliance formulated a tax
strategy for sport that it hopes will bring about legislative change to ‘promote, protect and provide for
community sport’. Its proposals include: allowing Community Amateur Sports Clubs (see para I1.124)
to claim Gift Aid on member subscriptions; including sports clubs in HMRC’s definition of charity,
so that they are treated as charitable organisations for tax purposes (see para I1.116 et seq.); making
SGBs exempt from corporation tax; and making endorsement income earned by overseas sportsmen
and women exempt from UK tax. On 4 March 2013, Sajid Javid, Economic Secretary to the Treasury,
announced a new public consultation, due to be issued later in 2013, calling for responses on proposals
to make it easier for Community Amateur Sports Clubs to take advantage of existing tax benefits:
‘Community Amateur Sports Clubs’ (March 2013, HM Treasury).
3 See eg ‘Britain “has closed the door” to major sporting events’, Telegraph 8 May 2008; ‘Bolt snubs
London over tax law’, bbc.co.uk, 13 July 2010 (‘Triple Olympic champion Usain Bolt announces he
will not compete in London before the 2012 Olympics, because of Britain’s tax laws’). See generally
Hedley, Hackleton and Watkins, ‘Sporting Chance’ (2013) Taxation, 16 May, p 10 (arguing that ‘the
UK tax system is out of line with the rest of the world and […] exemptions are becoming increasingly
necessary to encourage organisers of world events and top international talent to compete in the UK’).
See further para I2.29.
4 ‘The Major Sporting Events (Income Tax Exemption) Regulations 2016’, HMRC policy paper (21 July
2016) (available online at gov.uk/government/publications/the-major-sporting-events-income-tax-
exemption-regulations-2016/the-major-sporting-events-income-tax-exemption-regulations-2016
5 ‘Soft Drinks Industry Levy comes into effect’ HM Treasury, press release (5 April 2018) (available online
at gov.uk/government/news/soft-drinks-industry-levy-comes-into-effect [accessed 28 September 2020]).
6 ‘UK Soft Drinks Industry Levy Statistics’, HMRC press release (October 2019) (available
online at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/848936/2019_Oct_SDIL_Comm.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
(e) The Department for Education
A3.44 In 2010 the Department for Education was established to replace the
Department for Children, Schools & Families (DCSF), and took on responsibility
for sport in the national curriculum and for sports facilities at schools, colleges and
universities. By virtue of s 84(3) of the Education Act 2002, physical education is
one of the foundation subjects of the national curriculum, and a compulsory subject
for pupils aged 5 to 16 in state-maintained schools in England and Wales.1 In October
2002, the incumbent Labour Government launched its physical education and school
sports strategy, ‘PE, School Sport and Club Links’, accompanied by a further
strategy document, ‘A Guide to the Physical Education, School Sport and Club Links
Strategy’. The plan, backed by Lottery and Exchequer funding of £1.5bn from 2003
to 2008, was to be delivered through eight PE programmes, including the introduction
of Specialist Sport Colleges, School Sport Coordinators and the Gifted and Talented
Programme. The ultimate aim of the scheme was to increase the percentage of school
children participating in two hours a week of high quality PE to 75 per cent by 2006
by creating 450 School Sport Partnerships across England.2 In 2008, the programme
was extended with the ‘PE & Sport Strategy for Young People’, intended to build
on the approach already in place, with further funding of £755m between 2008 and
2011. The new strategy raised the bar for youth sports participation further, making
a ‘five hour offer’: a commitment to offering new opportunities for 5–16 year olds
to increase the amount of hours per week playing sport, with the help of school,
voluntary and community providers.
1 The National Curriculum for England states that ‘the Government believes that two hours of physical
activity a week, including the National Curriculum for physical education and extra-curricular
activities, should be an aspiration for all schools. This applies throughout all key stages’.
2 The Department for Education’s September 2010 ‘PE and Sport Survey’ described School Sport
Partnerships in the following terms: ‘Partnerships are families of schools which typically comprise
a Specialist Sports College linked to a set of secondary schools, each of which has a further group of
primary and special schools clustered around it.’
A3.45 Notwithstanding the apparent success of these policies in increasing youth

sports participation in schools,1 in October 2010 the new Secretary of State for
Education, Michael Gove, announced that they would be dropped in order to give
schools the freedom to concentrate on competitive sport:2
‘Our approach differs fundamentally from that of the last Government. As part of
this change of approach, I have concluded that the existing network of school sport
partnerships is neither affordable nor likely to be the best way to help schools achieve
their potential in improving competitive sport. While the network helped schools to
increase participation rates in the areas targeted by the previous Government, the
fact remains that the proportion of pupils playing competitive sport regularly has
remained disappointingly low. Only around two in every five pupils play competitive
sport regularly within their own school, and only one in five plays regularly against
other schools.
I can confirm therefore that the Department will not continue to provide ring-fenced
funding for school sport partnerships. I am also announcing that the Department
is lifting, immediately, the many requirements of the previous Government’s PE
and Sport Strategy, so giving schools the clarity and freedom to concentrate on
competitive school sport’.
At the same time he also announced the new School Games, an Olympic-style sports
competition for schools.3 Following strong criticism of the abandonment of the prior
administration’s policies, however,4 in December 2010 Mr Gove announced that

funding for School Sports Partnerships would continue until August 2011 (at a cost
of £47m). He also confirmed that a further £65m of funding would be provided until
2013 to fund one day a week of secondary school PE teachers’ time to be spent
out of the classroom encouraging intra- and inter-school competition in primary
schools, that Lottery funding for the School Games project would increase, and
that the government was committed to reviewing the PE curriculum to place greater
emphasis on competitive sport.5 Nevertheless, in its February 2013 report Ofsted
(the government inspector and regulator of schools in England) acknowledged the
investment made in school physical education by the previous administration and
the success of its school sport partnerships policy, and challenged the then-Coalition
Government to build on that success:6
‘the report confirms there is more good and outstanding PE than at the time of the last
Ofsted PE survey in 2008. Sustained government investment has enabled schools to
make significant improvements in PE and school sport. However, continuing these
improvements will present a formidable challenge for schools against a backdrop
of greater expectations. Ofsted recommends that the Department for Education
considers devising a new national strategy for PE and school sport that builds on
the successes of school sport partnerships and enables schools to make a major
contribution to the sporting legacy left by the 2012 Olympic Games’.7
1 In its most recent ‘PE and Sport Survey’, in September 2010, the Department for Education found that
during the 2009/10 academic year 84 per cent of pupils in years 1 to 11 were spending at least two
hours on PE per week at school, an increase of 40 per cent on the 2003/04 figures.
2 See gov.uk/government/publications/refocusing-sport-in-schools-to-build-a-lasting-legacy-of-the-
2012-games [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 See gov.uk/government/policies/getting-more-people-playing-sport/supporting-pages/the-school-
games [accessed 28 September 2020].
4 See eg Vaughan, ‘End of sports strategy is “devastating contradiction”’, Times Educational Supplement,
29 October 2010. See also Hart, ‘London 2012 Olympics: Government accused of ‘devastating’ legacy
with school spending cuts’, Daily Telegraph, 20 October 2010.
5 See gov.uk/government/news/new-approach-for-school-sports-decentralising-power-incentivising-
competition-trusting-teachers [accessed 28 September 2020].
6 ‘Beyond 2012 – outstanding physical education for all’ (Ofsted, February 2013, 1203670).
7 Further controversy came in October 2012 with the enactment of the School Premises (England)
Regulations 2012, which replaced a previous legal requirement on secondary schools to provide a
minimum of 5,000 square metres of outdoor space with a requirement merely to provide ‘suitable’
outdoor space (reg 10 of the School Premises (England) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/1943). This has
again drawn criticism from many quarters, with concerns that the new regulations will make it easier
for schools to sell off outdoor space and accusations that it contradicts the specific commitment set
down in the 2010 Coalition Agreement to ‘protect school playing fields’.
A3.46 In July 2013, the House of Commons Education Committee issued a report
praising the School Games programme but recommending that the Department for
Education require schools to offer non-competitive as well as competitive sport, and
that it should continue to focus on investment in sport at primary school level, but
move away from short-term funding initiatives (such as the two-year ‘primary school
premium’ funding) by committing to ‘a long-term vision for school sport which is
properly supported by long-term funding’. The Committee concluded:
‘School sport is simply too important to be picked up and dropped. If school sport
is to grow from the grass-roots, it needs long-term funding and time to develop. We
would like to see an end to school sport being kicked around as a political football,
and successive governments commit to a long-term future for school sport’.1
Since then, successive governments have continued to support and fund the ‘primary
school premium’. In April 2019, the Department for Education confirmed that
£320 million will be made available to primary schools in England to improve the
quality of PE and sport.2 The Department of Education also played a key role in the
development of ‘School Sport and Activity Action Plan’3 and on its announcement
then-Education Secretary Damian Hinds hailed the health benefits of sport: ‘[sport]
not only keeps pupils fit and healthy but helps them grow in confidence and learn
vital skills. My ambition is for every pupil to have the chance to find a sport they
love, setting them up to lead healthy, active lives […]’.4 The Action Plan represents
cross-department collaboration, with the Department for Education working together
with DCMS and the Department for Health and Social Care to ensure that sport
and physical activity are an integral part of both the school day and after-school
activities.5
1 HC Education Committee, ‘School sport following London 2012: No more political football’, 3rd
Report of Session 2013–2014, Vol 1, HC 164-I, 22 July 2013, pp 3–4.
2 ‘DfE confirms Primary PE and Sport Premium for 2019/20’ Youth Sport Trust, press release (30 April
2019).
3 See further A3.34.
4 ‘New plan to help children get active’ Sport England, press release (14 July 2019) (available online
at sportengland.org/news-and-features/news/2019/july/14/government-launch-school-sport-and-
activity-action-plan/ [accessed 28 September 2020]).
5 ‘School Sport and Physical Activity Action Plan’ (Department for Education, 2019).
(f) The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
A3.47 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (formerly

the Department for Communities and Local Government) oversees local authorities,
county councils and district councils, ie the organisations that have traditionally had
primary responsibility for providing facilities and opportunities for mass participation
in sport in the UK.1 Section 19 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 19762 permits (but does not require) a local authority to provide sports and
recreational facilities of any and all types for use by such persons as it sees fit,
and/or to contribute to the expenses of any not-for-profit organisations providing
recreational or sports facilities. In the late twentieth century, the pressure on local
authority revenue caused by the move from domestic rates to poll tax to council
tax led to widespread cuts in spending on non-statutory services such as sport, as
well as to sales of capital assets such as sports facilities.3 However, local authority
spending on sport and recreation facilities (admittedly heavily subsidised by Lottery
funds) remains one of the most significant sources of public funding for sport in
this country: local authorities own and operate the sports centres, swimming pools,
playing fields and specialist facilities that facilitate mass participation in sport.4
Faced with an enormous budget deficit, the then-Coalition Government announced
in December 2012 that local authority budgets would be cut by an average of 3
per cent (with the wealthiest councils facing cuts of nearly 9 per cent),5 putting
serious pressure on local authority spending on sports facilities.6 On the other hand,
the Coalition Government followed through on its promise to decentralise power
away from Whitehall by enacting the Localism Act 2011, which gives communities
a ‘Right to Buy’ and a right to challenge the decisions of local authorities when sport
and recreational facilities are under threat.7
1 See ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (DCMS, March 2001) at p 52: ‘Local authorities are key providers
of sport and recreation and play a central role in the delivery of sport in the community’; Joint
UK Government/Sports Councils’ Response to the Commission Consultation Paper ‘The European
Model of Sport’ (May 1999), para 27 (‘The promotion of public health through activity, whether sport
or less formal physical activity, is essentially a matter which can be dealt with satisfactorily at a lower
or national level. Local government in the UK plays a full part in promoting health through sport and
leisure, as well as local sports organisations and we certainly believe they are capable of promoting
sport for all initiatives’).
2 As amended by Pt I of Sch 13 to the Educational Reform Act 1988.
3 The Conservative Government introduced legislation in 1980 (the Department of Education and
Science Regulations 1980 and the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980) that encouraged
local authorities to sell off their playing fields to private developers in order to raise finances for
investment in educational facilities. It is estimated that between 1981 and 1997 around 5,000 sports
fields were sold to developers. In 1996 measures were introduced requiring local authorities to consult
with Sport England (then the English Sports Council) on receipt of a planning application affecting a
playing field. However, Sport England was given no power to prohibit the development. In 1998 new
procedures were introduced pursuant to the Town and Country Planning (Playing Fields) (England)
Direction 1998, empowering the Secretary of State of the Environment to examine applications where
the local authority announced its intention to reject the advice of Sport England. In addition, s 77 of
the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 required local authorities to obtain the consent of
the Secretary of State for the Environment to the disposal of school playing fields. In July 2001 the
Department for Education issued Guidance 0580/2001 for the Protection of School Playing Fields.
Applications for the sale of school playing fields must now be considered by an independent advisory
committee called the School Playing Fields Advisory Panel: see fieldsintrust.org/.
4 In 2013, Sport England estimated that local government was responsible for more than 50 per cent of
the total resources available to sport every year.
5 See bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20784599 [accessed 28 September 2020].
6 See the Sport & Recreation Alliance briefing paper, Local Authorities (sportandrecreation.org.uk/
lobbying-and-campaigning/policyareas/access-facilities/local-authorities [accessed 28 September
2020]): ‘Clubs are operating in a challenging environment due to local authority spending cuts.
Authorities have more incentive to sell or close facilities which are used by clubs, and funding for
sport and recreation are being drastically reduced’.
7 But see the Sport & Recreation Alliance briefing paper, Local Authorities, (sportandrecreation.org.
uk/lobbying-and-campaigning/policyareas/access-facilities/local-authorities) [accessed 28 September
2020]: ‘There is little reason to be assured by the promise of a “Right to Buy”, which will do little more
than provide an opportunity to bid against a developer’.
A3.48 The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government is also

responsible for issuing the National Planning Policy Framework, setting out the
government’s planning policies for England and how it is intended they be applied
by local authorities. Planning law requires that applications for planning permission
to local authorities be determined in accordance with the Policy Framework unless
material considerations indicate otherwise. The most recent Policy Framework,
issued in February 2019,1 made a number of specific provisions for sports facilities,
including the following:
‘96. Access to high quality open spaces and opportunities for sport and physical
activity is important for the health and well-being of communities. Planning
policies should be based on robust and up-to-date assessments of the need for open
space, sport and recreation facilities (including quantitative or qualitative deficits
or surpluses) and opportunities for new provision. Information gained from the
assessments should be used to determine what open space, sports and recreational
facilities is needed, which plans should then seek to accommodate.
97. Existing open space, sports and recreational buildings and land, including
playing fields, should not be built on unless:
(a) an assessment has been undertaken which has clearly shown the open space,
buildings or land to be surplus to requirements; or
(b) the loss resulting from the proposed development would be replaced by
equivalent or better provision in terms of quantity and quality in a suitable
location; or
(c) the development is for alternative sports and recreational provision, the needs
for which clearly outweigh the loss of the current or former use’.
1 See assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/810197/
NPPF_Feb_2019_revised.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].
A3.49 In July 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
in partnership with Sport England announced the introduction of a new fund, the
Integrated Communities Innovation Fund.1 The Innovation Fund is designed to
use sport and physical education to tackle the key causes of integration problems
in communities. On 20 May 2019, Communities Minister Lord Bourne announced
that 16 ‘trailblazing’ projects across the country would receive £3,000,000 of new
funding to support ‘innovative approaches to integration’, including a table tennis
club run across three housing estates in Brighton, and a large scale sporting festival in
Birmingham.2 Speaking on announcement of the funding initiatives, Sport England

CEO Tim Hollingsworth said:3
‘Sport England is proud to be working with the Ministry of Housing, Communities

and Local Government to help integrate communities up and down the country
[…] Not only does taking part in sport and physical activity have powerful mental
and physical health benefits, it can help people develop new skills and bring them
together in a shared experience’.
1 ‘Integrated Communities Innovation Fund’. Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
press release (9 July 2018) (available at gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-communities-
innovation-fund [accessed 28 September 2020]).
2 ‘Tens of thousands to benefit from Integrated Communities Innovation Fund’, Ministry of Housing,
Communities and Local Government press release (20 May 2019) (available at gov.uk/government/news/
tens-of-thousands-to-benefit-from-integrated-communities-innovation-fund [accessed 28 September
2020]).
3 Ibid.
(g) Devolution
A3.50 Responsibility for sport in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has
devolved to their respective Parliaments and Assemblies. In the Scottish Executive,
the Minister for Public Health, Sport and Wellbeing is the Executive’s voice on
sport, sporting events and legacy, obesity, and physical activity.1 In the National
Assembly for Wales, responsibility for sport lies with the Minister for Culture, Sport
and Tourism.2 In the Northern Ireland Executive, responsibility for sport lies with
the Department for Communities.3 Each of those bodies has a funding and policy-
implementation relationship with its own country sports council similar to the
relationship that exists between DCMS and UK Sport and Sport England.
1 See gov.scot/about/who-runs-government/cabinet-and-ministers/ [accessed 28 September 2020].
2 See gov.wales/cabinet-members-and-ministers [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 See communities-ni.gov.uk/ [accessed 2 November 2020].
(h) UK Sport
A3.51 While it sets the sports policy framework, the government delegates
responsibility for implementing that policy to non-departmental public bodies. The
original body was the GB Sports Council, which was set up in 1962 with responsibility
for co-ordinating sports development across the whole of the UK. Following various
reorganisations and re-branding exercises, today UK-wide issues are coordinated by
the United Kingdom Sports Council (aka UK Sport), save for anti-doping policy,
which is implemented by UK Anti-Doping.1 The ‘Home Country Sports Councils’
– the English Sports Council (aka Sport England), the Scottish Sports Council (aka
Sport Scotland), the Sports Council of Wales (aka Sport Wales), and the Sports
Council of Northern Ireland (aka Sport Northern Ireland) – deal with sport in their
respective countries.2 These are official, publicly funded, non-departmental public
bodies, established by Royal Charter (except UK Anti-Doping, which is established
as a private company limited by guarantee), operating under funding arrangements
with DCMS or its equivalent in Scotland, Wales and Ireland, and accountable to
Parliament, via DCMS, with their work being scrutinised by Parliamentary Select
Committees.3 The function of UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils,
broadly, is to advise the government on sports-related issues in the UK, to distribute
public funding for sport, and (by placing conditions on access to that funding) to
develop sport in line with government policies on ‘sport for all’ and international
success in elite sport. Meanwhile, the function of UK Anti-Doping is to implement
the government’s National Anti-Doping Policy.4
1 See para A3.117 et seq and para C2.23 et seq.
2 Their respective websites are at uksport.gov.uk, sportengland.org, sportscotland.org.uk, sportni.net,

sportwales.org.uk, and ukad.org.uk.
3 Such as the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, as to which see para
A3.59.
A3.52 UK Sport was established by Royal Charter on 19 September 1996. Its

primary mission is to fund, develop, and support a sports movement system capable
of producing a constant flow of world class Olympic and Paralympic performers. In
particular, from 1 April 2006 UK Sport became fully responsible for the elite sport
performance system in England and the UK, including taking responsibility for, and
incorporating into its existing World Class Performance programme, four matters
previously dealt with by Sport England and the other Home Country Sports Councils,
namely the funding of World Class Potential Athletes, the strategic direction of the
English Institute of Sport, the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme, and the 2012
scholarship scheme.1 Until February 2019, its World Class Performance Programme
operated at two distinct levels: ‘Podium’ (ie supporting athletes with realistic medal-
winning capabilities at the next Olympic/Paralympic Games); and ‘Podium Potential’
(ie supporting athletes whose performances have suggested that they have realistic
medal-winning capabilities in either the next or the next-but-one Olympic Games).2
In February 2019 UK Sport announced its new strategy for the Paris 2024 and Los
Angeles 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games cycles, introducing a third funding
tier, ‘Progression’, which is designed to support athletes with medal winning potential
in one of the next three Games. UK Sport Chair Dame Katherine Grainger said the
new strategy will help ‘sustain medal success while enabling more communities to
be inspired by the power of sport’.3
1 See para A3.24. Minister for Sport Richard Caborn explained in February 2007: ‘The aim was to
streamline the way sport is organised, clarify the responsibilities of sporting bodies and greatly improve
the chances of Britain’s medal hopefuls for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Despite earlier
changes, Sport England was still not delivering what we expected and needed. Though the earlier reforms
had reduced the size of the centre, it still loomed too large over the delivery on the ground through the
Regional Sports Boards. And while the regions had been given greater autonomy, they had not been
given a clear direction. So while regions focused primarily on sport others saw driving up physical
activity as their main objective. Using funds earmarked for sport to do this was not acceptable and
indeed in my view had to change. The decision last April gave Sport England a much sharper focus on
increasing participation in community sport through its Regional Sports Boards. It also gave UK Sport
a clear remit for delivering success in high performance sport and developing elite athletes from the
playground to the podium. This meant responsibility for the World Class Potential Programmes for
Olympic and Paralympic sports, the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme and the funding and directing
of the work of the English Institute of Sport, all transferred across from Sport England to UK Sport.
This may have taken longer than we had hoped, but I am confident we now have both the leadership and
the locally focused structure to make a real difference’. Caborn, sportsthinktank.com event (February
2007). Speaking in UK Sport’s Annual Review of 2006, Sue Campbell, Chair of UK Sport, stated: ‘For
the first time we have a sporting system that properly integrates the funding and management of high
performance sport and provides the ‘one stop shop’ that sports were crying out for’.
2 See at uksport.gov.uk/our-work/world-class-programme [accessed 28 September 2020]..
3 ‘UK Sport sets out exciting blueprint for the future of elite sport’ UK Sport, press release (12 February
2019) (available online at uksport.gov.uk/news/2019/02/12/uk-sport-sets-out-exciting-blueprint-for-
the-future-of-elite-sport [accessed 28 September 2020].).
A3.53 UK Sport’s funding of athletes is released in four-year cycles, to coincide

with each Olympic and Paralympic Games. Athletes on the World Class Performance
Programme receive funding through two channels: UK Sport funds national
governing bodies to provide a range of programme support services, and separately
athletes are entitled to apply for Athlete Personal Awards to assist with living costs
and costs of training and equipment. The level of award available to athletes depends
on a number of criteria, not least the likelihood of the athlete winning a medal at the
next Olympics or Paralympics.1
1 See uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/how-uk-sport-funding-works [accessed 28 September
2020].
A3.54 The funding that UK Sport distributes to elite athletes and their governing
bodies traditionally comes from two sources: the Exchequer (in 2017/18 UK Sport
received £62m from HM Treasury); and from the National Lottery (in 2017/18 it
received £74.9m from the Lottery).1 In the lead-up to London 2012, a third source of
funding was established, the ‘Team 2012’ programme, which sought to raise funds
through private sponsorship to support athletes bound for the London Olympics.2 In
the London 2012 Olympic cycle, UK Sport distributed a total of £249m to Olympic
sports in the UK, and just under £50m to Paralympic sports.3 In subsequent Olympic
cycles the level of funding has increased. While certain sports have seen their funding
drop or withdrawn completely (in the case of handball for Rio 2016 and badminton
for Tokyo 2020), the overall funding allocated to Olympic sports was £274.4 million
for Rio 2016 and £265.1 million for Tokyo 2020, and the overall funding allocated to
Paralympic sports was £72.8 million for Rio 2016 and £70.8 million for Tokyo 2020.4
1 UK Sport 2017/18 Annual Report and Accounts (available at uksport.gov.uk/resources/annual-reports
2 See ‘Team 2012 Launched’, 1 October 2009 (available at uksport.gov.uk/news/2009/10/01/team-
2012-launched [accessed 28 September 2020]).
3 See ‘12 Facts about 2012’, uksport.gov.uk/news/2012/05/03/uk-sports-12-facts-about-2012 [accessed
28 September 2020].
4 ‘UK Sport Investment – Tokyo 2020 Cycle (2017–2021)’, UK Sport, press release.
(i) The Home Country Sports Councils
A3.55 With UK Sport addressing common issues at a UK level, the responsibility

for developing sport on a home country basis falls to the respective Home Country
Sports Councils. Following the April 2006 restructuring,1 they no longer have any
responsibility for elite sport. Instead, their focus is firmly on community sport:
their aim is to increase participation levels, including by increasing the number of
facilities at which sport can be played and the number of coaches who can teach new
participants how to play.
A3.56 The English Sports Council, operating as Sport England, was established by
Royal Charter on 19 September 1996. Its mission is to transform sport and physical
activity so that everyone can benefit.1 As part of its role, Sport England acts as the
gatekeeper for distribution of public funding (including lottery grants and Exchequer
finding) to be awarded on a competitive basis. In 2018/19 it received £199.4m
of Lottery funding and £104.3m of Exchequer funding for that purpose.2 Sport
England’s funding decisions are focused on achieving the five outcomes3 promoted
in ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’, which in turn defines
three Sport England organisational targets:4
(a) to increase the number of people who are regularly active by 500,000 nationally;
(b) to increase the number of women who are regularly active by at least 250,000
nationally; and
(c) to increase the number of people from lower socio-economic groups who are
more active by 100,000 in targeted locations.
In determining which sports qualify for funding, Sport England operates a recognition
process based on whether such activity falls within the European Sports Charter’s
definition of a ‘sport’.5 Sport England’s application of this test has not been without
controversy, having previously recognised darts, model aircraft and rifle shooting as
sports but not ‘mind sports’ such as bridge.6
1 Sport England Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2018–19 (available online at sportengland.
org/media/14046/sport-england-2018-19-annual-report-and-accounts.pdf [accessed 28 September
2020]).
2 Ibid, p 14.
3 See para A3.33.
4 Sport England Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2018–19, p.10.
5 European Sports Charter, Council of Europe (16 May 2001). See Article 2: ‘”Sport” means all forms
of physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improving
physical fitness and mental well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition
at all levels’ (available online at rm.coe.int/16804c9dbb [accessed 28 September 2020]).
6 See R(EBU) v Sports Council England [2015] EWHC 2875, para 55. The English Bridge Union
launched judicial review proceedings to challenge Sport England’s decision that bridge does not
qualify as a sport. The challenge was made on the basis that the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘sport’
in the European Charter was sufficiently broad such that it did not necessarily require any ‘physical
activity’. However, this was dismissed by the High Court with Mr. Justice Dove finding that Sport
England’s interpretation (that a pastime had to include ‘physical activity’ to qualify as a sport) was in
line with a ‘proper construction of the objects and powers contained in the Royal Charter’.
A3.57 Other investments made by Sport England to aid community sports

participation include:
(a) £10m per year of Exchequer funding to bodies with specialist skills, knowledge
and services in particular aspects of sport, such as women’s participation, child
protection, and disability sport (including the English Federation of Disability
Sport, StreetGames, Volunteering England, and the Sport + Recreation
Alliance);
(b) £17.6m of Exchequer and Lottery funding to the Football Foundation, a body
that issues grants to local football clubs to improve facilities and/or to provide
kit and equipment;
(c) more than £45m to Olympic venues, such as the Velodrome and Aquatics
Centre, to re-purpose them to become community sports venues following the
2012 Games;
(d) £35m to the School Games project;1
(e) more than £135m to the Places People Play scheme;2 and
(f) £5m towards protecting and improving community playing fields.3
1 See para A3.30.
2 Ibid.
3 As noted above (see para A3.47), Sport England is a statutory consultee on all planning proposals
involving playing fields, where it seeks to ‘ensure that England’s planning system favours the
retention of existing opportunities and the development of new facilities – where this is consistent with
principles of sustainable development’. ‘Sport England’ (April 2000, Sport England). See generally
Sport England planning policy statement, ‘A sporting future for the playing fields of England: policy
on planning applications for development on playing fields’ (available at sportengland-production-
files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/a-sporting-future-for-the-playing-fields-of-england-
planning-policy-statement.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020]).
A3.58 In October 2010, Jeremy Hunt, then-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport, announced that:
‘UK Sport and Sport England will be merged to create a more unified, coherent and
cost-effective structure as part of the Government’s 2012 Olympic Games legacy
plans. DCMS is also working with the Youth Sport Trust to explore how they could
be brought into the new structure’.1
In January 2013, however, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson announced a
U-turn:
‘In view of […] the challenges associated with merging a UK-wide organisation with
an England only body, I have concluded that we will retain UK Sport and Sport England
as two separate entities with a shared reform agenda. To maintain momentum, and
ensure that the two organisations deliver the economic and strategic benefits intended
from the merger, we intend to conduct a joint review of both organisations in 2014–
15, as part of the Government’s rolling programme of reviews of non-departmental
public bodies. They will also be asked to co-locate, share significantly more back
office services and align their strategies. With this approach, I am confident that both
organisations will be able to reduce their administrative costs over this spending
review period and that we can deliver the strategic benefits of closer working between
the two organisations with immediate effect. This fits logically within the context of
the Government’s public bodies reform programme which will reduce the number of
public bodies by a third, and it directly contributes to improvements in accountability
and transparency, and will cut out waste and duplication from the system. It will also
contribute to Government-wide reductions of over £2.6 billion in the administration
costs of public bodies over the spending review period’.2
1 ‘Improving efficiency and transparency: DCMS cuts quangos’, DCMS press release, 15 October 2010.
2 Minister for Sport, Hugh Robertson, HC Deb 23, January 2013, 11WS-12WS.
(j) Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee
A3.59 The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee is appointed by the
House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of DCMS
and its associated public bodies. The Committee holds several inquiries a year, to
which witnesses provide written and oral evidence.1 Following an inquiry, it issues
a report making recommendations on how DCMS should act. Inquiries held by the
Committee in recent years have covered:
(a) the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games;
(b) ticket touting;2
(c) the failed bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup;3
(d) football governance;4
(e) racism in football;5
(f) homophobia in sport; 6
(g) accessibility of sports stadia; 7 and
(h) doping in sport. 8
1 See generally parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/culture__media_and_sport.cfm [accessed
28 September 2020].
2 See HC Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Ticket Touting’, 2nd Report of Session 2007–08
(HC 202, 10 January 2008).
3 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, 6th Report of Session
2010-12 (HC 1031, 5 July 2011). The Committee criticised FIFA for not investigating properly the
allegations of corruption in relation to the bidding process. It also recommended that The FA review
its bidding strategy, and that the Government also review the manner in which it reviews and supports
bids to host major events.
4 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Football Governance’, 7th Report of Session
2010–12 (HC 792, 29 July 2011). See also HC Culture, Media and Sport, ‘Football Governance Follow-
Up’, 4th Report of Session 2012–13 (HC 509, 29 January 2013). See further para A3.105 et seq.
5 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Racism in Football’, 2nd Report of Session
2012–13 (HC 89, 19 September 2012).
6 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Homophobia in Sport’, 7th Report of Session
2016–17 (HC 113, 12 February 2017).
7 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Accessibility of Sports Stadia’, 5th Report of
Session 2016–17 (HC 62, 16 January 2017).
8 See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Combatting Doping in Sport’, 4th Report of
Session 2017–19 (HC 366, 5 March 2018). The Committee concluded that UK Anti-Doping does not
have the investigative or testing resources to fulfil its role effectively and called for a change in the law
to ‘criminalise the supply of drugs to sports people’ (para 152). Given that DCMS had conducted a
review of the same issue and concluded just a few months previously that doping in sport should not
be criminalised (see para A3.39), that recommendation was never likely to go very far.
B The three main methods of government intervention in sport
A3.60 In recent years, as the social and economic status of sport has grown, the
government’s engagement with sport has evolved and it has taken a far greater
involvement in how sport is governed. There are a number of reasons for this:
(a) Successive administrations have seen the potential to harness the power of
sport to achieve important public policy goals.
(b) Increased investment of public money in sport brings with it an expectation of
a greater say in how taxpayers’ money is spent.
(c) Many issues facing sports governing bodies are beyond their direct ability to
control, ie public order issues like football hooliganism and ticket touting, and
integrity issues such as doping and match-fixing. Sport itself has turned to
government for support (legislative, operational, and financial) on these issues.
(d) There has been significant public and media pressure for the government to take
direct involvement in sporting matters, because of the huge impact that sport
has on both foreign and domestic policy. In particular, there is an expectation
that governments will play a direct role in (i) supporting their national teams to
achieve international success, and (ii) supporting bids to bring major sporting
events to this country. There is also the notion that sport can be used as a tool
to apply sanctions to rogue international states.
A3.61 It is possible to identify three different mechanisms that the government

uses to intervene in the sports sector:
(1) Direct intervention, by means of legislative and/or regulatory measures that
directly impact upon sporting activities. The key examples are identified at
paras A3.63 to A3.101.
(2) At the other end of the spectrum, exhortation, whereby government uses its
authority to exhort/persuade/pressure sports governing bodies to act in a certain
way. This approach sometimes sees the government implying that it might be
forced to take legislative action or adopt a specific policy direction if the sport
does not bend to its will; but more often it is careful to stress only that it has an
opinion as an interested and knowledgeable bystander. Examples of the use of
this approach are set out at paras A3.102 to A3.111.
(3) Indirect intervention, using the leverage that comes with control over access
to public funding for sport to pursue an increasingly broad agenda in its
burgeoning partnership with the private sports movement.1 The scope of
this indirect regulation is slowly increasing because of the perception that
government sports policy can only be implemented in partnership with the
private sports movement, and the recognition that such a partnership, and
the increased public funding that comes with it, must be on a professional
basis in accordance with normal public standards of transparency, equity
and accountability. Thus, recognition as the governing body of a sport, and
access to public funds for that sport, now depends on compliance not only with
objective standards on public interest issues such as child protection, equality,
and anti-doping, but also on issues relating to corporate governance and
accountability that see the government taking a far more interventionist role
(albeit indirectly, through UK Sport and the Home Country Sports Councils)
not only in developing the strategic policy of sport but also in overseeing the
way in which sport is governed and administered on a day-to-day basis. The
practicalities of this mechanism are discussed at paragraphs A3.112 to A3.124.
1 See generally Houlihan, Dying to Win, 2nd Edn (Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), pp 15–25.
(a) Direct intervention, by means of primary legislation
A3.62 Consistent with the traditional non-interventionist approach taken by

successive UK governments in the sports sector, there is no broad legislative
programme for the UK sport sector, underpinned by a grand policy design, ie there
is no UK equivalent of the French ‘Code du sport’.1 Rather, legislation or other
intervention is generally countenanced only as a measure of last resort, in response to
a pressing public interest requirement that a sport cannot or will not meet by its own
regulatory measures. A summary overview of some of the key legislation follows.2
1 See para A1.7. Calls do periodically resurface for the introduction of a body of UK ‘sports law’,
the main proponent in recent years being Lord Moynihan, who has pointed to the rapid growth and
commercialisation of sport (and the associated challenges that this brings) as cause for the United
Kingdom to follow the example of many other countries by adopting a body of law designed to ‘protect
and promote well-being in this society’. Lord Moynihan in a House of Lords debate on 19 December
2018 (available at hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2018-12-19/debates/CFBD805F-55CB-4D69-B313-
730392F62C76/SportRecreationAndTheArts [accessed 28 September 2020]).
2 Obviously, the sports sector, like any other sector, is subject to the general law of the land, including
the reams of legislation that is not in any way specific to sport. Some of the generic statutes that impact
most on the sports sector are addressed elsewhere in this book. This chapter deals only with legislation
specific to, or impacting mainly upon, the sports sector.
(i) Public safety
A3.63 Introduced in response to recommendations made after the stand collapse

at Ibrox Stadium in 1969 that killed 66 spectators, the Safety of Sports Grounds Act
1975 (SSGA 1975) established a system of licensing and control of major sports
stadia. Section 1 of the SSGA 1975 requires designated sports grounds with capacity
for more than 10,000 spectators to apply for a safety certificate from the local
authority.1 Section 2 of the SSGA 1975 gives the local authority a broad discretion
to include any conditions in the certificate that it deems necessary to secure spectator
safety, and s 10 allows it to cap the number of spectators that may be admitted into
the stadium. Section 12 makes it a criminal offence to contravene safety requirements
imposed under the licensing scheme.
1 The Safety of Sports Grounds (Accommodation of Spectators) Order 1996 amended the SSGA 1975
to reduce the capacity threshold from 10,000 to 5,000, but only in relation to stadia where Premier
League or Football League football is played. The Fire Safety and Safety at Places of Sport Act 1987
also amended the SSGA 1975 by specifying (as a result of the Popplewell reports on the Bradford City
fire and Heysel Stadium disasters of 1985) that stands with a capacity of 500 or more at sports grounds
not designated under the SSGA 1975 must also obtain a safety certificate from the local authority. The
application procedures are set out in the Safety of Places of Sport Regulations 1988, SI 1988/1807.
A3.64 After the Hillsborough disaster of 15 April 1989, the government

commissioned Lord Justice Taylor to make further recommendations regarding crowd
control and safety at sports events. The Taylor Report, published in 1990,1 found that
existing safety standards were not complied with, and were in any event inadequate.
It made various recommendations to improve safety standards, the principal one
being that major football stadia (specifically, the grounds of Premier League and
Football League Division One clubs) should become all-seater, and terracing
should be improved at Division Two and Three grounds. The Football Spectators
Act 1989 implemented most of the Taylor Report recommendations. Section 10
of the Football Spectators Act 1989 requires that any stadium hosting spectators
for a designated football match (currently Premier League, Football League, and
international matches) must be licensed by the Football Licensing Authority, a new
body established by the 1989 Act. In order to receive a licence from the Football
Licensing Authority, the stadium must comply with the safety criteria recommended
in the Taylor Report. The Football Spectators Act 1989 also obliges local authorities
to comply with directions from the Football Licensing Authority on the issue of
licences for such stadia under the SSGA 1975, including imposing conditions as to
capacity and seating.
1 The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster (Final Report, Cm 962), Taylor LJ.
A3.65 In 1998, with the structural improvement programme for major football
grounds recommended by the Taylor Report largely completed, the government
concluded that there was no longer a need for the Football Licensing Authority to act
as a further regulator of such football grounds, over and above the regulatory role of
local authorities under the SSGA 1975. A Culture and Recreation Bill was introduced
on 14 December 2000 to reconstitute the Football Licensing Authority as the ‘Sports
Grounds Safety Authority’ and to repeal the separate licensing function for major
football stadia established by the Football Spectators Act 1989 and administered
by the Football Licensing Authority. The Bill stalled initially but, following the
government’s announcement in October 2010 that the Football Licensing Authority
was to be one of the 192 quangos to be scrapped,1 the Bill was resurrected and passed
into law on 12 July 2011 as the Sports Grounds Safety Authority Act 2011. Today,
the Sports Grounds Safety Authority retains a review function with respect to safety
certificates issued by local authorities in relation to such stadia (including the power,
via the Secretary of State, to require the inclusion of conditions in such licences), but
has also taken on an advisory role for central and local government authorities on
safety issues associated with sports grounds.2
1 ‘Improving efficiency and transparency: DCMS cuts quangos’ (DCMS, 15 October 2010).
2 See generally sgsa.org.uk.
A3.66 In recent years there has been growing support for the introduction of
safe standing areas at major football grounds. In response to a 2018 petition that
campaigned for the introduction of safe standing at Premiership and Championship
football clubs,1 then-Sports Minister Tracey Crouch announced that the DCMS
was commissioning an external review into the matter.2 The review concluded that
the current evidence was not ‘robust’ enough for the purposes of making a full
assessment over the safety risk of persistent standing and whether any change to the
current policy would ensure ‘equivalent or improved spectator safety’.3 Notably, the
Conservative Party Manifesto in the lead up to the 2019 General Election included
a commitment to ‘work with fans and clubs towards introducing safe standing’.4
Separately, the Sports Ground Safety Authority undertook research into the safety
aspects of standing and published its initial findings on 7 February 2020, which
recognised the positive safety steps that have been taken at grounds to mitigate the
risk of injury.5 The final report was due to be published in the summer of 2020.
1 The Conservative Government’s petition to ‘Allow Premier League and Championship football clubs
to introduce safe standing’ that was signed by over 112,000 people, available at petition.parliament.uk/
archived/petitions/207040 [accessed 28 September 2020].
2 See at hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-06-25/debates/8A09C8B2-14D5-4E2D-8F3E-
1D7FF3838818/FootballSafeStanding [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 ‘Standing at Football: A Rapid Evidence Assessment’ report published by CFE Research on
3 October 2019.
4 Conservative Party Election Manifesto (2019) (available online at assets-global.website-files.com/5
da42e2cae7ebd3f8bde353c/5dda924905da587992a064ba_Conservative%202019%20Manifesto.pdf
5 See at sgsa.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Safe-management-of-standing-at-football-emerging-
findings.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].
(ii) Public order
A3.66A The Football Spectators Act 1989 envisaged that the Football Licensing
Authority would also have a public order role, controlling access to designated
matches via a national football membership scheme. That never materialised, but
other statutes have been enacted to address the serious public order issues associated
with football.1
1 See generally Pearson ‘Legislating for the Football Hooligan: A Case for Reform’ in Greenfield &
Osborn (Eds) Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (Frank Cass, 2000); Greenfield & Osborn
Regulating Football (Pluto Press, 2001), Ch 1.
A3.67 On Lord Justice Taylor’s recommendation,1 the Football (Offences) Act

1991 added three football-specific crimes to the statute book specifically to address
the ‘English disease’ of football hooliganism. Therefore, in addition to the generic
crimes of assault, criminal damage, riot, affray and so on that apply at sporting events
as they do throughout the land, under the Football Offences Act 1991 it is an offence
at a designated football match to throw anything at or towards the playing area, or
any area adjacent to the playing area to which spectators are not generally admitted,2
to engage in indecent or racial chanting,3 or to go onto the playing area, or any area
adjacent to the playing area to which spectators are not generally admitted, without
lawful excuse.4
1 ‘The Hillsborough Stadium Disaster’ (Final Report, Cm 962), Taylor LJ.
2 Section 2 of the Football Offences Act 1991.
3 Ibid, s 3.
4 Ibid, s 4.
A3.68 In Scotland, following several sectarian incidents involving the two Glasgow
clubs, Rangers and Celtic, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening
Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 was passed into law on 1 March 2012, making
it an offence:
(a) to engage in any hateful, threatening, or otherwise offensive behaviour
expressed at or around football matches that is likely to cause public disorder;1
and
(b) to make threats of serious harm or that are intended to incite religious hatred,
whether sent by mail or posted on the internet.2
1 Section 1 of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland)
Act 2012.
2 Ibid, s 6. In its report on racism in football (HC Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Racism in
Football’, 2nd Report of Session 2012–13 (HC 89, 19 September 2012)), the Culture, Media and
Sport Select Committee stated: ‘We acknowledge that the situation in Scotland is different to that in
England and we commend the efforts being made there to tackle abusive behaviour. The Government
should look at the legislation which has already been enacted in Scotland and, if necessary, incorporate
lessons learned into any future legislation for England and Wales’.
A3.69 Section 1 of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 makes
it unlawful to carry alcohol or allow alcohol to be carried or consumed on public
transport whose primary purpose is to transport spectators to a regulated sporting
event (which includes trains and buses running special services to regulated football
matches and also any vehicle hired for the purpose of transporting spectators to
regulated football matches, ie ‘football specials’). Section 2 makes it an offence to be
drunk while trying to enter or while in a regulated sports ground, to drink in sight of
the pitch, or to have in one’s possession an article that can be thrown and cause injury
to another. In addition, in an effort to ensure segregation of opposing fans, section 166
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 makes the unauthorised offer for
sale or sale in a public place of tickets for a designated football match a criminal
offence.1
1 See para H7.90 et seq; Greenfield and Osborn ‘Criminalising Football Supporters: Tickets, Touts and
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994’ [1995] 3 SATLJ 36. In 2006, s 166A of the CJPO Act
1994 was amended by s 53 of the Violent Crimes Reduction Act 2006 to extend the prohibition to sales
or offers for sale of tickets to a regulated match over the Internet.
The Scottish Parliament recently took a step further in relation to the UEFA 2020 Championships
(now scheduled to take place in 2021). On 23 January 2020 the UEFA European Championship
(Scotland) Act received Royal Assent (legislation.gov.uk/asp/2020/1/contents/enacted [accessed
28 September 2020]), making it a crime for any person to tout tickets for profit, whether in person,
via a secondary resale site, or privately, in connection with any Euro 2020 Championship match held
in Scotland.
For other sporting events, ticket touting is not in itself an offence, but individuals may be subject
to existing criminal law in respect of theft, deception, obstruction or threatening behaviour. Certain
sports have called for statutory protection against resale of tickets to be extended to their events (see
eg ‘UK’s Big Five Sports Demand Ticket Protection’, Sportcal.com (4 April 2007)), particularly after
similar statutory protection was afforded to the 2012 Olympic Games (under s 31 of the London
Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006), the 2014 Glasgow Commonwealth Games (under
the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act 2008), and has been proposed for the 2022 Birmingham
Commonwealth Games (under ss 10–25 of the draft Birmingham Commonwealth Games Bill 2019–
20). But then-Minister for Sport, Gerry Sutcliffe, noted in a House of Commons debate on 23 June
2008: ‘The Government do not intend to introduce new regulation to tackle ticket touting. Ticket
touting is banned for football matches on public disorder grounds, and for the Olympic Games in 2012
to meet International Olympic Committee bid conditions. The Government has consistently taken
the view that the consumer interest comes first, and market-led measures to benefit consumers are a
far better option than the burden of legislation’. Successive governments have maintained that line.
See eg the provisions introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in respect of sale of tickets via
online secondary platforms and the general consumer protections on unfair contract terms. See also the
provisions introduced by the Digital Economy Act 2017 in respect of secondary ticketing, including
criminalising the use of bots to purchase tickets in bulk and requiring re-sellers to provide unique
ticket numbers to help the buyer identify the location of the seat.
A3.70 Section 14A of the Football Spectators Act 1989, as amended by the
Football (Disorder) Act 2000, requires the court to impose a football banning order
on anyone convicted of a relevant football-related offence1 if it ‘is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent
violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’. If the
court does not impose such an order, it must explain why not.2
1 A full list of relevant offences is set out in Sch 1 to the Act.
2 In R v Boggild and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1928, [2012] 1 WLR 1298, the trial judge decided
not to impose football banning orders on a number of individuals who had been found guilty of a
football-related offence (affray outside a public house 15 minutes after the conclusion of a Premier
League match), stating: ‘I looked at the legislation but decided that a banning order is appropriate in
cases where there is a future risk of football violence and it is essentially a preventative measure rather
than a punitive element of the sentence’. Instead of banning orders, the judge imposed ‘prohibited
activity requirements’ on the defendants pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, preventing them
from attending any football match, other than home matches of their own team, Everton FC, for
two years. The Crown Prosecution appealed, arguing that the intention of the legislation was that
‘those who were convicted of relevant offences would in the normal case be made the subject of a
football banning order’, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, ruling that: ‘there has been
ample opportunity […] to frame the [Football Spectators] Act as to make a football banning order a
mandatory consequence of a football-related conviction. That opportunity has plainly deliberately not
been taken. I am not surprised for myself that it was not thought necessary or desirable, but in any
event that decision is not for this court but for the legislature’.
A3.71 Section 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 allows the police to apply
to a magistrates’ court to impose a banning order on any person that the police can
prove, to the civil standard, ie on the balance of probabilities, ‘has at any time caused
or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’.
There is no requirement that the violence or disorder have been football-related. If
the police can make that showing, then provided that the court ‘is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent
violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches’, it must
impose a banning order on that person. Section 14B therefore authorises the banning
of a person who has not been convicted of any offence, football-related or otherwise.
To support applications for a banning order under s 14B, the police usually rely on
previous convictions, often in combination with a ‘hooligan profile’ compiled by the
UK Football Policing Unit (as in Gough1), but previous convictions are not a necessary
prerequisite, ie the police may apply based on (for example) a ‘hooligan profile’ alone.
1 See para A3.73.
A3.72 A person made the subject of a football banning order under the Football
Spectators Act 1989 may not attend regulated football matches in England and Wales,
nor may he travel abroad when designated football matches are being played abroad;
instead he must report to a police station (domestic match) or surrender his passport
(overseas match).1 As regards matches in England and Wales, the magistrates’ court
has no power to limit an order to particular matches or in relation to particular teams
(as confirmed in Thorpe2). The Football Banning Orders Authority determines
which matches played abroad trigger the travelling ban in particular cases. They will
include any overseas match or tournament involving the England national team, any
overseas match involving the team supported by the banned person, and any other
high-risk match between club sides in an international competition. Where a non-
custodial sentence is imposed, the banning order imposed under s 14A of the Football
Spectators Act 1989 must be in place for between three and five years following
conviction; where a custodial sentence is imposed, the ban must be for between 6 and
10 years. A football banning order imposed under s 14B of the Football Spectators
Act 1989 will be for a minimum of three years and maximum of five years. As at
1 August 2019, there were 1,771 football banning orders in force, which represents a
decrease of 44 per cent from the 3,174 reported on 29 November 2011.3
1 See the Football Spectators Act 1989, the Football (Disorder) Act 2000, and s 52 of the Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006. See also R v Boggild and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1928 at 1304A-E.
2 In Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Thorpe [2015] EWHC 3339 (Admin), the magistrates’ court
sought to impose a limited banning order as to three named clubs (Fulham, Brentford, and Chelsea)
on the basis that it was necessary and proportionate to protect the subject’s ECHR Article 8 right to
private and family life (see para E13.57). This was subsequently overturned by the High Court, which
concluded that there was no reason to adopt anything other than a natural construct to the words used
in the Football Supporters Act.
football-related-arrests-banning-orders-1819-hosb2219.pdf [accessed 28 September 2020].
A3.73 In Gough v Chief Constable of Derbyshire,1 two individuals were banned

for two years each pursuant to s 14B of the Football Spectators Act 1989 from
attending regulated football matches in the UK or from travelling overseas when
designated football matches were taking place overseas. They challenged the bans
as an infringement of their rights under the European Convention of Human Rights
(under Art 6,2 because s 14B makes criminal sanctions applicable simply on a
‘reasonable suspicion’, proved only to the civil standard; and under Art 8,3 because
s 14B stops people who had not been convicted and imprisoned from leaving the UK)
and under Art 49 of the EC Treaty4 (on the basis that s 14B constitutes an unlawful
and disproportionate restriction on the subject’s right to give and receive services
throughout the EU). The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court’s dismissal
of these arguments, primarily on the basis that, if the strict showing required by
the Football Spectators Act (that the defendant had a propensity for taking part in
football hooliganism) was made out, interference with that individual’s rights was
necessary for the prevention of disorder. Given that there was a power to allow the
subject to travel abroad if he could prove to the Football Banning Orders Authority
on the balance of probabilities that the trip was for a purpose other than to attend
football matches, the ban from international travel was not disproportionate to that
aim. The Court of Appeal did emphasise, however, that the serious restraints that
banning orders involved meant that there had to be individual consideration of each
case, and in relation to each case magistrates must be satisfied that the individual has
caused or contributed to violence or disorder in the UK or abroad, and that there are
strong grounds for believing the individual is likely to become involved in violence
or disorder if permitted to attend matches in the future. The Court of Appeal stated
that the magistrate should apply an exacting standard of proof to such questions that
would in practice be hard to distinguish from the criminal standard.
1 [2002] EWCA Civ 351, [2002] 2 All ER 985, [2002] All ER (D) 308 (Mar).
2 In relation to the right to a fair trial, see para E13.36.
3 In relation to the right to respect for private life, see para E13.57.
4 See para E12.69.
A3.74 Under s 14J of the Football Spectators Act 1989, breach of the terms of
a banning order is an arrestable offence. A person guilty of an offence under this
section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six
months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both. This applies to
the failure to report to a police station when required, failure to surrender a passport
when required, and the entry into a stadium hosting a regulated football match when
the subject of a banning order.
(iii) Sexual offences
A3.75 Under s 16 of the Sexual Offences Act it is an offence for a person aged
18 or over to engage in any sexual activity with a person under 18 years of age if
that older person holds a ‘position of trust’ (such as a teacher or social worker),
such sexual activity being deemed an abuse of the position of trust. In the wake
of numerous sex abuse scandals in recent years in different sports,1 there has been
growing calls for the criminalisation of sex between a coach and an athlete under 18
years of age. Then-sports minister Tracey Crouch stated in 2017 that she had reached
‘ministerial agreement’ with the Ministry of Justice for the required changes to the
law, which would bring the sport industry into line with other sectors.2 Anne Tiivas,
the head of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’s child
protection in sport unit, welcomed this move:
‘We know that some sports coaches spend years grooming young people and then,
as soon as their 16th birthday comes around, they target them for sex. Ever since the
football abuse scandal broke we have been strongly urging government to close this
loophole that leaves children in sports and other out-of-school clubs vulnerable to
adults who want to prey on them’.3
In June 2018, the Conservative Government published its second annual progress
report on ‘Sporting Future’: A New Strategy for an Active Nation and confirmed that
proposals were being developed to extend the definition of a ‘position of trust’ in the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 to capture sports coaches who hold a particular position of
trust.4 At the time of writing, however, no changes to the Sexual Offences Act have
been made.
1 Following revelations by Andrew Woodward in 2016 regarding the abuse he suffered as a young
footballer by serial paedophile Barry Bennell, a vast number of allegations of child abuse have since
come to light across a range of sports (from archery to cannoeing to bobsleigh, see telegraph.co.uk/
archery/2017/06/30/archery-latest-olympic-paralympic-sport-hit-sexual-abuse-allegations/ [accessed
28 September 2020]). In 2018, it was reported that (according to Offside Trust, a body set up for
survivors of child sexual abuse in football) at least 80 sports coaches were convicted of child sexual
abuse since 2016, leading then-FA Chairman Greg Clarke to refer to this as one of the biggest crises
in the history of the governing body (see bbc.co.uk/sport/football/46453955 [accessed 28 September
2020]). See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding in Sport).
2 See bbc.co.uk/sport/42018265 [accessed 28 September 2020].
3 See at theguardian.com/sport/2017/nov/16/law-change-coaches-relationships-16-17-year-olds-illegal
[accessed 28 September 2020].
4 Sporting Future: Second Annual Report, published January 2018.
(iv) Prohibited sports: combat sports
A3.76 As a matter of public policy, the criminal law generally does not recognise
consent as a defence to the charge of intentionally inflicting actual or serious harm
on another.1 However, boxing and other lawfully constituted combat sports2 are
exempted from that general rule, so that the infliction of injuries in the normal course
of such sports will not attract criminal liability. The exemption does not stand on
the strongest of footings, either legally or logically,3 and periodically (usually after
a high-profile fight has resulted in a particularly horrific injury) attempts are made
to introduce legislation to repeal the exemption. However, notwithstanding its weak

foundations, the standing of this exemption in English law remains solid,4 and none
of the attempts at a legislative repeal has yet come close to succeeding.5
1 See para G2.22.
2 From the case law it is clear that sparring and wrestling would fall within the exemption, but there is
no definitive list of what other combat sports fall within the exemption. See para G2.81.
3 See para G2.81, where it is explained that no court has specifically held that boxing is exempt from the
criminal law; rather, the exemption has been implied from the reasoning of the House of Lords in R v
Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, as to why prize fighting is not legal.
4 See A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 per Lane LCJ: ‘nothing which we have said
[about fighting outside the context of sport being unlawful] is intended to cast doubt upon the accepted
legality of properly conducted sports and games’.
5 Indeed, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson indicated his strong support for the sport in 2013.
In response to a Parliamentary question: ‘should the Government not encourage sports that measure
athleticism without inflicting brain damage?’, he stated, ‘No is the simple answer to that question.
Many sports contain an element of risk—riding and cycling, both of which have much higher injury
tallies than boxing, come to mind. At London 2012, the majority of injuries were not from boxing, but
from other sports. Most young people like an element of risk, and boxing has a really important role to
play in encouraging young people to take up sport, particularly in deprived and inner-city areas. I am
keen to encourage them to do so’. HC Deb, 10 January 2013, 451.
For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, including a survey of the public interest arguments
for and against an exemption, see Gunn and Ormerod, ‘Despite the Law: Prize-Fighting and
Professional Boxing’ in Greenfield & Osborn (Eds), Law and Sport in Contemporary Society (2000,
Frank Cass), pp 21–50. See also Anderson, ‘Time for a Mandatory Count: Regulating for the Reform
of the Professional Boxing Industry in the UK’ (2005) 13(1) Sport and the Law 40.
(v) The Horseracing Levy and the Tote
A3.77 Gambling activity in this country is by no means confined to betting on the

outcome or other aspects of sports events, but a substantial proportion of it is based on
horse racing and other sports events,1 and gambling is the source of a corruption risk
for sport that many governing bodies have seen fit to introduce bespoke regulations to
address.2 Government legislation on gambling3 has included various sports-specific
provisions, including requiring the industry to contribute part of its turnover to the
horse racing industry via the Horserace Betting Levy Board, licensing of on-course
bookmakers, and restricting pool betting on horseraces to the Horserace Totaliser
Board. Since the 1960s, then, the UK Government has been directly involved in the
determination of funding for the sport of horse racing, with the Levy Board collecting
a statutory levy on both on-course and off-course horse racing betting turnover, such
amount to be determined by the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media &
Sport if no agreement is reached between the Levy Board and the bookmakers.4 The
levy collected each year is distributed in accordance with the Horse Betting Levy
Board’s business plan.5
1 According to a 1998 report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 71 per cent of the 1997
turnover of licensed betting offices was on horse racing, 20 per cent on greyhound racing, 5 per cent on
other sports, and 4 per cent on numbers betting: ‘Ladbroke Group plc and the Coral betting business: a
report on the merger situation’ (Cm 4030, 1998, MMC). In a 2009 report, ‘Economic Impact of British
Racing’, Deloitte calculated that the betting industry had generated over £5.5bn from British racing
over the preceding five years. See also para B4.3 et seq.
2 See generally Chapter B4 (Fighting Match-Fixing and Related Integrity Issues).
3 For the historical position, see the Betting and Gaming Act 1960, as amended by the Betting,
Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963, the Gaming Act 1968, the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976 and
the National Lottery Act 1993. See generally Smith, The Law of Betting, Gaming and the Lotteries
(Butterworths, 1987). In July 2001, the Gambling Review Body, headed by Sir Alan Budd, issued a
report recommending a broad liberalisation of UK gambling laws, backed up by stricter regulation of
various high-risk areas. Specifically, it proposed that all regulation relating to gambling be incorporated
into a single Act of Parliament, with regulation and licensing undertaken by a single regulator, to
be called the Gambling Commission. Its recommendations were broadly adopted, and Parliament
eventually passed the Gambling Act in April 2005. The Act establishes the Gambling Commission
(see para B4.51) as the regulatory body for gambling except the National Lottery and spread betting
(which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority). It suggested that bookmakers at greyhound
tracks should be licensed and regulated in the same way as bookmakers at race courses, as should the
privately-owned tote and pool operators. Certain aspects of the Gambling Act of particular relevance
to sport are discussed at paras B4.14 and B4.47.
For a number of years, a perceived major flaw in UK gambling legislation was that it covered only
betting operators situated in the UK. As a result, betting operators located off-shore did not need a
licence from the Gambling Commission and did not need to contribute a percentage of their revenues
to the levy, even though they may be offering bets to the UK market via the internet, thus evading
regulation and resulting in a substantial decline in the funds distributable to the sport through the
Levy scheme each year. In 2014, the Gambling (Licensing & Advertising) Act took effect, meaning
that all remote gambling operators in the United Kingdom required a licence from the UK Gambling
Commission and were subject to the same reporting and other duties as onshore operations.
4 See eg ‘41st Levy Scheme Finalised’, DCMS press release 35/02 (7 March 2002). See generally the
Horserace Betting Levy Board’s website, at hblb.org.uk.
5 See hblb.org.uk/page/1.
A3.78 In March 2000, having ‘identified no overriding reason why the assessment,
collection and apportion of a levy on horserace betting should be a proper function
of the public sector’,1 the Home Office announced the government’s intention to
abolish the horserace betting levy and the Horserace Betting Levy Board and to sell
the Totaliser Board to a consortium of racing interests, thereby seeking ‘to bring to
an end the Government’s direct involvement in the administration and financing of
racing, so enabling racing to take responsibility for its own affairs’.2 In November
2000, the government issued a consultation paper proposing that horse racing’s
governing body, the British Horseracing Board,3 succeed the Levy Board as the
central funding body for racing, and that a new statutory regulator be established to
approve and monitor all racecourse betting operations. Implementation was delayed
initially by a dispute between the British Horseracing Board and the bookmaking
industry over the commercial arrangements that should replace the levy, and although
the Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004 was passed to implement the
sale of the Tote and abolition of the levy,4 in December 2006 the then-Minister for
Sport, Richard Caborn, advised the House of Commons that the government had
decided to retain the Levy Board and the levy on the basis that, following the ECJ’s
decision on database rights in November 2004 that destroyed horse racing’s leverage
over the betting industry,5 no commercially-based alternative funding mechanism
was available. The provisions of the 2004 Act relating to abolition of the levy would
therefore be repealed and the levy retained ‘until such time as a secure and adequate
alternative commercial funding arrangement can be identified’.6
1 Home Office (2000) ‘A Consultation Paper on the Proposed Abolition of the Horseracing Betting
Levy Board and the Licensing of Racecourse Betting and Pool Betting on Horseracing’ quoted in
the ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), para 13.5. The initial rationale had been that with the
legalisation of off-course betting, the horse racing industry would have to be compensated for falling
gate receipts: Zeffman, ‘Developments in British Horse racing’, paper delivered at BASL Conference,
November 2005.
2 ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), para 4.24.
3 Now the British Horseracing Authority: see britishhorseracing.com.
4 The Act also enabled the National Lottery to introduce Olympic Lottery games, the proceeds of which
were ring-fenced for Olympics expenditure.
5 See para H1.97.
6 ‘Future of the Horserace Betting Levy Board announced’, Parliamentary Written Statement,
14 December 2006. See Osborne, ‘Horse racing shake-up stumbles at the first hurdle’, Daily Telegraph,
1 August 2006.
A3.79 On 5 May 2011, DCMS Minister John Penrose MP called for pre-
consultation views on three potential options for reform of the levy, as well as asking
for any additional alternative approaches:
(a) retaining the levy system but with the amount to be determined (where not
agreed) not by the Secretary of State but rather by a non-political independent
arbitration process;
(b) abolishing the levy using the existing provisions in the Horserace Betting and
Olympic Lotteries Act 2004, and replacing it with an independent commercial
agreement between gambling and racing, enforced as a condition of the
bookmaker operating licence issued by the Gambling Commission; or
(c) abolishing the levy using the existing provisions in the Horserace Betting and
Olympic Lotteries Act 2004 and, to ensure that horseracing and gambling come
to their own commercial agreement independently of government, establishing
a statutory ‘Horserace Betting Right’ comparable to copyright.1
The government received responses on this consultation in July 2011 but has taken
no further action on the issue to date, and the Levy Board remains in operation.
1 See eg DCMS Business Plan 2011–15 (May 2011) in which it states that it is a Coalition priority
to ‘resolve the future of the Tote and end government intervention in deciding the right level of the
Horserace Betting Levy’.
A3.80 The Horserace Totalisator Board (‘the Tote’) was a non-departmental public
body established by the Racecourse Betting Act 1928 ‘to offer on-course pool betting
on horseracing as an alternative to starting price betting with bookmakers’ and to
distribute its profits for ‘purposes conducive to the improvement of breeds of horses
and the sport of horseracing’.1 By 2008/09 the Tote’s turnover was £2.9bn, making it
the fourth largest bookmaker in the UK, with over 500 betting shops and a presence
at 61 racecourses. As far back as 1999, however, a tripartite review carried out by the
Home Office, the Treasury and the Tote recommended that the Tote be sold to the
private sector.2 The Horserace Betting and Olympic Lottery Act 2004 changed the
law to enable such sale, but a number of potential bids fell through for lack of funds
and/or concerns about falling foul of EU state aid rules.3 Eventually, in June 2011 the
government announced the sale of the Tote to bookmaker Betfred, with 50 per cent
of the proceeds of sale to be distributed to the racing industry.4 In March 2012, the
government announced that the funds would be distributed to the sport by:
(a) a new charity, the Racing Foundation; and
(b) a grant system operated by the national governing body for the sport, the
British Horseracing Authority.5
1 From the Tote website, reproduced in the House of Commons briefing paper, The Tote, SN/HA/2746,
23 July 2010.
2 Home Office, Tote review: report of the Steering Group, 1999.
3 HC Debate 26 May 1999, vol 332 c152W.
4 DCMS press release, ‘Tote to be sold to Betfred for £265 million’, 3 June 2011.
5 DCMS press release, ‘Details of £90 million pay-out to racing after Tote sale unveiled by Minister with
responsibility for horseracing John Penrose’, 28 March 2012. See generally the House of Commons
briefing paper, The Tote, SN/HA/2746, 23 July 2010.
(vi) Tobacco and gambling sponsorship
A3.81 Sponsorship of sports teams and events has historically been a major
promotional tool for tobacco brands and betting operators, and a significant source
of income for many sports. The Labour Party made a manifesto commitment in
1997 to ban advertising and promotion of tobacco products (including promotion
via sponsorship of sports events), and originally intended to do so by implementing
the EC Tobacco Advertising Directive 98/43/EC. However, after that Directive was
annulled by the European Court of Justice on jurisdictional grounds,1 the government
adopted a private member’s bill as a government bill, which became the Tobacco
Advertising and Promotion Act 2002. Section 10 of the Act specifically prohibits
using a sponsorship arrangement to promote a tobacco product. Under s 10(2), both
parties to such an arrangement (for example, a sports event organiser and a tobacco
sponsor) would be guilty of an offence under the Act. Various sports particularly
dependent upon income from tobacco sponsorship (such as snooker and darts) asked
the government for assistance in replacing this key source of income,2 but to no avail.
1 376/98 Germany v European Parliament [2000] ECR I-2247. Now see the Directorate approximating
Member State laws on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco, 2003/33/EC, discussed at para H3.94.
2 See para H3.97 et seq.
A3.82 The promotion and advertising of bookmaker brands has come under
increased scrutiny in recent years, particularly in football. In 2017, The FA undertook
a review of its relationships with gambling firms, following which it moved to
terminate an existing long-term commercial relationship with Ladbrokes worth a
reported £4,000,000.1 Following this decision, The FA has been under increased
pressure to limit all association with the gambling industry, including in 2020 in
the context of its existing FA Cup ‘bet to view’ streaming deal with certain betting
operators. Under the arrangement, The FA granted betting operators the right to
make footage of certain third-round matches available to any end-user customer that
placed a bet or put a deposit in their account in the 24 hours before kick-off of such
match. At the time of writing, the arrangement is being investigated by the Gambling
Commission.2 As part of its manifesto in the lead up to the 2019 General Election,
the Conservative Government committed to a review of the 2005 Gambling Act in
order to ‘make Britain the safest place to be online’,3 which may have a significant
impact on sponsorship deals in football. Then-Minister at the Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Nigel Adams, stated that ‘football’s link with betting’ will
form a key part of the Government’s ‘imminent review’.4 At the time of writing,
however, betting operators have not been banned from sponsoring sports properties.5
1 See bbc.co.uk/sport/football/40367939 [accessed 29 September 2020].
3 See ‘Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain’s Potential’, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2019.
5 See further para H3.78–H3.84.
(vii) Listing of events
A3.83 The public interest dimension of broadcasting is expressly recognised in

the UK and beyond.1 The broadcasting of showpiece sports events in particular is
deemed to serve as a focal point for the nation, a moment of shared culture and
identity.2 As a result, access to such sports events by their broadcast on free, widely
available media is considered by many to be not only an important mechanism of
‘sport for all’,3 but also an important aspect of the public’s (human) right to freedom
of information.4
1 For example, the European Commission’s ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe’
(COM (96) 443 final) stated that ‘television and radio have a general interest dimension […] being
linked to moral and democratic values, such as pluralism, information ethics and protection of the
individual […] ’.
2 Witness, for example, the empty streets of the City of London at midday on Friday 7 June 2002, when
England played Argentina in Group F of the FIFA World Cup Finals. See also Jason Cowley’s report
after the England-Portugal quarter-final match in the 2004 UEFA European Championship Finals, in
the Observer, 27 June 2004: ‘Thursday’s epic football clash between England and Portugal was far
more than just a game. It created a communal experience rarely felt in our modern age’. The Minister
for the Arts, Estelle Morris, called it ‘a special evening that brought the nation together’: Hansard,
HC Deb 31 January 2005, Col 685. According to the BBC, the exclusive television broadcast rights
holder of the Games in the UK: ‘The London 2012 Olympic Games delivered the biggest national
television event since current measuring systems began, with 51.9m (90 per cent of the UK population)
watching at least 15 minutes of coverage’. BBC press release, ‘London 2012 Olympics deliver record
viewing figures for BBC’, 13 August 2012 (bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/latestnews/2012/olympic-viewing-
figs.html [accessed 29 September 2020]).
3 See Estelle Morris, Minister for Arts, Commons debate, Hansard HC Deb 31 January 2005, Col 685:
‘It is important that key sporting events are made available to all television viewers, including those
who cannot afford or choose not to spend their money in that way. […] The listed events are those that
are believed to have a special national resonance. […] [T]he purpose of the list […] is to involve the
nation and ensure that the unifying factor can be brought to bear’.
4 See EC Directive 2010/13/EU, Recital 5: ‘Audiovisual media services are as much cultural services
as they are economic services. Their growing importance for societies, democracy – in particular by
ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism – education and culture
justifies the application of specific rules to these services’; European Parliament, ‘Resolution on
the broadcasting of sports events’, B4-0326/96, [1996] OJ C166/109: ‘[The European Parliament]
considers it essential for all spectators to have a right of access to major sports events, just as they
have a right to freedom of information […] [and therefore] considers that exclusive broadcasting
rights for certain sports events which are of general interest in one or more Member States must be
granted to channels which broadcast in non-encrypted form so that these events remain accessible
to the population as a whole’. See also Joint UK Government/Sports Councils’ Response to the
Commission Consultation Paper ‘The European Model of Sport’ (May 1999) at para 21: ‘The right to
information […] Subscription and pay-per-view television is not in itself a threat to sport, so long as
it is balanced by requirements to ensure access by a substantial proportion of the public to events of
major importance to society without any additional charge being made for reception of these events
(ie on free to air television)’; ‘Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events’, DCMS Consultation Document,
DCMS, November 2009, para 36 (‘the Secretary of State also considers the listing regime fulfils
obvious and justifiable public interests – namely the societal and cultural goals of pluralism, public
debate, full and comparatively unfettered participation and positive access to information. In a society
such as the United Kingdom, in which sport is so richly and fully integrated into its fabric, such goals
are of considerable importance’).
A3.84 Legislation has existed in the UK since 1981 to secure ‘free’ public access
to sports and other events deemed to be of national importance.1 The current statute
is the Communications Act 2003, s 299 of which empowers the Secretary of State
to ‘maintain a list of sporting and other events of national interest’, public access
to which must be protected through coverage on free-to-air, widely available
television. The Act distinguishes between category 1 broadcasters (broadcasters
whose programming is available without charge to 95 per cent or more of the
population,2 ie currently BBC1, BBC2, ITV1, Channel 4, and Channel 5)3 and
category 2 broadcasters (ie all other broadcasters); and bars a category 2 broadcaster
from acquiring exclusive broadcasting rights to a listed event without the consent
of the Office of Communications (OFCOM),4 unless those rights have already been
offered to category 1 broadcasters on ‘fair and reasonable’ terms, and no category 1
broadcaster has been willing to acquire them on those terms.5
1 Prior to 1981, the same result was achieved by a voluntary agreement between the BBC and the
ITV Network. The first piece of relevant legislation was the 1981 Broadcasting Act. The Cable and
Broadcasting Act 1984, and further Broadcasting Acts in 1990 and 1996 updated and amended the
statutory protections to reflect developments in the broadcast sector, such as pay-per-view television
and subscription services through satellite television.
2 The Digital Economy Act 2017 amended the legislation to give the Secretary of State the power to
amend the 95 per cent threshold in light of fears that, due to changing viewing patterns, it may prove
difficult for television broadcasters to reach such threshold in the near future. However, as at the time
of writing, the Secretary of State has not exercised this right.
3 Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events, Ofcom, 2 September 2008, Annex 2.
4 Previously responsibility for regulating the list of events sat with the Independent Television
Commission (or ‘ITC’).
5 On 4 July 2019, Ofcom published its proposed methodology for determining whether a service (assessed
over a range of platforms, including IPTV) meets the ‘qualifying conditions’ set by Ofcom. See ‘Listed
Events: Identifying television services that are free-to-view and widely available’, Ofcom (ofcom.org.
uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/124447/consulation-listed-events.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020]).
For indicative purposes only, Ofcom provided a list of services that it considered would qualify, which
included BBC 1, BBC 2, Channel 3 Network (broadcast as ITV, STV, UTV), Channel 4, ITV2, ITV3,
BBC 4, More 4, Film 4, ITV4, CBBC, CBeebies, BBC News, and BBC Parliament. If implemented,
the change in methodology would mean that a larger number of channels would qualify as a category
1 broadcaster. At the time of writing, however, no decision has been taken on the adoption of the new
methodology.
A3.85 In mid-1997, the Department of National Heritage (the predecessor to the

DCMS) announced that a set of relevant factors would be developed to ensure that
the list only includes events ‘which we can all, no matter what our personal loyalties,
recognise as a quintessential part of our national life and our sense of common
identity’. The criteria eventually adopted included as a primary requirement that
‘the event has a special national resonance, not simply a significance to those who
ordinarily follow the sport concerned; it is an event which serves to unite the nation;
a shared point on the national calendar’.1
1 Appendix to letter sent by the DCMS to various sports bodies in November 1997.
A3.86 An Advisory Group on Listed Events, chaired by Lord Gordon of

Strathblane, was appointed to consider which events met these criteria and to
make recommendations to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media & Sport. After
consulting with sports rights holders, the Advisory Group issued its report on 2 March
1998, unanimously recommending that certain events (called Group A events) remain
protected from exclusive live broadcast by category 2 broadcasters, but that other
events (Group B events) be made available for exclusive live broadcast by category
2 broadcasters so long as category 1 broadcasters were offered an opportunity to
carry secondary coverage (ie deferred ‘as live’ or highlights coverage). In June 1998,
the Secretary of State announced that he had accepted ‘the general principles’ of
the Advisory Group’s report, including the recommendation to distinguish between
Group A and Group B events, and that distinction is now reflected in ss 299(1B) and
300 of the Communications Act 2003.
A3.87 The protected Group A events that emerged from Lord Gordon’s review
were the Olympic Games; the FIFA World Cup Finals tournament; the FA Cup Final;
the Scottish FA Cup Final (in Scotland only); the Grand National; the Derby; the finals
of the All England Lawn Tennis Championships (Wimbledon); the UEFA European
Championship Finals tournament; the Rugby World Cup Final; and the Rugby
League Challenge Cup Final. Those events cannot be broadcast exclusively live in
the UK by Sky plc or other non-‘public’ broadcasters within the meaning of the Act,
unless authorised by Ofcom. Ofcom publishes a Code on Sports and Other Listed
Events (initially issued by its predecessor, the ITC) that identifies the criteria against
which Ofcom will decide whether to give such consent.1 Paragraph 1.14 states:
‘In deciding whether to give its consent it may be sufficient for Ofcom to establish
that the availability of the rights was generally known and no broadcaster providing
a service in the other category had expressed an interest in their acquisition to the
rights holder, or had not bid for the rights. However, Ofcom will wish to be satisfied
that broadcasters have had a genuine opportunity to acquire the rights on fair and
reasonable terms and, in reaching a view, will take account of some or all of the
following criteria:
(a) any invitation to express interest, whether in the form of public advertisement
or closed tender, in the acquisition of the rights must have been communicated
openly and simultaneously to broadcasters providing services in both
categories;
(b) at the beginning of any negotiation the documentation and/or marketing
literature must set out in all material respects the process for negotiating and
acquiring the rights and all material terms and conditions, including what rights
were available;
(c) if the rights to the listed event were included in a package of rights, the package
must not have been more attractive to broadcasters providing services in one of
the two categories. Preferably, the rights should be capable of being purchased
independently of other rights, eg to highlights, delayed transmissions, other
events;
(d) the conditions or costs attached to the acquisition of the rights (for example,
production costs) must have been clearly stated and must not be preferential to
one category of service;
(e) the price sought for the rights must have been fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory as between the two categories of programme service. What is a
fair price will depend upon the rights being offered and the value of those rights
to broadcasters. A wide range of prices is likely to be regarded as fair but when
required to make its own judgement on the matter Ofcom will have regard to,
inter alia:
(i) previous fees for the event or similar events;
(ii) time of day for live coverage of the event;
(iii) the revenue or audience potential associated with the live transmission
of the event (eg the opportunity to sell advertising and sponsorship; the
prospects for subscription income);
(iv) the period for which rights are offered; and
(v) competition in the market place.
(f) such other facts and matters as appear to Ofcom to be relevant, in the particular
circumstances that have arisen’.
1 ‘Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events’, Ofcom, 2 September 2008.
A3.88 The Group B events are cricket test matches played in England; non-Finals
play in the All England Lawn Tennis Championship; all matches in the Rugby World
Cup Finals Tournament prior to the final itself; Six Nations Championship rugby
matches involving the four home unions; the Commonwealth Games; the World
Athletics Championship; the Cricket World Cup (final, semi-finals, and matches
involving the home nations); the Ryder Cup; and the Open Golf Championship. These
events can be broadcast exclusively live in the UK by a ‘non-public’ broadcaster as
long as a ‘public’ broadcaster (ie currently the BBC, ITV, Channel 4, and Channel
5) has been granted the right to show delayed coverage of at least 10 per cent of the
scheduled duration of the event, subject to a minimum of 30 minutes for an event
lasting an hour or more.1
1 ‘Code on Sports and Other Listed and Designated Events’, OFCOM, 2 September 2008, para 1.18.
A3.89 The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport can add events
to or delete events from the list at any time, subject to a duty to consult with the
BBC, the Welsh television authority, Ofcom, and the rights owners of the events
in question.1 The last such review took place in the first half of 2009, after then
Secretary of State Andy Burnham announced that he had appointed ex-FA director
David Davies to chair an independent advisory panel to review the list.2 The terms of
reference for the panel were to review:
(a) the principle of listing;
(b) the criteria against which events were currently, or might in the future, be
listed; and
(c) the events on the current list, and whether there should be any changes thereto.3
1 In 1997, in an effort to pre-empt listing of further events, the rights-holders to certain major events
(The FA, Premier League, ECB, UK Athletics, LTA, RFU, RFL, Racecourse Association, R&A, and
PGA European Tour) signed up to a Voluntary Code of Conduct for the Broadcasting of Sports Events,
agreeing to make every reasonable effort to strike a balance between the need to make their events
available to the public and the need to generate rights fees for investment back into their sports. They
also agreed to reinvest not less than five per cent of fees received into the ‘grass roots’, ie at community
level, of their sports. The Code was last amended in 2008 and its signatories today include all of
England’s major sports governing bodies (with the exception of the RFU).
2 ‘Burnham announces Chair of free-to-air events review’, DMCS press release, 10 December 2008.
3 Review of Free-to-air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of
State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 7.
A3.90 After a formal consultation that prompted input from 187 interested
parties, including rights holders, broadcasters and other organisations, and after
commissioning the British Market Research Bureau to undertake a survey of public
views on the issue1 and commissioning Frontier Economics to undertake an analysis
of viewing patterns for sport on television as well as developments in the sale of
sports broadcasting rights,2 the Davies Panel published its report in November 2009.
The report highlighted the wildly divergent views of, on the one hand, the viewing
public, who expected access to key sporting events on free-to-air TV in return for
their licence fees3 and, on the other hand, pay TV broadcasters and SGB rights-
holders, who ‘believe [that protections for key sporting events] represent a significant
financial penalty for sport and are an unwarranted commercial interference that
reduces competition for their rights’.4 As the Panel stated at para 117 of its report:
‘For those who opposed listing, there was the strongest belief that the Government
had no place in substituting its own view for that of the governing bodies of sport.
They were best placed to make the balanced judgement between broadcast exposure
of their sports, and the need to develop their grassroots as well as elite performers at
whatever cost. In particular, they felt it wrong that any sport should suffer a financial
loss – without compensation – from reduced competition when the rights to their
biggest events were assured to a free-to-air broadcaster. Competition, the Panel was
repeatedly told, was essential to keep the FTA broadcasters ‘honest’ in the bidding
process. If listing was to remain nonetheless, they preferred the current arrangements
to continue, with as few changes as possible’.
1 Hewitson and Clegg, ‘Free-to-Air Events, Summary Report on Qualitative Phase of work undertaken
for DCMS’, June 2009.
2 The impact of listed events on the viewing and funding of sports, Frontier Economics, November 2009.
3 See Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary
of State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 50 (‘82% [of the individuals surveyed]
believed they had an entitlement to watch certain key events free-to-air because they had already paid
a licence fee’).
4 Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events, Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of
State for Media, Culture and Sport, November 2009, para 62. See also ibid at para 68: ‘Put starkly, in
the present economic climate, at least three of the five channels qualified to show listed events because
of their 95 per cent audience reach have struggled to table bids at a level most governing bodies would
have found fair and reasonable. The Panel does not believe that situation is likely to change for some
time’.
A3.91 The Panel stated that ‘in the current circumstances they supported the
principle of protecting some major events for the widest possible TV audience, if
necessary by means of listing them’.1 It concluded that, going forward, the criteria
applied to determine whether or not an event should be listed should be as follows:2
‘In order to be eligible to be listed, an event must have a special national resonance
and not simply a significance to those who ordinarily follow the sport concerned.
Such an event is likely to fall into one or both of the following categories:
• it is a pre-eminent national or international event in sport; or
• it involves the national team or national representatives in the sport concerned.
It should also be likely to command a large television audience’.
Finally, the Panel concluded that ‘guaranteeing highlights or delayed coverage’ of
the Group B events ‘was no longer a sufficient response’ and it ‘therefore decided to
recommend a single list of live events protected for free-to-air television based on the
criteria’ listed above.3
1 Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport,
November 2009, para 124.
2 Ibid, para 138.
A3.92 Based on these conclusions, the Panel recommended that the new, single
list of events protected for free-to-air television should include the Summer Olympic
Games, FIFA World Cup Finals, UEFA European Championships, Grand National,
FA Cup Final (in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Scottish FA Cup Final (in
Scotland), home and away qualification matches in the FIFA World Cup tournament
and in the UEFA European Championships (in the home nation to which the relevant
match relates), the All England Lawn Tennis Championship (in its entirety, not just
the finals), Open Golf Championship, home Ashes Test matches, Rugby World Cup
matches, and matches played by Wales in the Six Nations (to be listed in Wales only).
Accordingly, the Panel recommended de-listing of the Winter Olympics, the Derby
and the Rugby League Challenge Cup Final (all of which were in Group A), as well
as England’s home cricket Test matches other than the Ashes, the Commonwealth
Games, the World Athletics Championships, the finals, semi-finals and match
involving home nations in the ICC Cricket World Cup, and the Ryder Cup.1
1 Report by the Independent Advisory Panel to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture and Sport,
November 2009, paras 170 to 173.
A3.93 The Panel’s report drew sharp criticism from the sports sector, which claimed
that the Panel had failed adequately to take into account the funding implications
for sports (and the subsequent consequences on investment at grassroots level) if
their events were listed.1 Shortly after receiving the Panel’s report, in December
2009 DCMS issued a public consultation seeking further evidence on the principles
of retaining a list; what constitutes a major event and how this should be assessed;
which sporting events pass the ‘Major Event Test’; the economic and wider impact of
listing, and how this should be measured; and which events should be listed, taking
all of these factors into account.2 The consultation document stated that:
‘the provisional conclusion of the present Secretary of State, Ben Bradshaw, is that
he should accept the recommendations put forward by the Panel […]. However,
the Panel expressed no view and took no account of the impact or consequences
on the sport or sporting body of listing, stating that it considered such matters were
for the Secretary of State to take into account. The Secretary of State’s provisional
conclusion is that, in making any final decision as to which events should be listed,
he should take account of the possible impacts such listing might have on the sport
for the Candidate Event in question and on those broadcasters who would be both
interested in, and capable of, broadcasting a Candidate Event if it were not listed’.3
A list of ‘principal factors that the Secretary of State has provisionally concluded
should be taken into account’ in determining whether an event should be listed were
set out, including the extent of any adverse impact on a sporting body (across all of
its activities) and the extent of any net financial effect on that body, the extent of any
positive commercial benefit from listing as well as any adverse/beneficial effects
on participation levels within the sport and the extent of direct and indirect public
funding provided to the sport previously and the level of such funding to be provided
in future.4 However, while the document acknowledged that the Secretary of State
‘should consider the impact of listing an event upon the finances of a sporting body’,
it asserted that:
‘in order to pass a domestic or EC threshold of being an event of major importance

for society it is likely (but not inevitable) that the IPR [intellectual property rights]
in relation to such an event are of heightened value, precisely because of the wider
appeal of such events to a potential viewing audience. The restriction of such rights
is therefore inherently likely to produce a substantial diminution in the value of
such rights. However, that diminution in itself cannot be sufficient reason to defeat
a listing regime’.5
Further, the consultation document noted that:
‘a properly managed sporting body is likely to wish to have a diversified income
source, in particular because of the recognised vagaries of broadcasting revenue
streams. The Secretary of State has therefore provisionally concluded that it is
unlikely to be sufficient to point simply to substantial decreases in net revenue’ as a
reason not to be listed’.6
1 For example, the CCPR noted: ‘A number of sports governing bodies and their ability to invest
in grassroots sport are likely to be deeply affected if these recommendations are adopted and the
Secretary of State should consider that carefully. CCPR press release, ‘Listed events review needs
to kick-start longer term debate about sport on TV’, 13 November 2009. See also Keane and Savino,
‘The Davies report on listed events – a question of sport or television?’, (2010) Ent LR 69 (‘The report
does not explain how the entire FIFA World Cup, UEFA European Championship, Rugby World Cup
and Wimbledon tennis championship are of major importance to UK society. The Panel discounts the
damaging impact listing has for competition and the value of such events for funding sport’).
2 ‘Review of Free-to-Air Listed Events’, DCMS Consultation Document (DCMS, December 2009).
3 Ibid, paras 8 to 10.
4 Ibid, para 44.
6 Ibid, para 41.
A3.94 Fortunately for rights-holders, Mr Bradshaw and his colleagues were voted
out of government in May 2010, shortly after the consultation had closed. Within
10 weeks of taking power, the new Coalition Government announced that it would
be deferring any decision on listing of events until 2013. Minister for Sport Hugh
Robertson stated:1
‘I fully support the principle of protecting major sports events for free to air
coverage. But with Digital Switchover concluding in 2012, this will result in the
widespread availability of a significantly increased number of television channels,
many of which will be free to air. Add to this the BBC’s Strategy Review, which will
cover sports rights, and the Ofcom Pay TV Review, the broadcasting context for this
decision is increasingly unclear.
The current economic climate also points to us not making a decision at this time
which could adversely impact on sport at the grassroots. I have therefore decided to
defer any review until 2013, when we will look at this again’.
In October 2012, the government announced that it had no imminent plans to review
the list2 and the changes to the list proposed by the Davies Report have remained on
the shelf. In July 2019 the Culture Secretary Jeremy Wright announced his intention
to add the Paralympics to the list of protected events, while also holding a separate
consultation on whether to protect the Women’s Football World Cup and other
women’s events. Any change would mark the first change to the list in over 20 years,
but at the time of writing the government has not made any further statement in
relation to these proposed changes.3
1 DCMS press release, ‘Decision on Free-to-Air Listed Events deferred until 2013’. DCMS 080/10,
21 July 2010.
2 See the comments of Ed Vaizey MP, Minister for Culture, Communications and Creative Industries,
HC Deb 23 October 2012 col 819W: ‘There are no plans to review the list of free-to-air sports events at
the current time. In 2010, the Government made the decision to defer the review of listed events, begun
by the previous Government, until 2013 following the completion of digital switchover. The current
list of events remains in force’.
3 ‘Equality and listed events: Written statement’, HCWS1751 (parliament.uk/business/publications/
written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2019-07-18/HCWS1751/
A3.95 UK legislation binds only broadcasters within the jurisdiction. Therefore,

the listing of events in and of itself does not prevent foreign broadcasters from
acquiring the exclusive rights to broadcast coverage of UK listed events into the UK
on their own channels. To address that issue, in April 1997 the EC Television Without
Frontiers Directive was amended to add a new Art 3A that established a system of
mutual recognition and enforcement for Member States’ lists of designated events.
That legislation was replaced in 2010 by the Audiovisual Media Services Directive,1
Art 14 of which:
(a) acknowledges the right of Member States to take national measures compatible
with EC law to ensure public access, via ‘live coverage or deferred coverage on
free television’, of ‘events which are regarded by that Member State as being
of major importance for society’ (ie each Member State determines the content
of its own list) (Art 14(1));
(b) requires that any Member State notify its list to the Commission, for publication
(after the Commission has satisfied itself that the list is compatible with EC
law) in the Official Journal (Art 14(2)); and
(c) requires every Member State to take appropriate steps to ensure that
broadcasters within its jurisdiction exercise cross-border rights that they hold
to sporting events in a manner that respects the notifying Member State’s list
of events (Art 14(3)).
These provisions are implemented into UK law by the Television Broadcasting
Regulations 2000 and the Communications Act 2003, which together confer a power
on Ofcom to provide information to competent authorities in other EU and EEA
states to enable them, in compliance with their obligations under the ‘Television
Without Frontiers’ Directive, to prevent broadcasters under their jurisdiction
circumventing the UK listed event rules. They also empower Ofcom to prevent a
UK-based broadcaster exercising exclusive broadcasting rights in another Member
State to an event that has been listed for protection in that Member State unless such
broadcaster is authorised to do so under that State’s listed event rules.
1 Directive 2010/13/EU.
A3.96 The UK’s list of major events was first notified to the Commission under the
Directive in 1998. After the Commission objected to aspects of the list, it was revised
and re-submitted to the Commission in 2000, which published it in the EC Official
Journal on 18 November 2000 ([2000] OJ C328/2). Kirch Media, the agency that at
the time held the UK broadcasting rights for the 2002 and 2006 FIFA World Cup
Finals, challenged the Commission’s decision to accept the list on the ground it was
incompatible with EC law, in that (among other things) it included events that were
not of major importance for the UK public, namely group matches in the FIFA World
Cup Finals not involving any home nation. The Court of First Instance upheld the
challenge, but only on the procedural ground that a Commission decision under
Art 3A of the Television Without Frontiers Directive has binding legal effects and
therefore should have been taken by the full College of Commissioners; it never
reached the merits of the challenge.1 On 15 October 2007, the European Commission
confirmed the adoption by the full College of the UK list of major events to be
televised free to air, ruling that the list of protected events set down in 1998, and the
process by which it was arrived at, was in accordance with EU law.2
1 Infront WM v European Commission (T-33/01) [2005] ECR II-5897.
2 Decision 2007/730/EC on the compatibility with Community law of measures taken by the United
Kingdom pursuant to Article 3a(a) of Directive 89/552, EC IP/07/1493, Brussels, 15 October 2007. It
had done the same with the lists from Italy, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Belgium, France and Finland
on 10 July 2007, on the basis that they were proportionate measures aimed at ‘an overriding reason
of public interest, which is to ensure wide public access to broadcasts of events of major importance
for society’, and so the derogation from the guarantee of free movement of services was justified:
Commission Decision 2007/475/EC of 25 June 2007 on the compatibility with Community law of
measures taken by Italy pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination
of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [2007] OJ L180/ 5 et seq.
A3.97 Within four months, FIFA and UEFA brought proceedings in the General
Court of the European Union challenging the Commission’s decision to approve
the UK list on both procedural and substantive grounds.1 When the General Court
dismissed both cases, FIFA and UEFA appealed to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU).2 In July 2013, the CJEU rejected those appeals on the
following basis:
(a) The CJEU accepted that the designation by a Member State of certain events
as being of major importance for society and the consequent prohibition of
their exclusive broadcasting on pay TV constitute obstacles to the freedom to
provide services, the freedom of establishment, the freedom of competition,
and the right to property. It ruled, however, that such obstacles are justified by
the objective of protecting the right to information and ensuring wide public
access to television coverage of those events.
(b) It pointed out that it is for the Member States alone to determine the events
that are of major importance and that the Commission’s role in that respect
is limited to determining whether the Member States have complied with EU
law in exercising their discretion. Thus, if an event has validly been designated
by a Member State as being of major importance, the Commission is to carry
out only a limited review of that designation and is required, in particular, to
examine only the effects thereof on the freedoms and rights recognised under
EU law that exceed those which are intrinsically linked to such a designation.
(c) The CJEU noted that not all the matches in the final stage of the World Cup and
the European Championships are of equal importance for the general public,
which tends to attach particular importance to decisive matches between the
best teams – such as the final and semi-finals – and those involving the national
team. Consequently, those tournaments must be regarded as events which are,
in principle, divisible into different matches or stages, not all of which are
necessarily capable of being characterised as an event of major importance.
(d) The CJEU stated that, contrary to the decision of the General Court, Member
States are required to communicate to the Commission the reasons justifying
why they consider that the final stage of the World Cup or the European
Championships constitutes, in its entirety, a single event of major importance
for society in the States concerned. It ruled, however, that those errors did not
have any impact in the present cases. The General Court found, on the basis
of the information provided by FIFA and UEFA and in the light of the actual
perception of the public in the United Kingdom, that all the matches in the
final stages of those two tournaments actually attracted sufficient attention
from the public to form part of an event of major importance. In particular, it
held that it was apparent from the file, first, that those tournaments, in their
entirety, have always been very popular among the general public and not
only viewers who generally follow football matches on television. Secondly,
those competitions have traditionally been broadcast on free television
channels in the UK.
(e) Finally, the CJEU found that, given the Commission’s limited power of review
of the designation by a Member State of an event as being of major importance
and the in-depth knowledge of broadcasters of the grounds underlying such
a designation, it is permissible for the Commission to indicate only succinct
grounds for its decision on the list of events of major importance drawn up by a
Member State. Moreover, where the effects of such a designation on the freedom
to provide services, the freedom of competition, and the right to property do
not go beyond those which are intrinsically linked to the classification of the
event concerned as being of major importance, it is not necessary to provide
specific grounds for concluding that it is compatible with EU law.
The CJEU concluded that FIFA and UEFA had not shown that the effects on the
freedoms and rights recognised by EU law of the designation of the final stages of
the World Cup and the European Championships, in their entirety, as events of major
importance were excessive.
1 Joined Cases T-68/08 FIFA v Commission and T-55/08 UEFA v Commission, 17 February 2011. For
example, FIFA argued that the Commission failed to provide reasons to justify the inclusion of all
64 World Cup matches on the UK list, that the UK Government failed to construct its list using a
‘clear and transparent procedure’, that matches not involving UK national teams were ‘not of major
importance for United Kingdom society, and that listing infringed FIFA’s ‘right to property’, as well as
EC Treaty provisions on competition, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services.
2 C-201/11 P UEFA v European Commission and C-204/11 P and C-205/11 P FIFA v European
Commission.
A3.98 The proper working of the UK’s listed event rules came up for scrutiny by
the House of Lords in the TV Danmark case.1 TV Danmark, the UK-based claimant
broadcaster, had acquired exclusive rights to broadcast in Denmark five ‘away’
qualifying matches played by Denmark in its FIFA 2002 World Cup qualifying group.
It sought to exercise those rights by broadcasting coverage of the matches exclusively
into Denmark from the UK. However, the matches were included on Denmark’s own
list of protected events, ie they could only be broadcast by broadcasters reaching at
least 90 per cent of the Danish population, and TV Danmark was a subscription-
based broadcaster reaching only 60 per cent of Denmark’s population. Furthermore,
the Danish free-to-air broadcasters that TV Danmark had outbid to acquire the rights
still wished to broadcast the same events and were prepared to pay for the right
to do so, just not as much as TV Danmark had bid. The ITC (and the Secretary
of State of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, intervening in the House of Lords)
argued that consent had to be denied to TV Danmark’s proposed broadcast of the
matches, because otherwise the Danish public would be denied the right to watch the
event on television in Denmark. TV Danmark argued that the ITC had to consent to
TV Danmark’s exclusive exploitation of the rights, because the public broadcasters
had had a fair opportunity (namely, the original tendering process) to acquire the
rights but had failed to do so. That was all the ITC Code required for consent to be
granted, and the fact that TV Danmark was not prepared, post-acquisition of the
rights, to share them with the public broadcasters (as the Danish listed events rules
required) did not change the analysis.
1 R v Independent Television Commission, ex p TV Danmark 1 Ltd [2001] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 WLR 1604.
A3.99 The Court of Appeal agreed with TV Danmark, stating that the tender
auction provided a fair opportunity for public broadcasters to acquire the rights,
which vindicated the public’s interest in watching the events, and post-acquisition
events were irrelevant and could not be taken into consideration by the ITC. The
House of Lords overturned that ruling, based on the premise that the purpose of the
Directive is ‘to prevent the exercise by broadcasters of exclusive rights in such a way
that a substantial proportion of the public in another Member State is deprived of the
possibility of following a designated event’.1 That right was not vindicated by giving
public broadcasters the opportunity to bid for the rights in an open auction. If that
was all that was required, then in effect there would be no restriction on free market
forces, and therefore no point to the legislation at all. As Lord Hoffmann said:2
‘The argument that the public is given the possibility of watching the event if the
public broadcasters are given the possibility of buying the rights at auction is in my
opinion wrong. The Directive requires the public to have the possibility of following
the event in the sense that a member of the public may watch it if he chooses to
switch on his television set’.
He noted that the auction acquisition process is a relevant factor to be taken into
account in deciding whether public broadcasters had an opportunity to acquire the
rights on ‘fair and reasonable terms’, but it is not determinative, because:
‘the clear purpose of Part IV [of the Broadcasting Act 1996] is, if necessary, to
protect the public interest in free access to important sporting events against market
forces. The ITC is engaged in a delicate balance of the interests of broadcasters,
sports organisers and the general public’.3
Since the auction itself was not determinative, it was appropriate (and could be
necessary) to look at subsequent events to determine whether the public broadcasters
had been given sufficient opportunity to acquire the rights on fair and reasonable
terms, such that consent to exclusive broadcast by non-public broadcasters should be
given. Here, the refusal of TV Danmark to give the public broadcasters an opportunity
to bid to share the rights with it (a requirement under the Danish law) meant that the
pre-condition to consent under the Code (a fair opportunity to acquire the rights on
fair and reasonable terms) was not satisfied. The ‘right of the European citizen to
watch his national football team’4 was thus resoundingly vindicated.
1 [2001] 1 WLR 1604 at 1613.
2 Ibid, at 1613.
3 Ibid, at 1614.
4 Ibid, at 1606. For comment on the case, see ‘Listed Sports Events Protected Against the TV Rights
Market’ (2001) 4(4) Sports Law Bulletin 1; Harrington, ‘UK Listed Events Ruling Looks Bad for Kirch’
Sportcal.com, 6 August 2001; Santy, ‘Listed Events Legislation – Identifying a Rationale’ [2001]
8(5) SATLJ 1; Barr-Smith ‘Listed Events and Sale of World Cup TV Rights’ [2001] 9(3) SATLJ 135;
Harris, ‘Transfrontier Broadcasting of World Cup Qualifying Games’ [2001] 9(2) SATLJ 100.
(viii) Hosting major sporting events
A3.100 As noted above, the government formally supported London’s successful

bid to host the 2012 Olympics,1 and supported and funded the staging of what was
widely seen to have been a very successful Games. The London Olympic Games
and Paralympic Games Act 2006 provided the legislative framework necessary for
London to host the Games. In particular it set up the Olympic Delivery Authority,
whose primary task was to deliver the venues and infrastructure for the Games.2 It
also delivered on commitments made to the IOC as part of the bid to host the Games
to introduce effective mechanisms for countering ambush of the Games through
unauthorised commercial activity and ticket touting.3
1 See para A3.23.
2 See para A3.39.
3 Ibid.
A3.101 Successive UK Governments have clearly seen the benefits in attracting

major sporting events to these shores:
(a) In November 2007, the Commonwealth Games Federation announced that
Glasgow had won the right to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The
Scottish Parliament passed the Glasgow Commonwealth Games Act in June
2008, which replicated many of the specific protections given to the IOC for
the 2012 Olympic Games.1
(b) In February 2007, the Treasury Department and DCMS jointly published an
official study into the feasibility of England hosting the FIFA World Cup Finals
in 2018. The report noted the government’s commitment to ensuring that the
UK is in a position to bid for and host major sporting events, as well as its
recognition that bids are strengthened if the government is able to lend active
support. It further noted that the decision whether or not to bid is for The FA
to make but aimed to provide The FA with a firm base from which to decide
whether or not a bid should be made. It noted that hosting a World Cup Finals
tournament would be likely to produce a positive economic impact, as well
as other associated intangible benefits. Following the report, the government
threw its weight behind a bid for the event, with then Prime Minister Gordon
Brown stating:
‘By 2018, it will be more than 50 years since England first hosted the World Cup,
and I believe it is time the tournament returned to the nation which gave football to
the world. With the Olympics in London in 2012, hosting the World Cup in 2018
would make the next decade the greatest in Britain’s sporting history. I want every
region of the country to share in the benefits of these sporting events, I want every
young person to be inspired by them to increase their own participation in sport, and
– if the FA decides to launch a bid – I would make it my personal mission over the
next few years to persuade countries around the world to support that bid’.2
In the event, despite vocal government support, £15m spent by the FA and
£2.1m spent by local councils hoping to host matches,3 the English bid gained
only 2 out of the 22 votes cast by the FIFA Executive Committee, and the
tournament was awarded to Russia.4
(c) The hosting of further major sporting events beyond the 2012 Olympics and
Paralympics Games became a pillar of the then-Coalition Government’s legacy
promise. In September 2012, Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson announced
that ‘to maintain the momentum from London 2012’, the UK had won the
right to host 20 global sporting events between 2013 and 2020.5 Notable events
have included the 2015 Rugby World Cup in England, 2016 IPC Athletics
Marathon World Cup in London, 2017 IAAF World Championships and World
Para-Athletics Championships in London, and 2019 ICC Cricket World Cup in
England and Wales.
(d) The Conservative Government elected in 2015 has continued on this path. In
2018, UK Sport published a list of ‘mega’ sporting events that it planned to
target over the next 15 years.6 The then-Secretary of State of Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport confirmed the government’s commitment:
‘the UK has consistently shown that we are a world-leading host of major sporting
events. They enhance the country’s reputation internationally, increase the profile
of sport at home and bring a significant boost to the economy. UK Sport’s targets
demonstrate our continued ambition to bring the best global sport events to the
country and remain a trusted partner of the sporting world’.7
(e) At the time of writing, England and Scotland are set to host parts of the Euro
2020 Football Championships (albeit postponed to 2021 due to the Covid-19
pandemic), the Commonwealth Games Federation has named Birmingham as
the host city for the 2022 Commonwealth Games,8 and the football associations
of England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are
reportedly considering a joint bid to host the 2030 FIFA World Cup Finals.9
1 Among other things, the Act placed restrictions on unauthorised street trading in the vicinity of Games
locations (s 2), a ban on unauthorised advertising in the vicinity of Games locations (s 10), a ban on
ticket touting (s 17), the ability to take urgent traffic regulation measures during Games time (s 39) and
empowers the Government to make compulsory land purchases (s 42).
2 See ‘Brown throws weight behind England’s 2018 World Cup bid’, the Guardian, 12 February 2007.
3 See the HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, HC 1031,
Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, para 1.
4 Following this disastrous result, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee held an
inquiry into the failed bid, the two main themes of which were ‘the role played by FIFA during the
bidding process, and the performance of the FA bid team’. See HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Committee Report, ‘2018 World Cup Bid’, HC 1031, Sixth Report of Session 2010–12. See para
A3.59, n 3.
5 Ministerial Written Statement by Hugh Robertson MP, ‘Sporting Legacy’, 18 September 2012. In a
further ministerial statement on 24 January 2013, Robertson announced that the UK had subsequently
won the right to host a further six major events in that period.
6 See UK Sport press release dated 4 October 2018.
7 Ibid.
8 See Commonwealth Games Federation press release dated 21 December 2017. The UK Government
has proposed the Birmingham Commonwealth Games Bill [HL] 2019-20, which has drawn parallels
with the legislation introduced to deliver the London Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 and
the Glasgow Commonwealth Games in 2014. Among other things, the Bill (which is now scheduled
for review by the Public Bill Committee) would permit the ‘provision of financial assistance to the
organising committee; require the organising committee to report on its work; regulate association
with the games; create offences in respect of ticket touting, advertising and trading; and permit the
Government to direct the preparation of a transport plan’. See ‘Birmingham Commonwealth Games
Bill [HL] 2019-20’ House of Lords Library Briefing, 22 January 2020 (researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk/documents/LLN-2020-0022/LLN-2020-0022.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020]).
9 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/50650490 [accessed 29 September 2020].
(b) Exhortation
A3.102 Public and media pressure is often brought to bear on government to intervene
in the sports sector in response to specific scandals or concerns. In particular, when
sports bodies get self-regulation wrong, the cry goes out for the government to ‘take
a controlling influence’.1 Such calls have been most often focused on football, as
the increasing commercialisation of the national game has left supporters and local
communities feeling increasingly alienated.2 For instance, in 2015 then-Secretary of
State for Culture, Media and Sport John Whittingdale threatened to impose a levy on
the Premier League’s broadcasting revenues for the ‘benefit of grassroots sports’.3
This idea resurfaced in the build-up to the 2019 general election, with Labour leader
Jeremy Corbyn calling for at least 5 per cent of Premier League TV income to be
diverted to the grassroots game so that those from working class communities were
no longer ‘priced out’ from the game.4 However, the government has steadfastly
resisted assuming a greater regulatory role in football, instead insisting on the right
and responsibility of football’s governing bodies to run the game autonomously,
while reserving the right to encourage those bodies to bring in such reforms as the
government sees fit. For example, in 2011 then-Sports Minister Hugh Robertson
stated:5
‘It is not for any Government to run sport or micro-manage its future. All sport – not
least football – is best run by dedicated professionals working within strong and
effective independent and accountable organisations. At the same time Government,
by virtue of public expectation and through the legitimate interest in the use of
public funds, has a genuine role to play in ensuring that those sports organisations
are working together effectively for the long term good of the game. […] I want
to be clear again that it is not for Government to run any sport. However there is
an appropriate role for Government in encouraging the authorities in […] altering
the landscape. Where there are challenges or recommendations that properly fall to
Government then we intend to address them fully’.
1 Welch, ‘Time for real action’ Daily Telegraph, 6 February 1999. The issue raised (usually with more
subtlety than in the following quote) is: ‘Who are these backward, unwieldy, misguided, greedy,
secretive or just plain incompetent organisations answerable to?’ (Hughes, ‘Banks seeks feel-good
factor’ Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1999). The answer given in that article by Tony Banks, then
Minister for Sport, was: ‘Sport is just too important for individuals and the country as a whole to be left
drifting […] There is a central role for government in sport. As enablers, as organisers, as arbitrators at
certain times where there is clearly a need for action. We need to modernise our sporting structures’.
2 See eg Conn, ‘Growing support for fan ownership’ Independent, 3 May 2002.
3 See ‘Government May impose levy on Premier League’s TV Money’ the Guardian, 9 September
2015 (theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/09/government-levy-premier-league-tv-money-minister
4 See ‘Jeremy Corbyn attacks ‘pricing out’ of football fans in Premier League’ The Guardian,
15 November 2019 (theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/15/jeremy-corbyn-attacks-pricing-out-of-
football-fans-in-premier-league [accessed 29 September 2020])
5 In written evidence to the House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee’s
Inquiry into Football Governance (January 2011).
A3.103 This traditional ‘hands off’ approach was notable in March 2002, when it
seemed that the loss of broadcasting rights fees caused by ITV Digital’s collapse
would make many Football League clubs insolvent. Despite public outcry,1 the
government made it clear that it would not intervene in what it saw as a private
contractual matter. Sports Minister Richard Caborn offered merely to act as
intermediary in negotiations.2 Similarly, in September 2007 Prime Minister Gordon
Brown resisted calls by UEFA President Michel Platini for governments to legislate
to curb the influence of money in football.3
1 See eg ‘Political Football’, Sports Business International (June 2002), p 54.

2 ‘Minister offers to act as intermediary in talks with Football League’ Financial Times, 26 March 2002.
3 His spokesman was quoted as follows: ‘Platini’s letter has raised some important issues that fans care
about and we do too. But these are matters for national football authorities to address and they should
respond directly to fans’ concerns. We will continue to encourage them to do so. The government
recognises and supports the autonomy of sport and its right to self-regulation. The running of football
is down to the game’s authorities and government can assist when asked’. ‘Brown unmoved by
Platini’s plea for government action’, Sportcal.com, 20 September 2007. This was not the first time
UEFA had appealed for government intervention in football. See eg ‘UEFA calls for investigation into
foreign soccer investors’, Sportcal.com, 4 September 2006.
A3.104 Another example of this type of ‘light-touch’, non-legislative intervention

is the pressure that the government applied to the England & Wales Cricket Board
(ECB) not to visit Zimbabwe in 2003.1 The government put considerable pressure
on the ECB not to go to Zimbabwe, but it specifically avoided going as far as the
Australian Government, which announced in May 2007 that it was prepared to enact
legislative and policy measures that would restrict the right of the Australian cricket
team to visit Zimbabwe for ICC-scheduled cricket matches.2
1 See PM press briefing, 30 December 2002: ‘Ultimately, it was a decision for the ECB to take since
they were the competent authority and an independent sporting body. We had made it clear that our
advice was that the England team should not go to Zimbabwe. In the end, however, it was for the ECB
to reach its own decision. We could advise, but we were unable to order or instruct. Although we were
talking about a national team and an international sport, it should be remembered that this was not a
nationalised sport inasmuch as it was not state-run – and nor should it be’.
2 See ‘Government blocks cricket tour of Zimbabwe’ The Australian, 13 May 2007.
A3.105 This approach was also evident during the Culture, Media & Sport Select
Committee’s inquiry into the state of football governance in 2010-11. In response
to a commitment set down in the Coalition Agreement to ‘encourage the reform of
football governance rules to support the co-operative ownership of football clubs
by supporters’,1 in December 2010 the DCMS Select Committee announced that it
was launching ‘a new inquiry into the governance of professional football clubs’.2
The committee received nearly 100 written submissions (from government, football
governing bodies, clubs, players, supporters groups and other interested parties)
and conducted eight oral evidence sessions, hearing testimony from 39 individuals,
including prominent individuals from The FA, the Premier League, and the Football
League, and concluding with evidence from Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson MP.
His written evidence, quoted at para A3.102 above, clearly reflected a preference to
maintain the traditional line that the government should generally seek to encourage
and exhort the sports sector to reform itself, with legislation to be used only as a
threat of last resort.3
1 ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’ (Cabinet Office, May 2010), p 14.
2 ‘Committee launches inquiry on Football Governance’, press release dated 7 December 2010.
Committee chairman John Whittingdale MP announced that the ‘inquiry will look at the case for
strategic Government intervention and improved self-regulation and will consider models which
involve supporters more in how clubs are run’. While the Committee’s inquiry was ongoing, Minister
for Sport Hugh Robertson fanned the flames by stating: ‘If you look across sport, it is very clear to
me that football is the worst governed sport in this country, without a shadow of a doubt’. ‘Hugh
Robertson: ‘Football is worst governed sport in UK’’, the Guardian, 20 January 2011.
3 Minutes of evidence of Hugh Robertson to Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee,
26 April 2011, at Q816 and 817.
A3.106 In his oral evidence to the committee, the Minister was asked ‘what can be
done by a Minister for Sport for a game that is self-governing?’ He replied as follows:
‘Well, in that we could, in extremis, pass legislation, as indeed a number of other

countries have done. That would, in my view, be a last resort. I think there is a fine
line between where Government can go and where it cannot, and it is emphatically
not for Government to run football, absolutely emphatically not. I think it is for
Government to make sure that football is in the best possible condition to run itself.
So I think I certainly have an influencing and persuading role. You certainly could
not accuse me of not making my views clear on this particular subject. If indeed we
judge in the end of that the situation is so bad and so immoveable that legislation
is the only way – some form of sports law – as in the case in many other countries
around the world – then that would be an option we would have to consider’.1
Committee chairman John Whittingdale MP then pressed him further:
‘Chair: Minister, you started in your first answer by referring to the plethora of
reports, inquiries and commissions that have crawled over this ground [football
governance] repeatedly and nothing has changed. Are you determined that on your
watch something is going to change?
Hugh Robertson: Yes, I am. […] Actually, what I want to do, I want to make sure
that at the end of my time as a Minister that football is in a better position than it was
when I took over. I think the most serious issue relates to governance and the way
the game is run, and I do not want to see it at the time that I leave, or get sacked or
whatever happens to me, that we haven’t tackled – because it is too much trouble or
it is too much effort, or anything – something that needs to be done in what is our
national game. […]
Chair: In order to force a change it is sometime necessary to have an alternative
which you don’t necessarily wish to deploy but which you could resort to if change
didn’t happen.
Hugh Robertson: Called legislation.
Chair: Called legislation, and that is your position?
Hugh Robertson: It is my position, Chair’.
1 Minutes of evidence of Hugh Robertson to Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee,
26 April 2011.
A3.107 Following the inquiry, the Select Committee published its first report on
29 July 2011, concluding that:1
(a) The FA needed ‘urgent reform to carry out its responsibilities effectively and
meet the future challenges of the game.
(b) The ‘Football Creditor Rule’2 should be abolished.
(c) A formal licensing model for professional clubs should be introduced ‘to
underpin the self-regulation measures already introduced by the Premier
League and the Football League’.3
(d) A new ‘strong fit and proper persons test, consistently applied throughout the
professional game’, to determine who should be entitled to own and/or control
a professional club, should be introduced, under the control of The FA.4
(e) Protections should be offered to supporters’ trusts wishing to purchase stakes
in professional clubs, both by government and by The FA.
(f) The FA should review its expenditure on grass roots.
The committee stated:
‘Almost all of our recommendations for the reform of football governance can be
achieved through agreement between the football authorities and without legislation.
We therefore urge the football authorities to consider our Report carefully, and to
respond positively with an agreed strategy and timetable for change. As a last resort,
we recommend that the Government consider introducing legislation to require
The FA to implement the necessary governance reforms in line with its duties as a
governing body’.5
1 HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘Football Governance’, HC 792-I, Seventh
Report of Session 2010-12.
2 See para B5.56.
3 See para B5.18.

4 See para B5.12.
5 Notably, not all of those who were questioned by the Select Committee shared its (and Hugh
Robertson’s) view of legislation only as a last resort: ‘The solution favoured by most was Government
intervention. However, it is also the case that the Government has little leverage on a game able to
generate huge revenues of its own, and the governing body of which is vehemently opposed to some
types of Government intervention. The most practical solution proposed was intervention by means of
a Sports Act to consolidate the position of the FA as the governing body of the domestic game. Because
such legislation exists in other European countries, this could not be constituted as undue Government
interference. Lord Triesman, for example, noted that: there are a number of countries that have a basic
sports law […] You can use it for all sorts of purposes but it can also, and it does in some countries,
allocate the key responsibility for the regulation of sport to the sports governing bodies so that they
must do it and they must be accountable for it. After that the Government stands back. He concluded
that “it would be a great pity to have to consider legislation as a means of doing it but it would not be
right to rule it out”. Ian Watmore similarly argued that Government intervention “whether that is an
Act or a strongly worded demand” was required. Most intriguingly, perhaps, William Gaillard from
UEFA appeared favourably disposed to a legislative solution. Citing the example of France, he told
us “there is legislation in my country […] where it is clearly stated what is the role of the national
association, the clubs, the leagues and so on, and therefore you avoid the turf wars that have been going
on in this country”’. HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee Report, ‘Football Governance’,
HC 792-I, Seventh Report of Session 2010-12, paras 257 and 258.
A3.108 In October 2011, DCMS made it absolutely clear that it supported the Select
Committee’s recommendations, and its proposals that legislation be introduced if
football’s governing bodies failed to act on them:1
‘The Government notes and supports the Committee’s assessment that almost all
their recommendations can be achieved through agreement between the football
authorities and without the need for legislation. The Government expects that
the football authorities, having considered the report carefully, will now respond
positively and collectively with an agreed strategy and a timetable for change. […]
The Government is fully committed to ensuring that the changes put forward by the
football authorities make a lasting and substantive difference. If that does not happen
the Government will introduce a legal requirement on the Football Association to
implement the appropriate governance clauses by the swiftest possible means. To do
that the Government will seek to secure, using all available channels, appropriate
legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows. There is a strong case for such
legislative proposals to be formally considered in pre-legislative scrutiny’.
1 ‘Football Governance: Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee Inquiry (HC792-1)’,
DCMS (October 2011). DCMS set a deadline of 29 February 2012 for the sport to agree proposals for
implementation of the Committee’s recommendations.
A3.109 In response, a ‘core group’ comprising David Bernstein (FA Chairman),

Roger Burden (FA National Game Board Chairman and FA Board member), Richard
Scudamore (Premier League Chief Executive), and Greg Clarke (Football League
Chairman), responded to the Select Committee’s report, first on 29 February 2012,1
and then again on 27 June 2012,2 with a set of proposals seeking to address the
Select Committee’s concerns. Secretary of State Jeremy Hunt asked the Select
Committee to look at the proposals. After holding two oral evidence sessions
(questioning individuals from the ‘core group’ and others within their organisations)
and receiving 23 written statements (many of which were provided by supporter
trusts) the Select Committee published a follow-up report on 22 January 2013.3 As
well as recommending that the government pass legislation banning the use of the
Football Creditors Rule ‘at the earliest opportunity’,4 the Committee stated:5
‘We urge the authorities to be more radical and more urgent in addressing the
problems faced by the game because of the weakness in its governance structure,
at both FA and club level. We recommend that, unless there has been clear progress
in all the areas we highlight […] within 12 months, the Government introduce
legislation as soon as practicable’.
The same day, then-Minister for Sport Hugh Robertson commented:6
‘We welcome the report from the select committee which shows the will there is
across parliament for football to modernise and change for the better.
We have been clear that we want the football authorities to carry out the reforms
they promised by the start of the 2013–14 season – most notably around improved
governance and diverse representation at the FA, the development of a licensing
system and greater financial transparency. If football does not deliver then we will
look at bringing forward legislation’.
1 HC Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Football Governance follow up’, HC 509, Fourth
Report of Session 2012–13 Vol 1, Appendix 1.
2 Ibid, Appendix 2.
3 Ibid.
4 As to which, see further paras B5.146 et seq and E2.83.
5 Ibid, para 18.
6 ‘English football ‘has a year to change’ say MPs preparing to urge legislation’, the Guardian,
29 January 2013.
A3.110 That deadline came and went without dramatic changes in the governance
and regulation of football, yet the threatened legislation did not materialise. Instead,
the threat changed to withholding public funding. For example, then-Sports Minister
Tracey Crouch noted in 2016: ‘at the moment we are seeing nothing from the
FA in terms of progress, they are likely to lose some public money or it will go
elsewhere in the delivery of football’.1 Following similar comments from high profile
figures within the sport,2 the Select Committee launched a new inquiry into football
governance in October 2016. Former FA executives David Bernstein, David Davies,
Greg Dyke, Alex Horne and David Triesman wrote to the Select Committee, stating
that The FA had failed to self-reform and was incapable of doing so, highlighting the
number of ‘elderly white men’ in the organisation as a stumbling block.3 In response,
Select Committee Chair Damien Collins said that a draft bill was being prepared in
order to deliver the necessary reforms:
‘We do not believe that The FA will comply voluntarily: it can survive easily without
the Government’s contribution of money to grassroots sport, and there are powerful
vested interests that refuse to accept the right of all those involved in football to
play a role in the governance of the sport. We are therefore preparing a draft Bill to
bring the structure of The FA, especially its Board and Council, more into line with
modern company practice and the Government’s guidelines for sports bodies’.4
Once again, however, the threat of legislation came to nothing.
1 See at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36877406 [accessed 29 September 2020].
2 Former FA chairman David Bernstein referred to the organisation as ‘outdated’ and in need of reform
(see at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/36697413 [accessed 29 September 2020]) and ex-FA executive
director David Davies commented that the FA is ‘screaming out for reform’ following newspaper
revelations about England manager Sam Allardyce, who lost his job after 67 days in charge following
misconduct (see at bbc.co.uk/sport/football/37497288 [accessed 29 September 2020]).
3 Letter to Chair, Culture, Media and Sport Committee from former FA executives, 12 December 2016
(see at data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/culture-media-
and-sport-committee/the-governance-of-football/written/44337.html [accessed 29 September 2020]).
4 ‘FA Governance to be debated in Parliament’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee press release,
3 February 2017 (see at old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/
culture-media-and-sport-committee/news-parliament-2015/football-governance-parliament-
debate-16-17/ [accessed 29 September 2020]).
A3.111 Questions over the self-regulation of football surfaced again following the
financial demise of Bury Football Club and its expulsion from the Football League
in August 2019. In the wake of public criticisms of the EFL’s failure to protect the
club as a ‘community asset’ from the failings of its owners, the Digital, Culture,
Media and Sport Committee held an inquiry that concluded there were ‘systematic
and structural problems’ in the EFL, and made a number of recommendations for
reform, including a strengthened Owners’ and Directors’ Test and preventing clubs
from borrowing against fixed assets such as stadiums.1 The message from Select
Committee Chair Damien Collins was a familiar one:
‘The authorities must learn to respect, and act upon, these concerns. If the reforms we
recommend are not introduced forthwith, the only alternative is for the Government
to step in’.2
In response, the EFL commissioned an independent review into the circumstances

leading to the withdrawal of Bury FC’s membership of the League, which concluded
that, while there were weaknesses in the EFL’s regulations, the real cause of Bury’s
demise was that the rules allowed clubs to spend more than their trading income
on player wages, bridging the gap with owner funding, which left them exposed to
collapse if the owner became unable or unwilling for whatever reason to continue to
continue that funding.3
1 ‘Committee calls for regulatory reforms to English football’ Culture, Media and Sport Committee press
release 5 November 2019 old.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/
digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/football-administration-correspondence-19-20/
2 Ibid.
3 Independent review into the events leading up to the expulsion of Bury FC from membership of the
EFL, 20 February 2020, efl.com/-more/governance/reviews/ [accessed 29 September 2020]. See paras
B5.13 and B5.120–B5.122.
(c) Indirect intervention, by means of making compliance with government

policy a condition of access to public funding and publicly-funded benefits
A3.112 This chapter has already addressed how, since 1996, the Labour, Coalition
and then Conservative Governments, building on the foundations laid by the
Conservatives’ 1995 White Paper and in particular the introduction of the National
Lottery, have pushed sport up the political agenda as a key instrument of public
policy. Having done so, however, the government of the day has also therefore had to
acknowledge the importance of the role of the private national governing bodies in
the organisation and promotion of sport in the UK,1 and has used the leverage created
by control over access to Lottery funding and increased Exchequer funding to co-opt
those bodies as partners in the implementation of public policy.
1 In its landmark April 2000 policy paper for sport, the Labour Government stated: ‘Many agencies
provide funding, support services and programmes for sport. However, delivery at community level
is largely driven by three key networks – education, local authority and national governing bodies of
sport’. See ‘A Sporting Future for All (April 2000), p 51. In its 2012 policy paper, Creating a Sporting
Habit for Life’ (January 2012, DCMS), the Coalition Government stated: ‘Whole Sport Plans are the
delivery contract between Sport England and each of the 46 funded National Governing Bodies for
Sport (NGBs). They set out how Exchequer and Lottery funding will be spent and what outcomes the
public can expect to see for this investment. As a result of the Whole Sport Plan approach, those who
know sport best are taking the decisions that will affect the development of their sport at a local and
national level. We want to continue and consolidate this approach in the next round of Whole Sport
Plans which runs from 2013 to 2017’.
A3.113 If government policy is to be implemented by partnering with national

governing bodies of sport, however, then those bodies have to conform to minimum
public standards of governance and administration in the running of their sports.1 In its
March 2001 policy statement, ‘A Sporting Future for All’, the government identified
the ‘fragmented and too often unprofessional’ organisation and management of sport
as an obstacle to its goals of mass participation and success at elite levels.2 It proposed:
‘a modernising partnership with the governing bodies of sport. The public sector
will continue to support sport at its foundations as it has in the past – and give sport
greater say over how those funds are spent – but on two conditions:
(1) that commercially successful sports also contribute to the same pot and invest
in grassroots facilities; and
(2) that all governing bodies agree to work to a number of clear and agreed targets
for the development of their sport’.3
This meant UK Sport and Sport England devolving funding powers to SGBs,
ie allowing those bodies to run their own Lottery-funded programmes, but only on
the basis that such bodies not only publish clear and realistic plans for broadening
participation and identifying talent, but also modernise their management systems and
structures so as to be able to demonstrate high standards of corporate governance.4
The policy statement continued:5
‘We recognise that a closer partnership with the governing bodies of sport is crucial
if we are to deliver our ambitious plans for English sport. We believe that governing
bodies must be responsible for setting the strategic vision for their sport and that
resources should be put behind these strategies to give them every chance of success.
Governing bodies must also take responsibility for demonstrating a high standard
of management, and clear, realistic plans for widening participation and developing
talent. In return those bodies will be able to secure more control over the distribution
of funding to their sport’.
1 In 1999, then-Sports Minister Tony Banks pointed out: ‘We’re discussing a list of priorities with
any sports governing body that receives public money and setting them systematic objectives. We’ll
continue to evaluate their progress’. See ‘Banks seeks feel-good factor’ Daily Telegraph, 20 February
1999. Similarly, in his evidence in 1998 to the Select Committee on Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport, Mr Banks stated: ‘In England I think we have spent the last 3½ years through the Lottery some
£700m or committed £700m worth of expenditure. That is the nature of it. We are then dealing with
organisations that in the past have been arguing around what is the equivalent of a few bob, though it
runs into greater sums than that, and I think in many ways the structures that were in place, with the
sort of fairly amateurish way that it was approached, have not moved easily into the area where there
are now large amounts of money, never enough of course, as you know, but large amounts of money
with sport becoming a bigger and bigger business as we go through. That is changing now in terms
of the personnel. Governing bodies are realising that they have to be professional and we require
them of course to make themselves very accountable for what is still public monies, because it is not
government money that is going through the Lottery, but it is public money, and if anything were to go
wrong, the responsibility undoubtedly would be visited back on us here in the House of Commons’.
2 ‘A Sporting Future for All’ (March 2001, DCMS) at p 5.
3 Ibid, at p 19.
4 Ibid, at p 45. See also ‘A Sporting Future for All: Action Plan’, Report of the Implementation Group
to the DCMS and DfEE (December 2000), Section 9 and App B.
5 Ibid, at p 47.
A3.114 Both UK Sport and Sport England played a role in implementing this policy.
For example, for its ‘Project Rio’ cycle leading up to the 2016 Olympic Games,
UK Sport’s funding decisions were based on ten ‘Investment Principles’,1 the third
of which was:
‘We will only invest in sports bodies which demonstrate the required standards of
leadership, governance, financial management and administration.
We will scrutinise the governance and leadership of all sports in which we invest to
ensure that organisations are run professionally and efficiently, with a commitment to
achieving the highest standards of corporate governance and financial management
with systemic excellence at all levels. Sports must be able to evidence that equality,
safeguarding and ethical standards are visibly integrated into their structures and
operations.
Implications
• We will not invest in an organisation where there is evidence that the governance
of that sport puts at risk the delivery of its longterm performance objectives.
• We will seek evidence that the senior leadership has the appropriate skills to
develop and guide the organisation’s strategic direction, with a commitment to
drive continuous improvement by leading and managing change.
• We will embed the required standards in our overall funding agreements,
holding sports to account for their delivery
• Performance reviews will focus on excellence in system development and
management as well as results
• Consistent failure to meet the required standards will result in the withholding
or withdrawal of funding’.
UK Sport has, by and large part, continued on this path. For the Tokyo 2020 Olympic
cycle, UK Sport announced its nine investment principles and, at principle four, re-
affirmed that ‘National Governing Bodies of sport hold the responsibility for the
development, profile, organization, governance and leadership of their sport’, adding
that ‘where a National Governing Body is unable to add value to this partnership, or
to effectively manage the delivery of the programme, we reserve the right to direct
all, or part, of our investment to a third party’.2
1 uksport.gov.uk/news/2012/10/05/road-to-rio-ramps-up-a-gear [accessed 29 September 2020].
2 uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-sport/investment-principles [accessed 29 September 2020].
A3.115 Similarly, any national governing body wishing to receive funding from
Sport England must meet high standards of governance and financial controls. In the
foreword to Sport England’s 2012 paper, ‘Sport England Governance Strategy: On
board for better governance’, Sport England chairman Richard Lewis stated:
‘Well-governed NGBs are critical to the delivery of our strategic investment

outcomes and a sustainable sector. We will continue to place particular importance
on driving up standards of governance in core-funded NGBs. We will also encourage
and support good governance in the wider sector through the standards we set as
investors in sport and the help and support we provide’.1
In 2015, the Conservative Government published its ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy
for an Active Nation’,2 which contained a commitment to introduce a new corporate
governance code: on 31 October 2016, the Code for Sports Governance was issued,
which set out minimum governance requirements with which organisations in receipt
of public investment must comply.3 Then-Sports Minister Tracey Crouch said:4
‘It is vital that our domestic sports bodies and organisations uphold the very highest
standards of governance and lead the world in this area. We want to ensure that they
operate efficiently and successfully while being transparent and representative of
society. We have been clear that we will expect them to adhere to the new Code for
Sports Governance if they are to receive public funding in the future’.
In a 2018 update, the government noted:
‘An aim of Sporting Future is to achieve global recognition of the UK’s Code for
Sports Governance as the “gold standard” for sports governance around the world.
UK Sport has made progress in influencing change across the international sporting
landscape. The task is not straightforward and requires a different approach to that
adopted in the UK. Each NGB [National Governing Body] that UK Sport funds
has a bespoke International Relations Strategy that captures key issues they seek
to promote in their International Federations. Across NGBs, there are around 70
specific “international governance reform objectives” that UK Sport has identified
this year and is actively pursuing. UK Sport also continues to seek to influence
change by supporting credible, high-calibre people from the UK, with a reform
agenda, to attain senior leadership positions within Federations. In 2017, 12
individuals achieved those positions at European and international level.
Through direct engagement with other governments, International Federations,
the International Olympic Committee and international organisations, DCMS
[Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport] and UK Sport have continued
to work closely to progress the new International Partnership Against Corruption
in Sport (IPACS) which builds on the London Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016. At
the most recent IPACS working group meeting in December 2017, three taskforces
were established focusing on: (i) reducing the risk of corruption in procurement
relating to sporting events and infrastructure; (ii) ensuring integrity in the selection
of major sporting events, with an initial focus on managing conflict of interest; and
(iii) optimising the processes of compliance with good governance principles to
mitigate the risk of corruption.
In addition to UK Sport’s work on international sports governance, it has actively
supported athlete voice, representation and welfare in international sport through
bespoke seminars, including with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the
International Olympic Committee and the International Paralympic Committee. This
year, UK Sport launched the new version of its flagship International Leadership
Programme, which equips high-calibre British sports administrators and retired athletes
with the knowledge and skills required to operate effectively in international sport.’5
In December 2018, UK Sport and Sport England announced that 55 of the 58 sports
under review were compliant with the new Code for Sports Governance.6 On 13 July
2020, they announced that the Code would undergo its first formal review.
1 ‘Sport England Governance Strategy: On board for good governance’ (Sport England, 2012). The
strategy set out a number key criteria for effective NGB governance: it recommended an open recruitment
processes for the appointment of board members, a maximum of 12 people on the board (at least 25
per cent of whom should be independent), and transparency of decision-making; and it described how
funding may be suspended where those criteria are not met: ‘Over the 2009–13 funding period, Sport
England investment in NGBs to deliver our sporting outcomes has been closely aligned to working
with them to improve their governance, finance and control frameworks. We have placed particular
importance on supporting NGBs in developing these frameworks because good governance is at the
heart of delivering sporting outcomes. During the 2009–13 funding period we recognised that NGBs
required time to develop their governance frameworks and we have supported and encouraged them in
this through our self-assurance and on-site audit processes and our relationship management activities.
Where significant concerns have arisen, funding has been suspended or moved to monthly or quarterly
payments until key issues were resolved. Building on the NGB governance improvements that have
already been made is important to us. In order to access 2013–17 funding we are setting a number of key
criteria for effective governance which we will require core funded NGBs to have in place. Where these
standards are not yet in place, applicants will be required to demonstrate a determination to meet them by
October 2014. This determination must be supported by a robust action plan with milestones agreed both
by your Board and by us. The key criteria for effective governance, set out below, draw together and build
upon the minimum standards we already set through the self-assurance and on-site audit processes. They
are requirements for the NGBs that we fund but we strongly encourage their dissemination by NGBs
through their own structures where applicable eg at county board or regional board level’. ‘Sport England
Governance Strategy: On board for good governance’ (Sport England, 2012).
2 See para A3.33.
3 Sporting Future – A New Strategy for an Active Nation, HM Government, 17 December 2015
4 uksport.gov.uk/resources/governance-code [accessed 29 September 2020].
5 Sporting Future – Second Annual Report, HM Government, 30 January 2018, paras 4.9-4.11.
6 ‘55 national bodies now fully compliant with new world leading Governance Code for Sport’,
UK Sport press release, 20 December 2018.
A3.116 However, it is not just good governance that is promoted by means of

funding conditions. The Sports Councils also use their control over the purse-strings
to require compliance with substantive government policy objectives. For example,
national governing bodies signing up to Whole Sport Plans with Sport England must
commit, as part of the funding agreement, to comply with the NSPCC’s sports child
safeguarding policy1 and the Equality Standard for Sport. Again non-compliance can
lead to suspension or even withdrawal of funding.
A3.117 Another good example lies in the field of anti-doping policy. Historically,
responsibility for anti-doping regulation and enforcement within sport in the UK
rested with the national governing body of each sport, working on a decentralised,
sport-by-sport basis. The national governing body, not the National Anti-Doping
Organization, retained responsibility for drafting appropriate anti-doping rules,
for investigating possible anti-doping rule violations under those rules (uncovered
by means of testing or otherwise), for determining whether an athlete has a case
to answer under the rules, for establishing a hearing panel to hear that case, and
for prosecuting the case before the panel. However, that landscape has changed
dramatically in recent years.1
1 See further para C2.20 et seq.
A3.118 Consistent with its non-interventionist approach to the regulation of sport

generally,1 the UK Government historically took a relatively hands-off approach to
the regulation of drug use in sport. It endorsed the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code and was an early signatory to the Council of Europe’s 1989 Anti-Doping
Convention.2 However, it never passed any specific legislation to incorporate the
provisions of these international instruments into domestic law, or to require sports
bodies to adopt anti-doping programmes reflecting their provisions.
1 In contrast, interventionist states such as France and Italy issued codified anti-doping regulations that sports
federations had to adopt and enforce, or else face being stripped of their right to govern their respective
sports. See eg French Law no 99 222 of 23 March 1999 and the Italian Law no 376 of 14 December 2000,
both on ‘Discipline of health protection in sports activities and of fight against doping’.
2 The Anti-Doping Convention (Council of Europe – European Treaties – ETS No 135) was adopted in
1989. Thirty-eight Member States of the Council of Europe have signed it, including the UK. Until the
introduction of the UNESCO International Anti-Doping Convention, it was the main legal instrument
for the harmonisation of doping rules at government level.
A3.119 With the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999 and
the adoption of the first World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 (‘the Code’), however,
the anti-doping paradigm shifted fundamentally. The UK Government ratified the
UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport, thereby committing to
base its anti-doping policy on the principles of the World Anti-Doping Code (‘the
Code’).1 In particular:
(a) Article 1 defines the purpose of the Convention, ie to promote the prevention
of doping in sport.
(b) Article 3 outlines the means to achieve this purpose, including an obligation for
State Parties to encourage all forms of international cooperation, particularly
with WADA, and also underlines the importance of ensuring that any measures
adopted against doping are consistent with the Code.
(c) Article 4 commits State Parties to the principles of the Code as the basis for
appropriate measures, to be taken at national level, including legislation,
regulation, policies or administrative practices, to achieve the objectives of
and to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Those obligations
(i) ensuring that national laws contain appropriate measures against
trafficking of prohibited substances and methods to athletes (Art 8);
(ii) applying financial sanctions (ie withdrawal of/ineligibility for public
funding) with respect to individuals who commit anti-doping rule
violations and organisations that do not comply with the Code (Art 11);
(iii) encouraging and facilitating cooperation between public and private
agencies in the fight against doping in sport (Art 13);
(iv) supporting the mission of WADA in the international fight against doping
(Art 14); and
(d) Article 9 calls for State Parties to take measures and to encourage relevant
organisations to take action against athlete support personnel who commit an
anti-doping rule violation.
In short, the Convention ‘impose[s] a legal obligation on all governments to work

with sport, under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, to eradicate doping
in sport’.2
1 International Convention Against Doping in Sport, ED.2005/CONVENTION ANTI-DOPING.
2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Explanatory Memorandum on the UNESCO International
Convention Against Doping In Sport, 1 February 2006, Cm 6742. But see comments of IAAF President
Lamine Diack to the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Madrid, 16 November 2007: ‘The fatal
flaw in the Convention is that the World Anti-Doping Code and the International Standards are not an
integral part of the Convention itself and they do not create binding obligations on the Governments
as a matter of international law. The Convention commits the Governments only to the principles
of the Code and the IAAF would respectfully suggest that this falls some way short of the type of
legally binding commitment that was called for in Copenhagen and which is so fundamental to the
principle of harmonisation that the Code is intended to achieve. As the leadership of WADA passes
to the Governments for the next four year period, this is an issue of critical importance that must be
addressed through amendment to the UNESCO Convention itself’. No amendments were made to
address this criticism, and therefore no sanctions could be applied under the Convention against Russia
after its state-sponsored doping scheme was uncovered in 2016.
A3.120 Between the advent of the Code in 2003 and late 2009, working within
the framework of achieving government policy by means of conditions placed on
access to public funding and benefits, the Drug-Free Sport Directorate of UK Sport
managed to introduce elements of centralisation and harmonisation to anti-doping
rule-making and adjudication among the UK’s national governing bodies, including
establishing an independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear all cases arising
under the anti-doping rules of the UK’s national governing bodies.1 And then in 2007
the UK Sport board announced that it was recommending that the government require
national governing bodies, as a further condition of eligibility for public funding,
to transfer exclusive results management authority (ie the authority to investigate
matters and determine whether there is a case to answer under the doping rules) to a
new independent National Anti-Doping Organization.2
1 See sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-anti-doping/nadp [accessed 29 September 2020].
2 See UK Sport press releases dated 25 July 2007 and 16 October 2007.
A3.121 Following consultation with the sports movement, in December 2009,

the government finalised and published its National Anti-Doping Policy,1 which
establishes a truly unified UK approach to the fight against doping in sport under the
auspices of UK Anti-Doping as the National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO) for
the UK. It requires the national governing bodies of sport in the UK to adopt either
the UK Anti-Doping Rules issued by UK Anti-Doping or other Code-compliant
anti-doping rules mandated by their international federations, to delegate results
management and case prosecution responsibility to UK Anti-Doping (save where
UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own systems are Code-compliant), and to appoint
the independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear and determine all charges that
the anti-doping rules have been breached (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that
their own tribunals are Code-compliant).
1 UK National Anti-Doping Policy, version 1.0, 14 December 2009.
A3.122 This interventionist approach is a cause of disquiet for those who continue
to adhere to the orthodox view that ‘government does not and should not run sport’.1
They question why the government is interfering in a sport’s ability to decide what
should constitute cheating in its sport and what the penalties for breach of the rules
should be, let alone taking away its right to police and enforce its rules by itself. But
whether or not public health and ethical considerations provide sufficient justification
for such a degree of intervention, the fact is that this government intervention has
largely been welcomed by most sports bodies, many of whom lack the resources
and expertise to deal with doping themselves.2 It has had a good degree of success in
practice in developing the effectiveness of the fight against doping in sport.3 It is also
a policy that enjoys broad support from the sporting media and wider general public,
making it a very difficult one for SGBs to challenge, as they can be seen as conflicted
when it comes to enforcement of anti-doping rules against their star athletes, making
independent results management by a public agency a necessity as far as the public
is concerned.
1 This came across strongly in the evidence that The FA gave to a 2004 Parliamentary Select Committee:
‘we strongly believe that sports governing bodies must take the lead in drug testing and doping policy
in their own sports. […] The FA and FIFA therefore set out the policy and procedure for anti-doping in
football. With regards to UK Sport, the FA retains them as our agents to collect and analyse samples,
and report findings. We also support any UK Sport education initiatives. […] Although there are some
250 “public interest” tests carried out by UK Sport in football, we are very much of the view that it
is football’s code, regulations and procedures that apply, and no one else’s. […] We have supported
UK Sport’s anti-doping directorate, and continue to do so. It has been an important initiative. However,
we see the FA as the national anti-doping directorate for football in England’. See also The FA’s
and the ECB’s response to the Government’s 2009 consultation on the establishment of UK Anti-
Doping: ‘The FA believe that compulsory centralisation of the results management, case presentation
and disciplinary functions does not represent the best approach for all UK national governing bodies
(NGBs), particularly those with the resources, expertise and experience to provide an effective process
within these areas consistent with its operational procedures and arrangements in other areas of sports
discipline. […] It must be recognised that the decentralisation approach essentially amounts to the
“nationalisation” of a sports regulatory function pursuant to which NGBs would be required to forego
independence, autonomy and primacy over its participants. Such an approach could potentially place
an NGB at odds with the process of its International Federation (IF), and potentially with those of other
NGBs within its sport where the relevant NADO adopts a different approach.’ And ‘It is imperative to
NGBs, and taxpayers, that the increased costs to implement the new UK Anti-Doping Organisation
will result in clear and significant benefits to the sports sector as a whole. By introducing this new
organisation there has been a significant shift in Government’s position in relation to the regulation of
sport, as it is removing the responsibility of decision making in relation to the sport’s participants from
within the jurisdiction of the NGB. It should not be underestimated that this will be at conflict with
other aspects of Government policy in relation to sport, and further many UK based NGBs will then be
operating at conflict with other NGBs within their International Federation’: ‘Summary of responses
to consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping Organisation’ (DCMS, November
2009).
2 See eg the response of the Amateur Rowing Association to the government’s 2009 consultation on the
establishment of UK Anti-Doping: ‘We would currently welcome the intention to centralise the results
management and case presentation. This would help to ensure consistency across sports in the UK
and assist the NGBs who do not necessarily have expertise in these areas or the funding available to
manage them’. ‘Summary of responses to consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping
Organisation’ (DCMS, November 2009).
3 See further para C2.23.
A3.123 The biggest driver for government intervention in doping, however, has
been the recognition that sport requires state support in order to protect its integrity
in the face of determined cheating from dopers and their entourages. It is very
difficult for a governing body to insist that the government should not get involved
in the governance and regulation of its sport while at the same time calling on the
government to step in to help because it cannot defend the integrity of its sport from
outside attack alone.
A3.124 Further evidence of the UK Government’s strong support for the fight to
protect the integrity of sport (in the area of anti-doping, safeguarding, and otherwise)
came in 2018, when provisions were incorporated into the Data Protection Act 2018
to ensure that UK Anti-Doping and SGBs are able to process personal data where
necessary to protect the integrity of sport.1
1 See para A4.61 to para A4.73.
CHAPTER A4
Data Protection and Sport

Emma Drake (Bird & Bird LLP)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A4.1
2 DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE....................... A4.3
A What is personal data and who are data subjects?....................................... A4.6
B What is processing and who are controllers and processors?...................... A4.14
C What is the scope of data protection law?.................................................... A4.26
3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT............................................ A4.34
A Lawful, fair and transparent......................................................................... A4.35
B Purpose limitation, data minimisation and accuracy................................... A4.94
C Storage limitation......................................................................................... A4.107
D Integrity and confidentiality (security)......................................................... A4.114
E Accountability.............................................................................................. A4.125
4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS.................................................................................. A4.153
A Articles 11 and 12 – the formalities of a request......................................... A4.154
B The rights of access and portability............................................................. A4.155
C The rights of rectification, restriction, objection and erasure...................... A4.166
D Significant automated decisions................................................................... A4.178
5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS...................................................................... A4.182
A What is a restricted transfer?........................................................................ A4.185
B When can organisations carry out a restricted transfer?.............................. A4.186
C What is different in the UK?........................................................................ A4.198
6 DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT.......................................... A4.203
A Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR.................................................... A4.205
B Cookies........................................................................................................ A4.226
7 LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT.................................................................. A4.239
A Supervisory authority powers...................................................................... A4.240
B Individual and group rights of action........................................................... A4.249
C Criminal offences and personal liability...................................................... A4.255
D Publicity and trust........................................................................................ A4.257
1 INTRODUCTION
A4.1 Processing of personal data underlies much of the regulation and policy
described elsewhere in this book. Personal data is processed in the registration of
athletes, the assessment of their eligibility to compete, in collecting intelligence to
prevent doping and match-fixing, and in safeguarding the welfare of participants.
It also fuels the commercial and competitive drivers of sport: it is captured in the
footage and film used to promote events and teams, it is analysed to deliver a marginal
gain or to assess a rival, and it is scrutinised to help profile and target fans and sell
sponsorship rights. The rights of individuals in relation to their personal data, and the
wider regulation of data use, must be considered not only to comply with the law, but
also to ensure the enforceability of sports rules, protect the value in sporting assets,
and deliver the full commercial potential of a fan-base.
A4.2 It is not the intention of this chapter to provide an exhaustive guide to data
protection law; there are dedicated works that do that.1 This chapter instead explains
the application of the principles of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)2 and the UK’s
Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) to the activities of sports organisations. Despite
the paucity of references to sport within the GDPR’s recitals and in the subsequent
guidance issued from authoritative sources, this new legislative framework has clear
and specific impacts on sports administration, regulation, and commercialisation.
This chapter will address those impacts, and will also touch on the application of the
EU’s ePrivacy regime, derived from amended Directive 2002/58/EC3 (‘the ePrivacy
Directive’), particularly its restrictions on electronic marketing and cookie compliance.
1 For a general introduction to data protection law and its application to organisations within the UK,
see the Information Commissioner’s Guide to Data Protection (ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-
to-data-protection/ [accessed 29 September 2020]). For more in-depth guides on the law and its
implementation in practice, see eg Boardman and Morgan, Data Protection Strategy: Implementing
Data Protection Compliance, 3rd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2019); Jay, Data Protection Law &
Practice, 5th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2020).
2 Regulation 2016/679 [2016] OJ L119/1 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
3 Directive 2002/58/EC [2002] OJ L 201/37 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.
2 DATA PROTECTION LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE
A4.3 Data protection law first saw substance in the Council of Europe’s 1981
Data Protection Convention (‘Convention 108’),1 which led to regulation on a
European level within Directive 95/46/EC on the processing of personal data
(‘the DP Directive’).2 In an effort to catch up with the forward-rush of technology,
and ostensibly to improve harmonisation across Member States, the European
Commission published a draft general data protection regulation to replace the
DP Directive in January 2012. This was subject to lengthy review and negotiations
between the European Council and European Parliament, and was finally passed into
law as the GDPR in April 2016. The GDPR came into force in 25 May 2018.
1 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data, European Treaty Series 108, (Strasbourg 1981).
2 Directive 95/46/EC [1995] OJ L281/1 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data.
A4.4 As an EU regulation, the GDPR has direct effect in EU Member States. The
DPA 2018 exists to fill certain gaps left by the GDPR for national variation,1 and
to address areas outside of its scope, such as law enforcement processing.2 Despite
Brexit, the GDPR remains part of UK law until the end of any transition period,3 and
the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 20184 (‘Withdrawal Agreement’) provides for
it to be transposed into UK law after withdrawal, subject to some limited amendments
made by the Data Protection, Privacy and Electronic Communications (Amendments
etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (the Data Protection Exit Regulations). This law
will then be known as the UK GDPR.5
1 Such as conditions for processing special category data under Art 9 (see para A4.55 et seq) and
exemptions (see para A4.90).
2 Processing of data for law enforcement purposes, where carried out by competent authorities, is
addressed by Directive (EU) 2016/680, which is implemented in Pt 3 of the DPA 2018.
3 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, Sch 5, para 1. This defers all provisions importing
and amending EU legislation on exit day until ‘IP completion day’, being 11pm of the last day of the
transition period (at the time of writing, this date is 31 December 2020).
4 SI 2019/419. As yet, most regulations are not yet in force, having been due to commence on exit day.
5 A schedule setting out the amendments that would be made by the Data Protection Exit Regulations
can be found at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/779335/Keeling_Schedule_for_GDPR.pdf [accessed 29 September 2020].
Data Protection and Sport 173
A4.5 While a substantial amount of the GDPR reflects concepts and definitions
that existed under the DP Directive and the Council of Europe’s Data Protection
Convention before that, the GDPR is stricter, and introduces some novel obligations
as well as enhanced individual rights. To understand the application of these rules to
sport, it is important to understand the GDPR’s most basic concepts.
A What is personal data and who are data subjects?
A4.6 Personal data is defined in Article 4(1) of GDPR as ‘any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)’. The Article goes on to
explain that:
‘an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person’.
A4.7 The two key questions to be answered are:

(1) whether the data – either alone or in combination with other data – causes a
data subject to be either directly or indirectly identifiable; and
(2) whether that data then relates to that data subject.
There is a substantial body of both European and UK case law and guidance on
these topics. Perhaps the most useful practical summary – emphasising the intended
breadth of the definition – comes in C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection
Commissioner,1 where the CJEU explained:
‘The use of the expression “any information” in the definition of the concept of
“personal data”, within [European data protection law], reflects the aim of the
EU legislature to assign a wide scope to that concept, which is not restricted to
information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all kinds of
information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of opinions and
assessments, provided that it “relates” to the data subject.
As regards the latter condition, it is satisfied where the information, by reason of its
content, purpose or effect, is linked to a particular person’.
1 C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, pp 34–35.
A4.8 This finding effectively summarises the position taken by the Article 29
Working Party1 within its Opinion No 4/2007 on the concept of personal data
(WP 136).2 That Opinion similarly explained that personal data should be considered
to include both ‘objective information such as the presence of a certain substance in
one’s blood’ and subjective information. The Article 29 Working Party also confirmed
that information does not need to be ‘true or proven’ in order to be considered personal
data; otherwise accuracy rules within data protection law would have little import.3
On the question of whether information ‘relates’ to a data subject, WP 136 says that
‘in general terms’ data may relate to a data subject ‘when it is about that individual’.
The Opinion outlines three different ways4 in which a relational link between the data
and data subject can be established:
(1) The ‘content’ of the data is evidently about the individual: the data itself is
evidently about an identifiable individual, such a medical result or an allocated
identifying number. The GDPR has since clarified that such data includes not
only obvious identifiers such as an individual’s name or date of birth, but also
information that has undergone pseudonymisation,5 and online identifiers such

as mobile device identifiers and IP addresses.6
(2) The ‘purpose’ of handling that data is one that will lead to a relationship of that
data with a data subject, ie the data will be used ‘with the purpose to evaluate,
treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual’,
such as the review of sporting footage to analyse an athlete’s performance.
(3) The ‘result’ of data processing is one that will lead to ‘an impact on a certain
individual’s rights and interests’ (emphasis in the original). WP136 underlines
that it is not necessary for this to be a substantial impact: ‘it is sufficient if
the individual may be treated differently’ as a result of the processing. For
example, the particular deterioration of sporting equipment such as racing car
parts or cycling equipment is not of itself personal data, except to the extent to
which this deterioration may be attributed to and used to assess or reprimand
an athlete or support worker.
1 A body that was established under the DP Directive as a cooperative body representing the data
protection authorities of all EU Member States, and that issued non-binding guidance. It has been
replaced under the GDPR by the European Data Protection Board.
2 WP136, adopted 20 June 2007.
3 Ibid, p 6.
4 Ibid, pp 10-11.
5 GDPR, Recital 26.
6 GDPR, Recital 30.
A4.9 An essential element of the definition of personal data is that it must relate
to an identifiable data subject. Data can identify a data subject either directly or
indirectly. Indirectly identifying information may be linked to a data subject through
a connection with other information held by the controller, or that could be readily
accessed by the controller (for example, data in the public domain). Nor does the
individual necessarily need to be known to the controller. In the world of esports,
for example, a player may be predominantly or uniquely known by a pseudonym.
The fact that the ‘real life’ player is unknown to a particular controller does not
stop information processed about them being considered personal data. Similarly,
the choice to deliver marketing to a particular cookie holder based on their browsing
history involves the processing of personal data, even if the only known identifier to
the organisation is that user’s cookie ID.
A4.10 The GDPR states, in Recital 26, that ‘to determine whether a natural person
is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used’.
The Recital elaborates that:
‘account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount
of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology
at the time of the processing and technological developments’.
The equivalent Recital under the DP Directive was considered by the CJEU in
C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Breyer), with the court
stating that identification would be unlikely in a case where:
‘[…] the identification of the data subject was prohibited by law or practically
impossible on account of the fact that it requires a disproportionate effort in terms
of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identification appears in reality to
be insignificant’.1
This leaves, in practice, a relatively narrow scope for anonymity, which is perhaps
not unsurprising given that anonymous data falls outside of data protection law
and the reach of regulators.2 For more information on anonymisation, a vast and
controversial topic of itself, organisations can consider lengthy guidance issued
by the UK’s supervisory authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO),3

and information produced by the Article 29 Working Party.4 The GDPR has since
introduced a new concept of ‘pseudonymous’ data, which has in practice narrowed
the bounds of anonymity even further.5
1 C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:C:2016:779, para 46.
2 GDPR, Recital 26: ‘The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous
information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person
or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer
identifiable’.
3 Information Commissioner, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ (November 2012). Note that this code
was drafted to address the previous UK law and is no longer official guidance. It remains accessible
and provides some assistance in the absence of more recent UK guidance. The ICO was understood to
be working on a new draft code during 2020.
4 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (WP 216) adopted
10 April 2014.
5 Article 4(5) of the GDPR defines pseudonymisation as ‘[…]the processing of personal data in such
a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use
of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject
to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an
identified or identifiable natural person’. Although pseudonymisation involves taking steps to reduce
the identifiability of the affected data, the GDPR clearly applies to such information. For more details,
see ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/what-is-personal-data/what-is-personal-data/#pd4 [accessed 29 September 2020].
A4.11 It is important to remember that personal data about one data subject can
be simultaneously the personal data of a third person. This is particularly true of
opinions, which are simultaneously the personal data of the holder and the subject.
They can also concurrently form part of the intellectual property of others (such
as photographs, or information forming part of a database).1 There is no inherent
concept of ownership within data protection law. Rather, controllers and processors
have responsibilities and individuals have rights over data.
1 See paras H1.81 (copyright in photographs) and H1.77 et seq (database rights).
A4.12 Within the definition of personal data, there are certain types of data that
require additional protection under the GDPR. These types of data are identified in
Article 9(1) of the GDPR as ‘special categories’ of personal data, namely:
‘personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or

philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership […], genetic data, biometric data
[processed] for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation’.
This special category data, previously known as ‘sensitive’ personal data under
the DP Directive, is treated differently under the GDPR, requiring an additional
legal basis to overcome a general prohibition of processing (see para A4.55) and
imposing additional accountability obligations (see Section 3E, ‘Accountability’
below). Separately, data relating to criminal convictions and offences (‘criminal
offence data’) are also subject to specific restrictions under Article 10 of the GDPR,
which are discussed in brief later in this chapter (see Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and
transparent’ below). In the UK, s 11(2) of the DPA 2018 expands the definition of
criminal offence data to specifically include ‘the alleged commission of offences’ and
‘proceedings’ in relation to offences, including their disposal and sentencing. The
ICO, in its guidance on criminal offence data, explains that in the UK, at least, the
definition should be considered to be even broader:
‘It includes not just data which is obviously about a specific criminal conviction or
trial, but also any other personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences,
including:
• unproven allegations;
• information relating to the absence of convictions; and
• personal data of victims and witnesses of crime.’1
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/criminal-offence-data/ [accessed 19 November 2020]. As
Art 10 imposes strict restrictions on the use of such data, this broad interpretation of the meaning of
criminal offence data is less typical in other countries that lack the broader permissions for use found
in the DPA 2018 (see Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’ below).
A4.13 Photographs and film footage should not necessarily be considered to be

special category data despite the fact that they may display an individual’s ethnicity,
or health data.1 Instead, it is the processing of this data to make use of these visible
characteristics that might result in the photographs or film footage being considered
special category data. Whether the ability to ‘infer’ special category data (such as
a choice to treat all those with the name Mohammed as Muslim) will ‘count […]
depends on how certain that inference is, and whether you are deliberately drawing
that inference’.2
1 ‘The processing of photographs should not systematically be considered to be processing of special
categories of personal data […]’. GDPR, Recital 51; see also European Data Protection Board,
‘Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices’, Version 2.0, adopted
29 January 2020.
regulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-is-special-category-data/#scd1 [accessed 29 September
2020].
B What is processing and who are controllers and processors?
A4.14 Data protection law applies to the controllers and processors who process
that data. Processing is very broadly defined in Article 4(2) of the GDPR as:
‘any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data, or on sets

of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording,
organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available,
alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction’.
In effect, this broad definition means anything done with personal data will be
considered processing and subject to data protection law, unless the particular use of
the data expressly falls outside of the scope of the GDPR (see Section 2C, ‘Storage
limitation’ below).
A4.15 Responsibilities under UK and European data protection law fall on

‘controllers’ and ‘processors’. A ‘controller’ is defined as a person or body ‘which,
alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data’.1 Controllers are predominantly responsible for data protection
compliance, and bear the vast majority of obligations under the GDPR and DPA 2018.
Processors, on the other hand, are bodies that ‘process personal data on behalf of the
controller’.2 Processors had no statutory obligations prior to the GDPR, and now
only have limited responsibilities relating primarily to data security. They cannot
choose to use the data they handle for their own purposes: if they do so, they then
become controllers for that processing.3 Although a processor’s statutory obligations
are limited, the effect of the requirement to have detailed contracts in place between
controllers and processors under Article 28 of the GDPR does increase their potential
liability.4
1 GDPR, Art 4(7).
2 GDPR, Art 4(8).
3 To do so without the consent of the controller would also be a breach of contract: see Section 3E,
‘Accountability’ below.
4 A processor who bears some responsibility for damage can also be initially sued for the entirety of the
damage. See Section 7B, ‘Individual and group rights of action’ below.
A4.16 It is possible for an organisation to be both a controller and a processor for

different processing activities. For example, the ICO’s guidance on controller and
processors states:
‘If you are a processor that provides services to other controllers, you are very likely
to be a controller for some personal data and a processor for other personal data. For
example, you will have your own employees so you will be a controller regarding
your employees’ personal data. However, you cannot be both a controller and a
processor for the same processing activity’. 1
It is also possible for there to be more than one controller involved in the same
processing activity. Where two bodies jointly determine the purposes and means of
processing for the activity, they will be considered ‘joint controllers’.2
regulation-gdpr/controllers-and-processors/ [accessed 29 September 2020].
2 GDPR, Art 26.
A4.17 There are also examples of organisations who are involved or associated in
the processing of personal data, but are neither controllers nor processors. Examples
of this are intermediary service providers (as defined by Directive 2000/31/EC) who
act as a ‘mere conduit’1 for data, such as ISPs that connect a user to the Internet.
Other organisations may avoid being controllers where they can demonstrate that
they process only anonymised information. However, organisations that do not have
access to personal data but that take essential decisions about its processing can still
be controllers, according to recent CJEU case law.2
1 Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce, [2000] OJ L178/1, Art 12.
2 In C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat – uskonnollinen yhdyskunta,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, para 75, the CJEU held that ’[…] a religious community is a controller […]
without it being necessary that the community has access to those data’. In C-210/16 Unabhängiges
Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH
ECLI:EU:C:2018:388, para 38, the CJEU held: ‘In any event, [data protection law] does not, where
several operators are jointly responsible for the same processing, require each of them to have access
to the personal data concerned’.
A4.18 The factual analysis of whether an organisation is a controller is not

straightforward. The Article 29 Working Party gave specific advice on this topic
in its ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’ (WP169),
noting that the point often ‘requires […] complex analysis and is […] likely to lead
to divergent interpretations’.1 This authoritative guidance is now due to be replaced
by the EDPB’s new Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controllers and processor
in the GDPR (‘Draft EDPB Control Guidelines’), although the final version of this
guidance had not been released at the time of writing.2 As both WP169 and the
Draft EDPB Control Guidelines explain, regulatory expediency has led to a broad
interpretation of the role of controller (and, as set out below in most recent cases, the
allocation of joint control). As explained in the Draft EDPB Control Guidelines:
‘as the underlying objective of attributing the role of controller is to ensure

accountability and the effective and comprehensive protection of the personal data,
the concept of ‘controller’ should be interpreted in a sufficiently broad way so as to
ensure full effect of EU data protection law, to avoid lacunae and to prevent possible
circumvention of the rules’.3
1 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”’, WP169
adopted 16 February 2010, p 12.
2 EDPB ‘Guidelines 07/2020 on the concepts of controllers and processor in the GDPR’ Version 1.0,
Adopted on 02 September 2020 for public consultation.
3 Ibid, p 9.
A4.19 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines examine, in detail, the ‘building blocks’
behind the definition of controller under the GDPR.1 Having explained that there is
‘no limitation as to the type of entity that may assume the role of a controller’, the
EDPB explains how to assess whether a body ‘determines’ the means and purposes
of data processing. It suggests that the circumstances ‘giving rise to control’ can be
distinguished as:
(a) ‘control stemming from legal provisions’ – responsibility for a certain task may
be set out by law. These might be statutory obligations to maintain certain
records, or obligations to carry out certain processing under legislation (such
as requirements under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002);2 or
(b) ‘control stemming from factual influence’ – absent specific responsibility
under law, the responsibility of a controller must be established following ‘an
assessment of the factual circumstances surrounding the processing.’ Control
may stem from ‘established legal practice’, or from the exercise of traditional
roles which imply responsibility for data protection purposes. For example, an
employer is responsible for data relating to its employees, and a retail business
is responsible for its customers’ data.3 A contract may also assist if it contains
‘sufficient elements to infer who exercises a decision-making role with respect
to the purposes and means of processing’.4 However, the key is to determine
which party – or parties – decide ‘why and how personal data are processed’.5
1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, pp 9–16. The EDPB sets this out as five ‘building blocks’: (a) the
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body; (b) determines; (c) alone or jointly with
others; (d) the purposes and means; (e) of the processing of personal data.
2 Ibid, p 11.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, p 12.
5 Ibid.
A4.20 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines explain that ‘the controller must decide
on both purpose and means of the processing’.1 A processor ‘can never determine
the purpose of processing’ and ‘decisions on the purpose of processing are clearly
always for the controller to make’.2 However, in assessing the determination of the
means of processing, the EDPB acknowledges that ‘some margin of manoeuvre may
exist for the processor’ to take certain decisions.3 The EDPB explains that there is an
important distinction to be made between:
(a) Determination of essential means – whoever makes this decision is a controller,
as these are ‘close linked to the purpose and scope of processing and are
traditionally and inherently reserved to the controller’. Examples given by the
EDPB of essential means are:
(i) which data will be processed;
(ii) the duration of data processing;
(iii) who shall have access to the data; and
(iv) whose data will be processed.4
(b) Determination of non-essential means – by contrast, the EDPB explains that
these ‘concern more practical aspects of implementation, such as the choice for
a particular type of hard- or software or the detailed security measures’. These
decisions can be delegated to the processor. 5
1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, p 13.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, p 14.
5 Ibid/
A4.21 Article 26 of the GDPR provides: ‘where two or more controllers jointly
determine the purposes and means of processing, they shall be joint controllers’. This
provision requires these controllers to document the allocation of responsibilities
between themselves in writing and to explain this allocation in a transparent manner
to individuals.
A4.22 Although WP169 predates these specific obligations, joint control was
anticipated under the DP Directive, and the Article 29 Working Party gave its views
on what should be considered joint control. They noted that:
‘[…] the mere fact that different subjects cooperate in processing personal data, for
example in a chain, does not entail that they are joint controllers in all cases, since
an exchange of data between two parties without sharing purposes or means in a
common or set of operations should be considered only as a transfer of data between
separate controllers’.1
WP169 goes on to say, however:
‘[…] in some cases, various actors process the same personal data in a sequence.
In these cases, it is likely that at micro-level the different processing operations of
the chain appear as disconnected, as each of them may have a different purpose.
However, it is necessary to double check whether at macro-level these processing
operations should not be considered as a “set of operations” pursuing a joint purpose
or using jointly defined means’.2
1 WP169, p 21.
2 Ibid, p 22.
A4.23 Recent CJEU cases seem to set the bar for joint control at a lower level
than suggested in WP169.1 This chain of cases is explored in the Advocate General’s
opinion in Case C-40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW
eV.2 The collective impact of this jurisprudence led Advocate General Bobek to ask
‘who then is not a joint controller? Will effective protection be enhanced if everyone
is made responsible for ensuring it?’3 Nonetheless, both he and the judges of the
CJEU found that the bar for being considered joint controllers must be set at a low
level, to ‘ensure the effective and comprehensive protection’ of data subjects.4 This
is not to say that liability is considered to be a matter to be equally split between
the parties regardless of involvement. The CJEU made it clear that ‘on the contrary,
[joint controllers] may be involved at different stages of that processing of personal
data and to different degrees, with the result that the level of liability of each of them
must be assessed with regard to all the relevant circumstances of the particular case’.5
1 See C-210/16 Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie
Schleswig-Holstein GmbH, and C-25/17 Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat
– uskonnollinen yhdyskunta.
2 C-40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV, Opinion of A-G Bobek,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1039.
3 Ibid, pp 70-71.
4 C-40/17 Fashion ID GmbH & Co. KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV, ECLI:EU:C:2019:629, para 70.
5 Ibid.
A4.24 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines also address joint control in the wake
of these CJEU judgments. The EDPB explains that the ‘overarching criterion for
joint controllership to exist is the joint participation of two or more entities in the
determination of the purposes and means of a processing operation’.1 It will not
be enough for entities to jointly determine purpose alone – joint activity must
extend to the determination of essential means. In discussing the assessment of
joint participation that organisations must make, the EDPB appears to adopt the low
threshold set by the CJEU judgments by emphasising the importance of considering
both ‘common decisions’ and ‘converging decisions’.2 On converging decisions, the

type of joint control established through the CJEU judgments, the EDPB explains:
‘an important criteria [sic] to identify converging decisions in this context is whether
the processing would not be possible without both parties’ participation in the sense
that the processing by each party is inseparable, ie inextricably linked’. 3
Joint determination of purpose, the EDPB adds, need not mean that the same purpose
is pursued, provided that the entities involved ‘pursue purposes which are closely
linked or complementary […] for example, where there is a mutual benefit arising
from the same processing operation’ and this isn’t simply a case of ‘being paid for
services rendered’.4 Joint determination of means, meanwhile, requires merely that
the entities have ‘exerted influence’ over the means of processing, and different
controllers can be solely responsible for determining certain means. In particular, the
EDPB says that if one entity provides the predominant means of processing – such
as a tool or platform – and makes it available to others, a controller who chooses to
make use of that tool should still be considered to be jointly determining the means
of processing.5 The use of such common tools or infrastructure will not always lead
to joint control, but organisations will need to show that ‘the processing they carry
out is separable and could be performed by one party without intervention from the
other’ or that the other party acts as a processor without a purpose of its own.6
1 Draft EDPB Control Guidelines, p 17.
2 Ibid, p 18.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, p 19.
5 Ibid, p 20.
6 Ibid.
A4.25 Sports organisations may often find themselves in joint control relationships,
given this low threshold and their frequent collaboration with others. For example, a
sports governing body may find itself a joint controller with a competition organiser,
or a professional club may find itself a joint controller with sponsors when carrying
out hosted marketing.1 A prudent approach, in light of the case law and the Draft
EDPB Control Guidelines discussed above, would be to assume that a joint control
relationship exists when interacting with other controllers over the same data unless
each party has clearly distinct purposes and processing activities. Sports bodies in
this position should take care to allocate data responsibilities and liabilities between
themselves and the other controller(s) in writing.
1 See Section 6A, ‘Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR’, below, on hosted marketing and joint
control.
C What is the scope of data protection law?
A4.26 Data protection law began life not as a general privacy law, but rather as a
reaction to the risks perceived in automated data handling when computers began
to land on office desks. This can be seen in the fact that the GDPR excludes from
its scope the use of personal data by an individual ‘in the course of purely personal
or household activity’,1 and is limited in Article 2(1) to processing ‘by automated
means’ and ‘other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a
filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system’. Non-automated data
will usually be in the form of paper records, or handwritten notes. The definition of a
filing system in the GDPR is ‘any structured set of personal data which are accessible
according to specific criteria, whether centralised, decentralised or dispersed on a
functional or geographical basis’.2 UK public authorities (caught by the Freedom
of Information Act 2000 or Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002) should be
aware that even unstructured non-automated data that they process will be considered
personal data, thanks to an extension of scope under s 21 of the DPA 2018.
1 GDPR, Art 2(2)(c).
2 The CJEU, in considering the identical language contained in the DP Directive, held in C-25/17
Tietosuojavaltuutettu intervening parties – Jehovan todistajat – uskonnollinen yhdyskunta, at para 57
that ‘it appears that the requirement that the set of personal data must be “structured according to
specific criteria” is simply intended to enable personal data to be easily retrieved’. This appears to
lead to a broader interpretation of what is caught by data protection law than was understood by the
previous UK law concept of a ‘relevant filing system’ under the Data Protection Act 1998.
A4.27 The other limit on the scope of both the GDPR and the UK GDPR that will
be created by the Data Protection Exit Regulations is territorial. This is not to say that
either piece of legislation is unambitious in this respect. On the contrary, many sports
organisations outside of the EU and the UK respectively will find themselves caught
by these laws. Article 3 of the GDPR states that data protection law will extend to
any organisation established in the EU,1 or to organisations established outside the
EU where they either offer goods or services to data subjects in the EU (irrespective
of whether payment is required)2 or monitor the behaviour of data subjects, so far
as their behaviour takes place in the EU.3 Guidance on the extent of this territorial
application has been produced by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB),4 in its
Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR under Article 3 (‘Territorial
Scope Guidelines’).5
1 GDPR, Art 3(1).
2 GDPR, Art 3(2)(a).
3 GDPR, Art 3(2)(b).
4 This is a legal body set up under Art 68 of the GDPR, composed of a representative from a supervisory
authority for each EU Member State, with tasks (including the drafting of guidelines) set out in Art 70
of the GDPR.
5 Version 2.0, published 19 November 2019.
A4.28 The concept of establishment, which Recital 22 of the GDPR tells us

‘implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements’, has
been broadly interpreted both by the courts and regulators. The CJEU has ruled both
that establishment ‘extends to any real and effective activity — even a minimal one’,1
and that the processing ‘in the context of activities’ of an establishment ‘cannot be
interpreted restrictively’2 and includes the carrying out of activities in a Member
State that lead to a non-EU operator’s activities being profitable, where these two
activities are ‘inextricably linked’.3 This could potentially extend the scope of the
GDPR to the wider processing of global sports organisations with representative
offices or subsidiaries located in the EU or UK carrying out promotion or sales
activities.
1 C-230/14 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, para 31.
2 C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v AEPD, Mario Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317,
para 53.
3 In Google Spain, ibid at para 56, the provision of a search engine by Google’s US company and its
associated data processing was considered to be established through Google’s Spanish entity, ‘since
the activities relating to the advertising space [performed by the Spanish entity] constitute the means
of rendering the search engine at issue economically profitable and that engine is, at the same time, the
means enabling those activities to be performed’.
A4.29 It is worth stressing that once considered established in the EU or UK, all
processing carried out in the context of that establishment will be covered by the
GDPR or UK GDPR respectively. This can include the processing of data collected
outside of the EU by an EU established entity. For example, a Premier League club
collecting data about its fans in Asia, or a European tennis tournament processing
data about entrants from all over the globe, must apply the principles of the GDPR to
the entirety of their processing.
A4.30 Beyond the broad interpretation of establishment, global sports bodies are
perhaps more likely to be drawn into the scope of European data protection law by
offering goods or services to data subjects located in the EU or UK, or by monitoring
their behaviour. The GDPR will apply to such processing activities, although not
to other unconnected processing carried out by affected bodies.1 On the offering of
goods and services, Recital 23 of the GDPR explains that:
‘[…] it should be ascertained whether it is apparent that the controller or processor

envisages offering services to data subjects in one or more Member States in
the Union. Whereas the mere accessibility of the controller’s, processor’s or an
intermediary’s website in the Union, of an email address or of other contact details,
or the use of a language generally used in the third country where the controller
is established, is insufficient to ascertain such intention, factors such as the use of
a language or a currency generally used in one or more Member States with the
possibility of ordering goods and services in that other language, or the mentioning
of customers or users who are in the Union, may make it apparent that the controller
envisages offering goods or services to data subjects in the Union’.
This clearly prompts a need for a case-by-case analysis of how EU data subjects
may come to receive goods or services. Additional guidance on relevant factors that
demonstrate the targeting of EU data subjects can be found in the Territorial Scope
Guidelines, such as the payment for advertising targeted at EU users or the use of
local top-level domains.2 Organisations likely to be covered by these rules include
global events such as the Olympic Games, whose local organising committees may
try to sell tickets to EU and UK data subjects, or seek to recruit them as volunteers.
1 Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 14: ‘The EDPB stresses that a controller or processor may be subject
to the GDPR in relation to some of its processing activities but not subject to the GDPR in relation to
other processing activities’.
2 Ibid, pp 17–18.
A4.31 There is limited guidance on what is meant by ‘monitoring the behaviour’

of data subjects. A plain English understanding of this provision could easily include
a wide variety of activities, including those carried out in pursuit of regulatory and
disciplinary policies described in this book, such as drug-testing and intelligence
gathering. This does not obviously require a technological element to the monitoring.
However, Recital 24 of the GDPR suggests the intention of the EU legislator was
narrower:
‘In order to determine whether a processing activity can be considered to monitor

the behaviour of data subjects, it should be ascertained whether natural persons
are tracked on the internet including potential subsequent use of personal data
processing techniques which consist of profiling a natural person, particularly in
order to take decisions concerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her or
his personal preferences, behaviours and attitudes’.
A4.32 The Territorial Scope Guidelines do not dwell on this aspect of extra-
territorial reach to any great length. The EDPB does explain that it sees the scope of
behavioural monitoring to be wider than merely internet-based activity, stating that
it ‘considers that tracking through other types of network or technology involving
personal data processing should also be taken into account […] for example through
wearable and other smart devices’.1 This still suggests a technological focus, but
among the list of examples given of monitoring activities are ‘market surveys and
behavioural studies based on individual profiles’, and ‘monitoring or regular reporting
on an individual’s health status’, neither of which is inherently technology-assisted.
It would be risky to assume that anti-doping or other integrity-monitoring strategies
involving the monitoring of individuals located in the EU or UK are excluded
from the scope of the GDPR by reason of either Recital 24 or the Territorial Scope
Guidelines. Sports bodies outside the EU should also consider how some of their
commercial activities may be caught by this limb of extra-territorial scope: many
websites are supported by use of cookies and targeted advertising. Both ‘behavioural
advertisement’ and ‘online tracking through the use of cookies and other tracking
techniques’ are listed as examples of behavioural monitoring caught by the GDPR.2
1 Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 19
2 All examples listed at Territorial Scope Guidelines, p 20.
A4.33 Where an organisation established outside of the EU is caught by the

GDPR, it is required by Article 27 to appoint an EU-based representative, subject to
some narrow exceptions involving occasional use or public bodies. Representatives
particularly stand in for – or alongside – the controller or processor for
communications purposes.1 They are also obliged to maintain a record of processing,
which is discussed further in Section 3E, ‘Accountability’, below.2 Importantly, ‘the
GDPR does not establish a substitutive liability of the representative in place of the
controller or processor it represents in the Union’.3 This is not an obligation that
will be replicated in the UK GDPR. If a body has no establishment in the UK but is
otherwise caught by UK data protection law,4 there will be a requirement to appoint
a ‘UK representative’.
1 GDPR, Art 27(4).
2 GDPR, Art 30.
3 Territorial Scope Guidelines, pp 27–28.
4 Ie through the offering of goods and services to data subjects in the UK or monitoring their behaviour
in the UK – see para A4.30
3 DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND SPORT
A4.34 Data protection law is founded on ‘principles’, set out in the GDPR in
Article 5. These ‘lie at the heart of the general data protection regime’,1 and underpin
the majority of the more specific obligations of the GDPR. This Section focuses on
the way these principles impact on the processing of data conducted by organisations
active in the sport sector.
regulation-gdpr/principles/ [accessed 29 September 2020].
A Lawful, fair and transparent
A4.35 The first data protection principle, set out in GDPR, Article 5(a), is that
personal data must be processed ‘lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in
relation to the data subject’.
(a) Lawful – the need for a lawful basis for processing
A4.36 All processing carried out by and on behalf of controllers must be lawful.
Clearly, if a controller carries out processing that is prohibited by law,1 it will fall foul
of this principle. Additionally, however, the GDPR requires that all processing must
have a lawful basis. The potential legal grounds for processing are set out in Article 6
of GDPR. Controllers must select and identify their legal basis for processing at
the outset, as it must be identified within the information given to individuals.2 The
ICO’s guidance cautions controllers to ‘take care to get it right first time – you should
not swap to a different lawful basis at a later date without good reason’.3 Different
data subject rights, set out in Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below, may apply
depending on the legal basis selected. Additionally, processing of special category

data can only take place where it satisfies a condition under Article 9 of the GDPR.4
1 Such as certain solely automated decisions, according to Art 22 of the GDPR.
2 GDPR, Arts 13 and 14 – discussed at para A4.84.
regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/ [accessed 29 September 2020].
A4.37 The available legal grounds under Article 6 are:

(a) consent (Art 6(1)(a));
(b) contractual necessity (Art 6(1)(b));
(c) legal obligations (Arti 6(1)(c));
(d) processing necessary to protect an individual’s vital interests (Art 6(1)(d));
(e) processing necessary for the performance of a task in the public interest or in
the exercise of a controller’s official authority (Art 6(1)(e) – in practice, this
limb is limited to public authorities; and
(f) processing necessary ‘for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by
the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject’ (Art 6(1)
(f)). This ground is not available to public authorities.
A4.38 Where processing is genuinely necessary to perform a contract (such as

processing associated with ticket sales) or to comply with a legal obligation (such as
processing necessary to comply with employment and tax laws), it will be clear which
legal basis should be selected. Where these grounds are not available, private sports
bodies will typically be left to decide whether to rely upon consent or whether it is
possible to process data on the basis of legitimate interest. For this reason, it is important
to understand the limits and pitfalls associated with these two limbs of Article 6.
(b) Consent and the problem of validity
A4.39 Consent is perhaps the best known legal basis for processing, and perhaps
the most overused. In order for consent to be valid as a ground for processing personal
data, it must be freely given, specific, and informed.1 It must also be ‘an unambiguous
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or clear
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to
him or her’.2 Consent therefore may not be implied from silence, pre-ticked boxes, or
inaction.3 It must also be capable of being withdrawn at any time, and data subjects
must be told this at the moment consent is obtained.4 Although the processing
carried out prior to consent being withdrawn is still lawful,5 an alternative legal
basis is required for any further processing after such withdrawal. Given the ICO’s
comment that organisations should not readily ‘swap’ legal basis at the moment it
becomes inconvenient,6 organisations should only seek to rely on consent where
they are comfortable that processing can be halted if consent is withdrawn, or where
there is no reasonable alternative. This said, reliance on consent as the legal basis
for processing cannot always be avoided: electronic marketing and the placement
of cookies can only be done with valid consent (see Section 6, Direct marketing,
ePrivacy and sport’, below) and it may be the only available legal basis for certain
uses of special category personal data.
1 GDPR, Art 4(11).
2 Ibid.
3 GDPR, Recital 32.
4 GDPR, Art 7(3).
5 Ibid.
6 See para A4.36.
A4.40 The concept of ‘freely given’ consent is considered further in both guidance
from the EDPB,1 and in the Recitals of the GDPR. Consent must be truly voluntary.
In the EDPB Consent Guidelines, the Board emphasised that ‘if the data subject
has no real choice, feels compelled to consent or will endure negative consequences
if they do not consent, then consent will not be valid’.2 This guidance should be a
reason for sports governing bodies to avoid reliance on consent where processing is
necessary to administer or regulate a sport; they should rely instead on legitimate
interests (discussed below from para A4.47). This is because if an individual cannot
participate in the sport without agreeing to the processing taking place, consent is
unlikely to be considered to be ‘freely given’ for data protection purposes.3 This was
a point raised by the Article 29 Working Party in various stages of the consultation on
the World Anti-Doping Agency’s International Standard for the Protection of Privacy
and Personal Information4 (ISPPI),5 and more recently by the EDPB in its letter to
the Presidency of the European Council and its enclosed ‘Remarks and comments on
the compliance of the WADA Code and its International Standards with the GDPR’
(‘Anti-Doping Remarks’):
‘Regarding consent, as mentioned in the Article 29 WP’s second Opinion 4/2009,

3.3, the requirement of such a consent to process personal data (Art 6.1 ISPPI),
including sensitive data (Art 6.3 ISPPI) does not comply with article 6, 7 and 9 of
GDPR. Indeed, although the ISPPI requires that such a consent “shall be informed,
freely given, specific and unambiguous” the sanctions and the negative consequences
attached to a possible refusal by participants to consent to the processing of their
personal information as required for the purposes of the Code may prevent them to
give a truly free consent (in this regard, see Article 6.2 of the ISSPI). Therefore, the
validity of such consent is problematic’.6
See further para A4.60 on practicalities relating to processing of special category data
in the context of sports rules, including in relation to anti-doping.
1 Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679, version 1.0 adopted 4 May 2020
(‘EDPB Consent Guidelines’).
2 Ibid, p 6.
3 This may not be true of consent obtained for other purposes in the rules of the sporting organisation
(See eg discussion of validity of consent to doping rules at para C3.7 and of consent to arbitrate
disputes at para D3.27 et seq) or indeed consent obtained to comply with other privacy rules outside
of the EU, where strict approach taken in the GDPR to validity of consent may not apply. To date
there has not been CJEU consideration the ‘freely given’ requirement of consent, but the guidance
from both the EDPB and the ICO is consistent and clear (ibid, and ico.org.uk/for-organisations/
guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/what-is-valid-
consent/#what2 [accessed 29 September 2020]). In the absence of judicial consideration, and given
the CJEU typically considers WP29 opinions and EDPB guidelines to be authoritative, reliance on
legitimate interests is less risky.
4 See para C2.19.
5 Opinion 3/2008 of the Article 29 Working Party on the World Anti-Doping Code draft International
Standard for the Protection of Privacy (WP 156), Second opinion 4/2009 on the World Anti-Doping
Agency (WADA) International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information, on
related provisions of the WADA Code and on other privacy issues in the context of the fight against
doping in sport by WADA and (national) anti-doping organisations (WP162), Letter from the Article 29
Working Party addressed to World Anti-Doping Agency, regarding 3rd stage of WADA’s consultation
in the context of the review of the World Anti-Doping Code and its International Standards (5 March
2013).
6 OUT2019-0035, p 5.
A4.41 The GDPR and EDPB Consent Guidelines also touch on other circumstances
where consent is unlikely to be considered to be freely given. First, Recital 43 of the
GDPR states that consent will not be freely given ‘where there is a clear imbalance
between the data subject and the controller’. In addition to the example of public
authorities given in this Recital, the employment relationship is flagged in the
EDPB Consent Guidelines as one with an imbalance of power likely to affect validity
of consent. As explained in the Guidelines, ‘employees can only give free consent in
exceptional circumstances, when it will have no adverse consequences at all whether

or not they give consent’.1 This could be the case where there is a genuine alternative
offered without detriment, such as providing an alternative method of accessing a
building if an employee refuses to provide details for a biometric access point.
1 EDPB Consent Guidelines, p 8.
A4.42 A further restriction on when consent can be considered to be freely given

is set out in Article 7(4) of the GDPR:
‘When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken
of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of
a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not
necessary for the performance of that contract’.
This provision restricts controllers’ ability to incentivise consent. Prior to the GDPR,
it had been common practice to effectively seek an individual’s consent as the price
of ‘free’ services or competitions. For example, ‘consent to our email marketing,
and you could win a signed t-shirt!’ The presumption in Article 7(4) is that seeking
consent for processing that is unnecessary for the performance of the contract is
invalid: the EDPB Consent Guidelines suggest that the circumstances where it will
be valid ‘will be highly exceptional’.1 The ICO has given is own guidance on the
validity of consent, and has touched briefly on this point:
‘The ICO’s view is that it may still be possible to incentivise consent to some extent.
There will usually be some benefit to consenting to processing. For example, if
joining the retailer’s loyalty scheme comes with access to money-off vouchers,
there is clearly some incentive to consent to marketing. The fact that this benefit is
unavailable to those who don’t sign up does not amount to a detriment for refusal.
However, you must be careful not to cross the line and unfairly penalise those who
refuse consent’.2
The difficulty for controllers is that such guidance does not give them certainty:
where is this line drawn? It is safer to either avoid incentives, or to obtain any consent
separately to ensure that it is not conditional.
2 ICO Guidance on Consent, 9 May 2019, v1.0.19, (‘ICO Guidance on Consent’), p 27.
A4.43 As well as being freely given, consent must be specific and informed. To
meet these requirements, the following information must be given to the data subject
no later than the time consent is obtained:
(a) The name of the controller.1 As set out in the ICO Guidance on Consent,
‘this means you need to identify yourself, and also identify any third party
controllers who will be relying on the consent’.2 This has had a particularly
detrimental impact on the ability to buy in marketing lists or obtain consent
for a wide group of third party partners or sponsors (see Section 6, ‘Direct
marketing, ePrivacy and sport’, below). As the ICO explains, such indirectly
obtained consent is only valid ‘if you were specifically identified’ at the time
consent was given as a controller who would be relying on that consent.3
(b) The purpose/purposes of processing.4 Consent may be need to be separated
into multiple granular consents if there are separate processing operations,
as Recital 43 of the GDPR says that ‘consent is presumed not to be freely
given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data
processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case’.
(c) Information about the right to withdraw consent.5
The EDPB also states that controllers should also explain what data is being collected
and used.6
1 GDPR, Recital 42.

2 ICO Guidance on Consent, p 27.
4 GDPR, Recital 42.
5 GDPR, Art 7(3).
6 EDPB Consent Guidelines. p 14.
A4.44 If consent has been determined to be the most appropriate legal basis for
processing, there are additional practicalities to be taken on board. First, Article 7(1)
of the GDPR explains that the controller must be able to ‘demonstrate’ that consent
has been obtained. While there is no rule preventing reliance on verbal consent,
controllers should maintain evidence of any consent they obtain. The ICO Guidance
on Consent tells us that controllers:
‘must keep good records that demonstrate the following:

• Who consented: the name of the individual, or other identifier (eg online user
name, session ID).
• When they consented: a copy of a dated document, or online records that
include a timestamp; or, for oral consent, a note of the time and date which was
made at the time of the conversation.
• What they were told at the time: a master copy of the document or data
capture form containing the consent statement in use at that time, along with
any separate privacy policy or other privacy information, including version
numbers and dates matching the date consent was given. If consent was given
orally, your records should include a copy of the script used at that time.
• How they consented: for written consent, a copy of the relevant document or
data capture form. If consent was given online, your records should include the
data submitted as well as a timestamp to link it to the relevant version of the
data capture form. If consent was given orally, you should keep a note of this
made at the time of the conversation – it doesn’t need to be a full record of the
conversation.
• Whether they have withdrawn consent: and if so, when’.1
A4.45 Many sports organisations will process data relating to children. As well as
affecting capacity to consent, this is relevant in other areas discussed in this chapter,
in particular in relation to transparency (see para A4.80) and rights (Section 4, ‘Data
subject rights’)). Parental consent may be required from children if consent is the
appropriate legal basis and the children lack capacity to consent. The ICO Consent
Guidance explains that usual UK rules apply, in that controllers ‘should consider
whether the individual child has the competence to understand and consent for
themselves (the “Gillick competence test”)’.1 Where consent is required for online
processing, the GDPR specifically requires that parental consent be sought for
children below a certain age.2 This age varies by Member State between the ages of
13 and 16 (the UK has selected 133). Organisations processing data from multiple
Member States need to ensure they meet requirements relevant to each country they
target.4 This may be far from straightforward to apply in practice.
2 GDPR, Art 8, where consent is sought for information society services.
3 DPA 2018, s.9.
A4.46 A further important limitation on consent is that it is not likely to be valid

indefinitely. The EDPB Consent Guidelines tell us:
‘There is no specific time limit in the GDPR for how long consent will last. How
long consent lasts will depend on the context, the scope of the original consent and
the expectations of the data subject. If the processing operations change or evolve
considerably then the original consent is no longer valid’.1
Recently, the ICO released a draft direct marketing code of practice (‘Draft Direct
Marketing Code’).2 This broadly repeated the EDPB guidance on this point, adding
only that ‘consent does not last forever’.3
2 ICO, ‘Draft Direct Marketing Code of Practice’, Version 1.0 for consultation, published 8 January 2020.
3 Ibid, p 41.
(c) Legitimate interests and balancing tests
A4.47 As set out in the ICO’s online guidance, ‘legitimate interests is the most
flexible lawful basis for processing’.1 As a result, it is perhaps the legal basis most
frequently used by most private organisations. It cannot be used by public bodies in
the performance of their tasks,2 but for these purposes, as in many other contexts,3
sports governing bodies would be considered private organisations, not public bodies.
In C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v
Rigas pašvaldibas SIA ‘Rigas satiksme’ (Rigas), the CJEU explained that this legal
basis consists of:
‘[…] three cumulative conditions […] namely, first, the pursuit of a legitimate
interest by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data
are disclosed; second, the need to process personal data for the purposes of the
legitimate interests pursued; and third, that the fundamental rights and freedoms of
the person concerned by the data protection do not take precedence’.4
regulation-gdpr/lawful-basis-for-processing/legitimate-interests/ [accessed 29 September 2020].
2 GDPR, Art 6(1)(f) para 2.
3 See para A1.19 (self-governance by sports governing bodies), Chapter E5 (Public or Private?), para
E12.126 (free movement), para E13.7 (human rights).
4 C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA
‘Rigas satiksme’ ECLI:EU:C:2017:336, para 28.
A4.48 Any number of interests may be considered legitimate. The GDPR

specifically cites some examples in its Recitals, including fraud prevention,1 direct
marketing,2 group administration,3 and network and information security.4 In Rigas,
the CJEU held that there was ‘no doubt that the interest of a third party in obtaining
the personal information of a person who damaged their property in order to sue that
person for damages’5 was a legitimate one. The ICO’s online guidance explains:
‘Because the term “legitimate interest” is broad, the interests do not have to be
very compelling (although in some instances they may be) and it does not rule out
interests that are more trivial […]. Showing that you have a legitimate interest does
mean however that you (or a third party) must have some clear and specific benefit
or outcome in mind. It is not enough to rely on vague or generic business interests.
You must think about specifically what you are trying to achieve with the particular
processing operation’.6
Determining whether an interest is legitimate is described by the ICO as the ‘purpose
test’. In a sporting context, this will require an organisation to go beyond determining
that they have a legitimate interest in holding (for example) athlete performance data,
and be precise about its intended uses of that data: for instance, an interest in retaining
a historical archive of results, in commercial exploitation of images and footage, or in
analysis to seek a strategic advantage. All of these uses may be legitimate.
1 GDPR, Recital 47.
2 Ibid.
3 GDPR, Recital 48.
4 GDPR, Recital 49.

5 C-13/16 Valsts policijas Rigas regiona parvaldes Kartibas policijas parvalde v Rigas pašvaldibas SIA
‘Rigas satiksme p 29.
A4.49 The next test, according to Rigas, is whether the use of data is necessary in
order to achieve this purpose. According to the ICO’s online guidance:
‘This doesn’t mean that [the use of data] has to be absolutely essential, but it must
be a targeted and proportionate way of achieving your purpose. You need to decide
on the facts of each case whether the processing is proportionate and adequately
targeted to meet its objectives, and whether there is any less intrusive alternative,
ie can you achieve your purpose by some other reasonable means without processing
the data in this way? If you could achieve your purpose in a less invasive way, then
the more invasive way is not necessary’.1
A4.50 The most limiting of the three tests is the need to consider whether the
identified legitimate interest is ‘overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular
where the data subject is a child’.1 This requires controllers to demonstrate that
they have considered the impact on data subjects. In Rigas and in Breyer, the CJEU
emphasised that the outcome of any balancing test ‘depends in principle on the
specific circumstances of the particular case’.2 Nonetheless, there is some guidance
in the GDPR and in guidance. In Recital 47 of the GDPR,3 particular import is placed
on whether individuals can ‘reasonably expect’ the processing. Controllers must be
able to show how individuals are informed about the relevant processing activities
or explain why a relevant exemption to notice applies. The ICO’s online guidance on
legitimate interests explains that notice, although important, is not the only relevant
factor:
‘Simply having warned the individual in advance that their data will be processed in
a certain way does not necessarily mean that your legitimate interests always prevail,
irrespective of harm. And in some cases you may still be able to justify unexpected
processing if you have a compelling reason for it’.4
1 GDPR, Article 6(1)(f).
2 Rigas, para 31, See also Breyer, para 62.
3 In particular, the Recital states that ‘[…] at any rate the existence of a legitimate interest would need
careful assessment including whether a data subject can reasonably expect at the time and in the
context of the collection of the personal data that processing for that purpose may take place. The
interests and fundamental rights of the data subject could in particular override the interest of the data
controller where personal data are processed in circumstances where data subjects do not reasonably
expect further processing’.
A4.51 As part of this assessment, it is important to whether the types of

negative impact that may result from the intended processing override the interest
the controller has identified. Recital 75 of the GDPR explains that ‘risk to rights
and freedoms’ includes a wide variety of injury, including ‘physical, material and
non-material damage’. Processing that deprives individuals of their rights, that is
discriminatory, that causes significant social or economic disadvantage, or results
in individuals being ‘prevented from exercising control’, are all listed as examples
of such risks. However, it is not the case that any negative impact on data subjects
will result in the legal basis being invalid. Instead, we are told by the ICO that it is
necessary to consider whether any negative impact is ‘warranted’.1 The position was
well summarised in the Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion 06/2014 on the notion
of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC
(WP217):
‘Legitimate interests of the controller, when minor and not very compelling may,
in general, only override the interests and rights of data subjects in cases where
the impact on these rights and interests are even more trivial. On the other hand,
important and compelling legitimate interests may in some cases and subject to
safeguards and measures justify even significant intrusion into privacy or other
significant impact on the interests or rights of the data subjects’.2
2 ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive
95/46/EC’, WP217, adopted 9 April 2014, p 30.
A4.52 Both Recital 75 of the GDPR and WP217 note that, when carrying out an
assessment, not all data or data subjects are equal. Recital 75 tells us that particular
risk arises when processing data of ‘vulnerable natural persons, in particular
of children’. WP217 confirms that ‘it is important to assess the effect of actual
processing on particular individuals’.1 The Working Party also flagged that the nature
of the personal data to be processed was a relevant consideration, noting that ‘in
general, the more sensitive the information involved, the more consequences there
may be for the data subject’.2 The previous processing of data may also be a factor
in a balancing test – for example, ‘whether the data has already been made publicly
available by the data subject or by third parties may be relevant’.3
1 WP217, p 41.
2 Ibid, p 39.
3 Ibid.
A4.53 The ICO has made clear that it expects controllers to carry out formal
‘Legitimate Interests Assessments’ to determine whether they have met these three
tests.1 A template can be found on its website.2 This assessment should be carried
out prior to the commencement of processing, and is an important part of the
accountability documentation that should be maintained by controllers (see Section
3(E) below).
2 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/forms/2258435/gdpr-guidance-legitimate-interests-sample-lia-
template.docx – [accessed 29 September 2020].
A4.54 Where controllers choose to rely on legitimate interests, this impacts on

other obligations, such as what must be included in a privacy notice, and on the
rights of individuals. In particular, the right to object to processing is a powerful tool
for individuals. This is further discussed in Section 4(B), ‘The rights of access and
portability’ below.
(d) Special category data
A4.55 Processing of special category data is unavoidable in certain areas of sport.

Health data, in particular, is captured through anti-doping tests, through management
of athletes’ injuries and performance, and in the assessment of eligibility for disabled
sport. Other types of special category data may also be processed. Information on
religion or ethnicity may be vital to help diversity initiatives, whilst an investigation
into a safeguarding allegation may involve the collection of information about a child
or alleged perpetrator’s sex life. Use of this data is however prohibited by the GDPR
unless the relevant controller can demonstrate that it has met one of the conditions
under Article 9(2).
A4.56 The available Article 9(2) legal grounds are:

(a) the explicit consent of the data subject (Art 9(2)(a));
(b) processing is necessary to meet employment law or social security law
requirements (eg collecting health data to provide maternity or disability
rights), as set out in EU or Member State law (Art 9(2)(b));
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of an individual where the
data subject is unable to give consent (Art 9(2)(c));
(d) certain processing by political, philosophical or religious non-profits or trade
union where processing relates solely to members and is not disclosed without
consent (Art 9(2)(d));
(e) processing involves personal data ‘manifestly made public’ by the data subject
(Art 9(2)(e));
(f) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity (Art 9(2)(f);
(g) processing is necessary for ‘reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis
of EU or Member State law’ (Art 9(2)(g));
(h) processing is necessary for preventative or occupational medicine, including
‘assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the
provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or
social care systems and services on the basis of EU or Member State law or
pursuant to contract with a health professional’ (Art 9(2)(h));
(i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public
health, such as protecting against serious cross-border threats on the basis of
EU or Member State law (Art 9(2)(i)); or
(j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes based on EU or Member
State law (Art 9(2)(j)).
A4.57 For processing of special category data to be legitimate, it must have an

Article 6 legal basis and it must meet one of these Article 9 conditions. A key difference
between the two Articles is that whilst Article 6 is self-executing, a number of the
provisions in Article 9 require reference to national or EU legislation. Controllers
cannot assume that they can (for example) identify for themselves whether there is
a substantial public interest in processing. Where a provision requires that there be
a basis in EU or Member State law, controllers must look to that law for such basis.
Although the GDPR recognises that references to laws can be broadly interpreted,
and do ‘not necessarily require a legislative act adopted by a parliament’,1 there is no
specific EU or UK sports legislation.2 Controllers therefore need to consider laws on
a country by country basis. For controllers located outside the EU, this may require
reference to multiple countries’ laws. In this chapter, we focus on the UK’s approach
to special category data, but now that the UK has left the EU, British controllers
should be aware that where they collect special category data from EU countries they
may also need to consider the laws of those countries.
1 GDPR Recital 41.
2 See para A1.8 and generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector).
A4.58 In most countries, these additional special category data conditions are set
out in subject-matter specific legislation. For example, in Ireland, a legal basis for the
Irish National Anti-Doping Organization (NADO) to handle special category data
is set out in s 43 of the Sport Ireland Act 2015. In the UK, special category data
conditions are included within the DPA 2018 in Sch 1. Under the GDPR, criminal
offence data is separately treated under Article 10.1 The UK legislator chose to
apply similar rules to such data by extending and adapting the special category data
conditions under the DPA 2018, Sch 1, Pt 3.
1 ‘Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures
based on Article 6(1) shall be carried out only under the control of official authority or when the
processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards for the
rights and freedoms of data subjects’.
A4.59 In addition to the five definitive conditions under Article 9 (explicit consent,
vital interest, non-profits, data manifestly made public, and legal claims), Sch 1 to the
DPA 2018 lists 28 potential conditions for processing special category data. While
this chapter cannot review all of these possible options, we will touch specifically on
the conditions that are most particularly relevant for sport: (from the GDPR) explicit
consent, legal claims, and data manifestly made public, and (from the DPA 2018)
safeguarding, anti-doping, and enforcement of ‘standards of behaviour’ in sport.
(e) Consent and the UK sport-specific provisions
A4.60 Explicit consent is the first possible condition for processing of special
category data listed in Article 9 of the GDPR. This needs to be differentiated from
the Article 6 consent as a legal basis for processing data generally, even though that is
already difficult to obtain in valid form.1 In the EDPB Consent Guidelines, the Board
explains that ‘the term explicit refers to the way consent is expressed by the data
subject. It means that the data subject must give an express statement of consent’.2 On
occasion, explicit consent will be the only valid method of collecting and processing
special category data. The EDPB Consent Guidelines give the example of an airline
company offering an assisted travelling service to disabled passengers.3 However, in
many of the circumstances in which sports bodies will process special category data
there will be concerns about validity, especially whether the consent has been freely
given, as discussed at para A4.40.
1 See para A4.40.
3 Ibid, p 20.
A4.61 Sports governing bodies and Anti-Doping Organizations (ADOs) in particular

risk any consent from participants being considered invalid due to the fact they
would suffer detriment if they did not consent, or because of a perceived imbalance
of power.1 Unfortunately, the GDPR itself does not include a clear legal basis for
the processing that sports must carry out to ensure integrity and clean competition.
A European Commission study carried out in 2017 on the impact of data protection
law on anti-doping policy2 considered the existing national frameworks in place across
all EU Member States prior to the introduction of the GDPR. It found that prior to the
introduction of the GDPR, research showed ‘a diverse picture’ of legal grounds used
to justify anti-doping, including explicit consent.3 The study’s authors also noted that
representatives of NADOs interviewed for the study ‘varied in their views as to which
grounds [under the GDPR] were most appropriate in the anti-doping context’.4
1 See para A4.40.
2 European Commission, ‘Anti-Doping & Data Protection: An evaluation of the anti-doping laws
and practices in the EU Member States in light of the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017)
(‘EU Anti-Doping Study’).
3 Ibid, p 115.
4 Ibid.
A4.62 Data processing for anti-doping purposes. The conclusion was that
Member States should look to include a specific legal basis in their national
legislation, under GDPR, Art 9(2)(i) or 9(2)(g), to permit NADOs and other
ADOs to process special category data for the purposes of anti-doping.1 This
was the approach that has been taken in Ireland to permit the processing of data
by the Irish NADO,2 and by Switzerland in its Loi fédérale sur l’encouragement
du sport (Federal Law for the Encouragement of Sport).3 Although neither the
old Data Protection Act 1998 nor any other UK legislation set out any sport-
specific condition for processing data prior to the introduction of the GDPR, the
UK Government undertook ‘significant engagement with sports governing bodies’4
in the drafting of the DPA 2018. As a result, the UK now has a number of
sports-driven conditions permitting processing of special category data, based on
Article 9(2)(i) of the GDPR.
1 EU Anti-Doping Study, pp 115-116. It should be noted that a number of the recommendations of the
authors of EU Anti-Doping Study are controversial, and the legal analysis included within it has not
been tested. Although this chapter cites some of their findings, it does not whole-heartedly endorse
their conclusions.
2 See para A4.58.
3 Article 21 of the Loi fédérale sur l’encouragement du sport et de l’activité physique du 17 juin 2011,
RO 2012 3953. This permits the processing and sharing of data, including ‘sensitive personal data’,
by anti-doping organisations (defined in the same Article) that collect data as part of their activities for
the purposes of analysing tests and sanctioning athletes that dope.
4 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 785, cols 1829 (13 November 2017).
A4.63 The processing of special category data for anti-doping purposes is addressed
in Schedule 1, para 27 of the DPA 2018. It permits processing that is necessary:
‘(a) for the purposes of measures designed to eliminate doping which are undertaken
by or under the responsibility of a body or association that is responsible for
eliminating doping in a sport, at a sporting event or in sport generally, or
(b) for the purposes of providing information about doping, or suspected doping,
to such a body or association’.1
The paragraph goes on to explain that for the avoidance of doubt, ‘measures designed
to eliminate doping includes measures designed to identify or prevent doping’.2
Unlike many of the conditions listed in Schedule 1, there is no need for the controller
to demonstrate the particular ‘substantial public interest’ of any particular anti-
doping activity.
1 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 27(1).
2 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 27(2).
A4.64 This provision is helpfully broad, in a way that the Sport Ireland Act 2015 is
not, in protecting the activities of a wide variety of ADOs, rather than only UK Anti-
Doping (UKAD) as the UK’s NADO. That reflects ‘the reality of split responsibility
for anti-doping in UK sport today’.1 In fact, there is no specific reference to UKAD,
to the World Anti-Doping Code, to a definitive list of measures considered valid
processing, or to a definition of sport. This was an intentional decision by the
government, as was discussed during the passage of the legislation, in recognition
of the fact that ‘a large number of organisations, both domestic and international,
work to prevent and eliminate doping in sport in this country’ and ‘have important
roles to play’ in ensuring clean sport.2 The Lords discussed the position of the British
Horseracing Authority at length, an organisation not subject to the World Anti-
Doping Code, and it is clear that the provision was intended to be able to permit
the processing of special category data by such organisations as well as UK-based
ADOs such as UKAD, the International Tennis Federation, and World Sailing.3 This
should not be considered so broad as to permit an ad hoc group to start an anti-
doping programme, as the processing must still be necessary, the organisation must
have clear responsibility for a sport or sporting event, and be able to demonstrate a
legal basis under Article 6 (being, most likely, a legitimate interest not overridden
by the rights and freedoms of individuals).4 Nonetheless, the clear intention of the
government was to ensure that legitimate processing of special category data for
anti-doping purposes could continue unencumbered by concerns about the validity
of athlete consent for such processing.
1 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 785, col 1829 (13 November 2017).
2 Hansard, HL (series 6) Vol 787, col 1566 (13 December 2017).
3 Ibid, cols 1557–1570.
4 Compliance with this condition, or with any other paragraph in Sch 1 to the DPA 2018, only assists
with meeting Art 9 of the GDPR. An Art 6 legal basis must always be met. See para A4.57.
A4.65 Data processing to protect the integrity of sport. The DPA 2018 also
recognises that sports may have other valid regulatory uses of special category or
criminal offence data outside of anti-doping. Schedule 1, para 28 to the Act permits
‘processing that is necessary for the purposes of measures designed to protect the
integrity of a sport or sporting event’.1 Such processing must ‘be carried out without
the consent of the data subject so as not to prejudice those purposes’,2 and must
be ‘necessary for reasons of the substantial public interest’.3 The types of measures
covered are those that protect against:
‘(a) dishonesty, malpractice or other seriously improper conduct, or
(b) failure by a person participating in the sport or event in any capacity to comply
with standards of behaviour set by a body or association with responsibility for
the sport or event’.4
1 DPA 2018, Explanatory Notes, para 647.
2 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 28(1)(b).
3 Ibid, para 28(1)(c).
4 Ibid, para 28(2).
A4.66 This has a potentially broad application. Clearly it envisages processing data
when investigating and enforcing rules designed to prevent or punish competition
manipulation, given the first limb of the description of measures.1 The second limb
opens the provision to a wider group of rules that require compliance with ‘standards
of behaviour’ set by a governing body or competition organiser. The condition allows
processing in relation to individuals participating ‘in any capacity’, which could
feasibly include not only athletes, officials, and support staff, but also spectators
where relevant standards are in place, such as The FA’s Respect Code of Conduct.2
Rules could relate to any type of behavioural matter, provided it could be shown
to be in the substantial public interest to regulate such behaviour. Examples could
include standards on discrimination, restrictions on gambling or social drug use by
participants, or regulations relating to crowd management and the safety of supporters
at sporting venues, provided that the controller could demonstrate that processing
could not be carried out in reliance on the explicit consent of the data subject, and that
processing meets the substantial public interest test. The types of processing this may
protect includes investigations, collecting and retaining information from sources
and witnesses, referring individuals to seek professional assistance, and the carrying
out and publication of enforcement action.
1 See generally Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Integrity Issues).
2 The FA Handbook for Season 2019/2020, p 591.
A4.67 The term ‘substantial public interest’ is not defined in either the GDPR or
the DPA 2018. The ICO, however, has given some thought as to its breadth:
‘Substantial public interest means the public interest needs to be real and of
substance. Given the inherent risks of special category data, it is not enough to make
a vague or generic public interest argument – you should be able to make specific
arguments about the concrete wider benefits of your processing. For example, you
may wish to consider how your processing benefits the public in terms of both depth
(ie the amount of benefit experienced from the processing, even if by a small number
of people) and breadth (the volume of people benefiting from the processing).
You should focus on showing that your overall purpose for processing has substantial
public interest benefits. You do not need to make separate public interest arguments
or show specific benefits each time you undertake that processing, or for each
separate item of special category data, as long as your overall purpose for processing
special category data is of substantial public interest’.1
It is important to note that the substantial public interest test is not required when the
same condition is used to justify the processing of criminal offence data.2
1 i c o . o rg . u k / f o r- o rg a n i s a t i o n s / g u i d e - t o - d a t a - p r o t e c t i o n / g u i d e - t o - t h e - g e n e r a l - d a t a -
protection-regulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-substantial-public-interest-
conditions/#substantial3 [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 DPA 2018, Sch 1, para 36.
A4.68 A consent ‘safeguard’ has also been included within paragraph 28. Unless
this safeguard is met, controllers are unable to rely on this provision to process
special category data. It sets a threshold requirement that reliance on consent from
the data subject is impossible in the circumstances because it would ‘prejudice’ the
purposes of processing to require such consent. The DPA 2018’s Explanatory Notes
explain that this ‘would cover a situation where giving the data subject a choice or
giving them the necessary information required for valid consent would prejudice
the purpose, or where valid consent is not possible because a refusal to consent
could cause detriment’.1 As discussed at para A4.40, this is precisely the concern that
prevents controllers from relying on consent in the enforcement of sport rules under
the GDPR. The threshold posed by this safeguard is therefore likely to be met by all
sports rules that can satisfy the other limbs of paragraph 28.
A4.69 Data processing to enable enforcement of safeguarding protections

in sport. A further condition in Schedule 1 of substantial interest to sport is the
condition permitting processing of special category data that is ‘required for the
protection of children or of adults at risk’ – namely, for safeguarding purposes.1
Specifically, Schedule 1, para 18 to the DPA 2018 provides a basis for processing
special category data for the purposes of ‘protecting an individual from neglect or
physical, mental or emotional harm’ or ‘protecting the physical, mental or emotional
wellbeing of an individual’. This is limited to protecting individuals under the age of
18, or adults considered ‘at risk’, repeating a definition lifted from s 42(1) of the Care
Act 2014.2 Similarly, controllers must be able to demonstrate that the processing is
in the substantial public interest and that reliance on consent is not possible because
the data subject cannot give consent, the controller cannot be reasonably expected to
obtain consent, or consent would prejudice the provision of protection.
1 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).
A4.70 This safeguarding condition was drafted with private sector bodies such
as sports governing bodies specifically in mind. In introducing the provision in the
House of Commons Committee, the Minister explained:
‘The Government recognise that statutory guidance and regulator expectations place
moral, if not legal, obligations on certain organisations to ensure that measures are in
place to safeguard children and vulnerable adults. [This provision] covers processing
that is necessary for protecting children and vulnerable adults from neglect or
physical or mental harm. This addresses the gap in relation to expectations on, for
example, sports governing bodies’.1
She went on to give a specific example of where this condition may prove important:
‘An example provided by a sports governing body is that a person may make an
allegation or complaint about a volunteer that prompts an investigation. Such
investigations can include witness statements, which reference sensitive personal
data, including ethnicity, religious or philosophical beliefs, sexual orientation and
health data.
[…] Keeping a record allows sports bodies to monitor any escalation in conduct
and to respond appropriately. Forcing an organisation to delete this data from its
records could allow individuals that we would expect to be kept away from children
to remain under the radar and potentially leave children at risk’.2
1 Hansard, HC (series 6) Vol 637, Public Bill Committees, col 38 (13 March 2018).
2 Ibid, col 39.
A4.71 Underlining part of the concern that prompted the inclusion of this
condition, the Explanatory Notes explain that the provision ‘makes it clear that front-
line practitioners and others can lawfully process personal data by retaining records
and sharing information where necessary, for the purpose of safeguarding children
and vulnerable adults’.1 The condition clearly assists the safeguarding activities of
sports bodies in the UK, provided that tests on age, vulnerability, substantial public
interest and necessary being met. This should provide comfort to those handling
sensitive cases and matters in this area, which is discussed further in Chapter B6.
A4.72 Where sports organisations seek to rely on any of these legal conditions, or on
other ‘substantial public interest’ grounds set out in Schedule 1 to the DPA 2018, they
must ensure that they comply with the two additional accountability requirements set
out in Schedule 1, Part 4. This requires that organisations put in place and maintain
an ‘appropriate policy document’ setting out how the organisation complies with
the principles of the GDPR for the relevant processing, in particular erasure and
retention,1 and that they include additional details on legal basis and the appropriate
policy document in their record of processing2 (which is further discussed at para
A4.132).
1 DPA 2018, Sch 1, paras 39–40.
2 Ibid, para 41.
A4.73 The ICO has now given guidance on the form of an appropriate policy
document, explaining:
‘An appropriate policy document is a short document outlining your compliance

measures and retention policies for special category data […]. It doesn’t have to take
any particular form, as long as it briefly outlines:
• the Schedule 1 condition (or conditions) you are relying on;
• your procedures for complying with each of the principles;
• your retention and deletion policies; and
• an indication of the retention period for the specific data.
If you process special category data for a number of different purposes you don’t
need a separate policy document for each condition or processing activity – one
document can cover them all’.1
The ICO also provides a template appropriate policy document on its website.2
regulation-gdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-substantial-public-interest-conditions/ [accessed
30 September 2020].
2 Ibid.
(f) GDPR conditions to consider – ‘manifestly made public’ and legal claims
A4.74 While the DPA 2018 provides some comfort to UK-based sports bodies
looking to process special category data for regulatory purposes, it provides
limited assistance to organisations that handle special category data for purely
commercial purposes, or international governing bodies based outside of the UK,
or whose responsibilities cover athletes and participants in EU countries. For these
organisations, it is necessary to look at alternative legal grounds to process data.
Outside of the UK, there are very limited instances where sports processing is
specifically addressed, and these are usually confined to anti-doping measures (as
described in para A4.62). As such, reference to the GDPR itself is necessary.
A4.75 Two of the GDPR’s Article 9 conditions worthy of particular highlight in this
context are Article 9(2)(e) (data has been manifestly made public by the data subject)
and Article 9(2)(f) (data processed ‘for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims’).
A4.76 Some of the natural consequences of high-profile sport may lead to special
category data being manifestly made public by the individual. An athlete competing
in the Paralympics must make public some evidence of their disability. A player
giving an interview to the press may discuss details of their religion. Participants
of all kinds may tweet information about their trade union membership, politics,
or sex lives. It must be the actions of the data subject that cause the information to
become public. As the ICO explains: ‘It’s not enough that it’s already in the public
domain – it must be the person concerned who took the steps that made it public’.1
The ICO guidance also suggests that controllers exercise caution when considering
information obtained from social media if information is only made public through
‘default audience settings’.2 It also cautions against assuming any public domain
release could be considered sufficient. The question is instead ‘whether any
hypothetical interested member of the public could access this information’.3
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-
gdpr/special-category-data/what-are-the-conditions-for-processing/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
A4.77 Prior to the GDPR, the English High Court had considered the question
of what information could be considered as validly processed under the equivalent
condition in the Data Protection Act 1998 and the DP Directive. In two cases, the
judge was asked to consider whether Google was required to delist details of the
claimants’ criminal convictions and whether Google had a legal basis on which
to justify this processing in the first place. In Townsend v Google Inc and Google
UK Limited,1 Stephens J held that:
‘ordinarily an offender wishes to hide his criminal activity rather than deliberately
taking steps to make it public. However, legally as a consequence of the open justice
principle by committing an offence he is deliberately taking steps to make the
information public’.2
The wording of the condition under the Data Protection Act 1998 slightly differed to
that under the GDPR, which replicates the wording from the DP Directive. In NT1
and NT2 v Google LLC and the Information Commissioner (intervenor),3 Warby
J held that this difference in wording did not provide ‘sufficient reason’ to depart from
an identical conclusion to that in Townsend.4 There is clearly no guarantee that either
a court considering the GDPR condition or the ICO would necessarily agree with
the principle, namely that actions that naturally result in information ending in the
public domain should considered to be manifestly made public by the data subject.
If correct, however, this may offer a potential legal basis in areas of processing that
may otherwise be difficult to justify, such as the processing of injury data as part of
talent identification profiling.
1 [2017] NIQB 81.
2 Ibid, para 62.
3 [2018] EWHC 799 QB.
4 Ibid, para 113.
A4.78 There is no direct guidance within the GDPR on how to interpret Article 9(2)
(f). The same wording is re-used in an exemption to data transfer rules (as to which see
Section 5, ‘International transfers’, below). Discussing this exemption, Recital 111
states that processing for such claims is exempt ‘regardless of whether in a judicial
procedure or whether in an administrative or any out-of-court procedure, including
procedures before regulatory bodies’. This is helpfully broad, but the necessity test
is more limiting. As explained by the Article 29 Working Party in its Guidelines on
Article 49 of Regulation 2016/679:
‘[…] The abstract applicability of a certain type of procedure would not be

sufficient…A data transfer in question may only take place when it is necessary for
the establishment, exercise or defense of the legal claim in question. This “necessity
test” requires a close and substantial connection between the data in question and the
specific establishment, exercise or defense of the legal position’.1
1 Guidelines on Article 49 of Regulation 2016/679, WP262, p 12.
A4.79 Clearly some processing in relation to sports rules can result in the
establishment, exercise or defence of a legal claim or position. It is more difficult to
demonstrate that all special category data relating to the investigation and enforcement
of sporting misdemeanours could be justified on this ground. The EU Anti-Doping
Study’s authors were dubious, asserting that ‘very few data in the anti-doping context
are processed in relation to legal claims’.1 Nevertheless, in countries where there is
no alternative local legal basis specifically permitting the processing of data for a
regulatory purpose such as anti-doping or competition manipulation, this may be the
best available option under Article 9, given the difficulty in relying on consent in this
context.
1 EU Anti-Doping Study, p 116.
(g) Fairness and transparency
A4.80 As well as requiring that processing be lawful, Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR
requires controllers to process data ‘fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to
individuals’. The GDPR does not expand on what is meant by ‘fairly’ in this context,
but it is discussed in the ICO’s online guidance on the GDPR:
‘In general, fairness means that you should only handle personal data in ways that
people would reasonably expect and not use it in ways that have unjustified adverse
effects on them. You need to stop and think not just about how you can use personal
data, but also about whether you should’.1
This is much like the reflection that controllers must carry out as part of a legitimate
interests assessment. Even where legitimate interests is not the Article 6 legal basis
contemplated to be used, a controller would be well advised to consider carefully
if the processing it intends to carry out has the potential to cause any unwarranted
prejudice to individuals. If a new processing activity fails this ‘sniff test’, controllers
should consider what steps could be taken to ensure that the processing is fair. This
is closely tied with the principles of data minimisation and accuracy, and we return
to this point in Section 3(B), ‘Purpose limitation, data minimisation and accuracy’,
below.
regulation-gdpr/principles/lawfulness-fairness-and-transparency/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.81 One way in which fairness can be addressed is through transparency,

ie ensuring individuals are informed about how their data will be processed.
Transparency is discussed in the GDPR in Article 5, as part of the first principle,
and is more precisely treated under Articles 12, 13 and 14. In its Guidelines on
transparency under Regulation 2016/679 (WP260), the EDPB explained:
‘Transparency is an overarching obligation under the GDPR applying to three central

areas: (1) the provision of information to data subjects related to fair processing; (2)
how data controllers communicate with data subjects in relation to their rights under
the GDPR; and (3) how data controllers facilitate the exercise by data subjects of
their rights’.1
In this section we will discuss the first of these elements, which is the obligation to
provide notice of data processing to the data subject. We will discuss the rest of data
subject rights and the relationship with transparency under Section 4, ‘Data subject
rights’, below.
1 WP260. rev 01, adopted on 11 April 2018, p 4.
A4.82 Controllers are required to tell individuals how they will process their data.
The content and form of this information is important. As explained in Recital 39 of
the GDPR:
‘The principle of transparency requires that any information and communication

relating to the processing of those personal data be easily accessible and easy to
understand, and that clear and plain language be used. That principle concerns, in
particular, information to the data subjects on the identity of the controller and the
purposes of the processing […]’.
A4.83 Specific obligations on the form of communication are set out in Article 12(1)
of the GDPR, while the rules on the contents of notices are set out in Articles 13 and
14. The former requires that communications to individuals:
(a) Be ‘concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible’; and
(b) Use ‘clear and plain language’, especially where directed at a child.
Article 12(1) states that the notice ‘shall be provided in writing, or by other
means, including, where appropriate, electronic means’. It also acknowledges that
information can be provided orally ‘when requested by the data subject […] provided
that the identity of the data subject is proven by other means’.
A4.84 Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR explain what must be in a data protection
notice and when it must be communicated. Article 13 addresses personal data
collected directly by the controller, whereas Article 14 addresses personal data
collected indirectly. They require that data subjects be told:
(a) the identity of the controller and their contact details (and, if applicable, the
details of their representative);1
(b) the purposes of processing;
(c) the legal basis for processing, including details of any legitimate interest;
(d) a description of the categories of data obtained from third parties and the
sources of that data, including whether these are publicly accessible;
(e) details of recipients or categories of recipients of personal data;
(f) details of any international transfer outside of the EU/UK, and details of the
safeguards in place (see Section 5, ‘International transfers’, for more details on
international transfers);
(g) how long data will be retained or, if a precise period cannot be stated, the
criteria that will be used to determine this period;
(h) information on applicable data subject rights, including the right to withdraw
consent if relevant, and the right to complain to a supervisory authority;
(i) where relevant, because of processing required by law or by contract, details
of what information the data subject is obliged to provide and the possible
consequences of failure; and
(j) the existence of any automated decision-making that might significantly affect
the data subject (as described in Article 22 of the GDPR) and details of the
logic (ie the parameters being used to direct the automation) and potential
consequences of such processing.
1 See para A4.33 on the obligation to appoint a representative. This should not be confused with a
requirement to name a contact person unless a data protection officer has been appointed. As a result,
this obligation does not apply to controllers established in the EU.
A4.85 Where data is collected directly from the individual, Article 13 requires that
this information is presented at the time the data is collected. Where it is collected
indirectly, Article 14 requires that the information is provided ‘within a reasonable
period’ and no later than the earliest of:
(a) One month after the data are obtained;
(b) The time of the first communication with the data subject; or
(c) The first disclosure of the data to a third party.1
1 GDPR, Art 14(3).
A4.86 WP260 expands on these requirements in some detail. Controllers are

expected to take particular care in drafting their notices. In discussing what is
‘intelligible’ and ‘clear and plain language’, the Article 29 Working Party said that
it is necessary that a notice ‘be understood by an average member of the intended
audience’.1 To achieve this, WP260 highlights a need to avoid ‘language qualifiers’
such as ‘may’, ‘often’ and ‘some’ to the extent possible, as well as ‘excess nouns’.2
Similarly, controllers are expected to use an active rather than a passive voice and to
reject ‘overly legalistic, technical or specialist language or terminology’.3 Examples
of poor practice given in the guidance include the use of broad generic or ‘abstract’
statements about how data will be used, such as ‘We may use your personal data to
develop new services’. Instead, specific and ‘definitive’ statements should be used.4
1 WP260, para 9.
2 Ibid, para 13.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, para 12.
A4.87 In order to convey this type of information with sufficient precision and
clarity, many sports organisations may find that it is necessary to have multiple
privacy notices in place. This will be especially necessary where an organisation
needs to address different types of data subjects with whom it interacts (such as
professional athletes and fans, whose data will be used in completely different ways).
In particular, children will need special consideration. WP260 tells us that controllers
must ‘ensure that the vocabulary, tone and style of the language used is appropriate to
and resonates with children so that the child addressee of the information recognises
that the message/information is being directed at them’.1 Processing of children’s
data online and providing notices has also been considered by the ICO in its Age-
Appropriate Design Code.2 It recommends the use of ‘just in time’ notices, prompts
to discuss the notice with an adult, and use of ‘child friendly’ methods such as
‘diagrams, cartoons, graphics, video and audio content, and gamified or interactive
content that will attract and interest children’.3 Importantly, this Code applies to any
‘information society services likely to be accessed by children’.4 As children are
defined as anyone under the age of 18, the Code will apply to most general audience
sites and services. For most sports organisations offering any type of online service,
including news or entertainment content, e-commerce, online games or on-demand
video, full compliance with this Code poses a substantial regulatory burden.
1 WP260, para 14.
2 Age Appropriate Design Code, 2 September 2020. Organisations are required to comply with the
code by 2 September 2021. In addition to transparency, the Code sets out guidance on a number of
topics, including data protection impact assessments, default settings, data minimisation, geolocation
data, and profiling. A full review of the Code goes beyond the scope of this chapter, but it should be
reviewed in full by any UK controller offering information society services to children or to a general
audience.
3 Age Appropriate Design Code, pp 37–42.
4 DPA 2018, s 123.
A4.88 In giving the required notice to both children and adults, there is a tension
between the obligation to be clear and concise, and the lengthy details that need
to be provided to data subjects under Articles 13 and 14. WP260 recommends that
‘layered’ notices are used, with more complete information displayed at different
stages, noting that this can ‘help resolve the tension between completeness and
understanding, notably by allowing users to navigate directly to the section of the
statement/notice that they wish to read’.1 In any event, certain core information
must be included in the first statement to individuals. In particular, the guidance
suggests this top layer must include, as a minimum, ‘the details of the purposes of
processing, the identity of controller and a description of the data subject’s rights’,
and ‘information on the processing which has the most impact on the data subject
and processing which could surprise them’.2
1 WP260, para 35.
2 Ibid, para 36.
A4.89 There will come a time in almost all data processing where information
given in a notice will need to be updated. If this is because a controller wishes to use
the data for a different purpose, Articles 13(3) and 14(4) require that data subjects be
told of the new purpose and also given all the relevant information otherwise set out
in para A4.84 above, prior to the commencement of the new processing. WP260 sets
out the expectation of the EDPB that any ‘substantial or material change’ should be
communicated to data subjects, which includes any changes in purpose, to the identity
of the controller. or to the methods individuals can use to exercise their rights.1
1 WP260, para 30.
A4.90 There are limited exemptions to the obligation to provide a notice. Within
the GDPR itself, the only exemption to providing a notice where information is
collected directly from the data subjects is where the individual already has all of the
relevant information required under Article 13.1 Although WP260 emphasised that
these should be interpreted and applied ‘narrowly’,2 more exemptions are set out in
Article 14(5) for indirectly collected data:
(a) The information has already been provided (this is unlikely, given the indirect
collection, unless the source has done this on the controller’s instruction);
(b) The information would be impossible to provide or would involve a
disproportionate effort, especially for archiving or research purposes, or where
it would make the achievement of the objectives of the processing impossible
or seriously impair them (discussed in more detail below);
(c) The controller is subject to a legal requirement to obtain the data and this law
appropriately prevents notice and provides appropriate safeguards; or
(d) A legally regulated obligation of secrecy prevents the provision of a notice.
1 GDPR, Art 13(4) and WP260, para 56.
2 WP260, para 57.
A4.91 There are also a number of exemptions under UK law that may allow
information to be processed without the provision of a notice. These are even more
specific, applying to particular types of processing purposes or activities. Most have
no relevance to sports bodies, but potentially pertinent exemptions include those for
data processing that is:
(a) necessary for the prevention or detection of crime, if providing notice would
prejudice this purpose (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 2);
(b) necessary for the purposes of, or in connection with, legal proceedings,
establishing, exercising or defending legal rights, or for obtaining legal advice,
if providing notice would prevent this purpose (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 5);
(c) covered by legal professional privilege, or in respect of which a legal advisor
has a duty of confidentiality (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 19);
(d) for journalistic, academic, artistic or literary purposes (‘special purposes’)
carried out with a view to publication, where compliance would be incompatible
with these special purposes and the publication would be in the public interest
(DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 26); and
(e) for management forecasting or planning, such as re-organisations, if providing
notice would prejudice this activity (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 22).
A4.92 Given the narrow nature of these exemptions, the vast majority of processing
by sports organisations will be subject to a notice requirement. Areas where sport
bodies carry out regulatory activity fall between the gaps of available UK exemptions,
and therefore the notice requirement will apply. While the UK has an exemption for
organisations processing data in pursuit of functions designed to protect the public,
these must either be functions conferred under law or functions ‘of a public nature
[…] exercised in the public interest’.1 Most sports bodies in the UK are private bodies
and therefore cannot take advantage of this exemption,2 the exceptions being public
bodies such as UKAD and Sport England.
1 DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 7.
2 See para A4.47.
A4.93 Where sports organisations have obtained data indirectly, it may be possible
in some circumstances to argue that notice is not required because informing the
data subject would involve disproportionate effort, or impede or seriously impair
a regulatory task. This would not exempt notice for any data collected directly
from the individual, where no equivalent exemption exists. There would also be a
need to inform relevant individuals of the general type of processing taking place,
even if a specific notice is not possible. This is because Article 14(5)(b) requires
that controllers relying on this exemption ‘take appropriate measures to protect the
data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, including making the
information publicly available’. The ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code supplies the
following comments on disproportionate effort:
‘If the processing has a minor effect on the individual then your assessment might
find that it’s not proportionate to put significant resources into informing individuals.
However the more significant the effect the processing has on the individual then,
the less likely you are to be able to rely on this exception.
You are unlikely to be able to rely on disproportionate effort in situations where you
are collecting personal data from various sources to build an extensive profile of an
individual’s interests and characteristics for direct marketing purposes. Individuals
will not reasonably expect organisations to collect and use large volumes of data
in this way, especially if they do not have any direct relationship with them. If
individuals do not know about such extensive processing of their data they are
unable to exercise their rights over it’.1
1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 50.
B Purpose limitation, data minimisation, and accuracy

A4.94 Purpose limitation. Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR requires that ‘personal
data […] be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’. This is known as
the ‘purpose limitation’ principle. It is in some ways an extension of transparency, in
that it requires controllers to state their intended purpose ‘at the outset’.1
regulation-gdpr/principles/purpose-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.95 Over time, controllers may wish to process data for new purposes. Prior
to carrying out this new processing, the purpose limitation principle requires that
controllers consider whether their new processing activity is ‘compatible’ with what
was described in their original notice to data subjects. If compatible, a new notice
must be sent. 1 If the activity is not considered compatible with that original notice,
it can only be carried out with the data subject’s consent2 or where required by law.3
1 See para A4.89.
2 This consent must meet the standards set out in the GDPR. See para A4.39 et seq.
3 GDPR, Art 6(4).
A4.96 The GDPR provides some detail on what will be considered compatible
processing. It tells us, in Article 6(4), that controllers should take into account:
(a) any link between the original and new purposes;
(b) the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular
regarding the relationship between data subjects and the controller;
(c) the nature of the personal data, in particular whether special categories of
personal data or criminal offence data are processed;
(d) the possible consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects;
and
(e) the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include encryption or
pseudonymisation.
A4.97 The ICO’s online guidance discusses the principles in more detail. In
particular, it explains ‘as a general rule, if the new purpose is either very different
from the original purpose, would be unexpected, or would have an unjustified
impact on the individual, it is likely to be incompatible with your original purpose’.1
Examples of compatible processing could include the sharing of data with a new
provider of similar services (such as a new cloud storage provider), or the retention
of new statistics to improve an existing record of sports performances. If individuals
have been told that certain processing will not happen, such as sharing their data
with third parties, that processing will necessarily not be compatible with the original
notice.
regulation-gdpr/principles/purpose-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.98 The fact that processing is compatible with the original notice does not
mean that new notice requirements are avoided, but no new separate legal basis is
required.1 The GDPR also tells us that certain processing – namely, processing for
‘archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes’ – should automatically be considered compatible.2
1 GDPR, Recital 50: ‘In any case, the application of the principles set out in this Regulation and in
particular the information of the data subject on those other purposes […] should be ensured.’
2 Ibid.
A4.99 Data minimisation. The data minimisation principle requires that ‘personal
data […] be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed’.1 The GDPR does not define what is meant
by ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary’, but the ICO online guidance
provides suggestions:
‘adequate – sufficient to properly fulfil your stated purpose;
relevant – has a rational link to that purpose; and
limited to what is necessary – you do not hold more than you need for that purpose’.2
1 GDPR, Art 5(1)(c)
regulation-gdpr/principles/data-minimisation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.100 The natural instinct of many organisations will be to amass large quantities
of data in the hope that it might have some hypothetical use in the future. This may
certainly be the case in sports organisations, where data analysis plays a large part
in the preparation, performance, and portrayal of elite sport. The data minimisation
principle prevents this type of approach. As explained by the ICO, controllers ‘must
not collect personal data on the off-chance that it might be useful in the future’.1 On
the other hand, the ICO recognises that it is necessary to collect enough personal data
to carry out processing activities properly. The guidance accepts that ‘data may also
be inadequate if you are making decisions about someone based on an incomplete
understanding of the facts’.2
regulation-gdpr/principles/data-minimisation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Ibid.
A4.101 Data minimisation is closely related to the principle of fairness, and what
data is ‘necessary’ will often be a question of what is proportionate or reasonably
foreseeable. An example of this consideration was highlighted within the ICO’s Draft
Direct Marketing Code, which explained that:
‘An individual may want as many people as possible to read their social media post
but that does not mean they are agreeing to have that data collected and analysed
to profile them to target your direct marketing campaigns. Likewise just because an
individual’s social media page has not been made private does not mean that you are
free to use their personal data for direct marketing purposes’.1
A4.102 Sports governing bodies and ADOs should also be aware that there has
been some discussion by the EDPB (and, before it, the Article 29 Working Party) of
the fairness and proportionality of automatic publication of enforcement action and
disciplinary decisions. In its Anti-Doping Remarks, the EDPB said that:
‘[…] public reporting [of anti-doping rule violations on the internet] should not be
automatic and mandatory but, according to the principles of necessity, proportionality
and data minimisation, should depend on the facts and circumstances of the case’.1
This is clearly at odds with the practice of many ADOs and is not a new opinion.
The Article 29 Working Party expressed the same view to the World Anti-Doping
Authority in 2013.2 Affected sports bodies should carefully consider the risks in
automatic publication of any type of disciplinary decision, and how they could take
steps to mitigate these risks (such as through limited publication duration, use of
summaries, or consultation with affected participants prior to publication).3
1 Anti-Doping Remarks, p 8.
2 Letter from the Article 29 Working Party addressed to World Anti-Doping Agency, regarding 3rd
stage of WADA’s consultation in the context of the review of the World Anti-Doping Code and its
International Standards (5 March 2013).
3 The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code mandates publication of decisions that an athlete or other person
has committed an anti-doping rule violation, but specifically states (at Art 14.3.4) that ‘publication shall
be accomplished at a minimum by placing the required information on the Anti-Doping Organization’s
Web site and leaving the information up for the longer of one month or the duration of any period of
Ineligibility’. The 2009 Code said it should be left up for ‘at least one (1) year’.
A4.103 Accuracy. Closely tied to the data minimisation principle is that of

accuracy – as well as having the appropriate amount of data, it is important that the
data is right. Article 5(1)(d) of the GDPR requires that personal data be ‘accurate
and, where necessary, kept up to date’. There can be negative consequences to the
processing of inaccurate data – an inaccurate address could lead to sensitive post
being sent to an incorrect recipient,1 or an incorrectly submitted name could prevent
the correct athlete from competing at a championships.2 This is clearly not limited
to poor privacy outcomes – the consequent decisions or actions taken on the basis of
inaccuracies can cause substantial financial harm and distress.
1 ‘Trust receives £60,000 fine after patient’s results sent to wrong address’, Guardian, 12 July 2012,
theguardian.com/government-computing-network/2012/jul/12/st-georges-healthcare-trust-fine
2 ‘European Athletics Team Championships: GB name shot putter for 4x400m relay’, BBC, 12 August
2019, bbc.co.uk/sport/athletics/49313460 [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.104 As the ICO guidance says, ‘it will usually be obvious whether personal
data is accurate’.1 Two points are worth particular reflection – how often must data
be updated, and how does this principle apply in respect of subjective data such as
opinions?
regulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.105 The ICO’s guidance is that the need for and frequency of any update should
be driven by the context. Some data will clearly never require an update: a video
recording of an event, for example, or the details of a one-off customer.1 Other data
may need more frequent review. The ICO suggests:
‘In some cases it is reasonable to rely on the individual to tell you when their personal
data has changed, such as when they change address or other contact details. It may
be sensible to periodically ask individuals to update their own details, but you do not
need to take extreme measures to ensure your records are up to date, unless there is
a corresponding privacy risk which justifies this’.2
regulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Ibid.
A4.106 The position of updating subjective data such as opinions is more difficult.
Individuals have a right to ‘rectification’, which is discussed in Section 4, ‘Data
subject rights’, below. It will not always be appropriate to ‘correct’ or erase subjective
data, even if this has had a substantial effect on the data subject. Subjective data might
include opinions used as part of a decision to select another athlete for a squad, or to
impose a ban on safeguarding grounds. The ICO’s guidance in these circumstances
is to record the subjective nature of the data, and ‘where appropriate, whose opinion
it is’.1 The guidance similarly advises controllers that ‘if an individual challenges the
accuracy of an opinion, it is good practice to add a note recording the challenge and
the reasons behind it.’2
regulation-gdpr/principles/accuracy/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Ibid.
C Storage limitation
A4.107 The principle of storage limitation is perhaps the one that poses the most
significant implementation problems to most data controllers. It requires that data
be ‘kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is
necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are processed’.1 In short – data
can only be retained for as long as it is demonstrably needed.
1 GDPR, Art 5(1)(e).
A4.108 The GDPR sets no specific time limits on retention. It does not specifically
exclude indefinite retention, but Recital 39 tells us that the storage limitation
principle ‘requires, in particular, ensuring that the period for which the personal data
are stored is limited to a strict minimum’, and ‘time limits should be established by
the controller for erasure or for a periodic review’. The clear expectation is that most
processing should have an end date, or at the very least a point at which the continued
need for the data is assessed.
A4.109 Retention limits are dictated by the purposes of processing. Certain

processing will have a clear natural retention limit, be that set in statute (such as
a relevant limitation period) or caused by changes in a relationship, such as the
end of an employment relationship. In other cases, it will be necessary for a case-
by-case assessment of the processing activity and what data is needed to be able
to fulfil the controller’s purposes. If identifying details are not required for these
purposes, the information should be anonymised, which is often a complex process.
Individual categories of data are also likely to be used for different processes by a
single organisation. For example, a sports governing body may hold details of an
athlete simultaneously for the purposes of maintaining a record of sporting results,
within the records of a disciplinary investigation, and as part of an annually renewed
registration database. In such circumstances, retention must be managed ‘purpose
by purpose’, with appropriate steps taken to ensure that there are appropriate access
controls, system segregation, and other measures in place to prevent data being used
by teams who no longer require the data in question.
A4.110 Determining an appropriate retention period is not always straightforward.

The ICO says that controllers ‘are in the best position to judge’ their appropriate
retention periods.1 However, if left entirely to the wishes of those who manage data
day to day, there will be a natural inclination to retain information ‘just in case’ for
very lengthy periods. Organisations must be prepared to demonstrate clearly why
they have selected a particular retention period and why this is appropriate to their
identified purposes. There may be certain circumstances in sport where indefinite
retention can be justified, such as the retention of sporting results to maintain a
history of the sport. The GDPR also recognises certain types of processing where
lengthy retention is permitted. Article 5(1)(e) tells us that ‘personal data may be
stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or

statistical purposes’, provided that there are safeguards in place and there will be no
other use of the data.
regulation-gdpr/principles/storage-limitation/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.111 Sports governing bodies and ADOs will need to make difficult decisions on
retention in the area of disciplinary investigations and the publication of disciplinary
decisions. There is some guidance here in the anti-doping context. WADA has, since
2009, included a mandatory International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and
Personal Information (ISPPPI) in support of the World Anti-Doping Code. This sets
standards similar, although not identical, to GDPR obligations. As the January 2021
edition of the ISPPPI makes clear,1 the intention of the ISPPPI is to set a ‘minimum’
standard of information protection.2 In the area of retention, Article 10 of the ISPPPI
contains a similar restriction to the GDPR (permitting only ‘relevant’ processing)
and Annex A to the ISPPPI sets some specific retention limits. These vary from
a maximum of 12 months for whereabouts information to indefinite retention for
disciplinary decisions. The ISPPPI requires a 10-year retention period for the vast
majority of anti-doping purposes, such as testing documentation and results, granted
therapeutic use exemptions and biological passports.
1 This version of the ISPPPI, which supports the 2021 version of the World Anti-Doping Code, was
adopted in November 2019 and will be effective from 1 January 2021. All references in this chapter to
the ISPPPI are to this 2021 version.
2 Article 4.1 of the ISPPPI.
A4.112 Although these are described as mandatory requirements, the ISPPPI also
requires that ADOs comply with local laws such as the GDPR where these exceed
or contradict the ISPPPI.1 In this context, it is important to be aware that the EDPB
has flagged its disagreement with the ISPPPI retention periods in its Anti-Doping
Remarks, stating that ‘the possibility to retain such sensitive data for an indefinite
time is not compliant’ with the GDPR.2 Governing bodies should therefore consider
the indefinite retention of information such as disciplinary decisions in identifiable
form to be inherently risky. However, there are clearly instances where disciplinary
data will need to be retained for lengthy periods. Decisions may have important
precedential value but as a practical matter they cannot be anonymised, while details
of safeguarding investigations can have ongoing relevance many years after concerns
are first raised. In these circumstances, where a single maximum retention period
would fail to address the fact that some data used for a particular purpose is more
important to retain than others, controllers should consider implementing a retention
policy based on regular periods of review rather than maximum periods of use. This
could involve committing to re-assess either individual records or entire sets of data
periodically, with information no longer deemed necessary being anonymised or
deleted. This could not be an arbitrary review – decisions to continue retention for
a lengthy period would need to be justified and documented. An example of factors
to consider is set out in the Anti-Doping Remarks, where the EDPB asked: ‘[…] for
example: Is the retention of a sample for an indefinite period still relevant once an
athlete retired or after expiration of the limitation period for proceedings?’3
1 Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the ISPPPI.
2 Anti-Doping Remarks, p 7.
3 Ibid.
A4.113 Once a retention approach has been determined, controllers must ensure
that this policy is documented and then implemented. Implementation is often more
difficult than determining a period in the first place. Controllers need to consider how
to integrate retention periods into live and back-up systems or – where technological
solutions cannot entirely meet the task – ensure that appropriate policies and
processes are in place to make sure that staff can carry out deletion and anonymisation
effectively. There is no value in setting retention periods without ensuring that they
are observed in practice.
D Integrity and confidentiality (security)
A4.114 Article 5(1)(f) requires that personal data be:
‘processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data,

including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against
accidental loss, destruction, or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational
measures (“integrity and confidentiality”).’
A4.115 Security requirements are set out in more detail in Articles 32–34 of the
GDPR. The GDPR does not oblige organisations to implement specific security
requirements. Instead, Article 32 requires that both controllers and processors
consider ‘the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope,
context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and
severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons’ in determining the relevant
security measures to put in place. The higher risk the processing, whether by the
nature of data or the data subject, the more robust the measures selected must be. As
discussed above at para A4.51, the GDPR tells us that the types of risk that need to
be considered are broad and go beyond the pure security risks that are listed under
Article 5(1)(f) and repeated in Article 32(2). For guidance on particular security
measures, and how to implement these, controllers and processors should refer to
the ICO’s guidance,1 and other sources of information security guidance such as the
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity2 and the National Cyber Security Centre.3
regulation-gdpr/security/ – [accessed 30 September 2020]. The ICO has produced a variety of guidance
materials on security, including information on encryption, cloud computing, and asset disposal.
2 enisa.europa.eu/topics/data-protection/security-of-personal-data [accessed 30 September 2020].
3 ncsc.gov.uk/section/advice-guidance/all-topics [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.116 The main ways in which the GDPR changed the requirements in relation to
the security principle was by extending security obligations to processors (who had
no previous statutory obligations, as explained at para A4.15) and by introducing
obligatory data breach reporting requirements to all controllers. It is this second
change that is worthy of specific attention by sports organisations. The vast majority
of UK data protection enforcement prior to the GDPR was based on breach of the
security principle, and with obligatory breach reporting we can expect this trend to
continue.
A4.117 There are two strands of breach reporting requirements under the GDPR –
reporting to the supervisory authority under Article 33 and reporting to the affected
individuals under Article 34. The only breach reporting requirement that applies to
processors is under Article 33(2), which obliges processors to notify controllers about
data breaches ‘without undue delay’. It is important to note that it is specifically
security breaches that these articles address. The definition of a ‘personal data
breach’ in Article 4(12) is a ‘breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful
destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’. There is no obligation to confess other
types of infringement, such as a failure to publish a privacy notice or to respond to a
rights request on time.
A4.118 The EDPB has adopted the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines on
Personal data breach notification under Regulation 2016/679 (WP250).1 These
guidelines provide some useful information on the interpretation of this definition of
‘personal data breach’. The EDPB treats the definition as encompassing three types
of information security breach:
(1) ‘Confidentiality’ breaches – where there is an unauthorised or accidental
disclosure of, or access to, personal data. This is the more commonly understood
type of breach, where data has been lost or taken by a third party.
(2) ‘Integrity breach’ – where there is an unauthorised or accidental alteration of
personal data. Examples of this type of breach include the incorrect replacement
of contact details, or a malicious amendment of results.
(3) ‘Availability breach’ – where there is an accidental or unauthorised loss of
access to, or destruction of, personal data. This could include an HR system
going down, or the corruption of data requiring use of an earlier back-up.2
1 WP250. rev 01, adopted on 6 February 2018.
2 Ibid, p 7.
A4.119 The threshold for reporting to supervisory authorities is set low.

Article 33(1) of the GDPR requires controllers to report breaches ‘without undue
delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware
[…] unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and
freedoms of natural persons’. With the bar set at any likely risk to individuals,
almost all breaches will arguably need to be reported. In contrast, controllers are
only required to inform the affected data subjects where the personal data breach ‘is
likely to result in a high risk’.1
1 Article 34(1) – there are some exemptions listed in Art 34(3) to this obligation to inform individuals,
including where the data is encrypted or otherwise technologically made unintelligible, or where
a controller has taken steps to remove the high risk to individuals. If reporting to individuals is
disproportionate, a public notice can be made as an alternative.
A4.120 More detail on the assessment of risks is set out in WP250, which states that
controllers should consider the ‘specific circumstances of a breach, including the
severity of the potential impact and the likelihood of this occurring’.1 In particular, it
recommends considering:
(a) ‘The type of breach’ – an availability breach where data was only temporarily
unavailable is unlikely to be as high risk as a confidentiality breach where the
same data is in unauthorised third-party hands.
(b) ‘The nature, sensitivity and volume of data’ and ‘the number of affected
individuals’– the EDPB explain that ‘usually, the more sensitive the data, the
higher the risk of harm will be to the people affected’ but that other factors such
as the context of the breach (eg the nature of the recipient of misdirected data
or the combination of data disclosed) could increase the severity of otherwise
innocuous information. The example given in WP250 is the disclosure of
the current name and address of an adopted child to their birth parents. High
volumes of data are considered to be higher risk due to the potential impact on
a large number of individuals.
(c) ‘The ease of identification of individuals’ – loss of directly identifying data is
likely to be higher risk than data that has been pseudonymised or from which
it is otherwise difficult to identify the data subject.
(d) The ‘severity of consequences’ – the disclosure of embarrassing data, or the
release of data to malicious actors, is more likely to be high risk. The EDPB
give the example of circumstances where an accidental disclosure is made to a
‘trusted’ third party such as a ‘commonly used supplier’. If this third party can
be reasonably expected to delete or return the data, the EDPB’s view is that
this ‘may remove the likelihood of risk to individuals, thus no longer requiring
notification to the supervisory authority […]’.
(e) The ‘special characteristics of the individual’ – the EDPB suggests that the
involvement of data relating to ‘children or other vulnerable individuals’ is
likely to increase risk.
(f) The ‘special characteristics of the controller’ – the nature of the controller may
have a bearing, with a NADO losing data about an athlete it is investigating
being more likely to be high risk than information lost by a company holding
the athlete’s details on a mailing list.2
In summing up the weighing of these factors, the EDPB suggests ‘if in doubt, the
controller should err on the side of caution and notify’.3 WP250 includes, at Annex B,
a list of ten breach scenarios that the EDPB would expect to be reported.4
1 WP250, p 24.
2 Ibid, pp 23–26.
3 Ibid, p 26.
4 Ibid, pp 31–33.
A4.121 The time given to report a breach, 72 hours from ‘becoming aware’, is not
generous. The EDPB tell us in WP250 that a controller is considered to become
aware when it has a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’ that personal data have been
compromised as a result of a security incident.1 There is an expectation that
organisations will put in place measures to ensure that breaches are promptly brought
to their attention.2 The first media report or complaint from an individual will not
be considered to have made the controller aware; rather, the controller would be
considered to have become aware at the point that its own investigation determines
to the appropriate level of certainty that a breach has taken place.3 The GDPR
permits partial reports to be made, and so it is not necessary to have completed a full
investigation prior to making an initial report.
1 WP250, p 12.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
A4.122 Where a processor is involved in a breach, it is still the controller that must
decide whether there is a risk to data subjects and whether reports to supervisory
authorities or individuals are necessary. The sole statutory role for processors is the
obligation to report personal data breaches to the controller ‘without undue delay’.1
As discussed below, in Section 3(E), ‘Accountability’, controllers may seek to impose
more requirements by contract, particularly on the remediation of breaches that are
the fault of the processor.
1 GDPR, Art 33(2).
A4.123 Reports must be made to the appropriate supervisory authority. For a UK

sports organisation where the breach only affects data subjects in the UK, the report
must be made to the ICO.1 For multi-jurisdictional breaches, there may be cross-
border reporting requirements. This will particularly be the case where the controller
is not established in an EU country. Sports bodies should also be mindful that
countries outside of Europe have data breach reporting obligations, particularly in
the US, Australia, and Asia. Reports must be made using the forms made available
by each authority, which vary in content, and require different information to be
provided, from details of staff training to the names and contact details of processors.
All will require the information set out in GDPR, Article 33(3), including the
nature and quantity of data lost, affected data subjects, the likely consequences
of the breach, and the steps taken to address and remedy any adverse effects. To
identify relevant supervisory authorities, WP250 advises that controllers should look
to their lead authority. For those outside of the EU, the EDPB recommends ‘that
notification should be made to the supervisory authority in the Member State where
the controller’s representative in the EU is established’.2 This should avoid a need to
report across a large number of Member States. Organisations located outside of the
UK should note that as a result of Brexit the ICO will need to be informed whenever
UK individuals are affected by a breach.
1 The ICO requires that reports be made through its website or through its phone line. More details can be
found at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-breach/ [accessed 30 September
2020].
2 WP250, p 18.
A4.124 If an organisation is comfortable that a breach does not have to be reported,

because it is unlikely to pose a risk to data subjects, this does not mean that it can be
entirely dismissed. Article 33(5) of the GDPR requires that ‘the controller document
any personal data breaches, comprising the facts relating to the personal data breach,
its effects and the remedial action taken’. This is one of many types of document
or log that controllers must maintain under the GDPR, as a result of the final data
protection principle, ie accountability.
E Accountability
A4.125 All the principles discussed earlier in this section existed under the
DP Directive, although the precision of their associated obligations may have
differed. The only entirely new principle under the GDPR is that of accountability.
Set out in Article 5(2), it requires controllers to ‘be responsible for, and be able to
demonstrate compliance with’ the other principles. The ICO explains that this means
controllers ‘now need to be proactive about data protection, and evidence the steps
[they] take to meet [their] obligations and protect people’s rights’.1 Both specific and
principle-based accountability requirements are threaded through the GDPR, which
we will consider in turn.
regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/ [accessed 30 September 2020]..
(a) Data protection by design and by default (Article 25)
A4.126 Data protection by design and default are the codification of a privacy by
design approach championed by data regulators prior to the GDPR. It is, in effect, a
proactive rather than reactive requirement to protect data. Data protection by design
is addressed in Article 25(1) of the GDPR. It requires that controllers, both at the
time of setting the purposes of processing and the time of processing itself, taking
into account the relevant risks:
‘implement appropriate technical and organisational measures […] which are

designed to implement data protection principles […] in an effective manner
and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the
requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects’.
In practice, this requirement embeds an obligation for controllers to consider and
implement privacy protections at the outset of processing. Sports organisations must
be able to demonstrate that this has been done, and that privacy protections are still
in place once processing is commenced. Any new customer relationship management
system or new participant research project or new collection or use of player data
should go through an assessment before it is started to ensure that data protection
measures and safeguards are in place.
A4.127 Data protection by default is then addressed in Article 25(2), which requires
that measures be in place ‘for ensuring that, by default, only personal data necessary
for each specific purpose of the processing are processed’. It goes on to say that
this ‘applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing,
the period of their storage and their accessibility’. This is closely aligned to the
data minimisation principle. As the ICO explains, when this principle is embedded
correctly, ‘the individual does not have to take any steps to protect their data – their
privacy remains intact without them having to do anything’.1
regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-by-design-and-default/ [accessed
30 September 2020]..
A4.128 Embedding these two principles in practice is not always straightforward,

particularly for smaller or more agile organisations that operate at a low level of
formal process. Inevitably it requires the imposition of, or integration with, project
initiation frameworks, and robust training to make sure staff use them. Without
such procedures, it can be difficult to ensure compliance with any of the previous
principles discussed. For example, notices cannot be drafted or amended without
lawyers being given notice of changes, access restrictions cannot be imposed without
a clear understanding of who needs to see what data, and security measures cannot be
assessed without knowing the nature of what needs to be protected.
(b) Processors and contracts (Article 28)
A4.129 Section 2(B) above (‘What is processing and who are controllers and
processors?’) discusses the differences between controllers and processors, and the
obligation to enter into written arrangements with joint controllers. At Article 28, the
GDPR sets out the legal framework under which controller–processor relationships
must operate. These obligations do not sit solely on the controller to implement.
Instead, the requirements sit mutually on both controllers and processors.
A4.130 The first requirement of Article 28 is that organisations must be rigorous

in their selection of a processor. Article 28(1) requires that controllers only use
processors that provide ‘sufficient guarantees’ of their compliance with data protection
requirements. Sports organisations should take particular care in their selection of
suppliers, given the large quantities of sensitive data they typically process and the
high profile nature of their processing. There is little point in implementing strong
information security and robust organisational measures to protect data, only to be
undermined by a reckless processor.
A4.131 The most substantial obligation under Article 28 is the requirement for a
written agreement between the controller and processor.1 This agreement must require
the processor to assist the controller with various aspects of compliance, and must
include a clear description and details of the processing with which the processor
is tasked. There is relatively limited scope for negotiation, as the obligations are
particularly prescriptive. Areas where disagreements do tend arise include:
(a) Cost – many of the obligations listed require the processor to agree to provide
assistance to the controller on compliance activities such as data breach reporting,
data protection impact assessment, and fulfilling data subject requests. There
is no obligation that this assistance be offered for free. Organisations trying to
assess an approach to costs should consider how often they are actually likely
to need to receive/provide this assistance in practice. For example, if a sports
organisation is making use of a cloud storage processor, it is relatively unlikely
that substantial assistance will be needed to gain access to data or to correct or
erase it. In contrast, a processor left with substantial delegated authority and
making use of its own systems should expect to provide this type of support
on a more regular basis or at least for this to be more time-intensive support to
provide.
(b) Sub-contracting – the GDPR does not allow processors to freely sub-contract
their processing to another ‘sub-processor’.2 Instead, controllers can either
individually consent to each sub-processor or generally authorise processors
to sub-contract.3 A general consent will typically be more flexible for both
parties, but must be done subject to a contractual obligation to provide the
controller with prior notice of any new sub-contractors and a right to object.4
Possibly the most difficult element for processors is the obligation to ensure
that any contract with a sub-processor has ‘the same’ obligations as set out
in the original contract.5 The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines state that this
should be understood in ‘a functional rather than in a formal way: it is not
necessary for the contract to include exactly the same words […] but it should
ensure that the obligations in substance are the same.’6 In a world of standard
terms, this is still very hard to ensure in practice.
(c) Breach assistance – processors are only obliged to inform controllers ‘without
undue delay’.7 In reality, controllers require a substantial amount of assistance
where processors are involved in personal data breaches. Providing the level of
detail required to complete the ICO’s breach report form will often be impossible
without more detailed assistance. Controllers would be well advised to seek
more detailed contractual provisions, rather than accept wording that mirrors
the vague GDPR obligation to ‘assist the controller in ensuring compliance
with Articles 32–36’.8
(d) Audit – the GDPR requires that processors be obliged to ‘[make] available to
the controller all information necessary to demonstrate compliance with the
obligations laid down in this Article and allow for and contribute to audits,
including inspections, conducted by the controller or another auditor mandated
by the controller’. Many processors, particularly large IT services providers,
are extremely reticent to allow on-site audits. This is understandable where
there is a need to maintain client confidentiality. However, any contract failing
to include provisions permitting on-site inspection in some form will be non-
compliant. This is not an obligation limited to the immediate processors. The
right of audit must flow down to sub-processors, which is often where there is
greater difficulty.
1 GDPR, Art 28(3). Guidance on the content of such an agreement has been given in the Draft
EDPB Control Guidelines. The EU Commission has also released, under Art 28(7), a draft
Implementing Decision on standard contractual clauses (Ares(2020) 6654429) that can be used by
controllers and processors to meet this requirement. Whilst these clauses are not final at the time of
writing, they are likely to be available from early 2021.
2 GDPR, Art 28(2).
3 Ibid.
4 GDPR, Art 28(3)(d) and Art 28(4).
5 GDPR, Art 28(4).
6 EDPB Draft Control Guidelines, p 40.
7 GDPR, Art 33(2).
8 GDPR, Art 28(3)(f). The Draft EDPB Control Guidelines provide specific commentary on breach
provisions, at p 37.
(c) Records of processing (Article 30)
A4.132 Prior to the GDPR, the vast majority of supervisory authorities throughout
Europe imposed obligations on controllers to make filings listing their processing
activities and the data they processed. Although the ICO has retained a separate filing
requirement,1 the requirement for detailed filings under the DP Directive has been
replaced by an obligation to create internal records of processing activities. These

must be maintained by both controllers and processors – and their representatives,
as applicable – although the details to be retained by processors are more limited.
A controller’s record must include:
(a) the names and contact details of the controller, any joint controller, the controller’s
representative (if applicable) and any appointed data protection officer;
(b) the purposes of processing;
(c) the categories of data subject, personal data and recipient;
(d) details of transfers to third countries, and the relevant safeguards being used to
protect that transfer (see Section 5, ‘International transfers’, below);
(e) details of any retention limits;
(f) a general description of security measures; and
(g) any additional requirements under the DPA 2018 if processing special category
data (namely, details of legal basis and the appropriate policy document).2
1 The Digital Economy Act 2017 safeguarded the ICO’s right to have a separate filing and charging
requirement, which was seen as necessary to protect the funding raised through controller registration.
This was set out in more detail in the Data Protection (Charges and Information) Regulations 2018,
SI 2018/480) More details can be found on the ICO’s website at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/data-
protection-fee/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 GDPR, Art 30(1). See further para A4.73.
A4.133 Processors must retain:

(a) the names and contact details of the processors and their representative(s) (if
applicable);
(b) the names and contact details of each controller on behalf of whom data Is
processed, including their representative and any appointed DPO;
(c) the categories of processing carried out on behalf of each controller;
(d) details of transfers to third countries, and the relevant safeguards being used to
protect that transfer (see Section 5, International transfers’, below); and
(e) a general description of security measures.1
1 GDPR, Art 30(2)
A4.134 For an organisation of any size or complexity, the creation of such a record
– and maintaining it to ensure its ongoing accuracy – will be a substantial endeavour.
Typically these are best structured purpose by purpose, but the GDPR does not
describe structure or form beyond requiring the record to be ‘in writing, including
in electronic form’. Examples are available on the ICO’s website, which give some
idea of the expected level of detail.1 The difficult nature of this task does not detract
from its importance. These records are considered fundamental to the accountability
principle, and are expressly intended under Article 30(4) to be reference documents to
be made available to the supervisory authority on request. In the event of a complaint
or breach, the ICO would be entitled to request a copy of the record as part of any
investigation.
regulation-gdpr/documentation/how-do-we-document-our-processing-activities/ [accessed
30 September 2020]..
(d) Data Protection Impact Assessments (Articles 35 and 36)
A4.135 The GDPR requires specific ‘data protection impact assessments’ (DPIA) to
be carried out when controllers plan to undertake processing ‘likely to result in a high
risk’ to data subjects.1 As explored below, a number of processing activities carried
out by sports organisations may fall into this category, particularly when handling
athlete data. These assessments must contain:
‘(a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the

purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest
pursued by the controller;
(b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations
in relation to the purposes;
(c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects […]; and
(d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security
measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to
demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the rights and
legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned’.2
In carrying out this assessment, the controller must involve their data protection
officer (if one has been appointed),3 and ‘where appropriate’ should ‘seek the views
of data subjects or their representatives’.4 If, following the assessment, the controller
cannot fully mitigate its risk, then the data controller must either abandon the intended
processing or consult with the supervisory authority.5
1 GDPR, Art 35(1).
2 GDPR, Art 35(7).
3 GDPR, Art 35(2).
4 GDPR, Art 35(9).
5 GDPR, Art 36(1).
A4.136 The GDPR gives us examples of processing where DPIAs will be required.
In particular, Article 35(3) explains that the following types of processing warrant
a DPIA:
(a) ‘systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects […] based on
automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based’
that produce legal or similarly significant effects;
(b) ‘large scale’ processing of special category or criminal offence data; and
(c) ‘systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale’.
A4.137 This is far from a complete list. In particular, the GDPR specifically requires
supervisory authorities to name further processing that they consider requires a
DPIA.1 Every supervisory authority in Europe has produced such a list, which has
been reviewed and made subject to the consistency mechanism of the EDPB. The
ICO’s list is available on its website, and adds amongst others:
(a) any profiling of individuals on a large scale – such as carrying out profiling
activities over a large customer database;
(b) matching and combining datasets from different sources – for example
integrating data received from a sponsor into a dataset of fans, or using such
data to identify which fans to send targeted marketing;
(c) any profiling of children; and
(d) tracking location, processing biometric or genetic data, using innovative
technology or reliance on an exemption to providing notice, ‘in combination
with any of the criteria from the European guidelines’.2
1 GDPR, Art 35(4).
regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/ [accessed
30 September 2020].
A4.138 The ICO’s reference to EDPB guidance is to the EDPB’s Guidelines on Data
Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is ‘likely
to result in a high risk’ for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (WP248).1 This sets
out nine criteria that can increase the risks associated with data processing. These
lift concepts from Article 35 and some of the associated Recitals, and provide some
explanation of how supervisory authorities will interpret these provisions. According
to the EDPB, processing will be considered high risk if any two of the criteria are
met, although ‘in some cases, a data controller can consider that a processing meeting
only one of these criteria requires a DPIA’.2 The full list of criteria is:
(1) ‘Evaluation or scoring’ – the EDPB says this includes ‘profiling and predicting’,
and could include activities such as assessing an athlete’s performance based
on biometrics or developing a profile on a fan.
(2) ‘Automated-decision making producing legal or similar significant effect’ –
this could include, for example, decisions to offer reduced prices to certain
customers based on profiling or recruitment software that automatically rejects
certain candidates as a result of certain pre-set criteria. Note that this differs
to the type of automated decisions discussed in Article 22 (against which
individuals have strong rights – see Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, below)
that relate to processing solely carried out by automated means.
(3) ‘Systematic Monitoring’ – this would include, for example, the use of CCTV
or other processing used to monitor or control data subjects, such as access
turnstiles, or network monitoring.
(4) ‘Sensitive data or data of a highly personal nature’ – this goes beyond special
category and criminal offence data to include location data, financial data,
or other ‘private’ information, where the anticipated processing could be
particularly intrusive.
(5) ‘Data processed on a large scale’ – the EDPB does not define ‘large scale’,
as it is not defined in the GDPR, but offers guidance that controllers should
consider not just the number of data subjects involved, or volume of data, but
also ‘the duration or permanence’ or ‘geographical extent’ of processing.
(6) ‘Matching or combining datasets’ – the EDPB emphasises this refers to
matching that would be beyond the reasonable expectations of a data subject,
due to the differing original purposes of the data or data coming from different
data controllers.
(7) ‘Data concerning vulnerable data subjects’ – the EDPB lists children,
employees, and patients as examples, and emphasises that it is the ‘increased
power imbalance’ that is a concern, where ‘individuals may be unable to easily
consent to, or oppose, the processing of their data, or exercise their rights’.
(8) ‘Innovative use or applying new technological or organisational solutions’ –
this could include processing such as using new wearables with athletes to
derive new biometric outputs.
(9) Processing that ‘in itself prevents data subject from exercising a right or using
a service or a contract’ – this could involve reference to performance metrics
to determine whether an individual is entitled to enter an event, or eligible for
funding.3
A list of examples of processing meeting the criteria, and requiring a DPIA, can be
found on pages 11 and 12 of WP248.
1 WP 248 rev.01 revised and adopted 4 October 2017.
2 Ibid, p 11.
3 Ibid, pp 8–11.
A4.139 Having determined that a DPIA is required, the controller must carry out the
formal assessment. This must be ‘started as early as is practicable in the design of the
processing operation even if some of the processing operations are still unknown’.1
In addition to the minimum contents set out in Article 35(7), Annex 2 of WP248 sets
out ‘Criteria for an acceptable DPIA’, elaborating on these basic principles. The ICO
has also produced a template, which is available on its website.2
1 WP248, p 14.
2 ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2553993/dpia-template.docx [accessed 30 September
2020].
(e) Data Protection Officers (Articles 37 to 39)
A4.140 Organisations have nominated chief privacy officers, data protection

managers, and information security leads since long before the GDPR was drafted.
Some of these individuals may have been nominally or formally appointed as the
‘data protection officer’. In some countries, this had formal legal recognition, but not
in the UK. The GDPR has now created a formal role of ‘data protection officer’ (a
DPO) and sets out in Articles 37–39 a statutory framework of DPO responsibilities,
minimum standards, and tasks.
A4.141 Not all organisations are required to appoint a DPO, although DPOs can be
appointed voluntarily. Article 37(1) says that organisations must appoint a DPO if:
(a) the organisation is a public authority or public body; or
(b) the core activities of the controller, or processor, consist of large scale:
(i) regular and systematic monitoring; or
(ii) processing of special category data or criminal offence data.
Recital 97 of the GDPR states that core activities involve the processing that relate to
‘primary’ rather than ‘ancillary’ activities.
A4.142 The EDPB has again adopted guidance on the designation and role of DPOs.1
In WP243, the EDPB states that core activities can be considered the ‘key operations
necessary to achieve the controller’s or processor’s goals’.2 The EDPB stresses that
core services or activities cannot, however, be separated from the data processing that
underpins them – such as hospitals from the retention of patient records, or a football
club from the processing of player data. The EDPB instead distinguishes ‘support
functions’ such as ‘paying employees or having standard IT support functions’.3 On
‘large scale’ processing, the same guidance is given here on the factors to consider as
is given in WP248 (as to which, see para A4.138). In addition, WP243 offers some
examples – processing of health data by a hospital would be considered large scale,
whereas by an individual doctor would not. Where a governing body or large club
handling similar data will fit in that spectrum is unclear. Similarly, processing of
customer data in the regular course of business by an ‘insurance company or bank’
is likely to be considered large scale. On the definition of ‘regular and systematic
monitoring’, the EDPB explains that this would cover ‘all forms of tracking and
profiling on the internet, including for the purposes of behavioural advertising’, but
that it is not limited to online tracking. A number of examples are given on p 9 of
WP243, including profiling and scoring for risk assessment, behavioural advertising,
CCTV and monitoring of wellness, fitness and health devices.
1 Guidelines on Data Protection Officers (‘DPOs’), revised and adopted on 5 April 2017, WP 243 rev. 01
(WP243).
2 Ibid, p 7.
3 Ibid.
A4.143 On a wide reading, a large number of sports organisations and ADOs will
find themselves obliged to appoint a DPO. In particular, a number of activities carried
out by ADOs and governing bodies are likely to involve large scale processing of
special category data or systematic monitoring, and certain large sports clubs may
also carry out processing on this scale. Examples of relevant core sports activities
likely to trigger a DPO requirement include:
(a) anti-doping processing, including administration of therapeutic use exemptions
and result management;
(b) safeguarding and other integrity processing, including the collection and
retention of intelligence data;
(c) CCTV, particularly of publicly accessible areas around stadia;

(d) behavioural advertising and profiling of large participant or fan datasets; and
(e) profiling and management of talent identification datasets;
It is important to note that it is not only controllers that must appoint a DPO. If a
processor provides services that facilitate these types of services on a large scale,
they may be required to appoint a DPO even if their smaller customers do not.
Processors offering intelligence and monitoring services are common within sport,
as are providers of wearable devices and associated technology. If these technologies
or services involve data processing, this DPO requirement may be triggered.
A4.144 If a DPO must be appointed, or if an organisation has chosen to voluntarily

appoint a DPO, this individual must meet certain minimum levels of competence.
They must, according to Article 37(5), have ‘professional qualities, expert knowledge
of data protection law and practices and the ability to fulfil the tasks referred to
in Article 39’. The EDPB expands on this in WP243, explaining that DPOs must
have expertise ‘commensurate with the sensitivity, complexity and amount of data
an organisation processes’ and ‘expertise in national and European data protection
laws and practices’. An understanding of the organisation and their sector is
considered ‘useful’.1 The ability to perform tasks is considered to be both a reflection
of expertise and the DPO’s ‘position within the organisation’.2 Article 38(3) of the
GDPR provides that the DPO ‘shall directly report to the highest management level
of the controller or the processor’, which requires a position of seniority (albeit that
the EDPB does not require the DPO to be part of a board, but rather able to report to
the board, for this obligation to be considered met).3
1 WP243, p 11.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, p 15.
A4.145 The DPO must be included within an organisation’s day-to-day compliance

activities, and must be consulted on data protection matters. The GDPR makes
specific provision for the DPO to be named in privacy notices,1 consulted on
DPIAs,2 monitor compliance and carry out training,3 act as the contact point for
the supervisory authority,4 and inform the organisation and its employees of their
duties.5 Organisations are also obliged to involve their DPO ‘properly, and in a timely
manner, in all issues which relate to the protection of personal data’.6 In practice,
this means involving the DPO in rights request responses and in the handling of
data breaches. Organisations must also ensure the DPO has sufficient resources.7 The
EDPB interprets this as including sufficient time to carry out their duties, adequate
financial support and staff where appropriate, continuous training opportunities and
active support from senior management.8
1 GDPR, Art 13(1)(b) and Art 14(1)(b).
2 GDPR, Art 35(2).
3 GDPR, Art 39(1)(b).
4 GDPR, Art 39(1)(e).
5 GDPR, Art 39(1)(a).
6 GDPR, Art 38(1).
7 GDPR, Art 38(2).
8 WP243, p 14.
A4.146 If an organisation must select a DPO, it can be difficult to determine who

to appoint to this task. There is no obligation for the DPO to be internal to the
controller, the EDPB recognising that DPO functions ‘can also be exercised on the
basis of a service contract concluded with an individual or an organisation outside
the controller’s/processor’s organisation’.1 This does not reduce the liability of the
organisation. As explained by the EDPB, ‘monitoring of compliance does not mean
that it is the DPO who is personally responsible where there is an instance of non-
compliance’.2 Instead, ‘data protection compliance is a corporate responsibility of
the data controller, not of the DPO’.3 Although the appointment of an external DPO
could be perceived as more costly, the appointment of an existing or new employee
and the provision of sufficient resources to complete the role may ultimately prove
no cheaper.
1 WP243, p 12.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
A4.147 There are also potential pitfalls to the appointment of an internal DPO. First,
a DPO’s position is protected by the GDPR. They may not be instructed on how to
fulfil their role, and cannot be dismissed or penalised for their performance of their
DPO tasks.1 Secondly, whilst they may carry out other tasks, they must be free of any
conflict of interest.2 The EDPB’s guidance is that this means that an individual cannot
simultaneously act as the DPO and hold a position that carries any responsibility
for determining the means and purposes of processing personal data.3 As a ‘rule of
thumb’, the EDPB considers this excludes senior management roles such as chief
executive, CFO, COO, chief medical officer, head of marketing, and head of IT.4
WP243 is silent, however, on the position of legal and compliance staff. In Belgium,
there has been enforcement action under the GDPR that has held that organisations
may be in breach if they appoint a single individual as DPO and as the individual
responsible for compliance, risk management, and internal audit.5 In the relevant
enforcement action, the Belgian DPA held that there would be a conflict because
it would be impossible for data processing as part of these compliance functions to
receive appropriate oversight from the DPO. This seems to go further than WP243,
but there is clearly risk attached to appointing a senior employee as the DPO. Such
a restrictive interpretation makes combining a DPO role with another function (as
is expressly permitted by the GDPR) very difficult. If the individual otherwise has
only a junior role, free from conflict, they may simultaneously be considered to
have too little influence, or too operationally involved in the processing activities to
oversee them.
1 GDPR, Art 38(3).
2 GDPR, Art 38(6).
3 WP243, p 16.
4 Ibid.
5 Belgian DPA, Chambre Contentieuse, Décision quant au fond, 28 April 2020 (available only in
French: autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/publications/decision-quant-au-fond-n-18-2020.pdf [accessed:
30 October 2020]).
(f) Codes of Conduct and Certification (Article 40 to 43)
A4.148 Given the principle-based and all-encompassing nature of the GDPR, it can
be difficult to precisely determine best practice within any given sector. Examples
are given in Recitals, and in guidance from the ICO and the EDPB, but these cannot
realistically give specific industry-based recommendations. However, Article 40 of
the GDPR has allowed industry groups to seek approval for ‘codes of conduct’. This
requires that Member States, supervisory authorities, the EDPB and Commission
encourage the creation of such codes, which may be approved either on a national
or multi-country basis. Given that the UK has now left the EU, bodies wishing to
develop a multi-country code will need to initiate this with a regulator in a Member
State.
A4.149 Article 40(2) permits codes to be submitted by ‘associations and other bodies
representing categories of controllers or processors’. These codes are not required to
cover specific topics, but must be for the ‘purpose of specifying the application’ of
the GDPR. Eleven examples are given of the type of precision that could be offered,
such as detail on ‘the collection of personal data’,1 ‘the exercise of the rights of data
subjects’,2 and ‘the information provided to, and the protection of, children, and the
manner in which the consent of the holders of parental responsibility over children
is to be obtained’.3 Once a code is approved, compliance with the code must be
monitored by a ‘body which has an appropriate level of expertise’ that is accredited
by the relevant supervisory authority, which must be independent from the code’s
proposers.4
1 GDPR, Art 40(2)(c).
2 GDPR, Art 40(2)(f).
3 GDPR, Art 40(2)(g).
4 GDPR, Art 41(1).
A4.150 In 2019, the EDPB published its Guidelines 1/2019 on Codes of Conduct
and Monitoring Bodies under Regulation 2016/679.1 These guidelines set out criteria
for assessment and approval of codes of conduct. Once approved, all codes of conduct
must be collated by the EDPB. At the time of writing, there are no approved codes
of conduct and none publicly announced as being under development in the sports
sector.
1 Version 2.0, adopted 4 June 2019.
A4.151 Organisations must not confuse the GDPR’s concept of codes of conduct
with the UK concept of statutory codes of practice. Part 5 of the DPA 2018 requires
the ICO to prepare and maintain a number of statutory codes, notably in the area of
data sharing, direct marketing, journalism, and processing of children’s data online.
Section 127 of the DPA 2018 explains that whilst failure to comply with a code ‘does
not of itself make a person liable’, any such code must be taken into account by the
Information Commissioner or any court or tribunal where it is relevant to a question
before them, subject to ensuring that codes are not given retrospective effect.
A4.152 Whereas codes of conduct seek to drive more tailored compliance and best
practice, certifications (discussed in Articles 42 and 43 of the GDPR) are instead a
method for organisations to demonstrate that they have met best practice. Details
of available certifications, once developed, must be made available by the relevant
supervisory authorities and collated by the EDPB. Once again, there are no approved
certification schemes at the time of writing. More information on certification can be
found on the ICO’s website,1 and in the EDPB’s Guidelines 1/2018 on certification
and identifying certification criteria in accordance with Articles 42 and 43 of the
Regulation 2016/679.2
regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/certification/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Version 3.0, adopted 4 June 2019.
4 DATA SUBJECT RIGHTS

A4.153 Data subject rights are discussed in Chapter III of the GDPR. Individuals
have the following rights:
(a) the right to be informed (Arts 13 and 14, discussed in Section 3(A), ‘Lawful,
fair and transparent’, above);
(b) the right of access (Art 15)
(c) the right to rectification (Art 16);
(d) the right to erasure (Art 17);
(e) the right to restrict processing (Art 18);
(f) the right to data portability (Art 20);

(g) the right to object (Art 21); and
(h) rights in relation to automated decision making and profiling (Art 22).
A Articles 11 and 12 – the formalities of a request

A4.154 Article 12 of Chapter III of the GDPR explores ‘transparent information,
communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject’.
Particularly important amongst these are:
(a) Ensuring the identity of the individual – the GDPR recognises that it is
important that the controller has confidence that the person making a request is
the data subject they claim to be. Article 12(6) says that ‘where the controller
has reasonable doubts concerning the identity’ of the requestor, ‘the controller
may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the
identity of the data subject’. The ICO recognises that this may create a delay
in responding to data subject rights, requiring only that a response is made
within a month of receiving any necessary confirmation of identity, but the
guidance emphasises that ‘it is important that you only request information that
is necessary to confirm who they are’.1 Controllers should not have a blanket
policy requiring identification. For example, if a controller has habitually
corresponded with an individual using their email address, they should not
require a copy of that individual’s passport to release information connected
to that correspondence. The more sensitive the information or the greater the
doubt, the more likely it is that requests for identifying documentation will
be appropriate. The need to be certain of a data subject’s identity does not
require controllers to retain additional information simply for the purpose of
complying with data subject rights. Article 11(2) of the GDPR tells us that if
a controller does not need to retain identifiers for its purposes of processing,
‘the controller shall not be obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional
information […] for the sole purpose of complying with this Regulation’.
Article 11(2) provides an exemption to complying with most rights requests
in these circumstances – although this can be lifted if the data subject can
prove their identity by the provision of additional information (such as, for
example, by providing details of a reasonable timeframe and their likeness to
allow themselves to be identified in CCTV).2
(b) The time available to deal with a request – controllers must respond ‘without
undue delay’ and are given ‘one month’ to deal with a request from receipt.3
According to the CJEU case law on the interpretation of Article 3 of European
Regulation 1182/71,4 EU regulations containing time periods expressed as a
month should be interpreted as relating to periods that will end on ‘the same
day’ of the month as the day on which the relevant statutory event took place.5
As the ICO more clearly explains in guidance:
‘You should calculate the time limit from the day you receive the request (whether
it is a working day or not) until the corresponding calendar date in the next month.
If this is not possible because the following month is shorter (and there is no
corresponding calendar date), the date for response is the last day of the following
month. If the corresponding date falls on a weekend or a public holiday, you have
until the next working day to respond. This means that the exact number of days you
have to comply with a request varies, depending on the month in which the request
was made.’6
This period is short in the life of an organisation, especially one trying to locate large
quantities of data. There is a limited ability to extend this time period by a further
two months, ‘where necessary, taking into account the complexity and number of
the requests’.7 However, this will be narrowly interpreted, and reasons for delay
must be explained to the data subject.8
(c) The cost that can be passed on the data subjects, and the ability to refuse the
request – Controllers are generally required to provide rights ‘free of charge’.9
The only exception is where a controller can show that a request is ‘manifestly
unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character’.
(d) The ICO tells us that the key factor to determining whether a request is
manifestly unfounded is whether ‘the individual genuinely wants to exercise
their rights’ and gives examples of unfounded requests such as those being
‘used to harass an organisation with no real purposes other than to cause
disruption’.10 Excessiveness does not relate to requests for a ‘large amount
of information’ where this may be ‘burdensome’ but instead, in the ICO’s
view, relates to repetitive or overlapping requests.11 The fee imposed must
be ‘reasonable […] taking into account the administrative costs of providing
the information or communication or taking the action requested’. Instead of
applying a charge, the controller can instead refuse to comply, in which case
they must inform the individual without delay – and within one month – of
the reasons for refusal, and ‘on the possibility of lodging a complaint with a
supervisory authority and seeking a judicial remedy’.12
(e) The form of any request – The GDPR is silent on the form a request may take.
Individuals are entitled to make a request in any form they please, be that
verbally or in writing. It can also be made, as the ICO guidance explains, ‘to
any part of your organisation (including by social media) and does not have
to be to a specific person or contact point’.13 This means that staff must be
trained to recognise and escalate requests, which do not need to specifically
cite the GDPR or DPA 2018 to be valid and to start the race to respond in
time. Individuals can be encouraged to use specific forms, which may help to
ensure more detail is provided in the initial request, but they cannot be forced
to use them.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 Such an example is given by the EDPB in Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through
video devices version 2.0 adopted on 29 January 2020.
3 GDPR, Art 12(3).
4 European Regulation 1182/71 [1971] OJ L124/1 on the rules applicable to time periods set out in acts
of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission.
5 C-171/03 Maatschap Toeters and M C Verberk v Productschap Vee en Vlees ECLI:EU:C:2004:714.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020.
7 GDPR, Art 12(3).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020.
11 Ibid.
12 GDPR, Art 12(4).
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
B The rights of access and portability
A4.155 The right of access is perhaps the best known and most used data protection
right. It is a right that existed in almost identical form under the DP Directive, and that
has received substantial consideration by both European and UK courts. As the ICO
explains, this right allows individuals ‘to obtain a copy of their personal data as well
as other supplementary information’ on how it is used.1 Sport organisations are not
immune to such requests, which are commonly used by employees and customers at
the outset of disputes. Requests can come from athletes probing selection decisions,2
alleged victims feeling shut out of safeguarding investigations,3 or fans unhappy with
the response a club has made to their complaint. Sports bodies need to be able to
recognise and respond to requests and be familiar with the available exemptions to
disclosure.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ / [accessed 30 September 2020].
2 See Chapter B2 (Selection).
3 See Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).
A4.156 An individual is entitled to obtain a copy of any personal data processed

about them by a data controller, unless there is an applicable exemption. This extends
to data in any media, whether contained in documents, emails, video footage, SMS
messages or phone call recordings. This is not a right to the full documents containing
data. As was discussed by the CJEU in C-1141/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie,1
provided data can be delivered in another form, there is no obligation to provide the
original document containing wider information. The entitlement to data is usually
interpreted broadly. Data in drafts, which is not repeated in final copies, remains
disclosable if retained.2 Data may need to be explained – the ICO has produced
drafted detailed guidance (‘Draft ICO DSAR Guidance’) that explains:
‘When providing a copy of the personal data requested, you are expected to give the
individual additional information to aid understanding if the data is not in a form
that they can easily understand. However, this is not meant to be onerous, and you
are not expected to translate information or decipher unintelligible written notes’.3
1 C-1141/12; C-372/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie,
Integratie en Asiel v M and S ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081.
2 Deer v University of Oxford [2017] EWCA (Civ) 121, para 156.
3 ICO Right of Access – draft guidance, p 32. This, as with other guidance cited here, is expected
to survive consultation, being positions held by the ICO under previous guidance issued under the
DPA 1998.
A4.157 Although courts have refused to extend the right of access to wider
documents, individuals are not restricted from using their subject access rights in
connection with a dispute. Some earlier cases, on the equivalent right of access under
the Data Protection Act 1998, questioned whether a data subject can be refused their
right of access where they have a ‘collateral’ litigious motive.1 This point was more
recently discussed in the Court of Appeal’s first decision in Dawson-Damer & Ors v
Taylor Wessing, where Lady Justice Arden ruled:
‘Confining the scope of subject access rights by reference to purpose is an

unprincipled restriction of the [subject access] right and will result in complex
litigation in an attempt to determine the “true” purpose of any application. There
is no reason why having a collateral purpose should disqualify a data subject from
relief’. 2
1 See eg Ezsias v Welsh Ministers [2007] All ER (D) 65 (Dec), Elliot v Lloyds TSB Bank PLC & Anor
(Case No: 0LS51908). These cases, and others liked them, turned on the interpretation of Auld LJ’s
comments in Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1764 at para 27.
2 Dawson-Damer & Ors v Taylor Wessing, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 para 91. At para 112, Lady Justice
Arden goes on to explain that judges in cases refusing access to data on the basis of Auld LJ’s
comments in Durant had misunderstood the context of his remarks.
A4.158 Information held in back-up systems or archives is still considered part of

the personal data accessible to the controller, and subject to a request for access
unless properly deleted.1 Similarly, if employees, directors or volunteers make
permitted use of personal emails or personal devices for work they do on behalf of a
controller, they should be expected to search those devices for relevant personal data
if this is proportionate.2 The data considered subject to a request is the data held at
the date of the request, although data can be amended or deleted if this would happen
on a routine basis.3 To ensure data is not amended or deleted improperly, the UK has
introduced a criminal offence in s 173 of the DPA 2018. This applies if a controller
alters or otherwise conceals information with the intention of avoiding its disclosure
to the requestor. More information on criminal offences under the DPA 2018,
including personal liability for directors and managers, is set out in Section 7C,
‘Criminal offences and personal liability’, below. Data created after the date of a
request is not subject to disclosure, unless a further request is made at a later date.
1 Draft ICO DSAR Guidance, p 25.
2 Ibid, pp 26–27.
3 Ibid, pp 28.
A4.159 As reviewed at Section 2A (‘What is personal data and who are data
subjects?’) above, it can be difficult to determine whether certain types of information
are properly considered personal data. In the context of subject access requests,
some information may be requested by individuals when it is not properly due. For
example, it is not uncommon for individuals who have made complaints to request
to see the outcome of any investigation. This may not always be appropriate. For
example, where a complaint has been made into a safeguarding or integrity matter,
the outcomes of any complaint may be highly confidential. The GDPR does not
entitle complainants to receive access to wider non-personal information stored in
complaint files, even where these are named after the relevant individual. Instead,
they are entitled only to any information that specifically relates to them as a data
subject.1 Another tricky category is information associated with someone acting
in their professional capacity. Controllers reviewing this information will have to
determine whether the data relates to the employee. The ICO’s detailed guidance on
the definition of personal data includes the following useful example:
‘Emails written by a lawyer to their client about their client’s matter all contain
references to the lawyer’s name and place of work, which will be the lawyer’s
personal data. However, the content of the emails are not about the individual lawyer,
but about the client’s instructions. The content of the email is not, therefore, personal
data where it concerns legal advice about the client’s legal query. If a complaint was
then made about the lawyer’s performance or advice and the emails were then used
to investigate this, the legal advice given in them would become personal data’.2
1 ICO, ‘Access to information held in complaint files’, version 3.0 published 6 June 2019.
2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-
gdpr/what-is-personal-data/what-is-the-meaning-of-relates-to/#pd1 [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.160 Locating data in wide-ranging requests is a substantial and resource-heavy

task, which should not be under-estimated. While controllers can ask a data subject
to be more precise in their request, they cannot require that more information is
provided. Individuals are entitled to request access to all personal data held about
them by a sports body, and to expect the sports body to carry out a robust search. As
the ICO explains:
‘If an individual refuses to provide any additional information or does not respond
to you, you must still comply with their request by making reasonable searches for
the information covered by the request. The time limit is not paused whilst you wait
for a response, so you should begin searching for information as soon as possible.
You should ensure you have appropriate records management procedures in place to
handle large requests and locate information efficiently’.1
This does not mean that controllers are required to search without regard to resourcing.
As EU law imposes a general principle of proportionality, which is recognised to
apply to data protection obligations on controllers,2 there must be limits on the
expectation to carry out complete searches. As explained by Lewison LJ in Deer v
University of Oxford:
‘[…] the result of such a search does not necessarily mean that every item of
personal data relating to an individual will be retrieved as a result of such a search.
There may be things lurking beneath another stone which has not been turned over.
Accordingly the mere fact that a further and more extensive search reveals further
personal data relating to that individual does not entail the proposition that the first
search was inadequate’.3
The burden, however, of proving the search has been adequately carried out lies with
the data controller. It will not be sufficient to down tools and argue that provision of
data would be disproportionate without making some effort to determine what could
be found and disclosed.4
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-of-access/ [accessed 30 September 2020]..
2 C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, para 88.
3 [2017] EWCA (Civ) 121, para 103.
4 See eg Dawson-Damer & Ors v Taylor Wessing, [2017] EWCA Civ 74 para 84, Lady Justice Arden.
A4.161 There will be occasions where requests for data cover information that is
held by processors or joint controllers. As noted above, contracts with processors
must include an obligation on the processor to provide assistance with requests.
Similarly, in the case of joint controllers, a written arrangement of responsibilities
as required by Article 26 of the GDPR should address the handling of data rights
requests. Controllers must ensure that their searches cover data held by such entities
appropriately.
A4.162 Having located the appropriate data, the controller must respond to the
data subject. Article 12(3) of the GDPR requires that, where a request has been
made electronically, a response shall be made electronically ‘where possible, unless
otherwise requested by the data subject’. In providing a copy of the information,
controllers have some discretion over whether to provide the documents in which
they are contained or whether to redact or extract personal data from these originals.
There is also the alternative of providing a summary of the data, although this should
only be done with caution. Although recognised as a valid alternative by the CJEU
in YS,1 the disclosed information must accurately reflect the entirety of the personal
data held by the controller. If a summary fails to properly disclose aspects of the data,
by summarising at too high a level, this will not meet the requirements of Article 15.2
Responses to data subjects must also contain the information set out in Article 15(1)
– which in effect requires the controller to provide much of the same information as
required under Articles 13 and 14 of the GDPR.
1 C-1141/12; C-372/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie,
Integratie en Asiel v M and S ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, para 60.
2 See R (on the application of Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2003] EWHC 2073),
where Munby J found a ‘gisting’ approach followed by prison staff responding to requests from
prisoners to be insufficient.
A4.163 There are a number of exemptions to data subject access under the
DPA 2018. Some of these are the same as the exemptions to provision of a notice,
discussed at para A4.91. Other exemptions particularly worth of note include:
(a) Protection of the rights of third-party data subjects (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 16)
– inevitably, certain personal data subject to a request will simultaneously be
the personal data of a third-party individual. This is particularly relevant to
opinion data, where both the holder and the subject of an opinion have rights
attached to the data. The DPA 2018 exempts the provision of third party
personal data in response to subject access request unless:
(i) the third party has given his/her consent; or
(ii) it is reasonable to release the information without their consent.
There is no obligation to seek a third party’s consent, nor may it always be

feasible to do so if the third party can no longer be contacted or if there would
be a risk that the consent would be invalid. In assessing whether disclosure
is reasonable, it is necessary for the controller to take into account ‘all the
relevant circumstances, including:
(i) the type of information that would be disclosed;
(ii) any duty of confidentiality owed to the other individual;
(iii) any steps taken by the controller with a view to seeking the consent of the
other individual;
(iv) whether the other individual is capable of giving consent; and
(v) any express refusal of consent by the other individual’.1
(b) Negotiations (DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 23) – if a request is made during an
ongoing negotiation with a data subject, information that might prejudice those
negotiations may be withheld from disclosure. This could include, by way of
example, details from internal club discussions on a contract offer yet to be
made to a player.
(c) Confidential references (DPA Sch 2, para 24) – where a reference has been
given in confidence for the purposes of education, training or employment,
a volunteer placement, an official appointment or provision by the individual
of any service, this reference – whether given or received by the controller
receiving the request – is not subject to disclosure upon an access request. This
is helpful in an employment context, but may also be a relevant exemption
where requests are received from match officials for access to confidential club
feedback on their on-field performances.
1 DPA 2018, Sch 2, para 16(3).
A4.164 In addition to the DPA 2018 exemptions, the GDPR includes a new exemption
in Article 15(4), which states that ‘the right to obtain a copy [of personal data]
shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others’. Recital 63 particularly
notes that this includes ‘trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the
copyright protecting the software’, although references to rights and freedoms in
the context of European legislation must be read to include any rights and freedoms
listed within the Charter of Fundamental Rights.1 Although this exemption does
not exempt controllers from confirming that they hold relevant personal data, this
exemption could prove useful to broadcasters, rights holders, and even – arguably –
sports governing bodies in integrity matters where disclosure might infringe on the
fundamental rights of the body or its other participants.
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2016] OJ C202/389.
A4.165 An associated right, of portability, makes use of the same exemption.

Introduced in Article 20 of the GDPR, this right permits individuals to request access
to information that they have provided to the controller ‘in a structured, commonly
used and machine-readable format’ and the right to transmit these to another
controller. This only applies where the processing has been carried out on the basis
of consent or contractual necessity and is carried out ‘by automated means’.1 An
individual can ask for the data to be transmitted directly to another controller, ‘where
technically feasible’.2 In the context of sport, this type of request might arise where
an athlete wishes to take biometric data to another club or coach, or where a fan
wishes to port their fantasy football selections to another provider. The mirrored
exemption in Article 20(4) will be important to rights holders – if porting the data
would infringe intellectual property rights, the individual’s request can be denied.
The EDPB considered portability in more detail in its adopted Guidelines on the
right to ‘data portability’.3 In discussing the format in which data should be shared, it
commented:
‘Where no formats are in common use for a given industry or given context, data
controllers should provide personal data using commonly used open formats
(eg XML, JSON, CSV, […]) along with useful metadata at the best possible level of
granularity […]’.4
1 GDPR, Art 20(1).
2 GDPR, Art 20(2).
3 Guidelines on the right to ‘data portability’ WP242 rev.01.
4 Ibid, p 18.
C The rights of rectification, restriction, objection, and erasure

A4.166 The right to rectify, or correct, personal data is set out in Article 16 of the
GDPR, which states:
‘The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller without undue
delay the rectification of inaccurate personal data concerning him or her. Taking
into account the purposes of the processing, the data subject shall have the right
to have incomplete personal data completed, including by means of providing a
supplementary statement’.
A4.167 In most cases, the correction of inaccurate data will be straightforward.

Such requests may often follow access requests. This right is closely linked to the
principle of accuracy discussed in Section 2B, ‘Purpose limitation, data minimisation
and accuracy’, above. The GDPR does not define inaccuracy, although the DPA 2018
defines personal data as inaccurate if ‘incorrect or misleading as to any manner of
fact’.1 Complexity can arise where there is a disagreement on subjective information
such as opinions. Here, the ICO advises: ‘As long as the record shows clearly that
the information is an opinion and, where appropriate, whose opinion it is, it may be
difficult to say that it is inaccurate and needs to be rectified’.2
1 DPA 2018, s 205.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-rectification/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.168 Although the same time limits set out in Article 12 of the GDPR apply to
this right of rectification, controllers would be best advised to deal with accuracy
requests swiftly. This is because Article 18(1)(a) of the GDPR allows individuals to
request that data be ‘restricted’ where the accuracy of the data is contested, until the
controller has determined their course of action. In these circumstances, a controller
may store the contested data, but may otherwise only use it with the consent of
the data subject or where necessary for establishment or defence of legal claims,
the protection of another natural or legal person, or for reasons of important public
interest.1 Such a request could jeopardise the swift resolution of eligibility disputes
or disciplinary proceedings where evidence is challenged.
1 GDPR, Art 18(2).
A4.169 If an controller has determined that data is accurate, as in the case of

all rights request rejections, the controller should inform the data subject of their
decision, their reasons, and the data subject’s right to complain or seek a judicial
remedy. The ICO also recommends that ‘it is also good practice to place a note on
your system indicating that the individual challenges the accuracy of the data and
their reasons for doing so’.1
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-rectification/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.170 The right to object has been much strengthened by the GDPR. This right, set
out in Article 21 of the GDPR, allows individuals to object and stop the processing of
data where:
(a) if the data is processed on the basis of legitimate interests or official authority,
the individual objects ‘on grounds relating to his or her particular situation’,
unless the controller can demonstrate that it has ‘compelling legitimate grounds
for the processing which override the rights and freedoms of the data subject’
or that it must use the data for ‘the establishment, exercise or defence of legal
claims’;1
(b) the data is used for direct marketing purposes;2 or
(c) the data is used for scientific or historical research or statistical purposes,
unless the processing is ‘necessary for the performance of a task carried out for
reasons of public interest’.3
1 GDPR Art 21(1).
2 GDPR, Art 21(2).
3 GDPR, Art 21(6).
A4.171 Whilst all rights must be brought to the attention of a data subject within
a notice, Article 21(4) requires that the right to object ‘be explicitly brought to the
attention of the data subject […] clearly and separately from any other information’.
This could take the form of a specific opt out, or could be set out at the top of relevant
privacy notices.
A4.172 The right to object to legitimate interests processing is clearly of potential

detriment to sports organisations. Unlike the right to object to direct marketing
processing, it is not absolute. Individuals must be able to point to their particular
circumstances to justify an objection. This is not an especially high bar: any reason
given by the individual will be acceptable unless the controller can point to ‘compelling
interests’ overriding this concern, or the need to use the data for legal claims or
another exemption applies under the DPA 2018.1 The need to point to compelling
interests effectively sets a new higher threshold that applies to the legitimate interests
assessment carried out by the controller at the outset of processing. The ICO tells us
that controllers should consider why the data subject has objected:
‘In particular, if an individual objects on the grounds that the processing is causing
them substantial damage or distress (eg the processing is causing them financial
loss), the grounds for their objection will have more weight. In making a decision
on this, you need to balance the individual’s interests, rights and freedoms with
your own legitimate grounds. During this process you should remember that the
responsibility is for you to be able to demonstrate that your legitimate grounds
override those of the individual’.2
1 None are likely to be relevant to an objection request to a sports body, and those most likely to be
relevant are discussed in relation to notice and access. All possible exemptions can be found in
Schedule 2, 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018 and are discussed by the ICO at ico.org.uk/for-organisations/
guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/exemptions/ [accessed
30 September 2020].
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-object/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.173 Where a data subject successfully objects to the use of their data, they may
also be entitled to have it erased. The right of erasure is set out in Article 17 of the
GDPR, and is also known as the ‘right to be forgotten’. This allows individuals to
request the erasure (or, alternatively, the restriction1) of their data if:
(a) the data are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent, and there is no other legal ground for
processing;
(c) the data subject successfully objects to data processing under Article 21(1) or
21(2);
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;
(e) the personal data must be erased in order to comply with law; or
(f) the personal data have been collected as part of an information society service
requiring parental consent under Article 8(1)2
1 GDPR, Art 18(1)(b).
2 GDPR, Art 17(1).
A4.174 Although this right appears restrictive, in practice these criteria are relatively
narrow in scope and even when met, broad exemptions apply. Controllers can reject
erasure requests where the data is needed by the controller:
(a) to exercise the freedom of expression and information;
(b) to comply with a legal obligation;
(c) for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise
of official authority;
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research, or
statistical purposes, where erasure is likely to seriously impair that processing
or render it impossible; or
(e) for the establishment, exercise, or defence of legal claims.
Again, other exemptions on the DPA 2018 may apply.1
1 See Schs 2, 3 and 4 of the DPA 2018.
A4.175 Erasure may be difficult where back-up systems ensure that information is
archived appropriately. This point is acknowledged by the ICO, who recognises that:
‘It may be that the erasure request can be instantly fulfilled in respect of live systems,
but that the data will remain within the backup environment for a certain period of
time until it is overwritten.
The key is to put the backup data “beyond use”, even if it cannot be immediately
overwritten. You must ensure that you do not use the data within the backup for any
other purpose, ie that the backup is simply held on your systems until it is replaced
in line with an established schedule’.1
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-erasure/ [accessed 30 September 2020].
A4.176 If a controller is obliged to erase information, it may also be required to

inform others to erase the same data. This will occur where the data has been disclosed
to others by the affected body. Under Article 19 of the GDPR, the controller must
notify each recipient of the request it has received, unless this proves ‘impossible’ or
requires ‘disproportionate’ efforts. The need to inform others will also arise where the
controller has ‘made the personal data public’.1 In these circumstances, controllers
must ‘take reasonable steps, including technical measures’ to inform other controllers
that the data subject has requested the erasure of ‘any links to, or copy or replication
of’ the relevant personal data.2 In determining what is reasonable, the controller will
need to take into account ‘available technology and the cost of implementation’.3
1 GDPR, Art 17(2).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
A4.177 Sports bodies are most likely to come across complex objection and erasure
requests in the context of:
(a) Use of photography and footage – it may be difficult to argue that an
organisation’s wish to make ongoing use of images based on legitimate interests
overrides the rights of the individual. It is advisable to rely on contractual

grounds where possible, but where this is not feasible (for example, where
dealing with children or amateur participants) it is often best to offer an explicit
right to object at the point data is collected, to avoid complaint at a later stage.
Broadcasters and publishers may be able to rely on freedom of expression
grounds to justify refusal of such requests.
(b) Disciplinary and integrity data – ADOs and sports governing bodies often
process details of integrity, doping, and safeguarding matters, and may publish
details of enforcement action they take. Where objection requests are received,
bodies are likely to defend these on the basis that this processing is necessary
for the compelling interest of protecting the sport’s integrity and the rights of
its participants to fair play. In relation to publication of enforcement action,
this is more likely to cause obvious damage or distress to an individual, and
organisations should be prepared both to robustly defend their decision making
and to take a case-by-case approach in assessing what ought to be published.
Where compromises can be made, such as applying more limited retention
periods or tailoring publication to restrict release of identifying details that are
not central to a charge or ban, this will demonstrate a proportionate approach.
D Significant automated decisions
A4.178 Article 22 of the GDPR provides that ‘the data subject shall have the right not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling,
which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him
or her’. Unlike the reactive rights discussed earlier in this Section 4, this is a proactive
obligation on the controller much like the individual’s right to be informed. Unless the
controller can meet a derogation, set out in Article 22(2), such significant automated
decisions are not permitted. The derogations only allow such decision-making tools to
be used if they are necessary for entering into or performing a contract with the data
subject, are authorised by law, or are based on the data subject’s explicit consent.1
1 GDPR, Art 22(2).
A4.179 This provision is relatively narrow in scope. There are few obvious examples
of when such decision making may be used in sport. In practice, the vast majority of
decisions will be made with human input, whereas only ‘solely’ automated decisions
are caught here. This is especially true where these decisions have legal or ‘similarly
significant’ outcomes. Examples of decision-making that may still be caught include:
(a) use of software to assess CVs and automatically reject certain candidates;1 and
(b) use of automated profiles to offer different prices to certain kinds of
preferentially treated customer (‘dynamic pricing’).
1 GDPR, Recital 71.
A4.180 The EDPB has examined the scope of Article 22 within its adopted
Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes
of Regulation 2016/679.1 This particularly looked at whether targeted online
advertising, used by many sports organisations, is likely to trigger Article 22. It
explained that:
‘in many typical cases the decision to present targeted advertising based on profiling
will not have a similarly significant effect on individuals […] however, it […] may
do depending upon the particular characteristics of the case, including:
• the intrusiveness of the profiling process, including the tracking of individuals
across different websites, devices and services;
• the expectations and wishes of the individuals concerned;

• the way the advert is delivered; or
• using knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the data subjects targeted’.2
1 WP251 rev 01, revised and adopted on 6 February 2018.
2 Ibid, p 22.
A4.181 If a sports body believes it is carrying out this type of processing, the
easiest solution is usually to insert a level of human review. The EDPB is clear that
this cannot be done by ‘fabricating human involvement’; human oversight must be
‘meaningful, rather than just a token gesture’.1 The alternative is to examine whether
the decision can be realistically based on consent, law, or contractual necessity. More
detailed guidance on this right can be found in the EDPB’s guidance and in the ICO’s
Guide to the GDPR.2
1 WP251 rev 01, p 21.
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-including-profiling/
5 INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS
A4.182 The vast majority of sports bodies will carry out some sort of international
transfer of personal data. International transfers take place when teams go on
international tours, when NADOs share data in the World Anti-Doping Authority’s
Anti-Doping Administration & Management System (ADAMS), and when a supplier
outsources processing work to a third party abroad. In an attempt to prevent the
undercutting of data protection requirements when European data leaves its borders,
the GDPR requires that protections be put in place before data can be transferred to
recipients outside of the European Economic Area – namely, the Member States of
the European Union, plus Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. These restrictions are
set out in Articles 45 to 47 of the GDPR.
A4.183 Under the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will be treated as part
of the EU for the purposes of data transfers until the end of the transition period.1
The parties have further agreed within the political declaration that they will work
towards the UK achieving an ‘adequacy decision’, which is a method of permitting
otherwise prohibited transfers under the GDPR, before the end of transition.2 If this
does not come to pass, EU organisations passing data to the UK will need to consider
alternative safeguards to ensure data is adequately protected.
1 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, [2019] OJ C384I/01, Articles 70–73.
2 HM Government, Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between
the European Union and the United Kingdom, para 8.
A4.184 When it imports the UK GDPR under the Data Protection Exit Regulations,
the UK will in effect gain its own data transfer regime with near-parallel provisions.
Given the close relationship between these two frameworks, this Section will address
first the GDPR’s requirements and tools for protection, and then the differences
for transfers of UK data that will come into effect under the Data Protection Exit
Regulations.
A What is a restricted transfer?
A4.185 Although not a term used by the GDPR, the ICO refers to ‘restricted transfers’
to describe transfers that are caught by the GDPR.1 The ICO guidance also sets out
the breadth of the type of processing that can be considered a transfer. It includes
both the ‘sending’ of data and ‘making it accessible’ to a receiver in a country outside
of the EEA, where the receiver is ‘a separate organisation or individual’. As such, an
employee logging into their emails on a transatlantic holiday will not cause a transfer
of data, but the sharing with a group company or supplier in another country would
be caught by the law. Online publication is often likely to result in transfer. As the
ICO explains:
‘If you load personal data onto a UK server which is then available through a
website, and you plan or anticipate that the website may be accessed from outside
the EEA, you should treat this as a restricted transfer’.2
regulation-gdpr/international-transfers/ [accessed 1 October 2020].
2 Ibid.
B When can organisations carry out a restricted transfer?
A4.186 Controllers and processors are able to carry out restricted transfers when the
data is transferred on the basis of an adequacy decision,1 on the basis of appropriate
safeguards,2 binding corporate rules,3 or a relevant exemption.4
1 GDPR, Art 45.
2 GDPR, Art 46.
3 GDPR, Art 47.
4 GDPR, Art 49.
A4.187 Adequacy decisions are binding decisions taken by the European

Commission, on the advice of the EDPB, to recognise certain jurisdictions or
schemes as adequately protecting personal data. Transfers made to these jurisdictions
or under these schemes are considered adequate and no further action is required. At
the time of writing, adequate jurisdictions include Switzerland, Argentina and New
Zealand: a full list can be found on the Commission’s website.1 Partial decisions have
also been put in place for:
(a) Japan, covering only private sector organisations;2 and
(b) Canada, covering only organisations subject to its Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).3
Until July 2020, it was also possible to rely on the Commission’s decision approving
use of the Privacy Shield framework (to which US organisations needed to subscribe
in order to be considered adequate).4 However, in C-311/18 Data Protection
Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (Schrems II) the
CJEU invalidated this decision.5 At the time of writing, the Privacy Shield framework
remains in place and the Federal Trade Commission has committed to continue
holding companies accountable to their commitments, but sports organisations
should not rely on a Privacy Shield certification as an adequate protection in respect
of a transfer of data to the United States.6
1 A complete current list can be found at ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-
dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en [accessed 1 October 2020].
2 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419, [2019] OJ L76/1.
3 Commission Decision 2002/2/EC, [2002] OJ L002/13.
4 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, [2016] OJ L207/1.
5 C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559.
6 ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1578975/simons_-_oral_remarks_hearing_on_
oversight_of_ftc_8-5-20.pdf [accessed 18 November 2020].
A4.188 Where no adequacy decision exists, organisations must seek to put in

place safeguards. Certain of these safeguards can be used without approval from
the supervisory authority. The types of safeguard available are listed in GDPR,
Article 46(2). Three types of transfer safeguard are potentially viable at the time of
writing: legally enforceable transfers between public bodies, standard contractual
clauses, and binding corporate rules.
A4.189 The first of these safeguards is only of help to public bodies, and only where
they transfer to other public bodies. More information on this safeguard can be found
in Article 46(2)(a), and the ICO’s guidance.1
A4.190 Binding corporate rules (BCRs) are group documents that permit intra-
group transfers. They can be adopted either to safeguard the controller-to-controller
transfers within an entire group, or to safeguard data entrusted to a group company
as a processor when shared with other group companies. Importantly, BCRs provide
no protection for onward transfers outside of the group and require initial approval
by supervisory authorities. A number of documents addressing the preparation and
approval of binding corporate rules have been adopted by the EDPB.1 BCRs are
unlikely to prove useful for most sports organisations. Few have substantial intra-
group transfers, and seeking authorisation for these policies requires substantial
and typically lengthy engagement with supervisory authorities. The most likely
circumstance in which sports bodies will come across binding corporate rules will be
where they deal with processors who have adopted BCRs to assist with their onward
transfer strategy.
1 These documents can be found at ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-
dimension-data-protection/binding-corporate-rules-bcr_en [accessed 1 October 2020].
A4.191 The method of international transfer most commonly used is the third in
this group, standard contractual clauses. The GDPR technically permits two types
of standard contractual clauses to be used: those approved and adopted by the
Commission,1 and those approved by a single supervisory authority that have then
been adopted by the Commission.2 To date, there have been no clauses approved
under this second heading.
1 GDPR, Art 46(2)(c).
2 GDPR, Art 46(2)(d).
A4.192 The standard contractual clauses (or SCCs) in use at the time of writing are
clauses that have been in place for some years prior to the GDPR. These are:
(a) Controller to Controller Set I (Commission Decision 2001/497/EC [2001] OJ
L181/19);
(b) Controller to Controller Set II (Commission Decision 2004/5271/EC [2004] OJ
L285/14); and
(c) Controller to Processor (Commission Decision 2010/87/EU [2010] OJ L39/5).
However, in November 2020, the EU Commission released a draft Implementing
Decision on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to
third countries under the GDPR (‘draft modernised SCCs’).1 Once finalised and
implemented, the draft modernised SCCs are due to replace the existing SCCs,
and organisations will be required to replace any existing transfers based on the
older provisions before the end of a sunset period (set at one year, or any earlier
contract amendment, in the current draft). This will be a substantial administrative
exercise for all affected organisations. The draft modernised SCCs are expected to be
implemented by early 2021. For UK organisations, it is not clear whether these will
be considered adequate for use in protecting transfers made from the UK at the time
of writing (see A4.201 below).
1 Ares(2020)6654686, 12 November 2020 – see in particular the Annex, which contains the draft
clauses.
A4.193 Both the existing and draft modernised SCCs (both sometimes referred
to as ‘model clauses’) include specific obligations on recipients (‘data importers’)
that closely resemble requirements on controllers and processors, respectively, as
existed under data protection law when these documents were first published. As
a result, the draft modernised SCCs include substantially strengthened obligations
on both controller and processor data importers. The provisions included within the
draft modernised SCCs for use with processor data importers meet the obligations of
Article 28(3) of the GDPR, although in practice data exporters are likely to want to
address at least some of these provisions separately to ensure an enhanced contractual
position.1 Both sets of SCCs also include third-party rights for data subjects, so that
they can enforce certain provisions themselves. In order to use the existing SCCs, as
the ICO explains (emphasis in the original):
‘[…] you must use the standard contractual clauses in their entirety and without
amendment. You can include additional clauses on business related issues, provided
that they do not contradict the standard contractual clauses. You can also add parties
(ie additional data importers or exporters) provided they are also bound by the
standard contractual clauses’.2
The draft modernised SCCs are due to clarify this flexibility in their content, with
both a clause explaining the hierarchy of the SCCs above any conflicting contractual
document, and an optional ‘docking clause’ that will allow other parties to accede
to the SCCs.3
1 See A4.131. In particular, controller data exporters may wish to include more specific provisions on
audit and data breach notification.
3 Draft modernised SCCs, clause 4 and clause 6 respectively.
A4.194 All sets of the existing SCCs require completion with the details of
processing, including applicable security measures for the controller-to-processor
set. Once the draft modernised SCCs are implemented, there will be a substantial
amount of tailoring required by organisations to implement these provisions for each
transfer. This is because, as compared to the existing SCCs – which provide separate,
standalone, agreements for each type of data transfer – the draft modernised SCCs
address all types of transfer within one document, in modular form. Importantly,
whilst the existing SCCs only allow for transfers made by EU controllers, the
draft modernised SCCs include content that will allow EU processors to use this
mechanism for transfers to both non-EU sub-processors and non-EU data controllers.
This will remedy a major gap in the use of the existing SCCs, which had placed EU
data processors at a disadvantage.
A4.195 The existing Controller to Processor SCCs were subject to challenge,

alongside the European Commission’s Privacy Shield decision, in the Schrems II
litigation. The CJEU held that the decision underpinning these existing SCCs
remained valid, but that controllers should not assume that reliance on the SCCs
alone is sufficient: they must:
‘take measures to compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country by
way of appropriate safeguards for the data subject’, and ‘since by their inherently
contractual nature standard data protection clauses cannot bind the public authorities
of third countries […] it may prove necessary to supplement the guarantees contained
in those […] clauses’.1
Controllers are told that they should assess relevant aspects of the third country’s
legal system, on a case-by case-basis,2 but are not given detailed assistance in the
CJEU judgment on the types of measures that should be put in place if they come to
the conclusion that reliance on SCCs alone is insufficient.
1 Schrems II, paras 131 and 132.
2 Schrems II, para 134.
A4.196 The effect of Schrems II can be seen in the draft modernised SCCs, having
been drafted in the wake of the CJEU’s decision and released shortly after the EDPB
released draft Recommendations on measures to supplement transfer tools such as the
existing SCCs.1 In particular, data exporters will be required to document the transfer
impact assessments they are required to carry out, and make this available to the
competent supervisory authority on request. This assessment must allow the parties
to warrant that there is no reason to believe laws in the third country would prevent
compliance with its obligations under the SCCs.2 Importantly, as well as the laws of
the third country, this assessment may also take ‘due account’ of the ‘circumstances’
of transfer including the nature of the data, the purpose of the transfer, the duration
of the contract, the number of sub-processors, the methods used to transfer data and
the type of recipient.3 The completion of these assessments adds an extra level of
complexity to any international transfer reliant on SCCs. Organisations seeking to
rely on the draft modernised SCCs once implemented should ensure that they take
account of any relevant guidance on their use.
1 EDPB ‘Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that supplement transfer tools to ensure compliance
with the EU level of protection of personal data’ Version 1.0, Adopted on 10 November 2020 for public
consultation. We do not address these at length, given the likelihood that the existing SCCs will be
replaced early in the life of this edition, but the final version of these Recommendations may well have
a bearing on the use of the draft modernised SCCs once implemented.
2 Draft modernised SCCs, clause 2.
3 Ibid.
A4.197 Exemptions to the restrictions on data transfers are limited. Article 49,
where they are listed, emphasises that they should only be used ‘in the absence of an
adequacy decision […] or of appropriate safeguards’, while the ICO references them
as ‘true exceptions’.1 They will therefore be narrowly interpreted. The exemptions
include:
(a) Transfers where the individual has given their explicit consent – as discussed at
para A4.60, explicit consent is set at a higher standard of proof than the consent
necessary for processing under Article 6. All the same risks to validity apply
and may prevent reliance on this exemption. Consent will also only be valid
here if the individual gives it ‘after having been informed of the possible risks
of such transfers for the data subject due to the absence of an adequacy decision
and appropriate safeguards’.2 For these reasons, this exemption should not be
used as a realistic alternative for bulk or regular transfers.
(b) Transfers necessary for the performance of a contract between the controller
and the data subject – this also covers ‘the implementation of pre-contractual
measures taken at the data subject’s request’.3 This may be relevant, for
example, for the transfer of ticketed tour attendees’ details to a hotel outside
the EEA. It only covers data necessary for the contract, not ancillary transfers.
Recital 111 also emphasises that this exemption can only be used where this
transfer is ‘occasional’.
(c) Transfers necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract in the
data subject’s interests – again, such transfers must be occasional according
to Recital 111. This may be of use to a controller arranging for emergency

medical treatment of an athlete abroad or arranging travel for dependents.
(d) Transfers necessary for important reasons of public interest – the ICO
guidance tells us that ‘there must be an EU or UK law which states or implies
that this type of transfer is allowed for important reasons of public interest,
which may be in the spirit of reciprocity for international co-operation’.4
Recital 112 gives the specific example of transfers needed to ‘reduce and/
or eliminate doping in sport’. The ICO’s view is that this should still exempt
only ad hoc transfers, stating categorically that controllers ‘should not rely on
this exception for systematic transfers’.5 It is worth reiterating that the World
Anti-Doping Agency receives anti-doping data from ADOs on the basis of
Canada’s adequacy decision for organisations covered by PIPEDA, rather than
in reliance on this exemption.6
(e) Transfers necessary to establish, exercise or defend legal claims – again
this must only be used for occasional transfers. Recital 111 tells us that this
exemption can apply to claims ‘regardless of whether in a judicial procedure
or whether in an administrative or any out-of-court procedure, including
procedures before regulatory bodies’. The ICO emphasises that ‘you cannot
rely on this exception if there is only the mere possibility that a legal claim or
other formal proceedings may be brought in the future’.7
(f) Transfers necessary for the vital interests of an individual unable to give consent
(g) Transfers from legally established public registers
(h) Non-repetitive transfers based on compelling legitimate interests – this is,
as the ICO explains, a ‘truly exceptional’ exemption that can only be used
when unable to rely on safeguards or an adequacy decision, where other
exemptions do not apply, and where it relates to a small number of individuals.
Safeguards would still need to be applied: the ICO gives the examples of ‘strict
confidentiality agreements, a requirement for data to be deleted soon after
transfer, technical controls to prevent the use of the data for other purposes,
or sending pseudonymised or encrypted data’.8 The relevant supervisory
authority would also need to be informed of the transfer. Although included
here for the sake of completeness, in practice it will be very rare that any sports
organisation relies on this exemption.
2 GDPR, Art 49(1)(a).
3 GDPR, Art 49(1)(b).
5 Ibid.
6 See Anti-Doping Remarks.
8 Ibid.
C What is different in the UK?
A4.198 Under the Data Protection Exit Regulations, due to enter into force at the
end of transition, the UK has sought to distinguish its own data transfer regime
from that of the EU’s GDPR. At the time of writing, however, there is relatively
little practical difference between the existing and proposed regimes. The UK’s data
transfer regime will largely be set out in a planned Schedule 21 of the DPA 2018.
A schedule showing the changes and the new wording has been published by the
government.1
Keeling_Schedule_for_Data_Protection_Act_2018.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020].
A4.199 In relation to adequacy, the UK is due to recognise all EU and EEA states
and institutions as adequate, along with countries benefiting from a current adequacy
decision granted or retained under the GDPR at the end of the transition period.1
Added to this list is Gibraltar.2 This list can be amended by the Secretary of State,
and new provisions will be added to the DPA 2018 granting the Secretary of State
the power to make new adequacy decisions through secondary legislation, and an
obligation to publish a list of adequate jurisdictions.3
1 DPA 2018, Sch 21, paras 4 and 5 (not yet in force).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, and DPA 2018, ss17A and 17B.
A4.200 BCRs that have been approved by the Information Commissioner prior
to the end of the transition period will be retained under Schedule 21. Once the
UK GDPR is in place, this will allow the Information Commissioner to approve
‘UK’ BCRs. This will be a separate approval regime to that followed by the EDPB,
although we can expect a similar approach to be taken by the ICO. BCRs that were
authorised by another European supervisory body will need to undergo a secondary
approval from the ICO to be valid following the end of the transition period,
A4.201 Similarly, while existing SCCs are due to be retained both for existing
transfers and for novel use under Schedule 21, the Secretary of State will be given the
power to repeal these transitional arrangements.1 The Secretary of State will be able
to put in place new SCCs that have been adopted by the Information Commissioner,2
in line with the procedure to be set out in a new s 199A of the DPA 2018. It is not
clear, at the time of writing, whether there will be any action taken to recognise the
use of the draft modernised SCCs (which may or may not be adopted prior to the end
of the transition period) as an adequate method of protecting UK transfers.
1 DPA 2018, Sch 21, paras 6, 7 and 8.
2 DPA 2018, s 17C.
A4.202 The GDPR exemptions will be retained in full form as part of the UK
GDPR. Under an amended Section 18 of the DPA 2018, the Secretary of State will
be able to provide further definition of which transfers are – or are not – considered
to be in the public interest.
6 DIRECT MARKETING, EPRIVACY AND SPORT
A4.203 Although the GDPR and UK GDPR are the predominant pieces of privacy
legislation that will be relevant to sports bodies, additional rules can be found in
particular in the EU’s ePrivacy legislation. This is currently embodied by the
ePrivacy Directive, which the UK has implemented in the (amended) Privacy and
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR). Although the
EU has proposed to replace the ePrivacy Directive with a Regulation, with a proposal
published in 2017, this complex piece of draft legislation has become a source of
sustained contention between Member States and will need to be considered by
future editions of this book.
A4.204 The ePrivacy Directive and PECR cover a number of topics that are relevant
only to a limited group of electronic communications services or network providers,
such are rules on itemised billing, use traffic data, and security breaches by these
providers. We focus here on two areas of wider application – rules on electronic
direct marketing, and cookies.
A Direct marketing – the GDPR and PECR

(a) What is direct marketing?
A4.205 Almost all sports bodies will carry out some sort of marketing activity. This
activity will be governed by the GDPR, DPA 2018 and PECR, which overlap. Direct
marketing is not defined by the GDPR, but is defined at s 122(5) of the DPA 2018 as
‘the communication (by whatever means) of advertising or marketing material which
is directed to particular individuals’. This covers not only commercial messages, but
also ‘all advertising or promotional material, including that promoting the aims or
ideals of not-for-profit organisations’.1 Targeted marketing that encourages people to
take up a sport, or to raise awareness of a linked charity, will be caught by the rules
discussed below.
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/ [accessed 1 October
2020].
A4.206 To be distinguished, however, are communications that are necessary for the
continuity or performance of services. The ICO says that this includes ‘correspondence
with customers to provide information they need about a current contract or past
purchase (eg information about service interruptions, delivery arrangements, product
safety, changes to terms and conditions, or tariffs)’.1 Including ‘general branding,
logos or straplines’ in such messages will not trigger application of rules on direct
marketing, but organisations should not include any clearly promotional messages,
such as messages encouraging additional purchases or contract renewal.2 The ICO
addresses the question of ‘what are “service messages”?’ in its Draft Direct Marketing
Code, stating that:
‘In order to determine whether a communication is a service message or a direct

marketing message, a key factor is likely to be the phrasing, tone and context […]
If a message is actively promoting or encouraging an individual to make use of
a particular service, special offer, or upgrade for example, then it is likely to be
direct marketing. However if the message has a neutral tone and simply informs the
individual for example of a benefit on their account then these are more likely to be
viewed as a service message […]
However, it is important to understand that you cannot avoid the direct marketing
rules by simply using a neutral tone. For example a message from a supermarket
chain sent to an individual saying “Your local supermarket stocks carrots” is clearly
still promotional despite the use of a neutral tone’.3
The ICO takes this distinction seriously, and has fined companies that have overstepped
the line, as explained in Section 7A, ‘Supervisory authority powers’,below. Alongside
service messages, ‘genuine’ market research is also excluded, but again it must not
stray into promotion or collecting details for marketing lists. Disguised marketing of
this kind is still regulated by the law.4
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/ [accessed 1 October
2020].
2 Ibid.
3 Draft Direct Marketing Code, pp 19–20.
4 Ibid, p 19.
(b) Direct marketing and consent
A4.207 The legal basis necessary for marketing activities depends on the type of
marketing being carried out. As discussed at para A4.49 above, the GDPR provides
that direct marketing can be a legitimate interest. This would appear to be preferable
to relying on an individual’s consent. Although individuals have an absolute right to
object to direct marketing, reliance on legitimate interests does not require evidence
to be retained and carries a lesser risk of being ruled invalid.1 The requirement to
carry out and document a Legitimate Interests Assessment does still apply. However,
the overlap with PECR forces controllers to rely on consent for certain types of direct
marketing.
1 See Section 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent’, above.
A4.208 Regulation 22(2) of PECR requires that:

‘a person shall neither transmit, nor instigate the transmission of, unsolicited
communications for the purposes of direct marketing by means of electronic mail
unless the recipient of the electronic mail has previously notified the sender that
he consents for the time being to such communications being sent by, or at the
instigation of, the sender’.
In practice, this requires that consent is obtained for electronic marketing. This is
defined as:
‘any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public electronic
communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient’s
terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient and includes messages sent
using a short message service’.1
As such, this requirement extends beyond email to other types of electronic
marketing, such as ‘texts, picture messages, video messages, voicemails, direct
messages via social media or any similar message that is stored electronically’.2
The ICO’s position that direct messages via social media are caught by PECR is
not universally accepted.3 PECR’s consent requirement does not extend to targeted
adverts placed through social media feeds, as these are not preloaded in a network
or sent to terminal equipment ahead of time. However, as discussed further below,
the ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code suggests that certain use of social media
marketing tools may require consent.
1 PECR, reg 2(1).
2 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/electronic-mail-
marketing/ [accessed 1 October 2020].
3 It is not clear whether the ICO sees these messages as being stored on terminal equipment, which would
appear incorrect from a technical perspective, or stored in the network rather than simply transmitted
by it. It is expected that this will be a point of pushback from industry in the ICO’s consultation on the
Draft Direct Marketing Code, where this position first appeared. Readers should review the position
taken in the finalised Code to confirm the ICO’s ultimate position.
A4.209 The consent required by PECR must meet the GDPR standards for validity.
This is not made plain by the GDPR itself, but the Data Protection Exit Regulations
have inserted a definition of consent into PECR, stating that ‘“consent” by a user
or subscriber corresponds to the data subject’s consent in the GDPR (as defined in
section 3(10) of the DPA 2018)’.1 This interpretation has also been adopted by the
EDPB,2 so is likely to be an approach followed in EU Member States. Given there is
a need to obtain consent to a GDPR standard, as the ICO explains, ‘trying to apply
legitimate interests […] would be an entirely unnecessary exercise, and would cause
confusion for individuals’.3
1 Data Protection Exit Regulations, reg 8.
2 Opinion 5/2019 on the interplay between the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR in particular regarding
the competence, tasks and powers of data protection authorities, adopted on 12 March 2019.
A4.210 There are two specific limitations to this requirement for consent for
electronic mail marketing under PECR. Before discussing them in detail, it is
important to emphasise that, under the ePrivacy Directive, Member States have varied
in their interpretation and application of these rules, and EU regulators will typically
argue that their local rules apply to recipients in their jurisdiction, particularly where
the sender is not established in a Member State. Sports bodies should take care to
check other countries’ rules where relevant.
A4.211 The first limitation to the PECR requirement for consent for electronic mail
marketing is to the type of marketing recipient to which they apply. In the UK, PECR
rules on direct marketing only apply where the recipient is an ‘individual subscriber’.
The ICO summarises the position as follows:
‘You can email or text an individual if they have specifically consented to receiving
emails or texts from you… Sole traders and some partnerships are treated as
individuals – so you can only email or text them if they have specifically consented’.1
PECR rules on marketing consent do not apply to ‘corporate subscribers’. This cover
both generic business email addresses and the phone numbers and email addresses of
named employees of such corporates. This electronic mail marketing can be based on
legitimate interests, much like use of non-electronic methods such as phone and mail
shots. The GDPR’s absolute right to object will still apply where a staff member is
targeted, as well as rules in the CAP Non-Broadcast Code that apply to all marketing,2
and so an opt out must be offered to these staff.
2 Committee of Advertising Practice, Non-Broadcast Code, v12.2.49 – Rule 10.
A4.212 The second limitation applies to existing contacts. Regulation 22(3) of the
PECR sets out what is known as the ‘soft-opt in’ – in practice, an opt-out approach –
that permits organisations to send electronic mail marketing to individuals where:
(a) contact details were obtained in the course of a ‘negotiation or sale’ of a product
or service;
(b) the marketing relates to that organisation’s similar products or services;
(c) the recipient was offered the ability to opt-out of marketing at the time details
were initially collected; and
(d) the recipient is offered the ability to opt-out in every subsequent message.
A4.213 The ‘soft opt-in’ is narrowly interpreted by the ICO. It can only be relied
upon where a negotiation or sale of a product or service has taken place and cannot
be used for details collected by other methods such as through profile creation or
registering for a specific newsletter. As the marketing must relate to similar products
or services, the soft opt-in cannot allow marketing for ‘non-commercial promotions’.1
It can never be used to justify marketing of third party products or services, and for
these purposes third parties includes group companies.
A4.214 Although the PECR rules on electronic mail marketing are perhaps its most
restrictive, there are also rules that apply to phone marketing. These are set out in
Regulations 19, 21 and 21A of PECR (Regulation 20 contains similar rules for fax
marketing, now rarely carried out). The ICO summarises these as follows:
‘In short, you must not make unsolicited live calls:

• to anyone who has told you they don’t want your calls;
• to any number registered with the TPS [telephone preference service] or CTPS
[corporate telephone preference service], unless the person has specifically
consented to your calls – even if they are an existing customer;
• for the purpose of claims management services, unless the person has
specifically consented to your calls.
You must always say who is calling, allow your number (or an alternative contact
number) to be displayed to the person receiving the call, and provide a contact
address or freephone number if asked […]
You must not make an automated marketing call – that is, a call made by an
automated dialling system that plays a recorded message – unless that person has
specifically consented to receive this type of call from you. General consent for
marketing, or even consent for live calls, is not enough – it must specifically cover
automated calls […]’.1
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/telephone-marketing/
[accessed 1 October 2020].
(c) Third party marketing and using social media tools
A4.215 Sports organisations often rely on their ability to engage their fan-base in
order to increase the value of their sponsorship deals. This in turn relies on the ability
to either share marketing lists or – more typically – send third-party marketing to
their fans. This is made more difficult by the GDPR’s rules on consent. As explained
at para A4.43, the GDPR requires that the identity of the controller be made clear to
the individual at the time consent is obtained. This makes the creation and sharing
of lists for a fluctuating list of sponsors incredibly difficult. The ICO’s guidance tells
us that marketers ‘must be very careful before using bought-in lists for recorded
calls, texts or emails. You can only use them if all the people on the list specifically
consented to receive that type of message from you. Generic consent covering any
third party will not be enough’.1 Even referring to a changing list of named third
parties in the consent language may fail to meet the requirements, unless consent is
always refreshed for newly named partners.
1 ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-pecr/electronic-and-telephone-marketing/using-marketing-lists/
A4.216 A common marketing practice in sport, and a common obligation in sports

sponsorship agreements, is the sending of sponsor or partner marketing materials to
a sports body’s signed-up fans.1 The ICO considered this scenario in its Draft Direct
Marketing Code, alongside the use of processors for direct marketing:
‘Using third parties to send your direct marketing can take different forms, for
example:
• you provide a third party with the contact details of your customers and ask
them to do it on your behalf; or
• you ask a third party to use their own marketing lists to send your direct
marketing content to individuals (sometimes known as ‘hosted marketing’).
Although in both these forms you are not physically sending the marketing yourself,
this does not mean that you stop being responsible for compliance’.2
The draft continues:
‘Both you and the third party are responsible for complying with PECR. For example
if Company A is encouraged by Company B to send its marketing emails then both
companies require consent from the individual under PECR – Company A because
they are the sender and Company B because they are the instigator’.3
The ICO also addresses ‘dual branding promotions’, giving the following example:
‘A supermarket decides to support a particular charity at Christmas and sends out a

marketing email to its customers promoting the charity’s work. Whilst the email is
promoting the charity, it also constitutes marketing by the supermarket itself as it is

promoting its values.
Although the supermarket is not passing the contact details of its customers to the
charity it still needs to ensure there is appropriate consent from its customers to
receive direct marketing promoting the charity. Where possible it would be good
practice for the supermarket to screen against the charity’s suppression list’.4
1 See para H3.40.
3 Ibid, p 83.
4 Ibid, p 27.
A4.217 The practical result of such guidance is to render compliance for ‘hosted’
marketing activities as prescriptive and difficult as the use of shared marketing lists:
sponsors will still need to be named or at the very least specifically foreseeable
recipients in consent language, and will still have direct responsibility for marketing
activities. The ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code also suggests that cooperation
over such activities is likely to be considered ‘joint control’, with the requirement to
enter into written arrangements set out in Article 26 of the GDPR.1
1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, p 27. See also discussion of joint control in Section 2A, ‘What is
personal data and who are data subjects?’, above.
A4.218 The Commissioner has indeed already taken enforcement action on hosted
marketing. In one monetary penalty notice, imposed on a controller (Grove Pension
Solutions Limited) that ‘instigated’ hosted marketing through third party sites, Grove
had sought legal advice, but the Commissioner commented that:
‘Consent will not be valid if individuals are asked to agree to receive marketing from
“similar organisations”, “partners”, “selected third parties” or other similar generic
description. Further, consent will not be valid where an individual is presented with
a long, seemingly exhaustive list of general categories of organisations […]
[…] it is clear […] that Grove are not specifically named, or identified in such a way
that would suggest they could lawfully instigate direct marketing to subscribers.
Further, the privacy policies […] list a wide range of sectors […] and also fail to
provide subscriber with the option to specify the types of marketing they would
wish to receive’.1
1 ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2614585/grove-pensions-mpn-20190326.pdf [accessed
1 October 2020], paras 32 and 33. Please note that the ICO removes all enforcement action from its
site after two years have elapsed.
A4.219 Hosted marketing activities are likely to remain more popular than list-
sharing within sport in any event, given the security risks associated with sharing
data with third parties and the value of these lists as an asset. Sports bodies should
take particular care in ensuring that no marketing rights are granted to sponsors
without reference to statutory limitations, and that their marketing language is
as precise as possible about the identities or specific types of third party whose
marketing may be sent, even where this marketing is likely to be limited to dual
activities. It may become more common practice to refresh these types of consents
on a regular basis, to account for changing groups of sponsors. Whilst this may
impact on the number of individuals who consent, it would provide clearer evidence
of valid consent. It would also better reflect the spirit of the ICO’s ‘good practice
recommendation’, made within the Draft Direct Marketing Code, that marketing
not be sent to new contacts based on third-party consents obtained more than six
months previously.1 Such an approach would, however, be a step-change from
current practices.
A4.220 Another method of third-party marketing that has become more popular
in recent years is the use of social media tools to identify and send marketing to
an organisation’s contacts, or to identify and target individuals who share similar
characteristics with those contacts (typically known as ‘lookalike’ marketing). As
explained above (see para A4.208), PECR does not require consent to be obtained
to carry out this type of marketing, provided it is carried out through advertisements
on an individual’s feed rather than through direct messages and does not rely on the
use of cookie data to identify relevant individuals (see Section 6B, ‘Cookies’ below).
However, in its Draft Direct Marketing Code, the ICO has determined that using
social media tools to send advertising to an organisation’s contacts is likely to require
consent under the GDPR. It says:
‘You must be upfront about this processing. Individuals are unlikely to expect that
this processing takes place, therefore you should not bury information about any
list-based tools you use on social media within your privacy information. It is likely
that consent is the appropriate lawful basis for this processing as it is difficult to see
how it would meet the three-part test of the legitimate interests basis. However you
will still need to ensure you also meet transparency requirements’.1
This is typical of the approach taken in a number of other European countries,2 but
it remains to be seen whether this guidance will be retained in the finalised code. In
particular, since this draft was released, the EDPB has released its own draft guidance
on use of social media tools, where it suggests that organisations may be able to rely
on legitimate interests.3 In contrast, where the ICO’s Draft Direct Marketing Code
does not suggest use of ‘lookalike’ marketing tools will require consent, the EDPB
guidance emphasises that consent is likely required due to the substantial involvement
of cookies and similar technology in identifying these audiences. Organisations will
need to take care in assessing their use of these tools once these guidance documents
are finalised.
2 Such as Germany, as per a decision by its Bavarian supervisory authority (VGH München, Beschluss
v. 26.09.2018 – 5 CS 18.1157) and Italy, as per the Italian supervisory authorities’ Guidelines
on Marketing and against Spam, July 2013, Gazzetta Ufficiale no 174 of 26 July 2013, web doc
No 2542348).
3 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 08/2020 on the targeting of social media users’, Version 1.0, adopted 7 September
2020 for public consultation. See in particular pp 17-18.
A4.221 The ICO’s view of the creation of ‘look-alike’ audiences – where customer
data is shared with social media platforms to identify similar individuals on their
networks to receive targeted advertisements – appears to be that these remain
permissible without consent where appropriate privacy steps are taken. The ICO
places emphasis on the need to inform individuals whose information is used to
create the look-alike audience that their data is shared for these purposes, and the
need to ensure that those who have objected to marketing-related processing are not
being used for this audience creation.1
1 Draft Direct Marketing Code, pp 91–92.
A4.222 A further type of marketing tool often used in sport is the ‘refer-a-friend’
or ‘viral marketing’ model. According to the Draft Direct Marketing Code, this is
unlikely to meet PECR requirements even where the person sends on a generated
marketing message rather than providing their friend’s contact details to the
marketer.1 Again, given the popularity of these methods, if the final Direct Marketing
Code maintains this position, there will be a number of sports bodies needing to
review their practices.
(d) Opting out and withdrawing consent
A4.223 As discussed in Sections 3A, ‘Lawful, fair and transparent?’ and 4C, ‘The
rights of rectification, restriction, objection and erasure’ above, whether PECR rules
apply or not, individuals are entitled to withdraw any consent they have given and to
object absolutely to any processing related to direct marketing. This includes both the
sending of marketing itself, and any other processing associated with the marketing,
such as creating profiles or sharing the data with third parties for marketing purposes
(including creation of look-alike audiences and similar).
A4.224 The Draft Direct Marketing Code explains:
‘Whilst you must comply with an objection to your direct marketing, this does not
automatically mean that you need to erase the individual’s personal data. In most
cases it is preferable to suppress their details’.1
This is because it will be necessary to retain evidence that the individual has taken
steps to exercise their rights, and to ensure that this request is respected where
marketing is carried out by third parties who may obtain the individual’s details, such
as social media tools. Sponsors and partners may often pass suppression lists to sports
organisations carrying out hosted or dual marketing on their behalf. Privacy notices
should explain that data will be retained on suppression lists. Erasure requests should
not affect the use of suppression lists, as this data needs to be retained to ensure that
the controller can comply with the PECR and the GDPR.
(e) Children and marketing
A4.225 A number of sports organisations may take steps to send marketing to

children. This is an activity that should be carried out with extreme caution. Electronic
mail marketing and profiling, in particular, will often trigger the requirements under
Article 8 to obtain verifiable parental consent. As mentioned at para A4.137, the ICO
has also included marketing to children as a type of processing that requires a DPIA
to be carried out. The CAP Non-Broadcast Code also contains rules on advertising
to children.1 Where organisations wish to profile or send marketing to children, they
should ensure they have considered both the final form of the ICO’s Direct Marketing
Code and the Age-Appropriate Design Code where this involves online activity.
1 CAP Non-Broadcast Code, Rule 5.
B Cookies
A4.226 Since 2012, PECR has also included consent rules on cookies and similar
technologies. Regulation 6 of PECR tells us that:
‘a person shall not store or gain access to information stored, in the terminal
equipment of a subscriber or user unless […] the subscriber or user of that terminal
equipment—
(a) is provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purposes of
the storage of, or access to, that information; and
(b) has given his or her consent’.1
1 PECR, reg 6(1) and 6(2).
A4.227 Cookies are text files that are downloaded and stored on an individual’s device
(‘terminal equipment’). The rules clearly also apply to other similar technologies,
such as ‘web beacons’ and ‘pixel tags’ that involve the placement of small images
on websites and in emails, and use of methods such as ‘device fingerprinting’ where
information already on a user’s equipment (such as their browser settings or IP
address) is ‘read’ to allow them to be identified as unique individuals.
A4.228 Cookies and similar technologies are used for a number of reasons. They are
often fundamental in the storing of personalisation settings on websites, in storing of
shopping carts between pages, in recognising a logged-in user, and in gathering site
analytics. They are also extensively used in both the targeting of advertising, and in
checking the advertising has been seen. It is through use of cookies that someone can
be haunted by an unbought football shirt across the internet, and be sent questioning
emails titled ‘Why don’t you read these any more?’
A4.229 As mentioned earlier in this section, consent under PECR must meet the
requirements of GDPR consent. Website owners and others who rely on the use of
cookies are obliged to meet the GDPR’s validity requirements, including the need
for consent to be given specifically to named controllers and through active and
unambiguous actions.
A4.230 The EDPB and the ICO have both considered GDPR consent in the context
of cookies. The ICO’s detailed cookie guidance tells us that applying GDPR consent
rules to cookies ‘means that:
(a) the user must take a clear and positive action to give their consent to non-
essential cookies – continuing to use your website does not constitute valid
consent;
(b) you must clearly inform users about what your cookies are and what they do
before they consent to them being set;
(c) if you use any third-party cookies, you must clearly and specifically name who
the third parties are and explain what they will do with the information;
(d) you cannot use any pre-ticked boxes (or equivalents such as ‘on’ sliders) for
non-essential cookies;
(e) you must provide users with controls over any non-essential cookies, and still
allow users access to your website if they don’t consent to these cookies; and
(f) you must ensure that any non-essential cookies are not placed on your landing
page (and similarly that any non-essential scripts or other technologies do not
run until the user has given their consent)’.1
1 ICO, Guidance on the use of cookies and similar technologies, v. 1.0.41 published 3 July 2019, p 11
(ICO Cookie Guidance).
A4.231 The EDPB Consent Guidelines give some specific examples of what is
not acceptable. First, it will not be valid to make access to a website contingent on
consent, through the use of ‘cookie walls’:
‘Example 6a: A website provider puts into place a script that will block content
from being visible except for a request to accept cookies and the information about
which cookies are being set and for what purposes data will be processed. There is
no possibility to access the content without clicking on the “Accept cookies” button.
Since the data subject is not presented with a genuine choice, its consent is not freely
given.
This does not constitute valid consent, as the provision of the service relies on the
data subject clicking the “Accept cookies” button. It is not presented with a genuine
choice’.1
A4.232 Secondly, the EDPB Consent Guidelines address the types of actions that
cannot signal ‘clear and affirmative action’ as required by Recital 32 of the GDPR,
which already tells us that ‘silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not […]
constitute consent’. Example 16 in the Guidelines explains that this means:
‘[…] actions such as scrolling or swiping through a webpage or similar user activity
will not under any circumstances satisfy the requirement of a clear and affirmative
action: such actions may be difficult to distinguish from other activity or interaction
by a user and therefore determining that an unambiguous consent has been obtained
will also not be possible. Furthermore, in such a case, it will be difficult to provide
a way for the user to withdraw consent in a manner that is as easy as granting it’.1
A4.233 As referenced in the ICO Cookie Guidance above, while sports bodies will
place some of their own cookies, a number of the cookies found on any commercial
site are likely to be ‘third party cookies’. These are placed in order to allow third
party organisations (namely, ad-tech providers) to track a user across multiple sites,
allowing for effective analytics and the placing of the unavoidable football shirt
advert on page after page that the user visits. The ICO Cookie Guidance tells us:
’PECR does not define who should be responsible for complying with the requirement
to provide information about cookies and obtain consent. The key point is not who
obtains the consent but that you provide clear and comprehensive information and
obtain valid consent’.1
In practice, ad-tech providers will almost certainly contractually oblige website
owners to obtain valid consent on their behalf. Google’s EU User Consent Policy
takes exactly this approach: it requires website owners using Google’s cookies to take
steps to obtain ‘end users’ legally valid consent’ and retain records of this consent.2
1 ICO Cookie Guidance, p 9.
2 google.com/about/company/user-consent-policy/ [accessed 1 October 2020].
A4.234 Although not a topic confined to cookies, behavioural advertising and ad-
tech frequently plays a part in sports bodies’ marketing strategies, and it is important
to understand how this system works when assessing data protection compliance. It
is beyond the ambit of this book to explain the functioning of ad-tech, but readers
may find both IAB UK’s Jargon Buster1 and its collection of explanatory YouTube
videos2 helpful to their understanding.
1 iabuk.com/jargon-buster [accessed 1 October 2020].
2 youtube.com/playlist?list=PLDqxnbCr0ozqPnH18Ydg-E6gJdMUwFSsO (IAB UK YouTube Playlist:
Digital Back to Basics) [accessed 1 October 2020].
A4.235 Returning to the form in which consent is obtained, the ICO Cookie
Guidance dedicates multiple pages to this topic. It tells us that:
(a) controllers should consider the ‘formatting’, ‘positioning’ and ‘wording’ of
cookie consent mechanisms to increase their prominence;1
(b) pop-ups or ‘splash pages’ may be ‘useful’ ways of ‘highlighting the use of
cookies and consent, although cookies cannot be set if users fail to engage with
any of the options available’;2
(c) for now (as written in 2019) ‘relying solely on browser settings’ to ascertain
consent ‘will not be sufficient’;3
(d) ‘pre-enabling’ non-essential cookies before consent is given will not be
compliant;4
(e) ‘a consent mechanism that emphasises “agree” or “allow” over ”reject”
or “block” represents a non-compliant approach, as the online service is
influencing users towards the “accept” option’.5 This includes the use of larger
icons or fonts; and
(f) ‘a consent mechanism that doesn’t allow a user to make a choice would also
be non-compliant, even where the controls are located in a “more information”
section’.6 This suggests that cookie consent mechanisms require a ‘refuse’
option, which should not be hidden behind an additional second layer.
2 Ibid, p 28.
3 Ibid, p 30 – the use of browser settings to signify consent is particularly foreseen in PECR, reg 3(A).
4 Ibid, p 32.
5 Ibid, p 33.
6 Ibid.
A4.236 These rules all still apply when cookies or similar technologies are used
on mobile devices, but are typically much harder to implement in this environment
thanks to the use of applications and much smaller screens. Guidance on the specifics
of mobile devices can be found in the ICO Cookie Guidance1 and in the Article 29
Working Party’s Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices.2
2 WP202, adopted 28 February 2013.
A4.237 There are limited exemptions to the cookies consent requirements, set out in
Regulation 6(4) of PECR. This Regulation exempts cookies that are:
(a) used solely for ‘carrying out the transmission of a communication’ over the
network – this is of little relevance to the uses of cookies by sports organisations
discussed above; or
(b) ‘strictly necessary for the provision of an information society service requested
by the user’.
A4.238 There is substantial commentary in the ICO Cookie Guidance on what

types of cookies can be considered ‘strictly necessary’. It explains that the exemption
has ‘narrow application’ and does not cover processing that is merely ‘important’.1
Examples it gives of cookies that are likely to be considered strictly necessary include
cookies that ‘remember’ goods in shopping baskets as a user progresses through web
pages, that ensure the security of services, or that allow pages to load promptly through
‘load balancing’.2 Examples of cookies failing to meet this exemption are analytics
cookies, any type of advertising cookie, and cookies allowing personalisation.3
Although analytics cookies are not considered exempt, the ICO does indicate that at
least first-party analytics cookies are unlikely to be an enforcement priority.4 More
assessment on the cookie consent exemptions can be found in the Article 29 Working
Party’s Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption5 and Opinion 09/2014 on the
application of Directive 2002/58/EC to device fingerprinting.6
2 Ibid, p 15.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid, p 36.
5 WP194, adopted 7 June 2012.
6 WP224, adopted 25 November 2014.
7 LIABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT
A4.239 Perhaps the main reason the GDPR has received such considerable attention
from organisations in all sectors is the substantial increase in risk attached to non-
compliance as compared to under the predecessor regime. Under the Data Protection
Act 1998, the ICO’s most powerful tool was the ability to impose a monetary
penalty of £500,000, and it had never been imposed prior to May 2018.1 The GDPR
substantially increases the maximum possible fines. To date, the ICO’s largest
proposed fine under the GDPR amounts to £20 million, imposed on British Airways
in October 2020.2 We discuss below the enforcement powers held by supervisory
authorities like the ICO, the rights of individuals to take action alone or as a group,
and criminal offences and personal liability under the DPA 2018.
1 Only sanctions in force at the time of the infringement can be applied. The ICO’s first fine of £500,000
was imposed on Facebook in October 2018, four months after the introduction of the GDPR, for its
part in the Cambridge Analytica data scandal. The ICO was unable to use its GDPR powers to fine
Facebook, as the related processing took place in December 2015. Facebook has since been fined $5
billion by the US’s Federal Trade Commission over the same incident.
2 ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/enforcement/british-airways [accessed 30 October 2020]. This was a
substantial reduction in fine as compared to the ICO’s ‘notice of intent’, where it proposed a monetary
penalty of £183.4 million. Part of the reduction in this case can be attributed to the financial impact of
Covid-19 on the airline. See ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/07/ico-
announces-intention-to-fine-british-airways/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
A Supervisory authority powers
A4.240 By far the most likely source of punishment for non-compliance with either
the GDPR or PECR will be the regulator. In this section, we shall examine the powers
of supervisory authorities to investigate potential breaches of and to enforce data
protection law.
A4.241 The powers of supervisory authorities are set out in Article 58 of the GDPR.
Each Member State is required to ensure these powers are granted as necessary under
national law under Article 58(6). Article 58(1) lists investigative powers, whilst
Article 58(2) lists enforcement powers. The UK has included these GDPR powers as
appropriate in the DPA 2018. These include the investigative powers:
(a) to order the controller and the processor (or their representative) to provide
any information the supervisory authority requires for the performance of its
tasks.1 In the UK, the ICO is granted ‘information powers’ in ss 142–145 of the
DPA 2018; and
(b) to carry out investigations in the form of data protection audits and to gain
access to any premises, data or equipment necessary.2 In the UK, the ICO has
audit and access rights that can be exercised through the issuing of ‘assessment
notices’ under ss 146–147 of the DPA 2018 and additional rules in Sch 15 to
the DPA 2018.
These powers under the DPA 2018 include the ability to issue ‘urgent’ notices,
including those which would allow (upon a warrant granted by a circuit judge) entry
and inspection of premises without notice, if notice would defeat the object of entry
or if the ICO needs urgent access.3 There is also an associated criminal offence for the
destruction or falsification of documents, information, equipment or material with
the intention of preventing the ICO from viewing or being provided with the relevant
asset.4
1 GDPR, Art 57(1)(a).
2 GDPR, Art 57(1)(b)(e) and (f).
3 DPA 2018, s 146(9).
4 DPA 2018, s 148.
A4.242 Article 57(2) of the GDPR lists the enforcement powers of supervisory
authorities. These are implemented in the UK through s 115(2) of the DPA 2018.
The ICO is empowered:
(a) to issue warnings to a controller or processor that its intended processing is

likely to infringe the GDPR;
(b) to reprimand a controller or processor for an infringement;
(c) to order a controller or processor to comply with a data subject’s rights;
(d) to order a controller or processor to bring operations into compliance with
the GDPR, including by implementing particular methods or in a particular
timeframe;
(e) to order a controller to communicate a personal data breach to a data subject;
(f) to ban particular processing, either temporarily or permanently;
(g) to order rectification, erasure or restriction of data, and to order notification of
such actions to those to whom the personal data have been disclosed;
(h) to withdraw or not issue a certification, or to order a certification body to
do that;
(i) to impose a fine; and
(j) to order the suspension of the flow of personal data to a third country or
international organisation.
A4.243 Under the DPA 2018, the ICO is granted the powers to issue enforcement
notices (ss 149–153) and to issue monetary penalties (ss 155–159). Historically,
the ICO has made frequent use of ‘undertakings’. Although not a formal power
under the Data Protection Act 1998, undertakings involved a softer commitment by
organisations to make changes to achieve compliance. The Commissioner has not
made use of this type of enforcement since June 2018, and appears to have replaced
it with use of its formal enforcement notice powers.
A4.244 Article 83 of the GDPR sets out the general conditions for imposing fines,
including the level of fines that may be imposed. Two different maximum levels of
fine apply:
(1) ‘Up to €10 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 2% of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is
higher’1 – this applies to breaches of Articles 8 (parental consent), 11 (accepting
additional information to identify a data subject), or any of Articles 25 to
39 (specific security and accountability obligations on the controller and
processor), Article 42 or 43 (certification).
(2) ‘Up to €20 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher’2
– this applies to breaches of Articles 5, 6, 7 and 9 (basic principles and legal
basis), Articles 12 to 22 (data subject rights), Articles 44 to 49 (data transfers),
failure to comply with a supervisory authority’s powers, and breaches of any
specific Member State laws in relation to freedom of expression, national ID
numbers, employment data, or research related processing.
Once the Data Protection Exit Regulations come into force, these amounts will be
translated in the UK GDPR into sums in pounds sterling (at the time of writing,
subject to any future amendment, these are set at £8,700,000 to replace €10,000,000
and £17,500,000 to replace €20,000,000).3
1 GDPR, Art 83(4).
2 GDPR, Art 83(5).
3 Data Protection Exit Regulations, Sch 1, para 62.
A4.245 Supervisory authorities are generally required to ensure their imposition of

fines is ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.1 In determining the level of fine to
impose, supervisory authorities must give ‘due regard’ to eleven criteria set out in
Article 83(2), which include:
(1) the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, including the nature of the
data, data subjects and circumstances;
(2) any mitigating action taken by the controller/processor including security
measures;
(3) any previous infringements and compliance with any orders given on the same
topic;
(4) the degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority;
(5) any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor;
(6) whether the infringement was notified by the controller/processor or came to
light through other means;
(7) adherence to any code of conduct or certification mechanism; and
(8) ‘any other aggravating or mitigating factor […] such as financial benefits
gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly, from the infringement’.
1 GDPR, Art 83(1).
A4.246 The ICO has also released a Regulatory Action Policy, which sets out its
objectives in taking action. These are:
(a) ‘to respond swiftly and effectively to breaches of legislation which fall within
the ICO’s remit, focussing on (i) those involving highly sensitive information,
(ii) those adversely affecting large groups of individuals, and/or (iii) those
impacting vulnerable individuals’.
(b) ‘to be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and consistent […] targeting our most
significant powers (i) for organisations and individuals suspected of repeated
or wilful misconduct or serious failures […] and (ii) where formal regulatory
action serves as an important deterrent […]’.
(c) to ‘[…] promote compliance with the law through the promotion of good
practice and provision of targeted advice […]’.
(d) ‘to be proactive in identifying and mitigating new or emerging risks arising
from technological and societal change’.
(e) ‘to work with other regulators and interested parties constructively, at home
and abroad’.1
1 ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2259467/regulatory-action-policy.pdf, p 6, [accessed
1 October 2020].
A4.247 It is too early to assess the ICO’s enforcement activity under this Policy, as it
has taken relatively limited action under the GDPR (at the time of writing, monetary
penalties had only been recently imposed on British Airways and Marriott in relation to
personal data breaches, whilst lengthy investigation into the activities of the activities
of credit referencing agencies as data brokers has resulted in no fines).1 Indeed, much of
the enforcement activity prior to May 2020 has related to breaches under the 1998 Act,
which, notably, still contains the enforcement rules for PECR and limits the maximum
fine that can be imposed for such breaches. Despite these being imposed under the old
law, it is possible to see that the ICO has become more willing to impose larger fines,
with a number of monetary penalties of the maximum £500,000 now levied, where
none had been imposed prior to the GDPR coming into force.
1 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/10/ico-takes-enforcement-action-
against-experian-after-data-broking-investigation/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
A4.248 In reviewing the activity of the ICO, it is possible to note certain trends:
(a) Breaches of security remain, unsurprisingly, at the heart of a large proportion
of enforcement action – this is not likely to change given the widened breach
reporting requirement. That said, organisations should not be discouraged to
report personal data breaches because of the risk of enforcement, particularly
given that the GDPR requires the ICO to consider the route of discovery and the
level of controller cooperation when assessing the level of any fine to impose.
(b) Transparency breaches are also of particular interest to the ICO – a number
of transparency breaches have now been punished with fines, including a
£400,000 penalty imposed on the ‘pregnancy club’ data broker Bounty for
failure to properly inform individuals of the breadth of their data sharing,1 and
a £120,000 penalty imposed on a television production company that failed to
properly inform pregnant mothers of the CCTV style filming being conducted
at a hospital clinic.2 The vulnerability of the affected data subjects was flagged
in both of these cases. A two-year investigation into credit referencing agencies
focused on their ‘invisible’ processing of personal data, with the ICO imposing
an enforcement notice on Experian requiring it to improve its notices and stop
processing of data collected unlawfully.3
(c) Breaches of marketing rules in PECR remain a high priority for the
Commissioner – again, this is unlikely to change given the high public demand
for action and the large number of complaints the ICO receives. Enforcement
action can be triggered for breaches of PECR even where there is a very low
level of complaint about the specific breach. The majority of this enforcement is
against flagrant offenders, such as data brokers and call centre operators, acting
with no regard to the rules. There is, however, a growing level of enforcement
against large businesses that ignore or misapply the rules. Examples of PECR
enforcement action include:
(i) A fine of £12,000 on Royal Mail Group in April 20184 for sending emails
to opted-out customers in relation to price reductions on stamps. Even
though Royal Mail argued that this was a service message and that they
had a legal obligation under the Postal Services Act 2011 to publicise
their tariffs, the ICO considered that the phrasing used and the style of
the message constituted marketing and not simply a service message.
Royal Mail had created two versions of the message, one for opted in
and one for opted out customers; however, according to the ICO it was
clear that both messages were promotional and Royal Mail had failed
to distinguish between service and marketing messages. The ICO stated
that ‘the use of more appropriate content and phrasing could have avoided
what was intended to be a service message becoming marketing’. There
was only one customer complaint in relation to over 300,000 sent emails.
(ii) A fine of £100,000 on EE Limited in July 20195 for sending marketing
text messages to opted-out customers, informing them about their ability
to check their current data usage through the EE app and the ability to get
an upgrade. The ICO did not accept EE’s argument that this constituted a
service message. Again, this was prompted by one complaint to the ICO
in relation to 2.5 million messages sent to opted-out customers.
1 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/04/bounty-uk-fined-400-000-for-
sharing-personal-data-unlawfully/ [accessed 1 October 2020]..
2 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/04/ico-fines-production-company-
120-000-for-unlawful-filming-in-maternity-clinic/ [accessed 1 October 2020].
3 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2020/10/ico-takes-enforcement-action-
against-experian-after-data-broking-investigation/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
4 ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/mpns/2258621/royal-mail-group-ltd-mpn.pdf [accessed
1 October 2020].
5 ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2019/06/ico-fines-telecoms-company-ee-
limited-for-sending-unlawful-text-messages/ [accessed 1 October 2020].
B Individual and group rights of action

A4.249 Although the vast majority of individuals who are dissatisfied with data
handling will complain to the ICO (or other supervisory authority), some will instead
take to the courts. As seen in Section 4, ‘Data subject rights’, above, individuals
must be informed of their right to take judicial action when their rights requests are
refused. The GDPR ensures that individuals can seek a ‘judicial remedy’ against
controllers and processors under Article 79 and compensation for ‘material or non-
material damage as a result of an infringement’ under Article 82. These rights are
implemented through ss 167–169 of the DPA 2018, which allow individuals to seek
compliance orders and compensation.
A4.250 Historically, compensation for data protection breaches has been raised
in a number of UK cases. Many of these cited breach of the Data Protection Act
1998 alongside broader claims of breach of confidence and privacy. These almost
exclusively relate to use of data by newspapers and magazines (including phone
hacking cases), and whilst these are important in developing the law under that Act,
they are not typical of the type of action a sports organisation is likely to face, and
many of them will have little relevance to cases under the GDPR. This is particularly
true of cases quantifying or discussing distress. The Data Protection Act 1998 did
not include, when enacted, any potential to claim damages solely for distress. The
Court of Appeal ruled in 20151 that this was an improper implementation of the
DP Directive, and required that compensation for distress be ‘read in’ by UK courts.
As a result, cases preceding this date must be read with this in mind. It is perhaps
sufficient to note that typically damages awarded for distress alone are modest in
comparison to the potential for fines under the GDPR.2
1 Google Inc v Judith Vidal-Hall and others [2015] EWCA Civ 311.
2 See eg Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 333, where £750 was
awarded for distress caused by inaccurate reporting to a credit reference agency; TLT v Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2217 where the details of an asylum seeker were
published on the Home Office website, resulting in payment of £12,500 in distress damages.
A4.251 It is important to stress that distress or pecuniary damage are not necessary
features for a successful claim, as is clear from Recital 85 of the GDPR and the case
of Lloyd v Google, where the Court of Appeal held in 2019 that a ‘person’s control
over data or over their [browser-generated information] does have a value, so […]
the loss of that control must also have a value’.1 Not every breach can give rise to a
claim, as there is a ‘threshold of seriousness’ that would exclude breaches such as
‘an accidental one-off data breach that was quickly remedied’.2 The Court of Appeal
also considered the assessment of those damages on an obiter basis, and noted
that a claim for loss of control alone would be worth ‘much less’ than if distress or
pecuniary damages were pleaded, but the appropriate sum would ‘not be nothing’.3
Where claims may relate to small breaches, or breaches that do not cause substantial
damage or distress, the risk for all bodies will only substantially increase where there
is the possibility of group litigation (discussed below).
1 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599, para 47.
2 Ibid, para 55, citing a principle established in Gulati v MGN Ltd ([2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch)) and
EWCA Civ 1291 (CA).
3 Ibid, para 77.
A4.252 Whilst the ICO must take care to ensure that it assesses the culpability of the
controller or processor in making any decision to impose a fine, this is not the case
for individuals. First, if the individual has suffered any type of damage, a controller,
or processor must prove that they were ‘not in any way responsible for the event
causing damage’ in order to escape liability.1 Then, ‘where more than one controller
or processor, or both a controller and a processor, are involved in the same processing’
and where they are ‘responsible for any damage’, Article 82(4) of the GDPR allows
individuals to make a claim for ‘the entire damage’ from a single party, ‘in order to
ensure effective compensation of the data subject’. If the data subject is successful,
the unfortunate controller or processor that has footed the full bill is then entitled to
‘claim back from the other controllers or processors involved in the same processing
that part of the compensation’ as corresponds to their respective culpability.2 It is
worth noting that joint controllers are no more at risk from these provisions than two
controllers who consider their activities separate, but whom the court judges to have
been acting over the same processing. Identical rules will apply.
1 GDPR, Art 82(3).
2 Ibid, Art 82(5).
A4.253 Both UK law and the GDPR allow for certain types of group and representative
action on data rights to take place. In Lloyd v Google, the Court of Appeal held that
it is possible to bring a representative action in respect of data protection breaches
in certain circumstances, provided that claimants have ‘the same interest’ required
by CPR Part 19.6(1). The risk here for data subjects is that this does not necessarily
mean they are put in the best position. Representative actions will naturally require a
reduction to the ‘lowest common denominator’ relating to the ‘loss of control’ over
data – fact-specific claims for additional damage or distress cannot be pleaded within
such a group if not suffered by all.1 This does not prevent the action taking place,
but data subjects wishing to seek recompense for more specific damages or distress
would need to take their own legal action, although ‘represented claimants could, at
least in theory, seek to be joined as parties if they wished to claim additional losses’.2
It is also possible to seek a group litigation order under CPR 19.11, allowing for
opt-in rather than opt-out groups of claimants to seek collective redress. By way of
example, such action has been initiated in the UK in respect of the British Airways
breach discussed earlier in this section.3
1 Richard Lloyd v Google LLC [2019] EWCA Civ 1599, para 75.
2 Ibid, para 76.
3 An order was granted in this matter by Warby J on 4 October 2019, judiciary.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/Weaver-ors-v-British-Airways-PLC-sealed-order.pdf [accessed 1 October 2020].
A4.254 The GDPR includes two separate provisions that can permit representative
rather than group litigation. First, Article 80(1) requires Member States to allow data
subjects to proactively mandate a non-profit body or similar public interest bodies
to lodge complaints or take judicial action on their behalf. Secondly, Article 80(2)
allows Member States to extend this to allow such a body to take its own action in
commencing complaints or judicial action (although not a right to seek compensation)
if it believes the rights of a data subject have been infringed. The UK has adopted
legislative provisions to incorporate the right in Article 80(1),1 but has not as yet
adopted regulations that would permit such a body to combine claims of multiple
data subjects. The DPA 2018 commits the government to reviewing these provisions
within 30 months of commencement (ie by end November 2020).2
1 DPA 2018, ss 187–189.
2 DPA 2018, s 189.
C Criminal offences and personal liability
A4.255 The GDPR establishes no criminal responsibility, but the DPA 2018
introduces offences in relation to the following activities:
(a) Destruction or disposal of documents in connection with information or
assessment notices (s 148) – this was discussed at para A4.241.
(b) Unlawfully obtaining or disclosing personal data (s 170) – this makes it an
offence to knowingly or recklessly obtain or disclose personal data without the
consent of the controller. The offence also covers the retention of improperly
obtained data and the procurement of unlawful disclosure, and the sale or
offer to sell any such illegally obtained data. It is a defence to have obtained or
disclosed the data for purposes of preventing or detecting crime, where required
by law, or where necessary for public interest or journalistic or similar purposes.
It will also be a defence if a person can show they had a reasonable belief that
they had the legal right or controller’s consent to obtain or disclose the data.
Examples of this type of offence include employees improperly accessing or
siphoning data, or private investigators obtaining information through illicit
means. Sports organisations making use of enquiry agents for intelligence
gathering purposes should ensure that those agents do not use unlawful means
to obtain this information, given the inducement limb of this offence.
(c) Re-identification of anonymised data (s 171) – this provision makes it an offence
to knowingly or recklessly re-identify information that has been de-identified
without the consent of the controller who took steps to de-identify the data.
Again, there are various defences set out in s 171(3) and (4), similar to those
discussed under the s 170 offence above. There is also a defence for testing
the effectiveness of de-identification in s 172, to prevent the criminalisation of
‘white hat’ probing of anonymisation techniques to ensure their robustness.
(d) Alteration of data to prevent disclosure to a data subject (s 173) – this is
discussed at para A4.158.
(e) Enforced subject access (s 184) – it is an offence to require an individual to
make a subject access request to certain records in connection with recruitment,
employment, or the provision of services. These include police, health and
certain statutory records. There are certain limited defences.
(f) Obstructing or failure to assist the ICO: (Sch 15, para 15) – it is an offence to
intentionally obstruct the ICO’s staff whilst they are carrying out a search and
seize warrant, or to fail to assist when required to do so under such a warrant.
A4.256 The offences in Schedule 15 are triable only in the Magistrates Court. All
the other offences could in theory be tried in a Crown Court, allowing for higher
fines. Although these offences can be committed by corporate persons, s 198 of
the DPA 2018 specifically allows for prosecution of directors, managers, company
secretaries or similar officers or individuals ‘purporting to act in any such capacity’
where the act has been committed with their consent, connivance, or attributable
neglect. This personal liability should be flagged to those in sports organisations who
wish to stretch the bounds of data protection law, in particular where this relates to
direct marketing. A similar personal liability Is extended to breaches of PECR, to
allow the ICO to impose monetary penalties directly on such individuals.1
1 PECR, Sch 1, para 8AA.
D Publicity and trust
A4.257 This Section 7 has focused on enforcement powers and liability, but it is
important to add that a main reason why sports organisations should comply with data
protection law is the importance of maintaining public trust. As clearly mentioned
in the ICO’s Regulatory Action Policy, the ICO is committed to ensuring that its
enforcement action has a deterrent effect. It will continue to take steps to make bad
practice public. Media outlets are quick to publicise poor data practices, particularly
where they relate to large data breaches. Individuals who do not trust a controller to
handle their data correctly are far more likely to exercise their data rights – at the
expense of the body having to handle these requests – and are much less likely to
consent to direct marketing or other data initiatives. Given the importance of data
in so many sporting activities, from the commercial to the regulatory, it is vital to
maintain a clean slate with the public whose information is so valuable.
CHAPTER A5
Best Practice in Sports Governance

Maria Clarke (Maria Clarke Lawyers) and Edwina Haddon and Jonathan Taylor QC
(both Bird & Bird LLP)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... A5.1
2 BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE......................................... A5.5
A International level........................................................................................ A5.6
B National level............................................................................................... A5.10
C Synthesising the key principles.................................................................... A5.19
3 PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE. A5.20
A Transparency................................................................................................ A5.21
B Accountability.............................................................................................. A5.27
C Stakeholder Representation......................................................................... A5.38
D Integrity Controls......................................................................................... A5.43
4 MONITORING COMPLIANCE......................................................................... A5.51
1 INTRODUCTION
A5.1 We start this discussion of best practice in sports governance with a reminder
of what governance is and why good governance is important:
‘What does Governance mean?

Governance can be defined as: “The system by which entities are directed and
controlled. It is concerned with structure and processes for decision-making,
accountability, control and behaviour at the top of an entity. Governance influences
how an organisation’s objectives are set and achieved, how risk is monitored and
addressed and how performance is optimised”. Governance is a system and process,
not a single activity and therefore successful implementation of a good governance
strategy requires a systematic approach that incorporates strategic planning, risk
management and performance management. Like culture, it is a core component of
the unique characteristics of a successful organisation.
Why is good governance important?
The fundamental reasons why organisations should adopt good governance practises
include:
To preserve and strengthen stakeholder confidence – nothing distracts an organisation
more than having to deal with a disgruntled stakeholder group caused by a lack of
confidence in the governing body. And on the positive side, a supportive stakeholder
base can generate benefits for the organisation though social and emotional support,
intangible but very valuable attributes that all organisations should strive to achieve
and sustain;
To provide the foundation for a high-performing organisation – the achievement
of goals and sustainable success requires input and support from all levels of an
organisation. The Board, though good governance practices, provides the framework
for planning, implementation and monitoring of performance and without a
foundation to build high performance upon, the achievement of this goal becomes
problematic. Achievement of the best performance and results possible, within
existing capacity and capability, should be an organisation’s ongoing goal. Good

governance should support management and staff to be “the best they can be”; and
To ensure the organisation is well placed to respond to a changing external
environment – business today operates in an environment of constant change.
Technology has created an information age that has transformed our world, and for
business to both survive and remain profitable to enable it to fulfil its mission and
achieve its vision, a system has to be in place to assist an organisation to identify
changes in both the external environment and emerging trends. This process of
understanding our changing world does not happen by chance, it requires leadership,
commitment and resources from the governing body to establish and maintain such
a system within the organisation. Change generally does not happen “over-night”, it
is there for all to see if they have in place a system for looking. Governing bodies,
as the ultimate leaders of an organisation, should take prime responsibility for this
activity.
In summary, governance encompasses the processes by which organisations are
directed, controlled and held to account. It includes the authority, accountability,
leadership, direction and control exercised in an organisation. Greatness can be
achieved when good governance principles and practises are applied throughout the
whole organisation and that’s why governance is important.’1
1 Governance Today, ‘Governance: what is it and why is it important?’ available at: (governancetoday.
com/GT/Material/Governance__what_is_it_and_why_is_it_important_.aspx?WebsiteKey=0cf4306a-
f91b-45d7-9ced-a97b5d6f6966) [accessed 1 October 2020].
A5.2 Sport is both a public good1 and a multi-billion dollar industry, with many
millions of stakeholders and consumers creating enormous public scrutiny in almost
every nation around the world. National sports teams are often seen as focus of a
nation’s hopes and aspirations on the world stage, and even as an expression of the
nation’s values.2 For governments that see sport as a useful instrument of public
policy,3 sport can also be a recipient of significant public funding and support.4 Yet
at the same time the sports movement jealously guards its self-proclaimed autonomy
and freedom from political interference.5 For all of these reasons and many more, the
non-public international and national sports governing bodies (SGBs) that govern,
regulate, and administer sport around the world have to have good governance
principles embedded throughout their entire operations, so that they can retain public
confidence in their work, so that they can defend their autonomy from a position of
strength,6 and so that as organisations they can perform to the same high standards
they expect of their athletes.7
1 See para A3.7.
2 See para A3.5.
3 See paras A3.7-A3.8.
4 See paras A3.13-A3.15, A3.52 et seq, and A3.112 et seq.
6 See eg European Commission, White Paper on Sport COM(2007) 391 final (11 July 2007), p13 (‘The
Commission acknowledges the autonomy of sporting organisations and representative structures (such
as leagues). Furthermore, it recognises that governance is mainly the responsibility of sports governing
bodies and, to some extent, the Member States and social partners. Nonetheless, dialogue with sports
organisations has brought a number of areas to the Commission’s attention […]. The Commission
considers that most challenges can be addressed through self-regulation respectful of good governance
principles, provided that EU law is respected, and is ready to play a facilitating role or take action if
necessary’); European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September
2013), p 3 (‘sports bodies that do not have in place good governance procedures and practices can
expect their autonomy and self-regulatory practice to be curtailed’). In 2013 the Commission stated:
‘The autonomy of sports bodies is now more susceptible than ever before. Interventions from the
courts, national governments or regulators, commercial interests or European institutions are more
likely. Indeed, in its 2011 Communication “Developing the European Dimension in Sport” the
European Commission developed its position beyond that of previous comments confirming good
governance is a condition for the autonomy and self-regulation of sports organisations’ (ec.europa.eu/
assets/eac/sport/library/policy_documents/xg-gg-201307-dlvrbl2-sept2013.pdf [accessed 1 October
2020]).
Best Practice in Sports Governance 257
7 See eg Sport Australia, ‘Governance – Club Development’ (sportaus.gov.au/club_development/

governance [accessed 1 October 2020]) (‘It is commonly accepted that governance structures have
a significant impact on the performance of sporting organisations. Poor governance has a variety
of causes including director/committee inexperience, conflicts of interest, failure to manage risk,
inadequate and inappropriate financial controls and generally poor internal business systems and
reporting. Ineffective governance practices not only impact on the sport where they present, but also
undermine confidence in the Australian sports industry as a whole’).
A5.3 For many decades, poor governance practices in the sports movement,
particularly at the international level, created a lack of transparency and accountability
that allowed corruption to flourish. The resulting scandals have been deeply damaging
to the SGBs and sports involved, destroying public confidence in each case in the
SGB’s readiness, its willingness, and/or its ability to run the sport in the best interests
of all of its stakeholders. The role of dishonour is long,1 but it suffices for present
purposes to highlight three prominent recent examples:
(a) International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) (now World Athletics)
– in December 2014 a German television documentary was broadcast that
accused high-ranking officials within the IAAF of taking bribes to cover up
doping in Russian athletics.2 In November 2015 an independent commission set
up by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) to investigate those allegations
found ‘a deeply rooted culture of cheating’ within Russian athletics, and
‘corruption and bribery practices at the highest levels of international athletics’.3
In a second report in January 2016, the same independent commission detailed
a ‘complete breakdown of governance structures and lack of accountability
within the IAAF’ that had permitted the son of the then-President (Lamine
Diack), together with the head of the IAAF Anti-Doping Department, to accept
bribes to delay the exposure of Russian dopers until after the 2012 Olympic
Games.4 In January 2016, four of the conspirators were banned for life from
the sport for their breaches of the IAAF’s Code of Ethics,5 which bans were
subsequently upheld at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).6 In addition,
the former President, his son, and his personal lawyer were prosecuted in France
for corruption offences, with verdicts due to be announced in September 2020.7
(b) Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) – on 27 May 2015,
the US Department of Justice announced that it was ‘charging 14 defendants
with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other
offenses, in connection with the defendants’ participation in a 24-year scheme
to enrich themselves through the corruption of international soccer’.8 Of those
14 individuals, nine were senior office-holders at FIFA. The US Attorney
General said that ‘the indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic
and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States. It spans at least two
generations of soccer officials who, as alleged, have abused their positions of
trust to acquire millions of dollars of bribes and kickbacks’, in particular in
relation to the sale of broadcasting rights to international matches,9 but also
(according to a subsequent superseding indictment) in relation to the sale of
votes for the right to host FIFA World Cup Finals tournaments, and for the
sale of votes in the 2011 FIFA President election.10 Several defendants pleaded
guilty to the charges, while others were convicted at trial, and a few remain
fugitives from justice as efforts continue to extradite them to the US to face
trial.11 Although the then-FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, was not indicted, he
was subsequently banned from the sport for six years for paying CHF 2 million
to UEFA President Michel Platini in return for his vote in the 2011 presidential
election,12 while Platini ultimately received a six-year ban.13 Meanwhile
FIFA General Secretary Jérôme Valcke was banned from the sport for ten years
for Ethics Code breaches relating to non-disclosure of conflicts of interest, and
the offering and accepting of improper gifts.14
(c) International Weightlifting Federation (IWF) – in January 2020, another

German television documentary (involving some of the same journalists
who had exposed the athletics scandal) was broadcast that accused the then-
President of the IWF, Dr Tamas Ajan, of financial irregularities, corruption,
manipulation of doping control, doping payment irregularities, and nepotism.15
In June 2020, reporting the outcome of his investigation into those allegations,
Professor Richard McLaren identified further serious wrongdoing (including
vote buying for the President and senior level positions of the Executive Board)
and highlighted the need for significant governance reform within the IWF.16
1 The highest profile early example was when members of the Salt Lake City bid committee bribed
senior members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to vote for Salt Lake City to host the
2002 Winter Olympics, which resulted in three IOC members resigning and six being expelled: ‘IOC
expels all six members in Salt Lake City scandal’, guardian.co.uk, 17 March 1999; Marquette Sports
Law Review, Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 7, ‘The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt
Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal’. In further reaction to the scandal, the IOC revised its
rules for future bidding processes, adopted an Ethics Code, and established an Ethics Commission to
enforce it. Rule 22 of the Olympic Charter now provides: ‘The IOC Ethics Commission is charged with
defining and updating a framework of ethical principles, including a Code of Ethics, based upon the
values and principles enshrined in the Olympic Charter of which the said Code forms an integral part.
In addition, it investigates complaints raised in relation to the non-respect of such ethical principles,
including breaches of the Code of Ethics and, if necessary, proposes sanctions to the IOC Executive
Board’.
Other event bidding controversies include FIFA’s bidding process for the right to host the 2018
and 2022 World Cups, which hit the headlines when eight FIFA Executive Committee members were
accused of corruption in respect of Qatar’s winning bid for 2022. The House of Commons’ Culture,
Media and Sport Committee reviewed the allegations in the course of an inquiry into The FA’s failed
bid to host the 2018 World Cup, and concluded: ‘The Committee was appalled by the allegations of
corruption made against members of the FIFA Executive Committee during the course of its inquiry.
[…] They are sufficiently serious for FIFA to commission a full, urgent and independent investigation,
and for the outcome to be made public. Instead, FIFA has given every impression of wishing to sweep
all allegations of misconduct under the carpet and of dismissing anyone bringing allegations to them
with an approach bordering on contempt’. House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee,
2018 World Cup Bid, Sixth Report of Session 2010-12 (HC 1031, 5 July 2011). A year later, in August
2012, Michael Garcia, the newly appointed chair of the investigative chamber of the FIFA Ethics
Committee, announced that he would investigate the award of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World
Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively. His subsequent report was not made public. Instead, Hans-
Joachim Eckert, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee’s adjudication chamber, published a 42-page
summary of the report, which cleared both Russia and Qatar of any wrongdoing. Shortly afterwards,
Garcia declared that the summary was ‘materially incomplete’, with ‘erroneous representations of
the facts and conclusions’ (bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30042309 [accessed 21 October 2020]), and
tried to appeal to FIFA’s Appeal Committee, which ruled the appeal inadmissible (bbc.co.uk/sport/
football/30491135 [accessed 21 October 2020]). FIFA eventually published the report after it was
leaked to the media, revealing that Garcia had concluded that the evidence established a prima facie
case of possible breaches of the FIFA Ethics Code by certain individuals (including several current
or former members of the FIFA Executive Committee) and that formal investigative proceedings
would be opened against those individuals, that various weaknesses in FIFA’s ethical and bidding
rules had been identified, but no ethical breaches by any bid teams had been identified (img.fifa.com/
image/upload/wnr43dgn3yysafypuq8r.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]). In March 2020, however, a
US Department of Justice indictment alleged that ‘several [FIFA] executive members were offered or
received bribes in connection their votes’ in relation to who would host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World
Cups (Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New
York on 18 March 2020, paras 90–95 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download
[accessed 21 October 2020]).
2 ARD, ‘The secrets of doping: How Russia makes its winners’, 4 December 2014 (youtube.com/
watch?v=iu9B-ty9JCY [accessed 21 October 2020]).
3 WADA, The Independent Commission Report #1 (9 November 2015), pp 10 and 12.
4 WADA, The Independent Commission Report #2 (14 January 2016), p 3.
5 IAAF v Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Dollé and Diack, decision 02/2016 of the IAAF Ethics Commission
panel.
6 Balakhnichev, Melnikov and Diack v IAAF and Ethics Commission of the IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417-
4419-4420.
7 Ingle, ‘Trial of Lamine Diack put back after presentation of new documents’ (2020) Guardian,
13 January.
8 justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-
and (27 May 2015) [accessed 21 October 2020].
9 Gayle, ‘Indictment containing 47 charges of racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering unsealed
against nine officials and five sports executives’ (2015) Guardian, 27 May.
This was not the first such scandal to hit FIFA. A long-running scandal over whether members of
FIFA’s Executive Committee had accepted bribes from a marketing agency, ISL, in order to secure
valuable marketing and television rights contracts to the FIFA World Cup was finally resolved in
April 2013, when the FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber named former FIFA President Joao Havelange
and former Executive Committee members Ricardo Teixeira and Nicolas Leoz as the recipients of the
bribes: Sepp Blatter under fire for bribery culture as honorary president Joao Havelange resigns (2013)
telegraph.co.uk, 30 April.
10 Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York
on 18 March 2020, paragraphs 90–99 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download
11 United States Department of Justice, ‘Sixteen Additional FIFA Official Indicted for Racketeering
Conspiracy and Corruption’ (justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-
conspiracy-and-corruption, 3 December 2015 [accessed 21 October 2020]); United States Department
of Justice, High-Ranking Soccer Officials Convicted in Multi-Million Dollar Bribery Schemes
(justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/high-ranking-soccer-officials-convicted-multi-million-dollar-bribery-
schemes, 26 December 2017 [accessed 21 October 2020]); Inside World Football (insideworldfootball.
com/2020/01/23/warners-extradition-fate-now-lies-hands-uks-privy-council/, 23 January 2020
12 Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 316 (upholding ban imposed by the FIFA Appeal Committee
as reasonable and fair: ‘It must be recalled that Mr Blatter as FIFA President was the top person in
the world of football. There is no higher position in football, and the FIFA President must especially
be aware of and conduct himself in accordance with his duties and responsibilities under the FCE
[FIFA Code of Ethics]. The standard of ethical conduct required under the FCE should be and should
be seen to be applied to the FIFA President as rigorously as if not more rigorously than that applied to
anyone else bound by the FCE. As stated in the very first sentence of the Preamble to the FCE (2006,
2009, and 2012 editions), “FIFA bears a special responsibility to safeguard the integrity and reputation
of football worldwide”. This special responsibility is borne in particular by the FIFA President as the
top person in the organisation and indeed in all of football and must be taken into account when the
FIFA President himself violates the FCE). See also Mohamed Bin Hammam v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625.
Mr Bin Hammam was banned by FIFA’s appeal committee from participating in any football-related
activity for life after he was found guilty of giving gifts and bribing voters during the 2011 FIFA
presidential election campaign. Mr Bin Hammam successfully appealed FIFA’s decision at the CAS,
which found that it was ‘not convinced to the standard of “comfortable satisfaction” that Mr Bin
Hammam made monies available to delegates […] for the purposes of inducing them to vote for him
in the election for the Presidency of FIFA’ (ibid, para 96). The panel noted that it wished to ‘make
clear that this conclusion should not be taken to diminish the significance of its finding that it is more
likely than not that Mr. Bin Hammam was the source of the monies that were brought into Trinidad
and Tobago and eventually distributed at the meeting by Mr. Warner [previously Vice President of
FIFA and President of CONCACAF], and that in this way, his conduct, in collaboration with and
most likely induced by Mr. Warner, may not have complied with the highest ethical standards that
should govern the world of football and other sports. This is all the more so at the elevated levels of
football governance at which individuals such as Mr. Bin Hammam and Mr. Warner have operated
in the past. The Panel therefore wishes to make clear that in applying the law, as it is required to do
under the CAS Code, it is not making any sort of affirmative finding of innocence in relation to Mr.
Bin Hammam. The Panel is doing no more than concluding that the evidence is insufficient in that it
does not permit the majority of the Panel to reach the standard of comfortable satisfaction in relation
to the matters on which the Appellant was charged. It is a situation of “case not proven”, coupled
with concern on the part of the Panel that the FIFA investigation was not complete or comprehensive
enough to fill the gaps in the record’ (ibid, para 95).
13 Platini v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4474.
14 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003.
15 ARD, ‘The Dark Side of Sport’, 5 January 2020 (youtube.com/watch?v=FLYzWqP1UF4 [accessed
21 October 2020]).
16 Independent Investigator Report to the Oversight and Integrity Commission of International
Weightlifting Federation, 4 June 2020 (iwf.net/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2020/08/
CORRECTED-300720-FULL-REPORT-MASTER-FINAL-FOR-PUBLICATION-v2.pdf [accessed
21 October 2020]).
A5.4 This chapter surveys the principles of good sports governance that have been
identified in reaction to these and other impetuses (Section 2), and then considers the
practical implementation of those principles (Section 3), before concluding with a
brief discussion of the mechanisms for monitoring compliance with good governance
principles (Section 4).
2 BROAD PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
A5.5 Since the turn of the century more than 50 sets of good governance principles
and indicators have been identified by a diverse group of stakeholders, including
the IOC,1 international sports federations,2 government agencies,3 umbrella sports
bodies,4 intergovernmental organisations,5 external consultants/NGOs,6 academics,7
and independent reviewers.8 In this section, we highlight some of the key principles
that have been identified from selected reviews.
1 IOC Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (2008);
IOC Consolidated minimum requirements for the implementation of the basic principles of good
governance for national Olympic Committees (2016). See also European Olympic Committee,
’Support the Implementation of Good Governance in Sport’ (SIGGS) (2016).
2 Association of Summer Olympic International Federations, Recommended Key Governance Principles
and Basic Indicators and First Assessment (2016); Second Assessment (2017); Third Assessment (2019);
Union Cycliste Internationale, ‘Report of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission’ (February
2015); Rowland, ‘An Independent Review of the World Squash Federation’ (19 October 2016).
3 Sport and Recreation NZ, ‘Nine Steps to Effective Governance’ (1st Edn 2004, 2nd Edn 2011, 3rd Edn
2019) and ‘Governance Lite – a concise version of Nine Steps to Effective Governance for smaller
sports organisations’ (2020); Sport Canada, ‘Pursuing Effective Governance in Canada National Sport
Community’ (2011); UK Sport and Deloitte & Touche, ‘“Investing in Change” – High Level Review
of the Modernisation Programme for Governing Bodies of Sport’ (July 2003), and now UK Sport,
‘A Code for Sports Governance’ (2017); Australian Sports Commission (now Sport Australia),
‘Mandatory Sports Governance Principles’ (2015) and ‘Sports Governance Principles’ (2020); ’Code
of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations’ (2016).
4 Sport and Recreation Alliance, United Kingdom, ‘The Voluntary Code for Sports Governance’ (1st
Edn 2011, 2nd Edn 2014), and ‘Principles of Good Governance and Recreation’ (2017).
5 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2005)8 of the Committee of Ministers on the principles
of good governance in sport; Recommendation CM/Rev (2011)3 of the Committee of Ministers
on the principle of autonomy in sport; PACE Appendix to ‘Good governance and ethics in sport’
Resolution 1875 (2012); PACE Appendix to ‘Towards a framework for modern sports governance’
Resolution 2199 (2018); European Commission, Expert Group GG ‘Deliverables 2: Principles of good
governance in sport’ (2013).
6 Sorrell, ‘Implementing Good Governance Principles in Sports Organisations: A painful obligation
or a platform for growth’, White Paper from Burson-Marsteller/TSE Consulting (April 2016); Play
the Game, ‘National Sports Governance Observer’ (2018); Sport Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA),
‘Declaration of Core Principles on Sport Integrity – Sport Governance’ (2016); Good Corporation,
‘Sports Governance Framework’ (2016).
7 Chappelet and Mrkonjic, ‘Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS): An
assessment tool for international sport governing bodies’ (Institut de hautes études en administration
publique, January 2013); Geeraert, ‘A Sports Governance Observer’ (2015); Birkbeck Sport Business
Centre, ‘Good Governance in Sport: A Survey of UK National Governing Bodies of Sport’ (April
2010).
8 See eg Lord Burns, ‘FA Structural Review’ (10 June 2005); McLeish, ‘Review of Scottish Football:
Governance, Leadership, Structures’ (December 2010); Slaughter and May, ‘Review of Governance
for the Rugby Football Union’ (November 2011); Crawford and Carter, ‘A Good Governance
Structure for Australian Cricket’ (December 2011); Lord Woolf and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
‘An independent governance review of the International Cricket Council’ (1 February 2012); The
Hon Warwick Smith AM, ‘The Independent Review of Swimming’ (19 February 2013) (Australian
swimming); Christopher Quinlan QC, ‘Review of the Disciplinary Panel, Licensing Committee and
Appeal Board of the British Horseracing Authority’ (September 2016); International Paralympic
Committee, ‘Remaining Fit For Purpose – a summary of the proposal to reform the governance of the
International Paralympic Committee’ (25 October 2019); English Football League, ‘2019 Governance
Review’ (efl.com/siteassets/image/201920/governance-reviews/governance-review.pdf [accessed
21 October 2020]).
A International level
A5.6 The International Olympic Committee (IOC) – The fifth of the ‘Fundamental
Principles of Olympism’ set out in the Olympic Charter states that:
‘sports organisations within the Olympic Movement […] have the rights and
obligations of autonomy, which includes […] the responsibility for ensuring that
principles of good governance be applied’.
In 2008, the IOC issued its ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the
Olympic and Sports Movement’,1 setting out basic governance principles collected
under the following headings:
(a) Vision, Mission and Strategy (setting out the body’s commitment to the
development and promotion of sport through non-profit organisations; the
promotion of the values of sport; organisation of competitions; ensuring a fair
sporting contest at all times; protection of the members and particularly the
athletes; solidarity; and respect for the environment);
(b) Structures, Regulations and Democratic Process (calling for regulations to be
clear, transparent, disclosed, publicised and made readily available; democratic
elections for offices; clear checks and balances between the different branches
of the governing body; and decision-making that is independent and free of
conflict);
(c) Highest Level of Competence, Integrity and Ethical Standards (including
the development and enforcement of ethical rules based on the IOC Code of
Ethics);
(d) Accountability, Transparency and Control (including the executive being
accountable to the members in general meeting);
(e) Solidarity and Development (fair and equitable distribution of resources and
financial revenues);
(f) Athletes’ Involvement, Participation and Care (including care for the safety,
wellbeing and education of athletes); and
(g) Harmonious Relations with Governments While Preserving Autonomy
(‘Cooperation, coordination and consultation are the best way for sporting
organisations to preserve their autonomy’).2
The IOC Code of Ethics states: ‘The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance
of the Olympic and Sports Movement, in particular transparency, responsibility
and accountability, must be respected by all Olympic parties’.3 A more detailed
document, setting out ‘Consolidated Minimum Requirements for the Implementation
of the Basic Principles of Good Governance for National Olympic Committees’ was
published in 2016.4
1 IOC, ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’
(1 February 2008).
2 For further discussion of the issue of government interference with the autonomy of sport, see para
A1.11 et seq.
3 IOC, Code of Ethics (2020) at Article D.11, p 16
4 International Olympic Committee, ‘Consolidated Minimum Requirements for the Implementation
of the Basic Principles of Good Governance for NOCs’ (2016) (stillmed.olympic.org/media/
Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/What-We-Do/Leading-the-Olympic-Movement/PGG-
Implementation-and-Self-Evaluation-Tools-23-12-2016.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).
A5.7 The Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF)1 –

The mission of ASOIF is:
‘to serve and represent the Summer Olympic IFs in the most competent, articulate
and professional manner on issues of common interest in the Summer Olympic
Games and the Olympic Movement, and on any other matter deemed necessary by
the IFs’.2
In November 2015, ASOIF created a Governance Task Force, which it ‘mandated
with helping [IFs] to promote and ensure a culture of good governance within their
structures […]’.3 In 2016 the Governance Task Force identified five key governance
principles (transparency; integrity; democracy; sports development; and solidarity
and control mechanisms), each measured by ten indicators, that it recommended ‘be
immediately embraced by all IFs in all their respective activities, decisions, processes
and regulations’.4
It is recommended that these five key principles should be included by IFs in their
statutes, rules and regulations through simple and easily measurable indicators as
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each IF. It is noted that over time
and as IFs improve their governance structures and policies, more sophisticated
indicators will come into play.
‘1. Transparency
Make the following information public (ie place in public domain eg via official
website):
• Statutes, rules and regulations
• Organisational charts for staff, elected officials and committee structures, and
other relevant decision-making groups including Remuneration Committee
• Vision, mission, values and strategic objectives
• A list of all national member federations providing basic information for each
• All elected officials with biographical info
• Annual activity report and main events reports
• Annual financial reports following external audit
• Allowances/financial benefits of elected officials and senior executives
• General Assembly agenda with relevant documents (before) and minutes (after)
with procedure for members to add items to agenda
• A summary of reports/decisions taken during Board & Commission meetings
and all other important decisions of IF
2. Integrity
• Incorporate in statutes all appropriate ethical principles which align with and
embrace the IOC Code of Ethics and are applicable to all members, officials
and participants
• Have clear rules to guard against conflicts of interest
• Establish regulations which comply with the WADA World Anti-Doping Code
and ensure that their members comply with it
• Establish regulations to tackle match-fixing and manipulation of competitions
in accordance with the Olympic Movement Code against the Manipulation of
Sport Competitions
• Establish confidential reporting mechanisms for “whistle blowers” together
with some form of protection for individuals coming forward with information
• Respect principles of sustainable development and regard for the environment
• Put in place integrity awareness/education programmes
• Provide for appropriate investigation of threats to sport integrity
• Cooperate with relevant public authorities on integrity matters
• Make public all decisions of disciplinary bodies and related sanctions, as well
as pending cases where and as applicable
3. Democracy
• Election of the President and a majority of members of all executive bodies
• Clear policies to ensure election candidates can campaign on a balanced footing
including opportunity for candidates to present their vision/programmes
• Elections process with secret ballot under a clear procedure/regulations
• Make public all open positions for elections and appointments including the
process for candidates and full details of the roles, job descriptions, application
deadlines and assessment
• Establishment and publication of eligibility rules for candidates for election,
including due diligence assessment prior to election/appointment
• Term limits for elected officials
• Provide for the representation of key stakeholders (eg active athletes) in
governing bodies. Due regard shall also be paid to gender representation and
the enactment of policies encouraging gender equality in all governing bodies
• Main decisions are taken on basis of written reports supported by criteria, with
opportunity for a secret ballot at request of voting constituents
• Defined conflict of interest policy with exclusion of members with a manifest,

declared or perceived conflict
• Governing bodies meet regularly: the General Assembly ideally once a year
4. Sports Development & Solidarity

• Transparent process to determine allocation of resources in declared non-profit
objectives
• Redistribution policy and programmes for main stakeholders
• Monitoring/audit process of the use of distributed funds
• Existence of environmental responsibility policy and measures
• Existence of social responsibility policy and programmes
• Education programmes for coaches, judges, referees and assistance to athletes
during and after career
• Due regard is paid to gender and geographical representation through guidelines
• Legacy programmes to assist communities in which events are hosted
• Anti-discrimination policies on racial, religious or sexual orientation
• Cooperation with relevant public authorities on social responsibility issues
5. Control Mechanisms
• Establish an internal ethics committee with independent representation
• Establish an internal audit committee that is independent from the decision-
making body and reports directly to the members
• Adopt accounting control mechanisms and external financial audit
• Adopt policies and processes for internal control and risk management system
• Adopt policies to prevent commercial interests from overriding sporting
regulations eg conduct of draws
• Observe open tenders for major commercial and procurement contracts
• Decisions can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis
of clear rules
• Due diligence and effective risk management in bidding requirements,
presentation, assessment and allocation of main events
• Awarding of main events to follow an open and transparent process
• Internal disciplinary procedure with appeals process and final recourse to the
Court of Arbitration for Sport
In June 2020, ASOIF announced that:
‘IPACS has agreed that the ASOIF model, which has now been used by more than
100 sporting federations, will be the basis for an international recognised benchmark
for sports governance, which is now under development’.5
1 The Association of Olympic Winter Sports (AIOWF) is formed of seven federations and it also
produces an annual governance review, using the same evaluation system as ASOIF (ie the same five
principles and 50 indicators).
2 ASOIF website (‘History’ section asoif.com/history [accessed 21 October 2020] and ‘About ASOIF’
section asoif.com/about-asoif [accessed 21 October 2020]).
3 ASOIF website (‘Governance Task Force’ section, asoif.com/governance-task-force [accessed
21 October 2020]).
4 ASOIF Governance Task Force Report, Approved by the General Assembly November 2016 (asoif.com/
sites/default/files/download/asoif_governance_task_force_report.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).
5 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, Third Review of International Federation Governance (16 June 2020,
asoif.com/sites/default/files/download/asoif_third_review_of_if_governance_fv-0616.pdf [accessed
21 October 2020]), p 5.
A5.8 The Council of Europe1 – The Council of Europe has spearheaded public
authority efforts to promote good governance in the sports movement, mainly through
the Enlarged Partial Agreement on Sport (EPAS):
‘EPAS provides a platform for intergovernmental sports co-operation between the

public authorities of its 38 member states. It also encourages dialogue between public
authorities, sports federations and NGOs. This contributes to better governance,
with the aim of making sport healthier and fairer and ensuring that it conforms to
high ethical standards.
It uses Council of Europe sports standards such as the European Sports Charter and
the Code of Sports Ethics as the basis for carrying out standards, monitoring them
and helping with capacity building and the exchange of good practice.’2
1 See generally Council of Europe website, coe.int/en/web/portal [accessed 21 October 2020].
2 Council of Europe (Democracy, Sport, ‘About the platform’ section, coe.int/en/web/sport-migrant-
integration-directory/about-epas [accessed 21 October 2020]).
A5.9 In December 2018, the Committee of Ministers to the Council of Europe’s

Member States published its recommendation on the promotion of good governance
in sport and the accompanying explanatory memorandum, stressing ‘the role that
governments can play in supporting the implementation of good governance in
sport’.1 The recommendations issued to member states were to:
‘1. ensure that their national legislation effectively allows for investigation,
prosecution and mutual legal assistance, including police and judicial co-
operation, in cases of corruption offences in sport;
2. apply a zero-tolerance policy regarding corruption in sport;
3. ensure that the competent authorities use the relevant anti-money laundering
and anti-corruption provisions and mechanisms to prevent and respond to cases
in the field of sport;
4. monitor directly or indirectly progress towards the implementation of good
governance principles by their national sport movement;
5. consider introducing compliance with good governance principles as criteria
for the awarding of public grants to sports organisations and for sports events;
6. encourage the leaders of their national sport movement to comply with and
actively promote good governance principles while acting within the framework
of international sports organisations;
7. encourage sports organisations acting on their territory to:
– apply the principles of democracy in their decision-making and operations,
and further strengthen their transparency, inclusiveness and democratic
ways of functioning, as well as their accountability;
– develop and implement appropriate good governance measures within
their own regulations and procedures;
– foster a good governance culture through educational initiatives;
– achieve a balanced representation in the diversity of their members –
including gender equality – within their decision-making processes;
– co-operate with independent experts reviewing the good governance of
sports organisations, where appropriate;
– publish the results of any self-assessment on good governance;
– establish external evaluations and audit policies, as appropriate;
– share information on corrupt practices with law-enforcement authorities;
8. Encourage co-operation with all key stakeholders to address any kind of
corruption in sport;
9. Prevent conflicts of interest within bodies – public or private – which are
in charge of both elite sport performance and sport integrity, particularly as
regards the fight against doping and the manipulation of sports competitions;
10. Make sure that whistle-blowers benefit from effective protection, and in particular
are covered by national frameworks for protection, as defined in Recommendation
CM/Rec(2014)7, irrespective of their contractual relation with their organisation.’
Notwithstanding the fact that the recommendations are not binding, they provide
the basis for a more coordinated international approach by public authorities to
encouraging good governance in the sports movement in their respective countries.
1 Council of Europe, Promotion of Goof Governance in Sport (Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)12
and explanatory memorandum (rm.coe.int/recommendation-of-the-committee-of-ministers-to-
member-states-on-the-p/168093fb61 [accessed 21 October 2020]). See also Council of Europe
Recommendation Rec (2005)8 of the Committee of Minsters to Member States on the principles of
good governance in sport, adopted on 20 April 2005.
B National level
A5.10 The Council of Europe’s recommendation that member states ‘consider

introducing compliance with good governance principles as criteria for the awarding
of public grants to sports organisations and for sports events’ has been in place for a
while in certain countries.
A5.11 The United Kingdom – In December 2015, the UK Government announced:
‘To have the strongest voice internationally when pressing for stronger governance
standards, we need to hold ourselves to the highest possible standards domestically.
As in international sport, there are still parts of domestic sport where governance
standards fall below those required of any public limited company or charitable
organisation. It is not acceptable that governance standards should still fall short in
any organisation that receives public money’.1
The UK’s Code for Sports Governance was launched in October 2016, setting out
the minimum standards of transparency, accountability and financial integrity that
would be required as from April 2017 from those national governing bodies (NGBs)
seeking public funding (via UK Sport or Sport England).2
1 Government of the United Kingdom, ‘Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation’
(December 2015), para 8.4.
2 Tracey Crouch MP, Sports Minister at the time, said: ‘It is vital that our domestic sports bodies and
organisations uphold the very highest standards of governance and lead the world in this area. We want
to ensure that they operate efficiently and successfully while being transparent and representative of
society. We have been clear that we will expect them to adhere to the new Code for Sports Governance
if they are to receive public funding in the future’ (uksport.gov.uk/resources/governance-code, October
2016 [accessed 21 October 2020]).
A5.12 The Code for Sports Governance emphasise the importance of five
governance principles:
(1) a clear and appropriate governance structure, led by a properly constituted
board of directors;
(2) increased skills and diversity in decision making (with a target of at least 30 per
cent gender diversity on boards);
(3) transparency and accountability (eg publishing more information and engaging
with stakeholders on the structure, strategy, and financial position of the
organisation);
(4) upholding high standards of integrity and conduct; and
(5) compliance with applicable laws/regulations, financial strategic planning and
controls, and risk management.1
The Code then sets out specific requirements in relation to each principle, which are
divided into tiers, based on the type and size of the investment received by the NGB
in issue. Tier 1 is the minimum level of mandatory requirements (with which any
organisation seeking funding must comply) and Tier 3 is the most exacting standard
(applying to investments granted over a period of years, for a continuing activity and/
or for funding over £1 million). Tier 2 falls in the middle and its requirements are to
be determined on a case-by-case basis.2
1 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 14 to 15.
2 Ibid, pp 10 to 11.
A5.13 It was announced on 13 July 2020 that the Code for Sports Governance will
undergo a review covering:
(a) further development of the elements that support equality, diversity, and
inclusion ensuring greater representation of people from black, Asian and
minority ethnic backgrounds, disabled people or people with a long-term

health condition, as well as female representation; and
(b) whether any elements of the Code can be improved in light of the three years
of experience of 200 bodies using the Code, whether any other elements can be
improved and developments in governance best practice in other sectors.1
1 UK Sport press release, ‘UK Sport and Sport England outline future developments to Code for Sports
Governance’ (13 July 2020).
A5.14 In 2017 the UK Sport and Recreation Alliance developed ‘The Principles of
Good Governance for Sport and Recreation’1 for the vast majority of organisations
operating in the sport and recreation sector that are not recipients of UK Sport or
Sport England funding:
(a) Integrity: Acting as Guardians of the Sport, Recreation, Activity or Area. The
Board must look to uphold the highest standards of integrity not only in what
it does but in the wider environment of its sport, recreation, activity or area.
(b) Organisation’s Vision and Mission. The Board needs to develop a strategic
plan that serves the organisation in light of its vision and mission.
(c) Leadership and Role of the Board. The Board should have the right balance of
skills and expertise required for the long-term success of the organisation and
its growth.
(d) Board Structure: The Board should be balanced, inclusive and skilled as well
as having representation of the diversity of the sport and the communities it
serves.
(e) Controls and Compliance. The Board needs to be conscious of the standards it
should operate to and comply with, and its role in exercising appropriate and
effective control over the organisation.
(f) Accountability and Transparency. The Board needs to be open and accountable
to its stakeholders and its actions should stand up to scrutiny when reasonably
questioned.
(g) Engaging with the Sport and Recreation Landscape. Directors need to be aware
of the international and domestic sporting worlds and position the organisation
appropriately, as well as maintain strategic relationships with key stakeholders
and other governing bodies.
1 Available at sportandrecreation.org.uk/governance/the-principles-of-good-governance [accessed
21 October 2020].
A5.15 Australia – Following disappointing swimming results for Australia at

the London 2012 Olympics, an independent review into the national swimming
federation concluded that it suffered from ‘a culture of non-strategic business
practices and a governance system that did not operate as well as it should’, and
that ‘a lack of transparency in decision making had led to a growing disillusionment
in those who held this responsibility and a general misalignment of stakeholders’.1
The Australian Sports Commission (ASC) subsequently introduced its ‘Mandatory
Sports Governance Principles’.2 In 2013, only the seven sports that received the
highest levels of ASC funding were required to meet these principles but from 2015
that number increased to 23 organisations, being those receiving ASC funding of
more than AUD 1.5million a year.3
1 The Hon Warwick Smith AM, ‘The Independent Review of Swimming’ (19 February 2013), p 7.
2 Australian Sports Commission, now Sport Australia, ‘Mandatory Sports Governance Principles’.
3 Bang, ‘Governments tighten control of national sport organisations’ (Play the Game, 8 December
2016).
A5.16 The Mandatory Sports Governance Principles were replaced with new
Sports Governance Standards in July 2020, which were introduced to help Australian
sports leaders face the challenges of COVID-19 and to build a stronger sporting
future.1 ’The Sport Governance Principles 2020 are aimed at giving sporting boards
and directors clear, consistent and educational advice that improves how sport is
governed, no matter the size or resources of the sporting organisation’.2 There are
nine principles, each including a description of the principle, together with questions
for directors to ask, examples and recommendations:
‘Principle 1: “The Spirit of the Game – Values-Driven Culture and Behaviours” – an

organisation’s culture and behaviours should be underpinned by values which are
demonstrated by the board and embedded in its decisions and actions
Principle 2: “The Team – Aligned Sport through Collaborative Governance” – across
a sport, boards should work together to govern collaboratively and create alignment
to maximise efficient use of resources and implement whole of sport plans.
Principle 3: “The Game Plan – A Clear Vision that Informs Strategy” – the board is
responsible for overseeing the development of the organisation’s vision and strategy
as well as determining what success looks like.
Principle 4: “The Players – a Diverse Board to Enable Considered Decision Making”
– a board should be a diverse group of people who collectively provide different
perspectives and experience to facilitate more considered decision making.
Principle 5: “The Rulebook – Documents that outline duties, powers, roles and
responsibilities – an organisation should clearly define and document its structure
and the duties, responsibilities and powers of members, directors, committees and
management.
Principle 6: “The Playbook – Board Processes which Ensure Accountability and
Transparency” – through effective processes and continual review of its performance,
the board is able to demonstrate accountability and transparency to its members and
stakeholders.
Principle 7: “The Defence – A System which Protects the Organisation” – to
proactively protect the organisation from harm, the board ensures the organisation
has and maintains robust and systematic processes for managing risk.
Principle 8: “The Best and Fairest – A System for Ensuring Integrity” – an
organisation should have measures and protocols to ensure integrity of the sport and
safeguard its participants.
Principle 9: “The Scorecard – Embedded Systems or Internal Review to Foster
Continuous Improvement” – the board must have an appropriate system of internal
controls to enable it to monitor performance, track progress against strategy and
address issues of concern.’
1 Sports Governance Principles microsite, SportAus/AIS online (sportaus.gov.au/governance [accessed
21 October 2020]).
2 Ausleisure online, New resource launched to help Australia’s sporting leaders (3 August 2020,
hausleisure.com.au/news/new-resource-launched-to-help-australias-sporting-leaders/ [accessed
21 October 2020]).
A5.17 Belgium – The Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations (the
‘Flemish Code’)1 explains in its introduction that it has been produced not in reaction
to a sporting crisis but rather based on ‘a profound conviction that good governance
benefits the Flemish sports federations’.2 The Flemish Code ‘presents 43 general
principles that are specified by way of 131 specific criteria. These principles and
criteria are supplemented with 25 tips to help the federations with implementation.
As of 2017, federations that implement good governance will be financially rewarded
by way of indicators that are developed in accordance with the code’.3 The funding
received by Flemish NGBs depends on the extent with which they meet the indicators
set out in the code. One of the main authors of the Flemish Code (who is also the
main author of the National Sports Governance Observer 2018) stated:4
‘The code and the indicators of good governance underscore the importance the
Flemish government attaches to good governance in sport federations. Understanding
that implementing good governance takes time, the Flemish government incentivises
the indicators’ implementation incrementally. In 2018, the federations were
guaranteed 75% of the total amount of good governance subsidies. The proportion
of guaranteed subsidies decreases by 25% each year. By 2022, the total amount of
governance subsidies is based on the federations’ implementation of indicators.’
1 There is no national approach to sport policy in Belgium. The regional government of Flanders has
responsibility for matters such as sports, culture, education and welfare in the region.
2 Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations, Sport Vlaanderen (2016) kics.sport.
vlaanderen/Sportfederaties/Documents/160711_Code_of_good_governance_in_Flemish_sports_
federations.pdf, p 6 [accessed 21 October 2020].
3 Ibid.
4 Geeraert, ‘Reports from Project Partners’ (Flanders, Belgium, National Sports Governance Observer
(2018), p 107.
A5.18 The Flemish Code is divided into three sections: transparency, democracy,
and social responsibility.1 The 43 general principles in the code are:
Transparency
Principle 1: The organisation publishes its articles of association, internal regulations,
organisation chart, sports rules and multi-annual policy plan.
Principle 2: The organisation publishes the agenda and minutes of its general
assembly meeting.
Principle 3: The organisation reports on the decisions of its board.
Principle 4: The organisation publishes information about its board members.
Principle 5: The organisation publishes the contact details of the board.
Principle 6: The organisation publishes information about its members on its website.
Principle 7: The organisation publishes an annual report, including financial
statements and reports of internal committees.
Principle 8: The organisation publishes regulations and reports about the
compensation and bonuses of its board.
Principle 9: In its annual report, the organisation reports on the implementation of
the present code taking into account any changes in terms of good governance.
Democracy and Social Responsibility
Principle 10: Board members are democratically (re-)appointed according to
rigorous and transparent procedures.
Principle 11: The organisation shall establish a standardised introduction procedure
for new board members.
Principle 12: The organisation strives to achieve a differentiated, balanced and
competent composition of its board.
Principle 13: The board establishes a nomination committee.
Principle 14: The organisation establishes a quorum in its articles of association or
internal regulations for the board and the general assembly.
Principle 15: A fixed term has been established as well as phased schedule based on
which board members step down from their role.
Principle 16: The general assembly represents the members and meets at least once
a year.
Principle 17: The board meets on a regular basis.
Principle 18: The organisation is characterised by unity of administration.
Principle 19: The organisation ensures that its internal stakeholders are involved in
the organisation’s operations.
Principle 20: The organisation provides support to its member organisations in the
areas of governance and management.
Principle 21: The organisation pursues a policy of social responsibility.
Principle 22: The organisation implements a policy on healthy and ethical sports in
accordance with the relevant regulations.
Principle 23: The organisation implements a policy on the fight against doping in
accordance with the relevant regulations.
Principle 24: The organisation implements a policy to combat match-fixing.
Principle 25: The organisation implements a policy for the promotion of equality
and diversity.
Internal accountability and control
Principle 26: The organisation respects the relevant legislation.
Principle 27: The board draws up on a multi-annual policy plan.
Principle 28: The board establishes procedures in terms of the premature resignation
of board members.
Principle 29: The organisation defines any conflicts of interest with a membership of
the board in its articles of association.
Principle 30: The organisation applies a clear governance structure, taking into
account the principle of separation of powers.
Principle 31: The board supervises management in an appropriate manner.
Principle 32: The general assembly supervises the board in an appropriate manner.
Principle 33: The organisation has an appropriate risk management system.
Principle 34: The organisation has a financial or audit committee.
Principle 35: The board applies an internal control system.
Principle 36: The board annually evaluates its own composition and performance.
Principle 37: The organisation is controlled by an external, independent auditor.
Principle 38: The board imposes a code of conduct on the members of the board,
management and personnel.
Principle 39: The board establishes conflicts of interest procedures that apply to the
members of the board.
Principle 40: The board establishes procedures for the processing of complaints in
the bylaws.
Principle 41: The board establishes an annual work plan and meeting schedules.
Principle 42: The organisation encourages the inclusion of external members on the
board.
Principle 43: If necessary, the board establishes supporting committees.
1 Code of Good Governance in Flemish Sports Federations, Sport Vlaanderen (2016, kics.sport.
vlaanderen/Sportfederaties/Documents/160711_Code_of_good_governance_in_Flemish_sports_
federations.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]), pp 9 to 40.
C Synthesising the key principles
A5.19 Clearly there is significant overlap between the various principles of good
governance in sport that have been identified by different stakeholders. Many have
called for an industry-wide standard of governance to be created and monitored.1

Academics have said that:
‘[the] key challenge in improving the governance of [SGBs] is to find a common

conceptual and empirical language for discussing the different aspects of governance.
Doing so would help build a sense of community among the sport system’s main
stakeholders and reduce the likelihood of “other” governance frameworks being put
forward’.2
In December 2019, the International Partnership Against Corruption in Sport
(IPACS)3 responded to calls for one agreed set of principles common to all SGBs
at all levels of all sports by committing to ‘using the ASOIF indicators as a basis to
develop a benchmark of sports governance at international and national level’,4 but
none had been published at the time of writing.
1 See eg Parent MM & Hoye R, ‘The impact of governance principles in sport organisations’ governance
practices and performances: A systematic review’ (2018) 4(1) Cogent Social Sciences (’This
systematic review has demonstrated that, despite an increase in interest in research associated with
good governance principles and guidelines in sport, there is a clear need for both the international sport
community and researchers to develop an agreed set of governance principles and language relevant
for international, national, provincial/state and local level sport governance organisations. This may be
unrealistic given the multitude of stakeholders involved, such as the International Olympic Committee,
IFs and numerous national (sport) agencies, as well as the different legal and cultural contexts between
national sport systems; but, this lack of coherence will limit the ability of both sport organisations to
improve their governance and researchers to understand which principles and guidelines are central to
improved governance performance in sport organisations’).
2 Chappelet and Mrkonjic, ‘Assessing Sport Governance Principles and Indicators’ in Winand and
Anagnostopoulos (Eds), Research Handbook on Sport Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019),
p 23.
3 IPACS is a multi-stakeholder platform with the mission to strengthen and support efforts to eliminate
corruption and promote a culture of good governance in and around sport. The founding partners are
the IOC, Council of Europe, OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development); the
UK Government, and the UNODC (United Nationals office on Drugs and Crime).
4 IPACS press release, ‘IPACS General Conference Highlights Achievements, Attracts More
Governments’ (17 December 2019, ipacs.sport/news/ipacs-general-conference-highlights-
achievements [accessed 21 October 2020]).
3 PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO

PRACTICE
A5.20 In this section, we address how the broad principles of good sports governance
that have been identified can be put into practice. We start with transparency, which
many see as an effective antidote to corruption.
A Transparency
(a) Publishing key documents and information on the SGB’s website
A5.21 Best practice suggests that at a minimum the SGB should publish on its
website:
(a) its statutes and bye-laws;
(b) sports rules;
(c) basic information about the members of the SGB’s legislative body1 and of its
executive board;2
(d) an organisation chart;
(e) its vision, mission, values, and strategic objectives;3
(f) the agenda and minutes of meetings of members in Congress or General
Assembly;
(g) if not the minutes of executive board meetings, then press releases announcing
key executive board decisions; and
(h) an annual activity report.
1 As to which, see para A1.28 et seq.
2 As to which, see para A1.33 et seq.
A5.22 In the governance reforms instituted in the wake of its 2015 corruption
scandal,1 the IAAF (now World Athletics) committed to improving its transparency
by also publishing ‘the composition of its different bodies, applications for roles,
decisions, reports, remuneration of IAAF officials, and decisions of the Disciplinary
Tribunal’,2 as well as an organisation chart.
1 See para A5.3.
2 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), para 3.14. The entire proposed
governance reform package was approved by 95 per cent of members that voted at a special congress
held in December 2016: ‘Overwhelming vote for IAAF reform delivered by membership’, (2016)
World Athletics online, 3 December.
A5.23 As part of its governance reforms, World Sailing has said that ‘a number of
documents will be made available on the World Sailing website including:
(a) World Sailing Strategy, organisational chart;
(b) calendar of the scheduled meetings including AGM, Board, Olympic Council,
Committees and Sub-Committees;
(c) disclosure of any financial compensation or other benefits paid or given to the
President, Board members or other World Sailing Officials;
(d) agenda, supporting papers and reports, and the minutes (recording the results
of voting) of all General Meetings including AGMs; and
(e) summary of all meetings of the Board, Olympic Council, Committees, Sub-
Committees and Working Groups’.1
Similarly, the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) has proposed that the
agenda and minutes of all General Assemblies will be published on the IPC website.
A calendar of General Assembly, IPC Governing Board and Committee meetings
will also be published. A summary of each IPC Governing Board meeting will also
be published’.2 ‘The criteria and process for awards will be published on the IPC
website, including the Paralympic Order’, and ‘all positions with the IPC including
Governing Board, Committees and staff will be publically advertised via the IPC
website and other avenues’.3
1 World Sailing, ‘the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform
the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 10.2(h). World
Sailing cancelled its 2020 Extraordinary General Meeting at which the governance reform proposals
were to be considered due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
2 International Paralympic Committee, ‘Remaining fit for purpose: a summary of the proposal to reform
the governance of the International Paralympic Committee’ (25 October 2019), para 3.9.1.b.i. The
IPC has cancelled its plans to hold its 2020 Extraordinary General Assembly due to the Covid-19
pandemic. A new timeline has been devised that will mean elements of the governance reform
proposals will be put before the membership to vote on at the 2021 IPC General Assembly and at the
2022 or 2023 IPC General Assembly.
3 International Paralympic Committee, ‘Remaining fit for purpose: a summary of the proposal to reform
the governance of the International Paralympic Committee’ (25 October 2019), para 3.9.1.c.i and
para 3.9.1.d.i.
(b) The purpose, values or strategy of the SGB
A5.24 The objectives of the SGB will usually be set out in its constitution. For
example, the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (FIH) state:
‘1.4. The fundamental purposes of the FIH are:

(a) to promote and develop Hockey at all levels throughout the world, in
accordance with the rights and freedoms of the Olympic Charter, and without
discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, gender, sexual orientation,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status;
(b) to govern and regulate the sport at the international level, and to recognise
Continental Federations and National Associations to govern and regulate
the sport at a continental/national level, in accordance with and subject to the
FIH’s ultimate authority over the sport;
(c) to protect the independence and autonomy of the FIH and its Members and
Continental Federations to govern and regulate the sport, including exercising
the right of democratic elections free from any outside influence;
(d) to control the organisation and scheduling of competitions (including,
without limitation, “world” or “international” championships and other events
purporting to be “world” or “international” events or to determine “world” or
“international” champions of Hockey), so as to ensure that the sporting calendar
is organised and scheduled in accordance with the best long-term interests and
priorities of the sport as a whole;
(e) to preserve the integrity of the sport, including (without limitation) by adopting
rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code and other appropriate codes
of conduct and ensuring that such rules and codes are enforced at all Hockey
events sanctioned by the FIH, a Continental Federation and/or a Member (as
applicable); and
(f) to establish and maintain an efficient administration to control, regulate and
direct the affairs of the FIH and the sport of Hockey.’1
1 International Hockey Federation Statutes, fih.ch/media/13314743/fih-statutes-2018.pdf (3 November
2018) [accessed 21 October 2020], para 1.4.
A5.25 To help strengthen the ethos and values of the SGB, which are the essential
foundation of any good governance model,1 the SGB should supplement those
general objectives by developing and publishing a detailed strategy plan, including
an implementation plan that uses key performance indicators to make the SGB
accountable to its members for achieving it. A good example comes from the
Badminton World Federation, which sets out its mission, corporate values, and a
strategic implementation plan for the period 2020 to 2024 on its website.2
1 Sorrell, ‘Implementing Good Governance Principles in Sports Organisations: A painful obligation
or a platform for growth’, White Paper from Burson-Marsteller/TSE Consulting (April 2016)
insidethegames.biz/media/file/28816/White%20Paper%20and%20Game%20Changer%20Model.pdf
2 Badminton World Federation (‘About’ section, corporate.bwfbadminton.com/about/ [accessed
21 October 2020]).
(c) Publishing the annual financial reports and other financial information
A5.26 The financial aspects of the recent weightlifting scandal1 confirm that a lack of
transparency about financial reporting can hide a multitude of sins, particularly when
power at the SGB is concentrated in the hands of a few. Therefore good governance
mandates independent auditing (in accordance with international accounting
standards) of the SGB’s annual accounts, and publication of the audited accounts for
review by stakeholders. Many also call for publication of the compensation and other
benefits paid to the SGB’s President and board members, as well as senior managers,
the amount of income tax paid by the SGB, and access to its archives containing
historical information on the same subjects. For example, the Fédération Equestre
Internationale (FEI) posts annual financial reports that have been externally audited,
and it includes an archive of these and other reports on its website.2 Meanwhile FIFA
publishes in its annual Governance Report the remuneration paid to its President and
council members, senior executives, and committee members.3
1 See para A5.3.
2 Fédération Equestre Internationale, inside.fei.org/fei/about-fei/resource-library/fei-annual-report
[accessed 21 October 2020]. Other examples include the Badminton World Federation, corporate.
bwfbadminton.com/about/annualreports/ [accessed 21 October 2020]; Union Cycliste Internationale,
uci.org/inside-uci/publications [accessed 21 October 2020]; and Fédération Internationale d’Escrime
(the International Fencing Federation), fie.org/fie/documents/reports [accessed 21 October 2020].
3 See fifa.com/what-we-do/governance/finances/ [accessed 21 October 2020], eg FIFA Governance
Report 2018, pp 60 to 63. Other examples of international federations who publish payments,
allowances and benefits include the Badminton World Federation, corporate.bwfbadminton.com/
statutes [accessed 21 October 2020]/, in Chapter 1 of its Statutes; and the UCI (uci.org/inside-uci/
publications [accessed 21 October 2020], see eg the 2018 Annual Report, p 122).
B Accountability
A5.27 ‘Sports bodies should establish clear levels of oversight and accountability
for their various decision-making bodies to ensure that powers are exercised
appropriately and consistently with the objectives and functions of the relevant
body. Proportionate checks and balances should be developed by the sports body
concerned’.1 Furthermore, ‘for all decision making organs, sports bodies should
clearly identify procedural rules and the rights of members/stakeholders to participate
in consultations, debates and/or decision making processes’.2
1 European Commission, Expert Group ‘“Good Governance” Deliverable 2 report’ (September 2013),
p 13.
2 Ibid at p 8. See CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 58 (‘If an International Federation proposes to make
changes to its rules, those rules should, if possible, be made after discussion, consultation and
explanation with the constituent bodies of that International Federation so that everyone at the National
Federations understands clearly what is permitted and what is not permitted. A similar process should
be undertaken if National Federations wish to change their rules so as to ensure that their constituent
members of clubs have that understanding. The Panel accepts that there must in every sport be
occasions on which discussion, consultation and explanation cannot take place before rule changes
are made, but, hopefully, such occasions will be rare. If they do occur, great care must be taken, after
the changes have been made, to explain the consequences and ramifications of the changes’); but
cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v. UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘For a regulator or legislator,
it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible and to hear
the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think of, eg,
parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a United
States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings to any
party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably subject the
[international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively preclude
it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F Supp 1103, at
1122)’ [other citations omitted]).
(a) The members in general meeting (Congress or General Assembly)
A5.28 The supreme decision-making body of an SGB is its membership sitting in

general meeting, sometimes referred to as the Congress or General Assembly.1 Many
of the key decisions of the SGB, including as to changes to its constitution, as to the
formula for distribution of development funds from the SGB to its members, and as
to the winding up of the SGB, are vested exclusively in the members in Congress.
World Sailing’s latest reforms include proposals to give members the further right to:
(a) approve the quadrennial World Sailing strategy plan;
(b) remove the President and/or the Board in accordance with the laws; and
(c) approve members of the Investigations Panel, Disciplinary Tribunal and the
Elections Panel, on the recommendation of the Nominations Panel.2
The members in Congress also have the right to review (and ratify or reject) decisions
made by other decision-making bodies of the SGB, such as decisions to issue
new rules or amend existing rules governing the playing of the sport. In addition,
meetings of the members in Congress ‘act as the conduit for the members’ views,
and can therefore play an important role in ensuring healthy democracy within the
organisation’.3
2 World Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to
Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 2.2(i).
3 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), p 32.
A5.29 Many SGBs have ‘one member one vote’, but some have weighted voting
for federations in different categories of membership or who meet specified criteria.1
The ‘one member, one vote’ approach is straightforward to understand and creates
democratic equality among members, however large and powerful or small and
marginal they may otherwise be. However, critics argue that it increases the risk
of corruption.2 Furthermore, the ‘weighted vote’ approach enables members who
contribute more to the sport to get more votes, so incentivising all members to pull
their weight. As a result:
‘transferring the approach of weighting of votes to international sport organisations

may improve their democratic quality as well as reducing such dark sides as
corruption and vote buying. While the representation of small member associations
is still guaranteed their voting power will be (slightly) reduced’.3
1 For example, in 2015 World Rugby changed its constitution so that member unions can gain one or
two extra votes by meeting specific governance criteria, or if they have qualified for the past two Rugby
World Cups, or if they have made a major contribution to the growth and development of the game:
‘Expanded game representation and independence at the heart of World Rugby governance reform’
(World Rugby online, 10 November 2015). Meanwhile the Badminton World Federation allocates its
member associations a minimum of one vote and a maximum of five votes ‘on the basis of criteria
that favour those that prove able to contribute the most to the further development of badminton’,
measured by objective milestones, including having more than 10,000 registered players in each of
the four years of the assessment period. In addition, the allocation of votes is reviewed every four
years on a retrospective basis: Pedersen, ‘Examples of evolving good governance practices in sport’ in
Transparency International, Global Corruption Report: Sport, (Routledge, 2016), pp 63–64.
2 Mittag and Putzmann, ‘Reassessing the Democracy Debate in Sport Alternatives to the One-
Association-One-Vote-Principle?’ in Alm, Action for Good Governance in International Sports
Organisations, Final Report (Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, April 2013), p 84.
3 Ibid, p 91.
A5.30 In any event, these all-important rights of membership mean that there
must be a transparent, objective, and fair process set out in the constitution for
the admission or expulsion of member federations.1 In addition, given the obvious
corruption risks of undue influence and even vote buying,2 there should be strong
ethical and procedural rules in place that minimise the risk of corruption of the voting
processes.3
1 See further the discussion of these issues for international SGBS at para A1.43 et seq and para A1.60.
The UK’s ‘Code for Sports Governance’ requires that membership of NFBs be inclusive and accessible:
‘membership based organisations are expected to take all reasonable steps to ensure they are accessible
to all sections of the community’ and that ‘[o]rganisations should think about the information provided
as part of the membership application process to ensure those to whom membership may be refused
understand why’. Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 18 to 19.
2 See examples at para A5.3.
3 See para A5.34 and the discussion of sanctioning individuals for breaching such rules at para B3.154
et seq.
A5.31 The recommendation is that members meet in Congress or Generally

Assembly annually,1 although the sheer number of members, and the expense of
gathering them together, mean that many SGBs hold such meetings only every two
or four years.
‘Ordinarily, the constitution of a sports body should include details of the entitlement
of relevant members, stakeholders and participants to vote at meetings, majorities
required for particular decisions, regularity of meetings, the right to receive notice
of meetings, order of business under consideration, and the opportunity to make
representations. Once established, there should be strict compliance with the
constitution and procedural rules’.2
There should also be clearly specified quorum requirements and a clearly defined
process to be followed when members are asked to make a decision, including
potentially provisions for a secret ballot.3
1 See para A5.7 and A5.18.
2 European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), p 8.
3 See further para A5.7 and A5.34 fn 5.
(b) The board of directors/governing council
A5.32 Between meetings of members, decision-making power has traditionally sat

with a board or council (akin to a company board of directors), chaired by the SGB’s
president. Traditionally the board (or the president alone) has exercised significant
executive power, including approving commercial contracts, with the SGB staff
providing more administrative than professional support. However, the risks of
having so much power concentrated in the hands of a few have been demonstrated
in many of the recent integrity scandals, leading to calls for the strict separation of
governance from management.1 Therefore the role and responsibilities of the board
should be made clear in the SGB’s constitution. If it has any executive function, that
should be clearly delineated and its accountability in that function to the members in
Congress made clear. Preferably the board should have a supervisory function only,
overseeing of the strategic direction, policies, and values of the organisation, and
supervising the management and standing committees in their work implementing
that strategy. Under this model, the board’s role is to provide leadership, to identify
values and standards, and to decide the strategy and priorities of the organisation,
while establishing a system for control of risks and otherwise supervising the work
of management. Management is usually led by a chief executive officer (aka ‘General
Secretary’ or ‘Director General’), and their roles, powers, and responsibilities, should
also be specified in the SGB’s constitution. The board is then accountable to the
members in Congress, the management are accountable to the board, and the staff is
accountable to management.
1 See eg IOC’s Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement
(para A5.6), Art 2.6 (‘A clear allocation of responsibilities between the different bodies such as general
assembly, executive body, committees or disciplinary bodies, should be determined. There should
be a balance of power between the bodies responsible for the management, supervision and control
of the sport organisations: principle of checks and balances’) and Art 3.6 (‘Leadership is above
management’).
A5.33 In addition to the transparency measures outlined above,1 there are various
means of holding the board accountable in the exercise of its rights and responsibilities.
In particular:
(a) Many members of the board are elected to that office by the member federations
voting in Congress.2 In case of poor performance or misconduct, the constitution
should give members the right to call an extraordinary meeting to remove some
or all of the board.3 In any event, at the end of their term (usually four years),
if they wish to stay in office the board members must be voted back on by the
members at a new election congress. In this way, the members are accountable
to the members as their electorate. This election process is such an important
means of holding the board to account that various measures must be taken to
protect its integrity.4
(b) The constitution may provide for independent directors to be appointed to the
board, to bring not only broader experience and different perspectives to bear
on the board’s deliberations but also independent oversight of its activities. The
value of independent directors is well-recognised in corporate governance,5 but
the sports movement has been slower to recognise their value. As far back as
2005, Lord Burns recommended that two independent non-executive directors
be added to the board of The Football Association (The FA):
‘there should be at least two independent directors and if the chairman was an
independent director then there probably should be another two as well. […] If we
are to have regulation of football, which I assume we do want, and as we implement
the rules that have now been developed in UEFA, then it needs a board that is
constituted differently from that which it is now. The present board is as if with the
Financial Services Authority we had a controlling interest by the banks whom they
are regulating. I do not think anybody would regard that as really being a satisfactory
state of affairs. So a lot depends on what you think the purpose of The FA is. Is it to
run the England team? Is it to be an effective governing body and regulatory body of
football? The more you want it to play the second role, the more that it has to have
some people on the board who do not have vested interests in the regulation that is
taking place‘.6
The UK Code for Sports Governance now requires that at least 25 per cent of
an NGB’s board are independent non-executive directors.7 Slowly international
federations are also taking up the idea.8
(c) There must be a clear and detailed policy for dealing with board members’
conflicts of interest, whether personal or institutional (ie arising from the board
member’s other position as a director or officer of a member federation or other
stakeholder9), including a system for declaration of conflicting interests and a
policy for when the conflict may be waived and when the conflicted member
has to absent themselves from the discussion. ASOIF recommends that:
‘[a] defined conflict of interest policy is published with evidence of implementation,
such as a register of interests and/or reference to the exclusion of conflicted
individuals from decision-making. The policy should distinguish between types
of conflict such as actual, potential and perceived with an explanation of potential
remedies. The register may not be public but the declared interests should be shared
among the Executive Board or corresponding group’.10
FIFA’s rules on the topic have been criticised:
‘the conflict of interest rules applicable to the board members do not establish
that conflicts of interest are reported before or at the start of every board meeting,
listed in the minutes, and recorded in the registry. They also do not require that
every commercial transaction with a third party, with which a board member has
an (in)direct familial or commercial relationship, must be submitted to the general
assembly or to a body mandated by the general assembly. Finally, the rules do not
establish the circumstances in which board members must abstain from voting’.11
One of World Sailing’s proposed reforms is:
‘[to] consolidate the various rules and policy on conflicts of interest into one rule/
policy and establish a programme of education for members of the Councils,
Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups on how to manage them. The
new independent whistleblowing mechanism, Investigations Panel and, if required,
the Disciplinary Tribunal provide an avenue for reporting and enforcing any alleged
breaches of conflicts of interest. The Tribunal will have the power to order a decision
null and void if it was decided when a person had a conflict of interest and voted
on it’.12
(d) The European Commission has stated that:
‘sporting bodies should allow for the appointment of technical or expert committees
(whether standing or ad hoc) and/or working groups for specialist work and advice
on relevant issues. The terms of reference, reporting lines and status of committee
decisions or recommendations should be clearly identified and communicated to all
members, stakeholders and participants’.13
For example, the World Athletics executive board:
‘has the power and responsibility to establish committees, taskforces or other groups
to carry out any work of the Executive Board, under its delegated authority including
but not limited to one or more sub-committees for finance, audit and risk’.14
Such committees can provide independent scrutiny and oversight of crucial
risk areas.15 In 2016 Mr Domenico Scala resigned as an independent member
of FIFA’s audit and compliance committee after FIFA passed rules giving
the FIFA Council the power to appoint and dismiss members of independent
committees until the congress the following year, in a move that was understood
to be an attempt to undermine independent scrutiny. Michael Hershman (a co-
founder of Transparency International) said that Mr Scala’s exit was ‘the worst
thing that could have happened’ to FIFA, and that:
‘I remain convinced now more than ever that FIFA, if it is to survive, there must be
independent oversight because they have no credibility‘.16
Further control mechanisms – in the form of eligibility checks, application of ethics
code, oversight by compliance officers, and investigation and enforcement by
independent integrity units – are discussed below.17
1 See para A5.21 to A5.26..
2 Some may be appointed, in which case there should be a nominations committee, with at least some
independent members, to identify suitable candidates (including those proposed by the board or others)
who can bring any missing competence, skills, experience, and diversity to the board. World Sailing is
proposing to introduce a nominations panel composed of (a) three independent persons (‘independent’
being a person that has not been a member of or held a position in World Sailing or with any of its
members in the last five years and does not have any close connection with any director or employee of
World Sailing) with expertise in non-executive governance recruitment, appointed by the board following
public advertisement; and (b) the president, in a non-voting capacity. The inclusion of the president is
to ensure that the nominations panel is aware of gaps in expertise or skills needed on the board. World
Sailing, ‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the
Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 4.2.
3 See eg World Triathlon’s Constitution, which provides for the removal of members of the Executive
Board by Congress (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/constitution_and_by-laws, 14 January
2020 [accessed 21 October 2020]), Art 34.12.
5 In 2019, independent non-executive directors made up 66 per cent of all directors of the top 150 FTSE
companies, excluding chairs: 2019 UK Spencer Stuart Board Index (Spencer Stuart, 2019), p 16.
6 Lord Burns, FA Structural Review (10 June 2005), p 2; evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport
Committee, ‘Football Governance’ (8 February 2011, HC), question 27. He explained further: ‘The
problem that we are trying to fix, and we have been through in some detail already, is the fact that the
board is dominated by people whose main interests lie on one side of the game or the other. If the board
is going to carry out a regulatory role then it needs some rebalancing, and for the reasons also that
Lord Triesman has explained, independent directors do bring a different perspective on life. They are
usually working elsewhere, they are seeing how other boards work, they see standards and practices
and the way that things are done, and they are able to help in terms of the whole culture of the way
in which a board operates. I have spent the last 13 or 14 years on a whole variety of company boards
and the independent directors really do bring a very different perspective. They ask the questions that
very often are not being asked by the executive team or the people who are not independent. Indeed,
following my report, I notice that there has been an introduction of independent directors on to the
national game board. I think there have been independent people brought on to the regulatory body that
has now been established. So the principle does not seem to be lacking in The FA. It is just that when
it comes to the FA board itself, the vested interests of the people who are on that board are making
it very difficult to get any real breakthrough on this. Having one person who is independent—and all
credit to Lord Triesman for seeking to carry out that role—it’s an enormously lonely role to be the only
independent director. Frankly to be chairman and the only independent director I think is even more
lonely’ (ibid, answer to question 49).
7 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 25 and 38.
8 World Rugby has two independent members on its 12-person Executive Committee. The ICC board
includes one independent director. The FIA Senate (12 members) can appoint up to four independent
members. The International Netball Federation has one board member approved (but not elected) by
Congress on the board’s recommendation.
Some IFs have the power to co-opt additional members for their skill and expertise. For example,
the FIBA (Basketball) Central Board (of 23 members) can co-opt up to six voting members;
the President of FIBV (volleyball) may co-opt up to four additional members to the Executive
Committee (of 13); and the UCI Management Committee (18 members) may co-opt up to two
additional persons.
9 For example, the ITF’s Code of Ethics states that in addition to personal conflicts, ‘Officials must also
disclose in the same manner any “institutional” conflicts of interest, ie, actual, apparent or potential
conflicts between the interests of the ITF and the interests of a Member or Regional Associational
or other body with which they are associated (whether by virtue of employment or otherwise). Such
conflicts may not be waived‘: International Tennis Federation, Code of Ethics (27 September 2019),
Art 2.2.3.
10 ASOIF Governance Support and Monitoring Unit, Guidance Document on Governance ‘Quick Wins’
(5 April 2019), p 8.
11 Geeraert, ‘An assessment of good governance in five international sports federations’ (Sports
Governance Observer 2018, November 2018), pp 32–33.
Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 10.2(f).
13 European Commission, Expert Group ‘Good Governance’ Deliverable 2 report (September 2013), pp
9 to 10.
14 World Athletics, Governance Rules (Book B – B3.1, 1 November 2019), Rule 4.29.
15 World Sailing, for example, has proposed to ‘monitor the internal controls and risk management
mechanisms and assess their effectiveness’ through an Audit Sub-Committee. World Sailing,
‘Refreshing the Foundation for our Future (Revised): A Summary of the Proposal to Reform the
Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 3.2(i).
16 Associated Press, ‘Domenico Scala exit damages reform at FIFA – ex-adviser Michael Hershman’
(2016) ESPN online, 2 June.
(c) Democratic elections of office-holders
A5.34 Requiring members of the board to be elected by the members of the SGB
and providing for their removal from office by members in case of misconduct is
an important constitutional constraint on the power of the board. Given the clear
potential for corruption of the electoral process, however,1 good governance demands
that a number of measures be put in place to guarantee that all elections are free and
fair, including not only:
(a) making sure that the SGB’s ethics code strictly prohibits undue influence over
or improper interference with the election process (eg through the buying and
selling of votes);2 but also
(b) ensuring there is a fair allocation of votes among members;
(c) giving members proper opportunity to nominate candidates for election;
(d) publishing an open and fair nominations process with clear deadlines;3
(e) publishing clear eligibility criteria for electoral candidates;4
(f) ( issuing clear campaigning rules that allow candidates for election a fair and
equal opportunity to present their credentials to members;
(g) having clear rules for the voting process itself, including:
(i) whether the ballot should be open or secret;5
(ii) how votes must be cast in order to be valid;
(iii) whether independent scrutineers are to be appointed to distribute ballot
papers (if the vote is not electronic), to count the ballot papers returned,
to rule on any vote validity issues, and to count votes cast;
(iv) what majority is required to win the election
(v) in case of multiple candidates, how candidates are to be eliminated over
different voting rounds; and
(vi) how any protests will be resolved;6 and
(h) establishing an independent committee to oversee the election and ensure that
the election rules are followed.7
The Covid-19 pandemic has also demonstrated the need for rules addressing
what happens when members cannot gather in person for an election congress,
including whether the election should be postponed (so prolonging the term of the
incumbents) or whether there should be provision to hold the election congress
remotely.8
1 See para A5.3.
2 See para B3.164.
3 All deadlines must be strictly met; no warning or grace period has to be given. See Chiyangwa v FIFA,
CAS 2017/A/5098, para 108 (‘The Panel notes, however, that the deadline was clearly made, in bold,
in the Letter, but does acknowledge that there was no warning that a failure to meet the deadline could
result in the eligibility process coming to an end. The Panel notes that this is not a disciplinary process,
where a warning of possible sanctions is customary so a party can defend themselves and be properly
heard, rather it was an application process for a job or position with one of FIFA’s bodies. If one fails
to answer questions asked of them during an interview process, the likely outcome is that one won’t
get the job. This is implicit and customary’).
4 See para A5.44.
5 In the 2016 FIFA presidential election, candidate Prince Ali bin al-Hussein applied to the CAS for
provisional measures requiring FIFA to use transparent voting booths during the vote, so that voters
could not take photographs of their ballot papers (so allowing them to vote freely even if they were
being influenced unduly, or bribed, to cast their vote for a particular candidate). His application
was rejected by the CAS: HRH Prince Ali Al Hussein v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4459; ‘FIFA election:
Prince Ali fails in attempt to force use of transparent voting booths’ (2016) Guardian online,
24 February.
6 In BTTC v ITTF, CAS 2005/A/996, the Brazilian national table tennis federation challenged the
elections of the executive board of the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) at the annual
general assembly, alleging that there had been serious irregularities, including bribery, the counting
of invalid votes, and lack of secrecy during the voting. The ITTF’s constitution and rules did not
contain a dispute resolution mechanism, so the parties agreed to refer the dispute to CAS. The CAS
sole arbitrator sided with the appellant and annulled the results of the election. Quoting Baddeley,
L’association sportive face au droit (1994), the sole arbitrator said: ‘the principle of equality of
treatment demands that the rights of those members who acted fairly and whose candidates were
not elected be preserved, since […] such principle is particularly important for an association: “…
[the] principle of equality of treatment between members imposes itself due to the fundamental
characteristics of an association, that is the pursuit of a common non-lucrative goal, the democratic
basis of the entity and the fact that the social relationship depends more on the cooperation between
members than on financial contributions”’ (ibid, para 138).
In Chanpanich v FA of Thailand (FAT), CAS 2013/A/3389, after he failed to be elected as FAT
president in 2013, Mr Chanpanich challenged the outcome of the election, alleging the existence of a
number of violations in the electoral process, including votes being cast by non-members/delegates,
and interference by senior members of the FAT staff. The CAS panel noted that ‘its duty is to settle a
legal dispute according to the law […] this Panel is not called upon (and in any case does not want)
to address sports politics […] even though it is aware that its decision will inevitably have effects on
the governance of FAT – a matter which has “political” implications, at least from a sporting point of
view. In other words, this award is not, and cannot be construed to be, an endorsement of either of the
Candidates who run for President of FAT: it is only about the observance of the rules applicable to, and
the impact of such “irregularities and breaches”, if any, on, the electoral process’ (ibid, para 115). It
rejected Mr Chanpanich’s appeal on the facts.
7 See generally ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF Council’, EPAS (2016)
INF13, p 7; ASOIF Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested components of electoral rules and processes
for international federations’ (19 October 2017), pp 6-8; SIGA Good Governance Universal Standards
Implementation Guidelines (siga-sport.com/pdfs/Good_Governance_Universal_Standards.pdf
[accessed 21 October 2020]), pp 3-4.
World Triathlon has a section in its constitution dedicated to elections, identifying (among
other things) which positions are elected by the congress, which members are eligible to vote, and
how voting is conducted: World Triathlon Constitution (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/
constitution_and_by-laws [accessed 21 October 2020], 14 January 2020), Art 30. World Triathlon
also publishes its voting numbers in congress minutes. See eg para 16 of the 2018 congress minutes
(triathlon.org/uploads/docs/2018_Congress_Minutes.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]).
8 Morgan, ‘World Sailing Board to discuss the status of Presidential election amid coronavirus concerns’
(2020) Inside The Games, 5 April (World Sailing considering options in light of inability to hold
congress in person and absence of provision in constitution or applicable law for ‘virtual’ congress).
On 23 July 2020, World Sailing confirmed that its members had approved a resolution to amend
the constitution to allow for an electronic election: ‘World Sailing’s Committee is now accepting
nominations for the 2020 election of the World Sailing President and Vice-Presidents’, 23 July 2020
(sailing.org/news/90120.php#.X0rQ3ZrsbIV [accessed 21 October 2020]).
A5.35 In December 2007, noting that ‘certain member associations paid too little
heed to […] democratic principles in the past’, FIFA issued a Standard Electoral Code
‘in order to unify electoral procedures at FIFA’s member associations and ensure
compliance with basic democratic guidelines during member association elections’.1
The Standard Electoral Code contains provisions on the electoral committee, the
candidatures, the voting procedure and the count, among other things. Failure to
apply the Standard Electoral Code or violation of its provisions is considered a
breach of the FIFA Statutes. Further, the Standard Electoral Code gives FIFA ‘the
right to intervene in the electoral processes of the association at any time to monitor
its integrity and check that [the] code and the statutes and regulations of FIFA are
being applied’, as well as the right to ‘suspend or invalidate the electoral processes
and/or appoint a provisional administration for the association, as the case may be’,2
meaning that FIFA is able to step in to prevent breaches before they happen.3
1 FIFA Circular (28 December 2007, no 1129), p 2.
2 FIFA Standard Electoral Code, Section G. Final Provisions (29 October 2007), ss 2 and 3.
3 In March 2020, after the scheduled elections for the board of the Football Kenya Federation (FKF)
were cancelled, the Kenyan Sports Disputes Tribunal ruled that the incumbents’ terms had ended and
so they had to vacate their positions. In response, FIFA stated that the Sports Disputes Tribunal’s’
decision went against the FKF’s recently amended Electoral Code, and required reinstatement of the
FKF Executive Committee: ‘Kenyan calls intensify for FIFA to step in as trust in FKF dissipates’,
(2020) Inside World Football, 3 May.
(d) Term limits
A5.36 Having term limits for elected officials is a simple but effective way to
ensure no one person remains on the board or a committee for too long, entrenching
their power and preventing new blood and innovation. The UK’s Code for Sports
Governance requires that a director serve either:
(a) four terms of two years;
(b) two terms of four years; or
(c) three terms of three years.1
ASOIF makes the following recommendations:2
‘10.1 The recommended limit is three terms of four years for all elected officials.
10.2 There may be a rule to prevent any elected official who has served three terms
in the same or multiple roles from serving another term without a break of
at least two years. Alternatively, there may be a limit on the total number of
terms which in individual can serve in multiple roles.
10.3 The terms may be counted from the congress at which they are initially
adopted.
10.4 It is recommended that there should be no exemption clauses.
10.5 A specific rule is needed to deal with the case of an official taking up their
position part-way through the term due to a vacancy. It may be decided that
filling a vacancy for any period of less than three years does not count as a full
term.’
At World Athletics, for example, elected officials can sit for a maximum of three
terms (of four years each) on its Council or its executive board, while the President:
‘is subject to a maximum total number of 5 terms in office (20 years), including
terms as a member of Council or the Executive Board. This means a person could
be a Council Member for two terms (8 years) and then have three additional terms
(12 years) as President‘.3
2 ASOIF Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested Components Of Electoral Rules and Processes for
International Federations’ (ASOIF, 19 October 2017), p 5.
3 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), paras. 3.5.
A5.37 Terms should be staggered so that the knowledge and experience of an entire
board is not lost overnight. For example, World Sailing has proposed the introduction
of staggered terms for board directors:
‘so that every two years at least 4 members on the Board will rotate off the Board
(unless re-elected or re-appointed) as follows: […] Year 1 (being the year of the
Olympics) – President, 2 elected directors, 1 appointed director and Chair of
Athletes’ Committee; [..] Year 3 – 3 elected directors, 1 appointed director’.1
Reform the Governance of World Sailing including adjustments’ (20 September 2019), para 3.2(g).
C Stakeholder representation
A5.38 SGBs should:
‘include the key stakeholder groups in decision-making structures, cooperate and
coordinate activities with other relevant sport organisations and relevant sport related
organisations, support and motivate member organisations to also establish good
governance standards and, form strategic alliances with key stakeholder groups to
further fuel the successful implementation of the organisation’s strategy’.1
For example, as part of the 2016 governance reforms in athletics, an entire
‘IAAF Convention’ was established in order to have representation from relevant
stakeholders. This ‘Convention’ is held in conjunction with each World Athletics
congress, and includes ‘representatives from across the global Athletics family
including Member Federations, Areas, athletes, coaches, sponsors and other
stakeholders’.2 Including representatives of stakeholders on the board is an effective
way of helping to develop a culture of inclusive decision-making. In her recent review
of UK Athletics, Dame Sue Street noted that ‘there is a desire for more transparency
and openness, particularly around decision-making. It was also suggested that the
culture has not been as collaborative as is necessary for the sport to succeed‘.3 As a
result, she recommended ‘that each HCAF [Home Country Athletics Federations] has
the right to nominate a director to the UKA [UK Athletics] Board, whilst maintaining
the requirement that all Board directors act in the best interests of UKA‘.4
1 SIGA Good Governance Universal Standards Implementation Guidelines (siga-sport.com/pdfs/Good_
Governance_Universal_Standards.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020]) p 5.
2 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), para 3.2.
3 Street, UK Athletics Review – Summary of Findings (May 2020), p 1.
4 Street, UKA Change Plan 2020 (May 2020), p 2.
A5.39 There may be issues about how member federations are represented on the
decision-making bodies of the SGB. Usually the constitution requires that there be
at least one representative of each continent on the board,1 but if there are different
categories of membership for national federations there should also usually be at
least some representation of each membership category on the board.2
1 See eg International Tennis Federation Constitution, Art 21(h)(iv) (itftennis.com/media/2431/
the-constitution-of-the-itf-2020-english.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020], 2020). Similarly, World
Rugby gives all six regional associations two votes on its council: ‘Expanded game representation
and independence at the heard of World Rugby governance reform’ (2015) World Rugby online,
10 November.
2 For example, the International Cricket Council (ICC) has two categories of membership: full
members (‘the governing bodies for cricket of a country recognised by the ICC, or nations associated
for cricket purposes, or a geographical area, from which representative teams are qualified to play
official Test matches (12 members)’) and associate members (‘the governing bodies for cricket of
a country recognised by the ICC, or countries associated for cricket purposes, or a geographical
area, which does not qualify as a Full Member, but where cricket is firmly established and organised
(92 members)’) (icc-cricket.com/about/members/about-our-members [accessed 21 October
2020]). The ICC’s articles of association provide that the ICC board of directors will consist of
one representative of each of the twelve full members and three representatives of the 92 associate
members. See ICC articles of association, Art 4.2(b) and 4.2(c) (icc-static-files.s3.amazonaws.com/
ICC/document/2017/07/10/07bf21fa-a22c-4828-a80a-f93b643d052b/ICC-new-constitution-22-June-
approved-by-Full-Council.pdf [accessed 21 October 2020], 22 June 2017).
A5.40 There are also increasing calls to give athletes a central role in the SGB’s
decision-making. Many SGBs now have athlete committees, but they often have
limited influence, and so some SGBs have included the chair of the athletes’
committee on its board or council. For example, the chair (or other designee) of the
Athletes’ Committee of the International Biathlon Union (IBU) is a voting member
of the IBU’s 11-strong Executive Board;1 the chair of the Athletes’ Commission sits
on the Executive Board of the World Squash Federation, together with a nominee
from the Professional Squash Association;2 and the chair and one other member of
the World Athletics Athletes’ Commission sit on the World Athletics Council3
1 IBU Constitution (October 2019), Art 16.1.2.
2 Pursuant to the recommendations of an independent review (Rowland, ‘An Independent Review of the
World Squash Federation’, 19 October 2016), p 17), See World Squash Federation, Memorandum &
Articles of Association (6 November 2019), Art 87.
3 World Athletics Constitution (November 2019), Art 41.1d.
A5.41 Another principle of good governance is that bodies make better decisions
when their membership is diverse. The sports movement has been very slow
to embrace diversity, whether of gender or anything else, but things are slowly
changing. For example, World Triathlon requires a minimum of 25 per cent of each
gender in the membership of its congress, executive board, and committees;1 while
the IBU constitution specifies that of the nine elected members of its executive
board, ‘there must be at least two representatives of the male gender and at least
two representatives of the female gender among them (provided that there are
at least two from each gender among the candidates for election)’, and the same
applies in respect of the elected members of the IBU’s Technical Committee and
Athletes’ Committee.2 Meanwhile the World Athletics Constitution specifies that in
the upcoming 2023 election Congress there should be a minimum of one female
Vice-President elected and in the 2027 election Congress there should be a minimum
of two female Vice-Presidents elected,3 in addition to a minimum number from each
gender required amongst the total number of Council members (ten of each gender
for the 2023 elections and 13 of each gender for the 2027 elections and thereafter).4
At the national level, the UK’s Code for Sports Governance requires NGBs to adopt a
target of, and take all appropriate actions to encourage, a minimum of 30 per cent of
each gender on its board, and that they demonstrate a strong and public commitment
to progressing greater diversity on the board (including in relation to black, Asian
and minority ethnic diversity, as well as people with disabilities).5
1 World Triathlon Constitution (triathlon.org/about/downloads/category/constitution_and_by-laws,
14 January 2020 [accessed 21 October 2020]), Arts 18 and 30.7.
2 IBU Constitution (October 2019), Arts 16.2, 24.2, and 25.2.2.
3 World Athletics Constitution (1 November 2019), Art 36.5c.
4 Ibid, Art 36.6c.
A5.42 At the same time, the board should not be so big as to become unwieldy. In
2019, the average board size in the top 150 FTSE companies was 10.3.1 The UK’s
Code for Sports Governance requires that the board should be of appropriate size
to meet the organisation’s requirements but no more than 12 people overall (unless
otherwise agreed with UK Sport or Sport England).2 This is easier to achieve when the
SGB also has a supervisory council sitting behind the board (because stakeholders’
desire for representation can be met by giving them seats on the supervisory council).
For example, World Rugby’s executive committee has 12 members (chairman, vice-
chairman, nine elected officials – two of which are independent members – and the
chief executive),3 while World Athletics’ governance reforms created an executive
board of nine members (president, four vice presidents, three appointed members
from either within the athletics family or independent, and the CEO as a non-voting
member).4
1 2019 UK Spencer Stuart Board Index (Spencer Stuart, 2019), p 15.
2 Code for Sports Governance (UK Sport and Sport England, 2016), pp 24 to 25.
3 ‘Expanded game representation and independence at the heard of World Rugby governance reform’
(World Rugby online, 10 November 2015).
4 IAAF, ‘Time for Change’ (IAAF Reform, 30 September 2016), para 3.4.
D Integrity controls
A5.43 Best practice in sports governance includes installing a number of integrity-
related control mechanisms on top of the constraints on SGB decision-making set out
above. For example, ASOIF’s Governance Taskforce has suggested1 that the SGB:
‘• Establish an internal ethics committee with independent representation
• Establish internal yet independent audit committee
• Adopt an internal control and risk management system
• Adopt accounting control mechanisms and external financial audit
• Carry out due diligence assessments of elected and senior officials prior to
election/appointment
• Observe open tenders for major commercial and procurement contracts
• Decisions can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis
of clear rules
• Due diligence and effective risk management in bidding requirements,
presentation, assessment and allocation of main events
• Awarding of main events to follow an open and transparent process
• Internal decisions can be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport’.
We discuss certain of these suggestions below.
1 ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF Council’, EPAS (2016) INF13, p 8.
(a) Integrity checks (vetting)
A5.44 Any person wishing to take up any position at an SGB (whether elected,
appointed, employed, or contracted) should have to meet specified eligibility criteria.
For example, the IBU’s constitution states:1
‘26.2 Anyone who wishes to become or remain an IBU Official must be Eligible to
do so. A person is not Eligible to become or to remain an IBU Official if he
or she:
26.2.1 is a minor according to Austrian law (save that minors may be
permitted to act as interns or apprentices within the IBU Staff as
permitted by Austrian law);
26.2.2 has been adjudged bankrupt and has not been discharged from
bankruptcy or is subject to a condition not yet fulfilled or any order
made under insolvency laws;
26.2.3 has been convicted in the previous ten years of an offence that
involved mistreatment of people (ie, physical or sexual abuse or
misconduct, hate crimes, or similar) or an offence that is punishable
by a term of imprisonment of two or more years (whether or not they
received such a term of imprisonment), and any appeal rights against
that conviction have expired or been exhausted;
26.2.4 is prohibited from being a director or promoter of or being concerned
or taking part in the management of a company due to their breach of
or noncompliance with any applicable law or regulation;
26.2.5 is subject to an order by a relevant authority that they are lacking in

competence to manage their own affairs;
26.2.6 is deprived of their civil rights by proper application of the law;
26.2.7 is serving a period of ineligibility imposed for breach of:
26.2.7.1 the IBU Integrity Code; or
26.2.7.2 any code of ethics or other rules of conduct of an
NF Member or of another sports organisation;
26.2.8 has been found by a relevant authority to have committed an anti-
doping rule violation (whether or not they served any period of
ineligibility for that violation);
26.2.9 has been removed from office by Congress or the Executive Board in
accordance with this Constitution or the Rules (or previous versions
thereof);
26.2.10 is otherwise prohibited from holding such position, or any similar
position, under any other circumstances provided by law;
26.2.11 otherwise fails an assessment, made by the Vetting Panel in
accordance with the Vetting Rules, of whether the person (a) is of
good character and reputation; (b) is able to meet the high standards
of conduct and integrity required of an IBU Official; and (c) is
physically and mentally fit to perform the role in question; or
26.2.12 in the case of a candidate for appointment to the BIU Board, does
not have the independence or experience or expertise required for the
role, as specified in the Constitution or the Rules.’
1 International Biathlon Union Constitution (19 October 2019), Art 26.
A5.45 SGBs should have a process in place to vet candidates against these criteria.1
‘One option is for a committee with an independent majority or at least independent

representation to determine whether or not each nominated candidate is eligible for
election according to agreed rules. The committee should report its decisions to the
[SGB] administration or the electoral committee, if one exists‘.2
For example, World Athletics uses a vetting panel made up of three people who are
independent of World Athletics and approved by the Congress on the recommendation
of the Council. A decision of the vetting panel that a candidate is ineligible may be
appealed to CAS.3 The Independent Governance Committee for the FIFA Governance
Reform Project said in 2012 that:
‘first and foremost it is fundamental that nominees for senior FIFA positions are
vetted by an independent Nominations Committee, to be put in place as soon as
possible, in order to ensure that candidates for the next elections fulfil the necessary
substantive criteria and ethical requirements and that the selection process is fair
and transparent‘.4
Candidates who have failed the assessment by that committee have challenged the
subjective nature of certain of the eligibility criteria, but the CAS has not upheld
those challenges.5
1 If the body tasked with such assessment raises concerns with the candidate and no response is received,
this could be grounds to terminate the eligibility process. Chiyangwa v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5098,
para 115 (‘In the Panel’s determination, the FIFA ERC was justified to raise any additional concerns
highlighted in the Mintz Report, to enable it to ultimately take a decision on the eligibility of the
Appellant. If those concerns go unanswered, what could the Appellant reasonably expect? The process
would be, and was, justifiably terminated at that point’).
2 ASOIF Governance Workshop, ‘Suggested Components Of Electoral Rules and Processes for
International Federations’ (ASOIF, 19 October 2017), p 5.
3 World Athletics Constitution (1 November 2019), Articles 65–69. The IBU has adopted similar
provisions. IBU Constitution (19 October 2019), Art 27.
4 Independent Governance Committee, FIFA Governance Reform Project, ‘First Report by the
Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee of FIFA’ (Basel Institute on
Governance, 20 March 2012), p 3.
5 In Bility v FIFA, CAS 2015/A/4311, para 57, the CAS panel noted that ‘an integrity check is rather an
abstract test as to whether a person, based on the information available, is perceived to be a person of
integrity for the function at stake’. The panel cited with approval the part of the decision in Adamu v
FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, ‘where it was stated that “officials as highly ranked as the Appellant [who
was a member of the FIFA Executive Committee at the time] must under any circumstance appear as
completely honest and beyond any suspicion. In the absence of such clean and transparent appearance
by top football officials, there would be serious doubts in the mind of the football stakeholders and
of the public at large as to the rectitude and integrity of football organizations as a whole. This public
distrust would rapidly extend to the general perception of the authenticity of the sporting results and
would destroy the essence of the sport”’ (CAS 2015/A/4311 at para 59). The panel concluded that
‘on the basis of all the information at its disposal, […] the FIFA Ad-hoc Electoral Committee could
reasonably come to the conclusion not to admit the Appellant as a candidate in the election for the office
of FIFA President in 2016. The Panel however deems it important to emphasise that the outcome of the
present arbitral proceedings shall not be interpreted as a ruling that the Panel perceives the Appellant
as being corrupt, dishonest or not a person of integrity, but rather that the Appellant is one of the first
persons subjected to the winds of change blowing through the FIFA administration and failed to meet
the very high standards of integrity that are currently demanded from the office of FIFA Presidency in
order to clean the image of the worldwide governing body of football’ (ibid, para 90). The CAS panel
in Derrick v FIFA, 2016/A/4579, para 87, endorsed the decision in Bility, noting that because of the
recent events concerning football organisations and FIFA in particular (as to which, see para A5.3) ‘it
had become necessary to increase and enhance the checks and controls of the potential high officials
that operate in these organisation’. It ruled: ‘In the light of the discretionary power provided for in the
FGR [FIFA Governance Rules], it is not the function of the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee to
decide whether a candidate has violated the FIFA Code of Ethics but to determine whether the person
at stake has an impeccable integrity record and to render its opinion on the suitability of the candidate.
In this respect, the FIFA Audit and Compliance Committee concluded that due to his disciplinary
record and the ongoing investigation against the Appellant before the FIFA Ethics Committee, the
Appellant did not meet the requirements necessary to become Vice-President of the FIFA, and the
Panel agrees with its decision’ (ibid, in CAS Bulletin (2018/1), p 41, para 3.).
See also the discussion of the English Football League’s similar ‘Owners’ and Directors’ Test’ at
para B5.12.
(b) Code of ethics
A5.46 Upon appointment, all officers, directors, employees and committee

members of the SGB must agree to be bound by a comprehensive code of ethics. The
IOC adopted its first Code of Ethics for members and officials in the wake of the Salt
Lake City voting scandal,1 and its ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance
of the Olympic and Sports Movement’ require international federations and national
Olympic committees to develop and enforce ethical rules based on that Code.2 ASOIF
therefore expects its members to ‘incorporate in Statutes all appropriate ethical
principles which align with and embrace the IOC Code of Ethics and are applicable
to all members, officials and participants’.3 Details of the contents of such ethics
codes and of cases dealing with alleged ethical violations are set out elsewhere in
this book,4 but they should generally include commitments to respect for the human
rights of all participants,5 including a prohibition of unlawful discrimination of any
kind, specific provisions on avoidance of conflicts of interest, prohibitions on exerting
undue influence and disclosing confidential information or exploiting it for improper
purposes, a section on gifts and hospitality, setting out what is acceptable and the
process that needs to be followed in order to accept such offers (paying heed to any
relevant national legislation, such as the UK’s Bribery Act 2010), commitments to
abide by any stand-alone integrity-related rules (eg anti-doping rules,6 rules against
the prevention of manipulation of competitions,7 and safeguarding rules8), and finally
a broadly-worded catch-all provision to sweep up any other unethical conduct.9
1 See para A5.3, fn 1.
2 IOC, ‘Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement’
(1 February 2008), principle 3.6.
3 ASOIF, ‘1st report of the Governance Task Force to ASOIF Council’, EPAS (2016) INF13, p 7. See
also ASOIF Governance Support and Monitoring Unit, ‘Suggested Components for Codes of Ethics
for International Federations’ (20 March 2019).
5 See generally Centre for Sport and Human Rights, Championing Human Rights in the Governance of
Sports Bodies (31 March 2018, sporthumanrights.org/en/resources/championing-human-rights-in-the-
governance-of-sports-bodies [accessed 21 October 2020]).
6 See generally Part C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).
7 See generally Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption).
8 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding). See also Mukurumbira KD, ‘13 characteristics of a
safeguarding in sport culture’ 17 December 2019 linkedin.com/pulse/13-characteristics-safeguarding-
sport-culture-desmond-mukurumbira/ [accessed 21 October 2020] (‘good safeguarding in sport
culture is a mark of good governance’).
9 In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, the appellant was sanctioned for contravening Art 3
of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which stated: ‘Officials shall show commitment to an ethical attitude while
performing their duties. They shall pledge to behave in a dignified manner. They shall behave and act
with complete credibility and integrity’. On appeal, the CAS panel rejected his argument that Art 3
contravened the requirement of legal certainty, ruling that it was ‘sufficiently clear and precise and
unambiguous and provides a sufficient legal basis to sanction the Appellant’ (ibid, para 150). It ruled
that the fact that the prohibition was ‘capable of catching a multitude of acts as unethical or lacking
credibility and integrity does not mean that it lacks sufficient basis’, because ‘generality and ambiguity
are different concepts’ (ibid, para 151). It was not necessary to list all of the acts that would be caught
by the prohibition, ‘as an official, in reading the rule, could clearly make the distinction between
what is an ethical attitude and what is not, what is acting with complete credibility and integrity and
what is not’ (ibid, para 152). ‘The Panel is of the view that the inherent vagueness of concepts such
as ethics and integrity does not preclude them to be used by sports legislators as a basis to impose
disciplinary sanctions on officials that do not conform their behaviour to those standards. Indeed,
in sports there are other notions, such as “unsportsmanlike conduct” or “sporting fairness”, that are
inherently vague and nonetheless may serve as basis to impose disciplinary sanctions. […] civil law
standards are often inherently vague and reveal their full meaning on the basis of judicial application
[…]. The Panel is of the view that the standards of conduct required of officials of an international
federation […] must be of the highest level because the public must perceive sports organizations as
being upright and trustworthy, in order for those organizations to legitimately keep governing over
their sports worldwide. […] Therefore, the Panel finds that it is legitimate and even desirable that
sports federation[s] include in their ethical codes a general rule residually forbidding any unethical
conduct of officials in order to cover all unacceptable situations that would not be caught by more
specific provisions’.
(c) Compliance officer
A5.47 In its policy document ‘Olympic Agenda 2020’, the IOC said it would
‘establish a position of a compliance officer, to […] advise the IOC members, IOC
staff, NOCs, IFs and all other stakeholders of the Olympic Movement with regard
to compliance’,1 and ‘give advice on new developments with regard to compliance’.2
World Athletics is one of the first Olympic Movement international federations to
follow suit.3
1 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 – Context and background’ (2014) IOC online, 9 December,
Recommendation 27.
2 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 -–Context and background’ (2014) IOC online, 9 December,
Recommendation 31.
3 World Athletics Vetting Rules, Art 5.1.
(d) Independent integrity units
A5.48 Clear separation of powers is vital for good governance.1 An SGB’s board
that also retains responsibility for investigating and prosecuting wrongdoing in the
sport is put in an impossible position when confronted with an allegation that a star
athlete or a member of the board has acted in a corrupt fashion. Even if it determines
quite properly, after a rigorous investigation, that there is no wrongdoing, or only
wrongdoing that requires a minimal sanction, its perceived conflict of interest means
that stakeholders will have no confidence in that decision, to the ultimate detriment
not only of the SGB and the sport but also of the person accused. That is why World
Athletics and the IBU have both set up operationally independent integrity units,
reporting to independent supervisory boards, to ensure that allegations of wrongdoing
are properly investigated and pursued independently and free of any actual or
perceived conflicts of interest. This means that if that investigation exonerates the
person involved, the media and the public will have confidence in that exoneration in
a way that they simply would not have if the exoneration came from the SGB’s board
or management.
1 ‘The concept of separation of powers in sports governance […] usually implies separating the disciplinary
bodies from the political and executive arms of a sports body. That means that active officials are usually
excluded from the disciplinary body and – if present – the appeal body of the SGB, thus separating
the disciplinary function from the political and executive arms of the organisation’. Geeraert, ‘The
governance agenda and its relevance for sport: introducing the four dimensions of the AGGIS sports
governance observer’ in Alm, Action for Good Governance in International Sports Organisations, Final
Report (Play the Game/Danish Institute for Sports Studies, April 2013), pp 16–17.
In 2011 it was recommended (among other things) that the role of FIFA’s Ethics Committee be
expanded, and that its independence be assured by having members elected by the FIFA Congress
rather than the Executive Committee, and that FIFA should consider appointing independent members
to the Committee. It was also recommended that the Ethics Committee conduct due diligence on
elected members of bodies and key personnel, even if they have been appointed by FIFA’s member
associations or confederations. If there was a suggestion of impropriety, the Ethics Committee should
be entitled to instigate proceedings ex officio rather than requiring authorisation from the President
or Executive Committee. Independent Governance Committee, ‘Governing FIFA: Concept Paper
and Report’, 19 September 2011. See also Independent Governance Committee, FIFA Governance
Reform Project, ‘First Report by the Independent Governance Committee to the Executive Committee
of FIFA’ (Basel Institute on Governance, 20 March 2012), p 4 (recommending ‘the separation of
an investigatory and an adjudicatory chamber as well as the right of the investigatory chamber to
set procedures in motion proprio motu ie the independent ability of the Ethics Committee to
initiate investigations […]. The judicial bodies must be given adequate resources both internally
and, if necessary, through contracting of outside experts in order to be able to carry out their
responsibilities’). FIFA’s Independent Ethics Committee was divided into two separate chambers in
2012 – the investigatory chamber and the adjudicatory chamber, FIFA website (fifa.com/who-we-are/
committees/committee/1882034/ [accessed 21 October 2020]). FIFA’s 2020 Code of Ethics states that
the chairperson of the investigatory chamber can initiate preliminary investigations themselves (Art
59.3). The FIFA Congress has the power (alone) to elect or dismiss members of the Ethics Committee
(FIFA Statutes 2019, Art 28.2(r)) and candidates for the Ethics Committee must pass an eligibility
check with a ‘Review Committee’ (FIFA Statutes 2019, Art 39.5).
Similar sentiments drove the creation by FIG of the ‘Gymnastics Ethics Foundation’ to deal with
infringements of the code of ethics, following the revelation of years of horrific sexual abuse of athletes
by a doctor who worked for the US national gymnastics team. FIG president Morinari Watanabe said:
‘Beyond the set missions, the creation of the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation is aimed at establishing
a veritable countervailing power in gymnastics governance. I would like to achieve a separation of
powers in the sport, between the administrative power that is the FIG, the legislative power provided
by the FIG Congress, and the judicial power enshrined in the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation’: ‘The
Council of the Gymnastics Ethics Foundation Meets for the First Time’ (2019) Around the Rings
online, 20 February.
Despite an independent governance review by the International Institute for Management
Development recommending to the IOC in July 2017 (olympic.org/news/ioc-executive-board-
concludes-meetings-with-governance-report-from-imd [accessed 21 October 2020]) that its Ethics
Commission should be granted greater independence to investigate cases of ethical misconduct (as
well as have an independent secretary and an independent budget) the IOC has failed to implement
such changes. For example: (a) the Ethics Commission members are IOC members, with the exception
of the chair (Art 1, Statutes of the IOC Ethics Commission); (b) the IOC Executive Board still retains
the sanctioning power for breaches of the Code of Ethics (Rule 59, IOC Code of Ethics); (c) the IOC
receives any ethics complaints and undertakes the relevant investigations (Rule 59, bye-law to Rule
59, para 1, IOC Code of Ethics); and (d) the IOC is the secretariat to the Ethics Commission (Art 5,
Statutes of the IOC Ethics Commission).
A5.49 For example, the Athletics Integrity Unit (AIU) manages all aspects of anti-
doping (education/prevention, testing, intelligence gathering, investigations, results
management, prosecution, and appeals) as well as all other integrity topics, including
bribery, corruption, betting, manipulation of competition results, age manipulation,
and misconduct concerning changes of nationalities. In short, whenever there is any
breach of any World Athletics rules, it is referred to the AIU for investigation and
potential prosecution, taking that significant burden away from the World Athletics
Council and executive staff, and also benefiting from having one procedural structure
for the investigation, prosecution and adjudication in disciplinary proceedings of
all integrity offences, leading to significant efficiencies and procedural economies.1

Crucially, while the AIU is a unit of World Athletics, it is operationally independent:
(a) Certain World Athletics employees are dedicated AIU staff members, reporting
to the AIU Head of the Unit, not to the World Athletics management or Council.
(b) The dedicated AIU Head of Unit does not report to the World Athletics Council
either, but rather to a separate Integrity Board, made up of three entirely
independent integrity experts, together with one (non-voting) Council member.
This Board provides independent assurance of the AIU’s independence and
freedom from improper interference.
(c) The AIU staff are located in the same building as the rest of World Athletics,
but their offices are secured so that no one can access them without their
knowledge. The close proximity allows for easy interaction with World
Athletics management and staff without compromising independence or
confidentiality.
1 See generally the AIU’s website, at athleticsintegrity.org/. The Biathlon Integrity Unit follows the
same model: see biathlonintegrity.com/.
(e) Mechanisms for reporting wrongdoing
A5.50 Another good governance control is a ‘whistle-blowing’ mechanism and

process that ensures the confidentiality of whistle-blowers and protects them against
retaliation. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime published a ‘Resource
Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons’ that highlights the
following key points:1
(a) Review existing legal frameworks and institutional arrangements in order to
strengthen existing good practice and identify gaps in relation to reporting.
(b) Use new technology and traditional communication methods to facilitate
reporting.
(c) Encourage the view that it is socially acceptable to report wrongdoing.
(d) Protect reporting persons using a combination of legal, procedural and
organizational measures.
(e) Consider how to provide reporting persons with access to advice.
(f) Ensure that competent authorities have the appropriate mandate, capacity,
resources and powers to receive reports, investigate wrongdoing and protect
reporting persons.
(g) Ensure that the staff of competent authorities have appropriate training and
specialised skills to handle reports and protect reporting persons.
Many SGBs (including the UCI, World Athletics, and the IBU) now have confidential
whistle-blower mechanisms in place,2 and CAS panels in turn have protected the
anonymity of testifying witnesses, provided due measures are in place to protect the
rights of the opposing party.3
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of
Match-Fixing’ (United Nations, 2016) p 60.
2 See eg biathlonintegrity.com/reporting-hotline/ [accessed 21 October 2020].
3 See para B4.38.
4 MONITORING COMPLIANCE
A5.51 The Olympic Agenda 2020 calls for ‘organisations to be responsible for
running self-evaluation on a regular basis. The IOC to be regularly informed of the
results of the organisations’ self-evaluations. In the event of missing such information,
the IOC to request such an evaluation at its discretion’.1 Play the Game’s ‘Sports
Governance Observer’ updated its benchmarking tool in 2019 so that it now measures
309 indicators of good governance, but to date it only covers six federations.2 ASOIF
has taken on the task of monitoring compliance with its governance standards by its
28 IF members.3 It uses its five key governance principles – transparency, integrity,
democracy, sports development/solidarity, and control mechanisms4 – to assess
its IF members (by way of questionnaire), and each principle is measured by ten
separate ‘indicators’.5 Each year since 2017, ASOIF’s and AIOWF’s6 members have
completed self-assessment questionnaires based on those indicators as well as new
ones on safeguarding and data protection/IT security. In 2020 the results of ASOIF’s
review of each international sports federation participating in the assessment were
made public (in summary form) for the first time.7
1 IOC, ‘Olympic Agenda 2020 – Context and background’ (2014) IOC online, 9 December,
Recommendation 27.
2 playthegame.org/theme-pages/the-sports-governance-observer/ [accessed 21 October 2020]. The six
international federations surveyed are the Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), the International
Gymnastics Federation (FIG), the International Ski Federation (FIS), the Fédération Internationale
de Volleyball (FIVB), the International Biathlon Union (IBU), and the International Ice Hockey
Federation (IIHF).
3 ‘ASOIF members start governance assessment process’ (2016) ASOIF online, 18 November. See also,
for non-Olympic federations, Global Association of International Sports Federations, ‘Governance
Questionnaire’ (2018).
4 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of International Federation Governance’ (16 June 2020,
21 October 2020]) p 8.
5 See para A5.7.
6 AIOWF’s Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of Governance of AIOWF International Federation
Members, AIOWF online’ (September 2020) assets.fis-ski.com/image/upload/v1598943205/fis-prod/
assets/Third_Review_of_Governance_of_AIOWF_IF_Members_2020.pdf [accessed 21 October
2020]). Of all the seven winter federations reviewed, the IBU had the most-improved AIOWF review
score, following its governance reforms and the overhaul of its constitutional and other regulatory
documents (see press release, IBU online (1 September 2020) biathlonworld.com/news/detail/ibu-
welcomes-results-of-the-aiowf-governance-review [accessed 21 October 2020]).
7 ASOIF Governance Taskforce, ‘Third Review of International Federation Governance’ (16 June 2020)
21 October 2020]); ‘Third Review of IF Governance reveals significant progress, challenges remain’
((2020) ASOIF online 16 June) asoif.com/news/third-review-if-governance-reveals-significant-
progress-challenges-remain [accessed 21 October 2020]). A total of 31 IFs participated in the third
governance review and the World Karate Federation (WKF) was revealed as the only governing body
who declined to participate. The WKF responded to ASOIF by stating that it has ‘not rejected to
participate in the study, on the contrary, as soon as [its] queries [that WKF purports to have sent in
writing to ASOIF and remain unanswered] are addressed by ASOIF, [it] would be more than pleased to
continue participating in the review, as [it] has done in the past’ (see Pavitt, ‘ASOIF defend governance
review after World Karate Federation criticism’ (2020) Inside The Games, 18 June).
A5.52 ‘Simple compliance is not however enough to drive real change in the
governance of sporting organizations. It is more than updating statutes. It is about
leadership and people with the right skills and integrity, incorporating a change in
culture, supported by a clear communication strategy and continuous monitoring to
measure and if necessary adjust the compliance process’.1 In recognition of this fact,
ASOIF announced in June 2020 that it is also planning ‘a pilot study on organisational
culture’.2
1 European Commission, ‘Expert Group on Good Governance – Promotion of existing Good
Governance Principles report’ (Final document, July 2016), p 5. See also Hardman, Why We Get the
Wrong Politicians (Atlantic Books. 2018), p xii (‘cultures are more dangerous than individuals: they
continue with each changing of the guard of bad guys, and are so pernicious that even those employed
to scrutinise them can sometimes miss what’s going on or fail to recognise how bad their effects are’).
2 ‘Third Review of IF Governance reveals significant progress, challenges remain’ (2020) ASOIF
online, 16 June.
PART B
Regulating Sport
CHAPTER B1
Drafting Effective Regulations – the

Legal Framework
Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC and Charles Flint QC (both
Blackstone Chambers)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B1.1
2 THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS SPORT.... B1.4
REGULATORY POWERS.................................................................................. B1.10
A Superior sport rules...................................................................................... B1.10
B National and transnational laws................................................................... B1.14
C General principles of law............................................................................. B1.18
SGB’S REGULATIONS...................................................................................... B1.49
A The basic approach: what would the words mean, in their context,
to a reasonable reader?................................................................................. B1.53
B Considering the words of the regulation, in their context within the
specific provision and within the regulations more generally, so that
the SGB’s rulebook is read as a coherent whole.......................................... B1.56
C Considering the broader factual context of the regulations, including
their purpose................................................................................................. B1.57
D The role of prior precedents in determining the proper meaning of
the regulation in issue.................................................................................. B1.60
E Canons of construction................................................................................ B1.61
1 INTRODUCTION
B1.1 The governing body of a sport (an SGB) has a right and a responsibility
to regulate the basis on which the sport is conducted in a manner that protects
and promotes fair and meaningful competition, on a level playing-field, wherever
the sport is played. This requires the SGB to find an effective and efficient way of
incentivising conduct that will advance these basic objectives, and of disincentivising
conduct that will prejudice them.
B1.2 The chapters that follow in this section consider the ways in which
SGBs regulate particular issues, such as eligibility, doping, match-fixing, other
misconduct, and safeguarding. In this opening chapter, we set out the parameters
for that discussion by considering the legal framework within which all SGB
regulations are drafted, whatever the topic being regulated. Other works explain
the theory and practice behind designing and implementing effective regulations,1
or give guidance on how to draft clear and precise regulations, in contexts other
than sport.2 We seek in this chapter to assist SGBs to produce effective regulations
in the context of their sports that will work as intended and that will withstand
legal challenge, by addressing the following topics that inform and constrain the
exercise of their regulatory powers:
294 Regulating Sport
(a) In Section 2 (‘The Autonomy Afforded to an SGB to Regulate Its Sport’), we

identify various ‘sporting imperatives’ that the courts, arbitral panels and/or
external regulators have accepted as legitimate, and therefore as justifying
regulatory intervention by the SGB. We also identify the different regulatory
models that an SGB may choose from to pursue those objectives. We explain
how the courts and arbitral panels are generally willing to acknowledge the
experience and expertise of the SGB and therefore to afford it a reasonable
‘margin of appreciation’ to craft such regulations as it deems necessary to
achieve these various underlying imperatives in its sport.
(b) SGBs are not immune from but instead must ensure that their regulations
comply with all of the requirements of applicable law. Section 3 (‘The Legal
Constraints on an SGB’s Exercise of Its Regulatory Powers’) addresses what
the ‘applicable law’ is in this context. It is not always obvious, at least in
relation to regulations that are intended to apply globally, across many different
national legal regimes. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)3 has found
different ways to prevent particular national laws undermining the uniform
application of an SGB’s regulations across all of those jurisdictions, including
on occasion by applying in their stead or alongside them ‘general principles
of law’ that are said to be common to all jurisdictions. In Section 3 we seek to
identify these ‘general principles’ and their effect, as developed and applied in
the CAS jurisprudence.
(c) Finally, in Section 4 (‘Resolving Disputes as to the Proper Meaning of an
SGB’s Regulations’), we set out the approach that English courts and CAS
arbitral panels are likely to take in resolving disputes about the meaning of an
SGB’s regulations, in other words how they are to be interpreted and applied
in particular cases. This is a topic of great importance not only for the people
who are expected to comply with the regulations, but also for the SGB when
drafting them, since it will want the regulations to be interpreted and applied as
intended.
1 See eg Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), Ch 2
(What is ‘Good’ Regulation?); Better Regulation Delivery Office, Regulators’ Code (Department for
Business Innovation & Skills, April 2014).
2 See eg Karpen and Xanthaki, Legislation in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2017); Xanthaki, Drafting
Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2014); McLeod, Principles
of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2009); Better Regulation Taskforce,
‘Principles of Good Regulation’ (2003); Bell & Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn
(Butterworths, 1995), pp 199–203.
3 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).
B1.3 Some of these topics are discussed in further detail in specific contexts in
other chapters. We provide cross-references to those discussions where appropriate
below.
2 THE AUTONOMY AFFORDED TO AN SGB TO REGULATE ITS

SPORT
B1.4 An SGB’s rulebook can be seen as analogous to a classic ‘public interest’

regulatory regime, in that the SGB, acting as the guardian of the sport, intervenes by
way of regulation to achieve outcomes that vindicate the public interest in the long-
term health and vitality of sport as an important instrument of public policy,1 and to
avoid outcomes that undermine that public interest.2 The relevant interests here extend
beyond those of participants to those of the wider public, because many if not most
sports have grown into activities that attract many spectators and broadcast viewers,
and that generate considerable commercial revenue. In this context, the courts, the
CAS and/or external regulators have accepted that the following objectives are
Drafting Effective Regulations – the Legal Framework 295
legitimate and therefore justify regulatory intervention even if it restricts the rights
and freedoms that participants would enjoy absent such regulation:
(a) The need to organise sport in a manner that ensures fair, meaningful and
structured competition, so as to encourage broad participation at the amateur
level and to incentivise the best athletes to make the sacrifices required to excel
at the elite level.3
(b) The need to achieve competitive balance between the contestants in a sporting
contest, so as to ensure the uncertainty of outcome that makes sport such a
compelling pastime and entertainment product.4
(c) The need to protect the integrity of sport from the scourges of doping5 and
match-fixing,6 as well as any other conduct or practice that threatens to
undermine the public’s confidence in the authenticity of the results achieved
on the field of play.7
(d) The need to protect the credibility and regularity of competitions between
different clubs, by preventing unilateral termination of contracts by players
or clubs during the season,8 as well as transfers of players from one club to
another that skew results late in the season.9
(e) The need to protect the credibility and regularity of competition between
national representative teams, by ensuring that athletes have a genuine link
with the nations they represent, and cannot switch quickly or frequently from
one national team to another, eg in exchange for payment (‘commerce of
nationalities’).10
(f) The need to fund and promote the quality and uncertainty of outcome of
competitions between clubs by distributing the revenues generated by the
competitions equitably and broadly between clubs,11 and by reducing the
ability of the richest clubs to buy up all the best talent.12
(g) The need to protect the financial integrity and sustainability of club competitions
by increasing the transparency and credibility of club finances, encouraging the
long-term viability and sustainability of club financial models, and ensuring
that the financing of player and manager acquisitions and remuneration is
supported by the revenue derived from football activities, and not by state
subsidies or subventions from owners.13
(h) The need to incentivise national federations and clubs to invest in development
programmes that identify and develop young athletic talent at grass roots
without fear of others free-riding on that investment.14
(i) The need to protect minors ‘from the social dangers inherent in their international
transfer’, specifically the trafficking, exploitation and abandonment of minors
in foreign countries.15
(j) The need to control and supervise the ethical conduct of its organs and
officials.16
(k) The need ‘to ensure the independent, impartial, specialized, and expeditious
resolution of sports disputes’.17
1 As to which, see para A1.8; and see also Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February
2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity,
2016/2143(INI), Recitals B, D, E, G, K, and AJ (‘[…] sport plays a prominent role in the life of
millions of EU citizens; whereas amateur and professional sport is not merely a matter of athletic
abilities, sporting achievements and competitions, but also brings a significant social, educational,
economic, cultural and unifying contribution to the EU’s economy and society, as well as to the
EU’s strategic objectives and social values; […] sport is not only a growing economic reality, but
also a social phenomenon which makes an important contribution to the European Union’s strategic
objectives, and to social values such as tolerance, solidarity, prosperity, peace, respect for human
rights and understanding among nations and cultures; […] practicing sports contributes to a better
quality of life, prevents diseases and plays a fundamental role in strengthening personal development
and health condition; […] sport also contributes to the integration of people and transcends race,
religion and ethnicity; […] both professional and grassroots sports play a key role in the global
promotion of peace, respect for human rights and solidarity, carry health and economic benefits for
societies and have an essential role in highlighting fundamental educational and cultural values, as
well as in promoting social inclusion; […] sport, in its broadest sense, represents a value system for a
community, and whereas these values form the basis of a shared language that goes beyond all cultural
and linguistic barriers; whereas it can help, and should be considered an opportunity, to strengthen
dialogue and solidarity with third countries, to promote the protection of basic human rights and
freedoms worldwide and to support EU external policy; […]’).
2 See generally Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012),
p 40. As such, they suffer from the same problems as other ‘public interest’ regulatory regimes, where
the regulators may be perceived as incompetent, corrupt, or ‘captured’ by (ie serving the private
interests of) the most powerful stakeholders. (Ibid p 42).
3 C-519/04 P Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991, paras 43 and 45 (legitimate objectives
of sporting rules include ensuring fair competitions with equal chances for all athletes, as well as
protection of athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of competitive sport, and ethical values
in sport); European Commission, Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules,
8 December 2017, para 219 (‘In line with the case law, the Commission considers that the protection
of the integrity of the sport, the protection of health and safety and the organisation and proper conduct
of competitive sport may constitute legitimate objectives that justify a restriction of competition’);
Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 508 (‘The IAAF has introduced the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations to provide for fair competition and a level playing field within the female category. The
Panel accepts that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are therefore intended to pursue a legitimate
objective’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798,
para 556 (‘ensuring fair competition in the female category of elite competitive athletes is a legitimate
objective for the IAAF to pursue. […] The Panel accepts that this is an important and legitimate
objective’); I v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 113 (‘In addition, the Panel remarks that anti-doping
rules are aimed at protecting the vested interest of all participants in fair competition. As already
noted, the principle of a level playing field is a cornerstone of sports law in general and of anti-doping
law in particular’); Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, para 323 (‘It does not appear to be in dispute
– nor could it sensibly be contested – that the general objective of ensuring fairness and integrity of
competition in elite competitive sport is a legitimate objective for an international sports governing
body to pursue’) and para 325 (‘Having regard to its margin of appreciation, the Panel considers that
an international sports governing body such as the IAAF is legitimately entitled to take the view that
fairness requires that the outcome of competitive athletics should be determined by natural physical
talent, training and effort, and that athletes should not be able to use artificial technology during
competitions in a way that provides them with an overall advantage over athletes who are not using
such technology. The Panel considers that this is particularly so where (as here) the mechanical aid
is one that most athletes would not, in practice, be able to utilise’) and para 333 (‘the aim of the
Rule – and in particular the aspect of the Rule that places the burden on the athlete who wishes to
use a mechanical aid to demonstrate the absence of a competitive advantage – is to ensure that where
a disabled athlete requires a prosthetic aid in order to participate against able-bodied athletes in a
particular event, the use of that aid does not enable the disabled athlete to achieve performances that
are better than they would be able to achieve if they did not have the disability at all. In other words,
the Rule is intended to (a) permit disabled athletes to compete against able-bodied athletes while using
mechanical aids that compensate for the effect of their disability, but (b) to prevent disabled athletes
from competing against able-bodied athletes that do more than compensate for the effect of their
disability. The Panel considers this to be a legitimate objective for the IAAF to pursue’). This need
to ensure that potential participants are not discouraged by unfair competition conditions that would
deny them any real chance of success is the basis for the age, sex, and weight competition categories
used in many sports.
4 European Commission, White Paper on Sport (2007), para 4.1 (acknowledging ‘the need to ensure
uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance between clubs taking part
in the same competitions’); Commission Staff Working Document, ‘The EU and Sport: Background
and Context – Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport’, COM(2007) 391 final,
SEC(2007)932, SEC(2007)934, SEC(2007)936, para 3.4 (a) (‘If sport events are to be of interest to
the spectator, they must involve uncertainty as to the result. There must therefore be a certain degree of
equality in competitions. This sets the sport sector apart from other industry or service sectors, where
competition between firms serves the purpose of eliminating inefficient firms from the market. Sport
teams, clubs and athletes have a direct interest not only in there being other teams, clubs and athletes,
but also in their economic viability as competitors’) and Annex A, para 2.1.5 (‘Legitimate objectives
of sporting rules will normally relate to the “organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport”
and may include, eg, the ensuring of fair sport competitions with equal chances for all athletes, the
ensuring of uncertainty of results, the protection of the athletes’ health, the protection of the safety
of spectators, the encouragement of training of young athletes, the ensuring of financial stability of
sport clubs/teams or the ensuring of a uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport (the “rules of
the game”). The specificity of sport, ie the distinctive features setting sport apart from other economic
activities, such as the interdependence between competing adversaries, will be taken into consideration
when assessing the existence of a legitimate objective’). See also Premier Rugby Limited v Saracens,
Sport Resolutions Panel (Rt Hon Lord Dyson, Aidan Robertson QC, and Jeremy Summers) decision
dated 4 November 2019 (competition law challenge to Premier Rugby’s salary cap rejected inter
alia because it pursued in a proportionate manner the legitimate objective of protecting competitive
balance within the league).
5 Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 131 (‘[…] eradication of doping
in sport, protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity are undeniably legitimate
objectives of extreme importance for the viability of sport at any level’); Jobson Leandro Pereira de
Oliveira v FIFA, CAS 2015/a/4184, para 196 (‘Contrary to the Player’s argument, the Panel finds that
the interests of FIFA justify an infringement in the Player’s privacy. The anti-doping policy of FIFA
is a crucial part of its governance and prevails over the Player’s right to work’); Sheikh Hazza Bin
Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 158 (‘[…] if there is any infringement
of personal rights under the rules, then the Panel considers that it is justified by the public interest in
the fight against doping in the sport […]’); IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.10
(‘It was well recognised that the continued battle to eliminate doping from competitive sport waged
by lawyers and laboratories on the one hand against (some) scientist and sportsmen on the other
is necessary if sport is to preserve its integrity and attraction’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 56
(‘[…] doping is the enemy of society as a whole, and of sport in particular. It is in the interests
of all that doping should be removed from sport (and society), and that those who participate in
sport should know that if they are caught cheating, for that is what doping is, severe punishment
will be meted out to them’); C-519/04P Meca-Medina & Mejcen v Commission [2006] ECR I-6991,
para 43 (objectives of FINA’s anti-doping rules – ‘to combat doping in order for competitive sport
to be conducted fairly and […] to safeguard equal chances for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity
and objectivity of competitive sport and ethical values in sport’ – are legitimate imperatives that are
fundamental to the conduct of the sport); Wilander & Novacek v Tobin & Jude, [1997] 2 CMLR 346
[CA], at 354 (‘It is clear, and indeed common ground, that a provision to the effect of r.53, designed
to ban cheating (and indeed danger to health) by taking drugs is free from any possible objection
on grounds of discrimination and is justified by an imperative requirement in the general interest’);
Johnson v Athletic Canada & IAAF, [1997] OJ 3201, para 30 (anti-doping rules justified ‘to protect
the right of the athlete […] to fair competition, to know that the race involves only his own skill, his
own strength, his own spirit and not his own pharmacologist’) and para 31 (‘The public has an interest
in the protection of the integrity of sport. Governments around the world subsidize their elite athletes
through carding systems. The public pays to attend events. The elite athlete is viewed as a hero and
his influence over the young athlete cannot be underestimated’); European Commission, ‘White Paper
on Sport’ (2007), para 2.2 (‘Doping poses a threat to sport worldwide, including European sports. It
undermines the principle of open and fair competition. It is a demotivating factor for sport in general
and puts the professional under unreasonable pressure. It seriously affects the image of sport and poses
a serious threat to individual health’).
6 Bradley v Jockey Club, [2004] EWHC 2164, Richards J, para 109 (‘As to the objectives of the
disciplinary procedures and the importance of those objectives, the Board was clearly entitled
to view the relevant Rules as being essential to the maintenance of the integrity of racing and to
attach corresponding importance to the enforcement of those Rules’); ECB v Kaneria & Westfield,
ECB Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (‘Self-evidently, corruption […] in cricket or
any other sport for that matter, is a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game. For the
general public, supporting the game and their team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend
time, money or effort to watch a match whose integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the
public’s disengagement from cricket would be catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply
cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished in the eyes of commercial sponsors. These partners could
not and would not link their brand to a sport whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who
have devoted their entire careers to the pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have
those genuine achievements called into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend
to devalue their worth. Accordingly, we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted out
of the game of cricket’), expressly approved on appeal, Kaneria v ECB, ECB Appeal Panel decision
dated July 2013, p 5; Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 140 (preferring
a broad interpretation of a disciplinary prohibition, because ‘this interpretation is also in line with
the “zero tolerance to match-fixing” which, according to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2010/A/2267)
presents one of the most important values and principles of behaviour in football. The observance
of these values and principles is indispensable for the protection and improvement of the integrity
of the game’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 25 (‘[…] integrity, in
football, is crucially related to the authenticity of results, and has a critical core which is that, in the
public’s perception, both single matches and entire championships must be a true test of the best
athletic, technical, coaching and management skills of the opposing sides. Due to the high social
significance of football in Europe, it is not enough that competing athletes, coaches or managers are
in fact honest; the public must perceived that they try their best to win and, in particular, that clubs
make management or coaching decisions based on the single objective of their club winning against
any other club. This particular requirement is inherent in the nature of sports […]’) and para 125 (‘The
Panel is of the opinion that among the “myriad of rules” needed to organize a football competition,
rules bound to protect the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost importance. The need to
preserve the reputation and quality of the football product may bring about restraints on individual
club owners’ freedom’); Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, paras 48 and 49 (‘Competitive sports
depend on the public perception that events are not fixed. The sports authorities determined several
decades ago that wagering by professional athletes on events in their own sport, even by athletes not
involved in the relevant event, is likely to erode the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for
unscrupulous exploitation of athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially
true of sports like tennis, where it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome. [49] The
sport of professional tennis has therefore established a prohibition on wagering by its practitioners.
This is a condition of participating in the sport. The Appellant has not come close to convincing the
Panel that this policy and legislation is illegitimate […]’).
7 For example, regulations may be designed to address the perception of conflict when clubs in the
same competition are under common ownership, as in AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA,
CAS 98/200, para 127 (‘the intention of the Contested Rule is to prevent the conflict of interest
inherent in commonly controlled clubs participating in the same UEFA competition and to preserve the
genuineness of results. In this respect, the Panel is persuaded that this is a legitimate goal to pursue’)
and para 129 (‘among the “myriad of rules” needed in order to organize a football competition,
rules bound to protect public confidence in the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost
importance’).
8 Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 157 (noting that restrictions on player movement
in breach of contract were justified because they were necessary to protect the integrity of competitions:
‘Should players be free to leave the competition at any given moment, the sporting value of the team
during the championship would be significantly impaired, affecting and compromising the clubs
and the smooth running of the championship as a whole’), citing as support the stance taken by the
European Commission in SETCA – FCTB/FIFA, Case IV/36.583 of 28 May 2012, para 56.
9 C-176/96 Lehtonen and Another v Federation Royale Belge des Sociétés de Basket-Ball, [2000] ECRI-
2681 (‘53. On this point, it must be acknowledged that the setting of deadlines for transfers of players
may meet the objective of ensuring the regularity of sporting competitions. 54. Late transfers might
be liable to change substantially the sporting strength of one or other team in the course of the
championship, thus calling into question the comparability of results between the teams taking part in
that championship, and consequently the proper functioning of the championship as a whole. 55. The
risk of that happening is especially clear in the case of a sporting competition which follows the rules
of the Belgian first division national basketball championship. The teams taking part in the play-offs
for the title or for relegation could benefit from late transfers to strengthen their squads for the final
stage of the championship, or even for a single decisive match’).
10 Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 58 (ITF rule
restricting changes in sports nationality has a legitimate objective in that it ‘prevents changes of
nationality for economic reasons and supports the ethos of the Davis Cup which is a competition
between nations’); European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.2 (‘The organisation
of sport and of competitions on a national basis is part of the historical and cultural background of the
European approach to sport, and corresponds to the wishes of European citizens. In particular, national
teams play an essential role not only in terms of identity but also to secure solidarity with grassroots
sport, and therefore deserve to be supported […]’); Tonga Rugby League v RLIF, [2008] NSWSC 1173,
para 70 (‘Prima facie, the concern that the credibility of international competition would be hurt
by players frequently changing their allegiance is legitimate’); Belize Basketball Federation v FIBA,
CAS 2009/A/1988, para 22 (‘The Panel is in no way unsympathetic to the concerns of the Respondent
and fully endorses the objective of preserving a link between national team competitions and national
teams, and the avoidance of a situation in which national teams are substantially or wholly composed
of sporting mercenaries acquiring belatedly nationalities of convenience’); International Baseball
Association, CAS 98/215, para 32 (‘First, the waiting period [required before transferring allegiance
from one country to another] serves the fairness and integrity of international competitions. These
could be endangered if athletes could suddenly and unexpectedly change their nationalities and teams
without any time limits at all’) and para 34 (‘sudden changes in athletes’ sporting nationalities would
seriously endanger the fairness and integrity of sports competition’) and para 32 (‘secondly, the
waiting period serves to deter unethical “commerce of nationalities” […]’); B v FIBA, CAS 92/80,
para 16 (rules requiring a three year waiting period before changing sport nationality ‘answer the
legitimate concern to prevent changes of basketball nationality from being dependent on the wishes or
interests of the players’).
11 European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.8 (‘Collective selling can be important
for the redistribution of income and can thus be a tool for achieving greater solidarity within sports.
The Commission recognises the importance of an equitable redistribution of income between clubs,
including the smallest ones, and between professional and amateur sport’); European Commission,
Case AT.40208, International Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 222 (‘the
Commission recognises that some forms of horizontal solidarity (for instance, equal distribution of
revenues to all the clubs participating in the same competition) or vertical solidarity (for instance,
redistribution of revenues from the elite/professional level of a sport to the low/grassroots level) may
justify limited restrictions to the economic freedoms of undertakings involved in sport, in particular
within a sport pyramid’); Resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an
integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI)),
para 72 (‘[The European Parliament] maintains that the selling of TV rights on a centralised, exclusive
and territorial basis, with equitable sharing of revenues, is essential to the sustainable funding of sport
at all levels and to ensuring a level playing field’).
12 C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921,
para 106 (‘In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football
in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of
equality and uncertainty as to results […] must be accepted as legitimate’).
13 Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, paras 75–76 (competition law challenge to UEFA’s financial
fair play rules rejected because they pursue in a proportionate manner the legitimate objectives of
improving the financial capability, transparency, and credibility of clubs, protect clubs’ creditors,
introduce more discipline and rationality into club finances, encourage clubs to operate on the basis of
their own revenues, and so protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football);
Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, para 103 (the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations
‘not only serve a private interest, but also a public interest in that the overarching objectives of these
regulations are […] inter alia to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, to
introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finance, to encourage responsible spending
for the long-term benefit of football and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of
European club football’); Premier Rugby Limited v Saracens, Sport Resolutions Panel (Rt Hon Lord
Dyson, Aidan Robertson QC, and Jeremy Summers) decision dated 4 November 2019 (competition
law challenge to Premier Rugby’s salary cap rejected inter alia because it pursued in a proportionate
manner the legitimate objective of protecting the financial viability of clubs in the league); QPR v
English Football League, Football Disciplinary Commission decision dated 19 October 2017 (same
in respect of the EFL’s Financial Fair Play rules); Resolution of the European Parliament adopted
on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance, accessibility and
integrity, 2016/2143(INI)), para 33 (‘[The European Parliament] welcomes good, self-regulatory
practices, such as the Financial Fair Play initiative, in that they encourage more economic rationality
and better standards of financial management in professional sports, with a focus on the long-term as
opposed to the short-term, thereby contributing to the healthy and sustainable development of sport
in Europe; emphasises that Financial Fair Play has encouraged better financial management standards
and should therefore be applied strictly’).
See also the recognition in RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, paras 102, 104, of the legitimacy
of the objectives underlying FIFA’s rules restricting third party ownership of and third party investment
in players (preserving the stability of players’ contracts, guaranteeing the independence and autonomy
of clubs and players as regards recruitment and transfers, safeguarding integrity in football and the fair
and equitable nature of competitions, preventing conflicts of interest and maintaining transparency in
transactions relating to players’ transfers), discussed at para B5.31.
para 106 (‘In view of the considerable social importance of sporting activities and in particular football
in the Community, the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of
equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players
must be accepted as legitimate’); Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated
2 March 2017, para 58 (ITF rule restricting changes in sports nationality has a legitimate objective in
that it ‘protects smaller national associations who may have invested money and support in bringing
on a player only to find that he defects to a wealthier national association’); ‘International Baseball
Association’, CAS 98/215, para 32 (‘secondly, the waiting period serves to deter unethical “commerce
of nationalities” […]. National federations can safeguard their economic interests in athletes by
requiring that the athlete may not represent another federation unless three years has elapsed or
the athlete has reimbursed his previous federation for all the costs which were incurred during the
athlete’s training and education’); European Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 2.3
(‘Rules requiring that teams include a certain quota of locally trained players could be accepted as
being compatible with the Treaty provisions on free movement of persons if they do not lead to any
direct discrimination based on nationality and if possible indirect discrimination effects resulting from
them can be justified as being proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued, such as to enhance and
protect the training and development of talented young players’). See also Resolution of the European
Parliament adopted on 2 February 2017 on an integrated approach to Sport Policy: good governance,
accessibility and integrity, 2016/2143(INI)), para 38 (‘[The European Parliament] calls on governing
bodies and national authorities at all levels to take measures that guarantee compensation to training
clubs with a view to encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, in accordance with the
Bernard ruling of the European Court of Justice of 16 March 2010’) (as to which case, see para F3.183
et seq).
15 RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, paras 189, 202, 291 (‘These rules are of great significance in
that they aim at protecting the most vulnerable stakeholders in the sport of football. They have been
implemented to prohibit the “commercialisation” of young players and to allow them to develop
and grow within their natural environment’). See also A v Club Athletico de Madrid & RFEF &
FIFA, CAS 2013/A/3140, para 8.22 (Panel ‘wholeheartedly shares the views expressed by FIFA that
Article 19 of the RSTP is a very important provision, which sets key principles designed to protect the
interests of minor players. […] Considering the above mentioned, the Panel is convinced of the need
to apply the rules on the protection of minors in strict, rigorous and consistent manner’); Midtjylland
v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.19 (‘certain rules may constitute a restriction to fundamental
rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate objective and are proportionate to the objective sought. In
the instant case, the Panel […] considers that FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor
players do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to
the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not admissible’).
16 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 157 (‘FIFA, as any other association incorporated under Swiss
private law pursuant to Article 60 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code (“CC”), has a legitimate interest in
and is entitled to control and supervise the conduct of its organs and officials by implementing inter
alia specific ethical standards of conduct in its rules’).
17 IAAF & WADA v RFEA et al, CAS 2014/A/3614, para 183, holding that pursuit of such objective
justifies designating the CAS as the dispute resolution forum for sports-related disputes.
B1.5 Obviously this is not an exhaustive list. It is always open to SGBs to identify
and pursue other ‘sporting imperatives’ that they consider to be legitimate, so long as
they do so lawfully and proportionately. Indeed, it is incumbent upon them to do so,
if they are to fulfil their role as custodians of their respective sports.
B1.6 Because the SGB is presumed to be best-placed to determine what is best

for its sport,1 and to have the mandate of its members to do so,2 the CAS, which has
ultimate jurisdiction over many if not most cases involving SGB regulations,3 has
consistently ruled that it is for the SGB (not the CAS or any other court or tribunal)
to determine what policies it should pursue, and therefore what regulations it should
issue, to best achieve its legitimate objectives,4 so long as it acts lawfully and
proportionately. This principle of deference to the SGB’s regulatory autonomy, also
well-entrenched in English law,5 and derived in part from the principle of separation
of powers between ‘legislature’ and ‘judiciary’,6 means that ‘an external tribunal
should refrain […] from interfering with the merits of policy choices made by sports
governing bodies […] The CAS cannot substitute its own judgment for that of sports
bodies with regard to policy choices’,7 even if it disagrees with the approach taken.8
1 Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 149 (‘[…] the FEI as a
sporting association is afforded a wide margin of appreciation in making rules to regulate the conduct
of its members. While this principle does not prevent a judicial or arbitral tribunal charged with
examining the rules to determine whether they constitute an infringement of fundamental rights, it
serves to emphasise that a sporting association will generally be in the best position to assess the rules
which are required to address issues arising in the sport which it runs’); Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364,
para 55 (‘[…] significant deference should be afforded to a sporting body’s expertise and authority to
determine the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its strategic imperatives’); Dominguez v
FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 101 (‘It is allowed to provide a discretion to the association and courts
should not lightly exercise their power of review over the association’s decisions made in the exercise
of such discretion, especially in cases in which sports governing bodies have special expertise and
experience in relation to their sport’).
2 Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, paras 62, 78 (rejecting argument that policy underlying rule
lacked ‘constitutional foundation’, given that the policy ‘has been presented to the GA [General
Assembly] every year since the FEI started applying it in 2012; all members were and are aware of
this practice and no objections have been raised or proposal made to change the current system’).
Cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘With regard to the right to be
heard, the Panel wishes to stress that the CAS has always protected the principle audiatur et altera
pars in connection with any proceedings, measures or disciplinary actions taken by an international
federation vis-à-vis a national federation, a club or an athlete. However, there is a very important
difference between the adoption by a federation of an ad hoc administrative or disciplinary decision
directly and individually addressed to designated associations, teams or athletes and the adoption of
a general regulation directed at laying down rules of conduct generally applicable to all current or
future situations of the kind described in the regulation. It is the same difference that one can find in
every legal system between an administrative measure or a penalty decided by an executive or judicial
body concerned with a limited and identified number of designees and a general act of a normative
character adopted by the parliament or the government for general application to categories of persons
envisaged both in the abstract and as a whole. The Panel remarks that there is an evident analogy
between sports-governing bodies and governmental bodies with respect to their role and functions
as regulatory, administrative and sanctioning entities, and that similar principles should govern their
actions. Therefore, the Panel finds that, unless there are specific rules to the contrary, only in the event
of administrative measures or penalties adopted by a sports-governing body with regard to a limited
and identified number of designees could there be a right to a legal hearing. For a regulator or legislator,
it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible and to hear
the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think of, eg,
parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a United
States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings to any
party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably subject the
[international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively preclude
it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F. Supp. 1103, at
1122)’ [other citations omitted]).
3 See generally Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).
4 Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘The rule-making power,
and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on
the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall
legislative framework’); Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828,
para 143 (‘One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue
their own rules relating to their governance, their membership and their own competitions’); USOC v
IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the
Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a
very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own
affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One
of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their
own governance, their membership and their own competitions’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17
(‘Like any other human or social activity, there cannot be any sports activity outside the framework
of State law. Depending on the various political and legal systems in the world, States grant to sports
organizations and governing bodies a certain degree of autonomy and allow them to establish, within
the framework of State law, their own sports laws and rules’).
5 See eg Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216, Richards J, para 43 (‘The test of proportionality
requires the striking of a balance between competing considerations. The application of the test in the
context of penalty will not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single “correct” decision.
Different decision-makers may come up with different answers, all of them reached in an entirely proper
application of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised that,
in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular, whether it
is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of discretion. The
decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of judgment. Another way
of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range of reasonable responses
to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests. The same essential approach
must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the primary decision-maker to strike
the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate. The court’s role, in the exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision reached falls within the limits of the
decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the penalty is lawful; if it does not, the
penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in the shoes of the primary decision-maker,
strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis what it considers the right penalty to be’), affirmed
on appeal, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056; Chambers v BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB) (‘[…] though the court
must not shrink from exercising a supervisory power which it has if it affects the claimant’s right to
work […], the BOA, if acting honestly and not capriciously and within its powers, is and must be a body
better fitted to judge what was needed than me, or any court’); Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions
arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 74 (‘It is well established that courts and tribunals should
exercise great caution before interfering with the decision of a specialist sporting body on a matter where
the expertise and experience of that body is relevant’); and ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute Resolution
Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 73 (‘The starting point is that sports governing bodies know
what is best for their sport. The law’s intervention therefore is consciously restrained’). See also Johnson
v Athletic Canada & IAAF, [1997] OJ 3201, para 33 (‘This court is required to extend a measure of
deference to the justifications advanced by the I.A.A.F. as the world governing body for amateur athletes
when considering the reasonableness of the ban. It is not this court’s function to serve as a court of
appeal on the merits of decisions reached by tribunals exercising jurisdiction over specialized fields. The
I.A.A.F. has special expertise not only in regulating amateur athletics but also in regulating, detecting and
preventing drug abuse’); and cases cited at paras B1.34 and E6.1 et seq.
6 Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 21.3 (‘CAS is an adjudicative, not legislative body. It is not
for CAS to write the rules of the FEI. As long as those rules are not incompatible with some relevant
aspect of ordre publique, be it competition law, the law of human rights, or Swiss statute, we have to
apply them as they stand. For us only the lex lata, not the lex ferenda has relevance’); FIFA & WADA,
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 142 (‘Swiss law grants an association a wide discretion to determine the
obligations of its members and other people subject to its rules, and to impose such sanctions it deems
necessary to enforce the obligations’) and para 125 (‘In a different context, this wide discretion is
referred to as “the margin of appreciation”’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200,
para 130 (‘Judges should not substitute for legislators, and the former should always allow the latter to
retain a certain margin of appreciation’).
7 NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, paras 6.22 and 6.23, cited with approval in Boxing Australia v AIBA,
CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.34, where the CAS panel accepted that it was for AIBA (and not the CAS)
to decide whether national federations should be permitted to enter one or two boxers into Olympic
qualifying events. See also Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 &
CAS 2018/A/5798, para 469 (‘It is clear from the range of expert evidence presented in this proceeding
that there are many scientific, ethical and regulatory issues on which reasonable and informed minds
may legitimately differ. The Panel is mindful that, in considering these issues, it is not acting as a
policy maker or regulator. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Panel to step into the shoes of
the IAAF by deciding how it would have approached issues had it been charged with making policies
or enacting rules itself. See eg CAS 2016/O/4684 ROC v IAAF. Instead its function is a purely judicial
one. The Panel must adjudicate the disputed legal issues on the basis of the applicable legal tests and
by reference to the arguments and the admissible evidence on the record in these proceedings. While
this inevitably requires consideration of arguments and evidence based on an array of policy and
scientific matters, the Panel must be mindful of its judicial role and the limits of that role’).
8 Cameron v UK Anti-Doping, CAS 2019/A/6110, para 110 (‘[…] the application of Article 10.2.1 of
the UKADR […] appears to be harsh, particularly where the presence of the non-Specified Substance
in question may not have been such as to enhance in any way the performance of the Appellant at
the bout. Nevertheless, the rules enshrined in the UKADR are for the benefit of all boxers and other
athletes falling within its scope, and they must be applied uniformly and without fear or favour. It will
be for UKAD and WADA to reflect on the necessity or utility of the rules, which allows an adjudicator
no flexibility in approach’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 &
CAS 2018/A/5798, para 551 (‘The Panel’s role is not to evaluate the adequacy of the IAAF’s general
policy-making process or to re-write its rules’); DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 86 (noting
proposed change to whereabouts rules to provide exception to ban on use of a phone call to locate
an athlete for drug testing, the Panel stated: ‘Whether that approach is sensible or justifiable was
not for the Tribunal to decide’); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119, 112 (acknowledging
criticism of a rule in the International Standard for Laboratories that the same analyst should not be
involved in the analysis of an athlete’s A sample and his B sample: ‘This reasoning, although rational
and plausible, fails before the CAS for a very simple reason: the arbitrators do not create the rules,
they apply them. This is all the more true because the authors of the anti-doping regulation kept the
rule which requires another analyst for the analysis of the B sample, even though they had heard the
comments of the laboratory directors. The rules can certainly be modified or refined, but such is not the
role of CAS. [113.] The applicable rule is clear and devoid of flexibility. The CAS arbitrators’ mission
is not to modify the rules nor is their mission to appropriate discretionary power when no text allows
them to do so’).
Cf Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, paras 323–24 (‘It does not appear to be in dispute – nor
could it sensibly be contested – that the general objective of ensuring fairness and integrity of
competition in elite competitive sport is a legitimate objective for an international sports governing
body to pursue. The Panel recognises that the concepts of “fairness”, “competitive integrity” and a
“level playing field” may sometimes be difficult to elucidate or define with precision in the context of
competitive sport, and that reasonable minds may sometimes differ as to whether particular matters do
or do not undermine fairness/integrity in particular sports. The use of certain technology to augment
a competitor’s performance may be regarded as a threat to fairness and integrity in some sports,
but not in others. Within a particular sport, different stakeholders may hold divergent views about
whether, and if so to what extent, particular matters undermine or protect fair competition and the
preservation of a level playing field. [324.] In this regard, the Panel is mindful that by virtue of their
status, expertise and responsibility for protecting and reconciling the interests of all stakeholders in a
particular sport, international governing bodies enjoy a margin of appreciation in determining what
factors are relevant to ensuring the fairness and integrity of the sport in question and what regulatory
measures are necessary in order to achieve this. At the same time, the Panel notes that the margin of
appreciation afforded to governing bodies is not unlimited, and that careful scrutiny is called for where
(as here) measures taken by a governing body are directed towards, and have a disparate impact on,
individuals with disabilities or other particular protected characteristics’).
B1.7 There is a number of different regulatory approaches for an SGB to choose

from, depending on which it believes will be most effective and most efficient in
achieving its underlying objectives.1 For example:
(a) Many SGB regulations involve ‘prior approval’ licensing schemes, seeking to
preserve minimum standards by making participation in the sport conditional on
the holding of a licence that is granted upon satisfaction of specified minimum
criteria.2 Examples are registration and licensing schemes for individuals or
teams to enter elite-level competitions,3 financial fair play rules,4 safeguarding
rules,5 and rules regulating player agents.6
(b) Some SGB regulations are incentive-based, using a carrot rather than a stick
to encourage stakeholders to behave in desirable ways.7 An example is the
FIFA regulations giving clubs that identify and develop young talented players
the right to compensation if the players leave before the clubs have received
an adequate return on their investment. This approach serves the objective of
encouraging clubs to invest in the identification and development of new young
talent for the sport, but it can be complex and have significant monitoring and
enforcement costs.8
(c) Most often, however, SGB regulations follow the classic ‘command and
control’ model of regulation,9 setting minimum standards of behaviour, backed
by appropriate sanctions, in order to deter and punish conduct that is seen
as detrimental to the sport, and to incentivise conduct that protects the sport.
Examples are anti-doping rules based on the World Anti-Doping Code,10
and anti-corruption rules prohibiting match-fixing and related misconduct,11
and more general rules against general ‘misconduct’.12 The strength of such
regulations comes from the SGB using its legal authority over the sport to
vindicate the common interest of all stakeholders in the protection of the
sport’s fundamental values. The potential weaknesses, which are typical of
such models, include a tendency towards legalism (producing over-inclusive
and/or unnecessarily complex or inflexible rules, due to a fear of missing
something important), the costs of compliance, and the costs of enforcement.13
1 See generally Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012),
Ch 7.
2 Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Hart Publishing, 2004), Ch 10 (Prior Approval).
The European Commission has acknowledged that such licensing systems created by international
sports organisations can be a useful ‘tool for promoting good governance in sport’ (European
Commission, ‘White Paper on Sport’ (2007), para 4.11).
3 In Katusha Management SA v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3031, para 89, the CAS noted that the licensing
regulations introduced by the UCI for teams wanting to participate in its World Tour events ‘appear
crucial for the safeguard[ing] of the viability, if not the survival, of the sport of cycling at national and
international level. Their role can hardly be underestimated. In fact, they are designed to allow UCI
to guarantee a proper competitive level, to address financial and organizational issues, and to increase
the standards in terms of ethics’.
4 See generally Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play).
5 See generally Chapter B6 (Safeguarding).
6 See generally Chapter F2 (Players’ Agents).
7 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp 111–14.
8 See Art 20 (Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism) of the FIFA Regulations on the Status
and Transfer of Players, which are discussed further at para F3.100.
10 See eg Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 181 (‘Strict liability for doping
violations is an essential cornerstone of anti-doping enforcement. Although capable of operating
harshly against athletes who inadvertently consume prohibited substances, strict liability is a necessary
means for ensuring that athletes assume the highest degree of personal responsibility for all substances
that enter their bodies. Only by cultivating a culture of responsibility, diligence and absolute intolerance
of doping can fairness in professional sport be achieved and maintained, in a manner that protects
all athletes’); Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 152
(‘The designation of the rider as the PR for breach of the EAD Rules is, in the view of the Panel,
soundly based in policy because the rider is generally in a position to take care and adopt appropriate
precautions to avoid a positive test. Anti-doping rules can fairly and legitimately be formulated to
encourage such conduct from ridel’s who are generally vested with control over the horse’). See
generally Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).
11 See generally Chapter B4 (Match Fixing and Related Integrity Issues).
12 See generally Chapter B3 (Misconduct).
B1.8 However, even with the ‘margin of appreciation’ afforded to it by the courts
and arbitral panels, the SGB does not have complete autonomy to issue whatever
regulations it wants. On the contrary, its regulations must comply with the mandatory
requirements of applicable law and be proportionate,1 and there is no principle of
deference, still less any legal immunity for SGBs, that will prevent the CAS or other
tribunals or courts with appropriate jurisdiction declaring invalid and so unenforceable
any regulations that fail that test either because they are unlawful or step beyond the
range of measures reasonably open to the SGB.
1 Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘The rule-making power,
and the balance to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on
the competent bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall
legislative framework. The duty of this Panel is to ensure that the exercise of such power does not
conflict with the rules that govern it […]’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 55 (‘Recognized by
the Swiss federal constitution and anchored in the Swiss law of private associations is the principle of
autonomy, which provides an association with a very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence.
The right to regulate and to determine its own affairs is considered essential for an association and is
at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations
is the competence to issue rules relating to their own governance, their membership and their own
competitions. However, this autonomy is not absolute’), cited with approval in Indian Hockey
Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 143; Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612,
para 100 (‘The autonomy of the IWF to regulate doping matters in relation to its (affiliated) members
is, however, limited by principles of Swiss association law that are applicable subsidiarily’); FIFA
& WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 123 (‘Swiss law grants to associations a wide discretion to
regulate their own affairs. The freedom of associations to regulate their own affairs is limited only
by mandatory law’); NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, para 6.23 (‘when a claim is based on policy or
political questions, the CAS shall dismiss it on grounds of non-arbitrability. In contrast, when a party
brings before the CAS a claim on legal grounds – eg violation of an association’s constitution or of
mandatory rules of law or of general principles of law – for the protection or implementation of rights
or the prevention or redress of unlawful acts, and the claim takes such a form that the CAS is capable
of acting upon it, the CAS shall consider it as a justiciable issue […]’).
B1.9 While there are common themes in the principles applicable to review of
SGB action across different legal systems, a pressing question at the outset is the
identification of the ‘applicable law’ with which the SGB’s regulations must comply.

REGULATORY POWERS
A Superior sport rules
B1.10 An SGB’s power to issue regulations is constrained by its constitution. Not

only must the organ or body within the SGB that issues the regulations have the
power to do so under the constitution;1 in addition, the regulations so issued must
fall within the scope of the SGB’s objects as identified in the constitution,2 and (in
accordance with the doctrine of ‘hierarchy of norms’) must respect any mandatory
requirements set out in the constitution,3 including any fundamental rights conferred
by the constitution on members or other participants in the sport.4
1 Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA, CAS 2009/A/1827, paras 7.1.6 and 7.19 (Executive Committee
bye-laws that would have had the effect of amending the Statutes were declared invalid, because AIBA’s
Statutes provided that they could only be amended by Congress); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401,
para 13 (‘[…] insofar as the promulgation, interpretation, or amendment of the IAAF Rules are
concerned, such powers are reserved exclusively to the appropriate organs of the IAAF’); CONI,
CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (finding that a new UCI rule did not, as contended, create a new category of
membership, and therefore it was not ultra vires the UCI management committee to issue that rule);
FFSA et al v FISA, CAS 97/168 (rejecting claim by member federations that the FISA Council did
not have authority, under the FISA Statutes, to adopt bye-laws limiting the placing of advertising on
athletes’ uniforms).
2 USACA v ICC, arbitration award of the ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator)
dated 16 June 2017, paras 50–51.
3 USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, paras 57–58 (‘By Rule 44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC
has incorporated the WADA Code into the IOC’s own Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of
the OC that a competitor must respect and comply with all aspects of the WADA Code. Accordingly,
the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of
the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the
WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation
is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’);
IRIFF v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1708, para 24 (‘In principle, FIFA has the freedom to establish its own
provisions, but there are limits to this autonomy. When creating new rules and regulations, the relevant
organs are bound by the limits imposed on them by the higher ranking provisions, in particular the
association’s statutes. This follows from the principle of legality which means that a lower level
provision may complement and concretize a higher ranking provision, but not amend, override,
contradict or change the higher one. This principle is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence’
[citations omitted]); Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS 2008/A/1725, para 25 (same); Liao Hui v IWF,
CAS 2011/A/2612, para 102 (‘It follows from this principle [of hierarchy of norms] that – subject to
well-defined exceptions – rules and regulations enacted by an association must be in compliance with
the highest regulatory framework, ie, the statutes of the associations. In case of contradiction between
lower ranking norms and the statutes it is the latter – subject to well-defined exceptions – that take
precedence’ [citations omitted]).
4 See eg Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 (‘The Athlete contended, and the IAAF
did not submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco
all provide that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking rules
that prevail. Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable and
proportionate, they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the
laws of Monaco’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (new UCI rule ‘does not interfere in the internal
affairs of national federations, and so does not infringe UCI’s Constitution in that regard’).
B1.11 There may also be other norms or rules that are hierarchically superior even
to the SGB’s own constitution. For example, if the SGB is a national federation, then
its rules will be required to comply with the statutes and rules of the international
federation of which it is a member;1 whereas if the SGB is the international governing
body of a sport that is part of the Olympic Movement, then Rule 25 of the Olympic
Charter states that its ‘statutes, practices and activities must be in conformity with
the Olympic Charter’. So, for example, the international federation is required not to
permit any government interference with its sport,2 and is also required to implement
the World Anti-Doping Code, including adopting anti-doping rules that incorporate
the mandatory requirements of that Code and make them applicable to all athletes
and athlete support personnel under its jurisdiction.3
1 See eg Article 2.2(b)(iv) of the Statutes of the International Hockey Federation (‘Each full Member
and provisional Member […] must adopt and implement and enforce within its Country Regulations
that are consistent with the [FIH] Statutes and Regulations, including (without limitation): anti-
doping regulations that are compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code and the FIH Anti-Doping
Rules; [and] regulations that are compliant with (a) the FIH’s Anti-Corruption Regulations and (b) the
FIH Sanctioned and Unsanctioned Events Regulations (each as amended from time to time)’). See also
IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 12 (‘[…] in accordance with the idea that the [IAAF] Rules
express the collective will of the entire IAAF Membership, it is both evident and entirely sensible
that, where the rules and regulations of a Member do not conform with or are wider than those of the
IAAF, it is the latter which prevail’); Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, Lord Woolf MR, para 37
(‘The BAF Rules are the rules for implementation in this country of requirements parallel to those
contained in the IAAF Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the BAF Rules then
the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’).
2 Olympic Charter, Rule 25 (‘each IF maintains its independence and autonomy in the administration of
its sport’), discussed at para A1.31.
3 Olympic Charter, Rule 43 (‘The World Anti-Doping Code is mandatory for the whole Olympic
Movement’) and Rule 25 (requiring international federations to adopt and implement the World Anti-
Doping Code). See also 2015 World Anti-Doping Code Article 20.3.1, which requires international
federations who sign the Code to ‘adopt and implement anti-doping policies and rules which conform
with the Code’, and Article 23.2.1, which states that Code signatories ‘shall implement applicable
Code provisions through policies, statutes, rules or regulations according to their authority and within
their relevant spheres of responsibility’. In USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, a CAS panel struck
down the IOC’s ‘Osaka rule’, which made anyone who had been given a doping ban of more than
six months ineligible for the next Olympic Games, and in WADA v British Olympic Association,
CAS 2011/A/2658, the same CAS panel struck down a BOA byelaw that made anyone who had
been given such a doping ban permanently ineligible for selection for the British Olympic team, in
each case because those provisions were contrary to the requirement in the World Anti-Doping Code
that signatories adopt the Code sanctioning scheme for doping offences and not any lesser or greater
sanctions. See also Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.36 (ruling that a UCI provision
that sought to impose an additional doping sanction to those mandated by the World Anti-Doping
Code was non-compliant with the Code and therefore invalid and unenforceable). Cf Chand v IAAF
& AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, paras 539–546 (rejecting argument that IAAF’s rule requiring female
athletes to reduce their endogenous testosterone in order to compete in the female classification was a
disguised doping sanction and therefore incompatible with the World Anti-Doping Code).
B1.12 What happens if the SGB adopts a regulation that contradicts or offends
against a higher norm? Is that regulation still enforceable as against its members or
athletes who are its target? Or is it void and unenforceable per se?1 The CAS has
ruled that if the SGB has simply promised a third party that it will adopt a particular
norm, but has not incorporated that norm into its own statutes, then it may be in
breach of its obligations to that third party, but its regulations are still enforceable
against its athletes, even though they contradict the norm in question.2 However, if
the norm has been validly incorporated into the SGB’s constitution, a regulation that
contradicts that norm contradicts the constitution and so is ultra vires and therefore
unenforceable against anyone.3
1 As argued in CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 43 (rejecting on the facts an argument that a UCI rule
providing for teams to register not with national federations but with the UCI was incompatible
with the UCI constitution) and para 37 (rejecting on the facts an argument that the same rule was
incompatible with the pyramid structure of regulation of Olympic sport mandated by the Olympic
Charter).
2 Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 98 (‘the legal relationships between IWF and WADA or the IOC
on the one hand are distinct from the contractual relationship between Appellant and Respondent on
the other hand. The latter is solely governed by the IWF regulations (including the documents referred
therein) and subsidiarily by Swiss law […]. Whether or not IWF is in breach towards third parties
in respect of the way it enacted its anti-doping policy is, therefore, in principle of no avail for the
legal relationship between Appellant and Respondent since the legal effects arising from the different
contractual relationships are, in principle confined to the parties of that legal relationship’) and para 99
(‘The autonomy of Respondent [IWF] in relation to Appellant [athlete] is, therefore, not restricted
by any contractual engagements entered into by IWF vis-à-vis third parties’); Parma FC SpA v
Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio & Torino FC SpA, CAS 2014/A/3629, para 32 (rejecting the
argument that Article 59 of the UEFA Statutes, requiring its member federations to include a provision
in their regulations giving the CAS jurisdiction over disputes arising under those regulations, should
be given effect as between a member federation and one of its clubs even if not explicitly incorporated
into its regulations, on the basis that ‘consistent CAS jurisprudence is clear that the UEFA (or FIFA)
Statutes merely “constitute an instruction to introduce a regulation providing for CAS arbitration”
(CAS 2004/A/676, paras. 2.6 and 2.7) and do not by themselves grant jurisdiction to CAS over appeals
against decisions passed by national federations or leagues. Therefore, Article 59 UEFA Statutes is not
directly applicable and does not form part of the rules of FIGC. FIGC remains an independent body
with its own set of rules [that do not give CAS jurisdiction over the dispute in hand]. If the FIGC rules
are not in compliance with the UEFA Statutes, it is for UEFA to take the necessary steps to ensure such
compliance’ [citations omitted]); Zubkov v IOC, 2017/A/5422, para 872 (even if the power in the IOC’s
Anti-Doping Rules for the 2014 Olympic Games to ban an athlete for life from the Olympic Games
for a doping offence ‘arguably violates the IOC’s undertaking not to change the WADC’s sanctioning
regime, such violation would simply constitute a breach of the IOC’s contract with WADA pursuant to
which the IOC would implement the WADC’s sanctioning regime “without any substantive change”.
In this context it needs to be stressed that the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private
organisation, the implementation of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual
agreement to this effect. As can be gleaned from Article 75 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, under
Swiss law the said breach does not lead to an invalidity of the breaching rule but merely to it being
voidable. Only in rare cases are decisions of a Swiss association void ab initio, ie, when they are affected
by a serious formal or material flaw. This is not the case here’) (citation omitted); Cooper & Grant v
BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 38 (‘The fact that BWLA may have agreed to incorporate the
rules of another organisation into their own rules by reason of their signature to UK Sport’s National
Anti-Doping Policy or otherwise would not avail the Appellants if BWLA had not done so. In principle
such failure might give rise to a suit for breach of contract by W ADA against BWLA; whether it
would in fact or law do so or not is outside the realm of my inquiry in disposing of the present appeal.
I cannot accept as a matter of construction or otherwise Dr Davis’ ingenious submission that either the
WADA Code (or the IWF Rules) confer third party rights on the athletes which are directly enforceable,
(although they are undoubtedly intended to benefit athletes). Furthermore the Appellants had no legal
basis on which to challenge any failure by BWLA to apply the W ADA or IWF Rules. BWLA is not a
body bound by principles of public law, and in any event the Appellants have not sought to judicially
review any decision of the Board’); WADA v Pakistan Cricket Board et al, CAS 2006/A/1190, paras
8.4–8.5 (The ICC Code contains no provision which obliges the PCB to allow a right of appeal of its
decisions to CAS. If the PCB were subject to such a mandatory provision, no right of appeal to CAS
would exist until the PCB amended its statutes or regulations to incorporate such a right of appeal’);
IAAF v Hellebuyck, CAS 2005/A/831, para 7.3.4.3 (‘In the present case the Appellant deliberately
did not adopt the exact same wording of the provision in Art 10.8 WADC in their rules. Whether the
Appellant thereby breached an obligation in relation to WADA can be left unanswered in this case.
Even if this were the case, the Panel cannot override the expressed will of the Appellant. Instead the
Panel is bound by the content of the properly established IAAF Rules’). Cf IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina,
CAS 2016/O/4464, para 77 (where IAAF Rule 40.8 provided that all results obtained by an athlete
after his anti-doping rule violation were to be disqualified, and did not permit deviation from that rule
where fairness required, ‘Considering that Article 10.8 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2009 […]
included a fairness exception, that this provision was part of the obligatory commitment of the IAAF
as signatory to the WADC according to Article 23.2.2 WADC and that the IAAF was not allowed to
include any substantial change to this provision, the Sole Arbitrator sees an obligation to understand
Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 2012-2013 harmoniously with Article 10.8 WADC. For whatever reason, the
fairness exception was not mentioned explicitly in the IAAF Rules 2012-2013, but had nevertheless
to be applied based on IAAF’s commitment to Article 10.8 WADC’). It is telling that in Sharmina the
missing provision favoured the athlete. If it had prejudiced the athlete, query whether the CAS panel
would have enforced it against her.
3 USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, paras 57-58 (‘By Rule 44 of the OC [Olympic Charter], the IOC has
incorporated the WADA Code into the IOC’s own Statutes. The IOC further provides in Rule 41 of
the OC that a competitor must respect and comply with all aspects of the WADA Code. Accordingly,
the IOC has by virtue of its own statutes and in particular, Rule 44, accepted the binding nature of
the WADA Code. Because the Panel has found that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the
WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the OC, the IOC Regulation is
not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, ie the OC, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable’); Riis
Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.36 (a UCI regulation that sought to impose an additional
doping sanction to those mandated by the World Anti-Doping Code was non-compliant with the Code
and therefore invalid and unenforceable).
In Zubkov v IOC, 2017/A/5422, however, a CAS panel held that even if the power in the IOC’s
Anti-Doping Rules for the 2014 Olympic Games to ban an athlete for life from the Olympic Games
for a doping offence ‘arguably violates the IOC’s undertaking not to change the WADC’s sanctioning
regime, such violation would simply constitute a breach of the IOC’s contract with WADA pursuant to
which the IOC would implement the WADC’s sanctioning regime “without any substantive change”.
In this context it needs to be stressed that the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private
organisation, the implementation of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual
agreement to this effect. As can be gleaned from Article 75 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, under
Swiss law the said breach does not lead to an invalidity of the breaching rule but merely to it being
voidable. Only in rare cases are decisions of a Swiss association void ab initio, ie, when they are
affected by a serious formal or material flaw. This is not the case here’ (para 872, citation omitted).
The CAS panel said this conclusion did not contradict the USOC v IOC award because in those
proceedings, ‘under the arbitration agreement between the parties, the CAS was called upon to make
a ruling pro or contra the validity of the respective IOC rule and thus was effectively empowered to
decide on that very question’ (ibid, para 873).
B1.13 If the superior norm in the hierarchy is an absolute one (eg it mandates that
the maximum ban for a doping offence is two years, with no discretion to exceed that
maximum), then it will be clear whether a lower norm contradicts it (eg by imposing
a four-year ban instead). But if the superior norm is not absolute, the position is
not so clear. For example, if the superior norm prohibits unlawful discrimination on
grounds (eg) of gender, then the question becomes whether the discriminatory effect
of any inferior regulation is proportionate to a legitimate objective and therefore
justified and lawful.1
1 Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 (‘The Athlete contended, and the IAAF did not
submit to the contrary, that the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of Monaco all provide
that there shall not be discrimination and that these provisions are higher-ranking rules that prevail.
Accordingly, unless the Hyperandrogenism Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate,
they will be invalid as inconsistent with the IOC Charter, the IAAF Constitution and the laws of
Monaco’); Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798,
para 548 (‘The conclusion that the DSD Regulations are prima facie discriminatory is merely the
starting point, and not the end, of the Panel’s legal analysis. In particular, it is common ground that a
rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and
lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective’). The
athlete in Chand also argued (CAS 2014/A/3759 at para 108): ‘In relation to the question of deference,
the Athlete submits that where a regulation is inconsistent with a higher-ranking legal rule – such as a
constitutional principle or the Olympic Charter – the CAS jurisprudence establishes that the regulation
must be declared invalid. Since the critical question is whether a lower-ranking rule conflicts with
a higher-ranking rule, the Athlete contends that the IAAF is not entitled to any special deference
or margin of appreciation in defending the Hyperandrogenism Regulations’. That argument was not
addressed by the Chand Panel in its award.
B National and transnational laws
B1.14 In addition to having to comply with any superior norms set out in (or
incorporated by reference into) the SGB’s own constitution, the SGB’s regulations
also have to comply with any applicable national and transnational laws. The SGB’s
constitution is likely to specify a governing law, usually the law of the country where
the SGB is headquartered or incorporated. And if the SGB is a national federation,
and its regulations only apply within the territorial jurisdiction of that nation, the
legality of its regulations can safely be assessed solely by reference to the applicable
national law.1 If the SGB is an international federation, however, the position will be
more complicated, because its rules apply globally, and therefore they will potentially
be subject not only to any national law specified in the constitution as the governing
law, but also to the mandatory requirements of the laws of every country in which
the rules will apply, and (if the rules apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the
European Union) the laws of the European Union.2
1 See further para B1.51, n.1.
2 36-74 Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, para 28 (‘By reason of the
fact that it is imperative, the [EU] rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships
in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or of the place
where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the Community’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201,
para 4 (EU provisions on free movement and on free competition fall within the special category of
mandatory rules that must be applied irrespective of the national law applicable to the merits of the
case). See also RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, para 73 (‘The Panel considers that the law
of the European Union (“EU law”), including in particular the provisions of the Treaties on freedom
of movement and competition law, must be taken into account by the Panel insofar as they constitute
mandatory provisions of foreign law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Swiss Private International
Law Act of December 18, 1987 (“PILA”)’) (unofficial translation from French); Mavromati and Reeb,
The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer,
2015), pp 547–49 (discussing the need for sports rules to comply with an ‘ordre public “international
and universal”’, including EU rules).
B1.15 This poses an obvious problem. International sport ‘is a global phenomenon
which demands globally uniform standards. Only if the same terms and conditions
apply to everyone who participates in organised sport, are the integrity and equal
opportunity of sporting competition guaranteed’.1 As the infamous Krabbe case
demonstrated,2 it would be impossible to establish a level playing-field throughout
the sport globally, and so to ensure equal treatment for all of its participants, if the
same rules were to be given different meanings and/or different legal effect in different
jurisdictions.3 Instead, the rules have to operate, insofar as is possible, outside of the
constraints of any particular legal system, so that they are not impacted by doctrines
or distinctions that are particular to that system, but instead are given uniform and
consistent meaning and legal effect across the globe.4
1 Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 12.
2 In Krabbe v IAAF, OLG Munich, judgment dated 28 March 1996, SpuRt 1996, p 133, a German
court held that the IAAF’s anti-doping rule imposing a four-year ban for a first doping offence was
disproportionate and therefore an unlawful infringement of the (German) athlete’s rights. Its view was
that any ban longer than two years would be disproportionate. Therefore, to preserve a level playing-
field throughout the sport, the IAAF and other international federations were forced to reduce the
sanction imposed in their rules for a first doping offence to two years not just in Germany but globally.
See Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’, [2003] (3) ISLR 61, 63.
3 Peñarol v Bueno, Rodriguez & PSG, CAS 2005/A/983 & 984, para 68 (‘[…] sport by its very nature
is a phenomenon that transcends national frontiers. It is not only desirable, but in fact indispensable
that the rules that govern sport at an international level are of a uniform character and largely coherent
worldwide. In order to ensure the uniform application at an international level, such rules and
regulations must not be applied differently from one country to the other, in particular with respect to
the interference of national laws with the rules and regulations of the sport’), free translation set out
in Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 13. See also Wigan Athletic
FC v Heart of Midlothian, CAS 2007/A/1298, para 129 (declining to apply contract law of Scotland to
dispute, notwithstanding that FIFA regulations expressly permitted ‘due consideration for the law of
the country concerned’, inter alia because ‘it is in the interest of football that solutions to compensation
be based on uniform criteria rather than on provisions of national law that may vary considerably from
country to country’); CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 56 (‘International rules, against doping as well as
in other areas of sport, are made for those who participate at the international level. If such rules are
duly made by an international federation they should be respected within the sport as being for the
benefit of all. They should not be liable to be eroded by the domestic law of any country’); Foschi v
FINA, CAS 96/156, para 10.2.4 (rejecting argument that appeal from decision of national panel should
be determined by reference to the law of that nation, on the basis that ‘an international federation deals
with national federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis.
It therefore has to apply the same law to all of them. It is unacceptable that, based upon the same facts,
different results might be reached depending on the law applied’); Mavromati and Reeb, The Code
of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp
551–52 (‘Given its nature, sport is an event that surpasses frontiers. It is therefore not only positive
but indispensable to have uniform and coherent sports rules at international level’). See also Cowley v
Heatley (1986) Times 24 July CA and the cases cited at para B1.27, n 3.
4 See eg Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 150 (‘[…] under the Appellant’s approach – where
mandatory provisions of Swiss law would automatically apply to all sanctions imposed by a sport
governing body under association law – a FIFA official with an employment contract (such as the
FIFA Secretary General) and a FIFA official without such contract (eg a FIFA Executive Committee
member) would effectively be treated differently, in that only the former – due to mandatory labour
law – would be exempt from sanctions, creating an imbalance and incoherence in the application
of the FCE, which would be unacceptable for the protection of ethical standards and of equality of
treatment within the association. Consequently, for this additional reason the mandatory provisions of
Swiss employment law are inapplicable to the present case. Instead the disciplinary authority of FIFA
is solely based on the FIFA regulations supplemented by association law’); Pechstein v ISU, German
Federal Court of Justice judgment dated 7 June 2016, para 59 (‘Sports federations such as the [ISU]
promote sports in general and particularly their own sport by creating the prerequisites for organised
sport. To achieve the relevant goals, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that the rules apply to
all athletes and are implemented everywhere in accordance with uniform standards. […] Particularly
in the area of doping, uniform application of the anti-doping rules of the federations and of the WADC
is indispensable to ensure fair international sporting competitions for all athletes’); Foschi v FINA,
TAS 96/156, para 102.4 (‘Moreover, an international federation deals with national federations and
athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis. It therefore has to apply the
same law to all of them. It is unacceptable that, based upon the same facts, a different result might be
reached depending on the law applied’).
The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which seeks to harmonise anti-doping rules globally across
all different sports, states this intent explicitly in Art 24.3, which provides that ‘the Code shall be
interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes
of the Signatories or governments’. And the Introduction to the Code states: ‘These sport specific rules
and procedures, aimed at enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way, are distinct
in nature from criminal and civil proceedings. They are not intended to be subject to or limited by
any national requirements and legal standards applicable to such proceedings, although they are
intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights.
When reviewing the facts and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other
adjudicating bodies should be aware of and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the
Code and the fact that those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around
the world with an interest in fair sport’. Based on these provisions, the CAS has resisted efforts to
interpret and apply Code-compliant anti-doping rules by reference to laws peculiar to a particular
national legal system. See eg FINA v Cielo Filho & CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.9 (‘[…] the
preamble to the WADC makes it clear that the WADC and its derivatives are not to be subject to
or limited by the laws of any particular nation’); Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 71
(although the ATP anti-doping rules provided for Delaware law to apply, ‘the ATP Rules have been
established by the Respondent on the basis of the WADC. One of the main intentions of the WADC is
the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping. In order to achieve that goal, it is necessary
to interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with
the WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sports federations and the respective CAS
case law’); WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 126 (same); Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025,
paras 10.6–10.8 (‘As most of the International Sports Federations have now resolved in their respective
rules to refer sports related disputes to the Court of Arbitration for Sport, this appellate body is striving
to achieve, despite differing governing laws of the Federations, a consistent and uniform application
of the WADC throughout the world and for all sports disciplines. All of the case law developed by the
CAS is based primarily on the rules issued by those federations. A large number of those federations
are domiciled in Switzerland, thus enabling in the absence of a specific choice of law in their respective
statutes the application of Swiss law. The WADA is itself a Swiss private law foundation with its seat
in Lausanne, Switzerland. […] The Panel accepts that the ITF Programme provides that it is to be
governed by and construed in accordance with English law, but that provision in the ITF Programme
is expressly stated to be subject to the requirement to interpret the Programme “in a manner that is
consistent with the applicable provisions of the Code [WADC]”. The Panel interprets those provisions
[…] as requiring it to construe the WADC in a manner which is consistent with Swiss law, as the law
with which the WADC must comply. Construing the WADC in that way means that the WADC is not
subject to the vagaries of myriad systems of law throughout the world, but is capable of a uniform
and consistent construction wherever it is applied. Any other construction would negate, or, at the
very least, seriously weaken, the purpose and objective of the WADC and its signatories’); Gibilisco
v CONI, CAS 2007/A/1426, para 48 (insisting on applying the ‘autonomous [WADC] definition of
the concept of “Attempt” that shall be applied in the assessment of any conduct eventually leading
to such violation’, apparently in reaction to a ruling in earlier proceedings in the case in Italy, in
which a domestic tribunal had thrown out a WADC charge of Attempted Use because the acts
alleged did not amount to attempt as defined under Italian criminal law); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC,
CAS 2006/A/119, para 41 (rejecting athlete argument that his agreement (as set out in the UCI anti-
doping rules) to submit disputes relating to those rules to CAS was trumped by Spanish national law
forbidding the arbitration of doping disputes, noting that ‘to decide otherwise would lead to a veritable
race for the most lenient national legislation’). See also ATP v Perry, ATP Tour Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 30 November 2005, para 49 (‘The principle of estoppel ought not to be brought into
consideration merely to frustrate the application of a comprehensive Code of harmonized doping rules
that the WADA Code represents and which are the parent derivative rules. Within that Code are rules
and remedies dealing with the situation at hand that are the appropriate rules within which to work out
a resolution of this dispute. The very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and
to preserve its integrity by not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate balancing of
interests reflected in the achievement of an international agreement to harmonize sport-doping rules
in the Code’); UCI decision regarding USADA v Armstrong, 22 October 2012, p 2 (‘It is UCI’s view
that USADA’s reference to national law is not appropriate. First article 24.3 of the Code states that that
Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to the existing
law or statutes of the Code signatories or governments. Secondly it would be in full contradiction
with the purpose of harmonisation of the Code that an action could be commenced against one athlete
but not against another because of different national legislations governing the statute of limitations.
Where WADA emphasises the need for harmonisation of sanctions, there should be no disharmony in
the possibility to sanction an athlete at all’). Cf CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 78 (statutes of limitations
‘are private law rules’ and therefore questions as to whether the statute of limitations provided for in
the World Anti-Doping Code has expired should be determined by the private law of the country where
the sports federation in question is domiciled).
B1.16 CAS panels have used various different means to achieve this goal of
affording regulations uniform and consistent meaning and legal effect across the
globe. For example:
(a) Article 187 of the Swiss Private International Law Act (PILA) provides that
‘the arbitral tribunal shall rule according to the law chosen by the parties or,
in the absence of such a choice, according to the law with which the action is
most closely connected’. CAS panels have on occasion taken the view that
this ‘enables the parties to mandate the arbitrators to resolve the dispute in
application of provisions of law that do not originate in any particular national
law, such as sports regulations of an international federation […]’.1 In other
words, the ‘applicable law’ is first and foremost the SGB’s own regulations,
which are regarded as ‘a legal regime de private juris, having an international,
or even global vocation, to be applied in the domain of sports rules governing’
the SGB’s sport.2
(b) Article 58 of the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration states that the
Panel ‘shall decide the dispute according to the applicable regulations and,
subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties […]’. CAS panels have
on occasion interpreted this as giving priority to the SGB’s regulations over the
requirements of the governing law of the regulations.3 The intent of Article 58
is said to be ‘to ensure that the rules and regulations by which all the (indirect)
members are bound in equal measure are also applied to them in equal measure.
This can only be ensured, however, if a uniform standard is applied in relation
to central issues’; thus, the SGB’s regulations are prioritised over national law
‘for good reason, namely to establish the most uniform legal standard possible
in appeal arbitration proceedings’.4 On this basis, where the SGB’s regulations
state that a national law applies ‘subsidiarily’ or ‘additionally’ to those
regulations, that national law is applied only to resolve any ‘issues that cannot
be resolved solely on the basis of the rules invoked by the parties’,5 ie to fill
any lacunae left by the regulations.6 If the SBG’s regulations address the point
in issue, however, CAS panels have gone so far as to say that those regulations
would prevail over any contrary provision of the governing national law, ‘even
if the otherwise applicable provision of Swiss law were mandatory’.7 The
notion that an SGB can contract out of mandatory national law is a surprising
and radical one, and runs contrary to decisions from the Swiss Federal Tribunal
and other CAS panels.8 This tension may be resolved by saying that, because of
the overriding need for a global level playing-field, CAS panels will only apply
mandatory national laws over conflicting SGB regulations where those laws
are considered to be ‘justified by a sufficient interest’,9 ie where they reflect
fundamental legal principles that are considered part of a ‘universal’ public
order.10
(c) In the important and much-cited AEK Athens award from 1998, CAS addressed
the need for uniform and consistent meaning and legal effect of regulations
across the globe through the concept of general principles of sports law. The
CAS panel ruled that:
‘[…] all sporting institutions, and in particular all international federations, must
abide by general principles of law. Due to the transnational nature of sporting
competitions, the effects of the conduct and deeds of international federations are
felt in a sporting community throughout various countries. Therefore, the substantive
and procedural rules to be respected by international federations cannot be reduced
only to its own statutes and regulations and to the laws of the country where the
federation is incorporated or of the country where its headquarters are. Sports law
has developed and consolidated along the years, particularly through the arbitral
settlement of disputes, a set of unwritten legal principles – a sort of lex mercatoria
for sports or, so to speak, a lex ludica [sic: lex ludorum] – to which national and
international sports federations must conform, regardless of the presence of such
principles within their own statutes and regulations or within any applicable national
law, provided that they do not conflict with any national “public policy” (“ordre
public”) provision applicable to a given case. Certainly, general principles of law
drawn from a comparative or common denominator reading of various domestic
legal systems and, in particular, the prohibition of arbitrary or unreasonable rules
and measures can be deemed to be part of such lex ludica’.11
(d) Other CAS panels have also followed this approach, including not only panels
sitting in the Ad Hoc Division, whose rules make express provision for the
application of such ‘general principles of law’,12 but also in the Ordinary
Division and the Appeals Division, where there is no such express provision.13
The English courts have taken a similar approach when it comes to construing
the rules of an international federation,14 as have English hearing panels sitting
at first instance in cases applying such rules.15
1 Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 57. See Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180,
para 6 (‘The wording of Article 187 para.1 of the Swiss PIL, which states that the parties may choose
the “rules of law” to be applied, does not limit the parties’ choice to the designation of a particular
national law. It is generally agreed by academics and commentators that the parties may choose to
subject the contract to a system of rules which is not the law of a State and that such a choice is
consistent with Article 187 of the Swiss PIL […]. The relevant statutes, rules or regulations of a
sporting governing body may therefore be designated by the parties as the applicable rules of law for
the purposes of Article 187 para.1 of the Swiss PIL […]’ [citations omitted]).
2 B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, para 10.
3 Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 12, citing Football Federation
of Kazakhstan v Pelzer, CAS 2014/A/3527, para 57. See also Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 541–42
(effect of CAS Code Article 58 is that ‘[t]he applicable regulations are therefore the first choice as
opposed to a legal order of a specific state’).
4 Haas, Applicable Law in Football-Related Disputes, [2016] (1) ISLR 9, 12–13.
5 Canadian Olympic Committee & Scott v IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, para 15. See also RFEF v FIFA,
CAS 2014/A/3813, para 153 (‘The Panel also notes the Appellant’s reference to Spanish law in
addressing certain issues but is satisfied at this preliminary stage […] that the FIFA regulations to a
greater extent address all the relevant issues for determination in this matter’); FC Barcelona v FIFA,
CAS 2014/A/3793, paras 8.3 and 8.4 (same); W v UK Athletics, CAS 2002/A/455, para 3 (national law
only applies to issues ‘which are not governed by the relevant rules of’ the SGB).
6 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS 2008/A/1725, para 12; Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al,
CAS 2006/A/1180, para 14 (‘The application of Swiss law stipulated in Art. 60 para.2 of the
FIFA Statutes is limited. The latter only applies in the alternative and, more particularly, if there
is a gap in the FIFA regulations, in particular RSTP 2001. However, where the FIFA regulations
conclusively regulate a legal question there is basically no scope for having recourse to Swiss law (see
CAS 2005/A/983 & 984, marg. no. 93)’).
7 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS 2008/A/1725, para 12, endorsed (albeit without attribution)
in Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases
and Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), pp 541–42; Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 147
(‘According to Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes, “[t]he provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-
related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the various regulations
of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss law.” The question, thus, is how this referral to “Swiss law” in
the FIFA Statutes must be construed. In the Panel’s view, it is obvious that Article 58 para. 2 of
the FIFA Statutes, by using the terms “primarily” and “additionally”, provides for a hierarchical
relationship between the “FIFA regulations” – including of course in such category the FIFA Statutes
and all other FIFA rules – and “Swiss law”. This hierarchical relationship has been understood in
constant CAS jurisprudence as implying that the “additionally” applicable Swiss law is merely
intended to clarify that the FIFA regulations are based on a normatively shaped basis, deriving from
Swiss law, and that any matter that is not covered by FIFA regulations must be decided in accordance
with Swiss law. Consequently, the purpose of the reference to Swiss law in Article 58, para. 2 of
the FIFA Statutes is to ensure the uniform interpretation of the standards of the football industry
worldwide. Swiss law does govern, for example, the interpretive methods with regard to FIFA rules.
Similarly, Swiss law applies when determining the question of standing to sue or standing to be
sued, because of a lacuna in the FIFA regulations that must be clarified under the “additionally”
applicable Swiss law (CAS 2014/A/3850, no. 62 et seq.). The same principle applies to the question
of who bears the burden of proof for particular issues, since this legal question – in the absence of
any explicit provision – is equally subject to Swiss law under Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes
(CAS 2014/A/3742, no. 59 et seq.; 2014/A/3527, no. 67). 148. By corollary, the referral contained in
Article 58, para. 2 of the FIFA Statutes to Swiss law cannot be construed as meaning that wherever
the FIFA regulations and Swiss law are in contradiction, Swiss law takes precedence. Nor can this
referral be construed to mean that FIFA regulations only take precedence insofar as this is compatible
with Swiss mandatory law. Instead, the wording (“primarily”, “additionally”) clearly indicates that,
in principle, the FIFA regulations always take precedence over Swiss law. 149. Such interpretation is
perfectly in line with Article 187, para. 1 of the PILA or Article 381, para. 1.a CPC. According thereto,
the parties may agree to apply “rules of law” to the merits. The term of art “rules of law” clearly covers
also rules that do not origin from a State legislator. Thus, the interpretation followed here, according
to which a non-national law takes precedence over a national law, is clearly covered by the autonomy
granted by Swiss statutory arbitration law […]. 150. For these reasons, the Panel finds that FIFA’s
authority to impose disciplinary sanctions cannot be limited by mandatory Swiss law’). See also
WADA v ONADE & Illescas, CAS 2016/A/4834, para 61 (‘The regulations of WADA and of the IAAF
are thus fashioned in a way that a national authority within the system of the anti-doping regulation
is bound by such rules. This means that ONADE is obliged to apply these rules even if it finds that a
rule in any way can be in conflict with its national law. This is a consequence of the membership to the
federation. The Athlete is similarly bound by these rules’).
8 X AG v Y, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 20 December 2005, ATF 132 III 285, para 1.3
(‘According to the practice of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, rules of private organisations are not
equivalent to legal norms/legislation even if they are very detailed and comprehensive such as the SIA
standards or the rules of conduct of the International Ski Federation. Rather, regulations drawn up by
private associations are in principle subordinate to state laws and can only be considered insofar as
state law leaves room for autonomous regulation. They do not constitute a “Law” within the meaning
of Art. 116 (1) IPRG [Federal Code on Private International Law] and cannot be recognised as a
“lex sportiva transnationalis” as advocated by a commentator. The rules of the (international) sports
federations can only be applied as a reference to substantive law and are therefore only recognised
as agreements between the parties, which are governed by mandatory national law provisions’ [free
translation, citations omitted]); Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 100 (‘The autonomy of the IWF
to regulate doping matters in relation to its (affiliated) members is, however, limited by principles of
Swiss association law that are applicable subsidiarily’); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986,
para 123 (‘Swiss law grants to associations a wide discretion to regulate their own affairs. The freedom
of associations to regulate their own affairs is limited only by mandatory law’).
9 Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, paras 7.4.2 and 7.4.3 (where FIFA Statutes provided that the
FIFA regulations would govern, with Swiss law applying subsidiarily, ‘non-mandatory provisions
of EC law’ were not applicable, but mandatory principles of EC law were applicable provided such
application was ‘justified by a sufficient interest’); Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, para 43
(‘An arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland, such as the case in this arbitration pursuant to Articl R28
of the Code, must therefore take into consideration foreign mandatory rules where three conditions are
met: (i) such rules belong to a special category of norms which need to be applied irrespective of the
law applicable to the merits of the case; (ii) there is a close connection between the subject matter of
the dispute and the territory where the mandatory rules are in force; (iii) in view of Swiss legal theory
and practice, the mandatory rules must aim to protect legitimate interest and crucial values and their
application must lead to a decision which is appropriate’);.
10 Grasshopper v Alianza Lima, CAS 2008/A/1725, para 13 (‘The application of the (rules of) law
chosen by the parties has its confines in the ordre public. Usually, the term ordre public is thereby
divested of its purely Swiss character and is understood in the sense of a universal, international or
transnational sense. The ordre public proviso is meant to prevent a decision conflicting with basic
legal or moral principles that apply supranationally. This, in turn, is to be assumed if the application
of the rules of law agreed by the parties were to breach fundamental legal principles or were simply
incompatible with the system of law and values. The mere fact that a provision is considered mandatory
according to Swiss Law, thus, does not suffice to qualify it to belong to the (transnational) ordre public’
[citations omitted]) and para 23 (‘FIFA’s autonomy to deviate from (mandatory) provisions of Swiss
substantive law is limited, however, by the (transnational) ordre public. The question to be raised,
therefore, is whether or not the provisions in Art. 15 of the DRC Procedural Rules is in breach [of]
fundamental legal principles’); Galatasaray SK v Ribery et al, CAS 2006/A/1180, para 7 (referring to
‘an international or universal order public policy. The Swiss Federal Court specified this – for arbitral
jurisdiction – more precisely in a recent decision and stated (ATF 8 March 2006, 4P.278/2005, marg.
no. 2.2.2) that what was concerned were “… basic values or values, which are still recognized, which
according to the understanding of the law that prevails in Switzerland, should form the basis of every
legal system” [“… valeurs essentielles et largement reconnues qui, selon les conceptions juridiques
prévalant en Suisse, devraient constituer le fondement de tout ordre juridique”]’).
11 AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 156 (citations omitted).
12 For example, under Article 17 of the CAS Arbitration Rules for the 2018 Commonwealth Games, the
CAS was required to decide any dispute referred to it ‘pursuant to the Constitutional documents of the
CGF, the applicable regulations, the general principles of law and the rules of law, the application of
which it deems appropriate’. See eg COC & Kibunde v IOC, CAS OG 2000/004, para 11 (‘Il est exact
qu’un reglement sportif doit respecter non seulement la loi mais également les principles généraux du
droit’) (free translation: ‘It is quite clear that sporting rules must observe not only the written law but
also general principles of justice’).
13 See eg B v FIBA, CAS 92/80, paras 10, 19 (applying ‘general principles of law’ to test the legality of a
FIBA regulation on transfers of sporting allegiance); Federazione Italiana Nuoto (FIN) v Fédération
Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), CAS 96/157, para 22 (‘It is the holding of the Panel that
it can intervene in the sanction imposed only if the rules adopted by the FINA Bureau are contrary
to the general principles of law, if their application is arbitrary, or if the sanctions provided by the
rules can be deemed excessive or unfair on their face’), cited in Australian Olympic Committee,
CAS 2000/C/267, para 61 (‘there could be a review of the Bureau decision if it was alleged that the
decision was contrary to the general principles of law. There is no assertion that the rules SW10.7,
GR 6, or any other of the FINA Handbook Rules are contrary to the general principles of law or
natural justice. Therefore, there are no grounds to review the Bureau decision on the bodysuit on
this basis’); Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 4 (‘In addition [to Swiss law], to the
extent it deems it appropriate, the Panel may apply general principles of law, which are applicable
as a type of lex mercatoria for sports regardless of their explicit presence in the applicable UEFA or
FIFA Statutes’); NISA v ISU, CAS 2003/O/466, para 6.23 (‘[…] when a party brings before the CAS
a claim on legal grounds – eg violation of an association’s constitution or of mandatory rules of law
or of general principles of law – for the protection or implementation of rights or the prevention or
redress of unlawful acts, and the claim takes such a form that the CAS is capable of acting upon
it, the CAS shall consider it as a justiciable issue […]’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772,
para 59 (‘[…] to ensure a level playing-field for the sport throughout the world, an international
federation’s rules have to apply equally in every national jurisdiction, which means they have to
be interpreted and applied based on the “general principles of law drawn from a comparative or
common denominator reading of various domestic legal systems”’, citing AEK Athens & SK Slavia
Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 156). Cf FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 124 (‘the
Panel is not prepared to take refuge in such uncertain concepts as that of a “lex sportive”, as has
been advocated by various authors. The exact content and the boundaries of the concept of a lex
sportive are still far too vague and uncertain to enable it to be used to determine the specific rights
and obligations of sports associations towards athletes’).
14 See para B1.51, n.5.
15 See UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 27 (‘In
the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is emerging of the general principles of sporting law governing
doping offences, independent of the municipal law of the state in which the sporting body happens to
be located. That approach can only be strengthened as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into
force’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006, para 5 (same).
B1.17 In these circumstances, it is important to know: (a) what these ‘general

principles of law’ are; and (b) what constraints they place on the SGBs in the exercise
of their regulatory powers.
C General principles of law
B1.18 As far as the authors are aware, the ‘general principles of law’ that are
applicable to SGBs’ regulations have never been codified or identified definitively,
either in any CAS award or otherwise. They have been described generally as ‘law
which is truly international’,1 and said to ‘comprise rules commonly observed in
legal systems worldwide’,2 being ‘derived not exclusively from any one national legal
system, but from international sport jurisprudence’.3 Where such ‘general principles
of law’ are discussed in the CAS jurisprudence, many of them bear a marked
resemblance to European public law principles applied as part of EU law, which
are derived from the common principles of the legal systems of the various Member
States.4 However, they do not claim any such specific provenance. Instead, it has been
suggested that ‘[e]ach area of doctrine arises from an almost instinctual level of legal
analysis, resting on general notions of fairness shared by a panel of arbitrators who
often hail from multiple countries with distinct legal systems’.5 A review of the CAS
jurisprudence and related literature suggests that these ‘general principles’ include
(or may include) the following principles.
1 Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 11. ‘To identify the “appropriate” “general
principles of law and rules of law”, sports law borrows from private and public law, appropriately
mixing Latinisms with French phrases, civilian and common law concepts’. (Ibid, p 12). ‘Such general
principles of law in the lex sportive or lex ludica consist or have affinity with, but are not identical
to, well established doctrines of national law and bridge common law and civil law concepts’. (Ibid,
p 308).
2 Ibid, p 13. An analogy may be drawn to some extent between such ‘general principles of law’ and
the ‘essential and widely recognized values that are the foundation of any legal order’ that the Swiss
Federal Tribunal uses to assess whether a CAS award violates substantive public policy (international
public order), which values include ‘pacta sunt servanda, respect for the rules of good faith, the idea
that a right must not be abused, the prohibition of discriminatory or confiscatory acts, and the protection
of persons who are civilly incapable’. Rouiller, ‘Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the
World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005,
p 46. See also N et al v FINA, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment dated 31 March 1999, 5P.83/1999,
para 3(a) (‘According to the case law, an order is contrary to public policy if it violates the fundamental
legal principles to the extent where it is no longer compatible with the legal system and the system
of values on which it is based: these principles include, in particular, contractual fidelity (pacta sunt
servanda), respect for the rules of good faith, the prohibition of the abuse of law, the prohibition of
discriminatory or spoliatory measures and the protection of persons who lack civil law capacity. Public
policy, within the meaning of Section 190(2(e)) LDIP, is no more than a simple incompatibility clause
lacking in any positive or regulatory effect on contentious legal relationships (negative public policy);
it must be understood as a universal rather than a national concept, intended to penalize incompatibility
with the fundamental legal or moral principles acknowledged in all civilized states; the contested
award will be revoked only if the result to which it leads is incompatible with public policy as thus
defined’ [citations omitted]).
3 Rouiller, ‘Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the
Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005, p 12.
4 See Beloff, ‘English Public Law: Europhiliac or Eurosceptic?’, in The struggle for simplicity in the law:
Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon (Butterworths); Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd
Edn (Oxford European Union Law Library, 2007); Vogenauer & Weatherill (Eds), General Principles
of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2017).
5 Erbsen, ‘The Substance and Illusion of Lex Sportiva’, in Siekman & Soek (Eds), Lex Sportiva: What
is Sports Law? (TMC Asser Press, 2012), pp 105-06.
(a) The requirement of legal certainty (nullem crimen, nulla poena sine lege
certa)
B1.19 Since most SGB regulations take a ‘command and control’ approach,
prohibiting and sanctioning conduct that is considered contrary to the regulatory
objective,1 the starting point for the discussion is the principles of legal certainty and
predictability, in other words the principles that an SGB’s regulations must be clear,
understandable, and predictable in meaning and application, so that those who are
subject to the regulations know (bearing in mind that they are not legally trained2)
what they can and cannot do, and what the consequences will be of any transgression.
These are undoubtedly fundamental principles of broad application in most if not
all legal regimes,3 and the underlying rationale is obvious. As the CAS panel in the
seminal Quigley case put it:
‘Any legal regime should seek to enable its subjects to assess the consequences
of their actions. While it would be naïve to expect that the average athlete at all
times bears in mind specific provisions of applicable regulations, the fact is that
the community of persons who are subject to a body of rules gradually develops a
certain understanding of it. […] When an athlete […] understands that he is subject
to rules which will punish him only if it is determined that he intended to take
a performance-enhancing substance, he may legitimately be expected to act in a
certain way, with a certain understanding of the consequences of his actions. […] If
he had been subject to a fundamentally different regime, ie, that of strict liability, his
understanding would have been different and his conduct might therefore have been
different. He might have summoned the fortitude to eschew medications prescribed
by a stranger. In other words, his conduct may have been responsive to his perception
of a greater risk of sanction. This is a matter of legitimate expectations, and it is
crucial to any decent system of law’.4
1 See para B1.7.
2 Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 13.3 (‘When considering whether the rules are sufficiently clear and
unambiguous the test to be applied is not whether a legally trained person would consider the rules to
be crystal clear and unambiguous but rather whether an athlete subjected to the rules who has no legal
education or experience understands the rules clearly and unambiguously’).
3 See eg Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603 (‘[There is a] standard of “lawfulness” set by
the Convention, which requires that all law, whether written or unwritten, be sufficiently precise to
allow the citizen – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in
the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines
[1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at p 267 (‘Elementary justice or, to use the concept often cited
by the European court, the need for legal certainty, demands that the rules by which the citizen is to be
bound should be ascertainable by him (or, more realistically, by a competent lawyer advising him) by
reference to identifiable sources that are publicly accessible’).
4 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, paras 30, 31, and 33. See also
Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149, para 31 (‘It is important that the fight against doping in sport, national
and international, be waged unremittingly. […] It is equally important that athletes in any sport […]
know clearly where they stand. It is unfair if they are to be found guilty of offences in circumstances
where they neither knew or reasonably could have known that what they were doing was wrong
[…]’). For examples of CAS cases applying these principles, see para B1.22, n.2, and see also Hui
v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 103 (the principle that a federation may only impose a disciplinary
sanction on a member if its rules provide a clear and ambiguous authority to do so ‘is also part of
considerations of sports law that have been taken into account by CAS panels in the past irrespective
of the (subsidiarily) applicable law to the merits’).
B1.20 The principle of legal certainty has both a procedural aspect (requiring a
transparent and coherent process for the issuing of regulations and for their subsequent
revision) and a substantive aspect (requiring that the content of the regulations is clear
and precise and enables those who have to comply to know exactly what is expected
of them and what will happen if they fail to comply).1 As the seminal passage from
the CAS award in Quigley states: ‘The fight against doping is arduous, and it may
require strict rules. But the rule-makers and the rule-appliers must begin by being
strict with themselves. Regulations that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes
must be predictable. They must emanate from duly authorised bodies. They must
be adopted in constitutionally proper ways. They should not be the product of an
obscure process of accretion. Athletes and officials should not be confronted with a
thicket of mutually qualifying or even contradictory rules that can be understood only
on the basis of the de facto practice over the course of many years of a small group
of insiders’.2
1 See the IOC’s Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement
(February 2008) (‘All regulations of each organisation and governing body, including but not limited
to, statutes/constitutions and other procedural regulations, should be clear, transparent, disclosed,
publicised and made readily available. Clear regulations allow understanding, predictability and
facilitate good governance. The procedure to modify or amend the regulations should also be clear and
transparent’).
2 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 55. This passage has
been cited with approval many times since, eg by the CAS panel in Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC,
CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 6.11. In WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated
10 October 2012, para 7.27, a AAA hearing panel cited the passage as authority for its warning that
‘WTC should take care to provide its athletes with clear, easy to understand rules so athletes need not
struggle to determine what conduct constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’.
B1.21 Looking first at the procedural requirement of a transparent and coherent

process for issuing regulations:
(a) Shortly before the 1998/99 football season started, UEFA issued a rule that a club
could not compete in a UEFA competition that season if it was under common
ownership with another club that was entered in the competition. When that
rule was challenged, the CAS panel in AEK Athens noted that ‘an adjustment to
the Contested Rule should not be arranged hurriedly, and commonly controlled
clubs and their owners should have some time to determine their course of
action, also taking into account possible legal questions (eg if shares are to
be sold, minority shareholders may be entitled to exercise pre-emptive rights
within given deadlines). There is an obvious need for a reasonable period of
time before entry into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule
may turn out to be excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs
and their owners’.1 The panel therefore endorsed a provisional order made
suspending the application of the rule while the challenge was pending, and
extended that suspension for a further season even after it had upheld the
legality of the rule, on the basis that ‘paramount considerations of fairness and
legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against allowing UEFA to
implement immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000 football season’.2
(b) In Boxing Australia v AIBA, Boxing Australia challenged a directive issued
by AIBA permitting national federations to enter only one boxer each into a
continental qualifying competition for the 2008 Olympics, on the basis that
that directive contradicted the rule and practice of its continental association
permitting two entries per federation. The CAS panel accepted that AIBA was
in principle entitled to adopt a rule reflecting its preferred approach, but only if
it ‘properly and timeously exercised such discretion. Paramount considerations
of legal certainty require that an international federation exercises its normative
discretion by adopting resolutions or regulations in proper compliance with
the formal procedures set out by its own statutes. International federations are
undoubtedly subject to the rule of law. It is not permissible for an international
federation bluntly to communicate by e-mail that it does not like a given rule in
force at continental level and demand the national federations of that continent
to simply disregard such rule even though it binds them contractually’.3 Instead,
‘in order to avoid any risk of uncertainty or arbitrariness, the policy choices
of an international federation must necessarily be translated into rules and
regulations, correctly adopted – as to both form and substance – and properly
and timeously publicized’.4
(c) Similarly, in Quigley, the CAS panel noted:

‘It might be possible by a carefully drafted clause to provide for some form of
ongoing adaptation of Regulations, eg by referring to a list of banned substances as
may be “revised from time to time” by a defined authorised body. But to imagine
that each and every Regulation, no matter how fundamental, is subject to being
transformed or eradicated “upon receipt of official (sic) changes in information”,
would be to deny the proper constitutional functioning of an international federation,
which must be orderly, predictable and transparent’.5
1 AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, para 161.
2 Ibid, para 163. This case is discussed further at para B1.36.
3 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, paras 6.29-6.30.
4 Ibid, paras 6.34 and 6.35. See also CONI, CAS 2000/C/255, para 58 (‘If an International Federation
proposes to make changes to its rules, those rules should, if possible, be made after discussion,
consultation and explanation with the constituent bodies of that International Federation so that
everyone at the National Federations understands clearly what is permitted and what is not permitted.
A similar process should be undertaken if National Federations wish to change their rules so as to
ensure that their constituent members of clubs have that understanding. The Panel accepts that there
must in every sport be occasions on which discussion, consultation and explanation cannot take place
before rule changes are made, but, hopefully, such occasions will be rare. If they do occur, great care
must be taken, after the changes have been made, to explain the consequences and ramifications of
the changes’). Cf AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 58 (‘For a regulator
or legislator, it appears to be advisable and good practice to acquire as much information as possible
and to hear the views of potentially affected people before issuing general regulations – one can think
of, eg, parliamentary hearings with experts or interest groups – but it is not a legal requirement. As a
United States court has stated, requiring an international sports federation “to provide for hearings
to any party potentially affected adversely by its rule-making authority could quite conceivably
subject the [international federation] to a quagmire of administrative red tape which would effectively
preclude it from acting at all to promote the game” (Gunter Harz Sports v USTA, 1981, 511 F. Supp.
1103, at 1122)’ [other citations omitted]).
In South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision
dated 5 June 2020, The FA’s rules included an express duty to consult with clubs before changing rules
that were applicable to them. The arbitral panel (chaired by Lord Dyson) found that the meaning of
that obligation was ‘informed by well-established public law principles as to what due consultation
requires’ (para 60), and that those principles (called the ‘Sedley criteria’, from the judgment of
Lord Wilson in R (Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014] UKSC 56) were that an ‘overall
assessment […] must be made of the facts to see whether addressees of a consultation had, in a real
and practical sense, been accorded a fair opportunity to express their views and opinions. […] the
ultimate litmus test is simply fairness; so how the application of the criteria play out in a particular
case will depend upon all of the surrounding circumstances’ (para 62, quoting with approval Green
J in R (Hutchison EG UK Ltd) v Teleconica UK Ltd [2017] EWHC 3376 (Admin) at 238). The
panel considered that the surrounding circumstances ‘will include the urgency of the situation and
considerations of practicability’ (para 63), and noted that in the context of determining how to address
promotion and relegation issues after the Covid-19 pandemic led to early curtailment of the 2019/20
football season, the urgency of the situation justified a streamlined consultation (paras 69, 71).
5 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 28.
B1.22 Moving from process to substance, while an SGB has broad autonomy to
bring disciplinary proceedings and to punish misconduct by a member,1 the principles
of legal certainty and predictability mean that no finding of breach may be made in
respect of, and no punishment may be imposed for, a member’s conduct unless the
rules in place at the time of the conduct clearly state that such conduct is prohibited
and that any transgression will attract a specified punishment,2 or at least a specific
type of punishment or range of punishments.3 If there is no clear legal basis for a
punishment in the rules, then it may not be imposed, even if all are agreed that it
would otherwise be warranted.4 For example:
(a) In Quigley, the UIT accepted that the athlete had not intended to use the
drug found in his system to gain a performance advantage, but said athletes
should be held strictly liable for the presence of prohibited substances in their
system. The CAS panel accepted that such an approach might be appropriate
in principle, but ‘[…] the fact that the Panel has sympathy for the principle of
a strict liability rule obviously does not allow the Panel to create such a rule
where it does not exist. […] The UIT had the right to punish Q. only on the
basis of rules in force’.5 Furthermore, given the stringent nature of a strict
liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’.6
The UIT rules in place at the time the athlete’s sample was collected did not
satisfy that test; to the contrary, they provided that ‘Doping means the use of
one or more substances mentioned in the official UIT Anti-Doping List with
the aim of attaining an increase in performance’. Nor did any other provisions
overrule this clear requirement of intent to gain a performance advantage. As a
result, ‘[…] the UIT had no legal basis for the sanctions it pronounced against
the Appellants. The sanctions must therefore be reversed’.7
(b) Similarly, in Rebagliati v IOC, a CAS panel dismissed the anti-doping charges
brought by the IOC against the snowboard gold medallist at the 1998 Winter
Olympics in Nagano, notwithstanding that his urine sample had tested positive
for a metabolite of marijuana, because his international federation, the FIS, had
not specifically prohibited marijuana in its rules. The Panel explained:
‘We do not suggest for a moment that the use of marijuana should be condoned, nor
do we suggest that sports authorities are not entitled to exclude athletes found to use
cannabis. But if sports authorities wish to add their own sanctions to those that are
edicted by public authorities, they must do so in an explicit fashion. That has not
been done here […]. We must decide within the context of the law of sports, and
cannot invent prohibitions or sanctions where none appear’.8
(c) In Tsagaev v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), the IWF purported
to suspend a member national federation due to repeated doping infractions
by some of its athletes, with the consequence that all of the member’s athletes
were excluded from the 2000 Olympic Games. A CAS panel upheld an
athlete’s challenge to the federation’s suspension, on the basis that the specific
provision in the IWF statutes that the IWF invoked to justify the suspension
stated that the sanction for repeated doping infractions by a member’s athletes
was a fine, and that the federation would only be suspended if it did not pay the
fine. The CAS panel also rejected the IWF’s alternative argument that it had
‘an inherent power to take appropriate action, including the suspension of a
member federation, if the behaviour of a member federation is harmful to that
particular sport’, holding:
‘Although an international federation may have certain general discretionary powers
to govern its sport even in the absence of specific provisions in the statutes or
regulations, the Panel is of the clear view that a suspension of an entire federation
from participation in the Olympic Games, including innocent athletes who have not
committed a doping offence or any other violation of the applicable rules, at least
requires an explicit, and unambiguous legal basis’.9
The Panel applauded the IWF for its desire to signal its commitment to stamp
out doping in its sport, but noted:
‘Laudable policy objectives, and alacrity in pursuing them, do not, however, obviate
the fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of having a legal basis for
disciplinary action’.10
(d) Finally, in Mutko v IOC, the IOC decided to exclude the former Russian
Minister of Sport from participation in all future Olympic Games, on the
basis that he bore ‘administrative responsibility’ for the state-sponsored
doping scheme uncovered by the McLaren report and confirmed by an IOC
disciplinary commission. He appealed to the CAS on the ground that there was
no legal basis in the Olympic Charter to impose such a sanction on him.11 The
CAS panel analysed the two Charter provisions cited by the IOC and decided
that neither of them provided a sufficient legal basis for the sanction imposed.
Rule 59 did not assist the IOC, because it applied ‘only […] to well-defined
categories of individuals or teams and the Appellant does not fall within any of
those categories’;12 and similarly Rule 44 only permitted the IOC to ‘refuse an
entry’ of a participant to a single edition of the Games, and was:
‘thus not viable as a legal basis for the sanction at hand because (i) the ROC or any
other entity has not submitted any application for the Appellant’s “entry” into an
edition of the Olympic Games, and (ii) the Appealed Decision bans the Appellant
from any participation in “all future Olympic Games”, thereby going beyond the
scope of the rule which only permits the rejection of an application to a single
edition of the Olympic Games. Therefore, Rule 44 is not a proper legal basis for
the Appealed Decision. In keeping with the above-cited CAS jurisprudence, the
Respondent cannot “adjust” Rule 44 to enable its application when the legislator
clearly did not intend for the rule to apply in situations like the present’.13
1 See para B1.6.
2 Mutko v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5498, para 60, quoting with approval Anderson et al v IOC,
CAS 2008/A/1545, para 30 (‘In the Panel’s opinion, this provision of the Olympic Charter is to be
properly read in accordance with the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité” in French), requiring
that the offences and the sanctions be clearly and previously defined by the law and precluding the
“adjustment” of existing rules to apply them to situations or behaviours that the legislator did not
clearly intend to penalize. CAS arbitrators have drawn inspiration from this general principle of law
in reference to sports disciplinary issues, and have formulated and applied what has been termed
as “predictability test”. Indeed, CAS awards have consistently held that sports organizations cannot
impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must be predictable.
In other words, offences and sanctions must be provided by clear rules enacted beforehand’); Mong
Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 149 (‘CAS jurisprudence requires, for a sanction to be
imposed, that sports regulations proscribe the misconduct with which the subject is charged, ie nulla
poena sine lege (principle of legality), and that the rule be clear and precise, ie nulla poena sine lege
clara (principle of predictability). As a matter of course, CAS panels have held that sports organizations
cannot impose sanctions without a proper legal or regulatory basis and that such sanctions must satisfy
a predictability test’) and para 152 (‘According to the principle of predictability, the offenses and
sanctions of a sports organization must be predictable, to the extent that those subject to them must
be able to understand their meaning and the circumstances in which they apply’) (citations omitted);
Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 197
(‘the starting point is the ISSF Constitution. Each Member should be able to identify with certainty
what disciplinary sanctions it could face which could threaten its membership of the ISSF, in instances
when the behaviour of the Member would be contrary to a stated purpose of the ISSF or if the behaviour
would bring the ISSF into disrepute. It should also be clear from the Constitution what the sanction
would be for the different behaviour of the Member’); Club X v D & FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3765, para 70
(‘the “principle of legality” (“principe de légalité”) requires that the offences and sanctions must be
clearly and previously defined by law and must preclude the “adjustment” of existing rules to enable
an application of them ot situations or conduct that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize.
CAS awards have consistently held that sports organisations cannot impose sanctions without a proper
legal or regulatory basis for them and that such sanctions must also be predictable (“predictability
test”). This principle is further confirmed by CAS 2007/A/1363, which holds that the principle of
legality and predictability of sanctions requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour
and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision’); Yerolimpos v
World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, paras 103–104 (‘It is well established that a sports
governing body such as the WKF may impose disciplinary sanctions upon its members if they violate
the applicable rules and regulations. […] It is, however, axiomatic that before a person can be found
guilty of a disciplinary offence, the relevant disciplinary code must proscribe the misconduct with
which he is charged. Nulla poena sine lege. It is equally axiomatic for the relevant provision with
which he is charged to be in breach first in accordance with the contra proferentem rule will be strictly
construed. Nulla poena sine lege clara. […] It is not sufficient to identify a duty; it is necessary as
well to stipulate that breach of such duty will attract disciplinary sanctions’), cited with approval in
Casas Vaque v FEI, CAS 2019/A/6202, para 193; Omeragik v FFM, CAS 2011/A/2670, para 8.13 (the
principle of legality ‘requires that the offences and sanctions must be clearly and previously defined by
law and must preclude the “adjustment” of existing rules to enable an application of them to situations
or conduct that the legislator did not clearly intend to penalize’). See also Wigan Athletic FC v Heart
of Midlothian, CAS 2007/A/1298, para 99 (noting a mandatory principle of Swiss law that ‘an
association must correctly apply its own regulations, another being that its regulations must be applied
and its decisions made in a predictable and cognisable manner, notably to ensure equality of treatment
and due process’). Cf WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27 (the two-
year ban that would otherwise have applied for the athlete’s use of testosterone without a therapeutic
use exemption was reduced by 12 months on the basis that the athlete bore No Significant Fault or
Negligence for his offence (see para C17.__), on the basis that the athlete’s failure to understand and
comply with the requirements in the rules was caused in part by confusing statements on the WTC’s
website).
3 Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003 (‘165. Pursuant to Article 5, para 1 FCE, the FCE may pronounce
the sanctions provided in the FCE, the FIFA Disciplinary Code (hereinafter the “FDC”) and the
FIFA Statutes. As a result, the FIFA Ethics Committee was entitled to apply the sanctions listed
in Article 6 FCE, Article 10 et seq. FDC and Article 65 of the FIFA Statutes. The aforementioned
provisions do not list specific sanctions for each and every ethical offense, but rather provide a range
of sanctions that may be imposed on a natural person, including the following: a warning, a reprimand,
a fine, a return of awards, a match suspension, a ban from dressing rooms and/or the substitutes’
bench, a ban on entering a stadium, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity and social
work. With regard to the fine, Article 15 FDC then stipulates that it “shall not be less than CHF 300,
or in the case of a competition subject to an age limit not less than CHF 200, and not more than
CHF 1,000,000”. 166. It is true that according to the principle of legal certainty, the offences and
sanctions of a sports organization must be predictable to the extent that those subject to them must
be able to understand their meaning and circumstances in which they apply (CAS 2008/A/1545, at
para 30 et seq.; CAS 2004/A/725, at para 20 et seq.). In the Panel’s view, however, it is unnecessary
and impractical for the FCE to list the specific sanction for each and every ethical offense, or to limit
very narrowly the amount of a possible fine (CAS 2017/A/5155 at para 48). 167. A sport governing
body must have a certain discretion to impose the sanction that it deems appropriate for the offense
committed under the particular circumstances and context of that case. It is in this light that Article 9,
para 1 of the FCE calls for the FIFA Ethics Committee to “take into account all relevant factors
in the case, including the offender’s assistance and cooperation, motive, the circumstances and the
degree of the offender’s guilt”. This is not to say, however, that the sport governing body is free, in
applying a sanction, to ignore the principle of proportionality; indeed, it must impose a sanction
that is proportionate to the offence, aa well as taking into account the sanctions – if themselves
proportionate – imposed on others for similar offences. 168. In light of the foregoing, the Panel holds
that Article 6 FCE and Article 15 FDC are sufficiently “determinable” (CAS 2017/A/5272, para 64)
and thus satisfy the predictability test. The Panel dismisses also the Appellant’s argument related to
the fact that FIFA rules on sanctions provide no limit to the ban, as the Panel deems it legitimate that
an association includes a ban for life among the possible sanctions it can impose (some offences can
indeed be so serious as to warrant exclusion for life of the guilty individual from that association)’).
4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 126 (‘In order to impose a sanction […] There must be
a sufficiently clear statutory basis for a penalty in the statutes or byelaws of the association’); Tsagaev
v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 25 (commending the IWF for seeking to take a tough stand against
doping by suspending the Bulgarian team due to three positive tests by Bulgarian weightlifters at the
Games, but noting the ’fundamental and no less legitimate requirement of having a legal basis for
disciplinary action’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘In sport, like all other areas of society, any
disciplinary measure on sanction requires a legal basis’), para 44 (‘[…] based on the WADC, […] a
sanction is possible if there is an anti-doping rule violation; absent any such anti-doping rule violation,
the WADC does not provide for any possible sanction’), para 58 (‘[…] the use of pharmaceutical
substances which are not expressly prohibited by sports law, and which are not similar or related
substances to those expressly prohibited, cannot be considered as an anti-doping rule infringement
and in that respect cannot, therefore, be the object of disciplinary sanctions’) and para 65 (‘any
disciplinary sanction should rely on a clear and firm legal basis’). See also Yerolimpos v World Karate
Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 111 (even if it would be sensible to prohibit the conduct at issue,
‘Common sense cannot make a disciplinary offence something which it is otherwise not’); Anderson
et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 64 (‘The IOC’s argument that it would be logical to disqualify
a team whose overall performance was boosted in some measure by one doped team member is not
without force and is even commonsensical. However, in the view of the Panel, mere logic may not
serve as a basis for a sanction because it would not satisfy the said predictability test […] and it could
lend itself to arbitrary enforcement’).
5 USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, paras 21, 22.
6 Ibid, para 17.
7 Ibid, para 35.
8 Rebagliati v IOC, CAS OG/98/002, para 26. See also USOC et al v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2004/A/725
(vacating disqualification of results of US relay team based on doping offence of one of its members
where rules provided only for disqualification of individual results of doping offender, not of results
of teams in which he played), at para 73 (‘The rationale for requiring clarity of rules extends
beyond enabling athletes in given cases to determine their conduct in such cases by reference to
understandable rules. As argued by the Appellants at the hearing, clarity and predictability are required
so that the entire sport community are informed of the normative system in which they live, work and
compete, which requires at the very least that they be able to understand the meaning of rules and the
circumstances in which those rules apply. […] There was simply no express rule in force at the time
of the Sydney Games which provided for the annulment of results obtained by a team, one of whose
members later was found to have been ineligible to compete at the time. As became apparent in these
proceedings, such a rule could only be said to have been produced by what the Panel in the Quigley
case referred to as “an obscure process of accretion” – here, as the IAAF would have it, a process of
complementation and inference”’); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10
(accepting athlete’s argument that rules only allowed disqualification of results after a positive result
from an in-competition test, not from an out-of-competition test, on the basis that ‘CAS has to rule on
the basis of sports law and cannot invent new sanctions. In other words, if regulatory documents define
sanctions and how they should be applied to particular offences, they should be strictly interpreted
by the sports authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the
IOC Medical Code provide for disqualification as the consequence of a positive out-of-competition
test. Since it has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to disqualify the appellant and
withdraw his medal should therefore be set aside’).
9 Tsagaev v IWF, CAS OG 2000/010, para 22 (emphasis in original).
10 Ibid, para 25. See also Panamerican Judo Union v International Judo Union, CAS 2009/1823,
para 9.6 (‘PJU’s eviction as Continental Union was no small matter; it entailed the extinction of
its raison d’être. It naturally cannot be legitimised in the absence of a clear legal foundation. For
reasons to be explained immediately below, the Panel has no doubt in concluding that the decision
lacked legal basis’); IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 12(A) (stating that the first question
to ask when reviewing the legality of the IWGA’s decision to suspend the IFBB from the World
Games is whether it had a ‘proper legal basis in the IWGA rules and regulations’) and14-41 (analysis
concluding that there was a proper legal basis in the IWGA rules for suspension); BWF v IWF,
CAS 2015/A/4319, para 57 (finding that the IWF rules clearly providing for the sanction imposed,
namely banning the BWF from entering athletes in the next edition of the Olympic Games); RPC v
IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745, para 83 (‘The decision of the IPC to suspend the RPC [from membership
for breach of its anti-doping obligations] was within its power, has a proper legislative basis and
was not irrational, or perverse, or outside the margin of discretion open to it. The Decision was not
evidently or grossly disproportionate’); Kuwait Shooting Federation v International Shooting Sport
Federation, CAS 2016/A/4727, para 208 (‘Finally, the Panel notes the arguments of the ISSF that
Article 1.13.5.1 [of the ISSF Constitution] gives it a wide discretion to suspend its members, citing
such as suspension should not be at the whim of the association’) and para 213 (‘This Panel does not
seek to condone the actions of the Kuwaiti Government in any way at all, however, the suspension
or expulsion of a member by an International Federation is a serious matter and must be done in
accordance with its own constitution and in accordance with the applicable law. Without calling into
question the right of the General Assembly of an IF [International Federation] to take disciplinary
measures against its national members, it appears in the present case that the reasons retained by the
ISSF to suspend the KSF are not justified by any applicable rule. Based on the foregoing, and after
taking into due consideration all the evidence produced and all submissions made, the Panel partially
allows the Appeal by the KSF and annuls the Appealed Decision’); and ICC v USACA, ICC Dispute
Resolution Chamber decision dated 16 June 2017, para 44 (The ICC’s ‘relationship with its members
is governed by contract, ie its Memorandum (“MOA”) and Articles of Association (“Articles”), and
the source of any power on the part of the ICC to expel or suspend a member must be found in
those instruments by which both parties are bound’) and paras 57-58 (‘These principles articulated
in CAS cases [citing RPC v IPC, CAS 2016/A/4745 and IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119] are not
discrepant, but rather dovetail with domestic [English law] jurisprudence. See generally Flaherty v
NGRC [2005] EWCA Civ 1117 CA (“it is the courts’ function to control illegality and make sure
that a body does not act outside its powers. But it is not in the interest of sport or anybody else for
the courts to seek to double guess regulating bodies in charge of domestic arrangements. Sports
regulating bodies ordinarily have unrivalled and practical knowledge of the particular sport that they
are required to regulate. They cannot be expected to act in every detail as if they are a court of law.
Provided they act lawfully and within the ambit of their powers, the courts should allow them to get
on with the job they are required to do” (para 20ff)’). Similarly, in Reel v Holder (for IAAF) [1979]
1 WLR 1252, affd [1981] 1 WLR 1226 CA, p.1231, the English Court of Appeal found that the IAAF
(now World Athletics) had no power under its rules to expel a member, and therefore the IAAF’s
expulsion of the Taiwanese athletic federation was held to be invalid.
11 As to which, see paras XX.XX.
12 Mutko v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5498.
13 Ibid, para 64.
B1.23 Clearly, then, where an SGB wishes to prohibit and punish certain conduct,
it should ensure that its regulations make it clear, by means of tailored and specific
clauses, both what conduct is prohibited and what the potential sanctions are for
breach of that prohibition. However, the SGB will not want to find in a subsequent
case that it has drafted the prohibitions in the regulations too narrowly, so that the
regulations do not cover conduct of a member that is clearly contrary to the interests
of the sport. Therefore, even if the SGB should seek to include specific definitions
of misconduct in its rules to the greatest extent possible, the SGB will usually also
include a catch-all prohibition in its disciplinary code,1 such as a prohibition of any

conduct that ‘brings the SGB and/or sport into disrepute’.2 It has been argued that
this approach offends against the principle of legal certainty, because a member or an
athlete who is subject to such prohibition cannot predict precisely how far it extends.3
The counter-argument is that the SGB cannot predict every single action that would
harm the sport, but must nevertheless be able to take action to punish such conduct
when it occurs.4 The member or athlete that is charged with breach of this general
prohibition is protected by the fact that the disciplinary panel would have to be
satisfied by the objective evidence that their conduct has in fact brought the SGB or
the sport into disrepute,5 or (if the rule prohibits conduct that ‘tends to bring the sport
into disrepute’ or that ‘may bring the sport into disrepute’) that the conduct gave rise
to a real risk that it would do so.6 The authors are not aware of any case where a panel
has rejected such a charge for lack of legal certainty. On the contrary:
(a) In Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting
Federation (IWF), Article 12.4 of the IWF’s Anti-Doping Policy provided:
‘If any Member federation or members or officials thereof, by reason of conduct
connected with or associated with doping or anti-doping rule violations, brings the
sport of weightlifting into disrepute, the IWF Executive Board may, in its discretion,
take such action as it deems fit to protect the reputation and integrity of the sport’.
The IWF relied on this provision to ban the RWF from entering any athletes in
the 2016 Olympic Games, after evidence emerged from the ‘McLaren Report’
and from re-testing of samples from previous Games that the RWF had been
involved in a centrally dictated program of doping of Russian weightlifters.
On appeal by the RWF, the CAS panel, applying the test set down in Tsagaev,
ruled that Article 12.4 of the IWF Anti-Doping Policy ‘constitutes a sufficient
legal basis’ to impose the ban, and that the evidence from the McLaren Report
and from the re-testing of samples was:
‘sufficient to bring the sport of weightlifting into disrepute. The Panel is unable
to agree that the term “disrepute” is ambiguous. It refers to loss of reputation or
dishonour. The Panel finds that the IWF’s conclusion that the above facts bring
the sport of weightlifting into disrepute is neither incompatible with the applicable
provisions nor arbitrary’.7
(b) Similarly, in Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation (WKF), Article 9.2 of

the WKF Statutes provided that ‘Members shall undertake work in complete
compliance with the rules governing the sport, maintaining a demeanour
commensurate with the activity performed’. The WKF purported to sanction
the WKF Secretary-General under that Article for sending letters to member
federations criticising the WKF President. On appeal, the CAS panel noted that:
‘disciplinary provisions are not vulnerable to the application of that rule [nulla
poena sine lege] merely because they are broadly drawn. Generality and ambiguity
are different concepts. The panel has little doubt that WKF sought, incumbently with
other sports governing bodies, to draft a disciplinary provision of a reach capable of
embracing the multifarious forms of behaviour considered unacceptable in the sport
in question’.8
The Panel found that on its proper construction Article 9.2 made it an offence
either:
(i) to fail to comply with the rules; or
(ii) to comply with the rules but with an inappropriate demeanour.
Since the conduct with which the Appellant was charged did not fall into either
category, and the WKF could not identify any other rule that such conduct
breached, the appeal against the sanction was upheld.9 However, if the conduct
had fallen into either category, and so had amounted to a breach of Article 9.2,
there is no suggestion in the award that the CAS panel would have considered
the charge to be bad for lack of legal certainty.10
(c) In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, a FIFA official was sanctioned for contravening
Article 3 of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which stated:
‘Officials shall show commitment to an ethical attitude while performing their
duties. They shall pledge to behave in a dignified manner. They shall behave and act
with complete credibility and integrity’.
The CAS panel found that Article 3 was ‘sufficiently clear and precise and
unambiguous and provides a sufficient legal basis to sanction the Appellant’.
It stated that the fact that the prohibition was ‘capable of catching a multitude
of acts as unethical or lacking credibility and integrity does not mean that it
lacks sufficient basis’, because (quoting Yerolimpos) ‘generality and ambiguity
are different concepts’. The Panel held that it was not necessary to list in the
Code of Ethics all of the acts that would be caught by the prohibition, ‘as an
official, in reading the rule, could clearly make the distinction between what is
an ethical attitude and what is not, what is acting with complete credibility and
integrity and what is not’. It said:
‘The Panel is of the view that the inherent vagueness of concepts such as ethics
and integrity does not preclude them to be used by sports legislators as a basis to
impose disciplinary sanctions on officials that do not conform their behaviour to
those standards. Indeed, in sports there are other notions, such as “unsportsmanlike
conduct” or “sporting fairness”, that are inherently vague and nonetheless may
serve as basis to impose disciplinary sanctions. […] [C]ivil law standards are often
inherently vague and reveal their full meaning on the basis of judicial application
[…]. The Panel is of the view that the standards of conduct required of officials
of an international federation […] must be of the highest level because the public
must perceive sports organizations as being upright and trustworthy, in order for
those organizations to legitimately keep governing over their sports worldwide.
[…] Therefore, the Panel finds that it is legitimate and even desirable that sports
federation[s] include in their ethical codes a general rule residually forbidding any
unethical conduct of officials in order to cover all unacceptable situations that would
not be caught by more specific provisions’.11
1 Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, Understanding Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2012), p 222 (‘regulated
industries may apply political pressure to regulators and demand detailed rules so that the rule of law
and principles of certainty are served but such types of rules may in reality be the very formulations
that are most easily side-stepped by creative compliers. One response is to reinforce detailed rules with
open-textured and general rules that are more difficult to circumvent’).
2 See eg Art 11 of the 2017 UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (‘1. Member associations and clubs, as well
as their players, officials and members, and all persons assigned by UEFA to exercise a function, must
respect the Laws of the Game, as well as UEFA’s Statutes, regulations, directives and decisions, and
comply with the principles of ethical conduct, loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship. 2. For example, a
breach of these principles is committed by anyone: […] d. whose conduct brings the sport of football,
and UEFA in particular, into disrepute; […]’). See further paras B3.97-B3.99.
3 Bitel, ‘Disciplinary Proceedings from the Point of View of the Individual’ [1995] 3(3) SATLJ 8
(criticising offence of ‘bringing the game into disrepute’ as nebulous and uncertain, and arguing that it
would be impermissible to use it to punish conduct that has not previously been punished and that the
individual athlete could not have foreseen would be considered a disciplinary offence).
4 Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings, 9th Edn (LexisNexis 2017), citing Henneberry v Law Society
(2000) unreported CO/1858/99 DC (‘It is […] ordinarily open to professional disciplinary tribunals
to apply sanctions for professional misconduct generally, regardless of whether it is conduct singled
out for mention in the rules. Were it otherwise professional people might be permitted to conduct
themselves in plainly deplorable ways without any disciplinary control’). See also Casas Vaque v
FEI, CAS 2019/A/6202, para 194 (‘The FEI GR only stipulate that incorrect behaviour shall attract
the prescribed sanction, but do not describe the prohibited behaviour as such. However, only because
the relevant provision is broadly drawn does not mean that this rule does not meet the legality and
predictability test’); Arzhanova v CMAS, CAS 2010/A/2284, paras 34–35 (‘The principle of legality and
predictability of sanctions requires a clear connection between the behaviour in question and the sanction
and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision (CAS 2007/A/1363). […] However,
when a special rule does not exist, the interpretation of other provisions, in particular corresponding
general clauses, may be the basis for a claim and/or a sanction (CAS 2007/A/1319; CAS 2007/A/1437)’.
5 Zubkov v FINA, CAS 2007/A/1291, para 19 (where rule prohibits conduct that brings the sport
into disrepute, not conduct that has the potential to bring the sport into disrepute, proof of potential
disrepute is not enough, proof of ‘actual disrepute is required’, ie, proof that public opinion of the sport
of swimming – and not just individuals involved in the sport -- is diminished as a result of the conduct
in question).
6 Bland v Sparkes (for the Amateur Swimming Association) (1999) Times 17 December (CA) (Otton LJ)
(‘the test whether the conduct tended to bring ASA into disrepute or himself into serious disrepute is
an objective test, namely, was there a real possibility that by virtue of what the appellant did that ASA
would be brought into disrepute and himself into serious disrepute’).
7 Russian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS OG 16/09, paras 7.4
and 7.13. See also IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, paras 18-25 (rejecting argument that there was
no proper legal basis in IWGA constitution to suspend a member from participation in World Games
for failure to run a proper anti-doping programme, because constitution gave IWGA power to suspend
wherever a member acted against the interests of the IWGA, or not in accordance with the World
Games rules, or caused adverse effects to the World Games by its organisation and performance, and
IFBB’s conduct met each of these tests).
Similarly, the appellant in Diack v IAAF & Ethics Commission of the IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4420,
argued (para 232) ‘that the IAAF Code of Ethics was in breach of the principles set forth under
Article 7 of the ECHR, as the Articles contained therein and relied upon to sanction him were “far
from clear [and] do not enable a person to know which specific acts or omission would make him
liable. Only general and vague concepts are invoked such as: “act in a manner likely to tarnish
the reputation of the IAAF [or] to bring the sport into disrepute”, ‘’fair play”, “corrupt conduct”.
Nonetheless, those conducts are never clearly and precisely defined within the Code of Ethics. Such
vague articles may therefore not be the basis for sanctions of a criminal nature, as is the case of the life
ban and a $25,000 fine imposed on Mr Diack and their application amounts to an infringement of Mr
Diack’s fundamental rights”’. Those arguments also received short shrift from the CAS panel: ‘234.
These provisions of the IAAF Code of Ethics set general norms. However, the Panel holds that such
general norms are quite normal in all sorts of formal and material legislation. Whether or not there
is a violation of such general norms is to be judged on the basis of facts, in a given situation. In its
Appealed Decision, the IAAF Ethics Commission Panel established such facts, in the light of which
it considered proven that Mr Diack, together with the other Appellants, conspired to conceal for more
than three years anti-doping violations by Mrs Shobukhova. The IAAF Ethics Commission Panel then
qualified these acts as dishonesty and corruption, and found that they did (unprecedented) damage to
Athletics, which the Appellants have brought into disrepute by their actions. 235. In this regard, Mr
Diack cannot reasonably claim that, if proven, the extortion of money, the purported aim of preventing
or at least delaying and concealing doping charges against Mrs Shobukhova for a considerable period
of time, cannot be regarded as likely to tarnish, and affect adversely, the reputation of the IAAF or
Athletics in general, and to bring the sport into disrepute. If established, all these acts and omissions
unquestionably constitute a breach of the applicable Code of Ethics and are in breach of the duty to act
with (utmost) integrity, honesty and responsibility in fulfilling a role in the sport of Athletics and fair
play. 236. The Panel finds that there can be no misunderstanding about the facts that the IAAF Ethics
Commission Panel considered proven. Hence, it dismisses Mr Diack’s argument that their articulation
was too vague. The fact that Mr Diack is of the view that the evidence on which the IAAF Ethics
Commission Panel relied is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the standard of proof applicable
in the present proceedings, is a different matter’.
8 Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 105.
9 Ibid at para 108.
10 See also D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, and Jongewaard v Australian
Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1605, both involving challenges to the application of clause 2.2(6)
of the AOC’s Ethical Behaviour By-Law, which stated that an athlete ‘must not by his or her acts
or omissions, engage in or participate in […] conduct which, if publicly known, would be likely to
bring […] themselves into disrepute or censure’. In both cases, the CAS panel proceeded on the basis
that the clause was enforceable as written, and neither athlete argued otherwise. In D’Arcy, the CAS
panel decided that ‘bringing a person into disrepute is to lower the reputation of the person in the eyes
of ordinary members of the public to a significant extent’ (para 46), and dismissed the swimmer’s
appeal on the basis that getting drunk in a bar and inflicting serious injuries on a former swimmer
was ‘conduct that could form an ample basis for the exercise of discretion to terminate [D’Arcy’s]
membership of the team’ (para 49). A different Panel came to the same conclusion in Jeongewaard in
relation to a mountain biker who drove while intoxicated and got into an accident that seriously injured
a team-mate who had been out with him.
11 Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, paras 150, 151, 152, 153, 154. See also Besiktas
Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 128 (‘Pursuant to CAS case law, the different
elements of the rules of a federation shall be clear and precise, in the event they are legally binding
for athletes and/or clubs […]. Inconsistencies might be on the charge of the legislator (federation).
However, the internal control upon the rules of the federation is manifestly relativized by the fact
that the different case law, CAS and national, does not require the strict certitude of the elements
provided for disciplinary sanctions of the sports federation, as required by criminal law. The different
case law rather recognizes general elements, which constitute the basis for disciplinary sanctions
(CAS 2007/A/1437). In this spirit, Art 2.08 UELR [UEFA Europa League Regulations, which states
‘If, on the basis of all the factual circumstances and information available to UEFA, UEFA concludes
to its comfortable satisfaction that a club has been directly and/or indirectly involved, since the entry
into force of Article 50(3) of the UEFA Statutes, ie 27 April 2007, in any activity aimed at arranging
or influencing the outcome of a match at national or international level, UEFA will declare such club
ineligible to participate in the competition’,] is subject to interpretation and needs to be interpreted’),
followed in Vanakorn v Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS), CAS 2014/A/3832, paras 85-88.
The Beziktas/Vanakorn awards reflect the fact that ‘[i]n continental Europe, which comprises
predominantly civil law jurisdictions, the traditional approach to drafting laws has been that of expressing
the law in general principles, with it being up to the courts and the executive to specify the details for
the application of the normative precepts to individual cases, taking into account the general intention of
parliament as expressed in the preambles, discussions and other documents. Continental law tends to be
expressed in shorter sentences, with less use of paragraphing but with more understandable principles,
despite the fact that the relationship between several principles may be more complex. This approach
leads on the one hand to simpler, clearer, and more general legislation, with the objective being for
the rules to withstand the passage of time. On the other hand it is a legislation that lacks the certainty
that would be afforded by a more detailed application of the principles. In contrast, in the common law
tradition, legislative drafting has always been intended to be precise, unambiguous, all-inclusive and
perhaps even exhaustive, with as detailed specification of legal scope as possible, even at the cost of
accessibility to its audiences, both specialists and laymen. [….] The great advantage of legislation based
on the general principles of civil law is that it is easier to read and its objectives are easy to understand.
However the disadvantage is its higher degree of uncertainty, as it is the executive and the courts that
will a posteriori provide content and sense to such general formulae. In these cases, the legislator is
renouncing control of the actual facts and passing them to the judicial, that is, is abandoning (implicitly
delegates) his own competence in favour of judges. This has been severely criticised from the point of
view of common law, as it is hard to predict how the courts will do part of the work which the legislator
has hitherto done’. Karpen and Xanthaki, Legislation in Europe (Hart Publishing 2017), p 141.
B1.24 Similarly, while the World Anti-Doping Code is clear that an athlete is
strictly liable for any prohibited substance found in his sample,1 not all substances
prohibited by WADA are listed by name on the WADA List of Prohibited Substances.
Instead, for example, the Prohibited List identifies by name various exogenous
anabolic steroids, but then states that any substance ‘with a similar chemical structure
or similar biological effect(s)’ to any steroid identified by name is also prohibited.2
This approach is necessary to achieve the aim of promoting doping-free sport,
because there is an almost unlimited number of steroids that may be derived from the
basic testosterone compound. It is not possible to know them all or to list them all
by name, and even if it were, new ones could be invented at any point, meaning that
the Prohibited List would have to be constantly updated. Therefore the Prohibited
List cannot be a closed list of substances; instead, catch-all language has to be used.
Arguments that this approach offends unfairly against the principle of legal certainty
have been rejected.3
1 See para C6.xx.
2 See para C6.xx.
3 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 118 (‘[…] The Prohibited List is not a closed list and does
not provide an exhaustive enumeration of substances, but it does establish the principle that all
steroids are prohibited. The list expressly identifies examples of various steroids and clearly states
that substances of similar chemical structure or similar biological effects are also anabolic steroids
and agents prohibited within the scope of class S1. The Panel notes that there are virtually an
unlimited number of potential variances of the Testosterone compound. It would be impractical to
require the identification of all forms of steroids and there is always the possibility for a nefarious
scientist to synthesize a new substance before it becomes detectable the Appellant rightly
concedes, and the Panel in any event finds, that there is a need, in principle, for a catch-all clause
in the form of a “related substance” clause in order to establish a level playing field for all athletes’)
and para 119 (‘The Panel is not prepared to follow the Appellant’s argument that once WADA is
aware of a substance that is “chemically similar” in structure to another prohibited substance(s),
then WADA must include the name of this “chemically similar” substance on the Prohibited List.
Imposition of such an obligation would be impractical. It would have the effect that a “chemically
similar” substance would in principle be covered by the Prohibited List initially and then depart
from it as and when at some unidentifiable time WADA fails to name it expressly. The creation
of such a mechanism would provoke endless disputes on when WADA would become “aware”
of a “chemically similar” substance and what the time line would be for WADA to comply with
its obligation to put it on the Prohibited List. This would lead to unequal treatment of the various
athletes depending on the sheer coincidence when the “chemically similar” substance is detected
in an athlete’s system. In addition, it would completely undermine the principle of legal certainty.
When would a stakeholder know whether or not WADA was aware of the chemically similar
substance within the above meaning?’); UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee
decision dated 24 February 2004 (‘30. The reason for the drafting of the list in the form of example
substances is derived from the complexity of the subject matter, the continuing advances in
scientific understanding and the need for a rule which is comprehensive, fair and clear. It would be
impracticable to identify all forms of steroids in the list of prohibited substances, and it is always
possible for new substances to be synthesised. It would be unfair to some athletes, and detrimental
to the health of others, to permit athletes to experiment with novel forms or derivations of steroids
until such time as the rule makers detected the new compounds and moved to add them to the list of
identified substances. […] 31. In this context the rule is actually clearer and fairer by being widely
drafted. All athletes are warned that they should not take drugs. No athlete who intended to comply
with the rules would consider taking any form of steroid on the grounds that its formulation was
different from that of a named steroid on the prohibited list. The principle of legal certainty, that is
that a person should know with clarity the legal consequences of his action, is thus advanced by the
form in which the rule is drafted. Nor can it be argued that the principle against doubtful penalisation
has any realistic application in a case where the athlete is disavowing any deliberate decision to
take any form of steroid’); IAAF v Walker, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 20 August 2000,
paras 18-19 (rejecting athlete’s argument that charging him with a doping offence based on the
presence in his sample of a substance that was not mentioned expressly on the list of prohibited
substances breached ‘the principles of legal certainty and legal clarity’, because the list stated that
not only substances mentioned expressly on the list but also substances that were ‘chemically or
pharmacologically related’ to substances mentioned expressly on the list were prohibited, and the
substance found in his sample fell into that latter category). Cf UEFA v Sakho, UEFA Control,
Ethics and Disciplinary Body decision dated 7 July 2016, para 21 (‘it is not enough for WADA to
simply state in its prohibited list that all substances that might possibly fit a very general description
(eg all Beta-2 Agonists) are prohibited. This is not specific enough’) and para 34 (‘there must be
legal certainty as to the substances on WADA’s prohibited list. Any uncertainty must be interpreted
in favour of the accused and, based on the foregoing discussion of Higenamine, there is clearly
considerable uncertainty in this case about the categorisation of Higenamine as a Beta-2 Agonist on
WADA’s prohibited list’), para 46 (‘the CEDB must be mindful of what it could reasonably expect
the Player (and his club and personal trainer) to have been able to learn about Higenamine from
publicly available sources, given the fact that it does not appear by name in WADA’s prohibited list,
that WADA does not appear to have made a firm determination itself, that WADA has not formally
communicated any determination to its accredited laboratories and that some (if not all) WADA
accredited laboratories are uncertain of Higenamine’s status on the prohibited list’), and para 49
(therefore dismissing charge that presence of Higenamine in player’s sample constituted an anti-
doping rule violation).
(b) The general legal principle of ‘respect for fundamental rights’

B1.25 The English legal system, like most of its counterparts, recognises
and gives legal protection to certain ‘fundamental rights’ derived from national
(constitutional) law and/or from international instruments,1 including the right to
freedom of expression, the right to equal treatment, and the right to a fair hearing.2
It is public bodies that have to respect such rights, and the English legal system, like
many others, classifies SGBs not as public bodies but as private regulators, and their
decisions as subject to private law as opposed to administrative law.3 However, there
are arguments even in such systems that SGBs are required as a matter of law to
respect these fundamental rights, and some commentators have argued that it should
be considered a general principle of law applicable to all SGBs, wherever they may
be based, that their regulations should be interpreted4 and applied in a manner that
respects these ‘fundamental rights’.5 Such rights may be regarded as implicit in the
contractual arrangements between SGBs and participants, and in some instances the
fact that state courts and tribunals must ensure the protection of these rights means
that they have ‘horizontal effect’ on SGBs, because if they are breached by a decision
they may be liable to review at state level.
1 For example, the rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights, and the fundamental
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition, Art 6(3) of
the Maastricht Treaty states: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law’. See
also Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, at 40 (contrasting the
concept of ‘fundamental rights’ in this context with the narrower concept of ‘human rights’ derived
solely from international legal instruments).
2 Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 252 (‘Although
the United Kingdom has no written constitution, the courts have recognised certain fundamental rights
as constitutional. This development pre-dates the HRA [Human Rights Act] 1998 and is the common
law at work in protection of fundamental rights. Thus the courts protect as constitutional the right
of participation in the democratic process, equality of treatment, freedom of expression, religious
freedom, and the right of unimpeded access to the courts’).
3 See also Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, para 320 (‘In addition to relying on the anti-discrimination
provisions in the IAAF Constitution, Mr. Leeper also relies on the CRPD [UN Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities] and the ECHR. The IAAF submits that neither of those
international instruments is applicable to the present case. In particular, the IAAF submits that the
CRPD and ECHR only apply to State Parties and public authorities exercising State powers, and do
not apply to private bodies which are not exercising such powers. The Panel accepts that the CRPD
and ECHR are international treaties which are directed towards, and binding upon, State Parties and
do not impose obligations on purely private bodies. The materials before the Panel do not establish
that under Monegasque law the IAAF itself owes any obligations to Mr. Leeper by virtue of either
the ECHR or the CRPD. In this regard, the Panel notes the observation of the CAS Panel in A v FIFA
CAS 2011/A/2426 that, “international treaties on human rights are meant to protect the individuals’
fundamental rights vis-à-vis governmental authorities and, in principle, they are inapplicable per se
in disciplinary matters carried out by sports governing bodies, which are legally characterized as
purely private entities”. While the present appeal does not concern a “disciplinary matter”, the Panel
considers that those observations are equally applicable to the Appellant’s reliance on the ECHR and
CRPD in this case’).
4 See para B1.61, n.12.
5 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] ISLR 3(3) 39, at 45-46 (‘irrespective
of the academic debate over the applicability of fundamental rights guarantees in purely private
sports matter[s], it would be right for sports organisations to take all appropriate action to respect
fundamental rights. Thereby, they would obey the (moral) precept of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights urging “every individual and every organ of society” to play its part in securing the
universal observance of human rights. Any other approach would only support the view that, in
their fight against doping, the sports governing bodies are in fact acting with the same unfairness
they pretend to combat’); Haas, ‘Role and Application of Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights in CAS Procedures’ [2012] 12(3) ISLR 43, 46 (‘at least some of the provisions of the
ECHR form part of an inalienable system of values in the sense of public policy (ordre public) which
state courts have to ensure observation of the various interfaces between the private and state justice
systems, therefore also in relation to arbitral jurisdiction’). The introduction to the 2015 World Anti-
Doping Code arguably reflects the same view, stating: ‘These sport specific rules and procedures
[…] are intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and
human rights’. See also Sheikh Hazza Bin Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591,
para 149 (the principle of deference to an SGB’s autonomy to run its sport ‘does not prevent a
judicial or arbitral tribunal charge with examining the rules to determine whether they constitute
an infringement of fundamental rights’); Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.19 (‘[…]
certain rules may constitute a restriction to fundamental rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate
objective and are proportionate to the objective sought. In the instant case, the Panel […] considers
that FIFA rules limiting the international transfer of minor players do not violate any mandatory
principle of public policy and do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would
have to be considered as not admissible’). See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA
& FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA &
FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 35 (‘there is an imbalance between the association
and the person affected. This is expressed by the fact that the person affected only has the choice
of whether to accept performing the sport under the conditions dictated by the association or to
give up performing the sport altogether. Since this imbalance carries the risk that the association
abuses its position of power, certain protective standards must apply (“droits de protection”) in the
interests of the person affected’) and para 45 (‘In the opinion of the Panel the club is not placed in an
unprotected position by the non-application of the criminal law prohibition of retroactivity because,
due to the measure’s character as a sanction, it is perfectly possible that other legal principles, which
are part of the “droits de protection”, apply. In this regard one must think of the principle of legality,
the principle of proportionality, the principle of equal treatment and also the principle of “nulla
poena sine culpa” (on all this see CAS 2007/A/1381, no. 99)’).
B1.26 There is plenty of jurisprudence discussing and applying the rights set out
in the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),1 the freedoms enshrined
in the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),2 and the rights
derived from national constitutions. It appears that the function of the ‘general
principle of respect for fundamental rights’ would not be to add to those laws and
rights,3 but rather simply to ensure that they apply to constrain SGB regulations that
transcend national and regional boundaries, notwithstanding that some SGBs may be
considered under their national laws to be private bodies that do not exercise powers
delegated by the state. For example, the CAS has said that provisions in an SGB’s
constitution regulating the conduct of elections of officers of the SGB must respect
the right to freedom of expression protected by Art 10 of the ECHR.4 It has also
repeatedly emphasised that provisions purporting to restrict judicial scrutiny of the
decisions of an SGB (eg by narrowing the scope of review to be undertaken by CAS
on an appeal against such a decision) will be carefully scrutinised to assess whether
they constitute a denial of the right to access to the courts guaranteed by Art 6(1) of
the ECHR.5
1 For further discussion of the ECHR (enshrined in English law by the Human Rights Act 1998) in the
context of sport, see Chapter E13 (Human Rights and Sport).
2 For further discussion of the freedoms guaranteed by the TFEU in the context of sport, see Chapters
E11 (Competition Law and Sport) and E12 (Free Movement and Sport).
3 See Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.17 (‘The Appellant also claims that Art. 19 RSTP
contradicts Art. 12 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on freedom of
assembly and of association. As submitted by FIFA, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not a legal
document having binding effect. In consequence, one cannot rely upon Art. 12 in order to assert any
legally enforceable right’); USOC et al v IOC, CAS OG 2000/001, para 26 (‘[…] the Claimants – and
Mr Perez – are frustrated by a clear rule [setting out conditions for transfers of sporting allegiance from
one national federation to another] which intrinsically operates in such a fashion as to cause the overall
duration of an emigrating athlete’s future Olympic eligibility to depend on the particular naturalisation
regime of the country in which he or she chooses to relocate. Contrary to the Claimants’ arguments,
there is no rule of “fairness”, to be derived from the Olympic Charter’s acknowledgement that the
practice of sport is a fundamental human right, which would under such circumstances create an outer
time limit of Olympic eligibility’).
4 King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.26 (‘The Panel would only comment that in any organisation,
including a sports governing body, domestic or international, there is a danger that those in control
may confuse their individual interests with those of the organisation as a whole and in consequence
overact and misuse their powers vis-à-vis those who oppose them. The taking of legal advice, the
institution of legal proceedings, and vigorous electioneering can only exceptionally be classified as
conduct violative of regulations reasonably drawn and reasonably to be applied. It is, the Panel notes,
political speech that ranks foremost in the hierarchy of the rights, embraced [in] the right to freedom
of expression protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights’). See also
Arzhanova v CMAS, CAS 2010/A/2284, para 42 (‘Good governance is important in sport, and thus a
member of the BoD [board of directors] of a federation should be able to raise questions without the
fear of being immediately sanctioned’).
5 Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 65 (declining to limit scope of CAS de novo review of first
instance decisions, because under ECHR Art 6(1) ‘[…] a person affected by a decision must have,
in principle, access to (at least) one instance of justice. It goes without saying that doping sanctions
strongly affect the rights of an athlete and that federation instances do not provide for access to justice
within the meaning of Art 6(1) ECHR, since they do not guarantee adjudication of the facts and the
law by a truly independent judicial instance. Restrictions to the fundamental right of access to justice
should not be accepted easily, but only where such restrictions are justified both in the interest of good
administration of justice and proportionality. The Sole Arbitrator fails to see why a restriction of his
mandate – contrary to the clear wording of the Art R57 of the CAS Code – would be in the interest
of good administration of justice’); Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.6 (‘[…] the
Panel has serious doubts whether an association could curtail a person’s right to appeal a decision by
which he or she is adversely affected. Were that the case, it would leave such a party without access to
any legal remedies’); Katusha Management SA v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3031, para 68 (warning against
applying precedents permitting limitations on the scope of CAS review ‘[…] to the detriment of an
athlete’s fundamental rights. In other words, an athlete basically cannot be precluded from obtaining
in CAS arbitration at least the same level of protection of his/her substantive rights that he or she
could obtain before a State court’); Volandri v ITF, CAS 2009/A/1782, para 70 (rejecting attempt in
tennis anti-doping rules to limit CAS de novo review of first instance decisions: ‘The Panel is of the
opinion that it must be able to review the Appealed Decision with regard to the fundamental rights of
the Player. Any other interpretation would lead to possible abuse of process and of authority, which
would be absolutely unacceptable and would represent a substantial and specific danger to sporting
spirit. Furthermore, any agreement between the parties to restrict the powers of this Panel would have
to be viewed critically in the light of the limitations imposed by the Swiss ordre public. Agreements
between athletes and international federations are – in general terms – not concluded voluntarily
on the part of the athletes but rather imposed upon them unilaterally by the federation. There is,
therefore, a danger that a federation acts in excess of its powers unless the content of the agreement
does take sufficiently into account also the interests of the athlete. The Panel has some doubts whether
a provision that restricts the Panel’s power to amend a wrong decision of a federation to the benefit
of the athlete balances the interests of both parties in a proportionate manner’). See generally Haas,
‘Role and Application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in CAS Procedures’
2012 12(3) ISLR ISLR 43. See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol
SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD,
CAS 2008/A/1584, para 30 (‘the Panel is of the opinion that the association’s legislator cannot
make the group of persons, who have a right to appeal, smaller than the statutory model; for it is an
indispensable essential part of the ordre public that an individual’s legal protection against measures
by an association is guaranteed by an external instance that is independent from the association. Since
it can be assumed that the association’s legislator wanted to comply with these (minimum) statutory
requirements, this is also an argument for granting third parties the right to appeal if they are directly
affected by the measure taken by the association’).
(c) The right to equal treatment
B1.27 There is perhaps one fundamental right, however, that is interpreted

and applied more broadly in the sporting context than in wider society. Although
many legal systems treat equal treatment under law as a general ‘principle of good
public administration’,1 discrimination is usually only unlawful when it is based on
nationality in the EU context, or on ‘protected characteristics’ such as age, disability,
gender reassignment, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation, marriage
and civil partnership and pregnancy and maternity.2 But in sport the paramount
importance of ensuring a level playing-field wherever the sport is played means
that all of an SGB’s regulations should apply equally to all participants in the sport,
absent a good objective reason for different treatment.3 On this basis, any unequal
treatment of participants is prima facie impermissible and requires justification in
order to be enforceable, whether the unequal treatment is based on a characteristic
protected by mandatory law or on some other ground. For example, the CAS has
considered arguments that the principle is infringed by a policy permitting national
federations in one continent to enter two boxers in Olympic qualifying competition
while national federations in other continents were only allowed to enter one,4 or
by rules prohibiting clubs under common ownership from competing in the same
competition.5 Although in each case the CAS panel found that on the facts there
was no discrimination, it proceeded on the basis that the claims could have been
upheld if the facts had been different. The corollary is that there are some elements
in the European Model of Sport,6 and in national international competition, in which
differences based on (for example) nationality, or age, or ability, are necessary.
1 See eg R v Hertfordshire Country Council ex parte Cheung (1986) Times, 4 April, per Lord Donaldson
MR (it is ‘a cardinal principle of good public administration that all persons who were in a similar
position should be treated equally’); R (McMorn) v Natural England [2015] EWHC 3297 (Admin)
(Ouseley J), para 200 (‘The decision-maker should decide like cases alike absent a rational justification
for deciding them differently’).
2 See generally Chapter E14 (Discrimination in Sport).
3 Sun Yang v FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 381 (‘This is the rule of law, now of singular importance
in the field of sport, and applicable to all athletes, irrespective of their background or status, their
standing or success. The application of the rule of law in the domain of sport requires all to be treated
equally’); FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 137 (‘Sanctions imposed by associations
must comply with the principle of equal treatment, eg insofar as all members or constituents of that
association must be treated alike. This is especially true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental
for any sports competition’); Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.37 (‘The Panel […]
shares the Respondent’s preference for equal treatment and it believes that the requirement of a level
playing field is a lex sportiva principle to be respected by all sports governing bodies and protected
by the CAS’); Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 10.2.4 (‘[…] an international federation deals with
national federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis.
It therefore has to apply the same law to all of them’); European Olympic Committee, CAS 95/144,
para 6.1 (referring to ‘[…] two fundamental principles of Olympism: equality and universality. Doping
rules must be the same for everyone, everywhere, applicable whatever the nationality of the person
concerned and whatever the sport they practice’); Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.24 (‘[…]
like cases should presumptively be treated alike’).
The SGB’s rules may make this requirement of equal treatment explicit. For example, Art 4.1(j)
of the 2019 IAAF Constitution requires the IAAF ‘[…] to preserve the right of every individual to
participate in Athletics as a sport, without unlawful discrimination of any kind’; while Art 11.2.3 of
WADA’s International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories states: ‘Signatory Consequences
shall be applied without improper discrimination between different categories of Signatory. In
particular, given that International Federations and National Anti-Doping Organizations have equally
important roles in fighting doping in sport, they should be treated the same (mutatis mutandis) when
it comes to imposing Signatory Consequences for non-compliance with their respective obligations
under the Code and the International Standards’.
The same principle also bars an SGB from issuing rules that treat it more favourably than its member
federations in case of disputes between them, eg in relation to the ability to recover the costs of the
proceedings. Bulgarian Chess Federation v FIDE, CAS 2012/A/2943, para 8.54 (‘[…] the article
provides that FIDE will be subject to the same liability as the federation in part one of the article.
In the vast majority of cases before the CAS it will be the member federations taking action against
FIDE. Thus, in the vast majority of the cases only part one of the article will apply. Interestingly, Art
13.6 of the FIDE Statutes provides in such instances for a full recovery of costs only if the federation
(initiates and) loses the appeal. If, however, the member initiates the proceedings against FIDE and
succeeds with its appeal, no full recovery of costs is foreseen by the provision in favour of the member
federations. This unequal treatment is disturbing and not justified by overriding interests in favour
of FIDE. In particular, the goal to discourage member federations from availing themselves of their
right to appeal FIDE resolutions does not justify such an unbalanced treatment of Respondent and its
members. To conclude, while an equal and balanced provision could be considered as being in line
with Swiss mandatory law, Art 13.6 of the FIDE Statutes is incompatible with the principle of equal
treatment of the parties and, thus, the decision of the General Assembly in relation to Art 13.6 of the
FIDE must be annulled’).
4 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455.
5 AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 65.
6 See para A1.__.
B1.28 The right to equal treatment means that a proposed interpretation of an

SGB’s regulations that would give them a discriminatory effect is to be avoided.1 It
also means that if the regulations, properly interpreted, do not treat all participants in
the sport equally, the discrimination has to be justified in order to stand.2 And even if
the regulations are non-discriminatory on their face, it is unlawful to apply them in a
discriminatory manner.3
‘As a matter of principle, every athlete has a right to receive equal treatment from
his sports association. The right particularly means that the sports association must
comply with the sports rules in relation to the athlete […]’.4
On this basis, the CAS has considered complaints based on an SGB’s allegedly
selective enforcement of a rule limiting athletes’ transfers of allegiance from one
country to another,5 and on an SGB’s alleged enforcement of its anti-doping rules
only against athletes from a particular country.6 If the facts support the claim of
discrimination and the SGB is unable to establish any objective justification for that
discrimination, relief should be granted.
1 Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória
Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 47 (UEFA
hearing panel, concerned about proportionality of rule that excluded a club from participation in UEFA
club competitions if it had ever been involved in match-fixing activities, interpreted it as applying only
to the season after the activities in question were proven, but the CAS panel criticised this, noting:
‘The Panel points out that this interpretation appears arbitrary, for there is nothing in the wording of the
rule that even begins to support it. Furthermore, it gives rise to an unequal treatment of clubs, which
is difficult to reconcile. For, if a club is found guilty of bribery in a sporting season, in which it does
not meet the sporting criteria for qualifying for the CL, this remains without consequence for it (for
ever). This is so even if the offence was only a short while back. However, a club, which qualifies for
the CL in a year, in which the prohibited conduct is proven, is treated differently. That club will not
be admitted, even if the offence took place perhaps many years in the past. However, it is not readily
apparent why the reputation of the CL should be harmed if a club participates in the CL in the one case
(according to the decision by the UEFA CDB of 4 June 2008), but not in the other’).
2 As in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 449 and Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa
v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 548: see paras B1.13, n 1 and E14.__; and
Gibraltar Badminton Association v IBF, CAS 2001/A/329, p 3 (‘[…] even if we accept the English law
definition stated by the Appellant “discrimination may be defined as treating someone less favourably
than others without justification”, there would be no discrimination in the present situation because the
IBF has good reasons to treat differently the participants in the Sudirman Cup’).
3 FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.34. See also Wigan Athletic FC v Heart of Midlothian,
CAS 2007/A/1298, para 99 (noting a mandatory principle of Swiss law that a sports association’s
‘regulations must be applied and its decisions made in a predictable and cognisable manner, notably to
ensure equality of treatment […]’); Adidas v The Lawn Tennis Association & Ors [2006] EWHC 1318
(Ch), para 44 (dress rule in tennis may be objectively justified but manner of proposed application,
to adidas’ identification but not to other manufacturers’ identifications, would amount to unlawful
discrimination against adidas).
4 W v UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 15.
5 Nabokov & Russian Olympic Committee & Russian Ice Hockey Federation v International Ice Hockey
Federation, CAS 2001/A/357.
The alleged difference in treatment has to be established on the facts. In World Rugby v Perinchief,
Board Judicial Committee decision dated 29 June 2015, a Mexican rugby player argued that it was
unfair, and in breach of the fundamental principle of equal treatment, to charge him with an anti-
doping rule violation based on low levels of clenbuterol found in his sample when other SGBs had not
charged athletes in similar positions on the basis that the finding was likely due to meat contamination.
The hearing panel held that it had no power to dismiss the charge on this ground, and that even if it
did, it would not do so as there were examples of athletes being pursued for violations based on similar
adverse analytical findings for low levels of clenbuterol. Ibid, para 75 (World Rugby’s anti-doping
rules do not give hearing panel ‘any power to dismiss the charge on the basis of what was asserted to
be (in our word) unfairness’) and para 76 (‘We are enjoined to consider any alleged ADRV on the basis
of the evidence presented to us and consider the individual charge on its merits. By that we mean the
BJC is required to consider whether or not an ADRV has been proved. In so doing it may consider,
for example, whether certain procedural irregularities are such that the ADRV cannot be proved. We
concluded that it does not have some general and inherent “supervisory power” or jurisdiction over the
bringing of proceedings. Even if we had such power, we would not have used it in this case. There are
examples of athletes being pursued for alleged ADRV where the Prohibited Substance in clenbuterol.
Contador is but one example’).
6 Russian Olympic Committee v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, paras 149–150 (recognising right to equal
treatment, but rejecting on the facts the ROC’s argument that its athletes’ right not to be discriminated
against on grounds of nationality had been infringed by the IAAF, since the regulation that the IAAF
was enforcing applied on its face to all national federations, without discrimination, and the IAAF had
not applied it in a discriminatory manner); Adams et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4703, para 58(iv) (‘[…]
as to an alleged discrimination, such contention is unsupported by any corroborating evidence: there
is no indication that the rules were (or would be) applied in a different way to athletes of different
nationality’); Czech Olympic Committee and Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF, CAS OG 98/004-
005, para 14 (again acknowledging right of equal treatment, but rejecting on the facts the claim that
that right had been infringed; other players had been allowed to play for a second country because they
were dual nationals, whereas the appellant’s player was not a dual national and so was not eligible to
play for Sweden).
B1.29 On the other hand, the requirement is to treat like cases alike, but also to
treat different cases differently.1
‘As the equality principle allows unequal treatment of different situations, as long
as such treatment is reasonable and justifiable, it seems to the Panel that often equal
treatment is in the eye of the beholder; therefore, application of implied assumptions
of equal treatment can lead to diverse answers, and is an infirm basis for bypassing
unambiguous legal provisions’.2
In particular, it is not a defence to enforcement action simply to show that the rule has
not been enforced in similar circumstances against other members or participants.3
The lack of action in those other cases may have been justified by objective factual
differences in the other cases.4 Alternatively the difference in treatment may be
because the SGB misunderstood the effect of its rules at that time,5 or it may be
simply that the SGB did not know of the other cases.6 The difference in treatment
would only be grounds for dismissal of the case at hand if it could be shown that the
SGB had consistently and deliberately applied different standards to other parties:
(a) without any objective justification for doing so,7 or

(b) and did not have any objective justification not to do so in the case at hand.8
1 See Lord Hoffman in Matadeen v Pointu [1999] 1 AC 98, 109 (noting that ‘Equality before the law
requires that persons should be uniformly treated, unless there is some valid reason to treat them
differently’, and stating ‘their Lordships would go further and say that treating like cases alike and
unlike cases differently is a general axiom of rational behaviour’); AEK Athens and SK Slavia Prague
v UEFA, CAS 98/200, paras 65–66 (‘It seems to the Panel that there is no discrimination in denying
admission to a club whose owner is objectively in a conflict of interest situation; likewise, eg there
is no discrimination in denying admission to a club whose stadium is objectively below the required
safety standards. In both cases, if the shareholding structure or the safety conditions are modified, the
club is admitted to the UEFA competition. Therefore, the Contested Rule does not target or single out
specific clubs as such but simply sets forth objective requirements for all clubs willing to participate
in UEFA competitions. [66] As a result, the Panel holds that the Contested Rule does not violate the
principle of equal treatment’). See also Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 15 (‘Equal
(or at least very similar) situations must receive equal treatment; conversely, unequal situations must
receive different treatment. The general principle requires the tribunal carefully to examine the facts of
the relevant cases to detect material similarities or differences and to explain the same […]’).
2 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.36.
3 See para B3.131, citing Football Association v Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June
2017, para 3.7(i) (‘an Independent FA Regulatory Commission is required to consider the particular
disciplinary charge(s) brought against the particular Participant that is/are before it. Whether other
Participants could and should have been charged with misconduct in the past for similar, or even
worse, comments is irrelevant to the judgment that we must make in this case’. The panel went on
to comment that ‘There was nothing before us to suggest that the decision to charge Mr. Moyes was
so arbitrary or capricious that it would offend principles of fairness and justice to allow The FA to
pursue it’); Rugby Football Union v Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018, para 46 (the player
raised the fact that in other cases players had not been subject to misconduct charges based on similar
conduct; however, it was conceded that this did not prevent the panel from finding the player guilty of
misconduct in that case).
4 Russian Weightlifting Federation v International Weightlifting Federation, CAS OG 16/09, para 7.15
(rejecting argument that a ban on the RWF from entering its athletes in the 2016 Olympic Games due to
doping ‘constitutes a breach of the principle of equal treatment’, because ‘[t]he Applicant has not shown
to the Panel that any other member federation has been involved in a similar doping scheme of such
magnitude. Consequently, the Panel finds that there is no breach of equal treatment in the case at hand’).
5 FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 28 (where the respondent accepted that it had not enforced
its bye-law restricting advertising on team uniforms in respect of other teams in the same way as it was
enforcing it in respect of the applicant’s team, the CAS panel stated: ‘The Applicant has a legitimate
grievance if their athletes were subject to such inconsistent treatment. However, if (as we have already
concluded) the Bye-Law was correctly applied in the decision complained of it is no defence that it
was incorrectly not applied to other competitors. We do, however, emphasize that as a general principle
consistency of treatment in a matter such as this is of the greatest importance, and that those who
enforce these rules […] should strive to attain it’). However, even if prior incorrect application does not
stop the SGB correcting the practice moving forward, it might stop the SGB from enforcing the rule
against those who were previously led to believe they would not be pursued: see para B1.39.
Federation, CAS 2001/A/357, paras 25–26 (‘The Respondent does concede that there have indeed
been players in the past, who have represented two different countries. However, since this happened
without the consent or even knowledge of the Respondent, those players cannot be taken into account
when deciding the present case. They were simply able to violate the IIHF rules because no one
noticed at the time, due to lack of computerization. Since those players were not “treated” by the
Respondent at all, Mr. Nabokov cannot have been treated unequally. The fact that some players have,
in the past, been able to violate the rules cannot mean that other players should benefit from their
misconduct. The Panel is not aware that the IIHF ever allowed another player to represent a different
country after turning eighteen. Therefore, this is not a case of unequal treatment’).
7 Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.5 (‘there is a general principle that no one can claim
for equal treatment by referring to someone else who has adopted an illegal conduct, without sanction
(Nemini dolus alienus prodesse debet). This principle is recognised by Swiss law […]. In general,
one cannot claim to benefit from the same treatment as another in circumstances where the treatment
granted to the other would be illegal. There is an exception to this principle where it can be evidenced
that the constant practice of the authorities is to benefit third parties with treatments that are illegal’).
8 Football Association v Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018,
discussed at length at para B3.130 et seq.
B1.30 Similar caution must be applied when considering equal treatment

arguments in the context of sanctions. The basic principle is clear: ‘sanctions imposed
by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment, eg insofar as all
members or constituents of that association must be treated alike. This is especially
true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental for any sports competition’.1 One
CAS panel has suggested that the right to equal treatment means that ‘wherever the
rules grant the sports association discretion or the scope to decide as it thinks fit, it
must exercise this power in the same way in relation to every athlete’.2 Another has
noted that:
‘in determining, as an international appellate body, the correct and proportionate

sanction, CAS panels must also seek to preserve some coherence between the
decisions of the different federations in comparable cases in order to preserve the
principle of equal treatment of athletes in different sports’.3
However, while the principle that ‘like cases should be treated alike’ is simple to
state, in practice the sanction imposed in a particular case will depend very much
on the hearing panel’s assessment of the particular facts and circumstances of that
case,4 which assessment may or may not be clear from the available reports,5 so that
proper comparison to the case at hand may be impossible. Furthermore, a decision
should not be followed for the sake of consistency where the hearing panel that made
it misapplied the rules and set the sanction at the wrong level: ‘Although consistency
of sanctions is a virtue, correctness remains a higher one: otherwise unduly lenient
(or, indeed, unduly severe) sanctions may set a wrong benchmark inimical to the
interests of sport’.6
1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 137.
2 W v UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 15. See also FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986,
para 137 (‘Sanctions imposed by associations must comply with the principle of equal treatment,
eg insofar as all members or constituents of that association must be treated alike. This is especially
true in sports where equal treatment is fundamental for any sports competition’); ISU v Malkova,
RSU & RUSADA, CAS 2016/A/4840, para 45 (‘As was said in CAS 2011/A/2615 at para 92, “In
determining as an international body the correct and proper sanction, CAS panels must also seek
to preserve coherence between the decisions of different federations in comparable cases in order
to preserve the principle of equal treatment of athletes in different sports”. Albeit equal treatment is
not a circumstances envisaged in the definition of NSF as a circumstances to be taken into account in
assessment of its degree and the appropriate sanction consequent upon it, the principle and rationale for
it is generally […] accepted as part of the lex ludica’); WADA v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870,
para 61 (reducing the sanction to six months in order to avoid the application of the IOC’s ‘Osaka
rule’, ie to avoid the athlete being banned as well from the next Olympics, ‘means that, assuming the
same degree of negligence (arguendo: the same level of negligence as Hardy’s), A-level athletes would
be entitled to a lower sanction (much lower: the half of it) than all other athletes. Such result is clearly
untenable: proportionality is to be measured only against the kind of conduct (or level of negligence),
and not the importance or level of the athlete’). See also doping cases cited at para C17.8.
3 WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 90.
4 ISU v Malkova, RSU & RUSADA, CAS 2016/A/4840, para 39 (‘Given that “all cases are very fact
specific and no doctrine of binding precedent applies to the CAS jurisprudence” CAS 2016/A/4643
para 82, it is, in the Panel’s view, dangerous to pray in aid tariffs imposed in other cases as distinct
from any principles set out in the them’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 55
(‘As to the period of ineligibility, the Panel is conscious of the desirability of “harmonisation of
sanctions” (WADC 10.2 and Rule 149) in international sport and international sporting disputes.
[…] Nevertheless, each case must be decided on its own facts’); IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs,
CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.16 (‘[…] previous awards, unless authoritatively stating principles of
general application, are of no real assistance given their fact sensitive nature and the lack of detailed
knowledge of their particular circumstances available to later panels or sole arbitrators’); Cielo and
others v FINA, CAS 2011/A/2495-2498, paras 8.2 and 8.3 (‘Other CAS decisions based on fact-
specific findings are of little relevance in deciding the present appeals unless the facts in such decisions
are identical, or at least extremely similar, to the facts with which the present appeals are concerned.
[…] While we are informed by the views expressed in those cases by different Panels on legal issues,
we do not consider that the particular outcomes in those cases are particularly useful in determining
the outcome of these appeals in the light of the significantly different factual situations pertaining.’);
Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.23 (‘In the Panel’s view, limited assistance can be gained
from any previous case in which a tribunal from which an appeal in brought to CAS, simply applies an
evaluation of all the circumstances to see whether the criterion of no significant fault or negligence is
met. […] Given that the exercise is multi-factorial, it would be highly unlikely that there could be an
exact read across from earlier to later cases’). See also Football Association v Marshall, FA Regulatory
Commission decision dated 8 May 2012, para 73 (‘Care needs to be taken in drawing too much from
authorities when it comes to assessing the degree of fault. Every case will depend on its own facts and
on the evidence seen and heard’).
5 Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 10.23 (‘[…] sanctions imposed by international federations
and by national anti-doping organizations without adjudicated determination by an independent tribunal
are of limited or no assistance. However, the decisions of national and international doping tribunals
provide helpful guidance, particularly where they contain sufficient details of the circumstances and
reasoning of the tribunal’).
6 Ibid, para 10.23. See also WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 101 (rejecting reliance on
a case imposing a three month ban because ‘the panel in that case did not examine the degree of fault
of the athlete, and the circumstances of that case cannot therefore be compared to the circumstances of
the current case’).
(d) The general legal principle of proportionality
B1.31 Most rights, even ‘fundamental’ ones such as the right to equal treatment,
are not absolute. Instead, restrictions on those rights (including restrictions set out
in the regulations of an SGB) are permissible so long as they have an adequate
legal basis,1 they are aimed at protecting a legitimate public interest,2 and they are
necessary and proportionate to the achievement of that interest.3
1 See para B1.22.
2 See eg Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.4.19 (‘[…] certain rules may constitute a
restriction to fundamental rights, when such rules pursue a legitimate objective and are proportionate
to the objective sought. In the instant case, the Panel […] considers that FIFA rules limiting the
international transfer of minor players do not violate any mandatory principle of public policy and
do not constitute any restriction to the fundamental rights that would have to be considered as not
admissible’). For examples of other objectives of sporting regulations that have been held to be
legitimate, see para B1.4.
3 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 49. See also Rouiller, ‘Legal
Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code with the Fundamental
Principles of Swiss Domestic Law’, 25 October 2005, p 29 (‘The restriction must also be warranted
on the basis of a sufficient public interest or the protection of the fundamental rights of others. In
accordance with the proportionality principle, a restriction of fundamental rights must not exceed what
is necessary in order to safeguard the public interest being pursued’). See eg Semenya v IAAF, Athletics
South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 548 (‘it is common ground that a
rule that imposes differential treatment on the basis of a particular protected characteristic is valid and
lawful if it is a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of attaining a legitimate objective’);
WADA & Kurtoglu v FIBA, FIBA AC 2005-6 decision dated 16 February 2006 at pp 10–11 (‘[…] not
every curtailment of this principle by the Respondent’s rules is incompatible with the human rights
and the general legal principles of Swiss Law. Rather the principle of proportionality for the athlete’s
benefit must be weighed against the legitimate interests of the sports federations. This particularly
includes the legitimate aim of effectively fighting against doping and the objective of the sports
federations to harmonise doping penalties. As regards the question of how the opposing principles
are to be reasonably harmonised in the rules and regulations, the Respondent has a certain amount of
latitude for deciding without interference by the courts’); Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216
(Richards J), para 43 (‘In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is recognised
that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified and, in particular,
whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment or margin of
discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary area of
judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the range
of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting interests.
The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for the
primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate’),
aff’d, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.
B1.32 Accordingly, proportionality is ‘the paramount condition for the validity of

restrictions on fundamental rights’.1 It ‘requires that:
(a) the measure taken by the governing body is capable of achieving the
envisaged goal;
(b) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged
goal;2 and
(c) the constraints which the affected person will suffer as a consequence of the
measure are justified by the overall interest to achieve the envisaged goal’.3
In other words, to be proportionate, a measure must pursue a legitimate aim, there
must be a sufficient ‘nexus’ between measure and aim, and the measure must go no
further than is reasonably necessary in pursuit of the aim.4 For example, in Bosman
the ECJ struck out UEFA’s regulations requiring payment of a transfer fee to a
player’s former club even after that player’s contract had expired, on the grounds
that there were less restrictive means of protecting competitive balance between
clubs, such as the clubs agreeing to share revenues from sale of match tickets and/or
broadcasting rights.5
1 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] ISLR 3(3) 39, 50–51. See eg IAAF v ARAF
& Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 185 (describing ‘the proportionality requirement under general
principles of law applicable in Switzerland and Monaco’ as part of ‘Swiss public policy’); Puerta v
ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.8 (referring to the need for the ITF’s anti-doping rules to satisfy ‘the
general legal principle of proportionality’); Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 44 (referring
to proportionality as ‘a widely generally accepted principle of sports law’); B v FIBA, CAS 92/80,
paras 10, 19 (applying proportionality as one of the ‘general principles of law’ to test the legality of
a FIBA regulation on transfers of sporting allegiance). Similarly, the Introduction to the 2015 World
Anti-Doping Code states: ‘These sport specific rules and procedures […] are intended to be applied
in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights’. Cf Russian Olympic
Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 129 (‘Because Rule 22.1(a) is not a sanction, it does
not have to pass any test of proportionality’).
2 Ibid, para 130, citing FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, paras 138–40.
3 Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, para 343 et seq (it was not necessary, and therefore it was
unlawfully discriminatory, to put the burden on a disabled athlete to show that the prosthetic blades he
ran on did not give him an artificial performance advantage; for the rule to be lawful, that burden had
to be reversed, and World Athletics had to show, if it wanted to hold him ineligible to compete, that the
blades did give him an artificial advantage).
4 IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.9 (‘In determining whether the limitation of
an ECtHR or EU or human right is proportionate, a court must conventionally ask whether: (i) the
measures designed to meet the legitimate objective are rationally connected to it; (ii) the means used
to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective; and (iii) the
measures strike an appropriate balance between the interests of society and those of individuals and
groups’); and Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 50 (the necessity
condition ‘implies that no less intrusive restriction is equally suitable to achieve such aim’).
para 110, endorsing the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz on this point at para 226 et seq.
B1.33 Proportionality ‘is also a general principle of law governing the imposition
of sanctions of any disciplinary body, whether it be public or private’.1 Specifically
in relation to disciplinary rules, the principle requires that ‘a reasonable balance must
be struck between the violation and the sanction’.2 More specifically, the sanction
must be ‘effective to achieve the purpose sought’, ie it must go as far as is necessary
to achieve that purpose,3 but it must ‘not exceed what is necessary for that purpose’.4
To the extent it is disproportionate, it will not be enforced.5
1 Rigozzi et al, ‘Doping and Fundamental Rights’ [2003] 3(3) ISLR 39, 50–51. See also Puerta v ITF,
CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.23 (‘Any sanction must be just and proportionate. If it is not, the sanction
may be challenged. […] When there is a cap or lacuna in the WADC, that gap or lacuna […] is to
be filled by the Panel applying the overarching principle of justice and proportionality on which all
systems of law, and the WADC, is based’). For a discussion of the extent to which the principle of
proportionality may be invoked to challenge the sanctions for anti-doping rule violations mandated in
the World Anti-Doping Code, see para C20.14 et seq.
2 IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, para 46.
3 IAAF v Zaripova, CAS 2015/A/4006, para 103(vi) (‘as to the principle of proportionality, the Panel
finds that, contrary to the Respondents’ contention, it requires the retroactive disqualification of results,
rather than the opposite. The principle of proportionality implies that there must be a reasonable
balance between the kind of misconduct and the sanction, and in particular that (i) the measure taken
by the governing body can achieve the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body
is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints on the affected person resulting from
the measure are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal. […] In this respect, the
Panel notes that: • the purpose of disqualification in the Athlete’s case is inter alia to prevent her from
gaining the advantage sought by her intentional, continued and severe doping violations over other
competitors, who competed without doping; • the measure of disqualification is certainly capable of
achieving the envisaged goal, since it implies the cancellation of the results obtained; • the measure
of disqualification is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, because the Athlete, who cheated in the
preparation of a given competition, would otherwise keep the benefits of the results achieved to the
detriment of clean competitors, and • the constraints on the Athlete are justified by the overall interest
of achieving the envisaged goal’).
4 IFBB v IWGA, CAS 2010/A/2119, paras 46-47 (rejecting IFBB’s submission that suspending it from
participation in the next edition of the World Games due to its failure to implement proper anti-doping
policies was disproportionate, because the sanction ‘is effective to achieve the purpose sought and does
not exceed what is necessary for that purpose’).
5 Reinholds v FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, para 16 (‘FISA’s Rules are unambiguous in providing for a life
ban for a first doping offence. However, that sanction could be reduced if it were impeachable under
Swiss Law, or in the exercise of the Panel’s powers if, in the Panel’s opinion, the sentence imposed
was disproportionate to the offence’); and see cases discussed at paras C20.17 and C20.19.
B1.34 Once a claimant shows that an SGB’s regulations restrict his rights, it will be
the SGB’s burden to demonstrate that the restrictions they impose are proportionate.1
In doing so, however, the SGB will be afforded a reasonable ‘margin of appreciation’,
since (again) it is considered better placed than the courts to determine what is
necessary and appropriate for its sport.2 Furthermore, on occasion an SGB ‘is entitled
under Swiss law to limit in its rules the circumstances to take into account when
fixing the sanctions and restrict the application of the doctrine of proportionality’.3
As a result, a court or arbitral panel will not interfere with the SGB’s regulations
simply because it might have taken a different view on the policy to be pursued
and the method for pursuing it. While this margin of appreciation always exists (in
relation to discretionary decisions as opposed to those dictated by law), the extent of
it may vary with the context and circumstances: where a restriction is more onerous,
a court or tribunal will be more prepared to intervene than where the restriction is less
so. On occasions a court or tribunal will only interfere if the regulations are shown
to be (in civil law terms) ‘evidently and grossly disproportionate’,4 or (in common
law terms) ‘irrational or perverse or otherwise outside the margin of discretion open
to’ the sports regulator.5 On other occasions the court or tribunal will be prepared to
be more intrusive, and the standard of proportionality applied will be considerably
lower than the civil law standard of gross disproportionality and the common law
standard of rationality.
1 Semenya v IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, para 540 (‘if
there is discrimination, then the burden of proof shifts to the IAAF to demonstrate, on the evidence,
that the DSD Regulations are necessary, reasonable and proportionate’); Chand v IAAF & AFI,
CAS 2014/A/3759, para 443 (same). Cf Stevenage Borough Football Club v The Football League Ltd.
(1996) CH 1996 S No 3043 (Carnwarth J) (‘where the system of control itself can be seen as in the
public interest, then in my view the onus lies on those seeking to challenge it to show that the particular
rules under attack are unreasonable in that narrow sense’).
2 See para B1.6, n 1.
3 WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 120. For example, the World Anti-Doping Code expressly
states that it is ‘intended to be applied in a manner which respects the principles of proportionality and
human rights’ (2015 Code, Introduction, p 17), and it then goes on to proscribe fixed sanctions (or a
fixed range of sanctions, with fixed minimums) that must be imposed for anti-doping rule violations
(see generally Chapter C17), and also drastically limits the factors that may be taken into account when
fixing a sanction within that range (see para C20.10 et seq). The CAS and the Swiss Federal Tribunal
have repeatedly rejected claims that this approach offends against the principle of proportionality (see
para C4.17 n 5).
4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 143 (‘The right to impose a sanction is limited by the
mandatory prohibition of excessive penalties, which is embodied in several provisions of Swiss law.
[…] However, only if the sanction is evidently and grossly disproportionate in comparison with the
proved rule violation and if it is considered as a violation of fundamental justice and fairness, would
the Panel regard such a sanction as abusive and, thus, contrary to mandatory Swiss law’); Squizzato
v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 10.26 (‘The Panel is bound to respect the freedom of associations
to establish their own rules […]. Therefore, one cannot deny that the bare rule provided in DC 10.5
restricts and substantially limits respectively the CAS panels’ discretion in reducing a suspension.
The Panel recognizes that a mere “uncomfortable feeling” alone that a one year penalty is not the
appropriate sanction cannot itself justify a reduction. […] [T]he principle of proportionality would
apply if the award were to constitute an attack on personal rights which was serious and totally
disproportionate to the behaviour penalised’). See also Reinholds v FISA, CAS 2001/A/330, para 16
(‘The Panel would require compelling evidence of invalidity under Swiss Law before it felt prepared
to interfere with the decision of an International Federation, which had debated the issue of sanctions
for doping offences over a long period and which had decided on a sanction which had the support
of the sport as a whole. Equally, the Panel would require compelling evidence before it was prepared
to exercise its powers to reduce such a sanction imposed by an International Federation as part of its
well-known and widely publicised policy on the ground that the sentence was disproportionate to the
offence’).
5 Sheffield United v FAPL, FAPL Arbitration Panel award dated 3 July 2007, para 38. See also Chambers
v BOA [2008] EWHC 2028 (QB), para 48 (‘Next, is the byelaw proportionate? […] Does the byelaw,
when subjected to the intensity of review described in Bradley, go further than is reasonable or
necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the BOA?’); Stevenage Borough Football Club v The
Football League Ltd. (1996) CH 1996 S No 3043 (Carnwarth J) (‘where the system of control itself can
be seen as in the public interest, then in my view the onus lies on those seeking to challenge it to show
that the particular rules under attack are unreasonable in that narrow sense. I also find it difficult to see
any reason in principle why the test applied to the exercise of discretion by such regulatory bodies,
acting in good faith, should be materially different to those applied to bodies subject to judicial review.
[…] [I]f admission criteria are shown to be arbitrary or capricious in effect, whether because [of] the
way in which they are formulated or in the way in which they are applied, they are in my view open to
challenge. But the onus is on those who make the challenge to establish their case, and the Court will
give due weight to the judgment of the responsible bodies’), affirmed (1996) 9 Admin LR 109 [CA];
and see discussion at E15.17.
B1.35 An SGB that wishes to avoid seeing its rules struck down as disproportionate
should bear in mind:
(a) that it will need to be able to show that there is no less intrusive way of achieving
the underlying objective;1
(b) that the more restrictive the intrusion is, the more compelling the justification
will need to be;2
(c) that evidence that other sports have adopted similarly restrictive or more
restrictive rules to address the same mischief should help to establish that the
SGB’s rule is reasonable and proportionate;3 and
(d) that it will be much easier to demonstrate proportionality if absolute prohibitions
are avoided and the SGB retains discretion to grant exemptions in exceptional
cases,4 where it considers that doing so will not undermine the objectives
behind the restrictions.5
A decision not to grant an exemption in a particular case could still be challenged,
but the courts are less likely to overturn that decision if a fair procedure has been
followed, no improper factors were taken into account, and the decision is not
irrational.6
1 See eg Better Regulation Taskforce, ‘Principles of Good Regulation’ (2003), p 4 (‘Policy solutions
must be proportionate to the perceived problem or risk and justify the compliance costs imposed –
don’t use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. All the options for achieving policy objectives must be
considered – not just prescriptive regulation. Alternatives may be more effective and cheaper to apply.
[…]’).
2 Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, para 511 (endogenous testosterone ‘is not being used to
determine whether an athlete should compete either as a male or as a female. Instead, it is being used
to introduce a new category of ineligible female athletes within the female category. The necessity
and proportionality of that restriction therefore requires particularly careful analysis’), para 513
(‘Excluding athletes from competing at all on the basis of a natural genetic advantage, or conditioning
their right to compete on undergoing medical intervention which reduces their athletic performance,
imposes a significant detriment on the athletes concerned, and is therefore only valid if it is clearly
established to be a necessary and proportionate means of achieving fair competition’), and para 528
(‘in order to justify excluding an individual from competing in a particular category on the basis
of a naturally occurring characteristic such as endogenous testosterone, it is not enough simply to
establish that the characteristic has some performance enhancing effect. Instead, the IAAF needs to
establish that the characteristic in question confers such a significant performance advantage over
other members of the category that allowing individuals with that characteristic to compete would
subvert the very basis for having the separate category and thereby prevent a level playing field. The
degree or magnitude of the advantage is therefore critical’) (emphasis in original).
3 Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, para 69 (finding that FEI policy of provisionally suspending
a doped horse for two months was proportionate given that, among other things, in similar cases
the British Horseracing Authority imposed a ban of 12 months); Tonga Rugby League v RLIF,
[2008] NSWSC 1173, para 69 (accepting that restraint was lawful because, inter alia, ‘[o]f the
rules of the international sports which are in evidence, the rules of the Federation allow the greatest
opportunity for a player to change countries’); AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200,
para 126 (in support of its argument that its rule prohibiting clubs under common ownership from
entering the same UEFA competition is proportionate, ‘Respondent mentions the stricter regulations
which may be found in the United Kingdom, such as the rules of the Premier League, the Football
League and the Scottish Football Association, or in the United States, such as the rules of the NBA,
the NFL, the NHL and the MLB’). See also European Commission, Case AT.40208, International
Skating Union’s Eligibility Rules, 8 December 2017, para 253 (‘The ISU argues, with reference to the
Wouters judgment, that every sport discipline has its own characteristics and that the fact that other
sports federations operate in a different manner does not put into question the ISU’s system. However,
first, the number and range of sports federations which do not have any pre-authorisation system
in place and the fact that the ISU refers in its response to the Letter of Facts to alleged restrictions
included in the regulations established by associations of professional players in golf or tennis, and not
in the statutes of the respective international federations as recognised by the International Olympic
Committee, confirm the view of the Commission that the ISU’s ex ante control system based on the
pyramid structure of sport is not “the norm” for regulating sport but rather one model alongside other,
alternative governance models. Second, while it may be acceptable for a governing body to adopt
stricter rules for its sport than other governing bodies, this should be justified on the basis of specific
facts and evidence related to the features of the sport in order to be inherent in the pursuit of legitimate
objectives and proportionate to them’).
4 Bedene & LTA v ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 64 (‘It is precisely
because of the existence of the right to apply for a discretionary exemption that Regulation 35 [saying
a player may only represent one country at senior national representative level] is unobjectionable.
Cases that the ITF regard as deserving of an exemption can be dealt with under Regulation 35(d). Once
that is taken into account, I can see no basis for a contention that Regulation 35 is itself in breach of
Article 49’); WADA v British Olympic Association, CAS 2011/A/2658, para 8.33 (‘The fact that the
Bye-Law foresees a possibility of an Appeal Procedure is certainly a good instrument to avoid totally
disproportionate decisions’). See also Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684,
para 132 (noting with approval provision allowing athletes to apply for special eligibility for
international competition despite suspension of their national federation, which meant that ‘the effect
produced by the suspension of a national federation […] was recently made more flexible, to take
into account individual cases, in a way consistent with the sought purpose of eradication of doping,
protection and promotion of clean athletes, fair play and integrity’).
5 International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, paras 51-52 (‘When considering [whether to grant] its
approval to the reduction or cancellation of the waiting period [required before transferring allegiance
from one country to another], the IBA should give consideration to the objectives behind the waiting
period rule’, and grant its approval if doing so would not undermine those objectives); Miranda v IOC,
CAS 2000/003, para 41 (decisions whether to reduce or cancel waiting period ‘should be guided by
the basic principles of the [Olympic] Charter’).
6 Cowley v Heatley (1986) Times, 24 July [CA], 1986 TLR 430, p 4 (‘It is the Court’s function to
control illegality and to make sure that a body does not act outside its powers. But I do not think the
interests of sport or anybody else would be served by the Court seeking to double-guess regulating
bodies in charge of domestic arrangements such as the organisation of the Commonwealth Games’);
Miranda v IOC, CAS 2000/003, para 36 (‘NOCs were intended to and do have an absolute discretion
to determine whether or not to reduce or cancel the three year period in a given case, unexaminable in
the absence of clear proof of abuse or ill will’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 101 (‘It
is allowed to provide a discretion to the association and courts should not lightly exercise their power
of review over the association’s decisions made in the exercise of such discretion, especially in cases
in which sports governing bodies have special expertise and experience in relation to their sport’) and
para 102 (noting, in relation to a challenge to a decision by the FIA that fairness did not require grant
of a retroactive TUE under ISTUE Art 4.3(d), ‘While the Panel accepts that CAS cannot replace its
assessment of fairness with that of the TUEC, it is nevertheless of the opinion that appeals may still be
permitted on the ground that the decision was arbitrary, grossly disproportionate, irrational or perverse
or otherwise outside of the margin of appreciation, or taken in bad faith or without the due process
rights provided to the athlete’).
(e) Protection of acquired rights and legitimate expectations
B1.36 As part of its well-established regulatory autonomy,1 an SGB is entitled to

amend its regulations for the future where it considers the changes are required in
order to achieve its underlying (legitimate) objectives.2 However, the law gives at
least some protection to those who have acquired rights under one set of regulations
that are taken away by a new regime.3 And CAS panels have used the doctrine of
venire contra factum proprium to prevent an SGB making sudden changes to rules
in circumstances where its members had legitimately expected that no such changes
would be made. According to the CAS panel in AEK Athens, this doctrine ‘provides
that, where the conduct of one party has led to the legitimate expectations on the
part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action
to the detriment of the second party […]’.4 Expressed in this way, the principle
appears to elide two separate English law doctrines, namely the public law doctrine
of legitimate expectation and the private law doctrine of estoppel.5 Its practical effect
is best illustrated by the AEK Athens decision itself:
(a) Having already issued rules for its 1998/99 competitions that contained no
ban on common ownership of clubs participating in those competitions, in
May 1998 (just three months before the beginning of the 1998/99 season)
UEFA introduced a new rule prohibiting clubs under common ownership
from competing in the same UEFA competition. A challenge issued by two
commonly-owned clubs to the lawfulness of the rule was eventually rejected
on the merits, the CAS finding that it did not infringe EC or Swiss competition
law or any other legal rights of those clubs. However, when the challenge was
first filed, the President of the CAS Ordinary Division granted the clubs an
interim order restraining UEFA from applying the rule for the 1998/99 season,
on the following grounds:
‘By adopting the Regulation to be effective at the start of the new season, UEFA
added an extra requirement for admission to the UEFA Cup after the conditions
for participation had been finally settled and communicated to all members. It did
so at a time when AEK already knew that it had met the requirements for selection
of its national association. Furthermore, it chose a timing that made it materially
impossible for the clubs and their owner to adjust to the new admission requirement.
[…] The doctrine of venire contra factum proprium […] provides that, where the
conduct of one party has led to the legitimate expectations on the part of a second
party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of
the second party […]. By referring to this doctrine, CAS is not implying that UEFA
is barred from changing its Cup Regulations for the future (provided, of course, the
change is lawful on its merits). However, it may not do so without allowing the clubs
sufficient time to adapt their operations to the new rules, here specifically to change
their control structure accordingly’.6
(b) In its final award, while rejecting the challenge to the legality of the new rule,
the CAS panel agreed that:
‘an adjustment to the Contested Rule should not be arranged hurriedly, and
commonly controlled clubs and their owners should have some time to determine
their course of action, also taking into account possible legal questions (eg if shares
are to be sold, minority shareholders may be entitled to exercise pre-emptive rights
within given deadlines). There is an obvious need for a reasonable period of time
before entry into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule may turn
out to be excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs and their owners’.7
It therefore endorsed the interim order that had been made, suspending
application of the rule while the challenge was pending:
‘The Panel essentially agrees with the foregoing remarks by the President of the
Ordinary Division of the CAS and with the ensuing conclusion that UEFA violated
its duties of procedural fairness with respect to the 1998/99 season. Indeed, a sports-
governing organization such as an international federation must comply with certain
basic principles of procedural fairness vis-à-vis the clubs or the athletes, even if clubs
and athletes are not members of the international federation […]. The Panel does not
find a hurried change in participation requirements shortly before the beginning of
the new season, after such requirements have been publicly announced and the clubs
entitled to compete have already been designated, admissible. Therefore, the Panel
approves and ratifies the CAS Procedural Order of 16 July 1998, which has granted
interim relief consisting in the suspension of the application of the Contested Rule
“for the duration of this arbitration or for the duration of the 1998/99 season of the
UEFA Cup, whichever is shorter”’.8
In fact, given that the CAS panel only issued its final award on the merits
after the following season (the 1999/2000 season) had begun, it continued the
suspension of application of the rule for the 1999/2000 season even though it
had upheld the legality of the rule, on the basis that ‘paramount considerations
of fairness and legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against
allowing UEFA to implement immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000
football season’.9
1 See para B1.6.
2 An athlete who agrees to be bound by the SGB’s rules ‘as amended from time to time’ is bound by
any subsequent amendments to the rules even if he does not agree with them, provided they do not
fundamentally alter the purpose for which the rules were originally drawn up. Doyle v White City
Stadium Ltd, 1935 1 KB 110 (CA) at pp 120–21 (‘The rules in fact were altered on June 17, 1932,
and no point is now taken that the new rules were not validly passed. But it is said that inasmuch as
the licence was originally granted before the rules had been changed the rules as they stood after
alteration and at the time of the fight were not binding upon the plaintiff. It will be observed however
that the terms of the application for the licence give plain leave to alter the rules or promulgate further
rules. When these rules as altered are still for the purpose of carrying out the original purpose of the
society or body of persons, the altered rules are made binding on the plaintiff. If there was an attempt
fundamentally to alter the purpose for which the rules had been originally drawn up, the prospective
agreement to adhere to fresh rules, or any alteration in the rules, would not apply. It is quite plain
from the decision in Thellusson v Viscount Valentia (1) that if and so long as the rules are akin to the
purpose for which a society exists, there is no inherent objection to an alteration of those rules or to
further rules being made for the same purpose. Here the alteration in the rules is for such a limited
purpose. If, for example, the alterations had been to turn a society connected with British boxing into
a society for conducting horse-racing, the position might have been far different’) applied in South
Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June
2020, para 88 (in Doyle, ‘Lord Hamworth was saying that there was an implied restriction on the
power to amend the rules, namely that it could not be exercised to alter fundamentally the purpose for
which they had been originally drawn up. But, subject to that limitation, it could be exercised to make
changes even if their effect was to deprive a person of a benefit which he had acquired and woudld
be able to retain under the rules before they were amended’) and para 89 (‘In our judgment, the same
reasoning should be applied to the proper construction of Article 147(d) and Rule J1(c)(i). These
provisions are in extremely wide terms. The only express limitation on the power they confer is that the
alterations should be “deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement the Rules
in so far as such regulation (sic) is not in conflict with any Rule”. We accept that, despite the apparent
width of this wording, it would not permit the making of an alteration which has nothing to do with
football, since that could not be deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement
the Rules. But the amendments to give effect to the Council Decision do not alter fundamentally the
purpose for which the Rules and Regulations were originally drawn up’) and para 93 (‘That is not to
say that The FA can exercise these powers within a season free from all constraints (other than that
the amendments are deemed necessary to provide for matters arising from or to implement the Rules).
In exercising its powers, The FA must act rationally, non-capriciously and otherwise comply with
public law principles. This obligation arises both because of the supervisory jurisdiction over sport
governing bodies (see e.g. Bradley v Jockey Club [2007] LLR 543 at [33] to [47] per Richards J) and
because the power being exercised is a unilateral power to amend the terms of a contract (see e.g.
Paragon Finance v Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685, at [30] and [32] per Dyson LJ; Braganza v BP Shipping
Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 1661 at [30] per Baroness Hale; No 1 West India Quay (Residential) Ltd v East
Tower Apartments Ltd [2018] 1 WLR 5682 at [37] per Lewison LJ)’). See also WADA v Bellchambers
et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 114 (‘The Players also contended that weight should be given to the
AFL Tribunal’s decision because of the distinction of the Tribunal’s members. They contended that
under the 2010 AFL Anti- Doping Code, applicable at the time of the alleged infractions, an appeal
was restricted and could not be a hearing de novo. The Panel observes that the contractual undertaking
of each Player encompassed changes to the AFL rules. Accordingly, the 2015 AFL Anti-Doping Code
applies to the procedural aspects of this appeal’).
3 In English law, there is no ‘general presumption that legislation does not alter the existing legal
situation or existing rights’, since ‘the very purpose’ of legislation is to change the existing law, often
by ‘altering existing rights for the future’. Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40,
[2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Roger at 192. However, there is a presumption that there is no intent
to disturb or interfere with ‘accrued’ rights. Ibid, per Lord Hope at 98 (referring to the ‘general
presumption that legislation is not intended to operate retrospectively. That presumption is based on
concepts of fairness and legal certainty. These concepts require that accrued rights and the legal effect
of past acts should not be altered by subsequent legislation’). See also s 16(1) of the Interpretation Act
1976 (‘where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears,
[..] (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that
enactment; […]’). This is a weaker presumption in practice than the presumption against retroactivity
(as to which, see para B1.40), because a regulation affecting vested rights does not purport to change
the legal position before the regulation came into force but instead only alters the position moving
forward, and ‘it is more likely that Parliament intended to alter vested rights in this way than that it
intended to make a retroactive change’. Wilson, ibid, per Lord Rodger at 195. However, it was held
not to assist the claimant club in South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule
K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020 (see fn 2, above, and fn 6 to para B1.38).
Furthermore, the courts have struggled to come up with a straightforward test to determine when a
benefit claimed under previous legislation amounts to a ‘vested’ or ‘accrued’ right that warrants such
protection. See Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire [1999] 1 WLR 1778 (CA), per Simon-Brown LJ at
1788F (‘whether or not there is an acquired right depends upon whether at the date of repeal the claimant
has an entitlement (at least contingent) to money or other certain benefit receivable by him, provided
only that he takes all appropriate steps by way of notices and/or claims thereafter’); Odelola v Secretary
of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25, per Lord Simon-Brown at 36 (‘Maguire seems to
me to point up the critical distinction between, on the one hand, legislation conferring “money or other
certain benefit” and, on the other hand, a mere statement of policy as to how presently it is proposed
to exercise an administrative discretion when eventually it comes to be exercised, a policy which may
change at any moment’). Some commentators have suggested that ultimately it appears to come down
to the court’s sense of ‘simple fairness’: Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide
to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018), para 4.50. That is reflected in Bedene, where the ITF
replaced a rule allowing transfers of allegiance from one country to another after a three-year waiting
period with a rule prohibiting any transfers after playing for a country at senior level. A player who had
taken several steps to transfer allegiance to a second country but had not yet completed the three year
waiting period by the time the rule was changed argued that, having relied irreversibly on the transfer of
allegiance provisions in the previous rule, he had a legitimate expectation that he would be permitted to
play for the second country once he had met the conditions under the old rule for such transfers, and it
would necessarily be unlawful for the ITF to act contrary to that legitimate expectation. The arbitrator
rejected that submission on the basis that there was no general rule protecting ‘irreversible’ reliance in
this way. Instead, whether protection was warranted would depend entirely on the facts, which the ITF
could take into account in considering an application for exemption from the rule. Bedene & LTA v
ITF, Sport Resolutions arbitration award dated 2 March 2017, para 75 (‘The basis for the Applicants’
contention was that Mr Bedene had relied upon the pre-2015 regulations before he became aware of its
successor rule. So does that mean that any applicant for an exemption who had in any respect, however
small, “irreversibly” relied upon the old rule must succeed? Why should this be the case? There is no
principle of law which requires such a conclusion. Mr de la Mare criticized the lack of some sort of
guidance defining or otherwise identifying relevant factors for the ITF to take into consideration in
reaching a decision on an exemption. But the obvious difficulty in formulating guidance or relevant
factors that are capable of distinguishing between cases of “irreversible” and “reversible” reliance, is
precisely the reason why an exception must be assessed, by the ITF, on a case by case basis’).
CAS panels have recognised the need to protect accrued rights in Clubul Sportiv Municipal
Ramnicu Valcea v RFF & RPFL, CAS 2014/A/3855 (where a CAS sole arbitrator agreed that a club
that had qualified for promotion in one season based on the rules in place for that season could not be
denied promotion based on a change to the rules made after the season was completed: ‘the promotion
and relegation of teams cannot be governed by a set of rules which was adopted after the end of the
relevant sporting season and amended the rules which were in force during said season. This would
result in disrupting the legal position acquired by the participating teams, which were entitled for
promotion at the end of the relevant sporting season, in the event that the adopted amendments would
not apply retroactively. [89.] In this respect, the application of such a set of rules by an association
violates th expression of providing legal protection to a person who relies on the principle of good
faith’), and in two international football SGB membership cases (although these can also be seen as
cases of the application of the principles of non-retroactivity and procedural fairness). In Gibraltar
Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, (paras 11 and 17) and Gibraltar Football Association
v FIFA, CAS 2014/A3776, (paras 281, 284, 290), the CAS panels held that the GFA had a legitimate
expectation that its membership application would be treated in accordance with the rules in place
when that application was made, which were satisfied although Gibraltar was not an independent
state as required under the subsequently amended rules. FIFA and UEFA could not change the criteria
applicable to the GFA after the application was made, even though the decision on membership had
not yet been made. In contrast in Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, the Jersey
FA had made its application after the change in criteria came into effect, and so it had no basis for
complaint, even though Jersey had a similar status under international law to Gibraltar. In Football
Association of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602, the Serbian association was unable to defeat the
Kosovo association’s application because Kosovo was held to satisfy the criteria.
4 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 61.
5 This is certainly how they were articulated, albeit unsuccessfully, in South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The
Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated 5 June 2020 (see fn 2, above, and fn
6 to para B1.38).
For the public law doctrine of legitimate expectation in English law, see United Policyholders
Group v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR 3383 (Privy Council), in particular per Lord
Neuberger at para 37 (‘where a public body states that it will do (or not do) something, a person who
has reasonably relied on the statement should, in the absence of good reasons, be entitled to rely on
the statement and enforce it through the courts’) and at paras 37–38 (‘in order to found a claim based
on the principle, it is clear that the statement in question must be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of
relevant qualification” […]. Secondly, the principle cannot be involved if, or to the extent that, it would
interfere with the public body’s statutory duty […]. Third, however much a person is entitled to say
that a statement by a public body gave rise to a legitimate expectation on his part, circumstances may
arise where it becomes inappropriate to permit that person to invoke the principle to enforce the public
body to comply with the statement’’), and per Lord Carnwath JSC at para 121 (‘Where a promise or
representation, which is “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”, has been given to
an identifiable defined person […] by a public authority for its own purposes, either in return for action
by the person […] or on the basis of which the person or group has acted to its detriment, the court will
require it to be honoured, unless the authority is able to show good reasons, judged by the court to be
proportionate, to resile from it […]’). See also cases discussed at para E7.81.
For the separate and distinct private law doctrine of estoppel by representation, see eg Feltham
et al, Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury Professional, 2017), p 15
(‘[…] where one person […] has made a representation of fact to another person […] by words or
by conduct, or (being under a duty to the representee to speak or act) by silence or inaction, with the
intention (actual or presumptive) and with the result of inducing the representee on the faith of such
representation to his relative detriment, the representor […] is estopped, as against the representee,
from making any averment substantially at variance with his former representation, save to the extent
that that the court mitigates that result to avoid injustice, and unless that estoppel would unjustifiably
subvert the policy of a rule of law’). For examples of the attempted use of this doctrine in the sports law
context, see eg Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226 (CA), per Lord Denning MR at 1231 (‘[…] there
is no need to go into the question of an estoppel. That would only arise if the admission of Taiwan [to
membership of the IAAF] were wrong. Even if it had been wrong, nevertheless there is a strong case
for saying that as everyone – except the People’s Republic of China – accepted them as a member for
22 years, it would be too late to say that their admission was not valid’) and also the selection cases
discussed at para B1.37, n 2 and in Chapter B2 (Selection).
However, the House of Lords noted that while there is an analogy between a private law estoppel
and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of
which may amount to an abuse of power, ‘[…] it is no more than an analogy because remedies against
public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority
exists to promote’. R (Reprotech) v East Sussex CC [2003] 1 WLR 348 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at
para 34. That is why it is not universally accepted that the doctrine of estoppel is a general principle
of law in the AEK Athens sense. See Russian Olympic Committe et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684,
para 125 (‘The parties disagreed as to whether or not the principle of estoppel applied as a matter of
the lex sportiva. The Panel did not find it necessary to decide this issue in this case, and expressly
declines to do so’).
6 Quoted in the final award, AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, at para 61.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid, para 62 (citations omitted).
9 Ibid, para 163.
B1.37 The AEK Athens award is therefore authority for the proposition that if an
SGB’s conduct gives rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of its stakeholders
that its regulations will not change for a given period, the SGB cannot then change
those regulations without giving the stakeholders sufficient notice and time to adapt
to the new requirements, if the absence of such notice and time would cause them
significant detriment.1 Other CAS panels have applied the principle to prevent
international SGBs changing Olympic qualification criteria after athletes had fixed
their training and competition schedules to meet them,2 and to prevent national SGBs
and national Olympic committees changing selection policies on which athletes had
relied. Another applied the principle to prevent UEFA applying new membership
criteria to an application for membership after it had led the applicant to believe it
would apply the old membership criteria to that application.3
1 See also DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 5 (‘[…] in order to terminate a common practice
[permitting an exception to a particular rule], similar principles apply as for the amendment of
rules and regulations; that therefore, for a change of rules to become binding upon the association’s
members it did not suffice that the competent (legislative) body within the association adopted the
amendments. In addition, for the new rules to take effect, the termination of the past practice had to be
properly communicated to the relevant stakeholder and the members of the association given a chance
to obtain knowledge of the contents of the new rules’) and para 6 (‘Taking into account that FIFA had
intended to enact a (new) practice without a period of transition, ie, instantaneous, and furthermore
amidst an ongoing – but to conclude in a few days – registration period and that FIFA required its
member associations to immediately advise and communicate with its affiliated clubs on this change,
the Sole Arbitrator found that the threshold for a proper communication of a change of rules or practice
had not to be set too low. In the case at hand the required threshold had not been met and therefore the
change of practice was not properly communicated to the Appellants who could therefore still rely on
the (longstanding) FIFA practice in their interpretation and understanding of the relevant rules’).
2 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.11 (‘[…] even if the Respondent had properly
and formally enacted a resolution adopting a new qualification system, the Panel is of the opinion
that an attempt to alter the Olympic qualification process with retrospective effect at such a
late stage – a few months before the Olympic Games – would violate the principle of procedural
fairness and the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium (the doctrine, recognized by Swiss
law, providing that where the conduct of one party has induced legitimate expectations in another
party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second
party)’) and para 6.17 (‘the Respondent might have legitimately changed the Olympic process for
Oceania, if it had done so prospectively and following its proper legislative procedures. […] [C]
rucial considerations of procedural fairness towards its members require international federations
to announce at a reasonably early stage the Olympic qualification process and not to alter it when
the national federations and their athletes have already started the sporting season leading to the
Olympic Games’) and para 6.31 (‘[…] had AIBA wished to adopt a provision clearly imposing
the one entry rule in all five continents, it should have enacted and publicized such provision at a
reasonably early stage and, at any rate, prior to the beginning of the sporting season leading to the
Olympic Games. If that had been the Respondent’s approach, the Panel would have had no hesitation
in rejecting Boxing Australia’s claim. However, the failure to properly and timeously adopt and
publicize the one entry rule compels the Panel to find that the Respondent is estopped from imposing
the one entry rule once the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games has started, in accordance
with the general principles of procedural fairness and venire contra factum proprium’); New Zealand
Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organising Committee, CAS OG 02/006, para 18 (‘In reaching its
decision, the Panel drew an analogy to the doctrine of “estoppel by representation”, a doctrine firmly
established in common law and known in other legal systems even though under a different heading
(eg reliance in good faith, venire contra factum proprium). This doctrine which the Panel applies as
a general principle of law (art. 17 of the CAS ad hoc Rules) is defined as: “An estoppel that arises
when one makes a statement or admission that induces another person to believe something and that
results in that person’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on the belief” (Blacks Law Dictionary,
7th ed 1999)’) and para 19 (‘By accepting the entries for the two athletes for both Slalom and Giant
Slalom, SLOC induced them to prepare and train for both disciplines for which they were properly
entered. To exclude them from competing in these two disciplines at this late stage would be unfair
and contrary to the above doctrine of estoppel’).
3 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 11. The panel highlighted the investment by the applicant
of ‘a considerable amount of time and resources in obtaining its admission as a UEFA member, relying
on the legitimate expectation that UEFA would not refuse its application without any justified reason’
(ibid, para 35). See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS 2014/A3776, par 284 (‘[…]
given FIFA’s special position, when a football association submits its membership application, it
acquires a legitimate expectation, based on the principles of good faith and procedural fairness, that
the international federation will apply, in the assessment of its candidature, the rules applicable at the
moment of the application and not any unknown and future criteria implemented by the international
federation at some point during the application process that would render the applicant ineligible for
membership’).
B1.38 This doctrine does not, however, bar an SGB from ever making required
changes to its regulations. Instead, the constraint is only temporary.1 Most SGBs
review and make amendments to the rule books at least once a year, in the close
season, and their stakeholders are aware of that and therefore have no legitimate
expectation that the regulations will not change unless and until that period has
passed and the regulations have been re-issued for the new season.2 If this process is
respected, then as long as the effective date for the new regulations gives stakeholders
enough time to comply with the new requirements without undue prejudice, there
is no legal basis to block the change. For example, the CAS panel in AEK Athens
noted that if UEFA had announced in the summer of 1998 that it would be bringing
in its prohibition on common ownership at the beginning of the 1999/2000 football

season, ‘no club could have later claimed to have legitimate expectations with
respect to the treatment of multi-club ownership’.3 Similarly, having ruled in August
1999 that the contested rule was valid and enforceable, the CAS panel held that it
could be implemented by UEFA starting from the 2000/01 season.4 Furthermore,
given that even legitimate expectations may be disappointed where it is necessary
and proportionate to do so in the public interest (ie, the interest of the sport as a
whole),5 in exceptional circumstances – such as the early curtailment of a season due
to a pandemic – where an SGB may be permitted to issue last-minute changes to its
regulations, even to the prejudice of some of its stakeholders, if the public interest
justification for those changes is particularly compelling.6
1 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 62 (‘UEFA’s procedural unfairness
concerning the timing of the new rule’s entry into force is of a transitory nature and, as a result, it is not
such as to render the Contested Rule unlawful on its merits with respect to all future football seasons.
The Claimants’ request to annul the Contested Rule on this procedural ground is thus rejected’).
2 Cf Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 151 (no legitimate expectation
that athletes of suspended federation would be permitted to compete in international competition
provided they underwent certain doping tests, because that rule stated it would only apply if and when
the national federation’s suspension was lifted).
3 AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 162.
4 Ibid, para 163.
6 In South Shields FC 1988 Ltd v The Football Association Ltd, FA Rule K arbitral panel decision dated
5 June 2020, after the Covid-19 pandemic led to the premature shut-down of the 201920 football season,
The FA’s Council decided to expunge the results obtained in the 2019/20 season in league competitions
below a certain level, and cancel promotion or relegation that season for those competitions. South
Shields was at the top of the table when the season was voided in this way and brought proceedings
against The FA for a declaration that the decision was invalid because it unlawfully deprived the club
of its accrued right to have the system of promotion and relegation apply as per the original rules
for the season 2019/20, meaning that it was entitled to be promoted to the next division for season
2020/21. The club argued that it had ‘an accrued contractual right to benefit from the NPL rules for
promotion to Step 2 as at the beginning of the 2019/20 seaon on the basis of which it participated
and performed in the NPL throughout that season’, and the express power given to The FA in the
rulebook to amend the competition rules did not extend so far as to permit the cancellation of promotion
and relegation in breach of that accrued right (para 83). The club relied on the presumption against
retroactivity articulated in Wilson (see fn 3 to para B1.36), but the arbitral panel said that Wilson simply
established that the key principle was one of fairness, and that amendments could be made to rules
even if they took away accrued rights (eg the right in Doyle v White City Stadium to receive £3,000 for
participating in a fight – see fn 2 to para B1.36) if the amendment was within the broad purposes of the
rules (para 89). The FA had to amend the 2019/20 rules to address the forced end to the season before
all of the fixtures had been completed. It could not do nothing; and each option open to it would to some
extent have defeated the expectations of clubs at the start of the season and involve some inevitablele
degree of unfairness (para 90). Therefore, while it had to exercise its amendment powers rationally, non-
capriciously, and otherwise in accordance with public law principles, provided it respected those limits
its decision could not be impugned on the basis that the outcome was unfair to certain clubs (para 93).
Meanwhile the broad amendment power in The FA’s rulebook meant that there was no clear and express
representation, and therefore no legitimate expectation, that if a club performed well enough on the field
it would be promoted at the end of the season, no matter what the intervening circumstances (para 97).
Rather, ‘the only legitimate expectation that any club could have had was that, if The FA exercised
its power to amend the Rules or Regulations, it would do so in accordance with the Rules’ (para 97).
And even if there had been such a clear and unambiguous representation (quod non), ‘the substantive
legitimate expectation argument would still fail […] because the unprecedented circumstances arising
out of the pandemic gave rise to a wider interest which overrode the legitimate expectation’ (para 98,
citing United Policyholders Group v AG of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR 3383 at 38 and 107
to 108): ‘As the governing body of football, The FA has a responsibility to consider and balance the
interests of the football community as a whole. This can involve making difficult decisions which will
please some and displease others. Taking such difficult decisions is one of the reasons why governing
bodies exist. The importance of such a balancing process is vividly demonstrated by the facts of this
case. If The FA had adopted the suspension option or the PPG [points per game] option, there would
presumably have been play offs in which some at least of the teams in Steps 3 to 7 would have been
unable to compete. That is because, as Mr Ambler explains, their player contracts commonly are for a
single playing season and do not extend over the summer period. If, contrary to our view, South Shields
had the alleged legitimate expectation, it was outweighed and overridden by the void option, which had
the merit of being workable and providing certainty and clarity’ (para 99).
The club’s estoppel argument also failed, because ‘the provisions relied on [in the rules] do not
give rise to the alleged representation. All of them were subject to the possibility that they might be
amended’ (para 103).
B1.39 Stopping an SGB from implementing new rules until all stakeholders
have had sufficient opportunity to adapt to them is one thing. What is much
more controversial is to stop an SGB from enforcing longstanding rules against
one stakeholder in particular, on the basis that it gave that stakeholder reason to
believe it would not enforce those rules against it. In such circumstances, issues of
unfairness to the individual stakeholder need to be weighed against the interests of
the sport as a whole in the uniform application and enforcement of the sport’s rules
of conduct,1 and therefore the hearing panel should be slow to find that the SGB is
estopped from enforcing its rules against the stakeholder in question.2 In the two
most often-cited cases on this point, however, there was no obvious consideration by
the hearing panel of the interests of the sport in proper enforcement of its rules, let
alone an appropriate weighing of those interests against the alleged unfairness to the
individual stakeholders in having the rules enforced against them in the particular
circumstances of those cases:
(a) In IAAF v USATF, the IAAF asked its US member federation, USA Track
& Field, to disclose decisions it had taken exonerating its athletes of doping
charges, so that the IAAF could consider whether to exercise its right of appeal
against those decisions.3 But when asked to identify the rule it was relying on to
require such disclosure, and when told that US law (and therefore the USATF
rules) prohibited such disclosure, the IAAF failed for a period of four years to
identify the provisions in its rules that required such disclosure (because it had
a mistaken understanding of its own rules) and did not challenge the USATF’s
assertion that US law prohibited such disclosure. When the IAAF finally
realised its mistake and brought proceedings against the USATF to enforce
the disclosure obligation, the CAS panel agreed that the IAAF anti-doping
rules did require such disclosure (and by that time the USATF had dropped its
argument that US law prohibited such disclosure), and therefore ruled that the
USATF was required to disclose any decisions exonerating athletes moving
forward. However, the CAS panel also held that by its previous conduct in
not disputing the USATF’s assertion that it was not required to disclose such
decisions to the IAAF, and in failing upon challenge to identify the IAAF rules
that required such disclosure, the IAAF had led the USATF to believe that
it could keep such decisions confidential, and so had induced the USATF to
promise the athletes concerned that the decisions exonerating them would be
kept confidential. Reneging on that commitment, the CAS panel said, would
frustrate the legitimate expectations of those athletes that ‘questions which
they thought were resolved should not now be re-opened’, which would lead
to ‘dramatic and undoubtedly painful consequences for the athletes in question
– no matter the eventual disposition of their cases – if disclosure were made
obligatory so long after the events in issue, and so long after they were led to
believe that their cases were closed’. Therefore, the CAS panel did not require
the USATF to disclose those previous exoneration decisions to the IAAF.4
This decision can be criticised on at least two grounds. First, the CAS panel
rejected the IAAF’s submission that there had to be there to be a positive, clear
and unequivocal representation to found a claim of legitimate expectation,5
saying instead (relying, purportedly, on the private law doctrine of estoppel
by conduct) that in appropriate circumstances silence and a failure to object
may ‘speak as loudly as any words’.6 Secondly, while clearly the Panel was
concerned about the prejudice that the exonerated US athletes would suffer by
having to face charges they had reasonably thought were dead, it appears to
have given no consideration whatsoever to the interests of the sport as a whole,
and in particular to the interests of the athletes who had competed against the
exonerated US athletes, in ensuring that the anti-doping rules were enforced
uniformly and consistently. At least in English law, even where the conduct of
a party has led to the second party relying on that conduct, or has given rise
to some form of legitimate expectation on the part of a second party, the first
party would be permitted to resile from its previous promise or practice as
long as it is not inequitable to do so,7 or (as it is put in the public law context)
‘where the authority is able to show good reason, judged by the court to be
proportionate, to resile from it’.8 Yet that possibility does not seem ever to have
been considered by the CAS panel in IAAF v USATF.
(b) In ATP v Ulihrach, the ATP charged a tennis player with an anti-doping rule
violation based on the presence of metabolites of a prohibited substance
(nandrolone) in his sample. He could not explain how the substance had got
into his system, and therefore the charge was upheld and he was banned for
two years.9 However, he applied to the hearing panel to reconsider the case
after evidence emerged that thirty other players had tested positive for the
same substance, the analytical evidence indicated that there may have been
a common source, all of the players had consumed or may have consumed
an electrolyte product that ATP trainers had handed out to players at ATP
tournaments, and the ATP had suspended distribution of the product pending
an investigation into its possible contamination. In such circumstances, the
ATP itself submitted that it was estopped from relying on the rule that made
players strictly liable for prohibited substances found in their systems. It noted
its investigation was ongoing but said out of fairness to the player it did not
want to delay the hearing panel’s reconsideration of the matter. The hearing
panel decided that this new evidence justified re-opening the proceedings, and
also justified an inference that the common source of the nandrolone found in
the samples was the electrolyte tablets handed out by the ATP trainers. Citing
IAAF v USATF, the hearing panel decided that:
‘the CAS lex sportif’ includes the legal principle of equitable estoppel, which ‘is
to be applied as a matter of fairness and good conscience to estoppe the person
whose conduct has brought the situation about from asserting their legal rights
against another party who may have been misled or affected by that conduct. […]
The estoppel precludes the ATP from enforcing its Rulebook and in particular Rule
C 3 where it states that “the Player’s lack of intent or lack of fault (is not) a defense
to a Doping Offense”. The estoppel has this effect because the ATP though its
trainers is by inference the likely source of the contaminated product. Therefore, the
estoppel precludes the ATP from enforcing its Anti-Doping Rule of strict liability.
Upon the application of the estoppel the burden would shift to the ATP [to prove]
that the apparent Doping Offense is not the result of the contaminated electrolyte
supplement product supplied by it’.
Since the ATP had no evidence to discharge that burden and rebut the
inference, the hearing panel decided to dismiss the charge, as the ATP itself
had requested.10 The hearing panel insisted that its decision should not be
taken as a qualification of, or an excuse for not complying with, the ATP’s
rules,11 but if the World Anti-Doping Code had been in place, and therefore
the ATP rules had given the ITF and WADA a right of appeal, those bodies
would surely have considered that the collective interest of the sport in
clean competition warranted exercising that right. Tellingly, when a similar
estoppel argument was run (on different facts) in a subsequent case, heard
after the World Anti-Doping Code had come into effect, a panel chaired
by the same arbitrator who had chaired the Ulihrach panel stated that the
application of the doctrine of estoppel in sports cases ‘ought to be restricted
to the most extreme and egregious circumstances’, and in particular that the
doctrine:
‘ought not to be brought into consideration merely to frustrate the application of

a comprehensive Code of harmonized rules that the WADA Code represents […].
Within that Code are rules and remedies dealing with the situation at hand that
are appropriate rules within which to work out a resolution of this dispute. The
very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and to preserve
its integrity by not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate
balancing of interests reflected in the achievement of an international agreement
to harmonise sport-doping rules in the Code. Therefore, for all of the foregoing
reasons the application of the doctrine of estoppel is rejected as a matter of
principle […]’).12
This ruling has been strongly endorsed in subsequent cases.13

1 Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 86 (‘the legitimate expectation of other participants, fans
and persons involved is that all participants will be bound by the same legal system’), and cases cited at
para B1.27. By way of analogy, the House of Lords has stated that ‘remedies against public authorities
[for breaching legitimate expectations] also have to take into account the interests of the general public
which the authority exists to promote’. R (Reprotech) v East Sussex CC [2003] 1 WLR 348, per Lord
Hoffman at para 34.
2 See eg Russian Weightlifting Federation (RWF) v International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), CAS
OG 16/09, para 7.7 (statement that IWF would not apply rule to ban RWF for three or more anti-
doping rule violations did not estop IWF from subsequently applying rule to ban RWF based on
different evidence of centrally dictated and managed doping program in which RWF was implicated).
Even in Football Association v Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December
2018, discussed at length at para B3.132 et seq., one of the very rare cases where a tribunal found that
a governing body’s practice of not charging team managers for particular misconduct gave rise to a
legitimate expectation that it would continue with this course, and so prevented it from charging the
defendant for such conduct, the tribunal specifically noted (at para 54): ‘Any outside body, such as the
Regulatory Commission or a Court, should think long and hard before deciding that a discretion has
been unfairly applied’.
3 For a discussion of the vital role that such right of appeal plays in ensuring harmonisation of
enforcement and sanctioning under the anti-doping rules, and in protecting against ‘home-town’
decisions, see para C16.3.
4 The USATF expressed its argument as one of estoppel, but the Panel held that the doctrine of legitimate
expectation was also relevant (citing AEK Athens and the selection cases referenced at para B2.76 et
seq, and noting that ‘underlying all these decisions lies the notion of “fairness”’). IAAF v USATF,
CAS 2002/O/401, para 68.
5 Which is an accurate statement, at least under English law: see para B1.36, n 3.
6 It held: ‘[…] the Panel is not persuaded that the “absolutist” approach advocated by the IAAF is
necessarily correct, particularly in the circumstances of this case. Statements or actions make take
a variety of forms and modes of expression, including inaction and omission. Moreover, silence or
omission may be equivocal in the circumstances of one case while providing positive evidence in
another’. IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 69. It noted that when explicitly asked, on several
occasions, to explain where the IAAF Rules required disclosure or to respond to the USATF’s own
contrary interpretation of those rules, the IAAF ‘refused to do so’, and when shown the USATF rules
precluding disclosure the IAAF ‘did nothing which would suggest that those Regulations violated
IAAF Rules’ (para 70). It concluded that this ‘is no mere omission […]. It is conduct which constitutes
a statement and which speaks as loudly as any words. By that statement, the IAAF led the USATF
to understand, in effect: we would like you to disclose the information we request; we believe it to
be desirable that you do so; but the Rules do not explicitly require such disclosure and we cannot
compel you to do as we ask; and we are unaware of any violation of IAAF Rule reflected in your
confidentiality regulation’ (para 72). However, under English law at least, silence or inaction may only
give rise to an estoppel if the silent party was under a duty to the other to speak or act: Feltham et al,
Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury, 2017), para 1.90 et seq.
7 Feltham et al, Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel, 5th Edn (Bloomsbury, 2017), para 1.85.
8 United Policyholders Group v A-G of Trinidad and Tobago [2016] 1 WLR 3383 (Privy Council),
para 12. See also Nadarajah v The Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] EWCA Civ
1363 (Laws LJ), para 68 (public authority’s promise or practice as to future conduct ‘[…] may only be
departed from, in circumstances where to do so is the public body’s legal duty, or is otherwise, to use
a now familiar vocabulary, a proportionate response […] having regard to a legitimate aim pursued by
the public body in the public interest’).
Under English law at least, one good reason might be the coming to light of new and material facts
that were not known when it was represented that a charge would not be brought. R v Abu Hamza
[2006] EWCA Crim 2918 at para 54, per Lord Phillips CJ (‘[…] it is not likely to constitute an abuse of
process to proceed with a prosecution unless (i) there has been an unequivocal representation by those
with the conduct of the investigation or prosecution of a case that the defendant will not be prosecuted
and (ii) that the defendant has acted on that representation to his detriment. Even then, if facts come to
light which were not known when the representation was made, these may justify proceeding with the
prosecution despite the representation’).
9 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 1 May 2003.
10 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, paras 26-28.
11 Ibid, para 31 (‘This is an exceptional case dealt with in accordance with fairness and good conscience
but not without regard to the responsibility of a player to know everything that is ingested’).
12 ATP v Perry, ATP Tour Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, paras 49 and 46
respectively.
13 Including in ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 95 (‘It is not
necessary to decide whether that very wide principle is consistent with English law, which by article 1.8
applies to these rules, or whether such a principle could be applied to WADA Code provisions, save in
the most exceptional circumstances. On the latter point this tribunal would agree with the comments in
ATP v Perry (ATP Tour Tribunal 2015) at paragraph 49’), appeal partially upheld on other, unrelated
grounds in Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643); UK Anti-Doping v X, confidential NADP Tribunal
decision dated 3 August 2017, para 98.
(f) The presumption against retroactivity (tempus regit actum)
B1.40 It is also important, when making changes to a regulatory regime, to be

clear when the new regulations come into effect, and to what extent (if any) they
are intended to apply to pending cases or to new cases that are based on facts
occurring before the effective date of the new regulations.1 There is a strong general
presumption,2 recognised in both common law and civil law systems, and displaced
only by the clearest contrary language, that new substantive rules should not be
applied retrospectively to matters occurring before they came into effect, to make
acts unlawful that were lawful when done.3 The same presumption (which some view
as an example of the application of the principle of legal certainty) is also well-
established in CAS jurisprudence: ‘The Panel confirms the principle that “tempus
regit actum”: in order to determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule
infringement, it has to be evaluated on the basis of the law in force at the time it was
committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that
occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’.4 By the same token,
the presumption is that the sanctions applicable for an offence are those that were in
place at the time the offence was committed, not any more stringent sanctions that
were introduced after the offence occurred.5
1 In addition, the SGB should consider whether transitional provisions are required to facilitate the
change from one regime to another, and in particular to cater for those who were complying with the
previous requirements and would be unfairly prejudiced by now having to comply with a different set of
requirements. See eg 57/72 Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker [1973] ECR. 321,
paras 19–20 (not unlawful for European Commission to issue new regulations coming into immediate
effect without any transitional provisions, because on the facts no harm would result to the legitimate
interests of parties who had diligently protected their rights under the old regulations). In Bedene &
LTA v ITF, the ITF changed its eligibility rules for international competition by withdrawing a previous
provision allowing transfers of allegiance from one country to another after a three-year waiting period
in favour of a rule permitting no transfers after representing one country. A player brought a legal
challenge, accepting that the ITF was entitled to change its rules and to adopt a ‘one country only’ rule,
but arguing that doing so without including sufficient transitional provisions to cater for athletes who
had already taken irreversible steps to transfer allegiance amounted to a disproportionate and therefore
unlawful infringement of his TFEU free movement rights. The arbitrator rejected that argument on the
basis that the rule permitted exemptions in deserving cases, which could include cases where an athlete
was caught in the transition between the two different rules. (See para B1.35, n 4).
2 In the criminal context, it is not a mere presumption but a rule. See Art 7(1) of the European Convention
of Human Rights (‘No one shall be guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission
which did not constitute a crime under national or international law at the time when it was committed.
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence
was committed’). Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is to similar effect.
3 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Nicholls at 831
(‘[…] the presumption against retrospective operation and the similar but rather narrower presumption
against interference with vested interests may be summed up by the dictum that Parliament is presumed
not to have intended to alter the law applicable to past events and transactions in a manner which is
unfair to those concerned in them, unless a contrary intention appears. […] [T]he greater the unfairness,
the more it is to be expected that Parliament will make it clear if that is intended’) and Lord Hope at
851 (referring to the ‘general presumption that legislation is not intended to operate retrospectively.
That presumption is based on concepts of fairness and legal certainty. These concepts require that
accrued rights and the legal effect of past acts should not be altered by subsequent legislation’); Lauri
v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402, per Lindley LJ at 421–22 (‘It is a fundamental rule of English law that no
statute shall be construed as to have a retrospective operation unless its language is such as plainly
to require such a construction; and the same rule involves another and subordinate rule to the effect
that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language
renders necessary’); Walker v UKA & IAAF, (QBD) 7 July 2000 (Toulson J), 25 July 2000 (Hallett J)
(IAAF not permitted to apply retrospectively a new rule providing for the provisional suspension of an
athlete pending appeal by the IAAF against a decision of a domestic panel exonerating him of doping
charges). See also Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 95 (‘The prohibition against retroactivity
is a fundamental principle of Swiss law and forms part of international public policy (ordre public)’);
Mavromati and Reeb, The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and
Materials (Wolters Kluwer, 2015), p 556, para 134 (‘A CAS panel may rule in equity by applying,
eg, the general principle of prohibition of issuing rules with retrospective effect (a priori applicable to
state courts). This rule is mutatis mutandis applicable to a sports federation such as FIFA, since such
prohibition is an expression of a general legal principle not limited to the state legislator’); Russian
Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 146 (‘retroactive criteria in general are to
be avoided as unfair and contrary to fundamental notions of due process and good sportsmanship’).
4 CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 51. See eg Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 119 (‘[…]
according to well-established CAS jurisprudence, intertemporal issues are governed by the general
principle tempus regit actum or principle of non-retroactivity, which holds that (i) any determination
of what constitutes a sanctionable rule violation and what sanctions can be imposed in consequence
must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the allegedly sanctionable
conduct, (ii) new rules and regulations do not apply retrospectively to facts [that] occurred before their
entry into force, (iii) any procedural rule applies immediately upon its entry into force and governs any
subsequent procedural act, even in proceeding related to facts [that] occurred beforehand, and (iv) any
new substantive rule in force at the time of the proceedings does not apply to conduct occurring prior
to the issuance of that rule unless the principle of lex mitior makes it necessary’) (citations omitted);
Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, para 8.38 (‘The prohibition of the retroactive application
of laws to facts which occurred before the introduction of those laws is a well-established principle in
Swiss law. CAS jurisprudence consistently recognises the principle that the law in force at the time the
act under scrutiny was committed is the law that must be applied’); WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian
et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 133 (‘[…] in order to determine whether an
act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, the Panel applies the law in force at the time the
act was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred
prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’); WADA v Hardy & USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870,
para 16 (same). See also RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, paras 151-52 (‘As to which edition of the
FIFA RSTP is applicable to this matter, the Panel notes that various breaches took place at different
periods between 2005 and 2012 during which periods various editions of the FIFA RSTP were in
force. Therefore, when mentioning the FIFA RSTP, the Panel shall by implication be referring to the
FIFA RSTP edition which was then in force vis-à-vis the specific facts or issues under consideration’).
5 Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 10 (‘[…] any determination of […] what sanctions can
be imposed must be done in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the allegedly sanctionable
conduct’); IAAF v ARAF and Yegorova and others, CAS 2008/A/1718, para 218 (rejecting IAAF’s
request for an increased sanction on the ground that the rules in force at the relevant time did not
provide for aggravated sanctions). See also IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras
76–77 (where anti-doping rule violation is committed over a long period, during which the rules were
changed to increase the sanction for that violation, the lesser sanction provided for in the original rules
should be applied); IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, paras 167–168 (same).
B1.41 For example, in Riis Cycling AS v UCI, the CAS held that the UCI’s 2012
‘Neutralisation Rule’ (providing that where a cyclist has received a doping ban of two
years of more, the results he obtains in the two years after he returns from the ban
may not be counted for purposes of determining whether a cycling team has sufficient
‘sporting value’ to be granted a World Tour licence) operated as an additional sanction
for doping and therefore was not compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code and
so was void and unenforceable.1 However the CAS panel also felt compelled to note,
obiter:
‘[its] very strong doubts as to the compatibility of the retroactive effect of the
Neutralisation Rule with Swiss law and with general principles of sports law. The
prohibition of the retroactive application of laws to facts which occurred before
the introduction of those laws is a well-established principle in Swiss law. CAS
jurisprudence consistently recognises the principle that the law in force at the time
the act under scrutiny was committed is the law that must be applied. […] The
fact that the Neutralisation Rule was automatically triggered by a doping violation
which occurred before the rule was introduced raises serious questions concerning
retroactivity’.2
2 Riis Cycling A/S v UCI, CAS 2012/A/3055, paras 8.38–8.39. See also International Olympic
Committee, CAS 2009/C/1824, para 7.3.6 (finding that a new IOC rule rendering anyone found to
have committed an anti-doping rule violation ineligible for the next Olympic Games could only be
applied to violations committed after the rule was promulgated, to avoid infringing ECHR, Art 7).
B1.42 The presumption against retroactivity applies to all of an SGB’s substantive

rules, not just its disciplinary code. In Gibraltar FA v UEFA, the Gibraltar Football
Association (GFA) applied for membership of UEFA. The UEFA Statutes in force at
the time stated that ‘membership of UEFA is open to national football associations
situated in the continent of Europe which are responsible for the organisation and
implementation of football in their particular territory’. A UEFA panel confirmed
that the GFA met that requirement, but (referring to the dispute between the UK and
Spain over Gibraltar’s sovereignty) recommended that UEFA’s membership criteria
be amended ‘to avoid similar problems in the future’ by restricting membership of
UEFA to a country that is ‘an independent state admitted to membership in the United
Nations’. UEFA changed its membership rules to implement that recommendation,
but also decided to apply the amended criterion to the GFA’s pre-existing application.
In effect, UEFA had changed the substantive conditions that an applicant had to meet
in order to become a member from a condition that the GFA could meet to one that
it could not. On appeal by the GFA, the CAS ordered UEFA to determine the GFA’s
application for membership in accordance with the UEFA Statutes in force at the
time the GFA had made that application, on the basis that retrospective application of
substantive rules changes was impermissible.1
1 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 10, citing S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, paras 72–73.
See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA, CAS 2014/A3776, para 281 (‘FIFA cannot apply
membership criteria which entered into force in 2014 retroactively to reject an application filed back
in 1997 (and never abandoned since then), as doing so would violate the general principles of non-
retroactivity of rules, and, especially in light of the circumstances, the general principles of procedural
fairness and good faith’).
B1.43 On the other hand, it is not a breach of the presumption against retroactivity
for an SGB’s regulations to provide that an act committed before the regulations
came into force disqualifies someone from holding a particular position with the
SGB moving forward.1 Nor is it a breach of the presumption against retroactivity
to increase the sanction for a second offence where the first offence was committed
prior to the rule change.2
1 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Hope at 851
(‘But the mere fact that a statute depends for its application in the future on events that have happened
in the past does not offend against the presumption. For a recent example […] the marking of a
disqualification order under section 28 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 against
a defendant from working with children in the future did not offend against the presumption where
the offending behaviour had occurred before that Act came into force’); Waddington v Miah [1974]
1 WLR 683 (HL), per Lord Reid at 695 (‘I use retrospective in the sense of authorising people being
punished for what they did before the Act came into force. But there is nothing to prevent Parliament
from authorising discrimination in the future between various classes of people and one ground of
discrimination could be that if certain people have done a certain thing in the past or had a certain
ancestry they shall be treated differently in the future from those who have not done that thing or
had a different ancestry’); Antonelli v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1998] QB 948 (CA),
per Beldam LJ at 958 (‘The provisions giving the Director power to disqualify are intended for the
protection of the public and it would be quixotic to suppose that Parliament intended that the public
should be protected from the activities of a practitioner convicted a week after the Act came into force
but not from those of a practitioner convicted a week before’). For example, an SGB may adopt a
regulation saying that no one may be an owner or director of a member club if they have previously
been convicted of a criminal offence of a certain gravity, as in The Football League’s ‘Owners’ and
Directors’ Test’ (discussed further at para B5.12).
2 In ITF v Puerta, the athlete had committed a doping offence under a set of rules that pre-dated the
World Anti-Doping Code, and those rules provided that a second offence would attract a ban of one
year. But the ITF then adopted Code-compliant anti-doping rules that provided that the ban for a
second doping offence would be eight years to life. When the athlete duly committed a second offence,
he argued that to give him such a ban would be to give the new rule retroactive effect, by making his
first offence a trigger not for a ban of one year but instead for a ban of eight years to life. The hearing
panel did not accept that argument, preferring instead the ITF’s submission that there is no retroactive
effect where the consequences of the first offence are not altered, only the consequences of the second
offence are altered, and that alteration is made before (not after) the second offence is committed, so
that the athlete is on notice before he commits his second offence of what the (new) consequences of
what a second offence would be. In short, there was nothing unfair about provisions that prospectively
(not retroactively) make the regime stricter than before. ITF v Puerta, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision
dated 21 December 2005, paras 79(3) and 81, affirmed in Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, section
11.6 (noting also that the first offence was an offence under both sets of rules). See also McTier v
Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWHC 212 (Admin) 75 (Kerr J), para 75 (noting that where
the question was whether conduct that occurred before a list of disqualifying conditions was issued
was covered by the list, ‘[…] the form of retroactivity contended for is not the strong form where
vested or accrued rights are retrospectively taken away; but a weak form involving only the application
of an adjusted sanctions regime to conduct of the type which, in a broad sense, was already the subject
of a similar though narrower sanctions regime at the time of the conduct complained of’).
B1.44 The CAS jurisprudence also reveals three further instances where the
presumption against retroactivity does not apply:
(1) Rules relating to procedural matters ‘In the absence of an express provision
to the contrary, laws and rules relating to procedural matters apply immediately
upon entering into force regardless of when the facts at issue occurred’.1 This
exception has been interpreted broadly, to include (for example) not only
new provisions changing the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings,2
but also evidentiary matters, specifically new evidentiary methods of proving
pre-existing disciplinary offences.3 CAS panels have also applied without
objection Article 25.2 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which states that
the new ten-year statute of limitations introduced in Article 17 of that Code is
a procedural rule that ‘should be applied retroactively’ to claims arising under
the 2003 or 2009 versions of the Code, as long as the previous (eight-year)
statute of limitations period applicable to such claims had not already expired
when the 2015 Code came into effect.4 In Gibraltar FA v UEFA, however,
the CAS noted (albeit obiter) that even purely procedural amendments may
not be applied retrospectively if doing so would be unfair or in bad faith. The
CAS panel decided that the change made in that case to UEFA’s membership
rules (discussed at para B1.42) was one of substance, not one of procedure.
However, the CAS panel also found that even if the amendment had been one
of procedure, to allow UEFA to rely on the amended membership criterion
would ‘entail a violation of general principles of law which are widely
recognised, particularly the principles of fairness and of good faith’, because
(inter alia) ‘one of the main purposes for the amendment proposal made by
the UEFA Executive Committee was to prevent the GFA’s application from
succeeding’.5
(2) Rules filling gaps In India Hockey Federation (IHF) v FIH and Hockey India,
the CAS held that if there is a gap in the rules that needs to be filled to make the
rules workable, then a rule change filling the gap may be applied retrospectively
to cases pending before the rule change, as long as doing so entails no unfairness
or bad faith or arbitrariness. The IHF and Hockey India were in dispute as to
which of them should be recognised as the IHF’s member national federation
for hockey in India, but the FIH Statutes contained no mechanism for deciding
between such competing claims. The FIH therefore amended its Statutes to
add such a mechanism, but when the IHF lost out under the new rule it went to
CAS, asserting that the presumption against retroactive application of rules and
the same ‘general principles of fairness and of good faith’ that the CAS panel
had identified in Gibraltar prevented the FIH applying the new mechanism to
the IHF’s previously-filed claim to membership of the FIH, because (the IHF
alleged) the new mechanism had been designed to frustrate its claim and to
prefer the competing claim of Hockey India. The CAS panel ruled that
‘the salient principles to be derived from Gibraltar are as follows: (i) Generally,
“laws and rules relating to procedural matters apply immediately upon entering
into force and regardless of when the facts occurred (paragraph 8); (ii) “On the
other hand, it is a general principle that laws, regulations and rules of a substantive
nature that were in force at the time when the facts occurred must be applied.”
(paragraph 8); (iii) Even a procedural rule should not be applied retrospectively
where “its application would entail […] a violation of general principles of fairness
and good faith” (paragraph 11)’.6
The CAS panel accepted that the new FIH mechanism was substantive, not
procedural, but also noted that it was needed to fill a gap in the existing rules
(because there was previously no mechanism for resolving competing claims
to membership), and that it was neutral as between the parties to the pending
dispute, ie it did not favour one over the other. The CAS panel therefore ruled
that it was not unfair or in bad faith to apply the new mechanism to pending
claims.7 That must be right, because otherwise an SGB would never be able to
change its membership criteria to add new requirements.
(3) Rule changes that favour the subject of the regulation (lex mitior) If a
member or athlete commits misconduct but the sanction set out in the rules
for that misconduct is reduced before the case gets to a hearing, the member or
athlete is entitled to the benefit of the new, more lenient rule. According to the
CAS, this doctrine of lex mitior is:
‘a fundamental principle of law applicable and accepted by most legal regimes and
which applies by analogy to anti-doping regulations in view of the quasi penal or
at the very least disciplinary nature of the penalties that they allow to be imposed’.8
‘The lex mitior […] not only entitles but obliges the Panel to apply the law as it
stands at the time of determination, where more favourable to the Appellants, just as
the presumption of retroactivity obliges it to apply the law as it stood at the time of
the offence, where more favourable to them’.9
‘By virtue of this principle, the body responsible for setting the punishment must
enable the athlete convicted of doping to benefit from the new provisions, assumed
to be less severe, even when the events in question occurred before they came
into force. This must be true, in the Panel’s opinion, not only when the penalty
has not yet been pronounced or appealed, but also when a penalty has become res
judicata, provided that it has not yet been fully executed. The Panel considers that
[…] the new provisions must also apply to events which have occurred before they
came into force if they lead to a more favourable result of the athlete. Except in
cases where the penalty pronounced is entirely executed, the penalty imposed is,
depending on the case, either expunged or replaced by the penalty provided by the
new provisions’.10
For example, in Strahya v FINA, after the athlete had provided a sample
that was found to have a prohibited substance present in it, but before the
hearing on the resulting doping charge, FINA adopted new anti-doping rules
implementing the World Anti-Doping Code, including a two year ban for a first
doping offence, which was shorter than the ban that would have applied under
the FINA doping rules in force when the athlete provided the sample. Applying
the doctrine of lex mitior, the CAS panel imposed only a two-year ban for his
offence.11 In DFSNZ v Gemmell, however, a CAS panel identified two limits to
the lex mitior doctrine:
(i) ‘the principle applies to sanctions and not to the elements of [the]
violation’, and therefore the athlete is not entitled to the benefit of a
subsequently adopted rule that changes the elements of an offence in a
way that means what he did would no longer amount to an offence (eg by
saying that he must have committed three whereabouts failures in just 12
months, rather than in 18 months);12 and
(ii) the new, more lenient, sanctions regime must be in force by the time of
the hearing, ie, rule changes not yet in effect cannot be anticipated.13
The CAS panel in IAAF v QAF & Balla agreed that the doctrine applies only
to sanctions, and therefore ruled that it does not apply to a new rule changing
the deadline for appeal:
‘the principle of lex mitior enables retroactive application of provisions insofar as
“penalties” or “sanctions” are concerned, if the new law is more favourable than the
provisions applicable under the principle tempus regit actum. The underlying idea
is that it makes little sense to sanction the party concerned according to out-dated
provisions, if the unanimous view now holds that the act in question carries a milder
sanction. 153. The Panel finds that the principle of lex mitior cannot be applied to
deadlines for appeal. Deadlines as such cannot be qualified as “milder” or “stricter”,
because the effects of such deadlines will always depend on who is the appellant
and what the contents of the appealed decision is. Deadlines for appeal by their very
nature are very different from “sanctions”. They apply irrespectively of whether or
not the person entitled to appeal has acted with or without fault nor do they – unlike
sanctions – express a disapproval of a party’s behaviour or infringe on his or her
personality rights. The deadline of appeal is – at the end of the day – a procedural
issue that is first and foremost dictated by considerations of appropriateness and/or
practicability as well principles such as legal certainty and foreseeability that cannot
be categorized as “more” or “less” favourable’.14
The CAS panel in Millar v BCF identified a further limit to the doctrine,
which is that it may be displaced by expressly providing that the new rules
are not intended to apply retrospectively to matters pending before they came
into effect.15 Finally, in IAAF v Kirdyapkin the IAAF argued that an athlete
could not cherry-pick but had to accept that only one set of rules applied,
and therefore if he wished the IAAF’s 2015 anti-doping rules to apply rather
than the IAAF’s 2009 anti-doping rules (because the 2015 rules included the
‘fairness’ exception to disqualification of subsequent results16), he also had
to accept that the ban for his ADRV had to be four years (as the 2015 rules
provided) not two years (as the 2009 rules provided). The CAS panel said
it ‘saw the force’ in that argument, but in the end decided the issue on other
grounds and therefore did not have to rule on the point.17
1 S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, paras 72-73. See also Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 92
(‘pursuant to the legal principle of tempus regit actum or non-retroactivity, the Panel is satisfied
that procedural matters are governed by the regulations in force at the time of the procedural act
in question’); CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, paras 80-81; S v FIG, 2001/A/340, para 14 (‘according to a
principle generally accepted in case-law and supported by legal opinion, new procedural rules apply
to all cases pending when they enter into force’). This distinction also applies in English law. See Bell
& Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 189; Lowe & Potter,
Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018),
para 4.52.
2 Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 133 (relying on ‘CAS jurisprudence to the
consistent effect that, pursuant to the legal principle of tempus regit actum, procedural matters are
governed by the rules in force at the time of the procedural act in question. Therefore, given that
burden of proof is a procedural principle, the Panel must apply in the present proceedings the rule
on burden of proof set out in Article 52 FCE (2012 edition)’) (citations omitted); Gnidenko v IOC,
2016/A/4803, para 94 (whereas the general rule is that the IOC bears the burden of proving an ADRV,
‘The 2015 WADC and, in particular, Article 3.2.1 [putting the burden on the athlete to prove a testing
procedure used was not scientifically valid], were the procedural rules existing at the time each of
the proceedings, giving rise to these appeals, was commenced. Accordingly, as accepted by the
Appellants, the Panel is of the view that the Appellants bear the burden of proving that the testing
procedures adopted by the Lausanne and Cologne laboratories were not scientifically valid’).
3 Petchstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 109 (‘The Panel would have no hesitation in
holding that new scientifically sound evidentiary methods, even not specifically mentioned in anti-
doping rules, can be used at any time to investigate and discover past anti-doping rule violations that
went undetected, with the only constraint deriving from the eight-year time limitation and the timely
initiation of disciplinary proceedings. As long as the substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as
doping is in force prior to the conduct, the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a
case of retrospective application of the law’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.5
(same); Caucchioli v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2178, para 33 (‘This Panel considers that the ABP
has not introduced a new prohibition, but represents only a new method of screening for blood doping,
which was already prohibited by other rules. New scientific methods, even if the anti-doping rules do
not mention them expressly, may be used to prove past violations, with the only limitations being the
term of use of the samples for anti-doping purposes (set at eight years) and the start of disciplinary
proceedings within the required deadline. [34.] Therefore, the use of new methods does not constitute
a case of retroactive application of rules, as long as the rules sanctioning conduct as an act of doping
were in effect prior to this conduct. Otherwise, we would not be able to take advantage of technological
advances to discover doping acts that went unnoticed due to the limitations of previous methods’),
citing E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10 (‘It simply cannot be the intent that this rule would
allow an accused to afford itself of the more favourable science. Applying such an argument to a
criminal case would be tantamount to requiring the court to find an accused innocent of a crime, even
if the DNA proves the accused is the culprit simply because the crime was committed prior to the
availability of DNA testing. This Panel finds that this simply cannot be the case’); WADA v Lallukka,
CAS 2014/A/3488, paras 113-114 (research paper and guidelines that post-dated alleged ADRV were
not rules but evidence relied upon by WADA to support ADRV finding, and therefore ‘the rule against
retroactivity’ did not prevent such reliance); Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 112 (2015
Code provision that an ADRV may be proved by analysis of B sample split into two bottles is an
evidentiary rule and therefore not a substantive rule that may not be applied retroactively).
4 IAAF v RusAF and Pyatykh, CAS 2017/O/5039, para 76 (eight-year limitations period on claim
against athlete had not expired as of 1 January 2015 and therefore it became subject to the new ten-
year limitations period); IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675, para 60 (same); Andrianova
v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 50 (claim dismissed because eight year statute of limitations had
already expired before 2015 Code came into effect).
5 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 16-17. See also Gibraltar Football Association v FIFA,
CAS 2014/A3776. See also Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 46 (‘The 2015 ADR qualify
the rule pertaining to the statute of limitation as a “procedural rule”. However, it does not necessarily
follow from this qualification that there are no limits to a retroactive application of such rule. Instead,
it follows from Art 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (the “ECHR”) that the procedure must be “fair”’).
6 Indian Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 137.
7 Ibid, para 154 (‘If the principles of fairness and good faith (among others) are not breached, if (by
way of example) no issue of legitimate expectation arises (as it did in Gibraltar), if the decision in
issue does not appear to have been made arbitrarily, then there are no grounds on which to infringe
upon an association’s right to autonomy. As Hockey India said, there was in this case no substantive
unfairness’).
8 Volandri v ITF, CAS 2009/A/1782, para 50; UCI and CONI, CAS 94/128, para 33 (in French,
English translation as quoted in CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 52) (‘The principle whereby a criminal
law applies as soon as it comes into force if it is more favourable to the accused ie, lex mitior, is a
fundamental principle of any democratic regime. It is established, for example by Swiss law (art 2,
para 2 of the Penal Code) and by Italian law (art 2 of the Penal Code). This principle applies to anti-
doping proceedings in view of the penal or at the very least disciplinary nature of the penalties they
allow to be imposed’). As it happens, the doctrine is ‘a creature unknown to English law’ (Beloff et
al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 13), but that has not prevented its application in CAS cases,
even by CAS panels made up of lawyers from common law jurisdictions, and nor has it prevented
its application by English domestic hearing panels, at least when applying globally applicable rules.
See eg BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of
change in 2009 version of World Anti-Doping Code that made the sanction for a second violation eight
years to life rather than a blanket life ban).
9 Meca-Medina v FINA, CAS 99/A/234, para 3.5.
10 UCI and CONI, CAS 94/128, para 33 (in French, English translation provided in CONI,
CAS 2005/C/841, para 52). See also WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and
CAS 2009/A/1844, para 134 (‘the new provisions must also apply to events which have occurred
before they came into force if they lead to a more favourable result for the athlete’); WADA v Hardy
& USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16 (‘This Panel, however, has the power, according to the “lex
mitior” principle, to apply those rules subsequently entered into force which are more favourable to
the athlete’); FINA & WADA v Tagliaferri, CAS 2008/A/1471 & CAS 2008/A/1486, para 9.6.1 (‘[…]
because of the principle of lex mitior […] the rule that is more favourable to the First Respondent
can be resorted to, even if it was not in force at the time the offence was committed’); V v Swiss
Cycling, CAS 2001/A/318, para 29, p 191 (CAS ‘always’ applies the lex mitior doctrine); V v FINA,
CAS 2003/A/493, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), pp 17, 23 (following
doctrine of lex mitior by applying two-year sanction based on new Code-compliant rules rather than
four-year sanction under rules in place when case was commenced); Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149,
para 27 (‘The doctrine of lex mitior, ie, that which permits a disciplinary tribunal to apply current
sanctions to the case before it, if sanctions are less severe than those which existed at the time of the
offence, is applicable in this case’).
The lex mitior doctrine became particularly important in the anti-doping sphere after 1 January
2009, when a series of amendments to the original (2004) World Anti-Doping Code came into effect.
Article 25.2 of the 2009 Code provided that a case ‘shall be governed by the substantive anti-doping
rules in effect at the time of the alleged anti-doping rule violation occurred unless the panel hearing
the case determines the principle of “lex mitior” applies under the circumstances of the case’. See
eg BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of 2009
Code change that made the sanction for a second violation eight years to life rather than a blanket life
ban). See also the various cases where a substance on the Prohibited List that was found in the athlete’s
sample has been subsequently re-classified as a ‘Specified Substance’, thereby triggering greater
discretion to mitigate sanction under the World Anti-Doping Code: Foggo v National Rugby League,
CAS A2/2011, para 44 (‘[…] the power to ameliorate the sanction only came about subsequent to the
time of the anti-doping rule violation when WADA relocated the drug from paragraph S6.a to S6.b
[making it a ‘Specified Substance’]. Thus, the doctrine of lex mitior applies. That doctrine permits a
disciplinary tribunal to apply current sanctions to the case before it if those sanctions are less severe
than those which existed at the time of the offence’); USADA v Brunemann, AAA Panel decision
dated 26 January 2009, para 10.3 (holding that substance should be considered a Specified Substance,
as it had been re-classified as of 1 January 2009, even though the sample in which it was found was
collected in 2008, and therefore the broader mitigation powers available under Code Art 10.4 should
apply, save that the maximum ban should not be two years, as 2009 Code Article 10.4 provided, but
the one year that the 2003 Code equivalent [Article 10.3] provided); SARU v Ralepelle and Basson,
SARU Judicial Committee decision dated 25 January 2011, para 10 (MHA found in sample collected
in November 2010 treated as Specified Substance, due to reclassification to this effect in 2011
Prohibited List); UK Anti-Doping v Duckworth, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 January
2011 (giving athlete benefit of 2011 reclassification of MHA as a Specified Substance by imposing a
six-month ban under Art 10.4).
11 Strahya v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, para 6.
12 DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, paras 103, 109 (‘The civil law basis of the principle applies to
criminal sanctions only’), para 112 (‘this Panel is of the view that it [the lex mitior doctrine] applies
to sanctions only and not to the elements of the violation. This view is based on the origin of the lex
mitior principle, namely a rule to allow a criminal to be sentenced under a more lenient regime […]
and is reinforced by the manner in which the Court of Arbitration for Sport has applied the principle’)
and para 119 (‘in this Panel’s view, it is appropriate that the principle only applies to sanctions, as there
is a need to protect the principles of the level playing field. It is inappropriate to apply what would
in effect be a modified lex mitior principle’). Cf Mayer et al v IOC, CAS 2002/A/389-393, para 73
(where the 2002 Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code banned any administration of blood to an
athlete, and the 2003 Code created an exception for administration of blood for legitimate medical
treatment, the CAS panel was prepared to apply the 2003 definition to the respondents’ 2002 acts,
‘relying on the lex mitior principle as applied by analogy eg, in TAS 96/156, F. c/FINA’); IBU v
Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 148 (lex mitior is ‘a general principle of law
related to sanctions of whatever kind and applies not only to sanctions, as the IBU contends, but also
to the elements constitutive of an ADRV’). It appears that the Mayer and Ussanova decisions were not
brought to the attention of the Gemmell panel. On the other hand, it does not appear from the Mayer
award that the issue of whether lex mitior principle applied only to sanctions was put to or considered
by the Mayer panel, and the precedent cited by the Mayer panel (Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156) involved
use of the lex mitior principle to give the athlete the benefit of a change in sanctions provisions, not a
change in the definition of an offence. Meanwhile, the Ussanova panel did not provide any authority
or reasoning for its ruling.
13 DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, paras 109 (lex mitior principle ‘cannot apply if the new sanction is
not in force at the date the sanction is imposed’). See also FINA v Mellouli & FTN, CAS 2007/A/1252,
paras 75–76 (‘To be sure, the Panel does not ignore the debate surrounding the introduction of
amphetamine into the list as part of the revision project of WADA. In any case the current list has
to be applied which excludes amphetamine as a specified substance’); Kambala and WADA v FIBA,
FIBA Appeals Tribunal award dated 23 August 2007, p 11, where the tribunal declined the athlete’s
request that it anticipate that cocaine would be re-classified as a Specified Substance (‘according to the
law at present, cocaine is not to be classified as such a substance. Whether this will change in future is
uncertain and is of no relevance to the present decision; for the Single Arbitrator must – in principle
– decide the case in accordance with the rules and regulation in force at the time the offence was
committed. […] There is likewise no scope for applying the principle of lex mitior in the present case;
for said principle requires that conflicting rules are or were in force. However, this is not the case’);
UK Anti-Doping v Watt, NADP Tribunal decision dated 6 November 2014, para 38 (‘Finally, we note
that under the 2015 WADA Code not yet in force Mr Watt’s case would attract a 4 year sanction: see
Article 10.7.1(c). There is no room for some anticipatory lex mitior here’); ATP v Rodriguez, ATP Tour
Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated September 2003, para 58 (‘[…] the principle [of lex mitior]
can not be applied when the existence or the non-inclusion of caffeine on the restricted list of the
forthcoming Prohibited List of WADA has not yet been confirmed and would in any event take effect
only from January of 2004 and not at the time of writing this decision’). Cf CONI & WADA v Petacchi
& FCI, CAS 2007/A/1362 & 1393, para 56 (panel took into account the 2009 WADA Code (which
was not due to come into force for some nine months after the hearing) when determining the ‘just and
proportionate’ sanction: ‘In the light of the specific circumstances of the case the Panel has concluded
that it would be just and proportionate to reduce the period of ineligibility to one year. In doing so the
Panel has taken into account that the amended [WADA Code], which the International Federations will
have to implement by 1 January 2009, would qualify Salbutamol as a “specified substance” and would
allow for the sanction to be reduced down to a reprimand (with no period of ineligibility). Even though
the new WADC is not yet in force, the Panel takes the view that it is both equitable and fair, and in
compliance with Article 255 of the ADR, to take these matters into consideration when exercising the
discretion given to it by Art 275 of the ADR’).
14 IAAF v QAF & Balla, CAS 2018/A/5989, paras 152–153.
15 Millar v BCF, CAS 2004/A/707, para 39.
16 See para C23.6 et seq.
17 IAAF v ARAF, Sergey Kirdyapkin & RUSADA, CAS 2015/A/4005, para 115 (‘The Panel sees the force
of the IAAF argument that specific rules cannot be picked from different systems. The lex mitior
principle prevents the continued applicability of a disciplinary rule after it has been replaced by a more
lenient one, and reflects, in favour of the accused, the evolution of a legislative policy, which translates
into rules the opinion that the same infringement is less severe than it was previously perceived.
However, this principle cannot be applied in a way that creates a law that never existed, composed of
a mixture of old and new rules and upsetting the rationale of both systems’).
(f) The principle of good faith
B1.45 A regulation that was issued by an SGB in bad faith would fall foul of
several different legal principles; no stand-alone doctrine of ‘good faith’ would be
needed to overrule it.1 However, the CAS has been clear that an SGB is also required
to interpret2 and apply its regulations in good faith:
(a) As noted above, the CAS ruled in Gibraltar FA v UEFA that even if UEFA
was entitled as a matter of principle to amend its membership criteria to fix a
problem exposed by an application for membership, UEFA was not entitled to
apply the new criteria to deny that pre-existing application, because that would
‘entail a violation of general principles of law which are widely recognised,
particularly the principles of fairness and of good faith’.3
(b) Similarly, while the rulings in IAAF v USATF and ATP v Ulihrach that the SGB
could not ‘in good conscience’ enforce its anti-doping rules against a member/
athlete in circumstances where the SGB could be said to have caused the
member/athlete’s breach, or at least induced it to believe the rule would not be
enforced against it, were couched as applications of the doctrines of legitimate
expectation and/or estoppel,4 they might just as well have been couched as
applications of the principle of good faith.5
(c) A further possible example can be seen in Yerolimpos v World Karate
Federation, where the CAS considered (but rejected on the facts) an argument
that a disciplinary sanction imposed on the appellant for breach of the WKF’s
rules should be struck out because the motive for the bringing of the disciplinary
proceedings was improper, an ‘abus de droit’.6
1 See eg AEK Athens & Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 99/200, para 157 (‘The Panel, on the basis of
previous remarks, finds that UEFA did not adopt the Contested Rule with the purpose of protecting its
monopoly power over the organization of pan-European football competitions (see supra, paras. 110-
113 and 143), and finds that the Contested Rule is not arbitrary nor unreasonable (see supra, paras. 48
and 125-136). Therefore, with regard to the substantive content of the Contested Rule, the Panel holds
that UEFA did not abuse its regulatory power and did not violate any general principle of law’).
In Hellenic NOC and Kaklamanakis v ISAF, CAS OG/04/009, para 24, a CAS panel asserted that
‘CAS will always have jurisdiction to overrule the Rules of any sport federation if its decision making
bodies conduct themselves with a lack of good faith or not in accordance with due process. In this
regard both applicants have made submissions that there was a lack of due process. If such were found
to be the case the Rules of Sailing might well not be applied to this dispute (See CAS OG 00/013
para. 7 and 23; CAS OG 02/007 para 5; TAS 2003/A/490 para. 29; and CAS 2000/A/305 para. 5)’.
On close analysis, however, this does not appear to be an assertion of a jurisdiction to ‘overrule’ an
SGB’s regulations for lack of good faith, but rather a statement that if an SGB applies its regulations
in bad faith in a particular case, then the CAS can rule that application of the regulations unlawful. The
authorities cited in support of the proposition involve applications of the uncontroversial proposition
that decisions made by match officials on the field of play will not be reviewed absent proof of bad
faith or malice (as to which, see para D2.136 et seq). That is certainly true of Segura v IAAF (the first
case cited), KOC v ISU (the second case cited), and CPC v IPC (the fourth case cited). The award in
the third case cited does not appear to be publicly available, but it was cited (along with the other three
cases) in CNOSF et al v FEI, CAS OG 04/007, in support of the proposition that ‘a number of CAS
awards have made it clear that CAS does not review decisions taken or rulings made on the playing
field except in cases where bad faith or malice had been demonstrated or was otherwise involved (See
CAS OG 00/013 para 7 and 23; CAS OG 02/007 para 5; TAS 2003/A/490 para 29; CAS 2000/A/305
para 5)’.
3 Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, paras 16-17, discussed at para B1.44. See also Gibraltar
Football Association v FIFAI, CAS 2014/A3776
4 See para B1.39.
5 As in, for example, W v UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 17 (‘the Respondent therefore rightly
considered the April Sample to constitute a separate breach of the rules. Furthermore, the Respondent
was not estopped from doing so by the principle of good faith. As can be seen from the extensive
correspondence, contrary to the Appellant’s opinion, the Respondent at no time gave the Appellant
any reason to believe that it would not treat the April sample as a separate breach of the rules’). See
also Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), p 14 (‘Good faith: This is the universal principle
according to which all persons are bound by a duty to act in a loyal, frank and open manner. For
example, when one party acts or makes statements knowing that another party will act in reliance
on these statements or acts, the former is precluded from reversing its position at the latter’s expense
(venire contra factum proprium). In common law systems this would be characterised as estoppel’),
and p 16 (‘In administrative law in civil law jurisdictions, the good faith principle applies when an
administrative body gives assurances to an individual that certain future actions by that individual
are legal when in truth they may not be. If such assurances are given (and provided that the body in
question was empowered to decide such matters), no sanctions can be imposed upon the individual
acting illegally in reliance on these assurances. Another application of the good faith principle (which
flows from the principle venire contra factum proprium, “no one may set himself in contradiction to
his own previous conduct”) is that a party may not create an ambiguous situation, for example by
making conflicting or unclear statements, and then take advantage of the ambiguity which it has itself
brought about […]’).
6 Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 99. See Beloff et al, Sports Law (Hart
Publishing, 2012), p 14 (‘Finally, the good faith principle precludes a party from availing itself of a
rule in a manner which is contrary to the rationale of the rule (abus de droit)’).
B1.46 None of these examples gives rise to significant concern for SGBs that there
has been too intrusive or uncertain an incursion by the CAS into their discretionary
decision making. However, the CAS has on occasion stated the general principle
in very broad terms, ie that an SGB must act at all times in good faith towards its
members and stakeholders.1 This is inconsistent with English law, which limits
contractual obligations to what is expressly stated (or necessarily implied) in the
contract, and rejects a general implied contractual duty of good faith as being far
too uncertain in scope and effect.2 The English courts have been clear that while
the principle of good faith applies to the interpretation of treaties (by virtue of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), the principle ‘is not to be taken to be
a source of obligation where none exists’.3 Instead, ‘its effect is relatively limited,
being designed to ensure treaty rights are used responsibly, rather than abusively,
arbitrarily or capriciously’.4 English lawyers for SGBs at least would look for the
CAS to take the same approach in applying the principle of good faith to an SGB’s
regulations. The proposition however finds resonance in Swiss law.
1 See eg S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, para 34 (referring to ‘the principles of good faith which should
characterise all dealings between international sports federations and the athletes within their
jurisdiction’); Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 62 (‘General principles of
international contract law require that a body such as the [FINA] Bureau act in good faith. This is
a universal principle according to which all persons are bound by a duty to act in a loyal, frank
and open manner’ [citations omitted]); Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 30 (referring to
‘the contractual nature of the membership to an association and the related obligation to act in good
faith in the context of contractual or pre-contractual discussions’); Australian Olympic Committee,
CAS 2000/C/267, para 62 (‘General principles of international contract law require that a body such
as the Bureau act in good faith. This is a universal principle according to which all persons are bound
by a duty to act in a loyal, frank and open manner. See Dasser, Internationale Schiedsgerichte und
Lex Mercatoria (Schultess Verlag, 1989), pp 108–109 and references; Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly
International) Public Policy’, in Sanders (Ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public policy
in Arbitration, (ICCA congress Series No 3, December 1987), p 308; Mayer, ‘Le principe de bonne
foi devant les arbitres internationaux’, in Dominicé et al (Eds), Etudes en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive,
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp 543–556 and extensive references therein.’). See also Gibraltar
Football Association v FIFA CAS 2014/A3776.
2 MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company SA v Cottonex Anstalt [2016] EWCA Civ 789, para 45; Globe
Motors Inc v TRW Lucas Variety Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396, para 68. But see Bates
v Post Office (No 3), [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) (implying duty of good faith into ‘relational’ contract).
3 See R (ST) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 12, per Lord Hope at 31.
4 Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart
Publishing, 2018), para 9.46.
(g) The ‘fairness principle’?

B1.47 Similarly, from time to time in the CAS jurisprudence, reference is made
to an SGB’s regulatory autonomy being constrained by ‘considerations of fairness’.1
To the extent that this is just a shorthand reference to the use of doctrines such as
legitimate expectation or estoppel to constrain an SGB from applying its rules in a
particular situation,2 it again does not give rise to significant concern for SGBs. As
the CAS panel noted in IAAF v USATF, ‘underlying all these decisions lies the notion
of “fairness”’.3 Similarly, if the complaint is one of a lack of ‘procedural fairness’,4
then again it is unobjectionable: the need for an SGB to follow fair procedures in the
application and enforcement of its rules is well-settled.5
1 See eg AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 163 (‘paramount considerations of
fairness and legal certainty, needed in any legal system, militate against allowing UEFA to implement
immediately the Contested Rule in the 1999/2000 football season’).
2 See para B1.36.
3 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 68.
4 As in AEK Athens and Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, para 62; Boxing Australia v AIBA,
CAS 2008/0/1455, para 6.11; and Hellenic NOC and Kaklamanakis v ISAF, CAS OG/04/009, para 24.
5 R v Commission for Racial Equality ex p Hillingdon London Borough Council [1982] AC 779 (HL),
per Lord Diplock at 787F-G (‘Where an Act of Parliament confers upon an administrative body
functions which involve its making decisions that affect to their detriment the rights of other persons
or curtail their liberty to do as they please, there is a presumption that Parliament intended that the
administrative body should act fairly towards those persons who will be affected by their decision’).
B1.48 However, any suggestion that there is a more substantive doctrine of

‘fairness’ that constrains the rule-making powers of an SGB does give rise to
significant concern for SGBs that there has been too intrusive or uncertain an
incursion by the CAS into their discretionary decision making. In particular, common
law lawyers acting for SGBs at least would regard with consternation statements
such as the following: ‘The fairness principle would allow the Panel to disregard
the strict application of a norm where it would clearly and disproportionately be
contrary to a strict understanding of fairness in sport’.1 If the regulation in issue does
not breach any legal rights, or frustrate any legitimate expectations, an SGB would
argue that there is no residual ‘rule of fairness’ that can be used to bring it down.2 To
invoke a (previously unheralded) ‘fairness principle’ to strike down a regulation that
the arbitrator disagrees with would arguably be to breach the important constitutional
principle of separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature, and
thereby to intrude improperly on the autonomy of the SGB to determine what
regulations are necessary or desirable to achieve its legitimate objectives.3
1 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c). No authority is cited in
the decision to support this proposition. To the contrary, it appears (with great respect) to have been
plucked out of thin air.
2 USOC et al v IOC, CAS OG 2000/001, para 26 (‘the Claimants – and Mr Perez – are frustrated by a
clear rule [setting out conditions for transfers of sporting allegiance from one national federation to
another] which intrinsically operates in such a fashion as to cause the overall duration of an emigrating
athlete’s future Olympic eligibility to depend on the particular naturalisation regime of the country
in which he or she chooses to relocate. Contrary to the Claimants’ arguments, there is no rule of
“fairness”, to be derived from the Olympic Charter’s acknowledgement that the practice of sport
is a fundamental human right, which would under such circumstances create an outer time limit of
Olympic eligibility’).
3 As to which, see para B1.6.

SGB’S REGULATIONS
B1.49 When an SGB’s regulations come to be applied in practice, it often turns

out that there is room for debate as to what they mean and therefore as to whether
or how they apply to the facts at hand.1 In such cases, the SGB’s view of what its
regulations mean is not dispositive. Instead, the proper meaning of those regulations
is a question of law, and in the case of dispute it will be for the court (or arbitral
panel) to determine what they mean.2
1 The experienced CAS arbitrators who have contributed a chapter to this book note somewhat wearily
(para D2.129) that ‘it is not uncommon […] for the regulations of sports organisations to be unclear,
incomplete and ambiguous, and in need of interpretation’.
2 For English law authority on this point, see eg Modahl v British Athletics Federation [1997] EWCA Civ
2209, per Lord Woolf MR at para 38 (‘the question of the interpretation of the BAF Rules is a question
for the courts. In the words of Denning LJ in the Lee case, the court “cannot permit a domestic tribunal
to deprive a member of his livelihood or to injure him in it, unless the contract, on its true construction
gives the tribunal the power to do so. I repeat “on its true construction”, that I desire to emphasise
that the true construction of a contract is to be decided by the courts and by no one else”’); Lee v The
Showmen’s Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329, 344 (CA) (‘Sir Frank Soskice argued that it was
for the committee of the guild to construe the rules, and that, so long as they put an honest construction
on them, their construction was binding on the members, even though it was a wrong construction.
I cannot agree with that contention. The rules are the contract between the members. The committee
cannot extend their jurisdiction by giving a wrong construction to the contract […] no matter how
honest they may be. They have only such jurisdiction as the contract on its true interpretation confers
on them, not what they think it confers. The scope of their jurisdiction is a matter of the courts’). See
also cases cited at para E7.51.
For CAS authority, see eg Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452,
para 43 (‘whatever may have been the interpretation placed on the applicable anti-doping regulations
by the Respondent and others in 2007, it is a matter for the Panel to determine the proper meaning of
the applicable regulation’); Russian Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI),
CAS OG 04/001, para 19 (‘The FEI letter mentions “Discussions and decisions during April 2004
referring to the interpretation of Article 624.2”. The Panel must emphasise, for the avoidance of doubt,
that the interpretation of the FEI Regulations, as indeed of the rules of any sporting body, is a question
of law. While it is always necessary to seek a purposive and contextual construction of such rules so
as to discern their true intent and effect, a body cannot impose by discussion or decision after the
coming into force of the rules, a meaning which they do not otherwise bear. The Panel must add that
while in practice the FEI (or any other body in similar circumstances) must form an initial view as to
the meaning of its rules, it is the Panel which is vested with the function of finally determining that
meaning, subject only to any recourse (if any) to the Swiss Federal Tribunal […]’); Australian Olympic
Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 50 (‘FINA can interpret its constitution as can any international
sports federation. The constitution, being the very essence and foundation of an IF, can have such
interpretation reviewed by the CAS. In this aspect the FINA Rules contained in the “FINA Handbook”
which comprise the constating instrument are reviewable as to their proper interpretation by CAS.
FINA can never be the final arbiter of its constating rules’) and para 51 (‘an IF cannot be the final
arbiter of its founding document under which all else is governed and developed’). The CAS panel in
Stillitano v US Soccer Federation and FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2241, para 10.18, ignored this large body
of constant jurisprudence when it held that ‘[…] sporting federations are afforded broad discretion
when interpreting their own statutes and regulations. Accordingly, the Panel will not substitute its
own judgment for the judgment of the PSC unless the PSC’s judgment was “manifestly erroneous or
plainly inconsistent with the clear wording of the regulations, or was rendered in violation of a party’s
fundamental rights or public policy.” (CAS 2009/A/1812 Stillitano v USSF & FIFA at 10.7 (citing
CAS 2006/A/1192 Chelsea Football Club, Ltd. v Adrian Mutu)’).
For the same reason, nor is the CAS (or other appeal body) bound by the view taken by the first
instance panel of the proper meaning of the provision in question: Belize Basketball Federation v
FIBA, CAS 2009/A/1988, para 19. However, the desire for consistency creates an imperative to follow
the meaning given by previous CAS panels (and even arguably first instance panels, where their
reasoning is persuasive) to the same SGB regulation. See para B1.60.
B1.50 Therefore, it is obviously important both for the SGB itself and for the
parties that have to comply with its regulations to understand how the court or arbitral
panel will approach its interpretive task.
(a) For the SGB, it is crucial to understand how the regulations would be interpreted
by the court in case of dispute, not only because it wants to be sure that the
regulations have the effect that it intended, in terms of getting others to do
what it wants,1 but also because the SGB has a ‘hard-edged’ obligation to act
in accordance with ‘applicable law’, including its own regulations, properly
interpreted. It is afforded no ‘margin of appreciation’ in this context. Therefore,
if it interprets its own regulations incorrectly, and so gives them an improper
meaning and effect, those adversely affected will have good grounds for legal
challenge.
(b) Similarly, for a member or athlete who is required to comply with the SGB’s
regulations, or else face potentially serious sanction, it is crucial to understand
how the regulations should be interpreted, not only in order to work out how
to comply,2 but also in order to mount a defence if the SGB brings a charge
of non-compliance that is not consistent with the meaning of the regulations,
properly interpreted.
1 Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 14 (‘the
drafter will find it difficult to convey the Parliamentary intent to the courts unless he knows that they
will attach the same meaning to his words as that in which he employs them. Hence the need for
a common standard of interpretation […]’); Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of
Rules for Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2014), p 331 (‘Rules of statutory interpretation form part
of the legislative environment within which drafting and the drafter operate. And, although these
rules are not there to absolve the drafter from the responsibility of producing a clear, precise and
unambiguous legislative text, they can facilitate the drafter in the formation of a pre-legislative
perception on how users will perceive the legislative expression produced. In other words, awareness
of the rules of statutory interpretation offers the drafter a window into the minds of users. This can
direct the drafter to fine-tune the legislative expression to the prejudices of user comprehension’)
and p 328 (‘rules of statutory interpretation are a drafting tool that facilitates the unearthing and
subsequent avoidance of unintended vagueness, ambiguity and incompleteness, thus contributing to
effective legislation’).
For example, once the drafter of an SGB’s regulations understands that the courts will favour an
interpretation that promotes the objectives of the regulations over one that frustrates them (see para
B1.57, n 5), he or she may decide that it is worth stating those objectives expressly in the introduction
to the regulations themselves, so that there is no subsequent debate about what they are. See eg the
International Cricket Council’s 2017 Anti-Corruption Code for Participants, which sets out at Art 1.1
the sporting imperatives that have led to the Code being issued, and states at Art 1.2 that it is to be
interpreted in a manner that advances those imperatives.
2 See Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 1 (‘If it
were not a known fact that, in the ordinary case in which the normal user of the English language
would have no doubt about the meaning of the statutory words, the courts will give those words their
ordinary meaning, it would be impossible for lawyers and other experts to act and advise on the statute
in question with confidence’).
B1.51 Sports lawyers therefore need to know what rules of law or principles of
interpretation the court or arbitral panel will apply to resolve the dispute as to the
proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations. And again, the SGB’s regulations may
expressly provide that they are governed by the laws of a particular jurisdiction (again,
usually the one in which the SGB is domiciled). If the SGB is a national federation,
and its regulations only address a topic that is confined to its national jurisdiction, the
courts and arbitrators are likely to apply the rules of interpretation of that governing
national law to determine the proper meaning of those regulations.1 The relevant
part of that national law that is applicable may vary dependent upon whether the
national law treats SGB regulations as akin to statutes or contracts for the purposes of
interpretation. If the regulations in question are issued by an international federation
and apply globally, and do not specify that they are governed by a particular national
law, the same need arises as identified above for harmonisation and consistency of
application of the regulations to ensure a level playing-field wherever the sport is
played.2 And this all-important objective requires:
‘that general principles of interpretation are to be applied [to determine the proper
meaning of the SGB’s regulations], rather than particular principles of interpretation
and law derived from one particular national legal system or another. The focus in
interpreting the [World Anti-Doping] Code should, accordingly, be on the principles
of interpretation which are common to all legal systems because, if that approach is
adopted, it is more likely that the Code will be interpreted and applied in a consistent
manner”. Such an approach to interpretation of the Code, or of anti-doping rules
of a sporting organisation based on the Code, is consistent with the international
nature of the text as a code which is intended to function outside the constraints of
a particular legal system and is analogous to the way in which common law courts
have treated the interpretation of international treaties or conventions’.3
The same applies of course, by parity of reasoning, to any regulations of an
international federation that are intended to apply uniformly across different national
legal jurisdictions, no matter what their subject-matter.4 And it also applies to the
regulations of a national federation that implement the regulations of the international
federation within the national federation’s territorial jurisdiction.5
1 For example, the English Football League’s regulations setting out disqualifying conditions for
football club owners and directors (discussed at para B5.12) apply only to English clubs participating
in competitions staged by the English Football League in England. Therefore, they fall to be interpreted
in accordance with normal English law principles, as was done, for example, in Cellino v The Football
League, decision of Professional Conduct Committee (Tim Kerr QC) dated 5 April 2014. There is no
need to refer to any other laws.
2 See para B1.15.
3 Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, paras 34-35, quoting David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping
Code (CUP 2008), p 86, and citing (inter alia) Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per
Lord Diplock at 281H (‘The language of an international convention […] should be interpreted, as Lord
Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1977]
3 All ER 1048 at 1052, [1978] AC 141 at 152, “unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by
English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation”’). See also, by way of further
analogy, Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation
(Hart Publishing, 2018), para 9.50 (‘treaties are generally intended to be given a uniform interpretation
by all states parties. As international instrument intended for a “varied judicial audience”, they should
not be interpreted by reference to concepts and technical rules of English law unlikely to have been in
the contemplation of those framing the treaty. Rather, the court “must search, untrammelled by notions
of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and international meaning of the treaty”, applying
“broad principles of general acceptation”’ [citations omitted]).
WADA has attempted to codify this principle at Article 24.3 of the World Anti-Doping Code,
which provides that ‘the Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not
by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments’. The obvious intent is
to ensure the uniform application of the Code across all jurisdictions and sports. In USADA v Rollins,
AAA Panel decision dated 14 April 2017, para 7.4, the hearing panel relied on Art 24.3 to reject an
argument that the word ‘negligence’, as used (but not defined) in Code-compliant rules, should be
given the meaning given to that word in the Swiss Criminal Code.
4 Cowley v Heatley (1986) Times, 24 July [CA], 1986 TLR 430 (‘But under the constitution the
headquarters [of the international federation] can be changed. For example, it could be decided some
time in the future that Nairobi, or any other place, should be the headquarters of the Federation. If
so, what system of law is one going to apply to a specialist word like “domicile” [appearing in the
federation’s constitution]? Is one then going to give it the meaning that it has in the law of Kenya? In
my judgment, the parties to this constitution cannot have meant that the rules should change in their
effect and impact according to which country the headquarters for the time being were situated. In
my judgment, the fact that this is a multi-national document encompassing people operating under
many different systems of law is a strong indication that words used in it are not to be given technical
meanings attributed to those words by the law of one particular constituent nation’); Australian Olympic
Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established by contract and FINA
derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming has promulgated rules and
regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a contract between the body and its
members. CAS, as an international arbitration body ought to interpret these contracts according to the
general principles used by international arbitration panels and as it is directed to do by Swiss law. The
general principles of international contract law are too numerous and too complex to be summarized
comprehensively for this opinion. For a general and authoritative presentation, see GOLDMAN, “La
lex mercatoria dans les contrats et L’arbitrage international: réalité et perspectives”; 106 Journal du
droit International 475, (1979)’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006,
para 5 (‘Under Article S [of the Tennis Anti-Doping Programme,] the Rules are governed by English
law. It is expressly provided that the programme is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
applicable provision of the WADA Code, taking into account the commentary to that code. As the
Rules are based on the WADA Code, it is clear that they must be interpreted consistently so as to
accord with generally internationally accepted principles of sports law which would be applied by
tribunals in other jurisdictions, and by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) to which any appeal
lies under Article O’). See also cases cited at para B1.15, nn 3 and 4.
5 UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 27 (‘The
phrase that requires to be interpreted […] is expressed in the rules of an international organization, the
IAAF, which rules are in turn derived from the IOC Anti-Doping Code. The rules apply to all athletes
engaged in international athletic competition and are intended to operate in a uniform manner across all
jurisdictions. It is thus clear that the rules must be interpreted consistently so as to accord with generally
accepted principles of law which would be applied by tribunals of other jurisdictions and by CAS, to
which any appeal lies under IAAF Rule 21. In the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is emerging of
the general principles of sporting law governing doping offences, independent of the municipal law
of the state in which the sporting body happens to be located. That approach can only be strengthened
as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into force’). See also Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ
2209, Lord Woolf MR, para 37 (‘The BAF Rules are the rules for implementation in this country
of requirements parallel to those contained in the IAAF Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the
interpretation of the BAF Rules then the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’).
B1.52 What, then, are the ‘principles of interpretation which are common to all
legal systems’ that are relevant to determining the meaning of such ‘transnational’
SGB regulations? And to what extent are they different from the principles of
interpretation that would apply under English law to determine the proper meaning
of an English SGB’s regulations of purely national application?
A The basic approach: what would the words mean, in their

context, to a reasonable reader?
B1.53 In both common law and civil law jurisdictions, the approach taken to the
interpretation of a document depends on the legal character of that document. ‘Is it
an ordinary contract freely negotiated between the parties concerned? Or is it more in
the nature of a statute, bye-law or legislative code imposed by one party on another?’1
The difficulty in relation to an SGB’s regulations is that they are something of a
hybrid. They are contractual in that they confer rights and impose obligations on
the SGB’s members, and on occasion the regulations expressly provide as much.
Where they have been debated and approved by the members at an annual general
meeting, they are manifestly agreed, even where individual members voted against
them.2 The position is more complicated where the regulations confer rights and
impose obligations on the SGB’s members’ members (for example, clubs and teams)
or even participants not in such membership at all (for example, athletes and athlete
support personnel, or even player agents). In that context the regulations are in some
sense imposed ‘unilaterally’, usually without negotiation or even consultation. While
participation in the sport may constitute a contractual acceptance to be bound by
the regulations, in terms of the extent of a participant’s input and degree of choice
they have distinct similarities with a statute or code.3 Lawyers from common law
jurisdictions would treat an SGB’s regulations not as legislation but as a contract
between the SGB, its members, and their members participating in the sport,4 to be
construed in accordance with the ordinary principles applicable to the interpretation
of any written contract.5 In civil law jurisdictions, the position is apparently less
clear. For a considerable time, the position under Swiss law for example was not
finally settled,6 though the position now appears to be that SGB regulations are to
be interpreted in accordance with the rules applicable to statutes, at least where the
SGB is a ‘large’ one,7 and that is the position taken by most CAS arbitrators.8 In
many instances, however, the point may be moot because ‘in practice the principles
of interpretation [of a contract and a law] overlap to a large degree’ in Swiss law.9
1 AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.5 (the issue of how a set of rules should be interpreted
‘raises the question what the legal character of such rules and regulations [is], which depends
upon identification as the “Olympic Qualification System Principles”. Is it an ordinary contract
freely negotiated between the parties concerned? Or is it more in the nature of a statute, bye-law or
legislative code imposed by one party on another?’); Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365,
para 121 (‘There is a need to clarify the nature of Article 14.3 as it is the indispensable prerequisite
for the application of the appropriate method of interpretation’). See eg Fothergill v Monarch Airlines
[1981] AC 251 (HL) (discussing principles of interpretation applicable to international treaties, and
how they differ from principles of interpretation applicable to domestic legislation).
3 Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 141 (‘The issue is whether the articles of
associations should be interpreted by using the principles applied to the interpretation of contract
or to the interpretation of statutory laws. As the articles of association form the contractual basis
of an association – a private law institution – it can be argued that they have much in common with
contracts and should therefore be interpreted through the contractual principles of the subjective intent
of the parties and good faith (Forstmoser/Meier-Hayoz/Nobel, §7 N 4; Zeller, §11 N 129-133; Valloni/
Pachmann, p 25). However, articles of association also set forth constitutive principles which may
have effects to others apart from the original members of the association, and should therefore be
subject to the more objective approach followed with respect to statutory laws (Forstmoser/Meier-
Hayoz/Nobel, §7 N 3)’.
4 Modahl v British Athletic Federation (No 2) [2001] EWCA Civ 1447, para 105 (Mance LJ), discussed
at paras E7.13 and E7.14 Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April
1999 (CA) (Clarke LJ) at p 3 of the Lawtel transcript (‘both the appellants and the ITF are contractually
bound by the terms of the [ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme’); and para D3.45 et seq. See also
Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2000/C/267, para 49 (‘The constitution of FINA is established
by contract and FINA derives its powers by contract. FINA, as the world-wide body for swimming
has promulgated rules and regulations for the sport. These rules and regulations also constitute a
contract between the body and its members’); USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, para 8.21 (‘[…] the
WADA Code is neither a law nor an international treaty. It is rather a contract instrument binding its
signatories in accordance with private international law’).
5 Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation, Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ),
at page 15 (‘The question for decision in this appeal depends on the true construction of section (V)3
[of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme], construed in the context of the contract as a whole,
which in turn must be set against its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix. We must of course
bear in mind in this regard the principles comparatively recently set out by Lord Hoffman in Investors
Compensation Scheme’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The Panel
has examined the terms of these rules in accordance with the English law rules of construction to
establish their proper meaning’); USACA v ICC, arbitration award of the ICC Dispute Committee
(Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) dated 16 June 2017, para 44 (memorandum and articles of
association of the ICC, a BVI limited company, ‘are to be construed in accordance with the ordinary
principles that apply to the interpretation of any written contract’).
Ultimately, however, the distinction is effectively moot, because the approach taken in English law
to the interpretation of statutes is very similar to the approach taken to the interpretation of contracts.
See Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245; Kirby,
‘Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts’ [2003] 24(2) Statute
Law Review 95–111; and see generally Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide
to Statutory Interpretation (Hart Publishing, 2018).
6 The Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that such regulations are not applicable as a ‘law’ but must be
considered as contractually agreed provisions like general terms of a contract. X AG v Y, Swiss Federal
Tribunal judgment of 20 December 2005, ATF 132 III 285, para 1.3; UEFA v Z. Association, Swiss
Federal Tribunal judgment of 22 December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para 4.2.1 (‘The statutes of a legal
entity in private law are normally interpreted according to the principle of trust, similarly to statements
of contractual intent. As is the case for the text of a law, an interpretation according to the objective
meaning is also conceivable, or even better according to some legal writers’). Various CAS panels have
taken the same view. See eg Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036,
paras 92–93 (‘92. The Panel agrees that the authority of international or national federations and/or
national anti-doping organizations to impose sanctions on athletes is normally based on a contractual
relationship. Such relationship may be grounded on the athlete obtaining a licence to participate in
competitions organized under the rules of a federation, or on an agreement – either explicit or implicit
– on participation in a specific sport event. 93. The terms of this contractual relationship consist inter
alia of the relevant anti-doping rules. While obtaining a licence to compete from a federation or when
participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts that the anti-doping rules of that federation or event
organizer bind him/her’); Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, paras 86, 88 (same).
However, other CAS panels have asserted that ‘[…] statutes and regulations of an association shall
be interpreted and construed according to the principles applicable to the interpretation of the law rather
than [according] to [the principles applicable to the interpretation of] contracts’. See eg Henriques v
IOC & IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6225, para 85; FA of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602, para 4; DFB
et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3; Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787,
para 126. See also Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365, para 134 (‘[…] the statutes of an
association are not bilateral contracts between the association and its members’) and paras 143–44
(‘As regards the statutes of larger entities, it may be appropriate to have recourse to the method of
interpretation applicable to the law, whereas in the presence of smaller enterprises, the statutes may
more legitimately be interpreted by reference to good faith. […] FIFA’s regulations have effects which
are felt worldwide, and should therefore be subject to the more objective interpretation principles’);
Overliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.17 (‘The Swiss Federal Tribunal and leading commentators
tend to interpret the statutes and regulations of associations in an objective way, comparable to the
interpretation of statutory law’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201, paras 28-29 (same).
7 Platini v FIFA, Swiss Federal Tribunal decision A_344/2017 dated 21 December 2017, para 3.3.4.1
(‘When interpreting statutes, the interpretation methods may vary according to the type of association.
For the interpretation of the statutes of large associations, we use methods of interpreting the law.
For the interpretation of the statutes of small associations, reference is made instead to the methods
of interpretation of contracts, namely an interpretation according to the principle of trust (judgment
4A_235/2013 of May 27, 2014, paragraph 2.3 and the case law quoted). The Federal Tribunal ruled
the same when it was called to interpret the statutes of a major sports association, such as UEFA,
in particular its statutory clauses relating to questions of jurisdiction (judgment 4A_392/200812 of
December 22, 2008, and the references). In the present case, the interpretation concerns rules of a
sports association at a lower level than the Statutes, ie, the CEF. Although they do not deal with an
issue related to jurisdiction, these rules have been enacted by the organization governing football at
world level, so that their scope is global. Their interpretation according to the principle of legitimate
expectation is therefore not taken into consideration. The Appellant is thus right to interpret them in
accordance with the methods of statutory interpretation’) (unofficial translation). The SFT went on to
explain (ibid, para 3.3.4.2): ‘Any interpretation begins with the letter of the law (literal interpretation),
but this is not decisive: the interpretation still has to find the true scope of the norm, which also
derives from its relationship with other legal provisions and its context (systematic interpretation),
the aim pursued, particularly the protected interest (teleological interpretation), as well as the will of
the legislator as it may be understood from the “travaux préparatoires” (historical interpretation). The
judge departs from a clear legal text only when the aforementioned other methods of interpretation
show that this text does not correspond in all respects to the true meaning of the provision in question
and leads to results which the legislator could not have wanted, which conflict with the sense of
justice, or the principle of equal treatment. In short, the Federal Tribunal does not favor any method of
interpretation and does not establish a hierarchy, based on a pragmatic pluralism in order to seek the
true meaning of the norm (ATF 142 III 402 at 2.5.1 and the judgments quoted)’ (unofficial translation).
8 See para D2.130.
9 AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.9, quoting with approval the statement in Rinaldi
v FINA, CAS 2007/A/1377, that ‘[…] in practice the principles of interpretation [of a statute and a
contract] overlap to a large degree and both methods converge considering that the literal meaning
(the wording) of the provision or clause is the starting point’. See also Ward v IOC, AIBA & ANOC,
CAS 0G 12/002, para 24 (‘According to Swiss doctrine as discussed in CAS case law when interpreting
a contract, “one first has to look at the text; if the text is not clear, then at what the parties intended; if
that cannot be established, then how the contract should be interpreted in an objective manner. There is
less unanimity, it seems, in Swiss doctrine and case law whether statutes or similar instruments should
be interpreted in a like manner. But it is the Tribunal’s impression that the better and more prevalent
view is that the same criteria should, so far as possible, apply”’ [citations omitted]).
B1.54 While there may be distinctions in approach, it appears that for the most
part the common law and the civil law apply similar concepts and ultimately arrive at
similar conclusions as to the proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations. In both systems,
an objective as opposed to a subjective approach is applied. The courts do not consider
what the drafters now say they intended those regulations to mean.1 Rather, they look
for ‘the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having
all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the
parties in the situation in which they were in at the time of the contract’.2 To ascertain
that objective meaning is one ‘unitary exercise’, an ‘iterative process’3 in which the
court or tribunal considers the meaning of the words of the regulation in question, on
the basis of how they would reasonably be understood by the members and athletes
they seek to regulate,4 given their documentary, factual and historical/commercial
context.5 As set out below, that means starting with the text of the particular provision
in question, but also taking into account the other provisions in those regulations
and in the rest of the SGB’s rulebook, and the background circumstances prevalent
in that SGB’s sport generally at the time the regulations were issued, including in
particular the objective purpose and object of the regulations, ie what aim objectively
underlies them.6 The meaning to be preferred is the one that is most consistent with
the objective meaning of the words of the provision in question, that gives all of
the SGB’s regulations together a consistent and coherent meaning overall, and that
applies the regulation in a pragmatic and common sense way that advances (or at
least does not frustrate) the purposes underlying the regulations.7
1 For English law authority on this point, see eg Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC), per Lord
Neuberger at 1627H-1628A (meaning of contract to reasonable reader is to be assessed by reference to
the words of the text in issue, set in their proper factual context, but ‘disregarding subjective evidence of
any party’s intentions’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association,
Sport Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para 35 (‘[…] (a) the ultimate aim of interpreting
a provision in a contract is to determine what the parties meant by the language used. […] (b) the
subjective interpretations of the parties – what they thought the Policy meant – are immaterial’).
For CAS authority, see eg Henriques v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6225, para 85 (‘The interpretation
of the statutes and rules of a sport association has to be rather objective and should always start with
the wording of the rule which falls to be interpreted. The adjudicating body – in this instance the
Panel – will have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate
grammar and syntax. In its search, the adjudicating body will have further to identify the intentions
(objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule, and such body may also take account
of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation, as well as the entire regulatory
context in which the particular rule is located’), quoting CAS 2010/A/2071, para 20; FC Girondins
de Bordeaux v FIFA, CAS 2012/A/2862, para 85 (‘Under Swiss law, the articles of association must
be interpreted in the sense of the text, as it can and should be understood, depending on the overall
circumstances. This interpretation is described as “objective” […]. That must also be true with regard
to the interpretation of regulations from an association’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 12
(‘The FIBT said that its intention and that of the IOC [in the rules they agreed for qualification for the
Olympic Games] was to give athletes of NOCs whose continents were not represented in any FIBT
events an opportunity to be represented. Further, according to FIBT, it was not contemplated that
the Continental Representation rule could be used in order to guarantee NOCs from non-represented
continents representation in all events. However, this intention is not reflected in the clear language of
the text. Rather the language in the document reflects the intention to provide representation of one
men’s 2-man bob or one men’s 4-man bob and one women’s bob team per continent’); Sport Lisboa e
Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube
de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 29 (‘[…] the wording of the
provision has particular importance compared with the historical “legislative materials”; for the rules
and regulations of an association must, first and foremost be interpreted according to their objective
wording and purport, not according to the subjective will of the association’s organs responsible for
the provision’); WADA v Troy & IRB, CAS 2008/A/1652, preliminary award on jurisdiction dated
18 March 2009, para 83 (‘It may well be that [the] distinction we have drawn between notice of a
written decision and receipt of such a decision is one which was not actually intended by the ARU but
construction of the ARU By-Laws is an objective not subjective task’).
In some civil law jurisdictions (eg France), the courts apparently do place importance on the
subjective intent of the parties (as noted by Lord Hoffman in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes
Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, at para 39), and consistent with that there are passing references in some CAS
awards to trying to determine ‘what the parties intended’ subjectively. See eg Ward v IOC, AIBA &
ANOC, CAS OG 12/002, para 24: ‘[…] one first has to look at the text; if the text is not clear, then at
what the parties intended; if that cannot be established, then how the contract should be interpreted
in an objective manner’; AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.10 (‘If the text of statutes,
or similar instruments is not clear and unambiguous, and if the intention of the “parties” to such
instruments cannot be established, the focus of interpretation must be on what the party subject to such
statutes, rules or regulations (as distinct from the maker thereof) could reasonably expect the meaning
thereof to be’). However, the clear weight of the CAS authorities focuses on the objective meaning of
the regulations, ie what the reasonable reader would think was intended, and not what the parties that
wrote them subjectively intended.
2 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 [HL] per Lord
Hoffman at 902. For further English law authority on this point, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon
Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, per Lord Hoffman at para 14 (‘It is agreed that the
question is what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been
available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean’);
Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] per Clarke LJ
at page 15 (‘The question for decision in this appeal depends on the true construction of section (V)3
[of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme], construed in the context of the contract as a whole,
which in turn must be set against its surrounding circumstances or factual matrix. We must of course
bear in mind in this regard the principles comparatively recently set out by Lord Hoffman in Investors
Compensation Scheme’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The Panel
has examined the terms of these rules in accordance with the English law rules of construction to
establish their proper meaning. Under English law, it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of the
document by reference to what meaning would be given to it by a reasonable man having all the
background knowledge that would reasonably have been available’).
For CAS authority, see eg Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS 2007/A/1407, para 10 (‘The
task of ascertaining the intention of the parties must be approached objectively, the question is not what
one or other of the parties meant or understood by the words used but the meaning which the document
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably
have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of concluding the
Termination Agreement’) and para 11 (‘The cardinal presumption is that the Parties have intended
what they have in fact said, so that their words must be construed as they stand. However this is not
to say that the meaning of the words in a written document must be ascertained by reference to the
words of the document alone. In the modern world of law, courts and tribunals in principle look at
all circumstances surrounding the making of the contract which would assist in determining how the
language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man’); AOC v FIBT, CAS
OG 2010/01, para 6.1 (‘As a legal document the Qualification System is to be understood according to
general rules of interpretation. The interpretation has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words
used in this context and the reasonable understanding of the addressees of such rules’).
3 Wood v Capita Insurance Services [2017] UKSC 24, per Lord Hodge at 10 (‘The court’s task is
to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their
agreement. It has long been accepted that this is not a literalist exercise focused solely on a parsing
of the wording of the particular clause but that the court must consider the contract as a whole and,
depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to
elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning’) and 13 (‘Textualism
and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for exclusive occupation of the field of
contractual interpretation. Rather, the lawyer and the judge, when interpreting any contract, can use
them as tools to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to
express their agreement. The extent to which each tool will assist the court in its task will vary according
to the circumstances of the particular agreement or agreements. Some agreements may be successfully
interpreted principally by textual analysis, for example because of their sophistication and complexity
and because they have been negotiated and prepared with the assistance of skilled professionals. The
correct interpretation of other contracts may be achieved by a greater emphasis on the factual matrix,
for example because of their informality, brevity or the absence of skilled professional assistance. But
negotiators of complex formal contracts may often not achieve a logical and coherent text because of,
for example, the conflicting aims of the parties, failures of communication, differing drafting practices,
or deadlines which require the parties to compromise in order to reach agreement. There may often
therefore be provisions in a detailed professionally drawn contract which lack clarity and the lawyer or
judge in interpreting such provisions may be particularly helped by considering the factual matrix and
the purpose of similar provisions in contracts of the same type. The iterative process, of which Lord
Mance spoke in Sigma Finance Corpn (above), assists the lawyer or judge to ascertain the objective
meaning of disputed provisions’); Re Sigma Finance Corp [2009] UKSC 2, per Lord Mance at 12.
4 For English law authority on this point, see eg Porter v National Union of Journalists [1980] IRLR 404,
407 (Lord Diplock) (‘I turn then to the interpretation of the relevant rules [of the NUJ], bearing in mind
that their purpose is to inform the members of the NUJ of what rights they acquire and obligations
they assume vis-à-vis the union and their fellow members, by becoming and remaining members of
it. The readership to which the rules are addressed consists of ordinary working journalists, not judges
or lawyers versed in the semantic technicalities of statutory draftsmanship’), quoted with approval in
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896, 902 (HL).
For CAS authority, see eg AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.1 (‘As a legal document the
Qualification System is to be understood according to general rules of interpretation. The interpretation
has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words used in this context and the reasonable
understanding of the addressees of such rules’).
5 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC), per Lord Neuberger at para 15 (‘When interpreting a written
contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to “what a reasonable
person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would
have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean”, to quote Lord Hoffman in
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, para 14. And it does so
by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words […] in their documentary, factual and commercial
context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the
clause; (ii) any other relevant provisions of the lease, (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the
lease, (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document
was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any
party’s intentions’). See also Re Globespan Airways Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1159, per Arden LJ (same
approach followed in the context of ascertaining proper meaning of a statute).
For CAS authority, see Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 129 (‘According
to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2013/A/3047) and Swiss law, there are four coequal methods of
interpretation. They are the grammatical (seeks after the semantically meaning of the word or phrase),
the systematical (seeks after the systematic position of an article in the legal texture of the greater
whole), the historical (seeks after the original intention of the rule) and the teleological method (seeks
after the spirit and purpose of the statute) of interpretation. While interpreting a statute, the judge has
to seek for an objectively right and satisfying decision, taking account of the normative context and
the ratio legis. Thereby no interpretation method prevails over another. Rather, the judge has to choose
those methodical arguments that allow approximating the ratio legis as close as possible’) (citations
omitted); Casas Vaque v FEI, CAS 2019/A/6202, para 195 (same); Aloyan v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4927,
para 74 (‘[…] under Swiss law […], the interpretation of the statutes and rules of a sport association
has to be rather objective and should always start with the wording of the rule which falls to be
interpreted. The adjudicating body – in this instance the Panel – will have to consider the meaning
of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax. In its search, the
adjudicating body will have further to identify the intentions (objectively construed) of the association
which drafted the rule, and such body may also take account of any relevant historical background
which illuminates its derivation, as well as the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule
is located’, citing various Swiss Federal Tribunal judgments and CAS awards); DFB et al v FIFA,
CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (same); Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126,
quoting with approval IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same). See also UEFA v
Z. Association, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment of 22 December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para 4.2.3
(while a purely literal interpretation of the provision in question may have suggested one result, a
logical and systematic analysis of the other provisions in the same regulations, seeking a practical
interpretation rather than an artificial one, justified going beyond a purely literal interpretation to read
into the provision that the decisions of UEFA organs that could be appealed to CAS were ‘jurisdictional’
organs, which result was corroborated by a ‘historical’ interpretation, since the legislative history of
the provision in question showed that the intent was to refer to jurisdictional organs and the omission
of the word ‘jurisdictional’ was inadvertent).
6 See para D2.130; Rouiller, Legal Opinion on Compatibility of Article 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping
Code with the Fundamental Principles of Swiss Domestic Law, 25 October 2005, p 17 (‘A legal text
is first interpreted according to the letter of the text (literal or grammatical method). Departure from
the literal meaning of a clear text is only called for where there are objective reasons to suggest that
the text does not convey the true intent of the provision in question. Such reasons may flow from the
preparatory work, the aim and direction of the provision being examined, and sometimes its place
within the law. Thus, the true intent and spirit of a legal text that admits of several interpretations are to
be sought, inter alia, on the basis of the preparatory work that led up to its adoption (historical method),
the aim that the rule seeks to achieve and the values on which it is based (teleological method), or its
relationship with other legal provisions (systematic method). Contrary to what we might think, the
historical method of interpretation is not fundamental and the interpreter is not bound to take the
preparatory work into account. It is only to be taken into account to the extent that the ideas that were
discussed during the discussions leading up to its adoption are expressed in the text. The importance
of the preparatory work for the analysis is, in any case, inversely proportional to how far back in time
that work was done. Lastly, it should be pointed out that all of these methods are intercoordinated and
not subordinated one to the other’).
7 For a good example of such an approach, see WADA v Troy & IRB, CAS 2008/A/1652, preliminary
award on jurisdiction dated 18 March 2009, para 66 (words of ARU regulation being interpreted ‘[…]
must be construed objectively, in accordance with the ordinary and fair meaning of the words used
and having regard to a consideration of the whole of the ARU By-law. The ARU By-law must be read
as whole and the words of each clause should be interpreted so as to bring them into harmony with
the other provisions of the ARU By-law. “The meaning of the terms of a contractual document is to
be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. That, normally,
requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding circumstances known to the
parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction”’ [citations omitted]) and at paras 67–73.
B1.55 Because this approach is broadly common both to civil law systems (or at least
Swiss law, the predominant law at the CAS, headquartered in Lausanne) and to common
law systems, it has been accepted by the CAS as a ‘general principle of interpretation’,
applicable whenever the meaning of an SGB’s regulations is disputed in CAS
proceedings.1 It is therefore important to consider this ‘iterative’ process of contractual
interpretation more closely, examining each of its constituent elements in turn.
1 Qatar FA v FIFA et al, CAS 2012/A/2742, para 197 (‘Pursuant to the general principles of construction
and interpretation of laws, in order to ascertain the intention of the law maker, the deciding body
should look at the ordinary and plain meaning of the law in question’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01,
para 6.1 (‘As a legal document the Qualification System is to be understood according to general rules
of interpretation. The interpretation has to start from the ordinary meaning of the words used in this
context and the reasonable understanding of the addressees of such rules’); Virgin Islands Olympic
Committee v IOC, CAS OG 10/003, paras 5–6 (‘General rules of interpretation must be applied.
The ordinary meaning of the words used must be considered in the context of the document under
consideration, the document being considered as a whole. […] The words of the document must be
given the closest scrutiny’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para 38 (‘The court or arbitrator must
consider what a reasonable person in the position of the parties to the contract would have understood
the contract to mean at the time it was entered into’), quoting David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping
Code (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 84.
B Considering the words of the regulation, in their context

within the specific provision and within the regulations more
generally, so that the SGB’s rulebook is read as a coherent
whole
B1.56 The starting point is always the text of the provision in issue.1 Again, the
task is to determine how the words as they appear in the text would reasonably be
understood by the people they seek to regulate. This approach entails:
(a) considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used;2
(b) considering also the grammar and the syntax3 and the punctuation,4 since they
can also have a significant impact on meaning;
(c) bearing in mind that to the audience for which the words are written (ie those
participating in the sport), the words may have a special or technical meaning
that they would not have for the ordinary reader;5
(d) seeking an interpretation that gives force (if possible) to each word used in the
provision, and does not render any words redundant;6
(e) avoiding as far as possible an interpretation that would require the words of
the provision to be altered or supplemented in a way that would change the
meaning of the provision and produce a result that is not justified by the natural
and ordinary meaning of the original words;7
(f) considering the words at issue not in a vacuum but in their ‘documentary’
context, ie in the context of the rest of the specific provision in which they
appear,8 because ‘English words derive colour from those which surround
them’;9 and
(g) also considering the words at issue in the context of the regulations as a whole,10
and in the context of the SGB’s rulebook more generally,11 so that they are read
as a coherent whole:12
(i) a proposed interpretation that would ignore or contradict other provisions
in the regulations should be rejected in favour of one that would be
consistent with the rest of the regulations;13 and
(ii) there is a presumption that a word that is used several times in a set of
regulations carries the same meaning every time it is used;14 whereas a
variation of language may indicate a change in meaning.15
1 For English law authority for this point, see eg Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC) per Lord
Neuberger at 1628C (‘[…] the reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and
surrounding circumstances […] should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language
of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying
what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual
case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision’); Du Plessis
v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 21 December 2016, [2017]
(3) ISLR SLR-67, para 4.4 (‘The starting point must be the language of the provision in question’).
For CAS authority, see eg DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘The interpretation of
the statutes and rules of a sport association had to be rather objective and had to always start with
the wording of the rule necessitating interpretation. Any adjudicating body would have to consider
the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate grammar and syntax’);
Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126, quoting with approval IFA v FAI,
Kearns & FIFA, CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same); AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, para 6.9
(‘[…] the literal meaning (the wording) of the provision or clause is the starting point’); TTF Liebherr
Ochsenhausen v ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, para 12 (‘By interpreting rules and regulations of
associations, the starting point and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal
interpretation)’); WCM-GP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612 & 471 & 473, para 36 (‘The first step […]
is for the Panel to construe the words used in the Regulations. Interpreting the law according to its
letter requires a tribunal to construe the meaning of the words used by the legislator. […] Contrary to
the submission made by the Appellant to convince the Panel that one should apply the principles of
legal certainty, proportionality and the rule contra proferentem automatically, Swiss law relies on such
principles only if there is ambiguity and no clear meaning can be drawn from an interpretation based
on the letter and the spirit of the law’).
2 See eg Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS 2007/A/1407, para 13 (‘The starting point in
constructing a contract is that the words are to be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Courts
assume that parties use language in the way that reasonable persons ordinarily do. Terms therefore are
to be understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless they have generally in respect to the
subject-matter a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the words or the context evidently
points out that they must in the particular instance be understood in some other special and peculiar
sense’) and para 14 (‘This conclusion is also confirmed by Swiss doctrine, particularly WINIGER,
Commentaire Romand – CO I, Basel 2003, n. 18-20 ad Art. 18 CO, which establishes that the parties’
common intention must prevail on the wording of their contract. […]’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and
UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The presumption is that the words in documents should be
given their natural and ordinary meaning and it is only when such an approach creates an unreasonable
result that it is necessary to look to other meanings’); Zubkov v FINA, CAS 2007/A/1291, para 19
(‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential” disrepute, nor to conduct “having
the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining the proper meaning of Section
12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words used. If the meaning of the words
used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings, or qualified meanings, into such
words’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 46 (‘We are of the view that the task
of the Panel is to give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of these words having regard to the
context of the rules as a whole’); AOC v FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.5 (interpretation to be given
to provision must be driven by ‘its plain meaning’).
See, by way of example WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 80
(‘By using the qualification “compelling”, the wording of Article 2.3 underscores the strictness with
which the justification needs to be examined’); WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 99
(‘This interpretation […] is fortified by the ordinary meaning of the word “dose” (eg, “a quantity of
medicine prescribed to be taken at any one time”: Random House Dictionary; “a definite quantity
of a medicine or drug given or prescribed to be given at one time”: Oxford English Dictionary)’);
Federation Francaise des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des Echecs, 2010/O/2166,
para 9.7.8 (‘one cannot ignore that according to the text of Section 1.2 of the [Electoral Regulations]
membership is a “should-requirement” as opposed to “must” or “shall”. The Panel therefore considers
that the requirement of a one-year membership is not mandatory but recommendatory’); Schuettler v
ITF, CAS OG 2008/003, para 7.4(ii) (‘Even where […] NOCs, when they enjoy the luxury of more
than 4 players in the top 48 to choose from, are encouraged to select them in order of ranking, they are
not compelled to do so. The phrase used is “should select” […] not shall or must or will select […]);
Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 179 (‘The Panel does not read “should” as a “must”. The
word “should” implies some form of recommendation or guideline and therefore does not impose an
obligation on Mr Barut’). See also to the same effect, on the difference between ‘shall’ and ‘should’,
the cases cited at C6.22 n 2.
3 Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] WLR 749 (HL), per Lord
Hoffman at 775 (‘The meaning of words, as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their
syntactical arrangement, as it would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we use to
understand a speaker’s utterance’); DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘Any adjudicating
body would have to consider the meaning of the rule, looking at the language used, and the appropriate
grammar and syntax’).
4 For example, Art 2.3 of the 2003 version of the World Anti-Doping Code provided that ‘refusing,
or failing without compelling justification, to submit to Sample collection’ was an anti-doping rule
violation. Based on the placement of the commas, some hearing panels concluded that the offence
was (a) refusal; or (b) a failure without compelling justification, ie, the athlete could not seek to argue
that there was compelling justification for his refusal to give a sample. See eg IRB v Nelo Lui, Board
Judicial Committee decision dated 24 April 2007, para 44. In the 2009 version of the World Anti-
Doping Code, Article 2.3 was amended to read ‘refusing or failing without compelling justification
to submit to Sample collection’, in order to make clear that an athlete could seek to offer ‘compelling
justification’ not only for a failure to submit to sample collection but also for a refusal to submit to
sample collection.
See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 860 (panel considered that the place where the
comma is situated in the phrase ‘the team may be subject to Disqualification, and/or other disciplinary
action as provided in the applicable rules of the relevant International Federation’ ‘seems to indicate
that the author of Article 9.1 of the IOC ADR in fact had in mind to provide for a different solution
for the two different scenarios’, namely that disqualification from the Olympic Games is the exclusive
prerogative of the IOC ‘whereas the imposition of “other disciplinary action” falls under the
responsibility of the IFs’); Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.55 (‘[…] it is important to note
that there is a comma after the phrase “administration or attempted administration of a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method to any athlete.” Following this phrase and a comma, there are no
further references to “athlete.” In the Panel’s view, therefore, the proper interpretation of Article 2.8 is
that the first par, “administration or attempted administration of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method to any athlete” is limited to actions with respect to athletes. However, the latter part, “assisting,
encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping
rule violation or any attempted violation,” is intended to be very broad and to cover any ADR violation
by any person bound by the ADR, including a coach or a support staff member, and is not limited to
the ADR violations of fellow athletes’).
5 For English law authority for this point, see eg Reel v Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226 (CA), per Eveleigh
J at 1232 (where IAAF rules permitted associations to put themselves forward for membership as
the national governing body of the sport in a particular ‘country’, the court noted that ‘The word
“country” has been used in the rules in order to delineate the area of authority. They do not use the
word in the sense of sovereign state’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics
Association, Sport Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para(f) (‘[…] where terminology is used
which has a known meaning in a particular context (such as the sport of rhythmic gymnastics), the
meaning of that terminology will be a question of fact to be determined by the tribunal’).
For similar CAS authority, see Celtic v UEFA, CAS 98/201, para 30 (‘[…] within the framework
of the rules of football, particularly concerning transfers, the concepts of “nation” and “country” have
different meanings than in the usual language, it being understood that those concepts – within the
context of football – do not correspond systematically and/or strictly to the existing political borders
of the concerned territories. As examples thereof, it may be pointed out that the transfer of a player
from Glasgow Rangers FC, a club affiliated to the SFA [Scottish Football Association], to Liverpool
FC, a club affiliated to the English FA, would constitute an international transfer within the meaning
of the FIFA Regulations, although both Glasgow and Liverpool are cities which are politically part of
the same state (the UK)’).
6 For English law authority for this point, see eg Secretary of State for Defence v Turner Estate Solutions
Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1150 (Coulson J.), para 62 (‘[…] in construing a contract, all parts of it must be
given effect where possible, and no part of it should be treated as inoperative or surplus’); Secretary of
State for Defence v Spencer [2003] EWCA Civ 784, [2003] 1 WLR 2701, per Peter Gibson LJ at 29
(‘It is elementary that one must seek to give meaning to every word used in a statute’).
For CAS authority, see eg ADO Den Haag v Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152, para 24
(‘[…] a fundamental tenet of legal interpretation is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat
quam pereat), according to which interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a
provision. An interpreter must not adopt a reading that would result in making a substantial part of
a provision redundant or without legal effect’); FC Barcelona v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.8
(‘this Panel must privilege the interpretation that allows the various provisions in a statute to coexist,
and cannot and should not interpret one provision so as to eliminate the scope of another one (ut regis
valeat quam pereat)’); Chernova v IAAF, CAS 2017/A/4949, para 83 (‘[…] the full applicability of
the jurisdictional requirements of Article R47 would lead to the impossibility of applying Rule 38.3
as a basis for CAS jurisdiction, as there would never be a previous decision to review or internal legal
remedies to exhaust. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the interpretive principle ut res magis
valet quam pereat (known in French as the principle of effet utile), according to which an interpretation
rendering a rule effective must prevail over one which renders it superfluous’); Andrianova v ARAF,
CAS 2015/A/4304, para 44 (‘Any interpretation of said provision must start with the plain wording of
the provision. According thereto, the new statute of limitation contained in Rule 47 of the 2015 ADR
“shall only be applied” to cases that have occurred prior to the entering into force of the 2015 ADR
(Effective Date), if the “statute of limitation period has not already expired” by that date. It is rather
obvious to the Sole Arbitrator that the latter term (“statute of limitation period”) does not refer to
the “new” statute of limitation in the 2015 ADR. Instead, it refers to the (old) statute of limitation
previously in force. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that no reference is made in this context to
“Rule 47”. Furthermore, any different reading would make little sense, because then the second half
of the sentence (“provided however that Rule 47 shall only be applied retroactively if the statute of
limitations period has not already expired by the Effective Date”) would be superfluous’); Indian
Hockey Federation v FIH and Hockey India, CAS 2014/A/3828, para 168 (‘The Panel prefers to find
an interpretation of the Article which does not make part of it redundant’); FA of Wales v UEFA,
CAS 2004/A/593, para 24 (‘The FAW had to admit at the hearing that its understanding of “implicated”
as “involved” would lead to the logical result that there would be no need for art. 12.4 UEFA DR, which
could thus be omitted’); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10 (rejecting
interpretation that would render part of the rule ‘superfluous’); International Baseball Association,
CAS 98/215, para 24 (same). For example, in H. v FINA, CAS 98/128, para 6, the CAS panel rejected
the athlete’s argument that a provision that out-of-competition testing ‘may be conducted with respect
to any banned substance or banned technique, focusing upon anabolic agents’, meant that such testing
was ‘limited to’ anabolic agents, because ‘to achieve the effect desired by H., the drafters of FINA Rule
DC 6.3 would not have needed the eight words “any banned substance or banned technique, focusing
upon”. Legal texts are presumed not to contain superfluous words’.
7 For English law authority for this point, see Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 (SC), per Lord Neuberger
at 1631, para 32 (‘I am unconvinced by this argument. It involves departing from the natural meaning
of clause 3(2) in each of those leases, and it involves inserting words which are not there’); Korda v
ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ) at p 15
of the Lawtel transcript (rejecting argument that a provision that ‘any dispute arising out of a decision
of a domestic panel shall be submitted to CAS’ should be read, in the context of the rules as a whole,
as ‘Any dispute [ie any dispute as to the enforceability and effect of the decision] arising out of any
decision made by the Anti-doping Appeals Committee [which is full, final complete and binding by
virtue of clause (L)8] shall be submitted [ie by way of arbitration on appeal] exclusively to the Appeals
Arbitration Division of the Court of Arbitration for Sport’, because ‘the words in square brackets
[…] introduce an impermissible gloss which is not justified by its language’); Ohuruogu v IAAF and
UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 11 (‘There is no wording in rule 35.17 that suggests that a
missed test cannot be declared as such until the athlete has been notified of any previous missed test(s).
To interpret rule 35.17 as meaning that such prior notification is necessary would involve correcting
the draftsman’s presumed mistake and adding extra words into the language of the rule. […] It is
not the Panel’s role to rewrite the IAAF’s rules and anyway, in the present circumstances, such an
approach is not available to the Panel under English law’); Cellino v The Football League, decision
of Professional Conduct Committee dated 5 April 2014, paras 64, 73-74 (accepting submission that
it would be adding an impermissible gloss to a rule making a ‘conviction’ a disqualifying condition
for a football club owner or director to say that the conviction must be final, with all appeal rights
exhausted: ‘Here, there are no relevant added words to qualify or expand the meaning of the word
“conviction” in sub-paragraph ix). I do not think I should read in such words. […]’); UK Anti-Doping
v Llewellyn, NADP decision dated 14 February 2013, para 5.19 (‘[…] the UKAD approach glosses
the language of Article 10.4 unnecessarily, and appears designed to produce a result which UKAD
believes is just whilst ignoring the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and failing to respect the
simplicity of the language used’); ITF v Gasquet, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2009,
para 65 (‘The “purposes of this Programe”, in the concluding words of Article F.4, include the purpose
of giving effect to the distinction between substances banned only in competition, and substances
banned at all times. The player invites us to read into the last sentence of Article F.4 the qualification
that the test is only deemed to be an in competition test if the player has actually played. We are unable
to accept that invitation; it would involve rewriting the rules, not construing them’), appeal upheld on
other grounds, ITF v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926; UK Anti-Doping v Watt, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 6 November 2014, para 35 (‘We agree with UKAD’s primary case that it is the presence of a
prohibited substance which constitutes an anti-doping rule violation. This is what the language of
Article 2.1 clearly states. It would be a violence of language to find otherwise’).
For CAS authority, see eg DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 89 (‘Nor is it appropriate for the
Panel […] to read into the express terms of the IST [International Standard for Testing] words that do
not exist, such as “save in exceptional circumstances”’); Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 58
(rejecting proposed meaning where ‘the proposition could be sustained if the qualifying word “only”
was inserted between the word “is” and the word “prohibited” but not otherwise’); Zubkov v FINA,
CAS 2007/A/1291, para 19 (‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential”
disrepute, nor to conduct “having the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining
the proper meaning of Section 12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words
used. If the meaning of the words used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings,
or qualified meanings, into such words. This is particularly so in our view when one has regard to the
possible sanctions and to the actual sanction imposed by the Disciplinary Committee here. Therefore,
when Section 12.1.3 speaks of “disrepute”, it does not cover potential disrepute’); AOC v FIBT, CAS
OG 2010/01, para 6.5 (‘The use of the word “and” attracted much of the parties’ attention in their
written submissions and at the hearing. The Olympic Council of Ireland argued that the word should
be used conjunctively and that, as a result, the maximum that the NOC of a non-represented continent
could receive would be one 2-man bob team, one 4-man bob team or one women’s bob team. However,
this would require a change in the actual language of the sentence and is contrary to its plain meaning.
In the Panel’s view the maximum entitlement is a representation of one man’s bob team (a 2-man bob
team or a 4-man bob team) and one women’s bob team. In the context of this sentence, the use of the
word “and” clearly reflects the intention of representation by one men’s bob team and one women’s
bob team. In other words, “and” is used in the sense of “in addition” or “also”. In order for the Olympic
Council of Ireland’s and the FIBT’s interpretation [to be correct,] the word “and” would have to be
substituted by “or” (emphasis added)’); Vroemen v KNAU & ADAN, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 172
(‘The Panel is of the view that it cannot go beyond the intention of the legislating body and it must
adhere to what is in the text of the regulation, drawing from the regulation’s silence the unwillingness
of the legislator to require more than what is expressly stated (ubi lex voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit; see
CAS 2006/A/1152 ADO Den Haug v Newcastle United FC, at para 8.8)’); Abdevali v United World
Wrestling, CAS AG 14/04, para 2.16 (‘These are the rules and regulations prescribed by the governing
body of the sport and cannot be rewritten or read down’).
8 Du Plessis v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 21 December 2016,
[2017] (3) ISLR SLR-67, para 4.4 (‘The starting point must be the language of the provision in
question. That language must be construed in its context’); Commonwealth Games Canada/Triathlon
Canada, CAS CG 2002/001, para 24 (‘It is in our view too facile to concentrate on the vocabulary of
“eligibility” and “suspension” without reference to the context in which those words are deployed’).
9 Bourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 691, 696 (Stamp J), cited in McLeod, Principles
of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2009), 20–21.
10 For English law authority on this point, see eg Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation),
Independent, 21 April 1999 [CA] (Clarke LJ) at p 18-19 of the Lawtel transcript (‘The question is how
section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme] should be construed in the context of the
Programme as a whole […]’).
For CAS authority, see eg Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 861 (‘In accordance with the
rules of interpretation under Swiss law which applies to the IOC ADR, the Panel “may also take into
account … the entire regulatory context in which the particular rule is located” (CAS 2017/A/4927
Aloyan v IOC, par 74 with further references’); RFEF v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, para 211 (‘An apt
interpretation of the drafter’s intention behind Article 9.4 of the FIFA RSTP requires it not to be read
in isolation but together with the entire texts that accompany and/or form part and parcel of Article 9
of the FIFA RSTP’); Foggo v National Rugby League, CAS A2/2011, para 46 (‘We are of the view
that the task of the Panel is to give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of these words having
regard to the context of the rules as a whole’); SV Wilhelmshaven v Club A et al, CAS 2009/A/1810 &
1811, para 45 (‘Based on a systematic analysis, the Panel shall determine that the interpretation given
to the rules does fit into the context of the whole regulation’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948,
para 39(d) (‘[…] words in, or a provision of, any contract are not construed in isolation from the rest of
the contract. Rather, they must be construed in the context of the contract as a whole’); IAAF v USATF,
CAS 2002/O/401, para 6 (‘Rule 61.1 does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It is but one provision
(and its crucial first sentence is but one sentence) in a suite of rules which govern various aspects of
the conduct of the IAAF and its Members. It is thus appropriate to examine Rule 61.1, as indeed any
Rule, in the context in which it exists and operates’) and para 16 (‘Other provisions of the IAAF Rules,
beyond those contained within what we have referred to as the “code” governing the control of drug
abuse, also offer important insight into the meaning and operation of Rule 61.1’).
11 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (interpretation of rules should be based on ‘the entire
regulatory context in which the particular rule is located’); Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648,
para 109 (World Anti-Doping Code and International Standards together form the World Anti-Doping
Program and therefore ‘cannot be considered in isolation’ but instead ‘must be read in conjunction
with one another’). For example, it may be necessary to consider other rules that are referred to in
the regulations being interpreted. Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent,
21 April 1999 [CA], per Clarke LJ at p 17 of the Lawtel transcript (‘Although the judge said that the
[CAS] code provided no guidance to the construction of section (V)3 [of the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping
Programme] and although Mr Flint may be right in saying that the code is not strictly incorporated into
the Programme, the code seems to be of considerable assistance in determining the correct construction
of the clause. The extracts from the statutes and the regulations [of CAS] to which I have referred show
that the Appeals Arbitration Division is essentially concerned with appeals from bodies such as the
Appeals Committee of the ITF’). And/or it may be necessary to consider also other regulations that the
regulations in question are implementing: Modahl v BAF [1997] EWCA Civ 2209, Lord Woolf MR,
para 37 (‘The BAF Rules are the rules for implementation in this country of requirements parallel to
those contained in the IAAF Rules. If there is any ambiguity as to the interpretation of the BAF Rules
then the IAAF Rules can be used to resolve that ambiguity’).
The regulations may also identify further permissible aids to construction, such as accompanying
‘Explanatory Notes’, or official commentary, such as the comments to the provisions of the World
Anti-Doping Code. Article 24.3 of that Code provides that the comments ‘shall be used to interpret
the Code’, and the CAS has noted that ‘[a]lthough these comments are not binding upon the Panel
in formulating its decision, they form a body of information which can be taken into account when
interpreting the rule and regulations in the WADC’. Knauss v FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, para 7.3.4.
However, there is conflicting authority on whether other documents may be permissible aids to
construction. See eg Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 13.3.1 (‘The FINA Rules must be read in
conjunction with the FINA Guidelines. FINA has argued that it is only the FINA Rules which apply,
not the FINA Guidelines. However, the Panel does not accept any submission that the FINA Guidelines
have no effect. If a body issues guidelines in order to explain and clarify its doping control methods and
techniques for the benefit of the federations, swimmers, coaches, managers and physicians and even
states that “the guidelines should be followed as far as reasonably practicable” (as the FIA Guidelines
do on page 5), the issuing body cannot be allowed to claim that its own guidelines do not apply and
have no legal effect. They must have some value, at least as a source of interpretation of the rules and
their application, even if they do not have the full force of the Rules upon which they are intended to
guide’); IAAF v Walker, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 20 August 2000, para 13 (‘athletes
may not ignore the Rules and simply rely on the Help Notes. The Help Notes are there purely for
the guidance of athletes and not for the purpose of interpreting either the Rules or the Guidelines
themselves’).
12 See eg USACA v ICC, ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator) award dated
16 June 2017, para 52 (‘the MOA and Articles [of the ICC] must be read as a coherent whole […]’);
Qatar FA v FIFA et al, CAS 2012/A/2742, para 197 (‘The cardinal rule of construction is that a law
should be read as a harmonious whole, with its various parts being interpreted within their broader
statutory context in a manner that furthers statutory purposes’); H. v FINA, CAS 98/128, para 3 (‘In
accordance with ordinary principles of construction, [the FINA Anti-Doping Rules] should be read as
a coherent whole’).
13 For English law authority, see eg USACA v ICC, ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC,
sole arbitrator) award dated 16 June 2017, para 52 (rejecting submission that a clause in the ICC’s
memorandum of association saying that the ICC must ‘administer […] the game of cricket worldwide
in cooperation with its Members’ meant that the member had a veto over any rule or action proposed
by the ICC, because ‘[i]f correct it would mean that the Articles providing for suspension or expulsion
– the antithesis of a cooperative exercise – would be inconsistent with the ICC’s objects’).
For CAS authority, see eg Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 56 (‘The Appellant’s argument
impermissibly invites the Panel to ignore the Glossary’), and para 63 (rejecting suggestion that an FEI
anti-doping rule should be interpreted as only banning the specified substances in competition and
not out of competition, because ‘if the Appellant’s contention were correct, there could be no reason
whatsoever for the provision of out of competition testing which [is] vouched for by Article 5.1 of
the EADCMR’); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 15.5 (‘We note that the balance of Article 2
(2.1.2 and 2.1.3) with its repeated emphasis of the importance of presence (save in carefully drawn
exceptions) is consistent with our construction’ of Article 2.1.1); H. v FINA, CAS 98/128, para 3
(athlete’s argument that the FINA Doping Rules did not ban cannabinoids – because Rule 2 said that
banned substances ‘include’ those listed in the IOC Medical Code, but the IOC Medical Code only
restricted and did not ban cannabis outright – rejected by the CAS panel on the basis that the word
‘include’ in that context ‘clearly means that the substances listed in the IOC Medical Code are banned
under DC 2.1 even if they are merely “restricted” for purposes of the IOC Medical Code. It also means
that the list is not exhaustive. DC 9 is entitled “Sanctions” and establishes in Article DC 9.2(d) that
“cannabinoids (such as marijuana and hashish)” lead to serious sanctions – up to lifetime expulsion in
the event of a third offence; up to three months in a case of first offence. In accordance with ordinary
principles of construction, DC should be read as a coherent whole. The conclusion must be that
cannabinoids are a banned substance for the purposes of FINA and its DC’); Celtic v UEFA, 98/201,
para 15 (rejecting a suggested meaning of one provision in a UEFA regulation because it contradicted
the clear wording of another provision in the same regulation, and instead preferring a meaning that
was consistent with that other provision).
14 For English law authority on this point, see eg Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authorities
[2012] UKSC 22, [2012] 2 AC 471, per Lord Phillips at 75 (‘When considering the meaning of a word
or phrase that is used more than once in the same instrument one starts with a presumption that it bears
the same meaning wherever it appears’).
For CAS authority, see eg Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 10.17 (‘Our conclusion that
the analysis of fault under Article 10.4 is not different from the analysis of fault under Article 10.5 is
supported and underscored by the commentary to the WADC, which uses similar language to describe
the analysis under both Articles’) and para 10.18 (‘The ITF submits, and the Panel agrees, that the fact
that the language is effectively identical confirms that the analysis required is the same’ under each
Article).
See also Australian Rugby Union v Sailor, ARU Judicial Committee decision dated 20 July 2006,
para 62 (‘As a principle of statutory construction, it is well recognised that expressions within a piece
of legislation will bear the same meaning throughout that legislation. It is inappropriate in construing
a statute to construe an expression as meaning one thing in one part of the statute, and another in
a different part of the statute’) and para 63 (‘Although this Judicial Committee is not engaged in a
strict process of statutory interpretation, it seems to us, by analogy with such an exercise of statutory
interpretation, the Judicial Committee would be falling into error if it did not interpret the phrase “In
Competition” as carrying the defined meaning throughout the By-Law and in the Schedules to the
By-Law’).
15 For English law authority on this point, see Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd
Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 115 (whereas a word used several times in the document is presumed
to have the same meaning throughout, ‘different words should, prima facie, be given a different
meaning. The drafter should never be presumed to have been gratuitous in his changes of wording’);
Re Globespan Airways Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1159, [2013] 1 WLR 1122, per Arden LJ at 42
(‘Paragraph 83(4) uses two different concepts: receipt and registration. Since different words are used,
it must be assumed that different events are referred to’).
For CAS authority, see Villanueva v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4534, where the CAS panel decided that an
athlete was not required to prove how the prohibited substance got into his system in order to establish
lack of intent (and so trigger mitigation of sanction under Article 10.2 of the 2015 World Anti-Doping
Code) in part because Article 10.2 did not mention any such requirement, whereas Articles 10.4
and 10.5 of the same Code expressly stated that such proof was a pre-condition to establishing No
(or No Significant) Fault or Negligence (and so qualifying for mitigation of sanction) under those
Articles. The Panel explained: ‘This engages the principle inclusion unius eclusio alterius: if such
establishment is expressly required in one rule, its omission in another must be treated as deliberate
and significant. The omission in FINA DC modelled on WADC 2015 of the need to establish source
as a precondition of proof of lack of intent must be presumed to be deliberate’ (ibid, para 35). See also
Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, para 122 (same); Hansen
v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 21.5 (rejecting argument that requirement of presence of minimum
amount of drug should be read into the rules to exclude the possibility that the drug was produced
naturally in the athlete’s body, on the basis that ‘EAMDC 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 recognise that provision may
be made in the Equine prohibited list [for] quantitative thresholds in cases where the substances can
be produced endogenously or ingested from the environment or as a result of contamination. [But] No
such provision has been made for Capsaican; and there is no indication in the evidence before us that
any is contemplated’). Cf Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190, para 52 (‘The Appellant’s submission
that because the 2015 EAD rules expressly stipulate that certain factors, ie, supplement mislabelling,
undisclosed third-party administration, are not available to support a case of no significant fault or
negligence, [therefore under earlier versions of the EAD Rules applicable] prior thereto they must have
been so available is based on no known canon of construction’).
Sometimes courts and tribunals will extend this principle to say that a proposed interpretation
cannot be right because if that was what the SGB had meant, then it could and would have just said it.
See eg Korda v ITF Ltd (t/a International Tennis Federation), Independent, 21 April 1999 (CA), per
Clarke LJ at p 20 of the Lawtel transcript (rule providing that ‘any dispute arising out of any decision’
of a domestic panel may be appealed to CAS should be given its natural, broad meaning because,
inter alia, ‘section V(3) could have been drafted more narrowly, but it was not’); Billington v FIBT,
CAS OG 2002/005, para 30 (‘If the “draftsperson” had wanted to provide otherwise, he or she would
have added a provision to the effect that athletes placed below the 8th position can move up, in order to
replace athletes in the top eight who do not participate’); FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 22
(‘had those who drafted the Bye-Law intended to apply it to clothing as worn, they could have said
so’). However, it has been cogently argued that this question, while often forensically attractive, is
‘seldom helpful’ in determining the proper meaning of the text, because the fact is that the dispute has
arisen precisely because the particular issue that has arisen was not foreseen by the drafter. Lewison,
The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), p 81.
C Considering the broader factual context of the regulations,

including their purpose
B1.57 If the above analysis yields a clear and unequivocal meaning, there is both
English law and CAS authority that that is the meaning that should be adopted, without
further ado, in accordance with the principle in claris non fit interpretario.1 However,
English law is now clear that regard should be had to the context even when there is no
apparent ambiguity in the text,2 and CAS jurisprudence concurs, in particular so far
as Swiss law is concerned.3 Therefore, the proposed interpretation must be tested not
only against the actual words used in the provision in question, in their documentary
context, but also against their wider factual (historical and commercial) context, and
against their underlying object and purpose.4 In other words, determining the proper
meaning of the words used in the provision in question always means the following
requirements:
(a) The meaning that the words would convey to a reasonable person given the
‘factual matrix’ in which the regulations came into being must be considered,5
ie (in this context) the background circumstances prevalent in that SGB’s sport
generally at the time the regulations were issued, including the problems the
SGB was facing that led it to issue the regulations.
(b) In particular the underlying object and purpose of the regulations, objectively
assessed, must be considered and an interpretation of the meaning of the
regulations that advances that purpose to one that would frustrate it be
preferred.6
(i) For example, in IAAF v USATF, the CAS panel rejected the USATF’s
argument that the IAAF’s rules should be interpreted as permitting
national federations not to disclose domestic decisions exonerating
their athletes of doping charges to the IAAF, because that would not
‘accord with the purposes of the Rule, which quite clearly is to ensure
that the domestic hearing process – from its conduct to the conclusions
which result – is subject to scrutiny by the IAAF and, if necessary, an
IAAF Arbitration Panel’.7
(ii) Similarly, in FIGC, Mannini, Possanzini and CONI v WADA, a CAS
panel ruled that the World Anti-Doping Code prohibition of ‘failing to
provide a sample’ had to be interpreted to include an unauthorised delay
in providing a sample after due notification of the requirement to do so,
during which the athlete was not chaperoned, because:
‘any other interpretation of the meaning of the word “failing” to submit to
sample collection under Article 2.3 would prevent achieving the purpose of
the anti-doping rules with regard to In-Competition sample collection, which
is to avoid giving athletes who want to cheat an opportunity to do so between
the point in time of notification and their arrival at the doping control station’.8
(iii) A more extreme example of the use of the purposive approach to inform
the meaning to be given to the text of the rule is Canadian Olympic
Committee & Scott v IOC. Rule 25 of the Olympic Charter provided that
an athlete who breached the IOC’s rules of conduct would be excluded
from the Olympic Games. The appellants argued that this meant that
the excluded athlete’s results from any competitions in which she
had participated during the Games should be disqualified, so that any
medals she had won should be taken from her and given to the next-
placed athlete. The IOC disagreed, and therefore declined to upgrade
the Canadian cross-country skier’s bronze medal from the Salt Lake
Games to gold after the two Russians who finished ahead of her were
found guilty of anti-doping rule violations. The Panel decided that ‘the
wording and grammar’ of Rule 25 ‘do not provide absolute clarity’ on
the issue, and so the meaning of Rule 25 ‘must be further sought in a
broader interpretation of the provisions of the OC [Olympic Charter],
complementing the literal with the purposive approach to interpretation’.
It then concluded that the principles of fair play and sporting ethics
enshrined in the Olympic Charter:
‘are irreconcilable with an interpretation of Rule 25 § 2.2.1 of the OC
which would allow an athlete excluded from Olympic Games for doping
to retain any Olympic medals gained at such games. To put it another way,
allowing an athlete to retain certain medals while excluding her/him from the
Olympic Games on the basis of Rule 25 § 2.2.1 would amount to ignoring the
Fundamental Principles upon which the OC is founded and make a mockery
of the confidence placed in such principles by other athletes’.
It therefore ordered that the Russians should lose their medals and the
other finishers in the race should all be bumped up two places.9
(iv) Taking the object or purpose behind the SGB’s regulations into account
means that that object or purpose has to be ascertained by the court or
tribunal.10 Some purposes are so obvious that they are taken as read. For
example, for there to be a level playing-field throughout a sport, all of
the participants in that sport must be treated equally,11 and therefore any
proposed interpretation that would lead to disparate treatment should be
rejected.12 Otherwise, however, if the SGB has not stated the objectives
underlying the regulations in the regulations themselves, then it may be
necessary to search the ‘legislative history’ in order to identify them.13
This sits somewhat uneasily with English law’s insistence that subjective
declarations of intent and statements made during the negotiation of the
‘contract’ are inadmissible to ascertain its meaning.14 However, there is
a distinction between examining contemporaneous documents as part of

the factual matrix to assess what the issues were in the environment in
which the regulation was adopted, and so the objective intention behind
it, and hearing evidence from drafters as to what the intention was, which
is subjective, and also affected by the fact of the dispute. Furthermore,
such evidence may be seen as admissible, in this context at least, on the
basis that SGB regulations are less of a negotiated contract and more
of a unilateral pronouncement akin to a statute (for which resort to
‘external aids to construction’ such as records of parliamentary debates
would be admissible15), and on the basis that other courts construing the
(transnational) regulations will be considering the legislative history, and
therefore harmonisation demands that English courts do the same.16 On
the other hand, even CAS panels would treat with great caution subjective
statements made by the SGB after the dispute has arisen, purporting to
identify the original intent behind the text in dispute.17
(c) The presumption is that a common sense outcome was intended.18 Accordingly,
the tribunal is entitled to prefer a proposed interpretation that is consistent with
common sense, given the context in which the regulation is to apply, and its
intended purpose, and to reject one that is not.19
(d) Similarly, the tribunal is also entitled to prefer a proposed interpretation that
would make the rule easier to administer over a proposed interpretation ‘that
would render the provision difficult (if not impossible) to apply in practice’.20
(e) According to Swiss law,21 ‘another aspect potentially relevant as a source
of interpretation of the rules is the common practice and understanding of a
certain provision by the relevant stakeholders’.22 One CAS panel has explained
that ‘the main prerequisites for the emergence of such a “binding common
practice” are that a certain understanding or application of a rule is practised
over a certain period of time (long standing practice) and that such practice
reflects the majority opinion of the relevant stakeholders’.23 This approach
may be motivated, at least in some cases, by notions of equal treatment and/or
legitimate expectation. For example, the CAS panel in Nabokov noted:
‘The Panel therefore has to acknowledge that the rule has always been interpreted as
providing a possibility of representing two countries but only for players who were
under the age of eighteen when they represented their first country. Since the Panel
finds this to be a valid interpretation of the rule and since it has been interpreted in
that way ever since it was implemented, the Panel will not interpret it differently.
This is in the interest of fairness to all other players whose eligibility for playing for
another country has previously been denied because of this particular interpretation
of Bylaw 204 (1)c’.24
Taken to its extreme, however, this approach could obviously undermine legal
certainty. For example, the CAS has relied on this doctrine to justify giving an
SGB’s regulations their ‘real meaning’ (which was the opposite of their literal
meaning) based on the practice of that SGB and its decision-making organs in
interpreting and applying the regulations.25 Such an approach is not favoured
in English law, unless (exceptionally) the practice is deemed sufficient to give
rise to an ‘estoppel by convention’,26 because of concerns that it undermines
legal certainty, and because it runs counter to the well-settled principles that
the parties’ subjective understanding of what the rules mean is irrelevant27 and
that the proper interpretation of the rules is a matter of law to be determined by
the courts or arbitral panels, not by the parties.28 However, it is not just a Swiss
law doctrine: it is reflected in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, is part of the Unidroit Principles for International Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, and is also accepted in
some other common law jurisdictions.29 As a result, it is perhaps hard to dispute
that it is a ‘general principle’ of law that may be used to help determine the
proper meaning of an SGB’s regulations, at least to the extent those regulations

are not confined in scope to England but instead have transnational effect.
1 For English law authority on this point, see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900, 2908,
para 23 (‘Where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it’, even if it
regards the results as commercially improbable); Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL),
per Lord Wilberforce at p 272 (‘it is usual, and indeed correct, to look first for a clear meaning of the
words used’ and only resort to consideration of the purpose of the enactment if the meaning of the
text is ambiguous); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport
Resolutions decision dated 5 March 2012, para 35(e) (‘where the parties have used unambiguous
language, the court must apply it’).
For CAS authority, see eg WADA v Covert, CAS 2012/A/2960, para 98 (‘A “purposive” reading of
the ISL would only be appropriate if the ISL provision in question contained some ambiguity so that
consideration of the underlying purpose of the text would help to clarify the meaning of the provision.
However, this is not the case here. Article 5.1.2.8 is clear as to what laboratories are required to do’);
Turkish Boxing Federation v AIBA, CAS 2009/A/1827, para 7.5 (‘Based on the evidence and the
arguments submitted, the Panel was not satisfied that the provisions of Chapter 1 of the AIBA By-laws
required an interpretation that deviated from their clear wording. In the absence of any ambiguity,
the Panel considered that the wording of Chapter 1 of the By-laws should be attributed its clear,
literal meaning’); Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, para 43 (‘the second sentence of the
OMAC Explanatory Memorandum’s paragraph cited by the IOC specifically and unambiguously states
that “the rules of the International Federation concerned […] govern the question of any invalidation
of the result obtained by the team” (see supra at 39). In the Panel’s view, this language, coupled with
the above quoted paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the OMAC’s Chapter II makes absolutely clear the IOC
legislator’s wish to leave the matter of the invalidation (or not) of team results to the discretion of
the interested International Federations. In this respect, the Panel evokes the generally recognized
interpretive principle “in claris non fit interpretatio”, meaning that when a rule is clearly intelligible,
there is no need of looking for an alternative or imaginative interpretation’); AOC v FIBT, CAS
OG 2010/01, para 6.3 (‘clear language […] must be respected and given meaning’); Celtic v UEFA,
98/201, para 15 (‘The Panel is of the opinion that both FIFA and UEFA Regulations are sufficiently
clear in their wording that they [do] not need to be completed or clarified through construction’).
2 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101 [HL], per Lord Hoffman at para 37 (noting his
own ruling in ISC v West Bromwich that ‘it was not necessary to find an “ambiguity” before one could
have any regard to background’) and at para 24 (‘in deciding whether or not there is a clear mistake,
the court is not confined to reading the document without regard to its background or context. As the
exercise is part of the single task of interpretation, the background and context must always be taken into
consideration’); Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896
(HL), per Lord Hoffman at 913B–C (‘The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would
convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words
is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using
those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The
background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of
words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the
parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax’); Mannai Investment Co Ltd
v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] WLR 749 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 775 (‘The meaning
of words, as they would appear in a dictionary, and the effect of their syntactical arrangement, as it
would appear in a grammar, is part of the material which we use to understand a speaker’s utterance.
But it is only a part; another part is our knowledge of the background against which the utterance
was made. It is that background which enables us, not only to choose the intended meaning when a
word has more than one dictionary meaning but also, in the ways I have explained, to understand a
speaker’s meaning, often without ambiguity, when he has used the wrong words’); R (Westminster
City Council) v National Asylum Support Service [2002] UKHL 38, [2002] 1 WLR 2955, per Lord
Steyn at 5 (‘language in all legal texts conveys meaning according to the circumstances in which it
was used. It follows that the context must always be identified and considered before the process
of construction or during it. It is therefore wrong to say that the court may only resort to evidence
of the contextual scene where an ambiguity has arisen’). See also (in the context of interpretation
of statutes); Bloomsbury International Ltd v Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
[2011] UKSC 25, per Lord Mance at 10 (‘In matters of statutory construction, the statutory purpose
and the general scheme by which it is to be put into effect are of central importance. They represent
the context in which individuals words are to be understood’); Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204
[HL], per Lord Diplock at 1206-07 (‘If one looks back to the actual decisions of this House on
questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence
of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions’);
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at p 280 (noting ‘an increasing
willingness to give a purposive construction to the Act’). See also Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation
Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245, 248 (‘The next heresy is the assumption that one
must identify a relevant ambiguity as a precondition to taking into account evidence of the settling
of a legal text. Enormous energy and ingenuity is employed by lawyers in trying to find relevant
ambiguities. This is the wrong starting point. Language can never be understood divorced from its
context. The symbols of language convey meaning according to the circumstances in which they were
used. The true purpose of interpretation is to find the contextual meaning of the language of the text,
ie what the words wold convey to the reasonable person circumstanced as the parties were. Speaking
of contracts, Lord Wilberforce said that there is invariably a setting in which the language has to be
placed. The court always entitled to be informed of the contextual scene of a contract. The same
principle applies to the interpretation of all legal texts’) and p 250 (‘Legislative language can only be
understood against the backcloth of the world to which it relates. Sometimes judgments do not fully
take into account the different levels of reasoning at which the context is relevant. As in the case of
other legal texts, the setting is relevant to what different meanings the language of the text may let in.
But it is also relevant when the judge comes to select among the possible interpretations the best one. It
is a fundamental misconception to think that the background to the statute may only be admitted in the
event of an ambiguity. Interpretation requires judges to make informed choices’); McLeod, Principles
of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), pp 14–15 (‘The traditional view […]
is that the process of interpretation starts with identifying the literal meaning of the enacted words. In
fact, however, this approach is fundamentally defective, because it proceeds on the false assumption
that a word, or group of words, will always have a single, plain meaning. The truth of the matter is that
many words have a variety of meanings and their meaning on particular occasions cannot be identified
without reference to the context within which they are used. […] particular importance is attached to
the context within which a provision appears and […] the purpose of a provision is a very important
part of its context. Both context and purpose, therefore, require closer consideration’).
3 Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para 39(a) (rejecting the idea ‘that modern principles of
interpretation, in any jurisdiction, now require there to be any doubt or ambiguity about the meaning
of a word or a phrase or a provision in a contract before consideration is given to the purpose or
object of the contract or its surrounding circumstances […]’); TTF Liebherr Ochsenhausen v ETTU,
CAS 2007/A/1363, para 12 (‘By interpreting rules and regulations of associations, the starting point
and the predominant element of construction is the wording (literal interpretation). Other elements
such as the systematic context, the purpose and the history of the rule may contribute to the correct
understanding of the meaning of the rule. This principle is accepted in both civil and common law and
it has been constantly applied by CAS panels’); Russian Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre
Internationale, CAS OG 04/001, para 19 (‘it is always necessary to seek a purposive and contextual
construction of such rules so as to discern their true intent and effect […]’).
4 As in, eg Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, paras 73-75. See cases cited at para B1.54, n 4. See
also IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 8 (‘As submitted by the IAAF, “the starting point and the
finishing point of construction is in the text”. Arguments from policy or purpose have their place in
such an exercise to the extent that they enable one to consider “whether or not the construction that a
literal interpretation favours is or is not compatible with the perceptible purpose of the Rule”’). See
also McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), p 16 (‘The
purposive approach to interpretation […] requires that regard must be had to both the purpose behind
the words and the meaning of the words, with the relationship between the two being that the purpose
may inform (but not supplant) the meaning’); Bell and Engle (Eds), Cross: Statutory Interpretation,
3rd Edn (Butterworths, 1995), p 19 (‘Under the purposive approach, the judge may look beyond the
four corners of the statute to find a reason for giving a particular interpretation to its words, and his role
is one of active co-operation with the policy of the statute’).
5 For English law authority on this point, see Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building
Society [1998] WLR 896 (HL), per Lord Hoffman at 912H–913A (‘The background was famously
referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the “matrix of fact”, but this phrase is, if anything, an understated
description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been
reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next [ie previous negotiations
of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent], it includes absolutely anything which would
have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a
reasonable man’).
For CAS authority, see DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘In its search [for the
objective meaning of the rule in question], the adjudicating body will have further to identify the
intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule, and such body may also
take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation’); Jersey Football
Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 126, quoting with approval IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA,
CAS 2010/A/2071, para 46 (same).
6 GNK Dinamo v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3324, para 9.11 (‘[…] the rules must be applied according to
their spirit not merely according to their letter. In other words, the Panel has to interpret the rules in
question in keeping with the perceived intention of the rule maker, and not in a way that frustrates it’);
Ward v IOC, AIBA & ANOC, CAS OG 12/002, para 25 (same); Irish Hockey Association v/Lithuanian
Hockey//International Hockey Federation, CAS 2001/A/354 and Lithuanian Hockey v/International
Hockey Federation, CAS 2001/A/355, para 7 (same); Juliano et al v FEI, CAS 2017/A/5114, para 82
(same); Cullwick v FINA, CAS 96/149, para 22 (same).
For English law authority on this point, see eg Modahl v The British Athletic Federation Limited,
1997 WL 1105493, 28 July 1997 (CA), per Lord Woolf at page 7 (doubting an interpretation of the rules
proposed by the athlete because ‘the adoption of any implied term which does not treat the disciplinary
process as a whole could be said to be inconsistent with the clear intent of the BAF and IAAF Rules
which is to confine the right of appeal to issues of substance and not to allow procedural defects to
interfere with disciplinary proceedings unless they would affect the integrity of the decision’); R v
British Basketball Association, ex p Mickan, 1981 WL 695917, 17 March 1981 [CA], per Lord Justice
Cumming-Bruce at p 3 (‘The […] Regulations […] have to be construed in the context of the object and
structure of the Association. In this context, Rule 20.3 does not have the meaning and effect for which
the appellants contend. The purpose of that rule is only to provide that where valid licences have been
granted, their operation shall date back to the date of receipt of documents and fees by the Association
[…]’); USACA v ICC, ICC Dispute Committee (Michael Beloff QC, sole arbitrator), para 52 (rejecting
submission that clause saying object of ICC is to ‘administer […] the game of cricket worldwide in
cooperation with its Members’ means the member must agree to any rule or action proposed by the
ICC, because ‘If correct it would mean that the Articles providing for suspension or expulsion – the
antithesis of a cooperative exercise – would be inconsistent with the ICC’s objects. […] Yet the MOA
and Articles must be read […] purposively. Presumptively as an international governing body ICC
must be able to govern’); Cellino v The Football League, decision of Professional Conduct Committee
(Tim Kerr QC) dated 5 April 2014, para 61 (accepting ‘the uncontroversial proposition that a sport
body’s rules should be interpreted in a manner that accords with the purpose of the rules and with
common sense, and not in a technical way’).
For CAS authority, see eg Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 75 (preferring a proposed
meaning of a rule that is ‘supported when interpreting FINA DC 10.1 in the light of its purpose’);
Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 140 (preferring the broader of two
opposing interpretations of a disciplinary prohibition, because ‘this interpretation is also in line with
the “zero tolerance to match-fixing” which, according to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 2010/A/2267)
presents one of the most important values and principles of behaviour in football’); FC Barcelona
v FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3793, para 9.14 (rejecting a proposed interpretation as ‘not reasonable in light
of the overall context and rationale for the rules concerning transfer of minors’, because it would
mean the rule did not capture all of the mischief intended to be addressed); Fédération Française des
Echecs et al v Fédération Internationale des Echecs, CAS 2010/O/2166, para 9.7.8 (requirement that a
candidate for election as president of the international federation ‘should have been a member of their
federation at least one year before the General Assembly’ should be interpreted as recommendatory
rather than mandatory, because of the use of ‘should’ rather than ‘must’ or ‘shall’, but also because
‘if membership in the nominating federation were mandatory, a number of FIDA federations would
never be able to submit candidates because in their countries individuals cannot be members of the
national federation but rather only in clubs which in turn are members in (regional bodies or) the
national federation’); WADA v Troy & IRB, CAS 2008/A/1652, preliminary award on jurisdiction
dated 18 March 2009, paras 70-71 (preferring an interpretation of the rules on appeals that enabled the
parties with a right of appeal to make an informed decision as to whether they should exercise that right
to an alternative interpretation that ‘would undermine the effectiveness of the provision for its obvious
purpose of facilitating the global supervision of the handling of anti-doping rule violation allegations
in the sport of rugby’); Midtjylland v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1485, para 7.2.5 (‘Any other construction
would be contrary to the clearly intended objective and spirit of the regulation. The Panel accepts
that to apply Art. 19 of the RSTP restrictively, to professional players only, could result in obviating
protection of young amateur players from the risk of abuse and ill treatment, which was clearly not
within the anticipation of the scope of the regulation’); Perez v IOC, CAS OG 2000/005, para 27
(in construing Olympic Charter rule regulating transfers of sporting allegiance between countries,
‘Having regard to the principles of the Charter, particularly those expressed in Rules 2, 3, 9 and 31
[the interests of athletes are fundamental; Olympic competition is between athletes not countries], the
Panel considers that the word “nationality” in Rule 46 and its Bye-Law should be construed broadly.
In so far as it is relevant to consider whether a person has lost his or her nationality, the Panel is of the
view that the person may be found to have lost it both in circumstances where he or she is de jure or de
facto stateless’); FFG v SOCOG, CAS OG 2000/014, para 24 (‘In our view a purposive construction of
Bye-Law 1 to Rule 61 in its entirety leads to the conclusion that the measurement must be carried out
on the clothing as worn’); Czech Olympic Committee and Swedish Olympic Committee v IIHF, CAS
OG 98/004-005, paras 25 and 29 (declining to adopt a strict interpretation of a rule sanctioning the
fielding of an ineligible player at the Olympic Games because it ‘would defeat the very purpose of the
rule’ and contradict the Olympic ideal of fair play); International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215,
para 35 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a rule that ‘would not correspond to the objectives
which lie behind the rule’) and para 36 (assessing the merits of competing interpretations of a rule
imposing a waiting period before a transfer of allegiance by ‘evaluat[ing] how these alternatives would
correspond to the objectives behind the waiting period rule’).
7 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 18. This case is discussed further at para B1.39.
8 FIGC, Mannini, Possanzini & CONI v WADA, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 62. See also Eder v IOC,
CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.43 (rejecting the suggestion that ‘possession’ in WADC Art 2.6 should be
interpreted as requiring proof of possession of all of the elements required to perform a prohibited
method as ‘unworkable and counter-productive to the fight against doping’).
9 Canadian Olympic Committee & Scott v IOC, CAS 2002/O/373, paras 46, 47, 51.
10 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (‘The adjudicating body would further have to identify
the intentions (objectively construed) of the association which drafted the rule’).
11 See para B1.27.
12 Celtic v UEFA, CAS 98/A/201, para 30 (holding that a UEFA circular should be interpreted in a way
that ensured equal treatment between national federations, because ‘bearing in mind the interest of the
game of football which is obviously the goal that any FIFA or UEFA statutes, rules and regulations
must serve, it is not conceivable in the opinion of the Panel that FIFA could deliberately have drawn
up rules which could entail severe disparities between clubs competing against each other in the same
football championship’); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 32 (rejecting argument rule should
be interpreted to mean decisions exonerating athletes of doping did not have to be communicated to
the international federation because, inter alia, ‘[a]ny other conclusion would result in international
athletics being played out on an uneven field, tilted this way or that according to the rules, whims and
relative weight of various IAAF Members, to the detriment of the sport and, perhaps more importantly,
its athletes’); Segura v IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, para 25 (declining to read into a rule requiring that
disqualification from a race be communicated ‘immediately’ a conclusion that the disqualification is
invalid if that requirement is not met, because ‘it would be intolerable to disregard the unchallenged
finding that on three occasions three separate judges found the Applicant to have infringed the rules.
The Panel must have regard to the interests of competitors who did not infringe the rules, and who
are entitled to the benefits of their effort’); International Baseball Association, CAS 98/215, para 25
(rejecting an interpretation of a rule that would have the ‘unacceptable’ consequence that ‘Athletes
with dual legal nationality would be put in a disadvantage in comparison with athletes who have only
one legal nationality’) and para 27 (‘there is no reason to treat athletes unequally in sports depending
on whether an athlete has one or more legal nationalities’).
13 See eg Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 135 (‘when interpreting
rules establishing by international sporting bodies, the intent of the sporting body when drafting the
rules (ie the sporting objectives that the rules reach for), inasmuch as it can be adequately ascertained,
is a factor of important weight. When the evidence at hand helps determine the organization’s intent
at the time of drafting the rules, and this intent does not blatantly contradict the text of the norm, this
should be taken into consideration’); DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3 (panel interpreting
rule ‘may also take account of any relevant historical background which illuminates its derivation’);
Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and
Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 26
(‘a source for interpreting a provision can also be its historical genesis’); IFA v FAI, Kearns & FIFA,
CAS 2010/A/2071, para 55 (‘the purpose of historical interpretation is to consider the historical
conditions in, from and because of which the current legal text originated. It requires ascertainment
of not only the genesis of but also the entire development underlying the text so as to ascertain how
it obtained its final linguistic expression and to enable useful comparison to be made of the present
with any previous rules regulating the same legal matter’). See eg UEFA v Z Association, Swiss
Federal Tribunal judgment of 22 December 2008, 4A_392/2008, para 4.2.3.3 (basing interpretation of
provision of UEFA Statutes in part on statements in the minute of the UEFA Congress as to the intent
behind the provision); FA of Wales v UEFA, CAS 2004/A/593, para 4 (same); FIFA v CONMEBOL
& Fernandez, CAS 2016/A/4416, paras 71-72 (deciding that it was permissible to adopt for one
recreational drug an approach permitted by the World Anti-Doping Code for a different recreational
drug, based on a detailed recounting of how and why the approach came to be included in the Code for
that second recreational drug).
14 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896, per Lord
Hoffman at 913 (‘The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of
parties and their declarations of subjective intent. […] The law makes this distinction for reasons of
practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret
utterances in ordinary life’).
On the other hand, evidence of such matters may be admissible to establish the factual matrix that
constitutes the background against which the meaning of the contract is to be determined. Chartbrook
Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] AC 1101, per Lord Hoffman at 42 (‘The rule
excludes evidence of what was said or done during the course of negotiating the agreement for the
purpose of drawing inferences about what the contract meant. It does not exclude the use of such
evidence for other purposes: for example, to establish that a fact which may be relevant as background
was known to the parties, or to support a claim for rectification or estoppel. These are not exceptions
to the rule. They operate outside it’).
Publishing, 2018), para 3.44.6. See also Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No. 2) [2003] UKHL 40,
[2004] 1 AC 816, per Lord Nicholls at 839-844 (discussing when courts may refer to statements made
in Parliament as a means of determining the proper construction of a statute). On the other hand, where
the SGB regulations in issue are more like a negotiated agreement, as in, for example, the qualification
rules for the Olympic Games, the normal principle of inadmissibility should apply. See eg AOC v
FIBT, CAS OG 2010/01, para 6.12 (‘In the Panel’s view the draft document submitted by the Olympic
Council of Ireland [namely, a previous draft of the Qualification System discussed between the IOC
and the FIBT] is of no assistance. It is clearly a draft which was the subject of internal discussions
between the IOC and the FIBT. There was no indication that the draft, or the discussion between the
IOC and the FIBT, were provided or made known to the FIBT’s members or the various NOCs or
athletes. Further, a review of the draft reveals that there are a number of other differences between it
and the final version of the Qualification System. These were not addressed or explained by the FIBT,
the IOC or the Olympic Council of Ireland and there was no explanation of the nature and content of
the discussion relating to the draft and the preparation of the final document. In these circumstances,
the Panel is not prepared to draw any inferences, or draw any conclusions on the basis of the different
versions of the Qualification System. It must base its decision on the final, published document’).
16 See by way of analogy Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL), per Lord Diplock at 282B
(given that foreign courts look at legislative history in interpreting meaning of international treaties, in
the interests of uniformity of application English courts should do the same).
17 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 135 (‘When the evidence at hand
helps determine the organization’s intent at the time of drafting the rules, and this intent does not
blatantly contradict the text of the norm, this should be taken into consideration. This, of course, does
not mean that any ex post ascertainment of purpose by the international body can be considered to be
an “authentic interpretation” of the rules, particularly when it is made once a dispute is filed’).
18 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Naughton [1997] 1 WLR 118 (QB) 130G-
H (Popplewell J).
19 For English law authority on this point, see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, per
Lord Clarke at para 21 (‘If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the
construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other’), followed
in GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions
decision dated 5 March 2012, para 35(d).
For CAS authority, see Stroman v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 58 (rejecting proposed interpretation
of FEI rule that ‘is suggested neither by language nor by logic’); Bassani-Antivari v IOC, CAS
OG 2002/003, para 23 (where the words in a provision of a rule were capable of two different meanings,
the one that was ‘illogical’ was rejected); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 30 (endorsing an
interpretation based on the plain meaning of the words where it was also ‘logical and practical’);
Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 142 (‘The Panel accepts that the texts of the above rules differ
in their language, but is not persuaded by the Appellant’s contention that the new rule expands rather
than merely emphasizes what is inherent in the old rule or that the latter is, on its true construction,
more favourable to him than the former. In the Panel’s view, both the offering and the giving of
gifts (other than of a kind specifically permitted) are proscribed under both sets of rules as being
objectionable. To focus on the absence of an express use of the word “offer” or “offering” in the old
rule makes no more sense than to focus on the absence of the word “give” or “giving” in the new rule.
It can hardly be contemplated that the draftsman intended to outlaw only offers but not actual making
of gifts in the new rule or, by parity of reasoning, intended to outlaw only making of gifts but not
their offer in the old rule. Both rules embrace acts which are the mirror image of each other vis-a-vis
gifts, ie giving or accepting, and the Panel considers that a purposive construction in this disciplinary
(not criminal) context eliminates any material distinction between them. Moreover, the Panel finds
that “giving” in the old rule must include “offering” since the vice lies in the offer. Whether or not an
offer is accepted depends solely upon the reaction of the intended recipient – a matter which is not
within the control of the offeror. Exculpating the offeror merely because there was a virtuous intended
recipient who declined it, while condemning an offeror whose offer is accepted, would be a very odd
and irrational rule that could not have been the intent of the draftsman’).
20 WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 104. See also WADA v Bataa & IPF, CAS 2013/A/3316,
para 55 (rejecting an interpretation that would create a distinction that would be difficult to apply in
practice).
21 Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, paras 124-25 (accepting ‘in principle’
UEFA’s submission that ‘under Swiss law a crucial factor for interpretation is how an association itself
applies a rule in question (so-called “Vereinsubung”) […] it is not even required that such application
amounts to standard, long-standing practice but a one-time application may suffice to be an “important
indication” (“gewichtiges Indiz”) as to how a statutory provision shall be applied’); FC Schalke
et al v FIFA, CAS 2008/A/1622-1624, paras 78–79 (‘under Swiss association law, customary law
can represent a valid set of rules of an association. For this, two requirements have to be met: (i) a
constantly and consistently applied practice of the respective association (inveterate consuetudo), and
(ii) the conviction of the members of that association that such practice is legally binding (opinion
necessitates) […]. It is undisputed under Swiss association law that such customary law may on the
one hand complement the statutes of an association, ie, fill a loophole within the statutes, and may
on the other hand help to interpret the statutes’). See also Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v
UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 and Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v UEFA &
FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1584, para 25 (‘A source for interpreting a provision is – apart
from the wording of the provision – also how it is applied in practice by the association’s organs’);
Fulham FC v FC Metz, CAS 2006/A/896, para 7.2.6 (‘In determining the intent of a party or the intent
which a reasonable person would have had in the same circumstances, it is necessary to look first to
the words actually used or the conduct engaged in. However, the investigation is not to be limited to
those words or the conduct even if they appear to give a clear answer to the question. In order to go
beyond the apparent meaning of the words or the conduct of the parties, due consideration is to be
given to all relevant circumstances of the case. This includes the negotiations and any subsequent
conduct of the parties’); Bulgarian Chess Federation v FIDE, CAS 2012/A/2943, para 8.20 (‘Art.
14.4 of the FIDE Financial Regulations does not explicitly exclude that an event can be organised by
someone that is not a “federation”. Furthermore, the provision should also be interpreted in light of
FIDE practice. The Respondent has provided evidence that events in the past have also been awarded
to non-federations’).
22 DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, para 3.
23 Ibid, para 4.
Federation, CAS 2001/A/357, para 9. See also Gibraltar FA v UEFA, CAS 2002/O/410, para 23
(rejecting a proposed interpretation of the UEFA membership criteria that would have required that
the applicant be recognised politically as an independent state on the ground, among others, that such
argument ‘is contradicted by the fact that UEFA already has – and had at the time when the application
was made – a number of member associations from countries which do not enjoy independent
statehood, such as Scotland, Wales or the Faroe Islands’).
25 In FC Pyunik Terevan v L, AFC Rapid Bucaresti & FIFA, CAS 2007/A/1358, having established that its
former player had breached his playing contract with it during the ‘protected period’, the appellant club
pointed out that the applicable FIFA regulation provided that in such circumstances ‘sporting sanctions
shall also be imposed’ on the player, and argued that the FIFA Dispute Resolution Committee had
erred in interpreting that regulation as giving it a power but not a duty to impose such a sanction. The
CAS panel agreed with the club that the text of the regulation was clearly mandatory (at para 55): ‘It
follows from a literal application of the said provision that it is a duty of the competent body to impose
sporting sanctions on a player who has breached his contract during the protected period: “shall” is
obviously different from “may”; consequently, if the intention of the FIFA Regulations was to give
the competent body the power to impose a sporting sanction, it would have employed the word “may”
and not “shall”. According based on the wording of art. 17 para 3 of the FIFA Regulations, a sporting
sanction should have been imposed’. However, it found that the ‘real meaning’ of the regulation
was different: ‘56. However this Panel considers that rules and regulations have to be interpreted in
accordance with their real meaning. This is true also in relation with the statutes and the regulations of
an association. Of course, if the wording of a provision is clear, one needs clear and strong arguments
to deviate from it. 56. During the hearing, FIFA observed that it is stable, consistent practice of FIFA
and of the DRC in particular, to decide on a case by case basis whether to sanction a player or not.
Even though it is fair to say that the circumstances behind the decisions filed by FIFA to demonstrate
such a practice differ from case to case, the Panel is satisfied that there is a well accepted and consistent
practice of the DRC not to apply automatically a sanction as per art. 17 para 3 of the FIFA Regulations.
The Panel is therefore inclined to follow such an interpretation of the rationale of art. 17 para 3 of the
FIFA Regulations which may be considered contrary to the literal interpretation, but appears to be
consolidated practice and represents the real meaning of the provision as it is interpreted, executed and
followed within FIFA’. Similarly, in DFB et al v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5063, the CAS panel relied on
such longstanding practice not just as demonstrating how the FIFA regulations should be interpreted
but as establishing an exception to a general rule set out in the FIFA regulations that was not mentioned
in those regulations.
Other CAS panels have taken a contrary approach, because of concerns about undermining legal
certainty. See eg Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, paras 125 (mandatory
regulations issued by SGBs ‘have priority over any deviating custom’); FC Schalke et al v FIFA,
CAS 2008/A/1622-1624, para 81 (‘Part of the Swiss doctrine […] contends that in the interest of legal
certainty customary law cannot be admitted contra legem; customary law may complement or help to
interpret the statutes of an association, but not derogate from their clear meaning’).
26 In short, where the parties have come to a shared view of the proper construction of their contract,
and have regulated their subsequent dealings on the basis of that common view, and one party would
suffer detriment if the other were permitted to resile from that common view, then the other may
be estopped from doing so. See eg Amalgamated Property Co v Texas Commerce International
Bank Ltd [1982] QB 84 at 122 (‘So here we have available to us, in point of practice if not in law,
evidence of subsequent conduct to come to our aid. It is available, not so as to construe the contract,
but to see how they themselves acted upon it. Under the guise of estoppel we can prevent either
party from going back on the interpretation they themselves gave to it […] There is no need to
inquire whether their particular interpretation is correct or not, or whether they were mistaken or
not. Suffice it that they have by the course of dealing, put their own interpretation on their contract,
and cannot be allowed to go back on it’); Costain Ltd v Tarmac Holdings Ltd [2017] EWHC 319,
para 101. In the context of sport, see the various selection cases where the CAS panel considered
that the selecting body should be estopped from interpreting its rules to exclude athletes that it had
previously led to believe would be eligible for selection, thereby inducing them to commit significant
time and effort to meeting the qualification criteria (discussed at para B1.37, n 2), and see Club X v
D & FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3765, para 70 (‘an association may be estopped from invoking a certain
rule or exercising such rule in a certain fashion if precedent representations induce a subordinate or
member to believe something resulting in that person’s reasonable and detrimental reliance on such
relief (“estoppel by representation”) (CAS OG 08/02)’); IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, paras 65,
74, discussed at para B1.39.
27 See para B1.54, n 1.
28 See para B1.50, n 1; James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd
[1970] AC 583, per Lord Reid at p 603 (‘it is now well settled that it is not legitimate to use as
an aid in the construction of the contract anything which the parties said or did after it was made.
Otherwise one might have the result that a contract meant one thing the day it was signed, but by
reason of subsequent events meant something different a month or a year later’), cited with approval
and followed in Pakistan Cricket Board v BCCI, ICC Dispute Resolution Committee decision dated
20 November 2018, para 30(vi). See generally Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), pp 179–182, 187. See also IWBF v UKAD & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230,
para 11.17 (‘[…] some reliance was also placed on what appeared arguably to be a laxer approach to
Article 10.4 by UKAD as prosecuting authority itself where cannabis use was concerned. The Sole
Arbitrator is unpersuaded that UKAD’s approach in such cases, whatever it may have been, can inform
construction in this way. The proper interpretation of a rule is a matter of law, not practice’); Russian
Olympic Committee v Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), CAS OG 04/001, para 19 (‘The
FEI letter mentions “Discussions and decisions during April 2004 referring to the interpretation of
Article 624.2”. The Panel must emphasise, for the avoidance of doubt, that the interpretation of the
FEI Regulations, as indeed of the rules of any sporting body, is a question of law. While it is always
necessary to seek a purposive and contextual construction of such rules so as to discern their true intent
and effect, a body cannot impose by discussion or decision after the coming into force of the rules,
a meaning which they do not otherwise bear. The Panel must add that while in practice the FEI (or
any other body in similar circumstances) must form an initial view as to the meaning of its rules, it is
the Panel which is vested with the function of finally determining that meaning, subject only to any
recourse (if any) to the Swiss Federal Tribunal […]’).
English law appears to be more ready to admit as a guide to the interpretation of a statute the manner
in which the statute has been interpreted and applied in practice, but this is not without controversy.
See Lowe & Potter, Understanding Legislation: A Practical Guide to Statutory Interpretation (Hart
Publishing, 2018), paras 3.58-3.60. Cf McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting
(Hart Publishing, 2008), pp 27–28 (discussing the difficulties under English law of putting weight on
guidance issued by regulators as to the proper interpretation of their regulations).
29 Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), pp 186–87 (noting
that the US and New Zealand permit reliance on parties’ subsequent conduct as evidence of proper
meaning of contract).
B1.58 Generally speaking, however, and notwithstanding the ‘iterative process’

outlined above that is to be followed to determine the proper meaning of the
regulation in question, the text of the regulation remains the starting point and the
end point of the analysis. For reasons of legal certainty and predictability, courts
and arbitrators should be slow to allow the contextual approach or the ‘purposive
approach’ to be used to derive a meaning that effectively re-writes the regulation.1
Similarly the court or tribunal should not under the guise of interpretation depart
from the obvious meaning of the words just because it does not like them. Its task is
to interpret and apply the regulations as it finds them, not to supplant the role of the
SGB by imposing its own view of what the regulations should say.2
1 WADA v Covert, CAS 2012/A/2960, para 98 (‘The Athlete has requested that the Panel give
Article 5.2.2.8 of the ISL a “purposive” interpretation, so as to find that the INRS laboratory
was required to retain the sample even though the laboratory had not been given notice to do so.
A “purposive” reading of the ISL would only be appropriate if the ISL provision in question contained
some ambiguity so that consideration of the underlying purpose of the text would help to clarify
the meaning of the provision. However, this is not the case here. Article 5.1..2.8 is clear as to what
laboratories are required to do. The Athlete’s proposed “purposive” reading would in fact be an
inappropriate re-writing of the article’); King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.6 (where the Appellant
had been charged with associating with certain individuals but the disciplinary rule in question only
prohibited associating with a suspended national federation, ‘the Respondent […] argued that there
was a lacuna [in the AIBA Disciplinary Code] which should be filled by purposive interpretation.
The Panel holds that such interpretation would be no more than disguised legislation and to accept
the Respondent’s invitation would violate the fundamental principle of criminal and disciplinary law
“nullem crimen sine lege”’).
2 For English law authority on this point, see Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 [SC], per Lord Neuberger
at 1628, para 20 (‘[…] while commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account
when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision
as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed,
even ignoring the benefit of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have
agreed, not what the courts think that they should have agreed’).
For CAS authority, see Russian Olympic Committee et al v IAAF, CAS 2016/O/4684, para 117 (‘[…]
this Panel’s duty is not that of rewriting a federation’s rules. The rule-making power, and the balance
to be struck in its exercise between the competing interests involved, is conferred on the competent
bodies of the sport entity, which shall exercise it taking also into account the overall legislative
framework. The duty of this Panel is to ensure that the exercise of such power does not conflict with
the rules that govern it, and not to alter the content (whether by way of interpretation or some other
form of “manipulation”) to transform them into something different’); Italian Canoe Federation et
al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(b) (‘[…] even if the Panel considered it [the approach
taken by the ICF in its qualification rules for the 2016 Olympic Games] to be counterintuitive, this
is a choice to be made by the ICF in what it understands is the best interest of the sport, a decision
that unless taken against specific duties or norms is not under the power of review of this Panel. The
Panel has full power to review the ICF’s correct application of its rules but it cannot mandate a specific
interpretation on the sole basis of what it considers to be more adequate to sporting logic’); RFEF v
FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3813, para 302 (‘However strict, [Article 105.4 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code]
must be construed in its ordinary literal sense to the effect that decisions regarding the amount and
allocation of costs and expenses by the FIFA disciplinary bodies are final and un-appealable, at least
to CAS’); FINA v Cielo Filho & CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.1 (‘All the parties and the Panel
are bound by the FINA Rules as properly interpreted. The Panel is not at liberty to give a loose or
sympathetic application to those Rules, as properly interpreted, merely because the Panel may think
that, in a particular case, they produce an unduly harsh or unreasonable result. The FINA Rules and
the WADC on which those Rules are modelled, are drafted in the way they are for very particular and
important reasons, based in the input of all the stakeholders in the Olympic movement and in other
major sports. It is not the role of this Panel to seek to do justice as it perceives it by giving the Anti-
Doping Rules an interpretation or application inconsistent with the language of those Rules, with the
object and purpose of those Rules or with the body of CAS jurisprudence which has developed in
respect of those Rules’).
B1.59 The only exception to this is where applying the natural and ordinary
meaning of the text would lead to an unworkable or illogical/absurd result.1 In such
cases, the approach may be that that cannot have been what was intended and there
must have been a mistake in the drafting, which may mean in some civil law systems
that words in the text may be ignored, or words not in the text may be added in, so as
to avoid the impractical or illogical/absurd result.2 However, an English court at least
would be very cautious about reaching that conclusion, for fear of crossing the line
from interpreting a contract to re-writing it as one thinks it should have been written.3
1 Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS 2007/A/1407, para 15 (‘The rule that words must be
construed in their ordinary sense will be departed from when the meaning would involve an absurdity
or create an inconsistency with the rest of the document’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885,
para 240 (‘In CAS 2007/A/1407, it was established that the “rule that words must be construed in
their ordinary sense will be departed from when the meaning would involve an absurdity or create
an inconsistency with the rest of the document”. In CAS 2006/A/1165, it was expressed that “the
presumption is that the words in documents should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and
it is only when such an approach creates an unreasonable result that it is necessary to look to other
meanings”’). In Salmond, this principle was used to reject the suggestion that under the rules, properly
construed, one could not be liable for complicity in an anti-doping rule violation if that complicity took
the form of putting an athlete under such pressure not to provide a sample that the athlete was held to
have a compelling justification for not providing the sample and so had not committed an anti-doping
rule violation.
2 For CAS authority, see Jersey Football Association v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, para 141 (‘A literal
understand[ing] of the requirement [that a federation applying for membership of UEFA must be based
in a country recognised by the UN as an independent state] must therefore be rejected, as otherwise
no applicant could ever meet the requirements [because the UN does not recognise countries]’) and
para 142 (instead the provision ‘must be interpreted as requiring the applicant to be based in a country
which is recognised as an independent state “by the majority of UN members”’); Fédération Française
des Echecs et al v Federation Internationale des Echecs, 2010/O/2166, para 9.7.8 (rejecting proposed
construction that an individual had to be a member of a national federation in order to be proposed
for election as an officer of the international federation, because ‘if membership in the nominating
federation were mandatory, a number of FIDE federations would never be able to submit candidates
because in their countries individuals cannot be members of the national federation but rather only
in clubs which in turn are members in (regional bodies or) the national federation’); E & A v IBU,
CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10 (‘It simply cannot be the intent that this rule would allow an accused
to afford itself of the more favourable science. Applying such an argument to a criminal case would
be tantamount to requiring the court to find an accused innocent of a crime, even if the DNA proves
the accused is the culprit simply because the crime was committed prior to the availability of DNA
testing. This Panel finds that this simply cannot be the case’); Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948,
para 39(b) (endorsing Chartbrook on this point); AOC & AWU v FILA, CAS 2008/A/1502, paras
6.15–6.22 (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a regulation because it was not logical); ADO Den
Haag v Newcastle United FC, CAS 2006/A/1152, para 15 (‘the Panel observes that the language
of a provision [in a sports body’s rules] governs its interpretation, where the language is clear and
explicit and does not involve an ambiguity or absurdity’); Korda v ITF, CAS 99/A/223, para 25 (‘We
cannot, even applying the contra proferentem rule, or the rule against doubtful penalisation support an
interpretation which results in such a paradox’). See also Segura v IAAF, CAS OG 2000/013, para 23
(where the rule says disqualification of an athlete must be notified to the athlete ‘immediately’ after the
race, to make it workable ‘The word “immediate” must, without any doubt, be read as qualified by a
notion of “reasonable under the circumstances” […]’). And see IAAF v Ottey, IAAF Arbitration Panel
decision dated 3 July 2000, para 15 (where rules on their literal meaning made the mere presence of
nandrolone in the athlete’s sample a doping offence, but it was accepted that humans may produce
nandrolone naturally at very low levels, even though there was no express requirement that the IAAF
prove the nandrolone found in the athlete’s sample was exogenous in origin, to avoid unfairness to the
athlete the panel found a lacuna in the rules and filled it by reading in a requirement that the IAAF must
prove that the quantity of nandrolone metabolite found in the athlete’s sample so exceeds the range of
values normally found in humans as to be not consistent with normal endogenous production).
For English law authority on this point, see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] AC 1101
(HL), per Lord Hoffman at para 21 (‘When the language used in an instrument gives rise to difficulties
of construction, the process of interpretation does not require one to formulate some alternative form of
words which approximates as closely as possible to that of the parties. It is to decide what a reasonable
person would have understood the parties to mean by using the language which they did. The fact that
the court might have to express that meaning in language quite different from that used by the parties
[…] is no reason for not giving effect to what they appear to have meant’) and para 25 (‘there is not,
so to speak, a limit to the amount of red ink or verbal rearrangement or correction which the court is
allowed. All that is required is that it should be clear that something has gone wrong with the language
and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have understood the parties to have meant’);
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] WLR 896 (HL), per Lord
Hoffman at 913D (‘[…] we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly
in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background
that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute
to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had’, ie one that flouts common sense);
Ohuruogu v IAAF and UK Athletics, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 8 (‘The presumption is that the words in
documents should be given their natural and ordinary meaning and it is only when such an approach
creates an unreasonable result that it is necessary to look to other meanings’).
3 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 [SC], per Lord Neuberger at 1628, para 17 (‘[…] the reliance
placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances […] should not
be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed.
The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes
of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be
gleaned from the language of the provision’) and para 20 (‘when interpreting a contract a judge should
avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party’). See also,
for the same approach in the context of interpretation of a statute, Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria
[2014] UKSC 10, per Lord Neuberger at 72 (‘When interpreting a statute, the court’s function is to
determine the meaning of the words used in the statute. The fact that context and mischief are factors
which must be taken into account does not mean that, when performing its interpretive role, the court
can take a free-wheeling view of the intention of Parliament looking at all admissible material, and
treating the wording of the statute as merely one item. Context and mischief do not represent a licence
to judges to ignore the plain meaning of the language that Parliament has used’).
D The role of prior precedents on the proper meaning of the

regulation in issue
B1.60 As noted above, the proper interpretation of a regulation is a question of

law, not of fact, and therefore a court is not bound by the interpretation given by
the parties, or by the interpretation given to the same clause by a previous court or
tribunal.1 Again, however, the ultimate goal is consistent and harmonised application
of the regulations wherever the sport is played. For that reason, therefore, and to
achieve predictability and equal treatment,2 just as under English law the meaning
of international conventions is to be determined by reference to international
jurisprudence,3 so too a court or arbitral panel that has to decide the proper
interpretation of an SGB’s transnational regulations should take into account how

the provision in question has been interpreted and applied by previous CAS panels.4
In fact, even though there is strictly no doctrine of precedent in arbitration,5 if
previous CAS panels have interpreted a particular provision in an SGB’s regulations
in a particular way, another CAS panel will not take a different view without good
reason,6 and (in the authors’ opinion) a first instance tribunal should consider itself
bound to follow that CAS authority, at least absent very good reason not to do so.
2 Nafziger, ‘Lex Sportiva’, in Lex Sportiva: What is Sports Law? (TMC Asser, 2012), pp 50 and 56
(following CAS precedents, including on the proper interpretation of sports rules and regulations,
‘would help apply three values that the principle of stare decisis serves: efficiency of the legal process,
predictability or stability of expectations, and equal treatment of similarly situated parties’, as well as
providing ‘authoritative interpretations of the principles and rules of international sports law’).
3 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL) per Lord Scarman at 290B and 293B and D. See
also Walter Rau Neusser Oel und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd [2005] FCA 1102, at 45 (Alsop
J) (‘[…] standard form contracts, including in particular standard forms [and] international terms and
conditions of organisations […] using phrases that have had meanings given to them by commercial
courts, should be interpreted, in the interests of international comity and international commercial
certainty, in a consistent way, giving weight to those previous decisions’).
4 Berger v WADA, CAS 2009/A/1948, para 25 (‘CAS has not yet had to determine the proper
construction of Article 13.4 of the 2009 WADC […]. It is, therefore, important that CAS, which is
the arbitral body principally entrusted with interpretation and application of the 2009 WADC, gives
a reasoned and publicly available decision on the proper construction of Article 13.4 so that in
future disputes involving the 2009 WADC or its derivatives the question of jurisdiction posed by the
construction of Article 13.4 of the 2009 WADC may be approached and dealt with by stakeholders
in the future in a “global and harmonised way” as is the object of the 2009 Code’). See also, in
the same context (doping cases decided under rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code):
WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 126 (‘the FIFA ADR has been established on the basis
of the WADC, whose main intention was the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping.
As recognised by CAS jurisprudence, in order to achieve this goal of harmonisation “it is necessary
to interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with
the WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sport federations and the respective
CAS case law”’), quoting Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 71; FINA v Cielo Filho &
CBDA, CAS 2011/A/2495, para 8.2 (‘CAS jurisprudence on the WADC, and its analogues such as the
FINA Rules, is of extreme importance in respect of the interpretation of the WADC and related anti-
doping regimes given the purpose of “enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonised way”
(see page 18 of the Preamble to the WADC)’); Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 7.2 (‘This
appeal is governed by the provisions of the [Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme and the World Anti-
Doping Code (the “WADC”), as interpreted and applied by the CAS (with relevant decisions of lower
panels of persuasive authority)’) and para 10.18 (citing as support for its interpretation of a provision
of the Code the fact that other CAS panels and a first instance panel in the UK have interpreted the
provision in the same way); IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 144 (‘[…] the IAAF [anti-doping]
rules in question are to be interpreted in a manner harmonious with other WADC compliant rules’).
See also Aloyan v IOC, 2017/A/4927, para 76 (gleaning support for its preferred interpretation from
the fact that ‘[t]he interpretation advanced by the Panel, in addition, is confirmed by a consistent CAS
practice, starting from the early cases’).
In principle at least, persuasive decisions of first instance panels should also be taken into account.
See Kendrick v ITF, CAS 2011/A/2518, para 7.2 (‘This appeal is governed by the provisions of the
[Tennis Anti-Doping] Programme and the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”), as interpreted and
applied by the CAS (with relevant decisions of lower panels of persuasive authority)’); but cf Glasner
v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 64 (rejecting suggestion CAS panel should defer to the expertise of
the first instance panel in applying the regulations to the sport in question, because ‘the rules that are
at stake here are based on the WADC, the purpose of which is to ensure the uniform application of
anti-doping standards throughout the world and across all sports. The Sole Arbitrator cannot see why
a federation would have more expertise in applying these rules of a truly transnational character than
CAS panels […]’).
5 Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643, para 82 (‘[…] no doctrine of binding precedent applies to the
CAS jurisprudence’). See para C18.16.
6 Anderson et al v IOC, CAS 2008/A/1545, paras 52-55 (‘This does not automatically entail that the
Panel is bound to decide in the same way as in CAS 2004/A/725 on the basis of either the “stare
decisis” or the “collateral estoppel” principles, as advocated by the Appellants. On the issue of
the precedential value of CAS awards, the Panel shares the view of other CAS panels. In the case
CAS 97/176, award of 15 January 1998, the panel rightly stated as follows: “in arbitration there is
no stare decisis. Nevertheless, the Panel feels that CAS rulings form a valuable body of case law and
can contribute to strengthen legal predictability in international sports law. Therefore, although not
binding, previous CAS decisions can, and should, be taken into attentive consideration by subsequent
CAS panels, in order to help developing legitimate expectations among sports bodies and athletes”
(at para. 40). Similarly, in the case CAS 2004/A/628, award of 28 June 2004, the panel stated as
follows: “In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis. However,
a CAS panel will obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of
law as a previous CAS panel” (at para. 73). Therefore, although a CAS panel in principle might end
up deciding differently from a previous panel, it must accord to previous CAS awards a substantial
precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential change to submit persuasive
arguments and evidence to that effect. Accordingly, the CAS 2004/A/725 award is a very important
precedent and the Panel will draw some significant guidance from it’); Jersey Football Association
v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4787, paras 142–43 (although ‘fully conscious of its legal power to reach a
different conclusion’, panel decided to follow the interpretation given to a UEFA provision by the
CAS panel in FA of Serbia v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4602); Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 86
(deriving support for preferred interpretation of rule from the fact that ‘CAS panels in the past have
interpreted the notion of “fairness” in this sense’); Billington v FIBT, CAS OG 2002/005, para 23
(deciding to follow decision of CAS panel in Bassani-Antivari v IOC, CAS OG 2002/003, as to the
proper interpretation of a provision of the CAS ad hoc rules).
The English courts would take a similar approach. See Carter v Bradbeer [1975] 1 WLR 1204 (HL),
per Lord Diplock at 1206 (‘In theory, too, this House no longer regards itself as being strictly bound
to follow its own previous decisions; but in fact on questions of construction of statutory provisions, at
any rate if they are recent, the Appellate Committee is loth to over-rule its own previous decision even
though a majority of its members think that the reasoning of the decision was fallacious’).
E Canons of construction
B1.61 Finally, if after following the process set out above the meaning of the
SGB’s regulations is still ambiguous or obscure, courts and tribunals may have resort
to the following canons of construction to ascertain that meaning:1
(a) If the text is capable of bearing two opposing meanings, a CAS panel will
prefer the meaning that provides legal certainty over one that does not.2
(b) Similarly, ‘any ambiguity in disciplinary rules must be resolved in favour of the
individual who may be made liable under them’.3 In particular:
(i) where it is unclear whether the conduct of the accused falls within a
particular prohibition and therefore constitutes a disciplinary offence,
there is a presumption in favour of a narrow construction that would
result in dismissal of the charge;4 and
(ii) even if an offence has been committed, a sanction may only be imposed
that is clearly provided for in the rules.5
(c) A related, but broader, principle is that any remaining ambiguity in an SGB’s
statutes or regulations should be construed contra proferentem, ie against the
SGB that drafted and issued the regulations and in favour of the member or
athlete who is subject to those regulations and had no part in drafting them.6
This canon of construction has particular force in the context of anti-doping
rules, because of the harsh sanctions that can apply.7 However, it may not apply
when the SGB is enforcing, against a member, rules that were adopted by all
members,8 or when it is applying qualification rules for the Olympic Games
that it agreed with the IOC.9
(d) Lex specialis:
‘If different (conflicting) rules are applicable to the same matter, the conflict of rules
is to be solved by applying the principle lex specialis derogate generali. According
thereto the (more) specific rule prevails over the more general rule, since the lex
specialis is presumed to have been drafted having in mind particular purposes and
taking into account particular circumstances’.10
(e) An SGB’s regulations are to be interpreted, if possible, in a manner that does
not put the SGB in breach of applicable law, since it is presumed that the
SGB intended to comply with applicable law, not to break it.11 This includes
preferring an interpretation that avoids infringing legally protected rights.12
(f) ‘As a matter of principle, an exception to a general rule is to be narrowly

construed’.13
(g) ‘In principle, a construction of a rule otherwise appropriate cannot be discarded
on the basis that persons will not act in relation to it in good faith’.14
1 But not if it does not. See Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190, para 52 (‘The canons of
construction prayed in aid by the Appellant do […] justify a strict approach to disciplinary rules;
but there is no ambiguity in the EAD rules which applied at the material time […]’); Stroman v FEI,
CAS 2013/A/3318, para 65 (rejecting request to construe anti-doping rule contra proferentem where
the rule was not ambiguous); Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.6.12 (‘the Panel concludes that
there is no ambiguity in the Programme which requires a construction “contra proferentem”’); WCM-
GP Ltd v FIM, CAS 2003/A/4612 & 471 & 473, para 36 (‘Contrary to the submission made by the
Appellant to convince the Panel that one should apply the principles of legal certainty, proportionality
and the rule contra proferentem automatically, Swiss law relies on such principles only if there is
ambiguity and no clear meaning can be drawn from an interpretation based on the letter and the spirit
of the law’).
2 WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 107 (‘The principle of legal certainty has an important
role to play in exercise of interpretation. There is no doubt that the WADA/FIS position has the merit
of certainty; those to whom the ß2A Provision is addressed need do no more than look at a label.
The Athlete’s position requires, as this appeal showed, the introduction of and reliance on detailed
scientific evidence (an exercise which may be beyond the resources available to most sportsmen
or sportswomen’); Yerolimpos v World Karate Federation, CAS 2014/A/3516, para 109 (rejecting
proposed construction of a rule that would have made it a disciplinary offence to fail to maintain
‘an appropriate demeanour in any activity performed’, on the basis that such a construction ‘falls
foul of any concept […] of legal certainty since “performed activity” has no sensible or predictable
meaning’); WADA v JBN et al, CAS 2012/A/2747, para 7.14 ( ‘arguments of legal certainty speak
against’ a proposed interpretation that would make it nearly impossible to determine when mitigation
of sanction would be permissible under the regulation and when it would not).
3 Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 15.2. For English law authority on this point, see Aitken v
DPP [2015] EWHC 1079 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 297 (67) (Warby J) (referring to the ‘rule against
doubtful penalisation’).
4 McLeod, Principles of Legislative and Regulatory Drafting (Hart Publishing, 2008), p 147 (‘[…]
penal provisions will be construed strictly in favour of the person who is liable to be penalised’);
Omeragik v FFM, CAS 2011/A/2670, para 8.14 (choosing a narrower construction that prevented the
SGB disciplining the appellant based on provisions that did not clearly proscribe his conduct). One
aspect of this principle is the presumption that an offence is not one of strict liability but requires proof
of fault. McLeod, above, p 148); Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10
(‘[…] if regulatory documents define sanctions and how they should be applied to particular offences,
they should be strictly interpreted by the sports authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the
IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the IOC Medical Code provide for disqualification as the consequence
of a positive out-of-competition test. Since it has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to
disqualify the appellant and withdraw his medal should therefore be set aside’). See also USA Shooting
& Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 17 (given the stringent nature of a strict
liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’). The most prominent
example of the displacement of this presumption is Article 2.1 of the World Anti-Doping Code, which
makes an athlete strictly liable for the presence of a prohibited substance found in his or her sample
(for more detail of which, see para C6.5).
5 King v AIBA, CAS 2011/A/2452, para 6.6 (where the Appellant had been charged with associating with
certain individuals but the disciplinary rule in question only prohibited associating with a suspended
national federation, ‘the Respondent […] argued that there was a lacuna [in the AIBA Disciplinary
Code] which should be filled by purposive interpretation. The Panel holds that such interpretation
would be no more than disguised legislation and to accept the Respondent’s invitation would violate
the fundamental principle of criminal and disciplinary law “nullem crimen sine lege”’); TTF Liebherr
Ochsenhausen v ETTU, CAS 2007/A/1363, para 16 (protecting ‘the principle of legality and
predictability of sanctions which requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour and
the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision’).
6 For English law authority on this point, see Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts, 32nd Edn (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2015) Vol 1, para 13-086; Ace Paper Ltd v Fry [2015] EWHC 1647, para. 38; W v
UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455, para 18 (‘The wording of the rule is clear but even if there were
an ambiguity the “contra proferentem” rule of interpretation under English law would apply – that
is, the interpretation to be adopted is that least favourable to the person putting forward the relevant
document’); Du Plessis v ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated
21 December 2016, [2017] (3) ISLR SLR-67, para 4.4 (‘Where possible, a disciplinary provision
must be capable of ready application but must, in the case of any ambiguity, be interpreted contra
proferentem […]’).
For CAS authority, see eg Guiaro v Beşiktaş Jimnastik Kulübü, CAS 2007/A/1407, para 18 (‘It
is also important to note that when seeking the real intention of the parties, in accordance with the
jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Court, the unclear declarations or wordings in a contract will be
interpreted against the party that drafted the contract (ATF 124 III 155, 158, consid. 1b), being the
responsibility of the author of the contract to choose its formulation with adequate precision (in dubio
contra stipulatorem)’); Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 80 (‘As a general rule any provision
with an unclear wording is to be interpreted against the author of the wording (interpretation contra
proferentem). […] It follows from this that any ambiguity or doubt as to the contents or scope of
application of the provisions in the FINA DC must turn against the Respondent, ie the drafter of these
rules’); GNK Dinamo v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3324, para 9.11 (‘The rule maker, not the ruled, must
suffer the consequences of imprecision’); Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and
CAS 2009/A/1753, para 4.28 (‘[…] contradictions in the applicable rules must be interpreted contra
proferentem, ie to the detriment of the promulgator of the conflicting or contradictory provision’),
followed in Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107 (‘In light of the fact that the IWF ADP
are unilaterally formulated by one of the parties and that the parties to the contractual relationship
have unequal bargaining power, this Panel finds it appropriate to apply the principle of “contra
proferentem” in the case at hand with the consequence that the provisions on sanctions contained in
the IWF ADP must be “read down” in order to be in line with the WADC’); FC Schalke et al v FIFA,
CAS 2008/A/1622-1624, para 94 (‘Under Swiss law, a general principle states that any provision with
an unclear wording has to be interpreted against the author of the wording (contra proferentem). This
principle also applies to association law […]. This means that, in principle, if no other reasons require a
different treatment, any ambiguous, or otherwise unclear, provision of the statutes has to be interpreted
against the association that has drafted the statutes, and not against the members’); FA of Wales v
UEFA, CAS 2004/A/593, para 6 (relying on ‘the widely recognized interpretative principle “contra
proferentem” (also known as “contra stipulatorem”), according to which an unclear clause should be
interpreted against the party who drafted it’).
7 See eg WADA v Batan & IPF, CAS 2013/A/3316, para 50 (‘[…] in such cases [of ambiguity in
a rule], and particularly in doping cases, CAS decisions have consistently applied the principle of
“contra proferentem” […]’) and para 51 (applying principle to prefer a restrictive interpretation of a
provision on mitigation of doping sanctions that favoured athletes charged with violation of the rules
in question); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107 (ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping Rules
should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the four-year ban stipulated in those rules ‘read down’
to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World Anti-Doping Code).
8 IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, para 11 (‘[…] the IAAF Rules are not to be read as terms proferred
by the IAAF to USATF (or to any other Member), but as resolutions adopted by and binding upon
all Members, including USATF. There is thus no basis for their being read or construed contra
proferentem one party or another in this arbitration’).
9 Italian Canoe Federation et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c) (‘[…] although the drafting
of the rules is clearly insufficient, this is not a case where the contra proferentem interpretation benefits
one party against the draft of an obscure rule. Quite the opposite, in this case the unclear rule both
benefits and damages national federations and their athletes and only does so after the event […]. The
contra proferentem rule of interpretation may be of importance in contractual interpretation where
one of the party drafts the obscure clause. It may also be of relevance in the interpretation of statutory
rules predisposed by an entity, on disciplinary measures where unclear wording cannot be the basis of
a conviction. However, it cannot be upheld in a case where the enacting body merely acts as a deciding
authority on issues that only affect its associates, none of which effectively intervened in the drafting
of the obscure rule. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to show that any party questioned
the clarity of the OQS before the World Championships’).
10 Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274, para 78. For English law authority on this point, see Vinus v
Marks & Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784 (CA), per Peter Gibson LJ at 27. For application of the
principle in the sports context, see eg IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 159; Chandimal v
ICC, decision of Judicial Commissioner (Michael Beloff QC) dated 25 June 2018, paras 4.4 and 4.7;
WADA v JBN, Dennis de Goede & NADO, CAS 2012/A/2747, para 7.12 (whereas 2009 WADC Art
10.5.2 is a general provision permitting mitigation of sanction in cases of No Significant Fault or
Negligence, 2009 WADC Art 10.4 is a lex specialis, providing for mitigation of sanction in cases
involving ‘Specified Substances’ in cases where there is no intent to enhance performance, even if
there is significant fault or negligence).
Publishing, 2018), para 4.17 (‘Since it is presumed that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary
to fundamental rights or any other “basic tenet of the common law”, it will not be taken to have done
so unless it makes its intentions to this effect very clear’). See eg R (on the application of Morgan
Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Comrs of Income Tax [2002] UKHL 21 (Lord Hoffman), para 8 (‘The
courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute, although literally capable of having some
startling or unreasonable consequence, such as overriding fundamental human rights, as not having
been intended to do so. An intention to override such rights must be expressly stated or appear by
necessary implication’).
12 For English law authority on this point, see s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires courts to
construe legislation in a manner compatible with the ECHR rights that the Act enshrines into English
law, and (if necessary) to read down provisions that would breach ECHR rights) (see paras E13.11–
E13.12); and Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation Amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ [2004] EHRLR 245,
251 (‘Even outside the field covered by the Human Rights Act 1998 Parliament is presumed not to
legislate contrary to the rule of law and fundamental rights. If Parliament wishes to do so it must
squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. General words cannot achieve such
a result: only an unmistakeable parliamentary intent will be sufficient. This is called the principle of
legality. It is a strong presumption’), citing R (Simms) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2000] 2 AC 115, 131E–G (Lord Hoffman) (‘In the absence of express language or necessary
implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were
intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual’). See also R (on application of Morgaan
Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2003] 1 AC 563 at 5 (Lord Hoffman) (‘The
courts will ordinarily construe general words in a statute, although literally capable of having some
startling or unreasonable consequence, such as overriding fundamental human rights, as not having
been intended to do so. An intention to override such rights must be expressly stated or appear by
necessary implication’).
For CAS authority, see Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 44 (‘[…] a federation cannot
opt out from an interpretation of its rules and regulations in light of principles of “human rights” just
by omitting any references in its rules and regulations to human rights’) and para 46 (‘The 2015 ADR
qualify the rule pertaining to the statute of limitation as a “procedural rule”. However, it does not
necessarily follow from this qualification that there are no limits to a retroactive application of such
rule. Instead, it follows from Art. 6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the “ECHR”) that the procedure must be “fair”’); IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina,
CAS 2016/O/4464, para 185 (where IAAF Rule 40.8 provided that all results obtained by an athlete
after his anti-doping rule violation were to be disqualified, and did not permit deviation from that
rule where fairness required, even though the equivalent World Anti-Doping Code provision did,
‘the Sole Arbitrator finds that a fairness exception must be read in to Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 2012-
2013 read together with Articles 40.8 and 23.2.2 WADC. Only when reading in this manner and
applying them fairly to the Athlete concerned both provisions can be understood as complying with
the proportionality requirement under general principles of law applicable in Switzerland and Monaco,
being the seats of WADA and the IAAF respectively’); Juventus FC v Chelsea FC, CAS 2013/A/3365,
para 175 (‘Chelsea’s interpretation of Article 14.3 is overly broad. It goes beyond the objective of
protecting contractual stability. […] It is incompatible with the fundamental principle of freedom to
exercise a professional activity and is disproportionate to the protection of the old club’s legitimate
interests’). Similarly, in Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.23, where the CAS panel detected
a gap in the Code, failing to provide for mitigation of the sanction for a second offence where both
offences involved limited fault on the athlete’s part, it filled the gap by reference to the principle of
proportionality. (See para B1.31). It has been suggested that ‘this approach, while undertaken in the
context of the rules of a private association by an arbitral tribunal, might be likened to the application
of the principle of statutory interpretation applicable in many jurisdictions, that a statutory provision
will be interpreted, wherever possible, in a manner which complies with constitutional or fundamental
rights’: David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p 89.
13 WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233, para 94, and see para 97 (referring to ‘the principle
of narrow interpretation of exceptions’). See also WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059,
para 116 (‘[…] an exception to the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence should in principle be
narrowly construed’).
14 Villanueva v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4534, para 48. See also IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs,
CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.32 (‘IWBF’s expressed concern that construing Article 10.4 according
to its ordinary and natural meaning which, the Sole Arbitrator has found, it bears, might encourage
athletes who could not establish how the prohibited substance entered their body to lie and claim
that they took it deliberately. The Sole Arbitrator does not consider that in principle it is appropriate
to approach a question of construction on such a premise. The assumption should always be that an
athlete will tell the truth; honesty is usually, if not always, the best policy. Further he has already
mentioned the limited opportunity to procure reduction of sentence where the use was of a substance
with the capacity to enhance performance. Moreover if an athlete started with a lie as to how the
substance came in his body, he would need to lie too as to his innocence in ingestion, and his lack of
culpability. Successful misleading of a panel by lies piled on lies might be a difficult, if not impossible,
exercise’).
Chapter B2
Selection
Elizabeth Riley (International Paralympic Committee) and Christopher Stoner QC
(Serle Court and Guildhall Chambers)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B2.1
2 THE SELECTION PROCESS............................................................................. B2.4
A Selection criteria.......................................................................................... B2.4
B Structure of selection policies...................................................................... B2.12
C Compatibility with other rules..................................................................... B2.18
D Procedure..................................................................................................... B2.27
3 ELIGIBILITY...................................................................................................... B2.38
A Nationality.................................................................................................... B2.40
B Hierarchy of governing bodies..................................................................... B2.43
4 APPEALS............................................................................................................ B2.44
A Grounds of appeal........................................................................................ B2.46
B Successful grounds of appeal....................................................................... B2.55
C Limitations on the appeal panel................................................................... B2.88
D Proper parties............................................................................................... B2.93
5 THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES................................................. B2.95
A The selection framework.............................................................................. B2.96
B Selection disputes relating to the Olympic and Paralympic Games............ B2.98
C The need for a more consistent approach at national level?........................ B2.100
6 CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................. B2.103
1 INTRODUCTION
B2.1 Selection pervades all sports at all levels, ranging from selection from a
squad of professional players for a football or rugby team to the selection of an
individual to compete in a particular sport at a particular competition, from local
grassroots competitions to the Olympic and Paralympic Games. It would not be
possible in this chapter to provide a detailed analysis of all selection issues covering
all sports, and no attempt is made to do so. Instead, this chapter focuses on the
essential aspects of selection that can, and frequently do, lead to selection disputes,
as well as on the mechanisms to deal with such disputes.1
1 For further reading see Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants
in Sport’ (August 2000) at sportlaw.ca/the-rights-of-athletes-coaches-and-participants-in-sport/
[accessed 28 October 2020]; Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection
Disputes Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1(1)
Entertainment Law 109; Findlay, ‘Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of
Policy Making’, 16 Marquette Sports Law Review 73 (2005); Corbishley, ‘Resolving questions of
Olympic selection – and update’, Sports Law Administration and Practice, August 2008, pp 6–10;
Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’ (Sport Resolutions, January 2013).
B2.2 The consequences of any particular selection decision can be euphoric

for the athlete selected, whilst devastating for the athlete not selected. However, it
is right to begin with the general observation that, while ultimately dependent on
the circumstances, it will be extremely rare for an athlete simply to be entitled to
selection for any given event as of right. As the CAS has stated: ‘being entitled to
consideration for nomination and being eligible for nomination is not the same as
having a right to nomination’.1 Ultimately, the ‘right’ to be selected will have to be
earned.2
1 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, para 7.
2 Indeed, Rule 44.3 of the Olympic Charter records that: ‘Nobody is entitled as of right to participate in
the Olympic Games’. Similarly, the IPC Handbook states that: ‘Nobody is entitled to any right of any
kind to participate in the Paralympic Games’.
B2.3 If there is one constant message to take away, it is not to underestimate

the importance of careful advance planning and consideration of the selection
process (from the initial drafting and appropriate communication of the selection
policy, through to the implementation of the policy and the process for appeals)
well in advance of any selection decisions actually being made. As is clear from the
many examples of selection appeals discussed below, the issue is often not with the
selection decision itself (which, while the athlete may disagree with it, is by and large
not open to challenge if properly made) but with the process surrounding the decision
and how it was reached. Moreover, as many governing bodies have found out to
their detriment, the fall-out from a badly handled selection dispute can be significant
and incredibly damaging to the sport and those involved. Good examples are the
widespread, negative media coverage when GB Taekwondo did not select the then
world number one and European champion, Aaron Cook, to participate in the 2012
Olympic Games, and the confusion surrounding whether or not the GB rhythmic
gymnastics team had in fact achieved the necessary qualifying score for the 2012
Olympic Games.
2 THE SELECTION PROCESS
A Selection criteria
B2.4 Selection criteria will be sport-specific, but for any given selection decision
the criteria will usually be formed from one of three alternative bases: objective
criteria, subjective criteria, or a hybrid of the two.1
1 See eg Japan Paralympic Committee (JPC) v International Paralympic Committee (IPC) &
International Blind Sport Federation (IBSA), CAS 2012/A/2831, paras 5 and 6.
B2.5 Objective criteria include factors such as time, position, distance, weight,
points or rankings gained at a particular event or over a series of events. Such criteria
have a mechanical application. For example, if an athlete meets a qualification time
in the relevant qualification event, they will be selected.1
1 For example, in Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 3, the relevant
selection criteria under British Swimming’s Olympic Games 2012 Pool Swimming Selection Policy
were ‘entirely objective’, being based solely on performances in particular events.
B2.6 On the other hand, with subjective criteria the selection of an athlete will be
at the discretion of the particular selectors.1
1 For example, in Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, para 43, the selection
policy governing the selection of a fifth athlete to support the four person women’s K4 crew was
extremely subjective, effectively allowing the selectors to determine the relevant selection criteria.
See also Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 10,
where the selection policy stated that ‘diving is an extremely subjective sport and thus there will be
a significant component of subjective decision making in regard to final selection of the team’, and
provided for final selection to be ‘at the sole discretion of the [National Performance Director]’.
Selection 393
B2.7 The third alternative is a hybrid of objective and subjective criteria, such
as where selection is at the subjective discretion of the selectors, but that discretion
is required to be exercised by reference to certain objective criteria (such as a list of
factors that the selectors must take into account when exercising their discretion).1
1 For example, under the British Judo Association’s selection policy for the 2012 Olympic Games, the
selectors were required to consider various factors, including ‘the player with the most potential to win
a medal, in the Selection Panel’s opinion’, as well as a number of objective criteria such as players’
results from specified competitions.
B2.8 Some sports may also use a mixture of the above for selection for a particular
event. For example, for an event where two places are available, one athlete might
be selected based on objective criteria (such as winning a particular event and being
‘first past the post’, as in the US track and field trials for the Olympic Games), with
the other place being filled at the selectors’ discretion. Alternatively, the selectors
might have a residual subjective discretion to fill any available places in a particular
event that are not filled by athletes meeting the objective selection criteria.
B2.9 As a generalisation, if the selection policy is for a team sport it is likely that
there will be at least an element of subjectivity so as to cater for personality traits,
team chemistry, and individual strengths in those competing for a particular place on
a team. Plainly, the best team will not necessarily comprise the top-ranked, fittest or
fastest athletes.1 As American football player and coach, Knute Rockne, remarked,
‘the secret is to work less as individuals and more as a team. As a coach, I play not
my eleven best, but my best eleven’. Selection in team sports is therefore often less
straightforward (and more subjective) than in individual sports.
1 For example, in Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, in selecting a fifth
athlete to support the four person women’s K4 crew, the selectors were perfectly entitled to take into
account (and prefer) the potential of the selected athlete to stand in as stroke in the event of illness
or injury, notwithstanding that Ms Belcher had achieved better results than that athlete in certain
competitions.
B2.10 Due to their mechanical application, objective criteria must be followed

when making the selection decision. Otherwise there will be a failure to follow the
selection policy that will most likely lead to the selection decision being set aside.1
1 See Section 4, below.
B2.11 With subjective criteria, there will necessarily be an element of discretion

exercised by those tasked with the selection decision. However, that discretion should
nevertheless be exercised fairly and rationally, having regard to the objectives of the
selection policy, and without bias.1
1 See Section 4, below. A decision that has been reached pursuant to a fair procedure, lawfully, and
within the limits of discretion open to the decision-maker, should be safe from interference from the
courts. See the discussion of Richards J in Bradley v Jockey Club, [2004] EWHC 2164, paras 33 to 46,
approved by the Court of Appeal in Bradley v Jockey Club, [2005] EWCA Civ 1056, and discussed in
detail at paras E7.15–E7.21. Also see Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.15.
B Structure of selection policies
B2.12 A selection policy should be in writing and, insofar as possible, should use
clear, intelligible language that can be understood by the athletes to whom it applies,
those who assist them (such as coaches), and the selectors themselves. While this
might sound obvious, a very common theme in selection disputes is the poor drafting
of the policy in question,1 and getting this right upfront will go a long way towards
helping to prevent future appeals. As the Appeal Committee commented in Roberts
v British Swimming: ‘it will already have become obvious to all concerned that time
and money spent on the drafting and adoption of a new, clear and coherent selection
policy will be well spent’.2
1 See eg GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions,
5 March 2012, paras 39 and 40, finding against the interpretation of the selection policy put forward
by the governing body (‘I would observe at the outset that the Policy is not well drafted. While it is not
unusual to see terminology and abbreviations in the rules of sporting competitions (which might mean
something to people knowledgeable about the particular sport but might not be readily intelligible to
outsiders not involved in the sport), the document is repetitive, it uses inconsistent terminology […] and
has a certain “cut and paste” appearance. Of particular note is that the two people from BG principally
involved in developing the Policy cannot agree on what it means’); Badrick v British Judo Association,
[2004] EWHC 1891 (Ch), para 24 (finding the BJA’s appeal procedure to be ‘very unsatisfactorily
drafted’); Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 13 (‘It
may be that the objectives could be better expressed in the Selection Criteria document, but that is a
matter for British Swimming’); Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 25
(‘The difficulty with this Selection Policy is that it is so badly drafted that in ascertaining the intention
of British Swimming in adopting the document in this form it is unrealistic to take the approach which
would be taken towards, for example, a commercial contract which had clearly been carefully and
expertly drafted so that one should pause long and hard before treating particular words and phrases as
redundant or, worse, meaningless’). Indeed, the same point has been made by Findlay and Corbett in
relation to Canadian selection disputes in ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes
Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1(1) Entertainment
Law 109, p 115 (‘a large number of disputes arise from the interpretation of the contract between sport
associations and athletes. In many cases, sport administrators do not have expertise in bylaw and policy
drafting […] Specifically, policies relating to team eligibility, selection and appeals are written by people
not skilled in draftsmanship. As a result, adjudicators will often have to interpret selection policies and
criteria that are vague, incomplete, contradictory and even silent on critical points’).
2 Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012. For the principles of interpretation to be applied, see generally para
B1.49 et seq and para B2.85.
B2.13 The detail for any given selection policy will be very much dependent upon
the individual sport, and quite possibly on the event to which the policy relates within
that sport. However, it is suggested that as a bare minimum a selection policy should
(a) Identification of the relevant eligibility criteria, which should be clearly stated.
Eligibility (discussed at Section 3, below) will determine whether a particular
athlete is entitled to be considered for selection.
(b) Identification of the relevant selection criteria and, if relevant, the weight to
be given to those criteria (for example, if certain matters are to be accorded
more weight than others). Objective criteria are usually easily identified and
should be clearly stated (for example, any minimum performance criteria, the
particular time to be achieved, or, if to be determined at a later stage, the means
by which the required time will be ascertained). For subjective criteria, any
matters to be taken into account (and, equally, any matters not to be taken into
account) should be identified. There is also some suggestion that the criteria
should be drafted so as to be ‘as objective as possible’.1
(c) If it is possible (however unlikely) for athletes to tie when seeking selection
(whether on times, points or otherwise), identification of how such a tie will be
resolved.2
(d) Identification of the event(s) to which the selection policy relates, whether that
be a specific trial event, a series of trial or qualifying events, or a series of
events over a period of time.
(e) As a corollary of the foregoing, if applicable, the relevant authorities or
bodies that have responsibility for the event(s) to which the selection policy
relates should be identified, together with any particular requirements and
documentation that relate to the event(s).
(f) Identification of the person(s), either by name or position (for example, the
head coach), who will be making the selection decision(s).
(g) Identification of the relevant timelines for the selection policy,3 including
when selection decisions will be taken, when (and how) those decisions will
Selection 395
be communicated to the athletes, and the period in which an appeal should

be made4 and heard. In particular, sufficient time should be allowed for the
resolution of any appeals (not least because a failure to do so may result in the
athlete seeking emergency relief in the courts).5
(h) Provision, if appropriate, for discretion to depart from the rules in certain
circumstances (for example, in the event of injury, illness or equipment failure,
due to the weather at the time of the trial event, or in other exceptional and/or
extenuating circumstances).6
(i) Provision, if appropriate, for the de-selection (and replacement) of athletes
following their selection (for example, due to injury, illness, or a doping or
misconduct issue).7
(j) A clear statement of all and any rights of appeal, including the permitted
grounds of appeal, the process that will be adopted, and the powers of the
appeal panel.8
(k) A clear statement of all and any lines of communication, such as the name
and contact details of an individual responsible for answering any questions
relating to the application of the selection policy.
(l) If appropriate, a suitable confidentiality clause. Such clauses may be useful in
enabling disputes to be resolved away from the media spotlight.
1 See Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI, CAS OG 06/008, para 12; Hutchison and others v British Fencing
Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 11. Although the authority for this proposition is
said to be the CAS decision in Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS OG 06/002, at para 5.16,
that paragraph does not in fact exist in the award. Instead the CAS in that case simply noted that ‘unless
selection rules set forth completely objective criteria […] a selection process must always rely in some
fashion or other on the subjective judgment of the persons who select the athletes’. However, while the
case does not appear to be authority for the proposition cited, the proposition (that even an exercise of
discretion should, so far as possible, be by reference to objective criteria) is unobjectionable.
2 The importance of tie-breaking provisions is neatly illustrated by the following example from the
2012 women’s 100m US Olympic track and field trials. The top three finishers from the event were
to be selected to represent the US at the 2012 Olympic Games. However, following an unusual third-
place tie between Allyson Felix and Jeneba Tarmoh, it became clear that USA Track & Field (the
national governing body) had no rules in place to break such a tie. After much delay, uncertainty and
speculation, the athletes were given a choice between a coin toss, a run-off, or ceding their place to the
other, with a run-off to take place in the event of disagreement. Both athletes initially agreed to a run-
off, only for Tarmoh to pull out shortly before the event and decline her place in the 100m. USA Track
& Field was heavily criticised in the media and there was, no doubt, much pressure on the athletes
involved, not least because of the possibility of a further (unexpected) run-off, to take place at short
notice and in close proximity to the Olympic Games themselves.
3 It may be of the utmost importance, depending on the sport and the relevant event(s) to which the
selection policy relates, to determine the right moment for the selection decisions to be taken. If trial
events are held too soon athletes may peak too early, such that the performance of those selected may
be materially different by the time of the relevant event; if trial events are held too late, it may be
unrealistic to expect athletes to peak twice in a short period of time.
4 The case of Netball New Zealand v IFNA, CAS 2010/A/2315 (concerning the eligibility of a netball
player to represent New Zealand) is an important reminder of the need to comply with appeal timelines.
In that case, as the appeal in question had not been filed within the applicable time limit, it was held to
be inadmissible and was dismissed accordingly, without consideration of the merits.
5 For example, for the 2012 Olympic Games British Swimming adopted a fast track appeals procedure
to allow selection disputes to be resolved in a timely manner. See also Gosiewski v British Judo
Association, 2012, unreported, where arguably insufficient time was allocated to the appeals process,
resulting in (among other things) the athlete being notified of the outcome of his appeal after the BJA
had already submitted its nominations to the British Olympic Association, and the de-selection of
another ineligible athlete in close proximity to the event.
6 For example, it was noted in Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 3,
that ‘the criteria for selection […] were entirely objective, based on performances [… in certain
events]. The Selection Policy does not (at least expressly) give the selectors discretion to depart
from those performance requirements in exceptional or extenuating circumstances, as some selection
policies do’. And in GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport
Resolutions, 5 March 2012, para 14, the arbitrator found that ‘If the benchmark score […] was not
achieved, BG would not be making a nomination. Specifically, it was agreed that there would be no
discretion with respect to the score’. See also Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the
United Kingdom Ltd, [2009] ISLR 75 (where the court found that NISA had adopted certain ‘first past
the post’ criteria, without any general discretion to override such criteria) and Graham v Equestrian
Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 60 (where the CAS noted that the extenuating circumstances
provision ‘could only excuse a combination from compliance with the requirements of competing
in the Nomination Events, not from compliance with the requirement of attaining [the international
federation’s minimum eligibility standard] by 23 April 2012. The extenuating circumstances provision
could not have excused that failure’).
7 Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1605 (where the AOC’s decision not to
accept the athlete’s nomination due to his involvement in a drink-related hit and run accident with
a cyclist, resulting in serious criminal charges, was found to be permissible under the terms of the
selection policy); Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland and others, CAS OG 12/03 (where the selection criteria
effectively permitted Horse Sport Ireland to revoke its nomination of the rider based on concerns
arising out of several disqualifications of the rider’s horses for hypersensitivity). See also D’Arcy v
Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574.
8 See eg Badrick v British Judo Association, [2004] EWHC 1891 (Ch), paras 19, 22 and 24, finding the
BJA’s appeal procedure to be ‘very unsatisfactorily drafted’.
B2.14 The selection policy, once drafted, must provide a complete code, as the
procedure to be followed will be that found in the words of the selection policy, and
not simply that which may be desired, whatever the merits of a case.1 Accordingly, in
circumstances where an athlete was selected for the Olympic Games and a newspaper
subsequently revealed e-mails between that athlete and an unnamed trainer concerning
doping practices, the de-selection of the athlete was not permissible as it was not
provided for in the selection rules.2 It should also be clear as to what documents form
part of the selection policy.3
1 GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March
2012, para 36 (‘it falls to this tribunal to determine what the Policy means. In doing so, sentiment must
play no part. The question is not whether the BG Group should be nominated to participate in the 2012
Summer Olympic Games. It is whether they have, in fact, met the qualifying standard that was set for
them in accordance with the terms of the Policy’); Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions,
30 June 2012, paras 17.3, 22.4 and 22.5 (‘Nor is it for an appeal body to rewrite a selection policy if it
believes the result is unfair or not what was intended. Instead, it must give effect to the plain meaning of
the words in the policy, as written, whatever the result produced […]. Reasonable people might disagree
with the selection criteria or approach chosen by Mr Pursley and his colleagues (the Appeal Committee
is simply not qualified to say), but it was common ground at the hearing that any such disagreement
would not be sufficient to justify any intervention or re-writing of the Selection Policy on the part of the
Appeal Committee. The fact that no other swimmer qualified for the second spot on Team GB for the
200m breaststroke event means this Appeal Committee does not have to be concerned that helping Molly
would hurt another athlete. But that does not provide any basis for the Appeal Committee to ignore or
to re-write the Selection Policy, even if it thought there were reason to do so (which it does not)’);
The Shooting Federation of Canada v Canadian Olympic Committee, ADRsportRED 04-0029, 3 May
2004, paras 30 to 34 (‘As arbitrator I have no authority, absent compelling legal grounds, to amend or
rewrite the agreement the parties reached in their negotiations. It is the parties who decide what is in
their negotiating interests. It is the parties who select the words to express the negotiated bargain they
made. It is the task of the arbitrator to apply the language of their agreement to the actions of the parties
to determine whether the agreement has been lived up to or improperly applied. It is trite to say that in
law, a party to a written contract must be held to the expressed terms of that contract. There are narrow
exceptions to this general rule, but these occur rarely and in this case, there is no factual or legal basis
for any finding of bad-faith, misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty as argued by the affected
parties. As I have said, I have no doubts the parties negotiated honestly and diligently at all times and
there is no basis for me to rescind the contract they made. Rather, my duty as arbitrator is to interpret
and apply that contract’); Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01, para 6.8 (‘The FIBT
argued that its intention and that of the IOC was to give athletes of NOCs whose continents were not
represented in any FIBT events an opportunity to be represented. Further, according to the FIBT, it was
not contemplated that the Continental Representation rule could be used in order to guarantee NOCs
from non-represented continents representation in all events. However, this intention is not reflected in
the clear language of the text’); Roberge v Judo Canada, Arbitration decision, 21 June 1996, p 7, noted
in Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000), pp
14 and 15 (‘What the [Appeal Panel] did, in effect, was to substitute its own decision as to who was
the better athlete and accordingly manipulated the rules of the Handbook by reversing the order of the
criteria to arrive at that conclusion. This is clearly inappropriate especially in a case such as this, where
the tie-breaking formula contained criteria that were clear, concise, objective and nondiscretionary. It
is not within the jurisdiction of the [Appeal Panel] to intervene into the affairs of Judo Canada and re-
write their selection rules based on what the [Appeal Panel] thinks is fair, or what it thinks the criteria
should be in order to select the best possible athlete. The tie-breaking formula involved, in essence, the
mechanical application of the criteria set out in the Handbook: adding up points, identifying the highest
Selection 397
category of tournament and counting the number of wins. There was absolutely no room for the abuse
of discretion, subjective evaluation or ambiguity. In such circumstances, it is not for the [Appeal Panel]
to become involved in whether the selection criteria enable Judo Canada to identify the best possible
athlete. It is up to the experts in the sport organization which, in this case, was the Technical Committee
[…]. The tie-breaking formula was set out in the Handbook so that all athletes knew well ahead of time
what the “rules of the game” were in the event of a tie. […] Decisions with respect to clear and concise
criteria cannot be appealed simply because an athlete does not like the outcome and feels they are a
better overall athlete than the person who won the tie-breaker. [To do this] would be grossly unfair’).
2 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, paras 7.5, 7.6 and 7.9.
3 Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, paras 34 to 36 (where it was found that
a crew boat strategy document was not a formal part of the selection policy but was merely guidance
as to that policy).
B2.15 Once promulgated, the selection policy should be made available to all
relevant parties,1 and will form a contract with all applicable athletes, to be construed
in accordance with usual contractual principles.2 Indeed, even where the athletes
are not party to the selection policy document, they may still have a legitimate
expectation that its provisions will be followed.3
1 See Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.16 (‘[…] the Panel wishes to express in clear terms
that it does not condone the lack of published qualification criteria that misled the Applicant by failing
to provide clear and timely notice of the performance standards she was required to meet in order to
be recommended by the ASF for nomination by the AOC to the Austrian Olympic team. To avoid any
future confusion, uncertainty, qualification conflicts, and athletes’ disappointed expectations, the Panel
strongly recommends that the ASF establish, identify, and publish clear criteria to enable athletes to
determine in a timely manner the Olympic Games qualification standards they are required to meet
to be recommended for selection by the AOC’), endorsed in Maria Birkner v COA & FASA, CAS
OG 14/003, para 8.4. See also Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI CAS, OG 06/008, para 7 (noting that ‘the
oral discussion of such [selection] criteria are an imperfect method of explaining to athletes what
the precise criteria are in order for all athletes to know what they must do and achieve in order to be
selected’); Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, where the CAS arbitrator
stated that ‘I would not hesitate to quash the decision, had the selection criteria been established before
the selection, but not been communicated to the athletes. In my view, a professional athlete […] has the
right to know the criteria […] which he or she must meet in order to qualify for the Olympic Games.
[…] the Federation and the National Olympic Committee should pursue a policy of transparency and
open information’.
2 See eg Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ISLR 75,
paras 35 and 38 (‘It seems clear that there is a contract: that is hardly capable of being in dispute.
[…] For the reasons indicated, the effect of the promulgation of the selection criteria was to render
them contractually enforceable […]’); Lynch v Horse Sport Ireland and others, CAS OG 12/03,
para 1.4 (‘It is common ground, or beyond dispute, that the Agreement and the Nomination Criteria
are contractually binding upon the Applicant and HSI’); GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British
Amateur Gymnastics Association (Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012), para 34 (‘The parties agree that
in determining what the parties meant, regard must be had to the ordinary principles applied by courts
when called upon to construe contracts. Although many of the cases discussed by courts relate to
commercial agreements, those principles can and should be adapted to guide the interpretation of
rules, regulations and other agreements which arise in the sport environment’).
3 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, paras 18 and 29, while the agreement
in question was between the Australian Olympic Committee and the Judo Federation of Australia,
the CAS held, on the facts, that ‘it is clear that the Agreement including the Annexures form a
comprehensive code in relation to the nomination and selection of Athletes, as defined, in the sport of
Judo for the 2000 Olympic Games. The Agreement became the terms of reference for the Athletes and
the Athletes by their participation in the selection events accepted and were entitled to rely upon the
Agreement. We conclude that Athletes vying for selection in the 2000 Olympic Games Team in the
sport of Judo have and at all times from 27 September 1999 have had a legitimate expectation that the
provisions of the Agreement would be complied with’.
B2.16 The proper approach to construing a contract under English law is addressed
in detail in Chapter B1.1 The following points are of particular importance when
considering the proper construction of a selection policy:2
(a) The essential purpose of the exercise of construction will be to give the words
used their natural and ordinary meaning, so as to determine what the parties
actually meant.
(b) In determining what the parties meant, evidence of the subjective intention of
the parties, including those responsible for the drafting of the policy and the
body whose policy is being considered, is inadmissible.3
(c) The standpoint that is properly adopted in construing the policy is that of a
reasonable person who has available to him or her all the admissible background
knowledge that would have reasonably been available to the parties when they
made the contract.
(d) If there is more than one possible construction, it is permissible to prefer the
construction that accords with common sense.4
(e) If the selection policy contains unambiguous language, that language must be
applied.5
(f) If the proper construction of the selection policy cannot be ascertained by
the usual principles of construction, the policy should be construed contra
proferentem, namely against the body that has advanced the policy.6 However,
it must be stressed that such an eventuality is very much a last resort and,
despite often being argued, in most cases it will be possible for the tribunal to
identify a workable construction.7
2 See GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics Association (Sport Resolutions,
5 March 2012), paras 35 and 69; Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras
31 and 32.
3 In addition to Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896,
see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 AC 1101 and the powerful statements in Lord
Steyn’s dissenting speech in Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank v Burnhope [1995] 1 WLR 1580 at 1587.
See also Kason Kek-Gardner Limited v Process Components Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 2131 at
para [16] per Lewison LJ.
4 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at 2908, para 21; Wood v Capita Insurance Services
Ltd [2017] UKSC 24 at para [11]; but note Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 at paras [17] to [20].
5 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 at 2908, para 23; Australian Olympic Committee v
FIBT, CAS OG 10/01, para 6.3.
6 See eg Devyatovskiy v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752, (a doping case), at paras 4.21 to 4.30, where the
CAS found that, in light of the contradictory provisions in the IOC rules (and in the absence of any
guidance in the rules as to how the conflict was to be resolved), the rules were to be construed contra
proferentem. For further cases to the same effect, see para B1.61.
7 See the comments of the Appeal Committee in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions,
16 June 2012, para 33. There is also an argument that contra proferentem does not apply
straightforwardly in selection disputes, where adopting the meaning of the selection rules that is
proposed by the athlete will usually mean disappointing another athlete. Italian Canoe Federation
et al v ICF et al, CAS 2015/A/4222, para 139(c) (‘[…] although the drafting of the rules is clearly
insufficient, this is not a case where the contra proferentem interpretation benefits one party against
the draft of an obscure rule. Quite the opposite, in this case the unclear rule both benefits and
damages national federations and their athletes and only does so after the event […]. The contra
proferentem rule of interpretation may be of importance in contractual interpretation where one
of the party drafts the obscure clause. It may also be of relevance in the interpretation of statutory
rules predisposed by an entity, on disciplinary measures where unclear wording cannot be the basis
of a conviction. However, it cannot be upheld in a case where the enacting body merely acts as a
deciding authority on issues that only affect its associates, none of which effectively intervened in
the drafting of the obscure rule’).
B2.17 To give one example, in GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur

Gymnastics Association Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, a particular issue arose
as to the use of a term that was well known within the sport of gymnastics. In such
circumstances, the arbitrator confirmed that the proper meaning of the phrase is a
question of fact. And if it is established that the word is used in accordance with the
meaning given to the word in the sport in question, the selection policy should be
construed accordingly.1
1 See, by way of analogy, Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia Oil and Cake Co Ltd [1917] 1 KB 320, at
p 330. See also Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 6th Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), Ch 5,
sections 7, 9 and 10; and para B1.56 n5.
Selection 399
C Compatibility with other rules
B2.18 When the selection policy is drafted, care must be taken to ensure that it
has regard to and is compatible with any other applicable rules, regulations and
agreements, whether internal or external to the governing body. The most vivid
illustration of this is found in the CAS decisions of USOC v IOC CAS 2011/O/2422,
and BOA v WADA CAS 2011/A/2658.
B2.19 The former case concerned what was colloquially known as the ‘Osaka
Rule’, a rule passed by the IOC Executive Board providing that:
‘any person who has been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months by
any anti-doping organization for any violation of any anti-doping regulations may
not participate, in any capacity, in the next edition of the Games of the Olympiad
and of the Olympic Winter Games following the date of expiry of such suspension’.
B2.20 The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) found itself in the invidious
position whereby a AAA panel in the case of USADA v Merritt (AAA No 77 190
00293, decision dated 15 October 2010) had declared that the Osaka Rule could
not be used to prevent the athlete from competing in the 2012 Olympic Games, but,
under the Osaka Rule, the IOC would not accept the athlete’s nomination.
B2.21 Pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the USOC and the IOC, the
CAS found that the IOC was contractually committed to the World Anti-Doping
Code (Code) and was therefore required not to have any rules that changed the effect
of the sanctions imposed by the Code. Rejecting the IOC’s argument that the Osaka
Rule was an eligibility rule, the CAS held that the rule was in fact an additional
sanction, in breach of the Code and the IOC Charter, and was therefore invalid and
unenforceable.
B2.22 In light of the decision in USOC v IOC, WADA subsequently determined

that a long-standing British Olympic Association (BOA) bye-law, which the BOA had
always argued was a selection policy, was in fact an additional doping sanction and
so non-compliant with the Code. The bye-law provided, in essence, that any person
found guilty of a doping offence would be permanently ineligible for membership of
Team GB or to hold accreditation as a member of Team GB for any Olympic Games
or other Olympic event (subject to a right of appeal in certain circumstances).
B2.23 The BOA appealed WADA’s determination to CAS, arguing that the bye-
law was a selection policy and not a sanction, and so was not precluded by the Code.
The dispute was determined by the same CAS panel as in USOC v IOC.
B2.24 The CAS found that, as a signatory to the Code, the BOA had agreed to
limit its autonomy accordingly. In particular, it was obliged not to have rules that
added to the sanction for doping mandated by the Code. As the bye-law was found
to impose an additional doping sanction, it was therefore non-compliant with the
Code. While the CAS accepted the BOA’s argument that ‘generally the application
of a selection function is separate and distinct from the imposition of a sanction for
a doping offence’ and that ‘[i]n the normal course of events, the WADA Code and
an NOC’s selection policy rarely intersect each other’, ultimately the BOA bye-law
imposed a doping sanction and so was incompatible with the BOA’s obligations as
a signatory to the Code. The CAS therefore made it clear that the BOA’s selection
policies had to reflect those obligations.
B2.25 Interestingly, the Australian Olympic Committee subsequently introduced

a not dissimilar rule requiring all members of Australian Olympic teams to make a
statutory declaration that they have not breached any applicable anti-doping rules
or, if they have breached such rules, that the sanction has been eliminated, waived
or already served. Any persons who do not make the declaration will be ineligible
for membership of a team or to receive funding, and knowingly making a false
declaration will be a criminal offence.
B2.26 Another common example of the need to comply with other rules is the need
for national selection policies to mesh together with the international federation’s
rules (and the rules of other sporting bodies).1 It was the British Judo Association’s
failure to ensure this alignment that led to at least two athletes being de-selected for
the 2012 Olympic Games on the basis that they were in fact ineligible for selection
under the British Judo Association’s selection policy.2
1 See eg Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, paras 6 and 17 (where the horse and
rider combinations had to meet the international federation’s minimum eligibility standard and be
nominated by their national federation in order to be selected by the Australian Olympic Committee).
D Procedure
B2.27 The procedure to be adopted in any given instance will be governed by the
terms of the selection policy in question, which in turn should reflect the needs of the
particular sport and event. However, it is possible to make some general observations
as to the procedural aspects of selection policies, in particular having regard to the
disputes that have arisen before domestic tribunals, the CAS, and the courts.
B2.28 Even before the selection policy is issued, it is suggested that certain steps
should be taken, as a matter of good practice, to ensure that the selection policy is fit
for purpose and, so far as possible, to insulate it from subsequent challenge, whether
via an appeals process or in the courts. These steps include:
(a) ensuring that the athletes are represented in the process of developing the
policy.1 This might be achieved by having an athlete representative on the body
tasked with drafting the selection policy or, alternatively, by asking the athletes
to provide feedback on the policy before it is issued; and
(b) testing the selection policy, in so far as it is possible to do so, by applying it
to previous scenarios to check that the results are as anticipated and, if not, to
determine what steps (if any) need to be taken to meet those expectations.
1 One of the learning points noted in Sport Resolutions’ review of selection disputes arising out of
the 2012 Olympic Games was that national governing bodies should work with athletes and their
representatives in advance of the selection process to achieve an agreed selection policy. See Harry,
‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’ Sport Resolutions, January 2013, p 4,
para 6.
B2.29 Once issued, the athletes to whom the selection policy applies should,
ideally, be required to provide their written acknowledgement and agreement to the
terms of the policy. How this is achieved will depend on the circumstances, but if
the selection policy relates to particular events, it is suggested that acceptance of the
selection policy should ordinarily form part of the entry requirements for those events.
Another option would be to invite athletes to complete an expression of interest form,
acknowledging their acceptance of the selection policy and also serving as a route
to capture other relevant information (such as eligibility status and preferred contact
details).
B2.30 The personnel who make the selection decisions will vary from sport to
sport, but all should be selected for their expertise and experience, giving them the
best possible understanding of the sport and event in question.
Selection 401
‘Selectors are chosen as such because of their experience and expertise. […] They
must make difficult decisions based upon judgment, experience and expertise and
[…], if coaches as well, must formulate strategies appropriate to ensuring the best
results for a team and then make selections consistently with those strategies’.1
It is also obviously crucial that the selectors are familiar with and understand the
selection policy.
1 Mewing v Swimming Australia CAS 2008/A/1540, para 21. See also Renshaw v British Swimming,
Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 17.1. Cf Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association,
Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 28, where the selection policy perhaps went too far in trying
to ensure that the selectors were wholly independent. Only one of the selectors had any fencing
experience and, as the appeal panel noted, ‘one risk inherent in the selection policy […] is that the
decision is ultimately taken by selectors who are wholly independent but also removed from first hand
knowledge of the technicalities of the different fencing disciplines and thus not in a good position to
make any judgement as to comparative performance. The integrity of the decision making process
thus depends critically on the role of the performance manager in faithfully relaying the advice of the
experts on the Performance Team and the Performance Advisory Group, with all the limitations and
reservations applying to that advice’.
B2.31 Again, depending on the sport and the particular circumstances, selection
decisions may be made by one individual or by a panel. If made by a panel, it is
sensible for the panel to comprise an odd number of members, thereby enabling
majority decisions to be made where necessary. If the responsibility falls on one
person, there is no objection to that person discussing their proposed selection
decisions with others provided that the decision is ultimately their own.1 Equally,
there can be no objection to recommendations being made to a selection panel
provided the selection panel do not unthinkingly endorse the recommendations but
instead actually ask themselves whether the recommendations are appropriate.2
1 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 62.
2 See eg Halsted v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 32.
B2.32 The selecting body may also wish to consider appointing an expert adviser
(such as an individual with relevant legal expertise) to assist it throughout the
selection process, including attending selection meetings to advise on procedural and
other matters. Such a person may prove to be a highly important, quasi-independent,
‘witness’ in the event of a challenge to the selection decision.
B2.33 Once a selection decision is made, the selection policy should provide for
how the decision is to be communicated to the relevant athletes. This will be most
important in respect of those athletes who have not been selected (and in some cases
individual notification may be preferable). Whilst it may not always be possible for
detailed minutes to be taken in selection meetings (albeit desirable1), in the authors’
view, at the very least, minutes should be taken in respect of those decisions that
might prove contentious, or, alternatively, a written reasoned communication for the
non-selection should be sent to the athletes concerned based upon the discussions
in the selection meeting.2 Where the selection policy contains a combination of
objective and subjective selection criteria (discussed at Section 2A, above), failure to
minute that each of the criteria or factors was fairly and consistently considered by
the selectors will render a selection decision vulnerable to challenge.
1 In its review of selection disputes arising out of the 2012 Olympic Games, Sport Resolutions
suggested that national governing bodies should take minutes of their selection meetings, in particular
so that in the event of an appeal they will be better placed to demonstrate that the selection policy has
been followed fairly. See Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’, Sport
Resolutions, January 2013, p 4, para 5.
2 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 63(d). See also Peternell v
SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, para 25, where the CAS noted that ‘cogent evidence of which
criteria, if any, were applied by the Respondents in reaching their decisions is lacking, thus rendering
it impossible to determine if the decisions were properly taken’.
B2.34 The reasons given for non-selection should be clear and intelligible and
should enable the athlete to understand why the decision was made and what
conclusions were reached on the principal issues.1 This is especially so in cases
involving subjective selection criteria.2
1 Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, para 81; Roberts v British
Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 63(e). And, by parity of reasoning with a challenge
to a planning decision, see South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at 1964,
paras 35 and 36.
2 See the comments of the Appeal Committee in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions,
16 June 2012, paras 62 and 63.
B2.35 During and after the promulgation of a selection policy, the relevant body
responsible for the selection process must also be careful not to make statements
outside of the policy that may give rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of an
athlete that they will be selected in any event.1
1 See Section 4B(e), below.
B2.36 If there is any need for the selection policy to be amended after it has been
issued, this should only be done if there is time to facilitate such an amendment
and on the basis that the amendment and its effect are clearly disseminated to all
those who might be affected. If an amendment is made, for example, after the initial
trigger for selection has passed, such as the first qualifying event having occurred, the
amendment is likely to be struck down.1
1 See Section 4B(e), below.
B2.37 As noted previously, in the majority of cases the athletes simply want to feel
that they have been treated fairly and consistently, in accordance with the selection
policy and pursuant to a clear and transparent process, and to understand why the
decision was reached (even if, ultimately, they do not agree with it). The above
procedures will help to achieve that and, hopefully, to reduce thereby the need for
appeals and the prospect of challenge. This is as much in the interests of the athletes
as those of the regulator, in particular as it helps to prevent time-consuming and
costly appeals that can be incredibly damaging to the sport and to those involved,
and that can be a major distraction for the athletes and teams affected, and the sport
as a whole (and often at a time when interest should be focused on the relevant
event). The proper handling of selection disputes can also help to prevent those
unsuccessful athletes from becoming disillusioned and, in the worst case, leaving
the sport altogether. For example, following his very public selection dispute with
GB Taekwondo in 2012, Aaron Cook switched to represent the Isle of Man in all
major competitions outside of the Olympic Games, and later competed for Moldova
in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.
3 ELIGIBILITY
B2.38 Eligibility is naturally a pre-requisite of selection, as it determines whether

the athlete in question is entitled even to be considered for selection. As with
selection criteria, eligibility will be sport-specific, and can include general matters
such as nationality, residency, membership, sex,1 age, weight, and impairment type
(for Para sports), as well as more specific matters such as having achieved minimum
performance standards, having competed in certain events, not being subject to a
disciplinary suspension,2 or having signed necessary agreements. There will not
always be a bright line between eligibility and the selection criteria themselves. It
will depend on the facts of each case and the selection policy in question.
Selection 403
1 See eg rules governing the participation of transgender athletes and/or athletes with differences of
sexual development that have been put in place by various sports. Rules of the latter kind were the
subject of challenge before the CAS in Chand v IAAF & AFI, CAS 2014/A/3759, and Semenya v
IAAF, Athletics South Africa v IAAF, CAS 2018/O/5794 & CAS 2018/A/5798, which is discussed in
detail at para E14.72.
2 For example, under World Rugby’s principle of ‘universality’, player suspensions (at any level of the
game) are applied universally such that a player cannot play rugby union anywhere during the period
of the suspension. See World Rugby Reg 17, Preamble D and Reg 17.19.11.
B2.39 As one high-profile example of an eligibility dispute, in Pistorius v IAAF,

CAS 2008/A/1480,1 and in Leeper v IAAF, CAS 2020/A/6807, the CAS had
to consider the validity and application of rules conditioning the eligibility of an
athlete using prosthetic legs to compete in IAAF-sanctioned events against able-
bodied athletes on the question of whether or not his prostheses gave him an overall
competitive advantage over an athlete not using such blades. On the facts, in 2008 the
CAS held that Mr Pistorius was eligible to compete as, pursuant to the IAAF rules in
place at the time, it had not been established that his prosthetic legs gave him a net
advantage over the other participants, whereas in 2020 the CAS held that Mr Leeper
was not eligible to compete because the IAAF (now known as World Athletics) had
established such advantage.
1 See discussion at para E14.42.
A Nationality
B2.40 An obvious historical area of tension was that between eligibility on the
grounds of nationality and European rules prohibiting discrimination based on
nationality (although this is now subject to the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement). This
issue is considered in more detail elsewhere in this book.1
1 See para E12.43 et seq.
B2.41 For present purposes, it suffices to note that the European courts recognised
the legitimacy of selection based on nationality for international events on the basis
that the decision was a matter of sporting interest and has nothing to do with economic
activity. Thus, in Walrave1 the European Court of Justice upheld the legitimacy of a
rule that provided that motorcycle pacemakers in certain cycle races had to be of the
same nationality as the ‘stayer’. In Deliège2 the same court determined that although
the selection rules had the effect of limiting the number of national participants that
could advance to an international tournament, such a limitation was inherent in
an international sports event and was not, of itself, a restriction on the freedom to
provide services or the freedom of movement.
1 Walrave v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405.
2 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège v Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associées
ASBL [2000] ECR I -2549.
B2.42 The issue of nationality is not, however, confined to European rules. Different
sports have different rules on national eligibility (and changes of nationality).1
Sometimes the issue can be as simple as determining whether an athlete is a citizen
of the country that he or she wishes to represent.2
1 For example, in March 2012, World Rugby’s Regulations Committee Panel determined that Steven
Shingler was tied to Wales under World Rugby Reg 8 (Eligibility to play for National Representative
Teams) and was therefore ineligible to play for Scotland. In 2018, World Athletics made various
changes to its transfer of allegiance rules to address concerns that the previous system was open
to abuse. See also Rule 41 and the accompanying bye-law of the Olympic Charter (which requires
competitors in the Olympic Games to be a national of the country they are representing), and the IPC’s
nationality policy governing participation in the Paralympic Games.
2 For example, see Phillip Darrell Jones v Commonwealth Games Federation, CAS CG 2010/01
(regarding the eligibility of an athlete to represent Norfolk Island in the Commonwealth Games).
B Hierarchy of governing bodies
B2.43 For any selection decision there are often rules on eligibility issued by a
number of governing bodies that have to be met (for example, those of national
and international federations, National Olympic and Paralympic Committees, the
Commonwealth Games Federation, and/or the International Olympic Committee
and International Paralympic Committee). It is therefore important that the various
selection policies mesh together correctly.1
1 See eg Rule 40 (and the accompanying bye-law) of the Olympic Charter: ‘To participate in the
Olympic Games, a competitor, team official or other team personnel must respect and comply with the
Olympic Charter and World Anti-Doping Code, including the conditions of participation established
by the IOC, as well as with the rules of the relevant IF as approved by the IOC, and the competitor,
team official or other team personnel must be entered by his NOC’. See further para B2.26.
4 APPEALS
B2.44 It is essential, in the interests of natural justice, for a selection policy to

include an opportunity for an athlete to challenge a selection decision. It is also
essential for good governance, as in the absence of an appeals procedure the unhappy
athlete may turn to the courts, which is unlikely to be in the interests of the sport.1
1 See eg the long-running legal dispute between triple jumper Charles Friedek and the German Olympic
Sports Confederation (DOSB), in which the athlete sought damages on the basis that the DOSB had
wrongly found that he had not met the applicable qualification standards and did not therefore nominate
him for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games (the case was eventually settled in 2016). See also the
damages awarded by a US court to mountain biker Susan Haywood in her case against USA Cycling
regarding her non-selection for the Athens 2004 Olympic Games; and the Swiss Federal Tribunal
case of Fédération Suisse de Lutte Amateur v Grossen, SFT 121 III 350, where the court awarded
damages against the FSLA due to a breach of the athlete’s legitimate expectation (on the facts) that the
qualification requirements set by the FSLA would not be changed.
B2.45 On a domestic level consideration should be given to the use of an

organisation such as Sport Resolutions to appoint the panel that hears any appeal
(as distinct from a wholly internal procedure), to provide an attractive degree of
independence and expertise to the appeals process. At the very least, the appointment
of an independent appeal panel is recommended at some stage of the process (ideally
comprising at least one legally qualified member).1 Further, depending on the sport,
if an additional tier of appeal is considered desirable, recourse to te CAS may be
appropriate.
1 One of the learning points from Sport Resolutions’ review of selection disputes arising out of the 2012
Olympic Games was that national governing bodies should make provision for an independent appeals
process. See Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London 2012 Olympics’, Sport Resolutions,
January 2013, p 4, para 3.
A Grounds of appeal
B2.46 The general principles governing challenges to the actions of sports

governing bodies are dealt with in Part E of this book. However, it is useful to give
specific consideration to the possible grounds of appeal of selection decisions.
B2.47 It is well established that, in the vast majority of cases, it is not the role of an
appeal panel to review the merits of a selection policy or a selection decision, ie the
issue is not whether the appeal panel agrees with the selection policy or selection
decision in question.1 As stated in Renshaw v British Swimming, ‘the purpose of
providing an athlete with a right of appeal against non-nomination is not to give
athletes a second chance of selection via a second tier selection panel. Instead it is
Selection 405
to provide machinery for the correction of an error’.2 Accordingly, ‘an appeal body
should be very cautious about overturning a selection decision. It should only do so
exceptionally, where the flaw in the decision goes well beyond a mere disagreement
with the merits of the selection decision made’.3
1 This sentence was cited with approval in Team Spirit v NISA, Sport Resolutions, 25 February 2016.
Also see Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 17.2 (‘the CAS is clear
that it is for the experts to make those decisions [to design a selection policy and make difficult
decisions in the implementation of that policy], and it is not for an appeal body to review the merits of
a selection policy or of a decision made in the implementation of that policy’); Couch v British
Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 12(h) (‘we reiterate that the
decision is made by the NPD, not this panel. Ms Couch does not agree with his view in certain
respects. It is not for us to decide whether he is right. Our decision is based merely on whether […] his
exercise of discretion fell within or outside the terms of the required criteria’); Halsted v British
Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 17 (‘To stray into category (ii) [matters
which amount to an attack on the judgments of the selectors and their weighing of all the ingredients
which go into balancing the competing claims of the candidates for selection] would be to do precisely
what a British Fencing Association appeal tribunal is not entitled to do, which is to act as a second-tier
selection body’); Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May
2012, paras 11 and 22 (‘The selection process is not a legal or adversarial process, and these
proceedings are not equivalent to judicial review of public bodies. The selectors have a difficult task to
balance the comparative merits of the candidates for selection and the overall interest of the association
in maximising the chances of securing medals at the Olympics. These are matters of sporting or
performance judgement and it is not for this panel to adjudicate on those questions’); Mewing v
Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 22 to 24 (‘the Appellant is really attacking the merits
of the nomination or selection decision by Mr Thompson. This, in my view, is impermissible in such
an appeal. In analogous circumstances courts have repeatedly warned against the impropriety of a
Court or other Tribunal coming to a conclusion on the merits of the case under the guise of making a
finding that the original decision-maker acted in bad faith or contrary to particular guidelines or
criteria. […] CAS has, in selection disputes, adopted an identical approach. […] this appeal could only
succeed if it could be shown that Mr Thompson […] did not give “proper, genuine and realistic”
consideration to the “overall needs of the team”. […] The fact that someone else, similarly considering
the matter, may have arrived at a different result, or even the fact that his decision is wrong, is
insufficient to enable the appeal to be successful as such matters go to the merits of the decision not
whether or not the decision-maker gave proper consideration to such matters’); Belcher v British
Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, paras 49 to 50 (‘The test I have applied is to find that a
decision may be open to challenge if, but only if, (i) It is not in accordance with [the] Selection Policy
as published; and/or (ii) The policy has been misapplied or applied on no good evidence and/or in
circumstances where the application of the policy was unfair (for example, because someone with
selectoral authority had given a categorical assurance to an athlete that the policy would not be
applied); and/or (iii) The decision maker has shown bias or the appearance of bias or the selection
process has otherwise been demonstrably unfair; (iv) Where the conclusion is one that no reasonable
decision maker could have reached. That last conclusion is one that any Judge or Arbitrator has to
approach with the utmost care. As I have already indicated, it is of fundamental importance that we
should not substitute our own judgment on the merits for those of the selectors – ie who would we have
selected, or who is the better athlete or has the better performance figures and so forth. So long as
selectors apply policy properly, and do so honestly, fairly and reasonably, and take account of relevant
facts (they being best judged to decide what is relevant and what is not), then their decisions must be
accorded the utmost respect’) and para 45 (‘It is absolutely no part of the role of an arbitrator to get
anywhere close to substituting his or her own judgement on the merits for what is essentially a
selectoral decision, assuming that that decision has been reached without bias, on the basis of all
relevant evidence and has resulted in a decision which satisfies the test of being one that a panel,
properly informed, could reasonably have reached’); Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports,
NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, paras 87 to 89 (‘This Tribunal is reluctant to intervene in selection
decisions, as they are very much for the sport. [citing Murdoch v Yachting New Zealand] “It was
common ground between all parties that it was not the role of the Tribunal to substitute its views for
those of the Nomination Panel on the merits of the decision as to whether the nominees will or will not
achieve a top 10 placing in their class at the Olympics. The limited grounds of appeal set out in the
NZOC Nomination Criteria and Selection Criteria are constructed in such a way as to direct the
Tribunal’s attention to matters of process and procedure.” […] We will not substitute our evaluation,
nor second guess the selection which requires judgment. Our concern in most cases will be with the
process adopted, including the way the reasons for selection or non-selection are expressed. They will
usually, as here, throw light on the validity of that process’); Watt v Australian Cycling Federation,
CAS 96/153, paras 7 to 10 (‘By their agreement the parties thus want the “selection decision”
scrutinized by this Tribunal, not in the sense that this Tribunal should set aside the decision simply
because it thinks a better one could have been made; but rather to determine whether the decision was
arrived at fairly and with due and proper regard, if any was owed, to the interests of the Appellant in
the peculiar circumstances which existed’); Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June
2012, para 10 (‘We are not a second-tier selection panel with a general power to review selection
decisions. We have no jurisdiction to intervene in a selection (or non-selection) just because there is
room for differing views about the fairness of the choice made by the selectors – even if (as will
frequently occur with sometimes finely-balanced decisions) those views reflect sharp differences of
judgment and are strongly felt by some of the involved parties to be unfair. Our task is limited to
deciding whether one or other of the specified grounds of appeal has been established’); Olubi v British
Bobsleigh, Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014, para 8 (‘A court or arbitral panel will not seek to put
itself into the shoes of the expert and experienced selectors, and will afford them a wide margin of
discretion in the exercise of their function. The court or arbitral panel is in no position to second guess
the selectors’ decision and replace it with its own. Rather on review it is appropriate to examine the
way in which the decision was taken, and whether that fell short on one of the bases set out above. If
the way in which the decision was taken did not so fall short, the court or arbitral panel will not assess
whether the decision was in its view correct’); Bias v Cycling New Zealand, NZST 06/19, para 16
(‘The legal position is however very clear; that we can and should only intervene if there was no basis
or justification for the decision reached by the selectors’). See also the Canadian case of McCaig v
Canadian Yachting Association, 24 April 1996, unreported, Man QB (Winnipeg), Case No CI96-01-
96624, noted in Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes
Preceding the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1 Entertainment
Law 109 at p 116, where Simonson J is reported as having said: ‘If the relief sought by the applicants
were to be granted, it would, by necessary implication, require the court to write into the agreement a
clause which does not exist. Apart from a claim of rectification, I know of no basis upon which a court
can rewrite a contract by inserting a fresh clause in an agreement, no matter how desirable it might be.’
The authors then proceed to observe: ‘It is not the adjudicator’s role to fix drafting errors where there
is no issue of interpretation – courts must give plain meaning to the words as written, even when they
produce an unintended result’. See also Findlay and Corbett, The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and
Participants in Sport (August 2000), pp 19 and 20; and para B2.14, n.1.
2 Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 16.
3 Ibid, para 18.
B2.48 In two CAS decisions,1 however, the CAS panel conducted a de novo
hearing of the selection decision itself:
(a) In D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee,2 the CAS held that, pursuant to
Art R57 of the CAS Code, it had ‘full power to review the facts and the law’ on
the appeal before it, and the athlete was therefore entitled to a de novo hearing,
ie a complete re-hearing on the merits of the AOC’s decision to terminate the
athlete’s membership of the Australian Olympic team in light of his admitted
breach of the AOC ethical behaviour rules.
(b) In Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF,3 the CAS again conducted a de novo hearing
based on Art R57 of the CAS Code, noting that ‘it is the duty of the CAS Panel
in an appeals arbitration procedure to make its independent determination of
whether the Appellant’s and the Respondents’ allegations are correct on the
merits, rather than limit itself to assessing the correctness of the previous
procedure and decision’. The panel accordingly went on to make the selection
decision itself, applying the selection criteria and selecting the appellant in
place of the athlete previously nominated.
1 Further, in the decision of Jo-Ann Lim v Synchronised Swimming Australia Inc, CAS (Oceania Registry)
A2/2016, the sole arbitrator, determining the matter under the law of New South Wales, said at para 60:
‘Pursuant to Article R57 of the Code and clause 12.18 of the By-Law, this Panel has the power to review
the facts and the law in determining whether there was an error on a question of law as to construction of
the Nomination Criteria and as to whether the Appeals Tribunal has breached the rules of natural justice’.
Having identified that there were no submissions to the contrary and that the parties agreed that the proper
construction of the Nomination Criteria was a question of law, the Arbitrator continued: ‘It is therefore not
necessary in this regard to consider questions of whether submissions before the Appeals Tribunal could
properly amount to evidence in circumstances where the rules of evidence do not apply. In any event, there
was agreement as to relevant factual matters for the purposes of the determination of this appeal’.
2 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, paras 7, 19 to 24, 38, 40 and 44.
3 Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, paras 11, 12 and 26 to 29.
B2.49 However, it is suggested that these cases are not a departure from the
principles set out above but are instead a reminder of the importance of careful
Selection 407
consideration of the terms of reference to an appeal panel (in particular, to the

CAS1). In D’Arcy the terms of reference incorporated the CAS Code without
amendment, and it was found to be ‘significant that there [was] no requirement in the
provisions applicable to the Appeal Arbitration Procedure to establish any particular
grounds of appeal’.2 In any event the CAS panel also reached the same finding as
the AOC and noted that, given the knowledge and experience of the AOC in such
matters, its ‘unanimous view must be given great weight’.3 In Peternell the terms of
reference again incorporated the CAS Code and, while the panel decided to make
the selection decision itself rather than remitting it back, the selectors had failed to
properly apply the selection policy and pursuant to the objective selection criteria
(the highest ranked available rider) it was clear that the athlete would be selected;
so it may be that on different facts (for example, with subjective selection criteria)
the panel would instead have decided to remit the matter.4 A further illustration of
the importance of the terms of reference is found in Karwalski v Squash Australia,
a case concerning selection for the Commonwealth Games.5 The CAS panel was
faced with a clear conflict between the selection policy (which stated that the
Appeal Committee ‘will conduct the appeal de novo’, but also in accordance with
the Guidelines to the Selection Policy) and the Guidelines (which stated that the
Appeal Committee ‘will function as a committee of review and will not take on the
role of an alternate [sic] Selection Committee’). The CAS panel determined that in
the face of an obvious conflict the provisions of the Selection Policy itself should
prevail and the Appeal Committee should therefore conduct the appeal de novo.
Accordingly, as noted at Section 2B above, a selection policy should contain a clear
statement of any rights of appeal, including whether there are any required grounds
of appeal or whether there is to be a de novo hearing of the selection decision itself
(which is likely to be rare).
1 See further Mavromati and Pellaux, ‘Article R57 of the CAS Code: A Purely Procedural Provision?’
[2013] ISLR 36.
2 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, paras 5, 22, 26 and 27.
4 See Mavromati and Pellaux, ‘Article R57 of the CAS Code: A Purely Procedural Provision?’
[2013] ISLR 36, p 41 (‘In the majority of cases, the lifting of the challenged decision is followed by the
issuance of a new decision. However, there might be some good reasons for the panel to refer the case
back to the previous instance […] fourthly, where there may be factual reasons, eg in selection matters,
where CAS often lacks the knowledge and factual basis to replace the decision of the selecting body
or when additional information or investigation are needed’). As an interesting postscript, Mr Peternell
had to appeal further to the CAS ad hoc division at the 2012 Olympic Games (Peternell v SASCOC
and SAEF, CAS OG 12/01), as the SAEF still did not nominate him for selection (instead nominating
the rider originally selected or, alternatively, suggesting the withdrawal of South Africa’s entry from
the event). The CAS held that both SAEF and SASCOC were obliged to recognise the jurisdiction of
CAS (and the previous CAS ruling) and therefore ordered that Mr Peternell be selected (see paras 49
to 56 of the award). While the reasoning of the CAS could perhaps have been clearer, the result was
arguably justified in light of the conduct of the parties, the CAS noting that ‘[t]he course of action
proposed by SAEF […] was, without doubt, against the obligation to recognise the jurisdiction of CAS
[…], against the applicable selection criteria […] and against the principles of Olympism expressed
in the Olympic Charter. To propose, as a kind of retaliatory measure, “to withdraw the Entry of South
Africa”, as SAEF did […], and to follow such a proposal, as SASCOC did […] is hardly within the
Olympic spirit or the promotion of ethics and good governance in sport’.
5 Karwalski v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, para 50.
B2.50 Whilst ultimately a matter for the drafting of any particular selection policy,
appeals are usually limited to the following grounds:1
(a) the selection policy was not properly followed and/or implemented (for
example, the selectors failed to apply the selection criteria, or did not give
‘proper, genuine and realistic’ consideration to the factors identified2);
(b) the selectors failed to take into account relevant considerations, or took into
account irrelevant considerations;3
(c) the selection process was tainted by bias;4
(d) the selection decision was made in bad faith, dishonestly, or perversely;5 and/
or
(e) the selection process was otherwise unfair6 (for example, the decision was not
arrived at fairly and with due regard to the interests and legitimate expectations
of the athlete;7 or the selection criteria were not fairly established or were not
applied equally to all athletes8).
1 See Belcher v British Canoe Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, para 49; Renshaw v British
Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 18.
2 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 19, 20 and 24.
3 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 58 and 63(c) (where the selection
policy did not allow any consideration to be given to the prospects of athletes at the next Olympic
Games or any other event except for the 2012 Olympic Games).
4 See Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, paras 23, 36, 79 and 82, for
an example of an (unsuccessful) argument based on gender bias.
5 Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 21 and 24.
6 It should, however, be noted that in the context of selection disputes the application of the rules of
fairness ‘is particularly dependent on the context […]. The selection procedure is not a judicial process
and the selectors are not required to give candidates an opportunity to make representations, in their
own favour or, still less, against the interest of other candidates’. Hutchison and others v British
Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13.
7 Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, para 10.
8 Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, paras 10 to 12 (where the selection
criteria were finalised after the selection event and never explicitly communicated).
B2.51 Other less common grounds of appeal that have been raised include that
the selection policy was contrary to general principles of law or had an arbitrary
application (which might include where a policy discriminates between athletes on
improper grounds),1 that the decision was irrational or was one that no reasonable
decision-maker could have reached,2 and that the athlete was not given a reasonable
opportunity to satisfy the selection criteria.3
1 COA v FIS, CAS OG 02/002, paras 5, 6, 11 and 12 (where the CAS found that the international
federation had not abused its discretion in determining the eligibility criteria for snowboarding events,
in particular as the determination itself was not arbitrary and the failure to have written rules governing
the re-allocation of unused slots and the failure to notify national federations of eligibility decisions
was not contrary to general principles of law or arbitrary); Schuler v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS
OG 06/002, paras 37 and 38 (where the CAS noted that arbitrariness could not be established where it
was not claimed that the selection body acted in bad faith or in a discriminatory manner, or where there
was no evidence that the selection process was unfair and the selection decision was unreasonable).
See generally on the right to equal treatment para B1.27 et seq.
2 Jongewaard v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1605, para 6; Belcher v British Canoe
Union, Sport Resolutions, 5 July 2012, paras 45, 49 and 50; Graham v Equestrian Australia,
CAS 2012/A/2828, para 80. See also Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.15 (‘[…] a NF
has a legal duty not to be arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable [in the application of both objective criteria
and subjective discretion]. Based on the submitted evidence in the present case, the Panel concludes
that the ASF did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary, unfair, or unreasonable manner because it
had a legitimate sports performance justification for not recommending that the AOC nominate the
Application for an allocation quota in women’s halfpipe’), confirmed in Maria Birkner v COA &
FASA, CAS OG 14/003, paras 8.2 to 8.3 (confirming that ‘a discretion based on “the evolution and
projection in the future” is not arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable’); Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming
Federation, CAS 2000/A/278.
3 Walker v Australian Biathlon Association, CAS 2011/A/2590, paras 7.40, 7.42 and 7.43, where the
CAS rejected the submission that the athlete was not given a reasonable opportunity to satisfy the
nomination criteria, as the changes to the race course applied equally to all participants and the athlete
was therefore afforded the same opportunity as everyone else. The CAS also noted that even if the
submission had been made out, the argument appeared to rely on an implied term to that effect and the
parties had not addressed the requirements for such a term. See also Liza Hunter-Galvan v Athletics
New Zealand Incorporated, NZST 07/08, 20 June 2008, paras 112 and 114.
B2.52 However, notwithstanding the discrete grounds of appeal identified above,

there is often a degree of overlap between those grounds and it may therefore be
possible to argue an appeal on more than one basis. For example, the case of Michael
v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549, was upheld on the grounds of actual bias
Selection 409
but may in fact be better explained as an example of a failure to follow the selection
policy.
B2.53 Even if the selection policy purports to limit the grounds of appeal, it has
been suggested that an appeal panel will not be bound by such limitations and will
instead be entitled to consider any free-standing legal grounds for challenge to the
selection policy and any decisions made thereunder.1
1 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 9
(‘Paragraph 18 of the selection policy allows an appeal only on the basis that the process outlined in the
selection policy document has not been followed. There must be implied a requirement for fairness in
the application of the process. Thus paragraph 18 permits a fencer to appeal if there is a case that there
has been a material deviation from the process laid down, or on the basis that the process has been
affected by substantial unfairness. A challenge on the grounds of unfairness might include a challenge
on the grounds that the decision making of the selectors was affected by bias. There is a requirement
for fair process’.); Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 22.3 (albeit
without the benefit of full argument on the point). Such an appeal may also be advanced on the basis
of a breach of legitimate expectations, as in Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, CAS OG 16/005 & 16/0076.
B2.54 Care must also be taken to ensure that arguments based on proper and
permissible grounds of appeal do not in reality amount to an impermissible attack on
the merits of a decision.1
1 See Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, especially at paras 16, 21 and 22.
B Successful grounds of appeal
B2.55 Ultimately each case will turn on its own facts, but it is possible to discern
from the reported jurisprudence the principal grounds on which appeal panels have
determined that a selection decision cannot stand and that an appeal should be
allowed.
(a) Eligibility
B2.56 Demonstrating that another (selected) athlete is ineligible is perhaps

one of the most straightforward ways of succeeding in a selection appeal (albeit
that such cases do not arise very often). This ground of appeal arose at the 2012
Olympic Games, where at least two selected judokas were subsequently found to be
ineligible for selection under the British Judo Association’s selection policy (as they
had not participated in the required events).1 This ground of appeal was also raised
unsuccessfully in Kerry v Ice Skating Australia, CAS 2013/A/3415.
1 Gosiewski v British Judo Association, 2012 unreported (although in any event the BJA decided not to
fill the spot vacated by one of the ineligible athletes); see Section 5, below. See also Schuettler v ITF,
CAS OG 08/003 (where the CAS held that the appellant was eligible to compete and ordered the ITF
to enter him for the Olympic Games). Cf Beresford v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2837 (where
being on a ‘short list’ was found, on the facts, not to be an eligibility requirement).
(b) Failure to follow and/or implement the selection policy
B2.57 Another relatively straightforward way to succeed with a selection appeal is

to show that the selection policy was not properly followed and/or implemented. In
general, this is easier to establish with objective criteria than with subjective criteria.1
1 See eg Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 12
(where the selection criteria were largely subjective and were found to be sufficiently widely drafted
to allow the selector to consider that the prospect of a medal in one event should not be jeopardised by
selecting one of the athletes for a further event where he considered that to do so may affect the athlete’s
performance in the first event); Olubi v British Bobsleigh, Sport Resolutions, 21 January 2014, para 14
(where under the relevant policy it was found to be for the national federation to decide how much
weight to attach to each of the listed factors); and the similar finding in Stanley v National Ice Skating
Association of GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013 and 12 December 2013,
paras 9 and 23.
B2.58 In GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British Amateur Gymnastics

Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012, it was found that, on a proper
construction of the selection policy, the GB rhythmic gymnastics team had met the
minimum benchmark score at the specified event and should therefore be nominated
by the British Amateur Gymnastics Association for the 2012 Olympic Games.
B2.59 In Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation,1 the CAS found that there had
been a failure to comply with the nomination criteria (which required the results of
certain events to be taken into account), as the selectors were not entitled to make
their own determination as to the results of an event (thereby overriding the outcome
of the protest hearing at the event). As that failure caused the weight given to the
performance of the athletes to be decreased, and as the selection decision itself was a
‘very close contest’ between the two crews, the CAS found that it was not possible to
say that the failure made no difference to the selection decision (ie the decision ‘could
have been different if the particular non-compliance had not occurred’). Accordingly,
as agreed by the parties, the matter was remitted back to the AYF to make a further
decision in accordance with the nomination criteria (although, ultimately, the same
crew was selected).
1 Beashel v Australian Yachting Federation, CAS 2000/A/260.
B2.60 In Berchtold v Skiing Australia,1 the selection criteria were not absolute and
fixed but were subject to an overarching discretion in extenuating circumstances. As
the selection panel failed to recognise that it had such a discretion (and so failed to
consider whether the particular circumstances were extenuating), the CAS found that
it had failed to properly follow and/or implement the selection policy. The matter was
therefore remitted back to the selection panel and the athlete who had brought the
appeal was subsequently selected.
1 Berchtold v Skiing Australia, CAS 2002/A/361, especially paras 13 to 18.
B2.61 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia,1 it was held that the nomination
criteria were not properly followed and/or implemented as the correct points table
was not applied to the results of the athletes in the relevant events. The appellant
was therefore nominated for selection. Similarly, in Iles v Shooting Australia, the
sole arbitrator found that the selection committee had failed to consider a mandatory
criterion (relating to an athlete’s long-term development) and the matter was therefore
remitted back to Shooting Australia for reconsideration.2
1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, para 30.
2 Iles v Shooting Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2016, paras 62 to 71 (a case determined in
accordance with the law of New South Wales). In an interesting postscript, the appellant was
subsequenty selected for the Rio 2016 Olympic Games as the athlete originally selected was ruled
ineligible by Shooting Australia after he was charged with drink-driving and firearms offences.
B2.62 The court in Elliot Hilton v The National Ice Skating Association of the
United Kingdom Ltd [2009] ISLR 75, found that NISA had adopted certain ‘first past
the post’ selection criteria, without any general discretion to override such criteria,
and Mr Hilton was therefore entitled to be selected in accordance with the published
selection policy. In a reverse scenario, in Stanley v National Ice Skating Association of
GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013, para 8, it was found
that NISA’s performance director had failed to exercise his judgment as required by
the selection policy, and had instead incorrectly applied a single criterion.
Selection 411
B2.63 Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011,

is another example of selectors failing to properly follow and/or implement the
selection criteria, specifically, by failing to properly consider the prospect of the
athlete obtaining a top ten finish, and failing to consider her development potential.1
In particular, the selectors did not properly consider the athlete’s fitness levels and
gave inappropriate weight to certain factors such as previous results and injury. The
case was accordingly remitted back to the federation and the athlete who had brought
the appeal was subsequently selected.
1 See paras 49, 97, 98 and 100 of the judgment.
B2.64 In D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee,1 the proper procedure was not
followed, as the decision to terminate the athlete’s membership of the Australian
team was taken by the wrong person. The matter was accordingly remitted so that a
decision could be taken by the correct body (although, in the event, the same decision
was reached).
1 D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1539, para 12, and D’Arcy v Australian
Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, p 3.
B2.65 Another straightforward example of a failure to follow the selection

policy is Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others,1 where the athlete’s appeal
against de-selection from the Olympic Games (based on a suspicion of doping) was
upheld on the basis that the selection policy did not provide for such exclusion. An
analogous scenario arose in the case of Samoa NOC v IWF, where the CAS held
that, under the IWF rules, the IWF’s decision to endorse a misconduct suspension
imposed on an athlete by his national federation required that suspension to be valid.
As the suspension had subsequently been set aside by the national courts, the IWF
decision (that the athlete could not participate in the Olympic Games) was no longer
supported and had to be set aside.2
1 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, paras 7.5, 7.6 and 7.9.
2 Samoa NOC v IWF, CAS OG 00/002, paras 6, 9 and 10. For further examples of where a selection
policy was not properly followed and/or implemented, see Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS
OG 04/001; Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 08/003; Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01.
B2.66 If the relevant non-compliance with the selection policy did not, in the view
of the appeal panel, ultimately affect the final outcome of the selection decision, the
appeal panel can refuse to uphold the appeal notwithstanding the error.1 However, the
athlete should not be required to prove that the error did affect the final decision, but
instead should be given the benefit of the doubt.2
1 See eg Halsted v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 22 June 2012, para 12 (‘It does not
follow from British Fencing Association’s failure to comply with that requirement in paragraph 13 that
the selection decision must be set aside. It is clearly implicit in the Selection Policy […] that a failure to
follow the process should have had, or have been realistically capable of having, a material effect on the
selection decision. It would make no sense at all if any failure to follow the process gave an automatic
right to have the selection decision set aside and reconsidered, even where no one could realistically say
that the decision would have been different if the process had been followed correctly and to the letter’).
2 Ibid, para 13 (‘On the other hand, section 13 is an important requirement. Where on a selection
decision British Fencing Association has failed to follow that part of the process, an athlete appealing
against that decision will normally be entitled to have the decision set aside unless it can be confidently
said that the non-compliance could not realistically have made a difference to the actual decision. The
athlete is to be given the benefit of any doubt on that issue. He does not have to prove that the non-
compliance did affect the decision’).
(c) Relevant and irrelevant considerations
B2.67 Arguments about relevant and irrelevant considerations are clearly fact-
specific and can be difficult to prove in the absence of an obvious failure to have
regard to relevant criteria or an obvious reference to irrelevant criteria. One example

of a failure to take into account relevant considerations (namely, the athlete’s illness
and injury, and the impact on their performance) is the case of Roberts v British
Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012. The Appeal Committee in that case
also noted that the ground of appeal would be established where it could be shown
that ‘relevant information was given obviously insufficient weight in a way that
was not within the ambit of a reasonable judgment’.1 However, although the matter
was remitted to British Swimming for further consideration, the athlete was not
subsequently selected.
1 Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, paras 40 and 60.
B2.68 It should also be noted that the fact that something is not specifically
mentioned in the selection policy does not automatically render it irrelevant if it is
otherwise consistent with that policy.1
1 See eg Mewing v Swimming Australia, CAS 2008/A/1540, paras 16 and 25 (where the unlikelihood of
the athlete getting a swim at the Olympic Games, if selected, was found to be a relevant factor); Couch
v British Swimming, British Swimming Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012 (where the selector was
entitled to consider that the prospect of a medal in one event should not be jeopardised by selecting one
of the athletes for a further event where he did not expect her to medal and where to do so may affect
the athlete’s performance in the first event).
B2.69 Relevant and irrelevant considerations are also often argued as a

failure properly to follow and/or implement the selection policy, as in Michael v
NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011. Beashel v Australian
Yachting Federation, CAS 2000/A/260, could also be explained as a case in which
the selectors took into account irrelevant considerations, namely, their own view as
to what the results of the nomination event should have been.
(d) Bias
B2.70 Another area where successful appeals have been brought is where it is
shown that the selection process was tainted by bias.
B2.71 The law on bias is discussed elsewhere.1 It suffices for present purposes to
note that the relevant legal test is ‘whether the fair-minded and informed observer,
having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that
the tribunal was biased’.2 However, it has been recognised that there is a danger in
applying rigid rules as to apparent bias or interest derived from judicial or quasi-
judicial cases to selection decisions.3 In particular:
‘[no] participant in the selection decision [is] expected to come to the process without
preconceived views as to which athletes are likely to stand the best chance of winning
medals. It is inevitable, particularly in the case of world class athletes, that some will
be very well known to those responsible for making recommendations and that they
may have formed clear views as to their competitive chances compared to others.
The reasonable observer would not expect […] that a national coach appointed by
the association should be excluded from a role in making recommendations to be
forwarded to the selectors because he happened also to be the personal coach to
some of the candidates for places’.4
Accordingly, while the legal test remains relevant, it is suggested that it should not be
subject to a mechanical application and the reality of the sporting context should be
recognised, especially where personnel are well known to each other.
1 See paras D1.76 and E7.70.
2 These are the words of Lord Phillips in Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001]
1 WLR 700 (CA), as adopted by Lord Hope in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 and Lord Bingham in
Selection 413
Lawal v Northern Spirit Limited [2004] 1 All ER 187. For a recent useful discussion on the principles,
see R (on the application of United Cabbies Group (London) Ltd) v Westminster Magistrates Court
[2019] EWHC 409 Admin. See also Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport
Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 12.
3 See Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13. See
also Kulesza v Canadian Amateur Synchronized Swimming Association Inc, 27 June 1996, unreported,
Ont Ct Gen Div (Ottawa), Case No 27763-0001, noted in Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes,
Coaches and Participants in Sport’ (August 2000), p 7 (where the court took the view that it was
entirely appropriate and sensible for coaches within Synchro Canada, who were familiar with the
athletes, to make the selection decisions).
4 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, para 13.
B2.72 The circumstances that may give rise to a real possibility of bias are many
and various. Examples include where one of the selectors is a family member, coach
or otherwise associated with an athlete competing for selection; where there is a
history of hostility from one of the selectors towards the athlete seeking selection;
or, in the case of subjective selection criteria, where one of the selectors has made a
comment that suggests a pre-determination of the issue.
B2.73 Thus, to build on the cited example, while in that case there had been a
prior dispute between one of the athletes and the performance manager, there was no
evidence of actual bias and, given the performance manager’s role in the selection
process and the fact that the dispute had been disclosed, there was no basis for
challenging the selectors’ decision on the grounds of apparent bias of the performance
manager.1 Further, while the appeal panel noted its reservations as to the process
whereby the national coach (who was also the personal coach of three of the candidates
and a member of the same fencing club) made recommendations to the selectors, it
found that his role did not render the process as a whole unfair (in particular as the
conflict of interest had been disclosed to the selectors, and the other bodies involved in
the selection process acted as a check on his recommendations such that the selection
decision itself was not made by him).2 However, dependent on the facts, an allegation
of apparent bias based on personal involvement may be made out.3
1 Hutchison and others v British Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 29 May 2012, paras 24 and 25.
2 Ibid, paras 27 to 31.
3 See Garrett v Canadian Weightlifting Federation, 18 January 1990, unreported, Alta QB (Edmonton),
Case No. 9003-01227, noted in Findlay and Corbett, The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants
in Sport, August 2000, p 9, where the athlete had been advised in writing of his selection for the
Commonwealth Games but during the team’s final training camp was told by the national coach that
he was being replaced by a reserve athlete (who he had bettered throughout the selection process). The
CWF and a court subsequently ordered the coach to reinstate the athlete to the team on the basis that
his actions were unauthorised, and the court also noted that the decision was affected by bias as the
national coach was also the personal coach of the reserve athlete. However, the coach did not comply
with the orders and the athlete was not subsequently able to compete at the Commonwealth Games as
the team had already been constituted.
B2.74 An example of a successful appeal based on actual bias is the case of

Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549. In that case the selectors were
found to have shown actual bias in making the selection decision as they took into
account the selected athlete’s illness when assessing their results, whilst failing to
consider the known illness of the appellant, apparently due to a belief that there was
a greater chance of achieving a medal if the other athlete was selected.1
1 Although this decision may be better explained as simply another example of a failure to properly apply
the selection policy, insofar as the selection panel failed to consider the ‘extenuating circumstances’ of
the appellant (as in Berchtold v Skiing Australia, CAS 2002/A/361). However, the case does not appear
to have been argued on this basis.
B2.75 Further, if the decision of a selection panel appears to favour one athlete
over another, without apparent explanation, the appeal panel may consider that there
is an appearance of bias, if not actual bias, which justifies the matter being subject to
further consideration.1
1 Fitzgerald v British Disabled Fencing Association, Sport Resolutions, 27 April 2012, paras 51 to 54.
(e) Amendments to the selection criteria, legitimate expectations, estoppel,

and fairness
B2.76 Another fertile area for appeals has been where the selection criteria
have been amended after their initial promulgation. While timely and properly
communicated amendments are perfectly permissible,1 the CAS has consistently
held that amendments that are arbitrary or unfair will not be permitted.
1 See eg Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 57 (finding that the selection criteria
had been properly amended in accordance with the selection policy). See generally para B1.38 et seq.
B2.77 In Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, the South African
Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee and the South African Equestrian
Federation purported to make a late amendment to the deadline for selection of
the national team. In refusing to uphold the amendment, the CAS stated that the
respondents had:
‘imposed new deadlines for qualification on such short notice that the Appellant
could have no hope of being selected to represent his country. Until the SAEA’s 23rd
May 2012 letter to the Appellant, he had no reason to believe that he would not have
a chance to qualify [his horse] Asih in accordance with the FEI Criteria. He had
governed himself accordingly. In the absence of any compelling evidence presented
to the Panel (a) of justification for a change, or (b) of publication of any purported
change to the deadline, the Panel finds that the Appellant was dealt with in an arbitrary
and manifestly unfair manner. At the very least applicable deadlines should have
been notified publicly and clearly so that any potential nominee had the opportunity
to make appropriate arrangements, which may have included selecting alternative
qualifying events and/or seeking an extension of the time limit for qualification’.
B2.78 In Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI,1 FISI purported to amend the selection
criteria as they did not provide for the situation where an athlete did not compete
in a selection event due to injury or because the coach had substituted another
athlete. However, the amendment was formulated only two days before the final
selection event and was communicated to the athletes orally at a meeting the day
before that event (at which the appellant was not present). The CAS found that the
amendment was:
‘a radical alteration to the original criteria. It came too late in the selection process to
be fair, particularly as it was not announced in a complete fashion and communicated
to the Applicant. Therefore, the Panel finds [the amendment] to be arbitrary and it
would be unfair and unreasonable in all the circumstances to apply it’.2
1 Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI CAS OG 06/008, para 16.
2 Ibid, para 16.
B2.79 In Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia,1 the purported amendment to the

selection criteria did not come into effect until after the selection events had taken
place. Again, the CAS held that any power to amend the criteria cannot be exercised
retrospectively once points have been accrued (and subsequently confirmed) at the
relevant selection events.
1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, para 28.
Selection 415
B2.80 Similarly, in Boxing Australia v AIBA,1 the CAS held that:
‘an attempt to alter the Olympic qualification process with retrospective effect
at such a late stage – a few months before the Olympic Games – would violate
the principle of procedural fairness and the prohibition of venire contra factum
proprium (the doctrine, recognized by Swiss law, providing that where the conduct
of one party has induced legitimate expectations in another party, the first party is
estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party)
[…]. In view of the above, the Panel is of the opinion that the Respondent might have
legitimately changed the Olympic qualification process for Oceania, if it had done so
prospectively and following its proper legislative procedures. The Panel notes that
the Olympic Charter requires international federations to propose to the IOC their
qualification systems “three years before the Olympic Games”. Even if this term was
not to be intended as a strict deadline, it is nonetheless a clear indication that crucial
considerations of procedural fairness towards its members require international
federations to announce at a reasonably early stage the Olympic qualification
process and not to alter it when the national federations and their athletes have
already started the sporting season leading to the Olympic Games’.
1 Boxing Australia v AIBA, CAS 2008/O/1455, paras 16 and 22. See discussion at para B1.21.
B2.81 In Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation,1 the federation had

communicated its general selection policy (‘few but best’) in advance, but not the
specific selection criteria (which were finalised after the selection event and never
explicitly communicated). The CAS found that the criteria had been fairly established
and did not breach any of the applicable rules (although noting that the federation
had ‘followed a procedure which is not practiced any more in several countries’).
However, as the appeal would not have been brought if the selection criteria had been
announced prior to the selection event, the CAS ordered the federation to bear part of
the athlete’s costs.
1 Chiba v Japan Amateur Swimming Federation, CAS 2000/A/278, paras 11 and 16.
B2.82 The case of Watt v Australian Cycling Federation1 is an example of

a successful appeal based on legitimate expectations. The ACF had provided the
athlete with a written guarantee of her selection, departing from its usual selection
policy and exempting the athlete from its requirements so that she could follow her
own training schedule and avoid any later disruption. The CAS held that as a result
the athlete had a legitimate expectation that she would be nominated in accordance
with that guarantee, and the ACF was not entitled to require her attendance at a
training camp or revoke her nomination (as the specified conditions in which it could
revoke the guarantee had not arisen). Accordingly, in doing so the ACF had breached
her legitimate expectation.
1 Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, paras 11, 14 and 26(g).
B2.83 A number of further examples of appeals, albeit unsuccessful, have arisen

based on representations and statements made to individual athletes. In Bauer v AOC
& ASF,1 the CAS held that email and verbal representations made to an athlete by
a staff member of a national federation may have created an expectation that the
athlete would be recommended for selection if certain performance criteria were
met. However, on the facts, the staff member had no authority to bind the national
federation to such representations.
1 Bauer v AOC & ASF, CAS OG 14/001, para 7.12
B2.84 Furthermore, in Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, there was extensive discussion as
to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The CAS panel stated:
‘The doctrine of legitimate expectations provides a procedural and, in some

jurisdictions, a substantive right, where representations have been made to a
person by someone in authority. It is designed to protect individuals from an abuse
of process. A procedural legitimate expectation is based on the presumption that
a person in authority will follow a certain process in making decision, while a
substantive legitimate expectation arises where a person in authority makes a lawful
representation that an individual will receive a substantive benefit’.1
The CAS panel determined, with expressed difficulty, that on the facts, whilst the
actions of the SSNOC President were unfair to the athlete, no substantive right arose
as a consequence.2
1 Chep & SSAF v SSNOC, CAS OG 16/005 & 16/007, at paras 44 and 45.
2 See also Zina v LOC, CAS OG 18/06, especially at paras 6.18 to 6.22. The doctrine is also discussed
at para B1.36 et seq.
B2.85 The terminology of an ‘estoppel’ dependent upon statements and

representations has also been used. In New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt
Lake Organizing Committee,1 two athletes whose nominations had previously been
confirmed by SLOC were subsequently informed (less than three days before the
relevant event) that they were not eligible to compete. On the facts, the CAS panel
found that it did not need to determine which interpretation of the eligibility criteria
was correct as:
‘it is the Panel’s view that SLOC and FIS are estopped from invoking their
interpretation […]. By accepting the entries for the two athletes […] SLOC induced
them to prepare and train for both disciplines for which they were properly entered.
To exclude them from competing in these two disciplines at this late stage would be
unfair and contrary to the above doctrine of estoppel’.
Further, in Simms v FINA,2 the CAS held (citing the decision in New Zealand
Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee) that FINA was estopped
from relying on its rules regarding change of sporting nationality as it had induced
the national federation to prepare and train the athlete for the particular event for
which it sought to enter her, and to exclude her under those circumstances would be
unfair and contrary to the rule of estoppel.
1 New Zealand Olympic Committee v Salt Lake Organizing Committee, CAS OG 02/006.
2 Simms v FINA, CAS OG 08/002.
B2.86 Similarly, in Clyde Getty v FIS,1 the CAS was ‘ready to subscribe to the
doctrine of “estoppel” set out in the CAS jurisprudence’. However, the submission
failed on the facts as FIS had not made any representation that the athlete was eligible
(but simply published documents listing the quota places that might be allocated to
NOCs), and had not provided any individual assurance to the athlete that he was
eligible. Accordingly, the CAS held (distinguishing CAS OG 02/006 and CAS
OG 08/002) that ‘FIS is not estopped from denying Mr Getty a quota place to be
entered into the Sochi OWG’.
1 Clyde Getty v FIS, CAS OG 14/002, paras 8.17 to 8.18.
B2.87 An interesting (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) case raising issues of

procedural fairness is the case of Gosiewski v British Judo Association, 2012,
unreported, which arose prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. In that case, after hearing
the athlete’s appeal (but before making a decision) the BJA appeals panel met
separately, in private, with some of the original selectors to discuss the case. The
athlete was not permitted to be present or to know or respond to what was said. This
fairly extraordinary appeals process arguably amounted to a fundamental procedural
irregularity, in breach of the principles of natural justice and also leading to the
Selection 417
appearance of bias (which was exacerbated by the fact that the members of the BJA
appeals panel were not all independent of the governing body).1 Ultimately, however,
this argument was not tested as the athlete had no further right of appeal from the
decision (although the British Olympic Association did subsequently uphold the
athlete’s eligibility arguments, resulting in the de-selection of the reserve judoka2).3
1 See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Judicial Review, 5th Edn, Vol 61A (LexisNexis, 2020), para 35,
‘Interests which may give rise to the appearance of bias’ (‘A person ought not to participate or appear to
participate in an appeal against his own decision […]; the general rule is that in such circumstances the
decision will be set aside’), applied in ERC v Gavin Henson, Disciplinary Committee decision dated
10 January 2006. See also Findlay and Corbett, ‘The Rights of Athletes, Coaches and Participants
in Sport’ (August 2000), p 12 (‘Where a decision-maker communicates with one of the parties in
the absence of another, a reasonable apprehension of bias or preference to that party may arise. Any
information discussed or exchanged with one party should be discussed or exchanged with all parties,
so that all parties have the opportunity to address the decision-maker on the issues in dispute. While
casual contact between a decision-maker and a party may be logistically unavoidable, the nature of
the contact should not relate to the subject matter of the hearing. Operational bias may also be alleged
where the decision-maker becomes involved in the proceeding to such an extent as to appear to be an
advocate for one side or another’).
3 For further examples of procedural unfairness, see Jo-Ann Lim v Synchronised Swimming Australia
Inc, CAS (Oceania Registry) A2/2016, paras 129 to 137 (relating to legal representation and the
exclusion of the appellant’s written submissions, although such unfairness was cured, on the facts, by
the availability of an appeal which allowed full reconsideration of the relevant issues); and Karwalski
v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, para 51 (where denying the athlete requested
documents meant there was ‘a quite serious denial of procedural fairness’, meaning that the Appeal
Committee ‘denied itself the opportunity of any submissions that might have been advanced on behalf
of Mr Karwalski in response to the material contained in those documents’).
C Limitations on the appeal panel

(a) The outcome of a successful appeal
B2.88 Ordinarily, and in line with the general principle that the purpose of an
appeal is to correct an error, where an appeal is upheld the matter should be remitted
back to the original selectors to make a new decision. There are many statements
in the existing case law to this effect,1 and the reality is that in most cases the
appeal panel will simply not have the sport-specific technical knowledge to make
the selection decision itself. It is, however, common for an appeal panel to make
directions when remitting a matter, for example, requiring certain factors to be taken
into consideration.2
1 See eg Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 20; Berchtold v Skiing
Australia, CAS 2002/A/361, paras 19 and 20; Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549,
para 16; D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1539, paras 12 and 13. Furthermore,
in Karwalski v Squash Australia, CAS (Oceania Registry) A3/2014, the CAS panel, despite having
determined that the rules provided for a de novo hearing, that there had been a ‘quite serious denial of
procedural fairness’ and that the relevant event was less than three weeks away, declined to substitute
its own views and remitted the matter to the Appeal Committee.
2 As in Roberts v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 16 June 2012, para 63; Michael v NZ Federation
of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, paras 100 and 101; and Stanley v National Ice Skating
Association of GB and Northern Ireland, Sport Resolutions, 5 December 2013, para 13.
B2.89 However, the remitting back of successful appeals is not an absolute rule,
and in certain circumstances there is authority to support an alternative approach:
(a) Where the outcome of the appeal is such that it is obvious that the selection
decision will be changed and that the appellant will be selected (this is most
likely to apply in the case of eligibility and objective selection criteria).1
(b) Where time considerations dictate that it is simply impracticable for the matter
to be remitted for further consideration by the selectors.2
(c) Where ‘there is evidence of a process so flawed that there could be no

confidence in its rectification’, or in ‘other exceptional cases’.3
(d) In the case of actual bias, the matter should not be remitted to the same
selectors who were guilty of that bias as ‘the inference that the bias which
existed could not be entirely eradicated in those circumstances is irresistible.
That is why a decision is never remitted to a biased decision maker absent
compelling necessity’, and to do so would necessarily infect that further
process with bias.4
(e) The approach may also depend on the terms of the relevant selection policy.5
1 Sullivan v Judo Federation of Australia, CAS 2000/A/284, paras 5 and 31 (where the CAS ordered that
the appellant be nominated); Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153 (where, in upholding
the ACF’s prior nomination of the athlete, the CAS found that it would be inappropriate to remit the
matter for further consideration); Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845, paras 28 and
29, and Peternell v SASCOC and SAEF, CAS OG 12/01 (where, applying the objective selection
criteria, the CAS found that the appellant should have been nominated as the highest ranked available
rider); Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS OG 04/001 (where the CAS held that, on a proper
interpretation of the regulations, the applicant was entitled to a second individual dressage place);
Schuettler v ITF, CAS OG 08/003 (where the CAS ordered the ITF to enter the athlete for the Olympic
Games); Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS OG 10/01 (where the CAS ordered that the Irish
two-man women’s bob team be replaced by the Australian team).
2 Dal Balcon v CONI & FISI, CAS OG 06/008, para 17 (where in light of time pressures the CAS
directed selection of the athlete, although given the objective selection criteria it was arguably clear
that the athlete would have been selected in any event); Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports,
NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, para 15.
3 Michael v NZ Federation of Roller Sports, NZST 02/11, 19 July 2011, para 15.
4 Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549, paras 11 to 13 (on the facts the CAS remitted the
matter to a newly constituted selection panel).
5 See eg D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1574, and Peternell v SASCOC and
SAEF, CAS 2012/A/2845 (where the CAS Code entitled the appeal panel to make the selection
decision itself); Michael v Australian Canoeing, CAS 2008/A/1549 (where the CAS was permitted
to make the selection decision in certain specified circumstances); Beresford v Equestrian Australia,
CAS 2012/A/2837, para 12; Graham v Equestrian Australia, CAS 2012/A/2828, para 16. See also
Russian Olympic Committee v FEI, CAS OG 04/001, Australian Olympic Committee v FIBT, CAS
OG 10/01, paras 7 and 8, and CBDG v FIBT, CAS OG 10/02, paras 2.3 and 5.24, discussing the power
of CAS, in exceptional circumstances, to recommend to the IOC (and others) that additional places
be created in an event in order to achieve a just and equitable outcome (for example, to allow the
originally-selected athlete to participate).
B2.90 Accordingly, if there is a desire to ensure that a successful appeal is referred

back to the original selectors for re-determination, it is important that this is provided
for in the selection policy.
(b) A lacuna in the selection policy
B2.91 In the (likely rare) case where it is determined that there is a lacuna in the
selection policy (ie an unanticipated set of facts for which provision has not been
made), it has been suggested that, while an appeal panel should not attempt to fill
the lacuna itself, it might remit the matter to the regulator for it to address as it sees
fit.1 However, it is suggested that the better view is that an appeal panel does not
have any such power. As previously discussed, it is simply a question of the proper
construction of the selection policy, and it is not the role of the appeal panel to re-
write that policy (absent any legitimate grounds of appeal).2
1 Renshaw v British Swimming, Sport Resolutions, 30 June 2012, para 22.
2 See paras B2.14 and B2.46 et seq.
B2.92 As stated in Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others:1

‘many will consider Mr. Mullera to be extremely fortunate to be the beneficiary of
[…] the lacuna in the RFEA’s selection criteria. However, under the current rules
Selection 419
and considering the explanation given by the RFEA, the RFEA may not exclude Mr.
Mullera from the Spanish team for the London Olympic Games’.
1 Angel Mullera Rodriguez v RFEA and others, CAS OG 12/06, para 7.9.
D Proper parties
B2.93 With any selection appeal, it is important to ensure that all parties who
might be affected by the outcome (in particular, any athletes who might be replaced)
are involved in the proceedings, not least so that the decision is binding and does not
give rise to a never-ending cycle of appeals.1
1 For example, in the case of Matt Lindland v US Wrestling Association and USOC, noted in Findlay,
‘Rules of a Sport-Specific Arbitration Process as an Instrument of Policy Making’ 16 Marquette Sports
Law Review 73 (2005), p 77, the rules did not allow for the selected athlete, Mr Sieracki, to be party
to Mr Lindland’s appeal proceedings. Mr Sieracki accordingly issued his own arbitral proceedings
and both athletes were successful, resulting in two irreconcilable judgments. While the matters were
eventually consolidated, the process was unnecessarily chaotic and protracted. A similar scenario
arose in the 2002 Commonwealth Games cases of Howey v British Judo Association and Lowe v
British Judo Association. There Howey appealed her non-selection to the Sports Dispute Resolution
Panel (now Sport Resolutions) and was selected in place of Lowe, only for Lowe to be re-selected
following her own separate appeal to the Sports Dispute Resolution Panel.
B2.94 For that reason, and in the interests of natural justice,1 even if the selection
policy does not expressly provide for the participation of those potentially affected, it
is suggested that the appeal panel should consider inviting such persons to be a party
to the appeal or to make any representations they consider appropriate.2
1 See R v Life Assurance Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation, ex parte Ross [1993] QB 17, p 50.
2 For examples of this approach, see Watt v Australian Cycling Federation, CAS 96/153, para 4; Schuler
v Swiss Olympic Association, CAS OG 06/002, para 2; Couch v British Swimming, British Swimming
Appeal Committee, 29 June 2012, para 5.
5 THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES
B2.95 Sections 1 to 4 of this chapter apply equally to selection in the context of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games (as can be seen in the cases mentioned throughout
this chapter). However, there are certain additional factors that warrant further
consideration of selection in this area. In particular, as noted by Findlay and Corbett,
‘selection disputes inevitably arise prior to any major games such as an Olympics’.1
Given the nature of such events, competition for places is fierce, and this is especially
so in the case of a home Olympic and Paralympic Games, which may be a once-in-a-
lifetime opportunity. With a home Games, the availability of additional qualification
spots through ‘host nation’ places also lends itself to an increased number of selection
disputes, particularly as such spots tend to be allocated on a more subjective basis
(this was seen at both the Sydney 2000 and London 2012 Olympic Games).
1 Findlay and Corbett, ‘Principles Underlying the Adjudication of Selection Disputes Preceding the Salt
Lake City Winter Olympic Games: Notes for Adjudicators’ (2002) 1 Entertainment Law 109.
A The selection framework
B2.96 Given some of the complexities, it is worth beginning with a high-level

overview of the selection framework that applies to the Olympic and Paralympic
Games. The framework is ultimately governed by the rules of the IOC and IPC,
each of which has its own requirements.1 The specific qualification rules for each
sport are then set by the relevant international federation, subject to approval by the
IOC and IPC, as applicable. However, as is well established in the jurisprudence,
only National Olympic Committees and National Paralympic Committees have the
right to enter athletes into the Olympic and Paralympic Games, respectively.2 Such
entries are typically made based on the recommendations of the relevant national
federations, and there is often a written agreement in place between each national
federation and the National Olympic Committee/National Paralympic Committee
setting out the specific requirements that apply (for example, it is not uncommon for
National Olympic Committees to set their own minimum performance/qualification/
other requirements, over and above those set by the relevant national and international
federation).
1 See the Olympic Charter, rules 40, 42 and 44, and the IPC Handbook.
2 For example, see Zina v LOC, CAS OG 18/06, at paras 6.10 to 6.15.
B2.97 Beyond the general selection framework, however, the substantive

requirements and rules governing selection often differ from country to country, and
from sport to sport. In the event of a dispute, the applicable rules must therefore be
carefully checked.
B Selection disputes relating to the Olympic and Paralympic

Games
B2.98 Many selection disputes arising in relation to the Olympic and Paralympic
Games are dealt with at national level, in the run up to the Games. That is certainly
the preferred option for all parties, as it allows the matter to be resolved on a timely
basis, well in advance of the event.
B2.99 In relation to each Olympic Games, there are typically also a handful of cases
brought before CAS relating to selection, often concerning the correct interpretation
and/or application of the applicable rules (which can be complex, as described
above).1 These cases are often brought before the CAS Ad Hoc Division, which
resolves disputes arising during or in the ten days prior to the Olympic Games.2 This
time restriction (found in the CAS Ad Hoc Division’s procedural rules) is important,
as many cases fail on this basis. Internal remedies available to an applicant should
also be exhausted.3 Careful consideration should therefore be given to the correct
forum for the relevant dispute: for example, might a national-level appeal body or the
CAS general appeals division be more appropriate?
1 Many of these cases can be found in the online CAS case database. Recent examples include: Maria
Birkner v COA & FASA, CAS OG 14/003; Herunga v Namibian National Olympic Committee, CAS
OG 16/015; Morgan v Jamaican Athletic Administrative Association, CAS OG 16/008; and Czech
Olympic Committee & Czech Cycling Federation v Union Cycliste Internationale, CAS OG 16/022.
An important point will be to determine exactly when, on the facts, the dispute arose.
2 See para D2.34 et seq.
3 See Pavicic v Fédération Équestre Internationale, CAS OG 16/014.
C The need for a more consistent approach at national level?
B2.100 In respect of selection generally, Sport Resolutions’ review of its 2012

Olympic Games selection appeals1 sets out a number of key learning points (many
of which are discussed further in Sections 1 to 4, above) and is a recommended read
for all national governing bodies and all persons and entities dealing with selection
matters generally. However, specific consideration should be given to the overall
approach to selection in the context of the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In
particular, the main difficulty with the present approach is that each sport is free to
Selection 421
adopt its own selection policy and, crucially, to determine its own appeals process.
Accordingly, there is little consistency between sports. In particular, while some
provide for appeals to an independent body such as Sport Resolutions, in other sports
the only appeal is to an internal body.2
1 Harry, ‘Review of Selection Appeals for London Olympics’, Sport Resolutions, January 2013.
2 In two judo cases in 2012 the British Olympic Association determined that the nominated athletes
were ineligible notwithstanding the fact that such arguments had previously been (wrongly) rejected
by the BJA’s internal appeals panel. See further para B2.85.
B2.101 For the 2012 home Olympic Games, for example, the British Olympic
Association selected around 550 athletes (not including reserves) to represent
Team GB, based on nominations from national governing bodies. Each national
governing body was responsible for putting together its own selection policy, and
many chose to make use of the independent dispute service, Sport Resolutions,
to handle any appeals. Sport Resolutions alone dealt with 19 selection appeals
in the run up to the games, but it is estimated that, overall, there were more than
50 appeals relating to the make-up of Team GB. Furthermore, while athletes did
not have any formal right of appeal to the British Olympic Association, it was
ultimately responsible for reviewing and accepting athlete nominations and did in
fact intervene in some cases.1
1 For example, in the Aaron Cook taekwondo selection dispute, the British Olympic Association
requested further information and clarification as to the selection process before accepting the national
governing body’s nomination. And in two judo cases the British Olympic Association found nominated
athletes to be ineligible, resulting in their de-selection from the team. See further para B2.85.
B2.102 Accordingly, in respect of selection for the Olympic and Paralympic Games,
it is suggested that while it should be for the sport to determine its own selection
criteria, there are benefits to be gained from having a uniform process, particularly
regarding the right of appeal to an independent appeal panel (as recommended by
Sport Resolutions). One example of such an approach is the Australian Olympic
Committee’s selection procedure, which (in summary) requires each national
federation to establish an impartial appeals tribunal comprising a legally-qualified
chair and two suitable panel members, with a further right of appeal to the CAS. It
is suggested that a similar approach would assist in reducing the number of appeals
as well as ensuring that, where possible, matters are properly and fairly resolved
prior to any nominations being made to the National Olympic and Paralympic
Committees.
6 CONCLUSIONS
B2.103 In conclusion, selection disputes are here to stay, particularly in relation to

major events such as the Olympic and Paralympic Games.
B2.104 The vast majority of selection appeals are not ultimately successful (ie with
the athlete being selected, as opposed to the appeal being dismissed or the appeal
being upheld but the athlete not being selected in any event). For example, of the 19
appeals handled by Sport Resolutions in the run-up to the 2012 Olympic Games, only
four were upheld and only one appellant (GB Rhythmic Gymnastics Group v British
Amateur Gymnastics Association, Sport Resolutions, 5 March 2012) was ultimately
successful in achieving selection. Similarly, all of the selection cases brought before
the CAS Ad Hoc division in relation to the Sochi 2014 Olympic Winter Games, the
Rio 2016 Olympic Games and the PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games were
unsuccessful.
B2.105 However, what is clear is that the time and effort spent by the selecting
body in getting its selection policy right is likely to be well worth the investment
in the long term. It will not only assist in reducing the number of selection appeals
but will also ensure that, where appeals do arise, they are properly, effectively and
consistently managed (thus avoiding the potential fall-out from a badly handled
selection dispute).
CHAPTER B3
Misconduct
Kendrah Potts (4 New Square), Stuart Tennant (The Premier League), and
James Eighteen (Northridge LLP)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B3.1
2 ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING...................................................................... B3.4
A The role of match officials........................................................................... B3.5
B The use of technology.................................................................................. B3.9
C Approach to on-field misconduct in individual sports................................. B3.19
3 POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD
INCIDENTS........................................................................................................ B3.23
A Additional punishment for on-field offences............................................... B3.24
B Retrospective action: foul play and misconduct charges............................. B3.28
C Post-match challenges to on-field decisions................................................ B3.34
4 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS...................................................................... B3.39
A The disciplinary process.............................................................................. B3.40
B Evidence....................................................................................................... B3.44
C Mens rea....................................................................................................... B3.45
D Potential criminal and civil liability............................................................. B3.51
E Interplay between criminal proceedings and misconduct charges............... B3.53
F Sanctions...................................................................................................... B3.54
5 TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES................................................................... B3.56
A Physical/verbal abuse between participants................................................. B3.56
B Abuse of Match Officials............................................................................. B3.61
C Cheating....................................................................................................... B3.65
D Mechanical doping....................................................................................... B3.69
E Political statements...................................................................................... B3.76
F Abuse of spectators...................................................................................... B3.79
G Vicarious/strict liability of clubs for conduct of their own spectators......... B3.83
6. REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT.................................................... B3.88
A The justification for regulating off-field misconduct................................... B3.89
7. DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT
PROVISIONS...................................................................................................... B3.96
A Drafting........................................................................................................ B3.97
B Implementation............................................................................................ B3.102
C Sanctions...................................................................................................... B3.104
8 TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES................................................................. B3.108
A Social media offences.................................................................................. B3.108
B Other forms of abusive or insulting comments or conduct.......................... B3.120
C Criticism and abuse of officials.................................................................... B3.137
D Criminal offences......................................................................................... B3.142
E Other forms of acceptable misconduct........................................................ B3.146
9 CODES OF ETHICS........................................................................................... B3.147
A Introduction.................................................................................................. B3.147
B Who is bound by Codes of Ethics?.............................................................. B3.151
C What behaviour is caught by a Code of Ethics?.......................................... B3.154
D Issues that arise in ethics proceedings......................................................... B3.174
1 INTRODUCTION
B3.1 Sport is played according to a set of rules that governs the on-field actions of
participants. On-field rules have existed since the inception of sport; however, as sport
has become increasingly commercialised and media scrutiny of behaviour has grown,
regulation has expanded to govern conduct beyond actions on the field of play.
B3.2 This chapter looks at misconduct in sport on and off the field of play. It
considers the nature of the regulations and the types of conduct that are prohibited,
as well as the procedural mechanisms for dealing with misconduct. The chapter starts
by looking at the regulation of on-field misconduct, before considering off-field
misconduct, including breaches of codes of ethics. It does not cover doping, match-
fixing, or financial misconduct, as these specific types of misconduct are addressed
elsewhere in the book.1
1 See Chapter B4 (Match-Fixing and Related Corruption), Chapter B5 (Regulating Financial Fair Play),
and Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement).
B3.3 Participants are expected to know the rules of their sport. However, as will
be seen later in the chapter, this is more straightforward in respect of certain forms
of conduct than others. Regulations concerning off-field conduct are often drafted in
more general terms than on-field regulations. It is easy, and necessary, to draft clear
regulations in respect of on-field actions: for example, prohibiting high tackles, or
eye-gouging. However, the nature and range of potential off-field misconduct has led
sport governing bodies (SGBs) to draft broad provisions, for example, prohibiting
any conduct that could ‘bring the game into disrepute’. In some cases, these broad
provisions are supported by ‘guidelines’, for example in the social media context, to
seek to ensure that participants understand what conduct will fall foul of the rules.
Further, SGBs have looked to supplement their regulations by introducing ethical
concepts such as core values1 and the ‘spirit of the game’.2 These concepts are
designed to encourage participants to adhere to certain standards of behaviour and
to ensure that a positive ethos is created and maintained. Whilst the basic forms of
misconduct might be obvious, the grey areas created by generic provisions can raise
issues in the fair resolution of cases, which are considered in detail below.
1 For instance, the RFU’s core values are Teamwork, Respect, Enjoyment, Discipline and Sportsmanship,
which are published on the England Rugby website. The significance of these core values is reflected
in a number of cases. See eg Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision
dated 19 November 2017, para 56 (‘those comments [towards the referee] struck at heart of the game’s
core values. The game is built upon respect. There must be respect for officials’) and para 57 (‘Rugby’s
Core Values are not empty words or slogans which can be signed up to and then ignored. They are
not to be treated as useful bolt-ons dreamt up by a marketing team. They are integral to the game and
are what make the game special’); Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 28 August 2018, para 45, (‘The Panel noted that the Player is expected to behave in line
with the core values of the Game, core values which underpin the entire ethos of the sport. The Panel
had been reminded that these core values are not empty words or slogans which can be signed up to
and ignored. Indeed, these core values require rugby players to act with respect and discipline’); Rugby
Football Union v Nathan Hughes, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 October 2018, para 115,
(the panel commented that the player’s actions ‘publicly undermined the core values of the Game, the
very values which the disciplinary process is designed to uphold’).
2 The concept of ‘Spirit of Cricket’ is enshrined in the International Cricket Council (ICC) Code of
Conduct and in the ICC Standard Test Match, ODI and T20 Playing Conditions. In football, the ‘spirit
of the game’ is included in Law 5 of the FIFA Laws of the Game.
2 ON-FIELD DECISION MAKING

B3.4 Sections 2 to 4 of this chapter look at how conduct on the field of play is
regulated. They consider, first, the processes for monitoring and sanctioning on-field
misconduct and, secondly, different types of offences.
Misconduct 425
A The role of match officials
B3.5 Match officials conduct the first level of review for on-field misconduct. The
laws of a sport usually provide that the match or event officials have full authority to
enforce the laws of the sport during the match or event in respect of which they have
been appointed to officiate, and to take action against players and other team officials
who infringe the laws.1
1 For example, the Powers and Duties of the Referee under Law 5 of the FIFA Laws of the Game
include: (a) the power to take disciplinary action against players guilty of cautionable and sending off
offences; and (b) the power to take action against team officials who fail to conduct themselves in a
responsible manner. In rugby union, World Rugby Law 9 in the Laws of the Game stipulates that ‘a
player who commits foul play must be either cautioned or temporarily suspended or sent off’.
B3.6 Depending on the sport, possible sanctions available to a match official

where there has been an infringement include:
(a) giving possession to the other team or giving the other team an opportunity to
score a goal/points (eg a penalty in football, or a penalty kick in rugby union);
(b) awarding points to the other team (eg a penalty try in rugby union);
(c) warning the player about his behaviour;
(d) temporarily dismissing the player from the field of play (eg a yellow card in
football or rugby union);
(e) permanently dismissing the player from the field of play (eg a red card in most
sports); or
(f) in extreme cases, abandoning the game.
B3.7 In most sports, the decisions of match officials are afforded a significant
degree of immunity from challenge or review.1 This is necessary to provide certainty
as to the result of the match. It also serves to limit the opportunity for legal challenges
after the event. In rugby union, the referee is deemed to be the ‘sole judge of fact and
law’ during a match and, except in limited circumstances (see Section 3B below),
the referee’s decisions on the field of play and their sporting consequences cannot
be altered retrospectively by the decision of a disciplinary panel.2 This means, for
example, that the score in a match cannot subsequently be amended by a panel on
the basis that a try was scored by a player who (it is subsequently found) should have
been sent off earlier by the referee in the match.
1 See para B3.34 et seq and para D2.136 et seq.
2 World Rugby Reg 17.17.2.
B3.8 Notwithstanding, decisions of match officials still come in for question,

both on and off the pitch. Those questioning such decisions on the pitch are destined
to receive short shrift, and the act of questioning an official’s decision itself carries
risks. In addition to resulting in a form of sporting advantage for the other side (such
as a free kick), the act of questioning a referee may also constitute misconduct.1
1 For example, the Misconduct section in the Laws of Rugby League provides that a player is guilty
of misconduct if he disputes the decision of the referee, although the notes to that Law provide that a
player may ask the referee the reason why a penalty has been awarded provided he does so respectfully.
B The use of technology
B3.9 For a referee trying to enforce misconduct rules during a match, the biggest
challenge is ensuring that appropriate action is taken against a player who commits
an act of misconduct and, equally as importantly, that action is not taken against a
player who has not committed an act of misconduct. However, a referee only sees
incidents live, in real time, and from one angle, and (unlike disciplinary tribunals
that look at incidents subsequently) often does not have the opportunity to replay
and slow down incidents to determine whether an offence was committed and, if so,
how serious the offence was (although the position is changing, as discussed below).
A referee can seek the view of any assistant referees, but they too will only have seen
the incident once.
B3.10 Video technology can be used during a match to review different aspects
of the match, from whether a goal or try has been scored to whether there has been
conduct justifying dismissal or lesser forms of misconduct. There has, in general,
been greater willingness to use video technology to review the fundamental aspects
of a game (such as the act of scoring1), as opposed to simple foul play. This may
be due to a combination of factors, including a view that judging foul play tends to
require a subjective interpretation from the match official, whereas the act of scoring
can largely be assessed on an objective basis, and the fact that whether a goal is
scored is so fundamental to the outcome of a match that it justifies interrupting the
flow of the game. However, the decision to dismiss a player (particularly early in a
match) could potentially have a greater influence on the result of the match than the
award of a goal or try, and many serious misconduct incidents (such as brawls and
tackles that lead to injuries) naturally lead to a break in play in any event.
1 In certain cricket matches where the Umpire Decision Review System (DRS) applies, each side has a
limited number of ‘reviews’ or ‘referrals’, allowing the team to refer a decision that a wicket has (or has
not) been taken to a third umpire, who will look at the television footage together with ‘Hawkeye’ and
other technology to help him decide. In tennis, video technology is used for line calls. In rugby league
and rugby union, where a referee is unsure whether a try has been scored, he may refer the decision
to the video referee/television match official, who then has the opportunity to watch the relevant play
from a number of angles and at different speeds to determine whether or not a try has been scored.
B3.11 For many years, sports other than the top American sports1 were reluctant
to introduce the use of technology during matches for fear that it could ruin the
rhythm and natural dynamic of games. However, following a number of controversial
decisions2 and the fact that audiences can now quickly view video footage on their
phones, a number of sports have started to embrace the use of technology, albeit
some in more limited circumstances than others.
1 The ‘major leagues’ (baseball, American football, basketball, and ice hockey) embraced the use of in-
match video technology from as early as 1985. For a general overview, see ‘The development of Video
Technology in Sport’ on the Stats Zone website (thestatszone.com/development-of-video-technology-
in-sport [accessed 29 October 2020]).
2 For example, Germany’s 4–1 victory over England in the 2010 World Cup, when Frank Lampard hit
a shot from outside of the penalty box that bounced off the crossbar and over the goal-line. The ball
came back out and the goal was disallowed because the assistant referee did not signal for a goal. Now,
goal-line technology is routinely used and a signal sent automatically to the referee indicating whether
or not the ball crossed the line.
B3.12 The challenge for sport is to strike the right balance between picking up
misconduct offences and allowing a game to flow naturally. The following issues
should be considered when deciding whether, and if so how, to use technology:
(a) Who can request the use of it – players and/or the referee?
(b) Are there any negative consequences if the review is unsuccessful (ie loss of
further reviews)?
(c) What types of incident(s) can be referred for video review?
(d) Is there a threshold for allowing a review?
(e) What is the threshold for overturning the on-field referee’s decision?
B3.13 The examples below indicate that sports have taken a varied approach to
the use of video technology, particularly in relation to misconduct, depending on
the requirements and priorities of their stakeholders and the perceived impact on the
entertainment value of their sports.
Misconduct 427
B3.14 In rugby union, if a referee is unsure whether an act of foul play has been
committed, he or his fellow match officials may refer the decision to the video
referee/television match official (TMO), who then has the opportunity to watch the
relevant play from a number of angles and at different speeds to determine whether or
not an act of foul play has been committed.1 At the time of writing, there is no right
for a captain or other players to request a referral to the TMO.
1 Laws 6.15 and 6.16 of the World Rugby Laws of the Game. The remit of the TMO is restricted to
clarifying situations relating to (a) whether an infringement may have occurred in the playing area
leading to a try or preventing a try, and (b) ‘clear and obvious’ acts of foul play.
B3.15 The use of technology for dealing with misconduct in football is still in
its infancy. In 2018, following years of trials, the International Football Association
Board (IFAB) introduced Video Assistant Referees (VAR) into the FIFA Laws of the
Game on a permanent basis. VAR is currently used to identify ‘clear and obvious
errors’ or a ‘serious missed incident’, which can include decisions regarding a penalty
where misconduct has occurred, a direct red card (not a second caution), or mistaken
identity when the referee cautions or sends off the wrong player.1 The referee must
always make the decision and his on-field decision should not be changed unless
there is a ‘clear and obvious error’. Whilst this may appear to be a clear and, prima
facie, high hurdle, as with so many thresholds, its application has been the subject of
debate.2
1 Paragraph 4 of Law 5 of the FIFA Laws of the Game.
2 For example, the decision to award a penalty to France in the 2018 FIFA World Cup was arguably
not a ‘clear and obvious error’ (see ‘Paul Pogba scores with the technology’s help to take France past
Australia’, Guardian, 16 June 2018); the decision only to award a yellow (rather than red) card to
Cristiano Ronaldo in the match between Iran and Portugal (see ‘Iran’s Carlos Queiroz berates FIFA
over Cristiano Ronaldo VAR escape’, Guardian, 25 June 2018); the VAR decision to award a penalty
to Brighton & Hove Albion for an alleged foul on Adam Connolly (the first VAR penalty decision
in the Premier League in season 2019/2020) (see ‘Premier League admit VAR decision to award
Brighton penalty against Everton was wrong’, The Daily Telegraph, 8 November 2019).
B3.16 One notable difference is that, unlike rugby union, football does not allow
the replay of the incident to be broadcast on the screens in the grounds and, therefore,
spectators have to wait for the decision from the referee (following his review of a
television screen at the side of the pitch). In circumstances where the majority of the
ground are, in any event, able to access footage on their phones, it is questionable for
how long this practice will continue to operate.
B3.17 In field hockey, the introduction of a video umpire has been seen as a very
positive development1 for assisting referees in reviewing the award/non-award of
penalty strokes (and has been recognised as highlighting good refereeing).2 There
are two types of referral in field hockey:3 (1) umpire referral; and (2) team referral.
The International Hockey Federation rules make clear that umpire referrals cannot
be made as a result of ‘protest, queries or pressure from players’ and ‘no one other
than the Match Umpires’ can stop the match to request a referral. In relation to team
referrals the rules provide that:
(a) each team is only allowed one team referral during regulation time per match
(which must be made through the match umpires);
(b) any team player on the field of play at the time of the incident can request a
team referral; and
(c) provided the correct ‘T’ signal is made to the match umpire and any explanation
is provided within the requisite time period, the team referral is deemed to have
been lodged correctly.
If the referral is upheld or the video footage is deemed to be inconclusive,4 the
referring team retains its right of referral; conversely, the team loses its referral if
there is no clear reason to change the match umpire’s original decision. A team
referral that has been adjudicated on following a referral by one team may not be the
subject of a subsequent referral by the opposing team. The final decision, including
any matter of interpretation, remains with the match umpire, not the video umpire.
1 See ‘“Video referrals” a good decision’, International Hockey Federation website, 9 July 2014.
2 Rules 12–14 in the FIH Rules of Hockey.
3 Appendix 8 of the tournament rules of the 2018 Hockey World Cup on the International Hockey
Federation website.
4 The signal is one of ‘No Advice Possible’ if the video footage is inconclusive, including through not
having the correct replays available, the ball never being in shot in the replays, the footage being of
insufficient quality to permit a decision, or technical problems with the referral equipment.
B3.18 There has been concern that the use of video technology would undermine
confidence in, and the authority of, the match referee. However, sport is now a huge
business and vast sums of money are won and lost on the decisions of referees.
There is therefore a strong argument that the predominant concern should be that the
correct decision is made. Further, video technology can highlight good refereeing
and prevent players from holding grudges against a referee for the remainder of the
match if an incident is reviewed. It is likely that sports will continue to grapple with
the challenge of balancing the use of technology to ensure that the correct decisions
are made on the field of play, whilst protecting the flow of the game and audience
experience.
C Approach to on-field misconduct in individual sports
B3.19 In individual sports such as tennis and golf, a tiered system of misconduct is
adopted, as a red card (or equivalent) would result in the player forfeiting the match.
B3.20 Individual sports often deal with on-field misconduct by putting in place
a Code of Conduct,1 which sets out escalating procedures and penalties for dealing
with on-court misconduct at tournaments. The usual starting position is that while a
match is in play, the chair umpire/referee makes the first determination as to whether
the rules or code of conduct have been breached. The umpire/referee may then refer
a matter to the tournament referee if he feels it necessary to do so, with the decision
of the tournament referee being final.
1 Examples include the Grand Slam Code of Conduct in tennis and the ICC Code of Conduct for Players
and Player Support Personnel in cricket.
B3.21 In tennis, for example, each Code of Conduct violation contains within it
a point penalty system, which can be employed by the umpire at his discretion, or
by the tournament referee after appeal by the player(s) concerned. A first breach
of a Code will ordinarily result in a warning from the umpire, a second breach in
a deduction of one point, while each subsequent breach results in the forfeit of one
game. The ultimate sanction in tennis is the ‘gross misconduct’ offence, which results
in disqualification1 from the match.2
1. For example, in tennis David Nalbandian was disqualified in the 2012 final of the Queen’s tennis
tournament for kicking an advertising board into a line judge’s leg, causing injury. A more recent
example is that of Nick Kyrgios, who was defaulted from the ATP Masters tournament in Rome in
2019 after slamming his racquet, kicking his water bottle, and hurling a chair on to the court. In golf,
Sergio Garcia was disqualified from the Saudi International Golf Tournament in 2019 for a breach of
Rule 1.2(a) of the Rules of Golf, after damaging the greens.
2 In cricket, under the ICC Code of Conduct, participants can receive a ‘red card’ for (a) threatening
to assault an umpire; (b) an act of violence on the field of play; or (c) using language or gestures that
seriously offend race, religion, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.
Misconduct 429
B3.22 Additional sanctions, such as fines and forfeiture of prize money, may also
be imposed after the conclusion of the match (see further Section 3A below).1
1 In the incidents referenced in para B3.21 n 1, in addition to disqualification, Kyrgios was fined $20,000
and forfeited his prize money of €33,635 (‘Nick Kyrgios defaulted from Italian Open after hurling
chair across court’, Guardian, 16 May 2019); while David Nalbandian was fined £8,000 and forfeited
his prize money of £36,500 (‘David Nalbandian hit with maximum fine after injuring line judge at
Queens final’, Daily Telegraph, 18 June 2012). Sergio Garcia did not receive further punishment as
the European Tour were satisfied with his apology and disqualification (‘Sergio Garcia escapes further
punishment for Saudi International disqualfication’, Sky Sports website, 5 February 2019).
3 POST-MATCH DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR ON-FIELD

INCIDENTS
B3.23 In addition to action taken by officials during a match, misconduct on
the field of play may also be the subject of post-match review and disciplinary
proceedings. Given the desire to respect the sanctity of the decisions of the match
officials, post-match proceedings related to on-field misconduct are generally limited
to the following types of cases:
(a) to seek additional sanctions for serious misconduct identified and sanctioned
during the match;
(b) retrospective action to sanction conduct that went unnoticed during a match;
and
(c) challenges by players to sanctions imposed during a match (although sports
seek to limit such challenges for the reasons noted above).
A Additional punishment for on-field offences

B3.24 Many sports provide that further sanctions may be imposed for the act of
misconduct in addition to the sanction imposed during the match. In order to preserve
the sanctity of the decisions of match officials, some sports limit the cases in which
additional sanctions may be imposed to particularly serious on-field offences. For
example, in team sports, additional sanctions are usually only applicable in cases
where the conduct resulted (or would have resulted) in the player’s dismissal from
the field of play during the match. The period of time served while off the field of
play in the relevant match does not usually count as part of the suspension.1
1 For instance, a player may be red carded in the first minute or the 79th minute of the match, but it
makes no material difference to the sanction given after the match.
B3.25 The Football Association rules provide for a ‘fast-track’ system for dealing
with further punishment following a red card. This involves The FA proposing a
sanction and giving a deadline for the player to accept or reject the proposed sanction.1
If the player does not accept the proposed sanction,2 the matter will be referred to a
disciplinary panel to be heard in the week following the match.
1 Sections (E)8–(E)24 of the FA Disciplinary Regulations; in Scottish football, see Section 13 of the
Scottish Football Association fast-track procedures.
2 See Section E of the FA Disciplinary Regulations, which provides that players may challenge the
imposition of a red card on the grounds of (a) mistaken identity, and (b) wrongful dismissal. Section
E also allows for the disciplinary consequences flowing from the red card to be increased or decreased
on the grounds that the circumstances of the dismissal were ‘truly exceptional’ such that the standard
punishment ‘would be clearly excessive’ (available to the player or club, see Fast Track 5) or ‘clearly
insufficient’ (available to The FA, see Fast Track 6). Section D of the FA Disciplinary Regulations
provides a sanction table for the various offences.
B3.26 In rugby union, the additional sanction applied after a match for on-field
offences is usually a playing suspension. The sanctions are set out in sanctioning
guidelines, which list the more common acts of foul play and the pre-determined
sanction tariffs.1 If a player takes issue with the award of the red card on the basis of
‘wrongful dismissal’ or ‘mistaken identity’, a hearing will be convened to resolve the
issue.
1 World Rugby Reg 17, Appendix 1.
B3.27 In individual sports, referees will usually be required to produce a match

report at the end of the match, which should include any incidents of potential
misconduct that might warrant further action. Players may subsequently be fined,
docked prize money, or disqualified from the tournament. In tennis, for example,
repeated breaches of a Code of Conduct and particularly flagrant or egregious
breaches, constituting ‘Aggravated Behaviour’, are classed as ‘Player Major
Offences’. If a player is alleged to have committed a Player Major Offence, the
usual process is that the relevant individual within the tournament’s governing body
will commence a formal investigation. The penalties for committing a Player Major
Offence range from a capped fine to suspension from the events organised by the
relevant governing body.1
1 For example, after calling the umpire a ‘liar’ and a ‘thief’ at the US Open 2018, Serena Williams
was fined by the United States Tennis Association (USTA) (‘US Open 2018: Serena Williams fined
over outbursts during final’, BBC Sport website, 9 September 2018). See also the ATP investigation
into the match-official abuse by Nick Kyrgios at the Cincinnati Open 2019 (‘ATP Concludes Kyrgios
Investigation’, ATP Press Release, 26 September 2019), which resulted in a suspension of 16 ATP
weeks and a fine of $25,000 (suspended for a six-month probationary period).
B Retrospective action: foul play and misconduct charges
B3.28 Where the foul play or misconduct was missed during the match, the result
of the match will still stand. However, in many sports footage of matches is reviewed
in full to identify incidents of potential foul play or misconduct that were not dealt
with during the match.1 This means that on-field offences that are not given the
appropriate sanction during a match can be considered in a disciplinary context post-
match.
1 For example, in rugby league, by the Match Review Panel and, in rugby union, by citing commissioners.
B3.29 Sports have grappled with the appropriate approach to take to retrospective
action, mindful of the need to balance the sanctity of decisions made by the referee
with ensuring that misconduct does not go unpunished. In order to find a balance,
some sports distinguish between foul play or misconduct that was detected by an
official during the match, which will not therefore be the subject of further action,
and foul play or misconduct that was not spotted by a referee, which may be subject
to further action.
B3.30 Football provides a good example of this approach. Charges may be brought
against a player after the match if the incident was ‘not seen and dealt with by the
Match Officials at the time’ or if there was ‘successful deception of a match official
by way of a clear act of simulation which leads either to a penalty being awarded or
the dismissal of an opposing Player’.1 Again, football adopts ‘fast-track’ procedures
to deal with these types of offences, which ensures resolution prior to the next set of
fixtures. While this is a positive step forward in many respects, it could be said that it
is rather perverse that if the referee sees the dive and gives a yellow card, that player
receives a lesser sanction than if the referee does not see it. On the face of it, the same
sanction should be imposed for the same type of misconduct.
1 Section (E)5 of the FA Disciplinary Regulations (the charges for ‘successful deception’ are brought
under FA Rule E(3)1 (improper conduct). See also Rule 201 of the SFA Regulations: ‘No player shall
Misconduct 431
cause a match official to make an incorrect decision and/or support an error of judgment on the part
of a match official by an act of simulation which results in that player’s team obtaining a Substantial
Advantage’. For an example of deception, see Football Association v Oumar Niasse, Regulatory
Commission decision dated 22 November 2017, which resulted in a two-match match suspension (for
a charge under FA Rule E3) following a contested hearing.
B3.31 In rugby union, the position in relation to retrospective action is more

straightforward. Foul play reviewers (known as Citing Commissioners) review
matches whilst they take place, and a ‘citing’ occurs where the Citing Commissioner
refers a player for an act of foul play that in the Citing Commissioner’s opinion
warranted that player being sent from the field of play.1 This includes incidents seen2
and not seen by the match officials. As a result, even where one or more of the match
officials has seen an incident and taken action during the game, such as giving a
penalty against the offending player as well as potentially a yellow card (sin bin),
further action can still be taken and an additional sanction imposed.
1 World Rugby Regs 17.6.1, 17.8.1 and 17.9.1.
2 World Rugby Reg 17.9.2 provides: ‘Citing Commissioners may cite Players for an act(s) of Foul Play
where such act(s) may have been detected by the referee or assistant referee and which may have been
the subject of referee action’.
B3.32 In individual sports, it is less likely that the misconduct will not be identified
during the match. There is generally no restriction on a governing body taking action
after the fact for an on-field incident that was detected by an umpire.
B3.33 In addition to foul play offences, governing body rules also typically confer
on the governing body an overarching power to bring misconduct charges for other
on-field incidents.1 This includes incidents such as inappropriate goal celebrations or
inappropriate language on camera.2 In such cases tribunals tend to assess whether the
conduct was improper or abusive on an objective basis,3 with the context and other
factors taken into account as mitigating factors.
1 See as examples, (a) The FA (Rule E3(1) and/or Rule E3(2) of the FA Regulations); (b) the RFU (Rule
5.12 of the RFU Rules; and (c) the BHA (Rule (J)19 of the BHA Rules of Racing.
2 One example of this is the case of Football Association v Nicolas Anelka, Regulatory Commission
decision 3 March 2014 (the player was suspended for five matches and fined £80,000 after his use of
the quenelle gesture as part of his celebration of a goal).
3 Football Association v Nicolas Anelka, Regulatory Commission decision dated 3 March 2014, paras
12–17 (‘[…] the question for us was whether NA’s use of the quenelle after scoring a goal during the
match was objectively speaking abusive, indecent, insulting and/or improper’); Football Association v
Luis Suarez, Regulatory Commission decision dated 30 December 2011, paras 50–73. For an example
where the player’s subjective intention was considered to be relevant, see paras B3.122 and B3.124.
C Post-match challenges to on-field decisions
B3.34 As set out above, sports have traditionally started from the premise that
referees, umpires and any other match officials must be allowed to officiate sporting
events freely, without legal interference. In other words, officials must have a field of
autonomy within which a degree of human error is accepted, subject only to limited
corrective mechanisms (such as video evidence) set in place under the sport’s rules.
B3.35 This approach is consistently recognised by CAS through a specific sports

law principle known as the field of play doctrine.1 The rationale for this approach
has multiple grounds, including that sporting decisions are best taken by those with
specialist expertise rather than judges; that sport should not constantly be interrupted;
that there is an inherent subjectivity in in-play decision-making; that to accept
jurisdiction would open the floodgates; and that off-field decisions overriding on-
field decisions would lead to significant difficulties in adjudicating sporting results.2
1 As considered in (for example) Horse Sport Ireland (HIS) & Cian O’Connor v Federation Equestre
Internationale (FEI), CAS 2015/A/4208; Emilios Papathanasiou v International Sailing Federation
(ISAF) & others, CAS 2006/A/1142; and Yang Tae Young (see next footnote). See also the discussion
of the doctrine at para D2.136 et seq.
2 In Yang Tae Young & Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) v International Gymnastics Federation,
CAS 2004/A/704, the CAS dealt with a request made after the 2004 Olympic Games to reallocate
medals on the basis that the officials had made an error when assessing the difficulty of a gymnastics
routine. The CAS panel held that a judging error by an official, even one that is later admitted, will not
constitute grounds for reversing the results of a competition. The panel stated: ‘to the extent that the
matter is capable of analysis in conventional legal terms, it could rest on the premise that any contract
that the player has made in entering into competition is that he or she should have the benefit of honest
“field of play’’ decisions, not necessarily correct ones’. It also directly addressed the justiciability
of decisions made by officials as a result of the use of technology: ‘Each sport may have within it
a mechanism for utilising modern technology to ensure a correct decision is made in the first place
(eg cricket with run-outs) or for immediately subjecting a controversial decision to a process of review
(eg gymnastics) but the solution for error, either way, lies within the framework of the sport’s own
rules; it does not licence judicial or arbitral interference thereafter. If this represents an extension of
the field of play doctrine, we tolerate it with equanimity. Finality is in this area all-important: rough
justice may be all that sport can tolerate’.
B3.36 The fact that a sporting event has already been contested and a victor
determined is a strong rationale not to interfere after the event, even in respect of
potential misconduct. Referees and umpires are appointed to determine the result
of the sporting context and there is a presumption that their decisions are honestly
taken, if not always correct given the possibility of human error. Consequently,
challenges to decisions taken on the pitch (whether regarding misconduct or goals
scored or seeking to have fixtures replayed) are rarely successful.1 In order to succeed
in an appeal before the CAS, for example, the appellant must show that the official’s
decision was tainted by corruption, fraud or arbitrariness, which is a high hurdle.2
1 One example of a successful challenge arose during the 2012 Olympic Games: the result of the
bantamweight bout between Magomed Abdulhamidov of Azerbaijan and Satoshi Shimizu of Japan
was overturned on appeal and the referee from Turkmenistan was expelled from the Games. The
referee had allowed the fight to continue despite the fact that the boxer from Azerbaijan had fallen to
the canvas six times in the third round. The AIBA overturned the result, saying that the referee should
have counted at least three knockdowns and stopped the bout. See also Romania and Spain v World
Rugby, World Rugby Appeal Committee decision dated 6 June 2018 (it was determined that the Panel
did have the power to order the match to be replayed but that there was insufficient evidence to justify
doing so).
2 See Mendy v Association Internationale de Boxe (AIBA), CAS OG 96/006; Korean Olympic Committee
v International Skating Union (ISU), CAS OG 02/007; Vanderlei De Lima & Brazilian Olympic
Committee (BOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), CAS 2004/A/727;
Netherlands Antilles Olympic Committee (NAOC) v International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF) & United States Olympic Committee, CAS 2008/A/1641. See further, Beloff, ‘The Field of
Play’, in Halsbury’s Laws of England: Centenary Essays 2007 (Lexis Nexis, 2007), pp 147–151.
B3.37 It remains to be seen whether the growth in the use of video technology
will encourage more challenges to decisions taken by match officials, potentially
including in relation to misconduct. The improvements in video technology will
mean that it may be easier for participants to demonstrate after the fact that a clear
error was made.1
1 An unsuccessful attempt to challenge the result of a competition was brought in the case of Rumyana
Dimitrova Neykova v International Rowing Federation (FISA) & International Olympic Committee
(IOC), CAS OG 00/012. The CAS heard a challenge against race results based on the accuracy of the
technical photo finish and timing equipment used during a rowing race at the Athens 2004 Olympic
Games. The athlete was unable to demonstrate that the equipment was inaccurate, and the panel did
not therefore determine the extent to which CAS could review a field of play decision made based
upon faulty equipment. However, the panel acknowledged (at para 13) that the accuracy of technical
equipment is ‘somewhat different to that of a typical official’s field of play decision’. The panel did
not explicitly rule out a review of a decision based on faulty equipment, thereby leaving the issue open
(although it seems likely that the circumstances in which a challenge will be justified will be few and
far between).
Misconduct 433
B3.38 In addition to challenges brought under the rules of the relevant sport, on-
field incidents could potentially be challenged in other forums. In respect of decisions
of match-officials, there is the potential issue of legal action as a result of on-field
decisions. FIFA expressly provides in its rules that match officials shall not be held
liable for ‘any other loss suffered by any individual, club, company, association or
other body, which is due or which may be due to any decision taken under the terms
of the Laws of the Game or in respect of the normal procedures required to hold, play
and control a match’.1 There have been threats of legal action in rugby union seeking
to have matches replayed because of errors by match officials (ie ‘gross negligence’
of the officiating team) but, to date, none have been successful.2
1 Law 7 of the FIFA Laws of the Game.
2 See for example ‘Bath Owner Bruce Craig writes to Champions Cup organisers to demand replay of
Toulouse defeat’, The Times website, 19 October 2018.
4 DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
B3.39 Chapter D1 deals with the disciplinary process generally. This section
focuses on issues that arise specifically in respect of disciplinary proceedings for on-
field misconduct.
A The disciplinary process
B3.40 One of the key differences between disciplinary processes for on-field
and off-field matters is that it is generally considered that on-field matters should
be resolved quickly, so that sanctions are determined before the next match. This
is important not only for the participant involved but also for opposing teams.
By imposing any period of ineligibility immediately, it avoids the arbitrariness of
sanctions being applied later in the season, which would inevitably lead to debate
as to whether the timing of an individual’s ban benefited one club over another. It is
critical for the integrity of sport that the scheduling of hearings is not used tactically.1
1 See for example Rugby Football Union v Rohan Janse Van Rensburg, RFU Appeal Panel decision
dated 7 February 2020 (ruling that the RFU’s appeal should be heard prior to the Premiership Cup
Semi-Final as ‘it is only fair that any Player affected by such proceedings, their Club and, of course,
any opposing Club, should have certainty as to the playing status of those selected to play’). Van
Rensburg, found not guilty at first instance, had been selected to play in this semi-final and his club,
Sale, objected to the appeal hearing taking place on the day of the match.
B3.41 The processes put in place by sports to deal with the issue of any further
sanction after a match will be sport specific and will take into account the following
factors:
(a) the need for speed;
(b) complexity;
(c) nature of offence;
(d) likely response from the player (ie will he or she contest the case?); and
(e) availability of panels – is a hearing in person required or can it be dealt with on
papers or by telephone/video conference?
B3.42 Given that decisions are often taken expeditiously in the week between
sporting fixtures, SGBs need to have disciplinary panels that can be put together
quickly to determine any additional sanctions. However, the importance of a speedy
resolution must be balanced against the rights of the individual or club that has
been charged. Should a participant require further time to consider their case (or if
a governing body needs additional time to investigate), there needs to be flexibility
within the rules to allow this to happen.
B3.43 As addressed above,1 football and rugby union both have procedures that
provide for the speedy resolution of cases involving on-field misconduct. Horseracing
also has a quick process. Each race is reviewed in real time and a rapid decision is
made in relation to any misconduct, including the calling of a stewards’ enquiry.
A stewards’ enquiry is held immediately after the race, at which the jockey and/or
trainer are questioned by experts in relation to any potential breach of the Rules of
Racing.2 A decision is then made in relation to the alleged misconduct. This allows
for a quick resolution to be made in relation to disqualification. This is particularly
important in horseracing given the role of betting: a quick decision on disqualification
is necessary to ensure that betting markets can pay out punters accordingly.
1 See paras B3.30 and B3.31.
2 Rules (H)21–(H)24 of the Rules of Racing.
B Evidence
B3.44 In expedited proceedings relating to on-field misconduct, there are generally
no formal rules of evidence, and a failure to comply with directions will not usually
invalidate proceedings or result in evidence being excluded. Panels are generally
given wide discretion to assess the evidence and to give it the weight they consider
appropriate. However, the following general principles are often applied:
(a) Expert evidence: the need for expert evidence will vary from sport to sport.
However, there is often a view by panels (who should have been selected
because they have the relevant expertise) that they are required to reach their
own view on the particular incident.1
(b) Opinion of the match referee: generally sports take the view that the referee has
too much of a vested interest (eg it may go towards the score he receives from
an assessor) and, as a result, his opinion may either not be admitted or may
carry limited, or no, weight.
(c) Video evidence: this is likely to be the primary evidence in any on-field
misconduct case. For respondents, it may be worth investigating whether
footage is available that shows the incident from other angles.
(d) Witnesses of fact: together with video evidence, this is likely to be the primary
source of evidence. Panels will, however, give some care to assessing evidence
given by teammates and opposing teams.2
1 See comments in relation to expert witnesses in Rugby Football Union v Matt Kvecic, RFU Disciplinary
Panel decision dated 28 January 2020 (‘As an appointed Panel of experts asked to deal with this rugby
hearing they determined that they were able to deal with the case and make the decision based on the
evidence already before them. There was no need for any additional evidence, opinion or otherwise’);
Rugby Football Union v Gaby Lovobalavu, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 21 February 2018
(‘Panels should be slow, when discharging their duty to reach reasoned findings on the evidence,
to have regard to such views. Panels are required to reach an independent determination, not rely
on the views of others’). See also para 3.5 of Appendix 1 to World Rugby Regulation 18: ‘Judicial
Committees should not permit the introduction of opinion evidence other than expert opinion evidence.
Expert opinion evidence is only likely to be permitted when the evidence falls outside the everyday
knowledge of members of the Judicial Committee or of the Judicial Officer’.
2 ICC v Anderson & Jadeja, decision of Judicial Commissioner dated 3 August 2014 (the Judicial
Commissioner took into account that the witnesses in this case were ‘hopelessly biased in favour of
one party or the other’).
C Mens rea
B3.45 Whether or not it is expressly provided for in the relevant rules, the mental
state of a participant (ie his mens rea or ‘guilty mind’) may feature in an assessment
of whether or not he is guilty of an on-field offence and/or (if he is guilty) of what the
sanction should be. This might involve analysis of whether the participant acted, for
example, intentionally, recklessly, or accidentally.
Misconduct 435
B3.46 By analogy, under English criminal law, proof of intent is governed by s 8

of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, which states that:
‘[a] court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,

(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable result of those
actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the
evidence drawing such inferences from the evidence as appears proper in the
circumstances’.
B3.47 As for recklessness, it was held by the House of Lords in R v G [2004]

1 AC 1034 that a person acts recklessly with respect to a particular result when he
is aware of a risk that it will occur, and it is (in the circumstances known to him)
unreasonable for him to take the risk. It need not be an ‘obvious and significant’ risk.1
1 See Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2020 (Sweet and Maxwell, 2013), para 17-
50.
B3.48 Under the relevant regulations, a governing body may have to prove that the
player had a particular mens rea in order to sustain the charge brought against him.
The position in rugby union was discussed in an appeal decision from the 2010 Six
Nations Championship involving the Irish hooker Jerry Flannery, who was found
guilty at first instance of kicking an opponent and suspended for a period of six
weeks. The Six Nations Appeal Committee, chaired by the RFU’s HHJ Jeff Blackett,
denied the appeal and upheld the original sanction, and on the question of mental
state said:
‘The Law relating to kicking an opponent (Law 10(4)(c)) does not include a
requirement for mens rea. It simply prohibits a player from kicking an opponent.
However, when a Disciplinary Committee considers whether to sanction a player
for an act of foul play an assessment of his intent at the time of the offending is
important. If the act is entirely accidental then no offence has been committed and
there is no sanction. If the act was not accidental the Disciplinary Committee must
decide whether it was intentional (that is deliberate) or reckless. There is no separate
classification of intent under the description of carelessness – an act which is careless
and mistimed (to use the description of the offence used by Mr Barriscale) may be
reckless in the context of rugby. That is, by being careless in mistiming his kick, the
player may have known or should have known that there was a risk of committing
an act of foul play. It would be a matter for the Disciplinary Committee to decide
whether a careless act amounted to recklessness or was merely accidental within the
context of rugby’.1
1 Jerry Flannery v Six Nations Limited, Six Nations Appeal Committee, 3 March 2010, unpublished.
B3.49 If the reasoning of the Appeal Committee in Flannery is correct, it means

(at least in rugby union) that accidental acts will not be treated as foul play, but
all other acts will be treated as foul play and will fall into one of two categories
(intentional or reckless), the former being more serious than the latter. Accordingly,
the line between accidental and reckless is an important one as it delineates foul play
(and potential sanction) and non-foul play (with no potential sanction). And yet, in a
rugby union context, there is often a degree of uncertainty as to whether a particular
act was committed recklessly or accidentally, and the line between those two states
has sometimes been blurred (unlike the line between intention and recklessness,
which is usually relatively clear).
B3.50 Take, for example, a rugby union player accused of stamping on an opponent
player (which is an act of foul play pursuant to Law 9.12 of World Rugby’s Laws
of the Game). If the tribunal finds that the player’s boot did make contact with an
opponent as he brought it down (in effect, the objective actus reus of the offence)
but is not persuaded that the player intended to make contact with the opponent (for
example, finding instead that he was intending to put his foot down onto the pitch),
the difficult question becomes whether his actions were reckless or accidental. The
World Rugby Regulations state that ‘reckless’ means the player ‘knew (or should
have known) there was a risk of committing an act of foul play’.1 It follows that
‘accidental’ means something along the lines of: the relevant player did not know
(and it was reasonable for him not to have known) there was a risk of committing
an act of foul play. Applying those tests to a given set of facts (such as the player
stamping) may not be straightforward.
1 World Rugby Reg 17.19.2(b).
D Potential civil and criminal liability
B3.51 Criminal and/or civil action against participants could also follow from
misconduct on the field of play, at least where serious harm has resulted to the
victims of the misconduct.1 For example, Duncan Ferguson became the first British
international footballer to be jailed for assaulting a fellow professional on the field of
play when he head-butted John McStay of Raith Rovers while playing for Glasgow
Rangers.2 One possible defence to a civil action is that the risk of the harm suffered
was part and parcel of playing the game and therefore the victim voluntarily assumed
the risk of it (ie volenti non fit injuria3). In rugby union, it is directly contemplated in
the regulations that conduct on the field that leads to a criminal conviction can also
trigger a sporting sanction.4
1 See generally Chapter G1 (Civil Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport) and Chapter G2
(Criminal Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport).
2 Ferguson was jailed for three months having had two previous convictions for assault (see ‘Soccer
player jailed for foul play’, Independent website, 12 October 1995).
3 A common law doctrine that states that if someone willingly places themself in a position where harm
might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against
the other party in tort or delict. The more flagrant the foul play, however, the more difficult it will be to
argue that the victim voluntarily accepted the risk of it. See further para G1.144 et seq.
4 RFU Reg 19.4.4. A case in which this arose is Rugby Football Union v John Scowby, RFU Disciplinary
Panel decision dated February 2017 (the player was given a sanction of 16 months for kicking an
opponent in the head causing the teeth to concave in (a period of suspension that the player, having
also been convicted of a criminal offence, part-served in prison)).
B3.52 Self-defence is a defence to a criminal charge.1 However, in a sporting

context self-defence is not an absolute defence to an act of on-field misconduct
and, instead, it will just be taken into account when determining sanction.2 And that
must be correct. The critical difference between action on a rugby pitch and ‘action’
outside a pub in a city centre (where self-defence would be an absolute defence) is
that in the former there are three or more match officials on hand ready to act as quasi
law-enforcers, preventing foul play and administering summary justice.
1 See eg Palmer v R [1971] AC 814 [PC] (‘It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked
may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is
reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. […] It
may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some
attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it
would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion
to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then
immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent
danger he may have to avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort
of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of
paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of
defence. Of all these matters the good sense of a jury will be the arbiter. There are no prescribed words
Misconduct 437
which must be employed […] in a summingup. All that is needed is a clear exposition, in relation to the
particular facts of the case, of the conception of necessary selfdefence. If there has been no attack then
clearly there will have been no need for defence. If there has been attack so that defence is reasonably
necessary it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact
measure of his necessary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish
a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would
be most potent evidence that only reasonably defensive action had been taken. […] The defence of
self-defence either succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved, in which case as a defence
it is rejected’). See further para G2.61 et seq.
2 See eg the case of Six Nations v Dylan Hartley, Six Nations Disciplinary Committee decision dated
27 March 2012, in which the Panel rejected an argument from Hartley that because his opponent
Stephen Ferris had first put his finger into Hartley’s mouth, Hartley’s subsequent bite was an act of
self-defence, and therefore not capable of being an act of foul play.
E Interplay between criminal proceedings and misconduct

charges
B3.53 Issues can arise where the player has been charged with a criminal offence
in respect of the conduct that also forms the basis of the misconduct charge. First,
there is a question as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should proceed
before the criminal proceedings are concluded.1 Secondly, there is the question of
how the disciplinary panel should treat the outcome and/or findings of the criminal
court (considered at Section 8D below). Finally, does the fact that the conduct was
tantamount to a criminal offence affect the standard of proof?2
1 Many sports proceed on the basis that disciplinary proceedings should not go ahead until the criminal
proceedings have been concluded. However, the law does not mandate this (see para D1.95), and The
FA Disciplinary Regulations provide, at section (A)23, that ‘the fact that a Participant is liable to face
or has pending any other criminal, civil, disciplinary or regulatory proceedings (whether public or
private in nature) in relation to the same matter shall not prevent or fetter the Association commencing,
conducting and/or concluding proceedings under the Rules’. Furthermore, Section (D)113–(D)115 of
the FA Disciplinary Regulations prescribe a power for the FA to suspend an individual on an interim
basis in circumstances where that individual has been ‘charged with a criminal offence’.
2 Re A Solicitor [1993] QB 69 at p 81 is authority by analogy for the proposition that where the alleged
on-field conduct is tantamount to a criminal offence (which would be the case if it amounted to,
for example, assault), the criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) should be applied,
particularly in cases in which the relevant regulations are silent as to the applicable standard of proof.
However, it is not a decision that has been universally accepted, and in any event most sports prescribe
the applicable standard of proof in their rules as balance of probabilities or comfortable satisfaction:
see further paras B3.181–B3.188. The CAS has rejected the suggestion that the criminal standard of
proof should apply in doping cases (see para C5.2) or in match-fixing cases (see para B4.37).
F Sanctions
B3.54 Decisions of SGB disciplinary tribunals do not bind subsequent tribunals.

However, previous cases can be persuasive and are often taken into account by panels
if only to ensure a degree of consistency.1
1 See para B1.30 for a discussion of the extent to which the principle of equal treatment means that ‘like
cases must be treated alike’ when it comes to sanctions.
B3.55 There is also the issue of enforcing sanctions. Under World Rugby’s
‘universality’ principle,1 all suspensions must be applied worldwide, at all levels
of the sport, so that (for example) a player who receives a four-week suspension
for conduct that got him sent off in an international match might miss a number of
club matches during the period of suspension. In contrast, suspensions arising from
English football automatically apply to FA-sanctioned competitions only, and so do
not apply to competitions sanctioned by UEFA or FIFA (instead, if The FA wants
a sanction to apply internationally, it must apply to FIFA).2 Similarly, suspensions
imposed by UEFA or FIFA for on-field matters arising in UEFA or FIFA sanctioned
competitions will not automatically apply to domestic football.3
1 World Rugby Reg 17, Preamble, section D.
2 Under section 66 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, on application from a FIFA confederation, association
or other organising sporting body, the sanction for a serious infringement can be extended to have
worldwide effect.
3 It is worth noting that FIFA also has the power, under section 27(6) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code,
to investigate, prosecute and sanction serious infringements that fall under the jurisdiction of FIFA
confederations and associations if ‘deemed appropriate in a specific case’ and if the ‘confederation,
association or other sports organisation fails to prosecute serious infringements within three months
from the infringement becoming known to the Disciplinary Committee’.
5 TYPES OF ON-FIELD OFFENCES
A Physical/verbal abuse between participants
B3.56 One of the most common forms of on-field misconduct is physical and verbal
abuse. In many sports players sometimes seek to gain a psychological advantage by
winding each other up verbally. It is also accepted that emotions often run high in
contact sports and players will let off steam towards one another, including through
the use of strong or ‘industrial’ language that would be unacceptable off the pitch
but which neither party feels particularly aggrieved about on the pitch. Nevertheless,
abusive or insulting language on the field of play may lead to disciplinary sanction
after the fact.1
1 Nick Kyrgios has been sanctioned on a number of occasions for verbal abuse. See for example
‘ATP Completes Review with Kyrgios Incident’, ATP Press Release, 24 August 2015, which involved
verbal abuse towards another player, Stan Wawrinka, during a match in Montreal. See also World
Rugby v Joe Marler, independent Judicial Committee decision dated 5 April 2016 (the player was
sanctioned (on the basis that this was an aggravated breach) for calling Samson Lee of Wales a ‘gypsy
boy’ during a Six Nations fixture between England and Wales).
B3.57 However, physical abuse is a dismissal/disqualification offence in most

sports. Physical abuse cases range from the more extreme cases of eye gouging,1
biting,2 testicle-grabbing,3 or fighting4 to more minor cases of pushing fellow
participants.5
1 See eg Football Association v Moussa Dembele, FA Regulatory Commission decision 6 May 2016
(Dembele was banned for six matches for a breach of FA Rule (E)3 as a result of eye gouging, which
constituted violent conduct); ECPR v Chris Ashton, EPCR Independent Judicial Officer decision dated
20 January 2016 (Ashton was suspended for 10 weeks for making contact with an opponent’s eyes).
2 See eg Luis Suárez, FC Barcelona & Uruguayan Football Association v. FIFA, CAS 2014/A/3665,
3666 & 3667 (the Uruguayan and Barcelona player was fined and suspended from playing in official
matches at any level for four months for biting an opponent); Rugby Football Union v Chris Ashton,
RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 September 2016 (the England international was suspended
for 13 weeks for biting an opponent).
3 See eg Six Nations v Joe Marler (England), Six Nations Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 March
2020 (Marler was given a suspension of 10 weeks for grabbing the testicles of Alun Wyn Jones of
Wales during a Six Nations fixture).
4 See eg the on-field fight between Lee Bowyer and Kieron Dyer (both of Newcastle) (‘Bowyer given
three game ban for brawl’, Telegraph website, 23 April 2005).
5 Rangers and Celtic were both fined £7,500 for a breach of Disciplinary Rule 204 of the SFA Regulations
(‘where three or more players and/or members of Team Staff from one team are involved in a
confrontation with opposing players and/or members of Team Staff of the opposing team during and/or
directly after a match’) (‘Celtic and Rangers fined £7,500 each for Old Firm derby brawl’, BBC Sport
website, 2 May 2019).
B3.58 Where abuse strays into certain areas (eg racial abuse), higher sanctions can
apply. For example, under The FA’s Rules E3(1) and E3(2):
Misconduct 439
‘[an] Aggravated Breach of Rule E3(1) is committed where any reference to race is
made in the course of abusive and insulting behaviour (or in the course of any other
breach of Rule E3(1))’.1
Any reference to other specified characteristics of ethnic origin, colour, nationality,
religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability is
also considered an aggravated breach under Rule E3(1), and is similarly likely to
be considered a more serious form of breach in other sports.2 Such abuse can also
amount to a criminal offence.3 Sport’s desire for inclusivity and the upholding of core
values (see para B3.3) provides another justification for prohibiting such abuse. The
aim of sports is to create an environment that encourages maximum participation,
and so any behaviour must be dealt with strictly where it causes any group to feel
they may be excluded from, or victimised within, a particular sport.
1 See eg Football Association v Sophie Jones, Regulatory Commission decision 19 March 2019 (the
player received a five-match suspension, a fine of £200 and was required to attend an FA educational
course after being found guilty of an ‘aggravated breach’ on the basis of having directed monkey
noises towards Renee Hector).
2 See eg England and Wales Cricket Board v Andrew Gale, decision issued in October 2014 (Gale
was given a four match ban for ‘using language or gesture that is obscene or of a serious insulting
nature’ as a result of using the word ‘kolpak’ towards Ashwell Prince) (see ‘Andrew Gale: Yorkshire
captain given second ban for abuse’, BBC Sport website, 3 October 2014); World Rugby v Joe Marler,
Independent Judicial Committee Decision dated 5 April 2016 (the player was required to make a
donation of £20,000 to charity and was given a two-match ban for calling Samson Lee of Wales a
‘gypsy boy’ during a Six Nations fixture between England and Wales).
3 Criminal charges were brought for on-field racist language towards opponents in the cases of John
Terry (see ‘John Terry cleared of racism against Anton Ferdinand, BBC News website, 13 July 2012)
and Fernando Forestieri (see more details of the criminal case referenced in Football Association
v Forestieri, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 July 2019). Both were acquitted of the
criminal charges but served disciplinary sanctions handed down by FA Regulatory Commissions. See
further discussion of the John Terry case at para G2.91.
B3.59 Most SGB rules prohibit misconduct by all participants, which therefore
includes officials, coaches,1 managers,2 and other support staff, which is important
given their influence and proximity to on-field proceedings.
1 For example in ITF v Nastase, SR/913/2017, the Romanian team coach Ilie Nastase was suspended
from acting in an official capacity for three years, denied access and accreditation for competitions
for one year, and fined $20,000. During a Fed Cup tennis match between Romania and Great Britain,
Nastase made abusive and threatening comments to the match officials and to members of the Great
Britain team, and engaged in ‘unfair conduct by intentionally interfering with the competition of
British player Johanna Konta and compromising her wellbeing’).
2 See eg Football Association v Alan Pardew, Regulatory Commission decision dated 11 March 2014
(Alan Pardew, then manager of Newcastle United, was given a ban of seven matches (three for
stadium ban and four as a touchline ban) and a fine of £60,000 for head-butting David Meyler of Hull
City); Football Association v Gus Poyet, Regulatory Commission decision dated 3 March 2015 (Gus
Poyet, then manager of Sunderland, was given a fine of £4,000 for ‘improper conduct’ as a result of
kicking over of a drinks barrel following an on-field decision of the referee); Football Association v
Francesco Becchetti, Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 January 2015 (Becchetti, owner and
President of Leyton Orient, was given a stadium ban of six matches and a fine of £40,000 for kicking
the Leyton Orient assistant manager at the end of the match). In Ignasi Casas Vaque v Federation
Equestre Internationale, CAS 2019/A/6202, a veterinarian who was serving as the Spanish team’s
Chef d’Equipe was sanctioned for misconduct, in particular abusing officials and calling them cheats.
B3.60 Finally, it is worth noting that while abusive language cases have elements
in common with other on-field cases (incidents are likely to be brief and factually
straightforward), they often differ in one significant respect: they are unlikely to be
caught on video or, where they are, the crucial audio element of the incident may
not have been recorded.1 This means that investigating these cases may take longer
than other on-field cases, and it may not be possible to investigate them fully within
time constraints that would otherwise apply. In the absence of audio evidence (or an
admission of guilt), the hearing may have to rely on witness evidence to confirm what
was said.2 Lip-reading (or ‘speech reading’) evidence may not provide the answer,
depending on the facts of the case.3 Aside from the time factor of gathering this
witness evidence, the only witness may be the person allegedly abused, as abuse is
less likely to be said when the referee is able to hear it and crowd noise means that
even participants who are nearby may not be able to hear. The evidence in such cases,
based on one word against one another, can be very finely balanced.4
1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Denny Solomona, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 April 2018
(the RFU only had the evidence of the alleged victim player against that of the alleged perpetrator);
ICC v Anderson & Jadeja, decision of Judicial Commissioner, 3 August 2014 (whilst there was video
evidence of the players together on the field of play, the Judicial Commissioner stated that ‘without
audio of the incident, I am not comfortably satisfied that the incident as described by Dhoni and Jadeja
took place as they describe’, and noted that the witnesses in the case were ‘hopelessly biased in favour
of one party or the other’).
2 See eg Football Association v Jay Rodriguez, Regulatory Commission decision dated 11 April 2018.
3 See R v Luttrell and others, [2004] EWCA Crim 1344, for a discussion of the issues that can arise in
relation to ‘speech reading’ evidence.
4 For a detailed consideration of the issues that can arise in verbal abuse cases, including how witness
evidence should be assessed, see Football Association v Luiz Suarez, Regulatory Commission decision
dated 30 December 2011. See also the discussion of the John Terry case at para G2.91.
B Abuse of match officials

B3.61 All sports prohibit both verbal and physical abuse of match officials. For
instance, the ECB Code of Conduct provides that ‘players and team officials must at
all times accept the umpire’s decision. Players must not show dissent at the umpire’s
decision’ and ‘players and team officials shall not intimidate, assault or attempt to
intimidate or assault an umpire’. Match official abuse ranges from the use of foul
language1 to verbal abuse that questions the integrity of match officials (eg calling a
match official a cheat2) up to physical abuse. Verbal abuse that questions the integrity
of a match official is usually seen as being more serious than foul language alone, as
it goes to the heart of a match official’s role as an independent decision-maker.3
1 See the example of Fabio Fognini who was fined $96,000 and given a suspended Grand Slam ban
(to cover the next two Grand Slams) for verbally abusing a female umpire (ie committing a ‘major
offence of aggravated behaviour and conduct contrary to the integrity of the game’) at the US Open
in September 2017 (see ‘Fabio Fognini: Italian fined £72,806 and gets suspended ban for US Open
outburst’, BBC Sport website, 11 October 2017). Similarly, Romanian tennis player Irina Spirlea was
disqualified in 1996 for directing abusive language at a match official.
2 See eg RFL v Joel Tomkins, Independent Operational Rules Tribunal decision dated 5 March 2019 (the
player was given a two-match ban and £500 fine after calling the official a ‘cheat’).
3 See the Serena Williams incident at the US Open 2018, where Williams called the umpire a ‘liar’ and
a ‘thief’ and was subsequently fined by the USTA (as reported on the BBC Sport website, ‘US Open
2018: Serena Williams fined over outbursts during final’, 9 September 2018). See also Ignasi Casas
Vaque v Federation Equestre Internationale, CAS 2019/A/6202, where a veterinarian who was serving
as the Spanish team’s Chef d’Equipe was sanctioned for misconduct, in particular abusing officials and
calling them cheats.
B3.62 Most sports prohibit any intentional physical contact with a referee, however
minor. This reflects the vulnerable position that a referee is in while on the field of play
(particularly at grass roots level).1 The significant bans given for physical or verbal
abuse of referees are on occasion criticised as being unduly harsh when compared
to bans given for negligent or reckless dangerous tackles that have the potential to
cause significant injury. However, arguments against this view include the need to
ensure that match officials do not leave the game, that others are encouraged to take
up officiating, that dangerous tackles are part of the game, but abuse of officials is
never necessary.
1 See Rugby Football Union v Barry Lockwood, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 29 September
2014 (the player was given a 20-year ban for punching the match official); and the Northern Ireland
Combined Counties League 40-year ban for three Mullingar Town players following the attack on
match official Daniel Sweeney (‘Referee attack: Three players given 40-year bans for assault on
Daniel Sweeney’, BBC Sport website, 23 November 2018).
Misconduct 441
B3.63 One common challenge in prosecuting cases of verbal abuse of referees is

that often the only witness is the match official. Although referees in some sports (not
football) now wear microphones so that their audio can be broadcast live, they are
often not sensitive enough to pick up comments from players. As neutral decision-
makers, there is no obvious reason for officials not to tell the truth, and therefore
tribunals are likely to accept their evidence. In addition, while usually it will not be
possible to hear the abuse on the footage of the match, the footage will often provide
evidence of the reason why a player might have abused a referee (for instance,
decisions that go against the player) and/or that might demonstrate the state of mind
of the player at the time (for instance, the footage might show the player getting
increasingly annoyed and gesticulating towards the match official).
B3.64 The FA introduced ‘Stage One Warnings’ for technical area occupants,
resulting in automatic touchline bans for accumulated warnings (given during the
match rather than retrospectively).1 Offences that merit a Stage One Warning include
throwing or kicking objects, disrespectful gestures towards officials, provocative or
inflammatory motions, gesturing for cards to be shown, and time wasting. Unlike the
punishments for players accumulating yellow and red cards, there is no cut-off point
in the season beyond which these warnings are wiped out. More serious touchline
offences, such as violent conduct, aggressive behaviour, spitting, or entering the field
of play to confront match officials can still result in the manager or coach in question
being sent from the dugout and charged with misconduct.2 It will be interesting to see
how this new mechanism impacts on the instances of match official abuse.
1 For example, four Stage 1 warnings equal 1 match suspension pursuant to Section 4 of Part D of the
FA Disciplinary Regulations.
2 See Football Association v Mauricio Pochettino, Regulatory Commission decision dated 4 March
2019 (Pochettino was given a two-match ban and fined £10,000 for approaching the match official in
an aggressive manner).
C Cheating
B3.65 ‘Cheating’, or deliberately infringing the rules of the game in order to gain
an advantage, covers a variety of different types of conduct, some of which are worse
than others. Cheating may be dealt with by the officials during the match and/or by
the SGB following the event.
B3.66 At one end of the scale are intentional, but likely ‘spur of the moment’,
incidents such as ‘intentional offending’ in rugby union (such as a deliberate knock-
on) or time-wasting, which will be penalised at the time and may result in a yellow
or red card. So-called ‘simulation’ in football (where a player pretends that he has
been fouled in an attempt to persuade the match officials to award him a free kick or
penalty) is (when detected) usually met with a caution for ‘unsporting behaviour’.1
1 See eg Football Association v Oumar Niasse, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 November
2017, para 15 (‘To the minds of the Commission members the movements of Mr Niasse’s body, in
particular the arching of the back and the collapsing of both legs, were simply not consistent with the
amount of force exerted upon him by Mr Dann and in exaggerating the effect of the contact made
between himself and Mr Dann, Mr Niasse deceived the referee and this led to a penalty being awarded
by the referee’. Niasse received a two-match match suspension).
B3.67 Pre-meditated cheating is generally considered a more serious offence.

One such incident is the infamous ‘ball-tampering’ (with sandpaper) incident, which
featured three members of the Australian cricket team. When approached for an
explanation at a press conference during the test match, the players said that the item
used to tamper with the ball was a bit of tape to which dirt and grit had attached.
Following an investigation, it transpired that the item used was sandpaper. Bancroft
was charged by the match referee and fined 75 per cent of his match fee and Smith
was charged by the ICC and fined 100 per cent of his match fee. Cricket Australia
elected to take further action and, pursuant to Cricket Australia’s Code of Conduct,
imposed lengthy playing bans and other restrictions on their future involvement
in cricket.1 This is a good example of circumstances where there may be a two-
tier process for dealing with on-field offences. Another example of pre-meditated
cheating is the European Rugby case against Harlequins and others in 2009, known
as ‘Bloodgate’, where a player bit into a blood capsule that he had concealed in his
sock, to fake a blood injury that would mean he could be substituted for a specialist
kicker in the final minutes of a semi-final match.2 An area that may be at risk of
exploitation in the future is the abuse of the head injury assessments for concussion.3
1 The sanctions were as follows: Warner (12-month ban and no consideration for team leadership in
future), Smith (12-month ban and restrictions on leadership in future), and Bancroft (nine months and
restrictions on leadership in future).
2 ERC v Harlequins & others, ERC Appeal Tribunal decision dated 17 August 2009.
3 Investigations have taken place in relation to the use of head injury assessments on a limited number
of occasions to date (both of which concluded with no case to answer): France and Wales during the
2018 Six Nations (see ‘Six Nations: France will not be punished for head injury assessments against
Ireland’, BBC Sport website, 15 February 2018); Ireland and France during the 2018 Six Nations
(see ‘Six Nations to review HIA protocol from France versus Ireland match’, the Guardian website,
4 February 2018). For a more general discussion in relation to HIAs see ‘Rugby’s concussion reviews
are “not fit for purpose’’, says brain expert’, BBC Sport website, 21 April 2017.
B3.68 Other forms of misconduct could fall in a category of ‘cheating the audience’,
rather than cheating to gain an advantage. One example of this is ‘tanking’,1 which
occurs most notably in tennis2 and snooker,3 although there have also been charges
in horseracing for failing to run a horse ‘on its merits’ or to ‘achieve the best possible
placing’.4 The rules in tennis stipulate that:
‘[a] player shall use his best efforts during the match when competing in a
tournament. Violation of this section shall subject a player to a fine up to $20,000
for each violation’.
Umpires have the authority to penalise players in breach of this rule in accordance
with the Point Penalty Schedule. This type of misconduct is discussed further in the
match-fixing chapter, at paras B4.9 and B4.21.
1 For example, the Badminton World Federation (BWF) disqualified eight participants at the London
2012 Olympics after charges for ‘not using their best efforts’ and ‘conducting oneself in a manner that
is clearly abusive or detrimental to sport’ (see ‘Olympics badminton: Eight women disqualified from
doubles’, BBC Sport website, 1 August 2012).
2 The ATP Rulebook, VIII (The Code), section 8.04 (Player Code of Conduct), subsection h) Best
Efforts. Nick Kygrios was fined €10,000 for failing to use best efforts in the 2016 Shanghai Masters
tournament (‘ATP sanctions Kyrgios’, ATP Press Release, 17 October 2016). See also an incident
involving Bernard Tomic, who was fined his full Wimbledon prize money of £45,000 for not
meeting the ‘required professional standard’ during a match at the 2019 Wimbledon Championships
(‘Wimbledon 2019: Bernard Tomic fined for not meeting ‘professional standards’, BBC Sport website,
4 July 2019).
3 See eg when Ronnie O’Sullivan refused to pot the black ball to complete a 147 break (‘Ronnie
O’Sullivan passes up 147 break at Welsh Open as prize is ‘too cheap’, the Guardian website,
15 February 2016).
4 See Rule (F)37 and (F)38 of the Rules of Racing.
D Mechanical doping
B3.69 In recent years mechanical doping has been a high-profile issue in cycling.
Mechanical doping, or ‘technological fraud’ as the Union Cycliste Internationale
(UCI) refers to it, involves the use of a motor, electromagnet, or other device to
power a rider’s bicycle. At its most basic, mechanical doping involves the use of
Misconduct 443
unauthorised equipment in a sporting contest. This clearly poses a risk to the integrity
of the sport, the credibility of race results, and the ‘spirit’ of cycling.1
1 See the UCI regulations, Chapter III (Equipment), Section 2: ‘Bicycles shall comply with the spirit and
principle of cycling as a sport. The spirit presupposes that cyclists will compete in competitions on an
equal footing. The principle asserts the primacy of man over machine’.
B3.70 Mechanical doping has been expressly prohibited by the UCI.1 A cyclist
found to have breached the regulations could be suspended for a minimum of
six months and given a fine of between CHF20,000 and 200,000 (approximately
£15,000 to £150,000). A team found to have breached the regulations could also be
suspended for a minimum of six months and issued a fine of between CHF100,000
and CHF1,000,000 (approximately £75,000 to £750,000).
1 Article 1.3.010 of UCI Regulations states: ‘The bicycle shall be propelled solely, through a chain
set, by the legs (inferior muscular chain) moving in a circular movement, without electric or other
assistance’. Article 12.1.013 prohibits the presence or use (within the margins of a cycling competition)
of a bicycle that does not comply with Art 1.3.010.
B3.71 Like anti-doping and betting monitoring, there is an element of sophistication

required in order to police mechanical doping. The UCI uses a number of methods to
check for motors and other prohibited devices: it has developed a specialist tablet to
scan bicycles using magnetic resonance testing, and makes use of thermal cameras,
visual and physical bicycle checks, and x-ray scans.
B3.72 The first ‘positive’ case of mechanical doping occurred at the UCI Cyclo-
cross World Championships in February 2016.1 The UCI detected a concealed electric
motor in the seat tube of the bicycle of Femke Van den Driessche following magnetic
resonance testing scans in the pit area. The rider denied knowledge of the motor
but did not defend herself at a hearing. The UCI Disciplinary Commission imposed
a suspension of six years, a fine of CHF20,000, and disqualification of a number
of results (including her European and Belgian Under-23 titles). This sanction is
significantly higher than the minimum sanction in the UCI regulations, suggesting
that the breach was taken extremely seriously, and the case was considered to
demonstrate culpability at the higher end of the spectrum. There have not yet been
any challenges to the regulations or scrutiny of the regulations during a contested
hearing. There are a number of issues that are therefore still to be considered,
including the apparent strict liability nature of the offence, and the evidence required
in order to prove a breach (particularly rider or team knowledge and responsibility
for a non-compliant bicycle).
1 See ‘The UCI announces Disciplinary Commission decision in the case of Femke Van den Driessche’,
(2016) LawinSport, 26 April. The reasoned decision is not published.
B3.73 Mechanical doping may also amount to a criminal offence. For example,
Cyril Fontayne, a French amateur rider was sentenced by the Criminal Court
of Périgueux after pleading guilty to ‘technological cheating’.1 The Criminal
Court sentenced the rider to 60 hours of community service and made an order for
damages to be paid to the French Cycling Federation (FCF) and the race organiser. The
sports disciplinary consequences were not dealt with by the UCI but rather by the
FCF (given the level of cycling at which the rider participated). It imposed a five-year
ban from the sport on the rider in December 2017.
1 See ’43-year-old amateur motor doper receives his punishment … including a €1 fine’, the Cycling
Weekly website, 14 March 2018.
B3.74 It remains to be seen to what extent mechanical doping will grow in other
sports. The most vulnerable sports are those in which athletes rely on mechanical
and technologically advanced equipment: for example, sports such as sailing,1 motor
sport, and certain Paralympic sports. One example from sailing is the case of Dirk de
Ridder v International Sailing Federation,2 in which it was found that the sailor had
given instructions to two shore crew in his team illegally to add weight to the forward
kingpost of the AC 45 boat 4 (to improve its performance) in breach of the Racing
Rules of Sailing. He was banned for 18 months.
1 See the Misconduct Guidance document issued by World Sailing, and the investigation into Iker
Martinez following a report of misconduct in relation to the mechanics of the boat which resulted in no
further action (‘No further action by World Sailing in Martinez misconduct protest’, Sailweb website,
27 February 2019).
2 CAS/2014/A/3620. See also ‘Sailing through sports disciplinary proceedings’, Nick De Marco QC,
Blackstone Sports Law Bulletin, 20 January 2015.
B3.75 Well-drafted and properly enforced regulations are critical to managing the
impact of new technologies in sports equipment. As ever, there is an ongoing battle
between those seeking to develop prohibited technologies and the development of
means of detection, and SGBs must ensure that detection methods keep up with such
developments and remain effective. Publicity, effective testing,1 and strong sanctions
help to deter cheating and indicate to fans and to honest athletes that the sport’s
governing body is serious about protecting the sport from the potential risks that new
technology may bring. In the case of mechanical doping, strong sanctions are likely
to be viewed as proportionate due to the subversive and highly prejudicial nature of
the conduct. The policing of mechanical doping needs to be properly resourced as
there is always a risk that in sports where athletes are professional and, therefore,
better funded and have access to equipment experts, the SGBs could be left behind.
1 In sailing, appointed individuals known as ‘measurers’ carry out pre-event equipment inspections – see
the ‘Equipment Rules of Sailing’. Whether this should be done pre-event, during the event or post-
event will depend on the specificity of each sport.
E Political statements
B3.76 Most sports seek to operate in a politically neutral environment. The

neutrality of sport is recognised in the IOC’s Olympic Charter as one of the
Fundamental Principles of Olympism.1 Where participants make political statements
in or around the field of play, they may be subject to a charge of misconduct.2
1 See Olympic Charter, Principle 5: ‘Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society,
sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality. They have the
rights and obligations of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport,
determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of elections free
from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be
applied’. See further paras A1.2 and A1.3.
2 See ‘Politics and sport: How FIFA, UEFA and the IOC regulate political statements by athletes’,
Charles Maurice, published on LawInSport. In 2018, after Colin Kaepernick and other NFL players
started kneeling during the pre-match playing of the national anthem to protest against police racism
and brutality, the NFL owners unanimously approved a new national anthem policy that required
players to stand if they were on the field of play but gave them the option to remain in the dressing
room if they so wished (‘New policy requires on-field players, personnel to stand for anthem’, ESPN
website, 23 May 2018). It was anticipated that those who fell foul of this policy would be subject to
misconduct charges, but the policy was suspended following legal action brought by NFL Players
Association (‘NFL anthem policy on hold under standstill agreement’, NFL website, 19 July 2018)
and players continued to kneel during the national anthem (see ‘Football’s “woke” moment is over’,
Vox website, 28 October 2019).
B3.77 In the case of Football Association v Pep Guardiola,1 Guardiola wore a

yellow ribbon whilst in the technical area during matches. The yellow ribbon was
found to be ‘undoubtedly a symbol of protest against the imprisonment of Catalonian
independence figures in Spain, and also a sign of solidarity with those imprisoned’.
Misconduct 445
Guardiola was first warned by The FA, but after displaying the ribbon in a further
match was charged with a breach of Rule E1(b) in respect of a breach of Regulation
A4 of the Football Association’s Kit and Advertising Regulations. The Regulatory
Commission rejected an argument that Guardiola displayed it inadvertently when he
unzipped his jacket. The panel imposed a fine of £20,000.
1 Football Association v Pep Guardiola, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 March 2018.
B3.78 In 2016 FIFA took disciplinary action against the Scottish and English
Football Associations after both teams wore poppies (commemorating Remembrance
Sunday in the UK) in a fixture on 11 November 2016. Following a fine by the
FIFA Disciplinary Committee, the matter was appealed to CAS. The case led to a
relaxing of the FIFA rules and the appeals were withdrawn.1
1 For full details of this case, see an article from Neeraj Thomas, ‘FIFA’s evolving stance on
commemorative symbols: The Poppy appeal case’, (2018) LawinSport, 21 February. The FA was
charged with a breach of Law 4(4) (as it was at the time) of the FIFA Laws of the Game which
stipulated that equipment must not have any ‘political, religious or personal slogans, statements or
images’.
F Abuse of spectators
B3.79 The rules of all sports prohibit the abuse of spectators by players or team
officials, either by way of a specific rule or by way of a more general misconduct rule.
In football, for example, neither the relevant Law of the Game (Law 12, under which
the referee would take action for abusive language or gestures during the game) nor
Rule E3(1) (under which The FA would take action after a game) requires the abuse
to have been aimed at a fellow participant for a breach to occur. Abuse aimed at a
spectator is therefore caught by both provisions.
B3.80 Probably the most infamous example of spectator abuse involved French
international footballer Eric Cantona (whilst playing for Manchester United), when
he kung-fu kicked a spectator in the crowd at Crystal Palace followed by a series
of punches of the fan in question. Cantona was arrested and convicted for assault,
resulting in a two-week prison sentence, which was overturned on appeal and instead
he was sentenced to 120 hours of community service.1 Manchester United suspended
Cantona for the remaining four months of the 1994/1995 season and fined him two
weeks’ wages. The FA extended the suspension to 30 September 1995 (which FIFA
then applied worldwide). In 2019 Brazilian footballer, Neymar, was banned for
three matches by the French Football Federation for ‘lashing out’ at a spectator from
Rennes (whilst playing for PSG).2
1 R v Cantona, (1995) The Times, 25 March, discussed further at para G2.59.
2 See ‘Neymar gets three-match ban for Coupe de France fan altercation’, ESPN website, 10 May 2019
B3.81 European Rugby dealt with an incident of physical abuse of a spectator in

2007 when Toulouse player Trevor Brennan entered the stand during a Heineken Cup
match with Ulster and repeatedly punched an Ulster fan in the head. He was banned
for life (reduced to five years on appeal) and fined €25,000.1 Significant sanctions are
justified in such cases in order to protect spectators.
1 Brennan v ERC, ERC Appeal Tribunal decision dated 1 June 2007.
B3.82 Perhaps more common, however, are incidents of verbal exchanges between
players and spectators.1 It is rare that these can be dealt with in accordance with
the standard expedited procedures for on-field incidents, as they often require a full
investigation, including interviewing witnesses to determine the circumstances and
appropriate action. There may also be a concurrent police investigation, which could
slow progress. In many cases, spectator abuse by players or officials occurs as a result
of significant provocation by spectators.2 This is not a defence to a charge, though it
may be a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate sanction.
1 See eg European Professional Club Rugby v Delon Armitrage, Appeal Committee decision dated
22 January 2015 (Armitrage’s sanction was reduced on appeal from a 12 week to an eight week ban,
after he was found to have ‘conducted himself in an unsportsmanlike manner by making a number of
comments to (or within earshot of) spectators including in some cases a number of children and had
used foul and abusive language by shouting and swearing in a very threatening manner at and inviting
spectators, in effect, to engage with him in a physical exchange’).
2 For example, in April 2020 The FA charged Eric Dier of Tottenham Hotspur for a breach of FA Rule
(E)3 for entering the stands following alleged abuse of his brother by a spectator. It was alleged that his
actions were improper and/or threatening. In July 2020, the charge was upheld and Dier was banned
for four matches (theguardian.com/football/2020/jul/25/eric-dier-tottenham-abuse-from-supporters-
taken-more-seriously) [accessed 2 November 2020].
G Vicarious/strict liability of clubs for conduct of their own

spectators
B3.83 The reason that participants, primarily clubs, are made responsible for the
conduct of spectators is that they are responsible for the safety of players, staff and
other spectators.
B3.84 In football, The FA rules provide that clubs are vicariously liable when their
spectators (and crucially ‘all persons purporting to be its supporters or followers’)
conduct themselves in ways proscribed by the rules.1 For example, after Jack Grealish
was assaulted on the field of play by a spectator,2 Birmingham City was given a fine
of £42,500 for breaching Rule (E)20(a) and (b) – the first for an assault by a spectator
in a number of years. Birmingham City sought to rely on the prescribed defence that
‘all events, incidents or occurrences complained of were the result of circumstances
over which it had no control, or for reasons of crowd safety, and that its responsible
officers or agents had used all due diligence to ensure that its said responsibility
was discharged’.3 The burden rested on the club to prove the defence on the balance
of probabilities. The defence was rejected by the Regulatory Commission, which
determined that had Birmingham City exercised all due diligence in respect of the
risk of pitch incursion, the spectator would have been prevented from reaching the
pitch.
1 See the full list of proscribed conduct in Rule (E)20 of the FA Regulations. As a comparator in Spanish
football, see Josep F Vandellos Alamilla, ‘An overview of the regulations on pitch invasions in Spanish
Football’ (2019) LawinSport, 12 June.
2 Football Association v Birmingham City FC, Regulatory Commission decision dated 16 September
2019. The spectator was sentenced to 14 weeks’ imprisonment, fined and banned from attending any
football match in the UK for 10 years. In addition, Birmingham City imposed a lifetime ban on him
attending any club fixture.
3 See also Football Association v Reading, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 August 2015;
Football Association v Aston Villa, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 May 2015 (Aston
Villa was fined £200,000); Football Association v West Ham, Regulatory Commission decision dated
18 January 2019; Football Association v Arsenal, Regulatory Commission dated 10 June 2019.
B3.85 UEFA also holds clubs strictly liable for the behaviour of their supporters
at matches in UEFA tournaments.1 The case of Olympique Lyonnais v UEFA2
provides useful guidance in relation to what may qualify as mitigating factors (such
as previous records pertaining to crowd disturbances and security measures taken)
and the required threshold that clubs seeking to advance any mitigation have to meet.
UEFA also has guidelines for officials to respond to crowd trouble during matches.3
1 See Arts 6 and 11(c) of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations. See eg GNK Dinamo v UEFA
CAS 2013/A/3324 & CAS 2013/A/3369, para 9.24 (the panel ‘determined that strict liability for the
behaviour of a club’s supporters is neither inconsistent with Article 6 of the European Convention
Misconduct 447
on Human Rights or Swiss Procedural Public Policy (see para.103 of [Fenerbahce SK v UEFA
CAS 2013/A/3139]), nor violative of the legal principle of Nulla Poena Sine Lege. (Ditto) see further
CAS 2013/A/3094 Hungarian Football Federation v FIFA paras 85-90’). Glasgow Celtic were fined
€35,760 (half suspended) after being found guilty of a lack of organisation and improper conduct by
supporters at the match with AC Milan (see ‘Dida banned, Celtic fined’, UEFA Disciplinary Notice,
12 October 2007).
2 CAS 2017/A/5299 (French club Olympique Lyonnais were given a fine and a suspended sentence
by UEFA following crowd trouble during their home UEFA Europa League 2016/2017 Quarter-final
match with Turkish club Beşiktaş JK).
3 Since 2009, UEFA has had official guidelines in place to help match officials handle incidents of
racism inside stadiums. These guidelines prescribe a three-step process upon becoming aware of racist
behaviour: (1) the power to stop the game and request an announcement over the public address
system; (2) if the racist behaviour does not cease after the game has restarted, the power to suspend the
match for a reasonable period of time; and (3) if the racist behaviour continues after a second restart,
the referee can abandon the match. For an example of the UEFA three-step protocol in practice, see an
article following the Bulgaria v England UEFA Euro 2020 qualifier in Bulgaria: ‘England stand tall on
shameful night of racism in Bulgaria’, BBC Sport website, 15 October 2019.
B3.86 In Scottish football, the Scottish Football Association sought to introduce a

regime of strict liability in respect of club liability for spectator conduct. However, it
did not get support from the required majority of clubs.1 There have been moves by
the devolved Scottish Parliament to step in and create strict liability legislation,2 but
none has been passed to date.
1 See ‘Strict liability: Only three SPFL clubs support misbehaviour measure’, BBC Sport website,
26 March 2019.
2 One such example was the Football (Strict Liability) (Scotland) Bill, but the consultation closed in
2017 with no progress.
B3.87 Where the rules of a sport do not contain express provisions, the SGB may
rely on general provisions to bring misconduct charges.1
1 See, as an example, the case of Rugby Football Union v Southend & Colchester, RFU Disciplinary
Panel, 11 January 2017 (charges were brought against Southend under RFU Rule 5.12 (the general
misconduct charging power) for a failure to control the behaviour of their spectators).
6 REGULATING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT
B3.88 Sections 6 to 8 of this chapter look at first, the role of and justification for
provisions regulating off-field misconduct, secondly, considerations when drafting
and enforcing misconduct provisions, and finally, examples of different types of
off-field misconduct, including the issues that arise when bringing enforcement
proceedings, and defences that might be raised.
A The justification for regulating off-field misconduct
B3.89 In recent years there has been an increase in the number of cases in which
charges have been brought for off-field misconduct. The range of conduct that
has resulted in charges has also expanded. Before looking at how different sports
approach misconduct, it is helpful to consider what the rationale is for regulating
off-field misconduct. This is not merely an academic question. The purpose of
provisions prohibiting off-field misconduct should be reflected in how they are
drafted and enforced, in order to ensure that the rules and the way they are applied
are proportionate.1
1 See paras B1.19 et seq and B1.31 et seq.
B3.90 There is no dispute that on-field conduct should be regulated. However, it

could be asked why athletes’ conduct out of competition should be regulated at all. It
might be said that once the match ends, athletes should simply be subject to the same
laws of the land as any other individual.
B3.91 Most sports have, however, already made significant inroads into regulating
the off-field conduct of participants. The primary reason is that misconduct by
participants can have negative consequences for the sport. In particular, a significant
concern for SGBs is that off-field misconduct could affect the commercial value of
the sport (for example by putting off sponsors,1 reducing ticket sales, or putting public
funding at risk) and/or dissuade the public from participating in the sport, which in
itself has financial consequences. Harm to the reputation and financial position of
the sport can, of course, have repercussions for the sport more broadly. A further
consideration for SGBs might be that they wish to defend the core values that they
proclaim to be at the heart of their sport, and therefore to punish participants who fail
to act as the role models they are widely expected to be.2
1 For example, in 2019 Diageo ended its long-term sponsorship of London Irish following the club’s
signing of Paddy Jackson, who had been found not guilty of rape the previous year (‘Guinness owners
Diageo end London Irish sponsorship over Paddy Jackson signing’, Independent, 14 June 2019);
in 2012 Rabobank withdrew from cycling and certain television channels in Germany refused to
broadcast the Tour de France in 2007 following widespread issues of doping in the sport; and in 2019
Qantas publicly encouraged Rugby Australia to take action following comments that were widely
considered to be homophobic posted by Australian rugby player, Israel Folau (‘Qantas chief Alan
Joyce breaks his silence on Israel Folau posts’, News.com.au, 10 May 2019).
2 See for example the comments of the panel in Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond, RFU Disciplinary
Panel decision dated 19 November 2017, paras 16–17 (‘It could not have been clearer that there
was a need for all, and in this instance, those in a position of leadership and influence, to make a
concerted effort to uphold and promote those core values, which, of course, included that of Respect.
As ambassadors for the sport and as role models for many others, it is essential that people such as Mr.
Diamond are not only aware of those core values but demonstrate this through their actions and words.
Their behaviour influences many others above and beyond those directly under their command. If they
cannot uphold those standards, what hope do the thousands of volunteer mini or junior coaches have
when seeking to impress these values upon youngsters and their parents?’).
B3.92 However, considerable care should be taken with the second consideration
in particular. Regulating off-field conduct is a significant encroachment into the
private lives of individuals. There must therefore be a strong justification for doing
so and the steps taken must be proportionate. Whilst encouraging better standards
of behaviour is laudable, where it does not affect the sport, there is a question as to
whether such an encroachment is justified.1
1 Take the example of a low-level player who posts an abusive and insulting tweet, which attracts no
media interest and is not even noticed by the SGB or the individual’s club for many years. If the tweet
does not amount to criminal conduct, on what basis should SGBs be able to impose sanctions for
conduct that has had no impact on the sport? In practice, these issues are often dealt with through the
SGB’s approach to bringing charges, rather than in how the rules are drafted (see para B3.102).
B3.93 Given that the primary reason for regulating off-field misconduct is to
protect the sport, should conduct only be sanctioned where it does in fact result in
harm to the sport (for example, where there is evidence of reputational harm or loss
of commercial revenue)? One issue with that approach is that a finding of misconduct
then often turns not on the conduct itself, but on the consequences of the conduct,
which is usually linked to the profile of the individual involved. It could be argued
that part of the job of being a professional athlete is to ensure that you do not behave
in a manner that harms the sport. SGBs rely on commercial and public funding
and public participation and attendance to run the sport, which in turn benefits all
participants, and therefore it is reasonable to require athletes not to do anything that
puts that at risk. It could then also be said to follow that it is not unreasonable that
higher profile athletes, who generally experience greater public scrutiny but often
receive greater rewards from their sport, might be charged in circumstances where
lower profile athletes might not.
Misconduct 449
B3.94 On the other hand, it might be said that the only fair approach is to prohibit
certain types of conduct and then to apply the rules equally to all participants.1 The
extent to which conduct receives media coverage or otherwise causes harm may then
be a factor a tribunal can take into account in determining the sanction. Albeit, even
at that point, it could be argued that it is unfair to visit on the participant the way in
which the media portrays certain events (which may in turn be countered by those
who consider that high profile athletes must accept increased obligations, on the
basis that such athletes know that there is a significant risk that their conduct will be
reported).2
1 See discussion of the importance of the principle of equal treatment in the application of sporting rules
at para B1.27 et seq.
2 See for example the comments in Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 28 August 2018, para 20 (‘The Panel was told that it was not right to say that this case
would not have been brought had the incident involved someone who did not possess some level of
celebrity. The RFU said very plainly that this was not a question of it targeting the Player’. However,
note the comments of the panel at para 49, which show that the profile of a player was a relevant factor:
‘Ultimately, the Player is a role model and, by committing an act of common assault and by resisting
arrest, acted in a way that was prejudicial to the interests of the Union and/or the Game. Putting the
boot on the other foot, it is certainly not behaviour which could be said to be in the interests of the
sport’). See also the comments in BCCI v Hardik Pandya, decision dated 19 April 2019, para 8 (‘In
our Country, the game of Cricket is often treated as religion, revered and the Cricketers are idolised.
The Cricketers wield immense influence in the Society, especially the youth, who look upon them as
role models. Therefore, a player of international standing needs to bear in mind that he is shouldering
a responsibility towards the society all the time, be it on or off the field, of motivating and inspiring
right conduct amongst those young minds who look upon such prodigies as role models’).
B3.95 Each sport will have its own view as to what it is seeking to achieve by
regulating off-field misconduct. Consideration of the purpose of the rules on
misconduct is important to ensure that they are drafted and enforced proportionately,
or else they may be deemed unlawful and so unenforceable.1
1 See paras B1.19 et seq and B1.31 et seq.
7 DRAFTING AND ENFORCING OFF-FIELD MISCONDUCT

PROVISIONS
B3.96 When drafting and enforcing off-field misconduct provisions, SGBs should
consider: (a) what mischief the rule is designed to prevent; (b) to which participants
the rule should apply; and (c) when the rule will apply (for example, are acts in the
privacy of a participant’s own home caught?).
A Drafting
(a) Structure of the rule and prohibited conduct
B3.97 There is a wide range of off-field activity that could potentially constitute
misconduct, and it would be difficult to anticipate all the situations that could arise.
SGBs want the ability to deal with any form of misconduct that harms the sport.
Therefore, most governing bodies choose to include in the rules a generic, catch-all
provision. Examples of these provisions are set out below:
(a) FA Handbook Rule E3(1): ‘A Participant shall at all times act in the best
interests of the game and shall not act in any manner which is improper or
brings the game into disrepute or use any one, or a combination of, violent
conduct, serious foul play, threatening, abusive, indecent or insulting words or
behaviour’.
(b) RFU Regulation 5.12: prohibits ‘any conduct which is prejudicial to the
interests of the Union or the Game’.
(c) ECB Directives, Regulation 3.3: ‘No Participant may conduct themself in a
manner or do any act or omission at any time which may be prejudicial to the
interests of cricket or which may bring the ECB, the game of cricket or any
Cricketer or group of Cricketers into disrepute’.
B3.98 Whilst there are a number of similarities between the examples above, there
are some distinctions that highlight useful factors to consider in drafting general
misconduct provisions:
(a) Is the aim to prohibit conduct that is generally prejudicial to the sport or
specifically conduct that brings the sport into disrepute? The former is broader
and would, in most cases, also encompass conduct that had brought the sport
into disrepute (on the basis that this in itself is prejudicial to the sport). The
structure of the regulation may take into account the culture of the sport.
For example, the focus of RFU Regulation 5.12 is on whether the conduct
is ‘prejudicial to the interests of the Union or game’. This is often judged by
reference to the Rugby Football Union’s core values.1
(b) The way in which the rule is formulated will affect what the governing body is
required to establish to prove the offence. A charge brought on the basis that the
conduct brings the game into disrepute might be found to require the SGB to
prove that the conduct had in fact had that effect.2 However, where the offence
is premised on ‘conduct prejudicial to the interests of the sport’, it appears that
media coverage or evidence of disrepute would not be necessary.3
(c) The scope of a misconduct rule can be extended by providing that there is a
breach where the conduct ‘may’ be prejudicial to the interests of the sport or
‘may’ bring the game into disrepute (see for example, ECB Regulation 3.3) or
‘risks bringing the sport into disrepute’. This would appear to remove any need
to show actual prejudice; rather, it will be sufficient for the governing body to
show that the conduct could be prejudicial or bring the game into disrepute.
(d) Another way of extending the scope of misconduct provisions is to prohibit
conduct that is simply ‘improper’, without having any regard to the effect on
the game (See eg FA Rule E3). Such broad language could leave open the
possibility of challenges on the grounds of lack of certainty.4 This is unlikely to
present a difficulty in well-established categories of misconduct, such as social
media offences or criticism of officials, where participants would be expected
to know that such conduct is considered improper; but it could present a basis
for challenging the rule if a charge is brought in respect of conduct that had not
previously been the subject of a charge.
(e) In order to reduce the scope for challenges to the rules and/or decisions to
charge, it can be helpful to include reference to specific types of behaviour
that are prohibited (See eg FA Rule E3).5 In such cases there is likely to be no
difficulty establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and less scope for a challenge
based on an absence of legal certainty.6 The potential for a challenge based on
legitimate expectation is not, however, excluded.7
1 See cases cited at para B3.3 n 1.
2 See eg Zubkov v Federation Internationale de Natation, CAS 2007/A/1291, paras 19–20. The panel
said: ‘The language of the relevant provision does not refer to “potential” disrepute, nor to conduct
“having the potential” of bringing the sport into disrepute. When determining the proper meaning of
Section 12.1.3 the starting point must be the ordinary meaning of the words used. If the meaning of the
words used is clear, it is not permissible, in our view, to read other meanings, or qualified meanings,
into such words. This is particularly so in our view when one has regard to the possible sanctions
[…]. Therefore, when Section 12.1.3 speaks of “disrepute”, it does not cover potential disrepute.
Section 12.1.3 speaks about “bringing the sport into disrepute”. The conduct in question must thus
result in the sport of swimming – as opposed to, for example, individuals involved in the sport of
swimming – being brought into disrepute. In other words: public opinion of the sport of swimming
Misconduct 451
must be diminished as a result of the conduct in question’. In the event, the coach was found guilty
of infringing another regulation. His sanction was reduced by CAS on appeal from expulsion (with a
recommendation that he not be readmitted within six years) to a ban of eight months.
3 This issue has been considered in cases brought under RFU Regulation 5.12. See eg Rugby Football
Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August 2018, para 16 (‘While not
essential to the question of whether the Player’s conduct was prejudicial to the interest of the Game,
reference was also made to the attention that the incident had received in the media’) and para 44 (‘The
question of whether the conduct had objectively brought the sport into disrepute was not something
that was required by the charge. The issue was not whether the sport had been brought into disrepute
but whether the conduct was prejudicial to the interests of the Union and/or the Game’).
5 Another option is the use of guidelines issued by SGBs to explain what types of conduct are likely to
be caught by the rules.
6 See para B1.23.
7 See para B3.99 n 3 and B3.132 et seq.
B3.99 There is an obvious benefit to SGBs in having a clause prohibiting off-field

misconduct that is drafted in broad terms. However, wide and generically drafted
clauses can raise a number of issues and present participants with potential defences:
(a) Is the governing body able to establish subject-matter jurisdiction?1
(b) Could the rule be challenged on grounds of lack of certainty?2
(c) Could the decision to charge be challenged on the basis that it was contrary to
the participant’s legitimate expectation?3
(d) To the extent there is ambiguity, participants may also turn to principles of
contractual and/or statutory interpretation, including, for example, contra
proferentum, such that the benefit of any doubt will be construed in favour of
the participant.4
1 For a discussion regarding establishing subject-matter jurisdiction see para D1.36.
2 For an example of a case in which this was successfully argued, see Football Association v Jose
Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018, discussed at para B3.132 et
seq.
3 CAS panels have consistently held that rules must be clear and predictable. See for example: Vanakorn
v FIS, CAS 2014/A/3832 & 3833, paras 84–86 (‘Since, at first, every sanction requires an express
and valid rule providing that someone could be sanctioned for a specific offence, in addition and
at this stage of its reasoning, the Panel describes general legal requirements for such legal basis in
line with CAS jurisprudence. Pursuant to CAS jurisprudence, the different elements of the rules
of a federation shall be clear and precise, in the event they are legally binding for the athletes (see
CAS 2006/A/1164; CAS 2007/A/1377; CAS 2007/A/1437). Inconsistencies/ambiguities in the rules
must be construed against the legislator (here: FIS), as per the principle of ‘contra proferentem’
(CAS 2013/A/3324&3369; CAS 94/129; CAS 2009/A/1752; CAS 2009/A/1753; CAS 2012/A/2747;
CAS 2007/A/1437; CAS 2011/A/2612). Further, the Panel notes that when interpreting the rules of a
federation, it is necessary to consider whether the spirit of the rule (in as much as it may differ from
the strict letter) has been violated (see CAS 2001/A/354 & 355; CAS 2007/A/1437; CAS OG 12/02).
It follows that an athlete or official, when reading the rules, must be able to clearly make the distinction
between what is prohibited and what is not (CAS 2007/A/1437). In CAS 2007/A/1363 TTF, award of
5 October 2007, in line with many CAS awards, the sole arbitrator protected ‘the principle of legality
and predictability of sanctions which requires a clear connection between the incriminated behaviour
and the sanction and calls for a narrow interpretation of the respective provision.’); USA Shooting v
Quigley, CAS 94/129, paras 33–34 (‘If he had been subject to a fundamentally different regime […]
his understanding would have been different and his conduct might therefore have been different […].
This is a matter of legitimate expectations, and it is crucial to any decent system of laws […]. The fight
against doping is arduous, and it may require strict rules. But the rule-makers and rule-appliers must
begin by being strict with themselves. Regulations that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes
must be predictable’). As a matter of English law, see Bailey and Norbury, Bennion on Statutory
Interpretation, 7th Edn (Lexis Nexis, 2017), Section 27.1 (Principle against Doubtful Penalisation: ‘It
is a principle of legal policy that a person should not be penalised except under clear law […]. [The
court] should therefore strive to avoid adopting a construction which penalises a person where the
legislator’s intention to do so is doubtful, or penalises him or her in a way which was not made clear’).
This topic is discussed in further detail at para B1.19 et seq, including a specific consideration
at para B1.23 of the enforceability of broad clauses prohibiting conduct that ‘brings the game into
disrepute’.
4 See para B1.61.
(b) To which participants do the misconduct provisions apply?
B3.100 In many sports the rules apply to all participants, regardless of their level,
whether they are professional or amateur and whether they are athletes or officials.1
However, in some cases, particular groups of participants (such as professional
athletes) are the subject of specific regulations. Applying prohibitions on off-field
misconduct to limited categories of participants might be one way of addressing the
need to be proportionate. However, in practice, the preferred approach of SGBs is to
draft the provisions widely and then to limit their application by exercising discretion
in deciding whether to charge.
1 See also para B3.59.
(c) When do the misconduct provisions apply?
B3.101 ‘Off-field’ covers a wide range of situations, from team nights out to
the privacy of a participant’s own home. Bearing in mind the need for rules to be
proportionate, there is arguably no justification for sanctioning acts that take place
in private. The position is different if acts carried out in private become public (for
example, as a result of photographs being published). This issue is considered further
at B3.126 et seq.
B Implementation
B3.102 As can be seen from the preceding section, provisions prohibiting off-field
misconduct tend to be drafted in very wide terms in order to ensure that governing
bodies have jurisdiction to deal with any situation that arises. However, charges are
not brought in every case in which a participant engages in conduct that falls within
the scope of the provisions. SGBs limit the scope of off-field misconduct provisions
through their decisions as to whether or not to bring a charge.1 This is necessary on a
practical level given that governing bodies do not have the resources to bring charges
in all cases. It can also be helpful when addressing arguments that widely drafted
clauses are otherwise disproportionate.
1 See Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December
2018, paras 65–67 (The FA explained that ‘The FA’s approach is not to take action for swearing alone
in respect of incidents that take place on or around the field of play and which might inadvertently be
picked up by live broadcast cameras. Achieving absolute consistency with this approach, bearing in
mind the sheer number of incidents and the myriad of circumstances in which it might be suggested the
behaviour falls outside that which is tolerated, would be quite impossible for any decision-maker […].
To do otherwise would fill Commissions with literally hundreds of cases every week of the season’)
and para 67 (the Regulatory Commission commented that The FA’s approach to charging seemed
‘entirely realistic’ and ‘readily justifiable’).
B3.103 However, as set out in detail in Part D of this book, SGBs are subject to
the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, and are required not to act arbitrarily,
capriciously or unreasonably, or contrary to a legitimate expectation. Consequently,
it is important that governing bodies give careful consideration to their approach
to bringing charges under misconduct provisions in order to reduce the risk of
challenges to the decision to charge.1
1 See eg Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December
2018, in which The FA’s decision to charge Mourinho was successfully challenged on the basis that it
was contrary to Mourinho’s legitimate expectation. The charge was therefore dismissed (see B3.132 et
seq).
Misconduct 453
C Sanctions
B3.104 The range of sanctions imposed in misconduct cases includes the usual
sanctions for breaches of SGB rules, such as fines, suspensions, and warnings or
reprimands. The level of sanction imposed for different types of misconduct is
considered in the following section (at Section 8 below).
B3.105 Given that off-field misconduct cases often involve some form of abusive
or insulting behaviour, one particular feature of sanctions in off-field misconduct
cases is that they often involve a requirement that the participant undertake an
education course of some form. Further, whilst not a sanction that panels usually
have jurisdiction to impose, off-field misconduct cases can also lead to professional
players losing their contracts of employment with the SGB or their club. These
contracts often contain clauses prohibiting the athlete from engaging in conduct that
is contrary to the interests of the SGB or the sport. If the athlete is found guilty of
misconduct, it is likely that they will also be in breach of their contract. Similarly, off-
field misconduct can have significant financial repercussions as a result of sponsors
terminating contracts with the athlete.1
1 For example, American Olympic swimmer Ryan Lochte lost sponsors after misconduct during the
2016 Olympic Games (‘Ryan Lochte loses all his major sponsors after Rio incident, apology’, Reuters,
22 August 2016); while Israel Folau was reported to have lost sponsors following comments about
homosexuality posted in 2019 (‘Israel Folau loses Asics sponsorship deal after breaching code of
conduct’, BBC website, 8 May 2019).
B3.106 Sanctions must be proportionate.1 In determining the level of sanction, panels

will look at all the relevant circumstances. This may include usual factors such as any
previous breaches of the rules, prompt admission, particular aggravating factors,2 and
the athlete’s income from sport. In misconduct cases, tribunals might also consider the
harm caused to the sport (eg the extent and nature of media coverage of the incident
or actual financial loss)3 and the financial impact on the participant of losing other
contracts. However, claims for mitigation based on a lack of education regarding the
rules are unlikely to be given much weight.4 The extent to which precedents will be
taken into account varies from sport to sport.5 Whilst there is no formal system of
precedent (which would be difficult as many cases are not published), precedents
should be considered in order to ensure a degree of consistency in sanctions, which is
fundamental to the fairness of the process and the application of the rule.6
1 See para B1.33.
2 The Rules of the FA provide that in cases involving an aggravated breach (ie ‘where it includes a
reference, whether express or implied, to any one or more of the following:- ethnic origin, colour,
race, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability’ (Rule
E3(2)) mandatory minimum sanctions apply (Football Association Disciplinary Regulation, Section
2). Even if not prescribed in the rules, these factors are generally taken into account by the tribunal as
aggravating features.
3 See eg England and Wales Cricket Board v Shiv Thakor, decision published 16 March 2018 (the media
release notes that, ‘In reaching its sentencing decision, the panel also took into account that clear
reputational damage had been done to the game due to widespread adverse publicity as well as the
nature of Mr Thakor’s criminal conviction’).
4 See eg Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September
2016, para 17 (‘the Commission does wonder how much education was required for a player even in
2012 to know that the comments […] were completely unacceptable and should not have been said let
alone published in a format where they could have been read by anyone searching the internet’).
5 Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February 2017, para 29 (‘caution
must be exercised when considering other cases said to be comparable to the instant case. Each case
turns on its own particular facts and circumstances. In respect of [another player’s] case, we do not
know what form of social media was used, how many followers Mr Babel had, the extent of the public
coverage of his post, or his income from football, all of which are potentially relevant considerations
in the Commission’s decision in that case’); EPCR v Mourad Boudjellal & RC Toulon, decision dated
17 July 2018 (‘We have been very much alive to the desirability of maintaining consistency within
rugby sanctions for similar offences but we also recognise that all cases are unique to their own facts,
this one offence in particular. In the interests of consistency we have reviewed all of the cases, which
EPCR provided in the ‘sanctions and costs’ bundle, and have assessed the sanction we pass with those
cases in mind’).
6 See further discussion of this topic at para B1.30.
B3.107 In order for the ‘totality of the sanction’ to be proportionate, there is an

argument that other punishments (eg imposed by the club, or the criminal courts)
should be taken into account,1 although a disciplinary panel appointed under an SGB’s
rules will be aware of the risk that a club has imposed its own penalty specifically
in an effort to influence the panel to lessen the sanction it would otherwise impose
under the rules.
1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 August
2018 (the player’s club imposed a fine of £2,000 and required the player to undertake 10 hours
of community service and the criminal court imposed a fine of £2,000 and ordered the player to
pay compensation to the police officer of £250. The panel decided not to impose a further sanction
‘taking into account the question of proportionality and totality of sanctions already handed to the
Player arising out of the same incident’ (paragraph 55)); Rugby Football Union v Nathan Hughes,
RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 October 2018 (the player was found guilty of misconduct
after posting an inappropriate tweet and given a two-week ban. He had already been fined £2,000 and
ordered to undertake 20 hours community service by his club. The panel commented, ‘This takes into
account the mitigating factors which are present, including the acceptance of the charge, the sanction
imposed by the Club – something that the Panel commends’ (para 118)).
8 TYPES OF OFF-FIELD OFFENCES
A Social media offences
B3.108 In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of
misconduct charges brought as a result of inappropriate social media posts. This
is unsurprising. Before the introduction of social media platforms such as Twitter
and Facebook, athletes had fewer ways of expressing their views publicly. The main
method of communicating with the public was through interviews with the media,
which were generally a more controlled (and edited) environment. Not only would
they have afforded the athlete the opportunity to consider their views in advance,
rather than blurting out what they thought in the heat of the moment, but third parties
(such as agents and clubs) could edit anything that was likely to cause offence and
put the athlete at risk of charges (post-match interviews being an exception).
B3.109 The introduction of social media platforms that allow participants to express
their views or feelings instantaneously, wherever they are, clearly increased the
potential for athletes to say things that SGBs do not consider appropriate. The potential
harm that can be caused is also greater given that social media reaches huge audiences
worldwide instantaneously. The question for SGBs was how to deal with such conduct.
B3.110 Social media offences are usually charged under general misconduct
provisions of the type described above. Some sports also have guidelines for
participants.1 Given the generic nature of misconduct rules, guidelines can be a useful
way of informing participants about the types of conduct that are prohibited without
restricting the scope of the rule. However, it could be said that today participants are
sufficiently aware of the type of comment that is likely to fall foul of the rules.2
1 For example, The FA introduced social media guidelines in 2012. The RFU also publishes guidance
for participants.
2 In Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016,
para 17, the Commission considered that even when The FA guidelines came out, ‘the Commission
does wonder how much education was required for a player even in 2012 to know that the comments
[…] were completely unacceptable and should not have been said let alone published in a format
where they could have been read by anyone searching the internet’.
Misconduct 455
B3.111 Social media offences can be broadly categorised into comments or

images that:
(a) are insulting or abusive generally;1
(b) are insulting or abusive because they are targeted at protected characteristics
(such as ethnicity, race, gender or sexual orientation);2 or
(c) involve criticism of officials (see section on criticism of officials at Section
C below).
Some SGB rules provide that the second category of misconduct constitutes
an ‘aggravated breach’, which results in fixed minimum sanctions or increased
sanctions.3 Other sports take a less prescriptive approach and leave this as a factor
for the tribunal to take into account in determining the appropriate level of sanction.
1 See eg Rugby Football Union v Nathan Hughes, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision 23 October 2018
(Hughes tweeted ‘What a joke’ as he left a hearing for an on-field offence for which he was given
a four-week ban. He was charged with and found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interests of
the Union on the basis that the tweet was critical of the judicial process, which was contrary to the
values of the Union (in particular ‘respect’ and ‘discipline’), and given a two-week ban. In addition,
his four-week ban for the on-field offence was increased to six weeks, on the basis that the reduction
for remorse was given on a false premise. See also The Football Association v Jason Puncheon,
Regulatory Commission decision dated 6 March 2014 (Puncheon was charged for posting a tweet
saying that Neil Warnock ‘Gives [players] extra wages n app bonus to make sure they pay him to get in
the team or on the bench’. Puncheon admitted the charge, apologised and removed the tweets shortly
after posting them. He was given a fine of £15,000 and a warning as to his future conduct).
2 See eg Football Association v Hamza Choudhury, Regulatory Commission decision dated 10 May
2019 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E(3) for comments on social media
made in 2013 and 2014 that included reference to ethnic origin, race and/or sexual orientation. He was
fined £5,000 and ordered to attend an FA education course); Rugby Australia v Israel Folau (2019)
(Folau had his contract with Rugby Australia terminated as a result of tweets that were alleged to be
homophobic, having been warned a year earlier for another tweet that was alleged to be homophobic)
(see para B3.114 below); Football Association v Marvin Johnson, Regulatory Commission decision
dated 26 September 2018 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3 for
tweets containing reference to gender, ethnic origin or race that were made in 2011. The panel gave
particular weight to the fact the player had ‘cleansed his Twitter account over a year ago’, as well as
his admission and remorse. The panel imposed a fine of £12,000 and ordered the player to attend an
FA education programme); Football Association v Ryan Fredericks, Regulatory Commission decision
dated 24 March 2017 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3 for tweets
containing reference to gender or sexual orientation posted in 2011. The panel imposed a fine of
£10,000 and ordered the player to attend an education programme); Football Association v Andre Gray,
Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016 (Gray was charged with two aggravated
breaches of FA Rule E3 for comments that made reference to gender, sexual orientation, colour or race
in 2012 and 2014. The panel imposed a ban of four matches, a fine of £25,000, a warning and ordered
the player to attend an FA education course); Football Association v Edoardo Cellino, Regulatory
Commission decision dated 18 April 2016 (Cellino was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule
E3(1) based on a Facebook comment that included a reference to disability. The panel imposed a three
match ban, a fine of £5,000, ordered Cellino to complete an FA education programme, and gave him
a warning as to his future conduct); Football Association v Ryan Tunnicliffe, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 17 June 2015 (the player was charged with an aggravated breach of FA Rule E3 after
posting a comment on Twitter that was insulting and included a reference to another player’s sexual
orientation. The panel imposed a two-match ban, a fine of £5,000, gave a warning as to future conduct,
and required the player to complete an education programme). For examples of earlier cases of social
media offences in football, see Tim Lowles, ‘Professional Footballers and Twitter: A match made in
(tabloid) heaven’, LawinSport.
3 See eg The FA Handbook Rule E3(2): ‘A breach of Rule E3(1) is an ‘Aggravated Breach’ where it
includes a reference, whether express or implied, to any one or more of the following:- ethnic origin,
colour, race, nationality, religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, sexual orientation or disability.
Mandatory minimum sanctions are applicable to certain Aggravated Breaches. Further provisions as to
sanctions applicable to Aggravated Breaches are found in The Association’s Disciplinary Regulations’.
(a) Objective or subjective meaning?
B3.112 In some cases, participants have sought to defend social media charges on
the basis that they did not intend the comment to be read in an offensive manner.
However, the prevailing approach taken by panels is to judge the relevant comments
based on their objective meaning,1 regardless of what the maker of the comment
intended, and regardless of whether the recipient of the comment did or did not take
offence.2
1 Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016,
para 15 (the panel considered whether the relevant comments were insulting based on an ‘objective
reading’); Football Association v Ryan Tunnicliffe, Regulatory Commission decision dated 17 June
2015 (the player claimed that he was shocked that his tweet could be construed in a discriminatory way
and that he did not intend it to have a homophobic undertone. The Panel commented: ‘The FA Rule
E3(2) simply states that ‘it includes a reference, whether express or implied […] and does not require
a Participant’s intention to prove the “Aggravated Breach”’ (at paras 14–15)); Football Association v
Edoardo Cellino, Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2016 (Cellino argued that in the
United States (where he grew up) the term ‘spastic’ was ‘largely inoffensive and a casual word for
clumsiness or foolish behaviour’. The panel rejected the cultural difference argument but accepted that
he did not deliberately set out to be offensive to people with disability); Football Association v Ryan
Fredericks, Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 March 2017 (in respect of tweets containing a
reference to gender or sexual orientation, the panel noted that, ‘the tweets were, objectively, abusive
and insulting’ (para 39) and ‘whilst the tweets were limited to the small number of individuals that
followed Mr Fredericks’s account at the time, they had the potential to cause offence more widely
[…] the tweets are not private conversation between two individuals, obscured from others, and it is
entirely possible that a follower of a private account may re-tweet a comment to a wider audience’
(para 40)).
2 Football Association v Bernardo Silva, Regulatory Commission Decision dated 12 November 2019,
paras 8-9 (‘The Commission accept that the Player did not himself intend the post to be insulting or
in any way racist […]. It is clear that the tweet was intended to be no more than a joke between close
friends. However, this was not a private jocular communication between two friends. The post was
on a social media platform exposed to the 600,000 followers of a high-profile and well-respected
professional footballer. It was quickly observed and reported upon by elements of the media’).
B3.113 The role of intention was considered in the context of a non-social media
misconduct charge in the case of Football Association v Wayne Hennessey (see para
B3.122 et seq). Whilst confirming that the appropriate approach in most cases will
be to apply an objective assessment of the words of conduct, the panel identified
circumstances in which the player’s intention may be relevant.
(b) Conflict with fundamental freedoms
B3.114 Social media charges have highlighted the potential tension between
freedom of speech and/or freedom of religion and regulation of public comments by
SGBs. An example of this is the case of Australian rugby player, Israel Folau. In 2018
Folau was warned by Rugby Australia over comments he posted online that were
considered to be homophobic. In 2019 Folau posted a further comment expressing
what were again alleged to be homophobic views. Folau, a devout Christian, claimed
that he was simply stating his views and that he was entitled to do so. Folau was
charged with misconduct and the panel determined that he had committed a ‘high-
level’ breach of Rugby Australia’s code of conduct, resulting in the player’s playing
contract with Rugby Australia being terminated.1 Folau did not appeal the decision,
but instead brought a claim against Rugby Australia in the courts for unfair dismissal
(on the basis that the tweets represented his religious views).2
1 The written decision is not publicly available, but see media releases by Rugby Australia (australia.
rugby/news/2019/06/06/fair-work-folau-statement [accessed 29 October 2020]; australia.rugby/
news/2019/05/17/folau-sanction-breach [accessed 29 October 2020]).
2 A statement by Rugby Australia on 4 December 2019 confirmed that the dispute had been settled
(australia.rugby/news/2019/12/04/if-joint-statement-dec [accessed 29 October 2020]).
B3.115 The contractual relationship between participants and governing bodies

provides a legal basis for regulating what athletes say in public. However, as set out
above, the extent of that regulation must be proportionate, which in this sense requires
a careful balance against the fundamental freedoms of free speech and religion.1 In
Misconduct 457
order to do this, it is helpful to look back at the underlying purpose of the regulation.
Most SGBs now aim to promote values such as diversity and inclusion, which are
seen as values that are important in society and therefore, in turn, to sponsors and the
public. Governing bodies are therefore becoming increasingly tough on conduct that
is seen to undermine those values (and particularly if the conduct actively encourages
intolerance or discrimination) on the basis that it could be damaging to the sport. At
the same time, individuals are, of course, free to hold whatever beliefs and views they
wish. The compromise would appear to be that whilst individual athletes are free to
express whatever views they wish in private, they cannot express their views publicly
if to do so will harm the sport.2 What then amounts to a breach in each case is to be
judged by a tribunal, after due process, which will consider whether the publicly
expressed view is prejudicial or brings the sport into disrepute.3
1 In R (Ngole) v University of Sheffield [2019] EWCA Civ 1127, a student social worker was dismissed
for posts about homosexuality based on his religious beliefs. The Court of Appeal held: ‘The right to
freedom of expression is not an unqualified right: professional bodies and organisations are entitled
to place reasonable and proportionate restrictions on those subject to their professional codes; and,
just because a belief is said to be a religious belief, does not give a person subject to professional
regulation the right to express such beliefs in any way he or she sees fit’ (para 4); ‘Turning to the
question of the legitimate aim of the professional regulations applicable here […] the maintenance
of confidence in the relevant profession falls within the legitimate aim of professional regulation,
and must be supported in law’ (para 104); ‘It must equally be the case that the obligation to maintain
confidence cannot extend to prohibiting any statement that could be thought controversial or even to
have political or moral overtones […]. The existence of a broad legitimate aim is a mere threshold to
the key decision in this case, as in almost all cases it must be. Such a legitimate aim must have limits.
It cannot extend too far. In our view it cannot extend to preclude legitimate expression of views simply
because many might disagree with those views: that would indeed legitimise what in the United States
has been described as a “heckler’s veto”’ (para 105).
2 See for example from Rugby Australia’s CEO: ‘Rugby Australia fully supports their right to their own
beliefs and nothing that has happened changes that. But when we are talking about inclusiveness in
our game, we’re talking about respecting differences as well’ (rugby.com.au/news/2019/05/17/folau-
verdict-castle-hore [accessed 29 October 2020]).
3 See eg The Football Association v Jose Mourinho, FA Appeal Board decision dated 9 June 2014,
para 6.3 (in the context of determining whether general comments about refereeing standards brought
the game into disrepute, the panel noted: ‘At the same time though, one of the cornerstones of our
society is the entitlement to free speech. For the purposes of football governance, any restrictions
on that right should be proportionate and only imposed insofar as they may be necessary in order to
serve the best interest of the game. Attempting to reconcile the two competing considerations can
sometimes create difficulties, both in terms of making charging decisions and adjudicating upon
misconduct charges that are brought. The question in this and every case where the issue falls to be
decided is: has the line been crossed between the accepted right to express a fair and honestly held
opinion, and unacceptable comments that lower the game in the estimation of right-minded members
of the public?’).
(c) What amounts to expressing a view?
B3.116 A further question highlighted by the Folau case is: what amounts to the
expression of a view? England rugby player, Billy Vunipola, ‘liked’ the Instagram
post by Folau that contained the alleged homophobic comment (and posted his own
views). Vunipola was given a formal warning by the RFU and asked to ‘unlike’ Folau’s
post. Given the way in which social media works, it seems likely that participants
will be deemed to have expressed a view, and therefore fall foul of the rules, by
‘liking’, retweeting, or otherwise adopting a third party’s view.1
1 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media use expressly provides that ’Re-posting or re-
tweeting inappropriate content represents an endorsement of that content and can be actionable’ and
advises participants not to ‘link’ to unsuitable content. The Football Association player guidance notes
that ‘Retweeting is treated the same as posting a comment yourself’. See also Football Association v
Keith Wyness, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 June 2017 (the Chief Executive of Aston Villa
FC claimed that he had not intended to retweet a caption with the video. The panel did not accept the
explanation, noting that ‘the offending tweet… was clearly written in plain language above the video
content and not obscured in any way. Put simply, it would have been difficult to miss’ (at para 28)).
(d) Responsibility for re-posting
B3.117 Another issue is whether participants commit a breach of the rules if their
comment was made/posted privately to friends or family but then subsequently re-
posted or otherwise made public by another person. One view, as set out above,
is that participants should be free to hold and express whatever views they wish
in private and if they are not responsible for publishing the comment, there is no
offence.
B3.118 However, participants would be advised to take considerable care over what
they say and where they say it. Certainly, it is unlikely to be a defence that at the
time a message was posted, the participant had very few followers, all of whom were
known to him.1 Each case will turn on its facts. However, if there is a chance that
the comment could get into the public domain (for example, through re-posting), a
participant risks being found to have accepted that possibility. A participant may also
be held responsible even if they were not responsible for comments or images ending
up in the public domain.2
1 Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016,
para 17 (‘We accept that AG had 50 followers who were friends and family when the first set of
comments were tweeted and about 2000 when he tweeted the second set of comments. However
AG’s twitter account was open to the public and could have been read by anyone with access to the
internet. Those who publish statements on the internet must be taken to knowingly run the risk that
their comments may be read by a very large number of people’).
2 Whilst not in a social media context, the case of England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales,
decision dated 7 December 2018, provides an interesting example. Hales sent images to a small group
of friends on Snapchat (such that the images would automatically self-delete from the recipients’
phones). The images were published several years later in the media without his prior knowledge.
He received a two-match ban (suspended for 12 months) and a fine of £10,000, of which £5,500 was
suspended for 12 months, and was ordered to undertake appropriate training.
(e) Permanent nature of social media
B3.119 A final word of caution for athletes is that charges have been brought several
years after the relevant tweet or comment was posted.1 Further, a participant will not
necessarily avoid charges because they delete the post quickly.2 This may, however,
be a mitigating factor when it comes to sanction.
1 See eg Football Association v Hamza Choudhury, Regulatory Commission decision dated 10 May 2019
(the player was charged for comments on social media made in 2013 and 2014); England and Wales
Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018 (the images were sent in 2014/2015);
Football Association v Andre Gray, Regulatory Commission decision dated 22 September 2016 (the
comments were made between 2012 and 2014).
2 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media states: ‘Deleting or apologising publicly for an
improper posting does not prevent disciplinary action being taken’.
B Other forms of abusive or insulting comments or conduct
B3.120 Misconduct rules are drafted in sufficiently wide terms to cover abusive or
insulting comments or behaviour that arise in a range of situations. Cases considered
under this heading include insulting, threatening or improper comments or conduct1
in forums other than social media (see above, Section 8A) (and excluding conduct
directed towards officials (see below, Section 8C)).
1 See eg Football Association v Robert Snodgrass, Regulatory Commission decision dated 25 April
2019 (the player was found guilty of misconduct as a result of using abusive and/or insulting language
towards a UK Anti-Doping official during an out-of-competition drug test. He received a one-match
ban and was fined £30,000); BCCI v Hardik Pandya, decision dated 19 April 2019 (the player was
suspended by the Board of Control for Cricket in India as a result of making allegedly sexist and
racist remarks during a television interview. He was called home from a tour of Australia (resulting
Misconduct 459
in missing five matches and forfeiting the corresponding match fees). The tribunal ordered payment
of 11,00,000 rupees to charity); Football Association v Tony Henry, Regulatory Commission decision
dated 9 July 2018 (Henry was found to have written a discriminatory comment in an internal club
email, which was forwarded to a journalist, and in a follow up interview Henry was found to have
made further discriminatory comments. The panel imposed a ban of 12 months and ordered him to
attend a Football Association education course); EPCR v Mourad Boudjellal & RC Toulon, decision
dated 17 July 2018 (the owner of Toulon was found to have made insulting and discriminatory
comments in an interview and press conference. The owner was already serving a ban for a previous
offence and therefore he was fined €75,000 with a further €25,000 to be suspended for three years. The
club was also sanctioned); International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated
6 February 2018 (Nastase was sanctioned for comments made during a press conference relating to
Serena Williams and her unborn child and for engaging in abusive and threatening conduct directed
at a member of the press (in addition to inappropriate on-field misconduct during a Fed Cup tie).
The tribunal considered the off-court conduct to amount to ‘mid-range offending’ in respect of the
Williams comments (for which a six-month ban from participating in events was appropriate) and
‘low-range offending’ in relation to the comments to the press (for which a three-month ban from
participating in events was imposed). A fine of $20,000 was imposed (as well as a separate sanction for
the on-field misconduct)); England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben Stokes, decision dated 7 December
2018 (Stokes was filmed mimicking Katie Price’s disabled son. Stokes had already served a three-
match ban and was ordered to pay a fine of £15,000); England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales,
decision dated 7 December 2018 (Hales sent images to a small group of friends that were found to be
inappropriate and that were published several years later in the media without his prior knowledge.
He received a two-match ban (suspended for 12 months) and a fine of £10,000 of which £5,500 was
suspended for 12 months, and was ordered to undertake appropriate training); Football Association v
Ryan Lowe, Regulatory Commission decision dated 21 August 2018 (a manager was found guilty of
misconduct as a result of using abusive and/or insulting language towards a UK Anti-Doping official
during an out-of-competition drug test. The Regulatory Commission imposed a two-match ground
ban and a fine of £1,500); Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision
dated 12 June 2017 (Moyes was found to have made an insulting comment to a journalist after the
official interviews had ended, for which he was fined £30,000); Football Association v Jack Wilshere,
Regulatory Commission decision dated 15 June 2015 (the player was found guilty of misconduct as a
result of making and/or inciting comments that were disparaging of Tottenham Hotspur FC during the
FA Cup trophy open bus parade. As it was a non-aggravated breach, he received a fine of £40,000 and
was warned as to his future conduct).
(a) Objective or subjective meaning?
B3.121 As noted above in the context of social media offences, panels have
tended to apply an objective test to determine whether comments are insulting or
abusive.1 FA Regulatory Commissions, for example, refer to this as the ‘reasonable
bystander test’. In applying this test, the circumstances in which the offending
comment was made should also be taken into account.2 There may still be room for
debate, as the language may, even objectively, have different possible meanings. This
may also be the case where the comment was in a foreign language. In such cases,
expert evidence may be necessary.
1 See para B3.112 et seq. See also International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision
dated 6 February 2018, para 64 (‘Objectively, such a comment breaches the Welfare Policy, as the
Tribunal considers that a reasonable person would find it inappropriate and unwelcome’).
2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal Board decision dated 18 November 2018, para 11 (‘the
Commission had correctly identified the need to consider all relevant facts and circumstances relating
to the utterances under scrutiny (ie to consider “context”) when applying the “reasonable bystander”
test’).
B3.122 However, the decision in Football Association v Wayne Hennessey1

demonstrates that a participant’s subjective intention may still be relevant in
certain circumstances. The player was charged with misconduct on the basis that a
photograph posted by the player’s teammate on Instagram showed the player giving
a ‘Sieg Heil’/‘Heil Hitler’ salute. The panel commented that if that had been the
meaning of the gesture, it would have been offensive, even if done in jest (at para 3).
However, the player claimed that he was waving to catch the waiter’s attention and
cupped his hand over his mouth to make his voice carry. The panel started by noting
that: ‘Whether or not words used or a gesture made amount to a breach of Rule E.3
because they are “abusive”, “insulting” or ‘improper” is to be decided objectively’.2
However, the panel further noted that in the previous cases on which it relied for
the proposition that the test is objective, the allegedly insulting words ‘had only
one meaning’, which it did not consider to be the position in that case. The panel
therefore commented:
‘Transposing that analysis to the present case, if it were the case that the only
possible explanation for what Mr Hennessey was doing with his hands was that he
was making a Nazi salute then whatever he might have said about his motivation
would not amount to a defence. Equally, if he was making a gesture which was
open to more than one interpretation but which he said he meant to be taken as a
Nazi salute then that would amount to good evidence that it was in fact an insulting/
abusive/improper gesture. Again, it would be no defence that he might have meant
no harm by it or intended it as a joke.
Those examples illustrate how in some circumstances the objective test necessarily
involves taking account of a subjective element. This is not in relation to the maker’s
motivation but so as to understand the meaning of a gesture made. What a player
intended will be irrelevant if the words used or gesture made can only have one
possible meaning or explanation. But intention may be very important if the meaning
is open to any doubt […]
Obviously, it would be different were there to be no other plausible explanation for
the gesture Mr Hennessey made. But in circumstances in which, as we have found,
there is or could be another possible explanation then the player’s evidence as to
what he meant by the words spoken or gesture made is a legitimate – indeed it may
be a valuable, even decisive – element of the analysis. Any other outcome would, in
our view, be wholly unjust […]
In the end, it comes down to this: we must interpret what the gesture was that Mr
Hennessey made. The picture might speak entirely for itself and be capable of only
one interpretation. If it were so, his motivation in making it would not be a defence’.3
1 Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 April 2019.
2 Ibid, para 54.
3 Ibid, paras 57–63.
B3.123 The panel considered evidence showing the player making gestures in other
situations and found that the player had a ‘lamentable’ knowledge of the Nazi regime.
In the circumstances, the panel found that The FA had not proven that the gesture was
a Nazi salute and therefore the charge was dismissed.
B3.124 The cases in which a participant’s subjective intention is relevant are likely
to be limited. In Football Association v Wayne Hennessey the player’s subjective
intention was relevant to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the alleged
misconduct (ie whether he made a Nazi salute) took place. In most cases, however,
there will be little dispute as to the meaning of the words or conduct and whether they
are offensive is still to be judged on an objective basis.
B3.125 The fact that the participant does not hold the belief conveyed by the
offensive words or conduct is also unlikely to provide a defence.1
1 Football Association v Tony Henry, Regulatory Commission decision dated 9 July 2018, paras 24–25
(the panel found that Henry had not in fact adopted a discriminatory policy of recruitment, but that ‘the
only objective interpretation [of the words] is that Mr Henry was adopting a discriminatory recruitment
policy at West Ham’); International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase, SR/913/2017 decision dated
6 February 2018, para 66 (the tribunal acknowledged evidence that Nastase was not a racist person
and stated that the decision did not imply that he was; however, this did not prevent the tribunal from
finding that he had made a racist comment).
Misconduct 461
(b) Conduct or comments made in public or private?
B3.126 As noted above at Section 6, SGBs have to determine where the line should
be drawn in regulating off-field misconduct. One aspect of this is whether conduct
that occurs, or words that are said, in private should give rise to a misconduct charge.
B3.127 In general, words and conduct said or taking place in private do not give rise
to disciplinary charges. However, the position is not always straightforward. First, as
discussed above in the context of social media offences, the fact that a post is made
on a private forum will not necessarily preclude a misconduct charge if the content is
subsequently re-posted. Even where a participant sends inappropriate images only to
a group of friends, he may still be responsible if one of the individuals subsequently
makes the content public without his knowledge.1 In such cases, the fact that the
participant did not intend the offending words to become public should, however, be
a mitigating factor.
1 England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales, decision dated 7 December 2018 (see para B3.120
n 1).
B3.128 Secondly, it is not always clear what constitutes ‘in private’. Off-field
covers a wide range of circumstances, from team-related events to the privacy of
a participant’s own home. Even in the context of team events, is there a difference
between training and team social evenings out? Further, similar to the position with
re-posting, what is the position if the conduct took place in private, but is caught on
camera and the photographs and/or conduct are subsequently reported in the media?1
The misconduct cases involving criminal conduct or otherwise inappropriate conduct
related to drinking suggest that tribunals are unlikely to be sympathetic to arguments
that conduct occurring during team events took place in private (see para B3.142
et seq).2 Given the widespread use of social media and constant access to cameras
on phones, it is likely that participants will be expected to be aware of the risk that
anything said or done could get into the public domain. Consequently, once the
misconduct has become public, it is likely that the onus will be on the participant to
establish that they believed that they were acting in a private context.2
1 For example, in Football Association v Wayne Hennessey, Regulatory Commission decision dated
12 April 2019, the gesture took place during a team dinner at a restaurant, but the photograph capturing
the gesture was posted by a teammate on social media. Ultimately, the panel did not need to determine
the issue of whether it was a public or private event and/or how that would affect the case. However,
it illustrates the difficulty that arises where participants believed that they were not in a public
environment when they committed the alleged misconduct.
2 See eg the comments of the panel in Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 12 June 2017. Moyes was found to have made an insulting comment to a journalist after
the official interviews had ended. Moyes claimed that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The
panel commented: ‘Although a group that consists of more than two people is capable of being private,
there was no evidence before us that Mr. Moyes could reasonably have expected that the other two
persons present would treat anything he might say to [the journalist] in confidence’ (at para 3.7(b). The
panel also noted more generally that ‘The nature of the relationship between two people is relevant to
the question whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy between them in communications’
(at para 3.7(c)). Moyes was fined £30,000. See also International Tennis Federation v Ilie Nastase,
SR/913/2017 decision dated 6 February 2018, para 65 (the tribunal rejected an argument that one of
the offending comments was made in private on the basis that it was said in Romanian during a press
conference in English, because Nastase attended in his official capacity as captain of the Romanian
team and it took place in Romania, with a number of Romanian speakers present).
(c) Inadvertent and non-targeted comments

B3.129 In most cases it is unlikely to be a defence that the offensive words were
not directed at a particular individual.1 However, the fact that comments were
inadvertently picked up by broadcast cameras may result in charges not being
brought or may serve as a defence.2
1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 5 November 2018,
para 24 (‘There is no specification within Rule E3 that suggests there must be at least one recipient
of abusive, threatening […] indecent or insulting words […]. A requirement in every case to identify
somebody who was actually insulted, abused and/or offended by words used in order to determine
whether there has been a breach of Rule E3(1) would lead to absurd and illogical consequences’).
In the context of criticism of officials, see also Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory
Commission decision dated 2 June 2014, para 5.3 (Mourinho was found to have brought the game into
disrepute as a result of ‘criticism of a general and indiscriminate nature’. The Panel noted that whether
his comments brought the game into disrepute ‘involves placing oneself in the position of an ordinary,
objective and fair-minded member of the public and how he, or she, is likely to have reacted to media
comments in any given case’).
2 See Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December
2018, para 83 (‘If the FA’s practice hitherto has been “not to take action for swearing alone in respect
of incidents that take place on or around the field of play and which might inadvertently be picked
up by live broadcast cameras’’, then, as we have said, it is arguable that Mr Mourinho’s conduct
fell within that category of behaviour in respect of which the FA says that it does not normally take
action’).
(d) Legitimate expectation
B3.130 Many sports have a huge number of individuals under their jurisdiction
and there will be numerous incidents that could amount to misconduct. However,
governing bodies do not have infinite resources and consequently many incidents
may go undetected and/or may be considered too minor to be prosecuted.1 This may
lead to complaints that they are not enforced consistently.
1 See eg the comments in Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated
13 December 2018, discussed at para B3.132 et seq.
B3.131 In most cases, however, arguments that a SGB has failed to bring charges in
other (arguably) similar circumstances, have not been successful. Rather, panels have
emphasised that their role is to judge the case on its own particular facts.1
1 Football Association v David Moyes, Regulatory Commission decision dated 12 June 2017, para 3.7(i)
(‘an Independent FA Regulatory Commission is required to consider the particular disciplinary
charge(s) brought against the particular Participant that is/are before it. Whether other Participants
could and should have been charged with misconduct in the past for similar, or even worse, comments
is irrelevant to the judgment that we must make in this case’. The panel went on to comment that ‘There
was nothing before us to suggest that the decision to charge Mr. Moyes was so arbitrary or capricious
that it would offend principles of fairness and justice to allow The FA to pursue it’); Rugby Football
Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018, para 46 (the player raised the fact that in
other cases players had not been subject to misconduct charges based on similar conduct; however, it
was conceded that this did not prevent the panel from finding the player guilty of misconduct in that
case).
See further the discussion of the principle of equal treatment at para B1.27 et seq.
B3.132 However, the position is different where the participant can establish that
they had a legitimate expectation that in the relevant circumstances they would not
be charged. In Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Mourinho was found guilty
of misconduct (at first instance and on appeal). However, a second Regulatory
Commission was convened to consider the specific question of whether Mourinho had
a legitimate expectation that he would not be charged. The Regulatory Commission
noted that The FA is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts, and went on
to consider developments in the law of legitimate expectation.1 In doing so, it noted
that it is no longer a requirement that the individual establish a clear and unambiguous
representation as the basis of their legitimate expectation; rather, an individual may
be able to rely on a policy or established practice.2
1 As to which, see generally para B1.39.
2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Regulatory Commission decision dated 13 December 2018,
para 35 (‘In a classic case, applying it in a sporting context, a “participant” might be able to identify a
clear and unambiguous representation by the sports regulator upon which he (a participant) had relied
Misconduct 463
in acting in a particular way. However, it is now clearly the law that the doctrine does not depend
upon establishing either such an unequivocal representation on the one hand or actual reliance on the
other’. The panel referred to the judgment of Laws LJ in R (o/a Niazi) v Secretary of State for the
Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 and commented (paras 38–40): ‘Laws LJ, in a masterful
exposition, identified the central feature of legitimate expectation as being that of fundamental
fairness in public administration. That means, he explained, recognising a principle which constrains
the power of public authorities, namely, that a change of policy which would otherwise be legally
unexceptional may be held to be unfair by reason of that authority’s prior action, or inaction. Laws
LJ’s judgment shows how far the principle had been developed from its original formulation based
upon express or implied promise and/or formulated as an estoppel. He identified three categories
of legitimate expectation. What he called the “paradigm case” of procedural expectation is where a
public authority has distinctly promised to consult those affected and has not done so. The second
category would be where, without any promise, the public authority establishes a policy distinctly and
substantially affecting a person or a group, such that they might reasonably rely upon its continuance
and then changes its policy without proper explanation or consultation in advance of so doing. The
third category he identified is where a public authority has distinctly promised to preserve an existing
policy for people who would be substantially affected by any change and, having done so, it would be
held to that promise: this, as Laws LJ explained, would be a “substantive” legitimate expectation’).
B3.133 The Regulatory Commission commented: ‘The key to this whole analysis
is fairness: in context, the question we must answer is whether it would be fair
for the FA to proceed against Mr Mourinho if the same or similar behaviour had
not previously resulted in disciplinary action?’.1 In carrying out this analysis, the
Regulatory Commission considered:
(a) whether there was an existing practice as to what conduct would be the subject
of the charge;
(b) whether Mourinho was at least in general terms aware of the practice; and
(c) whether the decision to charge Mourinho constituted a departure from the
established practice.2
para 50.
2 Ibid, para 49.
B3.134 Whilst Regulatory Commission decisions are not binding even within
the context of Football Association cases, the approach taken by the Regulatory
Commission in Football Association v Mourinho provides a useful insight into how
such cases may be approached:
(a) The Regulatory Commission noted that it did not consider that there was any
difference between an ‘approach’, ‘policy’, and ‘practice’.1 The Regulatory
Commission also noted that the absence of an unequivocal undertaking or
expression of a policy is not decisive.2
(b) The Regulatory Commission considered The FA’s explanation as to its
approach to charging.3 However, it also noted that it could not consider The FA’s
explanation of its own policy alone. Consequently, the Regulatory Commission
looked at previous cases relied on by The FA.4
(c) The Regulatory Commission rejected an argument that the fact that Mourinho’s
conduct fell within the scope of the rules put him on notice that he could be
charged.5
(d) As to the issue of reliance on the alleged policy, Mourinho did not seek to
argue that he made a conscious decision to behave as he did based on his
understanding of The FA’s policy. However, he claimed that he did not expect
The FA to charge him in the circumstances. The Regulatory Commission
found that:
‘it is reasonably to be inferred that at the time Mr Mourinho, at least in general
terms, was aware of the fact that some forms of misbehaviour were tolerated by
the FA and some were not. That explains why he was genuinely surprised – and
aggrieved – to be told he faced a charge’.6
(e) In light of its findings, the Regulatory Commission considered that charging
Mourinho was a ‘material departure from previous practice for which no good
justification has been provided’.7
para 63.
2 Ibid, para 59.
4 The Regulatory Commission concluded: ‘It follows that we accept that throughout the period of several
years from which examples were taken no participant has previously been charged for behaving in the
way that it has already been established that Mr Mourinho behaved. Further, we consider that there are
several examples of conduct which was more objectionable than the conduct in the instant case’ (ibid,
para 82).
5 Ibid, para 87.
6 Ibid, paras 46–47, and at para 53 (‘The FA suggests that the terms of the Fast Track Procedure and of
Rule E 3(1) have the effect of putting Mr Mourinho on notice that he might be in breach if he behaved
as he did. We do not agree: the words may tell him what the rule says and, in general terms, that there
is a particular practice as to its enforcement. But they do not go so far as to warn him that what he did
on this occasion would be regarded as covered by that practice or that his conduct probably would, or
could well, result in a sanction’).
7 The Regulatory Commission relied on the comments of Lord Hoffmann in R (o/a Bancoult) v
Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 (at 60): ‘It is not essential
that the Applicant should have relied upon the promise to his detriment, although this is a relevant
consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an
abuse of power and such a change of policy may be justified in the public interest’.
B3.135 Whilst the Mourinho case might offer some hope to participants, it seems
likely that the number of cases in which participants will succeed in a defence based
on legitimate expectation will remain low. Even in the Mourinho case, the Regulatory
Commission was at pains to emphasise that ‘it is of fundamental importance to
recognise that a regulator such as the FA has a broad discretion as to the application of
its rules’,1 and that ‘any outside body, such as the Regulatory Commission or a Court,
should think long and hard before deciding that a discretion has been unfairly applied’.2
para 51.
2 Ibid, para 54.
B3.136 Notwithstanding the high hurdle for participants to succeed in legitimate

expectation cases, there was a final word of warning for SGBs: ‘As a comment, we
add only that if the FA wishes to put players, managers and all other participants
on notice that in future it intends to treat words heard in such circumstances, or
words that are inaudible but where the meaning is obvious, or conduct to a similar
effect, as a breach of the rules, then it could easily do so’.1 Therefore, where an SGB
has adopted a particular policy or approach to charging over a period of time, if it
subsequently intends to change its approach, it would seem advisable to publicise
this (for example by updating guidance).2
para 89.
2 For an example of a governing body giving such guidance, see Rugby Football Union v Steve Diamond,
RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 November 2017, paras 13–15 (‘the RFU and Premiership
Rugby made great efforts to address the challenges of maintaining Rugby’s core values. Meetings took
place with the Directors of Rugby and various relevant officials. Concerns had been expressed about
the possible erosion of rugby’s core values. Match officials have been directed to stamp out incidents
which challenge the authority of match officials. Further to a meeting in late July 2017, on 16th August
2017 all Directors of Rugby received an email setting out these concerns and further guidance’).
C Criticism and abuse of officials

B3.137 Criticism of match officials is a common basis for misconduct charges.1
This section deals with criticism or abuse of match officials off the field of play (on-
field abuse of officials is dealt with at para B3.61).
Misconduct 465
1 See eg Football Association v Jurgen Klopp, February 2019 (Klopp was charged for comments during a
post-match interview that questioned the integrity of the match referee and/or implied bias. Klopp was
fined £45,000); Football Association v Neil Warnock, Regulatory Commission decision dated 20 May
2019 (Warnock was found guilty of two charges of making comments that questioned the integrity
of the referee or implied bias and a further charge involving comments that brought the game into
disrepute. He received a fine of £20,000); Paris Saint-Germain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v
Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), CAS 2019/A/6367 (Neymar’s sanction was
reduced to a two-match ban for comments made about officials); Football Association v Pontus Jansson,
decision dated 25 October 2018 (Jansson received a one-match ban and £1,000 fine after describing
a decision during a match as ‘robbery’); Football Association v Lee Bowyer, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 15 October 2019 (Bowyer was charged with making comments that constituted improper
conduct and/or questioned the integrity of the Match Referee (and on on-field improper conduct charge).
After admitting the offence he was fined £4,000 and banned for three matches); Ignasi Casas Vague v
Federation Equestre Internationale, CAS 2019/A/6202 (the appellant, the Chef d’Equipe for a team,
was sanctioned for abusive language towards race officials after a race was cancelled. He was banned
for three months and fined CHF2,000); Football Association v Arsène Wenger, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 10 January 2018 (Wenger was found to have tried to enter the officials’ dressing room
and aggressively questioned the integrity of the officials. He was given a fine of £40,000 and a three-
match touchline ban after admitting misconduct); Rugby Football Union v Neil McCarthy, decision dated
28 February 2017 (McCarthy admitted a breach of Regulation 5.12 after he went to the match officials’
changing room after the match, swore at the officials and called them a disgrace, resulting in a three-week
ban); Rugby Football Union v Diamond, decision dated 23 February 2017 (the Director of Rugby and
coach at Sale Sharks admitted two breaches of Regulation 5.12 following derogatory comments made
to the press after the match about the match referee, resulting in a six-week stadium ban, of which half
was suspended); Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February 2017
(the player posted ‘10 against 12 but still fighting and winning as a team’. After admitting the offence he
was fined £40,000 and warned as to his future conduct); Football Association v Keith Wyness, Regulatory
Commission decision dated 5 June 2017 (the Chief Executive of Aston Villa FC claimed that he had not
intended to retweet a caption that was found to be offensive with the video. The panel did not accept the
explanation. He received £10,000 fine and ban of three weeks); Football Association v Jose Mourinho,
Regulatory Commission decision dated 4 November 2015 (Mourinho was found to have gone into the
officials’ dressing room at half time and used abusive language. Given his previous record, the panel
imposed a one-match stadium ban and a fine of £40,000); Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal
Board decision dated 2 June 2014 (Mourinho was found to have brought the game into disrepute as a
result of ‘criticism of a general and indiscriminate nature’, for which he was fined £10,000.
B3.138 SGBs prohibit criticism of officials not only because it goes against
sporting values, such as respect and discipline, but also because it has the potential to
undermine the integrity of the sport by affecting how officials perform.1 At the same
time, however, it could be argued that fair criticism of officials is not unreasonable.
The need to strike a reasonable balance was recognised by a Football Association
Appeal Board panel in Football Association v Jose Mourinho. The panel expressed
the view that ‘The question in this and every case where the issue falls to be decided
is: has the line been crossed between the accepted right to express a fair and honestly
held opinion, and unacceptable comments that lower the game in the estimation of
right-minded members of the public?’2 However, in recent years it appears that SGBs
and tribunals are taking a stricter approach, which is reflected in relevant guidance.3
1 See eg the comment in Football Association v Bacary Sagna, Appeal Board decision dated 1 February
2017, para 48 (‘For a professional player publicly to question the integrity of a referee – to, in effect,
suggest that he was biased in favour of one team and against another – is unacceptable. It undermines
the respect for referees which is essential for the proper and fair functioning of football at all levels,
professional and non-professional. Professional players, especially high-profile and senior players at
leading clubs with a strong public following, bear a particular responsibility not to act in this way’).
2 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, decision dated 9 June 2014, para 6.3. See also Paris Saint-
Germain & Neymar Da Silva Santos Junior v Union des Associations Européennes de Football
(UEFA), CAS2019/A/6367 para 70 (‘The Sole Arbitrator notes that the penalty awarded to Manchester
United was a disputed decision which was taken after a lengthy review of video footage. It must be
admissible for such decisions to be discussed controversially, even more so if they are match deciding.
If one wants football to stir emotions, people must also have the freedom – of course within certain
limits – to discuss such match-deciding decisions, even with emotions riding high. In particular, it
must be possible for a player to state that he thinks the decision in question to be wrong’).
3 The Rugby Football Union guidance on social media, for example, states: ‘Do not criticise or imply
bias in match officials’. The Football Association guidance to players notes: ‘Do not imply bias or
attack the integrity of Match Officials’.
B3.139 Whether a particular comment is critical of officials will be a matter for the
panel, judged on an objective basis. It is likely that the fact that the words used were
not critical will not be a defence if the overall intent was in fact to criticise. Similarly,
the fact that criticism was not directed at a particular official is also unlikely to enable
the participant to escape a charge.1
1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, Appeal Board decision dated 2 June 2014, para 5.3 (Mourinho
was found to have brought the game into disrepute as a result of ‘criticism of a general and
indiscriminate nature’. The Panel noted that whether his comments brought the game into disrepute
‘involves placing oneself in the position of an ordinary, objective and fair-minded member of the
public and how he, or she, is likely to have reacted to media comments in any given case’).
B3.140 Many of the cases involve negative comments about officials made after
a match. However, participants may also breach the rules (a) where comments are
made before the match, and (b) even if the comments are positive.1 In The Football
Association v Rafael Benitez (Regulatory Commission decision dated 8 October
2018), the panel explained:
‘The intention behind the regulation is perhaps an obvious one. Any comments,
whether positive or negative, made about an appointed Match Official before a
match is a risk to the integrity of that match – whether perceived or otherwise. It can
also bring an additional layer of pressure onto a match referee which could have had
a negative impact on the game. Thus, positive comments can be just as harmful as
those that are negative’ (at para 12).
The panel further noted:
‘post-match comments are not treated in the same way. There is no rule prohibiting
post-match comments about appointed Match Officials or Match Officials generally.
This is because there is obviously no risk to the integrity of that match which has
already been played, and Match Officials for any future games would not have been
appointed at that stage’.
On this basis, it would appear that post-match comments about officials that are not
critical are unlikely to constitute a breach.
1 The FA’s Essential Information for Clubs 2018/2019 (Level Professional) warns participants that the
following may lead to disciplinary charges: ‘Any comment, whether positive or negative about an
appointed Match Official made prior to the game’.
B3.141 One of the defences advanced in cases of this nature is that charges have not
been brought in other allegedly similar cases. However, this will not normally avail a
participant. Football Association panels in particular, have regularly stated that they
consider each case on its own merits. This is clearly the correct approach: whether
another participant escaped sanction is not a basis for not bringing charges or finding
that an offence has not been committed. An exception to this position is where it can
be established that the participant had a legitimate expectation, based on a pattern of
charging, that the governing body would not bring charges given the particular facts
of the case.1
1 Football Association v Jose Mourinho, discussed at para B3.132 et seq.
D Criminal offences
B3.142 Where participants commit a criminal offence, there is clearly potential for
their conduct to be prejudicial to the interests of the sport and/or bring the game into
disrepute. It is no surprise, therefore, that there have been a number of cases in which
participants who are involved in criminal conduct have subsequently been charged
with misconduct.1
Misconduct 467
1 Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018 (the player pleaded guilty to
criminal offences (common assault and resisting arrest), which led the court to impose a fine of £2,000
and order payment of £250 to the police officer. The club imposed a further fine of £2,000 and required
the player to undertake 10 hours of community service. The player was found guilty of misconduct and
warned as to his future conduct but the panel imposed no further sanction); England and Wales Cricket
Board v Shiv Thakor, decision dated March 2018 (the player was found guilty of indecent exposure,
for which he was given a three-year community order, ordered to pay over £1,000 in costs, and put on
the sex offenders register. He pleaded guilty to a misconduct charge for which he received a suspension
of six months (of which three months were suspended)); Rugby Australia v Tolu Latu (2019) (after
pleading guilty to a criminal charge of drink driving and driving while suspended, Latu was charged
with a breach of the professional player code of conduct and received a four-match ban and fine of
$5,000 (RugbyPass, 19 June 2019 ‘Rugby Australia heap further punishment on Tolu Latu following
drink-driving conviction’)).
B3.143 An interesting issue arises where players are charged with misconduct after
being acquitted of a criminal offence. Given that the standard of proof in civil cases
is lower (being the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt), this
can lead to a situation in which the player is found innocent of a criminal offence but
guilty of misconduct.1 In other cases the misconduct charge (for example for bringing
the game into disrepute), whilst related to the conduct for which criminal charges
were brought, might relate to the player’s conduct more broadly and therefore does
not turn on whether the player is found guilty of a criminal offence.2 Equally, the
fact that a player is not charged after being arrested does not mean that they will
necessarily avoid a misconduct charge.
1 See Football Association v Forestieri, Regulatory Commission decision dated 24 July 2019, paras 43–
57, which contains a detailed analysis of The FA’s Disciplinary Regulations 23 and 24 and the interplay
between criminal and civil standards of proof. Regulation 23 states that ‘the fact that a Participant is
liable to face or has pending any other criminal, civil, disciplinary or regulatory proceedings (whether
public or private in nature) in relation to the same matter shall not prevent or fetter The Association
conducting proceedings under these Rules’. Regulation 24 states that ‘the result of those proceedings
and findings upon which such result is based shall be presumed to be correct and true unless it is
shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that this is not the case’. On appeal, in Football Association
v Forestieri, Appeal Board decision dated 4 September 2019, the Appeal Board upheld the approach
taken by the Regulatory Commission in determining that the effect of Regulation 24 is limited to
meaning that ‘it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person was guilty’
(para 20) and that ‘clear and convincing evidence’ does not involve a higher standard of proof than the
usual balance of probabilities (paras 29–32). Forestieri was acquitted of the criminal charge but found
to have committed an aggravated breach of Rule E3(3)).
In 2012, John Terry was accused of using racially abusive language towards a black player,
Anton Ferdinand of Queens Park Rangers. Terry was charged with a criminal offence under s 28
of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, and s 31(1)(c) and (5) of the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. He was acquitted. R v Terry, Westminster Magistrates’ Court, 13 July
2012, available at: judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-john-terry.pdf
[accessed 29 Octoer 2020]. In subsequent disciplinary proceedings relating to the same incident,
Football Association v John Terry, Terry was found guilty of breaching FA Rule E3(2) and given a
four-match ban and fine of £220,000. The panel noted: ‘It follows that the mere fact that a respondent
has been acquitted of a criminal charge whose subject-matter is identical, is not capable of acting
as a procedural bar preventing the FA from bringing disciplinary proceedings. This is because of
the differing standards of proof […]. There was broad consensus between the Parties that ‘facts and
matters’, in the context of criminal proceedings, can only be discerned where there is a guilty verdict.
In that event, one can infer certain key facts and matters from the outcome, namely the constituent
ingredients of the offence which the magistrate(s), judge, or jury found to be proved. Conversely,
where the outcome is an acquittal, with a simple ‘not guilty’ verdict, what led to the ‘result’ or outcome
(ie the ‘facts and matters’ upon which it was based), are not capable of discernment’ (see paras 5.3 to
5.20).
2 England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben Stokes, decision dated 7 December 2018) (the player was
involved in a brawl during a night out following a one-day international match. He was found not
guilty of any criminal offences. However, he pleaded guilty to a charge of misconduct based on his
conduct that evening more broadly).
B3.144 There are, however, also examples of high profile cases in which participants
have not been charged with misconduct despite having been found guilty of a criminal
offence.1 To the extent there is inconsistency within a sport as to the circumstances
in which criminal conduct will result in a misconduct charge, this could potentially
leave open the possibility of a challenge on the basis that a charge is contrary to
the participant’s legitimate expectations and/or is based on a rule that infringes the
requirement of legal certainty.2
1 Cases in which no misconduct charge appears to have been brought include: England rugby player
Danny Care was reported to have been arrested in 2012 for drink-driving for a second time in three
weeks and to have been fined £3,100 and banned from driving for 16 months, as well as being fined by
his club (‘Danny Care ‘devastated’ as he is ditched by England’, Guardian, 5 January 2012); England
footballer Wayne Rooney was reported to have been arrested in 2017 for drink-driving, for which he
was banned from driving for two years and ordered to undertake community service (‘Wayne Rooney
pleads guilty to drink-driving’, Guardian, 18 September 2017); French footballer Hugo Lloris was
reported to have pleaded guilty to drink driving and to have been fined £50,000 and banned from
driving for 20 months (‘Hugo Lloris fined and banned for being ‘completely drunk’ while driving’,
Guardian, 12 September 2018).
B3.145 The fact that a participant would be subject to separate proceedings

(criminal, disciplinary and a club internal review) in respect of the same conduct
is unlikely to preclude misconduct charges,1 although it may affect the sanctions
imposed.
1 See eg comments in Rugby Football Union v Danny Cipriani, decision dated 28 August 2018,
para 41 (‘For a player to face criminal charges, internal disciplinary charges and charges by the RFU
is nothing out of the ordinary. The Panel was not persuaded by the submission made on behalf of the
Player that this “triple jeopardy”, as it was called, went to the issue of fairness so far as the question
of whether the charge was proven or not was concerned. The Panel determined that this was only
relevant to the level or fairness of any sanction that was handed down, should the charge be found
proven’).
E Other forms of unacceptable conduct
B3.146 There have been numerous cases in which players have been sanctioned
for what is considered to be unacceptable conduct involving alcohol or otherwise
occurring on social occasions.1 In most of the cases the misconduct occurred whilst
the participants were at a team event and/or participating in a competition, thereby
bringing it squarely within the type of situation that most SGBs are seeking to
regulate.2
1 See eg England and Wales Cricket Board v Alex Hales and England and Wales Cricket Board v Ben
Stokes, decisions dated 7 December 2018 (the players were charged following a night out and their
involvement in a brawl following a one-day international victory); in 2017 England cricketers Jonny
Bairstow and Liam Plunkett were fined £2,000 and Jake Ball was fined £1,000 and all received formal
warnings for going out drinking during a series; in 2017, England cricketer, Ben Duckett was fined
£1,500 after an incident whilst out drinking; in 2016, American swimmer, Ryan Lochte, was banned
for 10 months and forfeited $100,000 after a drunken escapade during the 2016 Olympic Games
(three other American swimmers who were involved in the incident were banned for four months);
in 2011, England rugby player, Mike Tindall, was fined £15,000 (reduced on appeal from £25,000)
following an incident in New Zealand that reportedly involved dwarf-throwing (two other players
involved in the incident were given suspended fines of £5,000); in 2011, England rugby player, Manu
Tuilagi, was fined £3,000 after jumping off a ferry whilst at the World Cup in New Zealand; in 2007,
England cricketer, Andrew Flintoff, took a hotel pedalo out at night whilst drunk and capsized after
an ‘eight-hour drinking spree with team-mates’. He received a one-match ban and was stripped of the
vice-captaincy.
2 For a case in which the participant was not officially involved in the tournament then being staged, see
Whitmore v International Skating Union, CAS 2016/A/4558 (American international speed-skater,
Mitchel Whitmore, was involved in a brawl with another speed skater during which he was alleged to
have hit him and knocked him to the ground. Whitmore was not participating in the tournament but
was present for rehabilitation purposes. The issue between the pair was resolved the next day when
Whitmore apologised. An International Skating Union Disciplinary Commission found Whitmore
guilty of misconduct and imposed a 12-month ban. The sanction was reduced by the Court of
Arbitration for Sport on appeal to six months).
Misconduct 469
9 CODES OF ETHICS
A Introduction
B3.147 Section 9 of this chapter considers: (a) Codes of Ethics; (b) the history of
their introduction and development; and (c) the issues that arise in relation to the
detection, investigation and prosecution of a breach of a Code of Ethics.
B3.148 The commercialisation of sport in the past few decades has seen it turn
into a very valuable commodity. This has led to a series of high-profile scandals
arising from serious misconduct by senior administrators. These episodes have been
extremely damaging for the sports in question and have had far reaching and long
lasting financial and reputational consequences. There is plainly a need to have a
framework in place that regulates the behaviour of senior administrators, supported
by robust sanctions if those individuals fall short of what is expected. This framework
should cover not only the traditional principles of good corporate governance, which
are dealt with in Chapter A5 of this book, but also extend to more basic moral
and ethical values. Those participating in a sport cannot be expected to conduct
themselves properly if those who regulate the sport do not do so themselves.
B3.149 One of the first such high profile incidents occurred in 1998, when
allegations surfaced that members of the Salt Lake City Organising Committee had
bribed senior members of the IOC to ensure that Salt Lake City was awarded the
right to host the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. The IOC appointed Dick Pound, the
then IOC Vice President, to head a committee to investigate the allegations with the
goal of ‘[wiping] out corruption within the IOC once and for all’.1 The investigation
led to three members of the IOC resigning and sanctions being imposed on a further
14 members, including the expulsion of six IOC board members.2 This scandal
prompted the IOC to develop an Ethics Commission whose first task was to produce
a Code of Ethics, which it did three weeks later on 25 May 1999, becoming the first
major sports governing body to introduce a Code of Ethics.3 Many SGBs have since
followed the same course. As Ban Ki-Moon, the former Secretary General of the
United Nations, and now the chair of the IOC’s Ethics Commission noted recently,
“A culture of ethics is key to the success of any organisation”.4
1 Thomas A. Hamilton, ‘The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic
Games Bribery Scandal’, 21 Marq Sports L Rev 219 (2010) at 223.
2 Ibid, 224.
3 Ibid, 225.
4 olympic.org/news/ban-ki-moon-delivers-ethics-commission-report-to-the-ioc-session [accessed
29 October 2020].
B3.150 It is now considered best practice to have a Code of Ethics as part of the
SGB’s regulatory framework.1 These documents have as their stated aim the need to
uphold the integrity and reputation of the sport in question. The provisions tend to
be similar across all sports and seek to ensure that individuals who are subject to the
code act in accordance with important moral values, such as dignity and honesty.
1 One or two SGBs, notably World Athletics, call their document a Code of Conduct. However, the term
Code of Ethics has been used in this chapter for consistency and ease of reference.
B Who is bound by Codes of Ethics?
B3.151 The misconduct provisions referred to earlier in this chapter typically apply
to those who participate in the playing of the sport, such as players or managers,
whereas a Code of Ethics is more often used as a tool to regulate the behaviour
of those who administer and officiate the sport. A number of sports even expressly
limit the application of their Code of Ethics in this way. The Code of Ethics of the
International Tennis Federation (ITF), for example, has a stated aim of helping to
‘ensure that [tennis] is governed ethically’1 and only applies to individuals such as
directors of the ITF, the President and COO and those who sit on an ITF committee.
Broadly speaking, cricket, Formula One, and cycling use their ethical provisions to
regulate a similar category of people.
1 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, art 1.1.
B3.152 Other sports take a different approach. The World Athletics Code of Conduct
applies to an extremely broad category of people, which includes officials, participants,
‘persons and entities bidding to host, or hosting, [international competitions]’, and
anyone ‘engaged by or acting on behalf of World Athletics’.1 FIFA has taken a
similar approach, and looks to bind those who play and govern the sport, including
any ‘person responsible for technical, medical or administrative matters in FIFA,
a confederation, a member association, a league or a club’2 (although, in practice,
almost all FIFA Ethics Committee prosecutions concern officials or members of the
administration).
1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 1.
2 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019 edition, definition of ‘Official’ paras 2.1 and 30.1. The FIFA Ethics
Committee has been willing to give this definition a broad meaning: Mr Jose Luis Chiriboga Merino
had no employment contract with the Ecuador Football Federation, did not ‘sign as an FEF official’ or
send his communications from an FEF email address, but was found to be bound by the FIFA Code
of Ethics because his integration ‘into FEF affairs went beyond the relationship of an external
intermediary/freelancer’ and he ‘seemed to participate heavily in the FEF decision-making process’ by
arranging meetings with the president and having letters signed by the general secretary (FIFA Ethics
Committee Adj ref no 11/2018, paras 12–23). Conversely, Mr Guillermo Tofoni provided a service to
the Argentinian Football Association whereby he organised friendly football matches for the national
team of Argentina. See FIFA Ethics Committee Adj ref no 9/2018, paras 19–42 for a discussion as to
why the provision of a service did not amount to being responsible for administrative matters at AFA.
B3.153 If the clause is intended to apply to a broad category of people, the sport
will need to consider how to ensure that those individuals agree to be bound by the
Code of Ethics, particularly as many of them would not ordinarily be licensed by or
registered with the SGB. If they are not, the SGB will also have to consider how it
can effectively sanction the person for a breach, as the SGB is unlikely to have an
ongoing relationship with them.
C What behaviour is caught by a Code of Ethics?

B3.154 Codes of Ethics generally use language that is extremely broad, such that
they could catch almost any behaviour that has negative connotations. Examples of
these provisions include the obligation to ‘act with utmost integrity and honesty at all
times including acting in good faith towards others’,1 ‘respecting human dignity’,2
and to ‘behave in a dignified and ethical manner and act with complete credibility
and integrity at all times’.3 These obligations are so broad that they could arguably
cover conduct such as bad sportsmanship, although the provisions do not appear to
have been stretched so far in practice. As with the general misconduct provisions
described earlier in this chapter (see para B3.97), it is useful for a SGB to have the
benefit of provisions that are flexible enough to cover a broad range of negative
behaviours. It might be said that a SGB is correct to adopt this approach given the
broad range of conduct that has been prosecuted as a breach of Codes of Ethics in
recent years, which extends from dishonesty (submitting false running times)4 to
serious sexual misconduct5 and even war crimes.6 As a result, it is likely that some
participants will try to argue that the provisions are too broad and contravene the
principle of legal certainty.7
Misconduct 471
1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 3.3.1.
2 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 2.1.2.1.
3 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 13.3.
4 See IAAF v Mr Virjilio Griggs, SR/Adhocsport/278/2019. In breach of the IAAF Code of Conduct, Mr
Griggs knowingly submitted manipulated competition results to the Panama Athletics Federation to
try to gain entry to the 2017 IAAF World Championships.
5 See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Keramuudin Karim, Adj. ref. no. 12/2019: Mr Karim, the President
of the Afghanistan Football Federation, was charged with a violation of the FIFA Code of Ethics based
on allegations of severe mental, physical, sexual and equal rights abuse of the female players.
6 See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Adj ref no 10/2019. Mr Ngaïssona,
the president of the Central African Republic Football Association, was arrested by the International
Criminal Court. He was allegedly the most senior leader and the National General Coordinator of
the Anti-Balaka group and alleged to be responsible for committing crimes against humanity and
war crimes in the Central African Republic. The FIFA Ethics Committee found him guilty of having
violated the FIFA Code of Ethics.
7 See para B1.19 et seq. See in particular Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417 –
4419 – 4420, para 232 et seq, where the appellants were charged with breaching fairly broad provisions
of the IAAF Code of Ethics, such as acting contrary to fair play, tarnishing the reputation of the IAAF,
and not acting with the utmost integrity, honesty and responsibility. One appellant argued that this was
a breach of Art 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the parts of the Code of Ethics
that he was alleged to have breached were ‘far from clear [and] do not enable a person to know which
specific acts or omission would make him liable […] such vague articles may therefore not be the basis
for sanctions of a criminal nature’. The CAS panel ruled that these provisions were ‘quite normal in
all sorts of formal and material legislation. Whether or not there is a violation of such general norms is
to be judged on the basis of facts, in a given situation’. The panel was clear that the appellants would
have understood that conspiring to conceal anti-doping violations over three years in return for money
would be a violation of these provision.
B3.155 A Code of Ethics typically also addresses and regulates specific behaviours,
such as when gifts can be accepted or conflicts of interest. Examples are set out below.
It is often the case that serious misconduct contravenes many different provisions of a
Code of Conduct, and the case law has been considered in the most appropriate place
below. For those SGBs based in the UK, the Code for Sports Governance, which
applies to all organisations in the UK that receive funding from Sport England and
UK Sport, contains provisions that inform how to draft an effective Code of Ethics.
(a) Bribery
B3.156 All Codes of Ethics contain a broad prohibition on bribery, being the offer,
acceptance or promise of any form of benefit or incentive in order to improperly
influence a particular action or decision. It is common for bribery to be one of the
charges brought against a participant in corruption cases, as so many cases involve
money changing hands.
B3.157 There have been a material number of high-profile examples of corruption

cases in recent years in which individuals looked to profit from the sport or bribe others
to secure their election to a position of power. On 27 May 2015, the US Department
of Justice announced that it was ‘charging 14 defendants with racketeering, wire
fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with
the defendants’ participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the
corruption of international soccer’.1 Of those 14 individuals, 9 were senior FIFA
officials. The Attorney General said that ‘the indictment alleges corruption that is
rampant, systemic and deep-rooted both abroad and here in the United States. It
spans at least two generations of soccer officials who, as alleged, have abused their
positions of trust to acquire millions of dollars of bribes and kickbacks’, in particular
in relation to the sale of broadcasting rights to international matches. Meanwhile, the
2015 WADA Independent Commission Report concluded that track & field athletes
were being exploited, that an ‘open and accepted series of unethical behaviours and
practices has become the norm’, and that there was ‘corruption and bribery practices
at the highest levels of international athletics’.2 These examples serve to demonstrate

that, whilst the regulatory framework in sport is undoubtedly improving and
constantly evolving to tackle these problems, it remains subject to one big limitation:
how to put in place effective and independent systems to police those who govern the
sport and exercise its decision-making powers.
1 justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-
and [accessed 29 October 2020]. Similarly, in 1993 Lamine Diack, then Vice-President of the IAAF,
was paid the sum of $60,000 in cash by a company at a time when it was in negotiations with the IAAF
to sign a marketing contract. In 2011 an IOC Ethics Commission found that he had placed himself in
a conflict of interest. He was only given a reprimand due to mitigating factors, such as the fact that
he was not an IOC member at the time it happened. IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Lamine Diack,
D/01/2011.
2 The WADA Independent Commission Report 1, dated 9 November 2015, para 1.7.1. See Balakhnichev,
Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417 – 4419 – 4420. Messrs Balakhnichev and Melnikov
were senior members of the Russian Athletics Federation and Mr Papa Massata Diack was a senior
consultant to the IAAF. These three individuals were found guilty of conspiring together to extract
money from the professional Russian marathon runner, Mrs Shobukhova. They took advantage of their
positions to obtain money from her in return for suppressing evidence of her abnormal blood profile,
so that she could compete in the 2012 Olympics when she should have been banned.
(b) Bidding
B3.158 The bidding process for hosting a major international sporting event can be
extremely competitive due to the commercial benefits that the event brings. There is
therefore a motivation for those involved in the bidding process to seek to improperly
influence those who decide the outcome of the process through, for example, the
giving of bribes and gifts.
B3.159 One of the first major bidding scandals in sport concerned Salt Lake City’s
bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics.1 The bid committee was later accused of:
‘providing more than US1.2 million in cash and gifts, such as: trips to Disneyland,
a Rolex watch, shopping sprees, and college scholarships to entice IOC members to
support its bid’.2
As stated above, Dick Pound’s investigation led to sanctions being imposed against
14 members, including the expulsion of six IOC board members. The US Justice
Department brought criminal charges against 15 individuals involved in the scandal,
although each person was eventually acquitted.3
1 Other event bidding controversies include: (1) an allegation that Jack Warner, then the
CONCACAF President and a member of the FIFA Executive Committee, ‘accepted a bribe from
the Moroccan bid committee in exchange for his vote for Morocco’ to host the 1998 FIFA World
Cup (according to the Request for Restitution that FIFA lodged with the United States District Court
Eastern District of New York, at p 10). This charge has not yet been decided at trial at the time of
writing; and (2) allegations that the bidding process for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, awarded to
Atlanta, also involved the bribing of IOC officials. None of the IOC documents made available to the
public by the IOC referred to these allegations. See Thomas A. Hamilton, ‘The Long Hard Fall from
Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal’, 21 Marq Sports L Rev
219 (2010) at 223, at 230– 231.
2 Mark Dodds, ‘Revisiting the Salt Lake City Olympic scandal: would the outcome be different today’
(2016) 12(1) Sport Management International Journal at 2.
3 Ibid, at 1.
B3.160 There were then, as there are now, rules that govern how a bid process for
a major event must be conducted. A consideration of those rules is outside the scope
of this chapter. However, the IOC took the view that there was a need to supplement
those rules with a Code of Ethics designed to regulate a broader range of behaviour.
Codes of Ethics often now address bidding directly, for example by requiring those
involved to be neutral when considering bids and to conduct a bid with honesty,
fairness and respect for others.1
Misconduct 473
1 See eg ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 2.7, and World Athletics Integrity Code of
Conduct dated 1 November 2019, para 3.3.13.
B3.161 Notwithstanding the specific provisions in Codes of Ethics, there continue

to be allegations relating to the bidding processes for major tournaments in sport,
and football in particular. The award of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to the Gulf state of
Qatar was tarnished with constant allegations of corruption. In August 2012 Michael
Garcia, the Chairman of the investigative chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee
announced that he would investigate the award of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World
Cups to Russia and Qatar respectively. His report was not made public. Instead,
Hans-Joachim Eckert, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee’s adjudication
chamber, published a 42-page summary of the report, which cleared both Russia
and Qatar of any wrongdoing. Shortly afterwards, Garcia declared that the summary
was ‘materially incomplete’, with ‘erroneous representations of the facts and
conclusions’.1 Garcia unsuccessfully attempted to appeal the summary to FIFA’s
Appeal Committee, which concluded that the summary was not capable of appeal.2
1 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30042309 [accessed 29 October 2020].
2 bbc.co.uk/sport/football/30491135 [accessed 29 October 2020].
B3.162 A US Department of Justice indictment included an allegation that bribery

took place in the bidding process for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa.1
The same indictment filed with the court on 18 March 2020 alleged that ‘several
[FIFA] executive members were offered or received bribes in connection their votes’
in relation to who would host the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups.2
1 A Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New York
dated 18 March 2020 stated that in ‘approximately 2004, high-ranking officials of FIFA and the South
African government indicated to the defendant Jack Warner that they were prepared to arrange for the
government of South Africa to pay $10 million to CFU purportedly to “support the African diaspora”
but in fact to secure the votes of WARNER and other CONCACAF representatives on the FIFA
executive committee in favour of South Africa as host of the 2010 tournament’ at para 86 (justice.gov/
usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 29 October 2020].). This charge has not yet
been determined by the court (as the US Department of Justice has not yet managed to secure the
extradition of Mr Warner from Trinidad and Tobago). FIFA has, however, made reference to the bribe
on pages 9 and 10 of the Request for Restitution that FIFA lodged with the United States District Court
Eastern District of New York (img.fifa.com/image/upload/amoaw7hmbus7mxnw6xot.pdf [accessed
29 October 2020].).
2 See the Superseding Indictment filed with the United States District Court Eastern District of New
York dated 18 March 2020, paragraphs 90 – 99 (justice.gov/usao-edny/press-release/file/1266856/
download [accessed 29 October 2020].).
B3.163 FIFA has attempted to prevent such incidents occurring in the future by
making changes to the bid process for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.1 These include:
(a) increasing transparency by making every step of the bidding process open to
the public, including the evaluation reports for each bid (which evaluation itself
will, to the extent possible, be based on objective criteria);
(b) each of the 211 member associations of the FIFA Congress will be entitled to
participate in the final vote on the venue for the competition, rather than just
the 15 members of the FIFA Executive Committee;
(c) each vote will be made public (in the past, as the voting process was confidential,
it was possible for members of the FIFA Executive Committee to take bribes
from multiple sources for the same vote);
(d) the bidding process will be scrutinised by independent auditors; and
(e) an enhanced version of the rules of conduct has been put in place, called the
Bid Rules of Conduct.
1 FIFA Bid Evaluation Report 2026 FIFA World Cup.
(c) Elections
B3.164 Most sports have detailed rules that regulate the election to key posts within
a SGB. These rules do not typically form part of a Code of Ethics, with notable
exceptions being tennis and athletics, which both have Codes of Ethics that address
the topic. However, there have been some high-profile examples of individuals being
accused of having paid bribes to secure election victory, although a significant issue
faced by the prosecutor is often establishing the link between the payment and the
vote.1
1 See Blatter v FIFA Ethics Committee, CAS 2016/A/4501. The 2015 US Department of Justice
investigation identified a payment in 2011 of CHF2,000,000 by FIFA to Michel Platini, who was
then Vice President of FIFA, member of the FIFA Executive Committee, and President of UEFA.
The FIFA Ethics Committee commenced an investigation and charged Mr Blatter with numerous
violations of FIFA’s Code of Ethics. One charge was that the payment was a bribe made in order to
obtain Mr Platini’s support for Mr Blatter’s candidacy in the 2011 FIFA presidential elections. Mr
Blatter’s explanation for this payment was that in 1998 he made ‘an oral agreement to hire French
football great Michel Platini as an advisor and ambassador for FIFA for a salary of CHF 1 million
per year. Because of FIFA’s troubled finances at the time, [he] and Mr Platini agreed that some
portion of the salary would be deferred until the organization could afford to pay the balance’. The
balance of CHF2,000,000 was then paid on 1 February 2011 when, according to Mr Blatter, FIFA’s
finances had improved. This was his position despite the fact that there was a written contract in
place providing for a salary of CHF300,000 per annum for the same services (which was paid in
full). FIFA’s position was that ‘the payment, 10 years after the fact, of an additional amount of CHF2
million, based on an alleged oral agreement providing for a yearly remuneration of CHF1 million
(instead of CHF300,000, as indicated in the written contract signed by Mr Blatter and Mr Platini),
defies any logic’. It must, therefore, be an undue benefit. However, the FIFA Adjudicatory Chamber
was ‘unable to reach the conviction that the payment was made in order to obtain Mr Platini’s
support of [Mr Blatter’s] candidacy’, and therefore found that it was not a bribe. On appeal, FIFA
submitted that it was enough that the payment (February 2011) and Mr Platini’s support (expressed
in May 2011) were a few months apart to demonstrate that the payment was a bribe. However, the
FIFA Appeal Committee rejected this analysis as there was evidence that Mr Platini approached
FIFA in February 2010 about the payment. CAS concluded that, even if there was a binding oral
agreement between Mr Blatter and Mr Platini in 1998, this agreement was superseded by the
employment contract between FIFA and Mr Platini, which provided for a payment of CHF300,000,
meaning that the payment was made with no contractual basis and was therefore an undue gift.
See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Bin Hammam, CAS 2011/A/2625: In March 2011 Mohamed
Bin Hamman, a senior FIFA official, ran for FIFA President. He asked Jack Warner, CONCAF’s
President, to convene a special meeting for him to present his candidacy to CONCACAF’s member
federations, which took place on 10 and 11 May in Trinidad and Tobago. Before the meeting, Mr
Bin Hammam wired US $360,000 to the Caribbean Football Union, and later provided a further US
$50,000. He attended the conference and made a 45-minute speech about his candidacy. After he
left, Mr Warner announced that there were ‘gifts’ for representatives of attending associations. Later,
each representative was given a sum of US $40,000 in cash in an envelope. A few days afterwards,
Mr Chuck Blazer, a FIFA Executive Member, hired a lawyer to investigate the source of the money,
whose report concluded that ‘At the meeting, Mr Bin Hammam and Mr Warner, caused cash
payments totalling approximately US$ 1,000,000 to be paid, or attempted to be paid to “Officials”’.
The report was leaked to the media and Mr Bin Hammam withdrew his candidacy. FIFA’s Ethics
Committee started proceedings against Mr Warner and Mr Bin Hammam. Mr Warner resigned from
all positions in international football and, in response, FIFA closed all ethics committee procedures
against him, wished him well and announced that ‘the presumption of innocence is maintained’
(fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-vice-president-jack-warner-resigns-1455834 [accessed
29 October 2020]). The FIFA Ethics Committee found Mr Bin Hammam guilty of various breaches
of FIFA’s Code of Ethics, including bribery, and this was upheld by the FIFA Appeal Committee.
CAS, however, took a different view. It found that it was not in dispute that ‘envelopes containing
US $40,000 were offered to CFU delegates’. However, CAS considered that there were two key
factual questions: (1) was Mr Bin Hammam the source of the money? and (2) was the purpose of
the money to buy votes for the FIFA Presidency? CAS was unable to conclude to its comfortable
satisfaction either that he was the source or, even if he was, that it was used to buy votes. CAS did,
however, state that the conclusion ‘should not be taken to diminish the significance of its finding
that it is more likely than not that Mr Bin Hamman was the source of the monies that were brought
into Trinidad and Tobago and eventually distributed at the meeting by Mr Warner and […] his
conduct […] may not have complied with the highest ethical standards that should govern the world
of football’, and ‘The Panel wishes to make it clear that […] it is not making any sort of affirmative
finding of innocence in relation to Mr Bin Hammam’.
Misconduct 475
(d) Political neutrality

B3.165 As already noted above, it has long been a fundamental cornerstone of
international sport that it should operate independently from government.1 The
purpose is to ensure, so far as is possible, that the same rules apply to everyone, that
sport is a politically neutral environment, and that it is free from discrimination. This
principle is reflected in the writings of the founder of the IOC who, over 100 years
ago, wrote that ‘the goodwill of all the members of any autonomous sport grouping
begins to disintegrate as soon as the huge, blurred face of that dangerous creature
known as the state makes an appearance’.2 The modern-day IOC Code of Ethics
records that two of the universal ethical principles of the Olympism are ‘respect of
the principle of the universality and political neutrality of the Olympic Movement’
and ‘maintaining harmonious relations with state authorities, while respecting the
principle of autonomy’.3 These principles are enshrined in most modern Codes of
Ethics.
1 See para A1.2, A1.3 and para B3.76.
2 Pierre de Coubertin, Une campagne de vingt-et-un ans (1887–1908) (Paris: Éducation physique,
1909), p 152.
3 IOC Code of Ethics 2020, arts 1.2 and 1.3.
B3.166 The relationship between politics and sport is frequently in the public eye.
There are numerous examples of sport having to navigate this often-difficult issue,
with one famous example being John Carlos and Tommie Smith raising a black-
gloved first during the 1968 Summer Olympics. More recently, examples include
FIFA sanctioning the English and Scottish football associations for allowing their
players to wear a poppy symbol to mark Remembrance Sunday, or NFL players
‘taking a knee’ while the national anthem was playing to highlight racial injustice
and police brutality in America.1 These cases may not always be considered in the
context of a Code of Ethics, but they serve as good examples of the potential for
tension between sport and politics. The principles were tested during the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi, which took place shortly after Russia had introduced a law that
banned giving minors information about homosexuality.2 The Sochi Games became
a platform for governments and participants from around the world to protest against
these laws, such protests being prohibited by the IOC Code of Ethics and Rule 50
of the Olympic Charter. Faced with athletes making a stand against discrimination,
the IOC was forced to compromise, and announced that the ‘Games cannot be used
as a stage for political demonstrations however good the cause may be […] on the
other hand athletes enjoy freedom of speech so if in a press conference they wanted
to make a political statement they are absolutely free to do so’.3 In advance of the
Tokyo 2020 Olympics, the IOC Athletes’ Commission released guidelines to Rule
50 which confirmed that incidents such as these will be assessed and any necessary
disciplinary action taken on a case by case basis.4
1 See para B3.78 n 1.
2 theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/russia-law-banning-gay-propaganda [accessed 29 October 2020].
3 reuters.com/article/us-olympics-bach/protest-in-press-room-not-podium-says-ioc-
idUSBREA0Q0VA20140127 [accessed 29 October 2020].
4 The following passage from Transparency International, Autonomy and governance: necessary
bedfellows in the fight against corruption in sport (undated), provides some further examples of the
challenging relationship between politics and sport: ‘At the turn of the twenty-first century sports
organisations in numerous countries, including Afghanistan, Gambia, Ghana, India, Kuwait, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama and Poland, denounced cases of state intervention in sport. These complaints led
the IOC to temporarily suspend the NOCs of Afghanistan, Kuwait and India, preventing them taking
part with their flag in the Sydney 2000, London 2012 and Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, respectively.
As early as the 1970s the IOC had protested, unsuccessfully, against a law (the Amateur Sport Act)
passed by the US Congress creating the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and giving it
property rights over the Olympic rings in the United States. Historically, however, it can be seen that
the countries excluded from the Olympics or other world events have all been relatively minor in terms
of either their size or sporting results’.
B3.167 The IOC has recognised that there are limits to the autonomy of the
Olympic Movement. When speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations
in New York in 2013, the IOC president made reference to the idea of ‘responsible
autonomy’, which he described as follows:
‘Regardless of where in the world we practise sport, the rules are the same. They
are recognised worldwide. They are based on a common “global ethic” of fair play,
tolerance and friendship. But to apply this “universal law” worldwide and spread our
values globally, sport has to enjoy responsible autonomy. Politics must respect this
sporting autonomy. For only then can sport organisations implement these universal
values amidst all the differing laws, customs and traditions. Responsible autonomy
does not mean that sport should operate in a law-free environment. It does mean that
we respect national laws which are not targeted against sport and its organisations
alone, sometimes for chiefly political reasons’.1
In a rare case involving the autonomy of sport, rather than political neutrality, an
individual was charged with infringing the IOC principle of the autonomy of sport as
a result of receiving state funding to support a campaign to be elected president of a
regional association of National Olympic Committees.2
1 Quoted in Transparency International, Autonomy and governance: necessary bedfellows in the fight
against corruption in sport (undated).
2 Malboum v Association of National Olympic Committees of Africa, CAS 2017/A/5163 (during a
campaign for election as president of ANOCA, Malboum was charged with breaching the principle
of the autonomy of sport on the basis that he received state funding to assist with the costs of the
campaign. The Executive Committee of ANOCA disqualified Malboum from the election. Malboum
appealed the decision to CAS. In addition to finding that there was no evidence of bribery (a charge
that was also effectively withdrawn by ANOCA at the hearing), the panel noted that ‘the Respondent
did not establish any convincing and sufficiently clear legal basis for the finding of any infringement
based on the support received by Mr Malboum and given by his government’(para 144(iii))).
(e) Gifts
B3.168 Codes of Ethics typically regulate the ability to offer and accept gifts.1
The giving or receiving of a gift is an easy way to exert improper influence over
an individual or give the perception of doing so, which can be just as damaging
to the integrity of a sport. It is common for gifts to be all or part of the focus of
corruption cases. Most sports recognise that it is not practical, or perhaps fair, to
prohibit gifts or hospitality altogether, and therefore allow modest gifts or hospitality
to be accepted. This gives rise to a number of related issues. When drafting these
provisions, consideration should be given to the following:
(a) It is common for an individual to be allowed to exercise a degree of judgement
as to when it is appropriate to accept a gift, but within the confines of defined
boundaries. Examples include a requirement to consider factors such as
whether accepting the gift might (i) give the ‘impression that he has been or
might be influenced’,2 (ii) create ‘an actual or apparent or potential conflict of
interest’,3 or (iii) be ‘frequent, lavish or prolonged’.4
(b) Should there be a cap on the value of the gift? The IOC and FIFA, for example,
permit ‘only tokens of consideration or friendship of nominal value, in
accordance with prevailing local customs’,5 or those that have ‘symbolic or
trivial value’6 respectively.
(c) Should the test change or be stricter in certain circumstances? The perception of
impropriety can be as damaging to a sport as actual impropriety. It is common
for a greater duty of care to be imposed where there is a tender or bid process
ongoing.
(d) Should there be any objective restrictions? It is common to include safeguards
such as (i) a prohibition on any cash gifts, or (ii) accepting any gifts from
certain individuals, such as someone bidding for a contract.
Misconduct 477
(e) Should there be reporting obligations? It would seem sensible to require

individuals to report any gifts over a certain value. The administrative burden
is low, and the requirement should deter officials from accepting gifts of a
greater value and taking the risk that they will not discovered. Most SGBs have
internal gifts and hospitality registers for declaring gifts.
1 For those SGBs in England and Wales, see the Bribery Act 2010, which criminalises the giving and
receiving of gifts in certain circumstances. Many other countries will have similar legislation.
2 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, para 2.4.2.1.
3 ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 1.3 of Appendix 3.
4 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, para 2.4.2.2.3.
5 IOC Code of Ethics 2020 Edition, arti 4.
6 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 20.1.
(f) Loyalty and conflicts of interest
B3.169 It is unsurprising that Codes of Ethics prohibit actual or potential conflicts of

interest. It is an important tool in seeking to prevent officials from putting themselves
in a position where they may be tempted to take a bribe or accept an improper gift.
The prohibition is often combined with a broader positive duty of undivided loyalty
to the sport, meaning the administrator is required to make decisions that are in the
sport’s best interests, without regard to the interests of himself or any other party.
B3.170 In some cases, the obligation is short and generic. FIFA, for example,
imposes an obligation to avoid a situation where a secondary issue could influence
a person’s ability to perform their duties with integrity and in an independent and
purposeful manner. In other sports, a much more prescriptive approach is deployed
that sets out a very detailed set of rules to follow. A person who is subject to such a
code will need to take care to avoid falling foul of what are very broad obligations
and often extend to relatives, family and even acquaintances.1 It would not be difficult
to conceive of a situation where a potential conflict arose between the interests of a
governing body and an acquaintance. In order to identify such issues, it is common
for there to be a regime in place requiring people to report any conflicts of interest.
1 See FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, para 19.1 and ITF Code of Ethics dated 1 January 2019, para 2.2.2.
(g) Discrimination
B3.171 Codes of Ethics universally prohibit any form of unlawful discrimination,

such as discrimination based on sex, religion, race, colour or sexual orientation. The
prohibition often includes broader concepts, such as discrimination based on any
‘difference’,1 any ‘opinion [or] any other reason’2 or ‘status’.3 Athletics goes one
step further and has included a positive obligation to ‘encourage and actively support
equality of gender in Athletics’.4
1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, Art 3.3.9.
2 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, Art 22.1.
3 IOC Code of Ethics 2019, Art 1.4.
4 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, Art 3.3.9.
B3.172 It is common for participants to try to defend discrimination charges on

the basis that they did not intend to act in a discriminatory manner. This is typically
rejected, with panels preferring to judge the act on an objective basis.1
1 See para B3.112. See IAAF Ethics Board v Vanessa Spinola, 05/2016, paras 17–19. Ms Spinola was a
Brazilian heptathlete who participated in the IAAF World Championships in Beijing in August 2015.
When lining up for the start of the 100m hurdles race, she was recorded on television moving her
hands to the outer corners of her eyes and pulling the corners of both her eyes towards the side of her
face. The panel accepted that she did not intend to cause offence. It went on to conclude at para 16 that
‘the fact that one viewer considers a gesture made by an athlete to be offensive will not, without more,
give rise to a violation of the Code. It must be shown that the complainant’s view that the gesture was
offensive was a reasonable view that may be shared by others with the result that the gesture can be
said to be objectively likely to affect adversely the reputation of the IAAF’. Note that this was decided
in relation to a charge of acting in a manner likely to affect adversely the reputation of the IAAF. The
panel decided it was not necessary to decide the discrimination charge. However, the quote is still
instructive as to how the latter would be considered. See also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Shprygin,
Adj ref no 5/2019: Mr Shprygin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Football Union of
Russia, posted a picture on social media of an image of SS skull and crossbones (a symbol of special
SS groups during World War II and later used by neo-Nazi organisations), together with the colours
and name of Dynamo Moscow. The panel found this to be offensive and discriminatory. The Panel
noted ‘Mr Shyprygin’s arguments that it was merely a picture of a fan’s T-shirt, that the real intention
of the T-shirt cannot be established, that he was not aware of the meaning and that he had no malicious
intent, were entirely unconvincing and inexcusable. Mr Shyprygin rightfully recognizes that at least
a person holding his position, should double-check and verify the content of what is posted on social
media.’
B3.173 The objective test can present problems, particularly as ethics cases tend to
be dealt with by international governing bodies, not domestic ones. It is possible that
some conduct will be considered offensive in certain parts of the world, but not in
others.1
1 See IAAF Ethics Board v Vanessa Spinola, 05/2016, paras 17–19. The Panel accepted that the gesture
‘is not everywhere construed as a racist or offensive gesture […]. However, the Panel also recognises
that athletics is a global sport watched by millions of viewers, some of whom would reasonably
construe the Gesture to be highly offensive […]. It is reasonable to find even well-meant gestures
offensive, where they mimic racial, religious, gender or other personal characteristics and where the
gestures have previously given rise to widespread controversy and criticism’.
D Issues that arise in ethics proceedings

(a) Non-retroactivity
B3.174 It is a common feature of the major bribery and corruption cases that the
mischief is not discovered for many years. Moreover, often the individuals concerned
repeat the corrupt acts numerous times over that period of time. One consequence
is that there may have been regulatory changes in the interim or even entirely new
regulations introduced.1 In these circumstances the legal principle of tempus regit
actum, or non-retroactivity, demands that an act must be governed by the regulations
that were in force at the time that the act took place. This is a fundamental principle
of Swiss law (which is the applicable law in cases brought by many international
federations) and is a part of international public policy.2 An exception to this principle
is that if new regulations, that have come into force since the act was committed
are more favourable to the accused in relation to applicable sanctions, they may be
applied.3
1 See Joseph S. Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, para 95, Mr Blatter was accused of causing FIFA to
make an unlawful payment of CHF2 million. A key issue in the dispute was whether FIFA was party to
an oral agreement made in 1998 that created the obligation to pay the money. The payment was made
in 2011. On FIFA’s case, there was no oral agreement in 1998, so the violation took place in 2011,
whereas on Mr Blatter’s case, the obligation arose in 1998. If correct, there could be no violation of
a Code of Ethics, as the first version was introduced in 2004. The Panel did not find that there was an
oral agreement, so the violation took place in 2011 when a Code of Ethics was in force.
2 See para B1.40 et seq. For examples of the application of the principle in the context of claims for
breach of Codes of Ethics, Makudi v FIFA, CAS 2018/A/5769, para 81; FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr
Tai Nicholas, 6/2019 (E18-00005), paras 4–6.
3 See para B1.44.
(b) Investigations
B3.175 It is often the case that a corrupt act is only brought to a SGB’s attention
because of a state investigation1 or the work of an investigative journalist. This is
Misconduct 479
understandable to some extent as SGBs do not have the powers of investigation

available to the state, although they do benefit from a greater level of flexibility when
bringing charges against a participant, as they are not bound by some of the stricter
rules of evidence that often restrict prosecutors on criminal proceedings.2
1 See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Adj ref no 10/2019, paras 89 and 90.
Mr Ngaïssona, the president of the Central African Republic Football Association, was arrested by
the International Criminal Court. He was allegedly the most senior leader and the National General
Coordinator of the Anti-Balaka group and alleged to be responsible for committing crimes against
humanity and war crimes in the Central African Republic. In response to complaints that the Ethics
Committee did not conduct its own investigation, but instead relied on third-party investigations, the
Ethics Commission stated that ‘it can decide whether the evidence provided to it is significant or
insignificant depending on the particular circumstances of the case and the quality of the document
itself. It is the Panel’s opinion that, principally, the reports and documents of the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC, a warrant arrest of the Office, a report from a Panel of Experts of the United
Nations and an investigative report of the International Federation for Human Rights contain a
comprehensive analysis of the armed conflict […] and the participation of Mr Ngaïssona in these
events […]. It is undisputed that the entities involved in the elaboration of these reports are well
known and have a world recognition without their impartiality being put in question whatsoever […].
Their impartiality and expertise in the assessment of the above-mentioned matter is undisputed and no
elements contained in the case file could eventually justify a different approach’. See also FIFA Ethics
Committee v Mr Keramuudin Karim Adj ref no 12/2019 for a further example. Mr Karim was the
President of the Afghanistan Football Federation. He was accused by male Afghan Football Federation
officials of subjecting the female players to severe mental, physical, sexual and equal rights abuse.
FIFA representatives were unable to travel to Afghanistan due to security concerns. FIFA was able to
rely on, amongst other things, a committee set up by the Attorney General of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and ‘correspondence from the Afghan public authorities, cooperation with international
and local institutions’. In IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Dae-sung Moon, No 01-2016, Mr Dae-sung
Moon, an IOC member, was referred to the IOC Ethics Commission as he had been accused of having
plagiarised a doctoral thesis he wrote in in 2007 at Kookmin University in the Republic of Korea.
The university opened an investigation but despite promising to inform the Ethics Commission of
its conclusion, it never did. In 2013, the Ethics Commission noted that ‘in the absence of a decision
by Kookmin University, which alone is competent to assess the validity and quality of the doctoral
theses […] [the Ethics Commission] is unable to propose any recommendation to the IOC President’.
On 6 March 2014, Kookmin University made a finding of plagiarism and cancelled the degree. Mr
Moon appealed, but the decision was upheld by the Seoul first-instance court and the Seoul Court of
Appeal. Mr Moon announced that he was filling an appeal with the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Korea. With the 2016 Olympic Games approaching, the Ethics Commission decided to provisionally
suspend Mr Moon on the basis that the ‘plagiarism has been confirmed by two judicial instances of
the Republic of Korea’, and that this in itself ‘tarnishes the reputation of the Olympic Movement’,
pending the Supreme Court decision. This decision was taken without any apparent consideration of
the underlying evidence. It is not clear whether this suspension was ever lifted.
2 See Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, paras 62–68. In deciding that a secret audio recording that was
gathered illegally in Spain was admissible in evidence before it, the panel noted that ‘the authority by
which a sporting association may set its own rules and exert its disciplinary powers on its direct and
indirect members does not rest on public or penal law but on civil law […]. According to established
case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, only civil standards are relevant to the disciplinary sanctions
imposed by sport association. In particular the Swiss Federal Tribunal noted that criminal law
principles may not be applied when dealing with evidentiary issues in disciplinary cases’. See further
para B4.38.
B3.176 It is becoming increasingly common for the body responsible for policing
ethics provisions to appoint an independent person to investigate the issue. However,
that will not always be possible due to the limited resources available to some SGBs.
In those circumstances, the SGB may be forced to rely on evidence uncovered by
state investigations or investigative journalists.
B3.177 Some people take the view that there is a limit to what sport can do about
criminal behaviour when it is taking place at the highest levels. David Howman,
former head of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), noted that ‘Sport has no
real power or jurisdiction: governments do. There are already several international
treaties in being for corruption’.1 The calls for a unified approach to corruption
in sport akin to WADA in the field of anti-doping are likely to continue while the
scandals keep appearing on the front pages of newspapers. However, one issue is
what investigative powers such a body could have beyond those that SGBs already
exercise. The Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis concluded that
‘National authorities should implement more robust regulatory and enforcement
approaches to betting related corruption in sport. The International Governing Bodies
and national federations can use their influence with the nations in which they operate
to promote this. The current shortcomings include a lack of specific criminal laws
addressing match-fixing in sport, a lack of sufficient proactivity among some law
enforcement authorities in investigating and criminally prosecuting such conduct,
and inadequate national regulations governing betting operators. If legal safeguards
cannot be assured, tennis authorities have various options, including declining to
sanction events in countries that do not offer an adequate legal environment to
combat integrity threats and restricting the sale of official live scoring data for events
or to operators in such countries’.2
1 wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2015-10/speech-by-wada-director-general-david-howman-challenges-
to-the-integrity-of-sport [accessed 30 October 2020].
2 Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis Final Report, para 503.
B3.178 One increasingly common way of improving the position is to ensure that the
investigation and enforcement of ethics matters is carried out by a body independent
of, or one that is otherwise at arm’s length from, the relevant sporting federation.
There has been a recent trend in sport to increase this level of independence so
that the body is – and is seen to be – acting without fear or favour, although these
perceptions can be difficult to assuage, given that the funding for such bodies will
invariably come from the sports federation.
B3.179 Since 2008, responsibility for investigating and prosecuting betting-

related corruption offences in tennis has sat with the Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU), an
operationally independent body originally set up by the ATP, the WTA, the ITF and
the Grand Slam Board. Following an independent review,1 this level of independence
was increased by creating a new supervisory board of the TIU,2 the appointment
of an independent CEO3 whose remit included the appointment of TIU staff,4 and
establishing the TIU as a separate legal personality.5 Since 2012, the FIFA Ethics
Committee has been split into an investigatory arm (the Investigatory Chamber) and
an enforcement arm (the Adjudicatory Chamber).6 The members of each Chamber
are independent of FIFA, albeit that they are appointed by the FIFA Congress7
following recommendation from the 37 member FIFA Council. The independent
integrity unit model has also been adopted in athletics. Since 1 January 2017,
integrity matters in athletics have been investigated and enforced by the Athletics
Integrity Unit (AIU).8 The AIU Rules establish a number of safeguards to preserve
the operational independence of the AIU from the governing body, World Athletics
(previously the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)). In
particular, oversight of the AIU is provided by an independent Integrity Unit Board,9
which has wide ranging powers10 including in relation to the funding of the AIU,11
approving decisions of the Head of the AIU as to whether there is a case to answer
(and therefore whether a matter proceeds from the investigatory phase to the issue
of a charge),12 and appointing and terminating the employment of the Head of the
AIU.13 In 2019, the International Biathlon Unit established a Biathlon Integrity Unit
along similar lines. See Chapter A5 for more detail about these governance reforms.
1 tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/Independent%20Reviews/Final%20Report_191218.pdf
2 Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis Final Report, para 319.
3 Ibid, para 336.
4 Ibid, para 337.
5 Ibid, para 333.
6 FIFA Statutes June 2019 edition, para 28(2)(r).
Misconduct 481
7 Prior to 2017, integrity matters were enforced by an independently established body, the IAAF Ethics
Board (itself formerly the Ethics Commission). Investigations were carried out by an independent
investigator appointed by the Ethics Board (para C 16, Statutes of the IAAF Ethics Commission, at
Appendix 6 to the IAAF Code of Ethics).
8 The Integrity Unit Board also comprises one council member of World Athletics and the Head of the
Integrity Unit, but those members are non-voting (see Rule 4.2 of the Athletics Integrity Unit Rules in
force from 23 November 2019).
9 Athletics Integrity Unit Rules dated 23 November 2019, rule 5.1.
10 Ibid, rule 5.1.1.
11 Ibid, rule 5.1.10.
12 Ibid, rules 9.1 and 9.3.
13 biathlonworld.com/news/detail/historic-ibu-extraordinary-congress-marks-beginning-of-new-era-for-
ibu (19 October 2019) [accessed 30 October 2020].
B3.180 Cricket has implemented an additional safeguard, which involves an audit

committee carrying out an ethical risk assessment at least every two years that looks
to identify those ‘commercial arrangements and individuals that are most susceptible
to inappropriate influence in the ICC’s decision making process’.1
1 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, art 3.1.
(c) Standard of proof
B3.181 There is no universally applied standard of proof in ethics matters; rather,

the applicable standard is set by the rules of the relevant sport and its ethics bodies.1
This means that an act that constitutes misconduct in one sport may not in another
due to a higher standard of proof.
1 See Daniel Köllerer v Association of Tennis Professionals, Women’s Tennis Association, International
Tennis Federation & Grand Slam Committee, CAS 2011/A/2490A, para 29, as an example of the
non-universality of the approach of sport to the standard of proof in these matters. The CAS panel
noted that it ‘does not agree with the Appellant that it is required to apply a different standard of proof
on the basis of CAS jurisprudence. There is no universal (minimum) standard of proof for match-
fixing offences. The cases to which the Appellant refers concerned match fixing under the UEFA rules,
which did not provide for an applicable standard of proof, and the UEFA itself proposed to apply
in these cases the standard of proof of “comfortable satisfaction”. While the Panel acknowledges
that consistency across different associations may be desirable, in the absence of any overarching
regulation (such as the WADA Code for doping cases), each association can decide for itself which
standard of proof to apply, subject to national and/or international rules of public policy. The CAS
has neither the function nor the authority to harmonize regulations by imposing a uniform standard of
proof, where, as in the current case, an association decides to apply a different, specific standard in its
regulations’.
B3.182 The most common approach is to impose a standard of proof of ‘comfortable

satisfaction’.1 Comfortable satisfaction is commonly understood to mean a threshold
that falls between the balance of probabilities and beyond reasonable doubt. Many
ethics violations are of a more serious nature and can carry with them significant
sanctions, such as lifetime bans. As such, it is often the case that ethics violations
require evidence that satisfies tribunals towards the higher end of the ‘comfortable
satisfaction’ scale.
1 This is, for example, the approach taken by the UCI: UCI Cycling Regulations, rule 12.6.011. The test
applied by the FIFA Ethics Committee has recently changed from a test of ‘personal conviction’ (art 51
of the FIFA Code of Ethics 2012) to one of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ (art 48 of 2019 edition). CAS
jurisprudence has confirmed that the standard of proof of ‘personal conviction’ and that of ‘comfortable
satisfaction’ are the same in practice. See Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, para. 88: ‘The Panel
is of the view that, in practical terms, this standard of proof of personal conviction coincides with
the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard widely applied by CAS panels in disciplinary proceedings.
According to this standard of proof, the sanctioning authority must establish the disciplinary violation
to the comfortable satisfaction of the judging body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation.
It is a standard that is higher than the civil standard of “balance of probability” but lower than the
criminal standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (cf. CAS 2010/A/2172 Oriekhov v. UEFA,
para. 53; CAS 2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec, Zdraveski v. UEFA, para. 85). The Panel will thus
give such a meaning to the applicable standard of proof of personal conviction’. See also Bin Hammam
v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2625, at paras 30 to 39; Blatter v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4501, at paras 117 to 122.
This is relevant in practice as there are likely to continue to be cases prosecuted under the 2012 edition
of the FIFA Code of Ethics.
B3.183 That sports set differing parameters as to the standard of proof required
to satisfy the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ threshold can be seen when comparing the
approaches taken. For example, in athletics, the rules require that the ‘standard of
proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt’.1 In that way, under its current rules, the standard of proof
in athletics is never as high as the criminal standard.2 Conversely, cricket specifically
provides that, for the most serious offences, the standard of proof required is the
criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.3
1 World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules dated 1 November 2019, rule 10.1. This is copied from
the World Anti-Doping Code, as to which see para C5.2.
2 This marks a change from the position under the rules previously in force in athletics. Rule 11(7) of
the Procedural Rules of the Ethics Committee (in force from 1 May 2015) provided: ‘The standard
of proof in all cases shall be determined on a sliding scale from, at minimum, a mere balance of
probability (for the least serious violation) up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt (for the most serious
violation. The Panel shall determine the applicable standard of proof in each case’.
3 ICC Code of Ethics dated 10 May 2017, Appendix 4, rule A12.
B3.184 Some sports adopt a lower threshold altogether. Tennis is an example of

such an approach. Breaches of the ITF Code of Ethics are determined on the balance
of probabilities.1 The same is true for breaches of the IOC Code of Ethics;2 and
for ‘Corruption Offenses’ under the Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (applicable to
participants across the ITF, ATP, WTA and Grand Slams).3
1 Rule 5.1, Procedural Rules Governing Proceedings Before An Independent Tribunal Convened Under
ITF Rules (effective 1 January 2019).
2 IOC Code of Ethics 2020, art 3.3: ‘The standard of proof in all matters under this Code shall be the
balance of probabilities, a standard that implies that on the preponderance of the evidence it is more
likely than not that a breach of this Code has occurred’.
3 The Tennis Anti-Corruption Program has as its governing law the laws of the State of Florida (Section
K.2); the test is formulated as the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ (Section G.3(a)), which is equivalent
to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.
B3.185 In civil proceedings under English law, recent cases have emphasised that
there is only one standard of proof in civil matters (the balance of probabilities).
However, where courts have some flexibility is in assessing whether the evidence is
sufficient for the claimant to prove its case. In this regard, it has been said that ‘the
more serious the allegation or the more serious the consequences if the allegation
is proved, the stronger must be the evidence before a court will find the allegation
proved on the balance of probabilities’.1 This approach has been followed in sports
disciplinary proceedings.2
1 R v Mental Heath Review Tribunal (Northern Region) and Ors [2006] QB 468 at para 62.
2 See eg Fernando Forestieri v The Football Association, Football Association Appeal Board decision
dated 12 September 2019; The Football Association v Peter Beardsley, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 18 September 2019).
B3.186 Invariably, appeals from decisions made pursuant to sports ethics rules are
made to CAS. The CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration does not address the
standard of proof that will be applied in CAS arbitrations. Instead, the CAS Panel
will look to whether the relevant sport has specified a standard of proof.1
1 See eg Adamu v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, paras 80 and 81; also Bin Hammam v FIFA,
CAS 2011/A/2625, para 35. Where the relevant rules do specify a standard of proof, CAS will itself
apply that standard. For example, in Köllerer v Association of Tennis Professionals, Women’s Tennis
Association, International Tennis Federation & Grand Slam Committee, CAS 2011/A/2490, the CAS
panel upheld the standard of ‘preponderance of the evidence’ in respect of match-fixing charges
Misconduct 483
(which can be equated to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities). In doing so, the panel
rejected the Appellant’s arguments that this standard of proof violated rules of national or international
public policy and was void for unconscionability. However, the panel noted that, whilst the seriousness
of the offences did not require a higher standard of proof to be applied, it considered ‘that it needs to
have a high degree of confidence in the quality of the evidence’.
B3.187 In the absence of an express standard of proof in the applicable rules, the
CAS panel will determine the standard of proof to be applied. At CAS, this is typically
‘comfortable satisfaction’. The test has its origins in CAS anti-doping jurisprudence
dating back to 1996,1 but has been consistently applied in ethics matters where the
standard of proof is not expressly provided for in the relevant rules. In FK Pobeda,2
the Panel noted:
‘85. Taking into account the nature of the conduct in question and the paramount
importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering the
nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing bodies
of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities, the Panel is of the
opinion that cases of match fixing should be dealt in line with the CAS constant
jurisprudence on disciplinary doping cases. Therefore, the UEFA must establish
the relevant facts “to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind the
seriousness of allegation which is made” (CAS 2005/A/908 nr 6.2)’.
This position has been endorsed in several subsequent CAS cases.3
1 Korneev v International Olympic Committee and Gouliev v International Olympic Committee, CAS
OG 03-04. See further para C5.2.
2 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA CAS 2009/A/1920.
3 See eg Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 53; Football Club Metalist et al v FFU,
CAS 2010/A/2267, paras 730–734; Besiktas Jimnastik Kuliibii v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, paras
116–125; Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA, CAS 2014/A/3625, paras 131–133.
B3.188 Even where there is agreement as to the applicable standard of proof, there
still may be argument over what, precisely, that standard of proof means and how it
should be applied to the facts in question.1
1 Balakhnichev, Melnikov, Diack v IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4417 – 4419 – 4420, paras 205–219. The CAS
panel had to determine what was meant by proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. It stated: ‘This Panel
notes that [it] is sometimes suggested that this standard can be expressed in a certain percentage. This
is to be rejected. As quoted above: “a mechanical comparison of probabilities, no matter how strongly
it indicates guilt is not enough to justify such a finding”. This Panel agrees to the other approach quoted
above: “A charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt if, after you have compared and considered all
of the evidence, you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the charge is
true”. The key words in the authority quoted above are “belief” and “conviction”. Those are human
criteria and not, indeed, mathematical. It entails that human beings, judges, arbitrators can come to
different conclusions based on the same facts’.
(d) Competing jurisdiction
B3.189 A participant’s conduct might contravene the rules of more than one SGB at
different levels of the pyramid in the same sport. This is a more common occurrence
where Codes of Ethics are concerned, because the wrongful act may well contravene
not only the international federation’s Code of Ethics but also the equivalent rules
of the national association (or confederation) to which the individual is affiliated.
It would be unsatisfactory if the individual was not held to account because the
national association and international governing body left it to each other to deal
with. Conversely, it would be equally unsatisfactory if that individual was prosecuted
twice for the same act.
B3.190 There is rarely any real limitation on the ability of a SGB at any level to take
action should they wish to do so. Codes of Ethics tend to be silent on the point. There
are some exceptions, such as:
(a) World Athletics’ Code of Ethics, which confirms that nothing in the rules of
their member federations can usurp the jurisdiction of the international ethics
body;1 and
(b) FIFA, which provides that its Ethics Committee shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to investigate FIFA matters, whereas if the conduct does not relate to FIFA
matters, it can only take action if no ‘proper proceedings’ are taken at national
or confederation level within three months of the Ethics Committee learning of
the matter.2
Flexibility is required to deal with each issue on a case-by-case basis. The willingness
and ability of national federations may vary considerably from one jurisdiction to
another, and as a result an international federation may be forced to take action due
to a particular national association failing to prosecute or conducting an inadequate
investigation or, worse, looking to cover up the matter.
1 World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct dated 1 November 2019, art 4.8.2.
2 FIFA Code of Ethics 2019, art 30(2). See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Oden Charles Mbaga, Adj ref
no 13/2018. Mr Mbaga was a FIFA referee, affiliated to the Tanzanian Football Federation, who was
found guilty in 2019 of manipulating the results of international matches in 2010 and banned for life.
The FIFA Ethics Committee had determined that it was entitled to investigate the matter because of
‘the absence of a proper investigation at member association and confederation level’, at para 11. See
also FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Samson Siasia, Adj ref no 3/2019, paras 10–15.
(e) Relationship with criminal proceedings
B3.191 Conduct that is contrary to a Code of Ethics may also constitute a potential
criminal offence, which leads to criminal proceedings running concurrently with
ethics proceedings. Indeed, it is often the criminal investigation that brings the
conduct in question to the attention of the SGB.
B3.192 If criminal proceedings are anticipated or underway, the SGB will need to
balance several competing considerations in deciding how to proceed. The criminal
prosecutor will often have a preference for disciplinary proceedings to be stayed so
that the criminal proceedings are not prejudiced. The individual being charged may
be concerned that a jury would be improperly swayed by the fact that he has been
found guilty in disciplinary proceedings where a lower standard or proof applies.
On the other hand, they might be keen to press on and hope either that a successful
outcome has the opposite effect,1 or that they can use any sanction to their benefit in
mitigation.
1 In Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, paras 39 and 44, Mr Asif argued that the publication of the first
instance decision was contrary to his right to a fair trial in the subsequent criminal trial and therefore
rendered the first instance disciplinary decision, not the criminal decision, unlawful, null and void.
The CAS panel dismissed this point and stated: ‘Even if [this argument was] made out, it would mean
that the ICC and/or the Tribunal would be in contempt of court and/or that there would be prejudice
to the criminal proceedings. These factors would not necessarily have any impact on the substance
of the findings, which were considered and decided upon before publication of the Determination
(publication ex post cannot impugn analysis conducted ex ante and any prejudice to the subsequent
criminal proceedings does not impugn the analysis contained in the Determination). In addition, the
Panel notes that Mr Asif was himself eager for the Tribunal proceedings to advance and that when
afforded the opportunity, he did not object to the Tribunal proceedings advancing ahead of the criminal
proceedings. He cannot therefore now claim that such advancement was to his detriment’.
B3.193 Neither English nor Swiss law requires a SGB to stay disciplinary proceedings
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings.1 However, it may be advantageous for
the SGB to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings because, if the charge
is proven, the disciplinary proceedings may be easier to conduct, particularly as
more extensive evidence may have been gathered in the criminal proceedings due to
the greater investigatory powers available to the state. If the conduct is sufficiently
Misconduct 485
serious, it would be open to the governing body to suspend the individual whilst the
criminal proceedings are completed.2 However, that could take a long time,3 and
therefore it might be fairest to press on with the disciplinary proceedings, given that
the individual will be unable to earn a living in the meantime due to the suspension.
There may also be considerable public pressure on the SGB to take swift action and
it may need to be seen to do so to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
sport. If the SGB does decide to wait, it should give consideration to charging the
individual and then staying the proceeding, to avoid problems with any applicable
limitation periods.3
1 ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of the ICC Code
of Conduct Commission, para 27.1, in relation to an application to stay disciplinary proceedings:
‘there is no automatic right to have disciplinary proceedings postponed until criminal charges arising
out of the same factual matrix have been finally determined’; FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Patrice-
Edouard Ngaissona, Adj ref no 10/2019, paras 72 and 74 rejecting the argument that disciplinary
proceedings should be stayed because the criminal proceedings may arrive at a different decision,
because ‘the mere argument that there is a possibility that the state court may come up with a different
decision than that of the FIFA Ethics Committee is not a serious reason, as the possibility of conflicting
decisions is present in every case of parallel proceedings involving a decision of a sporting governing
body and a criminal court […] if one were to accept this argument, the FIFA adjudicatory proceedings
would end up always suspended’ (para 74). The FIFA panel also noted that there may be circumstances
where the protection of integrity in sport requires prompt action and the SGB cannot wait until state
proceedings have concluded (para 72). See also CAS 2010/A/2267 Football Club Metalist et al v FFU,
para 746 (same).
2 On 27 May 2015 14 individuals, of which nine were FIFA officials, were charged by the US Department
of Justice with racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering. At the time of writing, the investigation
is still ongoing with a new superseding indictment being unsealed on 6 April 2020 (justice.gov/usao-
edny/press-release/file/1266856/download [accessed 30 October 2020]). It is clear that these criminal
proceedings will continue to run for many years. For example, the US Department of Justice has
been trying to extradite Jack Warner from Trinidad and Tobago since 2015, but he still remains
there, despite having lost his final appeal in June 2019. See FIFA Ethics Committee v Mr Jose Maria
Marin, Adj ref no 23/2018: Mr Marin was charged by the US Department of Justice in 2015 with
racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracy. He was convicted but appealed. Whilst
the FIFA Ethics Committee opened its investigation in May 2015, it did not conclude its investigation
until 17 December 2018, which was three months after Mr Marin had been sentenced to four years in
prison by the US criminal courts. Mr Marin argued that the FIFA investigation was ‘a mere recitation
of the United States government’s case-in-chief’. He applied for a stay so he could focus on the appeal
of the conviction and not prejudice the criminal proceedings. The panel dismissed the application on
the basis that the disciplinary proceedings are separate, and the FIFA Ethics Committee is not obliged
to follow the outcome of state proceedings.
3 Codes of Ethics do not usually include limitation periods for investigation; however, there are
some exceptions. The FIFA Code of Ethics 2019 provides that as a general rule breaches cannot be
prosecuted after five years, save for certain offences such as bribery, which has a 10-year limitation
period. However, that limitation period shall be suspended where ‘criminal proceedings are formally
opened against a person’ (see Art 12). The UCI Code of Ethics 2019 has a ten-year limitation period
(see Arts 4).
B3.194 Where a Code of Ethics is international in scope, this can present Ethics
Committees with a number of challenges. First, an act may be a crime in one
country, but not another. Similarly, some conduct may be considered to be unethical
in certain cultures, but not others. Furthermore, the conduct in question may have
already been considered by one or more foreign courts. The extent to which an
Ethics Commission can simply rely on investigations and prosecutions by a State
is likely to vary considerably, given the variances in quality and reliability from
one jurisdiction to another. On the one hand, an Ethics Commission is independent
and should vigorously examine the evidence itself. On the other hand, a SGB does
not have the resources of a State and cannot be expected to investigate matters as
thoroughly. Historically, whilst Ethics Commission decisions stressed that they
needed to consider the conduct in question independently of any findings of a
criminal court, they would often simply rely on the fact that guilt was established by
a State to find a breach of the Code of Ethics in question.1 As a general rule, modern
national courts are better funded, benefit from more thorough investigations, and
are more sophisticated. The result is a more robust approach and proper scrutiny of
the underlying conduct. In 2018 a CAS tribunal had to resolve a technical, factually
complex dispute as to whether an individual had committed forgery in relation to the
amendment and adoption of changes to the statutes of the Football Association of
Thailand. It described the problem as follows:
‘Although it is certainly true that the Adjudicatory Chamber, the FIFA Appeal
Committee and the Panel in the present appeal arbitration proceedings are to make
their own independent investigation and that they should not simply rubberstamp the
outcome of criminal law proceedings, and while acknowledging that the standard of
proof to be applied is different, the majority of the Panel finds that it cannot be ignored
that the Bangkok Appeal Court may be better-positioned to appreciate the intricacies
of Thai law and the dealings of the [Department of Provincial Administration]’.2
1 See IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Guy Drut, No D/06/05. Mr Drut, an IOC member, was found
guilty by the Paris Criminal Court of illegally funding political parties. He said he did not appeal
against his conviction in order to spare his family, and continued to serve as mayor of his town. The
President of the French Republic granted him an amnesty that erased his sentence. However, the
Ethics Commission noted that the ‘removal of the sentence leaves intact the acts for which [he] was
sentenced. In this regard, the Ethics Commission recalls that whether or not the conduct of an Olympic
party is ethical is wholly independent of its criminal nature’. The panel felt compelled to rely on the
findings of the criminal court and sanction Mr Drut without independent consideration of the evidence.
See also IOC Ethics Commission v Mr Un Yong Kim, No D/01/05. Mr Un Yong Kim was the IOC Vice-
President and on 3 June 2004 he was found guilty by the Seoul Central District Court of embezzlement
and corruption and sentenced to two and a half years in prison (a sentence upheld by the Seoul Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea). The Ethics Commission noted that ‘whether or
not the conduct of an Olympic party is ethical is independent of whether such conduct may be qualified
as criminal. Indeed, the same acts may not be criminally punishable depending on the law in different
countries, but remain ethically reprehensible. A fortiori, serious acts for which a judicial authority
imposes a sentence must be considered as constituting conduct, which tarnishes the reputation of the
Olympic Movement […] and that it is not within the IOC Ethics Commission’s jurisdiction to assess
the validity of judicial decisions made by a country’s legal authorities […] it notes the fact of having
been found guilty […] [which] seriously tarnishes the reputation of the Olympic Movement’. The
Ethics Commission recommended that Mr Kim be expelled (Case No 1/04). This demonstrates the
willingness of some panels simply to rely on a conviction of a domestic court with no consideration
of the underlying evidence (although there is a tension between this position and the statement that
whether the conduct is ethical is independent of whether it is qualified as criminal). Mr Kim did accept
that he received a fair trial.
2 Makudi v FIFA, CAS 2018/A/5769, para 122.
B3.195 With limited exceptions,1 modern Codes of Ethics do not tend to engage
with the relationship between the code and criminal behaviour.2 This is likely to be
because each case needs to be examined on a case by case basis for the reasons set
out above. The procedural rules that govern how a breach of a code is prosecuted
typically defines how a panel should approach parallel disciplinary and other
proceedings.
1 The ITF, for example, notes that its Code of Ethics applies to conduct ‘notwithstanding local criminal
laws or other applicable laws or regulations’ (see para 1.6); and World Athletics’ Code of Conduct
notes that conduct that violates the code may also be criminal, that the code is intended to supplement
such laws with further rules of conduct, and that the code does not undermine those laws in any way
(para 4.6).
2 Whilst a panel is required to consider whether the conduct in question is a breach of the relevant
Code of Ethics, it may be swayed by what is commonly considered criminal. In Makudi v FIFA,
CAS 2018/A/5769, paras 101–103, a CAS panel was required to consider the necessary elements of
forgery as far as Art 17 of the FIFA Code of Ethics was concerned. The panel noted that it had ‘some
doubts about whether there must have been an intent to cause damages or gain a benefit. Given that
criminal law, English and Swiss criminal law in particular, determine that forgery is only committed
if there is an intent to prejudice someone or to cause financial loss or damage or obtain an unlawful
advantage, the Panel considers it questionable whether a sport governing body like FIFA can use the
same terminology (ie falsification) in its regulations, while at the same time detaching such terms from
the constitutive requirements commonly associated therewith’.
CHAPTER B4
Match-Fixing and Related Corruption

Iain Higgins (USA Cricket), Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP), Adam Lewis QC
(Blackstone Chambers) and Tom Mountford (Blackstone Chambers)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B4.1
2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM...................................................................... B4.3
A As the sports betting market grows ever larger, match-fixing scandals
have beset sport after sport........................................................................... B4.3
B The response of the Olympic Movement..................................................... B4.13
C The response of the UK Government.......................................................... B4.14
D The response of the Council of Europe: the Macolin Convention............... B4.17
3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN
SPORT................................................................................................................. B4.18
A Who should be subject to the rules?............................................................ B4.19
B What conduct should be prohibited?............................................................ B4.20
4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES........................................ B4.36
A Standard of proof......................................................................................... B4.37
B Evidence....................................................................................................... B4.38
C Provisional suspension................................................................................. B4.39
D The impact of criminal proceedings............................................................ B4.40
5 SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES.......................................................... B4.41
6 PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES......... B4.44
A Intelligence-gathering and investigations..................................................... B4.45
B Obtaining information from third parties..................................................... B4.47
C Working with the Gambling Commission and the police............................ B4.48
7 THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY?......................... B4.55
1 INTRODUCTION
B4.1 Match-fixing and related corruption is, like doping, an insidious threat to
the essence of sport, taking away uncertainty of outcome and thereby compromising
the integrity of the sporting contest, and therefore its attraction for participants and
spectators, and so its commercial value.1 This form of corruption is clearly primarily
fuelled by those who wish to cheat on the betting markets,2 but its adverse impact
spreads far beyond the defrauding of bookmakers and punters. If the authenticity of
the sporting spectacle is exposed just once as a façade, confidence in every sporting
achievement is corroded.3 The story of the young baseball fan pleading with the
1919 World Series fixer, ‘Shoeless’ Joe Jackson – ‘Say it ain’t so, Joe!’ – may well be
apochryphal,4 but it captures succinctly the faith-shattering betrayal of trust that such
corruption represents. That is why match-fixing is seen as a ‘mortal danger’ to sport,5
‘a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game’.6 And that is also
why, as addressed below, the English courts and the Court of Arbitration for Sport
alike have consistently upheld robust regulatory efforts to stamp out that ‘cancer’,7
and why sports have gone to great lengths to investigate the problems that they face,
and to address them both at the level of prior prevention and at the level of detection
and sanction, in a manner designed to restore confidence in the integrity of their

competitions.8
1 See eg Pound, ‘Responses to Corruption in Sport’ (Play the Game Conference, 3 October 2011) (‘It
is of the essence of sport that the outcome of any contest is uncertain, depending upon a combination
of factors, including the skill of the players, the playing conditions, tactics, conditioning and many
others. This is what makes sport interesting and exciting for player and spectator alike. Activities
which put in doubt the reality of the competition destroy the essence of the competition’). See also
then-IOC President Jacques Rogge, 1 March 2011 (‘Sport is based on a hierarchy that derives its
social and moral values from the concept of merit. The winner should be the one who has poured the
most lawful resources into their preparation or who has worked the hardest. If in future the concept
of a champion as a model of excellence becomes tarnished by the manipulation of matches or the
corruption of players, then the entire credibility of sport will vanish. […] There are already countries
where football competitions are no longer credible and where the public has very clearly lost interest
in that sport’).
For a discussion of the fight against doping in sport, see Section C (Anti-Doping Regulation and
Enforcement). While there are far more reported cases of doping than of match-fixing (Gorse and
Chadwick, ‘The prevalence of corruption in international sport’ (CIBS, 2011), p 2: ‘Of the 2,089
cases collated [from between 2000 and 2009], 95.64% were doping cases […] 2.73% of cases collated
were examples of match-fixing (betting and non-betting related) with 1.63% of the cases being
examples of the misuse of inside information for betting purposes’), many argue that match-fixing
is worse than doping, because doping is at least cheating to win, whereas match-fixing is cheating to
lose. See eg Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anti-corruption strategy’, (2013) 11(4) World Sports
Law Report 14. And some sports, such as football, appear to believe that match-fixing is a much
bigger threat for them than doping. See eg Harris, ‘Gambling is “bigger threat to sport than doping”’,
(2009) Independent, 6 March (‘One senior official explained the threat to the country’s most popular
spectator events, saying: “Football, rugby and cricket don’t have a doping problem, but they know
they have serious gambling problems”’). See also Gorse and Chadwick, ‘The prevalence of corruption
in international sport’ (CIBS, 2011), p 3 (‘Globally, whilst athletics followed by American sports
(baseball, American football, basketball) and cycling had the highest incidents of doping, football
represented the principal sporting medium for incidents of betting related match-fixing’).
2 See para B4.4.
3 See eg the comments of England cricketer Paul Collingwood after the news broke of Pakistani players
deliberately bowling ‘no balls’ during the England-Pakistan Test match at Lord’s in August 2010 (see
para B4.22): ‘once those allegations were made it just devalued everything we had achieved in the
series. You could see that in the way we celebrated taking those last wickets to win the match and the
series; it was joyless. Poor Jonathan Trott and Stuart Broad, both of whom had made brilliant hundreds
to get us out of the mire at 102-7, were devastated by the allegations. I have no doubt that Pakistan
were trying their hardest to break their partnership and that Trott and Broad’s achievement was 100%
valid, but inevitably people start to see shadows everywhere. […] I love this game because it is two
teams playing honestly against each other and the best team win. If we cannot provide something the
public can believe is 100% straight, then forget it, the game is gone. No player will want to play it and
no spectator will want to watch it. That’s why I advocate penalties and the strongest deterrents. To me,
anyone found guilty of match-fixing or spot-fixing should be banned for life’ (Mail Online, 10 October
2010). See also the remarks of Mr Justice Cooke when sentencing the three Pakistani cricketers and
their agent involved in that spot-fixing, in R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, 3 November 2011, para 1:
‘The gravamen of the offences committed by all four of you is the corruption in which you engaged in
a pastime, the very name of which used to be associated with fair dealing on the sporting field. “It’s not
cricket” was an adage. It is the insidious effect of your actions on professional cricket and the followers
of it which make the offences so serious. The image and integrity of what was once a game, but is now
a business is damaged in the eyes of all, including the many youngsters who regarded three of you as
heroes and would have given their eye teeth to play at the levels and with the skill that you had. You
procured the bowling of 3 no balls for money, to the detriment of your national cricket team, with
the object of enabling others to cheat at gambling. Now, whenever people look back on a surprising
event in a game or a surprising result or whenever in the future there are surprising events or results,
followers of the game who have paid good money to watch it live or to watch it on TV, in the shape
of licence money or TV subscriptions, will be led to wonder whether there has been a fix and whether
what they have been watching is a genuine contest between bat and ball. What ought to be honest
sporting competition may not be such at all’.
4 See Asinof and Gould, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series (Owl Books, 1963).
5 ‘Platini reiterates “mortal danger” facing football’, (2011) insidewordfootball.biz, 18 September.
IOC President Jacques Rogge said ‘together with doping, [match-fixing] is now the biggest threat
facing sports’. See Braw, ‘You can cure cancer, but you can’t cure doping and illegal betting’,
huffingtonpost.com, 9 January 2012.
6 ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, ECB Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (‘Self evidently,
corruption, specifically spot fixing, in cricket or any other sport for that matter, is a cancer that eats
at the health and very existence of the game. For the general public, supporting the game and their
Match-Fixing and Related Corruption 489
team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend time, money or effort to watch a match whose
integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the public’s disengagement from cricket would be
catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply cannot afford to have its reputation tarnished
in the eyes of commercial partners. These partners could not and would not link their brand to a sport
whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who have devoted their entire careers to the
pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have those genuine achievements called
into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend to devalue their worth. Accordingly,
we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted out of the game of cricket’, expressly
approved on appeal, Kaneria v Westfield, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 5). See also
Verbruggen, Foreword to ‘Sport Accord: Integrity in Sport (understanding and preventing match-
fixing)’ (November 2011) (‘Fans must believe that what they see on the field of play represents a
true test of the competitors’ skills. If they cannot, there is a real risk that they will ignore sport and
take sponsors and broadcasters with them’). In the sentencing of the former Premiership footballer
Delroy Facey upon his conviction for match-fixing under the Bribery Act 2010, Judge Mary Stacey
also adopted the language of match-fixing as a cancer, telling Facey, ‘It’s about the fans of the teams
involved, the families who follow the fortunes of their teams with passion, loyalty and devotion. You
have betrayed all that trust, all that confidence and it’s like a cancer at the heart of football’ (bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-england-32512704 [accessed 30 October 2020]). The risk of sponsors and broadcasters
pulling their investments from sports that do not take rigorous action against match-fixing should not
be underestimated. When the News of the World printed its exposé of spot-fixing at the Lord’s Test
match between England and Pakistan in August 2010 (see para B4.22), the ICC’s commercial partner,
ESPN Star Sports, wrote to the ICC within the week, noting the adverse impact that such scandals
have on the commercial value of the broadcasting and sponsorship rights to cricket events, and calling
on the ICC to take prompt and decisive action against corruption in the sport so as to protect the sport
and the value of the rights granted to its commercial partners. See also ‘Serie A rights-holder Sky
Italia urges action on match-fixing in Italy’ (2011) Sportcal.com, 13 June. Indeed, commercial partners
have pulled out of sport in the wake of match-fixing scandals. See eg ‘Renault suffers twin sponsor
blow’, 24 September 2009, news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/motorsport/formula_one/8273965.stm [accessed
30 October 2020] (sponsors ING and Mutua Madrilena terminated sponsorship arrangements with
Renault F1 after it was found guilty of fixing 2008 Singapore Grand Prix by ordering Nelson Piquet
Jr to crash deliberately to gain an advantage for his team-mate Fernando Alonso); ‘Japan Sumo
Association announces record losses after match-fixing scandal’, Sportcal.com, 23 February 2012
(losses caused by cancellation of Grand Sumo Tournament and decision of national broadcaster not
to broadcast replacement event); ‘Puma drop Bafana over fixing scandal’, iol.co.za/sport/soccer,
21 October 2013 [accessed 30 October 2020] (Puma terminated supply contract for SA national team
after revelations referees were bribed to fix 2010 World Cup warm-up matches). See also Institut
de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to
preserve the integrity of sport’ (2012) SportAccord, 13 February, pp 4 and 45 (‘sport will die if the
public and sports authorities do not take action to combat fraud’, citing the example of the Chinese
professional football league, which, because of corruption leading to the imprisonment of several
executives of the federation, resulted in the main sponsor and television broadcaster refusing to renew
their contracts with the league).
7 See paras B4.41 to B4.43.
8 As addressed in para B4.10, in 2018 an Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis commissioned by
all the tennis governing bodies (ITF, ATP, WTA, and Grand Slams) reported on the nature and scale
of match-fixing and related breaches of integrity faced by the sport and the adequacy of its efforts to
address the problem, and made recommendations as to the future. An Interim Report was published
in April 2018, supported by a Record of Evidence and Analysis, and a Final Report in December
2018. Thereafter the tennis governing bodies took extensive steps to implement the recommendations.
The documents collectively provide a good overview of the phenomenon, the difficulties faced in
addressing it, and some of the ways forward. The documents are available on the Tennis Integrity
Unit’s website, tennisintegrityunit.com (‘Tennis Integrity Reports’).
B4.2 We provide below a brief overview of the recent history of match-fixing in

sport, with crises in cricket, horseracing, tennis, and football eventually prompting
not only action within those sports individually, but also concerted action both at
national level in the UK, and internationally under the auspices of the International
Olympic Committee and the Council of Europe (Section 2); we analyse the rules
that sports governing bodies (SGBs) have put in place to try to address the problem
(Section 3) and the procedural and practical issues arising in the enforcement of
those rules (Sections 4 and 5); we discuss the efforts that have been made in the UK
to develop productive partnerships between SGBs, the Gambling Commission and
the police to facilitate the gathering of intelligence and the effective enforcement of
the rules (Section 6); and we offer some thoughts about the future (Section 7). As
with the rest of this book, our focus is on English law, and in particular on the body of
jurisprudence produced by the English courts and the Court of Arbitration for Sport
when ruling on challenges to decisions made by sports tribunals in cases of match-
fixing and/or related corruption.1
1 We do not deal here with ‘non-competition focused’ corruption (ie ‘where the threat is related to a
management decision over who gets to host events, who gets media or marketing rights to events,
who gets nominated or elected for important management positions in sport’) (Oxford Research A/S,
‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’ (April 2010), p 7), albeit that there are some who
argue that corruption on the field is facilitated, if not encouraged, by corruption in the governance
of the sport. Some forms of non-competition focused corruption may have very obvious effects on
the pitch, such as ‘transfer bungs’ in football to persuade a manager to bring about the signing of a
particular player. These forms of corruption may have even more direct effect; for example, a manager
accepting bribes relating to matters such as team selection and substitutions to ensure that appearance
fees are triggered. These issues are addressed in other parts of the book, including Chapter A5 (Best
Practice in Sports Governance) and Chapter B3 (Misconduct).
2 THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM
A As the sports betting market grows ever larger, match-fixing

scandals have beset sport after sport
B4.3 Although the earliest reported example of match-fixing may have been
motivated by a desire only for personal glory,1 and although there may also be other
non-monetary motivations for match-fixing,2 there is little doubt that most match-
fixing and related corruption is fuelled by those wishing to cheat on the sports betting
markets. The link between sport and betting has existed for centuries,3 but it expanded
steadily during the 20th century, as fans adopted betting as a way of demonstrating
their attachment to particular sports and teams;4 and as betting on sport grew, so did
match-fixing and related corruption. Taking just a few notorious examples: in 1910
four Australian Rules footballers were banned from the sport (two of them for five
years, two for life) for accepting bribes from bookmakers to underperform in club
matches;5 ten years later, eight members of the Chicago White Sox baseball team
were banned for life for accepting $5,000 each from a gambling syndicate to throw
matches against the Cincinnati Reds in the 1919 World Series;6 in 1951, the New
York District Attorney arrested three stars of the CCNY college basketball team, the
national champions, for fixing games for money;7 in 1964, four English footballers
were jailed for bribery, corruption and defrauding bookmakers after they agreed to
lose a forthcoming match and placed winning bets on that outcome;8 and in 1989
Pete Rose, the head coach of the Cincinnati Reds, was banned from baseball for life
for betting on matches involving his team.9
1 It is said that in the Olympic Games in 388BC, Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his competitors
in a fighting tournament to allow him to win a gold medal. See Maennig, ‘Corruption in International
Sports and Sport Management: Forms tendencies, extent and countermeasures’, (2005) 5(2) European
Sport Management Quarterly, pp 187–225.
3 The laws of both cricket and golf were codified for the first time in 1744 in order to facilitate betting
on those sports. Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford,
February 2008), p 1.
4 The ‘football pools’ concept (in which individuals attempt to predict the outcome of top-level football
matches each week) became widely popular within the UK in the first half of the 20th century, with
the first ‘Littlewoods’ pools coupons being distributed to football fans outside Manchester United’s
Old Trafford ground in 1923. There were also steadily increasing volumes of gambling on different
sports in high street betting shops. See footballpools.com/cust?action=GoHelp&help_page=about_us
5 Fagan, ‘How Gambling Ruined Sport’, sfaganweb.wordpress.com/2012/12/02/how-gambling-ruined-
sport [accessed 30 October 2020].
6 Asinof and Gould, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World Series (Owl Books, 1963).
7 Time Magazine, ‘Sport: The Big Money’, 26 February 1951, content.time.com/time/magazine/

article/0,9171,814439,00.html [accessed 29 November 2020].
8 For several years, professional footballer Jimmy Gauld had systematically interfered with Football
League matches, enticing players into fixing matches and betting on the outcome. His criminality
came to light in December 1962, after he approached Sheffield Wednesday player David Layne, a
former colleague at Mansfield Town, to identify a new target game. Layne suggested that Wednesday
were likely to lose their imminent match against Ipswich Town, and proposed to his fellow players
Peter Swan and Tony Kay that they ensure that outcome. The three all bet against their own side in the
match. In 1964, Gauld sold his story to the Sunday People for £7,000, incriminating not only the three
Wednesday players, but also himself. All four received jail sentences. See Simon Inglis, Soccer in the
Dock (Collins, 1985).
9 Report of John Dowd to the Commissioner of Major League Baseball in the Matter of Peter Rose,
manager of the Cincinnati Reds, 9 May 1989, seanlahman.com/rose/dowd/dowd_i.html [accessed
30 October 2020].
B4.4 Sports betting markets (both regulated and unregulated, and both legal and
illegal1) have grown ever bigger over the end of the 20th century and the first part of
the 21st century, with the explosion of online betting fuelled by the globalisation of
live sports broadcasting leading to a radical shift of business from high-street betting
shops to online platforms that enable betting on sports events from remote locations 24
hours a day.2 At the same time, bookmakers have developed new betting products, each
of which offers new opportunities for manipulation and corruption, including ‘spread’
betting,3 ‘in-play’ betting,4 ‘spot’ betting,5 betting exchanges that allow the punter to
‘lay’ (ie bet against) a particular outcome,6 and the possibility of ‘cashing out’ a bet
before the end of an event.7 Such products allow betting on certain outcomes without
the need for a player to throw an entire match, for example in tennis by deliberately
losing a set but going on to win the match. They also allow fixing that shifts the in-
play odds, however marginally, allowing for a greater return to be made. At the same
time, betting algorithms have been developed that allow rapid betting on marginal
odds shifts, and ‘courtsiders’ have reported scores at a match ahead of the official
feed, allowing the odds to be beaten. These developments have prompted the reported
infiltration of organised crime into sports betting,8 attracted by both the money-
laundering opportunities and the opportunity to guarantee substantial returns through
fixing.9 This has been aided by the significantly more relaxed controls placed upon the
Asian betting markets by the bookmakers in those markets: they do not restrict stakes,
require registration and identification, or close down suspect markets as quickly as
European-regulated bookmakers.10 At the same time, in sports such as tennis, they have
also facilitated ‘self-funded’ low level and low value corruption, where, for example,
players outside the tours can make small amounts of additional money by themselves
betting on certain outcomes.11 As a result, in the last decade of the 20th century and the
first two decades of the 21st, the most popular sports for betting (cricket, horseracing,
tennis and football) have suffered a series of corruption scandals.
1 Sports betting may be with regulated or unregulated operators and is against the law in many countries.
Until recent developments, with the repeal of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
lifting the federal ban on sports betting, it has been illegal in much of the United States. Islamic
countries such as Pakistan outlaw all forms of betting. Betting is also prohibited for cultural reasons in
India (except for betting on horseracing) and other Asian countries. However, betting is nevertheless
rife in many of those countries. In 2012 journalist Ed Hawkins estimated that there were as many
as 100,000 illegal bookmakers in India, serving millions of punters: Hawkins, ‘Bookie, gambler,
fixer, spy’ (AIPS Media 2012). 2019 estimates place the size of India’s underground betting market
at between $45bn and $150bn: ‘Cricket World Cup: Illegal bookmakers still thriving’, BBC News,
14 July 2019. In January 2013, Interpol told delegates at a conference that ‘illegal betting which drives
match-fixing encompasses a market that is said to be in the range of hundreds of billions of Euros
per year, with estimates that the large bookmakers have revenues on the same scale as the Coca-Cola
company’: ‘Match-fixing proceeds “on same scale as Coca-Cola revenues”’, Sportcal.com, 18 January
2013. According to Transparency International and the Asian Racing Federation, Asia accounts for
80 percent of the estimated $500 billion in illegal betting volumes globally.: ‘Authorities across Asia
battle illegal gambling surge ahead of World Cup’, Reuters, 11 June 2018.
2 See eg IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’
(SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 49 (‘The risk of fraud that is currently threatening the integrity
of our sporting competitions is the result of an interaction between the vulnerabilities intrinsic to the
operation of the world of sport, and the formation of a worldwide betting market, one section of which
is totally unregulated’); Monitor Quest, ‘Guarding the Game: preserving the integrity of sport’ (March
2011), p 9 (‘Today the lure of fame and fortune remain powerful inducements to cheat or misbehave,
but the sheer amount of money at stake and the new technologies to enhance performance and facilitate
cheating provide a powerful incentive multiplier. Globalisation makes contemporary integrity threats
more costly and potentially more damaging to both the business and the social import of sports as well
as more difficult to prevent and contain’); Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting
corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), pp 2–3 (‘The availability of e-betting has increased
the liquidity of sports wagering markets, made them more competitive, promoted the growth of new
modes of betting (exchanges and index (spread) betting) and facilitated the offering of new types of
bet and of in-play betting. All of these changes have potential to affect incentives for athletes and
officials to participate in fixing […] The rising volumes of betting in themselves make the incentive to
fix greater. In a market with low liquidity, the amount of money that a syndicate could stake without
driving the odds against itself is limited, reducing the payoff from an initial investment in bribery.
Potentially the greatest absolute rewards to a successful fix will be found in the most liquid markets
and here the risks of detection will also be lower since high bets will be commonplace’).
For many reasons, not least the fact that sports betting is an illegal activity in many countries (see n
1), the value of the global sports betting market is very difficult to estimate with any degree of certainty.
A January 2011 AIPS symposium was told that in 1995 there had been 200 betting companies around
the world with gross revenues of €4 billion, but that had grown by 2010 to 10,000 betting companies
with gross revenues of €19 billion; and that in Italy in 2010 there was approximately €9.7 billion of
betting, of which approximately €5.5 billion was illegal betting: ‘Federations “must adapt to money
in sport” in fight against illegal betting and corruption’, Sportcal.com, 28 January 2011. In 2011
consultants appointed by SportAccord asserted that the size of the legal sports betting market had
grown exponentially during the period 2000–2010, with total sales volume reaching €100m in 2010
(SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 27). In 2013 Sportradar estimated the
value of the market at ‘anywhere between $700bn and $1tn a year’: Football betting – the global
gambling industry worth billions’, BBC Sport, 3 October 2013; while an investigation by the UK
data and technology publication Wired in 2019 estimated the sports betting market to be worth
€1.47tn (around $1.73tn): ‘Inside the endless fight to kill the $1 trillion match-fixing industry’, Wired,
9 July 2019.
3 Rather than a simple ‘win or lose’ outcome (as in the case of ‘fixed odds’ betting), in ‘spread betting’
the bet is based on beating the ‘spread’, ie the predicted score-line (eg ‘Green Bay Packers to
win by 14 points’) or number of goals/points/other incidents in the match, with the winnings (or
losings) a multiple of the amount by which the punter beats (or fails to beat) the spread. Spread
betting therefore carries a high level of risk and reward, with potential losses or gains far in excess of
the original money staked. See eg SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 21.
And as a result, guaranteeing the outcome by corrupting the participants in the match is all the more
attractive. For example, in his 2009 autobiography, ‘Taking Le Tiss’, the former Southampton FC
captain, Matthew Le Tissier, revealed that when Southampton played Wimbledon in 1995, he planned
to kick the ball directly into touch from the kick-off to beat the bookmakers, who were predicting
that it would take nearly a minute to go out. Le Tissier claimed that he would have made nearly
£10,000 from spreadbetting by his friends, but one of his team-mates, unaware of the bet, stopped the
ball from going out: ‘Le Tissier in failed betting scam’, (news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/teams/s/
southampton/8236108.stm (3 September 2009) [accessed 30 October 2020]).
4 ‘Live’ or ‘in-game’ betting, ie betting while the event is being played, provides further opportunities
for participants to manipulate the action to gain an advantage for themselves or their co-conspirators.
See ‘FIFA and UEFA take on in match betting’, insideworldfootball.biz, 30 March 2011 (football
governing bodies assert live betting increases risks of corruption); IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and
corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), pp 39–40 and
p 70 (‘firstly, it is not easy to control in real time, secondly, some types of bet are easier to manipulate,
and thirdly betters can – and do – adapt their behaviour in line with variations in the market odds.
Some criminals are suspected of influencing matches directly from the side of the pitch by using
various codes’). See generally Gambling Commission, ‘In-running (In-play) betting: position paper’
(September 2016).
5 ‘Spot’ betting involves the offering of odds on specific incidents during the match, such as the winning
margin of the first set in a tennis match, the nature of the first points scored in a rugby match (try,
penalty, drop-goal), or the number of runs scored in a ten-over period (or ‘bracket’) in a cricket
match. See the various examples listed by Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting
corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), pp 8–9 and Appendix C. Because of the ease with
which the outcome can be controlled by an individual participant, such bets carry a significant risk
of corrupt manipulation, particularly since they allow the athlete to make illicit earnings from one
aspect of a match without having to lose the match itself. For example, in cricket, during England’s
second innings in the Lord’s Test match between Pakistan and England in August 2010, the Pakistan
fast-bowler, Mohammad Amir, bowled what is regarded as being one of the best fast-bowling spells
of all time against England, taking four wickets for only eighteen runs. And yet, in the middle of that
inspired spell, he deliberately bowled a ‘no ball’ that had no bearing at all on the outcome of the game,
but that had been pre-agreed (along with two others, one by him, one by fellow bowler Mohammad
Asif) for corrupt purposes. See ICC v Amir, Asif and Butt, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated
5 February 2011 (discussed at para B4.22). In 2012, former Southampton footballer Claus Lundekvam
reportedly confessed: ‘We could make deals with the opposing captain about, for example, betting on
the first throw, the first corner, who started with the ball, a yellow card or a penalty. Those were the
sorts of things we had influence over. The match results were never on the agenda’: ‘Player arrested
in Norwegian match-fixing probe’, uk.reuters.com, 11 July 2012. Tennis offers the opportunity for
players to fix a particular element of a match, such as a game, or a set, without losing the match, see
Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10). So too in snooker a particular frame can be fixed, see WBPSA v
Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013, aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated
15 May 2014, and the more recent investigations and subsequent bans given to Yu Delu (10 years and
9 months) and Cao Yupeng (six years) following an investigation by the World Professional Billiards
and Snooker Association: ‘Yu Delu and Cao Yupeng match-fixing: Chinese pair banned in snooker
corruption scandal’, BBC Sport, 1 December 2018.
Spot fixing has increased in prevalence despite the fact that it does not fit the typical idea of a liquid
betting market. Ordinarily, the higher the volume of trading, the higher the stakes that can be placed
without shifting the bookmakers’ odds unfavourably (see para 3.1 of B Van Rompuy, ‘The Odds of Match
Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity Risk of Certain Sports Bets’ (Asser Institute, January 2015).
6 On person-to-person betting exchanges (such as the one operated by Betfair, which was founded
in 2000), betting odds are offered by individual punters, not by a professional bookmaker. So, for
example, if an individual disagrees with the odds that the market has set for a particular bet, he can
offer his own odds on an on-line betting exchange and take bets at those odds, with the exchange taking
a commission. Such exchanges offer obvious opportunities for manipulation, in particular by enabling
individuals to offer odds and take bets on a team or a participant to lose rather than to win. Indeed, it
was betting on his own horses to lose that got Miles Rodgers banned from horseracing (see para B4.19,
n.8) and it was Betfair, acting on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding it had entered into with
the Jockey Club (see para B4.49) that tipped the Jockey Club off to his corrupt activities.
7 Cash out allows the individual to get money back on the bet(s) they have placed before the event
being betted on is over. Such amount to be received is determined at the point at which the individual
chooses to ‘cash out’ on the basis of the likelihood at that time of the bet(s) winning. Cashing out
is typically offered alongside ‘in-play’ betting: Gambling Commission, ‘Understanding the cash
out option’, gamblingcommission.gov.uk/for-the-public/Safer-gambling/Consumer-guides/Betting/
Understanding-the-cash-out-option.aspx [accessed 30 October 2020].
8 See eg Europol Report into ‘The involvement of organised crime groups in sports corruption’
(5 August 2020), which estimates the global annual criminal proceeds from betting-related match-
fixing to be €120 million: ‘Sports corruption is a serious crime involving organised crime groups
operating transnationally. These gangs are often poly-criminal and can well serve as a platform
for organised crime groups to further high-scale money laundering schemes […]. Online betting is
increasingly used by organised crime groups to manipulate sports competitions and criminals usually
target lower-level competitions across different sports, with football and tennis the most targeted sports
by criminal networks’. An example of the specifics of such organised criminal activity that has been
prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic is the institution of ‘ghost matches’, whereby organised
crime groups advertise fake games on social media, blogs or fake websites, in order to make money
from bets subsequently placed. The intersection between organised crime and sports betting was first
articulated in 2012: IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of
sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 5 (‘The increasingly frequent presence of transnational
criminal organisations in instances of corruption in sport is a major concern. […] The increase in
sports betting throughout the world represents a windfall for criminal organisations […] Sports betting
also represents a money-laundering opportunity for criminal organisations’); ‘Match-fixing proceeds
“on same scale as Coca Cola revenues”’, Sportcal.com, 18 January 2013 (Interpol secretary-general
Ron Noble: ‘Criminal organisations benefit from match-fixing in the profits it promises and in its
ability to launder their ill-gotten gains from other criminal activities. Match-fixing is clearly a many-
headed dragon that we must slay with a coordinated national and international effort’).
9 Due to increasing competition among online sports betting companies, average pay-out rates
have reportedly increased to over 92 per cent of the total amounts staked: SportAccord Report,
‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011); ‘Protecting the Integrity of Sport Competition: The Last Bet
for Modern Sport’, Sorbonne-ICSS Integrity Report, 2012–14, (Laurent Vidal, 2014), researchgate.
net/publication/280112161_Protecting_the_Integrity_of_Sport_Competition- The_Last_Bet_for_
Modern_Sport [accessed 30 October 2020]. This explains why sportsmen and women are offered
so much to fix matches. See further, eg sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Cooke in R v Majeed,
Butt, Asif and Amir, 3 November 2011, para 11.4 (‘There is evidence of a telephone call [with a
bookmaker], conducted in the presence of the journalist, where there was discussion of $1m changing
hands. You told the journalist that it would cost £50,000–£80,000 to fix a bracket, £400,000 to fix a
20/20 match result, anything between £300,000-£450,000 to fix a one day international and £1m to fix
a test match’). See also ibid. para 16 (‘Notional punters stood to gain sums in excess of £150,000 from
cheating when gambling on 3 no balls and more in respect of a maiden over’).
10 See para 5.2 of B Van Rompuy, ‘The Odds of Match Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity Risk of
Certain Sports Bets’ (Asser Institute, January 2015).
11 See Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.
(a) Cricket
B4.5 In the period between 1994 and 2001, numerous investigations and
enquiries were undertaken into match-fixing in international cricket, involving all
of the leading cricket-playing countries. Listed in the Condon Report,1 they included
an inquiry into 1994 allegations by an English cricketer, Don Topley, ultimately
unproven, that English country cricket teams had pre-agreed the outcome of their
matches for their mutual benefit; an inquiry established by the Sri Lankan Cricket
Board into suspected deliberate under-performance by the national team during a
tour to India due to the influence of an Indian bookmaker; admissions by Australian
star players Mark Waugh and Shane Warne that they had accepted money from an
Indian bookmaker in exchange for weather and pitch information in games involving
Australia during 1994 and 1995, leading to Waugh being fined AU $10,000 and Warne
AU $8,000; an investigation in 1998 commissioned by the Australian Cricket Board
into whether Australian players had engaged in betting, bribery, match-fixing, and/or
the unauthorised receipt of money or other benefits, in particular focusing on alleged
approaches made to Dean Jones, Allan Border and Ricky Ponting, and allegations
that the second match of the 1992 World XI v Indian XI series was fixed (none of
which was ultimately proven); the findings of the Qayyum Inquiry that members of
the Pakistan national team had been involved to varying degrees in betting and match
fixing, and recommending that Salim Malik and Ata-ur-Rehman be banned from
cricket for life and that other Pakistan players should also be punished, including
removing the captaincy of the national team from Wasim Akram; approaches
made by Indian nationals in 1999 to the New Zealand captain, Stephen Fleming,
and an England player, Chris Lewis, to fix a Test match between the two countries;
the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation’s report in 2000 of the involvement of
organised crime in betting and related corruption in Indian cricket,2 which ultimately
led to the Board for the Control of Cricket in India banning former Indian captain
Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma for life, as well as imposing five-year bans
on Indian players Manoj Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and team official Dr Ali Irani; and
then (most notoriously) the South African captain, Hansie Cronje (who had also been
named in the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation report) confessing that he had
received payments from bookmakers in return for providing inside information and
manipulating the results of particular matches, including a Test match between South
Africa and England, which resulted in a life-time ban for Cronje, and a six-month ban
for each of Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams for failing to report bribes offered
to them by Cronje to under-perform in a one-day-international match.3
1 Sir Paul Condon, ‘Report on Corruption in International Cricket’ (April 2001), icc-cricket.com/
about/35/anti-corruption.
2 Indian Central Bureau of Investigation, ‘Report on cricket match-fixing and related malpractices’
(October 2000). Sharma’s ban was subsequently reduced to five years, and in November 2012 an
Indian court quashed Azharuddin’s lifetime ban on the ground of breaches of natural justice, including
that the BBCI committee that had been convened to decide on the ban included a senior policeman
who had been involved in producing the CBI report that accused Azharuddin of fixing. The court did
not offer any opinion on the merits of the allegations about Azharuddin’s involvement in match-fixing.
Azharuddin v BCCI (CCCA No 408 of 2003), 8 November 2012.
3 See Wilde, Caught: The Full Story of Cricket’s Match-Fixing Scandal (Aurum Press Ltd, 2001).
B4.6 In April 2001, Sir (now Lord) Condon published his report on corruption
in international cricket.1 The first comprehensive study of this nature carried out in
any major sport, it described at least 20 years of corruption linked to betting on
international cricket matches, and suggested that corrupt practices and deliberate
under-performance had permeated the sport. Condon found that there was a
prevailing culture of silence, apathy, ignorance and fear within the sport of cricket,
all of which had led to a lack of understanding and information about the depth
of the existing corruption problem. He recommended that the International Cricket
Council (ICC) create a dedicated anti-corruption unit to deter, detect and punish
such corrupt activity, as well as the development and delivery of a professional and
comprehensive training and education programme. He also emphasised the need to
provide a more secure environment around players on tour and to restrict players’
use of mobile phones during matches, so as to limit potential corruptors’ access to
players. These recommendations were implemented with the creation of a dedicated
ICC Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) and the adoption of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code
for Participants2 and the Minimum Standards for Players and International Match
Officials.3 This regime got thoroughly tested in 2010 in the now-infamous Pakistani
cricketers’ spot-fixing case,4 and by the IPL case in 2013 when three Rajasthan
Royals players and 11 bookmakers were arrested on suspicion of fixing matches
in the 2013 Indian Premier League.5 All three players ended up with life bans, as
did a co-owner of the Rajasthan Royals team.6 Meanwhile in 2014 a Bangladesh
Cricket Board tribunal banned former Bangladesh captain Mohammed Ashraful for
eight years for match-fixing in the 2013 Bangladesh Premier League (reduced to
five years, with two of them suspended, on appeal), banned players Lou Vincent
for three years and Kaushal Lokuarachchi for 18 months (reduced to 12 months
on appeal) for failing to report corrupt approaches to fix BPL matches, and banned
Salim Chowdhury and Jishan Chowdhury, respectively the chairman and the
managing director of the BPL champions, the Dhaka Gladiators, for ten years each
for orchestrating the fixing.7 A number of South African players were charged and
found guilty of match-fixing related corruption offences by Cricket South Africa in
connection with the 2015/16 RamSlam T20 competition. Gulam Bodi was banned
from playing cricket for 20 years and jailed for five years; former international
players Thami Tsolekile, Lonwabo Tsotsobe and Alviro Petersen were given bans of
12, 8 and 2 years respectively; and three other players received bans ranging from 7
to 10 years.8 More recently, the Bangladesh Test captain Shakib Al Hasan was given
a two-year ban for failing to report corrupt approaches in relation to an ODI tri-series
including Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe and a match for Sunrisers Hyderabad in the IPL.9
In a similar vein, the Pakistan Cricket Board handed Umar Akmal a three-year ban
for failing to report corrupt approaches in April 2020,10 and the Afghanistan Cricket
Board banned Shafiqullah for six years for trying to fix the outcome of a match in the
2018 Afghanistan Premier League in May 2020.11
1 Sir Paul Condon, ‘Report on Corruption in International Cricket’ (April 2001), scoop.co.nz/stories/
WO0105/S00039/report-on-corruption-in-international-cricket.htm [accessed 29 November 2020].
2 The current version of which can be downloaded at: icc-cricket.com/about/integrity/anti-corruption/
acu-publications [accessed 30 October 2020].
3 icc-cricket.com/about/integrity/anti-corruption/acu-publications [accessed 30 October 2020].
4 See para B4.22. In the wake of that scandal, the ICC commissioned Bertrand de Speville (former
Solicitor-General of Hong Kong) to carry out a review of the operations of the ACU. He reported that
since 2001 the face of international cricket had changed significantly, becoming incredibly lucrative for
commercial sponsors, for the betting industry (legal and illegal), and for some (but not all) players and
cricketing authorities. Against that background, he provided some commentary and recommendations
on the operation of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code and on the operational practices of the ACU, and
recommended increasing the resources and staffing of the ACU so as to cope with the recent increase
in corruption in the sport. See de Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the
International Cricket Council’ (August 2011, reissued with minor amendments in January 2012), icc-
live.s3.amazonaws.com/cms/media/about_docs/518b7096b002c-Bertrand%20de%20Speville%20
Report%20-%20A%20Review%20of%20the%20Anti-Corruption%20Arrangements%20of%20
the%20ICC.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].
5 ‘IPL final overshadowed by off-field events as team official arrested in ongoing corruption scandal’,
sportcal.com, 28 May 2013; ‘Indian Government could bring in spot-fixing law after arrests of IPL
players’, sportcal.com, 20 May 2013.
6 hindustantimes.com/cricket/ipl-flashback-2013-spot-fixing-rocks-nation-as-rohit-sharma-leads-
mumbai-indians-to-maiden-title/story-vPtqfvqtVeHdfxRCaa343J.html [accessed 30 October 2020].
7 ‘Match-fixing: Mohammad Ashraful banned for eight years’, bbc.co.uk, 18 June 2014; ‘Ashraful’s
ban reduced to five years’, espncricinfo.com, 29 September 2014.
8 ‘Gulam Bodi sentenced to five years in prison’, espncricinfo.com, 18 October 2019; ‘Tsotsobe handed
eight-year ban’, espncricinfo.com, 11 July 2017; ‘Tsolekile among four players sanctioned by CSA’,
espncricinfo.com, 8 August 2016: (12-year ban for ‘contriving to fix’, and failing to disclose the full
details of an approach; seven-year ban for Jean Symes for failing to disclose a payment ‘which he
knew or ought to have known’ was given to him to breach the anti-corruption code; and 10-year bans
for Ethy Mbhalati and Pumelela Matshikwe for receiving a payment/incentive to fix, making an illegal
payment, and failing to disclose a payment and approach).
9 ‘Shakib Al Hasan banned after accepting three charges under ICC Anti-Corruption Code’, icc-
cricket.com, 29 October 2019; ‘Shakib Al Hasan banned from all cricket for failing to report bookie
approaches’, espncricinfo.com, 29 October 2019.
10 ‘PCB hands Umar Akmal three-year ban from all cricket’, espncricinfo.com, 27 April 2020.
11 ‘Afghanistan’s Shafiqullah banned for six years’, espncricinfo.com, 10 May 2020.
(b) Horseracing
B4.7 British horseracing’s watershed moment came in October 2002, when

(following two high profile criminal cases1) the BBC’s flagship current affairs
programme, Panorama, reported allegations (including by the Jockey Club’s former
head of security, Roger Buffham) of race-fixing by jockeys, of links between flat
jockeys and well-known Hong Kong criminals, of bookmakers offering free betting
for leading trainers, and of an institutional failure by the Jockey Club to police the
sport.2 In response, a ‘Security Review Group’ established jointly by the British
Horseracing Board (BHB) and the Jockey Club came up with 36 recommendations,
including strengthening the Rules of Racing, as well as improving the effectiveness,
culture, openness and administration of the Security Department. The review
emphasised that the principal activity of the Security Department should be to police
the Rules of Racing (leaving criminal matters to the police), and recommended that
the Security Department, the Jockey Club, and the BHB improve liaison between
themselves, with the wider racing and betting communities, as well as with the police
and other government agencies.3
1 In 2000 a trial of five persons accused of conspiracy to defraud by doping two racehorses collapsed
at Southwark Crown Court with the trial judge directing acquittals of all five. Three of the defendants
were subsequently excluded by the Jockey Club from all racecourses and other premises licensed by
the regulator in Great Britain. And in 2002 allegations surfaced in one of a series of criminal trials
involving an international drug smuggling gang about the corrupt activities of certain individuals in
horseracing. See Report of the Joint BHB/JC Security Review Group (July 2003), Executive Summary,
p 1.
2 ‘Panorama exposes “corruption of racing”’, 6 October 2002, news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/
horse_racing/2299209.stm [accessed 30 October 2020].
3 Report of the Joint BHB/JC Security Review Group (July 2003). See BHB press release dated 1 July
2003, ‘Joint BHB/JC Security Review Group Unveils Its Findings and Makes Recommendations’,
at britishhorseracing.com/press_releases/joint-bhbjc-security-review-group-unveils-its-findings-and-
makes-recommendations/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
B4.8 Even before the Panorama programme was broadcast, however, the Jockey
Club was launching the first of what became a series of disciplinary cases alleging
betting-related corruption. In June 2002 it had charged former champion jockey
Graham Bradley with feeding inside information to gamblers for reward over a
period of several years. The charges were upheld, and led to a five-year ban.1 Similar
cases followed, including in 2005 against jockey Gary Carter, who was given a
five-year ban for passing inside information to bettors,2 and a nine-day disciplinary
hearing in February 2007 concerning Shane Kelly and three other jockeys that led
to disqualifications for the jockeys and exclusion from racing for others.3 A criminal
prosecution later that year of leading jockey Kieren Fallon and others for conspiracy
to defraud punters was not so successful: the defendants were all acquitted when the
judge upheld a submission of no case to answer.4 Some saw this as an embarrassment
for the Jockey Club and its successor regulator, the British Horseracing Authority
(BHA). However, the regulators had not conducted the prosecution, and when the
BHA commissioned Dame Elizabeth Neville to review the way the recommendations
of the Security Review Group had been implemented, she endorsed the improvements
the BHA had made to its Integrity Services team since 2003, noting how many
agencies described racing’s approach as ‘a model for the effective investigation
of corruption in sport’.5 Dame Elizabeth’s recommendations included developing
memoranda of understanding between the BHA and the police, to ensure a proper
understanding of the relationship between the two bodies and their respective roles
and responsibilities when sports cases and criminal case overlapped. Based on the
lessons of the Neville Report, the activities of the Integrity Services team at the
BHA now include conducting investigations into breaches of the Rules of Racing,
gathering intelligence in respect of potential wrongdoing in the sport, inspections of
training establishments, monitoring real-time betting markets for suspicious betting
activity, and protecting the integrity of the stabling area and weighing room on
racecourses on racedays. An Integrity Review carried out in 2016 concluded that the
lessons of the Neville Report had led to a strengthened integrity framework within
British horseracing, while a subsequent review carried out by Christopher Quinlan
QC led to improvements within the BHA’s disciplinary structure.6 Several of the
cases that the BHA has brought against fixing and related corruption are discussed
below.
1 See Graham Bradley enquiry result, 29 November 2002.
2 See Jockey Club v Gary Carter, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 September 2005.
3 See HRA v Kelly et al, HRA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 April 2007.
4 See para B4.49.
5 Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing
– An Independent Review’, 13 May 2008 (the ‘Neville Report’), para 1.12.
6 See britishhorseracing.com/regulation/integrity/ and integrityeducation.britishhorseracing.com/
[accessed 30 October 2020]. For further details of the Quinlan Review, see paras D1.72–D1.75 and
D1.79.
(c) Tennis
B4.9 In August 2007, after an unusually high number of bets was taken on the
Betfair exchange for fourth-ranked Nikolay Davydenko to lose a second round match
in Sopot, Poland against 87th-ranked Martin Arguello (many of which bets were
placed after Davydenko lost the first set), and Davydenko then retired injured in
the third set, Betfair voided all of the bets on suspicion that the outcome had been
fixed.1 After a lengthy investigation, both players were cleared of any wrongdoing,2
but in the meantime several other players reported that they had received approaches
to fix matches,3 prompting a review of the sport that concluded that professional
tennis was not institutionally or systematically corrupt, but that there was sufficient
intelligence to indicate that attempts were being made to corrupt players so that they
did not play to the best of their ability (‘tanking’) and/or to persuade them to provide
inside information to facilitate corrupt betting practices.4 A commission of enquiry
established by tennis’s governing bodies recommended in 2008 the introduction of a
uniform anti-corruption code for tennis and the creation of a dedicated integrity unit
focusing on deterrence, detection, and education, and the tennis authorities quickly
announced that they would implement those recommendations.5 Thereafter, the
Tennis Integrity Unit (TIU) was created, and several cases brought under the Uniform
Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme led to substantial sanctions being imposed on
players (including life bans) that have been upheld by the CAS.6
1 McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15, 17.
2 ‘Davydenko cleared of match-fixing’, bbc.co.uk, 12 September 2008.
3 McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15,
17. Betfair also reported suspicious gambling patterns in the match between Richard Bloomfield
and higher-ranked Carlos Berlocq at Wimbledon in 2006, although again it was concluded after
consideration that there was no prohibited activity. ‘Officials Look Into Irregular Betting on Match’,
ESPN.com, June 28, 2006 (sports.espn.go.com/sports/tennis/wimbledon06/news/story?id=2502709
4 Gunn & Rees, ‘Environmental Review of Integrity in Professional Tennis’ (May 2008).
5 ‘Tennis Governing Bodies Appoint Jeff Rees as Director of Tennis Integrity Unit and Adopt Uniform
Anti-Corruption Code’, press release dated 27 August 2008.
6 See para B4.43.
B4.10 Less than a decade later, however, a fresh scandal erupted in tennis. On
the eve of the 2016 Australian Open, BuzzFeed News and the BBC claimed in ‘The
Tennis Racket’ that they had obtained ‘secret files exposing evidence of widespread
match-fixing by players at the upper level of world tennis’, to which it was suggested
a blind eye had been turned by the tennis authorities. The piece criticised choices
made by the tennis governing bodies and the TIU following the 2008 review. The
governing bodies commissioned an independent review.1 This review concluded that
the sport faced a serious integrity problem because the nature of the game lent itself to
manipulation and to deliberate under-performance for non-betting reasons, amongst
other reasons. The player incentive structure, under which few players earned enough
to break even, created a fertile breeding ground for breaches of integrity, and the
advent of on-line betting and the sale by the governing bodies of official live scoring
data had provided the opportunity to bet on many matches (down to the lowest level
of competition), where incentives were highest and security lowest. While no level
was immune, the problem was most significant outside the ATP and WTA Tours and
Grand Slams. The review assessed what had happened in the past and concluded that,
while there was no evidence of a ‘cover-up’, there were a number of occasions where
the actions taken by the sport were inappropriate or ineffective, resulting in missed
opportunities. Furthermore, there were a number of ways in which the policing
structure was inadequate, in particular after the commencement of live scoring data
sales vastly increased the number of matches on which bets could be placed. The
review made a series of recommendations aimed at:
(a) removing opportunities and incentives for breaches of integrity;2
(b) establishing a newly-empowered TIU with an independent Supervisory Board;3
(c) preventing breaches of integrity through education, control of access, and
disruption;4
(d) enforcing expanded integrity rules and changing the TIU’s approach to
investigating and punishing offenders;5 and
(e) (5) encouraging national and international cooperation and enforcement.6
The tennis governing bodies committed to the implementation of the proposals and
set about doing so during 2019 and 2020. In recent years, professional players Karim
Hossam, Diego Matos, and Youssef Hossam have all received lifetime bans following
TIU investigations for various offences, including match-fixing, betting, providing
‘inside information’ and failing to report corrupt approaches.7 The cases brought by
the TIU are identified on its website.8
1 The Independent Review of Integrity in Tennis, Lewis, Wilkinson and Henzelin. The Tennis Integrity
Reports taken together (Interim Report April 2018 (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/
Independent%20Reviews/IRP-2018/Interim%20Report.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]), supported
by a Record of Evidence and Analysis (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/Independent%20
Reviews/IRP-2018/Independent_Review_of_Integrity_in_Tennis-2018.pdf [accessed 30 October
2020]) and the Final Report in December 2018 (at tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/app/media/
Independent%20Reviews/Final%20Report_191218.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]) provide detail
in relation to the nature and extent of the issues in relation to betting related corruption in tennis, the
difficulties in dealing with them, and the mechanisms to be used in doing so.
2 Recommendation 1: The opportunities for breaches of integrity should be reduced through limitations
on the supply of official live scoring data, in particular at the lower levels of tennis. Recommendation
2: There should be changes to the organisation of professional tennis to address the incentive problem,
by restructuring the player pathway.
3 Recommendations 3 and 4: The TIU should be reorganised with independent oversight. There should
be an independent TIU with an independent Supervisory Board, more, and more diverse staff, secured
funding, and external auditing.
4 Recommendation 5: Completion of enhanced integrity training should be a condition of playing, and
the training should be extended to other key participants. Recommendations 6 and 7: Access to players
should be controlled through, amongst other things, changes to accreditation and to the standards of
facilities and security at events. Measures should be implemented to deal with rampant online abuse
of players. There should be an ‘exclusion’ procedure, and consideration should be given to the use of
disruption techniques and integrity testing where legal and appropriate.
5 Recommendation 8: Changes in the rules, including to broaden the prohibitions on such conduct as
deliberate contrivance of a match and abuse of inside information, and to strengthen cooperation and
reporting obligations. The new rules should be accompanied by a practical guidance document so that
the effect of the rules can be easily understood. Recommendation 9: There should be changes to the
TIU’s investigative processes, including the addition of internal betting expertise and independent
tennis expertise, and improved intelligence gathering, storage and use. Recommendation 10: Changes
to disciplinary processes, to permit more expeditious and cost-effective proceedings while protecting
the rights of the accused, to be implemented by the new independent Supervisory Board and TIU.
Amongst other things, it was recommended that the Supervisory Board and TIU consider replacing
the current two-stage process – which includes a de novo appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
– with a single-stage process before an independent and impartial tribunal, or a two-stage process
where the appeal is not de novo but rather reviews whether the first instance decision was flawed.
Recommendation 11: Enhanced transparency of the TIU and the disciplinary process, including
publication of all resolutions of proceedings. Recommendation 12: More effective engagement and
cooperation with national federations and law enforcement agencies, as well as with other SGBs and
third parties.
6 The review urged national authorities to make greater use of the criminal law and of the mechanisms
provided by The Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (see para
B4.17).
7 ‘Egypt’s Karim Hossam banned from tennis for life for multiple match-fixing offences’, BBC Sport,
3 July 2018; ‘Diego Matos: Brazilian tennis player banned for life for match fixing’, BBC Sport,
9 September 2019; ‘Tennis match-fixing: Egyptian Youssef Hossam banned for match-fixing’,
BBC Sport, 4 May 2020.
8 tennisintegrityunit.com
(d) Football
B4.11 Football’s enormous popularity, and its global television coverage, mean
that it accounts for a significant portion of sports betting worldwide, in both regulated
and unregulated, and both legal and illegal, betting markets. Most estimates calculate
that around 70 per cent of the global sports betting market’s trade comes from trading
on football.1 As a result it is no surprise that the sport has been afflicted more than
most with match-fixing scandals.2 Law enforcement authorities have led the way
in prosecuting those involved, most prominently in Germany3 and in China,4 but
also in many other countries.5 In May 2011, FIFA announced that it was entering
into a 10-year agreement with Interpol to develop and implement a global training,
education, and prevention programme focusing on betting-related match fixing, and
that it would underwrite that programme to the tune of €20m.6 In February 2012,
FIFA announced that there were up to 50 active national investigations into match-
fixing in the sport.7 Also in 2012, FIFPro (the International Federation of Professional
Footballers) published the results of a survey of more than 3,000 professional
footballers competing in 15 different leagues in Eastern Europe. One in eight of the
footballers surveyed said he had received an approach to fix a match (in Kazakhstan
the figure was one in three), and almost a quarter of the footballers surveyed (in
Russia, almost one half) said they were aware of match-fixing in their respective
leagues.8 The sense of crisis became palpable, with Michel Platini, the then-President
of UEFA, asserting that:
‘football, like most sporting disciplines, is in mortal danger.9 The very essence of
our sport is based on the integrity of results, from school sport up to the World Cup.
Obviously, the credibility of every competition is affected. Today, there is not a week
that goes by without newspaper headlines which speak of a suspicion, an inquiry or
an arrest linked to the integrity of our competitions’.10
1 See para B4.12, n.1 and ‘Football betting – the global gambling industry worth billions’, BBC Sport,
3 October 2013).
2 See generally Hill, The Fix: Soccer and Organised Crime (McClelland & Stewart, 2008), exposing
(among other things) match-fixing at the 2006 FIFA World Cup Finals, involving corrupt members of
the Ghana national team.
3 In 2005, Robert Hoyzer, a German referee, admitted fixing and betting on matches in which he had
officiated, in league with organised criminal gangs in Croatia. He was banned for life from football and
imprisoned for 29 months, along with two Croatian co-conspirators. Ibid, pp 166–67. In November
2009, the German police in Bochum announced that they had arrested more than 200 people suspected
of bribing officials and players to fix UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League matches,
as well as domestic matches in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary,
Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey. ‘Match-fixing inquiry probes 200 European football games’, news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8370748.stm [accessed 30 October 2020], 20 November 2009. Eventually two
of the conspirators were convicted of fraud under the German Criminal Code and were sentenced
in May 2011 to 5½ years in prison each, although in December 2012 the appeal court remitted one
sentence back to the district court for reconsideration as it had failed to take into account properly as
a mitigating factor the defendant’s cooperation with the investigation. Mintas, ‘Hoyzer & Sapina: a
criminal match-fixing law needed’, 11(2) World Sport Law Report, February 2013, p 3.
UEFA used evidence handed over by the Bochum police authorities to get a referee banned for life
for failing to report an approach made to him to fix a UEFA Europa League game in return for a bribe
of €50,000: Oreikhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172 (discussed at para B4.38).
4 More than 50 former players, coaches, referees and other officials in the Chinese domestic football
leagues have been convicted of corruption-related offences, and many of them have been imprisoned
for lengthy periods. For example, in January 2012, the deputy chief of the China Football Association
was sentenced to 10½ years in prison, the former referees’ director was jailed for 12 years (plus
fines), and several other officials were also imprisoned for match-fixing related conduct that had
helped Shenhua win the 2003 Chinese Super League title: ‘Shanghai Shenhua stripped of 2003 title
as Chinese FA clamps down on match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 19 February 2012; ‘Soccer officials
sentenced in China’, nytimes.com, 13 June 2012.
5 For example, in July 2011 a criminal trial commenced in Turkey, involving 93 defendants accused
of involvement in a conspiracy to fix 19 matches in the top two divisions of the Turkish domestic
football competition. In August 2011, at UEFA’s urging the Turkish Football Federation refused to
allow Fenerbahce to participate in the 2011–2012 Champions League due to its alleged involvement in
the scandal: Arseven, ‘Turkish match-fixing: criminal law’s interaction with sport’, World Sports Law
Report, September 2011, p 8. Fenerbahce later dropped a CAS appeal that it had filed against UEFA
and the Turkish Football Federation, challenging its exclusion from the tournament: ‘Players banned
in Turkish match-fixing probe’, dailytimes.pk, 9 May 2012. In May 2012, a football disciplinary panel
cleared all of the 16 Turkish clubs linked to the investigation of involvement in match-fixing, but
imposed bans of between one and three years on two players and eight officials. Ibid. However, the
criminal trial continued, and in July 2012 Aziz Yildrim, the President of Fenerbahce, was convicted of
match-fixing and related offences and sentenced to more than six years in jail: ‘Fenerbahce chairman
sentenced to jail for match-fixing – and then bailed’, Guardian website, 3 July 2012. As noted in the text
above, in June 2013 the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body ruled that Fenerbahce should be barred
from participation in UEFA competitions for three seasons (including the 2013/14 UEFA Champions
League) and Besiktas should be barred from participation in the UEFA Europa League as a result of
their involvement in match-fixing. ‘Decisions on Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Steau Bucharest’, uefa.
com/uefa/disciplinary/news/newsid=1967131.html [accessed 30 October 2020].
In Italy, in November 2011 Luciano Moggi, the former general manager of Juventus, was found
guilty of sporting fraud and conspiracy and sentenced to five years and four months in jail for his
role in the 2006 ‘Calciopoli’ match-fixing scandal (in which Juventus, AC Milan, Fiorentina and
Lazio were accused of rigging the outcome of games by selecting particular referees to officiate in
them). The Italian FA banned Moggi for life, stripped Juventus of its 2005 and 2006 Serie A titles,
relegated it to Serie B, and deducted points from AC Milan, Lazio, Fiorentina and Roma. Some
15 other individuals were also found guilty of match-fixing. See ‘Disgraced Italian soccer official
Moggi banned for life’, Sportcal.com, 16 June 2011; ‘Former Juventus chief jailed in long-running
match-fixing case’, Sportcal.com, 9 November 2011. In early 2012, the Italian FA imposed a series of
sanctions on 21 clubs and 52 players for match-fixing and corruption, including the former Atalanta
captain, Cristiano Doni, who admitted to fixing Serie B matches and was banned for three and a half
years, the former Lazio and Italy striker Giuseppe Signori, who was banned for five years, and 15
other players who were banned for between one and five years: ‘Cristiano Doni admits fixing Italian
Serie B matches’, usatoday.com, 24 December 2011; Oliverio and Swing, ‘Match fixing: Italian and
international measures’, (2012) Vol. 10(7) World Sports Law Report 11. And in May 2012, after an
investigation that involved 280 policeman across 23 different cities, Italian police arrested 19 people
(including a number of players, such as the captain of Lazio, Stefano Mauri) on suspicion of match-
fixing. A police statement indicated that eight matches from 2011 were under review and that five
people had also been arrested in Hungary on suspicion of involvement in an illegal international
betting ring headed by arrested Singaporean Tan Seet Eng..
Also in 2011, a Croatian bookmaker, Marijo Cvrtak, was sentenced in Germany to more than five
years in prison for fixing football matches, including a 2007 World Cup qualifying group match between
Norway and Malta and domestic matches in Norway: ‘Norwegian football official finally react to
suspicions of match-fixing’, newsinenglish.no, 9 July 2012. In July 2012, a player for Norwegian club
Follo was arrested and charged with the manipulation of results in two matches, following a report by
the club to the Norwegian FA, which referred the matter to the Norwegian criminal authorities: ‘Player
arrested in Norwegian match-fixing probe’. uk.reuters.com, 11 July 2012.
6 ‘FIFA’s historic contribution to INTERPOL in fight against match-fixing’, fifa.com, 9 May 2011,
fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-historic-contribution-interpol-fight-against-match-fixing-1431884
7 ‘FIFA extends worldwide sanction to 26 football participants’, fifa.com, 9 February 2012.
8 FiFPro Black Book Eastern Europe, ‘The problems professional footballers encounter: research’
(FIFPro Services BV, 2012)
9 ‘Platini reiterates “mortal danger” facing football’, (2011) insidewordfootball.biz, 18 September.
10 ‘Combating match fixing is “top priority”, says UEFA general secretary Infantino’, insideworldfootball.
biz, 28 November 2011.
B4.12 UEFA responded by declaring the fight against match fixing ‘certainly the
top priority for UEFA, the UEFA President and the UEFA Executive Committee in the
years to come’,1 establishing a network of integrity officers across Europe, recruiting
a Swiss criminal prosecutor to become its new chief legal counsel for integrity
and regulatory affairs, signing a memorandum of understanding with Interpol, and
scrapping all statutes of limitations in its disciplinary rules so that it could pursue
match-fixing claims.2 In February 2013, Europol announced that a major investigation
involving police teams from 13 European countries and running from July 2011 to
January 2013 had uncovered an extensive and sophisticated criminal network involved
in widespread football match-fixing. Europol stated that a total of 425 match officials,
club officials, players, and serious criminals, from more than 15 countries, were
suspected of being involved in attempts to fix more than 380 professional football
matches, including FIFA World Cup Qualifiers, UEFA Champions League games,
and fixtures in Europe’s elite leagues, involving over €2m in corrupt payments to
those involved in the matches and generating over €8m in betting profits.3 UEFA
rules specify that UEFA may declare a club ineligible to participate in UEFA club
competitions for one season as an ‘administrative measure’ if it is comfortably satisfied
that the club been directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging
or influencing the outcome of a match.4 On its website it lists nine clubs that have
been excluded in this way,5 including Besiktas and Fenerbahce, who were excluded
from the 2013/14 UEFA Champions League and Europa League due to their prior
involvement in match-fixing, and Albanian club KF Skenderbeu, who were banned in
April 2018 for ten years from participating in UEFA club competitions for systemic
match-fixing over a period of years (a decision that was subsequently upheld by the
CAS).6 FIFA has produced a detailed handbook to guide member associations on how
to develop an integrity programme and how to conduct investigations into match-
fixing;7 while UEFA has developed a network of integrity officers in each member
association to work with its own integrity officers working on a Europe-wide level.8
Recent cases include Dickson Etuhu, who was found guilty of attempted match-fixing
in 2019 by the Swedish Court of Appeal in relation to a Swedish Allsvenskan match
in 2017 and subsequently banned from football in Sweden for five years,9 and former
Nigeria coach Samson Siasia, who was banned for life by FIFA in 2019 for agreeing
to ‘receive bribes in relation to the manipulation of matches’.10 In the UK in 2015, the
former Premier League footballer Delroy Facey was jailed for two and a half years
after being convicted of match-fixing under the Bribery Act 2010, with the sentencing
judge saying that his offences struck ‘at the very heart of football’.11
1 ‘Combatting match fixing is ‘top priority’, says UEFA general secretary Infantino’, insideworldfootball.
biz, 28 November 2011.
2 ‘UEFA Approves Europe-wide Network of Integrity Officers to Counter Match-fixing’, Sportcal.com,
21 March 2011; ‘UEFA, Interpol to tackle football-related crimes’, uefa.com, 11 January 2012; ‘UEFA
regulations allow club sanctions for past match-fixing’, (2013) 11(6) World Sports Law Report 1.
3 Europol, ‘Update – Results from the largest football match-fixing investigation in Europe’, 6 February
2013, europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/update-results-largest-football-match-fixing-investigation-
in-europe [accessed 30 October 2020].
4 See Art 50.3 of the UEFA Statutes (‘The admission to a UEFA competition of a member association or
club directly or indirectly involved in any activity aimed at arranging or influencing the outcome of a
match at national or international level can be refused with immediate effect, without prejudice to any
possible disciplinary measures’) and Reg 4.02 of the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa
League 2018–21 Cycle Regulations and Sivasspor Kulübü v UEFA (CAS 2014/A/3625).
5 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/news/0243-0f8e5ded692c-b45c308f173c-1000--integrity/
6 ‘Decisions on Fenerbahce, Besiktas and Steau Bucharest’ uefa.com/uefa/disciplinary/news/
newsid=1967131.html; ‘UEFA welcomes the CAS decision on Skënderbeu’, uefa.com, 12 July 2019
7 FIFA, ‘Protect the Integrity of Football’, Practical Handbook for FIFA Member Associations
(resources.fifa.com/image/upload/protect-the-integrity-of-football-x4103.pdf?cloudid=rjvao05ofvgib
ipajldl [accessed 30 October 2020].
8 See uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/news/0243-0f8e5ded692c-b45c308f173c-1000--integrity/
9 ‘Dickson Etuhu handed five-year ban for match-fixing in Sweden’, Guardian, 16 April 2020.
10 ‘Former Nigeria great Samson Siasia handed life ban by Fifa’, BBC Sport, 16 August 2019.
B The response of the Olympic Movement
B4.13 Cricket, horseracing, tennis, and football attract far more betting interest
than other sports,1 which have therefore suffered far fewer match-fixing scandals.2
However, the Olympic Movement could not ignore the growing public concern
with match-fixing scandals in sport. The 2009 Olympic Congress concluded that
‘Governments should recognise that close collaboration and action in the fight to
put an end to illegal and irregular betting, and match-fixing is essential, both in
relation to Olympic-accredited events and to the wider world of sport competition,’3
In March 2011 the IOC convened a summit on combating corruption in sport, with
IOC President Jacques Rogge stating:
‘It is clear that betting, through the financial benefits it generates, provides huge
opportunities to sports organisations. However, there is a significant problem
when betting leads to the manipulation of competitions and therefore threatens the
integrity of sport. Cheating driven by betting is undoubtedly the biggest threat to
sport after doping. For the sports movement it is crucial to develop a unified strategy
and to collaborate closely with public authorities and the legal gambling industry.
Only then will we be able to address efficiently this complex issue’.4
Following the summit, the IOC recommended that Olympic sports adopt
appropriate regulatory frameworks for fighting corruption and implement targeted
anti-corruption education and communication programmes. It also announced that
the IOC would establish a Working Group to analyse the best way to monitor sports
betting and develop collaboration with governments and their agencies to promote
legislation and develop agreements for the sharing of information about corruption
in sport.5 In February 2013, the IOC announced it would tighten the prohibition
on betting in the rules for the Sochi Winter Games 2013 and that it was working
with the Council of Europe on an ‘International Convention against Manipulation
of Sports Results’,6 which became the Macolin Convention discussed at para
B4.17. In October 2013, the IOC signed an MOU with Interpol to set up a formal
structure for cooperation on integrity issues;7 the following month it announced it
would set up its own anti-corruption unit to work on risk prevention, information
and dissemination and harmonisation of rules;8 and in 2015 it set up a whistle-
blower hotline on match-fixing.9 The IOC then developed the Olympic Movement
Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions as a set of harmonised
rules to protect all competitions falling within the Olympic family from the risk of
manipulation, and Rule 1.4 of the Olympic Charter now makes compliance with
that Code mandatory for the whole Olympic Movement.10 The latest version of the
Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions sets
out that breaches will lead to a sanction ‘which may range from a minimum of a
warning to a maximum of life ban’.11 The IOC now has an internal unit dedicated
to monitoring compliance through a ‘Code Implementation Support Network’,12
and has partnered with Interpol to produce a ‘capacity-building programme’.13 The
IOC’s suspension of the International Boxing Association (AIBA) as the Olympic
governing body for the sport of boxing in May 2019 was in part due to the refusal
of the body to remove officials linked to a series of fixing allegations surrounding
bouts at the 2016 Rio Olympics.14
1 The more betting there is on a sport, ie the more liquid the betting market on that sport, the greater
the potential for fixing: Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ
of Salford, February 2008), p 3 and p 29 (noting that the betting markets on football and tennis are
particularly liquid). See SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November 2011), p 6 (‘Whilst match-
fixing can have other causes, there is strong correlation with betting. Sports which are most often
the subject of betting are, therefore at much greater risk’). Figures from the Gambling Commission
indicate that there is much more betting (at least with UK betting operators licensed by the Gambling
Commission) on football and horseracing than any other sport, with those two sports accounting for
more than a third of the betting integrity cases dealt with by the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit. See
DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act 2005’, 25 November 2011,
para 29. See also Gambling Commission – Industry Statistics 2009–2012 (annual betting turnover of
approx £5.1m on horseracing, approx £1.4m on greyhound racing, approx £1m on football, and approx
£600,000 on all other sporting (and some non-sporting) activity). See also Gorse and Chadwick, ‘The
prevalence of corruption in international sport’ (CIBS 2011), p 24 (reported cases of match-fixing and
use of inside information for betting purposes in Europe from 2000 to 2010 came from football, horse
racing, tennis, greyhound racing, rugby and cricket).
In addition to the amount of betting on a particular sport, a 2008 University of Salford research
report identified the following factors as indicators of situations in which betting-related corrupt
conduct is more likely to occur: where there are low salaries within the sport (and therefore a greater
vulnerability to the illicit financial rewards offered for corrupt conduct); where there is a discrepancy in
salaries between participants in the sport; where the sport is of an individual rather than a team nature
(since outcomes are easier to fix in an individual sport than in a team sport, where the cooperation of
more than one person would generally be required); where the scrutiny of the sport is less intense (for
example domestic matches tend to have a lower profile, less resources and less regulatory attention
than international matches); or where the outcome of a game does not affect the final placing in a
tournament (for example, an end-of-season ‘dead rubber’ between two mid-table teams is much more
at risk of corruption than a cup final). See Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting
corruption’ (University of Salford, February 2008).
2 Then-IOC President Jacques Rogge asserted in January 2011 that ‘[t]here has never been a case of
any suspicious betting in the Olympics’, although he continued that ‘it has to happen some day and
we will have to be prepared’: ‘IOC chief Rogge declares war on illegal betting’, sportzpower.com,
29 January 2011. Prior to the London 2012 Olympic Games, the Joint Assessment Unit assessed
the potential risk to the Games from betting-related corruption as low, and afterwards the Gambling
Commission reported that betting on the London Games, while ten times greater than betting on the
Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, was still much lower than betting on professional sports such as
football and tennis. See Gambling Commission, ‘Working together to protect the Integrity of Sport:
the role of the Joint Assessment Unit at the London 2012 Olympic Games’ (March 2013), paras 21–23.
Football accounted for 20–25 per cent of all bets on the London Games; tennis 15–20 per cent; and
basketball 10–20 per cent. The men’s 100m final was reported to have the largest betting volumes on
any single event at the Games: ibid, para 28.
3 Recommendations of the Olympic Congress, 2009, olympic.org/Documents/Conferences_Forums_
and_Events/2009_Olympic_Congress/Olympic_Congress_Recommendations.pdf [accessed
30 October 2020].
4 ‘Sports Movement agrees on unified strategy to tackle irregular betting’ (IOC press release,
24 June 2010), olympic.org/news/sports-movement-agrees-on-unified-strategy-to-tackle-irregular-
betting/92584 [accessed 30 October 2020].
5 ‘IOC sets up three sub-groups to decide objectives in fight against illegal and irregular betting’,
sportcal.com, 15 June 2011. In September 2011, SportAccord published a set of Model Rules on
Sports Betting for its member federations to incorporate into their own rulebooks: see SportAccord
Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011). In February 2012 the
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) released its own set of Model
Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption for its members (since supplemented by the ‘Model Rules for
International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code
on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version published in December 2018),
see further at para B4.21, n 2). In May 2013, the IOC’s Founding Working Group on the fight against
irregular and illegal betting in sport ‘strongly encouraged’ international sports organisations to adopt
rules based on the ASOIF model rules ‘to ensure a consistent approach’. See ‘Founding Group on fight
against irregular and illegal betting calls for a universal monitoring system’, IOC press release dated
14 May 2013, olympic.org/news/founding-group-on-fight-against-irregular-and-illegal-betting-calls-
for-a-universal-monitoring-system/199073 [accessed 30 October 2020].
6 ‘IOC strengthens betting prohibition’, Sportcal.com, 13 February 2013. As to the international
convention, see para B4.17, n 4.
7 ‘Interpol to work with IOC in promoting integrity in sport’, sportcal.com, 22 October 2013.
8 ‘IOC to set up anti-corruption unit’, sportsresolutions.co.uk/news, 4 November 2013.
9 ioc.integrityline.org/.
10 Olympic Charter, Rule 43: ‘Compliance with the World Anti-Doping Code and the Olympic
Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions is mandatory for the whole
Olympic Movement’; Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions
(2018), Art 7.1.
11 Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions, olympic.org/
prevention-competition-manipulation/regulations-legislation [accessed 30 October 2020].
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid ‘INTERPOL and IOC: shaping a global network on sports integrity’, 17 May 2019, interpol.
int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/INTERPOL-and-IOC-shaping-a-global-network-on-sports-
integrity [accessed 30 October 2020].
14 ‘IOC EB recommends boxing keep its place on the Tokyo 2020 Sports Programme and suspension
of recognition of AIBA’, Olympic.org, 22 May 2019; ‘IOC Inquiry Committee report highlights how
problems with AIBA extend further than Rakhimov election’, insidethegames.biz, 23 May 2019.
C The response of the UK Government
B4.14 In 2001 the Gambling Review Body endorsed Home Office proposals for
a new legislative framework to deal with corruption in betting in the UK, including
corruption in sports betting. That led to the passing of the Gambling Act 2005, which
(among other things) makes ‘cheating at gambling’ a criminal offence.1 However,
in keeping with the strongly non-interventionist approach traditionally taken by
successive UK Governments to matters of sports regulation,2 the Gambling Review
Body insisted that primary responsibility for dealing with corruption in sport should
remain with the SGBs:
‘It is clear that corrupt actions to affect the outcome of a sporting event are
wholly unfair to the innocent punter and bookmaker. However we believe that the
responsibility for preventing such actions lies with the individual sports. They have
a strong motive for doing so. Spectators will not attend an event where they believe
that the outcome has been fixed in advance […] We would mainly expect the punter
(and the non-betting spectator) to be protected by rules and disciplinary procedures
imposed by the sports themselves’.3
The Gambling Review Body noted Jockey Club recommendations that more specific
criminal offences be introduced directly relating to criminal behaviour in sport and
related betting, such as the doping of a racehorse or greyhound, bribery of sports
participants or officials, and corruption in connection with horseracing and other
sports events, or in relation to betting on horseracing and other sports events. The
Gambling Review Body did not endorse those recommendations, however, for two
reasons:
‘We consider that measures to improve the conduct of sportsmen, sporting officials
or of punters are outside our remit. We do not think it should be the role of the
Gambling Commission to monitor the behaviour of sportsmen. […] Although we
are not unsympathetic to the case that has been put to us, for example that there
should be a specific offence of doping a horse, we do not consider that it is properly
within our remit to make recommendations relating to such an issue. We have had
to concern ourselves with matters that are more directly linked to the actual activity
of gambling, although our proposals for the licensing of bookmakers would mean
that swift action could be taken against any licensed person who became involved in
attempting to influence the outcome of a race in such a way. Secondly, we consider
that sports bodies could do more to regulate the participants in their sports, and they
should not always look to the criminal law to enforce their regulations. We agree
that the law on corruption could be clearer and suggest that the Home Office should
consider whether the law could be clarified to meet the concerns we have heard. But
overall, we consider that more could be done within the current framework to ensure
that betting is fairly conducted. We recommend that the Gambling Commission
should work closely with the Jockey Club, and others, to ensure that betting is
conducted in a fair manner and that there is not unfair access to information. Areas
they may wish jointly to consider might include whether the ban on betting should
be extended to more people (for example, trainers)’.4
Consistent with those sentiments, in April 2006 the Department for Culture, Media
& Sport issued an ‘Integrity in Sports Betting 10 Point Plan’, setting out a code of
practice designed to encourage SGBs to take action to protect the integrity of betting
on sport, to safeguard participants and consumers, and to develop relationships with
betting operators, statutory organisations, and Government departments.5
1 See para B4.48.
2 See para A1.10.
3 Gambling Review Body, ‘Gambling Review Report’ (2001, HMSO), paras 26.33, 26.38 and 26.39.
4 Ibid, paras 16.50 and 16.51.
5 DCMS, ‘Integrity in sports betting: a 10-point plan’ (April 2006); ‘Caborn calls on sports to tackle
betting cheats’ (DCMS, 19 April 2006).
B4.15 The Gambling Commission,1 an independent non-departmental public body

sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS),2 was established
pursuant to the Gambling Act 2005 to regulate gambling in the UK, including by
licensing UK-based betting operators on condition that they comply with the
Gambling Act and with additional licence conditions and Codes of Practice issued
by the Commission. When it opened its doors in 2007, it echoed the DCMS stance
by stating that it was focused on its statutory objectives of ensuring that gambling is
crime-free, fair and open, and that children and vulnerable people are protected, and
that it intended to leave it to SGBs to protect the integrity of their sports.3 Gradually,
however, in the face of persistent lobbying by the Sports Rights Owners Coalition
and others, the position began to shift a little. In 2009, the Minister for Sport noted:
‘The Government is concerned that, although considerable progress has been made
in recent years by SGBs, the betting industry and the Gambling Commission,
the possible threat to the integrity of sport remains an ever present and complex
problem requiring multi-agency solutions. If the UK is to maintain its reputation
as a jurisdiction where fair play is the guiding principle for both sport and betting,
it is vital that the risks of corruption arising from all sources are reduced as far as
possible. The sports themselves – governing bodies, clubs and players, the betting
industry and enforcement authorities – principally the Gambling Commission and
the police – all play important roles. The Government is determined to ensure that
everything possible is done to maintain the integrity and reputation of sport’.4
The Minister therefore convened a panel of industry experts to ‘make recommendations
on how the various bodies concerned [with sports betting integrity] could work
together more effectively’, including ‘the design and implementation of an integrated
strategy to uphold integrity in sports and associated betting’.5 When it reported in
February 2010, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that the 2006 10-Point
Plan be replaced with a new Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to
Sports Betting that included minimum standards for all sports to implement in their
own rules;6 that sports provide regular education and communication programmes
on sports betting integrity to all of their participants;7 that a ‘pan-sports integrity
unit’ be established under the auspices of the Gambling Commission, ‘to ensure
the efficient handling of intelligence followed by an effective investigation process
and, where appropriate, leading to disciplinary action under sports’ rules or criminal
prosecution’;8 and that each sport:
‘[…] put in place mechanisms for recognising and capturing intelligence in relation
to sports betting integrity and, as may be appropriate, communicating it to the Sports
Betting Intelligence Unit […] at the Gambling Commission. At the same time,
ensuring the SGB has the capacity to respond appropriately to intelligence received
from the unit and from betting operators, including the capacity to handle and store
sensitive information securely’.9
It also recommended the formation of a sports betting group to provide leadership
for sport and to share good practice on betting integrity matters, including the
development of the Code of Conduct.
1 See generally gamblingcommission.gov.uk.
2 See para A3.38.
3 See para B4.51.
4 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Terms of Reference, p 44.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, para 1.
7 Ibid, paras 1.3 – 1.4.
8 Ibid, para 1.6.
9 Ibid, para 7 (Foreword). The Panel was careful to recommend that ‘the principal focus of the Gambling
Commission in this area should continue to be the investigation of crime in relation to betting, and that
sports must retain sovereignty over, and responsibility for, investigation of disciplinary matters’. Ibid,
para 1.12. However, it recommended that the Gambling Commission ‘provide a facility to receive
intelligence generated across all sources, not least sports, analyse it, make connections and identify
patterns. Such a Unit would, as it built up intelligence across sports and betting, be able to support SGBs
and betting operators’ own prevention and deterrent efforts by the provision of relevant pooled intelligence,
as well as supporting the Gambling Commission’s own law enforcement efforts, subject to the capability
of the SGB in question and statutory constraints on data protection and privacy’. Ibid, para 1.13.
B4.16 The Sports Betting Group was formed with a mandate to bring together
sports bodies to discuss sports betting integrity issues and, where appropriate,
promote co-ordinated action on integrity matters, develop and maintain the Sports
Betting Group Code of Practice, communicate to sports bodies the importance of
protecting their sports from the threats posed by sports betting corruption, provide
help, guidance and support to sports bodies to put in place measures to protect
against sports betting corruption, and engage with government and other relevant
parties including the Gambling Commission and the betting industry to recommend
improvements to the legislative and regulatory regime. Its terms of reference state
that it brings together representatives from across sport to provide leadership and
share good practice in working against sports betting corruption, with a particular
focus on match fixing, spot fixing, and the misuse of inside information, to ensure
that SGBs have sufficient help and guidance in relation to sports betting integrity
issues.1 At the heart of its work is the development of the SBG Code of Practice,
comprising seven key actions that the Group recommends SGBs to take to put in
place as industry-wide minimum standards to mitigate against any increased risk
of corrupt practices caused by sports betting,2 ranging from the need for clear rules
setting out what is and is not acceptable in relation to betting, through to educational
frameworks, information-sharing arrangements, and regular reviews. SGBs who
have published rules in accordance with the Code include The Football Association,
the Premier League, the Rugby Football Union, the BHA, and the England and Wales
Cricket Board. The Sports Betting Group has also encouraged innovative means
of education to minimise the risks to integrity posed by corrupt betting.3 It works
alongside bodies such as the Sports Betting Integrity Forum to achieve the aims of
the Sports Betting Integrity Action Plan, an annually-updated plan first introduced
in 2015 and published by the Sports Betting Integrity Forum that sets the overall
direction of the consolidated drive to minimise the risks of betting-related integrity
breaches in UK sport.4
1 Sports Betting Group – Terms of Reference (2016), sportsbettinggroup.org/downloads/SBG%20

Terms%20of%20Reference%20-%202016.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].
2 ‘The Code of Practice’, available at sportsbettinggroup.org/code-of-practice/ [accessed 30 October
2020]..
3 See eg the involvement of Mervyn Westfield, the former professional cricketer discussed further at
para B4.49 who was banned for five years following charges of spot fixing, in a series of education
resources aimed at professional cricketers in the UK.
4 2019 iteration available at sbif.uk/images/temp/SBI-Action-Plan-2019-FINAL-February-2019.pdf
D The response of the Council of Europe: the Macolin

Convention
B4.17 In 2008 the European Parliament called for ‘the Commission and the
Member States to explore with sports and betting operators the creation of a workable,
equitable and sustainable framework to ensure that all sports in Europe remain free
from illegal betting practices’;1 while in its November 2011 resolution on ‘Online
gambling in the internal market’, it stated its view ‘that a common definition of sport
fraud and cheating should be developed and that betting fraud should be penalised as
a criminal offence throughout Europe’, and called for cooperation between the police,
sports bodies and the betting industry in investigating match-fixing in connection
with sports betting.2 Meanwhile at the 18th Informal Council of Europe Conference
on 22 September 2010, the Council of Europe agreed a resolution that:
(a) called upon all relevant bodies to partner together in the fight against sports
corruption and to design a policy and action setting out an overall approach;
(b) encouraged governments to consider whether their current legislation
satisfactorily addressed issues related to the manipulation of sports results;
(c) encouraged sports movements to achieve an appropriate level of self-regulation
and preventative activities;
(d) encouraged betting operates to achieve an appropriate level of self-regulation
and preventative activities; and
(e) encouraged all stakeholders to cooperate with each other.3
On 15 March 2012, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on ‘International
cooperation on promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of
results (match-fixing)’, welcoming the work performed on the feasibility of a
new international legal instrument relating to manipulation of sports results, and
invited the negotiation of such a convention that could be opened for signature to
non-European states, as well as exploration of the possibility of establishing an
international network of national authorities in charge of betting and sports integrity
issues.4 In December 2012, the head of the Council of Europe office in Brussels noted
that such a convention ‘will facilitate the much-needed mobilisation against match-
fixing. It will support close cooperation between sports movement, betting operators
and public authorities. The convention will promote education and prevention
programmes, as well as an effective detection with betting monitoring systems and
an exchange of intelligence. Last but not least, it will establish clear legal provisions,
defining criminal behaviours and allowing effective international co-operation
for law enforcement investigations’.5 The Council of Europe’s Convention on the
Manipulation of Sports Competitions (known as the Macolin Convention),6 was
eventually concluded on 18 September 2014, but only came into force on 1 September
2019, after opposition from Malta (a gambling haven) led to delays in obtaining
the necessary number of ratifications by state party signatories.7 The stated purpose
of the Convention is to prevent, detect, punish, and discipline the manipulation of
sports competitions, and to enhance the exchange of information and national and
international cooperation between the public authorities concerned, and with sports
organisations and sports betting operators. The Convention calls on governments to
adopt measures, including legislation, that create criminal sanctions for match-fixing
in their jurisdictions and to promote the exchange of information among and by
their betting regulators concerning illegal, irregular, or suspicious betting activities.
It urges signatory countries to encourage their national sports organisations to
prohibit betting or misuse of inside information by participants in sports; and its
Article 13 encourages the establishment of national platforms where law enforcement
agencies, local sports federations, and betting operators and regulators can exchange
intelligence, and coordinate their efforts, investigations, and legal proceedings to fight
the manipulation of sports competition.8 The UK Government signed the Convention
in December 2018,9 but has not yet ratified it.
1 European Parliament on the White Paper in Sport (2007/2261(INI)/A6-0149/2008), para 82.
2 2011/2084(INI), paras 32–33. See also European Parliament written declaration on combating
corruption in European sport, 0007/2011, 14 February 2011.
3 IM18 (2010) 7.
4 See SportAccord press release, 27 April 2012. A similar declaration was drawn up by the EU Sports
Ministers in Nicosia in September 2012 (ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b1/eusf2012-nicosia-
declaration-fight-against-match-fixing.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020]), and the European Commission
at the same time expressed its support for the Council’s work in promoting an international convention
on match-fixing: Vassiliou, ‘The fight against match-fixing’, EU Sport Forum, 20 September 2012
(speech/12/621) (‘Such a Convention could send a powerful signal that public authorities are
committed to fighting against match fixing. It would establish common pan-European standards to
preserve the integrity of sport against manipulation of results. It would also create a useful platform
for pan-European cooperation by involving all the parties that need to work together: the public
authorities, the sport movement and betting operators. It is an initiative that deserves to be supported’).
5 Froysnes, Seminar on sports betting and anti-money laundering (Brussels, 11 December 2012).
6 coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/215 [accessed 30 October 2020].
7 coe.int/en/web/sport/manipulation-of-sports-competitions#:~:text=The%20Macolin%20
Convention%20is%20a,force%20on%201%20September%202019 [accessed 30 October 2020].
8 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions,
CETS 215, 18 September 2014 (rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMCo
ntent?documentId=09000016800d383f [accessed 30 October 2020]).
9 DCMS press release, gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-signs-macolin-convention-to-tackle-
match-fixing-in-sport (6 December 2018) [accessed 30 October 2020]..
3 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN

SPORT
B4.18 We consider in this section of this chapter the regulations that SGBs have
put in place as the basis for fighting corruption in their sports, before turning in
Section 4 to the practical difficulties they face in policing and enforcing those rules.
A Who should be subject to the rules?
B4.19 Rules prohibiting match-fixing and related misconduct need to cover the
competitors on the field of play, since they can most directly influence the course
and outcome of the sporting contest. The rules also need to cover team management
and coaching staff, who can direct what those competitors do on the field of play,1
as well as match officials, who can influence what happens there even without the
connivance of the competitors. Depending on the sport, there may well also be others
with a direct (if less obvious) influence on the contest.2 Furthermore, even if a person
working within a sport has no influence at all on the field of play, they might have
access to inside information about a forthcoming contest that could give someone an
unfair advantage in the betting market.3 Each governing body will therefore have to
think carefully how widely it should define who will be covered by its anti-corruption
rules.4 Obviously, the governing body only has jurisdiction over those who have
accepted (or who are deemed by their participation in the sport to have accepted)
its rules,5 and many of those involved in match-fixing and related misconduct may
stand well beyond that limited reach.6 However, that does not mean the regulator
has to ignore them. For example, the Rules of Racing give the BHA the power not
only to ‘disqualify’ a licensed person for breach of the rules, but also to ‘exclude’ an
unlicensed person when it considers ‘it is in the interests of racing to do so’. This
exclusion may be for such a period of time as the BHA sees fit.7 On this basis, the
BHA has brought several cases seeking exclusion of persons who are not subject to
its rules for conspiring corruptly with persons who are subject to the rules, and its
Disciplinary Panel has granted such exclusion orders.8 World Rugby has a similar
provision in its Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting),9 and the Independent
Review of Integrity in Tennis recommended the addition of such a rule to the Tennis
Anti-Corruption Program.10
1 See eg FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 8 (‘to establish
“influence” on a match for the purposes of rule E8 the evidence must show at least some actual
influence. Such influence might well be inferred from a person’s position – the most obvious example
being a team manager or coach’).
2 As just a few examples: (a) the level of influence (including financial influence) that agents have over
their athlete clients in some sports may warrant making those agents subject to the anti-corruption
rules; (b) in motor-racing the rules would need to apply to team mechanics, engineers, and the like;
and (c) in cricket, pitch curators and groundsmen are able to prepare certain pitches that are likely to
ensure particular outcomes, and so therefore need to be covered.
3 See para B4.23. For example, a player’s agent is covered by the RFU’s rules: see RFU v Hart,
RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018.
4 To take a few examples:
(a) The SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011)
recommend ‘a definition of “participants” in any competition that is as inclusive as possible,
concerning all accredited individuals including athletes, judges, IF and National Olympic
Committee employees, officials and families, the event organising committee and the entourage of
all participants’; while the ASOIF Model Rules (which are intended for international federations
governing the sports that take part in the summer Olympic Games) are stated to apply to ‘all
Participants who participate or assist in an International Competition’, with ‘Participant’ defined
as ‘any Athlete, Athlete Support Personnel, judge, referee, delegate, commissioner, jury of appeal
member, competition official, National Federation team or delegation member and any other
accredited person’. See ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art
2.1 and Appendix 1 (since supplemented by the ‘Model Rules for International Federations and
their members to assist in implementing the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the
Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version published in December 2018).
(b) The ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code defines ‘Participants’ at Art 1.4 as including ‘Players, Player
Support Personnel, ICC Official, Match Referee, Pitch Curator, Player Agent, Umpire and Umpire
Support Personnel’ .
(c) World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) covers ‘Connected Persons’, defined as
‘any International Player, Contract Player, International Match Official, Contract Player Support
Personnel, any coach, trainer, selector, health professional, analyst, team official, administrator,
owner, shareholder, director, executive, staff member and/or any other person involved with and/or
engaged in relation to the Game by a Union or its National Representative Team and shall include
any Union/Association/World Rugby panel of Match Officials at International Match and/or
Contract Player level, Disciplinary Personnel, any Agent and/or representative of an International
Player, Contract Player or Contract Player Support Personnel and/or family member and/or
associate of any of the foregoing (to the extent that such family member/associate falls under the
jurisdiction of a Union, Rugby Body and/or World Rugby) and/or any other individual or entity
involved in the organisation, administration and/or promotion of the Game at International Match
and/or Contract Player level’.
(d) The Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program covers not only players but also ‘Related Persons’
(ie ‘any coach, trainer, therapist, physician, management representative, agent, family member,
tournament guest, business associate or other affiliate or associate of any Player, or any other
person who receives accreditation at an Event at the request of the Player or any other Related
Person’) and ‘Tournament Support Personnel’ (ie ‘any tournament director, official, owner,
operator, employee, agent, contractor or any similarly situated person and ATP, ITF and WTA
staff providing services at any Event and any other person who receives accreditation at an Event
at the request of Tournament Support Personnel’).
5 See paras A1.10 and C3.8.
6 There may still be jurisdictional issues, however, even where all of the co-conspirators are subject to
the sport’s rules. In particular, if an athlete who fixed a match is in the UK, he is likely to be subject
to his national governing body’s anti-corruption rules. But what if he was persuaded to fix the match
by an athlete based in another country and subject to the jurisdiction of a different national governing
body. And/or what if the match was in the other country and/or it was an international event in the
UK? Delicate questions of jurisdictional conflict can arise, which are often best addressed by national
federations having discretion to delegate authority to enforce their rules to each other and/or to the
international federation, and/or the international federation having the right to step in and take over
investigation and prosecution of the matter where it sees fit.
7 The exclusion power was in Rule (A) 64 of the BHA Rules of Racing in effect until 2019. In the Rules
of Racing applicable until May 2020 the power was contained in Rule 13 of BHA Investigations and
Disciplinary Powers section of the Rules of Racing. This Rule 13 remains in effect in the latest version
of the Rules of Racing, published on 15 July 2020 (‘The BHA may issue an Exclusion Order against
any person, whether or not they are subject to the Rules, where it is in the interests of racing to do so.
The Exclusion Order may be indefinite, or for such period as the BHA may specify’).
8 Examples are:
(a) City tailor Christopher Coleman, who was the subject of an indefinite exclusion order on
22 January 2003, having been found to have bought information from jockey Barrie Wright
and others over a period of years. See Jockey Club v Coleman, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 22 January 2003. In Jockey Club v Gary Carter, Jockey Club Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 28 September 2005, it was found that Coleman had bet on eight horses ridden by
Carter in August and September 2003 to lose, using information that he had bought from Carter.
Coleman was therefore made the subject of a further indefinite exclusion order. A similar order
was made against his son Dean, who was found to have helped in the Carter operation.
(b) HRA v Kelly et al, HRA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 April 2007, where one Ajaz Khan
was found to have organised the corrupt betting involved and was excluded for 10 years. Five of
his associates were each excluded for a minimum of three years.
(c) Miles Rodgers, punter and lead defendant in the 2007 criminal prosecution of Kieren Fallon
and others (see para B4.49), was one of those targeted for disciplinary proceedings by the BHA
after the criminal case collapsed. In 2009 Rodgers admitted most of the allegations against him
in those proceedings. A charge he did not admit, of asking jockey Fergal Lynch to ‘stop’ a horse,
was also upheld. The Disciplinary Panel ordered Rodgers’ indefinite exclusion, and recommended
that the BHA not consider relaxing that sanction for 10 years. See BHA v Burke & Rodgers,
BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 July 2009.
(d) In BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 January 2013, para 29, the
corrupt conspirators included two professional footballers, both of whom were made the subject
of exclusion orders.
9 See Art 6.4 of World Rugby Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) (‘1. The Anti-Corruption
Officer may make an application to a Judicial Officer to deem any person who is and/or is seeking
to become a Connected Person [a wide-ranging definition granting similar scope to those who fall
within the BHA Exclusion Orders, as set out at B4.19, n 4(c)] to be an Unsuitable Person where the
Anti-Corruption Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person may be and/or may have
been involved in any Unsuitable Conduct. […] 4. Following consideration of the evidence presented
to him, the Judicial Officer shall either (i) impose a Provisional Suspension (where sought by the
Anti-Corruption Officer) or, (ii) deem a Subject to be an Unsuitable Person where he considers that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Subject may be and/or may have been involved in
any Unsuitable Conduct. 5. The Anti-Corruption Officer shall notify the Unsuitable Person and the
Union(s) concerned in writing advising them of the decision of the Judicial Officer. Where a person
has been deemed to be an Unsuitable Person he may not, following receipt of notification, be involved
in the Game as a Connected Person and no Connected Person shall associate with an Unsuitable
Person in a professional or sport-related capacity. Unions shall acknowledge and enforce any such
decision and its consequences forthwith’).
10 See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.
B What conduct should be prohibited?

B4.20 A sport will want to prohibit any conduct that risks undermining the all-
important public confidence in the authenticity and integrity of its results.1 There
is a temptation to create a very general requirement, for example an obligation
‘to safeguard the integrity of sport by refraining from any attempt to influence the
elements of a competition in a manner contrary to sporting ethics’,2 in order to avoid
anything falling between the cracks.3 However, most sports have taken the view that
the better approach is to define a list of tailored offences targeted at specified acts and
omissions, even if they then conclude that list with a general offence that is intended
to operate as a catch-all.4
1 See para B4.1, n.1.
2 SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), para 1.
This appears to be based on Art A.6 of the IOC’s Code of Ethics, which states: ‘in the context of
betting, participants in the Olympic Games must not, by any manner whatsoever, infringe the principle
of fair play, show unsporting conduct, or attempt to influence the course or result of a competition, or
any part thereof, in a manner contrary to sporting ethics’.
Similarly, Arts 11 and 15 of the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (Edition 2019) provide that
disciplinary measures may be imposed for ‘unsporting conduct’ and that participants ‘shall conduct
themselves according to the principles of ‘ethical conduct, loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship’. Art
11 then gives examples of conduct that amount to a breach of these principles, including engaging in
‘active or passive bribery and/or corruption’ and bringing the sport into disrepute. Art 12 (introduced in
the 2014 edition) specifically addresses the ‘Integrity of matches and competitions and match-fixing’,
including a participant ‘acting in a manner that it likely to exert an unlawful or undue influence on
the course and/or result of a match or competition with a view to gaining advantage for himself or
a third party, participating in betting on competition matches, using or providing others with inside
information and failing to report approaches’. In Pobeda, UEFA sanctioned a club and its president and
captain for match-fixing based on general statements in the UEFA Disciplinary Regulations (Edition
2008) (and therefore under an edition of the Disciplinary Regulations published prior to the addition
of the specific provision now in Art 12). The defendants did not challenge the charges on grounds of
legal uncertainty or otherwise, and the CAS panel was happy that the general prohibition covered
match-fixing even though it did not specifically mention it: ‘the Panel is convinced that match fixing
touches at the very essence of the principle of loyalty, integrity and sportsmanship because it has an
unsporting impact on the result of the game by inducing players not to perform according to their real
sporting capacities and because they get rewarded for their misconduct. Match-fixing is cheating and
constitutes a clear violation of the basic principles under which sporting competitions shall be carried
out’. FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 78.
3 Cf ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, Dame
Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, 13 May 2008, para 1.24 (‘The Review Team has taken into account
views on how the rules for the BHA should be formulated. We are of the view that, ideally, rules
should be based on a set of underlying principles. The rules themselves should not be too detailed in
order to allow them to be applied more flexibly. The recommended model would be to have a set of
principles supported by codes of conduct with rules which sit under them. A breach of a principle or
a code of conduct can lead to a liability to disciplinary sanction, even if there is no specific rule. This
gives flexibility and means that it is not necessary to try to cater for every eventuality in the rules’).
4 See para B4.33.
(a) Not playing to your merits, match-fixing, or spot-fixing

B4.21 The key objective of sporting regulators is to maintain public confidence in
the integrity and authenticity of the sporting contest, ie that the contest is being played
on a level-playing field, that every contestant is trying their best to win, and that the
contest will therefore be determined by sporting merit, and not by any illicit factor.1
Accordingly, the starting-point of any code in this area must be a clear prohibition of
any deliberate under-performance for fixing purposes. In some contexts, there may
need to be prohibition of deliberate under-performance even if not directly for fixing
purposes, since advance knowledge of such intended underperformance facilitates
corrupt betting. However, there are traps for the unwary. In particular, care must
be taken not to make the prohibition too narrow2 or too broad,3 or to include any
unnecessary elements. For example, some codes require proof of receipt of a bribe or
reward in return for the fixing,4 but the mischief is in the fixing of the outcome or other
aspect of the contest, not in the motivation for it.5 Fixing is deeply damaging to sport
even in those (not unusual) occasions when it is not done for any bribe or reward.6
As a result, many anti-corruption codes treat receipt of a bribe or other reward not
as a requisite element of the cornerstone offence,7 but rather as an aggravating factor
when it comes to determining the appropriate sanction for that offence.8 Similarly,
whether or not the fix is in fact carried out, or is successful in delivering the intended
outcome, may be relevant to sanction, but it should not be a necessary element of the
offence itself: simply agreeing to carry out the fix is enormously damaging in itself,
obviously where it is uncovered and is splashed on the front pages of the global
press, but also where it remains concealed (because it leaves the athlete vulnerable to
pressure to act corruptly again in the future).9
1 See para B4.1, n.1.
2 For example, the advent of spot-betting (see para B4.4, n 5) means that the rule must prohibit not only
match-fixing but also ‘spot-fixing’, ie the fixing not only of the eventual outcome but also of other,
narrower aspects of the contest. Notwithstanding that the outcome of the match remains unaffected,
such conduct is deeply damaging to the integrity and image of the sport (because it tells the public that
not everything they see is real, and because it exposes the perpetrators to corrupt relationships with
fixers that can easily expand into broader corruption down the line), and therefore must also be clearly
prohibited and heavily sanctioned. See eg Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which prohibits
‘fixing or contriving in any way or otherwise influencing improperly or being a party to any effort
to fix or contrive in any way or otherwise influence improperly, the result, progress, conduct or any
other aspect of any International Match or ICC Event’ (emphasis added). This broad formulation also
‘treats indifferently fixing and being party to a fix. This allows for the inculpation of both ringmaster
and performers in relation to the same incident’: ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal
decision dated 5 February 2011, para 33.
The ASOIF Model Rules include a virtually identical provision under the heading ‘Manipulation of
Results’. See ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 3.2(a). This
provision was supplemented by the Model Rules of the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention
of the Manipulation of Competitions (2016, now updated in its latest version, published in December
2018), intended as an update to the ASOIF Model Rules 2012. Article 2.2 of the 2018 update defines
‘Manipulation of sports competitions’ as ‘an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an
improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part
of the unpredictable nature of the sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue Benefit for
oneself or for others’. Meanwhile World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) specifies two
examples that are included in the definition of ‘Fix’ at Regulation 6.2; namely ‘improperly ensuring
that a particular incident(s) takes place or does not take place during an Event(s) or at a particular time
or juncture during an Event(s)’ and ‘improperly manipulating the scoring or any other aspect of an
Event(s)’.
Rule (F)37 of the BHA Rules of Racing states that a jockey must, and must be seen to: ‘ask their
horse for timely, real and substantial efforts to achieve the best possible position; and take all other
reasonable and permissible measures throughout the Race to ensure the horse is given a full opportunity
to achieve the best possible position.’ Rule (F)38 states that ‘a Person must not prevent or try to prevent
a horse from obtaining the best possible position.’ Regarding instructions, Rule (F)39 makes clear that
‘a Trainer is responsible for ensuring that a Jockey who rides a horse trained by them in a Race is given
instructions that shall allow the Jockey to ensure that the horse is given a full opportunity to achieve
the best possible position’; Rule (F)40 sets out that, ‘if a Jockey deliberately does not ensure that the
horse runs the Race to achieve its best possible position, or if a Race is used to school or condition a
horse, a Trainer shall be responsible unless the Trainer can demonstrate that the Jockey was given the
necessary instructions.’
The historical equivalent of Rule (F)37 was often charged in combination with a charge that the
rider has participated in a corrupt ‘conspiracy to commit a corrupt or fraudulent practice in relation
to racing’ contrary to Rule (A)41.2 by providing inside information to third parties (eg that he will
not, or will not try to, win the race or gain a place) so that they can bet against that outcome. See
eg McKeown v British Horseracing Authority, [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 2, and BHA v Heffernan
& Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 23 January 2013, para 7.
3 For example, making a participant’s ‘failure to perform to the best of his ability in any match, race or
other event in which he participates’ a corruption offence (Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s proposed
Code of Conduct, para 2.6) might seem overbroad, since an athlete could fail to perform to the best of
their ability for many reasons, most of which are not corrupt in any way (eg ill health). On the other
hand, planned deliberate under-performance, such as ‘tanking’ in tennis, has the potential to allow
for corrupt betting when known of in advance. Care needs to be taken to set the prohibition at a level
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the sport. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para
B4.10.
The Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 4.5(c)
requires sports to proscribe ‘“tanking” (including, in particular, owing to an arrangement relating to
betting on the outcome of any match or event) other than for legitimate tactical reasons within the rules
of the respective sport)’.
The approach adopted by the British Horseracing Authority is to impose a positive duty on a jockey
to both ensure the horse provides all necessary efforts and ‘take all other reasonable and permissible
measures throughout the Race to ensure the horse is given a full opportunity to achieve the best
possible position’ (see para B4.22, n 1): Rule (F)37 of the BHA Rules of Racing. Trainers have a
corresponding duty to give instructions to ensure the best possible placing: Rule (F)39.1. These duties
could be broken carelessly or recklessly, without any element of corruption, and the conduct could be
sanctioned accordingly.
4 For example, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s Code of Conduct would make it an offence for a
participant to ‘receive, or seek to receive, or seek a bribe in order to fix or contrive a result or the
progress of a match, race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’ (para 2.3),
or to ‘offer, or attempt to offer, a bribe in order to fix or contrive a result or the progress of a match,
race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’ (para 2.4). The SportAccord
Model Rules also link the fixing offence to receipt of a reward. See SportAccord Model Rules on
Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), para 6 (‘Ensuring the occurrence of a
particular incident, which is the subject of a bet and for which he/she expects to receive or has received
any reward’). However, they also require the incident to be the subject of a bet, which would not be
helpful in cases where the perpetrator has fixed an aspect of a match with corrupt intent but for one
reason or another (eg the fixer was testing him out, or the ‘fixer’ was really an undercover reporter) no
bet has in fact been placed.
5 See Pound, ‘Responses to Corruption in Sport’ (Play the Game Conference, 3 October 2011) (‘It is
still, however, not the betting as such which is the problem, but the underlying corruption of the result
or competition. Betting in those circumstances is simply a means of monetizing the corruption’).
6 This is described in one report as ‘sporting motivated match-fixing’, as compared to ‘betting motivated
match-fixing’: Oxford Research A/S, ‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’ (April 2010).
For example, in the context of tennis, players may underperform or ‘tank’ because they wish to move
on to another tournament more quickly, and injured players may play although incapable of competing
in order to earn first round loser’s fees (see Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10). In 2002 French
rugby club Agen were found guilty of deliberately losing their last match in the pool stages of the
European Challenge Cup, not to earn illicit rewards, but rather to avoid qualifying for the knock-out
stages of the Cup, because they wanted to concentrate their efforts on the domestic league. Agen v
ERC, ERC Appeal Committee decision dated March 2002. Meanwhile, in the 2002 Australian Formula
One Grand Prix, Rubens Barrichello allowed his team-mate Michael Schumacher to overtake him just
before the finishing line, to assist Schumacher’s bid for the drivers’ championship, prompting the
FIA in 2003 to ban the practice of team orders. In 2012, the Australian Football League investigated
allegations that Melbourne had deliberately lost games towards the end of the season so as to improve
its draft picks for the following season: see ‘Brock McLean quizzed on tank claims’, theaustralian.
com.au, 2 August 2012. A Chinese badminton coach admitted in 2008 that he had advised one Chinese
player to lose her semi-final match against another Chinese player whom he deemed to have a better
chance to win gold in the final (‘China coach admits match fixing’, uk.eurosport.yahoo.com, 23 March
2008), and two South Korean pairs, one Chinese pair and one Indonesian pair, were expelled from
the badminton tournament at the 2012 London Olympic Games for deliberately trying to lose dead
rubber qualifying matches in order to secure a more favourable draw in the knock-out stages: ‘BWF
kicks out eight players from London 2012 women’s doubles for deliberate poor play’, Sportcal.com,
1 August 2012. Similar allegations were made against the Japanese women’s football team, who were
alleged to have deliberately played for a draw in the final group match in order to avoid having to travel
to Glasgow from Cardiff (goal.com/en-us/news/1587/olympics/2012/08/02/3281424/martin-rogers-
japans-womens-soccer-team-plays-to-intentional [accessed 30 October 2020]).
Another possibility is that the deliberate underperformance is prompted not by the promise of
reward but rather by threats and intimidation. There have sometimes been suspicions that that was
the inducement (or part of the inducement) in some horseracing corruption cases. The BHA Rules
of Racing steer clear of including any reference to inducement or otherwise – Rule (J)27 states that
‘a person must not: commit any corrupt or fraudulent practice in relation to horse racing in any
jurisdiction; or conspire with any other person for the commission of such a practice’. By contrast, the
ICC Anti-Corruption Code is one of several that makes a belief of a threat to one’s physical safety a
defence to a corruption charge. See para B4.35.
7 For example, ‘an infringement of Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Code does not require a player to gain financially.
The question to be answered is whether Mr Asif fixed, contrived in any way, influenced improperly,
or was a party to any effort to fix, contrive in any way, or influence improperly, the result, progress,
conduct or any other aspect of any International Match or ICC Event. In other words, a player who is
involved in a fix breaches Art 2.1.1 notwithstanding that he does not benefit financially from doing so.
Accordingly, the Panel does not consider the absence of financial gain to be determinative of the fact
that there is no infringement’. Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 64.
8 See eg Art 6.1.1.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (‘the Anti-Corruption Tribunal must first
determine the relative seriousness of the offence, including identifying all relevant factors that it
deems to aggravate the nature of the offence under the Anti-Corruption Code, including […] where
the amount of profits, winnings or other Reward, directly or indirectly received by the Player or Player
Support Personnel as a result of the offence(s), is substantial and/or whether the sums of money
otherwise involved in the offence(s) were substantial’). See further the Tennis Integrity Reports, para
B4.10.
9 See eg Art 2.1.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, and Art 3.3 of the ASOIF Model Rules on Betting
and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), each of which prohibits simply seeking or accepting a bribe
to fix or improperly influence the result, progress or conduct of a match or competition, irrespective
of whether or not the fix is carried out. See also FA Rule E5.2 (‘A Participant shall not, directly or
indirectly, offer, agree to give, give, solicit, agree to accept or accept any bribe, gift or reward or
consideration of any nature which is, or could appear to be related in any way to that Participant, or any
other Participant, failing to perform to the best of their ability; or that Participant or any other person
(whether a Participant or not), directly or indirectly, seeking to influence for an improper purpose,
the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of, or occurrence in or in connection with, a football
match or competition’); and ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.6, which makes it clear that it is not
relevant to the establishing of any offence under the Code that the player’s performance and/or the
conduct and outcome of the match were not affected, and/or that the bet did not pay out. See also
Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit, CAS 2014/A/3467, para 109 (mere agreement to lose is an
offence, even if player subsequently were to play to win); FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission
decision dated 23 July 2009, para 26 (‘the point is not whether you can prove that as it turned out a
particular player did or did not actually affect the outcome. It is that football matches must be free of
all possible suspicion that every single player is not honestly and wholeheartedly doing his very best
to help his team win, within the laws and spirit of the game’). So, for example, in February 2006 the
WPBSA banned snooker player Quinten Hann for eight years for agreeing with undercover journalists
that he would lose a game at the China Open in return for money, even though the journalists went
public before the game and so the fix never happened: ‘Guilty Hann given eight-year ban’, bbc.co.uk,
17 February 2006. Similarly, Stephen Lee was found to be in breach of snooker’s anti-corruption
rules by agreeing to play and then playing in a way designed to achieve a particular outcome without
the need for proof that he deliberately lost a match that he could and should have won. WBPSA v
Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013, paras 23, 82, aff’d, Appeals Committee
decision dated 15 May 2014.
The English appeal courts took a similar view in Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd.
Following a failed criminal prosecution against him for match-fixing (see para B4.49), the Liverpool
goalkeeper sued the News of the World for libel over an article accusing him of corruptly throwing
matches. A jury awarded damages of £85,000 but the Court of Appeal and House of Lords both ruled
that this was perverse. Both courts held that on the evidence, any reasonable jury would have found
that Grobbelaar had agreed to fix matches. Although it was not proved that he ever actually did so,
his conduct in agreeing to do so was, for the Court of Appeal, enough to prove that the sting of the
article complained of was substantially true: [2001] EWCA Civ 33, [2001] 2 All ER 437. Although
the House of Lords disagreed with that conclusion, it held that proof of the agreement was enough to
mean Grobbelaar was a person with no reputation deserving of legal protection, and to reduce damages
to £1: [2002] HL 40; [2002] 1 WLR 3024.
In ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 141,
the Tribunal rejected a charge that Mr Butt had agreed with his agent to bat out a maiden deliberately
at the Oval Test between England and Pakistan, because it was ‘not convinced that he intended to
implement his apparent promise to bat a maiden […] . He did not in fact do so. It would not have been
something he could guarantee […] [because] a maiden depended on the performance not merely of
the batsman but of the bowler and fielders of the other team. He was, it is possible, merely playing
along without any intention of involving himself in a risky undertaking to act on it’. In the subsequent
criminal proceedings (see para B4.49), the Court of Appeal was not so generous, finding that Butt’s
not batting out a maiden over ‘was not a sudden change of mind. Butt did not suddenly repent of his
involvement. It was simply that, as everybody would recognise, with a hard, new ball bowled in first-
class cricket, a batsman could not guarantee that he would provide a maiden over’: R v Amir & Butt
[2011] EWCA Crim 2914, para 14.
B4.22 There are several examples in the case law of such fixing or attempted
fixing, both of the outcome of matches (‘match-fixing’)1 and of particular aspects
of matches (‘spot-fixing’).2 In particular, in April 2010 a CAS panel upheld UEFA
charges that a club president had fixed his football team’s loss in the first qualifying
round of the UEFA Champions League 2004/05, relying on the evidence of unusual
betting patterns, but also on witness testimony that the president had told the players
he would be killed if they did not lose the tie. Because of the gravity of the offence,
the CAS panel also upheld the life ban that UEFA had imposed on the club president.3
In March 2012, another CAS panel upheld charges of attempted match-fixing by
Austrian tennis player Daniel Köllerer, specifically, that he had offered other players
approximately $10,000 per match to lose particular matches in the first round of
ATP Tour events, and also upheld the life ban imposed on him at first instance,
notwithstanding that none of his offers had been accepted and so no tennis matches
had in fact been fixed.4 As for spot-fixing, in February 2011 an Anti-Corruption
Tribunal upheld charges that Pakistani cricketers Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif
and Mohammad Amir had conspired to bowl three ‘no balls’ deliberately at pre-
determined moments during the Lord’s Test match in August 2010, and banned the
players for ten, seven, and five years respectively, which bans were again upheld by
the CAS;5 while in June 2012 an ECB Disciplinary Panel upheld charges that Danish
Kaneria had persuaded Mervyn Westfield to concede 12 runs in his first over during
Essex’s Twenty20 match against Durham in 2009, and banned Westfield for five
years and Kaneria for life. Kaneria’s appeal against liability was dismissed in April
2013 and his appeal against sanction was dismissed in June 2013.6 In 2018, an Ethics
Hearing Panel of the Badminton World Federation upheld charges of match-fixing

against the Malaysian badminton player Zulfadli Zulkiffli and related complicity and
wagering charges against another Malaysian badminton player, Tan Chun Seang.
Zulkiffli was banned from the sport for 20 years and fined US $25,000 and Tan was
banned for 15 years and fined US $15,000, which sanctions were upheld by the
CAS.7
1 For example, a charge of being party to an effort to fix the result of a match was upheld in Darts
Regulatory Authority v Ulang and Chino, DRA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15 June 2018;
while charges against a jockey of deliberately failing to ride a horse on its merits (ie riding to lose) as
part of a corrupt conspiracy were upheld in Ad Vitam, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 9 October
2015, paras 18, 54–56, aff’d, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 6 January 2016; and a charge that a
trainer had instructed his jockey to stop a horse was upheld in BHA v Best, BHA Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 14 December 2016.
2 See eg The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April
2018 (player found to have deliberately caused himself to be booked, his friends having bet on that
occurrence).
3 FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920. In February 2010, it was announced
that UEFA’s Control and Disciplinary Body had imposed a lifetime ban on match referee Novo Panic,
based on information about match-fixing provided by the German police. ‘Bosnian referee handed life
ban for match fixing’, 24 February 2010.
4 Köllerer v ATP CAS 2011/A/2490. The tennis player’s complaint to the European Commission that
the Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme was unlawful was unsuccessful: Case AT.40022, Match fixing
sanctions in tennis, administrative closure of the case, 28 June 2013. See also Savic v Professional
Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621 (life ban for attempted fixing); PTIOS v Guzman, Anti-
Corruption Hearing Officer’s decision dated 14 March 2019 (imposing lifetime ban for making corrupt
approaches to other players, and noting other cases where a lifetime ban had been imposed for similar
offences)..
5 ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011; appeals denied,
Asif v ICC CAS 2011/A/2362 and Butt v ICC CAS 2011/A/2364.
6 ECB v Kaneria & Westfield Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, appeal against liability
denied, 26 April 2013, appeal against sanction denied, 9 July 2013.
7 Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01,
aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847.
(b) Betting on the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any match or
competition
B4.23 Betting by sportspersons on matches they are playing in should be prohibited,

irrespective of any proof of fixing, because (as an FA Regulatory Commission noted):
‘how can the fair-minded […] fan have any solid confidence that a match is not fixed
if there are players on the pitch who have thousands of pounds to gain if their own
team loses? Or any confidence that any of the players in their team are playing their
honest best to win the game?’1
In fact, it is not just the players who must not bet: if a club is in financial difficulties,
it may be an owner or chairperson who directs the players to lose, so that losses can
be covered with gambling winnings.2 Therefore, all anti-corruption codes include
prohibitions on all participants (broadly defined) betting (directly or indirectly3)
on their own matches.4 However, should players also be prohibited from betting on
their team’s matches in which they are not playing?5 Going further, should they be
prohibited from betting on matches not involving their own team but played in the
same competition? Or from betting on any match at all in their sport?6 Many would
argue that any sort of relationship between a participant and bookmakers is to be
discouraged, for fear that it makes the participant vulnerable to corrupt influences
down the line (for example, if the participant runs up large gambling debts that
cannot be repaid7). Indeed, if this argument were accepted, it would speak in favour
of a blanket ban on participants betting on any sport while they are in a position of
influence in their own sport.8
1 FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 19. It therefore does not
matter whether or not the result was actually influenced: ‘the point is not whether you can prove that
as it turned out a particular player did or did not actually affect the outcome. It is that football matches
must be free of all possible suspicion that every single player is not honestly and wholeheartedly
doing his very best to help his team win, within the laws and spirit of the game’. Ibid, para 26. See also
FA v Barton, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017, para 132 (‘The Betting Rules
create strict liability. There is no need to show any evidence of an intention to influence a match. They
exist to protect the integrity of the game and public confidence in football. That is why the perception
of the impact on the integrity of the game is an important consideration’), and para 138 (‘The reason
why they [betting on your own team] are serious aggravating factors is because of the perception such
betting gives rise to. (a) Betting on team to lose – if the match or any aspect was in fact “thrown” or
fixed there would be specific charges to reflect that. The gravamen of betting in this way is that it
creates suspicion of wrongdoing, that something is not right with the match or an aspect of it. It is a
serious aggravating factor because it strikes at the integrity of football. […] (b) Betting on own team
– simply betting on a participant’s own team, even if it is to win, gives rise to the same perception
that the gambler has an unfair advantage over the public generally and the organization taking the bet.
That too is serious’), appeal on sanction upheld in part, Barton v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated
24 July 2017; RFU v Blake, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 May 2015, para 49 (‘we must
have regard to the wider interests of the Game. It is important that those involved in the Game and the
wider public understand that any breach of the anti-corruption and betting regulations will and must be
treated seriously. Such behavior undermines public confidence in the integrity of the sport and strikes
at the foundations of the Game. It is fundamental to the sport’s integrity that the participants and public
alike believe they are watching and involved in a genuine contest between two teams competing to
win’), appeal dismissed, RFU Appeal Panel decision dated 25 June 2015.
2 The authors of the IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’
(SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 24, suggest that that was the motivation of the club chairman
banned for life for match-fixing in FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920.
3 Without a ban on ‘indirect’ betting as well as direct betting, it would be too easy for a participant to
circumvent the prohibition by placing his bets indirectly, for example, through a friend or relative.
That is why the Sports Betting Integrity Panel included in its model Code of Conduct requirements
not only (a) that the participant ‘not place or attempt to place a bet on a match, race or other event
or competition in which he or his club participates’; but also (b) that the participant ‘[n]ot solicit
or facilitate, or attempt to solicit or facilitate, another person to bet on a match, race or other event
of competition in which he or his club participates’. See Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in
relation to Betting, Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Chapter 2a, Arts 2.1
and 2.2. Similarly, the SportAccord model rules prohibit participants ‘participating in all forms of,
or support for, betting or gambling related to their own matches and competitions in their sport’ and
‘instructing, encouraging or facilitating any other party to bet’ (SportAccord Model Rules on Sports
Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011)); while Art 2.2.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption
Code prohibits ‘soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading, encouraging, intentionally
facilitating or authorising any other party to enter into a Bet in relation to the result, progress, conduct
or any other aspect of any International Match.’
4 See n 3. The prohibition needs to cover not just betting to do badly but also betting to do well. This is
not because a striker who bets on himself to score a goal has an incentive to play selfishly, rather than
as part of the team. (A contractual bonus for scoring goals has the same effect, and that is expressly
permitted under FA Rule C1.10). Instead, it is because the arrangement puts the participant in a
relationship with bookmakers that could develop into a broader (and corrupt) relationship, which is a
risk that no sport can afford to take.
Horse-racing is a special case, because it was created as a betting product, and owners have always
been allowed to bet on their horses to win. However, the BHA Rules of Racing are clear that the owner
of a horse must not ‘must not place a lay Bet on a horse in which they have any interest’. (Rule (J)9).
See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011 (owner banned
for laying his horse to lose, under the old Rule (A)92).
5 In such a case, the participant may still be able to affect the outcome of the match. FA Rule E8.1
prohibits players betting on ‘the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of, or occurrence in
or in connection with, a football match or competition; or any other matter concerning or related to
football anywhere in the world, including, for example and without limitation, the transfer of players,
employment of managers, team selection or disciplinary matters’. In FA v Harris, FA Regulatory
Commission decision dated 23 July 2009, para 8, the FA Regulatory Commission held that ‘to establish
“influence” on a match for the purposes of rule E8 the evidence must show at least some actual
influence. Such influence might well be inferred from a person’s position – the most obvious example
being a team manager or coach. However, although the Player in this case was a Chester City player
and was therefore actively and closely involved and in constant contact with other players in that club
right up to the AFC Bournemouth v Chester City FC match itself, we cannot safely infer that he had
any influence on the Match and there is no direct evidence that he had any such influence’. On the other
hand, that player may well have inside information that would give him an unfair advantage over other
punters. See RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 2 (‘The Tribunal
are prepared [to accept] that in the context of the other allegations against the player [including betting
on games in which he played], [betting on games he was not playing in] is not the most serious of
offences unless the player had some inside information such as knowing that certain players would not
be playing in specific games’).
6 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s proposed Code of Conduct adopts the narrower approach,
prohibiting a participant from betting (or soliciting or facilitating betting by a third party) on ‘a match,
race or other event or competition in which he or his club participates’. See Code of Conduct on
Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010),
Chapter 2a, Arts 2.1 and 2.2. The ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code goes further, with Art 2.2.1 prohibiting
those covered by the Code (ie all international players and their support personnel) from betting on all
‘International Matches’, and Art 2.6.1 says it is irrelevant whether or not they were personally involved
in the match or event in question. To express the prohibition more narrowly, so allowing a cricketer to
bet on international matches involving other teams, was felt to expose the sport and its participants to
unnecessary risk, giving those with corrupt motives a reason to engage with the participants and try to
develop inappropriate relationships with them on the basis that they might be able to influence their
fellow players.
The SportAccord model rules went even further, banning participants from betting on ‘their own
matches and competitions in their sport’. SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation
to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6a. Similarly, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program
prohibits wagering on ‘any Event or any other tennis competition’, ie the whole of the sport. UTACP Art
D.1.a. (2019). The Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011),
para 4.5(b) required sports to ban ‘betting, gambling or entering into any other form of financial
speculation on any match or on any event connected with the sport involved’. See generally Gambling
Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October
2011), para 3.13 (‘A full restriction from betting on the sport does have the advantage of creating clear
lines of accepted and unaccepted use of information for betting by sports participants. It also means
that cases where the individual is involved in betting can be determined quickly. We recognise however
that in some sports (mainly horse and greyhound racing) betting is very closely connected with the
sport, and in fact horseracing as it exists in the UK is unlikely to be commercially viable without
licensed owners and trainers betting. It can also be said that a full restriction from any betting on the
sport is harder to enforce and less understandable to the participant – for example, a lower league
player may not understand why he is not permitted to place bets on a top league final’). The Gambling
Commission queried whether participants in sports where some betting is allowed should be required
to disclose their betting activity and that of persons closely connected with them. Ibid, para 3.15. See
further FA v Barton, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017, para 142 (‘Betting on
all football by participants is banned for good reason. […] An individual’s sporting connections may
be many and varied. The sporting public cannot know what information is or may be being deployed
or relied upon when a footballer bets on a football match’), appeal on sanction upheld in part, Barton
v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 24 July 2017.
7 See IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord,
13 February 2012), pp 19–20 (noting a report that German footballer Rene Schnitzler in January 2011
had admitted taking bribes to fix matches in order to pay off his gambling debts). See also Forrest et
al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p 18
(‘A dysfunctional gambler […] may be more tempted to fix because of an urgent need to make good
his gambling losses and, if he comes into regular contact with illegal bookmakers, is more liable
to be approached with inducements’). Young sportsmen with plenty of free time and disposable
income appear well capable of running up such debts. For example, in April 2006 it was reported
that Manchester Utd and England footballer Wayne Rooney had run up a £700,000 gambling debt:
‘Mystery bookmaker maintains low profile’, Times, 12 April 2006.
8 The authors are not aware of any SGB that has adopted such a broad rule. The closest are the
ASOIF Model Rules, which reflect their Olympic-oriented provenance by prohibiting betting not only
on events in one’s sport but also betting on events ‘taking place in another sport at an International
Competition hosted by a Major Event Organisation in which the Participant in participating’.
ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 3.1(a) (since supplemented
by the ‘Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in implementing the
Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions’ (latest version
published in December 2018). In that case though, the athlete has a close connection with those other
sports, since they are being played at the same event in which the athlete is competing.
B4.24 In Montcourt v ATP, a CAS panel was quick to reject a player’s argument
that the prohibition on him betting on matches in which he was not playing was
improper because ‘online betting was private entertainment which should not warrant
a decision by the sports authorities having the effect of interrupting the pursuit of his
livelihood’.1 Deferring heavily to the expertise of the tennis authorities to determine
what was necessary to protect their sport, the CAS panel ruled:
‘This is an unpersuasive and over-ambitious argument; the arbitrators are wholly

disinclined to act as censors of bona fide legislation in this field. Competitive sports
depend on the public perception that events are not fixed. The sports authorities
determined several decades ago that wagering by professional athletes on events in
their own sport, even by athletes not involved in the relevant event, is likely to erode
the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation
of athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially true of
sports like tennis, where it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome.
[49] The sport of professional tennis has therefore established a prohibition on
wagering by its practitioners. This is a condition of participating in the sport. The
Appellant has not come close to convincing the Panel that this policy and legislation
is illegitimate […]’.2
1 Montcourt v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, para 48.
B4.25 There are many different examples from recent years of participants in
different sports falling foul of betting prohibitions, including in horseracing,1 rugby
league,2 rugby union,3 tennis,4 football,5 cricket,6 handball,7 boxing (at the 2016
Olympic Games),8 and snooker.9
1 See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011 (owner banned
for laying his horse to lose); ‘Australian jockey Oliver banned for betting on race in 2010’ (Sportcal.
com, 20 November 2012) (Australia’s leading jockey, Damien Oliver, banned for eight months after
admitting that he had bet on a rival horse in a race in 2010).
2 In 2004, St Helens rugby league players Sean Long and Martin Gleeson were both banned (for three
months and four months respectively) for betting on St Helens to lose a match against the Bradford
Bulls when they found out that the St Helens team would be missing several players. RFL v Long &
Gleeson, RFL Advisory Panel decision dated 17 June 2004. In 2010, Oldham assistant coach Mark
Cass was found guilty of betting on rugby league matches, including on games involving his own
club, Oldham, and was banned for one year (news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/rugby_league/8488366.stm
[accessed 30 October 2020]). And in 2011 Doncaster captain Shaun Leaf admitted betting on rugby
league matches (including betting against his own team in matches in which he was playing, which
the RFL Disciplinary Panel found to be ‘[p]articularly worrying’ and ‘a very serious matter’), and was
banned for 18 months and fined £500. RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August
2011, p 4.
3 In RFU v Blake, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 May 2015, appeal dismissed, RFU Appeal
Panel decision dated 25 June 2015, Leicester Tigers defence coach Philip Blake accepted charges
that he had bet on Leicester Tigers to win two different matches, and was banned for six months.
In RFU v Hart in 2018, RFU-registered agent Matthew Hart was found guilty of breach of World
Rugby Regulation 6.3.1(c) and RFU regulations 8.3.2 and 17.3.1(c) for placing 1476 bets on rugby
union worldwide over a period of three and a half years and for non-cooperation with the RFU Anti-
Corruption Officer. The RFU Disciplinary Panel imposed a sanction of 22 months suspension upon
him, having rejected his defence that the bets he placed were all placed on behalf of his father. RFU v
Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018.
4 See eg Di Mauro v ATP, CAS 2007/A/1427 (ban for betting on ATP matches in which player was
not involved reduced from nine months to seven months on appeal, and fine reduced from $60,000 to
$25,000, due to concerns about proportionality, particularly given that similar and even worse offences
had been punished by the tennis authorities with bans of less than six months); Montcourt v ATP,
CAS 2008/A/1630 (ban for betting reduced from 8 weeks to just less than 6 weeks, and fine of $12,000
upheld, on the basis the player only gambled $192, on 36 matches in which he did not participate);
ATP v Luzzi, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer, ATP press release dated 28 February 2008
(player banned for 200 days and fined $50,000 for wagering 273 times over three years on the outcome
or other aspect of a match, including placing one €3 bet on himself to win a match); PTIOs v Ribeiro
Navarrete, Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer decision dated 3 October 2017 (banning player for eight
months, four months suspended, and fining him $1,000, for making bets on 28 matches in which he
had not been involved). Other tennis betting cases are discussed at McLaren, ‘Corruption: Its Impact
on Fair Play’ (2008) 19(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 15, 22.
5 See eg FA v Harris, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 23 July 2009; FA v Barton,
FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 26 April 2017 (Commission imposed a sanction of 18
months suspension from football and a fine of £30,000 on the footballer Joey Barton for admitted
misconduct in placing 1,260 bets on professional football over a 10 year period, including betting on
his own team to lose, albeit in matches in which he did not play), reduced on appeal to a little over 13
months, Barton v FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 24 July 2017, because Regulatory Commission
had provided no good basis to reject expert evidence that Barton was not in control of his gambling
addiction even though he was able to set limits, because he was addicted to the process, not to winning.
6 In 2004, an ECB Disciplinary Panel found Surrey cricketer Ed Giddins guilty of betting on his team to
lose a match against Northamptonshire, banned him for five years, and fined him £5,000 plus £1,000
costs, the maximum available sanction under the ECB rules at the time. ‘Giddins fined and banned for
betting’, espncricinfo.com/england/content/story/141175.html, 24 May 2004 [accessed 30 October
2020].
7 In February 2013, the French Handball League announced that seven members of the Montpellier
handball team (including two Olympic gold medalists) had been found guilty of having ‘directly or
indirectly placed bets’ on the result of a game they played in after Montpellier had already won the
league. Bets were placed amounting to €88,000 (40 times the usual amount for a match of this kind),
almost all of them on Montpellier to be losing at half time to a team placed well below them in the
French First Division. The seven team members were each banned for the maximum ban under the
applicable rules of six months. Mackay, ‘Olympic handball gold medallists given maximum ban for
illegal betting’, 8 February 2013 (insidethegames).
8 ‘IOC issues severe reprimands to three boxers for betting on events at Rio 2016 Olympics’,
insidethegames.biz, 28 September 2016, insidethegames.biz/articles/1042112/ioc-issue-severe-
reprimands-to-three-boxers-for-betting-on-events-at-rio-2016-olympics [accessed 30 October
2020]; and stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/
Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/IOC-Ethics-Commission-decision-MichaelConlan-Eng.pdf [accessed
30 October 2020].
9 In each of WPBSA v Perry, WPBSA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 25 July 2017, and
WPBSA v Maflin, WPBSA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 29 August 2017, the player was
banned for three months for betting on other players’ matches.
(c) Using or disclosing ‘inside information’ for betting purposes
B4.26 The rules also need to prohibit participants using or passing on inside
information for betting purposes, even if doing so has no impact on what then
happens on the field of play.1 This is not so much because use of inside information
undermines the integrity of the betting market,2 but rather because again it is harmful
to the image of the game, and in particular it puts the participant into a relationship
with unscrupulous punters or bookmakers that could be a gateway to future corrupt
acts that do impact on the field of play. For example, if a jockey is feeding a punter
confidential information about the chances of the horse they are riding in a particular
race, it may progress from there to agreeing to stop the horse in the race, so that the
punter can obtain a guaranteed profit by betting on the horse to lose.3 However, two
aspects in particular of the definition of this offence need careful consideration. First,
what constitutes ‘inside information’ for these purposes?4 Secondly, what constitutes
impermissible disclosure of that information? In particular, should there be a ‘safe
harbour’ provision for disclosure of personal information to family and friends?5 Or
should any disclosure be prohibited only where the participant knows (or should
have known) that it might be used for betting purposes?6 Alternatively, is it only
receipt of ‘reward or gain’ in exchange for the information that makes the disclosure
impermissible?7
1 A lot of information may be considered helpful in a betting context, even though disclosure of it for
betting purposes might have no impact on events on the field of play. Obvious examples include the
details of who has been selected to play for a team in a match; whether a player is carrying an injury;
the pitch conditions at a cricket match; the total number of runs at which a captain plans to declare his
team’s first innings in a Test match; and so on. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10).
2 It might be said that a fair betting market is not the primary concern of an SGB (unless, of course,
the sport is horseracing, which gets most of its funding from the betting industry, and therefore has
a vested interest in a healthy betting market on the sport). However, SGBs rely on information from
betting operators to help them police and enforce their anti-corruption codes (see paras B4.47, B4.52
and B4.53), and so they cannot afford to omit from those codes a rule required by the betting operators
to help protect the integrity of those markets.
3 Indeed, in horseracing cases, those two separate offences (providing inside information, namely
that you are prepared to stop the horse if necessary to keep it from placing, and actually not giving
the horse a true run to prevent it from placing) are often charged together. See eg BHA v Burke &
Rodgers, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 July 2009, where this was alleged against jockey
Fergal Lynch, and McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB) at para 8
(both referring to earlier versions of the rules); BHA v Heffernan, Disciplinary Panel decision dated
14 January 2013, paras 6 and 7.
4 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel suggested that ‘[w]hat is regarded by Sports Governing Bodies to
constitute “inside information” will also differ between sports. […] it would be impractical to ascribe
a particular definition to what may constitute “inside information” without a full understanding of how
that may in turn impact on each sport’s specific needs in seeking to preserve integrity. The Group was
however very clearly of the view that every sport must have in place a sufficiently wide rule to guard
against misuse of inside information’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010),
p 19. It offered as a good example the following definition from the then BHA Rules of Racing, Rule
(A) 36.1: ‘Inside Information is information about the likely participation or likely performance of a
horse in a race which is known by an Owner, Trainer, Rider, stable employee or any of their service
providers as a result of acting as such and is not information in the public domain’. In Babbs and
Celaschi v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 3 June 2013, para 15, a BHA Appeal Board
rejected an attack on the adequacy of that definition, and an argument that the information alleged
to have been passed had to be particularised, on the following basis: ‘the phrase “information about
the participation or likely performance of a horse in a race” in Rule (A)36.1 has inherent within it the
two requirements which Mr Winter contends are missing, since, not being in the public domain, that
information will in all probability both have value and be price sensitive. And we do not consider
the rule necessarily requires the particularisation of the inside information allegedly communicated
in contravention of it. There will be cases where it is perfectly obvious that some sort of inside
information was communicated to a person without it being possible to say precisely what it was’.
The Gambling Commission agrees that ‘sports should develop their own definition of inside
information, specific to their sport’. Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside
information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.5. However it ‘considers a reasonable
general definition of inside information to be […] information relating to the participation in, or the
likely or actual outcome or development of an event which is known by an individual as a result
of their role in connection with that event and which is not in the public domain. Information is
considered to be in the public domain if it has been published, is on public record or is accessible by
an interested member of the public’. Ibid, para 3.3.
The SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011)
include the following broad definition: ‘Any non-public information relating to any competition or
event that a participant possesses by virtue of his/her position within the sport. Such information
includes, but is not limited to, factual information regarding the competitors, the conditions, tactical
considerations, injuries, or any other aspect of the competition or event but does not include such
information that is already published or a matter of public record, readily acquired by an interested
member of the public, or disclosed according to the rules and regulations governing the relevant
competition or event’. There are similar definitions in the ICC Anti-Corruption Code and in World
Rugby’s Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting).
Even such a broad definition, however, will leave room for argument. In August 2011 an
RFL Disciplinary Panel dismissed a charge that rugby league player Shaun Leaf had breached the rule
against disclosure of inside information on the basis that the information that he was alleged to have
passed on about a forthcoming match (along the lines of ‘the pack [of forwards] is shit’ and ‘there are
a lot of young players out’ or ‘the team is not mentally strong’) was merely ‘the sort of information
that the Tribunal believe an interested spectator would have a view about and that the information
would be readily available to such spectators. The Tribunal believe that this rule was designed to deal
with incidents such as when a player or club official would know what team is fielded on a specific
day’. RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 3. Cf HRA v Winston et
al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 13 (‘In the Panel’s view, the ordinary
meaning of the word “information” in Rule 243 is wide enough to include both facts about a horse
and views about its chances. There are sound reasons of principle for adopting this ordinary meaning
of “information”, so that the giving of opinions for reward is outlawed by Rule 243. […] It cannot
be said that it is an unreasonable imposition on jockeys or other licence holders to stop them from
selling privately their opinions about the chances of a horse for big reward. So in principle the Panel
concludes that it is sensible to interpret the Rule as banning the sale for substantial reward of both facts
and opinions […]’). This latter approach seems appropriate, so long as the opinion can still sensibly
be regarded as ‘inside’ information, formed by virtue of the insider’s role as such and not simply from
information that is in the public domain.
5 In principle, a sportsperson ought not to be prohibited from sharing certain news of his selection,
position, injury, or intention to play in a particular game with his close friends, family, and support
group (unless he knows or should know that they might use that information for betting purposes:
see para B4.26 n 6). So, for example, the ICC Anti-Corruption Code contains the following guidance
note: ‘nothing in this Article [2.3] is intended to prohibit any such disclosure made within a personal
relationship (such as to a member of a family) where it is reasonable for the Player or Player
Support Personnel to expect that such information can be disclosed in confidence and without being
subsequently used for betting’. In December 2011, Gold Coast Suns defender Nathan Bock was
banned for two matches and fined AU $10,000 for telling a friend and a family member that he would
be playing as a forward in a forthcoming fixture, following which they duly placed a series of bets on
him to score the first goal and won AU $40,000 when he did score that goal: ‘Nathan Bock banned two
games, fined AU $10,000 for leaking inside information’, adelaidenow.com.au, 14 December 2011.
Similarly, if a player announces in a press conference that he is injured and will not be playing in
a forthcoming match, that should not be a breach of the rules, because the news is being disclosed
publicly to everyone at the same time. For example, disclosing injury or selection news through Twitter
may not be a concern, because it is a recognised form of public dissemination of news, and anyone can
sign up to receive the tweets in question. But what if a similar disclosure is made to an athlete’s closed
or private group of followers on other social networking sites, such as Facebook or MySpace? The
Gambling Commission has suggested that this could be deemed ‘misuse’ of inside information: see
Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair and open betting’
(October 2011), para 3.24 (‘There is a tendency for sports participants to consider communications
like these as informal – the equivalent of a chat at a party or on the phone. Where membership is
strictly limited to close friends and family, this may be the case and information is likely to be released
only where it would be communicated in person. However, where membership is semi-open, caution
has to be taken since this may be communication of inside information either carelessly or for reward.
A long established tactic for potential corrupters has been to informally establish a relationship with
a participant with the intention of grooming them for a potential fix. Social media open another
potential front for such activity […]’). The ICC Anti-Corruption Code seeks to retain flexibility by
specifying that the key factor is not the breadth of the disclosure but whether or not it could give the
recipients a betting advantage: ‘it may be an offence under this clause to disclose Inside Information:
(a) to journalists or other members of the media; and/or (b) on social networking websites, where
the Participant might reasonably be expected to know that disclosure of such information in such
circumstances could be used in relation to Betting […]’. (See ICC Anti-Corruption Code, guidance
note to Arti 2.3.2). Similarly, Art 6.3.3 of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) states:
‘This Regulation shall not prohibit a disclosure of Inside Information to the general public at large
(for example, without limitation, in a live media interview or in the news section of a Union’s website)
such that the information thereby ceases to be Inside Information nor shall it prohibit a disclosure of
Inside Information to a close personal associate provided that the Connected Person is aware of and
complies with Regulation 6.1.3(b) and where in the circumstances it is reasonable for the Connected
Person to expect that the Inside Information can be disclosed in confidence and that it will not be
used in relation to Wagering. Subject to the foregoing, this Regulation shall prohibit a disclosure, for
example, to journalists, members of the media, online social network contacts and/or other persons
where the Connected Person knows and/or may reasonably be expected to know that disclosure of the
Inside Information could be used in relation to Wagering’.
6 The usual approach is reflected in the prohibition suggested in Art 6(g) of the SportAccord Model Rules
on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011): ‘Using any “Inside Information”
for betting purposes, including disclosing “Inside Information” to any person (with or without reward)
where the athlete might reasonably be expected to know that its disclosure could be used in relation
to betting’. See also Art 2.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which prohibits both ‘[u]sing, any
Inside Information for Betting purposes’, and ‘disclosing Inside Information to any person where
the Participant knew or should have known that such disclosure might lead to the information being
used in relation to Betting in relation to any International Match’. Cf FA Rule E.8(1)(b) and (2)(c): ‘a
Participant shall not use any information relating to football which the Participant has obtained by virtue
of his or her position within the game and which is not publicly available at that time for or in relation to
betting’’, unless he can show (FA Rule E.8(1)(c)) that ‘he did not know, and could not reasonably have
known, that the information provided would be used by the other person for or in relation to betting’.
In The Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 163, it
was found that ‘if a person assesses the odds on the Respondent moving to a particular Club (having
been provided with inside information about the move by the Respondent) for the purpose of deciding
whether to bet that would constitute using the information in relation to betting’). However, the defence
of lack of knowledge that that was the use to which the information was to be put was ruled to be
established on the facts, and therefore several different charges of provision of inside information for
use for betting purposes were rejected, in The Football Association v Sturridge, Regulatory Commission
decision dated 15 July 2019, para 169, aff’d in part, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020,
para 129, para 153, although the Appeal Board found the defence was not made out in respect of another
charge and therefore substituted a finding that the charge was proved (para 143).
In horseracing a charge of providing inside information for reward is often combined with a charge
of conspiracy to commit a corrupt practice, which can be established without proof of reward (see para
B4.21, n 5). Each of those charges requires intent. See BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 14 December 2011, para 65 (‘in the cases of the jockeys, it was necessary to determine
not merely whether any inside information might have been imparted by them, but whether they did
so intending that it could be used for lay betting purposes’). However, the Gambling Commission
has queried whether disclosing inside information in a careless or reckless manner should also be
an offence: see Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues paper: inside information and fair
and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.17. The Gambling Commission was still advocating the
prohibition of the release of information for reward or gain (by the participant or their associates),
including careless or reckless release of information, in 2018, recommending that all SGBs include
within their rules clauses relating to the misuse of such information in this way (Misuse of inside
information: Policy position paper, Gambling Commission, 30 August 2018).
7 As suggested by the Gambling Commission: see Gambling Commission, ‘Betting integrity issues
paper: inside information and fair and open betting’ (October 2011), para 3.16. See eg Article 6.3.3(c)
of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting): ‘No Connected Person shall or shall Attempt
directly or indirectly to […] give and/or receive Benefit for the provision of Inside Information
(notwithstanding whether any Inside Information is actually provided)’ – (d) and (e) prohibit the same
where attempts are made to solicit such a benefit. See further, eg the old BHA Rules of Racing, Rule
(A) 36.2, discussed in McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 66 –
note that this has since been updated to remove reference to any reward, with Rule J(16) now reading
‘no Person may communicate Inside Information to any other person unless permitted to do so under
these Rules’. However, where disclosure of inside information is proven, the receipt of ‘any material
reward, gift, favour or benefit in kind’, a reward in exchange for that information is often inferred. See
eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 156, under the
old Rule (A)36.2 (‘The Panel was sure that [the jockey] was passing information and riding to lose
if necessary in return for reward from Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore, even though it is not possible to
identify exactly what that reward was’) and para 167 (‘The Panel decided that [the jockey] was also
in breach of Rule 243. The inside information was her indication of willingness to take steps to hinder
OBE GOLD in the race. Though there was no evidence of overt reward for this, the panel concluded
that she would not have done this without payment’), appeal partially upheld, BHA Appeal Board
decision dated 10 April 2012, paras 89–125 (jockey acquitted on the facts); HRA v Winston et al,
Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 42 (‘As for payment for this information,
this is necessarily a matter of inference. The Panel concluded that there must have been substantial
payments to Fitzpatrick for the material he provided. It is impossible to say how much, or how payment
was made’). However, the requirement of proof of receipt of a reward for the information provided
will cause the charge to fail, even if the person who discloses the information subsequently receives
some benefit from the recipient of that information, if there is insufficient evidence that the benefit was
given in exchange for the information. See WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated
16 May 2008, para 39; and Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission,
1 July 2008, para 8.3. This would leave the regulator relying on an offence such as receiving a gift or
benefit in circumstances likely to bring the game into disrepute (as to which, see para B4.28).
(d) Ensuring the occurrence of a particular incident in a match or competition

for betting purposes
B4.27 A bookmaker may accept a bet on aspects of a sporting event that do not
impact at all on the course or outcome of the contest in question. For example,
it may be possible to bet on what colour shirt a player will wear in a particular
match (tennis), which fielding position a particular player will take at the start of
an innings (cricket), how many players will wear long sleeves or gloves (football),
how many players will wear a particular colour of boots (rugby), whether a pie will
be eaten (football),1 and so on. While a participant may consider the manipulation
of such occurrences to be harmless, because no underperformance is involved and
the progress or the outcome of the match is not affected, such conduct nevertheless
should cause the regulator serious concern, because it engages the participant in the
manipulation of what happens on the field of play in order to fix a betting market,
and therefore is corrupt in itself, as well as having a clear potential to develop into
something even more sinister. Here the expectation that a bet will be placed has to
be a part of the offence, because otherwise there would be nothing wrong with the
behaviour in issue. Therefore, for example, Art 2.2.3 of the ICC’s Anti-Corruption
Code prohibits ‘ensuring the occurrence of a particular incident in an International
Match or ICC Event, which occurrence is to the Player or Player Support Personnel’s
knowledge the subject of a Bet and for which he/she expects to receive or has received
a Reward’.2
1 A much-publicised example of such an incident took place during the FA Cup fifth round tie between
Sutton United and Arsenal in February 2017, after which Wayne Shaw, the Sutton United reserve
goalkeeper, was found to have breached FA Rule E5(a), in that he intentionally influenced a football
betting market by eating a pie whilst sitting on the substitutes’ bench, in The Football Association v
Shaw, Regulatory Commission decision dated 6 September 2017.
2 An identical provision can be found in the ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption
(February 2012), at Art 3.2(b); and there is also a very similar provision at Art 6(e) of the SportAccord
Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011).
In Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, the player argued that it was irrational to ban him for five years
for spot-fixing under Art 2.1.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (see para B4.22) when his alleged
misconduct also constituted an offence under Art 2.2.3 of the Code, which had the additional elements
of knowledge of betting and expectation of award, but carried a ban of only two to five years. The CAS
panel rejected that argument on the following grounds: ‘the Panel is satisfied that Articles 2.1.1 and
2.2.3 of the Code capture distinct infringements of varying gravity. The Panel understands that the ICC
considers “match fixing” and “spot fixing” to be a more serious infringement than betting on aspects of
the match that are not directly relevant to the outcome of the game, but that such betting is nonetheless
an activity that the ICC wishes to purge. Although the drafting of these provisions could more clearly
convey the ICC’s intent (which the ICC might consider amending during the next review of its Code),
the Panel is nevertheless persuaded that Mr Butt’s sanction is not irrational because the sanction for
Article 2.2.3 of the Code is intended to cater for offences which might be less serious’. Ibid, para 68.
It also noted: ‘the Panel does not consider it unreasonable or perverse that the ICC considers that
an offence of betting should carry a lower minimum sanction than an offence of corruption. The
Panel notes that [the] ICC is free to impose five year sanctions under Article 2.2.3 of the ICC Code,
indicating that it has foreseen cases where betting can be as serious as certain corruption cases but
considers the ICC is in principle free to decide subjectively the minimum sanctions it wishes to impose
for specific conduct by reference to a number of different factors, including the long and sad history of
corruption in cricket’. Ibid, para 69.
(e) Providing or receiving gifts in suspicious circumstances
B4.28 The ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes the following an offence: ‘Giving
or providing to any Participant any gift, payment, hospitality or other benefit […] in
circumstances that could bring him/her or the sport of cricket into disrepute’.1 This
is partly because gift-giving can be a precursor to a corrupt approach; and partly to
address the fact that it may not be possible to link a particular payment to provision
of inside information or a particular act of underperforming.2 Charges of a breach
of this provision were upheld against cricketers Maurice Odumbe, Marlon Samuels,
and Mervyn Westfield.3
1 ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.4.1 A similar offence is suggested in the SportAccord Model Rules
on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6(f); whereas Rule (J)1 of the
BHA Rules of Racing states that a professional rider ‘must not accept, agree to accept or solicit, any
Consideration in connection with riding in a Race except a Professional Jockey may accept, agree to
accept or solicit: (1) consideration stated in the Race Conditions, or the equivalent for a Race run under
the rules of a Recognised Racing Authority; (2) consideration from a Sponsorship Agreement for
sponsorship; and/or (3) consideration from the Owner, Owner’s Representative or Breeder of a horse
for riding that horse in a Race’.
Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the
promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of results, notable match-fixing
(28 September 2011) specifically recommends that sports bodies’ rules against manipulation of results
include rules ‘prohibiting provision or receipt of any gift or other benefit in circumstances that might
reasonably be expected to bring them into disrepute’.
2 See WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, para 49 (‘The majority is
of the view that the Anti-Corruption Code rightly targets not only corrupt and dishonest activity but
also behaviour that objectively might be considered a precursor to corrupt and dishonest activity’).
Similarly, in his 2011 review of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, Bertrand de Speville noted that ‘gift-
giving is often the precursor to an improper approach’. He also explained that ‘[e]xperience in other
walks of life shows that a gift offence (less serious than bribery) is an invaluable alternative offence in
the numerous instances where the necessary connection between the gift or benefit and the improper
conduct cannot be proved’. In this respect, he suggested that the ICC’s Art 2.4.1 was not strict enough,
and that instead it should be an offence for any participant to accept a gift without the prior permission
of the ICC unless such gift was listed on a pre-agreed list of permitted gifts. He also suggested that,
in all cases, a specific form could be completed, which would describe the gift, the circumstances
of its offering and acceptance, the identity of the donor and the applicant’s estimate of its value. See
de Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’,
August 2011 (reissued with minor amendments January 2012).
Mr de Speville also suggested that consideration be given to the inclusion of an offence of ‘unexplained
wealth’ or ‘illicit enrichment’, where the offence consists in owning property or living a lifestyle in
excess of official earnings unless a satisfactory explanation can be given. He suggested the following
language for the offence: ‘(1) Any person […] who: (a) has a standard of living incommensurate with
his present or past official emoluments; or (b) is in control of wealth disproportionate to his present
or past official emoluments; is in breach of this code unless he gives to [a tribunal established by the
ICC Code of Conduct Commission for the purpose] a satisfactory explanation of how he is able to
have such a standard of living or how such wealth came under his control. […] (2) Where a tribunal
is satisfied in proceedings for a breach under subsection (1)(b) that, having regard to the closeness of
his relationship to the person charged with the breach and to other circumstances, there is reason to
believe that any person is or was holding wealth as a gift from the person charged, such wealth shall,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be or have been in the control of the person
charged. […] (3) In this section, “official emoluments” means the earnings payable under terms of
engagement as a player or player support person or by the ICC and includes a pension or gratuity
payable under such terms of engagement’. Ibid. The ICC in response recognised the rationale behind
the recommendation, but noted that ‘to try and implement such a system in relation to international
players and support personnel from different jurisdictions, whose assets may have been transferred
into further jurisdictions, who are at different stages in their careers, who have many sources of
income, and which is likely to require the cooperation of governments and/or financial institutions and
authorities, is likely to be very difficult indeed, not to mention hugely burdensome on the players and
extremely difficult to administer’. It therefore continues to rely, instead, on the more general Art 2.4.1
provision noted above. Cf Forrest et al, ‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ
of Salford, February 2008), p 30 (‘it would be a credible anti-corruption measure if referees were
subject to random financial audit to establish that there was no income that could not be attributed to
legitimate sources’).
3 Enquiry relating to Maurice Odumbe, report by Mr Justice Ahmed Ebrahim dated 13 August 2004
(Odumbe banned for five years for bringing game into disrepute by receiving money and other
rewards from a bookmaker, and receiving money for fixing a match in Zimbabwe); WICB v Samuels,
Disciplinary Committee decision dated 16 May 2008, para 39; and Report of the Official Enquiry
of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 8.3 (Samuels banned for two years for
allowing punter to pay his hotel bill shortly after giving that punter information about team selection);
ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012 (Westfield banned for five
years for commission of this offence based on his receipt of £6,000 after agreeing to concede 12 runs
in the first over he bowled in a Twenty20 match against Durham). In the second case, Marlon Samuels
was found to have given an associate information about who would be playing for the West Indies team
in a particular match, and about two weeks thereafter to have received a benefit from the associate in
the form of settlement of his hotel bill. He was not charged with misuse of inside information because
there was no evidence that he had provided the information in exchange for the hotel bill payment.
Ibid; see para B4.26. Instead, he was charged with breaching Art C4(ix) of the ICC Code of Conduct
(as it then was) by receiving a benefit in circumstances that could bring him or the game of cricket
into disrepute. The ICC Code of Conduct Commission agreed with the Disciplinary Panel that to
make out the charge it was only necessary to prove that the player knew he had received the money
or other benefit; it was not necessary to prove dishonesty or corrupt intent on the part of the player.
Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 7.1. It also
agreed that having one’s hotel bill settled by a bookmaker shortly after providing that bookmaker with
information about the team for a forthcoming match ‘could bring the game of cricket into disrepute’.
Ibid, at para 7.5.
(f) Reporting obligations

B4.29 Understanding that SGBs have limited investigative powers and resources,
most anti-corruption codes make it an offence to fail to report any invitation given to
the participant – or (to the participant’s knowledge) to another participant – to take
part in conduct that would amount to a breach of the rules.1 A failure to report such
an approach prejudices the sport by allowing such activity to continue unchecked.2
It also places the participant in a vulnerable position moving forward (because his
failure to report the approach could be interpreted as acquiescence).3 Obviously if
the person making the corrupt approach is also bound by the rules, reporting the
approach will allow the authorities to take action against him; but even if he is outside
the rules, reporting the approach allows the authorities to build up a more detailed
intelligence picture of his activities, and so to prevent or at least restrict them in the
future.
1 For example, Rule J(27) of the BHA Rules of Racing provides: ‘a Person must, as soon as reasonably
practicable, provide the BHA with full details of any knowledge of: approach or invitation made to
them or any other person which would amount to a breach of these Rules; and incident, fact or matter
which may amount to a breach of the Rules.’. Similarly, Art 2.4.4 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code
makes the following an offence: ‘Failing to disclose to the ACU (without unnecessary delay) full
details of any approaches or invitations received by the Participant to engage in Corrupt Conduct under
the Anti-Corruption Code’. Meanwhile the Sports Betting Integrity Panel’s model Code makes it an
offence to fail to ‘report any approach or other activity which contravenes, or which may contravene,
the sports rules on betting’. Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports in relation to Betting, Report of
the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), chapter 2a, Article 2.5. Similarly, the Sport Accord
model rules prohibit ‘failing to disclose information to the competent IF or competition authority
(without undue delay) full details of any approaches, invitations to engage in conduct, or incidents that
would amount to a breach of the IFs or competition rules related to betting’. SportAccord Model Rules
on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), Art 6(h). See further the Tennis
Integrity Reports, para B4.10.
2 BWF v Perssons, BWF Ethics Hearing Panel decision dated 18 March 2019, para 101 (‘The failure
to report an approach allows for corrupt persons to continue to conspire to manipulate badminton
matches. This is the primary policy rationale for adopting a “failure to report” sanction in a sport
disciplinary code. Given the limited coercive and investigatory powers of the BWF, it is crucial and
fundamental that participants in badminton report approaches to manipulate matches to the BWF
without undue delay in order for the BWF to continue to implement its core objective to protect the
integrity of badminton competitions’).
3 ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11-13 September 2012, p 8 (‘sports organisations […]
should actively promote a culture where individuals, including athletes, officials and administrators,
have an obligation to report any incidents of or attempts at unethical or corrupt behavior that they
encounter and can be reassured that their concerns will be investigated thoroughly and appropriately.
This obligation is very important, not only to move people to report, but also because if they do
not, they can be sanctioned just for not alerting the relevant bodies. A global obligation for athletes,
officials and sports organisations, to report cases to law enforcement agencies, should be envisaged for
the future’).
B4.30 Participants have been banned for failing to report corrupt approaches
in several sports, including football,1 handball,2 tennis,3 cricket,4 snooker,5 and
badminton.6 In the football case, the failure to report the corrupt approach resulted
in a life ban for the offending referee that was upheld by the CAS panel on appeal,
indicating the importance placed on compliance with the reporting obligation (albeit
that the CAS panel seemed to be influenced by a strong suspicion that the referee had
acted on the offer by fixing the match in question).
1 In Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, a CAS panel upheld a life ban imposed on a match referee
for failing to report an approach made to him to fix a UEFA Europa League match in return for a bribe
of €50,000. In May 2011, a CAS panel upheld a UEFA panel’s ruling that Hungarian player Vukasin
Poleksic failed to report contacts made to him by a criminal gang that was planning to manipulate a
UEFA Champions League match in which he participated, and therefore upheld the two-year ban that
the UEFA panel had imposed on him: see CAS press release dated 5 May 2011.
2 In 2009, two referees officiating in the European Handball Champions League were caught in customs
with US $50,000 hidden in their luggage. An EHF Arbitration Tribunal found that another referee had
offered them that money to fix a particular match and banned them for five years for failing to report
that offer. European Handball Federation Official Statement, ‘EHF Arbitration Tribunal takes final
decision in prominent case’, eurohandball.com, 31 July 2009. It is not clear from the statement why
they were not banned for (apparently) accepting that offer by taking the money.
3 In January 2010, tennis player Ekaterina Bychkova admitted being approached by a professional
tennis gambler through her website, who asked her to provide information about when she was likely
to lose and proposed that she might deliberately lose on occasions, so that he might profit by betting on
her opponent, and share his winnings with her. She did not agree to participate in the scheme but did
not report the approach to the authorities. She was therefore banned for 30 days and fined US $5,000.
See Ekaterina Bychkova, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer dated 8 January 2010. See also,
for example, the ban imposed on Venezuelan official Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez for failing
to report corrupt approaches regarding a scheme to enter incorrect scores: ‘Venezuelan match official
Armando Alfonso Belardi Gonzalez suspended and fined for corruption offences’, Tennis Integrity
Unit, 19 June 2020, tennisintegrityunit.com/media-releases/venezuelan-match-official-armando-
alfonso-belardi-gonzalez-suspended-and-fined-corruption-offences.
4 In the Hansie Cronje affair (see para B4.5), Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams were both banned
for six months for failing to report bribes offered to them by Cronje to under-perform in a one-day-
international match. And in ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated
5 February 2011, paras 141 and 232, the Tribunal held that Mr Butt’s non-disclosure of a corrupt
approach made to him by his agent to bat out a maiden deliberately at the Oval Test match between
England and Pakistan was a breach of his reporting obligation under Art 2.4.2 of the ICC Anti-
Corruption Code that warranted a ban of one year. See also the bans imposed on Lou Vincent and
Kaushal Lokuarachchi in the Bangladesh Premier League case referenced at para B4.6, n 7, as well as
that given to Shakib Al Hasan referenced at para B4.6, n 8, and Umar Akmal referenced at para B4.6,
n 9.
5 In September 2010, snooker player John Higgins was found guilty of ‘failing to disclose promptly
to the Association full details of an approach or an invitation to act in breach of the Betting Rules’
(namely to throw one or more frames). Ian Mill QC, the chair of the hearing panel, stated: ‘On the
basis that [the businessmen at the Kiev meeting] intended what they said [ie to organise fixing of
snooker matches for betting purposes], it was obviously a matter of the greatest importance to the
integrity of the sport of snooker that those intentions were immediately reported. Mr Higgins’ failure
in this respect was extremely foolish. In mitigation, Mr Clancy SC on his behalf reminded me of his
client’s exemplary record both in terms of achievement and conduct, and of his role as an ambassador
for the sport. I very much bear these matters in mind. But I also consider that with such a status come
particular responsibilities to other players in the game, to the Association, to its sponsors and to the
viewing public to ensure that the Association’s Rules bearing on the peculiarly sensitive subject of
gambling and corruption are strictly adhered to’. He therefore suspended Higgins for six months,
fined him £75,000, and ordered him to pay £10,000 in costs to the WPBSA: WPBSA v Higgins and
Mooney, decision of Ian Mill QC dated 8 September 2010, p 3. On the other hand, he found that Mr
Higgins’ representative, Mr Pat Mooney, who had discussed fixing with the businessmen and had
arranged the meeting with Mr Higgins, knowing that fixing was to be discussed, and never reported
anything to the WPBSA (of which he was also a director), ‘committed the most egregious betrayals
of trust – both in relation to the WPBSA, to which he owed fiduciary obligations as a director and
by reason of his great influence in the world of snooker, and to Mr Higgins whose entire career and
professional future he inexplicably put at serious and wholly unjustifiable risk’. Mr Mooney was
therefore banned from snooker for life and ordered to pay a contribution of £25,000 in costs. Ibid.
See also, more recently, the one-year ban given to Jamie Jones, after he was found to have breached
the rules of the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA) by failing to report a
corrupt approach (David John and Jamie Jones: Pair banned after snooker match-fixing investigation,
BBC Sport, 6 February 2019.
6 BWF v Perssons, BWF Ethics Hearing Panel decision dated 18 March 2019 (bans of 12 months
and six months imposed for two separate offences of failure to report corrupt approaches, to run
consecutively).
B4.31 Some anti-corruption codes include an even broader whistle-blowing

obligation, making it an offence to fail to disclose full details of any incident, fact or
matter that comes to the attention of a participant that may evidence an offence under
the code by another.1 Indeed, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program states
that a participant who ‘had knowledge of a Corruption Offense and failed to report
such knowledge’ is ‘responsible’ for that offence and can be sanctioned ‘to the same
extent as if the Player had committed the Corruption Offense’.2
1 For example, Art 2.4.5 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes the following an offence: ‘Failing to
disclose to the ACU (without unnecessary delay) full details of any incident, fact, or matter that comes
to the attention of a Participant that may evidence Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code by
another Participant, including (without limitation) approaches or invitations that have been received by
another Participant to engage in Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code’; while Art D.2.a.ii
of the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program states: ‘In the event any Player knows or suspects
that any other Covered Person or other individual has committed a Corruption Offense, it shall be the
Player’s obligation to report such knowledge or suspicion to the TIU as soon as possible’. See further
the Tennis Integrity Reports (para B4.10).
The IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’
(SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 82, specifically recommended that a sport’s anti-corruption rules
include not only an ‘obligation to report any attempted approach’ but also an ‘obligation to declare any
suspicions about third parties (“whistle-blowing”) with guarantees of confidentiality and protective
measures if necessary’.
2 Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Program, Art E.1. See further the Tennis Integrity Reports (para
B4.10).
B4.32 Furthermore, well-drafted anti-corruption codes make it an offence not to

cooperate fully with an investigation into a potential breach of the code, meaning
that a participant who is suspected of wrongdoing is required to answer questions
posed and providing documents and records demanded by the investigators,1 and
even to hand over their communications devices so that information on them can be
downloaded and searched.2 The rules of horseracing and tennis give the regulator the
power to keep a non-cooperating participant out of the sport unless and until he starts
cooperating.3 In Mong Joon Chung v FIFA, the CAS panel noted that it ‘recognizes the
importance that sports governing bodies establish rules in their respective ethical and
disciplinary codes requiring witnesses and parties to cooperate in investigations and

proceedings and subjecting them to sanctions for failing to do so. Sports governing
bodies, in contrast to public authorities, have extremely limited investigative powers
and must rely on such cooperation rules for fact-finding and to expose parties that are
violating the ethical standards of said bodies. Such rules are essential to maintain the
image, integrity and stability of sport’.4 Hearing panels in different sports have relied
on the same reasoning to impose significant sanctions for failures to cooperate with
an investigation into potentially corrupt conduct. For example:
(a) In RFU v Hart, a hearing panel imposed a ban of four months for failing
to disclose a betting account in response to a direct question from the RFU
investigator, stating:
‘We take the view that any attempt to mislead the regulator as they embark on an
investigation of matters such as these is a serious matter and needs to be met with
a sanction which reflects that. Such behaviour must usually be met by a period of
suspension’.5
(b) In Ad Vitam, a professional gambler and horse owner who failed to submit to
an interview or to provide telephone billing records demanded by the BHA was
banned for two years, the panel noting that:
‘It is necessary for him and others to appreciate that interviews and records disclosure
are vital parts of the regulator’s resources for policing horseracing, and that failure to
co-operate will lead to heavy penalties’.6
(c) In PTIOS v Gaviri, a refusal to submit to interview and to hand over a mobile
phone was met with a ban of three years. The hearing officer explained:
‘80. The idea behind TACP provisions on supplying information is based on a
principle of those who are innocent have nothing to hide, and inversely by inference,
that those who appear to be hiding something possibly may have reasons for doing
so […] 82. The gravity of the conduct in breaching F.2.b. and c. at the level of
non-cooperation as an offense goes to the very heart of the TACP. The TIU has
no coercive investigative powers. It is dependent upon the contractual agreement
of the Player to cooperate fully with investigations conducted by the TIU. This
principle must be rigorously observed and applied when a Player fails to cooperate.
The conduct here is one of the most serious categories of breaches of the TACP
that could occur. Furthermore, no justification for the Player’s conduct has been
proffered at all. 83. A Player who engages in the type of conduct exhibited in this
case may well be engaged in a fallback position to receive a lighter charge of non-
cooperation to avoid the more serious charges which the TACP provides for up to
ineligibility for life. The TACP would be undermined if this is the case […] 85. The
gravity of the conduct in failing to make the phone available is aggravated by the
failure to complete the interview process. These two matters combine to make this
Player’s conduct of the most serious nature. Therefore, a penalty at the maximum
level is justified in this case’.7
(d) In ICC v Ansari, the Disciplinary Panel accepted that:
‘the starting point in considering the appropriate sanction for an offence under
Article 2.4.6, where a Participant has failed or refused to hand over a Mobile Device
following a valid Demand, must be a period of 5 years of Ineligibility. This is the
minimum sanction for offences under Article 2.1 of the Code, ie the most serious
corruption offences, and it is essential that Participants are offered no incentive not
to cooperate with an ACU investigation’.8
1 Art 2.4.6 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code makes it an offence to ‘fail […] without compelling
justification, to cooperate with any reasonable investigation carried out by the ACU in relation to
possible Corrupt Conduct under the Anti-Corruption Code’. Article 6(i) of the SportAccord Model
Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) creates a similar offence, as
does Article 6.3.5(c) of World Rugby’s Regulation 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting), while Art 6.3.4(b)
makes it a standalone offence to ‘tamper with, obstruct, delay and/or destroy any evidence, potential
evidence, documentation and/or information which may be relevant to an Anti-Corruption Breach

(actual or potential) and/or an investigation into anti-corruption or pursuant to these Anti-Corruption
Regulations’.
The old Rules of Racing also required persons subject to the rules ‘to provide any information
or record which the Approved Person reasonably believes is relevant to an investigation conducted
under this part’ (Rule (A) 50.1), including telephone billing accounts, records relating to sponsorship
agreements, training accounts, accounts relating to the sale and purchase of horses, and betting
accounts (Rule (A) 50.4), whether by supplying the information in writing or by attending for interview
to supply the information (Rule (A) 50.2). In BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated
22 May 2013, para 12, the Disciplinary Panel banned Neil Clement for a year and fined him £3,000 for
failing to cooperate with an enquiry, noting that ‘[t]he reason for this fine was that Mr Clement’s non-
cooperation caused serious expense to the BHA, including the costs of a Court application to procure
disclosure of his telephone records’. This provision is now found at Rule (L)2.3.
2 For example, Art 4.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code empowers the ACU General Manager to make a
written demand to participants to provide information downloaded from their mobile devices. In ICC v
Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, para 6.12, the panel rejected an argument
that the participant was entitled to reject a request to hand over his phone for downloading because it
infringed his privacy interests and those of the persons with whom he communicated using the phone, on
the basis that the right to privacy is not absolute ‘and must yield to more potential public interests such
as the suppression of crime or other cognate misconduct’, that ‘A potential intrusion on a participant’s
privacy is in any event the price that a participant must pay for his participation in the sport’, and that
‘A participant retains the right to refuse to permit the intrusion, albeit at the price, potentially, of further
participation in the sport’. See also ICC v Ikope, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 March 2019,
para 6.22 (‘Moreover, an international sports federation has to fight the insidious threat of match-fixing
without the coercive powers of the state to assist it in investigating and uncovering corrupt conduct. That
justifies imposing a positive obligation on participants to cooperate with investigations by the federation
into possible wrongdoing, including an obligation to turn over a phone immediately upon demand, so
that the investigators can examine it for any potential evidence. None of the participant’s rights, whether
a constitutional right to privacy or otherwise, are breached thereby’); PTIOS v Klec. Anti-Corruption
Hearing Officer decision dated 21 August 2015, para 5.7 (‘the Player claims that one reason for his
actions was the fact that the phone contained personal information. Yet in the transcript of the interview
on the 2 March 2015, he stated he did not know what information was on his phone. Such an explanation
is unacceptable, particularly when the TIU investigator advised of the protections in place with respect
to the privacy of the Player. Section F.2(c) of the TACP explicitly requires that a Player co-operate with
the TIU and comply with demands made. The TACP provides that the TIU will keep the information
confidential, except where necessary to disclose in furtherance of the prosecution of a Corruption
Offense or other legitimate judicial or governmental prosecution reasons. The TIU also provided those
same assurances to the Player during his interview. Additionally, as explained to the Player, there are also
laws regarding data protection imposed on the TIU, the breach of which could give rise to civil lawsuits
for damages. Based on all of the foregoing, I do not accept the Player’s conduct and explanation as being
acceptable in determining the level of sanction’).
3 The old Rules of Racing provided that a licensed person who fails to cooperate fully with an
investigation faces being ‘summarily excluded by the Authority under Rule 64, without prejudice to
the Authority’s power to take any further Disciplinary Action’ (Rule (A) 50.7), unless he has good
cause for his failure (Rule (A) 50.3.1). The fact that he failed to get his telephone service provider to
agree that he could obtain itemised details of his calls will not be treated as good cause for a failure to
provide such details. (Rule (A) 51). This provision is now found at Rule (L)6.
A tennis player who fails to comply with a demand for information from the Tennis Integrity Unit
about an alleged corruption offence commits a separate corruption offense and may be subject to
provisional suspension. UTACP Art F.2. and F.3.
4 CAS 2017/A/5086, para 189. See also Valcke v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5003, para 266 (‘The cooperation
of the individuals subject to the ethics or disciplinary rules of a sports association is necessary if the
integrity of sport is to be protected […]’).
5 RFU v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018, para 80.
6 Ad Vitam, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 9 October 2015, para 72, aff’d, BHA Appeal Board
decision dated 6 January 2016.
7 PTIOS v Gaviri, hearing officer decision dated 30 April 2018, quoted with approval by the disciplinary
panel in ICC v Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, para 7.20.
8 ICC v Ansari, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 19 February 2019, paras 7.18-7.19. See also the very
similar decision in ICC v Ikope, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 March 2019, para 8.16 et seq.
(g) Attempts and complicity
B4.33 The rules need to cover any attempted breaches of the above provisions that
did not succeed,1 any breaches that the participant commits through a third party,2
and any efforts by a participant to persuade another participant to breach the rules.3
Match-fixing offences of their nature tend to involve more than one person (and will
often involve more than one participant in the sport), and it is important to note
that some complicity in the overall scheme will usually trigger liability. However, it
may not be necessary to establish more than the acts of one participant. In 2017, a
CAS panel clarified that the offence of ‘conspiring’ to influence a match contrary to
then FIFA Disciplinary Code Art 69(1) (now Art 18(1) in the 2019 FIFA Disciplinary
Code) did not require involvement of a second person:
‘“to conspire” to influence a match may be deemed to include all intentional actions,
secretly planned, aimed at manipulating the result of a match, be that in combination
with, or to the advantage, of others, or by the person who conspires acting alone, or
to his individual benefit’.4
1 See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.5.1: ‘Any attempt by a Participant, or any agreement by a
Participant with any other person, to act in a manner that would culminate in the commission of an
offence under the Anti-Corruption Code, shall be treated as if an offence had been committed, whether
or not such attempt or agreement in fact resulted in such offence.’ The earlier exemption of liability
in the case of a Participant renouncing the attempt or agreement before its discovery has now been
made merely a mitigating factor.’ The same provision was copied into the ASOIF Model Rules on
Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), at Art 3.5(a), and exists in slightly updated form in the
December 2018 IOC Model Rules detailed at para B4.21, n 2: ‘Any form of aid, abetment or attempt
by a Participant that could culminate in a violation of this Code shall be treated as if a violation had
been committed, whether or not such an act in fact resulted in a violation and/or whether that violation
was committed deliberately or negligently.’ The ‘renunciation’ proviso was taken from the definition
of ‘attempt’ in the World Anti-Doping Code, see para C7.22.
2 See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 2.5.2: ‘A Participant who authorises, causes, knowingly assists,
encurages, aids, abets, covers up or is otherwise complicit in [any breach of the Anti-Corruption
Code] committed by his/her coach, trainer, manager, agent, family member, guest or other affiliate
or associate shall be treated as having committed such acts or omissions himself and shall be liable
accordingly under the Anti-Corruption Code’.
3 See eg Art 2.1.4 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which after defining each offence adds a further
offence of ‘directly or indirectly soliciting, inducing, enticing, instructing, persuading, encouraging or
intentionally facilitating any Participant’ to commit the offence; and Art 3 of the ASOIF Model Rules,
which after each offence adds a further offence of ‘inducing, instructing, facilitating or encouraging a
Participant to commit’ such offence (ASOIF Model Rules on Betting and Anti-Corruption (February
2012), Art 3, passim), as well as including a separate offence of ‘knowingly assisting, covering up or
otherwise being complicit in any acts or omissions of the type described in Rule 3 committed by a
Participant’. Ibid, at Art 3.5(b). Cf BHA Rules of Racing, Rule (J)24.5: ‘a Person must not assist, or
encourage, or cause another Person to act in contravention of a provision of these Rules’).
4 Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, para 74.
(g) Catch-all provisions
B4.34 In addition, some anti-corruption codes contain catch-all offences

(eg proscribing conduct that ‘is contrary to the spirit of the sport’ or that ‘brings the
sport into disrepute’1) that are designed to catch any corrupt conduct that is not caught
by the specific offences.2 The CAS has taken a robust approach towards arguments
that such drafting contravenes the requirement of legal certainty.3
1 See eg Art 1.1.10 of Chapter C of the International Biathlon Union’s Integrity Code, which makes it
an offence for a participant to ‘commit any other act that risks undermining public confidence in the
integrity of a Biathlon Competition or the sport of Biathlon’. Meanwhile, the Australian Governments’
National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 4.5(f), requires sports to proscribe ‘any
other form of corrupt conduct in relation to any match or event connected with the respective sport’.
The same approach is taken more generally in sports codes of conduct, which usually include the
catch-all offence of ‘bringing the game into disrepute’ (discussed at paras B1.23 and B3.143).
2 The RFL charged Shaun Leaf with breach of such a provision for telling someone who turned out
to be an undercover journalist ‘that the game of Rugby League is being fixed by players deliberately
dropping balls or players not trying, and to discuss players betting, Chief Executives betting and make
allegations about entire teams such as Crusader not trying or betting to lose due to financial difficulties’.
This was said to be ‘a breach of the Rules. In the Tribunal’s view this is clearly impairing the public
confidence in the integrity and honesty of Rugby League. The Tribunal do not believe that Mr Leaf
is fraudulent or corrupt as such but certainly has engaged in conduct which is against the interests of
Rugby league and risks impairing confidence in our sport’. See RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 11 August 2011, pp 3–4. See also WPBSA v Jogia, WPBSA statement dated 25 July
2012 (frequency and timing of Jogia’s contacts with punters, his lack of a consistent explanation for the
contacts and the suspicions raised by the pattern of bets they placed on him to lose a particular match,
created an actual or apparent conflict of interest for him as a member of the WPBSA or otherwise
risked impairing public confidence in the integrity of the match). A disrepute charge does seem fitting
for false allegations of corruption in sport, as in Jockey Club v Bradley. The defendant jockey claimed
in his autobiography that he had tried to get the 1987 Cheltenham Gold Cup abandoned in order to
help an associate win a bet. Charged with conspiracy to commit a corrupt practice, he gave evidence
that the story was untrue. A charge of ‘conduct prejudicial to the integrity, proper conduct or good
reputation of horseracing in Great Britain’ was added, and upheld: Jockey Club v Bradley, Jockey Club
Disciplinary Panel decision dated 13 December 2002. That prohibition was found in the old Rules of
Racing at Rule (A) 30.1; it can now be found in the BHA Rules of Racing at Rule (J)19.
(h) Possible defences
B4.35 Article 2.7.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code gives the participant a
defence to any breach if he can show he committed the offence due to an ‘honest
and reasonable belief that there was a serious threat to his/her life or safety or to the
life or safety of another person’.1 This reflects the potential involvement of serious
organised crime in match-fixing conspiracies in cricket, while similar concerns have
been expressed in football.2
1 See eg Mr Justice Cooke’s remarks in sentencing Mohammad Amir, R v Majeed, Butt, Amir & Asif,
3 November 2011, para 37: ‘you decided not to give evidence of the pressure to which your basis of
plea referred. You have referred, in material presented to the court, to threats to yourself and your
family, saying that there are significant limits to what you can say in public. The reality of those threats
and the strength of the underworld influences who control unlawful betting abroad is shown by the
supporting evidence in the bundle of documents, including materials from the Anti-Corruption and
Security Unit of the ICC’. A similar defence is created by Art 6.3.8 of World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-
Corruption and Betting), and in the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme at Art E.4, although
an attempt to rely on such defence was rejected on the facts in Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit,
CAS 2014/A/3467, paras 113–117.
2 ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security [Chris Eaton] calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’,
22 August 2011, insideworldfootball.biz, (‘Intimidation is a huge problem. Players from less developed
parts of the world are especially vulnerable’). Football referee Oleg Oriekhov claimed that his failure
to report an approach made to him to fix a match was due to fear for the safety of his family: Oreikhov
v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172 (discussed at para B4.43).
4 PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN CORRUPTION CASES
B4.36 In many respects, the standard disciplinary procedures used to determine

general misconduct charges1 will also work perfectly well in the hearing and
determination of corruption charges. However, some specific thought is required in
the following areas.
1 As to which, see Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings).
A Standard of proof
B4.37 The SGB will have the burden of proving each offence charged, but what
standard of proof should be required to discharge that burden? The CAS panel in
Köllerer v ATP roundly rejected the player’s arguments that the seriousness of a
corruption charge meant it had to be proven to the criminal standard (ie beyond
reasonable doubt), either as a matter of Florida law (the governing law of the Tennis
Uniform Anti-Corruption Programme),1 or as a result of CAS jurisprudence,2 or as a
matter of national or international public policy.3 Nor did the CAS panel consider that
the intermediate standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ that is used under the World
Anti-Doping Code has to be applied in corruption cases.4 Instead, the CAS panel ruled
that the tennis authorities were entitled to use the civil standard of ‘preponderance of
the evidence’, aka ‘balance of probabilities’, which standard ‘is met if the proposition
that the Player engaged in attempted match fixing is more likely to be true than not
true’.5 Domestic disciplinary panels applying English law have also upheld the use of
the civil standard of proof in corruption cases,6 and rejected arguments that a higher
standard should be applied in the case of allegations of criminal or quasi-criminal
conduct.7 On the other hand, the CAS panel in Köllerer stated that in assessing
whether the evidence met the civil standard, it ‘has borne in mind that the Player has
been charged with serious offences. While this does not require that a higher standard
of proof should be applied than the one applicable according to the UTACP, the Panel
nevertheless considers that it needs to have a high degree of confidence in the quality
of the evidence’.8 Again, domestic hearing panels applying English law have taken
the same approach.9
1 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 85 (‘First, while Florida law might impose a mandatory
standard of proof in cases involving punitive damages, the current case relates to sanctions that follow
from a breach of contract. By signing a consent form, the Player agreed to both the standard of proof
and the contractual sanctions in case of breach. Therefore, neither Section 768.72 of the Florida
Statutes nor the cases to which the Appellant referred are applicable’). The CAS panel also rejected
the player’s argument that the standard of proof clause in the rules was ‘unconscionable’ because the
player had no choice but to sign the consent forms accepting the rules, pointing out that he had had
adequate opportunity to read the rules before signing, he had consented to similar rules in the past, and
the ATP Player Council (which negotiated rule changes on behalf of all players) had not objected to
this standard of proof. Ibid, paras 89–90.
2 Ibid, para 86 (‘the Panel does not agree with the Appellant that it is required to apply a different
standard of proof on the basis of CAS jurisprudence. There is no universal (minimum) standard of
proof for match-fixing offences. The cases to which the Appellant refers concerned match-fixing
under the UEFA rules, which did not provide for an applicable standard of proof, and the UEFA itself
proposed to apply in these cases the standard of proof of “comfortable satisfaction”. While the Panel
acknowledges that consistency across different associations may be desirable, in the absence of any
overarching regulation (such as the WADA Code for doping cases), each association can decide for
itself which standard of proof to apply, subject to national and/or international rules of public policy.
The CAS has neither the function nor the authority to harmonize regulations by imposing a uniform
standard of proof, where, as in the current case, an association decides to apply a different, specific
standard in its regulations’).
The CAS cases referred to in that part of the Köllerer award were Pobeda and Oriekhov, as to which
see para B4.43. In Pobeda, in the absence of any provision in the UEFA rules specifying a standard of
proof in match-fixing cases, the CAS panel ruled: ‘Taking into account the nature of the conduct in
question and the paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also considering
the nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing bodies of sport as
compared to national formal interrogation authorities, the Panel is of the opinion that cases of match
fixing should be dealt with in line with the CAS constant jurisprudence on disciplinary doping cases.
Therefore, the UEFA must establish the relevant facts “to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having
in mind the seriousness of allegation which is made”’. FK Pobeda, Zabrcanec and Zdraveski v UEFA,
CAS 2009/A/1920, para 85. This ruling was endorsed by a different CAS panel in Oriekhov v UEFA,
CAS 2010/A/2172, para 53, and again by a third CAS panel in Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062,
para 91. So if match-fixing charges are brought under rules that do not specify the required standard
of proof, the CAS jurisprudence is clear that the default standard applied will be the ‘comfortable
satisfaction’ standard used in the World Anti-Doping Code (as to which, see paras C5.1–C5.3).
Cf Besiktas Jimnastik Kulubu v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3258, para 119 (‘CAS jurisprudence is clear
that the applicable standard of proof in match fixing cases is indeed comfortable satisfaction, if not
even the lower one of balance of probabilities as in CAS 2009/A/1920’).
3 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 87 (‘the Panel does not consider that applying the standard
of proof provided for by the UTACP would violate any rules of national and/or international public
policy. The Appellant argued that the standard of proof used by the Governing Bodies is inappropriate
for the sanctions connected with corruption offences but has not cited any supporting authority. This
Panel does not consider that the Governing Bodies have violated any principle of public policy by
applying the standard of proof for corruption offences provided for by the UTACP’). See also Savic
v PTIOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.32(ii) (noting this aspect of the Köllerer ruling with apparent
approval, although the approval was obiter as the Savic panel decided that the higher standard of proof
– ‘comfortable satisfaction’ – had been met in any event).
4 The World Anti-Doping Code provision is discussed at paras C5.1–C5.3. The ASOIF Model Rules on
Betting and Anti-Corruption proposed the same standard, requiring that a charge of breach of the rules
be proved ‘to the comfortable satisfaction of the Hearing Panel, a standard which is greater than the
mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt’. ASOIF Model Rules on
Betting and Anti-Corruption (February 2012), Art 4.1. The IOC Model Rules in contrast provide, at
Rule 3.3: ‘The standard of proof in all matters under this Code shall be the balance of probabilities, a
standard that implies that on the preponderance of the evidence it is more likely than not that a breach
of this Code has occurred’ (Model Rules for International Federations and their members to assist in
implementing the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions
(December 2018)).
Article 3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code adopts a flexible approach, stating that the panel must
be ‘comfortably satisfied that the alleged offence has been committed, bearing in mind the seriousness
of the allegation that is being made.’. This standard of proof used to be determined on a sliding scale
from, at a minimum, a mere balance of probability (for the least serious offences) up to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt (for the most serious offences) – this had been included at the insistence of the
cricket players’ unions, and meant that in the 2010 spot-fixing case, where the Pakistani cricketers
were charged with the most serious offences available under the Code, the ICC was required to prove
the charges beyond reasonable doubt. ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision
dated 5 February 2011, para 26. Article 3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code now imposes a lesser
obligation: ‘[the] standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’
Both World Rugby’s Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) (Art 6.6.1) and the BHA’s Rules of
Racing Judicial Panels Code Article 11 require proof of charges only on ‘the balance of probabilities’.
The Regulatory Commission noted in The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission
decision dated 18 April 2018, that ‘although the standard of proof remains that of the balance of
probabilities the Regulatory Commission recognised that it needed to have a high degree of confidence
in the evidence before it could find the charges had been proved’ (para 8). This was considered in light
of the seriousness of the charges raised against the defendant, who was subsequently found guilty of
influencing a football betting market by deliberately getting booked.
5 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 82. See also Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF,
CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 99 (‘The BWF Rules, under which this hearing is conducted, mandate
the application of the balance of probabilities to the standard of proof. Kollerer is not authority for
the proposition that the CAS should impose a higher standard of comfortable satisfaction where an
association has decided to apply a different, specific, standard in its regulations. Mr. bin Zulkiffli has
not cited any national or international rules of public policy that require this Panel to reject, or fail to
follow, the BWF Rules on this issue. The mandated standard is that of the balance of probabilities’).
6 See eg Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, para 45 (‘In our judgment
the standard of proof in these proceedings before the Panel is the balance of probabilities. The Rule
in paragraph 16 makes it clear that the standard of proof is the civil standard. Lord Hoffman and
Baroness Hale made clear in their speeches [in In re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009]
1 AC 11] that the so-called heightened standard of proof in civil proceedings was no longer good
law. We do not accept that this standard must be adopted because paragraph 16 was promulgated
before In re B was decided. The House of Lords, now the Supreme Court, declares what the law is
and always has been. There is, in our judgment, no room for construing paragraph 16, as importing,
and bound by, the law as it was or may have been in 2001’) and para 47 (‘Although, as we accept,
the charges against these appellants were serious and the consequences, particularly for the jockeys
were serious, they were not criminal proceedings. They do not come into any of the cases in the first
category referred to by Lord Steyn in R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester [2003] 1 AC 787.
Further, we are not helped by standards adopted by other bodies or standards applied where the
penalties followed criminal proceedings. The BHA has a duty to ensure that the integrity of racing
is preserved. In our judgment it is entitled to provide for a standard of proof, namely the civil
standard of proof which in our opinion is appropriate and, as we find, fair’). See also Cavanagh v
The FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 23 October 2009, para 32 (‘it is clear that, in relation to the
disciplinary proceedings which are the subject of these appeals, the standard of proof is the balance
of probabilities, and that there is no “sliding scale” or intermediate standard of proof between the
civil and the criminal standard’); WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September
2013, para 13 (‘where criminal action is alleged in a civil context, it may appropriate to take into
account as a starting point that such action is inherently improbable, but the standard remains the
balance of probabilities test’, citing In re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11),
aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014; Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang and
Chino, DRA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15 June 2018, para 8 (applying balance of
probabilities standard to charge of match-fixing). See para D1.103 for further discussion of In re
B and other English cases.
Cf Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 4 (‘Agreement was reached between
the parties that, having regard to the complexities and importance of this case and the nature of the
allegations made, the standard expected of the ECB was “the equivalent of the criminal standard” –
the alternatives sought by the parties being “in practice indistinguishable.” The Panel accepted that
agreement and has proceeded on that basis – before, therefore, either charge were proved, the Panel
would have to be sure that the ECB had proved its case’).
7 Cavanagh et al v The FA, FA Appeal Board decision dated 23 October 2009, para 32 (‘in relation to the
disciplinary proceedings which are the subject of these appeals, the standard of proof is the balance of
probabilities, and that there is no “sliding scale” or intermediate standard of proof as between the civil
and criminal standard’, citing In re H [1996] AC 563 at 586).
8 Köllerer v ATP, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 97. Other CAS panels have taken the same line in anti-doping
cases. See paras C5.1–C5.3.
9 See eg Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, para 48 (‘We accept that in
making its findings the Panel should use its common sense in the way explained by Lord Hoffmann [in
In Re B (Children) (FC) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11]. We further accept that these were serious
allegations and that cogent evidence was required to prove the allegations. However, it is clear that the
standard of proof was debated before the Panel. In re B was referred to in the Panel’s reasons and we
are quite satisfied that the Panel had in mind the observations made by Lord Hoffmann and Baroness
Hale to which we have referred. In our judgment the Panel applied the correct standard of proof’);
BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 12 (‘When considering the
serious allegations he [Mr Ahern] faced, the Panel was particularly conscious of the need for reliable
evidence to justify any findings adverse to him. That was in part because of the standard of proof that
the Rules require and in part also because Ahern co-operated with the BHA Investigators. He readily
provided his telephone records and attended interviews. He has had a career without any comparable
problems or Rule breaches. His previously good character and cooperation with BHA Investigators
emphasised to the Panel the “common sense” need for cogent evidence to prove the BHA’s case’) and
49 (rejecting on the basis of the same approach a charge of breach of the rules by another person).
See also ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, para 8 (‘We are
satisfied that the appropriate standard of proof is proof on the balance of probabilities but, that having
regard to the grave nature of the allegations and the consequences of any finding of guilt in relation
to them that we should look for very cogent proof before making any adverse finding against Danish
Kaneria. The Panel concluded that in reality this meant that we should be sure of any fact before we
relied on it as proving a case against Danish Kaneria’), and on appeal, Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel
decision dated May 2013, para 4 (‘Agreement was reached between the parties that, having regard
to the complexities and importance of this case and the nature of the allegations made, the standard
expected of the ECB was “the equivalent of the criminal standard” – the alternatives sought by the
parties being “in practice indistinguishable.” The Panel accepted that agreement and has proceeded on
that basis – before, therefore, either charge were proved, the Panel would have to be sure that the ECB
had proved its case’).
B Evidence
B4.38 The anti-corruption code should also be clear that rules restricting
the admissibility of evidence in court proceedings do not apply in disciplinary
proceedings to enforce the code; instead the charges may be proved by ‘any reliable
means’.1 This should then be the key criterion used to resolve the various evidentiary
issues that may arise in corruption cases, including the following:
(a) As the CAS panels in Oriekhov and Savic noted, ‘when assessing the evidence,
the Panel has well in mind that corruption is, by nature, concealed as the parties
involved will seek to use evasive means to ensure that they leave no trail of their
wrongdoing’.2 As a result, while there may (exceptionally) be direct evidence
of corruption,3 the law is clear that indirect (aka ‘circumstantial’) evidence
may be sufficient to sustain a corruption charge,4 with the SGB proving certain
‘primary’ facts and then persuading the hearing panel that it can legitimately
infer from those facts the other necessary elements of the charge(s) brought.5
‘The strengths or weaknesses of a case based upon circumstantial evidence
are, invariably, tested and resolved by reference to the explanations which are
given for the circumstances said to be indicative of guilt’.6 Hearing panels
have not hesitated to draw such inferences, and so to sustain such charges,
where the evidence so warrants.7 For example, evidence that a betting market
on a particular match has deviated from the ordinary movement of odds in
accordance with the mathematical model may be a ‘decisive sign that some
bettors had some information that the mathematical model did not have and
expected that at least two goals be scored irrespective of the lapse of time’.8
(b) There is no right to silence in sports disciplinary cases. If a participant refuses
to cooperate with an investigation, and/or to answer questions before the
hearing panel, an inference may be drawn that they have something to hide/
that their answers would hurt their defence.9
(c) Evidence that the SGB wants to rely on may have been obtained by covert
means, such as concealed surveillance equipment used by the police or (more
controversially) by undercover journalists.10 Even if some hearing panels may
find such methods distasteful, arguments that the evidence should be excluded
on grounds of abuse of process or illegality are highly unlikely to succeed,
certainly where the SGB itself was not involved in the allegedly abusive or
illegal acts.11
(d) Alternatively, evidence may be offered through witnesses who desire anonymity
to avoid the risk of retaliation from criminal elements involved in the corrupt
conspiracy that their evidence will uncover. Again, this is against the interests
of the person charged, impinging on their right to confront their accusers.
The CAS panel has balanced these conflicting considerations by permitting
witnesses who can establish a concrete risk of retaliation to give evidence
anonymously on condition that the CAS panel is able to check their identity,
any prior statements they have made are also provided to the other party (again,
in anonymised form), and the other party is given an appropriate opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses, with restrictions as necessary to protect their
anonymity (eg by telephone, with audio scrambler, and with cross-examination
questions vetted by panel to ensure they will not identify the witness).12
(e) Where the allegation is that a race or match (or some aspect thereof) was
fixed, it will usually be necessary to produce evidence of what happened in
the race or match.13 It may also be appropriate to introduce expert evidence to
assist the hearing panel in interpreting that evidence, although in some cases
(especially horseracing) the members of the hearing panel are likely to be very
familiar with the sport and therefore may not require expert assistance.14 On
the other hand, the fact that no one can point to a specific act of deliberate
under-performance in the match in question does not mean there was no
deliberate under-performance: ‘it is in the nature of match-fixing that it must be
concealed. If every time a snooker match was fixed it was evident from the way
the game was played, then match-fixing in snooker would soon be stopped. It is
not necessary in order to establish match-fixing that the WPBSA can identify a
deliberate error at the table’.15
(f) Finally, where evidence of unusual betting patterns is offered as proof of
match-fixing,16 a CAS panel has warned against falling into the prosecutorial
fallacy (often seen in athlete biological passport cases17) that if the probability
is low of seeing such patterns when conditions are normal, then the probability
of match-fixing is high. In Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA, the CAS panel
noted:18
‘85. The Panel finds that this is similar in respect of the analytical information
derived from the BFDS. The BFDS analyses whether the analytical information
regarding betting on football matches can be explained by “normal” circumstances.
The conclusion that the statistical information cannot be explained by “normal”
circumstances does not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the
results are to be explained by match-fixing. The reporting of an “escalated” match
deriving from the BFDS is by no means conclusive evidence that such match was
indeed fixed, but remains subject to review.
86. In order to come to the conclusion that a match is fixed the Panel finds that
the analytical information needs to be supported by other, different and external
elements pointing in the same direction, ie a differentiation must be made between
the so-called quantitative information and a qualitative analysis of the quantitative
information.’
1 See eg Art 3.2.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code: ‘The Anti-Corruption Tribunal shall not be bound
by rules governing the admissibility of evidence in judicial or other proceedings. Instead, facts may be
established by any reliable means, including admissions and circumstantial evidence’. This provision,
the origin of which was the World Anti-Doping Code (see paras C7.2 and C7.8), means that the hearing
panel ‘must consider weight rather than admissibility, subject always to the overriding imperative of
fairness which is necessarily to be implied into the Code. We recognise that the principles that have
lain behind the exclusion of certain forms of evidence from being heard in English courts, will have
resonance even where questions of weight are being considered. It is obvious, for example, that hearsay
evidence of what someone said outside of the Tribunal hearing is of less weight than evidence given
by witnesses in court’. ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February
2011, para 29. See also Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 9 (‘the Panel is
required to and did consider the inherent weakened evidential value of hearsay evidence’).
2 Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 54; Savic v PTIOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.7.
3 For example, if one of the conspirators boasts to a friend about the proceeds of the conspiracy (such
as Mervyn Westfield showing his team-mate, Tony Palladino, a bag filled with the £6,000 he had been
paid for deliberately underperforming in a match), or (more usually) if the conspirators are recorded
covertly by the police (as in Oriekhov, for example) or by undercover journalists (as in Butt, Higgins,
Leaf, etc).
4 See eg Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel decision
2018/01, at para 188: (‘Consequently, it is more likely than not that direct evidence will be the
exception and indirect evidence the standard when dealing in cases involving alleged corrupt activity.
In this respect, the CAS has previously held “It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single
items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation but, taken together, establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt” (CAS 2015/A/4059 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA)’), aff’d Zulkiffli
v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847; ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, Anti-Corruption
Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 30 (‘Direct, eyewitness evidence is, however, not the
only way of proving criminal charges. Circumstantial evidence can in certain circumstances suffice’),
citing Attorney General of Jersey v O’Brien 2006 WL 690572 (PC App No 50 of 2005 (Lord Hoffman)
(‘It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an
innocent explanation, but, taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt’), and noting that
‘[t]his approach is vouched for in the specific context of sports law’ in certain doping cases (para 32),
in which the CAS has held that it was enough, to sustain a charge of manipulation of a drugs test
sample, to satisfy the hearing panel that the athlete was the only person who at the relevant time
had the motive, opportunity and technical skill to manipulate the sample in a manner that would be
undetected. Those cases were Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.5, and Smith de Bruin v
FINA, CAS 98/A/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), pp 255, 268, although
now there are others: see para Cx.xx. In such circumstances, it is for the athlete to put forward an
alternative theory identifying a plausible alternative culprit that is sufficiently supported by evidence
to undermine the panel’s satisfaction on the point. See eg Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.6
(‘Once the probability that manipulation occurred in this phase of the chain of custody [ie when the
sample was in the athlete’s control] becomes apparent then some explanation or plausible hypothesis
that the athlete was not involved must be brought forward to refute the circumstantial evidence as to
the probability of the manipulation either being carried out by the Appellant or with his consent and
approval’). See also WADA v FIBA & Morgan, FIBA AC 2005-1, decision dated 22 June 2005, p 7
(‘both forms of determining the facts (direct evidence and circumstantial evidence) are, in principle,
equal’); Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel decision dated May 2013, para 9 (‘The Panel has reminded
itself that circumstantial evidence could be powerful evidence provided that it was based on reliable
facts and assisted in bolstering or undermining the ECB case’). See also the use of circumstantial
evidence to prove doping charges in cases discussed at para C5.5.
5 The question is whether it is reasonable and logical to infer a fact for which there is no direct evidence
from those facts that have been proved. See eg Ad Vitam, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 6 January
2016, para 105 (‘in this type of case ie where corrupt practice for financial gain is alleged, but denied,
[…] there will often be contested issues of fact in connection with which the tribunal has to ask itself
whether the drawing of a given inference is, or is not, justifiably to be made. And, in making that
decision, it will need to focus upon the facts, evidence and argument touching upon all aspects of
the case, not only individually, but in so far as they may legitimately and logically be seen to inter-
connect’) and para 106 (‘Reward (or not) in this type of case is a cardinal example of those instances
where, typically, it will be fair and appropriate for the adjudicating Panel to consider whether, direct
evidence absent, an inference should or should not be drawn that a particular event has happened’),
citing McKeown v British Horseracing Authority, [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 132; BHA v Ahern
et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 13 (‘there was little if any dispute about
primary facts. The betting activities of Mr Clement were a matter of record. […] The evidence of
telephone and other contact between Mr Clement and Ahern was likewise mostly common ground.
The Panel’s task was to determine whether the inference of a corrupt conspiracy between Mr Clement
and Ahern was a legitimate one’); WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 September 2013
(agreement to fix inferred from evidence of communications followed by patterns of betting indicating
great confidence in a particular outcome), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014; The
Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, para 26 (‘We
have no doubt the betting evidence demonstrates a betting syndicate. The nature, size and timing of the
bets can only demonstrate coordinated action: the possibility of chance or coincidence is fanciful’).
There is a detailed and helpful analysis of the use of circumstantial evidence, and in particular of
when it is and is not proper to draw inferences from findings of fact, in McKeown v British Horseracing
Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), paras 124–133, 256–257, 264, and passim. For example, where
a punter has contact with a jockey, and then places substantial bets on that jockey’s horse to lose, it
may be inferred that the jockey told the punter something that made him confident of the outcome. See
ibid, paras 53–59, especially para 57 (pattern of substantial and successful lay bets on horse ridden
by jockey who had been in contact with punter ‘was sufficient to raise the inference that they were
inspired by inside information, unless there was a good explanation to the contrary’); BHA v Sines
et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 184 (‘the size of the lay bets
in this account […] – respectively the first, second, fourth and sixth largest lay bets on the account –
demonstrate a confidence which indicates knowledge that Mr Crickmore had inside information’) and
para 79 (‘the pattern of phone calls shows a connection between Mr Crickmore on the one hand and
those who operated the various accounts which is sufficiently striking to lead to the inference that they
were placing the lay bets on the basis of information derived from him. And the relative size of those
bets for the accounts in question […] raises questions as to the reasons for the confidence displayed in
the lay selections. The confidence was explained by inside information which was obtained in relation
to these races, which in some cases went as far as indications from jockeys that they would ride to
lose if necessary’); BHA v Ahern et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 May 2013, para 19
(‘There is thus a wealth of evidence which indicates that Mr Clement’s lay bets against the five Ahern
rides at issue in this enquiry were inspired by information from Ahern. His betting demonstrated a
preference for laying Ahern rides. The risks which he was prepared to run on such bets was higher
than was usually found in the accounts he operated. […] The betting followed contacts between Ahern
and Mr Clement on or before races, as the timelines put before the Panel generally demonstrated. […]
The sheer size of the bets in the case of JUDGETHEMOMENT indicated a confidence in the outcome
that is seen to be justified by what happened in the race, where Ahern deliberately took steps to ensure
that the gelding did not run on its merits. The Panel was left in no doubt that Mr Clement knew that
the gelding would be ridden to lose’). In such circumstances, it may also be inferred that the jockey
was rewarded for provision of this information, even if there is no direct evidence of such reward. See
eg HRA v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 16 February 2007, para 42 (‘As for payment
for this information, this is necessarily a matter of inference. The Panel concluded that there must
have been substantial payments to Fitzpatrick for the material he provided. It is impossible to say how
much, or how payment was made. It may even have been the case that Fitzpatrick was sharing in the
profits with Mr Nicholl. The sheer volume of phone contacts between Mr Nicholl and Fitzpatrick after
suspect races is consistent with discussion about how the betting had gone, and Fitzpatrick’s evidence
to the Panel that he had no idea of the extent of Mr Nicholl’s betting was a palpable lie’). See also
para B4.26, n 7.
Similarly, it may be inferred from efforts to conceal what one is doing that one knows that those
actions are corrupt. See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December
2011, para 131 (‘Fairley was the intermediary between Mr Sines and Doe. This was designed to
conceal what was passing between Doe and Mr Sines, because both understood that they were engaged
in corrupt behaviour’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February
2011, para 131 (rejecting Butt’s argument that text messages suggesting match-fixing were just teasing
by his agent because, among other things, ‘Mr Butt’s responses to various requests for information
directed to him by the ICC […] had not revealed the totality of the mobile phones that he used during
the West Indies tour, nor did Mr Butt give to the ICC the explanation that he gave to us, namely that
there were other mobile phones but ones whose details he could not then recollect. In response to the
ICC’s formal demand for information, Mr Butt admitted what he had failed to accept in response to
the ICC’s original demand for information, ie that in the period 25 April to 16 August 2010 he was the
user of two SIM card phone numbers, to which Mr Majeed texted incriminating text messages in St
Lucia. This suggested a certain sensitivity on Mr Butt’s part which would have been unnecessary if he
had simply been the victim of a tedious tease. The episode in Spring in St Lucia then appears to have
been the overture to the main performance in Summer in England’).
Going further, it can be inferred from a proven lie about the nature of a phone call, or bet, that
there was something improper about it. BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated
14 December 2011, para 196(iii) (‘If Mr Nick Gold really thought there was nothing improper
about the lay betting which the BHA was seeking to investigate, there was no reason to tell that lie
[ie that he based his bets on time figures]’); HRA v Winston et al, Disciplinary Panel decision dated
16 February 2007, para 66 (‘The only sensible inference from this sustained course of lying [to the
HRA investigators] is that Fletcher was trying to cover up his involvement with Mr Nicholl because he
was fully involved in supplying information to support Mr Nicholl’s corrupt betting’); ECB v Kaneria
& Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 6 (‘We utterly reject his account of
the telephone calls and texts to and from Anu Bhatt during the vital days in question. Analysis of the
length, sequence and timing of these phone calls simply does not permit of the innocent explanations
given by Kaneria. If, as we find, he is lying about these calls and texts, there can only be one logical
reason – to tell the truth would be damning’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal
decision dated 5 February 2011, para 140 (‘we are compelled to reject Mr Butt’s construction of
these interchanges [tape recordings of telephone calls between Butt and his agent relating to a fix at
the Oval] for these reasons. […] Mr Butt has been inconsistent in his attitude towards the Oval calls,
moving from a position of denial that he was the counterparty, to a position of inability to recollect one
[way] or another – to one of putting the ICC to proof – to one of acceptance. […] He must (we find)
have – despite his denials – have read the NOTW article which contained extracts from his dialogue
with Mr Majeed and known full well from the start that it was indeed he at the other end of the line’).
6 The FA v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 104.
7 See cases cited in note 5. On the other hand, while sometimes the inference is irresistible (ie the fact to
be inferred is as certain as the proven facts from which it is to be inferred), other times it may simply
be one of several possible inferences, in which case it may not be enough to sustain the regulator’s
burden of proof. See eg RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, p 3 (‘The
fourth allegation is that the player is alleged to have tried to influence a team mate to affect a result.
[…] This has caused the Tribunal much deliberation. Reading the evidence provided, it is possible to
draw an inference that this is what Mr Leaf was trying to achieve. However, bearing in mind the burden
of proof, the Tribunal are unable to say with sufficient certainty that Mr Leaf was trying to influence
Mr Colton’). If the primary facts are equally consistent with guilt and innocence, they should not be
considered probative of one rather than the other. Sines et al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated
10 April 2012, paras 121-22 (‘121. […] we find that the factors relied upon by the Panel were in the
circumstances not sufficient to permit the inference being drawn that she [Milczarek] was part of the
alleged conspiracy. 122. The telephone call at 16.45 was a single call of short duration. It is possible
that it could have been a call by Mr Crickmore for Fallon even if Fallon was not in the car at the time.
The text to Fallon at 17.40 could have been made on the journey back to Newmarket during a break
in the journey. Milczarek was at the time a young jockey of good character with every reason not to
jeopardise her career. 123. In our judgment there was insufficient evidence to support the Panel’s
conclusion that Milczarek was party to the conspiracy. […]’).
If there is sufficient evidence of guilt, however, it will not assist the participant to point out that
the various facts relied on, taken on their own, are not inculpatory. See Attorney General of Jersey v
O’Brien, 2006 WL 690572 (PC App No 50 of 2005 (Lord Hoffman) (‘It is in the nature of circumstantial
evidence that single items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation, but, taken
together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt’). And still less will it assist the participant to point
to an ‘exonerating’ fact that is in fact equally consistent with guilt as with innocence. For example, in
Savic v PTIOs, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.22, the allegation was that Savic had approached X to lose
the first set of his match against Y, on the basis that Y would then lose the next two sets so that X won
the match, but X declined the approach. The Panel noted: ‘it was suggested by the Appellant that there
was no evidence that [Y] was approached in order to fix his match [with X]. This, however, does not
seem to the Panel to be of itself significant. There are a number of explanations, all as consistent with
the Appellant’s guilt as with his innocence, the most obvious being that without [X’s] cooperation, no
purpose would be served by approaching [Y] as well’.
8 Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, para 83. See also Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062, para 100
(evidence that betting on the Norway-Malta UEFA qualifier favoured the outcome 4-0 supported
finding that match was fixed). Cf Darts Regulatory Authority v Ulang and Chino, DRA Disciplinary
Committee decision dated 15 June 2018, para 45 (‘The Committee took the view that in a sporting
case context suspicious betting patterns required other corroborative evidence to establish a link to
the sports individual and/or entity concerned. A conclusion that any statistical information cannot be
explained by usual circumstances does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the results are to
be explained by match-fixing by the specific individual charged’), citing Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v
UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4650.
9 In Olaso de la Rica v Tennis Integrity Unit, CAS 2014/A/3467, a CAS panel rejected the player’s
complaint that when interviewed he had not been advised of his right to silence, noting (para 81)
that the Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme imposed ‘a duty to cooperate with investigations with
investigations led by the TIU. The Respondent reminds to that respect that this obligation is essential
to the success of the Governing Bodies of professional tennis’ efforts against corruption in the sport
of professional tennis, because they do not have the investigatory powers of a government law
enforcement authority’; and that under applicable law (Florida law), parties could waive constitutional
protections, and therefore ‘the Player validly waived any right to remain silent that he may have had
– issue which has not been demonstrated – in connection to this case, by signing the 2010 Player’s
agreement. Consequently, the TIU did not commit any violation of the Player’s rights with respect to
the interviews led by Mr. Willerton’ of the TIU (para 82). In Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton
World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01, paras 176-77, the hearing panel rejected the
suggestion that the player should have been cautioned before interview that he had a right to silence,
because the applicable rules provided ‘no legal basis’ for such caution, but instead obliged the player
to answer ‘any reasonable question’. On appeal, the CAS panel held that it ‘is entitled to have regard
to the fact that Mr. bin Zulkiffli chose not to give evidence, or explain the inconsistent statements made
to the BWF Panel that led it to conclude that he lacked credibility. There was no evidence to explain or
rebut the matters on which the BWF Panel relied to reach its conclusion. Accordingly, there is no reason
for this Panel to call into question those conclusions’. Zulkiffli and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846
& 5847, para 74. See also ICC v Butt et al, decision of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Ethics
Commission, dated 23 December 2010 on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 27(4)
(‘There is certainly no “right to silence” in the disciplinary proceedings’), citing Jefferson v Bhetcha
[1979] 2 All ER 1108, R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241,
and Archer v South West Thames Area Health Authority, unreported, 5 August 1985 (QBD) (Steyn
J.); Harris, Disciplinary and Regulatory Proceedings, 10th Edn (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2019),
para 12.131 (right to silence ‘would seem to have no application in disciplinary proceedings based on
contract’), citing (inter alia) R v Institute of Chartered Accountants ex parte Nawaz [1997] 16 PNLR 43
(CA) (no objection in public policy to a professional conduct rule requiring self-incrimination by
accountant), and Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108 (no right to refuse to swear affidavit in civil
proceedings on the basis that it would disclose defence in concurrent criminal proceedings). See also
BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 121 (Paul Doe
‘complained that it had been wrong to require him to disclose his telephone records. But the privilege
[against self-incrimination] cannot apply to externally produced records. He also relied upon this
privilege to excuse himself from attendance at the hearing. The issues for decision concern breaches of
the Rules of Racing and not criminal charges. In any event, Doe had submitted to the Rules that govern
racing as a condition of his licence and that required him to cooperate with the Enquiry. There was
nothing in his objections’). The CAS has similarly ruled that there is no right against self-incrimination
in doping cases brought under sport disciplinary rules. USADA v Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645,
para 53, and USADA v Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, paras 57–58.
Thus, for example, Art 3.2.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code provides: ‘The Anti-Corruption
Tribunal may draw an inference adverse to a Participant who is asserted to have committed an offence
under the Anti-Corruption Code based on his/her refusal, without compelling justification, after a
request made in a reasonable time in advance of the hearing, to appear at the hearing (either in person
or by video or telephone link, as directed by the Anti-Corruption Tribunal) and to answer any relevant
questions’. This is copied from Art 3.2.5 of the World Anti-Doping Code.
In appropriate circumstances, a similar adverse inference might be drawn from a party’s failure
to call a witness who would appear to have relevant information and whose attendance is within
that party’s control. See eg Wiszniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority (1998) EWCA Civ
596, (1998) Lloyd’s Rep Med 223, 240 (under English law, if a party fails without good reason to
call a witness whose evidence would have been relevant to an issue in dispute, then if the other party
introduces at least some evidence on the issue, no matter how weak, the court would be entitled to
draw an inference that the missing witness’s evidence would have hurt the party that failed to call him
or would have helped the other party).
10 As it was, for example, in Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172, para 7 (transcripts of telephone
conversations recorded by the German police); WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision
dated 16 May 2008, para 21 (telephone conversation recorded covertly by the Indian police); ICC v
Butt, Asif & Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal determination dated 2 February 2011, para 37–40
(recordings of conversations, including telephone conversations, made covertly by an undercover
journalist).
11 See eg ICC v Butt, Asif & Amir, decision dated 10 November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman
of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional
suspension, paras 12–13 (‘unlike the common law of the United States of America, there is no
doctrine of exclusion of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” known to English common law (R v Sang
1980 AC 402). With the exception of evidence whose admission would constitute an abuse of process
(or pursuant to statute, ie Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Section 75 (where its prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value)), English adjectival law concentrates on weight rather than
admissibility. [13]. It goes without saying that the reliability of evidence may be affected by the way
in which it was gathered and presented, but sting operations are often the only way of bringing into
the public domain unacceptable behaviour, whether it be (apparently) soliciting bribes as the price
of voting in a particular way in the contest to stage the FIFA World Cup, or (certainly) unmasking
Members of Parliament who offer to peddle their connections for reward (to give only two recent
well publicised examples)’); RFL v Leaf, RFL Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 August 2011, pp
1–2 (‘There is no doubt that Mr Leaf was targeted due to the tip off […] that Mr Leaf was the man
to speak [to] in regards to placing bets. […] The Tribunal are not here to deal with the way in which
the Sun Newspaper have acted and reported on the story; the Tribunal are dealing with Mr Leaf. As
a teacher Mr Leaf is regarded by the Tribunal as being of good intelligence and should be able to
weigh up such situations and is therefore responsible for his own actions the Tribunal believe even
if the actions of the journalist may be reprehensible. Mr Leaf states he has been foolish, however the
Tribunal believes it is more than foolish and even the conduct of Mr Sweet and the way in which Mr
Leaf has been “set up” does not exculpate Mr Leaf from his own actions in this matter [betting against
the team he was playing for] which as already stated is a serious breach of the operational rules’).
To similar effect from the English courts, see eg Hasan v General Medical Council [2003] PC 52,
para 9 (rejecting challenge to disciplinary proceedings brought against a doctor based on evidence
developed by undercover journalist of the doctor’s forgery of medical reports to aid an asylum claim
and a faked road traffic accident and personal injury claim; the fact that the doctor had been duped by
the journalist did not ‘remove the sting’ from the charges, ie ‘that he was willing, when approached,
to enter into transactions in his professional capacity which were profoundly dishonest’); Council for
the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v Saluja, [2006] EWHC 2784 (Admin), paras 124, 129 (it
was a manifest error of law to stay disciplinary proceedings as an abuse of process on basis undercover
journalist had entrapped doctor into selling her a sick note so she could go on holiday from work,
because of ‘[…] the substantial difference between a doctor at his professional practice being pressed
to provide a false medical certificate and a drug dealer being importuned by an undercover officer. On
the face of it, […] Dr Saluja could have said no when asked to provide the certificate. He could have
asked the “patient” to leave. It is difficult to see how the offer of money in such circumstances, albeit
with some importuning or pressure, could be said to amount to such misconduct by the journalist as
to compromise the integrity of the disciplinary process’, and because ‘[s]ome disciplinary offences
(particularly where the patient has an interest in keeping quiet) will only come to light through the use
of techniques such as were used here’).
In ATP v Köllerer, decision of Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer dated 31 May 2011, para 143,
the hearing officer stated: ‘Subject to Florida law permitting (in the context of rules which include
provision that the strict rules of evidence do not apply; see Article G.3.c), I would probably have
been willing to receive and consider evidence of covert sound recordings’. Indeed, CAS jurisprudence
suggests that such evidence would be admissible even if obtained in illegal fashion. See eg Adamu
v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2426, para 75 (FIFA allowed to rely on conversations covertly recorded by
undercover journalists even though such recording was illegal under Swiss law, because FIFA had not
performed any illegal activity to obtain the recordings; ‘the mere circumstance that some evidence has
been illegally obtained do not necessarily preclude an arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland to admit
it into the proceedings’); WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 10.5(c) (‘under
Swiss law […] such evidence can be used, even if it was collected with violation of certain human
rights, if there is an overriding public interest at stake. In the case at hand, the internationally accepted
fight against doping is a public interest, which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s
personal rights’). Similarly, under English law, evidence obtained ‘unlawfully, improperly or unfairly
is admissible as a matter of law’ in both criminal proceedings (Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2020,
(Oxford University Press, 2020), at para F2.1) and civil proceedings. Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The
Queen, [1955] AC 197, 199 (‘In their Lordships’ opinion, the test to be applied in considering whether
evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the
Court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained’).
12 Keramuddin v FIFA, CAS 2019/A/6388, para 135 (‘In light of the witnesses’ interest in keeping
their identities anonymous, the Panel found that it could strike a proper balance between the
Appellant’s right to be heard and to a fair trial and the necessity to protect witnesses’ interest. It did
so by checking the identity, through a CAS counsel, of the witnesses, and giving the Appellant the
opportunity to confront the protected witnesses as required under Article 6(1) ECHR, while placing
certain limitations to protect them (see supra at para. 35). Indeed, the Panel granted the Appellant the
opportunity to directly cross-examine the protected witnesses over the phone, while protecting the
identities of the witnesses by (i) having them use a voice scrambler, and (ii) requiring the Appellant
to provide the Panel, in advance of the hearing, the questions he intended to ask the witnesses in
order for the Panel to ensure that they were not aimed at, or have even the unintentional effect of,
identifying the witnesses, all the while allowing the Appellant to ask additional questions not sent
in advance so long as they were not translated/posed until after the Panel had an opportunity to vet
them (see supra at para.47). The Panel also sent a CAS counsel to the secret location from which
the protected witnesses testified to properly identify them and ensure that they testified without any
undue interference from any third party during the cross-examination (see supra at para. 35 and 48)’);
FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, paras 44,
72–74, and 75 (‘The Panel made sure that the Appellants received the minutes of the interrogations
of the protected witnesses and that the Appellants were able to directly cross-examine the protected
witnesses over the phone during the Hearing. A counsel of the CAS assured that the witnesses were
properly identified and that they were alone at the time of the examination-in-chief and the cross-
examination. The Panel repeatedly denied requests of the Respondent that anonymous witness
statements should be admitted without providing the Appellants with the minutes or without granting
them the right to cross-examine them’). Cf UCI v Contador, CAS 2011/A/2384, para 184 (application
by WADA to rely on anonymous witness refused because it was ‘disproportionate in view of all of
the interests at stake. In particular the Panel found that it was insufficiently demonstrated that the
interests of the witness worthy of protection were threatened to an extent that could justify a complete
protection of the witness’ identity from disclosure to the Respondent, thus, curtailing the procedural
rights of the Respondents to a large degree’). For the position in the English courts, see eg Deripaska
v Cherney [2012] EWCA 1235, paras 12–14 (party applying for witness to remain anonymous must
convince court there is a real risk of reprisal, objectively verified, if order is not granted; generalities
about potential threats are not enough). See Sturman, ‘The Difficulty Detecting Corruption’, paper
at Corruption in Sports Conference, 11 December 2012, endorsing approach taken by CAS panel in
Pobeda (‘There is no reason whatsoever why sporting tribunals should not develop a practice where
“protected” witnesses give evidence before sporting tribunals with appropriate measures, but it is
sincerely to be hoped that careful procedural rules will be adopted to ensure that the interests of
justice do not become subordinate to the “need” for convictions in “integrity” cases. Experience in
the criminal courts has shown that if investigators are given unfettered power and discretion they may
well behave inappropriately. A promise of anonymity or special measures can be used by a dishonest
witness to evade searching cross-examination and to conceal the truth. Misconduct in a “noble cause”
is still misconduct and it is very hard for the defence to test whether a statement has been obtained
through improper coaching and leading if (for example) access to transcripts is withheld’).
13 See eg BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 110 (‘There
were three criticisms made by the BHA of Fizsimons’ ride of IT’S A MAN’S WORLD at Lingfield on
13 February 2009, which were said to amount to breaches of Rule 157. These were that he deliberately
missed the break by restraining his mount in the stalls; that having regained contact with the field,
he eased off and made no effort to progress, and that there was no real substantial effort in the last
2 furlongs of the race’). Of course, it may be that actions on the racecourse or the field of play that
appear innocent in isolation take on a more sinister hue when considered in combination with off-field
events. See eg ibid, at para 147 (‘the available recordings do not enable it to be said one way or the
other whether there was any active restraint that was responsible for this [slow emergence from the
stall]. What can be said is that there was an absence of effort by Fairley at least to correct the awkward
position of the horse’s head just before the gates opened, and an absence of effort to push the horse out
when they had opened. In other circumstances, there might have been innocent explanations for that,
but given Fairley’s lies at a later stage about his knowledge of and contacts with Mr Sines and given
the pattern of telephone contacts which show Doe acting as an intermediary to transmit information
to Mr Sines who then put in motion the organisation of the lay betting (both himself and through Mr
Crickmore), the Panel concluded that there was no innocent explanation and that there was a breach of
Rule 157 in this case’).
14 See McKeown v British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 212 (‘There is in
my view no general requirement flowing from the overriding requirement to conduct disciplinary
proceedings fairly either for the prosecuting body to adduce and tender for cross examination or
for the Disciplinary Panel to ensure the attendance of expert witnesses as a necessary condition for
respectively bringing and finding [cheating on the field of play] proved against a member of a sporting
body. There is in principle no reason why a tribunal including members with relevant experience and
knowledge of the sport in question should not draw on their knowledge and experience of viewing
and interpreting video evidence and drawing inferences from it and from the evidence relating to such
things as the nature and record of the contestants. Indeed there is every reason why they should be free
to do so’).
15 WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision date 16 September 2013, paras 46, 85, aff’d, Appeals
Committee decision dated 15 May 2014.
16 See para B4.25, n3 and B4.47, n 3.
17 See para C7.6.
18 Klubi Sportiv Skenderbeu v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4650.
C Provisional suspension
B4.39 The SGB’s rules should give it the power to remove those charged with
corruption offences from the sport until the charges have been resolved.1 A provisional
suspension operates on a precautionary principle and must weigh the potential harm
to the sport of allowing the participant to continue to participate if the charges are
established against the harm to the individual of being suspended from participation if
the charges are not made out. There is a strong argument that the public’s confidence
in the integrity of the sport, and in the ability of its regulators to protect that integrity,
will be fundamentally shaken if someone is allowed to continue to participate in the
sport where (for example) the Crown Prosecution Service has determined that there
is enough evidence to charge him with a criminal offence,2 or where clear evidence of
his apparent corruption has been splashed over the front pages of the world’s press.3
In such circumstances, and indeed in any case where there is sufficient evidence to
support a charge, English courts are unlikely to uphold any challenge to a provisional
suspension, notwithstanding the substantial hardship caused to the participant and the
unfairness to him/her if the charges are later dismissed.4 However, the case that set
that precedent involved jockey Kieren Fallon, and the criminal charges against him
that led to his provisional suspension subsequently collapsed in very public fashion,5
which is a chastening reminder to SGBs to consider matters of provisional suspension
carefully. A provisional suspension is not an early indication of guilt,6 though the
cogency of the evidence against a participant may be a relevant factor in balancing
the potential harms. In addition, the rules should give the participant charged a
meaningful opportunity to challenge that provisional suspension either before it is
imposed or soon thereafter.7 If these precautions are taken, and the participant does
not challenge the provisional suspension, or else challenges it unsuccessfully, then
even if the participant is subsequently exonerated at the full hearing of the charges,
the SGB would have a strong defence to any claim the participant may try to bring
for damage to reputation and/or lost earnings during the period of provisional
suspension.
1 Paragraph 28.1(f) of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on the promotion of the integrity of sport against the manipulation of results, notable match-
fixing (28 September 2011) specifically recommended that sports bodies’ rules on manipulation of
results include ‘mechanisms for the temporary prohibition from any participation in sports activities of
athletes and sport officials under prosecution’. The SportAccord Report, ‘Integrity in Sport’ (November
2011), p 52, said the same thing.
For an example of such a provision, see Art 4.7.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, which provides
that where a participant has been charged under the Anti-Corruption Code or in other circumstances,
such as a participant being subject to criminal charges, the ACU General Manager ‘[…] shall have the
discretion, in circumstances where he/she considers that the integrity of the sport could otherwise be
seriously undermined, to Provisionally Suspend the Participant pending the Anti-Corruption Tribunal’s
determination of whether he/she has committed an offence’. Cf Art 6.8 of World Rugby’s Regulation
6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting), which requires World Rugby to apply to a Judicial Officer, on notice
to the player, to impose a provisional suspension, with such suspension to be granted if the Anti-
Corruption Officer ‘has demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that there is a ‘prima facie case
that the Connected Person has committed an Anti-Corruption Breach’.
2 As in Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB), where the HRA
provisionally suspended jockey Kieren Fallon after the Crown Prosecution Service charged him with
several offences arising out of an alleged conspiracy to fix races in which he was competing (see para
B4.49), and resisted, as an improper collateral attack on the CPS’s charging decision, a challenge by
Fallon to the suspension based on an argument that there was no merit in the charges against him.
3 For example, on 28 August 2010, in the middle of the Lord’s Test match between England and Pakistan,
the News of the World devoted its front page and more than 20 internal pages to a sensational account
of a conspiracy it claimed to have uncovered of spot-fixing (the bowling of deliberate ‘no balls’) by
three Pakistani players during that match, including photographs (and videos posted on its website)
of the players’ agent accepting £150,000 in bundles of £50 notes and providing in return information
about precisely when the ‘no balls’ would be bowled, followed by the bowling of those ‘no balls’ at the
exact times predicted. The story was greeted with uproar, not only among the media and fans but also
among the players in the match itself, with reports of scuffles between players triggered by accusations
of cheating. See eg ‘Pakistan match-fixing claims: tensions boil over as Jon Trott and Wahab Riaz
clash’, telegraph.co.uk, 11 October 2010. In the circumstances, the ICC had to act, which it did by
charging the players on 2 September 2010 and at the same time exercising the power conferred on it
under Art 4.7.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (see n 1) to suspend the players pending hearing and
determination of the charges (which provisional suspension was subsequently upheld by the Chairman
of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission upon challenge by two of the players: see n 7, below).
Similarly, the WPBSA provisionally suspended John Higgins in May 2010 after The News of the
World published clear evidence from an undercover ‘sting’ that Higgins and his agent Pat Mooney had
discussed match-fixing with undercover reporters. In each case, the period of provisional suspension
served was credited against the ban subsequently imposed when the corruption charges were upheld at
trial: see para B4.30, n 5.
4 In July 2006, an HRA Appeal Board affirmed the HRA Disciplinary Panel’s imposition of a provisional
suspension on jockey Kieren Fallon pending determination of criminal charges that Fallon had agreed
to fix races (as to which, see para B4.49). The Disciplinary Panel had said: ‘We realise the hardship that
suspension and the length of time over which such hardship may last will cause, but we also recognise
the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride
pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged
both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction
of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is
so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate. In our view, the damage done
would be very hard to repair and, as the Regulator, we are anxious to avoid that damage’. HRA v
Fallon, HRA Appeal Board decision, July 2006, para 11. Fallon challenged the legality of that ban in
the High Court, alleging (among other things) that it was not appropriate simply to rely on the fact
that criminal charges had been brought; rather the HRA had to consider the evidence and determine
for itself whether it was sufficient to warrant a provisional suspension. The High Court accepted that
the ban ‘will be of very significant and irremediable detriment to Mr Fallon and those connected to
him, including his dependents and those otherwise wishing to use his services as a jockey’, and also
agreed ‘that it is a strong thing to prevent someone from plying his trade and from earning a living,
at least in Great Britain, by reason of charges which have been brought but which have not yet been
proved’, such that ‘strong counteracting factors’ were required to justify it. However, the High Court
had regard to the upholding of the perceptions of integrity of horseracing’, and in particular ‘the
damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride
pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely damaged
both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such; and by the adverse reaction
of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged with an offence which is
so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate’, given those factors it declined
to disturb the HRA Disciplinary Panel’s judgment that provisional suspension was warranted in Mr
Fallon’s case: Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB), paras 58, 62.
See also by way of analogy Modahl v British Athletic Federation Ltd [1999] All ER (D) 848 [HL],
where Lord Hoffmann acknowledged without objection the IAAF’s rules providing for provisional
suspension upon a positive doping test (‘I think that the IAAF adopted its system of instant suspension
followed by disciplinary proceedings in the belief that although it might sometimes cause injustice
in the individual case, it was necessary in the wider interests of the sport.’); Guest v Commonwealth
Games Canada and Triathlon Canada, CAS CG 02/001, para 7.9 (an interim suspension even without
a hearing is appropriate in a doping case because ‘the public interest of the sport trumps the private
interests of the athlete’); Behan/Tyrell/Casela Park, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 5 October
2010 (‘There is much to be said for the view that the gelding ought not to have been allowed to run
at Musselburgh after the determination by the Newcastle Stewards that this was a deliberate failure
to run it on its merits. The BHA may wish to consider giving Stewards the power to suspend a horse
with immediate effect when they determine that a deliberate breach has occurred, even though the
matter has then to be referred to the Disciplinary Panel because the Stewards’ penalty powers are
limited. There are no doubt arguments pointing against this (such as the effect on innocent owners and
the fact that the betting public is at least warned about a future race when there has been an enquiry
that finds deliberate breach). But this present case is one where, in the Panel’s view, the argument
for an immediate suspension prevails. What if it had won at Musselburgh and the money had been
down, even at cramped odds because of the publicity the Newcastle race had received? That would
cause more damage to the reputation of racing than the possible injustice to the owner’); and ICC v
Butt, Asif & Amir, decision dated 10 November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code
of Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional suspension,
para 29 (‘at one stage if not finally it appeared to be accepted that if the first criterion was established
so would the second one: that is to say that if there was a seriously arguable case against the Players
for breach of the various provisions of the Code with which they were charged, it would seriously
damage the integrity of sport if they were permitted to continue to play until charges against them
were finally resolved. I find that that is indeed so. It is the essence of sport that competition should be
fair, and outcomes uncertain. The principal Code is not the only instrument governing international
sport which recognises that in its governing instruments; the IOC Charter is another. There is constant
jurisprudence, both of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and of the domestic courts to that effect’)
and para 32 (‘It was eloquently expressed on their [the players’] behalf that not only was cricket their
only livelihood, and that absence from the game would seriously damage their earning capacity and
the interests of those who depend financially upon them; but that they would also suffer in terms of
their physical aptitude for the game from any prolonged periods of absence. In such situations public
interest has to be balanced against private interest; and I do not consider that matters alluded to were
so compelling (or, in this context, unusual) [that they] can tip the scales against the suspension if
otherwise justified on the basis of satisfaction of the two criteria. Such disadvantage is the inevitable
concomitant of a suspension’).
5 See para B4.49.
6 The FA v Wood, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, para 6.
7 See eg Art 4.7.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, regarding where a Provisional Suspension has
been imposed: ‘the Participant shall be given an opportunity to contest such Provisional Suspension
in a Provisional Hearing taking place before the Chairman of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission
(sitting alone) on a timely basis after its imposition.. At any such Provisional Hearing, it shall be the
burden of the ICC to establish that in such circumstances, the integrity of the sport could be seriously
undermined if he/she does not remain Provisionally Suspended pending determination of the charge(s)
or such other date (as may be applicable)’. Such a hearing was held in the Pakistan spot-fixing case,
where the Chairman of the ICC Code of Conduct Commission, Michael Beloff QC, ruled that the
first requirement (serious arguable case) did not mean (as Messrs Butt and Amir contended) that the
case had to be proven (at that stage) beyond reasonable doubt; rather, it ‘means more than merely an
arguable case. It is a case which is less than a prima facie case but more than one which establishes that
[there is] a serious issue to be tried. […] It is not, however, necessary for the [ICC’s] ACSU General
Manager to show that on a contested application he has much the better of the argument’. ICC v Butt,
Asif & Amir, decision dated 10 November 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of
Conduct Commission, on application by Messrs Butt and Amir to lift their provisional suspension,
paras 9(1), 11. As to the second requirement, Mr Beloff ruled: ‘it seems to me that the phrase “in
such circumstances” recognizes that there may be circumstances in which there is a strong arguable
case against a Player but nonetheless the integrity of the sport would not be seriously undermined
if a provisional suspension was not imposed on him, eg if the Player’s offence was merely failure
to act as a whistleblower by disclosing to the ACSU full details of any facts that have come to the
Player’s attention that may evidence an offence under the Code by another Player’. Ibid, para 9(2).
He held these requirements were met in the case before him, largely because the videotapes shot
by the undercover journalists appeared to show the players’ agent the night before the Lord’s Test,
correctly predicting the incidence of three ‘no balls’ in England’s first innings in that Test, which was
compelling prima facie evidence of fixing. He therefore did not lift the provisional suspension that had
been imposed by the ICC when it charged the players.
D The impact of criminal proceedings
B4.40 Conduct that breaches a sport’s anti-corruption code may also amount to a
criminal offence, in the UK1 and/or overseas.2 And while it is clear that the police and
the Crown Prosecution Service usually prefer to leave it to SGBs to take action in
such cases,3 there are circumstances where they have to act themselves, for example
because the publicity is too great to ignore (as in the Pakistani spot-fixing case), or
because the corrupt actions involve serious criminality by notorious criminals who
are beyond the SGB’s reach.4 Therefore, the SGB needs to be ready to decide what
to do with its own disciplinary proceedings if the police start investigating the matter
and the CPS starts considering criminal charges. The authors’ experience is that if
the criminal authorities do get involved, they prefer that the sports bodies cede the
field to them completely, staying any disciplinary investigation or proceedings until
the criminal investigation and any criminal proceedings have been completed. This
appears to be partly due to concerns about the competence and/or impartiality of
the SGB in bringing its own charges (given that an unsuccessful outcome might
undermine a subsequent criminal case), partly due to concerns that if the disciplinary
proceedings are conducted first and a result adverse to the participants is published,
they may argue that their right to a fair criminal trial has been prejudiced,5 but mostly
due to an apparent desire to have complete control over the matter (including all
witnesses and evidence) until criminal proceedings are complete. Nevertheless, there
are good countervailing reasons for the SGB not to stay its own hand. For example,
in some cases the initiative of SGBs can be important spurs to action by criminal
authorities, and the investigation reports and reasoned decisions in sports corruption
cases adjudicated by sports ethics bodies can lay the foundations for criminal
authorities to open investigations/bring prosecutions. Alternatively, the police may
take a long time to investigate the matter and the CPS may take a long time to decide
whether to charge, and all the while the SGB may be perceived to be doing nothing
to protect the sport.6 The participants in question could be provisionally suspended in
the meantime,7 but out of fairness to them, and in light of its duty to maintain public
confidence in its commitment to take robust action to defend its sport from corruption,8
the SGB needs to consider whether it is possible to press ahead rather than to stay
its proceedings pending completion of the criminal investigation/proceedings.9 The
longer that a provisional suspension is continued, the more susceptible it is likely to
be to legal challenge, and in circumstances where no criminal prosecution may ensue
at the end of a criminal investigation (on account, inter alia, of the requirement for a
reasonable prospect of a conviction to the criminal standard of proof10), a SGB needs
to consider and keep under review the appropriateness of suspending a participant
and awaiting the outcome of any criminal process then afoot. There is no legal rule
that sports disciplinary investigations/proceedings must be stayed while a criminal
investigation is ongoing, or even if criminal charges are brought. To the contrary,
English law recognises the strong public interest in disciplinary proceedings going
ahead without delay, in order to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
sport and in the commitment of the regulators to take robust action to protect that
integrity. Further, sports disciplinary bodies are likely to be able to impose sports-
specific sanctions if a disciplinary charge is upheld that are not available through
any criminal process. Therefore, disciplinary proceedings should only be stayed if
the defendant is able to show convincingly that there is a serious risk of serious
prejudice to them in their defence of the criminal proceedings.11 As a result, the

SGB’s anti-corruption code needs to give it the power (but not the duty) to stay
disciplinary proceedings pending completion of criminal investigations/proceedings
where appropriate, so that it can take decisions on a case-by-case basis.12
2 See para B4.50.
3 See para B4.53. They may argue, by analogy with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v Barnes
[2004] EWCA Crim 3246 (see para G2.46), that the sport’s disciplinary rules create adequate
sanctions for the player’s misconduct, and therefore it is not in the public interest to devote public
funds to pursuing a criminal prosecution as well.
4 As in the case of the criminal proceedings in Germany relating to match-fixing in football: para B4.11,
n 3.
5 The courts have consistently been robust on this point, insisting that the judge presiding over the
criminal trial can protect against such prejudice by giving clear directions to the jury to decide the
criminal case on the evidence alone. See eg A v Tayside Fire Board [2000] SC 232 (Outer House)
(Lord Bonomy) (‘there is no reason to think that in this case, as distinct from other criminal cases, the
jury could not be relied upon to reach a verdict on the evidence presented to them in the light of the
directions given to them by the trial judge. There is in my opinion no basis for fearing that the jury in
the criminal proceedings would act contrary to their directions. In any event, any trial will take place
long after the conclusion of the proposed hearing’).
6 For example, after bookmakers reported suspicious betting on a snooker match between Stephen
Maguire and Jamie Burnett on 14 December 2008, Strathclyde Police immediately launched a
criminal investigation, but did not hand over a file to the Procurator Fiscal until April 2010, and the
Procurator Fiscal then took until May 2011 to decide that there was insufficient evidence to charge the
players: see ‘Maguire and Burnett not charged over snooker bet probe’, 18 May 2011 (bbc.co.uk). See
also ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security [Chris Eaton] calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’,
22 August 2011 (insideworldfootball.biz) (‘Europe’s largest ever match-fixing trial, in Bochum,
Germany, started in 2009 and found that over 100 games had been manipulated but it took over two
years to conclude. “Who knows during that period how many matches were fixed by the same people
who were eventually convicted?” asked Eaton. “We can’t wait for police in some countries to run their
own long-term investigations. We want to take action against these ruthless criminals immediately”’).
7 See para B4.39.
8 See para B4.41, n 10.
9 See Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing Authority and Integrity in
Horseracing – An Independent Review’, 13 May 2008, para 8.18 (‘it is the widespread view of all
of those the Review Team interviewed, not just that the criminal justice system is an inefficient and
inadequate means by which to seek to regulate horseracing, but that the regulation of malpractice in
horseracing can be better performed by the BHA than by external criminal prosecution agencies. This
view is shared by the Review Team. The Review Team considers that the BHA should investigate and
prosecute alleged breaches of the Rules and Orders of Racing notwithstanding that this conduct may
amount to a criminal offence, subject to the exceptions set out below. The only circumstances in which
disciplinary matters which are under investigation by the BHA should be remitted to the police or the
Gambling Commission for consideration for criminal investigation are where the disciplinary powers
of the BHA are so inadequate in an individual case that the evidence necessary to prove the charge
cannot be obtained, or the penalty would be ineffective; where the conduct disclosed to the BHA
concerns substantial non-racing or non-betting matters of a serious nature (eg threats of violence,
intimidation or blackmail); where the disciplinary panel, appeal board or the Board of the BHA
recommends such a step at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings’) and para 8.28 (‘The BHA has
an overriding need to move more swiftly to protect the integrity of horseracing. While it fails to act or
does not act, the integrity of horseracing may be subject to continuing damage. The BHA cannot allow
its obligation to maintain the integrity of the sport to be compromised by the timetabling demands of a
criminal investigation, as the objectives of the BHA as the regulator of horseracing, and the objectives
of criminal authorities are very different. Therefore, in all but the most exceptional cases, breaches
of the Rules of Racing should be investigated and prosecuted by the BHA [notwithstanding parallel
criminal investigation and prosecution]’).
10 See the Code for Crown Prosecutors, 26 October 2018 (cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-
prosecutors [accessed 30 October 2020]).
11 See Neville Report, op cit, para 1.36 (‘There is no legal principle that prevents the BHA from
investigating, or commencing or continuing disciplinary proceedings against a person subject to the
Orders and Rules of Racing, notwithstanding that there is a risk that criminal or civil proceedings
may be brought, or indeed in circumstances where they have already been commenced. In most cases
there will be no impediment to the continuation of the BHA investigation and disciplinary process, but
there are certain considerations in deciding whether to continue with disciplinary proceedings […]’);
ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code
of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 27(1) (‘There is no
automatic right to have disciplinary proceedings postponed until criminal charges arising out of the
same factual matrix have been finally determined’), citing Jefferson v Bhetcha [1979] 2 All ER 1108,
R v British Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241 (QBD) (Woolf J), Archer
v South West Thames Area Health Authority, unreported, 5 August 1985 (QBD) (Steyn J), and A v
Tayside Fire Board [2000] SC 232 (Outer House). See also Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling
Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.25 (recognising
that SGBs’ disciplinary investigations and proceedings relating to match-fixing and related corruption
may proceed in parallel to criminal investigations and proceedings).
Indeed, the strong public interest in effective enforcement of professional rules of conduct means
that a stay of disciplinary proceedings should be refused unless the party seeking the stay can show
that there is a real risk of serious prejudice leading to injustice in one or both proceedings if a stay is
not granted. ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of
ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 27(2), citing
R v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, ex parte Gallagher, CA 30 September 1991, reported Law Society
Gazette 15 April 1992; R v Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, ex parte Brindle
[1994] BCC 297, 316G-H; R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Fayed [1992] BCC 524,
531. See also R v Chance, ex parte Smith, 1995 BCC 1095, 1100G; R v Executive Council for the
Joint Disciplinary Scheme, ex parte Hipps, unreported, QBD, 12 June 1996 (Dyson J). If a real risk
of serious prejudice is shown (eg from interference with prosecution witnesses after their ‘dry run’ in
the disciplinary proceedings, or because publicity about the disciplinary proceedings might affect the
jury in the criminal proceedings), there is authority that ‘a domestic tribunal ought, save exceptionally,
to adjourn its proceedings’, but the strong public interest in not impeding the disciplinary process
‘requires the most penetrating analysis of whether the real risk has been established’. ICC v Butt
et al, decision dated 23 December 2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct
Commission, on application to stay disciplinary proceedings, para 21(10). See also R v British
Broadcasting Corporation, ex parte Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241 (QBD) (Woolf J) (‘while the court
must have jurisdiction to intervene to prevent a serious injustice occurring, it will only do so in very
clear cases in which the applicant can show that there is a real danger and not merely a notional danger
that there would be a miscarriage of justice in the criminal proceedings if the court did not intervene’).
Where the CPS has not yet decided whether to bring criminal charges, the potential criminal charges
are different from the disciplinary charges (albeit that they arise out of the same facts), the standard
of proof in the disciplinary proceedings is lower than the criminal standard (see para B4.37), any
criminal trial will not take place for several months at least, after the disciplinary proceedings are over,
and the judge presiding over the criminal trial can protect against unfairness by directing the jury to
ignore anything other than the evidence before them, ‘the threshold of serious risk of serious prejudice
to a criminal trial (if any) is certainly not reached’. ICC v Butt et al, decision dated 23 December
2010 of Michael Beloff QC, Chairman of ICC Code of Conduct Commission, on application to stay
disciplinary proceedings, para 32, para 33.
In Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 44, the player argued that the publication of the first instance
tribunal’s decision upholding the disciplinary charges against him violated his right to a fair trial on the
criminal charges he subsequently faced, and so rendered those disciplinary proceedings (as opposed
to the subsequent criminal proceedings) unlawful. The CAS panel quickly rejected that argument:
‘Even if [Mr Asif’s rights had been infringed], it would mean that the ICC and/or the Tribunal would
be in contempt of court and/or that there would be prejudice to the criminal proceedings. These factors
would not necessarily have any impact on the substance of the findings, which were considered and
decided upon before publication of the Determination (publication ex post cannot impugn analysis
conducted ex ante and any prejudice to the subsequent criminal proceedings does not impugn the
analysis contained in the Determination). In addition, the Panel notes that Mr Asif was himself eager
for the Tribunal proceedings to advance and that when afforded the opportunity, he did not object to
the Tribunal proceedings advanced ahead of the criminal proceedings. He cannot therefore now claim
that such advancement was to his detriment’.
Why would a participant want to press ahead with the disciplinary proceedings if he also faced
criminal charges based on the same conduct? He might hope that he can quickly clear his name in the
disciplinary proceedings, thereby undermining the criminal case against him. But if he is unsuccessful
in the disciplinary proceedings, and is banned from the sport for a long time, if he is also convicted of a
criminal offence he can plead the disciplinary ban in mitigation of criminal sanction. Indeed, according
to the judge who sentenced the Pakistani spot-fixers (R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, sentencing
remarks of Mr Justice Cooke, 3 November 2011), the disciplinary bans imposed on those players
by the Anti-Corruption Tribunal meant that Salman Butt received a criminal sentence of 30 months
rather than 48 months (ibid, para 28: ‘I take fully into account the ICC ban and the effect it has on you,
which in itself is a considerable punishment for a man in your position. This enables me to take a more
lenient course, than I otherwise might. But for that ban, the sentence would have been of the same
order as that which I would have imposed on Majeed if he had not pleaded guilty’), and also triggered
lenient treatment for Mohammad Asif (ibid, para 33: ‘I take account of all that is said on your behalf
and in particular I bear in mind the 7 year ICC ban imposed last year, of which 2 years are suspended,
and its effect on your career as a fast bowler now aged 28, which means that your cricketing career is
effectively over. This in itself is a considerable punishment for a man in your position. This enables me
to take a more lenient course, than I otherwise might. That is the punishment imposed by the cricket
authorities but these crimes of which you have been convicted require that a sentence be imposed
which marks them for what they are and acts as a deterrent for any future cricketers who may be
tempted’) and Mohammad Amir (ibid, para 43: ‘I take account also of the 5 year ICC ban imposed last
year, and its effect on your career as a fast bowler now aged 19, which will create problems for you in
returning to play when the ban expires. That is the punishment imposed by the cricket authorities but
these crimes of which you have been convicted require that a sentence be imposed which marks them
for what they are and acts as a deterrent for any future cricketers who may be tempted, notwithstanding
the mitigation which I have heard’).
12 See eg Art 10.2 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code (‘[…] the ICC has the right (but no obligation)
to suspend investigations under this Anti-Corruption Code to avoid prejudice to, and/or to give
precedence to, investigations conducted by other relevant authorities into the same or related matters’);
IBU Integrity Code, Chapter E, Art 3.5 (‘Where it deems it appropriate, the BIU may coordinate
and/or stay its own investigation pending the outcome of investigations and/or prosecutions by other
competent bodies, including law enforcement and/or other regulatory or disciplinary bodies’).
5 SANCTIONS IN CORRUPTION CASES
B4.41 The SGB also needs to consider what sanctions should apply in the case of
proven breaches of the anti-corruption code. Few anti-corruption codes provide for
disqualification of results of matches affected by corruption,1 but all of them provide
for the offending party to be banned for a period from participating in the sport.
How long should the ban be? Simply leaving the question to the discretion of the
hearing panel is not helpful to that panel, which will expect at least some guidance
as to the relative seriousness with which the regulator views the different offences in
the code (or else it is likely to seek to establish comparators within or without the
sport by reference to past cases).2 The regulator should therefore consider specifying
either fixed bans for the different offences, reflecting what it believes to be necessary
to protect the sport,3 or else a range of permissible bans, with a non-exhaustive list
of aggravating and mitigating factors to guide the hearing panel as to where to fix
the ban within that range in a particular case.4 As is the case with all sanctions for
professional misconduct, the sanctions imposed for breach of the anti-corruption
rules must be proportionate to the offence,5 and the rules should generally not paint
the tribunal into a corner by denying it any discretion to address the circumstances
appropriately.6 However, in considering what is proportionate, the sports body
(and the hearing panel exercising any discretion given to it by that sports body) is
entitled to weigh against the impact of a ban on the athlete not only the importance
of the objectives underlying the rules (English courts and tribunals have repeatedly
recognised that the profound threat that corruption presents to sport justifies a
rigorous regulatory response7), the seriousness of the particular breach of those rules
by the participant,8 the need to deter others from similar wrongdoing,9 the need to
protect the image of the sport, and above all the need to maintain public confidence
in the determination of the sport to stamp out corruption.10 It is also well-established
that considerable deference is to be given to the experience and expertise of the SGB
in weighing up those competing considerations and determining what is required to
protect its sport, so much so that that judgment will not be disturbed unless it is so
unreasonable that no rational person could agree with it.11
1 Disqualification of results is standard in doping cases (see para C23.1 et seq.), but there of course
the corruption is designed to enhance performance, not to impede it. It is far less obvious that results
tainted by match-fixing or spot-fixing or similar misconduct should be disqualified. For example,
Art 6.3.1 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code specifies that ‘the Anti-Corruption Tribunal will have no
jurisdiction to adjust, reverse or amend the results of an International Match or ICC Event’. In contrast,
however, Art 6.10.2 of World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting) specifies that in all cases, in
addition to bans and fines, the Judicial Officer should consider ‘appropriate further options including
without limitation the cancellation of sports results/events, demotion, points reduction, return of
rewards, replay of fixtures (for example in cases of Match Official corruption) where risk of fraud
has been established or identified, withdrawal of accreditation, exclusion from Match venues and/or
official Player environs, as appropriate’.
2 Hearing panels are unlikely to be impressed, for example, with World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption
and Betting), which for every single offence specifies a range of sanctions from a reprimand and/
or warning all the way up to a life ban (Art 6.10.2) (although it does then provide a list of potential
aggravating and mitigating factors to give the Judicial Officer at least a little bit of guidance: Arts
6.10.3 and 6.10.4).
3 As an example, the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code fixes four years as the standard ban for most
first offences, absent any mitigating or aggravating factors. (See Chapter C16 (Basic period of
ineligibility)).
Another option would be to fix a minimum sanction for an offence, and leave it to the hearing panel
to decide whether (and, if so, how far) to go above the minimum. For example, Art 6 of the ICC Anti-
Corruption Code sets out a range of possible sanctions for each offence, between a fixed minimum and
maximum, including a range of five years to life for the most serious offences, involving corruption
or intended or attempted corruption of events on the field of play. In ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir,
Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, paras 205–210 and para 237, the hearing
panel rejected the players’ arguments that it should go lower than from the five-year minimum in the
circumstances of that case, even against Mr Amir, the very inexperienced 19-year-old bowler, whom
it found to be least culpable of the three: ‘Although the minimum sanction is severe, it is not so severe
as in his case to take it into the realms of gross disproportion or oppression such as might enable us
to disapply the Code. We have to balance private and public interest’. However, the hearing panel did
add the following ‘recommendation’ at the end of its determination (at paras 241–42): ‘We appreciate
that in devising the Code the ICC must have evaluated the need for the sanctions prescribed in the
context of the international game, and in an endeavour to restore to the hallowed phrase “It just isn’t
cricket” its previous role as a hallmark of honesty. Nonetheless, informed as we are by our diverse
judicial experience, we would suggest that part of the Code relating to sanctions might usefully have
injected into it a measure of flexibility. Continuity and consistency are important legal values, but
minimum sanctions always pose problems for judges who wish to tailor penalties to a range of diverse
facts, not all of which can have been envisaged by the legislative body: hypothetical examples where
a minimum 5 year ban would be palpably unfair can be easily suggested. An ability to suspend or part
suspend a ban would allow greater play to a Tribunal’s sense of what is fair and reasonable in special
circumstances. Alternatively, the ICC itself might be accorded the power to refer a case to the Tribunal
to consider the lifting of a ban, if, since its imposition, circumstances had changed in a material way’.
A similar concern had been expressed in WICB v Samuels, Disciplinary Committee decision dated
16 May 2008, paras 50–53, in relation to a fixed penalty of two years for the offence of receiving a
benefit in circumstances that might bring the game into disrepute: ‘50. The Committee as a whole
was extremely disappointed to note that the prescribed penalty to be imposed for commission of
the offence the majority found proved is a minimum ban for a period of two years. The apparent
mandatory nature of this minimum penalty does not at all sit well with the Committee. While we
appreciate the need to be firm in wiping out every vestige of corruption in international cricket, we have
serious reservations about the propriety of a Code that prescribes mandatory minimum punishments
generally and particularly for the offence the majority found proved. 51. From the standpoint of both
the offence concerned and the person who might commit the same, an enormous range in character
and culpability is possible. The circumstances in which this particular offence may be committed
and the personal background and motive of the offender may vary radically from one accused person
to another. As indicated before, the offence does not only target the corrupt and the dishonest. It is
therefore wholly unreasonable and unfair to visit upon all who are caught within its reach a uniform
and very severe penalty of a mandatory two year ban. […] We consider a minimum two year ban to
be entirely disproportionate in the circumstances. […] 53. If the prescribed penalty remains unaltered,
it is quite likely that tribunals in the future may, in certain cases, refuse to find proven cases laid
under this part of the Code only because of the unjust nature of the mandatory sentence that must be
imposed. In other words, the cricketer concerned and/or cricket itself may well have been brought
into disrepute but the offender would be entirely exonerated by tribunals sympathetic to the plight of
the player. We do not think that such a scenario conduces to the aims of the Anti-Corruption Unit’.
The ICC Code of Conduct Commission agreed, on the basis that ‘the consequences of a 2 year ban
on someone found to be guilty of lack of prudence rather than lack of probity may appear to infringe
the principle of proportionality’. Marlon Samuels, Report of the Official Enquiry of the ICC Code of
Conduct Commission, 1 July 2008, para 9.5.
In his 2011 review of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code, Bertrand de Speville also took the view that
breaches of the anti-corruption regulations may not merit the minimum period of ineligibility specified,
and that minimum sanctions might therefore cause tribunals to dismiss the charge rather than impose
what they perceived to be an unjust punishment. He therefore recommended that the ICC should
adhere to the ‘normal principle in the administration of justice of leaving it to the tribunal to impose
the appropriate sentence, subject to a maximum’. De Speville, ‘A Review of the Anti-Corruption
Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’, August 2011 (reissued with minor amendments
January 2012). And in its 2012 report, the MCC World Cricket Committee also recommended that
there should be no minimum sanctions for specific offences, and that the hearing panel body should
instead have the flexibility to determine different sanctions to fit different crimes. However, it did
recommend that ‘sentences should tend toward the severe, and captains, vice captains and coaches
should be dealt with most harshly, given their positions of power and influence’, receiving life bans.
Marylebone Cricket Club, ‘Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s Anti-Corruption
and Security Unit’, 20 February 2012.
On appeal in Salman Butt’s case, however, the CAS panel rejected Mr Butt’s submission that it
should impose a sanction that was lower than the 5-year minimum mandated under the ICC Anti-
Corruption Code. Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 42. It reasoned that ‘as a general rule,
significant deference should be afforded to a sporting body’s expertise and authority to determine
the minimum level of sanction required to achieve its strategic imperatives’ (ibid, at para 55, see also
para 73), and asserted that ‘the Panel will only deviate from that minimum level of sanction where
the case gives rise to exceptional circumstances (including where the sanction is disproportionate)’.
Ibid, para 73; see also paras 56, 63. And it said: ‘[T]he Panel does not consider unreasonable or
perverse a minimum sanction of 5 years ineligibility for engaging in corruption in breach of
Article 2.1.1 of the ICC Code. Such a sanction is significantly shorter than equivalent sanctions
in other sports. […] Accordingly, in the Panel’s view, the sanction imposed on Mr Butt is rational
where, as here, the conduct had the potential to, and did, impair significantly the credibility
of the game’. Ibid. para 69. It was not persuaded that ‘the sanction imposed by the Tribunal was
disproportionate. It is also not persuaded that any of the mitigating factors advanced by Mr Butt
qualify as exceptional circumstances, which would enable the Panel to modify the minimum sanction
[…] ’. Ibid, para 76.
4 For example, the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption Programme provides that the sanction for most
player offences will be up to three years, but gives the hearing panel to go up as far as a life-ban
for the most serious offences (those aimed at corrupting performances on the field of play, those
involving provision of inside information, and those involving failures to report). See UTACP Art
H.1.a. It also provides for a fine of ‘up to $250,000 plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings
or other amounts received […] in connection with any Corruption Offense’. Ibid. The sanction for
most offences involving non-players is loss of accreditation for at least one year. Ibid, para H.1.b.
The BHA’s Guide to Procedures and Penalties specifies a range of sanctions for each offence, with
an entry point. This approach, also taken in rugby union when sanctioning on-field misconduct, has
some similarities with sentencing guidelines in the criminal courts.
The model rules produced by the Sports Betting Integrity Panel, ASOIF, and SportAccord all
carefully avoid specifying what the sanctions should be for breach of those rules. For example, the
SportAccord rules simply state that the sanctions should be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.
SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011), p 3.
The IAAF announced in July 2012 that it was adopting the ASOIF Model Rules for athletics and
would include provision for a ban of two to four years for breach of those rules: ‘IAAF Unveils
Sanctions for Illegal Betting at London Olympics’, 5 July 2012, aroundtherings.com/articles/view.
aspx?id=39941. Any breaches of Rule 3 of the World Athletics Manipulation of Sports Competition
Rules (as developed from the 2018 Model Rules), covering illegal betting, are dealt with under the
disciplinary proceedings set out in the World Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules. The Disciplinary
Tribunal therefore has discretion to impose a sanction up to and including a life ban (Rule 11 World
Athletics Disciplinary Tribunal Rules). See para B4.21, n 2 regarding those Model Rules, intended to
be incorporated by international federations and their members above and beyond the ASOIF Model
Rules). Further, more detailed, guidelines as to sanction are set out in the Guidelines for the Sanctioning
of Competition Manipulation by Sports Organisations, an internal reference document published by
the Olympic Movement Unit on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions in October 2018.
Section 7 of the Guidelines sets out the relevant sanctioning period for the offences of betting (0-3
years), manipulation and corrupt conduct (24 years), inside information (0–3 years), and failure to
report a corrupt approach (0–2 years).
5 See generally para B1.31 et seq. In relation to doping sanctions, see paras C20.14–C20.19.
6 See eg Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB), paras 27, 108, aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ
1056, discussed at paras E7.15–E7.21. CAS jurisprudence is to the same effect. See eg Al Eid v FEI,
CAS 2012/A/2807, para 10.24 (‘in exercising its discretion under Article 10.2, the key consideration
should be the legal principle of proportionality, ie the sanction has to be commensurate with the
seriousness of the offence, taking into account the underlying objectives of the ECM Rules and the
mischief they are aimed at preventing. Or, in more formal terms, (i) the objectives being pursued must
be sufficiently important to justify taking away an offender’s right to pursue his or her profession, (ii)
the sanction imposed must be rationally connected to the pursuit of those objectives, and (iii) it must go
no further than is necessary to meet those objectives’) and para 10.25 (‘There is therefore a balancing
exercise to be done. The Panel must assess (1) the culpability of the offender; and (2) the harm caused
or risked by his offence, measured in each case by reference to the objectives of the rules in question
and in particular the mischief that they are aimed at preventing. Against that, the Panel should weigh
the impact of the sanction on the offender, and any mitigating factors’). See also WPBSA v Lee,
Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 September 2013, paras 4 and 7 (‘the sanction imposed must be
proportionate to the circumstances of the particular case and the particular defendant’), aff’d, Appeals
Committee decision dated 15 May 2014.
7 For example, in Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB), para 109, aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ
1056, in rejecting the jockey’s challenge to the proportionality of a five-year ban imposed on him
for selling inside information and other breaches, Mr Justice Richards acknowledged the importance
of strong rules with strict sanctions to counter corruption in horseracing (‘As to the objectives of
the disciplinary procedures and the importance of those objectives, the Board was clearly entitled to
view the relevant Rules [of Racing] as being essential to the maintenance of the integrity of racing
and to attach corresponding importance to the enforcement of those Rules’). Similarly, in Fallon v
Horseracing Regulatory Authority [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB), para 58, the High Court upheld the
HRA Appeal Board’s decision to suspend the jockey pending determination of charges against him
(see para B4.39) because of ‘the damage that can be done if persons the subject of a serious criminal
charge are permitted to ride pending trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing
would be severely damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such;
and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept that a jockey charged
with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is permitted to continue to participate’. See
likewise the sentencing remarks of Judge Anthony Morris QC in R v Westfield, 17 February 2012,
p 3 (‘If because of corrupt payments it cannot be guaranteed that every player will play to the best
of his ability, the reality is that the enjoyment of many millions of people around the world who
watch cricket, whether on television or at cricket grounds, will eventually be destroyed. […] In my
judgment it is necessary to impose an immediate custodial sentence in this case not only to mark
the seriousness of the offence but also to deter others in your position from accepting such corrupt
payments’); and of the Court of Appeal in R v Amir & Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914, para 32 (‘If
for money or any other extraneous reward it cannot be guaranteed that every Test player will play on
the day as best he may, the reality is that the enjoyment of many millions of people around the world
who watch cricket, whether on the television or at Test Matches, will eventually be destroyed’) and
para 35 (‘cricket will be poorer for the loss [of Mohammad Amir during his ban]. But in the long term
the game would be utterly impoverished if the court failed to make it clear that conduct like this is
not simply a matter of breaking the rules of the game and therefore subject to internal regulation and
discipline by the ICC, but that it is also criminal conduct of a very serious kind which must be marked
with a criminal sanction’); and in Majeed v R; Westfield v R, [2012] EWCA Crim 1186, para 1 (‘The
prizes for successful gambling [on cricket] can be very great, and the scope for corruption is therefore
considerable. For the health, indeed the survival of the game as a truly competitive sport, it must be
eradicated’).
Sports tribunals have been similarly robust. For example, the hearing panel in ECB v Kaneria
& Westfield stated: ‘Self evidently, corruption, specifically spot fixing, in cricket or any other sport
for that matter, is a cancer that eats at the health and very existence of the game. For the general
public, supporting the game and their team within it, there is no merit or motivation to expend time,
money or effort to watch a match whose integrity may be in doubt. The consequences of the public’s
disengagement from cricket would be catastrophic. Furthermore, the game of cricket simply cannot
afford to have its reputation tarnished in the eyes of commercial partners. These partners could not
and would not link their brand to a sport whose integrity had been so undermined. For players who
have devoted their entire careers to the pursuit of hard fought and properly competitive sport, to have
those genuine achievements called into question by the corrupt actions of a tiny minority, may tend
to devalue their worth. Accordingly, we have no doubt that this is a cancer which must be rooted
out of the game of cricket’. ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June
2012, para 14, appeal against liability denied, 26 April 2013, appeal against sanction denied, 9 July
2013. And the CAS itself has said the same thing on several occasions. For example, the CAS panel
in AEK Athens & SK Slavia Prague v UEFA, CAS 98/200, paras 25, 125, noted: ‘[25] […] integrity,
in football, is crucially related to the authenticity of results, and has a critical core which is that, in
the public’s perception, both single matches and entire championships must be a true test of the best
athletic, technical, coaching and management skills of the opposing sides. Due to the high social
significance of football in Europe, it is not enough that competing athletes, coaches or managers are in
fact honest; the public must perceive that they try their best to win and, in particular, that clubs make
management or coaching decisions based on the single objective of their club winning against any
other club. This particular requirement is inherent in the nature of sports […]. [125] The Panel is of
the opinion that among the “myriad of rules” needed to organize a football competition, rules bound to
protect the authenticity of results appear to be of the utmost importance’. The CAS panel in Montcourt
v ATP, CAS 2008/A/1630, paras 48-49, held: ‘Competitive sports depend on the public perception
that events are not fixed. The sports authorities determined several decades ago that wagering by
professional athletes on events in their own sport, even by athletes not involved in the relevant event,
is likely to erode the legitimacy of the sport and give opportunities for unscrupulous exploitation of
athletes who embark on the slippery slope of betting. This is especially true of sports like tennis, where
it is sufficient to corrupt a single player to fix the outcome. [49] The sport of professional tennis has
therefore established a prohibition on wagering by its practitioners. This is a condition of participating
in the sport. The Appellant has not come close to convincing the Panel that this policy and legislation
is illegitimate […]’. The CAS panel in Fusimalohi v FIFA, CAS 2011/A/2425, para 165, held: ‘Match-
fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the like are a growing concern in many
major sports. The conduct of economic and business affairs related to sporting events requires the
observance of certain “rules of the game” for the related activities to proceed in an orderly fashion.
The very essence of sport is that competition must be fair. This is also true for the organization of an
event of the importance and magnitude of the FIFA World Cup, where dishonesty has no place. In the
Panel’s view, it is therefore essential for sporting regulators not to tolerate any kinds of corruption
and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be
tempted to consider adopting improper conducts for their personal gain’. The CAS panel in PTIOs v
Liindahl, CAS 207/A/4956, para 67, was equally clear that ‘Match-fixing is one of the most serious
types of corruption offences in sport and tennis regulators are right in demonstrating zero tolerance
to match-fixing and imposing severe sanctions which both punish a corrupt player and also serve as
an effective deterrent for other players’. See also ibid, para 77: ‘The Panel views match-fixing as a
severe corruption offense which must be severely punished in order to both represent the disgust of
the sporting community from such behaviour and deter sports people from engaging or assisting in
such acts. These offenses endanger the whole premise upon which sports are built and may risk the
existence of sports in future. The Panel believes that an offense of match-fixing on its own is grave
enough and that one should not “count” offenses or look only into whether it was an “active” or a
“passive” act in order to decide on the exact sanction in a given case’). On that basis, CAS panels
have consistently upheld very substantial bans imposed on those found to have acted corruptly: see
para B4.43.
8 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216, para 113 (‘Having directed itself correctly and given proper
consideration to all relevant matters, the Board then carried out, as it was required to do, a careful
balancing exercise, looking on the one hand at the important purpose served by the Rules and the
seriousness of the breaches of those Rules, and, on the other hand, at the mitigation and at the impact
of disqualification upon the claimant and his family’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056.
9 Ibid, para 109 (‘[The Board] was entitled to look to a penalty that reflected, as it said, the elements
of punishment, deterrence and prevention. In relation to deterrence it bore properly in mind that the
level of increase so as to deter others from like conduct must not be out of proportion to the size of
penalty which would otherwise fall to be imposed, and it made the reasonable observation that the
extent to which the passing of information had been revealed in the particular inquiry demonstrated
the need for an element of deterrence’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. See also Oriekhov v UEFA,
CAS 2010/A/2172, para 78 (‘match-fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the
like are a growing concern, indeed a cancer, in many major sports, football included, and must be
eradicated. The very essence of sport is that competition is fair, its attraction to spectators is the
unpredictability of its outcome […] . It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting regulators
to demonstrate zero tolerance against all kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to
serve as an effective deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted through greed or fear to
consider involvement in such criminal activities. Match officials are an obvious target for those
·who wish to make illicit profit through gambling on match results (or indeed on the occurrence of
incidents within matches). They must be reinforced in their resistance to such criminal approaches.
CAS must, applying naturally to considerations of legality and of proportionality, respect in its awards
the approaches of such regulators devoted to such virtuous ends’), endorsed in Zulkiffli v BWF, and
Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 120, and see para 130 (‘It is important that the period
of a banning order imposed should act as an effective deterrent to those who might be tempted in the
future to act in a similar way. […] It is also necessary to take into account the future consequences
that a reduction in the ban would likely have for the sport of badminton’); ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir,
Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 217 (‘We must take account of the
greater interests of cricket which the Code itself is designed to preserve and protect. There must, we
consider, be a deterrent aspect to our sanction. … Such sanctions as we impose must accordingly
ensure that players are fully aware that dire consequences await them should it ever be shown that they
have been parties to spot fixing or other corrupt practices’); and, on appeal from that decision, Asif
v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 72 (rejecting plea against seven-year sanction on ground that ‘given
the history of corruption in cricket and the considerable adverse publicity caused by this episode, the
Panel considers that strong enforcement action is necessary to send a signal of deterrence’); Sines et
al v BHA, BHA Appeal Board decision dated 10 April 2012, appeals against penalties, para 8 (‘The
penalties on Mr Nick Gold and Mr Peter Gold [exclusion orders of 7 and 5 years respectively] may
to some seem harsh. But this conspiracy and particularly the conduct of Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore
struck at the heart of the integrity of Racing. It must be made clear to all those who contemplate taking
part in this sort of conspiracy, in whatever capacity, that they must expect that the penalties for doing
so will be severe’). Cf WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 September 2013, para 7 (‘It
is therefore essential that [the] sanction is indeed sufficient to deter others from match-fixing and spot-
fixing. It need not follow however that only a life-time ban will operate as such a sufficient deterrent.
And in any event, the sanction imposed must be proportionate to the circumstances of the particular
case and particular defendant. It is trite that a more effective deterrent is not justified if the punishment
does not fit the crime’), aff’d, Appeals Committee decision dated 15 May 2014.
In The Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 185,
the Appeal Board (following the judgment of Richards J in Bradley) rejected the player’s submission
that it was disproportionate to increase a sanction purely to deter persons other than the player (‘We
consider that the Commission was entitled to impose sanctions upon the Respondent that reflected
elements of punishment, deterrence and prevention and that it was entitled to increase the level of
sanctions imposed in order to deter (both the Respondent and others) provided that such an increase
was not out of proportion to the size of penalty which would otherwise fall to be imposed’). See
also PTIOs v Kryvonos, AHO decision dated 18 May 2017, para 78 (‘I have found that the Player
deliberately engaged in conduct, through double faulting, which completely demolished the integrity
of the first round qualifying Match in the Tournament. I have found that this deliberate play, which
coincided with betting activity, made a complete mockery of the Match. The function and purpose
of the Match is to determine the best qualified player to proceed to the upcoming Tournament. That
function and purpose was lost by the Player’s actions on court. Therefore, the underlying purpose
and function of the Match was destroyed by the corruption that occurred. Such conduct affects the
integrity of the Tournament but also the integrity of the tennis community at large. lt has a pervasive
effect beyond the individual and his misconduct. The impact on the tennis community justifies a
significant sanction to deter others beyond any aspect of the sanction based upon individual deterrence
and punishment’).
10 Indeed, the Court of Appeal has confirmed (in the context of sanctions imposed on solicitors for
professional misconduct) that this objective takes precedence over other sanctioning factors (such
as the financial impact that a prospective sanction would have on the individual offender, and/or that
there is little risk of re-offending), and can require and justify the imposition of the most serious
sanctions available: ‘To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the
profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied
readmission […] A profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence
which that inspires’. Bolton v Law Society [1994] 2 All ER 486 [CA] at 519E. The Court of Appeal
made the same point again in the specific context of a sport’s anti-corruption rules in Bradley v Jockey
Club [2005] EWCA 1056, para 24: ‘Where an individual takes up a profession or occupation that
depends critically upon the observance of certain rules, and then deliberately breaks those rules, he
cannot be heard to contend that he has a vested right to continue to earn his living in that profession
or occupation. Any disciplinary tribunal, or the court when exercising a supervisory jurisdiction,
must give careful consideration to whether the circumstances require a penalty that will prevent
the culprit from continuing to earn his living in his chosen profession or occupation. But a penalty
which deprives him of that right may well be the only appropriate response to his offending’. Many
hearing panels have emphasised this point. See eg Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton World
Federation Ethics Hearing Panel decision 2018/01, para 255 (‘it is paramount, where an individual has
undertaken corrupt behaviour or behaviour which directly strikes at the heart and essence of sporting
competition, that a significant sanction must be issued: both as a strong deterrent to future offenders,
but also and primarily to demonstrate the seriousness of the violation and the zero-tolerance to be
shown to such behaviour’), aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847; The
Football Association v Sturridge, Appeal Board decision dated 27 February 2020, para 199 (‘On two
separate occasions on 19 January 2019 the Respondent issued unequivocal instructions to Leon to
bet £1,000 on his moving to Sevilla. The fact that no bet was placed and the fact that on 20 January
2019 the Respondent directed Leon not to bet are obvious mitigating features. However, the plain
fact is that it was a matter of chance so far as the Respondent was concerned that Leon did not bet
as he was instructed to do. Such flagrant breaches of the Rules called for sanctions which combined
punishment, deterrence and prevention. They also called for sanctions which made it clear to the
public that the Regulatory Commission was intent upon protecting the integrity of the sport. Further, in
our view, there needed to be some correlation between the sanctions imposed and the guideline for the
offence of providing inside information for the purpose of betting. In our view a suspension of 6 weeks
(with 4 of those weeks not to be served unless the Respondent re-offended) did not achieve those
objectives and that is so even though such a sanction was additional to a financial penalty of £75,000.
We appreciate that the list of genuine mitigating features was long in this case but, despite that, the
length of the suspension should have been measured in months not weeks. Further, in our view, there
was no basis for a direction that part of the suspension should not take effect unless the Respondent re-
offended’); RFU v Hart, RFU Disciplinary Panel decision dated 12 April 2018, para 77 (‘In deciding
what the appropriate sanction should be we have reminded ourselves that breaches of anti-corruption
regulations undermines public confidence in the integrity of the sport and strikes at the foundations
of the values of the game. It is fundamental to the integrity of the game that the public has confidence
that those regulated within the sport are properly adhering to the anti-corruption rules. Any breaches
of such rules must be treated seriously’).
The ‘Bolton rule’ has also been relied on by BHA Licensing Committees to decline applications
from those banned for ‘stopping’ or corrupt conspiracy for reinstatement after the expiry of their bans.
Fergal Lynch, Licensing Committee decision dated 28 February 2011, at para 30 (‘30. In our decision
similar considerations [to those discussed in Bolton in relation to solicitors] apply to jockeys, albeit in
this different context. … Take, for example, the stopping of a horse. The consequences are not limited
to the financial loss of those who gambled on the specific race in the belief that it was a genuine
contest between each horse. The consequences extend to the potential for raising public doubt over the
genuineness of other races. In the absence of appropriate measures not only of punishment but also
of condemnation and protection from the possibility of the act itself, the obvious danger is that public
confidence will be undermined and with it the reputation of British horse racing. There is potentially a
very slippery slope and one which is relevant to the ambit of the test of suitability to be applied under
the Rules. In our decision those factors can lead a Licensing Committee to decide not to grant a licence
irrespective of the efforts made by the jockey concerned to re-establish him/herself and to show he/she
is now a redeemed character. In our judgment the Rule requiring suitability is to be construed in the
manner we have decided to maintain and protect public reputation and confidence. The public must be
able to trust jockeys and the Principle is to be applied to the test of suitability in appropriate cases’).
11 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 216, para 43 (‘The test of proportionality [of the penalty
imposed] requires the striking of a balance between competing considerations. The application of
the test in the context of penalty will not necessarily produce just one right answer: there is no single
“correct” decision. Different decision-makers may come up with different answers, all of them reached
in an entirely proper application of the test. In the context of the European Convention on Human
Rights it is recognised that, in determining whether an interference with fundamental rights is justified
and, in particular, whether it is proportionate, the decision-maker has a discretionary area of judgment
or margin of discretion. The decision is unlawful only if it falls outside the limits of that discretionary
area of judgment. Another way of expressing it is that the decision is unlawful only if it falls outside
the range of reasonable responses to the question of where a fair balance lies between the conflicting
interests. The same essential approach must apply in a non-ECHR context such as the present. It is for
the primary decision-maker to strike the balance in determining whether the penalty is proportionate.
The court’s role, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, is to determine whether the decision
reached falls within the limits of the decision-maker’s discretionary area of judgment. If it does, the
penalty is lawful; if it does not, the penalty is unlawful. It is not the role of the court to stand in the
shoes of the primary decision-maker, strike the balance for itself and determine on that basis what
it considers the right penalty to be’) and at para 46 (‘The importance of the court limiting itself to a
supervisory role of the kind I have described is reinforced in the present case by the fact that the Appeal
Board includes members who are knowledgeable about the racing industry and are better placed than
the court to decide on the importance of the rules in question and the precise weight to be attached
to breaches of those rules’), aff’d [2005] EWCA Civ 1056. See also Brennan v Health Professions
Council [2011] EWHC 41 (Admin), para 59 (deferring to Council to determine appropriate sanction,
because it is ‘better placed to understand what the physiotherapy professional needs in a case of this
sort […] to deter other physiotherapists from similar behaviour and to maintain the confidence of the
public, and of the sporting world in particular, in the integrity of the profession’). The Commercial
Court considering the challenge to the life ban imposed on Danish Kaneria to be within the range of
reasonable responses to his offence: Kaneria v ECB [2014] EWCH 1348.
B4.42 This is clearly illustrated by the CAS panel’s award in Butt v ICC. The
ICC Anti-Corruption Code specified that the sanctions for the spot-fixing the players
were found to have committed1 had to include a ban of at least five years and up to
life. At first instance, the hearing panel banned Butt for ten years, Asif for seven
years, and Amir for five years, on the basis (inter alia) that spot-fixing was not as
serious as match-fixing,2 and that overly harsh sanctions would bring the system into
disrepute. Wishing to give the players an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, the
hearing panel also suspended the last five years of Butt’s ban and the last two years
of Asif’s ban so that, if they met specified conditions, then like Amir they would
also be able to return to the sport after only five years each, ie they would also only
serve the minimum ban required under the Code.3 Many perceived those sanctions
to be lenient, given the damage the players had done to the sport,4 but Butt and Asif
still appealed to CAS on the basis that the bans were disproportionate. The CAS
panel did not hesitate in rejecting those appeals, noting that ‘significant deference
should be shown to the ICC in developing sanctions to meet its strategic priorities.
That deference should only be deviated from on grounds of irrationality where the
decision to sanction or the length of the sanction was self-evidently unreasonable or
perverse’.5 Notably, it said: ‘The Panel does not consider unreasonable or perverse
a minimum sanction of 5 years ineligibility for engaging in corruption in breach of
Article 2.1.1 of the ICC Code. Such a sanction is significantly shorter than equivalent
sanctions in other sports. […] Accordingly, in the Panel’s view, the sanction imposed
on Mr Butt is rational where, as here, the conduct had the potential to, and did,
impair significantly the credibility of the game’.6 It ruled that ‘consistent with the
principles established in Puerta, the Panel will only deviate from that minimum
level of sanction where the case gives rise to exceptional circumstances (including
where the sanction is disproportionate)’.7 And it was not persuaded that ‘the sanction
imposed by the Tribunal was disproportionate. It is also not persuaded that any of the
mitigating factors advanced by Mr Butt qualify as exceptional circumstances, which
would enable the Panel to modify the minimum sanction […]’.8
1 See para B4.22.

2 ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 201.
Cf WPBSA v Lee, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 24 September 2013, para 6 (‘The damage to
the sporting integrity of a contest is clear if the end result is fixed. But there is also damage to the
sporting integrity of a contest if even a part of it is not played honestly without affecting the end
result. Participants, spectators and television audiences are entitled to see the entire contest played out
with both sides trying their best. Furthermore, it may often not be possible to engage in such “spot-
fixing” without at least the potential for the end result to be affected. […] [7] It is therefore essential
that sanction is indeed sufficient to deter others from match-fixing and spot-fixing’), aff’d, Appeals
Committee decision dated 15 May 2014
3 Ibid at para 23.
4 In Kaneria v Westfield, ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 4, Danish Kaneria cited the Butt
decision as part of his challenge to the life ban imposed on him at first instance for inducing Mervyn
Westfield to spot fix (para B4.49(iii)). The ECB Appeal Panel rejected his appeal, noting: ‘The Panel
has taken full account of the cases drawn to its attention and, in particular, the more modest sentences
imposed in the cases of Butt and others. Each case must be considered on its own merits and within
the context of the problems faced in the relevant jurisdictions. It is noted that Mr Butt’s appeal to the
CAS was on technical grounds and CAS was not asked by the ICC to consider whether the sentences
were unduly lenient. The Panel, whilst noting the authorities which suggest that spot-fixing might be
less serious than match-fixing, consider that, in the circumstances of this case, the distinction is not
significant. Spot-fixing, being easier to arrange and harder to detect is an on-going evil as are recent
trends further to extend corruption to less high-profile cricket’. Ibid at p 5.
5 Butt v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2364, para 69.
6 Ibid, para 73.
7 Ibid, para 69. (As to the Puerta principles, see para C20.17).
8 Ibid, para 76.
B4.43 Because of the threat that corruption poses to sport, hearing panels have not
hesitated to impose very lengthy bans for corruption offences.1 And CAS panels have
repeatedly upheld the proportionality of life bans for acts of corruption in appropriate
circumstances. In Pobeda, the president of a football club who was found to have
attempted to fix a UEFA Europa League football match was banned for life from
the sport, even though he personally did not carry out any corrupt acts on the field
of play. On appeal, the CAS panel said that it was ‘aware of the severe consequence
of the sanction imposed on Mr Zabrcanec. It does, however, not find any mitigating
circumstances which could lead to a reduction of the sanction. Match fixing is one
of the worst possible infringements of the integrity of sports. Therefore, the Panel
finds that a life ban from any football related activities against Mr Zabrcanec is
an adequate sanction and not disproportionate’.2 Similarly, in Oriekhov, a football
referee was banned for life for failing to report an offer of a bribe to fix a match, even
though he had no prior disciplinary offences and there was no finding that he had
actually fixed the match or that he had received any money to do so. In rejecting the
referee’s argument that a life ban was disproportionate to his offence, the CAS panel
emphasised again that the supreme importance of preserving public confidence in the
integrity of the sport far outweighs the adverse impact on the livelihood of the banned
offender.3 Meanwhile in Köllerer, where the appellant was banned for life for having
offered three fellow tennis players bribes to lose specific matches, the CAS panel
stated:
‘After careful deliberation, this Panel sees no option other than to confirm the lifetime
ban imposed by the [Anti-Corruption Hearing Officer]. As explained in detail by the
Governing Bodies, the sport of tennis is extremely vulnerable to corruption as a
match-fixer only needs to corrupt one player (rather than a full team). It is therefore
imperative that, once a Player gets caught, the Governing Bodies send out a clear
signal to the entire tennis community that such actions are not tolerated. This Panel
agrees that any sanction shorter than a lifetime ban would not have the deterrent
effect that is required to make players aware that it is simply not worth the risk’.4
And in Savic, the CAS panel endorsed that reasoning and rejected another tennis
player’s appeal against a life ban imposed for offering a fellow player a bribe to lose
the first set of a match, on the basis that:
‘[…] the interest that the sanctioning authority is seeking to enforce is the protection
of the integrity of sport against corruption, a fundamental sporting principle explicitly
mentioned in the UTAP provisions. This is a compelling interest to balance against
the appellant’s rights to work unlike the obviously lesser interest of contractual
stability sought to be relied on by FIFA in Matuzalem to justify a life ban. There are
other means to enforce a debt than a lifetime ban; but such a ban is the only truly
effective means of purging a sport of corruption’.5
Similarly, in Lamptey v FIFA, a CAS panel upheld a lifetime ban imposed by FIFA on
the referee Joseph Lamptey for conspiring unlawfully to influence match results in
his role as referee in the FIFA World Cup qualifier match held between South Africa
and Senegal on 12 November 2016, stating:
‘the very essence of sport is that competition is fair, its attraction to spectators is the
unpredictability of its outcome. It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting
regulators to demonstrate zero tolerance against all kinds of activities intended to
influence the result of a match in a manner contrary to sporting ethics[…]’.6
On the other hand, in Sammut v UEFA, a CAS panel found the life ban imposed by
the UEFA appeals panel disproportionate, and replaced it with a 10-year ban, because
although it had been proven that the player was an accomplice in the agreement to
lose a UEFA European Championship qualifying match 0-4, it had not been proven
whether he actually took active steps to help throw the match: ‘At least in theory, Mr
Sammut could have simply been a messenger between the unknown players who
actually conspired to implement the fix and the persons who were willing to provide
the money for it’.7
1 In Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang (Badminton World Federation, Ethics Hearing Panel, decision
2018/01) at para 254, aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF, CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, the World
Badminton Ethics Panel reviewed the sanctions applied for match manipulation and spot-fixing in
various CAS decisions in various sports from 2009 to 2017, and found that the most common sanction
was a life ban, with other common sanctions being a 10- or 7-year ban.
See eg ECB v Kaneria & Westfield, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 22 June 2012, p 1 (life ban
for Danish Kaneria for inducing Westfield’s fixing, five years for Westfield), Kaneria’s appeal against
sanction denied 9 July 2013; BHA v Sines & Ors, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 28 April 2012,
paras 215–222 (jockeys Paul Doe and Greg Fairley each disqualified for 10 years for twice ‘stopping’
their mount, with a further five-year ban for involvement in a corrupt conspiracy, partly concurrent,
such that the total ban was 12 years for each jockey); BHA v Ahern et al, Disciplinary Panel decision
dated 22 May 2013, paras 2–3 (eight-year ban for a jockey who stopped his horse, on the basis that ‘a
stopping ride, even of a horse unlikely to win, remains the cardinal sin that a jockey can commit. […]
It was also submitted that an 8 year penalty was out of line with what would happen in other sports,
and is too lengthy for a “moment of madness”. The stopping ride was more than a mere momentary
act. It was planned and done for reward, the Panel decided. The Panel was not equipped with the
detail to enable a comparison of the approach to dishonesty in other sports even if such an exercise is
appropriate, so can say little about it. So far as racing is concerned, the Panel can see why the starting
point is at that level. Stopping a horse is just about the worst breach a jockey can commit, and all must
understand that potentially career ending penalties will follow’).
2 FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920, para 115. The
CAS panel also upheld an eight-year ban on the club taking part in UEFA competitions, because ‘[t]
he episode at half time during the second game in Erevan shows that the President was not afraid
to talk to the whole team about the plot and that nobody dared to oppose. Only reactions inside the
clubs can prevent that games are manipulated, and only strong sanctions against the clubs will set
the necessary signal to the officials and the players that the direct or indirect support of match fixing
activities are not tolerated but can lead to severe consequences for the entire club and not only for
the leading actors of the plot. Such sanctions should not only prevent individuals from manipulating
games, but also encourage the other members of the club to take action when they become aware of
such manipulations’. Ibid, para 117.
3 Oriekhov v UEFA, CAS 2010/A/2172 (‘77. The Panel accepts that, until the recent events under
scrutiny in this appeal, the Appellant’s reputation was untarnished, his refereeing skills were well
recognized and that he did not instigate the match manipulation. It also accepts that it should proceed
on the basis that he did not actually manipulate the match or receive moneys to affect its outcome. 78.
However, the Panel has to remind itself that match-fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion,
bribery and the like are a growing concern, indeed a cancer, in many major sports, football included,
and must be eradicated. The very essence of sport is that competition is fair; its attraction to spectators
is the unpredictability of its outcome. 79. There are several pronouncements of CAS panels to that
effect. 80. It is therefore essential in the Panel’s view for sporting regulators to demonstrate zero
tolerance against all kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions sufficient to serve as an effective
deterrent to people who might otherwise be tempted through greed or fear to consider involvement in
such criminal activities. Match officials are an obvious target for those who wish to make illicit profit
through gambling on match results (or indeed on the occurrence of incidents within matches). They
must be reinforced in their resistance to such criminal approaches. CAS must, applying naturally
to considerations of legality and of proportionality, respect in its awards the approaches of such
regulators devoted to such virtuous ends. […] 82. In view of the importance of the UEFA Europa
League, of the level of this competition, and of the sporting and financial interests at stake, the highest
standards of behaviour must be demanded of all the people involved – players, managers, coaches,
officials. It is vital that the integrity of the sport is maintained. Given his experience as a senior referee,
the Appellant should have been particularly sensitive of his obligations and role in preserving and
promoting such integrity. By not disclosing these improper approaches, he lamentably failed not only
to obey the relevant regulations in their letter and spirit, but indeed to display any common sense.
83. The whole match fixing scandal and in particular the allegation related to the manipulation of the
match in Basel caused a great and widely publicized damage to the image of UEFA and of football in
general, inevitably raising doubts about whether match results are properly the product of footballers’
skills, or improperly the product [of] other illegal activities. In that context, the Appellant’s mitigation
is inadequate to displace the conclusions of three footballing bodies as to the appropriate penalty for
his misconduct. 84. Based on all the above, the Panel finds that a life ban from any football related
activities against the Appellant is a proportionate sanction […]’).
4 Köllerer v ATP et al, CAS 2011/A/2490, para 123. However, it did vacate as disproportionate the
additional $100,000 fine imposed at first instance, on the basis that ‘it would be inappropriate to
impose a financial penalty in addition to the lifetime ban, as the sanction of permanent ineligibility
provides for the deterrence that corruption offences call for’. Ibid, para 127.
5 Savic v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621, para 8.34. See also ibid, para 8.33
(citing Oriekhov, noting that ‘Match fixing is the most serious corruption offence in tennis and a threat
to the integrity of professional sport, as well as to the physical and moral integrity of players. It also
constitutes a violation of the principle of fairness in sporting competitions’, and also agreeing with the
CAS panel in Köllerer as to the need for a strong sanction to deter others). Following the CAS panel’s
ruling in Köllerer, however (see n 4), the CAS panel set aside the $100,000 fine that had also been
imposed at first instance, on the basis that the life ban was sufficient to provide the deterrent effect
required in corruption cases. Ibid, at para 8.38.
6 Lamptey v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5173, paras 93–94.
7 Sammut v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3062, para 179. See also The Football Association v Wood, FA Regulatory
Commission decision dated 18 April 2018, paras 32–33 (lifetime ban would be disproportionate for
deliberately getting booked in two matches for betting purposes because the outcome of neither match
was affected, it was only two matches, the sums involved were relatively modest, and the player did
not benefit personally; five-year ban imposed instead).
6 PRACTICAL ISSUES IN ENFORCING ANTI-CORRUPTION RULES

B4.44 However well-conceived and drafted a set of anti-corruption rules may be,
they are of little use if they cannot be policed and enforced effectively.1 And corrupt
activities do not take place, as other sporting misconduct might do, under the full glare
of the floodlights on the field of play. Nor can they be uncovered, as some doping
can, by analysing an athlete’s urine or blood samples in a laboratory. Instead, they
are clandestine criminal (or quasi-criminal) conspiracies, undertaken by participants
who know they face substantial bans if they are caught, and therefore are prepared
to go to great lengths to keep their activities secret. Given that SGBs are not public
bodies, and do not have state powers of coercion, they have to be very resourceful in
gathering anti-corruption intelligence and in conducting investigations that produce
sufficient evidence on which to bring a charge for breach of anti-corruption rules.2
1 See generally the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10. Of course, prevention is better than cure.
A SGB needs to educate its participants, so that they understand the harm done by match-fixing and
related misconduct, including potentially to their future earning power, and they therefore realise the
need not only to avoid such misconduct themselves, but also to report any approaches they receive
to participate in such misconduct, and/or any other evidence they see of such activities. Indeed,
many commentators have suggested that education should be emphasised as much as detection
and punishment. See eg Oxford Research A/S, ‘Examination of threats to the integrity of sports’
(April 2010), p 30. Education was one of the BHA’s first initiatives following the 2002 Panorama
programme (see para B4.8), and the Sports Betting Integrity Panel concluded that it is ‘imperative
that sports provide regular education and communication programmes on sports betting integrity
to all competitors and participants’: Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010),
para 1.6. SportAccord developed a Code of Conduct for players & team officials, based on five guiding
principles: (i) Be Smart (know the rules); (ii) Be Safe (never bet on your sport); (iii) Be Careful (never
share sensitive information); (iv) Be Clean (never fix an event); and (v) Be Open (tell someone if you
are approached). Education of players was also a principal strand of the ten-year programme that
Interpol agreed to deliver, with the support of substantial funding by FIFA, within the framework of
a dedicated FIFA Anti-Corruption Training Wing at the Interpol offices in Singapore: see para B4.11,
n 6.
There are also other forms of prevention, such as paying professional athletes adequately. The
SportAccord Model Rules on Sports Integrity in relation to Sports Betting (September 2011) suggest
that federations establish ‘regulations to ensure national federations and clubs fulfill their financial
obligations towards their athletes and sports officials, ie regular pay and good conditions for their
professional athletes and sports officials (including referees and judges)’. See also ICSS report on
Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13 September 2012, p 4 (‘Where the economics of sport are perceived
as working against the interests of the individual, the temptation to manipulate results through cheating
increases, and individuals are more vulnerable to the corrupting influence of others’); Forrest et al,
‘Risks to the integrity of sport from betting corruption’ (Univ of Salford, February 2008), p 30 (‘High
pay for officials is essential to the minimisation of risk not only because it makes individuals think
more carefully about what they stand to lose if found fixing but also because poor rewards, especially
compared with players, breeds resentment and a willingness to hit back at the system’); Harman,
‘Gamble taken on “integrity unit” to defeat match-fixing’, Times, 9 October 2007 (quoting then-
ATP President Etienne de Villiers as saying: ‘there can be potential vulnerability lower down the scale,
where [tennis] players may be less mature and can make a lot more money in these circumstances than
a struggling tennis professional ever could simply by playing’).
Another preventative option is to disrupt corrupt activity by limiting access for potential corruptors
to dressing rooms, weighing rooms, etc, and/or requiring players to hand in their mobile phones for
the duration of a match. See eg Art 6.3.5(f) of World Rugby Reg 6 (Anti-Corruption and Betting)
(‘World Rugby may issue a direction prohibiting and/or restricting the use of Mobile Communication
Devices on the day of an International Match for certain Connected Persons involved with the
conduct of the International Match […]’). Accreditation systems (including background checks) are
implemented and rigorously enforced at international cricket matches by representatives of the ICC’s
Anti-Corruption Unit, so as to ensure that appropriate restrictions are put in place to control access
to the participants and to monitor the contacts that participants have with third parties away from the
venues. The ACU has also developed a set of Players’ and Match Officials’ Area Minimum Standards,
which are applied at all international cricket matches, restricting access to the dressing areas prior
to, and during a cricket match, and prohibiting the use of mobile telecommunications technology
and access to the internet from within the restricted areas. Members of the ACU monitor compliance
with such regulations by means of a hand-held scanner device that can identify whether any mobile
communications device has accessed the internet within a specific area. These regulations are intended
to remove any temptation that may be presented to the participants to disclose information during the
course of a match that could potentially be of significant value for betting purposes. Tennis has similar
provisions: see ‘Wimbledon given watchlist of tennis corruption suspects’, telegraph.co.uk, 11 June
2011 (‘A blacklist of “undesirables” suspected of betting corruption in tennis has been handed to
Wimbledon authorities ahead of the tournament. Wimbledon is expected to ban anybody named on the
list from restricted areas, including the players’ changing rooms, practice courts and even restaurants’).
2 See generally Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anti-corruption strategy’ (2013) 11(4) World Sports
Law Report 14.
A Intelligence-gathering and investigations
B4.45 The steps that a SGB can take on its own include the following:1
(a) Intelligence-gathering:
(i) It can provide a dedicated whistle-blowing telephone line or email
address for participants in the sport and others to report any information
or suspicions of corrupt behaviour, including on a confidential basis
where necessary.2
(ii) It can make it a requirement under the anti-corruption code for participants
to report corrupt approaches and other evidence they come across of
corrupt conduct,3 with any failure to make such a report punishable by a
stiff sanction.4
(iii) It can include provisions in the code for mitigation or suspension of

part of a ban imposed for breach of the rules if the offender provides
information that assists it in uncovering wrongdoing by others, along the
lines of the ‘substantial assistance’ provision in Art 10.7.1 of the 2021
World Anti-Doping Code.5
(iv) It can even provide for a complete amnesty for participants to report past
misconduct, such as the three-month amnesty announced by the ECB in
January 2012 for players to report corrupt approaches they had received
in the past (but had previously failed to report).6
(v) It can set up an anti-corruption unit, staffed by analysts, betting experts,
intelligence officers and investigators who are trained to investigate leads
and develop intelligence into evidence that can support a charge.7 It can
also equip them with sophisticated databases to store, cross-refer, and
match that intelligence to reveal suspicious patterns and connections.8
(b) Investigations:
(i) It can give itself broad powers in its rules to investigate those who are
subject to its authority, including the power to require participants who
are suspected of being involved in wrongdoing or are believed to have
some relevant information about such wrongdoing to answer questions
and/or produce documents.9
(ii) It can require participants to consent to the production of documents
by third parties, such as the production of telephone records by mobile
phone service providers,10 which can be vital to establish patterns of
incriminating contacts between co-conspirators.11
(iii) More controversially, it can require participants suspected of wrongdoing
to hand over their laptops and phones and other devices for downloading
of information, so that the SGB can see not just when a participant
communicated with another, but also what they emailed or texted or
messaged to each other.12
1 See generally the Tennis Integrity Reports, para B4.10.
2 A hotline was one of horseracing’s early 21st century initiatives and was also recommended (for
example) in the Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), at para 1.9. For the
London 2012 Olympic Games, the IOC established a confidential hotline and (to avoid language
difficulties) an email hotline, which it publicised through the international federations and the
national Olympic committees and through an ‘Integrity Corner’ in the Olympic Village. See Potts,
‘The battle for integrity in sport’, 23 February 2013 (lawinsport.com). A similar service was
established in snooker in November 2010 in response to the Higgins case (para B4.30, n 5): ‘Snooker
introduces anti-corruption hotline’, 15 November 2010 (sportindustry.biz). UEFA also maintains
a confidential reporting platform (integrity.uefa.org/index.php?isMobile=0 [accessed 30 October
2020]).
The potential sources of anti-corruption intelligence include not only participants within the sport
but also many non-participants, such as journalists, spectators, sponsors, relatives, and friends of
participants. For example, part of the evidence used in the Pakistani cricketers’ spot-fixing case was
provided anonymously to the ICC ACU’s confidential email address.
3 See para B4.29. For example, it was a report by a tennis player that David Savic had approached him,
asking him to throw a set in a forthcoming match, that ultimately led to a life ban for Savic. See Savic
v Professional Tennis Integrity Officers, CAS 2011/A/2621, paras 2.6 and 2.7.
4 See para B4.30.
5 See ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13 September 2012, p 8 (‘effective “plea
bargaining” procedures could be established in criminal proceedings as well as in disciplinary
proceedings, to promote self-reporting. Clearly, in the majority of cases a sanction may still be required
and it would therefore not be an “amnesty” but a proportionate penalty reduction in line with the level
of cooperation of the individual. Such an approach may benefit the overall investigation and widen the
parameters of those to be sanctioned’). See eg ICC Anti-Corruption Code Art 6.1.2.7, which makes
it a mitigating factor on sanction for the participant to provide ‘Substantial Assistance to the ICC, a
criminal authority or professional disciplinary body that results in the ICC discovering or establishing
an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code by another Player or Player Support Personnel or that
results in a criminal or disciplinary body discovering or establishing a criminal offence or the breach
of professional rules by another Player or Player Support Personnel or other third party’. To qualify as
Substantial Assistance, the information provided ‘must be credible and must comprise an important
part of any case that is initiated or, if no case is initiated, must have provided a sufficient basis on which
a case could have been brought’. This provision is based on the ‘substantial assistance’ provision (Art
10.7.1) in the 2021 World Anti-Doping Code, as to which see para C21.2. In the Westfield/Kaneria
spot-fixing case (see para B4.22), the ECB supported Mervyn Westfield’s appeal against his five-year
ban on the basis that he had provided evidence vital to its prosecution of Danish Kaneria, that the flow
of such information from cricketers was vital to the fight against match-fixing and related corruption,
and that it was concerned that the five year ban imposed on Westfield might serve to discourage others
from providing information in the future. On that basis, the ECB Appeal Panel (somewhat reluctantly)
amended the ban imposed below to allow for Westfield to return to club cricket (not professional
cricket) after two years rather than the three years specified by the first instance panel. Westfield v ECB,
ECB Appeal Panel decision dated July 2013, p 23 (‘The panel accepts that the ECB, together with
other national bodies, is deeply worried at the extent and scope of corruption currently threatening the
game and that it is privy to alarming evidence worldwide. In those circumstances, the Panel noted its
concerns at any sentence which it considers might inhibit the flow of information’).
6 ‘Fixing amnesty introduced by ECB’, 12 January 2012 (bbc.co.uk/sport) (quoting ECB spokesman
as follows: ‘Information is critical in addressing the threat posed by corruption in sport. The decision
of the board to provide a window for retrospective reporting of alleged approaches will greatly assist
the ACCESS unit in compiling a more complete picture of the source and focus of approaches which
may have taken place in the past. Individuals may not have thought these approaches were worthy
of reporting at the time and, prior to the decision of the board, may have been concerned that the
fact that they did not report such activity may have put them at risk of disciplinary action’). See
also ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22 August
2011 (insideworldfootball.biz) (proposing limited amnesty period, where conduct disclosed will not
be subject of disciplinary proceedings, but noting that no amnesty can be given from possible criminal
investigation and prosecution).
7 According to the Sports Betting Integrity Panel, ‘[t]he experience of some sports, particularly cricket
and horseracing and latterly tennis, has demonstrated that the gathering, analysis and dissemination
of intelligence with a view to identifying patterns of activity and a formalised targeting policy are
crucial to successfully combating threat to integrity. Painstaking analysis of many suspect matches/
events, cross-referencing common elements/personnel, may be necessary before a potentially
corrupt target (player, players’ support staff, related or other person) may be identified. […]
Currently, sports facing these problems which do not have an effective integrity unit, either tend to
pursue intelligence-gathering/investigations in an uncoordinated and somewhat haphazard fashion,
usually on a case-by-case basis or seek the assistance of a sport which does have an operational
intelligence unit or, in isolated cases, the problem is just ignored. Good practice adopted by those
sports which do have an integrity unit, has indicated that a co-ordinated and focused process of
intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination by identifying patterns of suspicious activity,
targeting potential offenders and ultimately providing evidence to bring disciplinary charges, is
the most effective way of combating corrupt betting activity. Investigations which concentrate
on individual suspect events face daunting problems of gathering sufficient probative evidence to
support disciplinary offences under the rules of a sport. Targeted intelligence created from analysis
of patterns of activity is most likely to enable an investigation to gather evidence to the required
standard of proof (balance of probabilities) necessary to prosecute disciplinary offences’. Report of
the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 34.
There are numerous examples of cases brought as a result of monitoring via data analysis of the
patterns of betting markets. In the UK, for example, The Football Association has had success in
pursuing cases where suspicious betting patterns have been reported by the companies with whom those
bets are being placed (The FA is an example of an SGB that entered into a number of Memorandums of
Understanding with betting providers that those providers would report suspicious activity to the SGB).
For example, in the case of The Football Association v Dexter Blackstock (FA Regulatory Commission
decision dated 2 May 2014), the extent of the defendant’s betting practices was brought to The FA’s
attention by a report from Betfair. Similar methods of data analysis have been used in cases brought
by the British Horseracing Authority. See eg BHA v Gerrard O’Mahoney, BHA Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 23 October 2014 and BHA v Darren Egan and Philip Langford, BHA Disciplinary
Panel decision dated 23 November 2015 (the latter case concerning a pattern of some 50,000 bets).
8 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel suggested that such a database should have, as a minimum,
searchable features on names, nicknames, locations, vehicles, telephone numbers; storage of digital
images; an integral destruction and weeding process (to ensure compliance with the Data Protection
Act: see generally Chapter A4 (Data Protection in Sport)); electronic grading; remote access with
firewall protection; investigation database for the management of enquiries; archive facilities; a briefing
facility; an interface with other databases within other sports; a database for confidential sources (with
strict access controls); and facilities for evidential disclosure. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity
Panel (February 2010), p 35.
9 See para B4.32. For example, Art 4.2 of the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code provides that the ACU ‘may
at any time conduct an investigation into the activities of any Participant that it believes may have
committed an offence under the Anti-Corruption Code […] and all Participants and National Cricket
Federations must cooperate fully with such investigations’.
In such investigations, it is important what participants say, but it can be just as important what they
do not say. For example, Mohammad Asif’s claim at the hearing in February 2010 that his ‘no ball’
had been caused by his captain Salman Butt instructing him just before the delivery in question to ‘run
faster, fucker’ was rejected partly because he had made no mention of that explanation when interviewed
by the police just days after the match in question. ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption
Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 155. See also BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary
Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 204(ii) (finding Mr Gold knew betting was based on
inside information supplied to his son, partly because ‘[w]hen interviewed by BHA Investigators in
September 2009, Mr Peter Gold was careful not to disclose the partnership which his son had recently
had with Mr Sines and Mr Crickmore, though there were opportunities during that interview to do
so’). And claims at interview to only a partial acquaintance with someone that are contradicted by
subsequently obtained telephone records can destroy the credibility of the witness. See eg ICC v Butt,
Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 154 (‘In his interview
with the police when asked about the frequency of his contacts with Mr Majeed, Mr Asif suggested
that they were sporadic; the upper figure he proposed was twice a day. It should be noted that at that
point Mr Asif was unaware that the billing records could (and would) be obtained. His estimate was
certainly vastly exceeded on the days when the ICC assert details of the conspiracy were apparently
confirmed. The billing records indeed make nonsense of his estimate. This forcibly suggests that the
downplaying was deliberate and designed to deflect attention from the true position’); BHA v Sines et
al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December 2011, para 207 (‘In interview, Mr Harris said
that his acquaintance with Mr Crickmore was very slight. That was untrue. The timelines for races 1
and 3 show that Mr Crickmore and Mr Harris were in frequent contact’); Kaneria v ECB, Appeal Panel
decision dated May 2013, p 26 (‘He [Danish Kaneria] claims to have been frightened of Mr Bhatt and
to have attempted to keep him at arm’s length and, having been warned off by Alan Peacock, to have
complied with the requirements of the anti-corruption Guidelines. The Panel finds that the telephone
records overwhelmingly refute this and his evidence that there were many missed calls (some of
which do not appear in the unchallenged records) to which he felt constrained to reply was wholly
unconvincing. He was in regular communication with Mr Bhatt sometimes in calls lasting a significant
time inconsistent with the explanations given by him’).
10 See para B4.32. For example, Art 4.3 of the ICC Anti-Corruption Code empowers the ACU General
Manager to make a written demand from a participant to furnish information, including phone records.
Article 4.3 was used in the Pakistani spot-fixing case to require the players to provide their written
consent to their mobile service providers supplying itemised billing records for the relevant periods
to the ICC, which evidence turned out to be strongly corroborative of the ICC’s allegations of a spot-
fixing conspiracy. See ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February
2011, para 44, para 142 (‘the very timing of other contacts recorded in the billing records is itself
inculpatory. They happened exactly at the times one would expect if Mr Butt was involved in Mr
Majeed’s dishonest enterprise, and had no other valid justification’), para 153 (‘The calls made to
and between Mr Majeed and Mr Asif as revealed in the billing records fitted into a pattern consistent
with the interchanges between Mr Majeed and MK [the undercover reporter pretending to be the
representative of a betting syndicate]. There is no cogent explanation of why Mr Majeed should be
in contact with Mr Asif at such hours during important test matches if the object was simply to deal
with commercial or social matters; the inference must be that there was something urgent to discuss’),
paras 173-74 (‘there were a number of other strong pointers towards Mr Amir’s culpable involvement.
First there was a coincidence of communications with Mr Majeed at critical points in the narrative’)
and para 181 (‘There is further unchallenged evidence of intense telephone and text communication
between Mr Majeed and each of the three players, frequently at or near midnight or even in the early
hours of the morning, in the middle of a hard-fought test match’). The same evidence was also relied
upon by the CAS panel in rejecting Mr Asif’s appeal. See Asif v ICC, CAS 2011/A/2362, para 62.
11 Telephone records have been vital to disciplinary cases brought by the BHA ever since the Gary
Carter case of 2005 (discussed at para B4.19, n 8). For instance, such evidence was relied on heavily
by the BHA Disciplinary Panel in BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated
23 January 2013, paras 32-37, para 104 (‘The telephone records show an almost frantic series of
attempts by Coppinger to contact Wilson before and after the race. There were 21 calls attempted in
the space of 33 minutes. This is not consistent with a casual tip’) and passim. See also McKeown v
British Horseracing Authority [2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 90 (‘The Panel found that Mr Reeder
was laying Skip of Colour because he had inside information about why it was not expected to win that
day. It held that the timeline was most revealing. Calls were made to Mr Reeder on the day before the
race by Clive Whiting, starting immediately after the latter had spoken with Mr Blockley. On the day
of the race Mr Reeder’s lay betting began within seconds of the end of a call from Clive Whiting, who
had himself been speaking seconds before to Mr Blockley. In evidence Mr Reeder said that he did not
know what the calls were about but the Panel found the inference to be too obvious to be doubted’).
12 See para B4.32. For example, the key evidence against the badminton players in Zulkiffi and Seang
was WhatsApp messages downloaded from their mobile devices that the hearing panel concluded
were conversations about fixing of badminton matches. Zulkiffli and Tan Chun Seang, Badminton
World Federation Ethics Hearing Panel, decision 2018/01, aff’d, Zulkiffli v BWF, and Seang v BWF,
CAS 2018/A/5846 & 5847, para 61.
B4.46 Other possible self-help remedies that have been mooted for SGBs include
paying informants,1 using covert surveillance techniques (ranging from simply
following/monitoring the activity of identified individuals to the planting of listening
and recording devices, where permitted under local law), conducting undercover
‘sting’ operations,2 and even subjecting participants to lie detector tests.3 As far as
the authors are aware, however, to date these techniques are not widely used. Instead,
they are seen by most as a step too far, even with a threat as grave as match-fixing.
1 ‘Exclusive: FIFA’s head of security calls for financial rewards for whistle-blowers’, 22 August 2011
(insideworldfootball.biz) (proposal for reward to be paid for information provided, subject to the
accuracy of the information provided and the benefit derived from it in terms of disciplinary results);
‘FIFA used organised crime gang informants to combat match-fixing’, Sportcal.com, 6 January 2012.
2 Sting operations by the media have uncovered some of the biggest match-fixing cases to date, including
the News of the World’s uncovering of the corrupt actions of Higgins and Mooney in snooker (para
B4.30, n 5) and of Butt, Amir and Asif in cricket (para B4.22), and the Sun covertly recording rugby
league player Shaun Leaf in a public house and then in a betting shop, talking about placing bets on
rugby league matches (para B4.25, n 2). However, those stings took place without the prior knowledge
or consent of the sports authorities. If they had instigated the stings themselves, they would have been
exposed to arguments of entrapment, at least if the participant could plausibly argue that they would
not have committed the misconduct in issue but for the invitation or opportunity offered to them as part
of the sting. (See para B4.38, n 9). However, in its February 2012 Report to the ICC’s Anti-Corruption
and Security Unit, while it did not condone entrapment, the MCC World Committee did suggest that
a ‘mystery shopper’ approach to (or ‘integrity testing’ of) a participant who is already under suspicion
could prove useful. See Marylebone Cricket Club, ‘Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to
ICC’s Anti-Corruption and Security Unit’ (20 February 2012).
3 In July 2011, former Australian cricket captain Steve Waugh suggested that lie detectors should be
used to counter match-fixing in cricket: ‘Steve Waugh: Illegal betting approaches are not uncommon’,
Guardian, 21 July 2011. In his report the following month, however, Bertrand de Seville noted that
the scientific community remained unconvinced about the reliability of a polygraph or lie-detector
test, and recommended that the ICC not introduce or support the use of the polygraph unless and
until its validity and admissibility have been accepted by the courts. See de Speville, ‘A Review of
the Anti-Corruption Arrangements of the International Cricket Council’, August 2011 (reissued with
minor amendments January 2012). In contrast, in February 2012 the MCC World Cricket Committee
recommended that players under suspicion be allowed to undergo polygraph testing on a voluntary
basis to exonerate themselves (Report of the MCC World Cricket Committee to ICC’s Anti-Corruption
and Security Unit, 20 February 2012), and in October 2012, the general secretary of the Singapore
Football Association claimed that the introduction of polygraph testing in Singapore’s domestic
league in 2001 had reduced the number of match-fixing cases in his country: ‘Singapore to use lie
detectors to cut down on match-fixing’, worldfootballinsider.com, 11 October 2012. In September
2012, the owner of Bulgarian football club Lokomotiv Plovdiv ordered its players and coaches to take
polygraph tests following allegations of match-fixing, telling the media that he wanted to be sure that
there were no untoward factors behind an unexpected loss to a team that were bottom of the league:
‘Lokomotiv Plovdiv players to take lie detector tests’, 25 September 2012. And in UCI v Contador,
CAS 2011/A/2384, paras 392-394, the CAS panel accepted the admissibility of polygraph evidence
offered by the athlete as proof that he did not take a blood transfusion, although it gave it only limited
weight. Other CAS panels have been even more circumspect. See WADA v BTF & Arman-Marshall
Silla, CAS 2017/A/4954, para 128 (‘the polygraph test results are not admitted in evidence’; such
tests must be treated as ‘mere personal statements, with no additional evidentiary value whatsoever
given by the circumstance that they were rendered during a lie detector test’); Villaneuva v FINA,
CAS 2016/A/4534, para 45 (‘Even in the original home of the device, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the rejection of polygraph evidence (said to support an appellant’s denial of drug taking) was
not unconstitutional (See US v. Scheffer, 1998 USSC 32). Polygraph tests were notoriously passed by
Lance Armstrong and Marion Jones, both of whom later admitted use of prohibited substances’) and
para 46 (‘In the Panel’s view, while CAS Panels may have previously found polygraph evidence to
be admissible, such evidence is of limited value. Moreover, the cost involved is disproportionate to
any probative value of such test. If, in the future, it were not, as a matter of practice to be entertained
by CAS panels, this would have the beneficial consequence that an athlete could not be criticized for
failure to submit to such tests as a means of seeking to show lack of intent’).
B Obtaining information from third parties
B4.47 An SGB’s investigative authority extends only to those who have agreed
to abide by its rules and to submit to its authority to enforce those rules.1 It has no
coercive powers over anyone else. However, there are ways that a sport governing
body can obtain information and evidence from third parties:
(a) In certain circumstances, it can obtain an order from the High Court, requiring
the disclosure of information in the possession of a third party. In particular,
in appropriate circumstances the court will grant a Norwich Pharmacal
order requiring disclosure of relevant information by a third party that has
become innocently mixed up in the wrongdoing of another, eg a mobile
telecommunications company whose phones and mobile services have been
used in furtherance of a match-fixing conspiracy, which represents a breach
of the rules of the sport and thus a breach of contract by the user of those
services.2
(b) It can enter into information-sharing agreements with betting operators, giving
it the ability to monitor (including on a real-time basis) betting patterns on its
events,3 to be alerted to suspicious betting patterns, and after the fact to access
further information about the person(s) who made the bets in question.4 (It will
also need access to betting experts to analyse the betting information obtained
in this way).
(c) However, voluntary information-sharing agreements are not always possible,
and even where they exist they can be ‘an insecure basis for information sharing
in a regulated environment’.5 Therefore, in 2007 the Gambling Commission6
exercised its powers under s 88(1) of the Gambling Act 2005 to require licensed
betting operators: (i) to report to a sports body that is listed in Pt 3 of Sch 6 to
the Act any information that the licensed operator suspects ‘relates to a breach
of a rule on betting applied by that sports governing body’;7 and (ii) to report
to the Gambling Commission any information that they suspect may relate to
the commission of an offence under the Act8 or may lead the Commission to
consider making an order to void a bet. In addition, the Gambling Commission
is empowered under s 30 of the Gambling Act to pass that information on (along
with any other information ‘received by it in the exercise of its functions’) in
appropriate circumstances to a sports body that is listed in Pt 3 of Sch 6 to
the Act. Sports bodies have welcomed this approach, saying it ‘has made a
noticeable difference in the ability of sports to secure important information’.9
(d) The Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that sports bodies also seek
to enter into information-sharing agreements with the Gambling Commission,
the police, ‘and any other relevant statutory body involved in the investigation
and/or prosecution of sports betting offences’.10 However, that suggestion
has been superseded to a large extent by the creation of the Sports Betting
Intelligence Unit, one of the main purposes of which is to facilitate such
information-sharing.11
1 See paras A1.10 and C3.8.
2 See Norwich Pharmacal v Customs & Excise [1973] UKHL 6. This process has been used by the
horseracing authorities, for example, to obtain telephone billing records, which are then used to
show contacts between the alleged conspirators and how those fit with information provided and
bets placed. The process was initiated in 2005 for the Gary Carter case (Jockey Club v Carphone
Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151(QB)) and is now a method of evidence-gathering in private law that
is familiar to and expressly approved by the court. See also McKeown v British Horseracing Authority
[2010] EWHC 508 (QB), para 60. See generally Dean, ‘Sport, Gambling & Corruption – Evidence
Gathering’, paper for 5RB Media and Entertainment Law conference, 2008, including at para 6.1
(noting that the court is likely to want proof that the regulator has exhausted all other possible options
for obtaining the records, including demanding them from the participant under investigation, before
coming to the court for an order against a third party) and at para 9 (‘If all the steps have been followed
carefully it should be relatively simply to get the Order sought. The key question for the Judge
will be whether the balancing act between the interests of the regulator in stamping out corruption
and the privacy rights of the individual comes down in favour of the regulator. Experience in the
context of horseracing corruption has been that the Court is willing to accept that the balance favours
disclosure’), citing Treacy J in Jockey Club v Carphone Warehouse [2005] EWHC 1151 (QB) (‘It is to
be observed that Article 8(2) demonstrates that Article 8 [privacy] rights are not absolute rights under
the Convention but are qualified rights. I am satisfied that, having considered the provisions of Article 8
and in particular Article 8(2), the purposes for which the Jockey Club requires the information in this
case is a matter which is encompassed in Article 8(2) and is a matter which justifies the release of the
information sought for the purpose sought by the Jockey Club’). It should be noted, however, that
telephone companies often only retain the billing records for 12 months, so that a prompt request may
be necessary once an investigation has started.
It may also be possible to get a court order requiring the police to share evidence that they have
collected as part of a criminal investigation. For example, in the cricket spot-fixing case, the ICC had
tape recordings from the News of the World of telephone conversations between Mazhar Majeed and
(purportedly) Salman Butt, discussing proposed spot-fixing during the Oval Test between England and
Pakistan. Mr Butt initially denied that he was the party on the other end of the line. The Metropolitan
Police had seized Mr Butt’s phone in August 2010, when the story first broke. The ICC therefore
obtained an order from the High Court further to CPR 34.4 (which gives the court the power to
‘issue a witness summons in aid of an inferior court or tribunal’), requiring the Metropolitan Police
to disclose to the ICC whether or not Salman Butt’s phone had received calls (and, if so, of what
duration) at the times of the Majeed phone calls on the NOTW recordings. The information provided
by the Metropolitan Police pursuant to that order showed that calls had been placed from Mazhar
Majeed’s phone to Salman Butt’s phone at the times and for the durations reflected on the recordings,
forcing Salman Butt to withdraw his previous denial and admit that it was him on the tape. The
Anti-Corruption Tribunal relied heavily on that evidence in upholding the charges brought by the
ICC against Mr Butt under the ICC’s Anti-Corruption Code. See ICC v Butt, Asif and Amir, Anti-
Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, paras 133–141 (finding Butt guilty of failing to
report Majeed’s approach to him to spot-fix the Oval Test) and para 142 (‘the aroma of the Oval calls
impregnate[s] the approach to the Lords Test’).
In England & Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm), the Commercial Court
held that disciplinary proceedings to enforce the ECB’s match-fixing rules constituted arbitration
proceedings to which the Arbitration Act 1996 applied, and so granted the ECB’s request for a witness
summons under s 43 of the Arbitration Act requiring Mervyn Westfield to attend the hearing of Danish
Kaneria’s appeal against the life ban imposed on him under those rules at first instance: see para B4.22.
For discussion of the broader implications of this case for sport, see paras D3.17–D3.19 and E4.8.
3 Bookmakers obviously have an interest in a clean betting market. See eg Mike O’Kane of
Littlewoods and the European Sports Security Association (ESSA), ‘Betting Industry meets IOC and
UK Government to discuss illegal betting threat to London Olympics’, Sportcal.com, 20 March 2012
(‘When sport is corrupted, and betting [is] used to profit from that corruption, it impacts sport and
legitimate betting industry alike. Punters always want to know that they’re getting a fair bet on their
chosen sport’); IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’
(SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 52 (‘A [betting] operator’s credibility depends on their being able
to ensure the genuineness of the sporting results on which they accept bets’). They also have an interest
in voluntary cooperation in an attempt to avoid legal regulation. Therefore betting operators such
as Betfair and the members of ESSA have entered into voluntary information-sharing memoranda
with SGBs, starting with the Jockey Club-Betfair memorandum in June 2003. Betfair now provides
counterparty sports bodies with software that allows them to access betting information themselves
remotely and on a ‘real-time’ basis; while ESSA operates its own early-warning system to pick up
and provide alerts in cases of rapid changes in odds, unusual betting volumes, and irregular betting
patterns. Sophisticated mathematical models are used to project the odds that should be expected
in a rational commercial market, and deviations by a certain margin are flagged for investigation. It
was information that the ATP received from ESSA, for example, that triggered the investigation into
Federico Luzzi that resulted in his ban for improper betting on the sport: see para B4.28, n 3.
UEFA, working with its commercial and betting partners, has established the Betting Fraud Detection
System (BFDS), which monitors every match played as part of a UEFA competition (in 2010, that
totalled 1,800 matches) as well as 29,000 other football matches in its members’ national jurisdictions
(and over 53,000 across all sports per year). The BFDS system analyses three types of data to provide
information on variations in the largest operators’ pre-match odds, live odds, and the Asian handicap.
The company also has a data archive that is updated instantly by a computerised matrix that captures the
history of matches and the way their scores evolve. This system of aggregating data provides specific
information on players and referees based on matches in which they have participated. These data –
which are not available to the general public – enable a wide range of criteria to be cross-checked and help
to identify leads in the event of suspicion. The system also serves to determine warning thresholds, with
particularly high levels of betting being transmitted to UEFA for investigation. See ‘UEFA Approves
Europe-wide Network of Integrity Officers to Counter Match-fixing’, Sportcal.com 21 March 2011.
For example, it was suspicious betting on a match in the first qualifying round of the UEFA Champions
League 2004/05 that led UEFA to uncover match-fixing by the president of one of the teams playing
in that match: FK Pobeda, Alexsandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA, CAS 2009/A/1920,
para 6. And it was principally that betting, and expert evidence analysing that betting, that led the CAS
to uphold the findings made against the club president and the life ban imposed on him. Ibid, paras
89–91. UEFA subsequently signed over the BFDS to data services company Sportradar (uefa.com/
insideuefa/protecting-the-game/integrity/#fraud [accessed 30 October 2020]).
Studying the BFDS can be used to recognise the patterns of sports betting to demonstrate the
markets for betting-related match fixing, which can then be focused on by the relevant SGBs. A study
carried out by the Asser Institute covering the detection system between May 2009 and September
2014 concluded that the markets which should be focused on the final score and the number of goals
scored during the game. (see para 4.2 of The Odds of Match Fixing – Facts & Figures on the Integrity
Risk of Certain Sports Bets, Van Rompuy B., Asser Institute, January 2015).
FIFA established its own subsidiary company, Early Warning System GmbH (EWS), which
monitored betting markets relating to FIFA competitions following its inception in July 2007 and also
monitored betting on certain club competitions, as well as on other sports: fifa.com/who-we-are/news/
fifa-early-warning-system-ews-2261080 [accessed 30 October 2020]. FIFA, like UEFA, signed over
the monitoring service to Sportradar, in doing so closing down this subsidiary in 2017.
The IOC used EWS to monitor the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing, before setting up its own
partner, International Sport Monitoring, with similar technical monitoring capability and intelligence,
to monitor activity around the Olympics Games (see ‘Rogge: IFs could risk Olympic expulsion if
they don’t join fight against match-fixing’, Sportcal.com 28 February 2011), and EWS alerted FIFA
to irregular betting patterns in the match corruptly refereed by Joseph Lamptey. Lamptey v FIFA,
CAS 2017/A/5173, paras 8, 11, 14.
4 See IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord,
13 February 2012), p 71 (‘Sports betting monitoring systems are effective in both surveillance and
tracking, and can serve as an early warning or – when used after the event – [to] help understand a fraud’).
Indeed, information about the timing, size and nature of bets placed can be very important evidence
in sustaining corruption charges. Good examples are Jockey Club v Carter, Disciplinary Committee
decision dated 28 September 2009, where the case was proved by mapping complex relationships
between unusual betting and telephone contact; and BHA v Heffernan & Ors, BHA Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 23 January 2013, where the Disciplinary Panel relied heavily on information about bets
placed by the alleged co-conspirators through their Betfair accounts. See eg Heffernan, at paras 79, 86,
96 (noting how one person charged, who had only placed nine bets before through his Betfair account,
with a largest liability risk of £54, put two separate £2,000 bets on a horse ridden by Heffernan to lose
the race) and 101. See also BHA v Sines et al, BHA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 14 December
2011, paras 66 et seq.; and cases cited at para B4.38, n.5.
5 Gambling Commission, ‘Integrity in Sports Betting – Information Sharing, Responses to the
consultation’ (Gambling Commission, June 2007), para 3.14. This comment was made in response to
lobbying by SGBs, who said in 2006 that ‘to continue to rely on a voluntary approach to information
sharing just leaves too much to the chance. If we are to have public confidence in the new licensing
regime and sports integrity, it must be seen to be applied to every betting operator and to be enforced
through licensing standards set by the Gambling Commission’.
6 See para B4.51.
7 See discussion at para B4.48 of the offence of ‘cheating at gambling’ under s 42 of the Gambling
Act 2005.
8 See Gambling Commission Licence Conditions and Code of Practice (29 July 2020), Licence
Condition 15.1, titled ‘Information requirements – Reporting suspicion of offences’ (‘Licensees must
as soon as reasonably practicable provide the Commission or ensure the Commission is provided
with any information from whatever source that they […] know relates to or suspect may relate to
the commission of an offence under the Act, including an offence resulting from a breach of a licence
condition or a code provision having the effect of a licence condition […] Licensees who accept
bets, or facilitate the making or acceptance of bets between others, on the outcome of horse races or
other sporting events governed by one of the sport governing bodies for the time being included in
Part 3 of Schedule 6 to the Act must also provide the relevant sport governing body with sufficient
information to conduct an effective investigation if the licensee suspects that they have any information
from whatever source that may: a. lead the Commission to consider making an order to void a bet; b.
relate to a breach of a rule on betting applied by that sport governing body’).
Schedule 6, Pt 3 of the Gambling Act originally listed the following as SGBs with whom
information could/should be shared: the ECB, the FA, the FA of Wales, the Horseracing Regulatory
Authority (now known as the British Horseracing Authority), the LTA, the Irish FA, the Jockey Club,
the National Greyhound Racing Club (now known as the Greyhound Board of Great Britain), the
PGA, the RFL, the RFU, the SRU, the Scottish FA, UK Athletics, and the Welsh Rugby Union. In
2007, the British Boxing Board of Control was added to the list by means of the Gambling Act 2005
(Amendment of Sch 6) Order 2007. In 2012, the list was amended again to add the IOC (in case
threats to integrity arose during the course of the 2012 London Olympic Games), The Association
of European Professional Football Leagues, Bowls England, the British Darts Organisation, British
Lions Limited, Celtic Rugby Ltd, The Commonwealth Games Federation, England Hockey, England
Squash, and Racketball Ltd, European Rugby Cup Ltd, FIFA, the IAAF (now World Athletics), the
ICC, the International Hockey Federation, the IRB, the ITF, London Marathon, The Motorsports
Association, the Rugby League International Federation, Six Nations Rugby Ltd, UEFA, the World
Darts Federation, and the WPBSA. See The Gambling Act 2005 (Amendment of Schedule 6) Order
2012. This was done ‘to accurately reflect other SGBs to ensure the coverage of the main sports in the
UK, and to better reflect the SGBs that the Gambling Commission deals with on a regular basis […] [as
well as to add] international bodies […] that cover the major domestic SGBs not currently covered by
the Schedule, and that have prominent profiles as well as developed information-handling procedures’.
DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act 2005’, 25 November 2011.
After a further round of consultation, in September 2017 the following bodies were added to the
list: UK Anti-Doping, the Tennis Integrity Unit, the Darts Regulation Authority, Rugby League
European Federation, Irish Rugby Football Union, International Paralympic Committee, Table Tennis
England, and the Ladies European Tour (gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/640229/OFFICIAL_government_response_updating_schedule_6.pdf [accessed 30 October
2020]).
The 2011 DCMS Impact Assessment noted: ‘The Gambling Commission may provide information
to SGBs that do not appear on the Schedule, but only where it would not breach existing statutory
or legal constraints, including data protection. Where information does not relate to a criminal
investigation or proceedings, and if the SGB is not listed on the Schedule, the GC has to make a
decision on a case by case basis as to whether it is appropriate to share the information, which can
be resource-intensive, and risks information not being shared accurately to the detriment of both the
sports and gambling markets’. DCMS Impact Assessment, ‘Amendments to Schedule 6, Gambling Act
2005’, 25 November 2011, para 7.
The Gambling Commission has noted that ‘betting operators can also pass other information that
they consider might be of relevance to the SBIU (Sports Betting Intelligence Unit: see para B4.52),
whether or not it reaches their criteria of “suspicious”. The SBIU has been working closely with
operators to embed this approach’. Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting
integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010), para 3.1.
Licence Condition 15 does not apply to spread betting companies, who fall under the jurisdiction not
of the Gambling Commission but rather of the Financial Conduct Authority. Therefore, information-
sharing arrangements with spread betting companies remain voluntary. In May 2013, the BHA brought
its first case, based on betting information voluntarily shared with it by a spread betting company
against jockey Eddie Ahern and others (see para B4.47, n 8). See statement from Adam Brickell,
Director of Integrity, Legal and Risk for the BHA, 22 May 2013.
9 Response of the BHA, BDO, ECB, FA, Football DataCo, LTA, PL, RFL, RFU and CCPR to the
DCMS Remote Gambling Consultation, 18 June 2010.
10 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), Code of Conduct on Integrity in Sports
in relation to Betting, Chapter 2a, Article 6.1. The key recommendation coming out of the City of
London Police review of the failed Fallon criminal prosecution (para B4.49) was that, when dealing
with sports regulatory bodies as part of a criminal investigation, the police force should ensure that
there is a formal framework in place to govern the relationship, set out in a written memorandum of
understanding: Commander Patrick Rice, ‘City of London Police – Review of Operation Krypton’,
published on 16 May 2008.
11 See para B4.52.
C Working with the Gambling Commission and the police

(a) English criminal law pertaining to match-fixing
B4.48 English law does not criminalise match-fixing or spot-fixing per se.
However, such acts may be charged as one or more of the following criminal offences
if evidence exists that would establish all of the necessary elements of the offence in
question to the criminal standard of proof:
(a) ‘cheating at gambling’, in breach of s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005;1
(b) the giving or accepting of corrupt payments, in breach of s 1 of the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1906 (in relation to acts pre-dating 1 July 2011, the date that
Act was repealed);2
(c) bribing or being bribed, in breach of the Bribery Act 2010 (in relation to acts
from 1 July 2011 on, when the Bribery Act came into force in place of the
Prevention of Corruption Act);3
(d) (possibly, although less obviously) fraud by false representation, in breach of
s 2 of the Fraud Act 2006;4 or
(e) (if any of the above offences is committed by two or more persons in agreement
with each other) conspiracy, which may be charged either as statutory
conspiracy, under s 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, or as the common law
offence of conspiracy to defraud.5
1 Section 42 of the Gambling Act 2005 provides: ‘(1) A person commits an offence if he (a) cheats
at gambling, or (b) does anything for the purpose of enabling or assisting another person to cheat
at gambling. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1) it is immaterial whether a person who cheats
(a) improves his chances of winning anything, or (b) wins anything. (3) Without prejudice to the
generality of subsection (1) cheating at gambling may, in particular, consist of actual or attempted
deception or interference in connection with (a) the process by which gambling is conducted, or (b) a
real or virtual game, race or other event or process to which gambling relates. (4) A person guilty of an
offence under this section shall be liable (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding two years, to a fine or to both […]’. In Majeed v R; Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim
1186, paras 26–28, the Court of Appeal upheld the use of this provision to convict Mazhar Majeed
for his part in the Lord’s spot-fixing conspiracy (as to which, see para B4.22), rejecting forcefully the
proposition that no offence had been committed because the gambling that was affected was ‘unlawful’
gambling that took place entirely abroad, on the following grounds: ‘27. […] The offence contrary to
s 42 is committed at the moment when “anything” is done “for the purpose of enabling or assisting”
anyone else to cheat at gambling. It has nothing to do with the proper regulation of gambling: it simply
creates an offence of cheating. In these cases, the offence was complete before any bet was placed.
The “fix” was organised in England, the matches which were the target of the “fixing” took place here,
and the rewards for participating were also paid here. In short the criminal conduct prohibited by s 42
occurred within the jurisdiction. 28. Interesting questions of territoriality might arise if it were ever
to be the case that an individual or individuals who were living abroad and placed their bets abroad
on the basis of the cheating which was organised and took place here were ever to be prosecuted in
this jurisdiction. We need not address them here. We are not dealing with the criminals abroad who
took advantage of the cheating organised in this jurisdiction. We are dealing with the criminals who
participated in it here’.
The Gambling Act wording in s 42(1)(b) in effect requires the prosecution to prove that the corrupt
act was done knowingly and specifically for the purpose of assisting another to cheat at gambling. This
was cited in commentaries and reports around the Gambling Commission’s decision in 2010 not to
pursue a prosecution in relation to a 2009 Blue Square football match between Forest Green Rovers
and Grays Athletic in circumstances where there were highly unusual betting patterns that correctly
predicted an unusual match turn-around and result. The Gambling Commission reportedly felt that
because it could not link a specific spot-fix in the game to a specific bet, it could not proceed with any
criminal prosecution under s 42.
In its 2010 report (see para B4.14), the Sports Betting Integrity Panel recommended that the definition
of cheating in s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005 ‘be reviewed and, if appropriate, given greater clarity’,
and that the two-year maximum sentence be reviewed. No explanation was given of the concerns
driving those recommendations, but the authors understand that the desire was that ‘sporting fraud’
be established as a bespoke criminal offence. In a February 2012 debate in the House of Lords, Lord
Moynihan agreed with that recommendation, stating that ‘the existing definition of cheating in the
Gambling Act 2005 is not, in my view, fit for purpose. A specific sports fraud definition is necessary’.
Hansard, 9 February 2012, debate on ‘Olympic Games 2012: Match Fixing and Suspicious Betting’,
p 7, col 413. He did not, however, offer any such definition for consideration. In reply on behalf of the
Government, Baroness Garden stated: ‘The review of cheating was not considered a priority at this
time, but that is not to say that it has been forgotten. We hope to address that issue. Along with the
Gambling Commission, we are looking at the range of offences related to sports-betting integrity to see
that we have the suite of powers necessary to combat the threat’. Ibid, p 13, col 423.
In 2014, Lord Moynihan included in his Governance of Sport Bill a provision that would have added
a new section 42(a)(3A) to the Gambling Act, specifying that
‘cheating at gambling may, in particular, consist of:
(a) a person engaging in conduct that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or
event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or
would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or the event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain
a financial advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the
event or the event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a
financial disadvantage was actually caused);
(b) a person offering to engage in, or encouraging another person to engage in, conduct that corrupts
or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being
reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of the event
or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial advantage, or to cause a financial
disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or the event contingency (whether or
not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial disadvantage was actually caused);
(c) a person entering into an agreement or arrangement in respect of conduct that corrupts or would
corrupt a betting outcome of an event or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless
as to whether, the conduct the subject of the agreement or arrangement corrupts or would corrupt
a betting outcome of the event or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a financial
advantage, or to cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event or
the event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial
disadvantage was actually caused);
(d) a person encouraging another person to conceal from a relevant authority conduct, or an agreement
or arrangement in respect of conduct, that corrupts or would corrupt a betting outcome of an event
or event contingency— (i) knowing that, or being reckless as to whether, the conduct corrupts or
would corrupt a betting outcome of the event or event contingency, and (ii) intending to obtain a
financial advantage, or cause a financial disadvantage, in connection with any betting on the event
or event contingency (whether or not a financial advantage was actually obtained or a financial
disadvantage was actually caused);
(e) a relevant person— (i) betting on an event or event contingency, (ii) encouraging another person to
bet on an event or event contingency in a particular way (whether or not that other person actually
bet on the event or event contingency concerned), or (iii) communicating the relevant information
possessed by that relevant person, or causing that relevant information to be communicated, to
another person who the first person knows or ought reasonably to know would, or would be likely
to, bet on the event or event contingency (whether or not that other person actually bet on the event
or event contingency concerned), in each case, where the relevant information possessed by that
relevant person is relevant to the bet concerned’.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0020/15020.pdf [accessed 30 October 2020].
However, the bill was never passed into law.
2 Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 provided: ‘If any person corruptly gives or agrees
to give or offers any gift or consideration to any agent as an inducement or reward for doing or
forbearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or forborne to do, any act in relation
to his principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any
person in relation to his principal’s affairs or business’, then he shall be guilty of an offence. The
use of this charge was challenged in the Majeed and Westfield cases (see para B4.44) on the basis
that the manner in which a cricketer performs on the pitch is personal to the cricketer and does not
involve any recourse to the ‘affairs or business’ of his employer, ie it is not aimed at his employer,
and there is no intent to induce the employer to do or not do anything. This was rejected by the
Court of Appeal on the basis that such construction was not supported by the case law, and ‘would be
wholly inconsistent with the statutory language’. Majeed v R; Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186,
para 21. The Court of Appeal ruled: ‘the way in which Butt, Amir and Asif, and Westfield performed
was personal to them and clearly contrary to and far removed from the wishes of the Boards which
employed them. Nevertheless, looking at the realities of the situation there could on the evidence have
been nothing closer to the heart of the affairs or business of a cricket Board than the performance of
the players selected by them to represent their and his country, or their and his county. In relation to
the Pakistan Cricket Board, that is why, among other provisions of the central contract signed by each
cricketer, he was obliged to refrain from doing anything which might damage the reputation of the
team for which he was playing, or the country he represented, or the Board which employed him. He
was obliged immediately to report to the manager of the team any incident which might damage the
reputation of the team, or the Board which employed him, and agreed that to seek or accept any bribe
or other reward to fix or contrive to influence the result, progress and conduct of an international match
was prohibited. There could not be any clearer indication of the simple proposition that the Pakistan
Cricket Board regarded the conduct of the players on the field as integral to its affairs and business, and
indeed that their play was integral to them. Precisely the same considerations apply to Westfield and
Essex County Cricket Club. That was the entire point of the agreement that he should play on behalf
of the country to the best of his ability’. Ibid, para 23. ‘The actions of these cricketers fell fairly and
squarely within the ambit of the 1906 Act, and the conspiracy count involving Majeed, and the count
against Westfield were clearly established’. Ibid, para 25.
3 The Bribery Act 2010 contains criminal offences of bribing and being bribed in the form of six ‘cases’,
two of active bribery and four of passive bribery, but each of which has the following two elements
in common: (1) an advantage, financial or otherwise, must be given, promised, or requested; and
(2) there must be improper performance of a function or activity of a public nature or of an activity
connected with a business or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or incorporate). This
second requirement means that persons who are acting purely in a personal capacity are not caught by
the Act, but if they are acting as part of a team (for example) they could be covered, and the rest of the
wording is potentially very broad in scope. It has been suggested that ‘the provisions of [the Bribery]
Act are now likely to cater for the facts of cases’ such as the Butt and Westfield cricket spot-fixing
cases in a clearer and more obvious way than the provisions of the old Prevention of Corruption Act
1906. See Milliken-Smith QC, ‘New Offences Under the Bribery Act 2010’, paper presented at Sports
Corruption Seminar (December 2012).
4 Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 states: ‘(1) A person is in breach of this section if he (a) dishonestly makes
a false representation, and (b) intends, by making the false representation (i) to make a gain for himself
or another, or (ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss. (2) A representation
is false if (a) it is untrue or misleading, and (b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be,
untrue or misleading. (3) “Representation” means any representation as to fact or law, including a
representation as to the state of mind of (a) the person making the representation, or (b) any other person.
(4) A representation may be express or implied. (5) For the purposes of this section a representation
may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system of device
designed to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention)’.
Any knowing participant in a match-fixing or spot-fixing scheme could be said to have made false
representations intending to make a gain and/or expose another to a risk of loss. The false representation
could be that a jockey is trying to win the race when actually he is not, or that a batsman is trying to
score runs when really he is trying to get out. However, if there is no allegation of betting, and so the
only persons deceived are the spectators watching the match, it is not easy to see what gain the jockey
or batsman has made or what loss the spectators have suffered or risked suffering, which is why the
common law conspiracy to defraud charge ran into difficulties in the Westfield case: see para B4.49. See
also Potts, ‘The battle for integrity in sport’, 23 February 2013 (lawinsport.com) (discussing whether
criminal law powers could be used to counter blood doping outside the Olympic Village during the
London 2012 Olympics: ‘In [the UK], the police may be granted a warrant to enter and search a
private residence where there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been
committed and that there is material on premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the
investigation. The question therefore was whether blood doping could amount to an indictable offence
that might justify a warrant to enter and search private properties for blood doping equipment. Under
the Fraud Act 2006, where a person dishonestly makes a false representation and thereby intends to
make a gain or cause loss to another he commits a potentially indictable offence. In the case of the
Games, all athletes were required to sign an entry form declaring that they would comply with the
WADA Code and other applicable anti-doping rules and thereby represented that they would compete
“clean”. By engaging in blood doping, which is a Prohibited Method under the WADA Code, any
representation by an individual that he was clean would have been a dishonest misrepresentation made
with the intention of competing with an unfair advantage and thereby gaining a personal advantage or
causing loss to another. Alternatively, the fact of having in their possession blood doping equipment
could amount to the separate offence of having possession of an article for use in connection with a
fraud, which is also an indictable offence. However, the Fraud Act did not provide a perfect solution as
this approach was arguably to shoe-horn the Act into a use for which it was never intended. It was also
contrary to public policy which has tended to avoid using criminal law to regulate sport. Fortunately
it was not necessary to test this approach during the Games. It is also worth noting that the Fraud Act
was viewed only as a last resort, to offer a solution in the event of a high profile incident such as that
in Turin, where questions would be asked if authorities could not act and police intervention could be
justified as a matter of public policy’).
5 The important aspect of a conspiracy charge is that it is complete on agreement. Money need not
change hands, or if it has, the match to be fixed need not have yet taken place. The agreement itself is
the crime, not the performance of the agreed acts. R v Anderson [1986] AC 27, [1985] 2 All ER 961.
B4.49 There have been seven high-profile English criminal prosecutions in recent
years of corrupt sporting conduct, five of which were successful:
(a) In 1995 Bruce Grobelaar and Hans Segers, both professional football
goalkeepers, were charged with conspiracy to accept corrupt payments, in
breach of s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, and Grobelaar was
charged individually under the same section, on the basis that they had accepted
money to let in goals and thereby improperly influence the outcome of games.
Both were acquitted after trial, although the evidence against Grobelaar (in
the form of covert recordings of Grobelaar’s conversations with an associate)
was strong enough for the Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords to
reject a subsequent jury’s decision to award Grobelaar £85,000 in damages
for defamation, on the basis that it would have been perverse on the evidence
for the jury to make any finding other than that Grobelaar had made a corrupt
agreement and had corruptly accepted money.1
(b) In R v Rodgers and others, following a lengthy investigation during which
the police reportedly arrested 36 people, conducted over 500 interviews, took
more than 1,300 statements, and prepared over 5,000 exhibits and nearly
40,000 pages of evidence,2 the Crown Prosecution Service charged former
champion jockey Kieren Fallon, five other jockeys and trainers, and the punter
Miles Rodgers, with conspiracy to defraud Betfair customers by the jockeys
deliberately losing races to order so that their co-conspirators would win bets
they had placed against those jockeys on the Betfair exchange. The alleged
victims of the conspiracy were any users of Betfair who bet on the races with
the defendants thinking that the jockeys would be riding to win.3 Despite the
lengthy investigation and an also lengthy trial starting in September 2007,
the prosecution collapsed when the CPS’s main witness, the Australian
racing steward Mr Murrihy, admitted in cross-examination that he had little

knowledge of the rules and culture of British racing. Mr Justice Forbes ruled
that Mr Murrihy’s evidence fell ‘far, far short of establishing a prima facie
breach of UK racing rules’ and, therefore, that no conspiracy to defraud could
be established, so that all of the defendants had to be acquitted of all charges.
Two further trials, involving the five other alleged conspirators, were also
subsequently dismissed.4
(c) In late 2010, the Crown Prosecution Service charged Essex cricketer Mervyn
Westfield with a single count of conspiracy to defraud members of the
Essex County Cricket Club, his team-mates in the match against Durham on
5 September 2009, and spectators at that match, ‘by dishonestly agreeing to
bowl his first over in a manner calculated and intended to allow the scoring of a
certain number of runs, and thereby playing other than to the best of his ability
as required by his contract of employment, and other than in accordance with
the game of cricket’. In response to an application to dismiss the charge on the
basis (inter alia) that there was no allegation that any of the alleged ‘victims’
had been induced to do anything by Westfield’s deceit, and therefore there was
no offence stated that was recognised at common law, the CPS commenced
new proceedings, charging Westfield with (1) accepting a bribe to act in a
corrupt manner in the affairs of his employer, Essex County Cricket Club,
contrary to s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; and (2) bowling in a
manner calculated and intended to allow the scoring of runs to assist others to
cheat at gambling, contrary to s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005. In January 2012,
when his challenge to the legal sufficiency of this new charge failed, Westfield
pleaded guilty to the first charge (the second being left on the file), and in
February 2012 he was sentenced to four months imprisonment.5
(d) In February 2011, following the News of the World’s exposure of ‘spot-fixing’
in the 2010 Lord’s Test match between Pakistan and England,6 the Crown
Prosecution Service charged Pakistani cricketers Salman Butt, Mohammad
Asif and Mohammad Amir, along with their agent, Mazhar Majeed, with (1)
accepting a bribe to act in a corrupt manner in the affairs of their employer,
the Pakistan Cricket Board, viz bowling deliberate no balls in the Lord’s Test,
contrary to s 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; and (2) conspiring
to bowl those no balls to enable others to cheat at gambling, contrary to s 42
of the Gambling Act 2005. Majeed and Amir pleaded guilty to the charges,
but Butt and Asif denied them and went to trial, where the jury found each of
them guilty on both counts. Mr Justice Cooke imposed the following sentences
(each to run concurrently in each case): (1) Majeed was sent to prison for two
years and eight months for the corrupt payments offence, and 16 months for
the gambling offence; (2) Butt was sent to prison for two years and six months
for the corrupt payments offence and two years for the gambling offence; (3)
Asif was sent to prison for one year on each count; and (4) Amir was sent
to prison for six months on each count.7 Butt and Amir both subsequently
appealed unsuccessfully against their prison sentences,8 and Majeed appealed
unsuccessfully against a ruling at first instance that the indictment properly
stated criminal charges under English law.9
(e) In June 2014, two businessmen and a non-league footballer, Michael Boateng,
were convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery in relation to the fixing of
football matches.10
(f) In 2015, the former Premier League footballer Delroy Facey was jailed for
two and a half years after being convicted of match-fixing under the Bribery
Act 2010, with the sentencing judge saying that his offences struck ‘at the very
heart of football’.11
(g) In 2020, Pakistan international batsman Nasir Jamshed was jailed for seventeen
months after pleading guilty to conspiracy to bribe batsmen to avoid scoring
runs from certain balls in a February 2018 Pakistan Super League game in
return for a share of £30,000. At his sentencing hearing, Judge Richard Mansell
QC said:
‘By far the most insidious consequence of these offences is the undermining of
public confidence in the integrity of the sporting contest, not simply in the individual
match directly affected but in the game of cricket generally’.12
1 See Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 33, [2001] 2 All ER 437, and on
appeal [2002] HL 40.
2 Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), p 3.
3 ‘Champion jockey Fallon “rigged races in £2.2 million betting fraud”’, Times, 9 October 2007.
4 See generally Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), the
City of London Police review of the case, written by Commander Patrick Rice. Commander Rice
concluded that, when dealing with regulatory bodies such as the Horseracing Regulatory Authority
as part of an investigation, a formal written protocol should be put in place to govern the relationship,
there should be a formal policy for funding investigations in partnership with regulatory bodies, and
national guidelines on appointment of expert witnesses should be followed. The BHA commissioned
Dame Neville to conduct a review of the case from the regulators’ perspective. She concluded that the
collapse of criminal proceedings against Fallon and the others demonstrated that the criminal justice
system was an ‘inefficient and inadequate means by which to seek to regulate horseracing and that
the regulation of malpractice in horseracing could be better performed by the BHA than by external
criminal prosecution agencies’. See Dame Elizabeth Neville DBE QPM, ‘The British Horseracing
Authority and Integrity in Horseracing – An Independent Review’, 13 May 2008, para 8.18 (also
discussed at para B4.8).
The HRA had taken interim action to prevent Fallon and other defendants from racing pending
determination of the criminal charges, and on challenge the High Court had upheld the HRA’s stance:
see para B4.39. After the trial, the BHA did bring disciplinary proceedings against Miles Rodgers, the
jockey Fergal Lynch and others, and trainer Karl Burke, and the proceedings ended in admissions,
disqualifications, and exclusions. That could be seen as vindicating Dame Elizabeth Neville’s view.
Kieren Fallon gave undertakings to the BHA and was not subject to disciplinary charges.
5 R v Westfield, sentencing remarks of Judge Anthony Morris QC, 17 February 2012. The judgment
rejecting Westfield’s appeal is reported at Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186. The ECB
subsequently brought disciplinary charges against Westfield (and his alleged corruptor, Danish
Kaneria) under its anti-corruption code. Westfield admitted the charges and was banned for five
years from first class cricket, while Kaneria (whom the CPS had not charged due to lack of evidence,
Westfield not being a cooperating witness at that time) was banned for life: see para B4.22.
6 See para B4.22.
7 R v Majeed, Butt, Asif and Amir, sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Cooke, 3 November 2011, para 4
(‘These offences, regardless of pleas, are so serious that only a sentence of imprisonment will suffice
to mark the nature of the crimes and to deter any other cricketer, agent or anyone else who considers
corrupt activity of this kind, with its hugely detrimental impact on the lives of many who look to find
good honest entertainment and good-hearted enjoyment from following an honest, albeit professional
sport’).
8 R. v Amir & Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914. Mr Asif’s application for leave to appeal against conviction
and sentence was denied in June 2013: ‘Mohammad Asif loses spot-fixing appeal’, June 2012 (beta.
dawn.com/news/1017770/mohammad-asif-loses-spot-fixing-appeal).
9 Majeed v R, Westfield v R [2012] EWCA Crim 1186. See para B4.48, n 2.
10 R v Michael Boateng, R v Krishna Sanjay Ganeshan and R v Chann Sankaran (Birmingham Crown
Court) Case Nos T20139135, T20139053, T20139135 (bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-27939919
12 ‘Cricketer Nasir Jamshed jailed over spot-fixing’, BBC Sport, 7 February 2020 (bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-51419342 [accessed 30 October 2020]).
B4.50 There has traditionally been a reluctance on the part of the public authorities
to pursue criminal action against match-fixers,1 even though many argue this area
of criminality is significant and should not be neglected.2 For SGBs, the possibility
that the police might investigate and the Crown Prosecution Service might prosecute
match-fixing or spot-fixing as a criminal offence is a double-edged sword. The
criminal authorities have significant coercive powers of investigation (including
search and seizure, arrest and interview, and obtaining of evidence from abroad) that
extend far beyond what a SGB can do, and also apply to persons who are outside the
governing body’s jurisdiction.3 And a potential criminal conviction of a participant
followed by a period of imprisonment can obviously act as a significant deterrent

to others. On the other hand, criminal investigations follow their own pace, and the
police can be very unwilling to cooperate with parallel sport investigations, which can
leave the SGB in the invidious position of having to decide whether to press ahead
with its own investigation and charges (when it may not have all of the evidence
that the police will gather, and may be accused of prejudicing any future criminal
trial) or else wait (often for months if not years) for the outcome of the criminal
investigation (and any subsequent prosecution and trial).4 As already noted, under
English law a governing body is generally entitled to choose either course, unless
there is a clear risk of prejudice to the criminal proceedings that trumps the public
interest in resolving the disciplinary matter promptly.5 In many cases, its choice may
depend on whether it feels able to keep the participant provisionally suspended from
the sport based solely on the criminal investigation/prosecution, and/or whether it
feels it has sufficient evidence at its disposal to commence disciplinary proceedings,
provisionally suspend the participant based on the disciplinary charges, and go to the
disciplinary hearing without waiting to see what comes out of the criminal process.
1 See ‘Match-fixing in sport – a mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27’ (KEA European Affairs,
March 2012) (ec.europa.eu/sport/news/documents/study-sports-fraud-final-version_en.pdf), p 1
(‘Case law is indeed very rare’) and p 47 (‘The major obstacles in prosecuting cases of match-fixing
activities are operational rather than legal. […] the main difficulty resides in providing evidence to
the prosecution – eg beyond common difficulties concerning the links among the related acts and the
transfer of money, the fact that a player has deliberately underperformed or that he/she had contacts
with the members of a criminal gang seem to be extremely difficult to prove. […] Lack of sufficient
evidence usually leads to the abandonment of investigations or to dismissal of cases. Furthermore, the
prosecution of match-fixing is extremely resource-intensive, taking both huge amounts of time and
money in relation to offences that in some countries result in extremely low sanctions. The prosecutor
is likely not to go ahead with a case if there are numerous uncertainties regarding the viability of
proceedings; if the offence is characterised as a misdemeanour; or if match-fixing is not considered
as a priority by the corresponding authorities’). In the UK, the precedent set by the failed prosecution
of Kieren Fallon and others (see para B4.49) is not a happy one. See Rice, ‘City of London Police,
Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), passim and at para 6.1 (total cost of the investigation
and prosecution was £950,000). And now see paras B4.51 and B4.52 (explaining that as a consequence
of the above factors, policy of Gambling Commission and police is to leave all but the most exceptional
cases to SGBs to pursue as disciplinary cases).
In February 2010, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel stated: ‘Experience in GB has shown that
police do not generally regard the investigation of “sporting crime” as a priority. In reality, the appetite
for police involvement in such matters is more likely to occur as a result of police already having an
interest in a target for other (non-sporting) criminal activity’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity
Panel (February 2010), p 36. Meanwhile, in its July 2011 response to the DCMS Select Committee
Inquiry into Gambling, the Sports Rights Owners Coalition asserted: ‘Sport also believes that too
low a priority is given by the Police and Gambling Commission to the issue. The reasons are perhaps
self-evident: complexities, absolute cost and police budget priorities coupled with cross border
jurisdictional issues. Consequently, greater efforts need to be dedicated to the resources available
to sporting bodies and the Gambling Commission and the Police should be mandated to investigate
and then prosecute all those who cheat. Match-fixing is a complex crime akin to financial fraud and
requires specialist and dedicated investigatory resource. We would highlight to the Committee that
while the Government currently invests approximately £8m a year to anti-doping measures (in grants
to the UK Anti-Doping agency) that it does not allocate any specific resources at all to the fight against
betting corruption’. Sports Rights Owners Coalition, Response to Culture, Media and Sport Select
Committee inquiry into Gambling (July 2011), p 4. See also Scotney, ‘Establishing an effective anti-
corruption strategy’, (2013) 11(4) World Sports Law Report 14, 15 (‘The Police have expertise to deal
with these issues when a criminal offence is suspected, but there is a clear reluctance of the police
service to become involved in “sporting offences” unless wider serious criminality is involved’).
2 See eg Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011), para 1.4
(‘Left unchecked, this corruption will devalue the integrity of sport and diminish the acceptability and
effectiveness of sport as a tool to develop and support many aspects of our society’); IRIS Report,
‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’ (SportAccord, 13 February
2012), p 7 (‘sport is proving to be particularly helpless in the face of the transnational resources
available to contemporary criminal organisations. The public authorities are concerned by the risk
of sport being penetrated by those criminal organisations that use it to launder the fruits of their
activities with virtual impunity. Concern for public order is now combined with the need to preserve
the image and place of sport in society as being a force for social cohesion and education for different
generations’); Froysnes, Seminar on sports betting and anti-money laundering (Brussels, 11 December
2012) (‘If we do not take the required measures, sport ethics will be challenged and the image of sport
will suffer: all the benefits we expect from sport in democratic societies (education, health, integration
[…]) will be threatened. Moreover, sport, as well as betting economies, which are very important
economic sectors, will collapse due to lack of confidence. If we do not take measures now, organised
crime will expand its influence over more and more sports competitors and officials. It will mean a
failure of defending the Rule of law in a very important sector of our societies’). The City of London
Police decided to act in the Fallon case (see para B4.49) because ‘the gambling industry within the
UK produces £9 billion profit. If the allegations made proved correct, it could have damaged not only
the reputation of the horse racing industry, but the UK economy itself’. Rice, ‘City of London Police,
Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), para 1.9.
In the Nicosia Declaration of September 2012 (ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/b1/eusf2012-
nicosia-declaration-fight-against-match-fixing.pdf), the EU Sports Ministers declared their view that
‘pwwrosecution of serious match-fixing cases, and notably of those with cross-border implications,
should be prioritised’.
3 See Rice, ‘City of London Police, Review of Operation Krypton’ (16 May 2008), para 5.8 (‘Whilst
the Jockey Club had certain powers specifically linked to internal discipline, their powers were limited
compared with the powers of the police. For example, the ability to enter premises and conduct
searches, as well as the power to deploy covert measures, was beyond those of the racing authorities’)
and para 5.9 (‘What soon became apparent was that although [one] individual had been dealt with
under Jockey Club discipline rules, the activity was continuing on a large scale through intermediaries.
The Jockey Club took the view that their powers were insufficient to tackle the problem’).
4 See para B4.40.
5 Ibid.
(b) The Gambling Commission
B4.51 The Gambling Commission1 undertakes investigations into suspected

breaches of the Gambling Act 2005 in its own right and in collaboration with the
police, and has the power to prosecute offenders and/or (under s 336 of the Act) to
order the voiding of bets where it is ‘satisfied that the bet was substantially unfair’.2
Its licensing objectives are to ensure that gambling is crime-free, fair and open, and
that children and vulnerable people are protected.3 This implicates the integrity of
sport only indirectly (in the need to keep the gambling market ‘fair’), and in the first
years after it started operations in 2007 the Commission resisted calls from sport that
it should take a proactive role in protecting the integrity of sport in the context of
sports betting, on the basis that there was little evidence of serious widespread risk to
the three licensing objectives arising from sports betting.4 However, that changed as
a result of pressure from the sports sector, and from the Sports Betting Integrity Panel
established by the Minister for Sport in 2009.5 The Commission now highlights on
its website that, alongside its core statutory objectives, it ‘combat[s] illegal gambling
activities and betting-related corruption in sports’.6
1 See para B4.15.
2 See Gambling Commission, ‘Licensing, Compliance and Enforcement policy statement’ (September
2009), sections 5.41 to 5.47.
3 Gambling Act 2005, s 1.
4 See para B4.14.
5 Ibid.
6 See Gambling Commission, ‘How we regulate the gambling industry’, gamblingcommission.gov.
uk/about/Who-we-are-and-what-we-do/How-we-regulate-the-gambling-industry.aspx [accessed
30 October 2020].
(c) The Sports Betting Intelligence Unit (SBIU)
B4.52 The Gambling Commission established the SBIU at the behest of DCMS,
to implement one of the key recommendations of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel.1
The SBIU’s purpose is to collect and analyse intelligence relating to corrupt activity
in respect of sports betting,2 in order to inform criminal and regulatory investigations
and prosecutions, and to share with ‘other partners, both nationally and internationally’
(including SGBs), so as to ‘help bring together the intelligence efforts of partners
and play its part in protecting sport from corruption’.3 The terms of reference for
the SBIU state that it ‘will produce intelligence products to inform investigative
decision making on the prosecution or disruption of criminal offences (eg cheating at
gambling, in breach of s 42 of the Gambling Act 2005) or regulatory action under the
Gambling Act. Where relevant and appropriate, these intelligence products may be
made available to third parties to assist disciplinary action’; that it will ‘focus upon
collecting and analysing information and intelligence relating to potentially criminal
activity, where that activity relates to a sporting event that occurred in Great Britain,
and/or involves parties based within Great Britain, and/or occurred with a Gambling
Commission licensed operator’; that it will ‘undertake targeted monitoring of betting
on specific events and by specific individuals’ (but not general pre-emptive monitoring
of betting markets or sports events, which ‘remains the role of betting operators and
SGBs’); that it will ‘act as the Commission’s gateway for sports betting intelligence
matters by establishing national and international channels of communication for the
receipt and dissemination of information and intelligence with relevant partners’;
and that it will ‘undertake debriefings of sports betting integrity cases conducted by
the Commission and partners to develop and share knowledge, working practises
and techniques’.4 The latest report regarding the work of the Gambling Commission
through the Sports Betting Intelligence Unit notes that ‘there have been incidents of
corruption in the UK but these seem to generally be opportunistic rather than linked
to organised crime. Based on current evidence, we believe that the risks of systemic
corruption of sports betting and sports activities in the UK are currently less than that
experienced in other jurisdictions’.5 The SBIU has continued to develop its role as the
secure intelligence and information portal between the Gambling Commission, law
enforcement and other agencies. The 2019 SBIU quarterly update showed reporting
engagements with over 30 non-GB countries, over 20 SGBs, and both national and
international law enforcement agencies.6
1 See Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), p 37: (‘Where information/
intelligence becomes available about a suspected breach of sports integrity connected with betting, or
where there may be some doubt as to the specific connection with betting, the Gambling Commission
will make an early assessment of the case, liaising, as necessary, with the betting industry and the
relevant Sports Governing Body. If the Commission assesses that the intelligence analysis and
emerging evidence indicates that a full investigation under section 42 is prudent, then it will inform the
sporting authority that the Commission will be responsible for the further investigation and conduct
of the case. The extent to which such notification may include details of the case will depend upon
the necessary confidentiality issues […]. However, it is important to recognise that the expertise/
experience of a particular sporting body may well add value to a section 42 investigation by the
Commission […] If the Commission decides that the circumstances of the case do not merit a full
section 42 investigation, then it will refer the matter back to the sporting authority to be deal with
[…]. It is envisaged that, in such cases, the Commission will hand over its investigation to date to the
sporting body to facilitate any subsequent development of that investigation by the sports body, with a
view to preferring any disciplinary charge(s) for a hearing before its disciplinary tribunal. This process
will ensure that the sovereignty of a sports body over its own sportsmen and women who break its
rules will be maintained. In respect of its role in the investigation of section 42 offences, the Gambling
Commission will also take an early view on the possible complexity of any case. If […] it concludes
that the case may require additional Police powers of investigation (eg covert surveillance/interception
of communications), then it will liaise with Police to discuss the way forward. […] At some stage in
that process, it may become clear that the circumstances do not merit a criminal enquiry and the matter
can best be dealt with by referring it back to a Sports Body to deal with its own sportsmen and women
as it sees fit under its own disciplinary process. Breaking down the various elements of the operational
process within a new pan-sports integrity unit, sited within the Gambling Commission, will mean
that the Commission becomes the real time “playmaker” in dealing with the receipt and analysis of
information/intelligence on all suspicious incidents in any way connected with betting integrity, the
development of the case and gathering of evidence, to the point where a decision has to be made on
how best to deal with it, (i) as a criminal investigation under section 42 (Gambling Commission or
Police only) or (ii) to refer back to a sport to deal with under its own discipline rules’).
The Report concluded that the unit should be housed at the Gambling Commission because it already
has significant powers of enquiry and empowerment to prosecute the offence of cheating and void bets,
and betting operators are obliged pursuant to their licensing conditions to report suspicious betting
activity to it. In support of this proposal, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel also recommended that
additional resources be established within the Gambling Commission for such purposes, including, most
notably, the appointment of an executive with specific responsibility for sports betting. Ibid, pp 37–38.
2 Sports Betting Intelligence Unit Terms of Reference, December 2018, para 2.1; ‘Protecting betting
integrity’, Gambling Commission, May 2019.
The main intelligence captured by the SBIU is information from licensed betting operators provided
under licence condition 15.1 about suspicious betting patterns on events. (See para B4.47). However,
members of the public can also provide intelligence, including by using dedicated email and phone
lines (including a ‘confidential intelligence line’), and other sources of intelligence include SGBs, law
enforcement, other Commission work or other regulators, and the media. See Gambling Commission,
‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ (December 2010),
para 3.1.
3 Gambling Commission, ‘Sports Betting Intelligence Unit terms of reference’ (December 2018),
para 2.1.
4 Ibid.
5 ‘Protecting betting integrity’, Gambling Commission, May 2019, para 1.7.
6 Sports Betting Integrity Quarterly Snapshot October 2019’, Sports Betting Intelligence Unit.
B4.53 The Sports Betting Integrity Panel also recommended that the Gambling
Commission and the police ‘provide greater clarity of expectation over when a
particular incident might be treated as a criminal investigation or a sports disciplinary
matter; and the circumstances under which police co-operation or, indeed, a police
lead would be appropriate’.1 In December 2010, the Commission published ‘The
Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’ for the first
time, in an attempt to provide that clarity. The latest iteration of the framework
was published in August 2017.2 This document states that the SBIU first assesses
the intelligence it has received to establish whether there is any potential criminal
activity and also:
‘whether the activity falls within its terms of reference, in particular whether the
activity relates to a sporting event that occurred in Great Britain, and/or involves
parties based within Great Britain, and/or occurred with a Gambling Commission
licensed operator’.3
If it does not consider that the matter should be referred for criminal investigation (for
example, because it involves a breach of sporting rules but not a crime), then it cannot
use its investigative powers to progress the matter, but instead will simply refer it to
the SGB to investigate and proceed as it sees fit.4 If the Commission believes criminal
investigation may be appropriate, its enforcement team will hold a case conference,
usually in consultation with the police, to determine whether the scope and scale of
criminality are sufficiently high, or other special factors exist that militate in favour
of criminal prosecution (such as the need to send a deterrent message, or the need
to set a precedent), or else whether the matter is better dealt with by the SGB (and/
or the betting operator).5 The document notes that criminal prosecution for cheating
at gambling will often take a long time and cost a lot of money, since it would be
necessary to establish the corrupt relationships and flow of money to the criminal
standard of proof; it therefore suggests that the better course in most cases would be
to refer the matter to the SGB to take action based on the lesser standard of proof
usually found in its rules.6 It concludes:
‘a SGB applying a sanction is likely to be a quicker and less costly deterrent than the
Commission or police pursuing a criminal sanction. As such there is a presumption
that only more serious cases would potentially be appropriate for a criminal
sanction’.7
1 Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February 2010), para 1.16. More specifically, it called for
‘development of agreed criteria/thresholds for determining whether carriage of an investigation/case
management should be undertaken by Sports Governing Bodies, the Gambling Commission or the
Police’. Ibid, p 13.
2 Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’
(December 2010), revised and updated (August 2017). Unless otherwise indicated paragraph
references below refer to the August 2017 version.
3 Ibid, para 3.3.
4 Ibid, para 3.7: ‘Our investigatory powers, such as those under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 (RIPA) and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), can only be utilised when investigating (which
covers intelligence work as well as enforcement work) a potential crime. As such we could not use our
powers once we consider an issue unsuitable for investigation’.
5 Ibid, paras 3.14 to 3.17.
6 Ibid, paras 2.
7 Ibid, 2010 version, paras 3–14. This statement does not appear in the 2017 version. Instead ‘each
case will be considered on its merits and appropriate action taken dependent on the circumstances’ (at
para 2.9).
B4.54 In the same document, the Gambling Commission stated that it ‘will
generally work with relevant SGBs and betting operators during the investigation
process’,1 and that it may share information with them during investigations, given
that they may prepare or progress disciplinary cases at the same time as a criminal
investigation, although it warns that ‘[t]hese should be the subject of joint discussions
to ensure neither the criminal nor the disciplinary action could negatively impact on
the other’.2
1 Gambling Commission, ‘The Gambling Commission’s betting integrity decision making framework’
(December 2010), para 3.25. See further para B4.34.
2 Ibid, para 3.27 (para 3.17on the 2013 version).
7 THE FUTURE: A WORLD ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY?
B4.55 Given that match-fixing is now clearly an international enterprise,

encompassing both sport participants and those outside the jurisdiction of sport, with
no respect for national boundaries, many stakeholders have suggested that a new
international agency should be set up to coordinate the fight against match-fixing and
related corruption in sport, following the model of the World Anti-Doping Agency,1
based on a uniform code of anti-corruption rules to be implemented by all sports, and
using the Macolin Convention2 as the vehicle for governments to ratify to commit their
support for that code, including by developing criminal law offences that support the
code and by providing a framework for the sharing of information between different
state authorities and by those authorities with the sports movement.3 While such an
approach offers various potential benefits,4 there remains resistance to the idea to
date, partly (it appears) because of a desire to preserve the ‘autonomy’ of sport,5 and
partly because bailing out the sports movement is currently perhaps not the highest
priority for governments. One further (and perhaps stronger) point against adopting
the WADA model is that it makes no provision for any stakeholders other than sport
and government, whereas in the context of match-fixing it is clear that the betting
industry must be on board as a committed third stakeholder if the enterprise is to have
any chance of success.6
1 As to which, see generally Chapter C2 (The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework).
2 See para B4.17.
3 For example, in January 2011 then-IOC President Jacques Rogge said that the sports movement ‘will
call upon the support of governments the same way we did in 1998 to create the World Anti-Doping
Agency because the sports movement cannot carry on this fight alone’ (‘Federations “must adapt to
money in sport” in fight against illegal betting and corruption’, Sportcal.com, 28 January 2011), while
SportAccord in its November 2011 report suggested that sport could suggest the establishment of
an international policing body with responsibility for collection of intelligence and investigation of
sports match fixing. ‘Sport Accord: Integrity in Sport (understanding and preventing match-fixing)’
(November 2011). See also ‘Calls increase for global body to fight corruption across sport’, Sportcal.
com, 13 October 2010. Meanwhile, WADA Director-General David Howman noted: ‘What we have
suggested is that governments should look at WADA as an appropriate model to address other practices
that challenge the integrity of the sport. […] We have evidence from Interpol and from Major League
Baseball that the people who are fixing betting are the people who are involved in illegal doping’: see
‘Drug gangs run corrupt betting’, theaustralian.com, 9 October 2010. He later added: ‘What I was
saying is don’t reinvent the wheel when you’ve got a system or a process in place which works, where
government works alongside sport. The WADA model was pretty useful. I’m not saying it should be
WADA work, but you can easily expand the WADA model to something that can encompass these
issues. … It’s not different people [involved in match-fixing and involved in trafficking performance-
enhancing drugs]. So if you set up different organisations to deal with the same issue, then you’ve got
a problem of sharing the information’: see ‘WADA warns against criminals taking control in sport’,
playthegame.org, 28 March 2011.
Jacques Rogge stated repeatedly that sport and government have to work together on match-fixing:
‘As a sport federation, we can point out suspicious behaviour in matches. Then comes the second
phase: the support of the government. Only the government can tap phones, issue arrest warrants
and search baggage. Only the government can infiltrate crime networks. Sport needs the government
and the government needs sport: only as an alliance can we fight illegal betting’. Braw, ‘You can
cure cancer, but you can’t cure doping and illegal betting’, huffingtonpost.com, 9 January 2012. The
UK Government and others have indicated they agree with that proposition. For example, the then
Australian Sports Minister, Mark Arbib, stated in January 2011: ‘Sport is international and corruption
in sport is international. The best way to fight corruption is to have an international approach that all
governments and sporting bodies sign up to’: ‘UK and Australian Sports Ministers pledge support
for IOC’s anti-corruption drive’, Sportcal.com, 10 January 2011. In February 2012, Baroness Garden
stated: ‘The UK Government agree that the most effective way to tackle this threat is to ensure
effective collaboration between all the parties involved: sports governing bodies, betting operators, law
enforcement agencies and the Gambling Commission’s Sports Betting Intelligence Unit’. Hansard,
9 February 2012, debate on ‘Olympic Games 2012: Match Fixing and Suspicious Betting’, p 12, col
422. And Interpol has also come out publicly in favour of consistent legislation worldwide on ‘sporting
fraud’ and international protocols to promote information-sharing between different national police
forces: ‘Interpol: information-sharing key to tackling match fixing’, 11(2) World Sport Law Report,
February 2013, p 1.
The IRIS Report, ‘Sports betting and corruption – How to preserve the integrity of sport’
(SportAccord, 13 February 2012), p 83, thought that setting up a WADA-style body to fight match-
fixing in sport ‘would seem premature at the moment’, but it did recommend the establishment of a
pan-sport ‘monitoring centre’, at international federation level, ‘to gather together all information that
might be useful to sports organisations on corruption in sport linked with betting’, which it thought
might eventually develop into a fully-fledged ‘agency for the integrity of sport’.
The International Centre for Sports Security (ICSS) launched an international global integrity
platform for sport in 2015, as a nominally independent body (effectively akin to a pressure
group), although it faced significant criticism as to its credibility in light of its stakeholders (ICSS,
governments, NGOs & sport launch integrity platform, 4 November 2015, sportsintegrityinitiative.
com/icss-governments-ngos-sport-launch-integrity-platform/).
Other commentators have noted the potential for a global anti-corruption agency to act as a lobbying
body dealing with both governments and national agencies, thereby leading to an improvement in both
the content of the laws and policies being implemented (‘Corruption in sport – why a global problem
requires a global solution’, LawInSport).
4 If betting operators are to be required to provide betting information to sporting bodies where they
suspect sporting rules have been breached (as they are, for example, in the UK: see para B4.47), that
task becomes a great deal easier (and therefore their assistance becomes a lot more effective) if they
can refer to a uniform code that is applicable in every sport. The same applies to law enforcement
bodies who are being asked to turn over information that they have obtained in the exercise of their
state investigative powers. Meanwhile, doubts about whether a sports body will deal competently and
appropriately with such information are addressed if there are uniform standards for data-processing
underlying the uniform code and if the uniform code provides for transparency and accountability by
giving third parties such as the international agency the right to oversee disciplinary proceedings and
rights of appeal to the CAS if the outcome is inconsistent with the uniform code (as does the World
Anti-Doping Code).
More fundamentally, governments are going to want to know that every sport has adopted rules that
are fit for purpose, and to which they can confidently provide their support.
In addition, experience with the World Anti-Doping Code has shown that the adoption of one uniform
code across all sports contributes greatly to legal certainty and consistency, and (by expressing the
view of the entire sporting movement about what rules and sanctions are necessary to combat doping
in sport) creates a regime that is highly resistant to legal challenge: see para Cx.xx. Furthermore, a
similar code in the area of match-fixing would deal with the problem of recognition of sanctions across
different countries and sports.
5 For example, the Sports Betting Integrity Panel strongly recommended ‘that the Government respects
Sports Governing Bodies’ autonomy and independence in the formulation of their own rules and
regulations in relation to sports betting, thus recognising the specificity of individual sports and the
different considerations which each sport needs to take into account’. It also asserted that there were
‘major difficulties’ in seeking consistent sanctions across all sports for betting offences, ‘not least
because of the fact that not all sportspersons’ careers had the same or similar longevity (contrast the
length of a golfer’s career compared to that of a footballer or rugby player). The impact and financial
repercussions, loss of congenial employment, etc caused by the same prescriptive ban or suspension
may, as a consequence, be considerably different’. Report of the Sports Betting Integrity Panel (February
2010), pp 12, 16 and 19. See also ICSS report on Sport Integrity Symposium, 11–13 September 2012,
p 16 (‘Federations are also keen to retain sovereignty over their own sport, determining the exact form
and application of the rules, as they believe that, while principles of integrity may be universal, the
exact application will differ from sport to sport. Furthermore, they are concerned about referral to an
outside body that would then interfere with the running of the organization and dictate rule changes
and punishments, excluding the federation from the process and keeping information from them. It is
feared that this may result in a loss of respect and authority for the federation, who may appear unable
or unwilling to deal with integrity breaches. In general, federations clearly desire to maintain their
position as sole contact for concerns within their sport, and develop and implement their own codes of
conduct’). Cf the Australian Governments’ National Policy on Match-Fixing in Sport (10 June 2011),
para 4.6 (‘penalties should be broadly consistent across sporting codes’).
6 See also ‘Rogge: Betting operators should help finance sport and its battle against match-fixing’,
Sportcal.com, 1 March 2011 (‘Creating a new body would not be creating a new WADA. WADA
works with one single code, one list of forbidden drugs, one set of sanctions. With betting, we would
be working much more closely with countries’ [existing] legislation. It could be an agency, but it
would be a different kind of agency. It can only work with the close co-operation of the three partners.
The sports movement has to educate sportsmen and their entourages and has to monitor its own
competitions. Then it must send the information to public authorities. Betting operators must agree
to give information whenever there is an irregular pattern of betting. Governments must agree to tap
phones and search bags’). See eg Chappelet, ‘The role of governments in the fight against corruption
in sport’ (18 March 2011), playthegame.org/news/comments/2011/the-role-of-governments-in-the-
fight-against-corruption-in-sport/ [accessed 30 October 2020]. (‘WADA’s model of parity between
governments and the sports movement is probably not the best. A third type of actors is actually
fundamental here: companies that manage the legal betting market estimated at several hundred billion
Euros a year. These companies should co-finance this international agency together with the sports
movement because they have, as have sports organisations, a vital interest in preserving a clean sport’).
CHAPTER B5
Regulating Financial Fair Play

Nick Craig (English Football League), and Jonathan Taylor QC and Sam Beer
(both Bird & Bird LLP)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B5.1
2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY................................................. B5.9
A Transparency of ownership of clubs............................................................ B5.10
B Dual association........................................................................................... B5.16
C Third party interests..................................................................................... B5.18
D Inter-game debt............................................................................................ B5.35
3 CLUB LICENSING............................................................................................. B5.41
A Licensing systems in rugby union................................................................ B5.42
B Licensing systems at national level in football............................................ B5.43
C The UEFA licensing system......................................................................... B5.45
4 COST CONTROLS............................................................................................. B5.69
A Break-even requirements............................................................................. B5.71
B Salary caps................................................................................................... B5.100
C Formula One................................................................................................ B5.124
5 WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY............................................ B5.131
A Some basic principles of insolvency law..................................................... B5.133
B A typical club insolvency............................................................................. B5.138
1 INTRODUCTION1
B5.1 There are many reasons why a sports governing body or competition
organiser (SGB) may consider it necessary to regulate ownership of a member club
and/or how the club’s finances are run. An owner who is unfit may bring not only the
club but also the competitions in which the club participates into disrepute, and/or
may run the club (which may be considered a ‘community asset’) into the ground.
Meanwhile a club that does not live within its means, that gambles everything on
huge player expenditure in pursuit of the massive rewards that come with on-field
success,2 risks not only its own future but also the financial well-being of other clubs
and players to whom it owes money, thereby destabilising the whole competition.
Without regulation, there is a risk that other clubs will feel forced to join in the
speculation in order to compete with their profligate colleagues, and the entire
enterprise could spiral out of control, with multiple club failures along the way. But
even if a club were to have limitless cash to spend, that raises its own issues of
unfairness (‘financial doping’) for SGBs that are trying to maintain a level playing-
field with some semblance of competitive balance between clubs and therefore at
least some degree of uncertainty of outcome.
1 The contents of this chapter represent the personal views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the sporting bodies they represent.
2 Take, for example, the English Football League Championship Play-off Final, often described as the
world’s richest club football match, because the prize for winning is promotion to the English Premier
League, which leads to a guaranteed annual income of £95m or more from central broadcasting and
sponsorship revenues alone. Even if the club is relegated after only one season, it is also guaranteed
to receive millions in ‘parachute payments’ in each of the following three seasons (assuming it is
not re-promoted), which themselves eclipse anything the English Football League can offer by
way of distributions of commercial revenues. According to estimates by Deloitte, the guaranteed
income generated by winning the 2018/19 Play Off Final would be about £170m. See deloitte.com/
uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/derby-and-villa-battle-for-biggest-prize-in-world-football.html
[accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.2 Various SGBs have therefore adopted regulations that are intended to
ensure one or more forms of ‘financial fair play’. For example, UEFA states that the
objectives behind its Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations1 are:
(a) to promote and improve ‘the standard of all aspects of football in Europe and to
give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every club’;
(b) ‘to ensure that clubs have an adequate level of management and organisation’;
(c) ‘to adapt clubs’ sporting infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media
representatives with suitable, well-equipped and safe facilities’;
(d) ‘to protect the integrity and smooth running of the UEFA club competitions’;
(e) ‘to allow the development of benchmarking for clubs in financial, sporting,
legal, personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria throughout
Europe’;
(f) ‘to improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their
transparency and credibility’;
(g) ‘the protection of creditors and to ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with
players, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually’;
(h) ‘to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances’;
(i) ‘to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues’;
(j) ‘to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football’; and
(k) ‘to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football’.
Other SGBs, in football and other sports, state that the same or similar objectives
underlie their own sets of financial regulations.2
1 Article 2 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations 2018.
2 See para B5.94 (English Football League), para B5.103-B5.104 (Rugby Football League), and para
B5.108 (Premier Rugby).
B5.3 Regulations that restrict a club’s ability to deal with its assets and to invest
its resources as it sees fit in order to compete with its rivals appear at first glance
to be a paradigm of anti-competitive interference that competition law is designed
to prevent.1 However, the European Commission stated in the working paper that
accompanied its White Paper on Sport that:
‘legitimate objectives of sporting rules will normally relate to the “organisation and
proper conduct of competitive sport’’ and may include, eg, the ensuring of fair sport
competitions with equal chances for all athletes, the ensuring of uncertainty of results,
[…] the protection of the safety of spectators, the encouragement of training of young
athletes, the ensuring of financial stability of sport clubs/teams or the ensuring of a
uniform and consistent exercise of a given sport (the ‘rules of the game’)’.2
Similarly, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)3 has recognised that the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations:
‘not only serve a private interest, but also a public interest in that the overarching
objectives of these regulations are […] inter alia to encourage clubs to operate on
the basis of their own revenues, to introduce more discipline and rationality in club
football finance, to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of
football and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club
football’.4
If the underlying objectives are legitimate, they justify regulatory intervention,
provided that any restrictions that the regulations impose on the rights and freedoms
Regulating Financial Fair Play 579
of participants in the sport are limited to what is necessary and proportionate to the
achievement of those objectives.5
1 See generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport).
2 Para 2.1.5 Annex 1 to the EC Staff Working Document – ‘The EU and Sport: Background and Context’
– Accompanying document to the White Paper on Sport. See also European Parliament Resolution
2016/2145(INI), para 33 (welcoming UEFA Club Licensing Regulations because ‘they encourage
more economic rationality and better standards of financial management in professional sports, with a
focus on the long-term as opposed to the short-term, thereby contributing to the healthy and sustainable
development of sport in Europe; […] Financial Fair Play has encouraged better financial management
standards and should therefore be applied strictly’).
3 See Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).
4 Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, para 103.
5 See paras B5.16 et seq (rules prohibiting multiple ownership), paras B5.21 et seq (rules prohibiting
third party influence over the sale of a club’s players), paras B5.45 et seq (UEFA’s financial fair play
rules), para B5.94 et seq (EFL’s financial fair play rules), and para B5.108 et seq (Premier Rugby’s
salary cap rules).
B5.4 National laws often impose various controls that ought to help ensure
that clubs and teams are run on a sustainable basis. For example, in the UK most
professional sports clubs are run as public or private limited companies,1 and therefore
have the following legal obligations:
(a) All companies must file annual financial accounts at Companies House within
a prescribed period after the end of their financial year. The accounts must
be audited by an independent firm of auditors, and those auditors have both
statutory and common law duties to ensure that the accounts as filed fairly
reflect the club’s financial position, including addressing whether there is any
issue about its ability to continue as a ‘going concern’, ie has the ability to meet
its debts as they become due. A failure by the company to file such audited
accounts can lead to the striking off of the company (such that it ceases to exist)
and even criminal prosecution for the directors who cause the default.
(b) Tax legislation imposes on any employer the obligation to deduct income tax
and national insurance contributions from employees’ wages at source and to
account for the same to HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on a monthly basis
throughout the tax year. Again, penalties will follow for companies that default.2
(c) Company law also imposes a general duty on the directors of a company to
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole,
and requires the directors to take into account:
(i) the likely long-term consequences of any decision;
(ii) the interests of the company’s employees;
(iii) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers,
customers, and others;
(iv) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the
environment;
(v) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high
standards of business conduct;
(vi) the need to act fairly as between members of the company; and
(vii) the interests of creditors.3
(d) Additional legal duties are imposed on directors in circumstances where it
appears a company may be insolvent, whether on a cash-flow or balance sheet
basis. The consequences for individual directors who breach those duties can
be significant.4
1 See para A2.41 et seq (private and public limited companies).
2 See Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations), Section 5. Most if not all professional football
clubs are now required to account for PAYE and NIC on a monthly basis.
3 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006.
4 See para B5.132.
B5.5 Some SGBs have made a failure to meet certain of the statutory requirements
outlined above a breach of their own competition rules, triggering a right for the SGB
to intervene. For example:
(a) Each of the Rugby Football League (RFL), Rugby Football Union (RFU),
The Football Association (The FA), and the English Football League (EFL)
requires its member clubs to file their annual audited accounts with the SGB.1
Where a failure to do so indicates potential financial instability, the SGB’s
rules give it the power to take action. For example, where the RFL ‘reasonably
has concerns for a club’s stability’, it can apply ‘special measures’, including
requirements to submit to an audit and provide a detailed financial forecast, as
well as restrictions on entering new contracts with players.2
(b) Both the RFL and the EFL require member clubs to declare to them any non-
payment of PAYE/NIC owed to HMRC, and to authorise HMRC to disclose
any defaults to them direct.3 Under the EFL rules, non-payment of PAYE/NIC
triggers an automatic embargo on the registration of players until the default is
cleared.4
There is a clear sporting justification for adding this layer of regulation on top of
what is already provided by statute. For example, a club might not be filing its
annual accounts because it is having trouble persuading its independent auditors
that it remains a going concern, which any SGB would want to know as soon as
possible; while any club failing to pay PAYE and NIC on its player wages when due
could reasonably be considered to be trading beyond its means and as such should
be subject to tighter controls in terms of future player signings than those who are
paying the PAYE and NIC on their player wage bill on time each month.
1 See RFL Operational Rule A3:9, RFU Reg 5.1, FA Rule I, and EFL Reg 16.2 respectively.
2 See RFL Operational Rule A3:3.
3 See RFL Rule A3:2 and EFL Reg 17.
4 EFL Reg 17.3.
B5.6 However, history has demonstrated that these legal requirements are
inadequate in and of themselves to address the mischiefs identified above, and
therefore SGBs have had to enhance the protections for their own competitions
through further regulation. In many cases SGBs have been put under pressure from
external bodies, most notably government,1 supporters, and the press, to adopt more
and tighter controls in respect of the ownership and finances of clubs participating in
their respective sports. As a result, an SGB that fails to regulate ‘financial fair play’
adequately risks being accused of failing in its duty to its stakeholders to safeguard
the long-term future of its competitions.
1 See in particular the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee’s consistent questioning of the
adequacy of English football governing bodies’ regulation of the ownership and finances of English
football clubs, discussed at para A3.102, and also at paras B5.13 and B5.145.
B5.7 Lawyers advising SGBs need to understand what different regulatory

approaches are available to address these various concerns, and which of them are
most likely to be effective in the sport in issue and to withstand legal challenge.
Lawyers advising clubs need to understand what the regulations applicable to them
require, how clubs can avoid falling foul of them, and what is to be done where there
is a suggestion that the clubs they advise – or their rivals1 – may have fallen foul of
the rules.
1 It might be argued that clubs owe a duty of financial fair play not only to the competition organiser but
also to the other clubs in the competition, including running their businesses rationally, paying all of
their debts as they become due (to other clubs, to HMRC, to trade creditors, and so on), and complying
with any cost control constraints imposed on all clubs by the SGB. It would not be fair if one club was
able (for example) to outspend its rivals for players because it was not paying off debts it owed, but
instead was living beyond its means.
Some SGBs have taken steps to impose such inter-club duties as a matter of contract in their
regulations. For example, Premier League Rule B.16 provides that ‘In all matters and transactions
relating to the League each Club shall behave towards each other Club and the League with the utmost
good faith’. In other contexts, the courts have construed similarly phrased obligations as requiring
the obligated party ‘to adhere to the spirit of the contract, […] to observe reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing, and to be faithful to the agreed common purpose, and to act consistently with
the justified expectations of the parties’. CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Co
[2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch) at para 246; Berkeley Community Villages Ltd v Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330,
para 97; Health & Case Management Ltd v Physiotherapy Network Ltd [2018] EWHC 869 (QB).
‘The duty is not a duty to prefer the interests of the other contracting party. It is, rather, a duty to
recognise and to have due regard to the legitimate interests of both the parties in the enjoyment of the
fruits of the contract as delineated by its terms’. CPC Group Ltd v Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment
Co [2010] EWHC 1535 (Ch) at para 240, quoting with approval the Australian case of Overlook v
Foxtel [2002] NSWSC 17. In other words, the party that is required to act in good faith is still entitled
to act in its own interests, ‘so long as pursuit of those interests does not entail unreasonable interference
with the enjoyment of a benefit conferred by the express terms so that the enjoyment becomes (or
could become) nugatory, worthless, or, perhaps, seriously undermined’. Gold Group Properties Ltd
v BDW Trading Co. [2010] EWHC 1632 (TCC). However, while there have been several high profile
cases of an SGB bringing action against a club for breach of the applicable rules (See eg, paras B5.99
and B5.114), the only case to date of which the authors are aware of one club suing another club for
such breach is the claim brought by Sheffield United against West Ham for damages after West Ham’s
breach of the rules of third party ownership in relation to Carlos Tevez helped West Ham to avoid
relegation at Sheffield United’s expense: see para B5.22 and para E7.27.
This issue has now been considered by CAS, in the context of qualification for UEFA club
competitions. In June 2015 UEFA had to consider whether Olympiakos, the champions of the
Greek domestic league in season 2014/15, should be eligible for the UEFA Champions League
following allegations of involvement in match fixing (see, more generally, para B4.11 and B4.12).
After completion of the internal appeals process, Olympiakos were admitted to the competition.
Panathinaikos, the runners up in the Greek league, who also qualified for the Champions League but
in an earlier qualifying round, sought to appeal that decision before CAS. Panathinaikos v UEFA and
Olympiakos, CAS 2015/A/4151, and the CAS panel ruled that Panathinaikos’ appeal was admissible,
because Article 62 of the UEFA Statutes provided that ‘only parties directly affected by a decision
may appeal to CAS […]’, and earlier CAS cases had found that ‘the UEFA statute does not exclude
the possibility that a third party can also be a party, ie a person against whom the measure taken by the
Association is not directly aimed’, if the decision also disposes of the rights of the third party, because
it is then directly affected by the decision (citing Sport Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD & Victoria
Sport Clube v UEFA & FC Porto Futebol SAD, CAS 2008/A/1583 & 1584). However, the CAS panel
found that Panathinaikos could not establish it had sufficient standing to pursue the appeal, because
the competition had already started so the ‘admissions’ phase was over and the club could not show
that it would automatically take Olympiakos’ place rather than other clubs more recently eliminated
from the competition in the play-offs. Panathinaikos v UEFA and Olympiakos, CAS 2015/A/4151,
paras 147–149.
In light of the above, SGBs should consider whether it is appropriate either (a) to regulate the manner
in which third party claims are considered, or (b) to prohibit them (as, for example, the EFL prohibits
third party actions in the context of enforcement of its Profitability & Sustainability Rules: see Rule
4.4 (‘Each Club shall, at all times and in all matters within the scope of these Rules behave with
the utmost good faith both towards The League and the other Clubs (provided always that only The
League shall have the right to bring any action whatsoever for any alleged breach of this requirement)’.
B5.8 This chapter therefore surveys some of the different regulations that SGBs
have adopted to ensure ‘financial fair play’ by their member clubs and discusses
how those regulations have stood up to legal challenge (Sections 2 to 4). And it also
discusses the particular issues that an SGB has to address when everything goes
wrong and a member club becomes insolvent (Section 5).
2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
B5.9 Transparency and accountability are at the heart of good governance.1 What
is at issue, though, is the degree of transparency required. For example, is it right
that supporters of a particular club have available to them details of each and every
shareholder of the club, together with full access to the accounting records of the
club? Alternatively, should supporters be expected to trust the SGB to gather all
relevant information and regulate the club accordingly? Or is there a balance to be

struck between the two? Various approaches have been tried to date.
1 See further para A5.21 et seq.
A Transparency of ownership of clubs
B5.10 Many would argue that even the sports clubs that are not owned by
supporters’ trusts but instead are privately owned (ie all Premier League clubs and
the vast majority of EFL clubs) are assets of their communities, a focal point of local
identity and pride. Supporters want their clubs to be successful, but a club is no good
to a supporter if it has to be liquidated because it has been run recklessly in a bid for
promotion, still less if it has been stripped of its assets by its owner. Requiring clubs
to disclose the identity of their owners helps ensure that they are held accountable for
their actions, and for the achievements (or otherwise) of the club, by the supporters
and wider public.1
1 See eg Premier League Rule G5 and EFL Reg 113, requiring member clubs to publish on their websites
details of any person holding a ‘Significant Interest’ in that club. A Significant Interest is set at a legal
and/or beneficial holding of 10 per cent or more of the voting rights in the club. Rights of associates
are taken together, as are rights of persons deemed to be ‘acting in concert’ (as that term is used in the
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers).
B5.11 Complete transparency of ownership is also of crucial importance to the

SGB. First, it means the SGB knows who is ultimately responsible for the club’s
finances, including providing any necessary support for its spending commitments.1
Secondly, it enables the SGB to ensure that the rules prohibiting common ownership
of clubs in the same competition are being respected.2 Thirdly, it means the SGB can
check the owners do not have any blemishes on their record that should disqualify
them from owning a ‘community asset’ such as a football club.
1 For example, whenever there is a change in control of a club (defined, broadly, as acquisition, eg,
by share purchase, of the ability to appoint the directors and/or to vote at least 30 per cent of the
members’ voting rights), the EFL requires the club not only to file information about the new owners
and directors (see para B5.12) but also ‘future financial information’ identifying projected income
and expenditure over any remainder of the current season plus the next season, and requiring the new
owners to demonstrate the source of funding sufficient to cover any shortfall. See EFL Reg 16.21.
Currently, however, the regulations do not mandate that this is provided before the change in control
takes place, a weakness that played a part in the demise of Bury FC in 2019: see review document cited
at para B5.13 fn 2.
Clubs in the Championship are required to file this information each season, whether or not they have
experienced a change in control: see para B5.51. If their losses are projected to exceed specified limits,
they may be required to provide proof of ‘secure funding’, ie, a legally binding agreement from the owner
to provide the required funds, together with a guarantee or letter of credit or other suitable security. See
EFL Profitability & Sustainability Rules (EFL Regulations, Appendix 5 Part 2), section 2.8.
One recommendation of the Bury Review (see para B5.122), was that the EFL consider extending
the requirement to file future financial information annually to all clubs in all three divisions.
B5.12 Each of the Premier League, the EFL, and The FA therefore requires member
clubs to disclose any new owners or directors, who have to establish that they are not
subject to any ‘disqualifying conditions’ (the ‘Owners’ and Directors’ Test’, formerly
known as the ‘Fit and Proper Persons Test’).1 The test applies to those owning
(whether individually or with associates or in concert with others) 30 per cent or
more of the issued share capital in a club. The test is also intended to identify shadow
directors – a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors
of the company are accustomed to act.2 The disqualifying conditions cover not only
those areas already addressed by English company law (such as disqualification as a
company director), but also matters such as convictions for offences of dishonesty3
or being subject to bans imposed by other SGBs.
1 See Premier League Rules Section F, EFL Reg 22 and Appendix 3, and FA Regulations on Owners and
Directors.
The RFL has a similar rule, which is RFL League Operational Rules Section C3.1. In contrast,
RFU Reg 3.4.3 and the accompanying Declaration at Appendix 1 to Reg 5 only applies where a new
entity is being incorporated, and does not include as many disqualifying conditions as the Premier
League, EFL, FA, and RFL tests.
2 Companies Act 2006, s 251(1). Under s 251(2) a person is not to be regarded as a shadow director by
reason only that the directors act on advice given by them in a professional capacity, under authority
of any enactment, or any direction of a minister of the Crown.
3 In March 2014, Massimo Cellino acquired ownership and control of Leeds United FC. On 18 March 2014,
a court in Cagliari, Italy, issued a judgment in criminal proceedings brought by the Public Prosecutor
of Cagliari, declaring Mr Cellino guilty of the crime of evasion of import tax payable in respect of a
boat. The EFL determined that judgment to be a conviction by a competent court having jurisdiction
outside England and Wales for a like offence to an offence involving a ‘Dishonest Act’, (ie an act that
would reasonably be considered to be dishonest), and therefore disqualified him under the Owners’ and
Directors’ Test. On 5 April 2014, a Professional Conduct Committee (consisting, by agreement of the
parties, of Mr Tim Kerr QC, as he was then) upheld Mr Cellino’s appeal against that decision. Mr Kerr
agreed with the EFL that the Italian court judgment constituted a ‘conviction’, even though under Italian
law the judgment is not final and Mr Cellino was therefore presumed innocent until all appeal rights had
been exhausted. However, Mr Kerr found that the judgment in its summary form did not provide ‘enough
factual information to reach the conclusion that what [Mr Cellino] was convicted of was conduct which
would reasonably considered to be dishonest’. When the reasoned judgment of the Italian court was
subsequently issued, the EFL decided, and on Mr Cellino’s further appeal Mr Kerr agreed, that those
reasons demonstrated that the court had indeed found Mr Cellino guilty of committing the offence with
dishonest intent, but by the time the proceedings were resolved, the period of disqualification remaining
was only a matter of weeks. Had the EFL been applying a subjective test of suitability at the point of
entry, such a convoluted set of proceedings may not have ensued.
B5.13 After the financial collapse and consequent expulsion from the English
Football League of Bury FC in August 2019 led to criticism from the Select
Committee and supporter groups,1 the EFL announced an independent review into the
circumstances leading up to Bury FC’s collapse, with a view to identifying possible
rule changes that might address the concerns of the Select Committee and supporter
groups. The scope of that review was not limited to the Owners’ and Directors’ Test,
but the final report2 noted:
‘Under the OAD Test, no one can become (or remain) an owner or a director (in title
or fact) of a Club unless he or she has disclosed all relevant facts to the EFL, and
the EFL has confirmed (based on that disclosure and its own background checks)
that he or she is not subject to any of the following Disqualifying Conditions: (1)
ownership or involvement in the management or administration of another Club or
PL club (because of the potential conflict of interest); (2) a ban by a football body or
other professional body, or previous failure to comply with the OAD Test disclosure
obligations or the football betting regulations; (3) an unspent conviction for one of
a list of specified offences, or for any offence that results in a prison sentence of at
least 12 months, or is subject to a football banning order, or he or she is a registered
sex offender; (4) disqualification from acting as a company director; or (5) personal
insolvency or prior involvement in two football club insolvencies (whether with
two different clubs or with the same club twice). A Club may be expelled from
membership of the EFL if it fails to remove a person who fails the OAD Test.3
The OAD Test therefore applies a limited set of objective criteria. If those criteria are
met, the test is passed. The OAD Test does not seek to make any further judgment
as to suitability (financial or otherwise) to own or manage a Club. For example, it
does not require proof of availability of funds, or experience of running a football
club, or a track record of rescuing distressed companies or of running a business as
a going concern.
Furthermore, the objective criteria that are applied do not include various criteria
that might be considered relevant to financial suitability. For example, the OAD Test
does not disqualify where there is a track record of company insolvencies (other than
of football clubs), of stripping assets from distressed companies, of failing to ensure
payment of creditors, or of failing to file company accounts.
[…]
This case has highlighted several issues with the EFL Regulations, in particular in
relation to […] the OAD Test. There is no doubt that the EFL applied the OAD Test
properly in relation to [Bury owners] Mr Day and Mr Dale. The question is whether
the test as currently written is fit for purpose. In particular, it only looks at a narrow
list of objective criteria, and does not take into account various other factors that
speak to whether a new owner or director is a fit and proper person to own/run a
member Club.’
1 The Committee’s Inquiry into the Administration of English Football Clubs was launched in September
2019, with an evidence session held on 21 October 2019. Then-chair of the Committee, Damian Collins
MP, said: ‘Systematic and structural problems are responsible for the tragic expulsion of Bury FC from
the League this year. These failures were avoidable, and it is essential that the authorities urgently
overhaul their framework if they wish to avoid the same fate befalling other clubs. We heard time and
again that supporters felt powerless as they watched their beloved club suffer shocking mismanagement
and financial misconduct. The authorities must learn to respect, and act upon, these concerns. If the
reforms we recommend are not introduced forthwith, the only alternative is for the Government to step
in’. See ‘Committee calls for regulatory reforms to English football’, 5 November 2019 (committees.
parliament.uk/committee/378/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/103576/committee-
calls-for-regulatory-reforms-to-english-football/ [accessed 1 November 2020]).
2 Independent review into the events leading up to the expulsion of Bury FC from membership of
the EFL, 20 February 2020, efl.com/-more/governance/reviews/ (‘the Bury Review’) [accessed
1 November 2020].
3 EFL Regulations, Appendix 3, Rule 4.4(b).
B5.14 SGBs have generally avoided expanded their ‘fit and proper person’ tests
beyond narrow objective factors for fear that any subjective judgment that an owner
is not ‘fit and proper’ to own a member club could be met with expensive legal
challenge. However, a regulation needs to go far enough to be effective, and a
decision to rule someone not ‘fit and proper’ would only be challengeable on limited
grounds analogous to those available on judicial review of the decision of a public
body, ie failure to apply the rules properly, procedural unfairness, or irrationality.1
1 See generally Part E (Challenges to the Actions of Sports Governing Bodies), and in particular Chapter
E7 (Grounds of Review Arising out of Control of the Sport).
B5.15 There are various precedents from which SGBs could draw that allow for
subjective judgment. For example, the Finance Act 2010 provides that a charity will
only be eligible for UK charity tax reliefs if the managers of the charity (being those
person having the general control and management of the charity, including directors
or trustees) are regarded as ‘fit and proper’.1 In contrast to the EFL’s bright-line
approach, the legislation does not specify when someone would not be regarded as
fit and proper. Instead a judgment has to be exercised in each case, based on the facts
and circumstances of that case. HMRC has issued guidance as to factors it would
consider to be negative indicators, including where individuals:
(a) have a history of tax fraud;
(b) have a history of other fraudulent behaviour including misrepresentation and/
or identity theft;
(c) are barred from acting as a charity trustee by a charity regulator or court; or
(d) are disqualified from acting as a company director.2
Other statutes create similarly subjective tests in the context of broadcasting,3
financial services,4 and driving instruction.5 In sport, World Athletics’ eligibility
rule for its own officials has a subjective element,6 as does its counterpart in the
constitution of the International Biathlon Union,7 and FIFA has a similar rule that has
been enforced by the CAS.8
1 Finance Act 2010, s 30 and Sch 6, Pt 1, paras 1 and 4.
2 A copy of the full HMRC guidance can be found at gov.uk/government/publications/charities-fit-and-
proper-persons-test/guidance-on-the-fit-and-proper-persons-test [accessed 1 November 2020].
3 Broadcasting Act 1996, s 3(3) and associated guidance issued by Ofcom.
4 Section 60A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The FCA Sourcebook can be found at
handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/FIT.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020].
5 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 123, and in particular s 125(3). Those provisions were considered by the Court
of Appeal in Harris v The Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors {2010] EWCA Civ 808. In the
lead judgment, Richards LJ analysed existing case law to determine the meaning of ‘fit and proper’,
including discussing, at para 20, the formulation adopted by Lord Bingham in R v Crown Court at
Warrington ex parte RBNB [2002] 1 WLR 195: ‘Secondly, some consideration must be given to the
expression “fit and proper” person. This is a portmanteau expression, widely used in many contexts. It
does not lend itself to semantic exegesis or paraphrase and takes its colour from the context in which
it is used. It is an expression directed to ensuring that an applicant for permission to do something has
the personal qualities and professional qualifications reasonably required of a person doing whatever
it is that the applicant seeks permission to do’.
6 Article 65.2 of the World Athletics Constitution (January 2019) requires that all prospective World
Athletics Officials must be confirmed by the Vetting Panel to have (a) satisfied an Integrity Check and
(b) not be subject to any disqualifying conditions. Article 8.2 of the World Athletics Vetting Rules
states: ‘For an Applicant, Existing Official or Specified Staff Member to satisfy an Integrity Check, the
Vetting Panel must decide, on the balance of probabilities, and after considering all relevant information
available to it, that the person: 8.2.1 is able to meet the high standards of conduct and integrity required
of an Official or Specified Staff Member; and 8.2.2 is of good character and reputation; […]’.
7 Article 26.2 of the IBU Constitution (October 2019) lists a series of disqualifying conditions, but
also includes the catch-all (at Art 26.2.11) that the individual ‘fails an assessment, made by the
Vetting Panel in accordance with the Vetting Rules, of whether the person (a) is of good character and
reputation; (b) is able to meet the high standards of conduct and integrity required of an IBU Official;
and (c) is physically and mentally fit to perform the role in question’.
8 See para A5.45 n 5.
B Dual association
B5.16 As already noted, transparency of ownership is also required to prevent

breach of the various rules that exist against multiple ownership of more than one
club in the same competition. For example, English football clubs are subject to
UEFA’s prohibition against any person having ownership or control of two clubs
participating in its competitions.1 In addition, the domestic rules effectively prohibit
multiple ownership of clubs across the Premier League and the EFL, via the Owners’
and Directors’ Test, by preventing someone becoming an owner or director of a
club in one of those competitions if they, either directly or indirectly, are involved
in or have any power to determine or influence the management or administration
of another club in the Premier League or the EFL.2 Each also prohibits an owner
or director from holding or acquiring any significant interest (ie more than 10
per cent shareholding)4 in a club while they either directly or indirectly hold any
interest in any class of shares of another club (though each only applies within the
Premier League and the EFL separately, rather than across both).3 Separately, the
EFL Regulations restrict persons from having any interest at all an EFL club if they
(or one of their associates) already have an interest (of any size) in another club in
the United Kingdom or Ireland, without the prior written consent of the EFL board.5
Further, the EFL Regulations restrict any EFL club having an association with or
influence over the running of any club in the United Kingdom or Ireland, without the
consent of the EFL board. This includes:
(a) holding or applying to hold any shares or securities of another club;
(b) issuing any shares or granting any holding to another club;
(c) lending money to or borrowing money from another club to guarantee its debts
or obligations; and
(d) having any power to determine or influence the management or administration
of another club or permitting another club to do the same.6
The Premier League imposes a similarly-worded restriction but it is:
(a) an absolute prohibition (rather than subject to board approval); and
(b) only applicable to English and Welsh clubs.7
Since these restrictions generally only apply to clubs in England and Wales (with the
exception of some of the EFL Regulations that also apply in Ireland and Scotland),
it is possible for an individual to own a football club in the Premier League or EFL
while also owning and/or having an interest in foreign clubs throughout Europe or
worldwide (although UEFA’s rules would prevent any such clubs from competing
against one another in UEFA competitions).
1 See Art 5.01 of the Regulations of the UEFA Champions League 2018-21 Cycle, 2019/20 Season. The
UEFA Club Financial Control Body considered the test for “decisive influence” under Art 5.01.c.iv
in case no AC-01/2017 in the context of Red Bull’s influence over Red Bull Salzburg and Red Bull
Leipzig. It concluded that the bar was ‘a high one, requiring the ability to direct the decision making
of both Clubs by any means’ (para 41) and that Red Bull’s relationship with Red Bull Salzburg was a
standard sponsorship relationship that did not reach the level of decisive influence.
2 Premier League Rule F.1.2 and EFL Regulations Appendix 5.
3 Premier League Rule F.1.3 and A.179 (and also I.5) and EFL Regulations Appendix 5.
4 Premier League Rule I.5.
5 EFL Reg 105.1.
6 EFL Reg 104.1.
7 Premier League Rule I.1.
B5.17 UEFA’s rules against multiple ownership were the subject of unsuccessful
challenge in the landmark AEK Athens case.1 After three of the quarter-finalists at
the 1997/98 UEFA Cup Winners’ Cup (AEK Athens, Slavia Prague and Vicenza)
were majority-owned by subsidiaries of the same British company, ENIC plc, UEFA
implemented restrictions against ownership of multiple teams in the same UEFA
competition. Under the new restrictions, since AEK Athens and Slavia Prague had both
qualified to compete in the 1998/99 UEFA Cup competition, AEK Athens was removed
from the competition on the basis that it had a lower coefficient than Slavia Prague. Both
clubs then challenged the rule on several grounds, including infringement of Swiss and
European competition law and the EU guarantee of free movement of capital. Having
initially stayed the implementation of the restrictions for the 1998/99 season due to the
lack of time given to affected clubs to comply,2 the CAS eventually held that:
(a) the aim of the rule, ‘preserving the authenticity and uncertainty of results
– by preventing the conflict of interest inherent in commonly owned clubs
participating in the same football competition – is certainly to be considered in
principle as a legitimate justification’;3
(b) the UEFA rule ‘is an essential feature for the organization of a professional
football competition and is not more extensive than necessary to serve the
fundamental goal of preventing conflicts of interest which would be publicly
perceived as affecting the authenticity, and thus the uncertainty, of results in
UEFA competitions’;4
(c) however, ‘there is an obvious need for a reasonable period of time before entry
into force, or else the implementation of the Contested Rule may turn out to be
excessively detrimental to commonly controlled clubs and their owners’.5
Accordingly, the CAS upheld the validity of the UEFA rule but declared that there
should be a further delay in its implementation (until the 2000/01 season) to allow
commonly owned clubs to adjust their plans.
1 AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, discussed at paras B1.36 and E11.123.
2 See para B1.21.
3 AEK PAE and SK Slavia Praha v UEFA, CAS 98/2000, para 153.
4 Ibid, para 136.
5 Ibid, para 161.
C Third-party interests
B5.18 Ownership of specific club assets can also raise regulatory concerns. For
example, in certain territories, most notably South American countries, Spain, Italy,
and Portugal, a system had developed whereby the rights in relation to the registration
of a player are divided into three distinct transactions:
(a) the employment contract between the club and the player, whereby the player
agrees to play for the club;1
(b) the ‘registration right’, being the right of the club to register the player with
the relevant national federation and to have the player play for the club in the
national federation’s competitions;2 and
(c) the ‘economic right’, being the right to receive the proceeds from any transfer
of the player’s registration to another club.3
Ownership of or interest in the third type of right, the ‘economic right’, is now
commonly referred to as ‘third-party ownership’, or (depending on the extent of the
economic right held) ‘third party investment’.
1 See Chapter F1 (Playing Contracts).
2 Sometimes described as a ‘federative right’. For an early example of litigation on other questions
but involving a player so owned, see Sunderland FC v Uruguay Montevideo, Nunez and Betencur
[2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 828, 26 April 2001, Blofeld J (attempt by Sunderland to avoid transfer
contract and player contract on the grounds of misrepresentation and mistake as to the identity of
the club transferring the player. Blofeld J held on the hearing of an interim injunction that fraud was
not made out; action in relation to innocent misrepresentation and mistake settled before trial. The
confusion over the identity of the club transferring the player arose out of the disparate ownership of
the registration right and economic rights in him).
3 The authority for the existence of these separate rights can be found in RCD Espanyol De Barcelona
Sad v Club Athletico Velez Sarsfield, CAS 2004/A/635, para 64, where the panel said: ‘In the Panel’s
opinion, in professional football a basic legal distinction is to be made between the registration
of a player and the economic rights related to a player’. See also discussion along similar lines in
RCD Mallorca v Club Atletico Lanus, CAS 2004/A/781.
B5.19 This model has allowed investors to put money into bringing players out of
poverty and having them trained at clubs, and to profit from doing so if the players
succeed and are sold on by the club for a significant fee. The players benefit, as
they otherwise might have been deprived of a chance to play at the highest level.
The clubs benefit, because they had the use of talented players that they would not
have had the financial means to bring on themselves. The investors benefit through
the very substantial profit that they make if a player they have invested in turned out
to be major talent. Rather like record companies justifying the profits they make on
recording artists, the investors would justify the return they made by reference to the
many players whom they brought on who did not succeed.
B5.20 The first difficulty, however, is that the third-party investors’ interests in the
player could conflict with those of the club that holds his registration. While the club
may want to keep the player, the third-party investors would want to maximise their
return by seeing him transferred (not always only to reap an immediate financial
reward, but also to advance his career), and would seek to include provisions in the
agreement to protect that interest. On the face of it, that affords third parties influence
over the playing decisions of the club. The second difficulty is that the model appears
to remove to a substantial degree the player’s autonomy and freedom of choice as to
where he plays. The third issue is the impact of the financial arrangements with the
third party in the context of financial controls imposed on member clubs. As a result
of these concerns, SGBs have felt it necessary to intervene by regulation to restrict or
even prohibit such investments.1
1 In addition to the following paragraphs, see also para F3.36 et seq.
(a) Third-party influence

B5.21 Third party influence is considered to arise where someone other than
the employer or employee has influence over the affairs of the club or player in
an employment relationship. In football, such arrangements are now expressly

prohibited by Article 18bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (RSTP), which provides:
‘No club shall enter into a contract which enables any other party to that contract or
any third party to acquire the ability to influence in employment and transfer-related
matters its independence, its policies or the performance of its teams.’
That regulation is deemed to be binding at national level and is to be incorporated
into the national association’s rules without modification.1 FIFA published a detailed
guide to the regulation, and cases interpreting and applying it, in September 2020.2
1 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Art 1(3)(a). Even where the national
association has failed to implement the regulation directly in its own statutes, it has been held that the
direct applicability wording of Art 1 is such as to enable the national association to take action in any
event. See the commentary by Pekka Albert Aho on the case of the Finnish FA v Tampere United in
(2011) 9(6) World Sports Law Report. In that case the rules of the Finnish Football Association did
not contain a provision implementing Article 18bis at the national level. They did, however require all
members to abide by the rules and decision of FIFA. The Finnish domestic dispute resolution body
agreed with FIFA’s representations that this was sufficient for the domestic governing body to apply
Art 18bis. In any event, many national associations have complied with the requirements of Art 1(3)
(a) and introduced their own provisions. See for example Football Association Rule C1.2.3 and Third
Party Interest in Players Regulations Rule A.1, and Art 60.2 of the Swiss Football Association’s Game
Regulations.
2 FIFA Manual on ‘TPI’ and “TPO’ in Football Agreements, September 2020, available at img.fifa.com/
image/upload/jhre73qeqmjn6hzi81rn.pdf [accessed 29 November 2020].
B5.22 In the most famous case involving third party influence, the economic rights
in the Argentine international players Carlos Tevez and Javier Mascherano were owned
by third parties that wished to find them clubs in Europe to showcase their talents and
so increase their transfer value. Arrangements were made for the players to sign with
West Ham on a basis that effectively allowed the third parties to determine when the
players would be transferred from West Ham and at what price. As a result, West Ham
obtained the playing services of two highly talented players without having to pay the
type of transfer fee that would have been required to sign the players without such
third-party rights over their future transfers. When West Ham registered the players, it
failed to disclose the nature of the third-party interests, and in particular its contractual
arrangements with the third parties. When the Premier League discovered the
arrangements, it charged the club with breaching the Premier League’s rules requiring
the exercise of good faith1 and prohibiting third party influence.2 While Mascherano
had been transferred to Liverpool in the January 2007 transfer window, before West
Ham’s breaches had emerged, Carlos Tevez had almost single-handedly kept West Ham
in the Premiership in 2006/07, at the expense of Sheffield United, who were relegated
in West Ham’s place, so that West Ham got a significant benefit from its serious breach
of the rules. Despite this, the Premier League disciplinary panel decided not to deduct
points from West Ham (a decision open to it under the rules), and instead imposed a
fine of some £5 million, a sanction that was considerably less than the transfer value
of the players and did nothing to redress the competitive imbalance created by the
club’s breach.3 Sheffield Utd sought unsuccessfully to challenge the sanction as too
lenient, contending that the only sanction that would restore competitive balance was
a deduction of points, which would have led to West Ham being relegated in place
of Sheffield Utd. The FA Rule K arbitrators held that Sheffield Utd had standing to
challenge the decision of the disciplinary body. They also held that if they had made
the initial decision, they would have imposed a deduction of points. However they
concluded that the decision to impose only a fine was not outside the range of decisions
rationally open to the disciplinary body, and that they therefore could not set it aside
in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction.4 The Commercial Court rejected the
club’s attempt to appeal the arbitration award on a point of law, concluding that the
appeal was in reality as to the application of the law, and not as to what the law was.5
Sheffield Utd was left having to play its next season in the Championship, and to sue
West Ham for compensation.6
1 See para B5.7 fn 1.
2 Premier League Rule I.7, on which FIFA based Art 18bis of the FIFA Regulations on the Status and
Transfer of Players.
3 FAPL v West Ham United, FAPL Disciplinary Commission decision dated 27 April 2007, discussed
further at para E2.40.
4 Sheffield United v FAPL, FA Arbitration Panel (Sir Philip Otton, David Pannick QC and Nick Randall),
reported in (2007) ISLR-SLR 77, and see paras E7.27–E7.30.
5 Sheffield Utd v FAPL, 13 July 2007, Smith J [Comm Ct].
6 Sheffield United and West Ham jointly announced a settlement in March 2009, without making details
of the settlement terms public: telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/competitions/premier-league/4981170/
West-Ham-and-Sheffield-United-reach-out-of-court-settlement-over-Carlos-Tevez-affair.html
[accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.23 More recently, following investigations into alleged breaches by Chelsea

FC of FIFA regulations relating to overseas transfer of minors, FIFA also identified
two cases where the players had been registered with overseas clubs but Chelsea
had entered into option agreements with those clubs (Rangers and Ajax) to acquire
the registrations of the minor players at a future date. The options included what
Chelsea and the other clubs regarded as relatively standard terms to protect Chelsea’s
interests pending the transfer of the player to Chelsea. For example, one agreement
provided that the overseas club would:
(a) retain the player’s registration until the due transfer date;
(b) ‘release [the player] for such periods of training and development or
participation in friendly matches or tours as Chelsea shall reasonably require’;
and
(c) not negotiate the transfer of the player to any other club without Chelsea’s
consent.
After investigation FIFA charged Chelsea with breach of the Article 18bis prohibition
on third party includes (as well as breach of the rules on overseas transfer of minors).
In response, Chelsea argued that there was no actual influence, and that the clauses
complained of were in effect ‘boilerplate’ standard clauses. In January 2019, the
FIFA Disciplinary Committee found that Chelsea had breached Article 18bis by
‘having concluded agreements which enable it to influence other clubs’ policies
and transfer-related matters’, and had breached Article 19 in relation to transfer of
minor players, and banned the club from signing players for two successive transfer
windows and imposed a fine of CHF 600,000.1 In April 2019, the FIFA Appeal
Committee rejected Chelsea’s appeal against that decision. It found that the intent of
Article 18bis was clear, being aimed at:
‘prohibiting clubs from signing any agreement that would entitle another party to
that agreement or a third party to practice any sort of influence on it with respect
to employment and transfer-related matters. Additionally, the provision prohibits
clubs from entering into an agreement that entitles them to influence another
club. Therefore, it is evident from the plain understanding of such article that the
legislator’s intention was to ensure that clubs could always take their decisions
independently of any external body. […] Furthermore, it must be clarified that a
club would violate art. 18bis of the RSTP not only if it has materially influenced the
independence and policies of another club with respect to employment and transfer-
related matters, but also when the contract in question effectively entitles the club to
have an influence on the other club in such matters, regardless of whether or not this
influence actually materialises’.2
It found that the provisions in question clearly breached Article 18bis because they
prevented the other clubs holding or loaning their players as they saw fit.3
1 FIFA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 6 January 2019, 160620 TMS ENG ZH.
2 FIFA Appeal Committee decision dated 4 April 2019, paras 51-53, copy available for download at
resources.fifa.com/image/upload/apc-160620-11-04-2019-club-chelsea-fc.pdf?cloudid=xoyz3gkc4u1
8rbsellqr [accessed 1 November 2020].
3 Ibid at paras 174–181.
B5.24 Chelsea appealed to the CAS. Its application for provisional measures
(getting the transfer ban suspended pending appeal) was rejected, and therefore it
was barred from signing players during the 2019 summer transfer window. However,
in December 2019 the CAS upheld Chelsea’s appeal in part, finding that the club
had breached the rules in significantly fewer and less serious cases than had been
determined by the FIFA Appeal Committee:
(a) The CAS reduced the club’s violations in relation to the transfer/first registration
of minors from the 98 found by the FIFA Appeal Committee to just 18,1 and
concluded that ‘the Club’s overall degree of guilt was quite low, and in any
event much less than that found by the FIFA disciplinary bodies’.2
(b) In relation to the third-party ownership violations (RSTP, 18bis para 1), the
CAS overturned the Appeal Committee’s finding in its entirety on the basis that:
‘to have contractual rights vis-a-vis a club for just a single player normally does
not amount to having the level of influence on another club required to trigger the
application of Article l8bis, para 1, RSTP, ie “the ability to influence in employment
and transfer-related matters its independence, its policies or the performance
of its teams”. In the vast majority of cases the proper interpretation of the terms
“independence”, “policies” and “performance of teams” requires much more than
a contractual obligation related to one player. In the Sole Arbitrator’s view, unless
a single player is so exceptionally important for a given club that an agreement
like the ones at hand can demonstrably influence that club’s sporting and economic
behaviour, there must be a network of similar agreements for various players that,
aligned together, can truly influence the “independence”, “policies” or “performance
of teams” of a club’.
(c) The panel also noted that it was important to consider ‘the relative standing,
prominence and market power of the involved clubs. It would be illogical, after
all, to consider that important clubs such as Rangers or Ajax, well-known on
the European stage, could be influenced in their “independence”, “policies” or
“performance of teams” based just on the obligations respectively undertaken
in reference to’ the two players.3
The CAS panel therefore decreased the two-window ban to one (which had already
been served at the time of the award) and reduced the fine to CHF 300,000.4
1 Chelsea Football Club Limited v FIFA, CAS 2019/A/6301, paras 128, 149-151, 159, 164 and 170 (as
summarised at para 180).
2 Ibid at para 196.
3 Ibid at paras 177–179.
4 Ibid at para 198.
(b) Third-party investment
B5.25 Club A may own the economic rights in a player registered with Club B (for
example, because Club A has loaned the player to Club B but the registration will be
transferred back to Club A at the end of the loan period). As a result, it is presently
lawful in most jurisdictions not only for another club but also for a third party to hold
or be assigned the economic rights in a player, so long as the third party has no ability
to influence the club to which the player is registered. This is commonly referred to
as ‘third-party investment’ (or ownership).1
1 The validity of arrangements where investors have an economic interest in the proceeds of the sale of
the registration of a player, but no influence over when he is sold or for how much, was addressed in
relation to the player Fabiano in Rio Football Services v Sevilla [2010] EWHC 2446 (QB), 6 October
2010, summary judgment hearing before Edwards-Stuart J. A range of challenges to the lawfulness
of the arrangements (including slavery, restraint of trade, penalty, and breach of the FIFA Rules) was
brought. The challenges failed, where the arrangements were limited to contractual obligations owed
by the signing club to pay to the investor a calculable amount upon the player being sold, or upon an
offer above a certain amount being made, when the signing club could not be obliged to sell or not to
sell. A critic of third party investment might however say that in practice, because the club might not
be able to afford to buy out the investment in this way upon the receipt of an offer that it did not wish
to take up but that was over the threshold, it might in practice be forced to sell a player it wished to
retain.
B5.26 However, in addition to the generic prohibition of third party influence,

some national football associations and some leagues chose to regulate (and in
some cases even prohibit) third party investment specifically, on the basis that while
there may be no express ability to affect a club’s decisions, in practice there may be
considerable influence, which will often be nearly impossible to prevent, or even to
discover. As the CAS put it in RFC Seraing:
‘the TPO has raised significant concerns among the public and football institutions
over issues such as the integrity of competitions, the opacity of the activities of TPO
investors, the risk of manipulation of results, money laundering and other criminal
activities, as well as ethical issues such as the concepts of ownership and trade in the
economic rights of the players themselves’.1
1 RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, para 18.
B5.27 Examples of such regulation in Europe included:

(a) The French Football League, which led the way, having introduced in the early
1990s what is now Art 220 of the 2019/20 Regulations, which provides that
a club cannot conclude a contract with any third party (with the exception
of another club) that directly or indirectly results in such person acquiring
or being granted all or some of the economic rights in the player (ie in the
transfer fees to which the club is entitled when transferring the registration of
that player to another club). Failure to comply will result in a fine equivalent
(at least) to the amount of the third-party interest, and may lead to restrictions
on future player signings.1
(b) The English Premier League has Premier League Rule U.36, which provides
that clubs may only ‘make or receive a payment or incur any liability as a
result of or in connection with the proposed or actual registration (whether
permanent or temporary), transfer of registration or employment by it of a
Player’2 in specified circumstances that are linked directly to other parts of the
regulations, eg payment of transfer fees,3 levies,4 or wages.5 Clubs may assign
future instalments of incoming transfer fees only where the transfer agreement
has already been concluded, and only then to recognised financial institutions.6
(c) The EFL’s Regulation 50.1 mirrors Premier League Rule U.36.
(d) The Football Association’s Third-Party Interest in Players Regulations adopt
provisions similar in effect to the Premier League and EFL rules.7
1 lfp.fr/reglements/ 2019_2020/reglement_integral.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020], Art 220.
2 Premier League Rule U.36.
3 Premier League Rule U.36.1
7 See FA Handbook Season 2019/20, p 357. The FA Regulations were considered in The Football
Association v (1) Queens Park Rangers FC and (2) Gianni Paladini (FA Regulatory Commission,
20th May 2011). The independent FA Regulatory Commission fined the club a record amount for
failing to notify arrangements that might allow third party influence over a signed player. The FA had
however also charged the club with breach of what is now FA Rule C1.2.3, which provides (amongst
other things) as follows: ‘No Club shall enter into a contract which enables any party to that contract to
acquire the ability to materially influence the Club’s policies or the performance of its teams in Matches
and/or Competitions’. A third party had rights in respect of the QPR player Alejandro Faurlin, but
those rights were suspended by an oral agreement between the club and the third party for the duration
of the playing contract. On this basis that charge was held not to have been made out. The case is a
good illustration of the difficulty in proving violations of the rules with respect to third party interests,
and the importance of properly framing charges. Breaches of ancillary non-disclosure regulations
(requiring the disclosure of the existence of third-party agreements) are more straightforward to prove.
B5.28 In contrast, other European leagues, for example the Portuguese league,
argued that to prohibit such arrangements was unnecessarily restrictive of a
mechanism that promoted player development in poorer nations. Examples include
the so-called ‘Benfica Stars Fund’ in Portugal, established in 2009, and raising €40m
for the benefit of the club. FC Porto annually published details of those players who
are subject to third party interests, including breaking down the percentages owned
by third parties. As of June 2011, the economic rights of only three members of
FC Porto’s 19-man squad were owned outright by the football club; the rights of all
the remaining 16 players were partially owned by third parties.
B5.29 A club in a country that does not prohibit third-party ownership of players
(eg Portugal, Spain, or Italy) could follow the Benfica model and sell a proportion
of the value of its playing squad to generate a surplus in player trading that would
help the club to meet UEFA’s break-even requirement.1 Since 2012, however the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations have provided that such proceeds could only be
recognised as income for purposes of the break-even requirement when the player’s
registration was permanently transferred to another club, a restriction that remains in
effect to this day.2
1 See paras B5.73-B5.90.
2 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations 2018, Annex X Section B(m) provides that ‘Appropriate
adjustments must be made such that any income/profit in respect of a player for whom the licensee
retains the registration is excluded from the calculation of the break-even result. For the avoidance of
doubt, any income/profit arising from the disposal of a player’s economic rights can only be included
as relevant income for the calculation of the break-even result following the permanent transfer of the
player’s registration to another club’.
B5.30 In September 2014, the FIFA Executive Committee banned third party
ownership of players’ economic rights outright, with effect from 1 May 2015.
RSTP Article 18ter was explicit:
‘No club or player shall enter into an agreement with a third party whereby a third
party is being entitled to participate, either in full or in part, in compensation payable
in relation to the future transfer of a player from one club to another, or is being
assigned any rights in relation to a future transfer or transfer compensation’.1
1 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, Art 18ter. See generally FIFA Manual on
‘TPI’ and “TPO’ in Football Agreements, Sept 2020, available at img.fifa.com/image/upload/
jhre73qeqmjn6hzi81rn.pdf [accessed 29 November 2020].
B5.31 The prohibition was challenged almost immediately. On 30 January 2015,

a Belgian club, Royal Football Club Seraing, concluded a third-party ownership
contract with Doyen Sports Investment Limited (Malta), an investment fund that had
entered into similar transactions with clubs across the world. The contract provided
that Doyen would pay the club 300,000 euros for 30 per cent of ‘the financial value
deriving from the federative rights’ of three specific players, meaning that Doyen
would receive 30 per cent of the proceeds of any future transfer of the registration of
any of those players. On 4 September 2015, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee found
RFC Seraing in breach of RSTP Article 18ter, banned the club from signing players
for four transfer windows, and fined it CHF 150,000. The FIFA Appeal Committee
upheld the original decision, and the club appealed to CAS, and as part of its appeal
challenged the legality of Articles 18bis and 18ter on the grounds that the restrictions
constituted unlawful obstacles to the free movement of capital, workers and services,
as well as unlawful restrictions on free competition.1 The CAS panel rejected the
challenges on the basis the restrictions on these freedoms were necessary to the
achievement of legitimate objectives and proportionate to the achievement of those
objectives. The panel’s reasoning was set out most fully in relation to the arguments
about movement of capital (but was repeated in respect of the other arguments):2
‘96. Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP prohibit certain types of financing
agreements for football clubs if they would have the effect of allowing any party
“to acquire, in the course of work or transfers, the capacity to influence the
independence or policy of the club or the performance of its teams” (Article 18bis
of the RSTP) or to allow a third party “to be able to make claims, in whole or in part,
to compensation payable in connection with the future transfer of a player from one
club to another club, or to be granted any right in connection with a future transfer
or transfer compensation” (article 18ter of the RSTP). This is an outright ban on the
financing of clubs by certain investors from certain financing schemes.
97. Therefore, the Panel notes that Articles 18bis and 18ter introduce a restriction
on the movement of capital from, to or between EU Member States relating to the
financing of clubs. […]
100. But if there are obstacles, restrictions to the freedoms guaranteed by the
TFEU are not necessarily prohibited obstacles. Beyond the justifications expressly
provided for by the TFEU, which are not invoked in the present case, the CJEU
accepts restrictions to those freedoms where the restrictive measure “pursues a
legitimate aim and is justified by imperative requirements in the general interest”
and “the application of such a measure [is] suitable for securing the attainment of
the aim in question and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that goal”
(CJEU December 15, 1995, Case C-415/93 “Bosman”, §§104 et seq.; CJEC March
31, 1993, case C-19/92 “Kraus”, § 32). The Panel notes that the case law of the
CJEU thus focuses in practice on the determination of the legitimacy of the goal
pursued as well as the necessity and adequacy of the measure in question to achieve
this goal (CJEU December 15, 1995, case C-415/93 “Bosman”, §§104 et seq.;
CJEU April 13, 2000, case C-176/96 “Lehtonen”, §§ 53 et seq.; CJEU March 16,
2010, case C-325/08 “Olympique Lyonnais”, §§38 et seq.).
101. In the present case, FIFA invokes several goals pursued by the measures in
question, which should be reiterated: preserving the stability of players’ contracts,
guaranteeing the independence and autonomy of clubs and players as regards
recruitment and transfers, safeguarding integrity in football and the fair and equitable
nature of competitions, preventing conflicts of interest and maintaining transparency
in transactions relating to players’ transfers.
102. The Panel notes that RFC Seraing does not challenge the legitimacy of these
goals and expressly recognizes the legitimacy of the goals of preserving the integrity
of competitions and commercial integrity, combating the lack of transparency of
investment in clubs and protecting the professional freedom of players.
103. Without it being necessary to analyse in detail the legitimacy of these goals
since it is not challenged, the Panel notes, without this being exhaustive, that the
goal of preserving the regularity of sporting competitions (CJEU April 13, 2000,
case C-176/96 “Lehtonen”, §§ 53 et seq. ), the balance between clubs and the
uncertainty of results (CJEU December 15, 1995, case C-415/93 “Bosman”, §
106), the sporting integrity of competitions, the prevention of conflicts of interest
and public confidence in the fairness of competition (European Commission, June
25, 2002, case COMP/37 806 “ENIC”, §§ 28 and 37), the integrity and objectivity
of the competition (CJEU July 18, 2006, case C-519/04 “Meca- Medina”, § 43),
the protection of the image and ethics of football (Paris Court of Appeal April 13,
2016, no. 13/20972 “P. v. International Football Federation”), have been deemed
legitimate by the CJEU, the European Commission or courts of EU Member States.
104. Consequently, the Panel, which also endorses the solutions found by the
European Commission and the CJEU in this respect, considers it established that the
goals invoked by FIFA to justify the measures in question and their restrictive effects
are legitimate goals within the meaning of EU case law on the freedoms guaranteed
by the TFEU. […]
108. Following an analysis of the practice of TPO, the Panel considers that this
practice gives rise to numerous risks, in particular: risks linked to the opacity of the
investors in question, who are not subject to any control by the football regulatory
bodies and who are free to sell their investment without any control; risks of
infringing professional freedom and players’ rights by being able to influence their
transfer in a speculative interest; risks of conflicts of interest, or even match-fixing
or manipulation, which are contrary to the integrity of competitions, since the same
investor may carry out TPO in several clubs in the same competition; ethical risks,
since the aim pursued is a speculative financial interest, not based on sporting or
even moral considerations. […]
109. As for the proportionate nature of the prohibition, first of all, the Panel notes
that while Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP are prohibitory measures, these
prohibitions are limited. As FIFA points out, articles 18bis and 18ter do not prohibit
any investment by third parties within the meaning of the RSTP in football clubs.
The only investments prohibited by these measures are those of the so-called “TPO”
type, ie those that allow any person “to acquire, through work or transfers, the ability
to influence the independence or policy of the club or the performance of its teams”
(Article 18bis) and in particular those that allow third parties within the meaning of
the RSTP “to be able to make claims, in whole or in part, to compensation payable
in connection with the future transfer of a player from one club to another club, or to
be granted any right in connection with a future transfer or transfer compensation”
(Article 18ter). Thus, these measures do not prohibit third party investors within
the meaning of the RSTP from financing football clubs, but only prohibit financing
which gives the investor the power to influence the independence and policy of a
club (ie not simply to have an indirect impact on the management of a club as might
be the case with the granting of a loan to be repaid, but may directly impede a club’s
managerial autonomy by being able to bind certain of its decisions), or involve a
contingent right or compensation for the transfer or transfer allowance of players or
its employment relationship (salary, length of employment, etc.). The measures in
question therefore only prohibit certain financing schemes and do not prohibit other
types of financing of football clubs. Therefore, investors wishing to invest capital in
football clubs are free to do so under the many other possible financing schemes.
110. Nor do the measures prohibit the financing by third parties within the meaning of
the RSTP of transfer operations, the financing of specific transfer operations remains
possible, as long as they do not contravene Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP.
111. Thus, contrary to the assertions of RFC Seraing, the measures in question do
not prohibit clubs from using certain sources of funding to finance their recruitment
of players, but only certain funding schemes.
112. Consequently, the Panel notes that the prohibition introduced by Articles 18bis
and 18ter of the RSTP has a limited character, does not have the consequence of
prohibiting certain investors from having access to the financing of football clubs
or, as claimed by the Appellant, of establishing a “circularity” in the economy or
financing of football. […]
121. Consequently, the Panel considers that the restrictions on the free movement of
capital resulting from Articles 18bis and 18ter of the RSTP are justified and adapted
to the achievement of the legitimate goals pursued by these measures.’
1 RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490. See case discussion at asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/rfc-

seraing-at-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sport-how-fifa-s-tpo-ban-survived-again-eu-law-scrutiny
[accessed 1 November 2020]. The club also argued that FIFA’s rules were contrary to the ECHR and
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (as a violation of privacy rights), Swiss law, and CAS case
law. The CAS dismissed the arguments on Article 8 of the ECHR and Swiss law on the basis that they
were insufficiently developed by the club (paras 147 and 160 respectively). It then held that Art 7 of
the Charter was inapplicable (para 148) and that the cited CAS case law was not binding and was not
relevant to the case (paras 163 and 165 respectively).
2 RFC Seraing v FIFA, CAS 2016/A/4490, paras 123 and 138.
B5.32 The club and Doyen appealed the CAS award before the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on a number of procedural grounds but also on grounds of substantive public
policy.1 On 20 February 2018, the Swiss Federal Tribunal dismissed the appeal.2 In
addition, the European Commission declined to open a formal investigation into the
compatibility of RSTP Article 18 with EU competition rules.3
1 See para D2.14.
2 X v FIFA, 4A_260/2017, decision of Swiss Federal Tribunal dated 20 February 2018, discussed in
sportlegis.com/2018/09/10/the-swiss-federal-judgment-in-the-third-party-ownership-case-fc-seraing-
v-fifa-and-the-decision-of-the-brussels-court-of-appeal-a-parallel-universe/ [accessed 1 November
2020]. See further para D2.14.
3 football-legal.com/content/tpo-the-european-commission-rejects-the-claim-of-doyen-sports-and-the-
belgian-club-of-nbsp-rfc-seraing (31 December 2017) [accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.33 Separately, the club and Doyen had also commenced proceedings against
FIFA and UEFA in the Belgian state courts, again challenging the legality of FIFA’s
ban on third party ownership arrangements. The attempt to have five questions
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) regarding the validity
of Article 18bis and 18ter was rejected at first instance on jurisdictional grounds.
On appeal, the Belgian Court of Appeal issued an interim ruling that the arbitration
clause in favour of CAS in the FIFA statutes did not bind RFC Seraing to submit
the dispute to CAS arbitration,1 but in December 2019 the Belgian Court of Appeal
rejected the club’s claims on the merits. FIFA reported that the court ruled that the
CAS award and the SFT judgment had res judicata effect, and so confirmed the
validity of the disciplinary sanctions imposed on RFC Seraing for infringing the
FIFA RSTP, and in addition confirmed that ‘the appellants did not bring to the Court
convincing arguments to doubt about the legitimate objectives of the FIFA rules’.2
1 18th Chamber of the Brussels Court of Appeal of August 29, 2018 (2018/6348), discussed in sportlegis.
com/2018/09/10/the-swiss-federal-judgment-in-the-third-party-ownership-case-fc-seraing-v-fifa-and-
the-decision-of-the-brussels-court-of-appeal-a-parallel-universe/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
2 fifa.com/who-we-are/news/fifa-welcomes-brussels-court-of-appeal-ruling-on-fifa-s-tpo-and-tpi-rules,
13 December 2019 [accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.34 With the RFC Searing case finally over, the chances appear small of a
successful challenge in the future to the FIFA prohibitions (and, consequently,
the respective domestic prohibitions) on both third-party influence and third-party
investment.
D Inter-game debt
B5.35 Clubs participating in the same competitions are forced to trade with one
another, most pertinently in the purchase and sale of registrations of players, but also
in relation to gate receipts and the like. Allowing one club to default on payment of
its debts to another club undermines the integrity of the competition, as one club is
playing by the (off-field) rules but the other is not and is thereby gaining an advantage.
It also has a potential domino effect, since a club not receiving expected payments
from debtor clubs may therefore have to delay payments to creditor clubs.
B5.36 Various SGBs therefore require full payment of all inter-game debts
as a condition of ongoing membership. Although it is the EFL’s version of this
rule (referred to as the ‘Football Creditor Rule’) that has attracted most attention
(unsurprisingly, given football’s high profile and the number of football clubs that
have experienced financial difficulties), similar rules operate in other UK-based team
sports, as well as at a European level:
(a) Article 48 of the EFL Articles of Association gives the EFL board the power
to impose sanctions on any member club that defaults on payment to any of
the creditors listed within Article 48, and requires the board to redirect central
distributions that would otherwise be paid to a defaulting club to satisfy those
creditors. Creditors include the EFL itself, the Premier League, The Football
Association, central pension schemes, other clubs, and the club’s employees
(but only in respect of arrears of remuneration due prior to termination of
employment, and expressly excluding claims relating to termination of
employment and damages for wrongful dismissal).1
(b) Premier League Rules E.26 to E.29 give the Premier League board similar
powers in relation to its member clubs.
(c) RFL Operational Rule A3:14 gives the RFL the power to deduct any amounts
that a club owes to the RFL, Super League Europe, any of their respective
‘commercial partners or suppliers’, and any club or other person subject to
the Operational Rules (which would include players), from any amounts ‘then
due or which at any time thereafter may become due to that Club’ from RFL
distributions, to be ‘used to meet such debt/s’.
(d) RFU Regulation 5.8.3 gives the RFU the power to set off against any funding
that it gives to a club any sums that the club owes to it for whatever reason.
(e) Article 49 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations (2018) provides that an
applicant club must not have any ‘overdue payables’ to other football clubs as
at 31 March immediately preceding the competition in question, relating to
transfer activities that occurred prior to the previous 31 December. Similarly,
under Art 50, the club must also be able to demonstrate that it has no ‘overdue
payables’ to employees or (under Art 50bis) social/tax authorities dating from
prior to the previous 31 December.2 Given the revenues that the club would
lose if it is not licensed to play in UEFA competitions the following season, this
is a strong incentive to ensure such debts are paid as a priority.
1 Those creditors are referred to as ‘Football Creditors’ and accordingly reference to the so-called
‘football creditor rule’ is technically a reference only to Art 48. However, in common parlance it
instead refers to the obligation to meet similar debts in full as a condition of continuing membership
following insolvency, which is dealt with at paras B5.144–B5.147.
2 In a manner similar to the HMRC reporting imposed by the RFL and EFL in England: see para
B5.5(b).
B5.37 The RFU provision effectively creates an express contractual right of set off
as between governing body and member1 that arguably does no more than confirm
what would be permitted in any event under the doctrine of equitable set off. Equitable
set off applies where party A is indebted to party B, but at the same time party B is
indebted to party A, and the two claims are so closely connected that it would be
manifestly unjust to allow party B to enforce payment against party A without taking
into account party A’s claim against party B.2 The PL, EFL and RFL provisions also
mirror that principle, but they go further in permitting those SGBs to set off against
amounts they owe a member club the debts owed by the member club to other clubs,
employees, and other third parties. In such circumstances, the principle of equitable
set off is unlikely to apply because there is no mutuality as between the various
parties, ie party A cannot set off some of its liability to party B simply because party
B owes money to party C.3
1 It is already established that the Articles of Association of a company operate as a contract as between
the company and its members (Companies Act 2006, s 33), and that the rules of a governing body also
constitute a contract as between the governing body and the members (see paras A1.55, B1.51, and
E8.3, and see EFL Reg 3.1).
2 Geldof Metaalconstructie NV v Simon Carves Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 667 at para 43(vi).
3 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] AC 785.
B5.38 The operation of the principle of set off in the context of the Football
Creditor Rule has been much criticised in the press, courts, and Parliament. However,
those criticisms have focused not on the operation of the rules as outlined above, but
on the application of the same rules within the context of the insolvency of member
clubs, which is discussed in Section 5, below.
B5.39 The EFL also incentivises financial prudence, and protects all member clubs
from financial imprudence by other member clubs, by providing in Article 45.3 of
its Articles of Association that ‘payments [of central distributions] to Member Clubs
under the Articles only become a legal liability of The League to a Member Club
if the Member Club completes all of its fixture obligations to The League for the
relevant Season’. The rationale for that approach was considered by the High Court
in HMRC v The Football League Limited,1 a case that rejected the argument that the
preference given to football creditors on a football club’s insolvency infringed the
insolvency laws.2 The court observed that:
‘[…] there are valid reasons for viewing participation in the [EFL’s] competitions
as a single venture for the entire season. For example, the point of The League
competition, and its value, lies in the fact that each club plays every other club in
the same division twice in the season. Failure by a club to finish a season creates
obvious problems for the competition, meaning for example that all previous results
of matches involving that club have to be disregarded. The competition is devalued
even if only one club drops out during the season and would in effect be destroyed
if a number did so.’
1 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch).
2 See para B5.146.
B5.40 Where a party has performed only part of an entire contractual obligation,
it can normally recover neither the agreed price (since it is not due under the terms
of the contract) nor any smaller sum for the value of its partial performance (since
the court has no power to apportion the consideration).1 Thus, by setting up an entire
performance contract, and applying the Art 48 right prior to the crystallisation of
the right to payment, the EFL (by agreement with its member clubs) incentivises
all clubs to complete the season, and protects the central pot for the benefit of other
member clubs if any club does fail mid-season.
1 Beale (Ed), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd Edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) at para 21-031 and Cutter v
Powell (1795) 6 TR 320. Similarly, parties to an agreement are able, by express words, to make entire
performance a condition precedent to payment of the contract price. See Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All
E R 176 at 181.
3 CLUB LICENSING
B5.41 One standard way of regulating the financial affairs of clubs is a licensing
system1 whereby a competition organiser requires the clubs to meet certain
requirements in order to be permitted (‘licensed’) to participate in its competitions.
Clubs may be denied access to the competitions if they fail to meet the relevant
criteria, even if they would otherwise qualify on sporting merit.
1 See generally para B1.7.
A Licensing systems in rugby union
B5.42 The regulations of Premier Rugby include minimum standards criteria1 that
the club being promoted from the Championship must satisfy in order to be eligible
for promotion (and that all clubs in the Premiership must satisfy in order to avoid
sanction). One criterion is primacy of tenure: the club must have sufficient control
over scheduling at its stadium so that it can plan matches to satisfy the requirements
of the league and broadcasters. When London Welsh was denied promotion to
the Premiership in 2012 on the basis that it did not satisfy that requirement, the
club challenged the requirement, arguing it distorted competition and therefore
contravened EU and UK competition law. The panel agreed, finding that the restriction
was ‘disproportionate to the objectives it was set to serve, and is accordingly void’.2
Three existing Premiership clubs had been granted an exemption from the primacy of
tenure requirement, but no further exemption was permitted for London Welsh. The
panel found that ‘there was insufficient justification for the current rule, in particular
having regard to the restrictions that it placed on aspirant Championship clubs’. On
the evidence, when the matter was considered by the Premiership clubs in 2011,
it was clear that the rule could be further relaxed to accommodate as many as five
clubs who did not have primacy of tenure; and there would have been no difficulty in
accommodating five clubs at an earlier stage. The RFU ought to have given anxious
consideration to the question whether the restrictive rule could be relaxed further for
London Welsh, and had it done so would have seen that the rule could be relaxed;
having failed to do so, it was not entitled to any margin of appreciation.3 The Welsh
Rugby Union’s licensing rules were also the subject of challenge in 2012, when
Pontypool challenged its relegation to the Welsh Championship on sporting merit on
the basis that other clubs in the Premier Division had failed to satisfy the league’s
licensing requirements, and so Pontypool should not be relegated while they remained
in the Premier Division. The High Court rejected the club’s claim and confirmed that
the WRU had discretion when applying its rules and its ‘discretion to deal with a
situation should not be usurped by the court’.4
1 Premiership Reg 2.6.
2 In the matter of an appeal involving London Welsh Rugby Football Club Limited and the Rugby
Football Union and Newcastle Falcons Rugby Football Club, decision of panel (James Dingemans
QC, Ian Mill QC, Tim Ward QC) dated 29 June 2012, para 49. See also similar decision in 2003 by the
Office of Fair Trading, discussed at para E11.116.
3 London Welsh, ibid, at para 73. A different decision on comparable subject-matter was reached in an
FA Rule K arbitration that same year between Handsworth Football Club and The FA. Handsworth
had been relegated on the basis that it had failed to meet the ground grading standards and appealed
on various grounds including breach of UK and EU competition law. However, the club only raised
arguments in relation to the restriction of competition two days before the hearing (having seen the
London Welsh decision) and the panel dismissed these arguments as improperly pleaded and having
been raised too late.
In News Limited v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited, the High Court of
Australia considered an SGB’s restriction of a league competition to 14 clubs, each granted a three-year
‘franchise’. Existing clubs were allowed to apply to participate and participation was determined in a
transparent and fair process according to objective criteria. Unsuccessful clubs were in effect unable
to compete at all professionally since the closed league was the only available viable tournament in
rugby league. The High Court of Australia rejected a competition law challenge by an excluded club,
finding that no club had been deliberately excluded in the sense of being targeted, that the 14–team
limit was rationally chosen for good commercial and sporting reasons, and that the closed league was
itself justified and proportionate for good commercial and sporting reasons.
4 Park Promotions Ltd t/a Pontypool Rugby Football Club v Welsh Rugby Union [2012] EWHC 2406
(QB), para 45.
B Licensing systems at national level in football
B5.43 The German Bundesliga (DFL) is widely credited with implementing the
first licensing system in football, codifying various regulatory controls over a club’s
operations into a formal licensing regime.1 Any club that fails to meet the terms of
the licence is potentially subject to disciplinary sanction, including (in the severest
cases) being barred from participating in the competition. An excluded club has two
opportunities to appeal to DFL disciplinary bodies, and then a further right of appeal
to the CAS. The German model is rarely criticised and was described by the Culture
Media and Sport Select Committee as a model that English football should emulate.2
1 The Bundesliga provides a summary of its operations in this area on its English language website – dfl.
de/en/topics/licensing/strict-system-of-success-the-licensing-system/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
2 Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I, p 3). For
a historical overview of the German licensing model, see the submission of Christian Müller, former
Chief Financial Officer of the DFL to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (HC 792-III, p
EV w201).
B5.44 In evidence to the Culture Media and Sport Select Committee’s Inquiry into
Football Governance in April 2011, the Premier League’s CEO responded to claims
that English football should operate a club licensing system by asserting that:
‘the reality is we have a licensing system. We have a very much more robust
licensing system now than we did two or three years ago. Our rulebook is effectively
the licensing system for clubs within our league’.1
His point was that the Premier League achieves the same goals as a licensing system
by requiring clubs to accept its rules as a condition of entry and ensuring effective
enforcement of those rules (including any rules as to financial conduct) through the
robust sanctioning of breaches. It would seem the Select Committee did not agree
this was sufficient, as one of its key recommendations was for:
‘[…] the introduction of a formal licensing model imposed rigorously and

consistently throughout professional English football to underpin the self-regulation
measures already introduced by the Premier League and The Football League’.2
Neither body implemented this recommendation. Instead, they continue to permit
entry to the competition based on sporting merit alone,3 and rely on compliance with
the terms of participation in the competition to ensure (among other things) financial
stability and fair play. On the other hand, Premier League clubs that wish to compete
in UEFA competitions (should they qualify based on sporting merit) must obtain a
UEFA licence, as described in the next section.
1 Oral evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 5 April 2011 (HC 792-II, p EV146).
2 Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I, p 3).
3 Although clubs will not be accepted into the EFL from the National League unless they meet the
Qualification Criteria set out at Part 1 of Appendix 1 of the EFL Regulations. This requires the club to
have a ground capacity of at least 4,000 with at least 400 seats and the ability to expand to 5,000 and
500 respectively (which must be achieved by 30 April of the club’s first season in the EFL).
C The UEFA licensing system

B5.45 UEFA first introduced a limited club licensing system in 2004,1 but it was
in 2009 that it first introduced detailed financial requirements that clubs have to meet
in order to be licensed to compete in UEFA competitions.2 The current edition of the
UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations (‘UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations’) was adopted by the UEFA Executive Committee in May 2018. Its
stated objectives are set out at para B5.2. Its key elements of the licensing system are
discussed below.
1 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-licensing/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
2 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/financial-fair-play/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
(a) The licensing process
B5.46 For two reasons, UEFA delegates responsibility to its member national
associations to grant or deny applications by their respective member clubs for a
UEFA licence:1
(a) First, UEFA only has direct relationships with FIFA, its member national
associations, and clubs who participate in its club competitions. Clubs that
aspire to qualify for UEFA club competitions may not, at the time of application,
be subject to UEFA’s regulations. However, they are members of and therefore

subject to the authority of their respective national associations.
(b) Secondly, for the 2017/18 season, almost 700 clubs applied for UEFA licences
across the 55 member national associations, even though only a fraction of that
number actually qualified to participate in UEFA club competitions. Further,
variances in local law/football regulations across the 55 national associations
mean that clubs in different territories have to comply with differing obligations.
To analyse and pass judgment on the financial results of each applicant club
would prove an overwhelming task even for the largest and most well-funded
governing body.
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 5(1). In certain circumstances the national association may
delegate this matter to a domestic league organiser, but in England The FA retains responsibility for
the task under the auspices of its Professional Game Board. See Terms of Reference for the Operation
of the Professional Game Board, para 3.1.14 (FA Handbook 2019/20, p 27).
B5.47 This approach brings with it other advantages. For example, if a national
association is spending time and money administering a licensing regime on behalf
of UEFA, that may encourage it to extend the licensing scheme to all clubs wishing to
participate in its own national-level competitions; in any event the national association
will still be benefiting from the additional skills developed by the people it employs
to administer the UEFA licensing system. In this way, the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations have been instrumental in improving regulatory standards across much
of European football.
B5.48 To avoid inconsistent application, UEFA has invested heavily in the

training and monitoring of national associations, and also sets out in Article 9 of
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations a standardised process for the verification of
the club licensing criteria.1 UEFA monitors the actions of the national associations
and has the right to sanction national associations that fail to apply the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations in accordance with their terms. For example, in the 2017/18
and 2018/19 seasons UEFA subjected 15 national associations to in-depth compliance
assessments, including on-site compliance audits conducted on UEFA’s behalf by
Deloitte and PwC. Four associations were referred for formal investigation, and three
(Albania, Kazakhstan and Serbia) were required to enter into settlement agreements
including undertakings as to future conduct.2
1 Article 9(3) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations: ‘The core process consists of the following
minimum key steps: (a) Submission of the licensing documentation to the licence applicants; (b) Return
of the licensing documentation to the licensor; (c) Assessment of the documentation by the licensing
administration; (d) Submission of the written representation letter to the licensor; (e) Assessment and
decision by the decision-making bodies; (f) Submission of the list of licensing decisions to the UEFA
administration’.
2 Details of the settlement agreements are available at uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-
financial-controlling-body/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.49 Article 7 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations requires the national
federation to set up a two-tier process for licensing decisions. The first instance body
decides whether a licence should be granted to the applicant club and whether a
licence that has been granted should be withdrawn.1 The second instance body is an
appeals body to which a club may appeal against the decision of the first instance
body.2
1 Article 7(2) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.
2 Ibid, Art 7(3).
(b) Financial criteria for grant of UEFA licence

B5.50 The financial criteria that a club must satisfy to be granted a UEFA licence
may be summarised as follows:
(a) The Article 49 requirement not to have overdue payables to other football
clubs, to its employees, and/or to the social/taxation authorities, has already
been mentioned above.1
(b) Article 47 requires clubs to produce finalised and audited annual accounts
by the 31 March deadline for applications (Annual Accounts). If the Annual
Accounts cover a period ending more than six months before 31 March, Art
48 requires the club to submit reviewed or audited interim accounts covering
at least the period up to six months prior to the application date (Interim
Accounts).
(b) Where the Annual Accounts and/or Interim Accounts include any kind of
qualified opinion in respect of the club’s ability to continue as a going concern,
and/or reveal a net liabilities position (negative equity) that has deteriorated
relative to the prior year’s accounts, Article 52 requires the club to prepare
and submit audited ‘future financial information’ (budgeted profit and loss
and cash flows for the period in question, with comparisons against the prior
season, with full commentary and details of assumptions) covering the period
starting from the end of the period covered by the Annual Accounts or Interim
Accounts (as appropriate) and ending no earlier than the end of the season in
which the club hopes to participate in UEFA competitions.
The intention, obviously, is to ensure that the applicant club has the ability to continue
as a going concern at least until the end of the season in which it seeks to participate
in a UEFA competition.
1 See para B5.36.
B5.51 The Premier League and EFL have imposed the same requirements on
clubs in the Premier League and Championship respectively (irrespective of whether
they qualify for UEFA club competitions). Further, the obligation to file future
financial information applies automatically each year to every club, not only where
the club’s annual accounts or interim accounts are qualified.1 However, where the
Premier League and EFL differ from UEFA is that adverse information in a club’s
annual accounts, interim accounts, or future financial information would not result
in the removal of the club from the competition, or prevent it from commencing
the following season. Instead there is a power to impose protective measures, such
as embargos on the signing of new players, and even the ability to require a club to
adhere to a business plan agreed with the Premier League or EFL (as applicable).2
1 Premier League Rule E.11; EFL Reg 16.16.
2 Premier League Rules E.14 and E.15, EFL Regs 16.19 and 16.20.
(c) Conditions not satisfied
B5.52 Where a club demonstrates one of three adverse indicators,1 additional

reporting requirements may be imposed. A breach of some of the requirements of
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations (such as the provisions that a club has a racial
equality practice,2 a minimum infrastructure of training facilities,3 or a supporter
liaison officer4) will not lead to denial of a licence but rather to a fine in an amount
to be determined by the national football association. If any club reports a wage-
to-turnover ratio of 70 per cent or more, or net debt exceeds 100 per cent of total
revenue, further action could be taken, including denial of a UEFA licence.5
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 62(3) (annual accounts or interim accounts containing an
emphasis of matter or qualified opinion in respect of going concern, annual or interim accounts
demonstrating the club has a worsening net liabilities position, and/or overdue payables).
2 Ibid, Art 23.
3 Ibid, Art 26.
4 Ibid, Art 35.
5 Ibid, Art 62(4).
(d) Ongoing financial monitoring
B5.53 The decision to issue a licence is necessarily based on a set of circumstances

at a pre-determined date some time prior to the commencement of the season in
which the club would actually participate in a UEFA competition. To address the
risk that a club’s financial position may deteriorate after that point, including during
the competition itself, the 2010 edition of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations
introduced the concept of ongoing Club Monitoring, which is conducted not by
national associations but rather by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body (CFCB).1
The CFCB monitors clubs’ ongoing compliance with the following requirements by
requiring them to submit ‘monitoring documentation’ to the national FA licensor that
demonstrates the following:
(a) No overdue payables to other football clubs as at 30 June, ie immediately
prior to the start of the relevant season.2 Where a club does have such overdue
payables as of this date, or where UEFA otherwise requests, the club must
demonstrate by 30 September that there are no longer any overdue payables to
other clubs.
(b) No overdue payables to employees and/or social/taxation authorities as at
30 June for any liability accruing up to and including 30 June (ie, there is
no delayed assessment).3 Where the club does have such overdue payables as
of this date, or where UEFA otherwise requests, the club must demonstrate
by 30 September that there are no overdue payables to employees or social/
taxation authorities.
(c) The ‘break-even’ requirement is met (see detailed discussion below).4
(d) The requirement to notify UEFA immediately of any events of ‘major economic
importance’ occurring during the licence season.5
1 Part III of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations (Arts 53–68) sets out the CFCB’s monitoring
responsibilities and requirements and is supplemented by Procedural Rules governing the CFCB’s
operations (uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/Clublicensing/02/60/83/59/2608359_
DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020]). The CFCB itself is divided into two parts – the
investigatory chamber (which investigates clubs’ compliance) and the adjudicatory chamber (which
decides cases referred to it by the Chief Investigator).
2 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 65.
3 Ibid, Art 66.
4 Ibid, Art 64.
5 Ibid, Art 67.
(e) The exception policy
B5.54 UEFA reserves to itself (but not to any national association) the right to
grant certain limited exceptions to the requirements of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations.1 These give UEFA the power, for example, to accommodate variances
due to national law (as long as they do not conflict with UEFA’s objectives) or to
extend implementation dates for specific requirements.
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 4 and Annex 1.B5
B5.55 One key area for the potential grant of exceptions is Art 12(2) and (3) of the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, which requires a club to have been a registered
member of a UEFA member association and/or its affiliated league (or to have had a
contractual relationship with such a registered member) for at least three consecutive
years. Any change to the legal form, legal group structure, or identity of the club may
be deemed an interruption of such membership or contractual relationship. The point
of this rule, as one CAS panel noted, is to avoid clubs circumventing the requirements
of the UEFA licensing system:
‘The panel recognises that this so-called three years rule has been adopted to avoid,
as UEFA put it, “circumvention of the UEFA licensing system”. In particular, clubs
are not to be permitted to create a new company or change their legal structure so
as to “clean up” their balance sheet while leaving their debts in another legal entity
(which is likely to go bankrupt). If allowed, this kind of device would obviously
harm the integrity of competition and would contradict the interest of the sport as
well as putting at risk the interests of creditors’.1
However, there obviously may be situations where a club wishes or needs to change
its legal form for good and valid reasons that do not undermine the objectives of the
UEFA Club Licensing System. In such cases, exceptions are usually granted by the
CFCB Investigatory Chamber (to whom responsibility for considering applications
for exceptions was transferred from the UEFA Executive Committee in 2018).
1 Fotbal Club Timisoara SA v UEFA, CAS 2011/A/2476, para 3.15.
(f) Policing compliance
B5.56 Art 68 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations states:
‘If one of the monitoring requirements is not fulfilled, then the UEFA Club Financial
Control Body makes a decision, including the possibility to conclude a settlement
agreement with the licensee, taking into consideration other factors as defined in
Annex XI, and takes the appropriate measure(s) without delay in accordance with
the procedure defined in the Procedural rules governing the UEFA Club Financial
Control Body.’
The disciplinary measures that the CFCB may impose include a warning; a reprimand;
a fine; deduction of points; withholding of revenues otherwise due from participation
in a UEFA competition; prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions;
restriction on the number of players that a club may register for participation in
UEFA competitions, including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the
employee benefits and expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purposes
of UEFA club competitions; disqualification from competitions in progress and/or
exclusion from future competitions; and withdrawal of a title or award.1 Decisions of
the CFCB may be appealed to CAS, which will decide whether the sanction imposed
for the breach is proportionate in all the circumstances, which will include comparing
it to sanctions imposed by UEFA in similar cases.2
1 Procedural Rules governing the UEFA Club Financial Control Body Art 29 (referred to in UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations, Art 72.2).
2 Ibid, Art 34.2. See, in particular, the discussion in paras B5.59-B5.65 of Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v
UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821.
B5.57 There may be an overlap between the jurisdiction or supervision of the

different bodies set up under the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, in particular
the national licensing authority and the UEFA supervisory body. The fact that
the national licensing authority may have found a club to have complied with the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, or may have already passed some sanction for
non-compliance, does not prevent the CFCB from exercising its own jurisdiction.1
1 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, para 108.
B5.58 A large number of cases has been determined since the adoption of the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, including by the CAS on appeal from decisions
of the CFCB. Copies of the decisions are published on UEFA’s website.1 The
jurisprudence establishes that clubs that are transparent and report accurately their
overdue payables at the assessment dates are usually given additional time to pay
before facing stricter disciplinary measures. On the other hand, if compliance
procedures establish the existence of hidden overdue payables, the clubs concerned
faces harsher disciplinary measures, including exclusion from future participation in
UEFA competitions.
1 uefa.com/insideuefa/protecting-the-game/club-financial-controlling-body/#Cases [accessed 1 November
2020].
B5.59 The case of Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA provided a good case
study of some of the issues that are likely to arise in enforcement of the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations, including the different roles of the national licensing body
(the national football association) and UEFA, the importance of the reporting
requirements, proportionality of sanctions, and the role of the CAS.1
1 CAS 2012/A/2821.
B5.60 Bursaspor had agreed to pay Portsmouth FC €500,000 for the transfer
of Collins Mbesuma from Portsmouth to Bursaspor in July 2007, payable by four
instalments of €100,000 each in August and October 2007 and €150,000 each in
April and August 2008. Bursaspor paid the first two instalments in 2007 but by June
2008 had not paid the third instalment of €150,000. The FA filed a claim against the
Turkish club with the FIFA Players’ Status Committee in January 2011.
B5.61 In March 2011, Bursaspor applied to the Turkish Football Federation (TFF)
for a licence to participate in UEFA competitions in season 2011/12. Article 49 of
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations requires clubs to prepare and submit with the
licence application all transfer activities occurring prior to the previous 31 December.
Bursaspor disclosed that there was a pending dispute with Portsmouth regarding an
overdue payment. On 9 June 2011 the TFF granted Bursaspor a licence to participate
in the 2011/12 UEFA Europa League. Bursaspor generated €250,000 of income from
that participation.
B5.62 In September 2011, the CFCB characterised the overdue payment of the
transfer fee as a breach of indicator 4 in Art 62(3) of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations,1 and asked the club to provide it with a clear explanation of why the
overdue payment was a genuine dispute. The club protested that it would not be fair
to apply any sanction whilst there was a dispute pending before FIFA and then, in
November 2011, paid the sums owed to Portsmouth. UEFA commenced disciplinary
proceedings against the club on the basis that it had failed to meet the requirements of
Art 65,2 because of its overdue ‘payables’ to Portsmouth as at 30 June 2011 and had
failed to meet the requirements of Art 49 by failing to report the overdue payables.
1 Article 62(3) of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations provides that if a licensee exhibits conditions
described by various indicators it is in breach; indicator 4 is that the licensee has overdue payables as
of 30 June of the year that the UEFA club competition commences.
2 Article 65 requires that there are no overdue payables to football clubs as of 30 June of the year that
the UEFA club competition commences.
B5.63 The UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body (CDB) found both breaches to
be proven, fined the club €200,000 and excluded it from one UEFA competition
for which it qualified in the next four years, but suspended the exclusion for a
probationary period of three years, on the basis that, in comparison with sanctions
imposed in other cases, it would be disproportionate not to suspend the exclusion,
and because Bursaspor was otherwise strong financially, and did eventually pay
Portsmouth the overdue amount.
B5.64 UEFA appealed against the decision of the CDB to the UEFA Appeals Body,
arguing that Bursaspor’s offences were so serious that its exclusion from UEFA
competitions should not be suspended. The Appeals Body found that Bursaspor had
‘grossly violated the applicable Regulations’ by creating a false impression that it did
not have any overdue payables on 31 March 2011. It found that the CDB had shown
‘unjustified lenience’ towards the club. The breaches were serious and an exclusion
of at least one year was proportionate. The fact that the club paid the overdue amount
after disciplinary procedure had been opened against it was not a mitigating factor
(presumably because that would act as an incentive for clubs to delay payment). The
Appeals Body decided to exclude the club from one UEFA competition for which it
qualified in the next three years, without suspending that exclusion, but reduced the
fine to €50,000.
B5.65 The club then appealed to the CAS, which made a number of important
findings.
(a) First, there was no dispute that the CAS had jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
Its jurisdiction derived from Art 62.1 of the UEFA Statutes 2010 and Art R47
of the CAS Code.1
(b) Secondly, UEFA had jurisdiction to impose the sanctions. The club had argued
that the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations delegated not only the licensing
but the sanctioning powers under Articles 1–52 of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations to national associations. But while it was true that the TFF was
the licensor,2 the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations set up a monitoring
process for all licensees that qualified for a UEFA competition,3 and UEFA
had competence to impose sanctions in respect of Art 49 of the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations as with the other articles.4
(c) Thirdly, the club had breached Art 65 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations
– there was an overdue payment to Portsmouth at the relevant time. There
was no agreement between Portsmouth and the club to extend the deadline for
payment and Bursaspor had not initiated any legal proceedings contesting its
liability for the claim.
(d) Fourthly, on the other hand, the club had not breached the disclosure obligations
in the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. The CAS underlined the importance
of these obligations, citing the decision in the Győri case that:
‘the disclosure obligations are essential for UEFA to assess the financial situation
of the clubs that are participating in its competitions and for this reason […] the
disclosure must be correct and accurate’.5
Bursaspor had disclosed the overdue amount and not hidden it. UEFA argued
that by declaring that there was a ‘pending dispute’ regarding the overdue
payables when there was never any ‘real dispute’, the club had provided
misleading information. However, the club had disclosed the true facts: the
overdue amount and the fact of a pending dispute. The TFF should have
asked the club to provide a clear explanation concerning the grounds of the
dispute, and the FIFA dispute arose before the disclosure obligations under
Art 65 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations came into force. The case
was distinguishable from the Györi case, which was a case about concealing
information.6
(e) Finally, the CAS ruled that the sanction imposed by the UEFA Appeals Body,
excluding the club from participating in one UEFA competition for which it
qualified in the next three years, was disproportionate.7 Whilst UEFA has a wide
discretion when it comes to sanctioning, account must be taken of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and the principles of proportionality and equal
treatment required a comparison with how other clubs had been sanctioned for
breaching the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. The UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations did not impose any standard sanction, but in view of the specific
circumstances of the case, and given that the breach of Art 65 of the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations occurred during a transitional period, the CAS decided
to suspend the ban for a period of three years, but to increase the fine back up
to €250,000, being the amount by which the club said it had benefited from
competing in the 2011/12 UEFA Cup competition.
1 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821. paras 72–74.
2 By Art 5 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.
3 Article 53 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.
4 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821. paras 86–108.
5 Győri ETO v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702 (discussed at para B5.66), para 136.
6 Bursaspor Kulübü Derneği v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2821, paras 114–127.
B5.66 In the Győri case, the club committed two breaches: it had overdue
payables; and it failed to disclose that fact. The CAS panel found that exclusion
for one season was not disproportionate.1 A different CAS panel also dismissed the
appeal of Beşiktaş against the UEFA Appeals Body’s decision to ban it from UEFA
competitions for one season due to its five different overdue payables totalling €4m.2
Finally, in the Málaga case, the CAS demonstrated that it would be prepared to
uphold a strict and severe application of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations,
dismissing the club’s appeal against a sanction fining it €300,000 and disqualifying
it from participating in the next UEFA competition it would otherwise have qualified
for in the next four seasons.3
1 Győri ETO v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2702. In Győri, the UEFA Appeals Body found that the original
sanction was harsh on the basis that the national association had not bothered seeking an explanation
for the overdue payable despite being on notice. Győri had relied on the national association having
issued a licence and could not therefore be judged too harshly, notwithstanding that the club had
provided misleading documentation. It may therefore be that sanctions will be less harsh where
national associations are complicit in any breach.
2 Beşiktaş JK v UEFA, CAS 2012/A/2824.
3 Málaga Club de Futbol SAD v UEFA, CAS 2013/A/3067.
(7) The impact of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations
B5.67 On 21 March 2012, the European Commission issued a joint statement with
UEFA extolling the virtues of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations:
‘UEFA, as a governing body for football in Europe, will promote [the objectives of
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations] in a balanced and proportionate way, acting
in accordance with all applicable legal rules, and, in particular, within the framework
of EU law. […]
‘The central principle of FFP (namely that clubs should “live within their means”
or “break even”) is based on the notion that football-related income should at least
match football-related expenditure. No business can lay solid foundations for the
future by continually spending more than it earns, or could reasonably be expected
to earn. Thus, the “break even” rule reflects a sound economic principle that will
encourage greater rationality and discipline in club finances and, in so doing, help to
protect the wider interests of football’.
The statement went on to summarise how the measures would be compatible with
EU state aid legislation, and the Commission committed to work with UEFA on fiscal
treatment of clubs across the EU, and compensatory measures that can be requested
from clubs receiving rescue and restructuring aid from public authorities.1
1 Joint Statement of UEFA and the European Commission, 21 March 2012.
B5.68 In January 2020, UEFA published its annual club licensing benchmarking
report for financial year 2018. The report found that 2018 was the second consecutive
year in which there was net aggregate profitability for clubs in Europe’s top divisions.
While profits were down to €140m in 20181 (from €579m in 2017), this was still
a major improvement on the €1.67bn net losses from 2011 (ie before the 2009
amendments to the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations started to have an effect).
Operating profits also contracted from €1.41bn in 2017 to €697m in 2018. The
report suggests that the reduction in operating profit ‘is primarily driven by [a] recent
spike observed in club wages (+9.4 per cent in FY2018)’2 and the reduction in net
profit ‘can be attributed to the compression of clubs’ operating margins as a result
of their cost bases growing faster than their revenue bases’.3 In the introduction,
the UEFA President Aleksander hailed the report as further evidence of the positive
impact of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations:
‘As financial performance has improved, clubs’ financial position has become
significantly healthier, with net assets increasing from less than €2bn to more than
€9bn in the space of a decade, a testament to the success of UEFA’s Financial Fair
Play regulations, the stable European football ecosystem and sustained and sensible
investment’.
1 English clubs were particularly profitable, taking in more than double the aggregate net profit of any
other European league (€382m) (The European Club Footballing Landscape, UEFA Club Licensing
Benchmarking Report Financial Year 2018, p 112).
2 Ibid, p 110.
3 Ibid, p 111.
4 COST CONTROLS
B5.69 While there is no direct, absolute correlation between amounts spent on

players and success on the field, statistically speaking the more a club spends on
players, the more likely it is to be successful on the field.1 It is therefore not surprising
that clubs tend to increase spending on players in an attempt to win promotion up
the league ladder, hoping eventually to reap the riches offered by the highest levels
of club competition (for English football clubs, the Premier League and UEFA
competitions). This leads to two problems: competitive imbalance (because some
teams can afford to spend a lot more than others) and financial instability (as clubs
gamble for the riches available by spending well beyond their means). Many SGBs
have therefore sought to regulate to control costs, in particular (but not only, or
always) expenditure on player wages.
1 See eg S Szymanski, (1998) ‘Why is Manchester United So Successful?’, Business Strategy Review,
9: 47–54 (‘We can state two general principles based on our research: (i) better league performance
leads to higher revenue (ii) increased wage expenditure leads to better league performance’).
B5.70 Cost control measures will vary from sport to sport, and in some cases within
an individual sport. However, the different approaches can be broadly summarised as
follows:
(a) The ‘spend what you earn’ approach (aka ‘break even’), effectively requiring
clubs not to spend more money on player transfer fees and wages than they
generate in income.
(b) The ‘salary cap’ approach, whereby a club’s spending on player wages is
limited to a fixed amount or to a percentage of turnover or other financial
parameter.
(c) The ‘luxury tax’ approach, whereby clubs may spend as much as they want,
but to the extent they exceed certain pre-determined limits they are required
to pay a ‘tax’ to the SGB, usually (but not always) for redistribution to their
competitors.
A Break-even requirements
B5.71 In contrast to a straight salary cap,1 a break-even requirement does not

limit what a club may spend on player wages to a fixed amount. Instead, the club
may spend whatever qualifying income it generates, even if that is far more than its
competitors. So this approach incentivises clubs to maximise their income sources,
and may lessen the chances of a legal challenge from player unions, but it does
nothing to promote competitive balance between the different clubs participating in
the competition.
1 See para B5.100.
B5.72 In addition, the degree to which the ‘break-even’ requirement promotes

sustainability may depend on what income qualifies to be counted for purposes of the
break-even requirement. Clubs have four main sources of cash inflow that may be
used to fund expenditure:
(1) Trading income –amounts generated through trading, including ticket sale
revenue, sponsorship revenue,1 merchandise revenue,2 proceeds of sale of
player registrations,3 and amounts received as central distributions from the
competition organiser in return for participation in a competition (usually, a
share of the revenues from the central sale of broadcasting and sponsorship
rights).4
(2) Equity – money invested by shareholders that is available for the club to use in
meeting its outgoings. These funds would not be returned to the shareholders
unless there is a solvent winding up of the club.
(3) Donations – amounts gifted to the club, whether conditionally or otherwise.
Subject to any conditions, the club is free to use the funds as it pleases.
(4) Loans – an amount lent to the club on condition of repayment at some future
point or on the happening of a specific event. Whilst the cash is received and
may be utilised, the debt will sit on the club’s balance sheet and interest will be
payable at the agreed rate until the debt is discharged or waived.
The question is whether all four should be taken into account for purposes of assessing
compliance with the break-even requirement. In accounting terms, ‘income’ consists
only of amounts generated through trading activities and reflected in a profit and
loss account, and therefore excludes equity infusions (ie proceeds from the issue
of new shares) and shareholder loans, which appear only on the balance sheet.5
In policy terms, allowing clubs to count shareholder loans and equity infusions as
income for purposes of the break-even requirement permits clubs to take on spending
commitments that they can meet only for so long as their owners remain ready,
willing and able to continue to fund them, which carries with it obvious risks.6
1 See Chapter H3 (Sponsorship).
2 See Chapter H5 (Merchandising and Licensing).
3 See Chapter F3 (Player Transfers).
4 Competition organisers usually require participating clubs to agree to the central sale of broadcasting
rights to matches played in the competition, in order to ensure the broadcasting of the competition
complements the other elements of the competition’s commercial programme but also to ensure that
the revenues are distributed in a manner that promotes competitive balance between the participating
clubs. See para E11.238 et seq.
5 Wigan Athletic FC v EFL, League Arbitration Panel decision dated 4 August 2020, paras 65-68 (owner
funding is not income in accounting sense and therefore a failure of an owner to provide promised
funding is not a force majeure event for purposes of the sporting sanction rule – as to which, see para
B5.150).
6 See eg Bury Review para 8.4 (‘the real problem is that the EFL’s Salary Cost Management Protocols
do not require League One and Two Clubs to pay player wages out of normal operating income, but
instead permit them to fund much higher spending through cash injections from the Club owner. That
means the Club becomes entirely dependent on the owner remaining ready, willing and able to sustain
that level of funding, and if the flow of funds is cut off, the Club is immediately plunged into financial
crisis. I do not see how this furthers the stated objectives of the EFL’s financial fair play rules (viz.,
to introduce more discipline and rationality in Club football finances; to encourage Clubs to operate
on the basis of their own revenues; to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of
football; and to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of EFL football)’).
(a) UEFA competitions
B5.73 The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations require clubs competing in

UEFA club competitions in a particular season to meet the so-called ‘break-even
requirement’ in the three prior seasons (the monitoring period), ie to ‘break even’
in terms of its profit or loss.1 The profit or loss is calculated by reference to relevant
income and relevant expenditure.2
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 59. For a detailed description of this requirement, see
Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, paras 116–121 and passim.
2 A club with income and expenditure of less than €5m in each of the two previous seasons is excluded
from the break-even requirement (Art 57(2)).
(i) Relevant income
B5.74 Relevant income is defined in Annex X of the UEFA Club Licensing

Regulations. It consists of income relating to gate receipts, sponsorship and
advertising, broadcasting rights, commercial activities, UEFA solidarity payments
and prize money, other operating income, profit on transfers of player registrations,
finance income and foreign exchange results, and any excess proceeds on disposal of
‘tangible fixed assets’, eg land, buildings or hardware.1 It specifically excludes2 non-
monetary credits, amounts by which income transactions with related parties exceed
fair value, income from non-football operations not related to the club, income in
respect of a player for whom the club retains the registration (so-called third party
investment),3 and credit arising out of use of insolvency processes.4 Contributions
from related third parties or equity participants are not included in relevant income5
but may be used to increase the acceptable deviation (the ‘maximum aggregate break-
even deficit possible for a licensee to be deemed in compliance with the break-even
requirement’) from €5m up to €30m.6 Applicable contributions include share capital
increases (less capital reductions), unconditional gifts (including debt waivers), and
income transactions (to the extent that they are above fair value).7 Equity participant
or related-party loans are excluded altogether.8
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 1(a) to (i).
2 Ibid, Annex X, Pt A, paras 1(j) to (n).
3 See para B5.25.
4 See para B5.133.
5 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt B, section (k).
6 Ibid, Art 61(2). See further para B5.80.
7 Ibid, Annex X, Pt E(1) to (3). See further para B5.81.
8 Ibid, Annex X. Pt E(4)(iv).
B5.75 In November 2018, Der Spiegel published details of emails hacked from
Manchester City’s computer systems, which it said showed that the club had
misreported owner equity funding as sponsor funding and so falsely claimed to have
met the break-even requirement. The CFCB Investigatory Chamber investigated,
concluded the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations had been breached, and referred
the matter to the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber on 15 May 2019.1 On 14 February
2020, the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber announced that it had found Manchester
City FC to have committed ‘serious breaches of the UEFA Club Licensing and
Financial Fair Play Regulations by overstating its sponsorship revenue in its accounts
and in the break-even information submitted to UEFA between 2012 and 2016’,
in that the club’s owners had arranged to pay 85 per cent of the fees promised by
sponsors Etisalat and Etihad (more than €200 million), as well as breaching its duty
of cooperation by failing to turn over documents, and that as a result the Adjudicatory
Chamber had banned the club from UEFA competitions for two seasons (2020/21
and 2021/22) and fined it €30 million.2
1 In Manchester City v UEFA, CAS 2019/A/6298, Manchester City’s attempt to overturn the decisions of
the CFCB Investigatory Chamber (a) to refer the allegations of breach of the break-even requirement to
the CFCB Adjudicatory Chamber; and (b) to refuse to suspend the process and first conduct an enquiry
into leaks, was found to be inadmissible on the basis that not all internal remedies had been exhausted
in relation to (a), and (b) was a procedural decision not a final decision that could be appealed to CAS
directly.
2 uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/newsid=2638659.html [accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.76 Manchester City appealed to CAS, which found in July 2020 that:
(a) Article 37 of the CFCB Procedural Rules, which says breaches of the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations must be prosecuted within five years of their occurrence,
means that prosecution of alleged breaches based on information submitted
by the club before 16 May 2014 was time-barred, because the prosecution of
the pending case was not commenced until the referral of the case from the
Investigatory Chamber to the Adjudicatory Chamber on 15 May 2019.1
(b) The fact that information submitted prior to 16 May 2014 (relating to
sponsorship fees paid in June 2012 and January 2013) was re-submitted after
that date as part of the rolling three-year monitoring period did not re-start
the limitations period, and therefore no alleged breach could be pursued in
relation to that information based on its re-submission in club filings made
after 16 May 2014.2
(c) As a result, the alleged breach consisting of disguised equity funding through
Etisalat in June 2012 and June 2013 and through Etihad in season 2012/13 was
time-barred and could no longer be prosecuted.3
(d) The rest of the charges were not time-barred, but they charged very serious
wrongdoing and therefore particularly cogent evidence was required to support
them. The leaked emails provided prima facie evidence of a rule breach, as
they describe an arrangement by which equity funding by the club’s owners
would be disguised as sponsorship income from Etihad, but they did not prove
that the transactions were in fact executed as described in the emails, nor did
the accounting evidence submitted by UEFA, and the oral and written evidence
submitted by the club (including from Etihad executives) was to the contrary
and was considered by the panel to be reliable.4
(e) Instead the evidence showed that Etihad had transferred to the club the full
amounts due under its sponsorship contract with the club, and there was ‘no
meaningful evidence’ that funding to cover those payments was provided by
the club’s owners to Etihad.5 Therefore the charges of breach of the break-
even requirements by disguising equity funding as sponsor funding had to be
dismissed.6
(f) However, the club seriously breached its duty under Article 56 of the Procedural
Rules to cooperate with the national licensor and UEFA and to provide them
with all information required to show that the break-even requirements were
met. In fact, by failing to produce the authors of the leaked emails to testify
before the Investigatory Chamber and by refusing to provide related documents
and other information, the club obstructed the investigation.7
(g) The majority of the panel found that no ban on participation was warranted
based on the club’s failure to cooperate alone, but a fine of €10 million was
warranted given the importance of cooperation in investigations conducted
by CFCB ‘because of its limited investigative means’, and because the club’s
lack of cooperation was so serious and a clear deterrent to such behaviour was
required.8
1 Manchester City FC v UEFA, CAS 2020/A/6785, paras 163–174.

3 Ibid, paras 196, 198.
4 Ibid, para 213–244.
5 Ibid, para 273.
6 Ibid, para 324.
7 Ibid, paras 321, 326.
8 Ibid, paras 334–35, 337.
(ii) Relevant expenditure
B5.77 Relevant expenditure is also defined in Annex X of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations. It consists of cost of sales and materials, all employee (both playing and
non-playing as well as directors) benefits expenses (including wages and all short-
term and long-term benefits), other operating expenses, amortisation/impairment of
player registrations, loss on disposal of/cost of acquisition of player registrations,
and finance costs and dividends.1 Relevant expenditure will also be increased to the
extent that any expense transactions with related parties are at less than fair value.2
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 2(a) to (e).
2 Ibid, Annex X, Pt A, para 2(f).
B5.78 However, certain areas of expenditure are exempted for policy reasons,
including expenditure on youth and community development activities, expenditure
on women’s football activities, non-monetary debits or charges, finance costs relating
to investment in infrastructure, costs of leasehold improvement, and expenses of
non-football operations not related to the club.1 The effect of the exclusions is to
enable owners to invest funds without restriction for the purposes of worthwhile
projects such as stadium development, or youth academies, but otherwise to control
the ability of wealthy owners to support wage costs far in excess of a club’s relevant
income.
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 2(g) to (m).
B5.79 Finally, the break-even result does not include profit/loss on disposal and
depreciation/impairment of certain tangible fixed assets, certain intangible assets
(other than player registrations), and tax expense/income.1
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Annex X, Pt A, paras 3(a) to (c).
(iii) ‘Acceptable deviation’
B5.80 Where relevant expenses are less than relevant income, the break-even
requirement is met. Where relevant expenses exceed relevant income, the club could
still meet the break-even requirement provided that the difference (ie loss) is less than
€5m (the so-called ‘acceptable deviation’). Where the difference is greater than €5m,
the club can still meet the requirement provided the additional amounts are no more
than a stated maximum (currently €30m) and are covered:
(a) by surplus generated in the previous two seasons; and/or
(b) by contributions from shareholders.1
1 UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, Art 61(2).
(iv) Transactions with related third parties
B5.81 Of particular interest is the concept of adjustment to fair value of transactions

with related third parties. An owner of a football club who also owns other companies
might procure that one of other companies buys sponsorship rights from the club at
an inflated value, thereby helping the buying company to reduce its profits and so
limit its tax bill, while inflating the relevant income of the club (and therefore its
spending capacity) for purposes of UEFA’s break-even requirement. The UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations therefore give UEFA the right to order a club to reduce a
particular income amount or increase a particular expenditure commitment where
the relevant transaction was concluded with a related third party1 at less than fair
value.2 The corresponding reduction/increase is then treated as a contribution from a
related party and falls within the cap on allowable contributions set in Article 61(2)
of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations. UEFA has issued further guidance on
the approach it will adopt in respect of sponsorship agreements, which involves
commissioning third party specialist global marketing agencies to conduct market
assessments taking into account tangible elements (eg what the sponsor would
have spent to get the same media exposure through classic advertising methods),
intangible elements (an inherently subjective assessment dependent on individual
circumstances of the sponsor and its objectives) and then a ‘return on investment’
rate. This is an area that is likely to give rise to extensive disputes between experts
when conflicting assessments make the difference between admission to or exclusion
from UEFA competitions.
1 Annex X, Pt E of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations sets out in detail the definition of Related
Third Party. It includes group undertakings, joint venture partners (directly or indirectly), and entities
under common control. The regulations require any assessment to have regard to the substance of any
relationship, and not merely legal form.
2 Part E, para 7 of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations provides that fair value is deemed to be the
amount by which an ‘asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable willing
parties in an arm’s length transaction’. A transaction is not deemed to be at arm’s length where it is ‘on
terms more favourable than would have been obtained if there had been no related party relationship’.
B5.82 In 2011, Paris Saint-Germain FC was acquired by Qatar’s sovereign

investment fund, Qatar Sports Investments. It was subsequently sponsored by the
Qatar Tourism Authority, thereby increasing its turnover and so its allowable spend
on player expenditure. In May 2014 it entered into a settlement agreement with UEFA
that included a number of agreed sanctions for breach of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations, in which context it was noted that ‘the contract between PSG and the
Qatar Tourism Authority has been carefully considered and a fair value, significantly
below that submitted by the club, has been assigned’.1
1 See uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/ClubFinancialControl/02/10/68/99/
2106899_DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020].
B5.83 When Paris St-Germain embarked on a further round of significant player

transfers in 2017, questions were again asked about the club’s ability to sustain that
expenditure based on its normal operating income. UEFA’s review of the club’s
financial results was concluded on 13 June 2018, when the CFCB Investigatory
Chamber determined no further action was required. On 22 June 2018, the Chairman
of the CFCB ordered the Adjudicatory Chamber to review that decision, and the
Adjudicatory Chamber ruled on 19 September 2018 that the case should be referred
back to the Investigatory Chamber for further investigation. However, Paris Saint-
Germain appealed to the CAS against that referral back, on the basis that Article 16(1)
of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations required any review to be instigated and
completed within ten days, and therefore the decision of the Adjudicatory Chamber
was manifestly late. UEFA accepted the merits of the club’s case before the CAS and
accepted that the 13 June 2018 decision should stand.1 It has subsequently removed
the 10-day deadline, but with prospective effect only.2
1 Paris St German v UEFA, CAS 2018/A/5937, para 64.
2 Presumably because of concerns that a retroactive rule change would be challenged as unlawful: see
para B1.40.
(v) Challenges to the legality of the UEFA ‘break-even’ requirement
B5.84 Unlike a (hard) salary cap, the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations do not
prevent a rich club spending much more on top players than another club in the same
competition. What they restrict is a club spending more than a certain amount relative
to its income. Thus, a rich club with a substantial income can spend much more on
players than a club with a more limited income competing in the same competition.
The UEFA Club Licensing Regulations prevent the latter club borrowing to finance
big spending on players to compete with the more established and richer club. From
this perspective the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations could actually reinforce the gap
between rich established clubs and clubs trying to compete with them. They may ensure
more financial stability, but it might be argued that they do so at the price of actually
diminishing, and not encouraging, a more level playing field between football clubs.1
1 See eg Daniel Geey, ‘The UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules: a difficult balancing act’ (2011) 9(1)
Entertainment and Sports Law Journal.
In addition, because the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations apply only to those seeking to compete
within a UEFA competition, and not to those competing in domestic leagues generally, they may have
a distorting effect on domestic leagues, although that argument becomes weaker with the growing
prevalence of similar controls at a domestic level1, for example, in the context of English football: see
paras B5.92 and B5.94.
B5.85 On 5 May 2013, Daniel Striani, a Belgian football agent, filed a formal
complaint with the European Commission, arguing that the ‘break-even rule’ (Art 57
of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations) has the following anti-competitive effects,
and therefore violated Art 101 of the Treaty Founding the European Union (TFEU),
or, alternatively, Art 102 of the TFEU, and/or articles 45, 56, and 63 of the TFEU:1
(a) restriction of investment;
(b) fossilisation of the existing market structure (current top clubs likely to remain
at the top);
(c) reduction of the number of transfers, or the transfer amounts, and of the number
of players under contracts per club; and
(d) consequently, a deflationary effect on the revenues of players’ agents.
On 20 June 2013, Mr Striani also brought a private action before the Brussels Court
of First Instance seeking damages from UEFA for its alleged breaches of EU law,
as well as a declaration that the relevant provisions of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations are void. That action gave the European Commission grounds to reject
the complaint lodged with it, without taking a position on whether he had a legitimate
interest in filing the complaint or the merits of that complaint, but rather on the basis
that the Brussels Court of First Instance was well-placed to deal with the matter.2
1 See generally Chapter E11 (EU and UK Competition Law Rules and Sport) and Chapter E12 (The
EU Free Movement Rules).
2 Decision in Case AT.40105 (UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules), C(2014) 8028 final, 24 October 2014.
B5.86 On 29 May 2015 the Brussels Court of First Instance held that it had no
jurisdiction to hear a case against UEFA, and that the challenge should have been
brought in Switzerland (UEFA’s country of domicile) pursuant to Article 2(1) of the
Lugano II Convention. However, it went on to determine that it remained competent
to order provisional measures under Article 31 of the Convention. Consequently,
it decided to grant the provisional measure requested by Mr Striani by prohibiting
UEFA from activating the ‘break-even’ requirement of the UEFA Club Licensing
Regulations until the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had ruled on
three questions referred to it by the Brussels Court of First Instance, namely:
(1) Must Article 101 of the TFEU (or Art 102 of the TFEU) be interpreted as
meaning that the UEFA rule known as the ‘break-even requirement’ or
‘break-even rule’ infringes that provision of EC law in so far as the UEFA

rule gives rise to a restriction of competition (or the abuse of a dominant
position), in particular a restriction ‘by its object’ in that it limits the right
to invest, which is either ‘by its object’ anti-competitive or is not necessary
for the achievement of the objectives pursued by UEFA, namely the long-
term financial stability of football clubs and the sporting integrity of
UEFA’s competitions, or, in the alternative, which is not proportionate to the
achievement of those objectives?
(2) Must Articles 63, 56 and 45 of the TFEU (as well as Articles 15 and 16 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) be interpreted as
meaning that the UEFA rule known as the ‘break-even requirement’ or ‘break-
even rule’ infringes those provisions of EU law in so far as that UEFA rule gives
rise to an obstacle to freedom of movement (capital, services, persons) which
is not necessary for the attainment of the objectives pursued by UEFA, namely
the long-term financial stability of football clubs and the sporting integrity of
UEFA’s competitions (and which is not justified by ‘overriding grounds of
public interest’) or, alternatively, an obstacle which is not proportionate to the
achievement of those objectives?
(3) Must the above provisions of EU law (or some of them) be interpreted as
meaning that those provisions (or some of them) are infringed by Articles 65
and 66 of the UEFA regulations entitled ‘UEFA Club Licensing and Financial
Fair Play Regulations’ in so far as the UEFA rule – even if a restriction or
obstacle to which it gives rise is logically connected to the protection of the
sporting integrity of UEFA interclub competitions – is disproportionate and/
or discriminatory in so far as it gives preference to the payment of certain
creditors and, as a corollary, treats the payment of non-protected creditors, in
particular football agents, less favourably?
B5.87 On 16 July 2015, the Ninth Chamber of the CJEU determined that the
referral by the Brussels Court of First Instance did not comply with the requirements
of the procedure established in Article 267 TFEU. The Brussels court had already
granted interim relief and otherwise declined jurisdiction. There were no further
matters for it to consider on which it required the guidance of the CJEU. It was not
sufficient that the issue of compatibility of the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations
with EU law was a hotly contested issue. The referral was ‘manifestly inadmissible’,
and therefore the questions went unanswered.1
1 C-299/15, Striani and others v Union européenne des Sociétés de Football Association (UEFA)
and Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football – Association (URBSFA), Order of 16 July
2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:519.
B5.88 Both UEFA and Mr Striani appealed the decision of the Brussels Court of
First Instance to the Brussels Court of Appeal, which ruled that the damage that Mr
Striani suffered from UEFA’s alleged breach of competition law was too indirect
to give the Belgian courts jurisdiction over UEFA. It noted that ‘the challenged
UEFA Regulation does not prohibit M. Striani and MAD Management […] from
exercising the activity of an intermediary in Belgium or abroad, nor does it regulate the
conditions in which this activity is to be exercised’. Moreover, the targeted provisions
‘do not prohibit the relevant clubs from having recourse to agents […] nor do they
limit this activity’. In fact, the prejudice alleged by Striani and MAD Management ‘is
only an indirect consequence of the adoption of the challenged UEFA Regulation’,
as ‘it is not related directly to the activity of the claimants and does not have direct
consequences on this activity in Belgium or abroad’. The Brussels Court of Appeal
therefore concluded that the courts of Switzerland (where UEFA is located) have
sole jurisdiction over the matter. It also criticised the first instance court for ordering
a stay of the UEFA regulations in the absence of any jurisdiction to do so.1
1 UEFA v Striani & co, Cour d’appel Bruxelles, judgment dated 11 April 2019, 2015/AR/1282, paras
40, 41 and 42. The Brussels Court of Appeal also rejected the attempt to give it jurisdiction by naming
the Belgian national football association as a co-defendant, pointing out that ‘the fact that URBSFA is
a member of UEFA does not turn it into a co-author of the regulations; the reasoning of the claimants
ignores the separate legal personality of UEFA’ (ibid para 48). The court ruled that the argument
that the national federation enforced UEFA’s rules was ‘confusing the licensing role conferred to the
national federations […] with the specific rules regarding the financial balance of clubs enshrined in
Articles 57 to 63 of the attacked regulations’; the rules of the national federation ‘do not impose any
constraints, or sanctions, with regard to the challenged break-even rules; these are the sole competence
of UEFA’ (ibid).
B5.89 Meanwhile, however, in 2016 the CAS had reached a decision on the merits
of a claim by Galatasaray that the decision of the CFCB to exclude it from UEFA
competitions in seasons 2016/17 and 2017/18 should be overturned because inter alia
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations on which it was based (and, particularly, the
break-even rule) were anti-competitive and therefore unlawful and unenforceable.1
The panel dismissed the appeal in its entirety and confirmed that the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations were a breach of neither Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU nor
Swiss competition law (which is similar in nature and effect to EU competition law).
Regarding Article 101 of the TFEU, the panel held that the regulations did not have
the object or effect of restricting competition, stating:
‘The Panel’s view is that the declared objectives of the CL&FFP Regulations, and
in particular their provisions relating to financial fair play, the legality of which is
challenged by the Club, are legitimate […].
‘[…] the Panel notes that the CL&FFP Regulations do not appear to prevent the
clubs from competing among themselves on the pitch or in the acquisition of football
players. The Panel agrees with the Respondent that, on the contrary, they produce
the effect that competition is not distorted by “overspending”, ie by those clubs that,
operating at a loss, allow themselves operations that could not be conducted on a
sound commercial basis, and gain an advantage over those clubs which respect the
constraints of financial balance (ie which take a behaviour that should be expected
by any reasonable entity in normal market conditions). In other words, their effect
is to prevent a distortion of competition. Further, they do not limit the amount of
salaries for the players: clubs are free to pay as much as they wish, provided those
salaries are covered by revenues. In addition, they do not “ossificate” the structure of
market (large dominant clubs have always existed and will always exist) and do not
exclude clubs from “essential facilities”: the UEFA professional club competitions
cannot be compared to railway infrastructures or to grids in the electric market.
Finally, it is to be noted that the “break-even” calculations take place over rolling
periods of three years. Therefore, “overspending” is allowed during one or two
football season, provided it is covered in the following one(s)’.2
Regarding Article 102 of the TFEU, the panel found that even if UEFA was in
a dominant position on a relevant market, the club had failed to explain how the
UEFA Club Licensing Regulations could possibly constitute abuse of that position.3
1 Galatasaray v UEFA, CAS 2016/A/4492, also discussed at para E11.172.
3 Ibid, para 82.
B5.90 In recognition of the severe financial difficulties faced by many European

football clubs as a result of the lockdown measures imposed to prevent the spread of
COVID-19, UEFA established an emergency working group to consider a regulatory
response. This led, on 18 June 2020, to the publication of a four-page addendum to
the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.1 The addendum provided that:
(a) there would be a one-month delay (to 31 July rather than 30 June) to the date
on which clubs must prove they have no overdue payables; and
(b) the assessment of the break-even requirement would be postponed for financial
year 2020, ie instead the average combined deficit of 2020 and 2021 would be
assessed during the 2021/22 monitoring period.
When announcing the addendum, UEFA emphasised that, although it was providing
some flexibility to clubs in light of the circumstances, it was committed to ‘retaining
the spirit and intent of financial fair play for football’s long-term viability’.2
1 See uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefaorg/FinancialFairPlay/02/64/22/29/2642229_
DOWNLOAD.pdf [accessed 1 November 2020].
2 uefa.com/insideuefa/about-uefa/news/025e-0fb60fd017ba-82857c2a2217-1000--temporary-
emergency-measures-for-financial-fair-play/ [accessed 1 November 2020].
(b) The Premier League
B5.91 The Premier League faced a number of issues regarding the implementation
of its own cost controls, mainly due to the enormous discrepancies in wealth between
the biggest clubs in the Premier League (who have some of the largest trading income
of all clubs globally) and the smaller clubs (who generate far smaller amounts from
their own ticketing, sponsorship and merchandising arrangements, and so depend to a
much greater extent on central distributions from the Premier League’s broadcasting
deals). In such circumstances, a fixed costs cap would be very unfair on the bigger
clubs, while a break-even requirement based on percentage of turnover would risk
entrenching the bigger clubs towards the top end of the table and restrict the ability
of smaller clubs to compete with them by using benefactor funding.
B5.92 Effective from the 2015/16 season, the Premier League adopted Profit &
Sustainability Rules incorporating a rolling three-year break-even requirement
similar to that used in the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations.1 Clubs losing an
aggregate of £15m across the relevant reporting period have to demonstrate their
ability to meet future payments to football creditors as well as their obligations to the
Premier League. Traditionally this has required a letter of support from owners that
they would provide the necessary funding to cover the losses. Clubs losing more than
£15m but less than £105m in aggregate across the reporting period are required to:
(a) provide future financial information for the next two seasons; and
(b) provide evidence of secure funding (to the satisfaction of the Premier League).2
Any failure to satisfy these requirements could lead to the Premier League:
(a) requiring the club to agree and adhere to a budget;
(b) requiring the club to provide further financial information; and
(c) refusing an application by the club to register new players or enter into new
contracts.3
In addition to these measures, any club losing more than £105m in aggregate across
the reporting period4 may be charged with breach of the Premier League rules and
referred to a disciplinary commission with broad powers to: reprimand the club,
impose an unlimited fine, suspend the club from playing, deduct points from the club,
order matches to be replayed, recommend expulsion of the club, order compensation,
ban registrations, or impose such other penalty as it thinks fit.5 To date, no club has
been found to have such losses and therefore no sanctions have been imposed.
1 Premier League Rules E.52 to 59.
2 Ibid, E.57.1 and 2.
3 Ibid, E.57.3 and E.15
4 Premier League Rule E.59 states that the £105m figure will be reduced by £22m for each season (out
of the previous three) that a club was in an EFL division rather than the Premier League.
5 Premier League Rules E.58, W.17 and W.49.
B5.93 Similar to the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, the Premier League’s
rules allow clubs to obtain credit for expenditure on youth development, community
activities, and women’s football, and transactions with related third parties
will be assessed for fair value.1 The Premier League also has the power to make
determinations regarding fair market value of related party transactions.2
1 Premier League Rule A.1.5.
2 Ibid, Rule E.53.
(c) The Championship
B5.94 The EFL has now had several ‘financial fair play’ measures in place for a
number of years, which are stated to have the same objectives as the UEFA Club
Licensing Regulations, namely:
(a) improving the economic and financial capability of clubs;
(b) increasing the transparency and credibility of clubs;
(c) placing the necessary importance on the protection of creditors by ensuring
that clubs settle their liabilities with players, HMRC and other clubs (or clubs)
punctually;
(d) introducing more discipline and rationality in club football finances;
(f) encouraging clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues;
(g) encouraging responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; and
(h) protecting the long-term viability and sustainability of League football.1
1 EFL Reg 18.1.
B5.95 For the clubs in the Championship (its top division), the EFL adopted a
break-even requirement, starting from the 2013/14 season. Like the Premier League,
it borrowed heavily from the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations, including allowing
‘acceptable deviation’ (ie overspend),1 excluding expenditure on youth development
and community-related activities, and requiring clubs to report the true value of
related party transactions. However, the EFL assessed clubs’ compliance on a season-
by-season basis, effectively in arrears. For example, the compliance of any club
participating in the Championship in the 2013/14 season was assessed in December
2014. If a club was found to have overspent, the sanction imposed depended on
whether or not it had been promoted to the Premier League at the end of the 2013/14
season. If it had not been promoted, the club was subjected to a transfer embargo
with effect from January 2015 until such time as it could demonstrate that it would
comply with the requirements of the regulations in season 2014/15. If the club had
been promoted in 2013/14, it would be subject to a financial penalty commensurate
to the amount by which it had overspent.2
1 In the 2013/14 season, the so-called ‘acceptable deviation’ (which represented a combination of
funded losses and equity contributions) amounted to £8m, reducing to £5m over the following two
seasons.
2 The sanctions escalated depending on the amount by which the club failed to meet the break-even
requirement. For example, a club overspending by £500,000 would be fined £100,000 whereas a club
overspending by £1m would be fined £600,000. Financial penalties were re-distributed amongst those
clubs who were compliant with the regulations in the same season.
B5.96 At the end of season 2013/14, QPR was promoted from the Championship
to the Premier League. It was subsequently found to have incurred a loss of £45.284
million in 2013/14, resulting in a financial penalty of £41.965 million. It challenged
the legality of the EFL’s rules on the basis that:
(a) they infringed Article 101(1) of the TFEU as they prevented, restricted or
distorted competition, both by object and also by effect; and
(b) they were ‘contrary to common law principles in Bradley v Jockey Club’.1
The panel dismissed the QPR challenge on both counts. It found that there was no
appreciable impact on competition arising from the rules,2 and in any case the rules
were ‘pursuing legitimate aims’ and were proportionate.3 It dismissed the Bradley
claims (mainly, that the sanctions were disproportionate) ‘for the same reasons’.4
Though not initially raised as an issue by the parties, the panel also found that
the rules were not invalid as a penalty clause, since the sanction imposed ‘is not
a penalty for breach of contract or a secondary obligation arising on breach of the
2012 FFP Rules’.5
1 Bradley v Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164, aff’d EWCA Civ 1056, discussed at para E7.15–E7.21.
2 QPR v EFL, decision of Football Disciplinary Commission panel (Lord Collins of Mapesbury, James
Flynn QC, Thomas de la Mare QC) dated 19 October 2017, para 289.
3 Ibid, para 338.
4 Ibid, para 366.
5 Ibid, para 374.
B5.97 QPR appealed but before the appeal was heard the proceedings were
settled with QPR agreeing to pay the EFL £17 million plus costs, and with the club’s
owners being required to write off shareholder loans to the value of £21.965 million.
Similarly, at the end of the 2014/15 season AFC Bournemouth and Leicester City
were promoted to the Premier League, and in each case they were subsequently
found to have spent more than permitted under the Championship’s financial fair
play rules, and so received fines commensurate with their respective overspends.
B5.98 However, it was not tenable for the Championship to have different financial
fair play rules from the Premier League, when clubs could be promoted between the
two divisions, and so with effect from season 2016/17 the EFL adopted the Premier
League’s Profit & Sustainability Rules for the Championship, albeit with reduced
permitted loss levels (£13m per season, or £39m over the rolling three-year period).1
1 See EFL Regulations 2019/20, Appendix 5 (Financial Fair Play Rules), Part Two (Championship
Profitability and Sustainability Rules).
B5.99 On 22 March 2019, Birmingham City received a nine-point deduction

from an EFL Disciplinary Commission for incurring losses totalling £48.9m over
three seasons (2014/15, 2015/16 and 2016/17) in breach of section 2.9 of the EFL’s
Profit & Sustainability Rules.1 On 14 May 2019, the EFL commenced further
proceedings against the club arising out of its failure to comply with a business
plan imposed on 1 August 2018. This focused on the requirement to adhere to a
player-related expenditure budget. The Disciplinary Commission held that there
was no absolute obligation to comply with the budget; rather, there was an implied
term requiring the club to use its best endeavours to comply. The panel considered
that the EFL had not established that the club had failed to use best endeavours, and
accordingly the charge of misconduct was dismissed.2 On appeal that ruling was
reversed. The obligation to comply with the budget was held to be an absolute one,
and there was no basis for implication of a term that it required the club only to use
best endeavours. The club was found to be in breach and received a reprimand.3 On
30 July 2020, it was announced that Sheffield Wednesday had received a 12-point
deduction for breach of the Profitability & Sustainability Rules due to the fact
that it had wrongly including profits from the sale of its stadium in its financial
statement for the period ending July 2018.4 The club’s appeal against that decision
was still pending at the time of writing.
1 SR/Adhocsport/199/2018, 22 March 2019.
2 SR/Adhocsport/253/2019, 6 March 2020.
3 SR/Adhocsport/086/2020, 29 June 2020
4 SR/Adhocsport/372/2019, 4 August 2020.
B Salary caps
B5.100 A salary cap seeks to limit directly what a participant may spend on player
wages. It almost always applies on a squad basis, never dictating a maximum amount
payable per player at any club, as that would go further than is necessary to achieve
the objective and would likely be quickly challenged by individual players. The most
common forms of salary cap are:1
(a) The fixed cap. No club or team may spend more than a prescribed amount
on player wages. The RFL operates a fixed salary cap for its Super League
competition,2 and Premier Rugby does the same for the Premiership.3 The rule
does not differentiate between the smaller and larger clubs participating in the
relevant competition: all clubs are subject to the same cap.
(b) A cap set by reference to the turnover of the club. The EFL used to operate a cap
on player expenditure for League One and League Two clubs that was based
on a percentage of relevant turnover, although that could be supplemented with
extraordinary funding.4
(c) A hybrid cap, which combines elements of both the fixed cap and the
‘percentage of turnover’ cap. For example, a club may spend up to 60 per
cent of its turnover on players, or £1m, whichever is the greater. The hybrid
cap helps limit the potential for polarisation of a league as between the larger
turnover clubs and those smaller clubs who would otherwise find it difficult
to compete (assuming that the smaller clubs have owners or other sources of
funding to make up the shortfall from turnover), but it limits risk-taking and
competitive imbalance by providing an overall fixed cap. When the RFL first
introduced a salary cap, in 1997, it was a hybrid cap.5
(d) The ‘luxury tax’ model permits clubs to exceed prescribed spending limits
on player wages but levies a tax on the excess spend. For example, in Major
League Baseball, the cap (referred to in the rules as the ‘threshold’) for the
‘Competitive Balance Tax’ was set at $195m for the 2017 season, rising to
$210m over the lifetime of the current collective bargaining agreement, which
ends after the 2021 season. A club exceeding the threshold for the first time must
pay a 20 per cent tax on the excess amount. A club exceeding the threshold for
a second consecutive season will see that figure rise to 30 per cent, and three or
more straight seasons of exceeding the threshold triggers a 50 per cent luxury
tax. If a club dips below the luxury tax threshold for a season, the penalty level
is re-set. Clubs that exceed the threshold by $20 million to $40 million are also
subject to a further 12 per cent surtax. Meanwhile, those who exceed it by more
than $40 million are taxed at a 42.5 per cent rate the first time and a 45 per cent
rate if they exceed it by more than $40 million again in subsequent years. From
2018, clubs that are $40 million or more above the threshold also have their
highest selection in the next draft moved back 10 places.6 No club exceeded
that threshold in season 2019, with only three clubs incurring a luxury tax bill,
which generated circa $25m in luxury tax payments.7
1 Other measures have been developed over time under the generic umbrella of salary caps but which of
themselves would not amount to what is commonly regarded as a cap. One example is the so-called
‘20/20 rule’ operated by the English Rugby League in the early in 2000, where a club could not pay
more than 20 players a salary over £20,000 per annum (see para B5.101).
5 See para B5.101.
6 The full terms of the Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement 2017/2021 can be
found at mlbplayers.com/cba [accessed 1 November 2020].
7 See spotrac.com/mlb/tax/2019/ [accessed 1 November 2020]. Unlike in other US sports, for example
the NBA, the MLB Competitive Balance Tax is not redistributed amongst the other competing teams
who comply with the relevant spending limits. Instead it is used to fund player-related benefit schemes.
(a) The RFL’s salary cap
B5.101 The RFL first adopted a salary cap in September 1997, effective from
1 January 1998. At inception, the cap was a hybrid, where no club could spend more
than the greater of (a) 50 per cent of turnover (as defined), and (b) £700,000. That
initial cap helped redress the financial difficulties that clubs were beginning to feel
as a consequence of wage inflation. However, the downside was that bigger clubs
were advantaged, as 50 per cent of their turnover might greatly exceed £700,000.
For example, a club with turnover of £1m would be able to spend up to £700,000 on
player wages; whilst a club with turnover of (say) £3m would be able to spend £1.5m
on player wages. As a consequence, for the 2000 season the RFL adopted what was
commonly referred to as the 20/20 rule – no club could pay a salary of £20,000 or
more to more than 20 players.1 The intention was to help avoid the possibility of
bigger clubs retaining the services of all the best players, thus restricting the size of
the talent pool available to others.
B5.102 As the first SGB to introduce a salary cap to British sport, the RFL can be
credited as a trailblazer, but the original salary cap did not prevent three clubs entering
into administration in the 2011 and 2012 seasons, most notably Bradford Bulls in
June 2012. The RFL’s salary cap rules were therefore refined and strengthened over
the years to what are now the Salary Cap Regulations and Financial Sustainability
Regulations.
B5.103 The RFL’s Salary Cap Regulations are stated to have the following
objectives:
(a) to protect the integrity of the Super League competition by ensuring that the
determinative factor in the sporting outcome is on-field sporting merit and not
off-filed financial considerations;
(b) to ensure that the Super League competition remains competitive and therefore
attractive to spectators and commercial partners;
(c) to protect and nurture a broad competitive playing structure by preventing clubs
trading beyond their means and/or entering into damaging and unsustainable
financial arrangements; and
(d) to protect the welfare and interests of all players participating or aspiring to
participate in the Super League competition.1
1 See section 1.11 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition.
B5.104 Meanwhile the stated objectives of the RFL’s Financial Sustainability

Regulations are:
(a) to encourage financial discipline, self-sustainability, and responsible spending,
and therefore protect the long-term viability of clubs;
(b) to protect and nurture a broad competitive playing structure by preventing clubs
trading beyond their means and/or entering into damaging and unsustainable
financial arrangements;
(c) to protect all other clubs and the competition’s integrity by ensuring that clubs
do not suffer insolvency events during a playing season;
(d) to protect the reputation of the sport as regards existing and potential
broadcasters and other commercial partners and suppliers;
(e) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of the sport; and
(f) to protect the welfare and interests of all players.1
1 See section 1 of the Super League Financial Sustainability Regulations, 2020 Edition.
B5.105 The effect of the two sets of regulations combined is as follows:

(a) Clubs are restricted to spending on player wages in the 2020 season the
lower of:
(i) the hard cap of £2.1m;1 and
(ii) the amount necessary to limit club losses in the season to £100,000 (the
maximum permitted loss under the Financial Sustainability Regulations).
(b) A club may apply to spend in excess of that amount, but it has to show that
the excess amount (including employer’s National Insurance contributions and
PAYE tax2) will be invested either:
(i) by way of equity contributions; or
(ii) by way of a loan that is not repayable within the relevant year or on less
than three months’ notice thereafter, or that is the subject of a personal
guarantee or other appropriate form of security from persons connected
with the club.3
(c) Where any club incurs losses in excess of the permitted amounts under the
Financial Sustainability Regulations, the club’s overall cap in the following
season will be reduced by an equivalent amount.4
(d) Both sets of regulations include detailed reporting requirements, in respect of
player-related expenditure but also in respect of ‘agreed operational budgets’, to
enable the RFL to monitor club compliance on a real-time basis. Monitoring is
the responsibility of the Head of Delivery for Professional Game Competitions
and Salary Cap (HDPGS).5
(e) Clubs may apply to the Chairman of the Operational Rules Tribunal to review
any decision of the HDPGS. However, this is expressed as a sole remedy,
and all clubs agree that they waive any other right of appeal or challenge that
might otherwise exist in respect of such decision. Further, the decision of the
Chairman of the Operational Rules Tribunal is expressed to be ‘the full, final
and complete disposition of the matter and will be binding on all relevant
Parties’.6
(f) Sanctions range from warnings to a recommendation to the board of the
Rugby Football League to remove the club’s licence to participate in the Super
League.7
1 The hard cap covers the highest paid 25 players. Excluded from the cap are players under the age of
21 and those paid £20,000 or less (unless they are otherwise in the top 25 players). A number of other
dispensations may be available for clubs that retain club-trained players, incur London allowances,
recruit ‘new and returning talent pool players’, or sign ‘marquee players’.
No cap applies to players registered with a club but who do not feature in the top 25 earning players
or who have not featured in any first team match.
2 See Chapter I1 (Taxation of Sports Organisations).
3 Rule 3.1.4 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition.
4 Rule 8(a)(ii) of the Super League Financial Sustainability Regulations, 2020 Edition.
5 Rule 7.1 of the Super League Salary Cap Regulations, 2020 Edition
6 Ibid, Rule 9.6. However, this is unlikely to shield such decisions from review by the High Court, which
does not take kindly to attempts to oust its jurisdiction: see para D3.64 et seq.
7 Ibid, Rule 7.9.
B5.106 Wigan RFLC was found to have breached the cap in each of seasons 2005
and 2007, and was docked two points and four points respectively, in addition to
being fined. The club was charged for a third time in 2018 for breaches associated
with the 2017 playing season, and was originally deducted two points, but on appeal
the points deduction was suspended.1
1 Wigan RLFC v Rugby Football League, Off Field Operational Rules Appeal Tribunal Decision,
March 2019.
B5.107 In 2016 Salford Red Devils and its owner Dr Marwan Koukash were
sanctioned for breaches that included an alleged overspend of £94,200. The panel
found that there had been ‘a deliberate and contrived attempt to circumnavigate
the Salary Cap. Since then it appears attempts have been made to cover up these
payments in an attempt to justify them’. The club was deducted six points and fined
£5,000. Its appeal against that decision was dismissed.1
1 Salford Red Devils and Dr Marwan Koukash v Rugby Football League Limited, Off Field Operational
Rules Appeal Tribunal Decision, 14 July 2016.
(b) Premiership Rugby’s salary cap
B5.108 Premier Rugby Limited, the organiser of the premier club league in
England, introduced its first salary cap in 1999, with an absolute cap on player-
related expenditure of £1.8 million. The objectives of Premier Rugby in applying a
salary cap are:
‘(a) ensuring the financial viability of all Clubs and of the […] competition
(b) controlling inflationary pressures on Clubs’ costs
(c) providing a level playing field for Clubs; and
(d) ensuring a competitive […] Premiership competition; and
(e) enabling clubs to compete in European Competitions’.1
Premier Rugby asserts that the salary cap ensures the ‘competitiveness of the league’
by ‘providing equal opportunity for clubs […] where on any weekend any team can
beat any other team,’ ensuring ‘the competition is exciting and unpredictable which
attracts fans, sponsors and broadcasters,’ and ensuring its financial sustainability by
‘helping ensure that the clubs build their businesses in a sustainable way’.
1 Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 2.2.
B5.109 The amount of the salary cap is linked to the distributions made by Premier
Rugby to its clubs of revenues generated by central broadcasting and sponsorship
deals.1 By July 2008 the cap had risen to £4 million, and for the 2019/20 season
the cap stood at £7 million. Exceptions and provisos are made to the salary cap
to promote other policy objectives. In particular, a club can exclude the salaries
of two players from the cap, enabling it to recruit world class talent. Within the
£7 million ceiling, clubs may access up to £600,000 of ‘Home Grown Player
Credits’ for wages payable to home-grown talent (capped at £50,000 per player).
Also, they can provide an unlimited education (academic or vocational) fund to
their players, and can replace long-term injured players without breaching the
cap. Injury dispensations up to a maximum of £400,000 per season continue to be
available to each club; a new ‘England Senior EPS or International Player Credit’
of up to £80,000 per player has been introduced to cover for player absence during
international periods; and there is an overrun tax on any salary spend of up to 5 per
cent over the base level (so currently £350,000).2 Premier Rugby has also set a cap
on expenditure in relation to so-called academy players3 (in contrast to football,
where expenditure on youth development activities is specifically excluded from
cost control measures4).
1 See premiershiprugby.com/about-premiership-rugby/about-us/salary-cap/ [accessed 2 November
2020].
2 Regulation 10 of the Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20
3 Ibid, Reg 3.1, sets the academy player payment ceiling at £100,000 for the 2019/20 season. This applies
to players aged between 16 and 24 and earning less than £30,000 per season. However, explanatory
notes issued by Premier Rugby indicate that the average salary of an academy player is circa £10,000,
meaning on average clubs should be able to retain up to 20 academy players.
4 See eg UEFA Club Licensing Regulations break-even requirement discussed at para B5.73 et seq.
B5.110 The 2019/20 Premiership Salary Cap Regulations impose a positive

obligation on clubs to notify Premier Rugby’s Salary Cap Manager of any ‘potential
or actual loopholes, lacunae or errors in the Regulations’.1 The CEO of each club is
made individually responsible for ensuring that the club complies with the relevant
reporting obligations;2 there is specific provision for confidential whistle-blowing;3
and in case of breach disciplinary action may be taken against the club’s CEO and
other officers signing declarations, eg the chairman or finance director, including
potentially requiring their removal from the club and the competition.4
1 Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Reg 2.3(a)(i).
2 Ibid, Reg 4.1.
3 Ibid, Reg 2.6.
4 Ibid, Reg 14.7. The consequences of such a finding are that the other clubs would be asked to consider
requiring the removal of the individual concerned from the club. If such a resolution is passed, no
other club is permitted to recruit that individual (Reg 14.7). In practice, this would also disqualify the
individual from taking a role in football, because they would not pass the owners’ and directors’ test:
see para B5.12. Where the individual concerned is a regulated professional (eg a lawyer or accountant),
this may also result in disciplinary action under the auspices of their professional body’s regulatory
regime.
B5.111 The Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations give Premier Rugby
extensive powers of audit to determine compliance with the regulations and impose
general duties of good faith on the clubs to co-operate with any such audit. For
example, Regulation 8.1(d) requires clubs to ‘answer as fully and honestly as possible
all queries of the accountants’ appointed by Premier Rugby to audit their accounts.
It is a breach of the rules to fail to co-operate with any request made by Premier
Rugby’s Salary Cap Manager or its auditors.1
B5.112 Up to and including the 2012/13 season, jurisdiction to consider alleged

salary cap breaches sat with a sub-committee of Premier Rugby, comprising Premier
Rugby’s Rugby Director and four club representatives, but with effect from the
2013/14 season that jurisdiction was given to an independent Disciplinary Panel
appointed by Sports Resolution UK. The following sanctions may be applied for
proven breaches:
(a) Where a club fails to lodge documents as required under the rules, this is in
effect an administrative breach, addressed by imposition of a series of escalating
financial penalties.1
(b) For any failure to co-operate, a club can be warned as to future conduct, fined
up to £100,000 and/or deducted up to six points.2
(c) There is an automatic sanction for cases of limited overspend arising from
budgeting errors and the like, is calculated as follows:3
Level of Overrun Overrun Tax

£0 to £49,999.99 £0.50 for every £1 overspend
£50,000 to £199,999.99 £1 for every £1 overspend
Over £200,000 £3 for every £1 overspend
(d) Where the Salary Cap Manager reasonably considers that a breach of the salary
cap by more than £350,000 has occurred, the Disciplinary Panel may apply a
range of sanctions, including both financial penalties and deduction of points.
In the context of the ‘senior ceiling’, ie payments to professional players, the
financial penalty is that for every £1 overspend over and above the £350,000
threshold, a further fine of £3 is payable (in addition to the overrun tax).4 The
club is also ordered to pay all costs incurred by Premier Rugby.
(e) The overspend could also trigger a deduction of points.5
Level of Breach Points Sanction

£0 to £349,999 0
£350,000 to £399,999.99 5
£400,000 to £449,999.99 10
£450,000 to £499,999.99 15
£500,000 to £549,999.99 20
£550,000 to £599,999.99 25
£600,000 to £649,999.99 30
Over £650,000 35
The above sanctions are regarded as entry points, meaning that the
Disciplinary Panel has discretion to reduce or increase them having regard to
the circumstances of the case. Factors to be considered include a guilty plea,
whether a breach was deliberate or reckless, prior conduct, and co-operation
with the process generally.6
2 Ibid, Reg 4.5(a).
3 Ibid, Reg 10.
4 Ibid, Reg 11.3(a).
5 Ibid, Reg 14.3(b). Whist these penalties may seem significant for a relatively small overspend, they
need to be considered in the context of the fact that Premier Rugby operates a fixed cap, so that
everyone knows from the beginning exactly what they can spend, and that amount never changes
(instead, allowances are made within the rules for exigencies such as player injuries and loss of players
to international duty). This contrasts with a percentage of turnover cap or break-even requirement,
where outside influences can impact upon the eventual wage to turnover ratio/break-even result.
6 Ibid, Reg 14.3(d).
B5.113 Even with a comprehensive rulebook creating stringent disciplinary

sanctions for breach, Premier Rugby found it difficult to shake off suggestions that
its clubs were finding ways around the salary cap regulations.1 This was not helped
by the fact that in October 2015 it was reported that Premier Rugby had entered into
confidential agreements with a number of clubs relating to ‘certain issues’ relating
to the salary cap regime. Premier Rugby was forced to deny that any club had been
found to have breached the ceiling on payments for senior players, but maintained
that if breaches were identified, disciplinary action would follow. No further details
were made public, leading only to further speculation.2 The controversy surfaced
again in March 2019, with a former club chairman alleging that he had been told by
several other club owners how they had been breaching the regulations.3
1 See eg Gavin Mairs, Daily Telegraph, 28 April 2010, ‘Salary Cap Abuses Put Clubs at Risk’, telegraph.
co.uk/sport/rugbyunion/club/7647789/London-Irishs-Andy-Martin-warns-that-salary-cap-abuses-
put-clubs-at-risk.html [accessed 2 November 2020].
2 bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/34611419 [accessed 2 November 2020].
3 bbc.co.uk/sport/rugby-union/47481608 [accessed 2 November 2020].
B5.114 On 20 June 2019, Premier Rugby charged Saracens with breaching the
salary cap rules. Saracen defended on the grounds (among others) that:
(a) the salary cap rules infringed Article 101(1) of the TFEU as they prevented,
restricted or distorted competition, both by object and also by effect; and/or
(b) they were an abuse of a dominant position in breach of Article 102 of the
TFEU.1
The independent panel chaired by Lord Dyson rejected these competition law
defences in full in its decision of 4 November 2019. Citing the QPR v EFL case
referred to at B5.96, the panel held that:
(a) none of the objectives of the salary cap rules ‘can reasonably be described
as having the purpose of restricting competition’,1 and, in any case, financial
stability is a legitimate objective;2
(b) Saracens has not demonstrated ‘that the salary cap has an appreciable adverse
effect on competition […]’,3 and in fact it ‘continues to operate in a pro-
competitive manner’;4 and
(c) ‘there is also no question of the Regulations constituting any abuse of an
individual or dominant position […]’.5
1 Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, para 34.
2 Ibid, para 35.
3 Ibid, para 105(b).
4 Ibid, para 106.
5 Ibid, para 110.
B5.115 Having dismissed Saracens’ competition law defences, the panel then went
on to set out the scale of the breaches in some detail in the judgment. In all, along
with breaches of disclosure obligations, the club had breached the senior ceiling
in each of seasons 2016/17, 2017/18, and 2018/19, though only the breaches in
2016/17 and 2018/19 were large enough to warrant a points deduction.1 Applying
the guideline sanctions set out in the regulations, the club faced an overall deduction
of 70 points plus a fine of £5.36m. However, the panel then considered whether
to exercise its discretion to increase or decrease these sanctions.2 Although the
panel determined that there were several factors relating to the club’s conduct that
could justify an increase in the sanctions, in view of the fact that Premier Rugby
did not request such an increase, the panel did not ‘consider it right to exercise’
its discretion to do so.3 Instead, the panel determined that the impact of a 70 point
deduction was ‘disproportionate and is not required to satisfy the underlying purpose
of the Regulations’,4 especially in view of the fact that the club’s breaches were not
deliberate, and so applied a deduction of 35 points together with the fine of £5.36m.
In spite of the reduction in sanction, the decision demonstrated that the salary cap
rules were enforceable, and that even the league’s most successful club could be held
to account, although questions were raised as to why it had taken so long.5
1 Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, paras 282 to 294.
2 Pursuant to Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations, Season 2019/20, Res 14.2 and 14.3(d) and (e).
3 Premier Rugby v Saracens Limited, SR/Adhocsport/201/2019, 4 November 2019, para 306.
4 Ibid, para 319.
5 For further discussion of the Saracens case and of whether salary caps are compatible with competition
law, see paras E11.165–E11.169.
B5.116 The club chose not to appeal the decision and then found itself having to
demonstrate that it would be compliant with the salary cap requirements for the
2019/20 season. It quickly became apparent that the club would be unable to do
so and, rather than be the subject of further proceedings, it instead chose to accept
relegation via an agreement with Premier Rugby. The club’s relegation to the
Championship was announced on 18 January 2020.
B5.117 In December 2019 Premier Rugby commissioned Lord Myners to conduct

a detailed review of the Premiership Rugby Salary Cap Regulations. His report,
published on 14 May 2020, made 52 recommendations on how the salary cap rules
and processes might be improved.1 These included:
(a) improved independence, particularly appointing a cap governance monitor to
separate investigation of salary cap breaches from the decision to prosecute;
(b) greater transparency, including early announcement of charges and publishing
an annual report detailing all breaches and sanctions;
(c) drafting recommendations, designed to make the rules clearer;
(d) increased accountability for owners/executives, players and agents;

(e) more flexibility regarding sanctions, including explicitly permitting the
stripping of titles and return of prize money; and
(f) providing more resources (and stronger investigatory powers) to the salary cap
manager.
In light of the report’s recommendations, Premier Rugby has stated its intention to
reform the rules in consultation with the clubs.
1 The full report and the full list of recommendations are available at premiershiprugby.com/news/
premiership-rugby-publishes-report-of-myners-review [accessed 2 November 2020].
(c) EFL Leagues One and Two: first Salary Cost Management Protocols, now a
salary cap
B5.118 In contrast to the break-even requirements adopted in the Championship
(to align with the Premier League),1 the EFL originally adopted (slightly different)
Salary Cost Management Protocols (SCMP) for its lower two divisions (League One
and League Two) that required the clubs in those divisions to limit their spending on
player wages and bonuses each year2 to:
(a) a specified percentage (currently 60 per cent in League One and 50 per cent in
League Two) of the club’s ‘Relevant Turnover’ (which included normal operating
income, such as gate receipts and other match revenues, net commercial revenues,
as well as distributions from the EFL and Premier League); plus
(b) 100 per cent of extraordinary income, referred to as ‘Football Fortune Income’
(which included cup prize money/facility fees, net transfer income, donations,
cash and equity injections, and accumulated profit).
Thus, the SCMP rules neither placed a cap on the amount that can be spent on player
wages, nor required clubs to fund player wages entirely out of normal operating
income. Instead clubs could spend as much as they wished on player wages, provided
their owners funded any shortfall.
1 See para B5.95.
2 All player contracts have to be lodged with the EFL before a player can participate in any match, so
that there is transparency of player costs. Serious consequences follow should a club engage in side
payments to players. For example, in May 2001 Chesterfield Football Club was deducted nine points
and fined £20,000 for making additional undeclared payments to a number of players, including Luke
Beckett.
B5.119 To police compliance with the SCMP rules, in June of each year all League
One and League Two clubs had to submit to the EFL details of their player expenditure
commitments and their estimated Relevant Turnover and Football Fortune Income
for the forthcoming season, and they then had to update those forecasts in December.
The EFL Finance Department reviewed SCMP submissions against information held
in the EFL’s files, performance of comparable clubs, and past performance of the
club in question (as verified by its accounts filed at Companies House). The EFL
could require further information to support the figures submitted (eg any significant
year-on-year increase in forecasted revenue), and disallow any items of income that
it considered to lack sufficient support. Where it was apparent from that process that
a club has breached or may be at risk of breaching the cap, the EFL could impose
a registration embargo on that club, preventing it from registering any more players
until such time as the club generated additional income or investment (normally by
way of equity or gift donations) to support the additional spending.1
1 See eg the situation faced by Swindon Town in October 2012 when the club was ordered to make
a compensation payment for an under-24 player signed from another EFL club. As a consequence,
Swindon breached the threshold (then 65 per cent) and an embargo was imposed by the EFL that
was only lifted when the club’s owners introduced new funding into the club. See bbc.co.uk/sport/0/
football/20229134 [accessed 2 November 2020].
B5.120 The EFL’s broadcasting deals are much smaller than the Premier League’s,1
and as a result central distributions to clubs are vastly smaller, which means that many
EFL clubs do not generate enough trading income to cover player costs, and instead
rely heavily on equity and donations from their owners to cover the shortfall, which
means they are horribly exposed if the owners lose interest or run out of money.
That raised the question of whether League One and Two clubs (at least) should be
prevented from funding player expenditure from owner funding. The Bury Review
pointed out:2
‘[…] the real cause of Bury FC’s collapse is the fact that Clubs are able to fund
player wages not just from normal operating income but by means of cash injections
from their owners. This can make Clubs completely reliant on owner funding to
remain competitive on the pitch. If such an owner becomes no longer ready, willing
and/or able (for whatever reason) to provide such funding, the Club is inevitably
plunged into deep financial crisis. In such cases, unless a new owner comes along
with sufficient funding to meet the Club’s commitments, there is nothing that the
EFL can do to save the Club. The real question the Bury FC case raises, therefore,
is whether the SCMP rules need to be revised to remove, or at least limit, the risks
attendant on reliance on owner funding to underwrite player expenditure.’
1 See para H2.2.
2 Bury FC Review (see para B5.13 n 2), at para 1.3.
B5.121 No one wants to stop owners investing money in their clubs. But (the argument
goes) owner funding should be invested in revenue-generating infrastructure (such as
larger stadia, and player academies) that will increase the club’s sustainable trading
income (and hence its spending power) in the long term, rather than being used
to plug the shortfall between current trading income and playing expenditure. For
example, Arsenal FC invested heavily in its income-generating infrastructure with
the relocation from Highbury to the Emirates Stadium, almost doubling turnover as
a consequence, while managing expenditure carefully. Similarly, Manchester United
has traditionally been held out as a club that finances on-pitch success by consistently
increasing commercial revenue. The counter-argument is that this favours the
established elite over clubs such as Manchester City, who will take many years to
catch up in terms of building sustainable trading income, and in the meantime need
to rely on cash infusions from their owner, the Abu Dhabi United Group, to remain
competitive.
B5.122 The Bury Review identified two alternative potential solutions:1

‘8.6.1 One solution would be to change the SCMP rules to require Clubs to live
within their means, funding player wages and other operating costs out of operating
income, and using owner funding to finance improvements to the ground, training
facilities, the academy, and other infrastructure projects, which would then generate
greater income and so boost the Clubs’ spending power. Undoubtedly there would
be difficult transitional issues, and some Clubs would become less competitive
on the field of play and so drop down the pyramid. However, all Clubs would be
financially sustainable, and the risk of loss of a Club from membership of the EFL
because of a financial crisis would greatly diminish. The tension between the two
potentially competing models of club ownership would be resolved, and the EFL
could monitor the Clubs’ financial affairs and help to prevent any problems from
developing, instead of being forced into crisis/rescue mode. Ambitious owners could
still put money into their Clubs, but to build academies and other infrastructure that
would generate promising young players and sustainable revenue streams to support
increased spending on players. Clubs could therefore still strive for promotion up
through the divisions, but based on a solid and sustainable financial platform, not
dependent on the continuing financial support of a wealthy owner.
8.6.2 A less radical alternative, which is less of a constraint on the freedom of Clubs
and their owners, would be to extend some of the elements of the Championship’s
Profit & Sustainability Rules to Leagues One and Two, by requiring League One
and League Two Clubs to produce – both as a condition of any proposed change of
Control and each year thereafter – a business plan that covers the upcoming season
but also any subsequent seasons for which the Club already has player expenditure
commitments (ie, the plan should extend at least to the termination date of the Club’s
longest player contract). The business plan should set out expected operating income
and outgoings during the relevant period, and identify any funding requirements
(where expected income does not cover expected outgoings). Along with the business
plan, the Club should be required to provide evidence satisfactory to the EFL of
sufficient committed and secure funding to meet those requirements. The concept of
‘Secure Funding’ as defined in the Championship Profit & Sustainability Rules could
be used, ie, the Club would have to be able to point to (a) cash deposited into the share
capital account to pay for shares; or (b) a legally binding and irrevocable commitment
from the owner to make such payments, secured by security satisfactory to the EFL,
which might be a personal guarantee from the owner, or a guarantee from a parent
company, or a letter of credit, or funds held in escrow, or such other security as the
EFL sees fit. This would reduce the risks attendant on permitting Clubs to finance
growing wage bills from extraordinary (owner) income rather than normal operating
income, by ensuring that committed and secure funding is in place to meet all of the
Club’s expenditure commitments. The risk would remain, however, that the owner
stops being ready, willing and able to provide the further funding (or further funding
commitment) required to sustain that spending once the original commitments are
discharged. In that event, the Club would have to find a new owner of sufficient
means, or else slash its player expenditure and other outgoings dramatically so that
they can be covered entirely by normal operating income.’
1 Bury Review (see para B5.13 n 2).
B5.123 In the event, the financial crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which
led to the early curtailment of the 2019/20 season, a rebate of central broadcasting
revenues, and the prospect of no crowds (and therefore no gate money) continuing
into the 2020/21 season, prompted the League One and League Two clubs to agree
to replace the SCMP rules with new salary cap rules, coming into effect as from the
2020/21 season. The key features of this new regime are as follows:
(a) Fixed caps of £2.5m for League One clubs and £1.5m for League Two clubs.
(b) Future caps will be index-linked to reflect changes in domestic broadcast
revenues (Rule 2.3).
(c) The following players are excluded from the calculations:
(i) any under-21 player (Rule 4.1.1); and
(ii) in the 2020/21 season, any player not included in the club’s squad list
(Rule 4.1.3).
(d) The following amounts are excluded from the calculations:
(i) promotion bonuses (Schedule 2, paragraph 1.1);
(ii) severance pay under clause 19 of the standard player contract (Sch 2,
para 1.3); and
(iii) cup bonuses in any squad bonus schedule (Sch 2, para 1.4).
(e) The value of any contract entered into prior to the date of adoption of the
rules (7 August 2020) is capped at a divisional average figure, meaning no
club is penalised for existing contracts, for their duration (Rule 3.1.1) and any
extension on the same terms for any under-24 player (Rule 3.1.4).
(f) Clubs relegated from (i) the Championship into League One, and (ii) League
One into League Two, will be subject to equivalent transitional arrangements
(Rules 3.2.1 and 3.2.4), together with an additional relaxation whereby any
player not then included in the club’s squad list will be excluded from the
calculation in the first season following relegation (Rule 4.1.2).
(g) Expenditure in excess of the cap will be addressed via an overrun tax (Rule
7) for breaches of up to 5 per cent (£125,000 and £75,000 respectively) (this
is in effect a luxury tax which will be redistributed and amongst compliant

clubs) and thereafter referral to a Disciplinary Commission in line with Rule 8
(sanction guidelines have been published alongside the Salary Cap Rules).
The obligations imposed on clubs, and the ability to audit them to ensure compliance,
are comprehensive and clearly laid out (Rule 5). The focus is on transparency, with
serious consequences for intentional misconduct.
C Formula One
B5.124 Uncompetitive or financially unsustainable teams are as much a problem in

Formula One as in any professional sport, and therefore the regulatory response has
become more and more robust here as well. In contrast to the other sports detailed
in this section, however, the cost base of Formula One is not primarily dictated by
salary costs. Formula One drivers and their technical colleagues are of course very
well remunerated, but it is the cars that are the key performance differentiator, and
research, development, testing and equipment costs greatly outstrip wage costs,
running into tens and often hundreds of millions of pounds.
B5.125 The difficulty that Formula One teams had in sourcing sponsorship revenues
in the recession that followed the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 prompted
them, acting under the umbrella of the Formula One Team Owners’ Association
(FOTA), to agree to a Resource Restriction Agreement (RRA) that limited:
(a) the amount of track testing and wind tunnel testing that a team could undertake;
(b) the number of staff it could employ; and
(c) external spend.
Williams F1 credited these cost controls with helping it increase its profits in its 2010
accounts by 25 per cent. However, there were important limitations to this approach:
the RRA restrictions were not regulations issued by the Fédération Internationale de
l’Automobile (FIA), the governing body of the sport; the only sanction for overspend
was a reduction in spending in future seasons; and in 2011 Ferrari and Red Bull
resigned from FOTA because they disagreed with the other teams over the future
direction of cost control.
B5.126 Starting with the 2012 season, the FIA began to introduce various cost control
measures into its Formula One Sporting Regulations and Technical Regulations,
including limiting the number of drivers that a team could use and the number of
engines and gear boxes that a driver could use per season; limiting teams on race day
to a spare chassis, not a spare car; and limiting the amount of track testing and wind
tunnel testing that a team could carry out during a calendar year.
B5.127 By 2019 there was enough support among the teams for the FIA to
introduce a comprehensive set of cost control regulations intended to ‘define the
future of Formula One from 2021 onwards’.1 The 2021 Formula One Financial
Regulations2 are designed to promote the competitive balance and sporting fairness
of the FIA Formula One World Championship, while strengthening the long-term
financial stability and sustainability of the teams. They introduce a cap on the amount
that each team may spend during a calendar year on defined costs, starting at US
$175 million in the 2021 calendar year, with that figure then decreasing gradually
over future editions of the Championship. Speaking on announcement of the 2021
Financial Regulations, FIA President Jean Todt remarked: ‘This is still a high figure,
but we consider it a first step’.3
1 ‘FIA and Formula One present regulations for the future’, 31 October 2019: fia.com/2021-f1-
regulations [accessed 2 November 2020]. The announcement stated: ‘Taking a holistic approach to
the future success of the pinnacle of motor sport, the new suite of Technical, Sporting and Financial
regulations are targeted at promoting close racer and more balanced competition, as well as bringing
economic and sporting sustainability to Formula One. From 2021 onwards Formula One will have:
Cars that are better able to battle on the track; A more balanced competition on the track; A sport where
success is determined more by how well a team spends its money not how much it spends – including,
for the first time, a fully enforceable cost cap (starting at 175M$, with plans to reduce this number in
the future) in the FIA rules. A sport that is a more sustainable business for those participating. A sport
that continues to be the world’s premier motor racing competition and the perfect showcase of cutting
edge technology’.
2 The 2021 FIA Formula One Financial Regulations, published on 31 October 2019 and available at fia.
com/multimedia/publication/2021-formula-1-financial-regulations-2020-03-06 [accessed 2 November
2020].
3 See note 1 above.
B5.128 Since in Formula One it is the car that is the key performance differentiator,
the cap covers expenditure that relates primarily to design and performance of the
car and excludes drivers’ salaries and other elements such as marketing costs and the
remuneration of each team’s three highest paid personnel. In the words of Ross Brawn,
managing director of the Championship promoter, Formula One Management:
‘It is absolutely essential for the future of F1 that we control spending. […] We tried
to capture the areas that make a difference between teams, where they can gain a
competitive advantage’.1
1 bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/50255770 [accessed 2 November 2020].
B5.129 The FIA has established a specialist body (referred to as the Cost Cap
Administration) to monitor compliance with the Financial Regulations, using
standard reporting and audit mechanisms,1 with suspected cases of non-compliance
being referred to the Cost Cap Adjudication Panel, a panel of independent judges.2
The possible sanctions for proven non-compliance range from financial penalties (in
amounts to be determined on a case by case basis) to sporting penalties in the form of
driver and/or constructor team points deductions and even (in extreme cases) outright
exclusion from the Formula One World Championship.3
1 2021 FIA Formula One Financial Regulations, Art 6.2.
2 Ibid, Art 7.1.
3 Ibid, Art 9.1.
B5.130 In May 2020, the World Motor Sports Council announced that changes
would be made to the Formula One Financial Regulations, ‘primarily due to the
ongoing need to reduce costs and safeguard the sport in light of the COVID-19
pandemic’.1 Most importantly, the cost cap was reduced to $145 million for 2021,
$140 million for 2022, and $135 million for 2023–2035, but at the same time various
items were re-classified from costs included in the cap to excluded items.1
1 ‘World Motor Sport Council approves changes to 2020, 2021 and 2021 FIA Formula One Regulations’,
27 May 2020, fia.com/news/world-motor-sport-council-approves-changes-2020-2021-and-2022-fia-
formula-1-regulations [accessed 2 November 2020].
5 WHEN IT ALL GOES WRONG – INSOLVENCY
B5.131 If financial controls fail, cash flow deficits may arise, and have to be met
either by way of equity injection or debt funding. If debt levels increase so as to
exceed the asset value of a business, or cash flow deficits are unaddressed so that bills
go unpaid, a member club may well be considered to be insolvent, and will need to
take steps to reduce its expenditure to more sustainable levels or seek to reduce the
levels of historic debt through formal restructuring processes. Whilst in the UK there
is no statutory definition of being insolvent, the Insolvency Act 1986 sets out certain
factors that raise a presumption of insolvency:
‘A company is deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of the
court that the company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due’.1
‘A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction
of the court that the value of the company’s assets is less than the amounts of its
liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities’.2
1 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(1)(e).
2 Ibid, s 123(2) and BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK-2007-3BL Plc and others
[2011] EWCA Civ 227.
B5.132 The Insolvency Act 1986 imposes strict duties on company directors to have
regard to the position of creditors in such circumstances,1 with serious consequences,
including assumption of personal liability for debts, if they trade on and thereby
worsen the position for creditors.2 On the other hand, the Act also offers relief
from impending creditor actions and opportunities for formally restructuring of the
company’s debts. Faced with those choices, clubs in financial difficulties quickly
turn to an insolvency practitioner for help and advice. The financial consequences
for a club that avails itself of such protection can be significant for the club itself,
the competition in which it participates, and its competitor clubs. The competition
organiser has to determine what the regulatory consequences should be.
1 ‘The question is not whether the directors knew or ought to have known that the company was insolvent.
The question is whether they knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect
of avoiding insolvent liquidation’, per Lewison J in Re Hawkes Hill Publishing [2007] BCC 172.
2 See for example ss 213 and 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which enable the court to order directors
to contribute to the assets of the company where they have engaged in conduct that amounts to (a)
fraudulent trading, or (b) wrongful trading.
A Some basic principles of insolvency law

(a) Types of insolvency proceedings
B5.133 Based on the Insolvency Act 1986, in England and Wales the insolvency
proceedings most often seen in the context of sport clubs are:
(a) Administration
This is the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner to manage the
affairs, business, and property of an insolvent company. The administrator is
appointed either by way of an order of the court (on the application of the
company, the directors, or creditors), or directly by the company, its directors,
or a ‘qualifying floating charge holder’, ie the holder of a floating charge
that grants the right to make the appointment. The statutory purpose of the
administration is:
(i) to rescue the company as a going concern;
(ii) achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than
would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in
administration); or
(iii) realising property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured
or preferential creditors.1
The administrator must perform his functions in the interests of the company’s
creditors as a whole, unless he considers that it is not reasonably practicable
to meet either of the first two purposes, in which case his duty is to not harm
unnecessarily the interests of the company’s creditors.2 The appointment of
the administrator triggers an automatic moratorium on creditor enforcement

action. Any outstanding proceedings, eg distress, litigation or enforcement
may not be continued without the leave of the court. Where the administrator is
appointed by the court, any winding up petitions are automatically dismissed.3
Where the appointment is by the company or its directors, any winding up
petitions are suspended and may be resurrected following the discharge of the
administration order.4
(b) Administrative receivership
This is the appointment of a licensed insolvency practitioner by the holder of
a ‘floating charge’. The role of the administrative receiver is to realise assets
for the benefit of the charge holder; no duties are owed to the general body
of unsecured creditors. The powers and duties of the administrative receiver
are not as comprehensive as those of an administrator, and no moratorium on
creditor enforcement action is triggered by his appointment.
(c) Company voluntary arrangement (CVA)
This is effectively a compromise agreement (otherwise referred to as a
composition or arrangement) between an insolvent company and its creditors
whereby the creditors agree to settle their claims against the company by
accepting (for example) payments over time and/or at a reduced rate. The exact
form of the CVA will vary from case to case and depend on the extent of the
assets and liabilities of the company concerned. A CVA has to be approved
by a majority (in excess of 75 per cent) by value of those creditors present
and voting at a specially convened meeting, having had not less than 14 days’
notice of the detail of the proposed CVA. The CVA must also be approved by
a majority vote of unconnected creditors. If approved, it binds all creditors,
including those who may have objected to the proposal. A CVA usually follows
a period of administration, but it need not do so.
(d) Liquidation
Liquidation follows a resolution of the shareholders of a company to cease
trading, or the making of an order of liquidation by the court on the application
of the company or its creditors. The liquidator is generally voted in by the
creditors. The liquidator will not usually operate the company but instead
will wind it up while realising as many assets into cash as possible, and then
distribute those funds pari passu to creditors in accordance with the statutory
scheme. In high profile cases, it is likely that the conduct of the matter will be
handled by the Public Interest Unit of the Insolvency Service.
1 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 3(1).
2 Ibid, para 3(4)(b).
3 Ibid, para 40(1)(a).
4 Ibid, para 40(1)(b) and HMRC v Portsmouth City Football Club Limited and Others [2010] EWHC 2013
at 46–47 per Mr Justice Mann. The difference between the two approaches is significant where a
creditor has presented a winding up petition prior to the appointment of an administrator. Section
127 of the Insolvency Act 1986 renders void any disposition of a company’s property made after the
commencement of the winding up, unless the court otherwise orders or the disposition is made by
an administrator during the period of suspension. The commencement of the winding up is the date
of the presentation of the winding up petition: see s 129(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. HMRC had
presented a winding up petition in respect of Portsmouth FC on 23 December 2009. The hearing
on the petition was adjourned in February 2010, but before the next return date administrators were
appointed by a qualifying floating charge holder. HMRC alleged that circa £23.5m had been paid by
the Premier League to ‘football creditors’ post presentation of the winding up petition out of monies
that were otherwise due to the club and this was therefore a disposition of the club’s property made
after the presentation of the winding up petition and so void under s 127. If those sums could be
recouped by the eventual liquidator of the old company, it would have generated a significant return for
unsecured creditors, including HMRC. Had the club itself applied to the court for an order appointing
an administrator, the December 2009 petition would have been dismissed and the potential claim
lost. The issue was not dealt with by Mann J, both because the Premier League was not a party to the
proceedings (see para [13]) but also because it was not necessary to do so to determine the issues at
stake. The court was able to proceed on an assumption that the s 127 claims were unanswerable, but
did stress that the existence of a defence ‘could not be ruled out’ (see para [60]).
(b) The ‘anti-deprivation’ principle
B5.134 The anti-deprivation principle ‘renders void any provision by which a debtor
is deprived of assets by reason of insolvency with the effect that they are not available
in the insolvency proceeding’.1 The rule is not absolute. As the Supreme Court has
noted:
‘The policy behind the anti-deprivation rule is clear, that the parties cannot, on
bankruptcy, deprive the bankrupt of property which would otherwise be available
for creditors. It is possible to give that policy a common sense application which
prevents its application to bona fide commercial transactions which do not have
as their predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, the deprivation of the
property of one of the parties on bankruptcy’.2
The importance of this in the context of sports club insolvencies is dealt with below.3
1 Per Richards J in The Commissioners For Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v The Football League
Ltd (FA Premier League Ltd intervening) [2012] EWHC 1372, at para 5.
2 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2012] 1 AC 383, per Lord
Collins at para 104.
3 See paras B5.140–B5.141 and B5.145.
(c) Preferential and non-preferential claims
B5.135 Unsecured creditors are divided into two different classes – preferential and
non-preferential:
(a) The following claims have always ranked as preferential:
(i) employee claims for arrears of wages (not exceeding four months or
£800, whichever is the smaller amount);
(ii) accrued holiday pay (uncapped); and
(iii) unpaid contributions to occupational pension schemes that have been
deducted from salaries during the immediately preceding four-month
period.
(b) Up until 15 September 2003, amounts due to HM Customs & Excise (for
example, VAT), the Inland Revenue (for example, amounts deducted from
gross salaries for PAYE tax) and claims relating to social security contributions
(for example, amounts deducted from gross salaries for employee national
insurance contributions, together with employer contributions) all ranked
as preferential claims.1 From 15 September 2003, however, the preferential
status afforded to those claims was removed – commonly referred to as the
‘loss of Crown preference’. Accordingly, any debts due to HMRC (formed
by the merger in 2005 of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise) are
unsecured non-preferential claims.
For non-preferential creditors to receive any payment by way of distribution from
an administrator following realisation of assets, or from a liquidator following
liquidation of the company, or under the terms of a CVA, all preferential claims
would first have to be discharged in full.
1 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch 6, paras 1 to 7.
(d) The pari passu principle
B5.136 Any distribution to creditors must be made pari passu, ie there must be equal
treatment for all creditors in the same class (ie secured or unsecured, preferential
or non-preferential). This means (for example) that where the funds available for
distribution to unsecured creditors equate to 50 per cent of the total amount of
unsecured claims, every unsecured creditor must receive 50 per cent of their claim.
No priority is afforded based upon any other criteria, eg oldest debt cleared first. The
pari passu principle cannot be displaced by agreement.
(e) Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations
B5.137 Whilst not strictly a principle of insolvency legislation, the Transfer

of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 20061 address the
consequences of a transfer of employees following the onset of insolvency proceedings.
The regulations differentiate between ‘non-terminal proceedings’ (ie administration
or CVA) and ‘terminal proceedings’ (ie liquidation). In the former case, the law
mandates transfer of the contract of employment of any person employed by the old
insolvent company to the new company acquiring the business. In the context of a
sports club, this means the buyer of an insolvent club from its administrator becomes
responsible for players’ wages, past, present and future.
1 SI 2006/246, which implemented into domestic law the provisions of the ‘Acquired Rights Directive’
(Council Directive 98/50/EC of 29 June 1998).
B A typical club insolvency
B5.138 When a club starts to be unable to pay its debts as they become due, the
directors have a choice to make: carry on trading in the hope that they are able to
find a solution whilst creditors increase pressure to obtain payment, or instruct an
insolvency practitioner. If significant inward investment is not secured, creditors such
as HMRC may issue and serve a winding up petition and/or the club or a qualifying
secured creditor may apply to the High Court for the appointment of an administrator.
(a) The withdrawal of membership

B5.139 At that point, many SGBs reserve the right to withdraw the club’s
membership of the governing body:
(a) Each EFL member club is the holder of one ordinary share in The Football
League Limited. The par value of each share is five pence. If a member club
suffers an insolvency event,1 the Articles of Association of The Football League
Limited give the EFL board of directors the power2 to serve notice on the club
to transfer its share to such person or company as the board may direct (usually
the EFL Company Secretary).3
(b) Similarly, each Premier League member club is the holder of one ordinary
share in the FA Premier League Limited, with a par value of £1. If a member
club suffers an insolvency event, the board of directors of the Premier League
may ‘at any time thereafter’ serve notice on the member club to transfer its
share to such person or company as the board may direct.4
(c) Every club is a member of the RFL. On the happening of an insolvency event
(which, in contrast to the EFL and Premier League definitions, includes the
presentation of any winding up petition and the service of a ‘statutory demand’
on the club), the RFL’s bylaws provide that ‘the member concerned shall
immediately cease to be a member upon written notice from the Company’.5
Bylaw 4.6 then affords the RFL’s board of directors absolute discretion as to
whether to serve such notice.6
(d) The Rugby Football Union is a co-operative originally registered under the
Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965, now the Co-operative and
Community Benefit Societies Act 2014.7 Its governing document is its rules, as
published from time to time and lodged with the Financial Services Authority
and maintained on its Mutual Public Register. The Rugby Football Union is
granted the power by its members to determine the criteria and conditions of
membership,8 and to cancel the membership of any club that fails to comply
with those requirements,9 or is otherwise in breach of its regulations.10
1 The general rule is that the EFL may only issue a notice of withdrawal once an insolvency practitioner
has been appointed, but there are two exceptions to that rule: (a) where notice is filed of intention
to appoint administrators pursuant to para 26 of Sch B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986. Of itself that
process does not result in the appointment of an insolvency practitioner to run the club, but it does
create a moratorium on creditor action, and that moratorium of itself is perceived to gain a competitive
advantage, justifying a notice of withdrawal; and (b) where the directors of a club apply for an
administration order.
2 The Football League Limited Articles of Association, Art 4.5.
3 Ibid, Art 4.7.
4 Premier League Articles of Association, Art 10.1.
5 Rugby Football League Handbook, Bylaw 4.5.
6 RFL Bylaw 4.6 states: ‘The Board is under no obligation to serve notice within any time limit upon
being notified of an Insolvency Event and may delay in serving notice and take steps to assist the
member, but such delay or assistance will not preclude its right to serve a notice of withdrawal of
membership at any point in the future’. Given that the insolvency event is analogous to a repudiatory
breach of contract by the club, the question arises whether a delay in serving the notice would be
considered an implied wavier of the breach and affirmation of the membership agreement. See eg Vitol
v Norelf [1996] AC 800 per Lord Steyn at 811 to 812.
7 See para A2.48.
8 Rugby Football Union Rules 2019/20, Rule 5.3.
9 Ibid, Rule 5.6.
10 Ibid, Rule 5.12.
B5.140 In 2012, HMRC challenged a number of provisions in The Football League’s

Articles of Association, alleging that they were unlawful individually because they
were contrary to public policy and collectively because they were ‘expressly designed’
to enable full payment of football creditors in preference to other creditors.1 As part
of its case, HMRC challenged Article 4.8 (giving the EFL the power to withdraw a
club’s share in the League) as contravening the anti-deprivation principle,2 because it
deprived the club of its most valuable asset, viz membership of the EFL.3
1 HMRC v The Football League Limited [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch).
2 See para B5.134.
3 HMRC v The Football League Limited [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), para 51.
B5.141 The EFL, supported by the Premier League as intervener (given its similar
rules) cited cases relating to membership of stock exchanges1 where it had been found
that ‘the loss of membership of a financial institution, such as a stock exchange,
where one has failed to meet one’s debts or has gone bankrupt cannot […] be said to
fall foul of the principle’ of anti-deprivation.2 The High Court felt able to distinguish
those cases on the facts because in each of them the holding of the share was ancillary
to the actual membership of the stock exchange,3 whereas in the EFL’s case there was
no distinction between the share in The Football League Ltd and the membership
of the league competition: it was the share that conferred the right to play in the
EFL’s competitions, own player registrations, and receive distributions from the
EFL. However, the High Court did accept that the cases demonstrated that ‘members
of a trading association cannot be required to deal with, or play against, a member
which defaults in its obligations to other members and the loss of membership for no
consideration is a permissible response to such default’.4 Having made that finding,
the court was able to hold that Article 4.8 was a bona fide commercial transaction
(as described by Lord Collins in Belmont5) and therefore did not infringe the anti-
deprivation principle.
1 The Official Assignee of Bombay v Shroff (1932) 48 TLR 443 and Money Markets International
Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1150.
2 Per Neuberger J in Money Markets International, at para 110.
3 Per Richards J in HMRC v The Football League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), at para 172.
4 Ibid, para 173.
5 See para B5.134, n 2.
(b) The exit from insolvency
B5.142 By activating a withdrawal of membership in accordance with the relevant

rules or regulations, the SGB gains the ability to determine whether, and under what
conditions the insolvent club should be permitted to retain its membership of the
competition. For example, Article 4 of the EFL Articles of Association gives the
EFL’s board of directors discretion to suspend the withdrawal of membership that
is served upon the insolvency event, in order to give the club time to re-organise
its affairs and so to retain its membership if it satisfies certain conditions. If those
conditions are met, the board may withdraw the notice and the club remains in
membership of the EFL. Alternatively, if they are not met, the EFL board can reinstate
the notice of withdrawal of the club’s membership, leading to its eventual expulsion,
where it considers that it is not tenable to retain the club as a member of the EFL (as
happened, for example, in August 2019, in the case of Bury FC, when it was unable
to fulfil its 2019/20 fixtures).
B5.143 In deciding whether to suspend the expulsion from membership, and (if
so) what conditions have to be met to retain membership, the SGB has to balance a
number of conflicting factors. For example:
(a) By compromising debt, sometimes at very low levels, clubs coming out of
insolvency establish themselves on a more solid financial footing, freed of the
debt obligations that existed prior to insolvency. Would other clubs, who have
lived throughout within their means and not defaulted on their obligations, be
prepared to continue to participate against such clubs on this basis?
(b) Would the public reputation of the sport be intrinsically damaged by the re-
admittance of a club that has defaulted on its financial obligations to creditors
inside and outside the game, including HMRC?
(c) What are the effects on a local community of permanent withdrawal of a club’s
membership (which may end the club’s very existence)?
The EFL’s ‘Insolvency Policy’ describes the dilemma that the SGB faces in such
situations: ‘[…] the choice for the League is whether to automatically withdraw
membership from (and so expel) any club which cannot pay its creditors in full or
whether there is some compromise. It is a fact that a policy of expulsion would have
a significant impact on the constitution and continuity of the League’.
B5.144 The starting point of the EFL’s Insolvency Policy is that ‘no Club should
gain (or seek to gain) any advantage within the context of professional football over
other Clubs by not paying all its creditors in full at all times’. However, the policy
also recognises that automatic expulsion upon insolvency would have a significant
impact on the integrity and continuity of the EFL’s competitions. The Insolvency
Policy therefore explains what the insolvent club needs to do in order to avoid losing
its membership of the EFL. Reflecting the EFL’s longstanding ‘rescue culture’, it
provides that the notice of withdrawal of the club’s share in The Football League
Ltd will be suspended to give the insolvent club a chance to re-establish its finances
and continue in membership, and will be withdrawn (ie the club’s membership of the
EFL will be maintained) if the club pays or secures all football creditors in full (to
safeguard the integrity of the EFL competitions),1 reaches agreement with secured
creditors, pays unsecured creditors a minimum dividend of an immediate 25 pence
in the pound or a deferred 35 pence in the pound,2 and provides a fully underwritten
business plan that demonstrates there is sufficient funding in place to enable the club
to complete its scheduled fixtures that season (and for the next one or two seasons, if
the EFL deems appropriate).
1 The EFL is not alone in this approach. For example, the Rugby Football Union requires a club seeking
to exit insolvency by way of a transfer of the club to a new entity to comply with a series of conditions,
one of which is the obligation to pay what it refers to as ‘Rugby Creditors’. Rugby Creditors includes
employees for wage arrears, amounts due to the Rugby Football Union and its group companies, and
payments due to other rugby clubs: see Rugby Football Union Reg 5.3.12, and para 21 of Appendix
2 to those regulations. Similarly, when granting membership to the new company established to take
over the operation of Rangers Football Club in the summer of 2012, the Scottish Football Association
required as a condition of the new membership that the club honour payments to certain football-related
creditors in full. The Scottish FA also took the opportunity to re-impose a ban on transfer activity that
had originally been overturned by the Court of Session in R v Scottish Football Association ex parte
Rangers Football Club Plc [2012] CSOH 95, effectively side-stepping future legal wrangling over the
power to impose such a sanction via the disciplinary route.
2 A failure to pay the minimum dividend to unsecured creditors might not lead to expulsion but it would
lead to an additional 15-point deduction on top of the 12-point deduction imposed pursuant to Reg
12.3 (see para B5.150).
In Leeds United Football Club v The Football League FA Rule K arbitration, 2007 (unreported),
the club’s challenge to the imposition of a 15-point deduction following the failure of the proposed
CVA failed because the claims brought had already been validly compromised; and they were brought
so late as to justify refusal of relief (following Stevenage Borough Football Club Limited v The
Football League Limited Carnwath J (1996) Times, 1 August and in the Court of Appeal at (1997)
9 Admin LR 109). However, the arbitral panel did determine that (a) the Football League’s board of
directors had the requisite authority to impose a 15-point deduction, (b) the League’s insolvency policy
document, properly construed, did not prevent the board imposing that condition, and (c) given the
absolute discretion afforded to the board, and having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to
an SGB in the exercise of such discretion, the decision did not fall outside the scope of what a rational
decision maker in their position could make.
B5.145 The ability to impose such conditions is well-founded in company law.

First, the articles of association of a company normally give the board of directors
absolute discretion to refuse to register any purported transfer of shares (and therefore
of membership).1 Secondly, such absolute discretion to refuse to accept a transfer
encompasses a discretion to accept the transfer subject to conditions.2 Thirdly, the
cause of action that allows a challenge to the imposition of such conditions is breach
of fiduciary duty by the directors, and that challenge can only be exercised by the
existing shareholders to whom that duty is owed.3 Fourthly, the courts will not impose
a contractual relationship on unwilling parties.4
1 The Table A Model Articles reflect this position at Model Article 26(5) – ‘The directors may refuse to
register the transfer of a share’. See also Art 6 of The Football League Ltd’s Articles of Association.
2 It is an established canon of construction that the greater can include the less – ‘Omne majus continet
in se minus’. See Bailey and Norbury (Eds), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 7th Edn (LexisNexis,
2017), Part 3 Chapter 7.1 and Part 4 Chapter 9.7.
3 See re Gresham Life Assurance Society ex parte Penney (1872) LR Chancery Appeals 446 per
James LJ.
4 See HMRC v The Football League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), discussed at para B5.140-141 and
B5.146, and Lee v Showman’s Guild [1952] 2 QB 329 and Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633, CA
(discussed at para E7.6).
B5.146 The specific requirement that an insolvent club must pay all ‘football
creditor’ claims in full as a condition of ongoing membership of The League is
particularly controversial.1 The reasons the EFL imposes this particular condition
were set out at length by Richards J in his judgment in HMRC v The Football League,
and include in particular:
(a) preventing clubs gaining a competitive advantage by not paying their debts to
other clubs;2
(b) avoiding putting other clubs – who have no choice but to trade with each other
– into financial difficulties (the ‘domino effect’);3
(c) securing the survival of clubs;4 and
(d) protecting the integrity of the competition.5
HMRC challenged this condition as being contrary to the anti-deprivation rule and
the pari passu principle.6 Richards J rejected the HMRC’s challenge on the basis
that no specific set of facts had been put before him and any decision would be fact-
sensitive.7 However, he also stated that, in most circumstances, the EFL’s rules would
not be rendered void by the principles invoked by HMRC.8 As well as the findings in
relation to the anti-deprivation principle discussed at B5.140–B5.141, he explained
that, in administration proceedings, the pari passu principle does not apply from the
commencement of administration; rather, it only applies at the point where there is
a distribution to creditors (if any).9 However, in closing, he cautioned that ‘The FL
should not regard the result of this case as an endorsement of its approach to football
creditors.’10
1 It has been criticised in particular by the DCMS, see Seventh Report of the Culture, Media and Sport
Select Committee, 29 July 2011 (HC 792-I) para 97.
2 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch) para 178 (‘Serious problems can arise, from a “sporting” perspective, when
a club spends more than it can afford in chasing that dream. It is very damaging to the integrity of
The League’s competition if member clubs working hard to live within their means, (only taking on
player wages and other commitments that they can afford) have to compete with others that do not feel
so constrained. A club that spends beyond its means is able to acquire better players and so achieve
better results than those that operate prudently. It is cheating. It achieves an obvious and improper
competitive advantage, in particular (but not only) where some of the debts in question are owed to
clubs against which it is competing, which are more socially and financially responsible. The actions
of the reckless risk tempting other clubs also to act imprudently just to compete on equal terms. Those
that resist the temptation are further disadvantaged’).
3 Ibid, para 179.
4 Ibid at para 181.
5 Ibid.
6 See also paras B5.134, B5.136 and B5.140–B5.141.
7 HMRC v The Football League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), paras 59 and 187.
8 Ibid, para 187.
9 Ibid, para 87–90.
10 Ibid, para 189.
B5.147 So-called ‘Football Creditors’ are regarded as unsecured creditors in law and
as such rank equally with all other unsecured creditors for payment (in accordance
with the pari passu rule discussed above1). However, it is now clear that the pari
passu rule only applies to the assets of the insolvent entity and cannot attach to
independent third-party funds. In the context of club insolvency, there is nothing to
stop a purchaser of the club using its own resources to pay certain creditors in full
whilst leaving all other creditors to claim a dividend through the insolvency process,
provided that the requirement to pay those creditors in full does not depress the price
it is prepared to pay for the company (and so decrease the dividend paid to the other
creditors).2
1 See para B5.136.
2 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Wimbledon Football Club and Others [2004] EWHC 1020 (Ch)
at [17], upheld on appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 655; In the matter of Portsmouth City Football Club Ltd
(In Administration) [2010] EWHC 2013 (Ch), para 68 (‘even if the CVA actually does provide for the
football creditors to be paid in full, it does not do so at the expense of the other creditors at all, so it
is not, in my view, unfair to those creditors. Subject to a particularly successful attack on the Premier
League’s insolvency policy and the corresponding provisions of its rules, so far as football creditors
are paid in full they are not being paid out of assets which would otherwise fall into the CVA, so they
are not being paid at the expense of the other creditors. The money out of which they are being paid
is money which would not otherwise come into the CVA (or into the club) in the events which have
happened or in any events which are likely to happen’). Where, for example, a purchaser acquires
assets from the insolvent company at an undervalue because of an obligation to pay certain creditors
in full, that might infringe the pari passu principle. See Neuberger LJ in the Court of Appeal, at [62].
B5.148 It can also be argued that the requirement that a club pay its players in full
is only a relatively modest extension of the rights already afforded to employees
under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006.1
As already explained, the effect of those regulations is to transfer the contracts of
employment, with almost all of the obligations relating to them,2 to the new business
following a sale of the business by an administrator.3
1 See para B5.137.
2 By virtue of Reg 8(4), liabilities for unpaid arrears of wages or holiday pay up to the date of the
appointment of administrator will not automatically transfer, and the ‘football creditor’ rules and
their equivalent s in other sports thereby afford an additional level of protection in that respect. Some
elements of those claims rank as preferential creditors (see para B5.135) but the remainder would
otherwise be non-preferential unsecured creditor claims.
3 There had been some doubt as to the application of Reg 8 in the context of so-called ‘pre-pack
administrations’ but this doubt was removed following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Key2Law
(Surrey) LLP v De’Antiquis and Others [2011] EWCA Civ 1567.
(c) Sporting sanctions for insolvency
B5.149 While the notice of withdrawal of membership triggered by the insolvency

event enables the SGB to ensure that the club only retains membership of the
competition if it exits from insolvency on terms acceptable to the SGB, it does not
redress the competitive advantage that the club obtains from the compromise of its
debts, both retrospectively (in that it has obtained a false position by living beyond
its means) and prospectively (in that it no longer is encumbered with the obligation
to service those debts, and so has more money to fund performance). Otherwise
clubs may not be dissuaded from spending beyond their means and so risking
insolvency, and owners may not be dissuaded from ceasing to fund a club and opting
for insolvency proceedings.1
1 Many clubs expressed concern when Leicester City FC went into administration in October 2002,
suffered no points penalty (because no rule was then in place), and won promotion at the end of that
season. The EFL’s member clubs responded by approving the adoption of the sporting sanction at an
Extraordinary General Meeting in October 2003 in order to (a) dissuade clubs from pending beyond
their means; (b) dissuade owners from ceasing to fund a club and opting for insolvency proceedings;
and (c) redress any disadvantage unfairly imposed on other clubs.
B5.150 There are various ways to avoid this potential unfairness:

(a) In the EFL, a sporting sanction of 12 points is automatically imposed when
the member club suffers an insolvency event.1 The EFL’s board of directors
also has discretion to deduct up to 12 points where a group company of the
member club suffers an insolvency event but the club itself does not.2 The
timing of any deduction depends on when it happens: after the fourth Thursday
in March, there is a risk of carry-over into the following season. Any appeal
must be lodged within seven days, the short deadline being justified by the
need for certainty as to the effect on the competition. The only ground of
appeal permitted is that the insolvency event was solely due to an event of
force majeure, defined as an event that:
‘having regard to all of the circumstances, was caused by and resulted directly from
circumstances, other than normal business risks, over which the Club and/or Group
Undertaking (as the case may be) could not reasonably be expected to have control
and its Officials had used all due diligence to avoid the happening of that event’.3
The costs of any appeal are borne by the club even if successful, on the basis
that the other member clubs should not have their distributions reduced in any
event. If it upholds the appeal, the League Arbitration Panel may overturn the
entire points deduction, or else reduce the amount of points deducted.
(b) The board of directors of the Premier League has the power, but not the
obligation, to impose a deduction of nine points where a member club and/or
a group company of the member club suffers an insolvency event.4 Where the
deduction occurs during the season it applies immediately. Where it occurs out
of season, it will apply in the following season. The deadline and grounds for
appeal are the same as in the EFL’s rules, but the panel appointed to hear the
case can only allow or dismiss the appeal, with no opportunity to substitute its
own sanction (with the exception of making an order dealing with the costs of
proceedings and/or the deposit).5
(c) Despite its rules containing no express power to impose a sporting sanction on
the occurrence of an insolvency event, the RFL has on at least three occasions
(Wakefield and Wrexham in 2011, and Bradford in 2012) imposed a deduction
of points on clubs entering administration.
(d) Under the Rugby Football Union’s rules, a sporting sanction is automatically
imposed when a member club suffers an insolvency event. Where an insolvency
event occurs mid-season, a club in the Premiership will suffer a deduction of
20 per cent of the total number of available points in the relevant competition
(including any bonus points) and clubs in lower divisions suffer a 25 per cent
deduction.6 If the club either is not relegated after the deduction, or would have
been relegated anyway (regardless of the deduction), a further deduction of 10
per cent if the club is in the Premiership (or 15 per cent for others) will apply
the following season.7 Where the insolvency event occurs out of season, the
regulations give the RFU the right to back-date the deduction to the previous
season or apply it in the next season, but states that, ordinarily, if the insolvency
occurs prior to the setting of the fixtures for the coming season, the points
deduction should apply to the previous season.8
1 EFL Reg 12.3.1.
2 EFL Reg 12.3.2.
3 EFL Reg 12.3.11. On 4 August 2020, a League Arbitration Panel ruled that the decision by the owner
of Wigan Athletic to stop funding the club’s trading deficit just weeks after paying more than £17
million and assuming more than £23 million of debt to buy the club was the sole cause of the club’s
administration, but it did not qualify as a force majeure event because (a) the owner’s decision was
deemed to be a normal business risk, and (b) as both owner and director, the owner fell within the
definition of ‘Official’ of the club under the EFL Regulations and had failed to use all due diligence
to avoid the decision to stop funding. Therefore, the club’s appeal against the 12-point deduction was
rejected, meaning the club was relegated to League One for season 2020/21. Wigan Athletic FC v EFL,
League Arbitration Panel decision dated 4 August 2020.
4 Premier League Rule E.40.
5 Premier League Rule E.48.
6 Rugby Football Union Reg 5.5.2.
7 Ibid, Reg 5.5.3.
8 Ibid, Reg 5.5.5. The provisions have not been without controversy. On 28 June Leeds Rugby Union
Football Club Limited, the operating company of Leeds Carnegie, concluded a CVA with its creditors
that would see (a) the parent company waive entitlement to dividends related to its debts of c.£4.75m,
and (b) a dividend to unsecured creditors of 11 pence in the pound. Importantly, the arrangement
received approval of 100 per cent of all creditors, which meant the provisions of what is now
RFU Regulation 5.5.7 applied. It provides that ‘where all outstanding creditors of that Club are paid
in full (or the outstanding creditors agree to waive or agree a repayment programme for outstanding
amounts) […] within six weeks of the [relevant insolvency event] then the Club shall not suffer a
points deduction[…]’. Accordingly, Leeds Carnegie finished season 2018/19 with no deduction (the
insolvency event occurring after the fixtures were announced for the following season), and started
season 2019/20 with no deduction because of the 100 per cent approval of creditors for the CVA,
whilst at the same time compromising liabilities of claims that were not waived (circa £1.2m) for a
payment of £175k.
B5.151 When first introduced in the English Football League in 2003, sporting
sanctions for insolvent clubs were viewed with suspicion. They were perceived as
further harming a club when it was at its lowest point. However, the SGBs mentioned
above have maintained the principle ever since and to date no member club has sought
to challenge the legality of such a sanction, presumably because it is accepted that the
sanction is necessary to deter financial mismanagement and to avoid insolvent clubs
getting an unfair competitive advantage.
B5.152 Mr Justice Marcus Smith provided some legal support for such sanctions,
albeit obiter, in the context of the challenge by New Saints FA to the decision by
the FA of Wales to end the 2019/20 season early (due to the Covid-19 pandemic)
and decide final rankings based on criteria other than the results of the matches that
had not yet been played. He stressed the importance, as a general rule, of deciding
competition outcomes exclusively by ‘sporting merit’ (ie results on the pitch), but
acknowledged that the Welsh FA’s Rule 17.10, which imposed a ten-point deduction
on any club that entered into administration, was an exception to that general rule.
He said:
‘Rule 17.10 affects, in a manner entirely devoid of “sporting merit”, the ranking of a
Club in administration by deducting points for reasons other than “sporting merit”.
The reason for this is, I infer, to preserve the financial health of the League. Viewed
in this light, the derogation from “sporting merit” is understandable, provided it is
narrowly construed’.1
1 New Saints FC v Football Association of Wales, [2020] EWHC 1838 (Ch), para 64(d).
B5.153 It is important, however, to make clear in the rules that the imposition of
a sporting sanction is automatic upon the occurrence of the insolvency event, and
not contingent upon the operation of due legal process (eg by way of a disciplinary
charge). In Hudson v Gambling Commission,1 Mr Justice Norris held that a regulator’s
bringing of disciplinary action against a company in insolvency (as opposed to the
exercise of summary powers by an executive) is subject to the moratorium on ‘legal
process’ imposed by paragraph 43(6) of Sch B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, meaning
it cannot proceed without the consent of the office holder (the administrator or
liquidator) or the High Court. However, in HMRC v The Football League, Mr Justice
Richards held that the Football League is not a regulator in the true sense of the word
(in contrast to, for example, Ofcom or Ofwat) but rather is a private governing body.2
It is therefore questionable whether the principle in Hudson would be followed in a
sporting context.
1 [2010] EWHC 1229 (Ch).
2 [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch), para 186.
CHAPTER B6
Safeguarding
Kate Gallafent QC (Blackstone Chambers) and Richard Bush (Bird & Bird LLP)
Contents
.para
1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................... B6.1
2 KEY TERMINOLOGY....................................................................................... B6.4
A Who is a ‘child’?.......................................................................................... B6.5
B Who is an ‘adult at risk’?............................................................................. B6.7
C ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’........................................................... B6.9
D ‘Harm’ and ‘significant harm’...................................................................... B6.10
E ‘Abuse’......................................................................................................... B6.12
F ‘Poor practice’.............................................................................................. B6.18
3 THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND......................... B6.19
A Sport and the child protection/care system.................................................. B6.19
B Overview of the child protection and care systems in England................... B6.25
4 SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT............................................................................ B6.32
A The importance of safeguarding in sport..................................................... B6.32
B The Child Protection in Sport Unit (CPSU) and CPSU Standards.............. B6.35
C Key roles and responsibilities...................................................................... B6.39
D Safeguarding policies and developing awareness........................................ B6.40
E Codes of conduct.......................................................................................... B6.44
F Positions of trust.......................................................................................... B6.45
G Reporting...................................................................................................... B6.48
H Information sharing...................................................................................... B6.49
I Safer recruitment and criminal record checks............................................. B6.54
J Safeguarding regulations and case management......................................... B6.82
K Monitoring and evaluation........................................................................... B6.104
L Dealing with non-recent/historic abuse cases.............................................. B6.105
M ‘Duty of Care’ and the scope of safeguarding in sport beyond children
and adults at risk.......................................................................................... B6.107
N The international dimension........................................................................ B6.113
1 INTRODUCTION
B6.1 Everyone should be able to participate in sport in a safe environment that
is free from abuse. While abuse might not perceived as compromising the integrity
of sport in the same way that doping and corruption can, in the sense of directly
affecting results on the field of play, it represents just as much of a corrosive threat to
sport, if not more, and it calls for an equally robust regulatory response.
B6.2 The UK is recognised as a world leader in safeguarding and child protection

in sport,1 although it must be acknowledged that this position has been reached in
significant part because sport in the UK has had to react to a number of serious
abuse cases in the past,2 which is reflective of the development of the domestic child
protection system more generally.3
1 See Lang and Hartill (Eds), Safeguarding, Child Protection and Abuse in Sport, 1st Edn (Routledge,
2015), Introduction.
2 Ibid, Chapter 1 (Safeguarding and child protection in sport in England).
3 See Lindon and Webb, Safeguarding and Child Protection, 5th Edn (Hodder Education, 2016),
Chapter 3 (The legislative and policy framework).
Safeguarding 643
B6.3 Since the last edition of this book, there have been a significant number
of high-profile abuse cases reported as taking place in sport, both in the UK1 and
elsewhere,2 which have had the effect of focusing considerable attention onto the
areas of safeguarding and child protection. Some of these cases have been ‘historic’
or ‘non-recent’3 in nature, whereas others have been recent, but they have all served to
highlight the ongoing need for sports organisations, and in particular sports governing
bodies, to remain vigilant in seeking to prevent abuse, to respond effectively when
abuse takes place, and to work alongside other stakeholders (such as the police and
local authorities).4
1 The most widely reported of these domestic cases is probably that of Barry Bennell, a prolific sex
abuser of children and a former junior football coach and scout, convicted of numerous charges of
child sexual abuse spanning the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (see eg ‘Football sex abuse: Who is Barry
Bennell?’, BBC News, 15 February 2018, available at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-38104681 [accessed
30 October 2020]). Following ex-professional footballer Andy Woodward coming forward in
November 2016 with his account of abuse by Mr Bennell, in turn prompting others to come forward
with their accounts of abuse, The FA launched an independent review into alleged non-recent child
sexual abuse in football, which The FA’s chairman, Greg Clarke, is reported as calling ‘one of
the biggest crises in the history of the governing body (see ‘Eighty sports coaches convicted of
child sex abuse, says Offside Trust’, BBC Sport, 5 December 2018, available at bbc.co.uk/sport/
football/46453955 [accessed 30 October 2020]). As at the time of writing, the report of The FA’s
independent review is yet to be published.
2 For example, the horrifying case of Larry Nassar, the former USA Gymnastics team doctor who
committed thousands of sexual assaults between the early 1990s and 2016. Nassar was ultimately
sentenced to between 140 and 360 years in prison. The case will have a lasting impact on
USA Gymnastics and the US Olympic Committee (among others) for many years to come (see ‘15
months on from Larry Nassar, USA Gymnastics struggles to find its way’, Guardian, 24 April 2019,
available at heguardian.com/sport/2019/apr/24/15-months-on-from-larry-nassar-usa-gymnastics-
struggles-to-find-its-way [accessed 30 October 2020]).
3 ‘Historic’ or ‘non-recent’ abuse is an allegation of neglect, physical, sexual or emotional abuse made
by or on behalf of someone who is now 18 years or over, relating to an incident which took place when
the alleged victim was under 18 years old. For more information, see the Non-recent abuse section
of the NSPCC’s website, at nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/signs-symptoms-effects/non-recent-abuse/
[accessed 30 October 2020]. How sports organisations can address such allegations is considered at
paras B6.105–B6.106.
4 An independent report into Nassar’s abuse highlights this issue well: ‘While Nassar bears ultimate
responsibility for his decades-long abuse of girls and young women, he did not operate in a vacuum.
Instead, he acted within an ecosystem that facilitated his criminal acts. Numerous institutions and
individuals enabled his abuse and failed to stop him, including coaches at the club and elite level,
trainers and medical professionals, administrators and coaches at Michigan State University (“MSU”),
and officials at both United States of America Gymnastics (“USAG”) and the United States Olympic
Committee (the “USOC”). These institutions and individuals ignored red flags, failed to recognize
textbook grooming behaviours, or in some egregious instances, dismissed clear calls for help from
girls and young women who were being abused by Nassar. Multiple law enforcement agencies, in turn,
failed effectively to intervene when presented with opportunities to do so. And when survivors first
began to come forward publicly, some were shunned, shamed or disbelieved by others in their own
communities. The fact that so many different institutions and individuals failed the survivors does not
excuse any of them, but instead reflects the collective failure to protect young athletes’. See McPhee
and Dowden, Report of the Independent Investigation: The Constellation of Factors Underlying Larry
Nassar’s Abuse of Athletes (Ropes & Gray, 2018), pp 2–3, available at nassarinvestigation.com/en
2 KEY TERMINOLOGY
B6.4 There are a number of specific and frequently used terms in the field of
safeguarding and child protection (used both inside and outside of sport), many of
which do not bear precise definition, and not all of which are used in a consistent
manner. Unfortunately, this can act as a barrier to understanding of the subject matter.
This section therefore seeks to provide some clarity in respect of some of the more
fundamental and commonly used of these terms.
A Who is a ‘child’?
B6.5 According to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by

the UK Government in 1991, ‘a child means every human being below the age of
eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
earlier’ (see art 1). Under English law, in the context of child protection legislation, a
‘child’ is defined at s 105(1) of the Children Act 1989 as ‘a person under the age of
eighteen’.
B6.6 Therefore, while safeguarding and child protection measures in sport can
quite properly take into account the fact that some children will be more mature than
others (and the term ‘young people’ can be used to refer to older children),1 such
measures will typically seek to protect all children, ie, all those under the age of 18.
1 See eg General Medical Council, Protecting children and young people: the responsibilities of all
doctors (2012, updated 2018), p 50, available at gmc-uk.org/ethical-guidance/ethical-guidance-for-
doctors/protecting-children-and-young-people [accessed 30 October 2020], a guidance document for
doctors, which states ‘We use the term ‘children’ to refer to younger children who do not have the
maturity and understanding to make important decisions for themselves. We use the term ‘young
people’ to refer to older or more experienced children who are more likely to be able to make these
decisions for themselves’.
B Who is an ‘adult at risk’?
B6.7 An ‘adult at risk’ is defined by statute as someone aged 18 or over who:

(a) has needs for local authority care and support;
(b) is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect; and
(c) as a result of his/her needs is unable to protect him or herself against the abuse
or neglect or the risk of it.1
1 This definition is set out at s 42 of the Care Act 2014 (and it is also reflected at Data Protection Act
2018, Sch 1, Pt 1, para 18(4)). Prior to the introduction of the Care Act 2014, the ‘No Secrets’ statutory
guidance, published in 2000, defined a ‘vulnerable adult’ (similarly) as a person ‘who is or may be
in need of community care services by reason of mental or other disability, age or illness, and who is
or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant
harm or exploitation’. Older safeguarding policies and procedures often refer to ‘vulnerable adults’,
although ‘adults at risk’ is now generally considered to be the more appropriate terminology.
B6.8 Sports organisations’ safeguarding measures should extend to affording

protection to ‘adults at risk’ as well as children, and recently some have begun to
afford regulatory protection further to all participants (regardless of their age or
whether they might be considered ‘at risk’) (see further paras B6.107–B6.112).
While what will be an appropriate approach to safeguarding will differ between
different sports and sports organisations, safeguarding measures can address both
children and adults,1 while allowing for any differences in context.
1 See eg RFU Regulation 21 – Safeguarding, Reg 21.5.1 (‘The provisions of RFU Regulation 21 are
applicable to Adults at Risk in Rugby Union and those working with them in the same way as they
apply to Children in Rugby Union and those working with them’).
C ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’
B6.9 ‘Safeguarding’ and ‘child protection’ are terms that are often used
synonymously, but there is a distinction between the two:
(a) ‘Safeguarding’ concerns all activities that support the wellbeing of children
generally.1 The term can also be used to refer to activities that support the
wellbeing of adults.2
Safeguarding 645
(b) ‘Child protection’ refers to prevention and response activity that is undertaken
to protect specific children who are suffering, or are likely to suffer, significant
harm.3
‘Child protection’ is therefore a critically important part of ‘safeguarding’, but
it is only one part of it. Best safeguarding practice in sport encompasses a wide
range of matters aimed at maintaining or improving the wellbeing of children and
adults, although of course child protection is an essential part of any approach to
safeguarding.
1 There is no statutory definition of what is meant by ‘safeguarding’, but statutory guidance defines
‘safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children’ as (i) protecting children from maltreatment;
(ii) preventing impairment of children’s health or development; (iii) ensuring that children grow up
in circumstances consistent with the provision of safe and effective care; and (iv) taking action to
enable all children to have the best outcomes. See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard
Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July
2018, pp 5–6, and 102.
2 For the purposes of illustration, see Department of Health & Social Care, Care Act factsheets,
Factsheet 7: Protecting adults from abuse or neglect, last updated 19 April 2016, available at gov.
uk/government/publications/care-act-2014-part-1-factsheets/care-act-factsheets [accessed 30 October
2020], which states ‘”Adult safeguarding” is working with adults with care and support needs to keep
them safe from abuse or neglect. It is an important part of what many public services do, and a key
responsibility of local authorities’.
3 There is also no statutory definition of what is meant by ‘child protection’, but the same guidance
defines child protection as ‘Part of safeguarding and promoting welfare. This refers to the activity that
is undertaken to protect specific children who are suffering, or are likely to suffer, significant harm’.
See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, p 102.
D ‘Harm’ and ‘significant harm’
B6.10 In the legislative context, ‘harm’ is defined by s 31(9) of the Children Act
1989 as:
‘ill-treatment (including sexual abuse and non-physical forms of ill-treatment) or

the impairment of health (physical or mental) or development (physical, intellectual,
emotional, social or behavioural)’.
Safeguarding policies adopted by sports organisations will often include a definition
of ‘harm’ that is the same as, or very similar to, this statutory definition (or reference
to ‘harm’ may be construed accordingly).
B6.11 There is no statutory definition of ‘significant harm’, which is the threshold

for state intervention in child protection cases (see para B6.27). Case law however
has defined ‘significant’ as meaning that the ‘harm must […] be significant enough
to justify the intervention of the State and disturb the autonomy of the parents to
bring up their children by themselves in the way they choose’.1 That this definition
is somewhat circular highlights that ‘harm’ is a flexible concept, which is entirely
appropriate given how highly fact sensitive and subjective safeguarding and child
protection matters can be.2
1 Re MA (Care: Threshold) [2009] EWCA Civ 853, per Ward LJ at para 54.
2 The immediately preceding version of this chapter noted the following (in considering the boundaries
of emotional abuse and the harm caused): ‘This is a very difficult area. For example, how is a sports
body to determine when the actions of a coach transgress the bounds of acceptable coaching process
into the realms of bullying and emotional/physical abuse? The difficulty is that no clear objective
criteria exist to determine when ‘tough’ (but acceptable) coaching strays into bullying/emotional abuse
[…] What is necessarily involved is not an objective determination as to conduct/demands that are right
or wrong, but rather a child-focused assessment relating to the circumstances and character of the child
in question. By way of example, out of a group of ten athletes participating in a coaching programme,
at one end of the spectrum one or two of such athletes will positively thrive on the challenges presented
by a tough coaching regime. Being made the subject of constructive criticism (or even less constructive
cajoling) will spur them on to ever-greater levels of achievement. There is perhaps a middle category
of five or six who are not particularly adversely affected by the coaching regime but equally they do not
positively benefit by these methods. There will be one or two children for whom such tough coaching
methodologies are positively harmful, amounting to emotional child abuse. Such children may exhibit
characteristics of emotional or physical harm consequent upon their experience. This may manifest
itself in such young persons themselves engaging in bullying or other inappropriate behaviour, weight
loss of inattention/disruptiveness in schooling, and (on the most serious cases) even self-harm’.
E ‘Abuse’
B6.12 ‘Abuse’ is another flexible concept, although (at its highest level) it can
generally be considered as conduct that is harmful, ie in the sense that it impairs
health or development.
B6.13 ‘Abuse’ is defined in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ (the

principal statutory guidance in respect of child protection and safeguarding) in the
following terms:1
‘A form of maltreatment of a child. Somebody may abuse or neglect a child by

inflicting harm, or by failing to act to prevent harm. Children may be abused in a
family or in an institutional or community setting by those known to them or, more
rarely, by others. Abuse can take place wholly online, or technology may be used
to facilitate offline abuse. Children may be abused by an adult or adults, or another
child or children’.
1 HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, p 102.
B6.14 Working Together to Safeguard Children goes on to identify the following

types of abusive conduct:1
(a) ‘Physical abuse’, being ‘a form of abuse which may involve hitting, shaking,
throwing, poisoning, burning or scalding, drowning, suffocating or otherwise
causing physical harm to a child. Physical harm may also be caused when a parent
or carer fabricates the symptoms of, or deliberately induces, illness in a child’.
(b) ‘Emotional abuse’, being ‘the persistent emotional maltreatment of a child
such as to cause severe and persistent adverse effects on the child’s emotional
development. It may involve conveying to a child that they are worthless
or unloved, inadequate, or valued only insofar as they meet the needs of
another person. It may include not giving the child opportunities to express
their views, deliberately silencing them or “making fun” of what they say or
how they communicate. It may feature age or developmentally inappropriate
expectations being imposed on children. These may include interactions that
are beyond a child’s developmental capability, as well as overprotection and
limitation of exploration and learning, or preventing the child participating in
normal social interaction. It may involve seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of
another. It may involve serious bullying (including cyber bullying), causing
children frequently to feel frightened or in danger, or the exploitation or
corruption of children. Some level of emotional abuse is involved in all types
of maltreatment of a child, though it may occur alone’.
(c) ‘Sexual abuse’, being ‘forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in
sexual activities, not necessarily involving a high level of violence, whether or
not the child is aware of what is happening. The activities may involve physical
contact, including assault by penetration (for example, rape or oral sex) or non-
penetrative acts such as masturbation, kissing, rubbing and touching outside of
clothing. They may also include non-contact activities, such as involving children
in looking at, or in the production of, sexual images, watching sexual activities,
Safeguarding 647
encouraging children to behave in sexually inappropriate ways, or grooming a

child in preparation for abuse. Sexual abuse can take place online, and technology
can be used to facilitate offline abuse. Sexual abuse is not solely perpetrated by
adult males. Women can also commit acts of sexual abuse, as can other children’.
(d) Finally, ‘neglect’ is ‘the persistent failure to meet a child’s basic physical and/or
psychological needs, likely to result in the serious impairment of the child’s health
or development. Neglect may occur during pregnancy as a result of maternal
substance abuse. Once a child is born, neglect may involve a parent or carer failing
to: a. provide adequate food, clothing and shelter (including exclusion from home
or abandonment) b. protect a child from physical and emotional harm or danger
c. ensure adequate supervision (including the use of inadequate caregivers) d.
ensure access to appropriate medical care or treatment It may also include neglect
of, or unresponsiveness to, a child’s basic emotional needs’.
1 HM Government,’ Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 102–104.
B6.15 The World Health Organisation’s definition of ‘child maltreatment’ is

similar to the definition of ‘abuse’ in ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ –
‘child maltreatment’ is:
‘The abuse and neglect of people under eighteen years of age. It includes all forms
of physical and/or emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect or negligent
treatment or commercial or other exploitation, resulting in actual or potential harm
to the child’s health, survival, development or dignity in the context of a relationship
of responsibility, trust or power. Four types of child maltreatment are generally
recognized: physical abuse, sexual abuse, psychological (or emotional or mental)
abuse, and neglect’.1
1 See World Health Organisation, ‘Child Maltreatment: 1,952 studies’, available at apps.who.int/
violence-info/child-maltreatment/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
B6.16 Similar forms of abuse are identified as being applicable to adults at risk in
‘Care and support statutory guidance’, issued under the Care Act 2014.1
1 Department of Health & Social Care, Care and support statutory guidance, October 2018, paras 14.16
and 14.7 (What constitutes abuse and neglect?).
B6.17 It is possible to identify further forms of abuse, which are usually variants
of those listed above.1 And while there is no ‘closed list’ of what might constitute
abusive conduct, the following forms of physical, sexual and psychological abuse
have been identified in sport:2
Threats to children
Individual Relational Organisational
Injury Sexual harassment Abuse from spectators
Depression Sexual abuse Discrimination
Self-harm Physical abuse Cultures which normalise abuse
Eating disorders Forced physical exertion Unhealthy training programmes
Disordered eating Emotional abuse Hazing
Virtual maltreatment Medical mismanagement
Neglect Systematic doping
Bullying Age cheating
Doping
1 For example, the NSPCC’s website additionally identifies bullying and cyberbullying, child sexual
exploitation, child trafficking, domestic abuse, female genital mutilation, grooming, and online abuse:
see nspcc.org.uk/what-is-child-abuse/types-of-abuse/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
2 See Mountjoy, M., et al, ‘Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and
recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model’, British Journal of Sports Medicine,
Volume 49, Issue 13, available at bjsm.bmj.com/content/49/13/883 [accessed 30 October 2020].
F ‘Poor practice’
B6.18 It is also important to note that some conduct will not be so bad as to be
considered ‘abusive’ or to cause harm but might nevertheless adversely affect those
subject to it. Such conduct falling short of abuse is generally considered to be ‘poor
practice’. Again, this is a flexible concept, and it is for respective sports organisations
to establish the boundaries of what they consider ‘poor practice’ to be.1
1 By way of example, the Premier League Safeguarding Policy (available at premierleague.com/
safeguarding [accessed 30 October 2020]) addresses poor practice in the following terms: ‘Poor
practice: This is behaviour that falls short of abuse but is nevertheless unacceptable. It is essential that
poor practice is challenged and reported even where there is a belief that the motives of an individual
are well meaning. Failure to challenge poor practice can lead to an environment where abuse is more
likely to remain unnoticed. Incidents of poor practice occur when the needs of Children and Adults
at Risk are not afforded the necessary priority, compromising their welfare, for example, allowing
abusive or concerning practices to go unreported, placing Children and Adults at Risk in potentially
compromising and uncomfortable situations, failing to ensure the safety of Children and Adults at
Risk, ignoring health and safety guidelines, or giving continued and unnecessary preferential treatment
to individuals’.
3 THE CHILD PROTECTION/CARE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND
A Sport and the child protection/care system
B6.19 Sports organisations do not have any general statutory legal duties in respect
of safeguarding or child protection. However, ‘Working Together to Safeguard
Children’ nonetheless makes clear that sports organisations do have a role to play:1
‘Sports Clubs/Organisations
63. There are many sports clubs and organisations including voluntary and private
sector providers that deliver a wide range of sporting activities to children.
Some of these will be community amateur sports clubs, some will be charities.
All should have the arrangements described in this chapter in place and should
collaborate to work effectively with the safeguarding partners as required by
any local safeguarding arrangements. Paid and volunteer staff need to be aware
of their responsibilities for safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children,
how they should respond to child protection concerns and how to make a
referral to local authority children’s social care or the police if necessary.
64. All National Governing Bodies of Sport, that receive funding from with Sport
England or UK Sport, must aim to meet the Standards for Safeguarding and
Protecting Children in Sport’.
1 This section of this chapter is focussed on the position in England and does not address the position in
other parts of the United Kingdom. It should be noted that the law and structure in each of the home
nations varies, although they are all based on similar principles. Information about the child protection
system in England and other parts of the United Kingdom can be found on the NSPCC’s website, at
learning.nspcc.org.uk/child-protection-system/ [accessed 30 October 2020].
B6.20 Furthermore, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’ makes clear that

safeguarding is a responsibility for everyone who works with children:
‘16. Everyone who works with children has a responsibility for keeping them
safe. No single practitioner can have a full picture of a child’s needs and
Safeguarding 649
circumstances and, if children and families are to receive the right help at the
right time, everyone who comes into contact with them has a role to play in
identifying concerns, sharing information and taking prompt action.
17. In order that organisations, agencies and practitioners collaborate effectively, it
is vital that everyone working with children and families, including those who
work with parents/carers, understands the role they should play and the role of
other practitioners. They should be aware of, and comply with, the published
arrangements set out by the local safeguarding partners’.
B6.21 In respect of adults at risk, the ‘Care and support statutory guidance’ is
similarly clear that concerns of ill-treatment are everyone’s concern:
‘14.37 Anyone can witness or become aware of information suggesting that abuse
and neglect is occurring. The matter may, for example, be raised by a worried
neighbour […] a concerned bank cashier, a GP, a welfare benefits officer, a housing
support worker or a nurse on a ward. Primary care staff may be particularly well-
placed to spot abuse and neglect, as in many cases they may be the only professionals
with whom the adult has contact. The adult may say or do things that hint that all
is not well. It may come in the form of a complaint, a call for a police response, an
expression of concern, or come to light during a needs assessment. Regardless of
how the safeguarding concern is identified, everyone should understand what to do,
and where to go locally to get help and advice. It is vital that professionals, other
staff and members of the public are vigilant on behalf of those unable to protect
themselves. This will include:
• knowing about different types of abuse and neglect and their signs
• supporting adults to keep safe
• knowing who to tell about suspected abuse or neglect
• supporting adults to think and weigh up the risks and benefits of different
options when exercising choice and control’
B6.22 It is therefore necessary for sports organisations to have a good (or at the
very least, working) understanding of how the child protection and care systems
operate (including any relevant local arrangements), in order to enable them to
engage effectively with relevant external safeguarding/child protection bodies when
it is necessary or desirable for them to do so. However, while the relevant statutory
guidance makes it clear that everyone who works with children and adults at risk has
a level of responsibility for sharing information in order to identify concerns, there
is no specific reporting law that requires sports organisations, or participants in sport
more generally, to report suspicions of abuse to the police or local authorities (or any
other party).1
1 Section 5B of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 introduced a mandatory reporting duty
that requires regulated health and social care professionals and teachers in England and Wales to
report ‘known’ cases of female genital mutilation in children that they identify in the course of their
professional work to the police. This duty came into force on 31 October 2015.
B6.23 When a sports organisation becomes aware of a concern and considers that
a child or adult at risk is in immediate danger, the most appropriate body to first
report the concern to will be the police. In cases where a sports organisation becomes
aware of a concern but the relevant individual is not considered to be in immediate
danger, the report should instead be made to the relevant department of the local
authority – each local authority will have an officer, or a team of such officers, with
responsibility for the management and oversight of allegations. Depending on the
factual circumstances giving rise to a report, it might well be appropriate to report the
concern to both the police and the relevant local authority. If the sports organisation
is a charity should also consider whether a serious incident report should be made to
the Charity Commission.
B6.24 The workings of the child protection and care systems might also be relevant
to a sports organisation if the local safeguarding agencies wish to engage the sports
organisation in any response to a concern (whether or not first reported by the sports
organisation) and/or in the event information is shared with the sports organisation
to which the sports organisation may wish to respond in accordance with its own
safeguarding procedures (for example, if it receives information that suggests a
licensed coach presents a risk of harm to children).
B Overview of the child protection and care systems in England
B6.25 The legislative framework for child protection in England is provided by the
Children Act 1989. It established some key principles, including that:
(a) the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration;
(b) children should be safe and protected by effective intervention if they are at
risk of significant harm; and
(c) agencies working with children should cooperate and work together in the best
interests of the child.
The Children Act 2004 (significantly amended by the Children and Social Work Act
2017) strengthened the legislative framework introduced by the Children Act 1989,
principally by encouraging partnerships between relevant agencies and creating
more accountability in the child protection system; however, it did not amend much
of the Children Act 1989.
B6.26 Under s 17 of the Children Act 1989, every local authority has a general
duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their area who are in
need. A child will be considered as being ‘in need’ if:
(a) he or she is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or have the opportunity of achieving
or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health and development without the
provision of services by a local authority;
(b) his or her health or development is likely to be significantly impaired or further
impaired without the provision of such services; or
(c) he or she is disabled.
B6.27 Under s 47 of the Children Act 1989, when a local authority has reasonable
cause to suspect that a child is suffering or is likely to suffer ‘significant harm’, it has
a duty to make such enquiries as it considers necessary to decide whether to take any
action to safeguard or promote the child’s welfare.
B6.28 Until recently, the duties of local authorities were fulfilled largely through
the work of local safeguarding children’s boards (LSCBs), which were multi-
agency bodies set up in every local authority featuring representatives from the local
authority, the police, health services, probation services, the local youth offending
team and the Children and Family Courts Advisory and Support Service. However,
from 29 June 2019, as a consequence of changes introduced by the Children and
Social Work Act 2017,1 LSCBs have been replaced by ‘safeguarding partners’ who,
in relation to each local authority area, comprise:
(a) the local authority;
(b) the local clinical commissioning group; and
(c) the local police.
All three partners have equal and joint responsibility for local safeguarding
arrangements, and they will work together with other relevant agencies, which
Safeguarding 651
includes (among various others) any person or body involved in the provision,
supervision or oversight of sport or leisure’.2
1 Resulting in amendment to the Children Act 2004, at s 16E.
2 See s 16E of the Children Act 2004 and the Child Safeguarding Practice Review and Relevant Agency
(England) Regulations 2018, reg 18.
B6.29 In the event that a child is considered to be in imminent danger, then local
authorities can take immediate action, including by seeking an emergency protection
order to remove a child to a place of safety,1 or an exclusion order to remove an
abuser from the family home.2 The police can remove a child to a place of safety for
up to 72 hours without obtaining a court order.3 If a child is not in immediate danger,
there will be an assessment of the child’s needs, which will include (but is not limited
to) determining whether the child is in need and should be assessed under s 17 of the
Children Act 1989, and whether there is reasonable cause to suspect that the child is
suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm under s 47 of the Children Act 1989.4
1 Children Act 1989, s 44.
2 Children Act 1989, s 44A.
4 The process for such assessment is determined at the local level. See HM Government, ‘Working
Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the
welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 15–16.
B6.30 Consideration of the various child protection measures that might ultimately
be appropriate in any given case are beyond the scope of this chapter, but include:
(a) child protection plans, which set out what action needs to be taken, by when
and by whom (including parents and carers), to keep the child safe from harm
and promote their welfare;1 and
(b) care proceedings, where professionals conclude that the parents or carers are
not able to provide safe or appropriate care, so the local authority seeks to take
the child into care (if successful, an appropriate care order will be made by the
court).2
1 Children Act 1989, s 31A.
B6.31 The position in respect of adults at risk and the care system is broadly
similar to that in respect of children and the child protection system. There are two
key duties imposed upon local authorities by the Care Act 2014 that concern adults
at risk:
(a) under s 9, local authorities have a duty to assess needs for care and support
where it appears to a local authority that an adult may have such needs; and
(b) under s 42, local authorities have a duty to undertake, or cause to undertake,
an adult safeguarding enquiry when it has a reasonable belief that an adult in
its area has care and support needs, is experiencing or is at risk of abuse or
neglect, and is unable to protect him/herself from that abuse or neglect because
of their care and support needs.
Pursuant to s 43 of the Care Act 2014, each local authority must establish a
Safeguarding Adults Board (SAB) for its area, the objective of which is to help and
protect adults in its area in cases of the kind described by s 42. Membership of the
SAB must include:
(a) the local authority;
(b) the local clinical commissioning group; and
(c) the local police, although other organisations and individuals may also be
included.1
1 See s 43 of and Sch 2 to the Care Act 2014.
4 SAFEGUARDING IN SPORT
A The importance of safeguarding in sport
B6.32 Participation in sport has many physical, psychological and social benefits,
and getting children active has long played an important part in government strategy
relating to children.1 However, the benefits of sport are not automatic, and sport
participation may have inherent underlying threats or dangers if there is an unhealthy
culture within a sport or sports organisation that allows harm to occur.2
1 See eg House of Commons Digital Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Changing Lives: the social
impact of participation in culture and sport’, Eleventh Report of Session 2017-2019, May 2019,
para 80, available at publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/734/734.pdf
2 See M Mountjoy et al, ‘Safeguarding the child athlete in sport: a review, a framework and
recommendations for the IOC youth athlete development model’, (2015) British Journal of Sports
Medicine, Vol 49, Issue 13, available at bjsm.bmj.com/content/49/13/883 [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.33 There are a number of reasons why safeguarding in sport is important,

including:
(a) First and foremost, the health and welfare of participants is of course
exceptionally important in its own right – there is a clear moral duty to provide
a safe environment, particularly those who might be more vulnerable to harm,
including children and adults at risk.
(b) Secondly, if a sport/sports organisation does not operate a sufficiently safe
environment, then that carries reputational risk (if, for example, such failures
manifest themselves in a high profile scandal), which in turn might:
(i) have an adverse impact on participation numbers (eg, children and their
parents/carers may be less likely to participate where there is not a safe
environment, whether that is real or perceived); and
(ii) potentially discourage commercial partners from investing in the sport/
sports organisation.
(c) Thirdly, because there is a clear risk of legal liability. In short, because abuse of
children and adults at risk is a foreseeable risk (at least in general terms), in the
event that such abuse occurs and a sports organisation has not taken sufficient
steps to mitigate that risk, it might well face a negligence claim.1
1 While a detailed discussion of the law of tort/negligence is outside of the scope of this chapter, as a
general principle, sports organisations owe a legal duty of care to children and young people under
their jurisdiction to take appropriate steps to address the known risks of participating in the sport. See
eg CPSU, ‘CPSU Briefing – Duty of Care’, May 2020, available at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/
best-practice/duty-of-care/ [accessed 31 October 2020]. See also para G1.66 et seq.
B6.34 In general terms, the principal aims of a sports organisation in respect of

safeguarding and child protection will include:
(a) Raising awareness of safeguarding and child protection issues and creating a
safe and secure environment for participation.
(b) Ensuring that there are clear procedures in place in order to:
(i) receive reports of abuse; and
(ii) refer reports of harm/abuse to the appropriate external agencies and/or
the police.
(c) Ensuring that appropriate disciplinary procedures are in place in order to
respond to instances of harm/abuse, or potential harm/abuse and, where
necessary, remove individuals from participation.
(d) Monitoring and maintaining appropriate policies and procedures in order to
ensure that safeguarding standards remain at an appropriate level.
Safeguarding 653
B The Child Protection in Sport Unit (CPSU) and

CPSU Standards
B6.35 In 2000, in light of cases of abuse in the 1990s and pressure from stakeholders,
Sport England partnered with the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children (NSPCC) to convene a Child Protection in Sport Task Force. The group
produced an action plan for child protection in sport that led to the creation in 2001
of the CPSU, a government-backed agency with responsibility for safeguarding and
child protection in sport.1
1 See Lang and Hartill (eds), Safeguarding, Child Protection and Abuse in Sport, 1st Edn (Routledge,
2015), Chapter 1 (Safeguarding and child protection in sport in England).
B6.36 The CPSU publishes and maintains standards for safeguarding and
protecting children in sport,1 which are based on current practice in child protection
and sport and are informed by safeguarding legislation and guidance, evidence from
research, and practical experience. The purposes of the standards are threefold:
(1) to help create a safe sporting environment for children and young people and
protect them from harm;
(2) to provide a benchmark to assist those involved in sport to make informed
decisions; and
(3) to promote good practice and challenge practice that is harmful to children.
1 The standards are available on the CPSU’s website at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/tools/standards-
for-safeguarding-and-protecting-children-in-sport/ [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.37 The funding agreements between Sport England/UK Sport and national
governing bodies require national governing bodies to implement and adhere to
the CPSU standards. However, whether or not a sports governing body or other
sports organisation is in receipt of public funding, the standards operate as a good
benchmark for the implementation of safeguarding policies and procedures.
B6.38 The CPSU standards are, in overview, as follows (and each is supplemented
by further CPSU guidance):
(a) Standard 1: Policy and procedures for responding to concerns. The organisation
should have linked procedures that provide clear step-by-step guidance on
what to do in different circumstances if concerns arise about children’s welfare
or protection.
(b) Standard 2: Operating Systems. Operating systems are needed to ensure that
policies and procedures are effectively implemented in practice and provide
clear step-by-step guidance on what to do in specific circumstances. They
clarify roles and responsibilities, and lines of communication.
(c) Standard 3: Prevention. Measures to help minimise the possibility of children
and young people being abused by those in a position of trust.
(d) Standard 4: Codes of ethics and conduct. Codes of ethics reflect the values and
principles that the organisation wants to promote and provide a moral basis for
policies and systems.
(e) Standard 5: Equity. Measures to ensure that the needs of all children and young
people to be protected from abuse are addressed.
(f) Standard 6: Communication. Ways of informing, consulting and listening to all
relevant parties about how children involved in the sport are to be safeguarded.
(g) Standard 7: Education and training. Opportunities to develop and maintain the
necessary knowledge, skills and understanding to safeguard children.
(h) Standard 8: Access to advice and support. Arrangements made to provide
essential information and support to those responsible for safeguarding
children. Children and young people who are being abused are assisted to
get help.
(i) Standard 9: Implementation and monitoring. Action taken to ensure that the
organisation’s intentions in relation to safeguarding children are taking place,
and to monitor and evaluate effectiveness.
(j) Standard 10: Influencing. Action taken by the organisation to influence,
encourage and promote the adoption and implementation of measures to
safeguard children by partner organisations.
C Key roles and responsibilities

B6.39 In order to effectively deliver any approach to safeguarding, a sports
organisation will need to establish the key roles and responsibilities that it requires.
This will vary between sports organisations, depending on such things as, for
example, the structure of the sport/the sports organisation and the available level of
resource. However, key safeguarding roles include:1
(a) Board safeguarding champion. The role of a board safeguarding champion is to
lead and inform safeguarding discussion and planning within board meetings,
to ensure the board prioritise these discussions and resource appropriately, and
to act as a link between the organisation’s lead safeguarding officer and the
board.
(b) Lead safeguarding officer. The lead safeguarding officer is the designated
person within a sports organisation with primary responsibility for managing
and reporting concerns, for putting into place safeguarding procedures,
and supporting club, county and regional welfare officers (where relevant).
Where an organisation has a case management group (see below), the lead
safeguarding officer will typically report to that group.
(c) Regional safeguarding officers. Regional safeguarding officers are persons
within a sports organisation with regional responsibility for managing and
reporting concerns, for putting into place safeguarding procedures, and
supporting club welfare officers (where relevant).
(d) Club safeguarding officer. A club safeguarding officer is a person within a sports
club with primary responsibility for managing and reporting safeguarding
concerns and for putting into place safeguarding procedures.
(e) Case management group. Case management groups typically comprise a
relatively small number of individuals with identified and relevant skills,
knowledge, and experience within the organisation, and at least one member
with practitioner expertise, eg a child protection expert. The primary role of
a case management group is to manage the sports organisation’s response to
reported safeguarding concerns, and the identifiable potential safeguarding
risks individuals pose (where a sports organisation does not have a case
management group, this role is usually fulfilled by the lead safeguarding
officer).
1 See CPSU, ‘Putting safeguards in place’, available at thecpsu.org.uk/help-advice/putting-safeguards-
in-place/#article-top [accessed 31 October 2020].
D Safeguarding policies and developing awareness
B6.40 The adoption of a safeguarding policy by a sports organisation serves as

a public statement of intent in respect of its commitment to safeguarding, and also
typically provides further information in respect of reporting safeguarding concerns
and the organisation’s various safeguarding procedures.
Safeguarding 655
B6.41 Safeguarding policies will typically include the following key information:
(a) A ‘mission statement’ and guiding principles in respect of safeguarding.
(b) Definitions as to what constitutes ‘abuse’.
(c) Details as to how to identify possible abuse and how to respond to any
safeguarding concerns that may arise, including how to report such concerns.
(d) Details as to how the sports organisation will respond to any concerns reported
to it, including its relevant procedures.
B6.42 Safeguarding policies may be supported by other documents, which can

contain additional detail and can be targeted towards certain audiences. Examples
include guidance as to transporting children or taking them away on trips, and the
safe and appropriate use of photography, mobile phones, and social media.
B6.43 Obviously, a safeguarding policy (and any related information and

documents) will be more effective if there is a high level of awareness among
participants and other stakeholders. That being so, safeguarding information should
be communicated widely and prominently, providing a sufficient level of detail
while at the same time being easily digestible. Further, appropriate training should
be provided to all persons who either work with children/adults at risk or who are
responsible for persons who work with them. Ultimately, a sports organisation should
look to achieve a culture in which the voices of participants, and particularly those of
children and adults at risk, are heard and in which their welfare is actively promoted.
E Codes of conduct
B6.44 Codes of conduct can serve to further embed an organisation’s commitment

to child protection and safeguarding. They also serve an important purpose in clearly
setting out expectations as to proper behaviour and best practice, as well as what
constitutes unacceptable conduct, ie ‘poor practice’ (and can thereby give the sports
organisation a clear basis to address poor practice as and when it might arise).1
1 The CPSU has published a number of sample codes of conduct, which are available at thecpsu.org.
uk/resource-library/policies/sample-codes-of-conduct-for-parents-children-and-staff/ [accessed
31 October 2020].
F Positions of trust
B6.45 Under ss 16 to 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is criminally unlawful

for persons in specific roles and settings to engage in sexual activity with 16- or
17-year-olds over whom they hold a position of trust, responsibility or authority
(and, as a result, have a considerable amount of power and influence in their lives).
Examples of these specific roles include teachers, care workers, and youth justice
workers, and specific settings include educational institutions, hospitals, and youth
offender institutions.
B6.46 However, roles within sport, eg coaches, instructors, officials, etc are not
covered (unless otherwise caught by the legislation, eg sports coaching in schools),
despite the fact that those in authority in sport can have substantial influence over
young people. That being so, the NSPCC/CPSU’s view is that because the current
legislation covering abuse of trust does not regulate coaches, etc sports organisations
should extend and adopt the principles of the legislation through their codes of
conduct, rules and disciplinary processes.1
1 See CPSU, ‘Preventing Abuse of Positions of Trust in Sport’, January 2015, available at thecpsu.
org.uk/media/2489/preventing-abuse-of-position-of-trust-jan15.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020]. To
similar effect, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson concluded in her ‘Duty of Care in Sport’ report, that
‘the definition of “position of trust” should be reviewed with regard to sports coaches. At the moment
teachers fall within this definition, which places restrictions on the relationship they can have with
people under 18 years of age under their tutelage. Sports coaches should be subject to these same
restrictions’. See Baronness Tanni-Grey Thompson DBE, DL, ‘Duty of Care in Sport: Independent
Report to Government’, April 2017, p 20, available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/610130/Duty_of_Care_Review_-_April_2017__2.pdf
B6.47 In November 2017, the then Sports Minister Tracey Crouch announced that
the Department for Culture Media and Sport and Ministry of Justice had agreed that
the position of trust laws would be extended to sports coaches, but the Ministry of
Justice apparently subsequently backtracked from that position.1 As such, there is
apparently no imminent prospect of a change in the law in this area.
1 See NSPCC, ‘Government U-turn on pledge to protect young people in sport’, 8 August 2018,
available at mandatenow.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Government-backtracks-on-pledge-to-
protect-children-in-sport-_-NSPCC.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].
G Reporting
B6.48 Sports organisations should establish clear reporting procedures to ensure

that any safeguarding concerns are reported to the organisation in a timely manner so
that action can be taken to address and manage them appropriately.1 Such procedures
should be clear, well-publicised, and easily accessible, with appropriate support made
available to those making reports, or those who wish to do so. Sports organisations
can receive reports of safeguarding concerns through a variety of means, such as
phone, email, and online safeguarding referral forms.
1 The CPSU has published a number of example reporting flowcharts, which are available at thecpsu.
org.uk/media/319549/safeguarding-reporting-procedure-flowcharts-watermarked.pdf [accessed
31 October 2020].
H Information sharing
B6.49 ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’1 makes clear that information

sharing is a crucial part of effective safeguarding. Further non-statutory guidance,
published by HM Government, ‘Information sharing: Advice for practitioners
providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers’2
underlines this in no uncertain terms, stating:
‘Sharing information is an intrinsic part of any frontline practitioner’s job when

working with children and young people. The decisions about how much information
to share, with whom and when, can have a profound impact on individuals’ lives.
Information sharing helps to ensure that an individual receives the right services at
the right time and prevents a need from becoming more acute and difficult to meet.
Poor or non-existent information sharing is a factor repeatedly identified as an issue
in Serious Case Reviews (SCRs) carried out following the death or serious injury
to, a child. In some situations, sharing information can be the difference between
life and death’.
1 See HM Government, ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children: A guide to inter-agency working to
safeguard and promote the welfare of children’, July 2018, pp 5–6, and 102.
2 Available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/721581/Information_sharing_advice_practitioners_safeguarding_services.pdf [accessed
31 October 2020].
B6.50 To illustrate the importance of information sharing, take the example of an

individual participant whose conduct harms (or poses a risk of harm to) children. If
Safeguarding 657
he/she were to move between clubs, and those clubs did not report that conduct to
their governing body, there is no central record of those concerns and the individual
might continue to move on to other clubs without any form of intervention. By way
of further example, a local authority might receive a report from a sports organisation
which, when taken alongside other information in its possession, means it can identify
and/or more effectively respond to a child protection concern.
B6.51 Information sharing in any given child protection/safeguarding matter

might, unavoidably, be an exceptionally difficult and sensitive matter. In particular,
the individual or body making the decision as to whether or not to share information
will often feel that if the information is shared, it will result in serious harm to
an individual’s reputation (which might not be warranted), whereas on the other
hand, if it is not shared, a child (or children) will suffer harm. However, fears about
sharing information cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the need to safeguard
against abuse or neglect, and the most important consideration is whether sharing
information is likely to support the safeguarding and protection of an individual that
might have been harmed, or is at risk of being harmed.
B6.52 In order to guide practitioners, ‘Information sharing: Advice for practitioners

providing safeguarding services to children, young people, parents and carers’ sets
out seven golden rules to sharing information. These ‘rules’ are of equal application
to safeguarding practitioners in sport, and the rules are as follows:1
1. Remember that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Data
Protection Act 2018 and human rights laws are not barriers to justified
information sharing, but provide a framework to ensure that personal
information about living individuals is shared appropriately.
2. Be open and honest with the individual (and/or their family where appropriate)
from the outset about why, what, how and with whom information will, or
could be shared, and seek their agreement, unless it is unsafe or inappropriate
to do so.
3. Seek advice from other practitioners, or your information governance lead,
if you are in any doubt about sharing the information concerned, without
disclosing the identity of the individual where possible.
4. Where possible, share information with consent, and where possible, respect the
wishes of those who do not consent to having their information shared. Under
the GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 you may share information without
consent, if, in your judgement, there is a lawful basis to do so, such as where
safety may be at risk. You will need to base your judgement on the facts of the
case. When you are sharing or requesting personal information from someone,
be clear of the basis upon which you are doing so. Where you do not have consent,
be mindful that an individual might not expect information to be shared.
5. Consider safety and well-being: base your information sharing decisions on
considerations of the safety and well-being of the individual and others who
may be affected by their actions.
6. Necessary, proportionate, relevant, adequate, accurate, timely and secure:
ensure that the information you share is necessary for the purpose for which
you are sharing it, is shared only with those individuals who need to have it, is
accurate and up-to-date, is shared in a timely fashion, and is shared securely.
7. Keep a record of your decision and the reasons for it – whether it is to share
information or not. If you decide to share, then record what you have shared,
with whom and for what purpose.’
1 The same ‘rules’ have also been referred to in the context of addressing concern relating to adults at
risk. See NHS England, Safeguarding Adults (section on information sharing), available at england.
nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/adult-pocket-guide.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.53 Data protection is addressed in detail in Chapter A4. However, in the

safeguarding context specifically, the sharing of information that is sensitive and
personal ‘special category personal data’ (which information relevant to safeguarding
often will be) can be shared legally without consent, if it is not possible or reasonable
to gain consent from the relevant individual, or if to gain such consent could prejudice
the well-being of a child or adult at risk.1 While obtaining consent from the relevant
individual should therefore be considered in all cases, it is likely that in many (if not
most) cases it will not be reasonable to gain consent from the relevant individual, or
possible without prejudicing the well-being of a child or adult at risk.
1 Data Protection Act 2018, s 10 and Sch 1, Pt 1, para 18, discussed at para A4.69 et seq.
I Safer recruitment and criminal record checks

(a) Safer recruitment processes
B6.54 An obvious way in which harm to children and adults at risk may be
prevented is to seek to ensure that those who pose an identifiable/known risk of harm
are not able to undertake roles that would allow them to have an inappropriate level
of access to them.
B6.55 Sports organisations should therefore put in place policies and procedures
across their sport/organisation in respect of the recruitment of staff and volunteers
who have contact with children and adults at risk. In particular, all those who have
significant contact with children and adults at risk should be subject to criminal
record checks, although such checks are only part of a safer recruitment process, not
a substitute for it.
(b) The Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS)
B6.56 In England and Wales, the criminal records checking regime is administered
by the DBS. The DBS is also responsible for making decisions regarding whether
individuals should be barred from engaging in ‘regulated activity’ with children and/
or adults and maintaining statutory lists of those individuals who are barred from
working with children and adults.
(c) DBS certificates

B6.57 There are four levels of disclosure, each provided by way of certificate:
(1) basic disclosure;
(2) standard disclosure;
(3) enhanced disclosure without barred list check; and
(4) enhanced disclosure with barred list check.
B6.58 The type of information and amount of detail provided by each level of
disclosure is prescribed by Pt V of the Police Act 1997 and the Police Act 1997
(Criminal Records) Regulations 2002. Under s 80 of the Protection of Freedoms Act
2012, disclosure can be sought only by (and therefore only in respect of) individuals
aged 16 or over.
B6.59 The basic DBS certificate1 will contain details of any ‘unspent’ criminal
convictions, conditional and unconditional cautions, or a statement that the individual
has no such convictions or cautions. Save that any applicant must be aged 16 or over,
there are no eligibility requirements in respect of an application for basic disclosure.
The basic DBS certificate will not detail any convictions or cautions that are ‘spent’
Safeguarding 659
for the purposes of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, ie those that are removed
from an individual’s criminal record after a certain period of time (depending on the
offence committed).
1 Police Act 1997, s 112.
B6.60 An application for a standard DBS certificate can be made by an individual

but must also be countersigned, or submitted electronically, by a ‘registered
person’ (see para B6.75), who must confirm the individual’s entitlement to apply
for the certificate. A standard certificate will contain details of ‘spent’ and ‘unspent’
convictions and/or cautions, and it will also contain details of any police reprimands
and warnings, unless it is ‘filtered’ out.1 Standard disclosure may only be sought if an
exception exists under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order
1975 such as to permit the potential employer to ask a question to include reference to
spent convictions and cautions (which includes assessing the individual’s suitability
to work with children).2
1 For example, offences will be ‘filtered’ out and not subject to disclosure where the offence is not one
of those defined as a serious or violent offence, and the applicant has no other convictions.
2 Police Act 1997, s 113A(1) and (2).
B6.61 An application for an enhanced DBS certificate can be made by an

individual but, again, must be countersigned, or submitted electronically, by a
‘registered person’ confirming entitlement to apply for the certificate. An enhanced
certificate will contain details of ‘spent’ and ‘unspent’ convictions and/or cautions,
any police reprimands and warnings, and any relevant police information.1 Where the
individual will be undertaking ‘regulated activity’, the disclosure will also contain
any information stored about the individual in respect of the relevant statutory barred
list(s). Enhanced disclosure may only be sought where:
(a) an exception exists under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions)
Order 1975; and
(b) the post applied for is covered by the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records)
Regulations 2002.
1 Under s 113B(4) of the Police Act 1997, before an enhanced DBS certificate is issued the chief officer
of every relevant police force is asked to provide any information they ‘reasonably believe to be’
relevant, having regard to the purpose for which the certificate is sought. In this respect, chief police
officers must have regard to statutory guidance.
B6.62 The DBS maintains a collection of guidance documents to assist in

determining whether a role is eligible for basic, standard or enhanced DBS checks,
including a helpful ‘eligibility tool’.1
1 See gov.uk/government/collections/dbs-eligibility-guidance [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.63 While the process of criminal record checking is obviously a very helpful
tool in preventing harm to children and adults at risk, it should be noted that the DBS
has very limited access to criminal records held overseas.1
1 See Home Office, ‘Guidance on the application process for criminal records checks overseas’,
December 2019, available at gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-records-checks-for-overseas-
applicants/guidance-on-the-application-process-for-criminal-records-checks-overseas [accessed
31 October 2020].
(d) ‘Regulated activity’
B6.64 Schedule 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 as amended,

most notably by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, sets out activities that will
constitute ‘regulated activity’ in the context of dealing with both children and adults.
B6.65 ‘Regulated activity’ is an important concept for the following reasons:

(a) First, an organisation is required by law to refer an individual to the DBS if
it removes them from a regulated activity because they have caused, or may
cause, harm to a child or an adult at risk (an organisation must understand what
regulated activity is in order to know if they have removed an individual from
it).1
(b) Secondly, it is an offence to allow an individual to engage in regulated activity
where it is known or believed that the individual is barred from such activity
(and so an organisation should take steps to establish whether or not an
individual is barred prior to engaging them to perform regulated activity).2
(c) Thirdly, while an organisation can request other levels of disclosure, barred list
information will be provided only for individuals who are in regulated activity
(and an organisation must obviously understand what regulated activity is in
order to know if they can request barred list information).
1 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 35.
2 Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 9.
B6.66 As noted above, the DBS has issued various guidance documents in respect
of eligibility for levels of DBS certificate disclosure – helpfully, this includes
guidance concerning ‘regulated activity’ in the context of sport.1 Most relevant for
sports organisations, when considering roles that involve contact with children:
(a) The following activities, if carried out more than three times in any 30-day
period, or at any time between 2am and 6am with the opportunity for face-
to-face contact with children, will constitute regulated activity in respect of
children:
(i) Teaching, training or instructing children, unless the teaching, training
or instruction is merely incidental to teaching, training or instruction of
persons who are not children.
(ii) Caring for or supervising children, unless the care or supervision is
merely incidental to care for or supervision of persons who are not
children.
(iii) Providing any form of advice or guidance wholly or mainly for children
relating to their physical, emotional or educational well-being (this does
not however include legal advice).
(b) Driving a vehicle specifically for children, including anyone supervising or
caring for children, will also constitute regulated activity, but only if it is
carried out more than three times in a 30-day period.
1 See DBS, ‘DBS Checks in Sport – Working with Children’, November 2018, available at assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758272/ENGLISH_-_DBS_
Checks_in_Sports_-_Working_with_Children_LATEST.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].and DBS,
‘DBS Checks in Sport – Working with Adults’, November 2018, available at assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/758275/ENGLISH_-_DBS_Checks_
in_Sports_-_Working_with_Adults.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.67 In the cases of teaching, training, instructing, caring for, or supervising

children (which may cover a number of roles in sport, but perhaps most obviously
coaches), if the individual performing these activities (person A) is supervised
by someone else who is in regulated activity with children (person B), then the
individual (person A) is not in regulated activity him or herself. By way of simple
illustration, with the caveat that the analysis in any case will always be fact-specific,
if one head coach who is undertaking regulated activity is supervising a number
of assistant coaches, then the assistant coaches will not themselves be undertaking
regulated activity. This was a significant change that was introduced by the Protection
of Freedoms Act 2012, with the intention of fewer individuals being classified as
conducting ‘regulated activity’.
Safeguarding 661
B6.68 Whether or not activities are ‘supervised’ is therefore an important

consideration for sports organisations, because (in the cases of teaching, training,
instructing, caring for and supervising) it determines whether activity is ‘regulated’
or not. There is statutory guidance in relation to the meaning of ‘supervision’,1 which
is supported by further (non-statutory) guidance issued by the CPSU and Sport and
Recreation Alliance (SRA).2
1 See Department for Education, ‘Statutory guidance: Regulated Activity (children) – supervision
of activity with children which is regulated activity when unsupervised’, 2013, available at assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280881/
supervision_of_activity_with_children_which_is_regulated_activity_when_unsupervised.pdf
2 See SRA/CPSU, ‘Defining “Supervision” and Regulated Activity – Sport and Recreation Sector
Guidance’, January 2017, available at thecpsu.org.uk/media/298545/defining-supervision-and-ra-
guidance-rev-jan17.pdf [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.69 The statutory guidance states that an activity will be considered to be

‘supervised’ where:
(a) there is supervision by a person who is in regulated activity;
(b) the supervision is regular and day-to-day; and
(c) the supervision must be reasonable in all the circumstances to ensure the
protection of children.
B6.70 The statutory guidance recognises that reasonableness will be determined by

the organisation having regard to all relevant circumstances. However, the following
are listed as standard considerations for all organisations:
(a) the number of children the individual is working with;
(b) the ages of the children, including whether ages differ widely between them;
(c) whether or not others are helping to look after the children;
(d) the nature of the individual’s work;
(e) how vulnerable the children are; and
(f) how many workers would be supervised by each supervising worker.
B6.71 Both the statutory guidance and the CPSU/SRA guidance provide
example case studies, and the CPSU/SRA guidance is particularly helpful for sports
organisations in applying the standard considerations above. For example, the
CPSU/SRA guidance notes that the statutory guidance tends to focus on the nature
of the activity instead of the type of relationship between the individual and the
child/children, but that in sport the position of the individual and the interaction
with children which is possible should also be considered when making a judgement
on the level of supervision required to reasonably protect children, ie consideration
should be given as to whether there is a ‘position of trust’. Further, a number of sports
governing bodies promulgate their own guidance in respect of regulated activity and
supervision, with reference to positions within their sport and their own rules and
regulations.
B6.72 In the event that an individual is not eligible for an enhanced disclosure
with a barred list check, he/she will still be eligible for other levels of disclosure in
accordance with their respective eligibility requirements. In particular, if an activity
to be carried out by an individual would have met the definition of ‘regulated activity’
before its amendment by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (which is substantially
the same as the current definition save for the ‘supervision’ element), the individual
may still apply for an enhanced disclosure without barred list check.
B6.73 Activity that will constitute ‘regulated activity’ in respect of adults at risk is
much narrower than that in relation to children, and concerns adults who need care
and assistance in relation to their day-to-day lives – it includes:
(a) providing health care;

(b) providing personal care (eg physical assistance with eating, drinking, toileting,
washing etc);
(c) providing social work;
(d) assistance with general household matters (managing cash, paying bills, and
shopping);
(e) assistance in the conduct of personal affairs (eg power of attorney); and
(f) conveying (ie providing transporting assistance as a consequence of the adult’s
age, illness, or disability).
(e) Process for obtaining DBS disclosure

B6.74 The process for obtaining a basic disclosure certificate is very simple and
can be done by individuals online.1
1 See gov.uk/request-copy-criminal-record [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.75 However, as above, in order to obtain a standard or enhanced certificate

it is necessary for the application to be counter-signed by a ‘registered person’,
ie a body registered with the DBS. Organisations can either register with the DBS
directly if they submit more than 100 check applications per year, or they can use
an organisation offering ‘umbrella body’ services to apply for DBS checks.1 The
latter option is often preferable from the perspective of a sports organisation, largely
because umbrella bodies offer specialist services, can provide support accordingly,
and act as an intermediary between the sports organisation and the DBS.
1 See HM Government, ‘DBS checks: guidance for employers’, available at gov.uk/guidance/dbs-check-
requests-guidance-for-employers#using-umbrella-body-services-to-submit-dbs-checks [accessed
31 October 2020].
B6.76 All registered bodies must comply with the DBS Code of Practice,1 which
requires umbrella bodies to take reasonable steps to ensure that organisations on
whose behalf they countersign/submit applications comply with their relevant
obligations, including that they are entitled to the information requested. If the DBS
considers that an organisation has failed to comply with the DBS Code of Practice, it
can refuse to provide the information requested.
1 See Home Office, ‘Revised Code of Practice for Disclosure and Barring Service Registered Persons’,
November 2015, available at gov.uk/government/publications/dbs-code-of-practice [accessed 31 October
2020].
B6.77 The DBS charges a fee for applications, although this is waived in respect of
voluntary positions.1 Many positions in grassroots/community sport will qualify for
such dispensation.
1 The DBS definition of a volunteer is defined in the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations
2002, at reg 2, as ‘Any person engaged in an activity which involves spending time, unpaid (except for
travel and other approved out-of-pocket expenses), doing something which aims to benefit some third
party and not a close relative’.
B6.78 Assuming that the DBS issues the information requested following an
application, the certificate will be provided to the individual applicant, thus affording
the individual the opportunity to review and challenge its content before showing it
to the sports organisation. Failing such a challenge, the individual would be expected
to provide a copy of the certificate to the sports organisation.
(f) Dealing with any information disclosed

B6.79 In the event that a disclosure reveals any information, it will be necessary for
the sports organisation to determine whether that information makes the individual
Safeguarding 663
unsuitable for the role/post he/she applied for. The following are appropriate
considerations:1
(a) whether the information revealed is relevant to the position applied for;
(b) the seriousness of any offence revealed;
(c) the age of the applicant at the time of the offence(s);
(d) the length of time since the offence(s) occurred;
(e) whether the applicant has a pattern of offending behaviour;
(f) the circumstances surrounding the offence(s) and the explanation(s) offered by
the person concerned; and
(g) whether the applicant’s circumstances have changed since the offending
behaviour.
1 See, NACRO/CPSU, ‘National governing bodies of sport – Making safe and fair decisions about
membership for people with criminal records’, 2018, available at thecpsu.org.uk/download/
media/423492/NACRO-NGBs-Making-safe-and-fair-membership-decisions.pdf [accessed 31 October
2020].
B6.80 The above, or any other suitable criteria adopted by a sports organisation, will
obviously need to be applied on a case-by-case basis dependent upon the particular
facts and circumstances of the applicant, and the role for which the application has
applied.
(g) Keeping DBS information up to date
B6.81 It is best practice to ensure that DBS information is updated on a regular

basis. To that end, the DBS provides an update service for standard and enhanced
disclosure, which allows applicants to keep their DBS certificates up to date.1
1 See gov.uk/dbs-update-service [accessed 31 October 2020].
J Safeguarding regulations and case management
B6.82 In order to effectively manage safeguarding risk within a sport, it is

necessary for sports governing bodies, and where relevant other sports organisations,
to introduce and maintain regulations and regulatory processes that are specific to
safeguarding. More general disciplinary regulations and procedures are very unlikely
to be adequate to address the specificities and sensitivities of safeguarding cases.
While many of the general principles of regulation apply to safeguarding regulations
as to any other form of sports regulation, eg as to jurisdiction, ensuring a fair
procedure, etc there are a number of aspects in respect of safeguarding that require a
context-specific response.
(a) Safeguarding offences
B6.83 The paramount consideration in respect of safeguarding regulations is to

ensure the welfare of participants, particularly children and adults at risk. A significant
part of this involves seeking to ensure that those who are involved in sporting activity
behave in an appropriate manner, and that those individuals who present an identified
risk are not afforded access to those they might harm (or that such access is suitably
controlled).
B6.84 Therefore, the cornerstone of any set of safeguarding regulations is usually

a ‘harm offence’ that allows the sports organisation to take action where:
(a) an individual has harmed one or more children/adults at risk; and/or
(b) an individual poses or may a risk of such harm.
In light of the broad nature of what might constitute ‘harm’ and ‘abuse’ generally
(as noted at paras B6.10–B6.17), this should be (entirely appropriately) a broadly
worded provision. It should also be made clear that a risk of harm can be founded
upon conduct that takes place outside of the sporting context, eg by reference to an
individual being investigated for, charged, cautioned and/or convicted of a relevant
criminal offence.1
1 For example, the safeguarding regulations of both The FA and the RFU both give the governing body
the power to suspend participants in circumstances where information suggests that an individual
poses or may pose a ‘risk of harm’, which may arise (among other things) as a consequence of a
conviction for a criminal offence or as a result of an investigation by the police or a local authority (see
Reg 3 of The FA’s Safeguarding Children Regulations, Reg 4 of The FA’s Safeguarding Adults at Risk
Regulations, and Reg 21.3 of the RFU’s Regulations). By way of further examples, England Hockey’s
Safeguarding and Protecting Young People in Hockey Complaints and Disciplinary Regulations
provide that ‘It shall be a ground for disciplinary action to be taken under these regulations where an
organisation/person over whom EH has jurisdiction is found to have harmed the safety and/or welfare
of a young person or young people in hockey, or whose conduct (whether in hockey or not) is deemed
to pose actual or potential risk of harm to the safety and/or welfare of a young person or young people
in hockey’ (see Reg 5.1), and the BHA’s Safeguarding Regulations provide that ‘No Person may (i)
engage, or attempt or threaten to engage, in conduct that directly or indirectly harms the welfare of
one or more Young Persons or Adults at Risk, and/or (ii) pose a risk of harm to one or more Young
Persons or Adults at Risk’ (see Reg 4.1), which is accompanied by a note that makes clear that it is
‘not necessary for conduct (or attempted or threatened conduct) to take place in the context of racing
activities.’
B6.85 Further, as noted above, safeguarding regulations will typically address safe
recruitment and set out relevant requirements in this respect. Safeguarding regulations
should therefore provide for consequences in the event that such procedures are not
complied with.
(b) Suspension/provisional suspension
B6.86 Depending on the seriousness of the case at hand, it might well be intolerable
for an individual to continue in their role (at the very least insofar as they are engaged
in activity with children/adults at risk) in circumstances where they have harmed a
child/adult and risk and/or they pose or may pose a risk of such harm.
B6.87 Safeguarding regulations should therefore give sports organisations the

power to suspend individuals from their activities (on such terms and conditions as
they see fit) where the organisation has reasonable cause/grounds to suspect that an
individual has harmed a child/adult at risk, or poses or may pose a risk of such harm.
Based on case law from the arena of public authority childcare law, the ‘reasonable
cause to suspect’ evidential threshold is very low, and ‘reasonable cause’ is capable
of existing on the basis of generalisation, without specific evidence or intelligence.1
1 S v The Swindon Borough Council and Wiltshire County Council [2001] EWHC Admin 334; Re H and
others (minors): (Sexual Abuse: Standards of proof) [1996] AC 563.
B6.88 Broadly, there are two ways in which a sports organisation could suspend
an individual, and safeguarding regulations could provide for either or both. First,
a sports organisation could simply suspend the individual on a sine die basis,
ie indefinitely, in which case the individual should be afforded the opportunity to
appeal/challenge that suspension. Secondly, a sports organisation could provisionally
suspend the individual, pending a full hearing of the matter before a safeguarding
body. The most appropriate approach will vary between sports organisations, in
particular depending on their willingness to impose a suspension by way of executive
decision (which willingness may be greater if the organisation considers that it has
sufficient safeguarding knowledge and experience).
Safeguarding 665
(c) Responding to safeguarding concerns – investigation
B6.89 Serious safeguarding concerns require a robust and immediate initial

response, informed and directed by the sport organisation’s lead safeguarding officer
and/or (where it has one) its case management group.
B6.90 A sports organisation will wish to ensure that it has the necessary powers
to fully and effectively investigate any safeguarding concerns. As with other areas of
sports regulation, this will include such things as:
(a) the power to compel individuals to provide information and documents;
(b) an obligation on individuals to cooperate with the investigation; and
(c) the power to suspend an investigation while any investigation by the police or
other authorities is ongoing (eg a local authority).
B6.91 One particular issue that often needs to be considered in child protection
matters (but which can arise in other disciplinary matters) is the interrelationship
between any governing body investigation and any investigation by the police or
other authorities. If a serious matter concerning child protection issues is referred
to a governing body, the governing body will need to decide whether or not to refer
the matter to the police or social services. If the issues are of a serious (potentially
criminal nature1), it is very likely that the governing body should involve the police
and social services. There then follows the question as to what the governing body
should do where a criminal investigation is also underway.2
1 Consider in particular the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
2 As to which see paras D1.95–D1.98.
B6.92 Investigations should be undertaken by those with the requisite skills,

knowledge and experience of investigating safeguarding concerns. This includes
having an understanding of the nature and context of the sport/sports organisation
and its policies and procedures, safeguarding experience, and general investigative
experience. Individuals with professional police, forensic or social work backgrounds
can often demonstrate these attributes. Investigators may be individuals already
working or volunteering with the organisation in some role or could be external
consultants specifically commissioned for the investigator role. Whoever undertakes
the investigation should follow a clear, documented and transparent procedure that
embeds a child-focused approach, understanding the role that children may play in
an investigation (eg as alleged victims, witnesses, or as the accused).1
1 Sport Resolutions UK operates the National Safeguarding Panel, which provides support to UK
sports governing bodies in the professional management of safeguarding complaints and concerns.
Sport Resolutions UK has published a number of guidance notes and template documents relating
to safeguarding investigations, which are available at sportresolutions.co.uk/services/national-
safeguarding/investigations [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.93 At the end of the investigation, the investigator should produce a professional,
comprehensive report, which may conclude:
(a) A child has suffered or is likely to suffer abuse. This will likely result in a
referral by the sports organisation to the relevant local authority (if one has not
already been made), and the instigation of safeguarding proceedings against
the accused individual.
(b) The concern relates to poor practice only. This will likely trigger some form
of response from the sports organisation, whether it be through a warning/
guidance as to future conduct, or the instigation of formal disciplinary
proceedings.
(c) The concern appears to be without foundation. This will likely result in
no further action being taken by the sports organisation (save perhaps to
acknowledge the outcome of the investigation).
(d) Responding to safeguarding concerns – risk assessment
B6.94 A tool that can enable a sports organisation to establish the actual or
potential harm presented by an individual is risk assessment. Such assessments can
be particularly instructive in cases that are complex either by reason of the available
evidence or the child protection/safeguarding issues presented. In order to be in a
position to require an individual to submit to risk assessment, the sports governing
body must ensure that an appropriate provision is incorporated within its regulations.
B6.95 The aim of risk assessment is to establish the actual or potential harm
presented by an individual.1 The assessment may be undertaken by an independent
expert (or experts), who will produce a report assessing the degree of risk presented
by the individual in question, considered against a range of factors, including:
(a) ‘static’ risk factors that are known to increase risk, such as age at conviction
(if any), previous convictions or concerns (if any), and alcohol or substance
misuse;
(b) ‘dynamic’ risk factors that are also known to increase risk, such as a lack
of victim empathy, escalation in angry behaviour, cognitive distortions,
rationalising behaviour, and impulsivity; and
(c) the nature of the relevant individual’s concerning behaviour, the damage/harm
that would result from such behaviour, and the probability it will recur and in
what circumstances.
1 See CPSU guidance in relation to the risk assessment process, available at cpsu.org.uk/help-advice/
case-management/ [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.96 The sports organisation will then decide, based on the report, whether the
conclusion as to an individual’s degree of risk warrants further action and, if so,
the nature of such action. For example, depending on the conclusion, it might be
appropriate to instigate safeguarding proceedings, or it might be appropriate to seek
to address the individual’s case in another manner, such as getting the individual to
undertake training and/or for him/her to be monitored for a period of time.
B6.97 If safeguarding proceedings are considered appropriate, then the sports

organisation can present the report to the safeguarding panel, together with any
recommendations as to measures to be imposed. The panel is thus invited to determine
whether it has been established that the individual presents or may present a risk of
harm to children, and it is not (as in other disciplinary contexts) asked to determine
guilt or innocence.
(e) Safeguarding panels and procedures
B6.98 Those who hear safeguarding cases and/or appeals brought under
safeguarding regulations should have sufficient safeguarding skills, knowledge and
experience to determine such cases. Further, the disciplinary procedures should
specifically address the risk of harm to children arising from proceedings themselves,
in particular the giving of evidence. For example, a disciplinary panel can be given
the power to determine the manner in which children’s evidence might be given
(eg on paper, behind screens or through a video link), bearing in mind (for example)
the objective of achieving a fair hearing, the possible damage to a child’s welfare
Safeguarding 667
from giving evidence, and the possible advantages that the child’s evidence will
bring to the determination of the truth.1
1 See eg the procedural rules of the National Safeguarding Panel, available at sportresolutions.co.uk/
images/uploads/files/NSP_Rules_2015_redraft_7_April_2015_-_SB_approved_17_April_2015.pdf
(in particular, para 10, dealing with the evidence of children) [accessed 31 October 2020].
(f) Risk management measures
B6.99 Where an individual is found to have harmed one or more children or

adults at risk, or to present a risk of such harm, a sports organisation’s regulations
should provide for appropriate risk management measures, reflecting the paramount
consideration of ensuring the welfare of participants and the fact that this might in
certain cases require on-going risk management support. More general sanctions,
eg fixed term suspensions and fines, might well not be appropriate in safeguarding
cases.
B6.100 Appropriate risk management measures for safeguarding cases might

include:
(a) an order to undertake specified training;
(b) an order requiring an individual to be monitored in specific matters; or
(c) Suspension for a specific period (up to and including permanent suspension)
on such terms and conditions as are considered appropriate.
(g) Sports organisations as the ‘prosecutor of last resort’
B6.101 Where a case is referred, or referred back, to a sports organisation by the

police and/or a local authority – because no criminal charge is issued, or there is no
determination of unsuitability to come into contact with children – this can place the
sports organisation in an invidious position.
B6.102 For example, in the context of criminal investigations, matters have to

be established beyond reasonable doubt. Investigations may be discontinued, or
prosecutions may fail, because that high standard cannot be met. In contrast, a sports
organisation’s disciplinary process will commonly apply a less stringent standard of
proof, such as the balance of probabilities.
B6.103 So, while there might be a discontinued criminal investigation or a failed

criminal prosecution, substantial evidence might nonetheless exist that would give
rise to ‘successful’ action under a sports organisation’s own procedures. Ultimately,
whether or not to proceed with any action under the sports organisation’s regulations
will inevitably be a highly fact-specific decision that will lie with the sports
organisation itself.
K Monitoring and evaluation
B6.104 A sports organisation should ensure that its safeguarding policy and
procedures remains effective and up to date. This requires, among other things, that
all incidents, allegations of abuse and complaints are recorded and monitored so
that key messages and learnings are identified and shared, processes are in place
to monitor compliance with the sports organisation’s safeguarding policies and
procedures, and policies and practices are reviewed (and revised if appropriate) at
regular intervals.
L Dealing with non-recent/historic abuse cases
B6.105 Sports organisations may find that they receive reports of abuse that took
place some time ago, perhaps even decades ago. Reporting of such abuse can be
delayed due to such things as the culture within a sport, fear of reprisals, the degree
of control exercised by the abuser, and a sense of shame or fear.
B6.106 Sports organisations should put procedures in place in order to address such
reports, which need to balance the protection of children in the present, and support
for the individual who has come forward.1 It is particularly important that action is
taken to investigate reports where there is a possibility that the alleged abuser is still
within the sport or may otherwise still be engaged in activities involving children.
The individual reporting the abuse should be provided with or otherwise directed
to appropriate support services, eg counselling services. The sports organisations
should report such allegations to the police and/or local authority on the same basis
as it would for non-historic allegations.
1 The CPSU has published guidance to support sports organisations in responding to reports of
non-recent historic abuse. See CPSU, ‘Responding to reports of non-recent historic abuse in sport
– CPSU Guidance’, February 2018, available at thecpsu.org.uk/resource-library/best-practice/
responding-to-reports-of-non-recent-abuse-in-sport/ [accessed 31 October 2020].
M ‘Duty of care’ and the scope of safeguarding in sport beyond

children and adults at risk
B6.107 Since the last edition of this book, there have been a number of high-profile
concerns affecting sports governing bodies relating to conduct and the welfare of
participants in British sport.1 In 2017, Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s ‘Duty of
Care in Sport’ report was published,2 which adopted a deliberately broad definition
of ‘Duty of Care’, ‘covering everything from personal safety and injury, to mental
health issues, to the support given to people at the elite level’ (so is certainly not to be
confused with the legal ‘duty of care’ in tort law). The report contained a number of
recommendations relating to athlete welfare generally and safeguarding specifically.
In 2018, UK Sport published a survey in which a third or so of the 682 respondent
athletes stated that they had either personally experienced or witnessed ‘unacceptable
behaviour’.3
1 See generally ‘Was 2017 the year British sport lost its way?’, BBC News, 29 December 2017, available
at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42353175 [accessed 13 November 2020]. Prominent examples (referred to in
the BBC News report) have included the case of international cyclist Jess Varnish, who alleged that
she had been the victim and bullying and discrimination, and international footballer Eniola Aluko,
who alleged that she had been subject to bullying and racist comments. More recently, at the time of
writing, British Gymnastics is under scrutiny in respect of the treatment of gymnasts. See, ‹British
Gymnastics head ‹appalled and ashamed› at multiple abuse stories›, Guardian, 10 July 2020, available
at theguardian.com/sport/2020/jul/10/british-gymnastics-head-appalled-and-ashamed-at-multiple-
abuse-stories [accessed 13 November 2020]. For completeness, it should be noted that this chapter
considers safeguarding matters from a sports regulatory perspective and not an employment law
perspective, but in the event that an employee of a sports governing body or other sports organisation
engages in misconduct against athletes (or others), that can of course be a disciplinary matter in an
employment context (as well as a sports regulatory issue).
2 See Baroness Tanni-Grey Thompson DBE, DL, ‘Duty of Care in Sport: Independent Report to
Government’, April 2017, available at assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/610130/Duty_of_Care_Review_-_April_2017__2.pdf [accessed
31 October 2020].
3 See UK Sport, ‘2017 Culture Health Check Report’, May 2018, available at uksport.gov.uk/~/media/
files/chc-report-final.pdf?la=en [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.108 In demonstrating increased concern about abuse and unacceptable

behaviour, sport is certainly not unique. Outside of sport, there have been matters
Safeguarding 669
such as allegations of bullying in Parliament, the Harvey Weinstein scandal, various

other entertainment scandals, and the birth of the #MeToo movement, all of which
things might be said to reflect a shift (or, if not a shift, certainly increased vocalising)
of attitudes as to what kinds of behaviours are not to be tolerated in modern society.
B6.109 In consequence, sports organisations are likely to continue to come under

increased scrutiny in cases where allegations of unacceptable behaviour arise
in connection with their activities, and not just in cases that concern children or
adults at risk.1 Accordingly, sports organisations might wish to consider what
they consider the boundaries of ‘unacceptable behaviour’ to be, and whether their
regulations will enable them to respond as they would wish to in cases concerning
allegations of unacceptable behaviour – regardless of the age or vulnerability of any
victim/complainant, and whether or not the behaviour took place in the context of a
participant’s sporting activity.2
1 For example, in the cases of Ched Evans, and Paddy Jackson and Stuart Olding, each of which
concerned rape allegations, the responses of the respective sports governing bodies, The FA and the
Irish Rugby Football Union (IRFU), were subject to close scrutiny in a sports regulatory context.
See The FA’s statement in respect of the Ched Evans case , 9 January 2015 (before Mr Evans was
ultimately acquitted), available at thefa.com/news/2015/jan/09/statement-ched-evans-090115
[accessed 31 October 2020], in which The FA’s then Chairman Greg Dyke said ‘We have reviewed
the Ched Evans case in some detail at The FA and we have examined both the legal requirements and
our rules and regulations and there is no basis for us to intervene directly in this particular case. That
said, it is important that we continue to look at the issue of behaviour and attitudes within football, and
recognise the unique privileges and responsibilities that come with being a participating member of
the national game’. See also, in the context of the Jackson and Olding case, a joint statement between
the IRFU and the players’ former club Ulster Rugby, dated 14 April 2018, available at ulsterrugby.
com/2018/04/irfu-and-ulster-rugby-statement-on-paddy-jackson-and-stuart-olding/ [accessed
31 October 2020], in which it is stated, ‘Following a review, conducted in the aftermath of recent court
proceedings, the Irish Rugby Football Union and Ulster Rugby have revoked the contracts of Patrick
Jackson and Stuart Olding with immediate effect. In arriving at this decision, the Irish Rugby Football
Union and Ulster Rugby acknowledge our responsibility and commitment to the core values of the
game: Respect, Inclusivity and Integrity. It has been agreed, as part of this commitment, to conduct
an in-depth review of existing structures and educational programmes, within the game in Ireland, to
ensure the importance of these core values is clearly understood, supported and practised at every level
of the game’. Jackson and Olding were subsequently found not guilty of rape in their criminal trial.
2 In Australia, the National Rugby League introduced a ‘No-Fault Stand Down’ rule that automatically
suspended players from playing in the National Rugby League while facing serious criminal charges
(being an offence punishable by 11 years’ imprisonment or more). The rule was brought in following
the so-called ‘summer from hell’ in which there were a number of allegations made against National
Rugby League players concerning sexual and domestic violence against women. The rule was
challenged by a player in the Australian courts as a restraint of trade. However, the rule survived that
challenge, with the judge in the case finding compelling evidence of the risk of sponsors, broadcasters
and fans being alienated and the financial viability of the game being compromised if players facing
such charges were permitted to continue playing pending the determination of the charges against
them. An important consideration in the decision was that the National Rugby League’s evidence had
established that the repercussions from the ‘summer from hell’ posed an immediate and significant
danger to its legitimate interests, and that nothing short of the urgent implementation of the ‘No-Fault
Stand Down’ rule would address this. See De Belin v Australian Rugby League Commission Limited
[2019] FCA 688. In cross-examination, the National Rugby League accepted that the rule did not
have parallel in any other sports it has researched. While the decision is clearly fact-specific, it is an
interesting case for any sports organisation that might wish to bring in a similar rule.
B6.110 A sports organisation might feel that it can rely on a ‘catch-all’ disciplinary
provision, such as ‘bringing the sport into disrepute’,1 and (in the absence of anything
more specific) such provisions might readily be invoked from time-to-time in order to
respond to unacceptable behaviour, eg serious cases of sexual harassment. However,
the primary difficulty with relying on a ‘catch-all’ provision (at least exclusively) is
that it is by its very nature broad in scope, which potentially leads to uncertainty in
marginal cases, ie where people might reasonably differ as to whether behaviour is
acceptable or not.2 For example, if there might be some disagreement as to whether it
is appropriate for a sports governing body to take action in relation to an incident of
behaviour that occurs, say, late in the evening after a match at a club’s facilities (and
so possibly something of a grey area as to whether it occurs in the context of sporting
activity),3 the governing body could seek to remove any doubt by specifically stating
that conduct that takes place on club premises, at club events, on club tours, etc is
covered.
1 As discussed at paras B3.97–B3.99.
2 See discussion of such clauses, in the context of the doctrine of legal certainty, at para B1.19 et seq.
3 See eg ‘City lawyer Alastair Main sentenced for slapping woman’s bottom’, BBC News, 26 January
2017, available at bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-38757990 [accessed 31 October 2020]. Mr
Main, a former England rower, committed the act in question at the London Rowing Club’s Christmas
party in Putney in 2015.
B6.111 Sports organisations might however consider that they should adopt
specific safeguarding regulations/provisions, or widen the scope of existing
safeguarding regulations, to provide regulatory protection to participants beyond the
more ‘traditional’ protection for children and adults at risk. Indeed, a number of
international governing bodies have begun to adopt this approach.1 Adopting such
an approach provides a sports organisation with a more tailored approach for dealing
with inevitably sensitive cases of unacceptable behaviour, which might include, for
example, providing the sports organisation with the power of provisional suspension
where necessary to protect other participants, provisions addressing how sensitive
evidence might be dealt with at hearings, and providing for sanctions such as
supervision orders, education orders, and other risk management measures.
1 See eg the FEI’s Safeguarding Policy Against Harassment and Abuse, and the ICC’s Safeguarding
Regulations, neither of which is limited to the protection of children or adults at risk (the ICC’s
regulations are designed to protect ‘Protected Person(s)’, meaning ‘Any person(s) engaged in activities
in connection with an ICC Event (whether as a Participant or otherwise), including (but not limited
to) Young Persons and Adults at Risk’). See also the Decision of the adjudicatory chamber of the
FIFA Ethics Committee dated 8 June 2019, in which the former President of the Afghanistan Football
Federation and former FIFA Standing Committee member was found guilty of having abused his
position by sexually abusing various female players, in violation of the FIFA Code of Ethics, which
Code specifically prohibits, among other things, harassment and sexual harassment. That decision was
later fully confirmed by CAS in July 2020.
B6.112 By way of very general proposition, the further removed a participant’s

conduct is from the sporting context, the less obvious the need for a sports organisation
to take any action. However, set against that, consideration should also be given as to
whether the conduct in question is of such a nature that it:
(a) brings the sport into disrepute (which is more likely if, for example, the
participant has a prominent, senior or officiating role within the sport); and/or
(b) suggests that the wrongdoer is a risk to other participants within the sport.
Such considerations might suggest that a sports organisation should be more inclined
to take action: in the former case, the conduct might perhaps suitably be addressed
by a charge of bringing the sport into disrepute (or other form of misconduct charge),
whereas in the latter case, the conduct might be more appropriately considered as a
safeguarding matter.
N The international dimension
B6.113 International sports organisations, such as international sports federations,

can have an important role to play in safeguarding and child protection.
B6.114 Of particular note, in 2017 the International Olympic Committee published

a ‘toolkit’ for International Federations and National Olympic Committees in respect
of safeguarding athletes from harassment and abuse in sport. The toolkit aims to assist
Safeguarding 671
International Federations and National Olympic Committees in the development of

policies and procedures to safeguard athletes from harassment and abuse in sport.1
Similarly, FIFA published its own ‘toolkit’ in 2019, which provides a framework
to assist its member associations in considering how they can prevent any risk of
harm to children in football and respond appropriately.2 The promulgation of such
‘toolkits’ can assist in raising standards across national sports organisations.
1 A copy of the IOC toolkit can be accessed at olympic.org/athlete365/safeguarding/ [accessed
31 October 2020].
2 A copy of the FIFA toolkit can be accessed at fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-guardians-
and-new-fifa-child-safeguarding-toolkit-for-member-associations-p [accessed 31 October 2020].
B6.115 Some international federations have also begun to introduce regulations

applicable to participants competing at the international level: for example, in 2019,
both the Fédération Équestre Internationale and the International Cricket Council
introduced such regulations.
B6.116 One particular challenge in respect of safeguarding and child protection

internationally is the movement of abusers across borders. There have been cases of
convicted paedophiles, banned by a sports organisation from participating in a sport
in one country, pursuing that sport in another country.1 In such cases, international
federations could operate as important hubs to help ensure that such individuals
cannot continue to participate in sport under their jurisdiction, eg by keeping a record
of those who have been sanctioned by national member federations and sharing that
information where necessary.
1 The most high-profile case being that of Graham James, the championship-level ice hockey coach
in the Canadian Ice Hockey League, who was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison for the
sexual abuse of two of his teenage players. Mr James was banned for life from coaching in Canada by
the Canadian Ice Hockey Association. However, after he had served his prison sentence, he moved to
Spain where he continued coaching ice hockey (see ‘Graham James coaching in Spain’, CBC News,
26 April 2001, available at cbc.ca/news/canada/graham-james-coaching-in-spain-1.301122, [accessed
31 October 2020]). Another example is Brett Sutton, a triathlon coach who was barred for life from
coaching in Australia after he admitted to five offences against a teenage girl in Australia, who went on
to coach in Europe (see ‘Every parent’s nightmare’, Observer Sport Monthly, 7 April 2002, available
at theguardian.com/observer/osm/story/0,,678189,00.html [accessed 31 October 2020]).
B6.117 However, while it is clear that in recent years there has been increased focus
and development in relation to safeguarding, there are obviously many obstacles to
the development of an international pan-sport approach, including the ability to share
information across sports and various differences in standards of acceptable conduct
between nations, and indeed between sports. A response to safeguarding and child
protection that might be considered as analogous to the international response to
doping therefore appears some way off, even if it is desirable. However, there is no
reason in theory why such an approach should not be possible, at least to combat the
most serious abuse, ie conduct that is unacceptable by any standard.
Part C
Anti-Doping Regulation and

Enforcement
CHAPTER C1
Introduction
Jonathan Taylor QC (Bird & Bird LLP) and Adam Lewis QC (Blackstone Chambers)
C1.1 Part C covers the use of performance-enhancing drugs in sport, and the
efforts that are made to combat that use in light of the harm that it does to the integrity
of sporting competition. Doping is an area of interaction between law and sport
that has seen a dramatic development over the last decades, and in particular since
the inception of the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code) in 2004. While it bears
similarities to other actions harmful to sporting integrity, doping involves a number
of aspects that are quite distinct to it. In the light of that dramatic development and
of those aspects, the fight against doping in sport now warrants being addressed
separately and in detail.
C1.2 Part C first provides an overview of the regulatory framework that has been
established in accordance with the Code1 to combat the use of drugs in sport, both
globally (under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, or WADA) and
specifically in the UK (under the auspices of UK Anti-Doping, or UKAD).2 It deals
with parties and jurisdiction,3 then discusses the practical issues involved in bringing
and defending disciplinary proceedings for breach (or, in the US terminology used
in the Code, ‘violation’) of Code-compliant anti-doping rules (an ‘Anti-Doping Rule
Violation’, or ‘ADRV’).4 After discussing the burdens of proof and the standards of
proof that apply under the Code,5 it takes the practitioner step by step through each
ADRV, from the point of view both of the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the
proceedings and of the athlete (or coach, trainer, team doctor, or other person) who
is the defendant in those proceedings.6 It then takes the reader through the steps a
hearing panel will follow to determine the period of ineligibility that should apply if
an ADRV is found to have been committed,7 as well as the other consequences that
might apply.8 In each case, it sets out what the relevant rules provide and how they
have been applied, as well as how hearing panels and the courts have responded to
challenges to the fairness and proportionality of those rules.
1 Unless otherwise stated, references in this Part C are to the 2015 version of the World Anti-Doping
Code. However, revisions to the Code were adopted at the World Anti-Doping Conference in Katowice
in November 2019 that came into effect on 1 January 2021. The key changes to be brought in with the
2021 Code are therefore also highlighted in this Part.
2 See Chapter C2.
3 See Chapter C3.
4 See Chapter C4.
5 See Chapter C5.
6 See Chapters C6–C15.
7 See Chapters C16–C22.
8 See Chapter C23.
C1.3 Disciplinary proceedings brought to enforce the anti-doping rules involve many
of the same considerations as disciplinary proceedings brought to enforce other rules of
(sporting) professional misconduct. Readers are therefore also referred in particular to
the law and practice relating to disciplinary proceedings generally discussed in Chapter
D1, ‘Disciplinary and Other Internal Proceedings’. Several other chapters also bear on
doping in particular contexts, and readers should also have reference to them.1
1 For example, Chapter A1 discusses international federations’ treatment of national members who
fail to apply the Code properly in their national jurisdictions. Chapter D2 deals with the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, the final instance court in many anti-doping cases. Part E deals with challenges
to the actions of sports governing bodies, which may involve anti-doping.
CHAPTER C2
The Anti-Doping Regulatory

Framework
Contents
.para
1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION............................. C2.1
2 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW.................................. C2.15
3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN THE UK... C2.20
1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION1
C2.1 It has been suggested that the use of performance-enhancing drugs has
always been part of sport, going right back to Ancient Greece.2 However, the
regulatory response started in earnest only in the late 1960s, after the deaths from
amphetamine abuse of Danish cyclist Kurt Jensen during the 1960 Rome Olympics
and English cyclist Tony Simpson during the 1967 Tour de France. The Council
of Europe first tabled a resolution against the use of drugs in sport in 1960. The
International Olympic Committee (IOC) established its Medical Commission in
1967, and introduced a programme for testing for stimulants and narcotics at the 1968
Olympic Games in Mexico City, the sole stated purpose being to protect athletes’
health. At the 1972 Games in Munich, over 2,000 samples were tested. In 1974, the
IOC expanded the programme to encompass the prevention of cheating, by banning
the use of anabolic steroids. It started testing for steroids at the 1976 Montreal
Olympics, although it was only in 1983 that the ability to detect steroids in urine
samples took a great leap forward with the introduction of gas chromatography and
mass spectometry techniques (news of which breakthrough led to the withdrawal of
a substantial number of athletes from that year’s Pan-American Games). There have
been several further advances since then. Advanced techniques of chromotographic
and spectroscopic analysis now make it possible to detect tiny quantities of drugs
(or their markers or metabolites) in a sample, sometimes even well after their
administration.3 Expansion of drug-testing programmes to encompass testing of
blood samples4 has allowed detection of peptide hormones and mimetics and their
analogues, as well as of blood-doping by means of homologous blood transfusions,5
while two different methods have been developed to detect abuse of human growth
hormone from analysis of blood samples.6
1 See generally Mottram, ‘An evolution of doping and anti-doping in sport’, in Mottram and Chester,
Drugs in Sport, 7th Edn (Routledge, 2018).
2 Mike Rowbottom notes that Galen, writing in the third century BC, observed the practice of Olympic
competitors consuming, apparently for performance-enhancement purposes, ‘the rear hooves of an
Abyssinian ass, ground up, boiled in oil and flavoured with rose hips and petals’: (2006) Independent,
1 August.
3 The increasing ability to detect ever smaller traces of prohibited substances has increased the ability to
detect past misuse but has also on occasion raised the question of environmental contamination.
4 It was during the 1980s that concerns about blood-doping first emerged. Cycling was the first sport
to introduce collection of blood samples (to be tested for erythropoietin, or ‘EPO’: see para C6.30),
followed by biathlon, skating, skiing, swimming, and athletics. For example, blood and urine samples
were collected for analysis at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, the 2001 IAAF World Championships
The Anti-Doping Regulatory Framework 677
in Edmonton, and (for the first time in Britain) at the 10th World Half Marathon Championships in
Bristol in October 2001. All endurance sports at the Winter Olympics at Salt Lake City in 2002 were
subject to blood-testing, as were footballers at the FIFA 2002 World Cup in Japan and Korea: see
‘FIFA acts to boot out World Cup drug fears’ (2002) The Times, 28 February.
5 See para C6.31.
6 See para C6.34 and C6.42.
C2.2 If these developments caused any complacency among regulators, that

vanished when Ben Johnson tested positive for stanozolol, a powerful anabolic
steroid, after his victory in the 100 metres sprint final at the 1988 Seoul Olympics
and had to be stripped of his gold medal. ‘This drew attention, as never before, to the
problem of drug use in sport. It did not, by any means stop such use, but it served
notice that the problem was far greater than sports officials had yet acknowledged’.1
The Dubin Inquiry in Canada, established in response to that debacle, found that
‘the use of drugs as a method of cheating has reached epidemic proportions’, and
concluded: ‘the evidence shows that banned performance-enhancing substances and
in particular anabolic steroids are being used by athletes in almost every sport, most
extensively in weightlifting and track and field’.2 Further, after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, evidence emerged of systematic state-sponsored misuse of drugs in the
former East Germany, prompting criminal prosecutions of doctors and coaches for
causing grievous bodily harm by giving steroids to minors.3
1 Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), p 53.
2 Mr Justice Charles Dubin, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned
Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (Ottawa 1990), p 517.
3 Franke W and Berendonk B (1997), ‘Hormonal doping and androgenization of athletes: a secret
program of the German Democratic Republic government’, Clinical Chemistry, 43:1262–1279;
Ungerleider, Faust’s Gold: Inside the East German Doping Machine (St Martins Press, 2001).
C2.3 In September 1988, the IOC adopted the ‘International Olympic Charter
Against Doping in Sport’. In 1994, it signed an agreement with the Summer and
Winter Olympic Federations and National Olympic Committees to unify anti-doping
rules and procedures based on a list of the prohibited substances and methods
established by the IOC Medical Commission, and in September 1994 it duly
presented a Medical Code relating to the use of drugs in sport, which included the
first IOC List of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods.1
1 IOC Preventing and Fighting against Doping in Sport (Lausanne, 1994).
C2.4 This first attempt at harmonisation of anti-doping rules had limited

success. There remained significant differences from sport to sport in terms of what
was banned, what was permitted, and what sanctions were imposed.1 This lack of
harmonisation was seen as a substantial weakness in the regulatory framework,
reflecting a lack of unity within the sports movement in the face of the drugs threat,
and significantly undermining the fight against drugs in sport. In November 1998,
therefore, the IOC adopted a single unified Anti-Doping Code, which it said should
be applied throughout the Olympic Movement. That Code became the basis for the
World Anti-Doping Code.
1 See generally Vrijman, ‘A Commentary on Current Issues and Problems’ in Drugs and Doping in
Sport (Cavendish, 2001), p 147.
C2.5 In July 1998, the Festina team was expelled from the Tour de France
after French criminal investigators seized evidence of systematic drug use. Further
evidence implicated other teams, some of which withdrew, leaving only 15 of the
original 21 teams to compete. This scandal (and in particular the opprobrium heaped
on sport for its perceived failure to police itself) prompted the IOC to organise
the World Anti-Doping Conference at Lausanne in February 1999, to discuss the
establishment of an independent anti-doping agency.1
678 Anti-Doping Regulation and Enforcement
1 Pound, ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency’ [2002] ISLR 53 (‘Few international federations have the
resources to implement significant anti-doping programs. Still others have preferred to turn a blind
eye to the practice or to engage in institutional denial of the existence of a problem. It is safe to say
that progress designed to eradicate the practice has been, at best, sporadic. The seminal event that
led to the creation of WADA was the Tour de France in 1998. During this event, the French police
found doping substances in the possession of certain of the teams and proceeded to arrest not only
officials, but also athletes. The sight of athletes being led away by the police, to face possible criminal
charges, was most dramatic. It also delivered a “wake-up” message to all other sports; if this could
happen to one of the major European sports, in its showcase event, then it could also happen to them.
The prospect of sport being governed by criminal law, with a concomitant intervention of the state,
was thoroughly unattractive’); Hanstad, Smith, Waddington, ‘The Establishment of the World Anti-
Doping Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes’,
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 2008; 43; 227.
C2.6 At the 1999 World Anti-Doping Conference, delegates from the Olympic
Movement, international federations, the United Nations, governments, national
anti-doping agencies, athletes and the medical profession acknowledged that the
only effective strategy to fight doping in sport was a uniform approach, coordinated
on a global scale through a partnership between sport and government. In the
‘Lausanne Declaration’, they agreed to establish an independent international anti-
doping agency, with a mandate ‘to co-ordinate the various programmes necessary
to realise the objectives that shall be defined jointly by all the parties concerned’.1
They also declared their commitment to make the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code ‘the basis for the fight against doping in sport’.2 That Code came into effect on
1 January 2000.
1 Declaration on Doping in Sport, World Anti-Doping Conference (Lausanne, 1999). See Pound, Inside
the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), pp 69–74; Houlihan ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency: Prospects for
Success’ in Drugs and Doping in Sport (Cavendish, 2001), p 125.
2 Declaration on Doping in Sport, World Anti-Doping Conference (Lausanne, 1999).
C2.7 The World Anti-Doping Agency was formally established on 10 November

1999, with a mission to coordinate and monitor the fight against doping in sport
on a worldwide basis.1 With headquarters in Montreal, Canada, it has a Foundation
Board of 36, of whom 18 are from the Olympic Movement and 18 from public
authorities, as well as an Executive Committee of 12, including five sports movement
representatives and five public authority representatives, one from each continental
region.2 This formal joint venture of government and the private sports movement,
coming together to address one of the key regulatory challenges facing the world
of sport, was then, and remains now, unique.3 It is a remarkable partnership, even
if (according to one of its principal architects) the commitment of governments
only came about because their bluff was called on all of their criticism of the sports
movement for failing to regulate itself effectively.4 Whatever the provenance of the
partnership, ‘this unusual structure is recognition of the fact that governments and
the sporting movement must act together to fight doping and that neither sector will
be successful without the collaboration and cooperation of the other’.5
1 According to its ‘constitutive instrument of foundation’, WADA’s objects are ‘(1) to promote and
coordinate at international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms including through in and
out-of-competition; to this end, the Foundation will cooperate with intergovernmental organizations,
governments, public authorities and other public and private bodies fighting against doping in sport,
inter alia the International Olympic Committee (IOC), International Sports Federations (IF), National
Olympic Committees (NOC) and the athletes; it will seek and obtain from all of the above the moral
and political commitment to follow its recommendations; (2) to reinforce at international level
ethical principles for the practice of doping-free sport and to help protect the health of athletes; (3)
to establish, adapt, modify and update for all the public and private bodies concerned […] the list of
substances and methods prohibited in the practice of sport; […] (4) to encourage, support, coordinate
and, when necessary, undertake, in full cooperation with the public and private bodies concerned,
[…] the organization of unannounced out-of-competition testing; (5) to develop, harmonize and unify
scientific, sampling and technical standards and procedures with regard to analyses and equipment,
including the homologation of laboratories, and to create a reference laboratory; (6) to promote
harmonized rules, disciplinary procedures, sanctions and other means of combating doping in sport,
and contribute to the unification thereof, taking into account the rights of athletes; (7) to devise and
develop anti-doping education and prevention programmes at international level, in view of promoting
the practice of doping-free sport in accordance with ethical principles; [and] (8) to promote and
coordinate research in the fight against doping in sport’.
2 Initially, various governmental bodies expressed concern about the (perceived lack of) independence
and transparency of WADA, and its ‘precise remit’, given the IOC’s heavy involvement. See
eg European Commission press release IP/99/767. The Commission said that ‘Governments would
not accept an agency which was merely an appendage of sports Organizations’: ‘The Fight Against
Doping in Sport’, Working paper for the First European Sports Conference (Olympia, May 1999).
Various steps were taken to resolve these concerns, including agreeing on equal representation of
sports bodies and governments on the WADA Foundation Board, and a rotation of the chair between
the two constituencies (although that last measure was blighted in controversy in 2007, when the
term of Richard Pound, the IOC’s nominee as WADA’s first Chairman, came to end. The government
stakeholders failed to agree on a single nominee, with Australian politician John Fahey being put
up against French sports minister Jean-Francois Lamour. Lamour eventually withdrew and Fahey
was elected chairman unopposed, but with great acrimony, at the World Anti-Doping Conference in
Madrid in November 2007). In November 2013, Sir Craig Reedie was installed as successor to Fahey;
and in November 2019 former Polish athlete Wittold Banka succeeded Reedie as WADA President.
As a result of governance changes agreed in 2019, the first two independent members of the
WADA Executive Board were appointed in December 2020, and the successor to Wittold Banka as
WADA President will also be independent both of the sports movement and of the public authorities.
3 Although there are those who have called for it to be replicated in the field of match-fixing and related
corruption, given that the threat such conduct causes, and the practical problems involved in fighting
it, are so similar to what is encountered in the anti-doping field. See para B4.55.
4 Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley, 2004), pp 72–73.
5 UNESCO Director-General’s Final Report on the Preparation of the International Convention Against
Doping in Sport, ED/2005/CONV-DOP Rep1 (Paris, February 2005), para 7.
C2.8 WADA immediately turned its attention to creating a new worldwide

anti-doping code, incorporating an agreed list of prohibited substances, a uniform
definition of doping offences, common standards for sample collection and analysis,
a harmonised set of sanctions (with carefully limited mechanisms for departure from
the specified norm), and the Court of Arbitration for Sport1 as the ultimate arbiter
of how the code should be interpreted and applied. After an extensive consultation
process, the draft code was presented to the delegates to the second World Conference
in Doping on Sport, held in Copenhagen in March 2003, and they voted to adopt it as
the first World Anti-Doping Code with effect from 1 January 2004.
1 See Chapter D2 (The Court of Arbitration for Sport).
C2.9 As the CAS has noted:

‘The WADC is not per se legally binding. The Signatories of the WADC are required
to implement applicable provisions through policies, statutes, rules or regulations
according to their authority and within their respective spheres of responsibility’.1
International Federations were required to sign up to the Code and implement Code-
compliant anti-doping rules prior to the 2004 Athens Olympics. All International
Federations who participate in the Olympic Games did so, as did most International
Federations who do not participate in the Games but whose members receive public
funding channelled through National Olympic Committees and are required to be
Code-compliant to be eligible for such funds.2 FIFA’s initial adoption of the Code was
qualified,3 but that qualification was eventually dropped when the CAS rejected FIFA’s
purported legal objections to aspects of the Code.4 Today there are 690 Signatories
to the Code, including the IOC and International Paralympic Committee (‘IPC’),
International Federations, Major Event Organizations, National Olympic Committees
and National Paralympic Committees, and National Anti-Doping Organizations.
1 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 15.
2 ‘IOC: “Mind” sports must drug test too’ (2003) Tribune Review, 16 April (chess and other ‘mind
sports’ to sign up to Code, and undertake drug testing, not because they perceive a drugs threat to their
sports, but because they receive public funding through their National Olympic Committees).
3 FIFA Congress Declaration of 21 May 2004, declaring only FIFA’s ‘respect for the World Anti-
Doping Code’, which FIFA subsequently argued constituted acceptance of the Code with the
reservation of ‘factors specific to football and generally recognized principles of law’. FIFA & WADA,
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, para 20.
4 FIFA & WADA, CAS 2005/C/976 and 986. The CAS was asked (a) if the FIFA rules are substantially
different to the provisions of the Code; and (b) if the Code provisions on sanctions are compatible with
Swiss law. It answered both questions in the affirmative.
C2.10 While governments were able to signal their political commitment to the
Code by signing the Copenhagen Declaration, many governments cannot bind
themselves legally to a non-governmental document like the Code. Therefore it was
agreed to develop a UNESCO Convention that governments could ratify, and then
incorporate by legislation into their national laws.1 The International Convention
against Doping in Sport was adopted unanimously by the 33rd UNESCO General
Conference on 19 October 2005. It came into effect on 1 February 2007, once 40
countries had ratified it. As of March 2020, 189 UNESCO Member States had
become state parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport.2
1 See Pound, ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency’ [2002] ISLR 53, 58 (governmental process of ratifying
a convention and then incorporating its norms into national law by legislation ‘is, perhaps, somewhat
short of ideal, but it would at least provide notice, that could be taken into account by state courts, of
the recognised international norms in respect of doping in sport and that, in the interim, before the
legislation actually becomes part of the domestic law, act to inhibit state court awards that might differ
from those made within the sport movement’).
2 unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=31037&language=E [accessed 2 November 2020].
C2.11 The UNESCO Convention1 gives governments a practical tool for aligning
their domestic policies with the Code. In particular:
(a) Article 1 defines the purpose of the Convention, ie to promote the prevention
of, and the fight against, doping in sport.
(b) Article 3 outlines the means to achieve this purpose, including an obligation for
State Parties to encourage all forms of international cooperation, particularly
with WADA, and also underlines the importance of ensuring that any measures
adopted against doping are consistent with the Code.
(c) Article 4 commits State Parties to the principles of the Code as the basis for
appropriate measures, to be taken at national level, including legislation,
regulation, policies or administrative practices, to achieve the objectives of
and to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Those obligations
(i) ensuring that national laws contain appropriate measures against
trafficking of prohibited substances and methods to athletes (Art 8);
(ii) applying financial sanctions (ie withdrawal of/ineligibility for public
funding) with respect to individuals who commit anti-doping rule
violations and organisations that do not comply with the Code (Art 11);
(iii) encouraging and facilitating cooperation between public and private
agencies in the fight against doping in sport (Art 13);
(iv) supporting the mission of WADA in the international fight against doping
(Art 14); and
(d) Article 9 calls for State Parties to take measures and to encourage relevant
organisations to take action against athlete support personnel who commit an
anti-doping rule violation.
In short, the Convention ‘impose[s] a legal obligation on all governments to work
with sport, under the auspices of the World Anti-Doping Agency, to eradicate doping
in sport’.2
1 unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/international-convention-against-
doping-in-sport/. See generally UNESCO Director-General’s Final Report on the Preparation of the
International Convention Against Doping in Sport, ED/2005/CONV-DOP Rep1 (Paris, February 2005).
2 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Explanatory Memorandum on the UNESCO International Convention
Against Doping In Sport, 1 February 2006, Cm 6742. But see comments of IAAF President Lamine
Diack to the World Conference on Doping in Sport, Madrid, 16 November 2007: ‘The fatal flaw in the
Convention is that the World Anti-Doping Code and the International Standards are not an integral part
of the Convention itself and they do not create binding obligations on the Governments as a matter of
international law. The Convention commits the Governments only to the principles of the Code and the
IAAF would respectfully suggest that this falls some way short of the type of legally binding commitment
that was called for in Copenhagen and which is so fundamental to the principle of harmonisation that
the Code is intended to achieve. As the leadership of WADA passes to the Governments for the next
four year period, this is an issue of critical importance that must be addressed through amendment to
the UNESCO Convention itself’. No such amendment was ever introduced, and even today there are no
meaningful consequences for breach by a State Party of its obligations under the Convention.
C2.12 In April 2006, WADA started a consultation process on proposed revisions

to the Code based on lessons learned during its first three years of implementation.1
Three successive drafts were circulated for consultation between then and August
2007, and in November 2007 the delegates to the World Anti-Doping Conference in
Madrid passed a resolution welcoming the Foundation Board’s adoption of revisions
to the Code, which came into effect on 1 January 2009 (the ‘2009 Code’). The
major changes introduced included a clarification of the rules as to management of
atypical findings, standardisation of whereabouts requirements, making provisional
suspension mandatory in certain cases, incentivising admissions and cooperation
with anti-doping authorities, and (perhaps most importantly) changing the sanctions
regime to increase the flexibility given to hearing panels to depart (both upwards and
downwards) from the fixed sanctions specified in the Code.
C2.13 From November 2011 to May 2013, WADA conducted another consultation
exercise on proposed revisions to the 2009 Code and the supporting International
Standards, with (again) three successive drafts being circulated for comment.
A revised Code was adopted by delegates to the World Anti-Doping Conference in
Johannesburg in November 2013 and came into effect on 1 January 2015 (the ‘2015
Code’). The major changes introduced by the 2015 Code included a new anti-doping
rule violation (Prohibited Association), a new four-year sanction for intentional
violations (but no more provision for aggravated sanctions), and greater emphasis on
more intelligent testing and on use of investigative techniques.
C2.14 From December 2017 to February 2019, WADA conducted a third global
consultation exercise on proposed revisions to the 2015 Code and the supporting
International Standards, again circulating three successive drafts to stakeholders
for comment. A revised Code was adopted by delegates to the World Anti-Doping
Conference in Katowice, Poland in November 2019, and will come into effect on
1 January 2021 (the ‘2021 Code’). The major changes to be introduced by the 2021
Code include providing that officers and employees and other persons involved
in Anti-Doping Organizations are bound by and liable for breach of certain parts
of the Code, adding a new anti-doping rule violation to protect whistle-blowers
from retaliation, potential reduction in sanctions for certain refusal and tampering
violations and increase in the maximum sanction for complicity, strengthening the
standards for fair hearings before independent panels, allowing greater scope for
mitigation of sanction in cases involving recreational drugs, and reintroduction of the
power to increase the sanction in cases of aggravating circumstances.
2 THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: AN OVERVIEW
C2.15 The Introduction to the 2015 Code states:

‘The Code is the fundamental and universal document upon which the World Anti-
Doping Program in sport is based. The purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-
doping effort through universal harmonization of core anti-doping elements. It is

intended to be specific enough to achieve complete harmonization on issues where
uniformity is required, yet general enough in other areas to permit flexibility on how
agreed upon anti-doping procedures are implemented. The Code has been drafted
giving consideration to the principles of proportionality and human rights.
[…]
‘All provisions of the Code are mandatory in substance and must be followed as
applicable by each Anti-Doping Organization and Athlete or other Person. The Code
does not, however, replace or eliminate the need for comprehensive anti-doping
rules to be adopted by each Anti-Doping Organization. While some provisions of
the Code must be incorporated without substantive change by each Anti-Doping
Organization in its own anti-doping rules, other provisions of the Code establish
mandatory guiding principles that allow flexibility in the formulation of rules by
each Anti-Doping Organization or establish requirements that must be followed
by each Anti-Doping Organization but need not be repeated in its own anti-doping
rules’.
Code Article 23.2.2 specifies that the Code provisions that must be incorporated into
Signatories’ anti-doping rules ‘without substantive change’ are Arts 1 (Definition of
Doping) and 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations), Art 3 (Proof of Doping), Art 4.2.2
(Specified Substances), Art 4.3.3 (WADA’s Determination of the Prohibited List),
Art 7.11 (Retirement from Sport), Art 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual
Results), Art 10 (Sanctions on Individuals), Art 11 (Consequences to Teams), Art 13
(Appeals),1 Art 15.1 (Recognition of Decisions), Art 17 (Statute of Limitations), Art
24 (Interpretation of the Code), and Appendix 1 (Definitions). Code Article 23.2.2
also states that ‘no additional provision may be added to a Signatory’s rules which
changes the effect of [these mandatory] Articles’.2
1 Except Code Arts 13.2.2, 13.6 and 13.7.
2 This is the provision that the IOC fell foul of with its ‘Osaka rule’ excluding from the next Olympic
Games athletes who had been banned for doping for more than six months, and the British Olympic
Association fell foul of with its bye-law excluding athletes who had been banned for doping for more
than six months from selection for the GB Olympic team for life: see para B1.11 n 23 and D2.197.
C2.16 The other provisions of the Code ‘establish mandatory guiding principles
that allow flexibility in the formulation of rules by each Anti-Doping Organization
or establish requirements that must be followed by each Anti-Doping Organization
but need not be repeated in its own anti-doping rules’.1 Thus, the Code leaves each
Signatory to decide, when incorporating the requirements of the Code into its own
rules:
(1) what the results management process should be;2
(2 whether an athlete charged with an anti-doping rule violation should be
provisionally suspended pending determination of the charge (save where
there is an adverse analytical finding for a non-Specified Substance, when
provisional suspension is mandatory);3
(3) what form the disciplinary process and hearing should take;4 and
(4) the route of appeal for a national-level athlete (ie whether to a national-level
appeal body or to the CAS).5
The Code also allows particular sports to apply to have additional substances and
methods added to the Prohibited List for that sport only (but not to have substances
or methods deleted from the list for that sport only).6
1 See Introduction to 2015 Code, p.16.
2 See Code Art 7 and the comment thereto: ‘Various Signatories have created their own approaches
to results management. While the various approaches have not been entirely uniform, many have
proven to be fair and effective systems for results management. The Code does not supplant each of
the Signatories’ results management systems. This Article does, however, specify basic principles in
order to ensure the fundamental fairness of the results management process which must be observed
by each Signatory. The specific anti-doping rules of each Signatory shall be consistent with these basic
principles’.
3 See Code Art 7.9 and paras C4.25–C4.30.
4 See Code Art 8. The types of issues that an Anti-Doping Organization has to address when formulating
its disciplinary procedures are discussed in Chapter D1 (Disciplinary and other Internal Proceedings).
5 See Code Art 13.2.2.
C2.17 Therefore, the Code provides a mandatory framework for the regulation
of drug use within a particular sport and/or a particular country. The Code requires
every Anti-Doping Organization to put in place rules and procedures to ensure that
all athletes and other persons under the Anti-Doping Organization’s jurisdiction are
informed of and agree to be bound by its anti-doping rules. In practice, that agreement
is likely to be evidenced by conduct (participation in the sport in the knowledge that
such participation is subject to rules and regulations to protect the integrity of the
sport) rather than in writing.1
1 See paras C2.9 to C2.11.
C2.18 Sitting below the Code in the World Anti-Doping Program are the
International Standards, which formalise different technical and operational areas
within standard anti-doping programmes. ‘Adherence to the International Standards
is mandatory for compliance with the Code’.1 In other words, an Anti-Doping
Organization is not Code-compliant, even if it has adopted anti-doping rules that
comply with the mandatory provisions of the Code, if it has not also incorporated
the International Standards by reference into those rules. The Code does, however,
create a substantial incentive for following the International Standards, by providing
that ‘compliance with an International Standard (as opposed to another alternative
standard, practice or procedure) shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures
addressed by the International Standard were performed properly’.2
1 Introduction to the Code, p 12. While the Code may only be changed by the Foundation Board (Code
Art 23.7), amendments to the Standards may be made at any time by the WADA Executive Committee.
The International Standard for the Prohibited List is changed at least annually: see para C6.35 et seq.
2 Strangely, although this provision is of great practical importance (see para C2.74 et seq), it does not
appear in the operative provisions of the Code, but instead is buried in Appendix One to the Code, in
the definition of the term ‘International Standards’.
C2.19 The current International Standards are:

(a) The List of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods, a cornerstone
document that is discussed at para C6.35 et seq.1
(b) The International Standard for Testing and Investigations, the main
purpose of which is help signatories:
‘to plan for intelligent and effective Testing, both In-Competition and Out-of-
Competition, and to maintain the integrity and identity of the Samples collected from
the point the Athlete is notified of the Test, to the point the Samples are delivered to
the Laboratory for analysis’.2
Its provisions on test distribution planning and on the sample collection
process itself,3 as well as storage and transport of samples after collection,
are of huge practical importance. It was expanded in 2009 to incorporate
mandatory whereabouts requirements,4 and in 2015 to incorporate standards
for the gathering of intelligence and the conduct of investigations.
(c) The International Standard for Laboratories, which sets out what
laboratories must do in order to secure and thereafter to maintain their WADA
accreditation (including following a proficiency testing programme).5 In
conjunction with a series of WADA Technical Documents on specific issues,
the ISL then sets out the standards that such laboratories must follow in
taking custody of and analysing samples to test for the presence of prohibited
substances, and reporting its findings to the Anti-Doping Organization with
results management authority over the case. Together with the International
Standard for Testing and Investigations, the ISL is a cornerstone of any case
where there is an allegation that a prohibited substance has been found in an
athlete’s sample.6 ‘Its main purpose is to ensure laboratory production of valid
test results and evidentiary data. It is also intended to ensure that the accredited
laboratories achieve uniform and harmonised results and reporting thereon’.7
(d) The International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions, which
identifies the criteria to be used to determine whether there is medical
justification for athletes to be granted permission to use prohibited substances
or methods, outlines the process to be followed in applying for a TUE, provides
for the confidentiality of such process, and explains the types of evidence
required to support an application.
(e) The International Standard for the Protection of Privacy and Personal
Information, the purpose of which is ‘to ensure that Anti-Doping
Organizations apply appropriate, sufficient and effective privacy protections to
the Personal Information they Process when conducting anti-doping programs,
in recognition of the fact that Personal Information gathered in the anti-doping
context can impinge upon and implicate the privacy rights and interests of
persons involved in and associated with organised sport’.8
(f) The International Standard for Code Compliance by Signatories, brought
into effect as from 1 April 2018, which sets out how WADA will monitor
compliance by Code Signatories with their obligations under the Code and
the International Standards, and identifies the procedure to be followed in
cases of non-compliance, which mirrors as closely as possible the procedures
followed in cases of Code non-compliance by individuals, including WADA
sending a formal notice alleging non-compliance and proposing consequences
from the range specified in Article 11 of the International Standard (from
2021, in Art 24.1.12 of the 2021 Code), and the Signatory either admitting the
non-compliance and accepting the proposed consequences, or else disputing
them, in which case the matter is referred to the CAS Ordinary Division for
determination, and it is WADA’s burden to prove, on the balance of probabilities,
that the Signatory is non-compliant as alleged, and to argue for the imposition
of the consequences it has proposed.
And, in addition, from 1 January 2021:
(a) The International Standard for Results Management, which sets out
the core responsibilities of Anti-Doping Organizations in relation to results
management, from initial review and notification of alleged anti-doping rule
violations, through provisional suspension, to hearings on the merits, issue of
a decision on the merits, and appeal.
(b) The International Standard for Education, the main purpose of which is
to establish mandatory standards to support Signatories in the planning and
implementation of effective education programmes.
1 For an overview of the categories of prohibited substances and the reasons why they are prohibited,
see Bird et al, Doping in sport and exercise: anabolic, ergogenic, health and clinical issues, Annals of
Clinical Biochemistry 2016, Vol 53(2) 196–221.
2 ISTI (March 2019), section 1.0.
4 See para C2.12.
5 ISL Part Two.
7 E. & A. v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 7.
8 ISPP (June 2018), pp 1–2. See para A4.110 et seq.
3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE IN

THE UK
C2.20 Consistent with its non-interventionist approach to the regulation of sport

generally,1 the UK Government historically took a relatively hands-off approach to
the regulation of drug use in sport. It endorsed the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code,2 and was an early signatory to the Council of Europe’s 1989 Anti-Doping
Convention.3 However, it never passed any specific legislation to incorporate the
provisions of these international instruments into domestic law, or to require sports
bodies to adopt anti-doping programmes reflecting their provisions. Instead, the
regulation, policing and enforcement of anti-doping rules in sport in the United
Kingdom were left largely to the national governing bodies of the respective sports.4
1 See generally Chapter A3 (Government Intervention in the Sports Sector). In contrast, interventionist
states such as France and Italy issued codified anti-doping regulations that sports federations had
to adopt and enforce, or else face being stripped of their right to govern their respective sports. See
eg French Law no 99 222 of 23 March 1999 and the Italian Law no 376 of 14 December 2000, both on
‘Discipline of health protection in sports activities and of fight against doping’.
2 See para C2.4.
3 The Anti-Doping Convention (Council of Europe – European Treaties – ETS No 135) was
adopted in 1989. Forty-seven member states of the Council of Europe have signed it, including
the UK, and eight non-members, including Australia and the United States. Until the introduction
of the UNESCO International Anti-Doping Convention, it was the main legal instrument for the
harmonisation of doping rules at government level.
4 See para A3.117.
C2.21 However, the creation of the public-private partnership of WADA in

1999 and the issue of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003 shifted the anti-doping
paradigm in the UK fundamentally. Between the advent of the Code in 2003 and
late 2009, working within the ‘policy’-based framework of conditioning access to
public funding and benefits on compliance with government policy,1 the Drug-Free
Sport Directorate of UK Sport managed to introduce elements of centralisation
and harmonisation to anti-doping rule-making and adjudication among the UK’s
national governing bodies. It implemented a National Governing Body Anti-Doping
Agreement, requiring a national governing body, if it wished to be eligible for public
funding, to adopt, police and enforce Code-compliant anti-doping rules. It issued
model Anti-Doping Rules that national governing bodies could adopt to fulfil the
first part of that commitment. It started to exercise the right of appeal given to it
under those rules to ensure that anti-doping decisions issued by tribunals appointed
by those national governing bodies were consistent with the Code. It established an
independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear all cases arising under the anti-
doping rules of the UK’s national governing bodies. It thereby introduced a level,
Code-compliant playing field across the whole of UK sport in terms of the rule
making and adjudication functions. And in 2007 the UK Sport board announced
that it was recommending that the government require national governing bodies,
as a further condition of eligibility for public funding, to transfer exclusive results
management authority (ie the authority to investigate matters and determine whether
there is a case to answer under the doping rules) to a new independent National Anti-
Doping Organization.2
1 See para A3.119.
2 UK Sport press releases dated 25 July 2007 and 16 October 2007.
C2.22 Following extensive consultation with the sports movement, in December

2009 the UK Government finalised and published its National Anti-Doping Policy,1
the introduction to which states:
‘The UK Government and the Devolved Administrations condemn doping in sport
and are committed to the pursuit of clean sport. They consider that this objective is
best pursued through a partnership between government and the sports movement
(in line with that represented on a global level by the World Anti-Doping Agency,
or “WADA”), and through the harmonisation of anti-doping rules using the
framework provided by the World Anti-Doping Code (the “Code”). Accordingly,
by ratifying the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport
(the “UNESCO Convention”), the UK Parliament has formally committed the
UK Government as well as the Devolved Administrations to the pursuit of doping-
free sport based on the principles set out in the Code.
Acting with the guidance of the UK’s National Anti-Doping Organisation (the new
non-departmental public body known as “UK Anti-Doping”, which has succeeded
the Drug-Free Sport Directorate of UK Sport in this role) and with the support of
UK Sport and each of the four Home Country Sports Councils, the UK Government
and the Devolved Administrations have sought to satisfy the requirements of the
UNESCO Convention by adopting the anti-doping policy framework set out in this
document (the “UK National Anti-Doping Policy”, or “Policy”). The purpose of the
UK National Anti-Doping Policy is to set out the policy objectives and requirements
of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations in the field of doping in
sport, and to identify the roles and responsibilities of each of UK Anti-Doping, the
Sports Councils, and the national governing bodies of sport in the UK (ie any sports
organisation that serves as the ruling body for a sport or for an event involving one or
more sports) (“NGBs”), as well as of the National Anti-Doping Panel, in delivering
on and/or otherwise supporting those objectives and requirements’.
The National Anti-Doping Policy establishes a truly unified UK approach to the fight
against doping in sport under the auspices of UK Anti-Doping as the National Anti-
Doping Organization (NADO) for the UK. It requires the national governing bodies
of sport in the UK to adopt either the UK Anti-Doping Rules issued by UK Anti-
Doping or other Code-compliant anti-doping rules mandated by their international
federations, to delegate results management and case prosecution responsibility to
UK Anti-Doping (save where UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own systems are
Code-compliant), and to appoint the independent National Anti-Doping Panel to hear
and determine all charges that the anti-doping rules have been breached (save where
UK Anti-Doping agrees that their own tribunals are Code-compliant).
1 UK National Anti-Doping Policy, version 1.0, 14 December 2009.
C2.23 The creation of UK Anti-Doping and the powers given to it by the National
Anti-Doping Policy have significantly enhanced the fight against doping in sport,
and not just by harmonising rule making, results management, and case adjudication
across all sports. It was UK Sport’s view that giving one central and independent body
a clear public mandate and authority to investigate violations and manage results
across all sports would help clear the path towards proper cooperation between public
and private anti-doping authorities. It was also UK Sport’s view that centralising
results management authority in this way would also facilitate information-sharing
by law enforcement agencies with the sports anti-doping movement. And this has
proved correct: since UK Anti-Doping opened its doors in December 2009, it has
applied significant resources to the investigation and pursuit of ‘non-analytical’
cases, based in particular on the sharing of intelligence and information with the
police, Customs, and other public agencies, with some considerable success.1
1 For example, UK Anti-Doping used evidence supplied by the police to obtain aggravated sanctions
against an athlete in UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December 2012,
paras 46–47 (four-year ban imposed based on admissions made at police interview that steroids
found in athlete’s home were for his personal use in training for competition); in UK Anti-Doping v
Olubamiwo, NADP Consent Order dated 13 June 2012 (boxer banned for four years for using multiple
prohibited substances repeatedly and intentionally over a period of several years as part of a doping
scheme or plan, based on evidence supplied by US law enforcement as part of Operation Raw Deal);
and in UK Anti-Doping v Fletcher, issued decision dated 29 November 2011 (four-year ban imposed
for trafficking in human growth hormone and various steroids).
CHAPTER C3
Parties
Contents
. para
1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS?.. C3.1
2 WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS?.............................. C3.5
1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING ANTI-DOPING

PROCEEDINGS?
C3.1 Although many different organisations are signatories to the Code, only
those signatories referred to in the Code as ‘Anti-Doping Organizations’1 are
‘responsible for adopting rules for initiating, implementing or enforcing any part
of the Doping Control process’.2 Most anti-doping proceedings are brought by
international federations3 or by National Anti-Doping Organizations (‘NADOs’)
such as UK Anti-Doping.4 The Code definition of ‘Anti-Doping Organization’ also
encompasses the organisers of major events (such as the IOC, as organiser of the
Olympic Games, and the IPC, as organiser of the Paralympic Games), but if there is
an anti-doping rule violation at those Games the IOC or IPC (as applicable) brings
proceedings only to disqualify the athlete from further participation in the Games.
It is for the international federation to bring its own disciplinary proceedings if it
considers that the ADRV also warrants banning the athlete from participation in other
events for a period.5
1 That American spelling is followed in this Part.
2 Code App 1, p 130, definition of ‘Anti-Doping Organization’. For a discussion of ‘Doping Control’,
see para C6.3.
3 Although many international federations are now responding to allegations of conflict of interest
(actual or apparent) by delegating their anti-doping functions to the International Testing Agency
(website: ita.sport) or to operationally independent units (eg World Athletics and the International
Biathlon Union delegate all of their integrity functions, including anti-doping, to – respectively – the
Athletics Integrity Unit and the Biathlon Integrity Unit).
4 UK Anti-Doping’s website is ukad.org.uk.
5 Code Art 7.1.1.
C3.2 The international federation’s anti-doping rules will apply to athletes

competing at international level. However, as part of the classic ‘pyramid’ model
of sports governance and regulation,1 the international federation’s rules will also
require its member national federations to apply the same or equivalent anti-doping
rules to athletes competing at national level. In many cases, the national federation
is ill-equipped to perform this role, and/or it is a condition of public funding that the
role be assigned to an independent body. It is also WADA policy, and in the 2021
Code it will become a requirement, that national federations recognise the authority
of their respective NADOs and delegate their anti-doping testing to the NADOs.
Therefore, WADA’s model anti-doping rules for international federations include a
provision acknowledging that the national federation’s anti-doping responsibilities
may be discharged by the NADO in its country. In the UK, for example, it is a
requirement of the UK National Anti-Doping Policy that national federations
delegate responsibility for managing results and bringing proceedings under their
anti-doping rules to UK Anti-Doping.2 Opt-outs are permitted on an exceptional
basis, but the only national federations in the UK that have reserved the right to
bring their own disciplinary proceeding for violation of their anti-doping rules are
the Football Associations of England and Wales, the Rugby Football Union, and the
England & Wales Cricket Board. UK Anti-Doping is responsible for policing and
enforcing the anti-doping rules of all other national federations in the UK, including
UK Athletics, the Rugby Football League, British Cycling, and the Lawn Tennis
Association. A NADO also has stand-alone jurisdiction, under Code Art 5.2.1, over
all athletes who are nationals or residents of, or members of or licensed by sports
organisations in, its country (wherever they may be at any one time) as well as any
other athletes who are present in its country (eg for training or competition).
1 See para A1.22.
2 See para C2.22.
C3.3 Usually the party that conducts or commissions drug testing (the ‘Testing
Authority’) is also the ‘Results Management Authority’, ie the party that manages the
results of the test, including taking any adverse analytical finding to a hearing,1 but
not necessarily. For example, a NADO may test a foreign athlete while he is training
in its country.2 If it is doing so by agreement with and as an agent of another Anti-
Doping Organization (eg the athlete’s international federation), usually that other
Anti-Doping Organization will have responsibility for managing the test results. In
the absence of prior agreement, Code Art 7.1 determines who has the authority (and
the responsibility) to manage the results. In accordance with Code Art 7.1.1, if there
is no other candidate, results management responsibility defaults to the international
federation, although it may then delegate that responsibility to its relevant member
national federation, which may in turn have agreed (or been required) to delegate it
to its NADO.3
1 Code Art 7.1 states: ‘Except as provided in Articles 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 below, results management and
hearings shall be the responsibility of, and shall be governed by, the procedural rules of the Anti-
Doping Organization that initiated and directed Sample collection (or, if no Sample collection is
involved, the Anti-Doping Organization which first provides notice to an Athlete or other Person of an
asserted anti-doping rule violation and then diligently pursues that anti-doping rule violation)’.
2 Code Art 5.2.1; WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 64 (US NADO has authority to
test Egyptian athlete while he is in the US).
3 See para C3.2. See also comment 46 to 2021 Code Art 7.3.1: ‘The Athlete’s or other Person’s
International Federation has been made the Anti-Doping Organization of last resort for Results
Management to avoid the possibility that no Anti-Doping Organization would have authority to
conduct Results Management. An International Federation is free to provide in its own anti-doping
rules that the Athlete’s or other Person’s National Anti-Doping Organization shall conduct Results
Management’.
Code Art 7.1.1 gives WADA the right to resolve any dispute between Anti-Doping Organizations
as to which of them should exercise results management authority in a particular case. This was in
response to a high-profile dispute that blew up in 2012 between the US NADO (the US Anti-Doping
Agency, or ‘USADA’) and the UCI over which of them had results management authority with respect
to evidence of anti-doping rule violations by Lance Armstrong and others. The UCI initially insisted
that it should have results management authority over the case, because the allegations involved
samples that it had collected and/or it had discovered the alleged violations. USADA took a different
view in USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility, dated
10 October 2012, p 157 et seq, on the basis that the violations had not been revealed by the testing
of Armstrong’s samples but instead had been discovered by USADA’s intelligence-gathering efforts,
and that in any event Armstrong was an American athlete who had subjected himself to US Cycling’s
rules. The UCI did not take the matter any further, noting that even if it was right that it had results
management authority under its rules, those rules delegated that authority to US Cycling, which was
required by virtue of its membership of the US Olympic Committee to delegate it again to USADA.
UCI decision regarding USADA v Armstrong, 22 October 2012. And nor did Armstrong test these
jurisdictional points, because after a federal court in Texas ruled that he was required to submit to
arbitration of USADA’s allegations he chose to take no further part in the proceedings, allowing what
was in effect a default judgment to be entered against him.
Certain of the other individuals charged as co-conspirators by USADA did dispute the charges,
and challenged USADA’s assertion of jurisdiction over them, but that challenge was rejected by the
AAA panel in USADA v Bruyneel and others, AAA Panel decision dated 7 June 2013. The AAA Panel
Parties 689
held that the defendants were subject to the UCI Rules, under which the body first discovering the
violation had jurisdiction, and therefore when they had submitted themselves to those rules they had
in effect agreed to the results management authority of USADA. That ruling was upheld in Bruyneel
v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618. This was
a robust rejection of the proposition that there was no arbitration agreement between USADA and the
defendants and that therefore there could not be jurisdiction. In a slightly different context, other courts
dealing with sports arbitration clauses may also be prepared to hold that an agreement arises between
two participants on the basis that each of them is individually bound by a governing body’s arbitration
clause: see Bony v Kacou [2017] EWHC 2146 (Ch), where it was held there was no arbitration
agreement and Mercato Sports (UK) Limited v Everton Football Club Co Limited [2018] EWHC 1567
(Ch), where it was held that there was. See also para D3.8.
C3.4 In the case of whereabouts violations, where each of the athlete’s international
federation, his NADO, and the NADO of any country in which he trains or competes
has the right to use the whereabouts information filed by the athlete in the central
database, ADAMS, to locate and test him,1 it is the Anti-Doping Organization with
which the athlete files his whereabouts information (ie his international federation
or his NADO) that manages the results of any filing failures or missed tests, and
has authority to charge the athlete with an anti-doping rule violation once three
whereabouts violations have been declared against the athlete in one 12-month
period.2
1 See para C9.2.
2 Code Arts 7.1.2 and 7.6; Annex I, section I.5 (Results Management) of the International Standard for
Testing & Investigations (March 2019).
2 WHO IS SUBJECT TO ANTI-DOPING PROCEEDINGS?
C3.5 All athletes competing in a major event will be subject to the anti-doping
rules issued by the organiser of that event.1 They may also be tested by the NADO
in whose country the event is held, where such testing is out-of-competition testing
or where (if in-competition) it is agreed with the event organiser in accordance with
Code Art 5.3.2 Athletes will also be subject to their international federation’s anti-
doping rules if they compete at international level, and to their national federation’s
anti-doping rules (or, by delegation, the rules of their country’s NADO) to the
extent they compete at national level. They will also be subject to the anti-doping
jurisdiction of any NADO in whose country they live or train or compete.3
1 See Code Arts 5.2.3, 5.3.1.
2 Code Art 5.3.2 (WADA to decide in case event organiser and NADO cannot agree on NADO testing
at event).
3 See Code Art 5.2.1 (‘Each National Anti-Doping Organization shall have In-Competition and Out-
of-Competition Testing authority over all Athletes who are nationals, residents, license-holders or
members of sport organizations in that National Anti-Doping Organization’s country’).
C3.6 A hearing panel convened to hear and determine a charge that an athlete has
committed an anti-doping rule violation will expect the Anti-Doping Organization
bringing the case to identify the ‘legal instrument’ that binds the athlete to the anti-
doping rules under which the proceedings have been brought.1 It will also want to be
satisfied that the athlete was aware (or should be deemed to have been aware) of the
rules and agreed (or should be deemed to have agreed) to be bound by and to comply
with them.2
1 Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 9.1.2. See also Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 105
(‘The Athlete can only be sanctioned for an ADRV according to the TADP if he was bound by the
respective rules at the relevant time, ie, at the time the ADRV was committed’). This reflects the fact
that the regulatory authority of most sports bodies is based on the athlete’s acceptance of and agreement
to abide by their rules, which therefore represent a contract between the governing body and the
athlete. See generally para A2.13. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165,
para 7.16 (‘It is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship between UKA and Ohuruogu is
contractual in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s new regime when she signed the
form that contained those procedures on 25 July 2005 […]’).
Where the ADRV charged is presence of a prohibited substance in the athlete’s sample, the
athlete cannot avoid liability by arguing that he used the substance before he became bound by the
anti-doping rules. Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 106 (‘the alleged ADRV in question here
is TADP Article 2.1, ie the presence of a Prohibited Substance in the Athlete’s urine sample (not
the administration or use of a prohibited substance). […] Such an ADRV is committed whenever
the laboratory analysis of an athlete’s urine or blood sample reveals that such sample contains a
Prohibited Substance. The Athlete – while competing at the Czech Republic Futures tournament – had
a Prohibited Substance in his system, ie at a point in time at which he was undoubtedly bound by the
TADP. Therefore, there is no question here of any retroactive application of the TADP. Instead, for the
Appellant to be bound to the TADP at the relevant time it suffices that the Appellant (allegedly) had a
prohibited substance in his body when he submitted to the July 2017 doping control. To find differently
would permit any athlete to abuse an assortment of performance enhancing substances prior to joining
the professional ranks and later to claim innocence just because substances were ingested (whether
intentionally or unintentionally) prior to his or her being bound by the rules’).
2 Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 9.1.2 (‘The question remains through which legal instrument
the Appellant is bound by the FINA Rules. In particular the following questions arise: Is there a
chain of references to the FINA Rules in the by-laws (starting from the Appellant’s swimming club
over the by-laws of the Italian Swimming Federation to the FINA Statutes)? Is there an agreement /
licence/“swimming passport” through which the Appellant has accepted that she is subject to the
FIA Rules?’); International Rugby Board v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 38 (‘[…] the
[ARU Anti-Doping] By-Law is only enforceable by reason of contract. Thus there must be some
evidence that the Respondent undertook contractually to be bound by the By-Law’).
C3.7 However, the anti-doping rules are now so well-known that athletes’ claims
of ignorance are generally given short shrift.1 Furthermore, the hearing panel will not
generally require proof of a specific written agreement to abide by the rules, signed
by the athlete.2 Instead, it will readily infer acceptance of the rules and agreement
to abide by them simply from the athlete’s participation in the sport.3 Indeed, the
2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules4 proceed expressly on that premise.5
1 See eg Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 88 (‘The Panel agrees with the FIA that the CAS
jurisprudence is clear that all those participating in organised sport are deemed to know that, in order
to ensure a level playing-field for all, there are strict anti-doping rules that must be complied with, and
they are deemed to be bound by those rules whether or not they have ever explicitly signed up to them
or even read them’, citing cases); FEI v Stroman, CAS 2013/A/3318, para 79 (‘[…] it is part of the lex
ludica that athletes […] who are subject to particular anti-doping regimes of their chosen sport must
themselves take steps to familiarise themselves with the content of those regimes’, even where the
rules, being international, are not in the athlete’s mother tongue); I. v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 93
(‘[…] it is a well-known facet of anti-doping law that every athlete has the duty to be acquainted with
the contents of the Prohibited List and to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her body. In
accordance with the legal principle ignorantia legis neminem excusat, an athlete may not escape anti-
doping liability merely because he or she was unaware of the content of anti-doping rules’); UK Anti-
Doping v Llewellyn, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 14 February 2013, para 5.3 (‘[…] the time
must surely by now have come when it is not open to any athlete, save perhaps in the most exceptional
circumstances, to contend that he or she is unaware of the WADC or of Anti-Doping Rules generally’).
See also cases cited at para C8.3, n 3.
2 Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697, para 84 (‘[…] a tacit declaration of will may be deduced from
a conduct of a party. The execution of a contract requires two concurrent declarations of intent, ie an
offer by one party and an acceptance by the other party. Absent any specific provision to the contrary,
the declaration of intent may either by expressly or tacitly. No written form requirement needs to be
met’); and cases cited in footnote 3, below.
If there is a written agreement, however (for example, an event entry form signed by the athlete,
agreeing to abide by the rules in question), that is likely to be dispositive. See eg Korda v ITF Ltd [1999] All
ER (D) 84 (Lightman J). The athlete denied that he had agreed to comply with the ITF’s Anti-Doping
Programme. In his May 1998 entry form for that year’s Grand Slam event at Wimbledon, however, he
had acknowledged the application of anti-doping regulations ‘imposed on the Championships […] by
the governing bodies of the game’. Mr Justice Lightman therefore had ‘no doubt that such a contractual
relationship has been established’. He rejected the athlete’s suggestion that the acknowledgement in
the form was simply a submission to the jurisdiction of the Appeals Committee sitting to hear cases
arising under that Programme, ‘rather than such as to establish in the circumstances the creation of a
contractual relationship. This appears to me to be totally unreal. Any submission to the jurisdiction of
the Appeals Committee sitting to hear cases arising under that programme, must in the circumstances
be part of an acceptance of a contractual relationship on the terms of the Programme which defines
the status, jurisdiction and procedures of the Appeals Committee’. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics
Parties 691
and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.16 (‘It is clear as a matter of English law that the relationship
between UKA and Ohuruogu is contractual in nature. Ohuruogu agreed to be subject to the UKA’s
new regime when she signed the form that contained those procedures on 25 July 2005 and it is clear
in the Panel’s view that she committed a doping offence under those procedures’); Ohlsson v WRU,
NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, pp 9-10 (‘The Appellant signed a Player’s
Registration Form on 27 August 2004 which provided – “[…] and I hereby undertake to observe the
by-laws, resolutions and regulations of the Welsh Rugby Union and Rules of the National League and
the Konica Minolta competition and any such replacement, substituting or successor competition”. On
31 May 2004 the Player had previously signed a Registration of Contract Player Form which provided
– “[…] and I hereby undertake to observe the by-laws, resolutions and regulations of the Union from
time to time and the Rules of the National League and the Principality Cup or any such replacement,
substitute or successor competitions”. […] Having expressly agreed on two occasions to be subject to
the regulations of the Respondents and those regulations incorporating IRB Regulation 21, the Appeal
Tribunal had considerable difficulty in understanding what the Appellant’s criticism of the decision
of the Judicial Committee [that he was contractually bound to observe the WRU’s anti-doping rules]
was in relation to this matter. The Appellant had by express contractual provision agreed to be bound
by all of the Respondent’s regulations which must include its anti-doping regulations which in turn
incorporate the relevant IRB Regulations. It follows that the Appellant was bound to submit to the Out
of Competition Doping Control Procedures in which the Appellant, without objection, took part on
27 January 2005’).
In such circumstances, arguments that it was not clear from the form what the athlete was being
asked to agree to (eg because the rules were not easily accessible) are also likely to be given short
shrift. See eg I. v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, paras 72–75; ASADA v Atkins, CAS 2009/O/A1. The hearing
panel in Atkins ruled that a lifeguard was subject to his national association’s anti-doping policy by
virtue of his signature of an application for membership of the national association that included an
agreement to be bound by ‘any regulations, policies and codes of conduct’ made under its constitution.
The arbitrator rejected the lifeguard’s claim that the anti-doping rules needed to be brought specifically
to his attention in order to be binding on him.
The Cologne Regional Court adopted similar reasoning in Lagat v WADA and IAAF, judgment dated
13 September 2006, pp 5–6, in upholding the defendants’ argument that certain of the athlete’s claims
were subject to arbitration by virtue of provisions in his sport’s anti-doping rules giving the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) jurisdiction over those claims. By signing the doping control form: ‘the
Claimant in principle also submitted himself as non-member to the rulebook and therefore to the
disciplinary power or arbitration of [the IAAF]. […] Indeed, normally the rules which competitors
in sporting events have to subject themselves to are stipulated in largely standardised competition
rules of the leading organisations responsible for the sporting discipline concerned and which apply
to all participants equally. This does not at all constitute a sanction unduly restricting the personal
or professional freedom of the individual, but is a necessary condition for sporting activity and the
participation in organised competitions. Therefore, every athlete […] assumes that written rules have
been drawn up by the relevant federation for the sport practised by him which must be complied with
equally by all athletes. As the Claimant declared by providing his signature that he was submitting to
the rulebook of [the IAAF] he cannot claim that he knew nothing about the sanctions to be expected
if rules were breached. The Claimant does not need to have intimate knowledge of the rules for the
submission to the rulebook of [the IAAF] to be valid. It is sufficient if he could have had knowledge
of them. There is no indication that the Claimant was unable to gain knowledge in a reasonable way
of the content thereof. The Claimant as a top athlete is aware that sport is operated in accordance
with fixed rules. As a professional athlete he is obliged in his own interest to have knowledge of
these rules, to inform himself so as not to suffer economic or legal disadvantages. […] Therefore the
Panel does not join the view of the Claimant that he was forced to sign the document. It is a part of
his profession to submit to doping tests between competitions as well as a condition for eligibility
for sporting competitions. He did not plead that he was not aware of this general rule or that he had
reservations about subjecting himself to the rules of [the IAAF] on that day, and if necessary why. It is
also not clear how the Defendant is supposed to have coerced the Claimant into signing’.
3 Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 86 (rejecting driver’s argument that he was not bound by
anti-doping rules because he never signed any document agreeing to be bound by them, and agreeing
with the FIA that ‘tacit agreement suffices. […] The regulation of international sports is important
in order to ensure sporting fairness, safety and in essence maintain the attractiveness of sports to
fans, media and sponsors thus ensuring the sports’ viability. Sportsmen and women often engage
in sport, even at its highest level, without analysis of the legal principles and regulations governing
such sport. Yet, the legitimate expectation of other participants, fans and persons involved is that all
participants will be bound by the same legal system and this is logically understood by all athletes.
Such tacit consent, stemming, for example, from the mere participation in international events, suffices
to bind these sportsmen and sportswomen by the regulations of the specific sport’) and para 87 (‘The
Panel further agrees with the FIA that just because some athletes are required to sign a consent form
explicitly agreeing to be bound by the FIA ADR and are thus bound by express consent, does not
mean that other participants in the same sport cannot be bound by implied consent’); Chicherova v
IOC, CAS 2016/A/4839, para 316 (‘[…] there was an implied contractual acceptance of the rules and
regulations including the Beijing ADR through participation and accreditation at Beijing 2008’) and
para 317 (‘Under Swiss law (namely Article 11 of the CO), contracts do not have to be in writing’);
Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, para 93 (‘While obtaining
a licence to compete from a federation or when participating in a sport event, an athlete accepts
that the anti-doping rules of that federation or event organizer bind him/her’); Dorofeyeva v ITF,
CAS 2016/A/4697, paras 84-86 (‘The execution of a contract requires two concurrent declarations of
intent, ie an offer by one party and an acceptance by the other party. Absent any specific provision to
the contrary, the declaration of intent may either be expressly or tacitly. No written form requirement
needs to be met. Furthermore, the declarations of intent must be corresponding in order for there
to be a valid contract. Thus, the Parties must agree on the essentialia negotii of the contract, ie – in
this specific case that the TADP is applicable between them […]. The Sole Arbitrator notes that […]
a tacit declaration of will may be deduced from a conduct of a party. A conduct from which one
might typically infer that someone agrees to be bound to the rules is […] if the person participates
in the sport’); Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.26 (‘[…] the Appellant, when she entered
the IWF European Championships, accepted the IWF Regulations and the sanctions provided in the
IWF ADP. As Respondent correctly submitted, by participating in an IWF competition, the Appellant
entered into a contractual relationship with the Respondent, and, consequently, subjected herself to the
IWF ADP with respect to doping matters’); I v FIA, CAS 2010/A/2268, para 70 (‘It is inconceivable
that an athlete – whatever his age – might take part in an international competition sanctioned by an
international federation without, at the same time, submitting to the sporting rules duly adopted and
duly published (in particular on the internet, as is the case here) by that international federation. Sport
requires for all competitors a level playing field, both in a literal and in a metaphorical sense, without
which it would not be true sport’); Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, paras 98–99
(‘Ms Pechstein has been participating in “international activities” for more than two decades […].
In willingly registering for international skating competitions sanctioned by the ISU, she obviously
expressed her acceptance of ISU rules and regulations, including the ISU ADR. [99]. In the Panel’s
view, anti-doping rules are as necessary to ensure a “level playing field” as, for example, the racing
rules obliging the skaters to change from inner to outer lane and vice versa when they arrive at the
crossing straight. […] When they accede to competition, athletes cannot pick and choose the rules
they like; accordingly, the Panel finds that Ms Pechstein has been at all times during her international
career under an obligation to comply with all ISU regulations, including all applicable anti-doping
rules’); USADA v Reed, CAS 2008/A/1577, para 5 (‘R, by virtue of his membership in USATT and
by participation in the US trials organised by USATT, agreed to be bound by the USOC National
Anti-Doping Policies and, specifically, the USADA Protocol. Accordingly, he submitted to binding
arbitration before the AAA and to appeal any decision of the AAA Panel to CAS’); WADA v
FECNA & Prieto, CAS 2007/A/1284, para 47 (‘[…] competitors generally submit themselves to all
applicable regulations of the relevant competition (including doping rules) by their participation in the
competition’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 68 (‘Concerning the player’s rights as
a minor and as an athlete, the Panel finds that no violations of such rights have been established. In
that connection, the Panel considers that, at the very least, the player became bound by the TADP by
participating in Roland Garros because by her doing so with her father’s consent they both demonstrated
their intention that she be subject to the rights and obligations stemming therefrom […]’); Ohlsson v
WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p 10 (‘Even if there had been no such
registration forms signed by the Appellant we would have been satisfied that the Appellant had agreed
to be subject to the Respondent’s anti-doping regulations and Regulation 21 by virtue of having taken
part in organised rugby within the geographical jurisdiction of the respondent and by taking part in
competitions organised by the Respondent’); CCES v Galle, SDRCC Doping Tribunal decision dated
23 April 2009, p 22 (‘As a member of CABA [the Canadian Amateur Boxing Association], Ms Galle
is bound [by] the CADP by virtue of her participation in sport and there is no requirement for her to
sign a particular document to that effect’); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision
dated 10 March 2015, para 10 (‘A player is deemed to accept the rules of the league in participating in
competition, including the applicable anti-doping rules, so that the principles set out by Mance LJ in
Modahl v British Athletic Federation [2001] EWCA Civ 1447 at paragraph 105 apply so as to create
an implied contract incorporating the Rules’).
This approach has been confirmed by a number of courts in different jurisdictions. For example, in
Modahl v British Athletics Federation [2001] All ER (D) 181, the English Court of Appeal held that by
entering competitions staged under and in accordance with the BAF’s rules, the athlete tacitly entered
into a binding contract with the BAF to abide by those rules, even though she signed no entry form
stating that expressly. (See further para E7.13 and E7.14). Similarly, in Korda v ITF Ltd [1999] All
ER (D) 84, the English High Court found that even though Mr Korda had not expressly agreed (in
writing or orally) to abide by the TADP, such an agreement was ‘plainly to be inferred’ from the facts
and circumstances of the case, including that ‘(a) Mr Korda was when he entered and participated in
the Meeting [the 1998 Wimbledon Championships] a person on whom an obligation was purported
to be imposed by Section (B) [of the Programme]; (b) There is no evidence as to Mr Korda’s state
of knowledge, but Mr Korda concedes that at all times he knew of the existence of the Programme,
though he does not concede that he knew its detailed provisions; […]’. The same is true of the Swiss
courts: see Roberts v FIBA, SFT decision 4P 230/2000, 2001 ASA Bull 523, 7 February 2001; and A v
Parties 693
Association B, SFT decision 5A.805/2014 dated 22 June 2015, para 5.4.3 (’The fact that the appellant
regularly participated in competitions as an elite athlete, without contesting her submission to the
rules of D and B, could be considered a sufficient basis to justify in fact the appellant’s submission
to the federation’s rules, the connection linking the athlete to the federation of which he is not
directly a member is based on a contractual link and not a connection of belonging to an association’)
(unofficial English translation). It is also true of the German courts: see Oberlandesgericht Dresden
(Dresden Appeal Court) decision dated 18 December 2003 (published in SpuRt 2004, p 75 et seq),
where the Appeal Court found that an athlete had submitted to the disciplinary rules of the German
athletics federation (Deutscher Leichtathletik-Verband, (DLV)), and to the jurisdiction of the DLV’s
disciplinary panel, even though he had not signed the annual athlete agreement for the relevant year,
because he had requested an authorisation to compete and it was undisputed that he had participated in
competitions organised by the DLV in that year. The Appeal Court cited (at p 76) a German Supreme
Court decision of 28 January 1994 for the proposition that ‘submission to the rules of the relevant
sports federation is not to be decided solely based on the competitor’s membership, but instead may
arise through participation in an event advertised by the sports federation or the obtaining of a general
authorisation to start or play’ (unofficial English translation).
Nor has the argument that there is no real consent because the athlete has no choice but to accept
the rules obtained any purchase. See eg Hill v NCAA, 1994 7 Cal 4th 1 (Supreme Court of California)
(‘[…] athlete participation is not a government benefit or an economic necessity that society has
decreed must be open to all. […] Participation in any organised activity carried on by a private non-
governmental organization necessarily entails a willingness to forego assertion of individual rights one
might otherwise have in order to receive the benefits of communal associations […]’); Legal Opinion
of Claude Roullier dated 25 October 2005 on Art 10.2 of the World Anti-Doping Code, pp 34–35
(‘Naturally, we cannot ignore the fact that a professional athlete can hardly be said to have any freedom
of choice when, in order to start a career, he or she requests a licence and applies for membership in a
federation. But the consent that is given at that time has to be considered an enlightened consent […]. If
the athlete’s prior acceptance of the sanctions set out in Article 10.2 of the Code can be so characterized
as enlightened consent, it is because the person concerned agrees to become a professional athlete, and
in order to accede to that eminently public role, naturally agrees to abide by the “rules of the game” in
the world he or she is entering, one of the most essential of which is fair play – the practical expression
of the principles of fairness and equality of treatment – which holds it as an imperative that one refrain
from using substances that can distort results. The interests of a loyal athlete can only coincide at that
point with those of the association that will offer him or her the means to demonstrate his or her talent
[…] and ultimately, to make a living from it. This is an ethical rule that must apply to the athlete in a
world where professional solidarity cannot be lacking. Accordingly, in this context of an association,
there is no place for a requirement identical to the one that the constitutional system imposes on the
State where it wishes to restrict personal liberty or economic liberty. On the other hand, standards
of an association that would be comparable to acts of the State infringing upon the essence of those
fundamental rights, such as sanctions that society as a whole would perceive as injurious or degrading,
would clearly not be admissible, in spite of the athlete’s prior acceptance. But experience shows that
this is not the case for suspensions imposed on professional athletes for reasons such as those on which
the Code is based’). See also cases cited at para C4.15.
4 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules, version 2.0, in effect as from 1 October 2019, para 1.2.2. These are the
relevant rules for most anti-doping proceedings brought in the UK: see para A3.121.
5 Ibid, Art 1.2.2: ‘To be a member of the NGB and/or of member or affiliate organisations or licensees of
the NGB, or to be eligible to participate (in the case of an Athlete) or assist any participating Athlete (in
the case of Athlete Support Personnel) in any Event, Competition or other activity organised, convened
or authorised by the NGB or any of its member or affiliate organisations or licensees, a person must
agree to be bound by and to comply with these Rules. Accordingly, by becoming such a member or by
so participating or assisting, an Athlete/Athlete Support Personnel (as applicable) shall be deemed to
have agreed: (a) to be bound by and to comply strictly with these Rules (without prejudice to any other
anti-doping rules applicable to him/her); (b) to submit to the authority of the NGB and of the NADO
to apply, police and enforce these Rules; (c) to provide all requested assistance to the NGB and the
NADO (as applicable) in the application, policing and enforcement of these Rules, including (without
limitation) cooperating fully with any investigation, results management exercise, and/or proceedings
being conducted pursuant to these Rules in relation to any potential Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s);
(d) to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any NADP first instance tribunal convened under these
Rules to hear and determine charges and related issues arising under these Rules; (e) to submit to the
exclusive jurisdiction of any NADP appeal tribunal and/or CAS panel convened under these Rules to
hear and determine appeals made pursuant to these Rules; and (f) further to Article 16, not to bring
any proceedings in any court or other forum that are inconsistent with the foregoing submission to the
jurisdiction of the NADP first instance tribunal, the NADP appeal tribunal and CAS’.
C3.8 The 2015 Code also imposes specific obligations on (and specifies serious
sanctions for non-compliance with those obligations by) many non-athletes,
including coaches, trainers, team doctors, and other ‘Athlete Support Personnel’,1
as well as (in certain cases) other ‘Persons’.2 Where such non-athletes are part of
the team that accompanies the athlete to the competition venue, they may sign terms
of accreditation for the event (or similar document) that expressly require them to
acknowledge their agreement to comply with the anti-doping rules applicable to
the sport. Alternatively, they may be required to obtain a licence from the national
federation to act as athlete support personnel in the sport, which may again include
an express acknowledgement of and submission to the applicable anti-doping rules.3
Even if not, again hearing panels may be happy to find that the coach or doctor or
similar has tacitly agreed to abide by a sport’s anti-doping rules simply by working
in support of athletes participating in the sport.4 However, the more attenuated the
non-athlete’s connection with the sport, the more difficult it may become for the
Anti-Doping Organization to establish to the satisfaction of the hearing panel that the
non-athlete should be deemed to have agreed to comply with the anti-doping rules of
that sport, and to submit to the jurisdiction of the hearing panel to hear and determine
charges that he or she has failed to comply.5
1 The Code defines ‘Athlete Support Personnel’ (App One, p 132) as: ‘Any coach, trainer, manager,
agent, team staff, official, medical, paramedical personnel, parent or any other Person working with,
treating or assisting an Athlete participating in or preparing for sports Competition’. An Athlete
Support Person may be charged with an ADRV under Art 2.5 (Tampering or Attempting Tampering),
Art 2.6 (Possession), Art 2.7 (Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking), Art 2.8 (Administration), Art 2.9
(Complicity or Attempted Complicity), Art 2.10 (Prohibited Association), and (under the 2021 Code)
Art 11 (Retaliation).
2 The Code definition of ‘Trafficking’ (Appendix 1 of the Code) refers to conduct by ‘an Athlete, Athlete
Support Personnel or any other Person subject to the jurisdiction of an Anti-Doping Organization’,
thereby suggesting that an ‘other Person’ may be liable for Trafficking, without explaining who might
be in this third, catch-all category who would not also be in the first two categories. Similarly, Code
Art 2.10 prohibits ‘association by an Athlete or other Person subject to the authority of an Anti-Doping
Organization in a professional or sport-related capacity with any Athlete Support Person who’ is
serving a doping-related ban.
3 Bruyneel v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618,
paras 118, 179 (USADA had anti-doping jurisdiction over Mr Bruyneel from the date he signed his
licence with his national federation, agreeing to be bound by the UCI ADR).
4 Patrugan v Romanian Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2017/A/5209, para 92 (‘[…] the Appellant, in her
own words, treated the athletes while they were in the training camp preparing for the 2015 World
Championships, and that she had received allowances from or on behalf of the RKCF in connection
with the support provided by her. […] [N]either [Romanian law] nor the WADC […] require for a
physician to qualify as “Athlete Support Personnel” that a specific written contract has been entered
into between the relevant sports federation and the physician, nor that the physician in question has
a specific certification in sports medicine’); USADA v Bruyneel and others, AAA Panel decision
dated 7 June 2013, para 36 (set out in full in AAA Panel decision dated 21 April 2014, p 19) (‘Dr
Celaya and Mr Marti are not License-Holders under the UCI ADR. There is no dispute on this point.
Nevertheless, as non-License-Holders, Dr Celaya and Mr Marti are still subject to the UCI ADR
through Article 18(1) and Article 1. As provided above, Article 18(1) states that any person who
“without being a holder of a license, participates in a cycling Event in any capacity whatsoever […]
shall be subject to these Anti-Doping Rules […] as they apply to a License-Holder.” Article 1 confirms
that the UCI ADR “shall also apply to other Persons as provided in article 18.” Here, USADA has
presented substantial evidence […] that Dr Celaya and Mr Marti participated in cycling events as
athlete personnel and accordingly meet the threshold requirements to be categorized in Article 18(1).
The Panel therefore finds that the UCI ADR apply to Dr Celaya and Mr Marti’), upheld on appeal,
Bruyneel v USADA, Marti v USADA, and WADA v Bruyneel et al, CAS 2014/A/3598, 3599 and 3618,
para 285; UK Anti-Doping v Skafidas, NADP Tribunal decision dated 22 February 2016, para 13 (‘So
in 2015 Dr Skafidas did not hold a licence to act as a coach but it is clear from the evidence that in
administering prohibited substances to Bernice Wilson in January or February he was assisting in her
preparation for competition […]’) and paras 14-15 (‘It is not necessary for a coach to be subject to the
UKA ADR that he should hold a valid licence from UKA or participate in events organised by UKA.
15. In acting as Bernice Wilson’s coach, trainer or manager between 2011 and 2015 Dr Skafidas was
bound by the UKA Anti-Doping Rules, and the contraventions alleged in this case fall within the
jurisdiction of this tribunal’); UK Anti-Doping v Philip Tinklin, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 May
2014, paras 5.4 to 5.6 (by transporting his own and other children to WABA events and competitions,
the respondent tacitly agreed to be bound by the anti-doping rules as an ‘athlete support personnel’);
USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 7 (‘Respondent [a coach] was
a registered member of USA Track and Field […]. He actively participated in the IAAF and USATF
events […]. He is the principal in charge of a group of elite distance athletes subject to IAAF and
Parties 695
USATF rules, known as the NOP. He provided athlete support services to many individuals associated
with the NOP during the relevant period. As such, he is an “Athlete Support Person” subject to the
USADA Protocol, the USOPC Anti-Doping Policies, and the Code’); USADA v Brown, AAA Panel
decision dated 30 September 2019, para 4.1 (‘Respondent [a doctor] was a registered member of
USATF, the national governing body for the sport of Track and Field in the United States during the
relevant period. He provided athlete support services to many individuals associated with the NOP
[Nike Oregon Project] during the relevant period. As such, he is an “Athlete Support Person” subject
to the USADA Protocol, the USOPC Anti-Doping Policies, and the Code’).
Similarly, outside the anti-doping context but relevant by analogy nevertheless, in ERC v Williams
et al, Appeal Committee decision dated 1 September 2009, pp 33–36, the tournament rules clearly
imposed obligations not just on players in teams competing in the tournament but also on coaches,
physiotherapists and other support staff working for those teams. The appeal panel rejected an
argument that a team coach and a team physiotherapist were not bound by those rules because they
had not signed a consent form agreeing to be bound, stating: ‘[…] both Mr Richards [the team coach]
and Mr Brennan [the team physiotherapist)] had entered into an implied contract with the [tournament
organiser] ERC on the basis of their conduct by which they submitted to the rules, including the
Disciplinary Rules, of the Tournament as contained in the Participation Agreement. The Appeal
Committee rejected the submission […] that this could only be achieved by an express agreement on
the part of Mr Richards and Mr Brennan. […] It may well be the case that neither Mr Richards nor
Mr Brennan had read the entirety of the Participation Agreement. However, failure on the part of an
individual to read the whole of the Participation Agreement does not mean that they are not bound
by the agreement if they actively and freely participate in the Tournament, operate the rules of the
Tournament, and therefore subject themselves to those rules’.
5 Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697, para 86 (‘A conduct from which one might typically infer
that someone agrees to be bound to the rules is […] if the person participates in the sport. It appears
evident to the Sole Arbitrator that the term “participation in sport” within the above meaning refers to
entering into the “sphere of control” of the sports organisation. […] only a (moral or natural) person
having control over a certain sphere can set up “condition for participation”. This, in case an athlete
participates in a competition organised by a federation the athlete agrees to be bound by the applicable
rules in said competition in turn for being admitted to the federation’s sphere of control. However,
in the case at hand the Appellant [a medical doctor] never participated in any of the competitions
organised and governed by the ITF. The Appellant never entered the Respondent’s “sphere of
control” and never had any connection to or ties with the ITF before the ITF Tribunal exercised
disciplinary authority over her. Once the Appellant entered the ITF’s sphere of control she clearly
and unequivocally contested the ITF Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This, it cannot implicitly be inferred that
the Appellant by participating in the disciplinary proceedings before the ITF Tribunal accepted to be
bound by the respective provisions’) and para 87 (‘The Sole Arbitrator cannot accept Respondent’s
argument that merely by becoming an expert in the field of sports, eg by becoming a more or less
renowned sports physician and treating or advising professional athletes one automatically agrees
to be bound by the TADP. If one were to follow this line of argument, the Appellant – by the mere
fact of becoming a sports physician – would have agreed to be bound by every existing anti-doping
rule of this world. Not only does it appear completely fictitious to deduce such a will from this rather
neutral conduct of the Appellant. In addition, it should be noted that one of the essentialia negotii
of a contract is that the parties are aware of the identity of their contractual partners. If one were to
follow Respondent’s submission not only would the Appellant have entered (tacitly) into submission
agreements with all anti-doping organisations around the world, but also ITF would have executed
– tacitly – contracts with all sports physicians around the world. Such intent, however, cannot be
followed from the Appellant’s conduct and, therefore, the Sole Arbitrator is not willing to accept such
legal construction’). The evidence in that case was that the sports physician advertised her services to
professional sportsmen and women on the basis that she was knowledgeable of the anti-doping rules
of their sport and would ensure that the treatment she gave them would not breach those rules, and she
specifically assured the tennis player in issue in her case that what she was recommending contained
nothing that was prohibited under the tennis rules. The evidence was also that it was agreed that the
sports physician was to be paid in part by a share of the player’s prize money from competing in the
sport. The ITF submitted that these facts showed the sports physician was aware of the tennis anti-
doping rules, including the rules imposing specific obligations on athlete support personnel such as
herself, and in the circumstances should be deemed to have agreed to abide by those rules, particularly
since that was what the player she treated would have expected. The Sole Arbitrator agreed that the
player and the sports physician had made an agreement on those terms, but rejected the suggestion that
‘the Athlete and the Appellant when executing the contract had in mind to confer upon the Respondent
any disciplinary competence with respect to the Appellant’. Ibid, para 92. See also para D3.8 n 4.
C3.9 One of the key lessons learned from the Russian scandal that blew up
after the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games was that the Code needs also to apply to
various actors who could interfere significantly with the integrity of the anti-doping
framework, such as officials and staff members working at international federations,1
NADOs,2 anti-doping laboratories,3 government ministries,4 and so on. The 2021

Code seeks to address this, at least in part. The Introduction specifies that not only
athletes and athlete support personnel but also ‘other Persons (including board
members, directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories,
and Delegated Third Parties and their employees) accept these rules as a condition of
participation or involvement in sport and shall be bound by these rules’. The comment
to that remark states: ‘Where the Code requires a Person other than an Athlete or
Athlete Support Person to be bound by the Code, such Person would of course not
be subject to Sample collection or Testing, and would not be subject to an anti-
doping rule violation under the Code for Use or Possession of a Prohibited Substance
or Prohibited Method. Rather, such Person would only be subject to discipline for
a violation of Code Arts 2.5 (Tampering), 2.7 (Trafficking), 2.8 (Administration),
2.9 (Complicity), 2.10 (Prohibited Association) and 2.11 (Retaliation). Furthermore,
such Person would be subject to the additional roles and responsibilities according
to Article 21.3. Also, the obligation to require an employee to be bound by the Code
is subject to applicable law’. Article 20 of the 2021 Code puts an obligation on Code
Signatories:
‘subject to applicable law, as a condition of such position or involvement, to require
all of its board members, directors, officers, and those employees (and those of
appointed Delegated Third Parties), who are involved in any aspect of Doping
Control, to agree to be bound by anti-doping rules as Persons in conformity with the
Code for direct and intentional misconduct, or to be bound by comparable rules and
regulations put in place by the Signatory’.
1 For example, IAAF President Lamine Diack and IBU President Anders Besseberg were both accused
of accepting bribes from Russia to bury or at least delay the prosecution of anti-doping charges against
Russian athletes: WADA Independent Commission report dated 14 January 2016; ‘Biathlon president
steps down after police raid in Austria’, AP News, 12 April 2018.
2 For example, officials at the Russian NADO, RUSADA, were found to have been involved in the
scheme to dope athletes and corrupt the drug-testing system to cover up evidence of that doping:
WADA Independent Commission report dated 9 November 2015, Chapter 12.
3 Dr Grigory Rodchenkov, the director of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory, masterminded the cover-
up of the doping of Russian athletes by burying positive test results for samples analysed at the
laboratory between 2012 and 2015 and by swapping ‘dirty’ samples for ‘clean’ ones at the 2014 Sochi
Olympic Games, albeit that he subsequently turned whistle-blower and exposed the entire conspiracy,
which he said was sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Sport: Report of Richard H. McLaren of
Investigation into Sochi Allegations, 9 December 2016.
4 Dr Rodchenkov accused Russian Minister of Sport Vitaly Mutko and Deputy Minister of Sport Yuri
Nagornykh of directing the organised scheme of doping and protection from exposure of Russian
athletes. The IOC’s Schmid Commission accepted that Nagornykh was directly involved, but ruled that
there was no evidence that Minister Mutko was directly involved, albeit that he was held responsible
for the actions of his officials. Schmid Commision Report to the IOC Executive Board, 2 December
2017. The IOC’s subsequent decision to ban Minister Mutko from attending the Olympics for life was
overturned by the CAS because there was no basis in the IOC’s rules to impose such a sanction. See
para B1.22.
CHAPTER C4
Preliminary Considerations in
Bringing and Defending a Charge
Contents
. para
1 GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE................................................................ C4.7
PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING RULE
VIOLATION........................................................................................................ C4.11
A Jurisdictional and procedural issues............................................................. C4.12
B Could the athlete be eligible for a retroactive TUE?.................................... C4.21
C Should the charge be dismissed due to delay or other unfairness?.............. C4.22
D If a provisional suspension is imposed pending resolution of the charge,
should the athlete or other person contest it?............................................... C4.25
E Should the athlete request confirmatory analysis of the B sample?............. C4.31
F Responding to the charge on the merits....................................................... C4.35
G Negotiating a consensual settlement of the charge...................................... C4.46
C4.1 Being accused of an anti-doping violation is not only enormously stressful

and expensive for an athlete; it will also be very damaging to his reputation, even if
eventually the charges are all dismissed. And in the meantime, the athlete may also
be provisionally suspended from competition,1 which could mean he misses out on
the Olympic Games, or a World Cup Final, or some other irreplaceable opportunity.
Therefore, the Anti-Doping Organization needs to satisfy itself, before it charges an
athlete with an anti-doping rule violation, that the athlete has a clear case to answer
on the evidence before it. That evidence must be competent,2 credible, and sufficient
if accepted by the hearing panel,3 to prove each element of the violation(s) charged4
to the rigorous ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof required under the Code,5
bearing in mind that the more serious the alleged misconduct is, the stronger the
hearing panel will require the evidence to be.6
1 See para C4.25.
2 In Modahl the Court of Appeal suggested that the assessment that there is a case to answer under
anti-doping rules may be based on evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law: Modahl
v BAF Ltd (28 July 1997, unreported), CA (Lord Justice Morritt). That is consistent with the fact that
the panel hearing an anti-doping case is not required to apply strict judicial rules as to admissibility of
evidence. Rather, it must simply decide whether the evidence is ‘reliable’. See para C5.5.
3 Cf R v Galbraith, 1 WLR 1039 (CA) (no case for a criminal defendant to answer if there is no evidence
that he has committed the crime alleged or if the evidence is tenuous and taken at its highest would not
be enough to found a conviction; but if the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s case depends on
the credibility of a witness or other matters generally within the province of a jury, and on one possible
view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly convict, then there is a case to
answer that should be submitted to the jury).
4 These are identified and discussed at Chapters C6 to C15.
5 Code Art 3.1, discussed at para C5.1.
6 See para C5.2.
C4.2 The most common, and usually1 straightforward, case is one based on an
‘adverse analytical finding’ reported by a WADA-accredited anti-doping laboratory
that a prohibited substance (or its metabolite or marker) is present in a urine sample
provided by an athlete. For example, a urine sample undergoes a number of screening
tests in the form of instrumental analysis, usually immunoassay or gas chromatography,

followed by confirmation of any positive findings by mass spectrometry analysis.2 After
a review by at least two certifying scientists, an adverse analytical finding is reported.3
The International Standard for Laboratories and related Technical Documents specify
exactly what the documentation pack reporting the adverse analytical finding must
contain.4 Given that an Art 2.1 ‘presence’ ADRV requires only proof of the presence of
the prohibited substance in the sample, and does not require proof of how it got there,
or of the athlete’s knowledge or intent, or that it enhanced the athlete’s performance,5
receipt of that laboratory documentation package, together with proof of the chain
of custody of the athlete’s sample from collection until delivery to the laboratory,
constitutes good prima facie evidence of a case to answer.
1 On occasion, cases based on adverse analytical findings can be anything but straightforward,
particularly if the analytical methods used by the laboratory are new or untested (see para C6.22 et
seq) and/or the substance in question is also produced naturally and the evidence that the substance in
the athlete’s sample is synthetic is not analytical but rather inferential (see paras C6.52 and C6.54). It
is therefore not uncommon for the Anti-Doping Organization to need expert assistance at the earliest
stages, to make a proper assessment of whether or not sufficiently reliable evidence exists of an anti-
doping rule violation for a case to be brought.
2 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.6. For a detailed account of the analytical process using gas chromatography and
mass spectrometry, see eg Gasser v Stinson (15 June 1998, unreported), QBD (Scott J); USADA v
Landis, AAA Case No: 30 190 00847 06, decision dated 20 September 2007, para 102 et seq; and
USADA v Jenkins, AAA Case No. 30 190 00199 07, decision dated 25 January 2008, para 37. See also
USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA-CAS No 30 190 00686 04, decision dated 9 December 2004 (discussing
analytical techniques for detection of EPO); Sheppard v CCES, SDRCC DT-05-0028, decision dated
12 September 2005 (same). See further the CAS cases discussed at para C6.25. See generally Prof Dr
J Segura, ‘Doping Control in Sports Medicine’ (1996) 18(4) Ther Drug Monit; D Catlin et al, ‘Testing
Urine for Drugs’ (1992) 207 Clinica Chimica Acta S13-S26; Donike, ‘Laboratory Procedures’, paper
presented at the IAAF’s First World Anti-Doping Seminar, Germany, March 1994.
3 ISL Arts 5.3.5.1.2. See generally Prof D Cowan, ‘When is a positive finding a doping offence?’
UK Sport Seminar, ‘Tackling Ethical Issues in Drugs and Sport’ (October 1996).
4 ISL Art 5.3.5.2.1 and the WADA Technical Document on Laboratory Documentation Packages,
TD2019LDOC.
5 See para C6.1.
C4.3 Code Art 7.1 requires the evidence supporting the adverse analytical finding
to be reviewed prior to charge to ensure that:
(a) there is no therapeutic use exemption (TUE) on file for the substance found in
the sample;1 and
(b) there have been no departures from the procedures set out in the International
Standard for Testing & Investigations or in the International Standard for
Laboratories that might have caused the adverse analytical finding.2
In athlete biological passport cases, there are also detailed requirements for review
of the evidence by a panel of experts, including giving the athlete an opportunity
to comment on any suspicious readings and having the experts consider those
comments, before any charges are filed.3 Similarly, in Art 2.4 cases (whereabouts
violations), the International Standard for Testing & Investigations requires that an
athlete be given a chance to comment on the evidence before any ‘filing failure’ or
‘missed test’ is declared.4 In other cases involving non-analytical evidence, Code Art
7.7 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to ‘conduct any follow-up investigation as
may be required under applicable anti-doping policies and rules adopted pursuant to
the Code or which the Anti-Doping Organization otherwise considers appropriate’.5
Subject to those basic principles, however, the Code leaves it to Anti-Doping
Organizations to determine how to manage results.6 Arguments that departures from
the applicable results management procedures mandate dismissal of a charge have
been given short shrift by hearing panels.7
1 The criteria for granting a TUE are set out in Art 4 of WADA’s International Standard for Therapeutic
Use Exemptions.
Preliminary Considerations in Bringing and Defending a Charge 699
2 See paras C6.6 and C6.22. For example, UK Anti-Doping retains independent scientific experts to
review every laboratory documentation package for possible departures from the procedures set out
in the International Standard for Laboratories that might have caused the adverse analytical finding
reported by the laboratory before charging an athlete based on that report.
4 International Standard for Testing & Investigations (March 2019), Annex A, Art I.5.2(d).
5 If there is a dispute as to the facts, then unless the evidence is clear-cut one way or the other, the dispute
is likely to have to be submitted to the hearing panel for resolution. Sometimes, however, it will not
be a question of disputed fact but instead a judgment call, eg does the excuse offered for an admitted
failure to provide a sample amount to ‘compelling justification’ under Code Art 2.3? (See para C8.4).
Again, this is something that the Anti-Doping Organization may conclude should be submitted to the
hearing panel to decide, in which case it should proceed to charge the athlete with the anti-doping rule
violation in question.
6 See comment to Code Art 7 (‘Various Signatories have created their own approaches to results
management. While the various approaches have not been entirely uniform, many have proven to be
fair and effective systems for results management. The Code does not supplant each of the Signatories’
results management systems. This Article does, however, specify basic principles in order to ensure the
fundamental fairness of the results management process which must be observed by each Signatory.
The specific anti-doping rules of each Signatory shall be consistent with these basic principles’).
7 For example, in Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, the CAS panel rejected the athlete’s argument that
the charge against him should be dismissed because the original charge alleged that the metabolite
found in his system came from DHCMT, and it was only an amended charge that alleged that it
could have come from other (also prohibited) parent substances (‘125. The Panel finds no prohibition
either in principle or the applicable rules against the ITF amending its charge. This is all the more
true considering that the amendment occurred well before the hearing of the ITF Independent
Tribunal took place. There is no evidence put before the Panel establishing that the Athlete’s case
was prejudiced by this amendment. Indeed, as the ITF notes, this amendment appears prompted
by the Athlete’s written submission that the M4 metabolite could have come from a substance
other than DHCMT’), and it also rejected the athlete’s argument that the amended charge should
be dismissed because it had not been submitted to an independent review board for review, as the
applicable anti-doping rules allegedly required (‘126. Moreover, contrary to the Athlete’s assertion,
the Panel agrees with the ITF that there is no requirement under TADP Articles 7.3 and 8.1.1 that
the Review Board approve a subsequent charge or any amendment to that charge. Nevertheless, and
at best, the ITF’s failure to seek a re-review by the Review Board for such amendment is minor
and following TADP Article 8.7.4, such technical departure of the TADP would not invalidate the
amended charge. In conclusion the Panel finds that there are no procedural impediments to preclude
this Panel from establishing an ADRV’). Similarly, in Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal
decision dated 6 January 2009, p12, the hearing panel held that the WRU’s failure to carry out the
preliminary review required by its regulations caused no prejudice to the athlete, because it did not
invalidate or cast any doubt on the analytical results from the laboratory on which the charge of an
anti-doping rule violation was based. See also UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, para 32b (failure
to issue summons to athlete by deadline specified in UCI rules did not entitle athlete to relief: ‘This
Panel concludes that Ullrich did not suffer prejudice in this regard, not least because he was fully
aware of the UCI’s investigation at the time, in particular by reason of his dismissal from his team
for suspicion of involvement in Operation Puerto. There is no evidence that Ullrich’s ability to mount
a defence has not [sic] been compromised, and Ullrich’s procedural objections to the UCI Rules have
not featured any factual allegation that his ability to put forward any facts or arguments or otherwise
mount his defence has been compromised’); ITF v Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
4 April 2005, paras 59, 61–62 (‘The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the athlete] should have been
notified of the adverse test result by about the last week of August 2004. It does not follow that the
entire charge should be dismissed. The Tribunal, having heard and weighed all the evidence, does
not accept that the player suffered any real rather than theoretical prejudice through lapse of time’);
USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 26 (permitting USADA to
add further charge because doing so would not cause ‘substantial prejudice’ to the respondent). Cf
USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 5.17 (‘The Panel believes that it
is important to strictly enforce Rule R-5 [requiring panel’s permission for any amendment to charge
letter] to ensure that an athlete has timely, clear notice of the specific anti-doping charges against
him in order to adequately defend himself against USADA’s allegations, particularly when a lifetime
suspension and retroactive invalidation of competition results are sought. Doing so potentially helps
to foster settlement (thereby avoiding formal adjudication) by clearly informing an athlete in writing
of the precise claims USADA seeks to prosecute’)’.
C4.4 As a general rule, in the case of an adverse analytical finding, the athlete
does not have a right at the review stage to make any submissions. Indeed, he is
not likely even to be aware that the review is taking place. Theoretically, however,
there could be cases where information is required from the athlete at this stage
in order to complete the review, in which case the athlete might be contacted. For
example, if the substance found in the athlete’s sample is one that might have been
used therapeutically, and the applicable rules provide that an athlete may apply for
a TUE retroactively, ie after being tested,1 then the Anti-Doping Organization will
have to find out whether the athlete was indeed using the substance therapeutically
and (if so) give him an opportunity to apply for a TUE, which (if granted) would end
the matter.2
1 For example, the Code suggests that a NADO may permit a recreational-level athlete not to get a
TUE in advance of competition; instead he would only need to apply retroactively if tested at
the competition. (See Code App 1, p 131, comment to definition of ‘Athlete’). Cf WTC v Moats,
AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012 (rules were clear that masters-level athlete who used
testosterone therapeutically committed an anti-doping rule violation by competing without obtaining
a TUE in advance, but his sanction was reduced under Art 10.5.2 because WTC had issued pre-race
documentation that suggested masters-level athlete could obtain TUE retroactively).
2 On occasion, involvement of the athlete at the review stage has led to unwelcome consequences for
both the regulatory body and the athlete, particularly if the decision as to whether or not there is a
basis for charge is drawn out as a result of the complexity of the investigation and dialogue. Chris
Froome had an atypical salbutamol reading at the 2017 Vuelta, and the UCI was still in dialogue
with him and had not made a decision as to whether to charge him by the time the run up to the 2018
Tour de France started. The Tour organisers threatened to exclude him from the race on the basis that
he was under suspicion, but the UCI was able to reach a conclusion before the race that the finding
was within the bounds of the rider’s therapeutic use of the asthma medication. See wada-ama.org/
en/media/news/2018-07/wada-will-not-appeal-uci-decision-in-christopher-froome-case, 2 July 2018
[accessed 6 December 2020],
C4.5 If the substance found in the athlete’s sample is one that could have been
produced naturally in the body, the finding will be classified as ‘Atypical’ rather than
‘Adverse’, and a further investigation is required to determine whether the substance
found was produced by the body naturally (ie whether it is an ‘endogenous’ substance)
or else added from the outside (ie it is an ‘exogenous’ substance);1 or to determine
whether it falls within the parameters of cases caused by meat contamination.2 If it
is concluded, as a result of that investigation, that the substance is endogenous, or
caused by meat contamination, there is no case to answer. If it is concluded that the
substance is or may be exogenous, or does not fall within the parameters specified
for a meat contamination case, the finding is treated as an adverse analytical finding
and progressed accordingly.
1 For a discussion of the form of the investigation in such cases, see para C6.40 et seq. The athlete must
cooperate with that investigation or face sanctions for misconduct under his sport’s general disciplinary
rules, or (in appropriate cases) for an anti-doping rule violation under Code Art 2.3 (refusal or failure
to submit to sample collection).
2 WADA Stakeholder Notice regarding Meat Contamination, 30 May 2019 (wada-ama.org/sites/default/
files/resources/files/2019-05-30-meat_contamination_notice_final.pdf [accessed 2 November 2020]).
The notice refers to the possibility that meat farmed in Mexico, China, or Guatemala might contain
clenbuterol. It says that WADA will update the notice if other prohibited substances are identified as
meat contaminants.
C4.6 There are two possible findings as a result of the review of an adverse
analytical finding:
(1) If there is a valid TUE that covers the adverse analytical finding in question,
or the adverse finding was caused by a departure from either the International
Standard for Testing & Investigations or the International Standard for
Laboratories, there is no case to answer and no disciplinary action will be taken
based on that finding.1
(2) If there is no valid TUE to cover the adverse analytical finding, and nor is
there any departure from the applicable Standards that could have caused the
adverse analytical finding, the athlete should be charged with an anti-doping
rule violation under Code Art 2.1 (for having a prohibited substance present in
his sample).2
The review of non-analytical evidence of an anti-doping rule violation may be more

involved, depending on the nature and scope of the facts likely to be in dispute,
but the options on conclusion of the review are the same: charge the athlete/athlete
support personnel, or not.
1 See Art 7.3.4 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules. This is subject to the fact that several parties will
have the right to appeal to CAS against the decision that there is no case to answer: see Code Art 13.2.
2 See Art 7.3.5 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘If pursuant to Article 7.3.3 UKAD determines that
there is neither a valid and applicable TUE with which the Adverse Analytical Finding is consistent,
nor a departure from either the ISTI or the ISL that caused the Adverse Analytical Finding, and nor
is it apparent that the Prohibited Substance was ingested by a permitted route, UKAD shall send the
Athlete a Notice of Charge in accordance with Article 7.8’.
1 GIVING NOTICE OF THE CHARGE
C4.7 The Anti-Doping Organization’s rules should provide for the athlete or other
person to receive proper details of the charge against him1 (including particulars of
the facts relied upon to support the charge2), of the procedure that will be followed
in determining the charge, and of the possible sanctions if the charge is upheld. The
Anti-Doping Organization will not be able to pursue charges at a hearing that it
cannot prove were duly notified to the athlete or other person, along with the facts
relied on in support of the charge, so that he has due notice of the case brought
against him.3 To ensure transparency and accountability, the charge letter will be
copied at the same time to WADA and those other parties that have a right of appeal
under the Code4 (but those parties must maintain strict confidentiality unless and
until the charge is upheld5).
1 That is the defendant’s right under English law: see paras D1.85 and E7.64.
2 See eg Art 7.8.1(b) of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘[The Notice of Charge should include] a
summary of the facts and evidence relied upon’.
3 See eg USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 5.17 (‘The Panel believes
that it is important to strictly enforce Rule R-5 [requiring panel’s permission for any amendment
to charge letter] to ensure that an athlete has timely, clear notice of the specific anti-doping charges
against him in order to adequately defend himself against USADA’s allegations, particularly when a
lifetime suspension and retroactive invalidation of competition results are sought. Doing so potentially
helps to foster settlement (thereby avoiding formal adjudication) by clearly informing an athlete in
writing of the precise claims USADA seeks to prosecute’); but cf cases referenced at para C4.3 n 7.
C4.8 The notice of charge will also need to advise the athlete if he is being
provisionally suspended pending determination of the charge1 and (in Article 2.1
‘presence’ cases) of his right to have his B sample analysed to confirm (or not
confirm) the adverse analytical finding reported in respect of his A sample.2
1 See para C4.25.
2 Code Art 7.3. See para C4.31.
C4.9 In addition, the Anti-Doping Organization is well advised to flag up to the

athlete in the charge letter the benefits of an early admission,1 and (in the context of
explaining the potential sanctions under the Code for the anti-doping rule violation(s)
charged) the possibility of agreeing an outcome without a hearing.2 In that context,
the Anti-Doping Organization may want to highlight in particular Code Art 10.6.1,
which allows suspension of a period of ineligibility in return for the athlete’s provision
of ‘Substantial Assistance’.3
1 In terms of potentially avoiding a four-year ban for presence or refusal (see para C17.1) or enabling the
start of the ban to be back-dated (see para C22.12).
2 See para C4.47.
3 See para C21.2.
C4.10 Having sent the notice, the Anti-Doping Organization is justified in pushing
for a determination of the charges as quickly as possible. For example, Mr Justice
Lightman said in Korda v ITF1 that:
‘a tight timetable designed to secure an expeditious procedure for the final
determination of charges of doping offences […] [is] plainly necessary for the proper
conduct of the sport of tennis, to ensure public confidence in its administration and
to safeguard the interests of players. Any sustained period of uncertainty as to the
outcome of proceedings whilst they take their course is likely to be highly damaging
to all concerned.’
For example, Art 7.8.1 of the 2019 Rules of the UK’s National Anti-Doping Panel
provide that the hearing should be held within 40 days of receipt of the request for
arbitration, ‘save where fairness requires, or the parties otherwise agree’.2 If the
athlete is subject to an interim suspension pending such determination,3 then he will
presumably also want the matter to be resolved without delay. In fact, Art 7.4.3 of the
Code gives him the right to an expedited hearing, as does Art 6.5 of the 2019 Rules
of the National Anti-Doping Panel.
1 Korda v ITF [1999] All ER (D) 84, QBD (Lightman J), cited with approval by the Court of Appeal
in that case: [1999] All ER (D) 337, CA. See also Bray v New Zealand Sports Drug Agency [2001]
2 NZLR 160, 166 (NZCA), which notes ‘the public policy concern that, in the interest of those tested,
those that may be competing against before the test results are known and the wider public interest in
encouraging drug free sport, the processes under the sports drug testing regime be carried out without
any undue delay’.
2 This reflects the fact that while justice delayed may be justice denied, not least if the athlete is
suspended in the meantime, the point will always be to endure that justice is done, which may include
ensuring that the athlete has a proper opportunity to prepare their case.

PERSON WHO HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH AN ANTI-DOPING
RULE VIOLATION
C4.11 A lawyer instructed to defend an athlete or other person who has been
charged with an anti-doping violation is likely to have to address a number of separate
but related issues in very short order, in particular where the charge is based on an
adverse analytical finding made in respect of a sample collected from his athlete
client (because of the urgent questions of B sample analysis and potential provisional
suspension). In particular, the lawyer will need to consider as a matter of urgency:1
(a) jurisdictional and procedural issues (who is bringing the proceedings, under
what rules, what law governs, and who will be adjudicating?);
(b) whether the athlete might be eligible for a retroactive TUE for the substance
found in his sample or in his possession;
(c) limitation and delay/fairness issues (are the proceedings time-barred, or has
there otherwise been delay or other unfairness such as to preclude them?);
(d) whether to contest any provisional suspension that has been or is proposed
to be imposed (or else whether to have his client voluntarily suspend himself
pending determination of the charge);
(e) how to respond to the invitation to have the athlete’s B sample analysed;
(f) how to respond to the charge on the merits; and
(g) whether to seek to negotiate a consensual settlement of the charge with the
Anti-Doping Organization.
Each of these issues is considered in turn below.
1 Each of which will be informed by a prior understanding from the athlete of how the prohibited
substance came to be in the athlete’s sample, so far as is possible. Most often the lawyer is confronted
with the instruction that the athlete does not know how the substance came to be there, in which
case the investigation and the consideration of these matters will be informed by the possible need
to establish contamination or error in sampling or testing. But if the athlete accepts ingestion, the
approach to these matters may be different.
A Jurisdictional and procedural issues
C4.12 To avoid any argument that an objection as to jurisdiction or law or procedure

has been waived by a delay in raising it, the athlete’s lawyer will want to establish a
number of points as quickly as possible.
C4.13 First, what anti-doping rules is the athlete charged with infringing?1 Is the
athlete or other person bound by those rules?2
1 An athlete cannot be charged with violating the World Anti-Doping Code itself, because the Code
is not itself a set of rules binding on athletes. Instead, it is the responsibility of the international
federation, NADO/national federation, event organiser, or other Anti-Doping Organization to put in
place binding anti-doping rules that implement the mandatory provisions of the Code in the sport
or event in question (see para C2.21), and it is those anti-doping rules that determine the rights and
obligations of the participants in the sport or event. See eg Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 872
(‘[…] the WADC is not a law but simply an instrument of a private organisation, the implementation
of which into another body’s regulations requires a contractual agreement to this effect’); Overvliet
v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675, para 7.5 (‘To become applicable, the WADA Code must be accepted and
implemented according to the Signatory’s authority and within its relevant spheres of responsibility.
In other words, the WADA Code and its provisions need to be transformed into the regulations of a
Signatory to become applicable’, citing Code Article 23) and para 7.6 (‘The WADA Code is not self-
executing and applicable by substitution. In order to be applicable, wholly or in part, the applicable
Code provisions must be implemented into the Signatory’s own regulations’); WADA & FIFA v CFA,
Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 131 (‘[…] the fact that FIFA is a
signatory to the WADC does not mean that the WADC applies between FIFA and its affiliates. As made
clear by the Introduction to the WADC (both in its 2003 and 2009 versions), in order to be applied,
the provisions of the WADC require implementation in the rules of the relevant organisation. Indeed,
the WADC can be used to help with interpretation, where the content of the FIFA rules is equivalent
to the WADC: however, it is not possible to have recourse to the WADC to alter or amend the FIFA
provisions where their content is not equivalent to the WADC’); Gatlin v USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461,
pp 7–8 (‘The WADA Code does not apply as between a signatory organisation and its members, unless
the signatory organisation has expressly incorporated the WADA Code into its own relevant rules.
Even though some provisions of the WADA Code have been incorporated into the 2006 IAAF Rules,
the WADA Code as a whole has not been expressly incorporated. Therefore, the WADA Code is
not directly applicable to this case’); IBU v Yaroshenko, IBU Doping Hearing Panel decision dated
11 August 2009, para 48 (‘[…] the WADA Code is not directly applicable to athletes in a particular
case. Therefore, the rules and regulations of the IBU which are adopted in order to implement the
WADA Code, ie IBU’s ADR, in particular, apply exclusively’).
As a result, if the rules and regulations of the sports body bringing the anti-doping case do not
properly incorporate the Code, the athlete or other person cannot be sanctioned based on the Code
but instead can only be sanctioned based on the anti-doping provisions that have been incorporated
into those rules and regulations; Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452
(decision imposing sanction for use of prohibited method vacated where League had not fully
implemented Code provisions prohibiting such use). By the same token, however, if the international
federation’s rules impose a greater sanction than the Code mandates, the international federation
may be in breach of its duty as a signatory to the Code to implement the Code’s sanction provisions
without amendment (see Code Art 23.2.2, USOC v IOC, CAS 2011/O/2422, and BOA v WADA,
CAS 2011/A/2658, discussed at B2.18 et weq), but that does not make the greater sanction any less
enforceable as against the athlete. See Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 99 (‘[…] the sheer fact
that the WADC differs from the IWF ADR has no impact on the – distinct – legal relationship between
the Appellant and Respondent. The autonomy of Respondent in relation to Appellant is, therefore, not
restricted by any contractual engagements entered into by IWF vis-à-vis third parties’). However, the
CAS panel in Liao Hui arrived at the same result by finding that ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping
Rules should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the four-year ban stipulated in those rules ‘read
down’ to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World Anti-Doping Code. Ibid, 107. See also
IAAF v Hellebuyck, CAS 2005/A/831, para 7.3.4.2 (‘The fact that the Appellant is a “signatory” to the
WADC does not mean that the WADC applies as between the Appellant and the athletes affiliated to
it. The Introduction to the WADC specifies that the WADC can apply in the relationship to the athletes
only if the provisions of the WADC have been “incorporated into the rules of the relevant Anti-Doping
Organization”. Of course, it does not follow from this that the WADC has no relevance whatsoever
in the relationship between the Appellant and the athletes affiliated to it. In certain circumstances the
WADC can be used to help with interpretation when the content of the IAAF Rules is equivalent to
the WADC. The limits of an explanatory or supplemental interpretation are, however, exceeded if, by
having recourse to the provisions of the WADC, the content of the IAAF Rules is altered or its meaning
reversed’) and para 7.3.4.3 (‘In the present case the Appellant did not adopt the exact same wording of
the provision in Art 10.8 WADC in their Rules. Whether the Appellant thereby breached an obligation
in relation to WADA can be left unanswered in this case. Even if this were the case, the Panel cannot
override the expressed will of the Appellant. Instead the Panel is bound by the content of the properly
established IAAF Rules’).
The CAS sole arbitrator in IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 78, took a different
view: ‘Considering that Article 10.8 of the World Anti-Doping Code 2009 […], in force at the relevant
time, included a fairness exception, that this provision was a part of the obligatory commitment of
the IAAF as signatory to the WADC according to Article 23.2.2 WADC and that the IAAF was not
allowed to include any substantial change to this provision, the Sole Arbitrator sees an obligation to
understand Rule 40.8 IAAF Rules 2012-2013 harmoniously with Article 10.8 WADC. For whatever
reason, the fairness exception was not mentioned explicitly in the IAAF Rules 2012-2013, but had
nevertheless to be applied based on IAAF’s commitment to Article 10.8 WADC. In a case where the
WADC did not allow for any substantial deviation of the IAAF Rules from the WADC, the provision
of Rule 47.5 IAAF Rules 2012-2013, otherwise providing that “in case of conflict between these
Anti-Doping Rules and the Code, these Anti-Doping Rules shall apply” is not applicable’). See also
FINA v Tagliaferri, CAS 2008/A/1471 and CAS 2008/A/1486, para 9.1.1 (where anti-doping rules
were intended to implement the Code, but had a different effect because of an error in translation, the
rules should be applied as if they accurately implemented the Code).
2 The answer is likely to be that he is bound, either because he explicitly agreed to be bound by those
rules or because his participation in the sport is deemed tacit agreement to be bound by all applicable
rules (see para C2.17).
An athlete can always retire, and so no longer be subject to the rules, in which case he could not
be held liable under those rules for anything he does after his retirement is effective. See eg Manjeet
Kaur, NADA Disciplinary Panel decision dated 11 June 2012 (athlete found to have retired from
active sport prior to attempt to test her, so that she was not subject to the anti-doping rules at that point,
and therefore was not liable for her refusal to submit to sample collection). However, the applicable
rules may require specific notice of retirement to be given (eg Art 1.4.1 of the UK Anti-Doping
Rules provides that an athlete in the National Registered Testing Pool or Domestic Pool must give
UK Anti-Doping written notice of retirement), and hearing panels have been firm in rejecting claims of
retirement from athletes who cannot show that they clearly and unambiguously retired from the sport
(including complying with any applicable notice provisions) before the alleged violation took place.
UK Anti-Doping v Canaveral, NADP decision dated 7 October 2019, para 28 (rejecting claim athlete
had retired before he was notified he had to provide a sample, due to lack of evidence he communicated
any intent to retire to any governing body: ‘there clearly must be evidence of at least some form of
communication from Mr Canaveral to some organisation connected with the governance of the sport
of Weightlifting in relation to retirement for him to be deemed to have retired for the purpose of
Article 1.4.1 of the ADR’); UK Anti-Doping v Colclough, NADP Tribunal decision dated 30 January
2014, para 42 (same); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2015,
para 12 (‘[…] the application of the Rules cannot depend on the subjective intention of the athlete,
nor the extent to which he is actively participating in the sport at the time when he is required to give
a sample. […] There is no provision in the Rules that the testing regime terminates when a player
ceases actively to participate in matches. On the contrary, Article 1.4.1 states that the athlete continues
to be bound by and required to comply with the Rules unless and until he has given written notice of
retirement to the national governing body. […] The fact that he was not under contract to play any
further games that season, or for the following season, did not relieve him from his duty to submit
to out-of-competition testing’); USADA v Davis, AAA Panel decision dated 15 April 2014, para 3.16
(rejecting athlete’s claim that he had retired and so was no longer required to provide whereabouts
information, where he had announced that he was going to retire but ‘failed to follow through on his
announcement by notifying USADA or USATF of his retirement and failed to act in a manner that is
fully consistent with that of a retired USATF registered athlete’); DFSNZ v Newman, Sports Tribunal
of New Zealand decision dated 31 January 2012, para 15 (rejecting claim athlete had retired prior
to refusing to submit to test); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP decision dated 7 June 2011, paras
3.4.12-3.4.23 (rejecting claim athlete had retired before providing sample that tested positive, because
he did not send his governing body formal notice of retirement, as was required under the rules to
remove him from its anti-doping jurisdiction); FINA v Aleshin, FINA Doping Panel decision No.
09/10 (athlete’s presentation of retirement form did not relieve him of the obligation to make timely
whereabouts filings prior to that date); USADA v Mortenson, AAA Panel decision dated 25 September
2006, para 26 (‘In this case, Mr Mortenson made no gestures towards retirement; he simply stopped
complying with the [whereabouts] requirements’). An Anti-Doping Organization retains jurisdiction
to seek sanctions against a retired athlete for ADRVs that he committed prior to such retirement. See
Code Art 7.11 and UCI v Ulrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, paras 50-57 (rejecting athlete’s argument that he
cannot be subjected to discipline by a member association after he has resigned as a member).
C4.14 Do the rules that are said to apply give the Anti-Doping Organization
authority to bring the case against the athlete, or does results management authority
lie with another party?1
1 See paras C2.17 to C2.20.
C4.15 Are there errors, omissions or ambiguities in the rules that could be
exploited? In particular, do the rules actually prohibit the conduct that the athlete is
charged with committing? The doctrine of legal certainty prohibits punishment for
particular conduct unless the rules in place at the time of the conduct clearly state that
such conduct is prohibited and that any transgression will attract a sanction.1 As the
CAS panel stated in the seminal Quigley decision:
‘The fight against doping is arduous, and it may require strict rules. But the rule-
makers and the rule-appliers must begin by being strict with themselves. Regulations
that may affect the careers of dedicated athletes must be predictable. […] Athletes
and officials should not be confronted with a thicket of mutually qualifying or even
contradictory rules that can be understood only on the basis of the de facto practice
over the course of many years of a small group of insiders’.2
If there is any ambiguity in the rules, the CAS jurisprudence is clear that it should
be interpreted contra proferentem, ie against the Anti-Doping Organization and in
favour of the athlete.3
1 This doctrine applies with full force in the anti-doping context: CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 17 (‘In
sport, like all other areas of society, any disciplinary measure on sanction requires a legal basis’) and
para 44 (‘[…] based on the WADC, […] a sanction is possible if there is an anti-doping rule violation;
absent any such anti-doping rule violation, the WADC does not provide for any possible sanction’).
Such an omission was more likely in pre-Code days, when the various sports all followed their own
(different) anti-doping rules. For example, in USA Shooting & Quigley v Union Internationale de
Tir, CAS 94/129, the UIT accepted that the athlete had not intended to use the drug found in his
system to gain a performance advantage, but said athletes should be held strictly liable for the presence
of prohibited substances in their system. The CAS panel accepted that such an approach might be
appropriate in principle, but ‘the fact that the Panel has sympathy for the principle of a strict liability
rule obviously does not allow the Panel to create such a rule where it does not exist. […] The UIT
had the right to punish Q. only on the basis of rules in force’ (paras 21, 22). Furthermore, given the
stringent nature of a strict liability rule, ‘if such a standard is to be applied, it must be clearly articulated’
(para 17). The UIT rules in place at the time the athlete’s sample was collected did not satisfy that
test; to the contrary, they provided that ‘Doping means the use of one or more substances mentioned
in the official UIT Anti-Doping List with the aim of attaining an increase in performance’. Nor did
any other provisions overrule this clear requirement of intent to gain a performance advantage. As a
result, ‘the UIT had no legal basis for the sanctions it pronounced against the Appellants. The sanctions
must therefore be reversed’ (para 35). Similarly, in Rebagliati v IOC, CAS OG/98/002, para 26, a CAS
panel dismissed the anti-doping charges brought by the IOC against the snowboard gold medallist at
the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, notwithstanding that his urine sample had tested positive for a
metabolite of marijuana, because his international federation, the FIS, had not specifically prohibited
marijuana in its rules. The panel explained: ‘We do not suggest for a moment that the use of marijuana
should be condoned, nor do we suggest that sports authorities are not entitled to exclude athletes found
to use cannabis. But if sports authorities wish to add their own sanctions to those that are edicted by
public authorities, they must do so in an explicit fashion. That has not been done here […]. We must
decide within the context of the law of sports, and cannot invent prohibitions or sanctions where
none appear’. See also Bouras v International Judo Federation, CAS 99/A/230, para 10 (accepting
athlete’s argument that rules only allowed disqualification of results after a positive result from an in-
competition test, not from an out-of-competition test, on the basis that ‘CAS has to rule on the basis of
sports law and cannot invent new sanctions. In other words, if regulatory documents define sanctions
and how they should be applied to particular offences, they should be strictly interpreted by the sports
authorities and the CAS. In this case, neither the IJF Anti-doping Regulations nor the IOC Medical
Code provide for disqualification as the consequence of a positive out-of-competition test. Since it
has no legal foundation, the respondent’s decision to disqualify the appellant and withdraw his medal
should therefore be set aside’). Omissions of this sort can still happen even in the era of the World
Anti-Doping Code. See Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452 (decision
imposing sanction for use of prohibited method vacated where League had not fully implemented
Code provisions prohibiting such use). See also USOC et al v IOC & IAAF, CAS 2004/A/725
(vacating disqualification of results of US relay team based on ADRV of one of its members where
rules provided only for disqualification of individual results of doping offender, not of results of teams
in which he played); IAAF v ARAF and Yegorova and others, CAS 2008/A/1718, para 218 (rejecting
IAAF’s request for an increased sanction on the ground that the rules in force at the relevant time did
not provide for aggravated sanctions).
2 USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 55. This passage has
been cited with approval in many subsequent doping cases. For example, in WTC v Moats, AAA Panel
decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27, a AAA hearing panel cited Quigley as authority for its
warning that ‘WTC should take care to provide its athletes with clear, easy to understand rules so
athletes need not struggle to determine what conduct constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’.
3 USADA v Gatlin, AAA Panel decision dated 1 January 2008, para 8.18 (‘Mr. Gatlin’s position that
the contract was not negotiated by him, and therefore any terms, if ambiguous, ought to be construed
in a light most favorable to him, is a long established maxim of contract interpretation’), aff’d,
CAS 2008/A/1461; and see cases cited at para B1.61.
In Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 4.28, the Beijing
Games consent form required the athlete to submit to the IOC anti-doping rules and the 2003 World
Anti-Doping Code, but there was a conflict between those documents because the IOC anti-doping
rules anticipated a change in the burden of proof that was only to come into effect with the 2009 Code.
(See para C6.22). The CAS panel resolved that conflict (and therefore the case) in favour of the athlete,
on the basis that ‘contradictions in the applicable rules must be interpreted contra proferentem, ie to
the detriment of the promulgator of the conflicting or contradictory provision’.
The fact that the provision in question is only in the Anti-Doping Organization’s rules because
it is a mandatory provision of the Code does not provide an escape route: in such circumstances,
the ADO ‘nevertheless must be perceived as the drafter of the FINA DC. Thus, [it] must bear the
legal consequences of any ambiguity of the relevant provisions.’ Glasner v FINA, CAS 2013/A/3274,
para 80.
The result could be that the athlete avoids liability for an anti-doping rule violation completely,
as in Quigley, where the CAS found that the (pre-Code) rules required proof of an intent to enhance
performance, and there was no such proof in the record in that case. USA Shooting and Quigley v
Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 35. Alternatively, ambiguity in the rules could lead
to reduction in sanction, as in WTC v Moats, AAA Panel decision dated 10 October 2012, para 7.27,
where the hearing panel reduced the otherwise applicable two-year ban by 12 months for No Significant
Fault or Negligence, under Code Art 10.5.2 (as to which, see para C18.6, n 10, on the basis that the
athlete’s failure to understand and comply with the TUE requirements in the rules was caused in part
by confusing statements on the WTC’s website. See also WADA v Batan & IPF, CAS 2013/A/3316,
para 50 (‘[…] in such cases [of ambiguity in a rule], and particularly in doping cases, CAS decisions
have consistently applied the principle of “contra proferentem” […]’) and para 51 (applying principle
to prefer a restrictive interpretation of a provision on mitigation of doping sanctions that favoured
athletes charged with violation of the rules in question); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 107
(ambiguities in the IWF Anti-Doping Rules should be resolved in favour of the athlete, with the four-
year ban stipulated in those rules ‘read down’ to comply with the two-year ban stipulated in the World
Anti-Doping Code).
C4.16 Did the rules prohibit the conduct at the time it took place, or is the Anti-
Doping Organization seeking to apply a new rule retroactively?1 Alternatively, have
there been any changes to the rules since the conduct took place2 that are favourable
to the athlete and therefore should be applied based on the doctrine of lex mitior?3
1 There is a strong general presumption, recognised in both common law and civil law systems, and
displaced only by the clearest contrary language, that new rules should not be applied retrospectively
to matters occurring before they came into effect, to render acts unlawful that were lawful when done:
see para B1.40. The same presumption is also well-established in CAS jurisprudence: ‘The Panel
confirms the principle that “tempus regit actum”: in order to determine whether an act constitutes
an anti-doping rule infringement, it has to be evaluated on the basis of the law in force at the time
it was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively to facts that occurred
prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’. CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 51; WADA &
FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 and CAS 2009/A/1844, para 133 (‘[…] in order to
determine whether an act constitutes an anti-doping rule infringement, the Panel applies the law in
force at the time the act was committed. In other words, new regulations do not apply retroactively
to facts that occurred prior to their entry into force, but only for the future’); WADA v Hardy &
USADA, CAS 2009/A/1870, para 16 (same). See also 2019 ISL Art 1.2.1 (‘If the application of a newly
approved Technical Document results in an Adverse Analytical Finding for a Sample collected before
the effective date of that new Technical Document, which would not have resulted in an Adverse
Analytical Finding with the application of the currently effective version of the Technical Document
(for example if the Decision Limit for a Threshold Substance has been lowered in the newly approved
Technical Document), the Laboratory shall report the finding as a Negative Finding’). Cf 2019 ISL Art
1.1 (‘A failure by a Laboratory or WADA-Approved Laboratory for the ABP to follow a requirement
in effect at the time of Analytical Testing, which has subsequently been eliminated from this ISL or
applicable Technical Document or Technical Letter at the time of a hearing shall not serve as a defense
to an anti-doping rule violation’).
Where an Art 2.2 use charge is brought based on longitudinal profiling in the Athlete Biological
Passport of the values of an athlete’s blood samples taken over a long period (see para C7.4), if the
rules change in that period it is the rules that were in force when the first ABP sample was collected
(or at least the first ABP sample relied upon in support of the charge) that should apply to substantive
issues in the case (subject to application of any lex mitior in the new set of rules): IAAF v ARAF &
Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras 72-76.
On the other hand, ‘in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, laws and rules relating
to procedural matters apply immediately upon entering into force regardless of when the facts at issue
occurred’. S v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, paras 72–73. This exception has been interpreted broadly,
to include (for example) not only new provisions applicable to disciplinary proceedings (Mong
Joon Chung v FIFA, CAS 2017/A/5086, para 133 (‘[…] given that burden of proof is a procedural
principle, the Panel must apply in the present proceedings the rule on burden of proof set out in
Article 52 FCE (2012 edition)’) (citations omitted)) but also evidentiary matters, specifically new
evidentiary methods of proving pre-existing disciplinary offences. Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/
A/1912-1913, para 109 (‘The Panel would have no hesitation in holding that new scientifically sound
evidentiary methods, even not specifically mentioned in anti-doping rules, can be used at any time to
investigate and discover past anti-doping rule violations that went undetected, with the only constraint
deriving from the eight-year time limitation and the timely initiation of disciplinary proceedings. As
long as the substantive rule sanctioning a given conduct as doping is in force prior to the conduct,
the resort to a new evidentiary method does not constitute a case of retrospective application of the
law’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.5 (same); Caucchioli v CONI & UCI,
CAS 2010/A/2178, para 33 (same), citing E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 8.10 (‘It simply
cannot be the intent that this rule would allow an accused to afford itself of the more favourable
science. Applying such an argument to a criminal case would be tantamount to requiring the court
to find an accused innocent of a crime, even if the DNA proves the accused is the culprit simply
because the crime was committed prior to the availability of DNA testing. This Panel finds that this
simply cannot be the case’); WADA v Lallukka, CAS 2014/A/3488, paras 113–114 (research paper
and guidelines that post-dated alleged ADRV were not rules but evidence relied upon by WADA to
support ADRV finding, and therefore ‘the rule against retroactivity’ did not prevent such reliance);
Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 112 (2015 Code provision that an ADRV may be proved
by analysis of B sample split into two bottles is an evidentiary rule and therefore not a substantive rule
that may not be applied retroactively). CAS panels have also applied without objection Article 25.2 of
the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, which states that the new ten-year statute of limitations introduced
in Article 17 of that Code is a procedural rule that ‘should be applied retroactively’ to claims arising
under the 2003 or 2009 versions of the Code, as long as the previous (eight year) statute of limitations
period applicable to such claims had not already expired when the 2015 Code came into effect (see
para C4.22, n 1).
After a number of cases were dismissed on the basis that the athlete had proved a departure from
the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories, and the Anti-Doping Organization
had not proved that that departure did not cause the laboratory’s adverse analytical finding (see para
C6.19), in 2009 the Code was amended so that the athlete had to prove not only that the laboratory had
departed from the requirements of the ISL but also that that departure could reasonably have caused
the adverse analytical finding. Only then would the burden shift to the Anti-Doping Organization to
show that the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding. (See para C6.18). In Blanco v
USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 6.2.1.3, USADA argued that the amended rule should be applied
even though the athlete’s sample had been collected in December 2008, ie one month before the
amendments came into effect, on the basis that the amendment related only to the burden of proof
and so was a ‘procedural’ rule and not a ‘substantive’ one (‘substantive’ rules being rules that affect
an athlete’s behaviour). The CAS panel decided there had been no departures from the ISL and so did
not reach the issue.
2 Although the CAS panel in DFSNZ v Gemmell held that the new, more lenient, sanctions regime
must be in force by the time of the hearing, ie rule changes not yet in effect cannot be anticipated
(CAS 2014/A/2, para 109), an NADP tribunal has taken into account imminent rule changes (then
in the context of specific provision in the 2015 Code Art 25.2, although not technically engaged):
UKAD v Gareth Warburton and Rhys Williams, NADP Tribunal decision dated 12 January 2015.
3 If the rules change in favour of the athlete between the time the acts in question occur and the time
the hearing panel comes to determine the charge, either in terms of what constitutes a violation (for
example, if a substance is dropped from the Prohibited List) or in terms of what the sanction is for a
particular violation (for example, the sanction for a second violation going from a blanket life ban in
the 2003 Code to a ban of eight years to life in the 2009 Code), the CAS jurisprudence is clear that
the criminal law doctrine of lex mitior applies by analogy, ie the athlete is entitled to the benefit of
the more lenient rule. For the doctrine generally, see para B1.44. For its application in the anti-doping
context, see eg Strahya v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, para 6 (after the athlete had provided a sample that
was found to have a prohibited substance present in it, but before the hearing on the resulting doping
charge, FINA adopted new anti-doping rules implementing the World Anti-Doping Code, including
a two year ban for a first doping offence, which was shorter than the ban that would have applied
under the FINA doping rules in force when the athlete provided the sample; applying the doctrine of
lex mitior, the CAS Panel imposed only a two year ban for his offence); V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493,
FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), pp 17, 23 (following doctrine of lex mitior
by applying two-year sanction based on new Code-compliant rules rather than four-year sanction
under rules in place when case was commenced); Kop v IAAF & TAF, CAS 2008/A/1586, para 125,
and BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision dated 4 May 2009, para 41 (giving athlete benefit of 2009
Code change that made the sanction for a second violation eight years to life rather than a blanket life
ban).
The doctrine of lex mitior can be important when a substance on the Prohibited List is re-classified
as a ‘Specified Substance’, thereby triggering greater discretion to mitigate sanction under the Code
(see para C6.64, n 6). See eg WADA v CBJ & Penalbar, CAS 2009/A/1954, para 5.5 (accepting
that furosemide should be treated as a Specified Substance even though it was not classified as such
when it was found to be present in a sample collected from the athlete, but was only re-classified
thereafter); USADA v Brunemann, AAA Panel decision dated 26 January 2009, para 10.3 (same).
This happened, for example, when methylhexaneamine (MHA) was re-classified in the 2011
Prohibited List as a specified substance. See eg SARU v Ralepelle and Basson, SARU Judicial
Committee decision dated 25 January 2011, para 10 (MHA found in sample collected in November
2010 treated as Specified Substance, due to its re-classification as such in 2011 Prohibited List);
UK Anti-Doping v Duckworth, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 January 2011 (giving
athlete benefit of 2011 reclassification of MHA as a Specified Substance, by imposing a six-month
ban under 2009 Code Art 10.4). Indeed, one hearing panel even anticipated that change, in a hearing
that took place just before the 2011 Prohibited List came into force. See DFSNZ v Brightwater-
Wharf, STNZ decision dated 29 November 2010, para 6 (‘The principle of lex mitior allows a later
law, which is in force at the time of the hearing, to be applied if that law is more lenient than the
law in force at the time of the offending. […] The WADA statement in relation to the application of
the principle to the change in status of methylhexaneamine in the 2011 Prohibited List appears to
extend this principle beyond its established application to cases which occur before a new law or rule
comes into force’). Generally, however, attempts to anticipate such changes should not work, at least
where they have only been mooted and not yet agreed. Kambala and WADA v FIBA, FIBA Appeals
Tribunal, p11 (declining invitation to anticipate that cocaine would be re-classified as a Specified
Substance: ‘according to the law at present, cocaine is not to be classified as such a substance.
Whether this will change in future is uncertain and is of no relevance to the present decision; for the
Single Arbitrator must – in principle – decide the case in accordance with the rules and regulation
in force at the time the offence was committed. […] There is likewise no scope for applying the
principle of lex mitior in the present case; for said principle requires that conflicting rules are or were
in force. However, this is not the case’); FINA v Mellouli & FTN, CAS 2007/A/1252, paras 75–76
(‘To be sure, the Panel does not ignore the debate surrounding the introduction of amphetamine into
the list as part of the revision project of WADA. In any case the current list has to be applied which
excludes amphetamine as a specified substance’).
The CAS panel in DFSNZ v Gemmell, in addition to holding that the new, more lenient, sanctions
regime must be in force by the time of the hearing, ie, rule changes not yet in effect cannot be
anticipated: CAS 2014/A/2, para 109, also identified a second important limitation to the doctrine,
namely that ‘the principle applies to sanctions and not to the elements of [the] violation’, and therefore
the athlete is not entitled to the benefit of a subsequently adopted rule that changes the elements of an
offence in a way that means what he did would no longer amount to an offence (eg, by saying that he
must have committed three whereabouts failures in just 12 months, rather than in 18 months). Ibid,
paras 103, 109.
The CAS panel in Millar v BCF identified a third limit to the doctrine, which is that it may be
displaced by expressly providing that the new rules are not intended to apply retrospectively to matters
pending before they came into effect: CAS 2004/A/707, para 39. See further para B1.44, nn 10–12.
C4.17 Alternatively, is there a viable argument that the rules are contrary to
applicable law, and therefore void and unenforceable? Whatever law applies,1 the
basic test is likely to be whether the Anti-Doping Organization can show that the
provisions in question are necessary and proportionate to the legitimate underlying
objective of protecting the integrity of the sport,2 in which assessment it will generally
be afforded a significant ‘margin of appreciation’, since it is considered best placed to
determine what is necessary and appropriate for its sport.3 In that context, the global
sporting consensus that the Code represents as to what is necessary and appropriate
to protect sport from the scourge of doping presents a substantial obstacle for any
challenger to surmount.4 As a result, to date the authors are unaware of any decision,
whether by a court or by the CAS or other arbitral tribunal, that an anti-doping rule
derived from the Code is unlawful. To the contrary, challenges to the legality of such
rules have been uniformly rejected.5
1 See para C3.5.
2 See para B1.31 (proportionality as general principle of law); para E7.83 (proportionality as principle
of English law).
3 See para B1.6 and para E6.1 et seq. In relation to anti-doping rules in particular, see Ohuruogu v
UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.12 (‘Professor Lundqvist’s evidence […] was that
out-of-competition testing is at the heart of any effective anti-doping programme. To carry out effective
testing of this nature, it is vital that athletes produce accurate whereabouts information so that they can
be tested by surprise. The IAAF has great experience and is at the forefront of the fight against doping
in athletics and its position is that it is important to have an effective penalty against athletes that do
not provide adequate whereabouts information, “pour encourager les autres”. It is not the CAS panel’s
role to second-guess the IAAF’s decision or policy in this regard’); WADA & Kurtoglu v FIBA, FIBA
AC 2005-6 decision dated 16 February 2006 at pp 10–11 (‘[…] not every curtailment of this principle
by the Respondent’s rules is incompatible with the human rights and the general legal principles of
Swiss Law. Rather the principle of proportionality for the athlete’s benefit must be weighed against the
legitimate interests of the sports federations. This particularly includes the legitimate aim of effectively
fighting against doping and the objective of the sports federations to harmonise doping penalties. As
regards the question of how the opposing principles are to be reasonably harmonised in the rules and
regulations, the Respondent has a certain amount of latitude for deciding without interference by the
courts’).
4 See Introduction to the 2015 Code, p 17: ‘These sport-specific rules and procedures, aimed at
enforcing anti-doping rules in a global and harmonized way, are distinct in nature from criminal and
civil proceedings. They are not intended to be subject to or limited by any national requirements
and legal standards applicable to such proceedings, although they are intended to be applied in a
manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights. When reviewing the facts
and the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and other adjudicating bodies should
be aware of and respect the distinct nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that
those rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an
interest in fair sport’. See also Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165, para 7.10
(‘The WADA Code was drafted in consultation with world sports governing bodies and has been
approved by the IOC and EU governments. It is therefore rightly regarded as the oracle of the anti-
doping movement’).
5 Standard of proof: In Pechstein v ISU, SFT, 10 February 2010, 4A_612/2009, para 6.3.2, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal rejected the athlete’s argument that it was a violation of Swiss public policy (and so
unlawful) to apply the Code’s ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof to a doping charge (see para
C4.18) rather than the criminal standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
Strict liability rule: In Gasser v Stinson, 15 June 1988 (unreported), Mr Justice Scott (as he
then was) rejected a Swiss athlete’s claim that IAAF rules imposing a mandatory ban for a strict
liability offence were in unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore void and unenforceable. See
also Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude, 19 March 1996, unreported, Lightman J; (1996) Times,
8 April (CA); Lightman J, [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 195; CA [1997] 2 Lloyds Rep 293 (rejecting same
argument in respect of Tennis Anti-Doping Programme); Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, para 20
(citing cases where Swiss Federal Court upheld validity of strict liability anti-doping rules under Swiss
law). In IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.10, the CAS Sole Arbitrator
noted: ‘It was well recognised that the continued battle to eliminate doping from competitive sport
waged by lawyers and laboratories on one side against (some) scientists and sportsmen on the other
is necessary if sport is to preserve its integrity and its attraction. It is also recognised that there may
in consequence of that battle be innocent victims. In the seminal case of Q v UIT CAS 94/129 in
considering the strict liability rule – now enshrined in the [UK Anti-Doping] Rules and Code – the
Panel while recognising the argument that such a standard “is unreasonable and indeed contrary to
natural justice because it does not permit the accused to establish moral innocence” (para 16) rejected
it. In an earlier case in England Gasser v Stinson 1988 15 June Scott J was prepare to accept that the
then rule of the International Association of Athletics Federations which did not allow an athlete even
at the stage of sanction to establish his moral innocence was not in unreasonable restraint of trade.
Neither decision, in particular the second, bears directly on the issue before the Sole Arbitrator but
each provides a reminder that a rule which at first sight may appear to be unfair to one athlete may
on mature consideration be justified as fair to athletes as a whole’. See also Unnamed tennis player
and WADA, ATP, & ICAS, European Commission decision dated 12 October 2009, COMP/39471,
para 34 (‘According to the principle of objective liability (strict prohibition) breach of the anti-doping
rules occurs when a prohibited substance is found in a sample taken from the player and this can lead
to penalties even in the absence of fault or negligence. This strict prohibition backed up by effective
penalties would appear to be inherently necessary in the fight against doping as any other rule would
afford athletes, with the presence of certain substances in their systems, to avoid the imposition of
penalties when there is no positive proof of fault or negligence. As it is for the athlete to decide which
substance to consume, the rule would not on the face of it appear out of proportion’). The legality of
the strict liability rule was reviewed and re-affirmed by the CAS panel in Purevdorj v United World
Wrestling, CAS 2019/A/6190, paras 108-112.
Proof of exogenous source: In Meca-Medina v Commission, European Court of Justice
(C-519/04P) [2006] ECR I-6991; [2006] ISLR SLR-175; [2006] All ER (EC) 1057 (discussed at para
E11.50–E11.52), the ECJ rejected the athletes’ argument that the presumption that more than 2ng/ml
of nandrolone in urine was exogenous breached EC competition law. Similarly, in Schafflützel and
Zöllig v Fédération Suisse de courses de chevaux, SFT decision 5C.248/2006 dated 23 August 2007,
para 4.6.3.2.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal confirmed that threshold values are better determined by
sports federations than by courts (‘It is not for the judicial body to determine for which substances
thresholds should be introduced, nor to set those thresholds. It is an issue that requires particular
and specific expertise and it is for the equestrian federations to decide it – within the context of their
autonomy (art. 63 para 1 Swiss Civil Code) – on the basis of consultations with parties concerned and
serious scientific studies’) (unofficial English translation). See also Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 580, 593
(7th Cir 2001) (rejecting challenge to legality of rule creating presumption that T:E ratio of greater
than 6:1 reflects doping: ‘Reduced to its essence, Slaney contends that the burden-shifting approach
adopted by the IAAF violates United States public policy. We disagree. According to the parties,
proving the presence of exogenous testosterone in the body by scientific tests is not possible at the
present time. Therefore, the IAAF has adopted the rebuttable presumption of ingestion from a high TE
ratio in an athlete’s urine. […] Were the IAAF not to make use of the rebuttable presumption, it would
be nearly impossible, absent eyewitness proof, to ever find that an athlete had ingested testosterone’).
The rules for providing testosterone use have since changed (see para C6.44 et seq) but the analysis of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remains instructive.
No need to prove substance enhances performance: In Schafflützel and Zöllig v Fédération Suisse
de courses de chevaux, SFT decision 5C.248/2006 dated 23 August 2007, para 4.6.3.2.2, the Swiss
Federal Tribunal also confirmed that it is not disproportionate to exclude challenges based on the
absence of performance-enhancing effect in an individual matter.
Reliance on indirect evidence of use: In UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia,
CAS 2010/A/2235, para 103, the CAS rejected the athlete’s claim that UCI rules permitting proof of
use of a prohibited method based not on direct evidence but rather on indirect evidence (longitudinal
profiles of the athlete’s doping results: see para C7.3 et seq) were discriminatory and/or disproportionate
and therefore anti-competitive.
Whereabouts rules: Courts in France, Spain and Belgium, and the European Court of Rights,
have rejected arguments that the Code’s rules requiring athletes to provide ‘whereabouts’ information
to facilitate out-of-competition testing (see para C9.1) infringe constitutional rights to privacy and/
or other laws (although in the Belgian case, the challenge was rejected on jurisdictional grounds,
without reaching the merits): L’Union Nationale des Footballeurs Professionnels, judgment of
Conseil d’Etat, dated 24 February 2011, No 340122 (Code whereabouts requirements do not infringe
athletes’ human rights or the principle of equality, the EU charter of fundamental rights, or the TFEU
provisions on restrictions on competition, because the whereabouts information is needed in order to
carry out unannounced testing, which is essential to the fight against doping, and the requirements are
proportionate to that aim); Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Sportifs and Others v France, non-final
judgment of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights dated 18 January 2018, application
no. 48151/11 (whereabouts provisions impinge upon athlete’s Article 8 rights to respect for private and
family life, but are justified on important public interest grounds, including the protection of health
and the fairness of sporting competition, and the broad consensus among medical, governmental and
international authorities that unannounced out-of-competition testing is required to combat doping,
and strike a fair balance between the different interests at stake); ‘Spanish court upholds UCI’s drug
testing measures’, sportcal.com, 7 September 2007 (rejecting challenge on the merits); ‘Belgian
court says it doesn’t have jurisdiction in key anti-doping case’, Associated Press, 28 November 2007
(rejecting on jurisdictional grounds challenge brought by cyclist to UCI’s asserted right to test cyclists
out of competition).
Sanction for whereabouts violation: In Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165,
the CAS panel rejected the suggestion that the IAAF’s one-year fixed sanction for whereabouts
violations was disproportionate, noting: ‘The WADA Code was drafted in consultation with world
sports governing bodies and has been approved by the International Olympic Committee and EU
governments. It is therefore rightly regarded as the oracle of the anti-doping movement’. It further
noted the discretion given to Anti-Doping Organizations under the Code to determine the sanction for
whereabouts violations based on the experience of their own sport, and said that ‘it is not the CAS
panel’s role to second-guess the IAAF’s decision or policy in this regard’. Ibid, paras 7.10, 7.12. This
was despite the CAS’s post-script that ‘there is no suggestion that [Ohuruogu] is guilty of taking
drugs in order to enhance her performance or otherwise and, indeed, this case can be viewed in all
the circumstances as a busy young athlete being forgetful’. (The 2009 Code harmonised this issue,
requiring all Anti-Doping Organizations to impose a sanction in the range of one to two years for
whereabouts violations, depending on the athlete’s degree of fault. See para C20.1
Two-year ban for first offence: In WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 177, the CAS
panel upheld the two-year ban for many first offences established by the Code, finding that ‘both
CAS jurisprudence and various legal opinions confirm that the WADC [sanction] mechanisms are
not contrary to human rights legislation’. See also A v UEFA, 4A_522/2012, SFT judgment dated
21 March 2013, para 4.2.2 (two-year ban for a first doping offence is not so disproportionate as to be a
violation of public policy); WADA v ASSIS & FPF, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 70 (same); FIFA & WADA,
CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, paras 150-154, in particular para 151 (‘[…] the two years’ ineligibility for
doping offenses where the athlete may not demonstrate “no significant fault or negligence” is not
excessive, and does not violate mandatory Swiss law’); and cases cited at para C20.16 et seq. The
opinions mentioned by the CAS panel in Jobson were Kaufman-Kohler et al, ‘Legal opinion on the
conformity of certain provisions of the draft World Anti-Doping Code with commonly accepted
principles of international law’, 26 February 2003, eg at para 164 (‘Based upon the weight of legal
authority, we conclude that a two-year suspension for a first doping offence is not disproportionate,
considering the gravity of the offence committed. In our view, a more lenient sanction for a first
offence is likely to seriously jeopardise the effectiveness of the fight against doping’); and Prof Dr
Claude Rouiller, Legal Opinion dated 25 October 2005, at p 50 (‘In spite of its severity, the system
providing for a fixed two-year suspension applicable – subject only to the exculpatory evidence and
limited attenuating mechanisms set forth in Articles 10.2, paragraph 2 and 10.5 of the Code – in the
case of a first anti-doping rule violation is compatible with the fundamental rights and the general
principles enshrined in or recognised by autonomous Swiss law; the athlete’s fundamental rights with
respect to a defence would of course have to be respected, which the Code requires at least implicitly’).
On the other hand, on two occasions CAS appeal panels have found that the Code provisions on
sanctions produced a disproportionate (and therefore unlawful) result on the particular (and unique)
facts of the case at hand. See para C20.19.
Different sanctions for Specified Substances: The CAS panel in WADA v Jobson,
CAS 2010/A/2307, par 120, also rejected the athlete’s argument that it violated ‘the principle of
equal treatment and proportionality of sanction’ to apply different sanctions to violations involving
Specified Substances under Code Art 10.4 than to violations involving non-Specified Substances (in
particular cocaine). The CAS panel reasoned that that approach ‘does not violate the principle of equal
treatment, due to the fact that all cases involving a non-”specified substance” in the world of organised
football are treated alike under the FIFA ADR. Additionally the application of 47(1) FIFA ADR only
to “specified substances” does not violate the principle of proportionality. The Panel finds that this
principle is guaranteed under the WADC and that FIFA is entitled under Swiss law to limit in its rules
the circumstances to take into account when fixing the sanctions and restrict the application of the
doctrine of proportionality’. The argument was also rejected in Santos v FINA, CAS 2019/A/6482,
paras 53-60.
Rule conditioning mitigation of sanction on athlete proving source of prohibited substance
found in sample: In IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230, para 11.25, a CAS
sole arbitrator rejected a submission that the requirement that the athlete prove (as a prerequisite to
mitigation of sanction) how the prohibited substance got into his system was unfair and disproportionate
and therefore unlawful under human rights legislation and the competition rules. (See discussion at
para C18.6).
Rule conditioning mitigation of sanction on athlete proving lack of fault or negligence:
Similarly, the CSA panel sitting in Eder v Ski Austria, CAS 2006/A/1102, para 52, rejected an argument
that the requirement that the athlete prove lack of fault or negligence as a pre-condition to elimination
or reduction of sanction under Code Art 10.5 (see para C18.5 et seq) was contrary to Austrian law
and the European Convention on Human Rights: ‘The shifting of the burden of proof to the athlete to
demonstrate that he or she acted without (significant) fault does not conflict with the presumption of
innocence. Athletes have a rigorous duty of care towards their competitors and the sports organisation
to keep their bodies free of prohibited substances. Anti-doping rule violations do not “just happen”
but are, in most cases, the result of a breach of that duty of care. This justifies (i) to presume that the
athlete acted with fault or negligence and (ii) to shift the burden of proof from the sanctioning body
to the athlete to exonerate him- or herself. On the other hand, to impose on the sanctioning body
to demonstrate that the athlete acted with fault or negligence would make the fight against doping
extremely difficult or impossible’. See also IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs, CAS 2010/A/2230,
para 11.25 (noting that a system of fixed sanctions based on a presumption of fault, with the athlete
having the burden to prove no or no significant fault, ‘is, in the Sole Arbitrator’s judgment, an entirely
proper and proportionate approach, achieving the requisite equilibrium’). Similarly, in A. v UGFN,
4A_522/2012, judgment dated 21 March 2013, para 4.2.2, the Swiss Federal Tribunal followed prior
decisions in rejecting the argument that the rule presuming fault from the presence of a prohibited
substance (see para C18.6) violates public policy.
Four year ban for intentional violation: CAS panels have also firmly upheld the proportionality
of a four year ban for an intentional violation of Art 2.1. Zielinski v IWF, CAS 2017/A/5178,
para 97 (‘The rules contained in the IWF ADP according to which the period of ineligibility may
be reduced based on fault-related and non-fault-related criteria are an expression of this principle of
proportionality. The Appellant has not brought forward any valid argument that the possibilities to
reduce the period of ineligibility built into the IWF ADP only insufficiently incorporate or implement
the general principle of proportionality. In addition, no facts have been established by the Panel
that would justify a reduction based on such principle’); Villanueva v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4534,
at paras 50 and 51 (‘[50.] The history of sanctions since the creation of WADA can be, if only
broadly, summarised in three chapters. Under WADC 2003, the basic sanction for a first offence
ADRV was two years. Under WADC 2009, it became two years, subject to increase to four years
in circumstances of aggravation. Under WADC 2015, it became four years, subject to decrease
in circumstances of mitigation. The sanctions screw was tightened in an effort to rid sport of the
scourge of doping. Guarding against doping is so fundamental to the ability to hold fair sporting
events and fund them that its presence jeopardizes the existence of sports itself. [51.] The
WADC 2015 was the product of wide consultation and represented the best consensus of sporting
authorities as to what was needed to achieve as far as possible the desired end. It sought itself to
fashion in a detailed and sophisticated way a proportionate response in pursuit of a legitimate aim. At
the request of WADA, Jean-Paul Costa, former President of the European Court of Human Rights,
wrote a Legal Opinion regarding the draft World Anti-Doping Code, which examines the issue of
the compatibility of several provisions of the draft revision of the WADC 2015 with the accepted
principles of international law and human rights (published in June 2013). In the Panel’s view it
would be a wholly exceptional, if any, case to allow particular circumstances to trump the provisions
of the WADC 2015 relating to sanctions for an ADRV. However, the Panel considers that there is
nothing exceptional about the present case’), followed in Gonçalves v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4761,
para 46, and Ferreira v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4758, para 51; WADA v Comitato Permanente Antidoping
San Marino NADO & Karim Gharbi, CAS 2017/A/4962 (‘55. Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator finds
that the Athlete wholly failed to meet his burden of proof; his doping violation must be deemed to
be intentional and he must therefore be sanctioned with a 4-year period. 56. Unfortunately the CPA
seems to have ignored the clear wording of Article 10.1.1 of the NADO Rules and the reinforcing
commentary in CAS cases and elsewhere, and both its submissions and those on behalf of the
Athlete confuse the rule, and its proportionality, with the allegedly mitigating factors in this case
and a subjective perception of the Athlete’s good character. 57. The Athlete’s family and financial
means and his apparent cooperation and truthfulness, do not demonstrate in any way that his
violation was unintentional under the clear test in the NADO Rules. To reverse the burden so that
it must be established in the face of the Athlete’s bare assertions of innocence that the violation was
intentional (whether “beyond reasonable doubt” or to a lesser standard) is to flout the relevant rules
and to undermine the fight against doping. 58. That fight is a global fight requiring the cooperation
and collective effort of all the countries and agencies involved including San Marino and its NADO.
To allow personal appearance and circumstance in the present case to reduce the required sanction,
contrary to harmonised rules, is to damage sport not only in the relevant country (where the athlete
concerned may be especially valued) but internationally, by diluting the reciprocity and “level
playing field” which fairness in international sport demands. 59. The collateral qualities of the athlete
concerned, and even previous local “heroism”, must not detract from this principle. On the contrary
this encapsulates why the rules must be followed in word and in spirit. There is nothing remotely
“disproportionate” in consistently applying the anti-doping measures now in place; and this cannot
depend on personal considerations without damaging the system as a whole. 60. Accordingly, the
full, 4-year sanction should and shall apply in this case and there is no justification in principle or
on the facts of this case for seeking to depart from it’). See also Overvliet v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2675,
para 7.29 (upholding legality of a four-year ban for a first offence in weight-lifting, even though that
was two years more than the Code prescribed, on the basis that ‘weightlifting is a sport in which
doping can significantly enhance the performances. It is notorious that anabolic steroids are used in
weightlifting. It is in the interest of the fight against doping to apply a high threshold as a deterrent to
commit a doping violation in weightlifting’).
Rule mandating automatic disqualification of results without proving performance-enhancing
effect: In Aloyan v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4927, paras 78-81, a CAS panel endorsed the rulings of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal (in decision of 4 August 2006, 4P.105/2006, para 8.2; and in decision of 23 August
2007, ATR 13 III 193, para 4.6.3.2.2) that Code Art 9, providing for the automatic disqualification of
results of a competition where a sample collected in connection with that competition tests positive for
a prohibited substance, is proportionate and lawful.
Rule mandating arbitration of anti-doping disputes: Pechstein v ISU, German Federal Court
of Justice, judgement of 7 June 2016, KZR 6/15, para 59(2) (requiring athletes to submit to CAS
arbitration as a condition of pursuing their profession as athletes is not an abuse of a dominant position,
because ‘Sports federations such as the Second Defendant promote sports in general and particularly
their own sport by creating the prerequisites for organised sport. To achieve the relevant goals, it is of
fundamental importance to ensure that the rules apply to all athletes and are implemented everywhere
in accordance with uniform standards. It is therefore generally recognised, particularly in the area of
international sport, that arbitration agreements determining the jurisdiction of a particular court of
arbitration are required to ensure a uniform procedure with regard to the implementation of the rules
of sports law. Particularly in the area of doping, uniform application of the anti-doping rules of the
federations and of the WADC is indispensable to ensure fair international sporting competitions for
all athletes. Furthermore, a uniform court of arbitration for sport can contribute to the development of
international sports law. Further advantages of an international sports arbitration, as compared to state
courts, include the specialist knowledge of the arbitrators, the speed of the decision-making process,
which is of paramount importance for the athlete involved in such proceedings, and the international
recognition and execution of arbitral awards’) (citations omitted) and paras 64–65 (‘An arbitration
agreement naming the CAS as the relevant court of arbitration does not violate the rights of the
Plaintiff in the light of Art. 6 ECHR, either. [65] Art. 6 para. 1 ECHR provides that, with respect to civil
law claims, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law. However, like the claim of access to the courts established by
the German Constitution, this right of access to ordinary courts may also be waived. In particular, the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts may be excluded in arbitration agreements if the arbitration agreement
has been entered into voluntarily, is lawful and clearly worded, if further the arbitration procedure has
been designed in accordance with the guarantees given in Art. 6 ECHR and if the arbitral awards can
be set aside by a court of law in case of procedural errors. According to the statements set out above
under bb), these requirements have been fulfilled. According to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights, the fact that the Plaintiff is obliged, to be able to exercise her profession, to sign the
registration form imposed by the Second Defendant does not mean that the arbitration agreement has
not been voluntarily signed and therefore infringes the Convention’) (citations omitted). Cf Canas v
ATP, Swiss Federal Tribunal judgment dated 22 March 2007, 4P.172/2006, para 4.3 (whereas athlete
accepted that he was required under the rules to submit to the jurisdiction of the CAS to arbitrate any
disputes with the governing body, his acceptance of a further rule purporting to waive his right to
appeal a subsequent CAS arbitration award to the Swiss Federal Tribunal was not enforceable against
the athlete, because the right to recourse to the courts is a fundamental one, and he was given no choice
but to agree that waiver as a condition of participate in the sport).
C4.18 Which hearing panel will hear and determine the charge(s) against
the athlete, and which procedure will it follow in doing so? The Code is not
prescriptive on this topic: it identifies certain basic principles of procedural
fairness that must be respected, including that the hearing panel must be ‘fair and
impartial’,1 and that there must be certain rights of appeal from its decisions,2 but
otherwise leaves it to the Anti-Doping Organization to determine the applicable
process.3 Most Anti-Doping Organizations specify that the charge will be
determined not by any court but by a specially convened disciplinary hearing panel.
Due to the specialist nature of the charges, some Anti-Doping Organizations specify
in their rules that the hearing panel must include, in addition to a legal chair, wing
members with medical and/or scientific expertise. In the UK, for example, most
cases are heard by the members of the National Anti-Doping Panel, an independent
panel of expert lawyers and lay persons, pursuant to a detailed set of procedural
rules that are intended to ensure fairness at each stage.4 If the process set out in the
rules is not fair, however, eg because the athlete is not given proper opportunity to
defend himself,5 or the hearing panel is not impartial,6 or there is no right of appeal
against that hearing panel to an independent appeal body,7 again there may be
grounds for challenge.8
1 Code Art 8.1 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to provide the athlete or other person charged
with ‘a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a fair and impartial hearing panel. A timely reasoned
decision specifically including an explanation of the reason(s) for any period of Ineligibility shall be
Publicly Disclosed as provided in Article 14.3’.
The 2021 Code introduced a requirement that the first instance hearing panel be ‘Operationally
Independent’ (2021 Code Art 8.1), meaning that ‘(1) board members, staff members, commission
members, consultants and officials of the Anti-Doping Organization with responsibility for Results
Management or its affiliates (eg member federation or confederation), as well as any Person involved
in the investigation and pre-adjudication of the matter cannot be appointed as members and/or clerks
(to the extent that such clerk is involved in the deliberation process and/or drafting of any decision)
of hearing panels of that Anti-Doping Organization with responsibility for Results Management and
(2) hearing panels shall be in a position to conduct the hearing and decision-making process without
interference from the Anti-Doping Organization or any third party. The objective is to ensure that
members of the hearing panel or individuals otherwise involved in the decision of the hearing panel,
are not involved in the investigation of, or decisions to proceed with, the case’ (2021 Code, App One,
definition of ‘Operationally Independent’). Cf paras D2.12 et seq and para E13.39 (discussing ‘right’
under Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to have a charge heard by an independent
tribunal).
At the appeal stage, the requirements change: 2015 Code Art 13.2 requires that the athlete be given
a right of appeal against an adverse first instance decision either (a) to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport in Lausanne, which is an independent body (see para D2.18), or (b) in the case of a national-
level athlete, either to the CAS or to ‘an independent and impartial body in accordance with rules
established by the National Anti-Doping Organization’). Article 13.2 of the 2021 Code clarifies that
the appeal body must be both ‘Operationally Independent’ (as to which, see the foregoing paragraph
of this note) and ‘Institutionally Independent’, ie ‘fully independent institutionally from the Anti-
Doping Organization responsible for Results Management. They must therefore not in any way
be administered by, connected or subject to the Anti-Doping Organization responsible for Results
Management’ (Code App One, definition of ‘Institutional Independence’, p.91).
2 See Code Art 13.2, mandating that decisions involving a national-level athlete may be appealed to
‘an independent and impartial body in accordance with rules established by the National Anti-Doping
Organization’; while decisions involving an international-level athlete or international events may be
appealed to CAS.
3 See comment to Code Art 8.1: ‘This Article is not intended to supplant each Signatory’s own rules
for hearings but rather to ensure that each Signatory provides a hearing process consistent with these
principles’.
4 The National Anti-Doping Panel’s procedural rules can be found at sportresolutions.co.uk/images/
uploads/D_1_-_2019_NADP_Rules.pdf [accessed 3 November 2020]. As the UK National Anti-
Doping Policy (para C2.22) expressly confirms, the National Anti-Doping Panel is entirely independent
of the national governing bodies and also of UK Anti-Doping, notwithstanding that it is appointed
under their rules and is funded by DCMS.
5 See para D1.90.
8 See Chapters D1 and D2.
C4.19 To answer each of these questions – how are the rules to be construed,
are the rules legal, is the procedure fair? – the athlete’s lawyer will need to
determine the law that governs the proceedings and the rules in question. The
rules may provide expressly that a particular national law applies.1 However, just
as under English law the meaning of international conventions is to be determined
by reference to international jurisprudence,2 there will be limits on the impact
of national law in interpreting and applying anti-doping rules that implement
the World Anti-Doping Code.3 It would clearly be contrary to the fundamental
harmonising purpose of the Code4 if the same Code-compliant anti-doping rules
were to be given different meanings and legal effect in different jurisdictions and/or
different sports. Therefore the Code requires hearing panels to construe and apply
Code-compliant anti-doping rules ‘as an independent and autonomous text and
not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the signatories or governments’.5
And that means following the general principles of international sports law that
have been developed by the CAS and other bodies in interpreting the Code,6 and
adopting an interpretation that is consistent with the jurisprudence of the CAS
interpreting the Code and/or Code-compliant rules.7
1 See eg Art 16.1.1 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules (applying English law).
2 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] AC 251 (HL).
4 See Code p 11: ‘The purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-doping effort through universal
harmonisation of core anti-doping elements’.
5 Code Art 24.3 and 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules Article 1.5.3.
6 See para B1.15 and (for a discussion of what those ‘general principles of law’ are) para B1.18 et seq.
See also Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 59 (FIA anti-doping rules ‘should be interpreted
and applied based on “general principles of law drawn from a comparative or common denominator
reading of various domestic legal systems”, quoting AEK Athens v UEFA, CAS 98/200); UK Athletics
v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 27 (‘The phrase that
requires to be interpreted […] is expressed in the rules of an international organization, the IAAF,
which rules are in turn derived from the IOC Anti-Doping Code. The rules apply to all athletes
engaged in international athletic competition and are intended to operate in a uniform manner across
all jurisdictions. It is thus clear that the rules must be interpreted consistently so as to accord with
generally accepted principles of law which would be applied by tribunals of other jurisdictions and
by CAS, to which any appeal lies under IAAF Rule 21. In the CAS jurisprudence an acceptance is
emerging of the general principles of sporting law governing doping offences, independent of the
municipal law of the state in which the sporting body happens to be located. That approach can only be
strengthened as the World Anti-Doping Code is brought into force’); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 13 February 2006 (same).
7 WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 126 (‘[…] the FIFA ADR has been established on the basis
of the WADC, whose main intention was the harmonisation of the worldwide fight against doping. As
recognised by CAS jurisprudence, in order to achieve this goal of harmonisation “it is necessary to
interpret anti-doping rules that have been established on the basis of the WADC in harmony with the
WADC, the respective set of rules of other international sport federations and the respective CAS case
law”’), quoting Hipperdinger v ATP, CAS 2004/A/690, para 71.
C4.20 An athlete’s lawyer who believes that there are grounds for challenge
will also want to consider whether it is necessary to bring that challenge before
the disciplinary hearing panel or else whether, and in what circumstances, a court
will intervene in the internal sporting process to hear that challenge. English
courts at least are generally likely to be reluctant to intervene in that process.1 In
the anti-doping context in particular the proceedings are likely to be characterised
as arbitration proceedings, and the disciplinary hearing panel as an arbitral panel,2
which substantially limits the right of either party to seek judicial intervention in the
process in any event3 (as well as diminishing the role of substantive and procedural
national law even further4). As a result, an athlete facing anti-doping proceedings
before an English-based tribunal acting under Code-compliant anti-doping rules
should in principle find it very difficult to persuade an English court to set aside
or intervene in those proceedings. But in those very narrow circumstances when
an English court might be persuaded to intervene, that court should take the same
approach to applicable law as would the disciplinary hearing panel. Those English
cases that have proceeded on a contrary basis have failed adequately to recognise the
international dimension of sports anti-doping regimes.5
1 See para E6.2.
2 The rules may state expressly that the proceedings before the hearing panel are to be treated as arbitration
proceedings. See eg Art 16.1.2 of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules: ‘These Rules shall constitute an
agreement to arbitrate, and proceedings before an NADP first instance tribunal pursuant to Article 8,
or before an NADP appeal panel pursuant to Article 13, shall constitute arbitration proceedings with
a seat in England or Wales to which the Arbitration Act 1996 shall apply’. Even if they do not say that
expressly, however, that is how the proceedings are likely to be construed. UK Athletics v Chambers,
Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, paras 25–26 (‘Under IAAF Rule 21 each
member federation is required to incorporate provisions requiring doping disputes to be referred for
decision to a tribunal, with an appeal exclusively to the [CAS], whose decision shall be final and
binding. […] Accordingly the jurisdiction of this Committee is derived from contract, under which
by virtue of UKA Rule 25, UKA and the athlete agree to accept its determination, subject to the
right of appeal to CAS. [26] The rules thus constitute an arbitration agreement in writing. As the
arbitration is held in England it is, under English procedural law, subject to the provisions of the
Arbitration Act 1996’); England and Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm)
(discussed at paras B4.22 and D1.4) (ECB’s disciplinary procedures for enforcement of match-fixing
rules constitute arbitration proceedings to which the Arbitration Act 1996 applies). That is particularly
so where (as under any Code-compliant rules) explicit provision is made for the decision of the first
instance hearing panel to be appealed to the CAS in Lausanne, thus as a matter of contract impliedly
excluding any right to seek court intervention (see Code Art 13), thereby precluding any challenge in
the English courts. Furthermore, while the Court of Arbitration for Sport is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Swiss courts, the Swiss Federal Tribunal recognised in 1993 that the CAS offers sufficient
guarantees of independence and objectivity for its awards to be final and enforceable by the Swiss
courts: Gundel v FEI & CAS, Fed. Tribunal, judgment of 15 May 1993, 1st Civil Division, extracted
in Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne 1998), p 561, discussed at para D2.8
3 In such circumstances, under English law, by virtue of the Arbitration Act 1996, the substantive
determination of facts and law is to be left by the courts to the arbitral tribunal. The English courts
retain a residual power to make orders in support of the arbitration (as in England and Wales Cricket
Board v Kaneria [2013] EWHC 1074 (Comm), where the court issued a witness summons to require a
non-party to attend the hearing to give evidence), but no power to review the substance of the decision
of the arbitral tribunal, and only a very limited power to call in the award for serious irregularity in
due process: Arbitration Act 1996 ss 67 and 68 (see para D3.18). And even the narrow procedural
protections of the Arbitration Act 1996 will generally only apply to that part of the process under
which determinations are being made by a national tribunal whose seat is in England and Wales, and
not to that part of the process that is determined by an international arbitral body whose seat is outside
the jurisdiction of the English courts. See s 2 of the Arbitration Act 1996. There are only limited
exceptions to this rule: see further para E2.105 et seq. So, for example, if the arbitration is before
CAS, it is the Swiss courts that have jurisdiction over CAS awards, which again will be exercised only
on limited grounds of illegality, serious procedural irregularity, or violation of public policy. See para
D2.45.
It should be noted, however, that the European Court of Justice will apparently not feel constrained
from ruling on any competition-law-based challenge brought before it, even if the underlying matter is
a doping dispute that has been resolved on appeal by CAS. In C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina, 18 July 2006
(ECJ), when CAS banned two swimmers for having nandrolone in their samples (see para C6.48, n 2),
the swimmers filed suit in the European courts on the basis that the 2 ng/ml cut-off used to distinguish
endogenous nandrolone from exogenous nandrolone infringed EC competition law. The ECJ rejected
the claim, but on the merits, not based on any deference to CAS’s arbitral jurisdiction: see para E11.50.
4 Even considerations arising from the European Convention on Human Rights may have very limited
application, as the effect of submission to arbitration is to waive many of the protections derived from
Art 6 of that Convention: see Stretford v The FA [2006] EWHC 479 (Ch), para 45, discussed at paras
D3.28–D3.31 and F2.35 et seq. See also Haas, ‘Role and application of Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights in CAS Procedures’ (2012) 12(3) ISLR 43–60.
In UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, the athlete submitted that his agreement (as set
out in the UCI anti-doping rules) to submit disputes relating to those rules to CAS was trumped by
Spanish national law forbidding the arbitration of doping disputes. The CAS rejected that submission
on the basis (among others) that Spanish law permitted waiver of the right to go to court in favour of
arbitration of disputes. The CAS noted that ‘to decide otherwise would lead to a veritable race for the
most lenient national legislation’. Ibid, para 41.
5 For example, in Modahl v British Athletics Federation Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1192 (CA) (discussed at para
C3.7, n 2), although the breach of contract claim was argued through the English courts exclusively by
reference to English law, on the basis that the contract (the disciplinary rules propounded by the British
Athletics Federation) was governed by English law, to the extent that the substance of the doping
dispute remained in issue the rules in question were actually the international rules of the IAAF, and
the alleged doping offence occurred in Portugal. The role of the BAF’s anti-doping tribunal was solely
to hear and determine the case in accordance with those international rules, and an appeal lay to the
IAAF Arbitration Panel sitting in Monaco. The IAAF rules did not provide for their meaning or effect
to be governed by any national system of law, and it would clearly be contrary to the interests of sport
for the same international rules to be given a different meaning and legal effect in different jurisdictions
(as to which, see further para B1.11).
Similarly, in the leading English case of Gasser v Stinson (15 June 1988, unreported), QBD, Sandra
Gasser was Swiss, the doping offence occurred in Italy, and the defendant was an English representative
of the IAAF. The fortuitous location of the headquarters of the IAAF in England led the English court
to assume jurisdiction and to apply English principles of restraint of trade to an international regime.
The IAAF has since moved to Monaco in an attempt to avoid the jurisdictional reach of the English
courts, an approach that initially at least did not prove particularly successful, mainly because the
national governing body is generally sued as well, making the joinder of the IAAF legitimate as a
‘necessary and proper party’. See Walker v UKA and IAAF (7 July 2000, unreported), QBD (Toulson
J) where a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction over the IAAF was rejected. See also Edwards v BAF
and IAAF [1998] 2 CMLR 363 (Lightman J).
B Could the athlete be eligible for a retroactive TUE?
C4.21 The Anti-Doping Organization will have checked before charging the athlete
for having a prohibited substance in his sample that he did not have permission to
use that substance for medical reasons (a ‘Therapeutic Use Exemption’, or TUE).1
However, if he was using it for medical purposes, but had not obtained a TUE in
advance, it might be possible in certain (narrow) circumstances to obtain a TUE
after the fact to cover that use.2 If a retroactive TUE is granted, the charge will be
withdrawn.3 If a retroactive TUE is not granted, but a prospective TUE is granted,
indicating that the athlete would have got a TUE if he had asked for it on a timely
basis, he will have committed an ADRV but the sanction may be mitigated.4
1 See para C4.40.
2 See Art 4.3 of WADA’s International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions (Jan 2019): ‘An Athlete
may only be granted retroactive approval for his/her Therapeutic Use of a Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method (ie, a retroactive TUE) if: a. Emergency treatment or treatment of an acute medical
condition was necessary; or b. Due to other exceptional circumstances, there was insufficient time or
opportunity for the Athlete to submit, or for the TUEC to consider, an application for the TUE prior
to Sample collection; or c. The applicable rules required the Athlete (see comment to Article 5.1) or
permitted the Athlete (see Code Article 4.4.5) to apply for a retroactive TUE; or d. It is agreed, by
WADA and by the Anti-Doping Organization to whom the application for a retroactive TUE is or
would be made, that fairness requires the grant of a retroactive TUE’.
A retroactive TUE must be obtained from the Anti-Doping Organization with TUE jurisdiction over
the athlete; it cannot be granted by the hearing panel that has been asked to determine the charge that
the presence of the substance in the athlete’s sample constitutes an anti-doping rule violation. WADA v
Qatar FA & Alanezi, CAS 2007/A/1446, paras 6.10–6.11. However, the CAS can hear an athlete’s
appeal against the Anti-Doping Organization’s refusal to grant a retrospective TUE. See O’Hara v
WADA & UEFA, CAS 2008/A/1511. In such a case, ‘the burden is on the Appellant to prove, on the
balance of probabilities, that the conditions that must be met to grant the TUE are fulfilled’. Ibid
para 81. But see Dominguez v FIA, CAS 2016/A/4772, para 102 (based on comment to ISTUE Art
4.3 stating that there is no right of appeal against a decision that fairness does not require the grant of
a retroactive TUE, CAS cannot ‘replace the TUEC’s fairness assessment with that of CAS’; instead it
may only be overturned if it is shown to be ‘arbitrary, grossly disproportionate, irrational or perverse
or otherwise outside of the margin of discretion, or taken in bad faith or without the due process rights
provided to the athlete’). See also Stewart v FIM, CAS 2015/A/3876, para 80 (‘There would have been
no requirement of fairness that required Mr Stewart to be granted a retrospective TUE simply because
he had failed to carry out his obligations and so through ignorance to apply timeously for a TUE’).
Art 4.1 of the 2021 ISTUE adds a new clause permitting grant of a retroactive TUE to an athlete
who ‘Used Out-of-Competition, for therapeutic reasons, a Prohibited Substance that is only prohibited
In-Competition’. The comment to that provision states that it ‘seeks to address situations where, for
Therapeutic reasons, an Athlete Uses a substance Out-of-Competition, but there is a risk that the
substance will remain in their system In-Competition. In such situations, the Anti-Doping Organization
must permit the Athlete to apply for a retroactive TUE (where the Athlete has not applied in advance)’.
In addition, the previous ‘where fairness requires’ ground for granting a retroactive TUE becomes a
standalone exemption allowing grant of a retroactive TUE when it would be ‘manifestly unfair’ not
to grant one, even if all the Art 4.2 criteria for grant of a TUE may not be fulfilled, but WADA’s prior
approval is required.
3 See eg USADA v McCall, USADA press release dated 9 June 2017 (‘On February 10, 2017, McCall,
32, received an intravenous infusion of normal saline solution at the recommendation of his physician
to treat an acute medical condition. At the time of the intravenous infusion, McCall was scheduled
to compete at UFC 208 in Brooklyn, New York, on February 11, 2017, but he was subsequently
removed from the card due to illness. Although saline is not prohibited under the UFC Anti-Doping
Program, according to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) Prohibited List, which has been
adopted by the UFC Anti-Doping Policy, all intravenous infusions and/or injections of more than
50mL per 6-hour period are prohibited at all times unless the athlete obtains a TUE in advance, or if the
infusion is legitimately received in the course of hospital admissions, surgical procedures, or clinical
investigations. After a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding the potential violation,
which included the retroactive TUE application process, USADA determined that the athlete had a
diagnosed acute medical condition for which the use of an intravenous infusion is consistent with the
standard of care. Because McCall’s TUE application was granted retroactively, his use of a prohibited
method will not result in an anti-doping policy violation’).
C Should the charge be dismissed due to delay or other

unfairness?
C4.22 An Anti-Doping Organization ordinarily has ten years to bring a charge

against an athlete for violation of Code-compliant anti-doping rules.1 However that
limitation period may be subject to extension if warranted on the facts of a particular
case.2
1 See Code Art 17 (‘Statute of Limitations’): ‘No anti-doping rule violation proceeding may be
commenced against an Athlete or other Person unless he or she has been notified of the anti-doping
rule violation as provided in Article 7, or notification has been reasonably attempted, within ten (10)
years from the date the violation is asserted to have occurred’. Code Art 25.2 provides that the ten-year
limitations period applies retrospectively to any claim that was previously subject to the eight-year
limitations period in the 2009 Code, provided the eight-year period had not already expired when the
2015 Code came into effect on 1 January 2015. See IAAF v RusAF and Pyatykh, CAS 2017/O/5039,
para 76 (eight-year limitations period on claim against athlete had not expired as of 1 January 2015
and therefore it became subject to the new 10-year limitations period); IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov,
CAS 2018/A/5675, para 60 (same); Andrianova v ARAF, CAS 2015/A/4304, para 50 (claim dismissed
because eight-year statute of limitations had already expired before 2015 Code came into effect).
2 The CAS panel in CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 78, stated that the ‘interruption, suspension, expiry
or extension of such time-bar […] should be dealt with in the context of the principles of private law
of the country where the interested sports authority is domiciled’. That is inconsistent with the goal
of harmonisation, but in USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January 2012, para 1.2,
where an athlete had testified falsely in AAA and CAS proceedings back in 2004 that he had never
taken EPO, and then in 2011 confessed to using EPO in 2001–2003, USADA brought proceedings
in 2011 seeking disqualification of the results he had obtained in 2001–2003. The athlete argued that
USADA’s proceedings were time-barred under Code Art 17 and an earlier IAAF six-year limitations
period, but the AAA Panel rejected that plea on the basis that ‘Hellebuyck’s perjury in a proceeding
before the anti-doping tribunal established by the USOC, WADA and IAAF precludes Hellebuyck
from arguing for any protection under IAAF or WADA rules regarding limiting the time USADA
has to pursue charges against him’. It gave two alternative legal bases for this ruling: (1) the doctrine
that he who seeks equitable relief must come with clean hands (see para 8.8: ‘Hellebuyck came to
this Panel with unclean hands. He committed perjury in his 2004 hearings before the AAA when
he testified that he had not used EPO. He did not have to testify at those hearings. Now, having
admitted he committed multiple doping offenses during the relevant time period that he lied about in
the 2004 hearing, he cannot assert that some procedural or substantive rule designed for the purpose
of ensuring the adequate presentation of timely and reliable evidence should work to his benefit to
avoid a determination that he committed the doping offence’); and (2) the doctrine of equitable tolling
of the running of a statute of limitations due to the athlete’s fraudulent concealment of the claim
now said to be tolled. Ibid, para 8.17. In October 2012, USADA relied on the Hellebuyck precedent
(among other things) in sanctioning Lance Armstrong for doping dating back to 1998. See USADA v
Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility, dated 10 October 2012,
pp 154–55 (‘The eight-year statute of limitation found in Article 17 of the Code was suspended by
Mr Armstrong’s fraudulent concealment of his doping. […] The running of a statute of limitations
is suspended when the person seeking to assert the statute of limitations defense has subverted the
judicial process, such as by fraudulently concealing his wrongful conduct’). The UCI disputed this
aspect of USADA’s decision – see UCI decision regarding USADA v Armstrong, 22 October 2012,
p 2 (‘It is UCI’s view that USADA’s reference to national law is not appropriate. First article 24.3 of
the Code states that that Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by
reference to the existing law or statutes of the Code signatories or governments. Secondly it would be
in full contradiction with the purpose of harmonisation of the Code that an action could be commenced
against one athlete but not against another because of different national legislations governing the
statute of limitations. Where WADA emphasises the need for harmonisation of sanctions, there should
be no disharmony in the possibility to sanction an athlete at all’) – but did not appeal it.
C4.23 Even where a charge is filed before the statute of limitations has run, the
person charged may argue that the Anti-Doping Organization’s delay in bringing the
charge causes unfairness that mandates dismissal of the charge without consideration
of the merits. For example, Article 5.1.2.1 of the 2021 International Standard for
Results Management says that once an Anti-Doping Organization has confirmed that
there is no TUE and no apparent departures from the sample collection and analysis
requirements that explain an adverse analytical finding, the Anti-Doping Organization
‘shall promptly notify the Athlete of the Adverse Analytical Finding’. Nevertheless,
as a matter of principle, a plea of ‘laches’ should in principle be particularly difficult
to sustain in the anti-doping context, where the purpose of the proceedings being
challenged is not to right a private wrong but rather to vindicate the public interest in
the integrity of sport.1 Such a plea is therefore unlikely to get off the ground unless
it can be shown that the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the claim has ‘slept on
its rights’ and that the delay has prejudiced the athlete, eg by making it more difficult
for him to gather the evidence he needs to defend himself.2 And even then, unless the
circumstances are ‘extreme’, ie unless the delay was ‘protracted, grave and culpable’
and has caused ‘serious prejudice’ to the athlete, the hearing panel is likely to prefer
to determine the charge on the merits and (if the charge is upheld) to address any
perceived unfairness caused by the delay in bringing the charge by back-dating the
deemed start-date of any ban imposed.3 If the person charged can point to a prior
representation by the Anti-Doping Organization that a charge would not be brought,
he can argue that the doctrine of estoppel or the doctrine of legitimate expectation
mandates dismissal of the charge,4 which might strengthen their hand somewhat,
although the same public interest arguments would still apply.5 Alternatively, if
they can show that the delay has prejudiced them in their ability to investigate and
determine how the prohibited substance found in their sample got into their system
(which they would have to prove in order to get the standard sanctions set out in
the Code reduced), they may argue that the charge should not be dismissed but the
requirement to prove source as a pre-condition to any mitigation plea should be
waived, or at least watered down significantly.6
1 Crews v AIBA, CAS 2009/A/1985, para 5.16 (although there was an ‘unacceptable delay on the part
of AIBA’ in bringing the case against the athlete, dismissal of the charge was not appropriate, because
‘[w]hilst it is important to bring home to AIBA the importance of dealing properly and promptly with
anti-doping matters, it does not follow that the appropriate way to do this is by allowing an athlete
to escape the consequences of her actions. This would merely advantage the athlete and act to the
disadvantage of those other athletes who had not committed doping offences’); ITF v Dorofeyeva,
Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, paras 41–42 (agreeing with ITF
submission that if the rules had intended that delay would lead to dismissal of the charge, they would
have said so expressly, ‘especially since the dismissal (otherwise that on the merits) of an anti-doping
charge would clearly be contrary to the public interest in the fight against doping in sport’), appeal
upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697.
2 Muralidharan v NADA et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, paras 90–91 (rejecting submission that a delay in
pursuing anti-doping charges – meaning that the case took nearly four years to resolve at domestic
level – was a fundamental breach of the rules that should lead per se to dismissal of the charges,
holding instead that the athlete had to show that he ‘lost any chance’ to defend himself, because the
delay ‘unduly prejudice[d] his right to obtain evidence, interview witnesses, or adequately defend the
claims brought against him’); UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, para 32b (failure to issue summons
to athlete by deadline specified in UCI rules did not entitle athlete to relief, because it did not result in
‘any prejudice to Ullrich that will affect these proceedings. This Panel concludes that Ullrich did not
suffer prejudice in this regard, not least because he was fully aware of the UCI’s investigation at the
time, in particular by reason of his dismissal from his team for suspicion of involvement in Operation
Puerto. There is no evidence that Ullrich’s ability to mount a defence has not [sic] been compromised,
and Ullrich’s procedural objections to the UCI Rules have not featured any factual allegation that his
ability to put forward any facts or arguments or otherwise mount his defence has been compromised’);
ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, para 42 (declining
to dismiss charge due to delay in prosecuting it where, among other things, the respondent ‘does not
point to any prejudice which she has suffered due to the period of avoidable delay’), appeal upheld on
other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697; ITF v Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision
dated 4 April 2005, paras 59, 61–62 (‘The Tribunal is prepared to accept that [the athlete] should have
been notified of the adverse test result by about the last week of August 2004. It does not follow that
the entire charge should be dismissed. The Tribunal, having heard and weighed all the evidence, does
not accept that the player suffered any real rather than theoretical prejudice through lapse of time. We
regard it as unlikely in the extreme, to the point of being fanciful, that there was some critical loss
of memory, between late August and 19 October 2004, of an event relevant to the likelihood of the
player’s drink being spiked’). See also Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, para 91 (athlete suffered no
prejudice from bringing of case based on re-analysis of sample almost eight years after sample was
provided, even if the delay meant she was unable to establish the source of the substance found in her
sample, because IOC was seeking only finding of Art 2.1 violation and disqualification of her results
in the competition following which she tested negative, as to which issues of fault or negligence are
irrelevant); WADA v Covert & FEI, CAS 2012/A/2960, para 102 (‘Finally, the Athlete submits that
destruction of the sample was a violation of substantive justice that alone warrants dismissal of the
appeal. The Panel disagrees. The Athlete has no standalone right to retain her sample. The potential
harm that could be visited on an athlete as a result of a premature sample destruction comes only
from actual prejudice to her right to a fair hearing, not from an inherent right to retain her sample. In
other words, because the Athlete failed to demonstrate prejudice there was no violation of substantive
justice’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 129 (argument that delay in bringing charges
prejudiced athlete’s ability to prove the supplements she had been taking were contaminated was
rejected because all athletes have a stand-alone duty, which exists independently of any drug-testing,
to keep careful records of the supplements and medications they ingest); World Athletics v Marimuthu,
Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/287/2019 dated 26 May 2020, para 118 (alleged delay in notifying
adverse analytical finding to athlete deemed irrelevant where athlete did not show how alleged delay
could cast doubt on the laboratory finding or that it prejudiced her in any way). Cf Volandri v ITF,
CAS 2009/A/1782, paras 98–99 (citing delays in results management that left athlete in state of
uncertainty and made it difficult for him to gather evidence to support his defence as factors in only
reprimanding athlete rather than banning him under Code Art 10.4.)
See by way of analogy R v Soneji and Another [2005] UKHL 49 (where Criminal Justice Act 1988
provided that an order for confiscation of proceeds of crime had to be obtained within six months of
sentencing, but did not say what the consequence would be if the CPS missed that deadline, Lord Steyn
said that ‘the emphasis ought to be on the consequences of non-compliance, and posing the question
whether Parliament can fairly be taken to have intended total invalidity’ (para 23). He decided that it
could not, and that instead the question was whether the defendant had suffered prejudice as a result
of the delay that outweighed the clear public interest in enforcing the confiscation provisions: ‘counsel
for the accused relied on an alleged injustice caused to the accused by the delay of the confiscation
procedures. In my view this argument was overstated. The prejudice to the two accused was not
significant. It is also decisively outweighed by the countervailing public interest in not allowing a
convicted offender to escape confiscation for what were no more than bona fide errors in the judicial
process’ (para 24).
3 Given the public interest in enforcement of a sport’s anti-doping rules, the hearing panel in ITF v
Burdekin, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4 April 2005, para 63, queried, in obiter dictum,
‘whether a doping charge could ever, in principle, fall to be dismissed by reason of protracted,
grave and culpable delay leading to serious prejudice to a player, for example through the death or
incapacity of a crucial defence witness’. However, it noted that, ‘at least in the absence of such extreme
circumstances, the Tribunal considers that any culpable delay can be met by adjustment of the starting
date of any period of ineligibility, through exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion under Article M.8.3(b)
of the Programme [to back-date the start date of the period of Ineligibility]’. Similarly, in USADA v
Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, the AAA Panel held it was not an ‘abuse of process’
for USADA not to charge an athlete support personnel until several years after it obtained evidence
against him, because the charge was still brought within the limitations period, but it noted that ‘[t]
here does not seem to have been a compelling reason, however, why USADA could not have brought
this case much earlier. In this case, there has been no new evidence brought forward since 2004.
There is nothing unique about this case or the evidence ultimately presented by USADA that would
require it to sit for 6 or 7 years before being charged, and in fact it might perhaps have been presented
more expeditiously at the time the other BALCO cases were brought, such as Collins, Korchemney,
and Harrison. Under WADA Code Article 10.9.1, the Panel has discretion to modify the start date
for its sanction. The Panel will avail itself of that discretion here because the conditions for doing so
are present. The anti-doping system is benefited by having cases of this sort brought to a hearing or
resolution sooner rather than later. This provides certainty to the accused and all of those affected, it
eliminates the involvement in sport of those engaged in doping at the earliest reasonable opportunity,
and it furthers the interest of athletes and governing bodies to have cases heard expeditiously. The Panel
understands that often there are competing priorities and resource limitations bearing on the ability of
an anti-doping agency to bring cases immediately. In addition, the system of anti-doping is benefitted
by anti-doping agencies being able to present the strongest case they can against an accused, especially
where evidence is being developed for that case during the statute of limitations period. Having said
that, the Panel is also of the view that the competing consideration of fairness to the accused dictates
that in cases like this – where there is seemingly no new facts or evidence developed for several
years – the period of time following investigation should properly be considered in determining the
appropriate start date for any sanction under WADA Code Article 10.9.1’. Ibid, para 9.14. The panel
therefore backdated the start date for the ten-year ban that it imposed on the athlete support personnel
by 26 months. See also ASADA v Wyper, CAS A4/2007, para 50 (‘I accept that under the enforcement
procedures which must be followed by ASADA, there will inevitably be a period before a decision
is made whether an infraction has occurred and before any period of ineligibility can commence.
This period should not be prolonged […]. In the exercise of my discretion under Article 13.9 as a
matter of fairness, I find that the start date for the period of ineligibility should be 7 February 2008
which is twelve months from the date of Mr Wyper’s interview with the investigator from ASADA on
7 February 2007. This is a reasonable period for the initial process to occur and reach a conclusion
after making allowances for such delay as may be attributable to Mr Wyper’). Cf Ohlsson v WRU,
NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, p 28 (where it took more than 40 months to get
from charge to decision, such delay was not cited as a ground of appeal but the NADP Appeal Tribunal
noted, obiter, that ‘National Governing Bodies and other bodies with anti-doping jurisdiction should
be aware that in another case delay of such magnitude, indeed delay of a lesser magnitude, might
provide grounds for the dismissal of the charge by reason of prejudice caused by delay’).
The exception to this line of authority is WADA v FPF & Costa Fernandes, CAS 2012/A/2922,
para 142, where a catalogue of errors, including the laboratory losing its WADA accreditation between
analysis of the A sample and analysis of the B sample, and the athlete being misled as to the status of
analysis of his B sample, meant that ‘the Player was in truth deprived of any possibility of establishing
how the Prohibited Substance – if any – entered his system’, which fact, in combination with the
laboratory’s loss of accreditation, led the panel to uphold the domestic panel’s dismissal of the charge.
The panel noted: ‘The provisions of [the] regulatory framework must be properly applied if sanctions
are to be administered to an athlete. It should always be borne in mind that such sanctions would
seriously impact his – by definition – relatively short career, and it is because of the brevity of an
athlete’s career, that he has the right to expect his anti-doping results management to be dealt with
appropriately at every stage of the process as well as to have access to an expedited and comprehensive
hearing on the merits. It is the responsibility and duty of all international sports federations to conduct
themselves in a fashion which is beyond reproach and is scrupulously in accordance with their anti-
doping rules and policies contained within their organization’s rulebook’. Ibid, para 140.
4 See para B1.39.
5 In IAAF v USATF, CAS 2002/O/401, the IAAF asked its US member federation, USA Track & Field,
to disclose decisions it had taken exonerating its athletes of doping charges, so that the IAAF could
consider whether to exercise its right of appeal against those decisions, but when asked to identify
the rule it was relying on to require such disclosure, and when told that US law (and therefore the
USATF rules) prohibited such disclosure, the IAAF failed for a period of four years to identify the
provisions in its rules that required such disclosure (because it had a mistaken understanding of its
own rules) and did not challenge USATF’s assertion that US law prohibited such disclosure. When the
IAAF finally realised its mistake and brought proceedings against the USATF to enforce the disclosure
obligation, the CAS panel agreed that the IAAF anti-doping rules did require such disclosure (and by
that time the USATF had dropped its argument that US law prohibited such disclosure), and therefore
ruled that the USATF was required to disclose any decisions exonerating athletes moving forward.
However, the CAS panel also held that by its previous conduct in not disputing USATF’s assertion that
it was not required to disclose such decisions to the IAAF, and in failing upon challenge to identify
the IAAF rules that required such disclosure, the IAAF had led USATF to believe that it could keep
such decisions confidential, and so had induced USATF to promise the athletes concerned that the
decisions exonerating them would be kept confidential. Reneging on that commitment, the CAS
panel said, would frustrate the legitimate expectations of those athletes that ‘questions which they
thought were resolved should not now be re-opened’, which would lead to ‘dramatic and undoubtedly
painful consequences for the athletes in question – no matter the eventual disposition of their cases – if
disclosure were made obligatory so long after the events in issue, and so long after they were led to
believe that their cases were closed’. Therefore, the CAS panel did not require the USATF to disclose
those previous exoneration decisions to the IAAF. (For a critique of that decision, see para B1.39.
6 In FINA v Palmer, FINA Doping Panel decision 03/15 dated 14 September 2015, a low concentration
of furosemide (a diuretic) was found in the athlete’s sample taken in July 2013, but she was not notified
of that finding until 20 months later, in April 2015. She sought to mitigate sanction under FINA’s
equivalent of Art 10.4 of the 2009 Code, and the hearing panel agreed that ‘the requirement [in that
rule] of proving how the substance entered an athlete’s body may be excused in these extraordinary
circumstances where the anti-doping organization with results management responsibility knew that
there was a positive test and still waited over 20 months to notify the athlete of the positive test’
(para 6.18), because the delay ‘undermined the prospect of her being able to meet this threshold
burden’ (para 6.14) and decreased her chances of determining the cause of her positive test (paras
6.16–6.17). It noted however: ‘Every situation where there is a delay after sample collection in
notifying the athlete of a positive test does not necessarily require that the athlete gets a lower burden.
For instance, in a re-testing scenario there is no reason to balance the equities as the FINA DP has in
this case because the anti-doping organization has not deprived an athlete of timely notice. (Further,
when retesting for serious doping substances like anabolic agents and hormones there is not an issue
because these substances do not entitle an athlete to specified substances treatment)’ (para 6.20),
whereas the classification of a diuretic such as furosemide as a specified substance is a recognition that
such a substance ‘can result in an unintended anti-doping rule violation’ (para 6.19).
In FINA v Schoeman, FINA Doping Panel decision 01/20 dated 3 April 2020, the hearing panel
found that FINA’s unexplained failure to notify the athlete of his positive test until nearly two months
after his sample was collected meant that ‘through no fault of his own the Athlete was deprived […]
of his best opportunity to identify the precise source of his positive test by testing the batches of the
supplements he was using at the time of his positive test’ (para 6.3.3(f)). It concluded: ‘Under these
circumstances, where the best opportunity to precisely identify the product which caused his positive
test was deprived by the entity which is prosecuting the case against him, the FINA DP finds that the
burden upon the Athlete to precisely identify the specific product which caused his positive test must
be lessened’ (para 6.3.3(h)). It therefore upheld his No Significant Fault or Negligence plea despite his
failure to identify that product, notwithstanding that that is a standard requirement under constant CAS
jurisprudence: see para C18.5 et seq. WADA’s appeal against that decision (on the basis that the athlete
had not shown that the delay had materially decreased his ability to prove source) (CAS 2020/A/7083)
was still pending at the time of writing.
See also Volandri v ITF, CAS 2009/A/1782, paras 98–99 (citing delays in results management that
left athlete in state of uncertainty and made it difficult for him to gather evidence to support his defence
as factors in only reprimanding athlete rather than banning him under 2009 Code Art 10.4). Cf Lei
Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, para 91 (athlete suffered no prejudice from bringing of case based on
re-analysis of sample almost eight years after sample was provided, even if the delay meant she was
unable to establish the source of the substance found in her sample, because IOC was seeking only
finding of Art 2.1 violation and disqualification of her results in the competition following which she
tested negative, as to which issues of fault or negligence are irrelevant).
C4.24 Alternatively, it might be argued that some other unfairness means the
charges should be dismissed, but again the facts will have to be compelling to persuade
a hearing panel to dismiss a charge other than on the merits. For example, a Mexican
rugby player argued that it was unfair, and in breach of the fundamental principle of
equal treatment,1 to charge him based on low levels of clenbuterol found in his sample
when other Anti-Doping Organizations had not charged athletes with similar findings
on the basis that those findings were likely due to meat contamination. However, low
level concentrations of clenbuterol could also reflect the end of excretion of doses of
clenbuterol administered to enhance sport performance some days or weeks before
the sample collection. The hearing panel held that it had no power to dismiss the
charge on theground of unequal treatment, and that even if it did, it would not do
so, as there were examples of athletes being pursued for violations based on similar
adverse analytical findings for low levels of clenbuterol.2
1 As to which, see para B1.27.

2 World Rugby v Perinchief, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 29 June 2015, para 75 (World
Rugby’s anti-doping rules do not give hearing panel ‘any power to dismiss the charge on the basis
of what was asserted to be (in our word) unfairness’) and para 76 (‘We are enjoined to consider any
alleged ADRV on the basis of the evidence presented to us and consider the individual charge on its
merits. By that we mean the BJC is required to consider whether or not an ADRV has been proved. In
so doing it may consider, for example, whether certain procedural irregularities are such that the ADRV
cannot be proved. We concluded that it does not have some general and inherent “supervisory power”
or jurisdiction over the bringing of proceedings. Even if we had such power, we would not have used
it in this case. There are examples of athletes being pursued for alleged ADRV where the Prohibited
Substance in clenbuterol. Contador is but one example’. Contador’s case was decided in UCI v Alberto
Contador Velasco and RFEC and WADA v Alberto Contador and RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386.
D If a provisional suspension is imposed pending resolution of

the charge, should the athlete or other person contest it?
C4.25 Where a prohibited substance that is not classified as a ‘Specified
Substance’1 is found in an athlete’s sample, and he is charged with the presence and/
or use of that substance, Code Art 7.9.1 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to
suspend the athlete provisionally pending determination of the charge. In all other
cases, including when a Specified Substance is found in the athlete’s sample, but also
in cases based on non-analytical evidence, Code Art 7.9.2 gives the Anti-Doping
Organization discretion to impose a provisional suspension, but does not mandate it.2
Any provisional suspension, whether mandatory or discretionary, may be challenged.
2 For example, the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules provide (at Art 7.10.2) that in cases involving the presence
of Specified Substances and in non-analytical cases, UK Anti-Doping may provisionally suspend the
athlete upon charge, subject to the athlete’s right (Art 7.10.3) to apply to the National Anti-Doping Panel
for an order that the provisional suspension should not be imposed (or should be lifted).
C4.26 The power (or even the obligation) to impose an interim suspension
prior to any final finding that an anti-doping rule violation has been committed
is a controversial one, especially given the harm that will be done to the athlete’s
reputation. An instructive analogy is to an application for a preliminary injunction in
a civil matter, where the court will be guided by the well-known American Cyanamid
principles of serious issue to be tried and balance of convenience:1
(a) The strength of the case on the merits may vary:
(i) Where there is an adverse analytical finding from a WADA-accredited
laboratory that there is a prohibited substance present in the athlete’s
sample, that is strong evidence of at least a prima facie case for violation
of Art 2.1 (presence of prohibited substance in sample), given that Art
2.1 is a strict liability offence, ie intent, knowledge or other fault is not a
requisite element of the charge.2
(ii) In other cases, particularly non-analytical cases, the position may
not be nearly as clear-cut. However, the CAS has ruled that an Anti-
Doping Organization may impose a provisional suspension where it has
‘sufficient evidence of individual guilt’ to establish at least ‘a “reasonable
possibility” that the suspended athlete has engaged in an ADRV. […]
A reasonable possibility is more than a fanciful one; it requires evidence
giving rise to individualized suspicion. This standard, however, is
necessarily weaker than the test of “comfortable satisfaction” set forth
in Article 3.1. Accordingly, a reasonable possibility may exist even if
the Federation is unable to show that the balance of probabilities clearly
indicates an ADRV on the evidence available. […] The provision would
permit, for example, a conclusion that “reasonable prospects of success”
exist where documents are insufficient (individually or collectively) to
ground an ADRV but nonetheless indicate misconduct for which further
investigations hold out the prospect of more and better proof’.3 In that
case, non-analytical evidence gathered and reported in the McLaren
report that the athlete may have been involved in the Russian doping and
protection scheme was held sufficient to justify a provisional suspension.
(b) The balance of convenience is finely set:
(i) The justification usually offered for the provisional suspension is that
sport depends entirely upon the supporter’s faith in the sporting spectacle
as a contest on a level playing-field, to be determined by sporting prowess
alone, and also in the supporter’s faith that the Anti-Doping Organization
will do whatever is necessary to protect that sporting integrity. The
argument is that that faith will be utterly undermined if it later transpires
that someone charged with (and later found to have committed) an
ADRV was allowed to compete.4
(ii) In addition to protecting the integrity of the competition, the Anti-
Doping Organization must also protect participants from an opponent
who has potentially cheated.5 There is no reliable way to compensate
the non-tainted athlete whose place was taken by the drugs cheat, and
although individual results and even team results may be retroactively
disqualified,6 that in itself may or may not be effective to wipe out the
effects of the tainted competitor. For example, in a tennis tournament,
there is no way to know how far an individual contestant may have
progressed if he or she had not been knocked out by the athlete whose
win over them is later disqualified.
(iii) On the other hand, if an athlete is suspended on an interim basis and
subsequently the doping charge is not made out, not only will the
athlete’s reputation be damaged forever. In addition, the athlete will have
missed out on competing in events during that suspension, the effect of
which on his career could never be known, which clearly constitutes
irreparable harm.7 Therefore, even if the athlete could show that the
charges were brought in breach of some contractual or other duty, so
that the governing body is theoretically liable to him in damages,8 his
losses are unquantifiable and therefore cannot be compensated by money
damages.
Nevertheless, the (rare) judicial pronouncements on interim suspension provisions in
anti-doping programmes have not been hostile (as long as those provisions were not
retrospectively applied9). In particular, Lord Justice Pill remarked in Modahl that:
‘the effect of suspension may be very serious for the athlete and [involve missing
important athletics events] […] I understand the need for that sequence of measures
in order to guard against the damages of drug-taking immediately before a big event.
It would be little comfort to other competitors if the defaulter could be punished only
after the event had taken place’.10
When the same case reached the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman noted, without
criticism:
‘I think that the IAAF adopted its system of instant suspension followed by
disciplinary proceedings in the belief that although it might sometimes cause
injustice in the individual case, it was necessary in the wider interests of the sport’.11
This is consistent with the CAS jurisprudence, which generally considered the
private interest of the athlete in competing to be outweighed by the public interest
of the Anti-Doping Organization and its stakeholders in excluding the athlete from
participation until the allegation that he or she has breached the anti-doping rules has
been resolved.12 That is why CAS has held that stays of provisional suspensions in
doping cases should be granted only ‘parsimoniously’.13
1 American Cyanamid v Ethicom Ltd [1975] AC 396 [HL].

2 See para C6.1 et seq. See also Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation and Triathlon Canada, CAS
CG02/001, para 7.13 (‘[…] while, of course, we are in no position to determine whether or not the
Applicant has committed a doping offence and note that he has publicly protested his innocence and
lack of understanding how a positive result could have been produced on a test of his samples, he has
not been able hitherto to identify the basis of his potential defence to a doping charge, and has certainly
not cast any doubt on the chain of custody, the integrity of the samples, the testing procedures, or
cognate matters’).
3 Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, paras 175-78. See also ibid, para 229 (‘Article 7.9.2 of the FIS
ADR, while requiring sufficient evidence of individual guilt to conclude that there is a reasonable
possibility of an ADRV, can and sometimes must be satisfied by reference to inferential reasoning.
This is appropriate, in the Panel’s view, considering that a provisional suspension is often necessary
precisely in situations where misconduct is reasonably possible, even probable, but is not yet proven.
In such cases, a suspension serves the interests identified by the FIS in its comments to the Appellant’s
Application for Provisional Measures: safeguarding the integrity of competitions and protecting the
interests of third-party athletes’) and paras 188–89 (rejecting arguments that provisionally suspending
an athlete based on evidence showing a reasonable possibility of an ADRV infringes the athlete’s Swiss
law rights to a fair hearing or to be presumed innocent: ‘Since there is no finding of guilt, the Panel does
not consider a provisional suspension to implicate, still less violate, a presumption of innocence’).
4 See cases discussed at para B4.39, n 4. See eg Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 229 (referencing
the public interest in ‘safeguarding the integrity of competitions and protecting the interests of third-
party athletes’ by keeping a potential cheat out of the sport); Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal
decision dated 6 January 2009, p 28 (‘Given that the charge against the Appellant was upheld by the
Judicial Committee, there can be little doubt that the integrity of sport as a whole and Rugby Union
in particular was prejudiced by the Appellant not being subject to Provisional Suspension during the
period from 6 April 2005 (at the latest) until 30 November 2006’). The situation is distinct from other
disciplinary situations, where the sports governing body may be sufficiently vindicated by a sanction
whenever served, and the possibility of acquittal makes an interim suspension seem unfair. It is distinct
because in those situations, the integrity of the sport is not so obviously threatened by the competitor
competing in the interim before being found guilty. At an earlier stage in the development of anti-doping
rules, the farcical result was reached that an athlete was found guilty by a first instance IOC tribunal,
lodged an appeal, competed and won, and then lost the appeal, all within the space of 24 hours.
5 Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 229; Report of the Independent International Review
Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July 2001, pp 65 and 66 (‘As a policy matter,
the Commission believes that by not allowing pre-hearing suspensions under any circumstances, any
incentive for an athlete to co-operate in the prompt adjudication of a doping case is reduced. The foot-
dragging tactics employed by some athletes and their trainers contribute significantly to the chronic
delays in the disposition of the USATF doping cases. Some athletes may have no reason to seek swift
resolution, because as long as the final adjudication is put off, they can continue to compete. Moreover,
the notion that athletes who have positive “A” and “B” samples may continue to compete and enjoy the
benefits of successful competition is an imposition on the rights of all clean athletes, who are entitled
to a level playing field. Accordingly, the Commission believes that consideration should be given
to a policy that would permit the suspension of athletes, at least upon a receipt of a confirming “B”
sample and a preliminary review of the case, during which the athlete has the opportunity to make a
submission’).
6 In accordance with Code Art 10.8. See para C20.6. Even if the forfeited prize money is given to the
athlete who lost to the doping athlete (see 2015 Code Art 10.9; 2021 Code Art 10.11), that will not
compensate him for his lost opportunity. His loss would be just as unquantifiable of that of the charged
athlete who is suspended and then cleared.
7 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2020/A/6781, para 54 (‘CAS has consistently recognised that, given the finite and
brief career of most athletes, a suspension, subsequently found to be unjustified) can cause irreparable
harm (see Preliminary Decisions in CAS 2008/A/1453; CAS 2014/A/3571; CAS 2016/A/4710),
especially when it bars the athlete from participating in a major sports event or if the athlete is unable
to compete in qualifying events necessary to compete in such major events (CAS 2015/A/3925)’).
8 Emphasis on the ‘theoretically’; no one has yet succeeded in such a claim: see para E15.5. And the
CAS decision in Legkov strongly suggests that as long as the Anti-Doping Organization has evidence
establishing a reasonable possibility that the athlete engaged in an ADRV, it need not fear liability
if later the further evidence required to bring an ADRV charge does not transpire. Legkov v FIS,
CAS 2017/A/4968, para 195 (‘The ultimate failure of an ADRV allegation in this case would not and
could not retrospectively invalidate the provisional suspension. Rather, a reasonable possibility alone
is sufficient to justify a provisional suspension’).
In any event, the authors are aware of no anti-doping programme that provides for a governing body
to give a suspended athlete a cross-undertaking in damages in case it is subsequently unable to make
out its charges.
9 In 1999, GB athlete Dougie Walker launched a High Court challenge to (a) the IAAF’s right to refer
the decision of a UK Athletics Disciplinary Committee exonerating Walker to an IAAF Arbitration
Panel; and (b) UK Athletics’ ability to comply with any IAAF Arbitration Panel ruling overturning its
decision. Walker advanced two grounds for the challenge: (1) that there was no contract between him
and the IAAF that gave the IAAF Arbitration Panel jurisdiction to declare him ineligible; and (2) that
on the basis of double jeopardy principles, the final decision of UK Athletics’ internal appeal tribunal
could not be overturned. UK Athletics contended that its decision to exonerate Walker was correct,
but also accepted that the IAAF did have the power to refer the matter to arbitration. UK Athletics
therefore defended both the IAAF’s challenge to its decision and Walker’s challenge to its ability to
abide by the result of the IAAF’s challenge. The IAAF sought first to escape the jurisdiction of the
English courts on the basis that it was based in Monaco. This was rejected by Toulson J: Walker v UKA
and IAAF (7 July 2000, unreported), QBD (Toulson J), 25 July 2000 (Hallet J). The matter came on
for a hearing before Hallet J as an application for an injunction restraining UK Athletics and the IAAF
from holding an appeal arbitration or from acting on the result: Walker v UKA and IAAF (25 July 2000,
unreported), QBD (Hallet J). The IAAF claimed that the athlete should be suspended pending the
IAAF arbitration hearing on the basis of IAAF Rule 59.4, which stated that even where an athlete had
been exonerated by his national federation, he could be suspended by the IAAF pending the IAAF’s
challenge to the exoneration. Both Walker and UKA contended that that rule could not apply to Walker,
because it had been introduced after his offence and could not validly be applied retrospectively. Hallet
J in argument showed support for this contention. The matter was settled on the basis that Walker
withdrew his allegation that the IAAF could not challenge UK Athletics’ decision, and the IAAF
accepted that pending an arbitration award actually overturning UK Athletics’ decision, Walker could
not be suspended. This left the athlete free to seek to qualify for the 2000 Sydney Olympics. For
fitness reasons, however, and because he had nearly served out the two-year ban that an adverse IAAF
arbitration award would re-impose, Walker decided not to run. This decision proved wise, as the IAAF
arbitration decision went against Walker and UK Athletics: see para C6.51.
10 Modahl v BAF Ltd (28 July 1997, unreported), CA.
11 Modahl v BAF Ltd (22 July 1999, unreported), HL.
12 See eg S v UCI & FCI, CAS 2002/A/378, order of 2 May 2002, p.4 (‘[…] the Appellant’s wish
to take part in some forthcoming events cannot prevail on the application by the UCI of its own
rules and its desire to fight doping in cycling’); Abdelrahman v Egyptian NADO, CAS OG 16/23,
para 7.11 (‘In coming to this conclusion [that the provisional suspension should not be lifted] the
Panel has also considered the interests of the Athlete in not being able to compete and possibly obtain
a medal as well as of the other athletes who would be deprived of their opportunity to be awarded
medals at the Rio Olympic Games should the Athlete successfully medal and is later determined to
have committed an ADRV. The Panel has further considered the interests of sports in general and the
IAAF in particular, noting the importance of protecting the image of sport from being tarnished by
the participation of athletes in competitions who are facing proceedings against them for the use of
prohibited substances’).
13 R. v UEFA, CAS 2005/A/958, order dated 9 November 2005, para 8.
C4.27 In Fallon v Horseracing Regulatory Authority, 1 a Horseracing Regulatory

Authority (HRA) appeal panel affirmed a first instance panel’s imposition of a
provisional suspension on jockey Kieran Fallon pending resolution of criminal
charges that Fallon had agreed to fix races. Fallon challenged the legality of that
ban in the High Court, alleging (among other things) that it was unjustified and
disproportionate. The High Court accepted that the ban ‘will be of very significant
and irremediable detriment to Mr Fallon and those connected to him, including his
dependants and those otherwise wishing to use his services as a jockey’, and also
agreed ‘that it is a strong thing to prevent someone from plying his trade and from
earning a living, at least in Great Britain, by reason of charges which have been
brought but which have not yet been proved’, such that ‘strong counteracting factors’
were required to justify it. However, the High Court said that, ‘having regard to the
upholding of the perceptions of integrity of horseracing’, it would not disturb the
HRA panel’s judgment that such factors existed in this case, which judgment had
been expressed as follows (see para 58 of the High Court judgment):
‘We realise the hardship that suspension and the length of time over which such
hardship may last will cause, but we also recognise the damage that can be done
if persons the subject of a serious criminal charge are permitted to ride pending
trial. There is a strong likelihood that during such a period racing would be severely
damaged both by the possibility of further racing fixing and the perception of such;
and by the adverse reaction of many members of the racing public to the concept
that a jockey charged with an offence which is so close to the heart of the sport is
permitted to continue to participate. In our view, the damage done would be very
hard to repair and, as the Regulator, we are anxious to avoid that damage.’
Given the at least partial2 similarities between the damage that match-fixing does
to the integrity of sport and the damage that doping does to the integrity of sport, it
is likely that the High Court would be similarly supportive, at least in principle, of
a provisional suspension imposed pending determination of an anti-doping charge,
certainly where the evidence in support of that charge consists of an adverse analytical
finding by a WADA-accredited laboratory.
1 [2006] EWHC 2030 (QB).
2 There is a difference between cheating to win and cheating to lose in terms of impact on other
competitors, but both devalue the spectacle and (crucially) undermine confidence in its integrity.
C4.28 However, a defendant in civil proceedings always has the right to be heard
on an application for an interim injunction against him. The Code also provides that
an athlete who is provisionally suspended should be heard before or immediately
after the provisional suspension is imposed, or at least that there should be a full
hearing on the merits as soon as possible thereafter.1 It is arguable that the omission
of such a right would be unlawful.2 On the other hand, the rules may limit the grounds
on which such challenge may be brought. 2015 Code Art 7.9.1 states only that:
‘[a] mandatory Provisional Suspension may be eliminated if the Athlete demonstrates
to the hearing panel that the violation is likely to have involved a Contaminated
Product’.3
2021 Code Art 7.4.1 adds that it may also be eliminated:
‘if the violation involves a Substance of Abuse and the Athlete establishes entitlement
to a reduced period of Ineligibility under Article 10.2.4.1’.
However, an Anti-Doping Organization may add other grounds for eliminating a
provisional suspension. For example, the 2015 Model Rules produced by WADA
for International Federations and those produced for NADOs give the Anti-Doping
Organization the option to include the following provision:
‘The Provisional Suspension shall be imposed (or shall not be lifted) unless the
Athlete or other Person establishes that:
(a) the assertion of an anti-doping rule violation has no reasonable prospect of
being upheld, eg, because of a patent flaw in the case against the Athlete or
other Person; or
(b) the Athlete or other Person has a strong arguable case that he/she bears No
Fault or Negligence for the anti-doping rule violation(s) asserted, so that any
period of Ineligibility that might otherwise be imposed for such a violation is
likely to be completely eliminated by application of Article 10.4 [No Fault or
Negligence]; or
(c) some other facts exist that make it clearly unfair, in all of the circumstances,
to impose a Provisional Suspension prior to a final hearing in accordance
with Article 8. This ground is to be construed narrowly, and applied only in
truly exceptional circumstances. For example, the fact that the Provisional
Suspension would prevent the Athlete or other Person participating in a
particular Competition or Event shall not qualify as exceptional circumstances
for these purposes’.
The 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules include such a provision, as do the rules of various
international federations, including the ITF and FIS,4 but there have been very few
reported decisions in relation to the provision to date. 5
1 See Code Art 7.9.1: ‘Provided, however, that a Provisional Suspension may not be imposed unless the
Athlete is given either: (a) an opportunity for a Provisional Hearing, either before imposition of the
Provisional Suspension or on a timely basis after imposition of the Provisional Suspension; or (b) an
opportunity for an expedited hearing in accordance with Article 8 on a timely basis after imposition
of a Provisional Suspension’. The CAS panel in Sinkewitz v UCI, CAS 2011/A/2479, para 76(i),
suggested that if a provisional suspension was imposed before disciplinary proceedings were brought,
and such proceedings were not brought quickly thereafter, it would have the power ‘to cure the “denial
of justice” implied in a provisional suspension, which, not being followed by disciplinary proceedings,
would be de facto turned into a final sanction without a hearing’.
2 See Mrs Justice Ebsworth in Jones v Welsh Rugby Union (1997) Times, 6 March: ‘it is properly
arguable that a system which in effect prohibits a party from challenging by question or by evidence
the factual basis of the allegations against him on its face lacks basic fairness, even if the end result
may seem to have been justifiable […]’. But see Guest v Commonwealth Games Federation and
Triathlon Canada, CAS CG02/001, para 7.9: ‘[…] under English law […] or indeed under general
principles of law, a hearing before an interim suspension is not normally required by principles of
fairness (see eg Lewis v Heffer [1978] 1 WLR 1061); moreover an interim or provisional suspension
without a hearing is common in the rules of other governing bodies concerned with the problem of
doping in sport: see eg those of the IAAF referred to in CAS arbitration SYD 15 Melinte v IAAF,
para 8a). The rationale for summary reaction to a positive test is obvious: the public interest of the
sport trumps the private interests of the athlete. It should be emphasised that such suspension, decided
on an urgent basis, does not deprive the applicant of a proper hearing at a later stage with the potential
for an appropriate remedy’.
In the United States, there is clear authority that an athlete must be given an opportunity to be heard
before an interim suspension is imposed: Harding v US Figure Skating Association 624 NYS 2d 723
(1994); Lindemann v American Horse Shows Association 851 F Supp 1476 (1994). See also Report of
the Independent International Review Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July
2001, p 12 (‘While USATF declined to impose provisional suspensions before final adjudication of
a case, its refusal to do so is premised on its understanding that a federal US statute and the USOC
consultation prohibit USATF from depriving an athlete of the opportunity to compete without a full
adjudicatory hearing’).
3 In CCES v Thompson, SDRCC DT decision 19-0316 dated 3 October 2019, para 83, the sole arbitrator
ruled that at this provisional stage (ie in contrast to when the hearing on the merits arrives), the athlete
challenging a provisional suspension on this ground only has to show that it is ‘likely’ (ie there is ‘a
superior degree of conviction’ than merely ‘possible’, but not as much as ‘more likely than not’) that
the anti-doping rule violation involved a Contaminated Product. As to the definition of Contaminated
Product, see para C20.3, n 1.
4 So did the 2015 FIS rules, as discussed in Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968. See also Sinkewitz v UCI,
CAS 2011/A/2479 (considering similarly limited grounds in UCI anti-doping rules).
5 In terms of ground (i) (charge has no reasonable prospect of success), see Legkov v FIS,
CAS 2017/A/4968, para 178 (‘Demonstrating […] no reasonable prospects […] requires more than
an assertion as to shortcomings with current evidence, such as a patent flaw in the case against the
Athlete’).
In terms of ground (ii) (‘strong arguable case that he/she bears No Fault or Negligence for the
anti-doping rule violation(s) charged’), see UKAD v X, NADP panel decision dated 8 October 2019,
para 33 (‘strong arguable case’ should be interpreted similarly to ‘good arguable case’ in freezing
injunction cases, ie applicant must show case which is more than barely capable of serious argument
yet not necessarily one that has a better than 50% chance of success), para 43 (provisional suspension
could also be lifted based on likelihood source of substance in sample was a Contaminated Product).
In terms of ground (iii) (other facts that make it ‘clearly unfair’ to impose a provisional suspension),
see Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 238 (it would be ‘clearly unfair’, for these purposes, if
provisional suspension is in place for so long that it loses its ‘essential interim character’); UK Anti-
Doping v X & Y, NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2016 (it would be unfair for athletes to be
provisionally suspended in circumstances where there had been a lengthy delay in charging them
following analysis of their samples, and they had provided subsequent samples that had tested negative
for any prohibited substances).
C4.29 As already noted, a challenge to the legality of a provisional suspension on

the grounds it is disproportionate would appear unlikely (always dependent on the
facts) to succeed in the light of the High Court’s decision in Fallon v Horseracing
Regulatory Authority.1 However, the analysis may change if too much time passes
before the case is heard on the merits. In Legkov v FIS, a very experienced CAS
panel found that the McLaren Report and the evidence it referred to established a
reasonable possibility that the athlete had engaged in an ADRV, and the athlete had
not shown that the FIS had no reasonable prospect of establishing an ADRV against
him. However, it noted:
‘At the same time the Panel is sensitive to the concern of the Appellant who stands
under the shadow of a suspension undefined in length (which must be balanced,
inter alia, against the legitimate interest of other athletes not to find themselves
competing against athletes who may well be cheaters). Competitions cannot be
repeated; the form and motivation of athletes wax and wane. Occupying in principle
the space between suspicion and conviction, suspensions gradually lose their
essential interim character with the passage of time. What conclusions the Oswald
Disciplinary Commission may draw is necessarily open to question but the Panel
believes it must and will one way or the other draw such conclusions. […] The Panel
appreciates the unusual magnitude and complexity of cases awaiting Mr Oswald’s
attention. It cannot however endorse an indefinite and indeterminable suspension
as proportionate. Noting the Appellant’s reasonable entitlement to legal certainty,
the Panel accordingly deems it appropriate and just that the current provisional
suspension expire after 31 October 2017, at which time it will be for FIS to decide
whether or not to seek a further suspension justified by new developments and
within the framework of the FIS ADR. This approach is entirely in accord with
Article 7.9.3.2, particularly point (c), as in the Panel’s view to impose a longer
suspension in the present circumstances would be clearly unfair’.2
1 See para C4.27.
2 Legkov v FIS, CAS 2017/A/4968, para 238.
C4.30 In deciding how to react to the provisional suspension, athletes must also
weigh the fact that if they do not sit out of competition while the charge is pending,
not only will any final ban subsequently imposed not be back-dated,1 but the results
that they secured in the interim will likely be disqualified (and any points and prize
money forfeited) in any event.2 Therefore, in cases where a ban seems likely, the
athlete may be best advised not to fight the provisional suspension, on the basis that:
(a) their decision not to challenge will not be taken as an admission of the merits
of the charge(s);3 and:
(b) the period for which they sit out of competition will be credited against any
ultimate ban.4
1 Pursuant to Code Art 10.11.3, discussed at para C22.1.
2 See Code Art 10.8, discussed at paras C23.6.
3 See comment to Code Art 10.11.3.2 (‘An Athlete’s voluntary acceptance of a Provisional Suspension
is not an admission by the Athlete and shall not be used in any way to draw an adverse inference
against the Athlete’).
4 Even if the Anti-Doping Organization does not seek to suspend the athlete provisionally pending
determination of the charge, the athlete can get credit for sitting out of competition voluntarily against
any ban subsequently imposed on him: see Code Art 10.11.3.2, discussed at para C22.9.
Art 7.4.4 of the 2021 Code introduced a requirement to accept a voluntary provisional suspension
within a specified period (ie within 10 days of receiving report of analysis of B sample or from notice
of any other ADRV).
E Should the athlete request confirmatory analysis of the

B sample?
C4.31 Whenever a urine sample is collected from an athlete for testing under Code-
compliant rules, it is split into two (an ‘A’ sample and a ‘B’ sample) prior to transport
to the laboratory.1 Where testing of the A sample returns an adverse analytical
finding and the athlete is charged with an Article 2.1 presence violation, Code Art
7.3 requires the Anti-Doping Organization to offer the athlete the opportunity to
have the reserve sample (the ‘B sample’) analysed to confirm that finding, with the
athlete and his representative(s) having the right to attend at the laboratory to witness
the B sample analysis in person.2 This is a protection against analysis of the wrong
sample, against possible tampering with the sample after it has been collected,3 and
against inadequacies in the analysis, and is seen by CAS as a fundamental right for
the athlete, denial of which leads to automatic dismissal of the charges.4 In practice,
it allows the athlete to confirm for himself:
‘that the correct container with the code number of the athlete’s urine sample is
being opened and that at the time of opening the seal was intact; in addition the
representative may also check the state of the urine sample. In the event that at this
stage variations or irregularities are apparent then these can be noted and can be used
later to challenge the test results’.5
If the athlete finds a scientist to attend at the laboratory for the B sample analysis
on his behalf, that scientist will also be able to confirm that appropriate procedures
are followed during the analytical process itself.6 To prevent anomalies occurring
because of variations in sensitivity of equipment from laboratory to laboratory,7 the
International Standard for Laboratories (ISL) mandates that the B sample analysis
must take place at the same laboratory as analysed the A sample.8 As a general rule, it
is almost always be wise to have the B sample analysed: the competing considerations
are cost, and awareness that the substance was indeed in the athlete’s body.9
1 ISTI Art D4.14.
2 See eg Art 7.8.1(e) of the 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules, establishing ‘the right of the Athlete and/or the
Athlete’s representative to attend the analysis of the B Sample’. The athlete cannot dictate the date the
B sample analysis will take place, but some flexibility may be required if he genuinely cannot make
the date specified, to avoid claims of unfair prejudice. See para C6.22 n 2.
3 De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.6 (‘The principal reason why the [B Sample]
is provided for in order to ascertain “the presence of a prohibited sample” (cf Article 2.1 WADC) is
to avoid any possible manipulation of the sample after the latter has been provided. In particular, the
B sample is needed to exclude the – remote – possibility that the prohibited substance is added to the
athlete’s sample after sample taking. In order to eliminate this risk – which is beyond the control of the
athlete – the predominant view holds that a safeguard in the form of a B sample is needed to protect
the athlete’s fundamental rights’).
4 See para C6.23.
5 Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 15. If the athlete does not attend, in person or by a
representative, ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.7 provides that the testing authority or results management authority
‘shall instruct the Laboratory to proceed regardless and appoint an Independent Witness to verify that
the ‘B’ Sample container shows no signs of Tampering and that the identifying numbers match that
on the Sample collection documentation’. The CAS panel in Del Pino v UIM, CAS 2015/A/3892,
para 56, rejected the athlete’s argument that the witness used was not sufficiently independent because
he came from another department of the university to which the laboratory was attached.
6 WADA v FME & Carmona, CAS 2006/A/1149, para 55 (‘Such analysis would have been carried
out in the presence of whomever the Player might have chosen, in order to verify the integrity of
the sample, the Laboratory’s compliance with protocol, and the methods used and readings recorded
by the Laboratory. In this manner, any legitimate procedural concerns could have been dealt with
in such a way as to ensure perfect compliance with his rights’). See also McLaren, ‘WADA Drug
Testing Standards’ (2007) 18:1 Marquette Law Review 1, 5 (‘The ‘B’ sample requirement provides an
informal process comparable to formal peer review. Although the athlete’s own experts cannot perform
the testing procedures themselves for reasons of perceived conflicts, they can keep a watchful eye over
the entire process, assuring the athlete that no step was skipped and no result was reached unfairly
from the standpoint of methodology’).
7 For example, in an unreported Jockey Club case dating back several years, a jockey’s A sample tested
positive for cocaine metabolites but at an extremely low level. The jockey exercised his right under the
applicable anti-doping rules (which did not follow the Code) to have his B sample tested at a different
accredited laboratory. The Jockey Club could not find a second accredited laboratory with equipment
sensitive enough to test down to the levels of the A sample test result. The B sample was eventually
tested at a second laboratory that was unable to detect any cocaine metabolite in the sample, and so the
case against the athlete had to be dropped. This would no longer be possible.
8 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.
9 For an instance where failure by the athlete’s representatives (there the national governing body) to
take up the opportunity to have the B sample analysed and to attend the analysis gave rise to significant
issues, see Wen Tong v IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161. A further consideration may be the availability of an
expert to attend on behalf of the athlete, and indeed to give expert evidence later. WADA takes the view
that scientists at WADA-accredited laboratories should not act for athletes if they are also involved in
work for governing bodies, on the basis that they may have access to privileged information and so be
conflicted. Some have questioned the fairness of this approach, if it precludes an adequate selection of
experts for respondents.
C4.32 If the analysis of the B sample does not confirm the presence in the athlete’s
sample of the prohibited substance found in the A sample, the result of analysis of the
entire sample is considered negative,1 meaning no further action may be taken based
on the original adverse analytical finding, and any provisional suspension that had
previously been imposed must be lifted immediately.2 If the analysis of the B sample
does confirm the presence in the athlete’s sample of the prohibited substance found
in the A sample, however, that will be deemed sufficient to establish the presence of
the substance in question in the athlete’s sample,3 unless a departure from the ISTI or
ISL is established that caused the adverse findings.4
1 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.12.
2 Code Art 7.9.2.
3 Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established by
[…] presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s A Sample, where
[…] the Athlete’s B Sample is analyzed and such analysis confirms the presence in the B Sample of the
Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found in the Athlete’s A Sample’. See further para
C6.1 et seq.
For details of confirmation requirements, see 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.13 (‘“B” Sample Confirmation
Procedure for Non-Threshold Substances and exogenous Threshold Substances: For Non-Threshold
Substances (including those with reporting limits as specified in the TD MRPL) and exogenous
Threshold Substances, the “B” Sample results shall only confirm the “A” Sample identification (in
compliance with the TD IDCR) for the Adverse Analytical Finding to be valid. No quantification or
reported estimation of concentrations of such Prohibited Substance, or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s)
is necessary’) and Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.14 (‘“B” Sample Confirmation Procedure for endogenous Threshold
Substances: For endogenous Threshold Substances, Adverse Analytical Finding or Atypical Finding
decisions for the “B” Sample results shall be based on the confirmed identification (in accordance with
the TD IDCR, applicable to Confirmation Procedures based on chromatography-mass spectrometry)
of the Threshold Substance or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) and their quantitative determination in
the Sample at a level exceeding the value of the relevant Threshold as specified in the TD DL or other
applicable Technical Document(s) or Laboratory Guidelines. The mean value determined in the “B”
Sample does not need to be identical to the mean value determined in the “A” Sample’).
C4.33 If the athlete waives analysis of his B sample, the adverse analytical finding
from the A Sample will suffice to establish the presence of the substance in question
in his sample.1 Where the athlete knows that the adverse finding reported in respect of
the A Sample is accurate (for example, because he knows the substance is contained
in a medication that he was taking at the time his sample was collected), it is likely
to be appropriate to waive the B sample analysis.2 This would avoid him having to
pay the costs of that analysis,3 and it would also avoid any possible argument that
an insistence on analysis of the B sample means that the athlete did not ‘promptly
admit’ the charge, and so cannot rely on Code Art 10.6.2 to get a four-year ban
reduced,4 or on Code Art 10.11.2 to get the start date of any ban backdated.5 In
most cases, however, notwithstanding that the chances of exoneration through the
B sample analysis may not be great,6 the athlete is usually best advised to insist on
the B sample being analysed.
1 See Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established
by […] presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s A Sample,
where the Athlete waives analysis of the B Sample and the B Sample is not analyzed […]’. See further
para C6.19.
ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.3 allows the Anti-Doping Organization to have the B sample tested even if the
athlete waives that right. See eg Art 8.2.2 of the ITF’s 2020 Tennis Anti-Doping Programme, which
provides that the ITF may arrange for analysis of the B sample even if the athlete does not request it.
Even if the athlete waives analysis of the B sample, however, and it is the Anti-Doping Organization
that requests such analysis, the athlete still has the right to be present for the opening and analysis of
the B sample, and a failure to respect that right may lead to dismissal of the case. Wen Tong v IJF,
CAS 2010/A/2161, paras 9.7, 9.11.
2 And, possibly, admit the ADRV and seek to mitigate sanction: see paras C4.46 and C4.47.
3 Art 7.9.6 of the 2015 UK Anti-Doping Rules provides: ‘Where Article 7.9.5 applies [ie where the
B sample analysis confirms the results of the A sample analysis], UKAD may require the Athlete to
pay the costs of the B Sample analysis.’
4 See C18.1.
5 See C22.1.
6 Non-confirmation of the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample is very much the
exception rather than the norm, but it does happen. See eg USADA v Leogrande, AAA Panel decision
dated 1 December 2008, para 2 (analysis of B sample did not confirm EPO positive from analysis of
A sample); UCI v Hamberger, CAS 2001/A/343 (amount of EPO in the B sample did not cross the
designated threshold, and therefore the case against the cyclist was dismissed). Similarly, the analysis
of the B sample of a urine sample taken from Kenyan middle distance runner Bernard Lagat in 2003
showed a different EPO isoform profile to that of the A sample (possibly because of ‘active urine’
phenomenon: McLaren ‘WADA Drug Testing Standards’ (2007) 8:1 Marquette Law Review 1, 10-
11), leading to Lagat’s exoneration: ‘IAAF: analysis of Lagat B sample is negative’, sportcal.com
2 October 2003. The same thing happened to Marion Jones in 2006: bbcsport.co.uk, 8 September 2006
(although suspicions remained that were vindicated by her confession of doping in October 2007:
‘Disgraced Jones could face further sanctions’, sportcal.com, 10 October 2007). See also Report of
the Independent International Review Commission on Doping Control – USA Track & Field, 11 July
2001, p 86 (discussing B samples that did not test positive for substances found in A sample, most
likely because of delay in undertaking B sample test); McLaren ‘WADA Drug Testing Standards’
(2007) 18(1) Marquette Law Review 12–14 (same).
In Gasser v Stinson (15 June 1988, unreported), QBD (Scott J), the test of the B sample confirmed
the presence of methyl-testosterone, ie the same finding as had been made upon analysis of the
A sample. However, other steroids were also detected in the B sample that had not been detected in the
A sample. Gasser’s representatives argued that this raised a doubt as to the reliability of the test results,
suggesting that the A and B samples were not from the same person. Evidence was given, however,
that the different results were the result of oxidisation of the ether reagent used in the testing of the
B sample, and on that basis both the IAAF Arbitration Panel and the English High Court accepted that
the different findings did not undermine the reliability of the positive finding of methyl-testosterone.
See also NADA v Sinkewitz, CAS 2012/A/2857, para 182 (‘The Respondent claimed that the difference
between the ratios established on the basis of the A- and B-sample (A-sample: 2.45 for kit 1 and 2,42
for kit 2; B-sample: 3,16 for kit 1 and 2.34 for kit 2) invalidated the test. However, Article 21.1.2 UCI-
ADR does not require that the analyses of the A- and B-samples show identical results but rather that
the analysis of the B-sample “confirms the presence of the Prohibited Substance”. That is confirmed
when the B-sample analysis shows values which indicate the presence of the prohibited substances.
Moreover, the Panel is satisfied with the explanations given by expert witnesses at the hearing that
the B-sample analysis is performed by using different anti-bodies and, therefore, leads to different
values’); Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, para 165 (‘[…] in the case of a non-threshold substance such as methandienone,
the laboratory method for analysing the B sample is not aimed at having identical analytical results or at
gaining information on the background or the quantification, but only at confirming the presence of the
prohibited substance. In other terms, the ISL only requires the identification in the B sample of the same
prohibited substance that was found in the A sample, and it does not require the chromatograms or the
quantities or the “background noises” to be exactly the same’); FIFA v SOAC et al, CAS 2016/A/4596,
para 110 (same); Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 9.5.9 (‘After evaluation of Mr Blanco’s
IRMS test results and weighing the opinions of the parties’ respective experts, the Panel does not
take the view that the variances between his A Sample and B Sample results are of such a nature and
dimension as to constitute a demonstrated lack of robustness or reproducibility. To this extent, the
Panel rejects the view that the variances cited by Mr Blanco constitute conditions or circumstances
which place the confirmation of his A Sample results into question. In the view of the Panel, his
B Sample analysis has succeeded in confirming the A Sample results’); IAAF v CBA and Dos Santos,
CAS 2002/A/383 (athlete’s plea for exoneration rejected where the T:E ratio reported for his A sample
was 37.82 and the T:E ratio reported for his B sample was 79.31).
Another possibility is that the laboratory may depart from the requirements of the International
Standard for Laboratories when it analyses the B sample. If the departure is material, then the case may
fail even if the B sample analysis confirms the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample:
see para C6.22 et seq.
For a very lucky athlete, a request for confirmatory analysis of the B sample may lead to exoneration
by unexpected means. Tyler Hamilton retained the gold medal he won at the Athens Olympic
Games despite analysis of his A blood sample revealing evidence of blood-doping, because the
laboratory inadvertently destroyed his B blood sample by freezing it: Hamilton v USADA & UCI,
CAS 2005/A/884, para 41. See McLaren, ‘The CAS Ad Hoc Division at the Athens Olympic Games’,
(2004) 15(1) Marquette Sports Law Review 175, 181. Hamilton’s luck did not hold out; he was banned
after analysis of a subsequent sample also revealed evidence of blood-doping: see para C6.31. And he
has since confessed all in a book – ‘The Secret Race: Inside the Hidden World of the Tour de France:
Doping, Cover-ups, and Winning at All Costs’ (Transworld Publishers, 2012) – that contributed,
through its detailed admissions of concerted use of prohibited substances in the US Postal Team, to
the downfall of Lance Armstrong.
More curious still was the case of the horse Waterford Crystal, which won gold for its show-jumper
rider at the 2004 Olympics. The A sample collected after that event tested positive for a prohibited
substance, but that finding could not be pursued because the B sample was stolen while on its way to
the laboratory for confirmatory analysis: ‘Plot thickens in Olympic horse doping case’, sportcal.com,
8 November 2004.
It was with these cases in mind that a comment was added to Art 2.2 of the 2009 Code, stating that
‘Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis of an A Sample (without
confirmation from an analysis of a B Sample […] where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a
satisfactory explanation for the lack of confirmation in the other Sample’.
Occasionally, although the B sample analysis confirms the adverse analytical finding in respect
of the A sample, there may be something about the finding that exonerates the athlete. For example,
in SRU v Macleod, SRU press release dated 24 November 2008, analysis of the athlete’s B sample
confirmed the elevated T:E ratio found in respect of his A sample, but also confirmed the presence of
ethanol (which had not been tested for in his A sample), and so supported the athlete’s explanation
that the elevated ratio was caused by acute ingestion of alcohol, warranting dismissal of the charge.
C4.34 Assuming the B sample is tested, should the athlete attend at the laboratory
for the analysis of the B sample, and/or send a representative to attend on his behalf?
By attending personally, he can certainly satisfy himself, by personally inspecting
the B sample bottle prior to analysis, that the sample is properly sealed and there is
no evidence of tampering.1 However, an analytical expert will also be able to observe
the analytical procedures followed and note any discrepancies.2
1 In S v International Equestrian Federation, CAS 91/A/56, Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne
1998), pp 93, 97, at the analysis of the B sample the athlete’s scientific representative noticed that
the bottles containing the B sample analysis were not properly sealed and therefore could have been
tampered with, which was held to invalidate the analytical results.
The athlete (or his representative) will be asked to confirm in writing that the B sample was
properly sealed and there was no evidence of tampering: see ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.6. If that confirmation
is provided, then it will be very difficult for the athlete to argue later that there is doubt about the
integrity of the B sample bottle. Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 65 (relying on confirmation
by athlete representative that B sample was properly closed and correctly sealed prior to analysis as
sufficient evidence of the identity and integrity of the B samples); Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607,
paras 2.6.5, 7.8.11 (same); Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235,
para 7.7 (rejecting any argument that the time taken to transport the sample or the means by which they
were transported cast doubt on the integrity of the samples and/or the validity of the test results, where
athletes signed forms after inspection of the B sample bottles, confirming that they were satisfied with
the integrity of the B samples); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 42
(‘Mr Wade’s representative was present for the opening of the B sample coded 859294 and verified the
integrity of the shipping container, the bottle, and the seal, as well as the transfer of the sample into a
sealed container for analysis’).
2 See para C4.31. In contrast to the position in relation to the integrity of the B sample seal (see para
C4.34), the athlete does not lose his right to raise issues about the propriety of the testing procedures used
to analyse the B sample if his representative does not note those issues when he signs the testing protocol
upon completion of the process. Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 239 (‘IRMS procedural
claims raised by the Appellant are not to be regarded as waived merely because the Appellant’s expert
[…] observed the B Sample analysis and signed off on the protocol’). This ruling contradicted earlier
decisions that had suggested that if no discrepancies are noted, any subsequent arguments that proper
procedures were not followed will be very difficult to sustain. USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision
dated 20 September 2007, paras 269-270; WADA v Portuguese Football Federation and Nuno Asis
Lopes de Almeida, CAS 2006/A/1153, p17; N. v FINA, CAS 98/208, para 30.
F Responding to the charge on the merits
C4.35 Article 7.1 of the International Standard for Results Management confirms
the right of the athlete to respond to the asserted anti-doping rule violation and
resulting consequences.1 However, the rules may only give the athlete a limited
period to provide such response, failing which he could be deemed to have admitted
the violation and to have acceded to the consequences specified in the charge letter.2
Therefore, in addition to all the jurisdictional, legal and procedural issues identified
above, the athlete’s lawyer will also want to address the following issues as a matter
of urgency.
1 Although again this would be his right under English law anyway, and in any event the Anti-Doping
Organization will want to know as soon as possible the nature of the athlete’s response to the charge
and the basis of that response, so that (where appropriate) it can start organising scientific and other
rebuttal evidence.
2 See eg 2021 UK Anti-Doping Rules, Art 7.11.3(e): ‘[charge letter to include] a warning that if the
Athlete or other Person does not deny the Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s) asserted or the proposed
Consequences or request a hearing by the prescribed deadline, the Athlete or other Person will be
deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and admitted the Anti-Doping Rule Violation(s)
asserted and the Consequences proposed in the Charge Letter’.
C4.36 The Anti-Doping Organization must prove each element of the charge to the
comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel,1 and therefore the athlete’s lawyer will
want to be sure exactly which anti-doping rule violation(s) his client has been charged
with, and what facts are relied upon in support of the charge(s).2 For example, if the
athlete is charged with an Art 2.1 ADRV, so that the Anti-Doping Organization has to
prove that a prohibited substance was present in a sample collected from the athlete,3
the charge letter should identify where and when the sample was collected, whether
the test was in-competition or out-of-competition (because certain substances are
only prohibited in-competition4), at what laboratory the sample was tested, and what
prohibited substance (or metabolite or marker thereof) was found in the sample. If
the laboratory documentation package supporting the adverse analytical finding is
not enclosed with the charge letter, a copy should be requested as a matter of urgency,
so that the accuracy and completeness of the laboratory’s work can be checked by
experts on behalf of the athlete. Unless the athlete knows how the substance reported
got into his sample, the athlete’s lawyer will want to determine whether there is any
apparent defect in the sample collection procedures followed by the testing authority
or in the sample analysis procedures followed by the laboratory that could have
caused the adverse finding,5 as well as whether the substance found in the sample
is one that is expressly listed in the Prohibited List,6 or, for example, is said to be
‘similar to’ an expressly-listed substance,7 what concentration of the substance was
found in the sample,8 and exactly what analytical procedures were used to detect
that substance.9 If the substance can be produced in the body naturally, the athlete’s
lawyer will want to know the basis for the Anti-Doping Organization’s assertion that
the substance found in the athlete’s urine is exogenous.10
1 See para C5.1.
2 The elements of each Code violation are analysed in turn at Chapters C6 to C15.
4 See para C6.38.
5 See para C6.20 et seq and para C6.29 et seq.
8 If the substance is one to which a ‘threshold’ applies (see para C6.40), the laboratory will have
quantified the concentration of the substance in the sample as part of its reporting of the adverse
analytical finding. If not, it will not have done, but the quantity may still be important, for example
to determine whether the analytical finding is consistent with a TUE held by the athlete (see para
C4.3), or with a theory of how the substance got into the system (see para C18.13), and therefore the
Anti-Doping Organization should be asked to get the laboratory to estimate the concentration of the
substance in the sample. ISL Art 5.3.5.2.6.3 provides that ‘the Laboratory should provide estimated
concentrations when possible and for information purposes only, upon request by the Testing Authority,
Results Management Authority or WADA, if the detected level of the Non-Threshold Substance, its
Metabolite(s), or Marker(s) may be relevant to the results management of an anti-doping case. In such
instances, the Laboratory should indicate the estimated concentration while making it clear to the
Testing Authority, Results Management Authority or WADA that the concentration was obtained by
an Analytical Testing Procedure, which has not been validated for quantitative purposes’.
9 See para C6.29.
C4.37 If the anti-doping rule violation charged is not a strict liability offence, ie if
fault is an element of the violation,1 or if the Code creates or permits a defence to
the charge,2 then there may be several fruitful avenues of enquiry for the defence
lawyer. If the charge is violation of Code Art 2.1 (presence of prohibited substance in
athlete’s sample), however, that is a strict liability offence,3 and if there is no obvious
issue with the identity or integrity of the sample or with the reliability of the adverse
analytical finding reported by the laboratory following analysis of that sample, the
first pressing question will be: does the athlete have any explanation for the apparent
presence of the substance in his sample?
1 As in the case of anti-doping rule violations under Code Art 2.2 (Attempted Use) (see para C7.1), Art
2.3 (refusal or failure to submit to, or otherwise evading, sample collection) (see para C8.1), Art 2.4
(whereabouts violations) (see para C9.1), Art 2.5 (Tampering) (see para C10.1), Art 2.6 (Possession)
(see para C11.1), Art 2.7 (Trafficking) (see para C12.1), Art 2.8 (administration) (see para C13.1), and
Art 2.9 (complicity) (see para C14.1).
2 For example, refusal or failure to submit to sample collection is not an anti-doping rule violation where
‘compelling justification’ exists for such refusal or failure: see para C8.3.
3 See para C6.1.
C4.38 The explanation could of course be that the athlete was knowingly cheating,
particularly where the substance found in his system is a performance-enhancing
substance that cannot be inadvertently consumed,1 in which case his lawyer should
be counselling a prompt admission (to avoid a four-year ban under Code Art 10.6.32
or to bring forward the start date of the ban3) and an offer of substantial assistance
to the Anti-Doping Organization in establishing anti-doping rule violations by others
(such as the coach, physician or other athlete who supplied the prohibited substance
to his client) in an effort to obtain suspension of part of the ban.4
1 See USADA v Youngquist, AAA Panel decision dated 28 February 2005, para 5.2 (‘[…] as dictated
by common sense, an athlete who tests positive for r-EPO cannot contend that she was unaware
of, or simply negligent in, how that happened. This is not a substance found in over-the-counter
supplements or that occurs naturally. Youngquist had to know that she was taking a banned
substance, or was grossly negligent in not knowing’); CCES v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated
12 September 2005, para 40 (‘The human body does not normally produce rEPO, and its presence
in the body of an athlete is therefore indicative of the intentional administration of an external
substance’); USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 10.8 (‘Because Mr
O’Bee used or attempted to use rhEPO, a prohibited substance that is administered by injection and
used intentionally to gain a competitive advantage, the Panel concludes there is no basis for finding
Mr O’Bee has “no fault or negligence” or “no significant fault or negligence” for his second doping
violation under Article 10.5’).
2 See para C18.6. If an athlete comes to his lawyer and confesses cheating before he has even been
caught, then if he can be persuaded to come forward and admit the offence to the Anti-Doping
Organization before it suspects anything (and in any event before it tries to test him), he can seek
mitigation of up to one half of the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility for the violation admitted
under Code Art 10.6.2 (discussed at para C18.6(c)).
3 See para C22.1.
4 See para C18.6(a).
C4.39 Alternatively, the substance might be one of the ‘recreational’ drugs found
on the Prohibited List, such as cannabis, and the athlete may acknowledge taking
it deliberately, but insist he did so out of competition, for ‘recreational’ reasons
rather than to enhance performance. In that case, again a prompt admission would be
sensible, combined with a plea of mitigation under 2015 Code Art 10.5.1.11 or 2021
Code Art 10.2.4.1.2
1 See para C18.4, n 2.
2 Under Art 10.2.4.1 of the 2021 Code, the athlete could receive a ban of just three months, or even less
if he undergoes an agreed treatment programme (see para C17.2).
C4.40 If the athlete denies deliberate ingestion, careful consideration needs to be

given to the possibility that he inadvertently ingested the prohibited substance. An
athlete will benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in this context. In particular,
prohibited substances are often ingredients in medication. If medication is the source,
and the athlete has a therapeutic use exemption for the substance,1 that should be
complete defence, at least if the amount found in the sample is consistent with the
dose prescribed.2 This is a point that the Anti-Doping Organization is supposed to
have checked specifically, and therefore the matter ought never to have got this far
if there is a TUE in place,3 but the point still ought to be checked by the athlete’s
lawyer, in case there has been an error,4 or indeed in case there is an opportunity to
apply for the TUE retroactively.5
1 See para C4.3.
2 See eg Nose v Slovenian Cycling Federation, CAS 2007/A/1356, para 7.4.1 (‘The basic finding of the
“use of a prohibited substance” is not the end of the considerations. The next question is whether the
Appellant was in possession of a legitimate TUE which allowed him to train and race still under the
influence of a prohibited substance. In that case, the use of a prohibited substance would have been
justified and the appellant would not have violated the applicable Anti-Doping Rules’). The TUE
must have been issued (or recognised) by the international federation if the athlete was competing
in international competition (Ibid, para 7.4.6) and it must be for the specific substance found in the
sample, and not for a substance in the same category of medication, even if it has the same therapeutic
purpose and effect. ATP v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, para 51
(TUE for terbutaline was no defence to charge based on presence of salbutamol dispensed by doctor
without player’s knowledge. However, it was the basis for a finding of No Fault or Negligence, as
to which, see para C18.19(b)). Furthermore, the concentration of the substance found in the sample
must be consistent with the timing and amount of therapeutic dose(s) specified in the TUE. See Code
Art 4.4 (‘The presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers, and/or the Use or
Attempted Use, Possession or Administration or Attempted Administration of a Prohibited Substance
or Prohibited Method shall not be considered an anti-doping rule violation if it is consistent with the
provisions of an applicable therapeutic use exemption issued pursuant to the International Standard for
Therapeutic Use Exemptions’).
3 See para C4.3.
4 For example, there can sometimes be confusion over who has authority to grant a TUE to a particular
athlete, and so the Anti-Doping Organization bringing the charge may not be aware of a TUE issued
by another Anti-Doping Organization.
5 See para C4.21.
C4.41 If there is no TUE, but the substance found in the athlete’s sample is a
substance that is produced naturally in the body,1 what is the basis for the Anti-
Doping Organization’s allegation that the substance found in the sample was not
produced naturally but rather is exogenous in source? If the basis is the level
of the substance found in the sample, is there any evidence that the athlete has
naturally elevated levels of that substance?2 Or could the finding be explained by
a medical or other condition? For example, in the case of a female athlete whose
sample has tested positive for nandrolone metabolites, could it be explained by
pregnancy?3 Again, an athlete will benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in
this context.
1 See para C6.42.
C4.42 If medication or a medical condition is not the explanation, has the athlete
been eating any food or taking any nutritional supplement that could be the source
of the substance in his system?1 Alternatively, has any family member or other close
associate been taking any medication or supplement with which the athlete’s food or
drink could have been contaminated?2 Are there any grounds for suspecting sabotage,
for example by the deliberate spiking of the athlete’s drink or food?3 Or could
anyone with whom the athlete has been intimate have been an inadvertent source
of contamination, through the passing of bodily fluids?4 Once again, an athlete will
benefit greatly from expert scientific advice in this context.
1 In rare instances, meat may contain residues of prohibited substances that have been used as a growth
promoter in the livestock in question: see paras C18.10–C18.13 and C18.19.
The sports supplement industry is largely unregulated, and manufacturers of such supplements often
use prohibited substances (in particular, stimulants and steroids) as the active ingredients that provide
the ‘buzz’ or the ‘kick’ promised in the marketing puff for the product. Sometimes such substances
are listed as ingredients on the product label, but often they are not. For example, in September 2001
an IOC-commissioned study reported that a quarter of 600 over-the-counter nutritional substances
had tested positive for prohibited substances not mentioned on the packaging: ‘IOC: 20 per cent of
supplements contain nandrolone’: sportcal.com, 21 September 2001; ‘IOC Medical Commission
Reissues Supplements Warning’ sportcal.com, 28 September 2001. See also UK Sport Nandrolone
Report and 19-Norsteroids Fact Sheet (January 2000); ‘British products fail IOC dope tests’,
Independent, 5 April 2002. And now the cases involve legions of athletes testing positive for prohibited
substances that were ingredients (including unlisted ingredients/contaminants) of supplements they
were taking. See para C18.19.
2 As in Puerta v ITF, where the athlete inadvertently ingested a few drops of his wife’s PMT medicine
after she used his water glass to mix the medicine (see para C18.17), or in La Barbera, where the
athlete alleged that he inadvertently ingested stanozolol when he crushed his dog’s medication tablets
(containing stanozolol) and then did not wash his hands before eating (see para C18.7), or in Errani,
where it was found that the source of the athlete’s adverse finding was likely one of her mother’s
anti-cancer pills, inadvertently dropped into the pasta that her mother was preparing for the family’s
evening meal (see para 18.16 n 4).
3 See para C18.19(j).
4 See para C18.19(l). For example, in ITF v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926, kissing was enough to pass a
tiny amount of cocaine, the trace metabolites of which were found in the athlete’s sample.
C4.43 If the athlete can find a potential source, it needs to be investigated

thoroughly, and evidence gathered with the assistance of a scientific expert. Although
inadvertent ingestion is not a defence to the charge, there is significant scope for
mitigation of sanction in such cases, provided the athlete can show how the substance
got into his system.1 However, it is important to be sure that the explanation offered is
consistent with the data contained in the laboratory’s report of the adverse analytical
finding, or else it is unlikely to be accepted.2
1 See para C18.1 et seq. The charge is still made out, but in particular circumstances a plea of No (or No
Significant) Fault or Negligence might be accepted, resulting in a lesser or even no sanction: see paras
C18.2–C18.4.
2 See para C18.6.
C4.44 If the source of the substance found in the athlete’s sample is reliably
identified, the focus of the athlete’s case is likely to be on mitigation, with no issues
taken about the identity or integrity of the sample or the reliability of the reported
adverse analytical finding. On the other hand, where the athlete is not able to establish
how the substance got into his system, there is no possibility of mitigation under
Code Art 10.4 or Code Art 10.5: acknowledgements of ignorance, accompanied with
declarations of innocence and even speculation as to possible sources (malign or
otherwise) will not suffice.1 Instead, in such circumstances, if the athlete maintains
his innocence, his lawyer needs to consider whether there is any basis to argue that
there were any defects in the procedures used to collect and analyse the athlete’s
sample that render unreliable the adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory
in respect of that sample. For example:
(a) Is it clear that the sample that produced the adverse analytical finding is the
sample that was provided by the athlete? Does the sample reference number in
the laboratory report match the number noted on the doping control form?
(b) Did the athlete note any discrepancy in relation to the sample collection
process on that form that might cast doubt on the identity of the sample, or that
might have enabled it to be tampered with after collection? If not, does he now
recollect any such discrepancy?2
(c) Does anything in the manner in which the sample was stored after collection
and then transported to the laboratory raise any doubts as to the identity or
integrity of the sample?3 (Analysis of this issue may have to wait until the
Anti-Doping Organization has filed evidence in support of its prima facie case,
with the position protected by the athlete in the interim not admitting that the
sample in question is the sample that he provided).
(d) Alternatively, does the laboratory documentation package reflect any
departures from the International Standard for Laboratories that might call into
question the validity or reliability of the adverse analytical finding reported by
the laboratory in respect of the athlete’s sample?4
2 The hearing panel is likely to be highly sceptical of any allegation that the doping control officer
departed from the normal sample collection process if no mention was made of it at the time in the
space provided for such comments on the doping control form. See para C6.17.

4 See para C6.22.
C4.45 Pre-hearing disclosure of documents and information may become an issue.

The Anti-Doping Organization will obviously have to produce materials relating to
the collection, transportation and analysis of the athlete’s sample in order to establish
its prima facie case (unless the athlete stipulates to the identity and integrity of the
sample, and/or to the accuracy of the analytical results), but what if the athlete wants
disclosure of further documents on which the Anti-Doping Organization might not
need to rely? Article 7.8.4 of the 2019 NADP Procedural Rules gives the chair of the
hearing panel the power to:
‘make such order as he/she shall deem appropriate in relation to the production of
relevant documents and/or other materials between the parties; provided that save
for good cause shown no documents and/or other materials shall be ordered to be
produced in relation to the laboratory analysis resulting in an adverse analytical
finding beyond the documents that are required, pursuant to the International
Standard for Laboratories, to be included in the laboratory report pack’.
‘The documentation of the analysis procedure performed on the sample is an essential
source of information for an athlete if he is to defend his case. Therefore, the ISL
and the WADA Technical Document for Laboratory Documentation Packages clarify
what kind of material shall be produced and provided by a laboratory to support
the finding of an Adverse Analytical Finding’.1 However, the scope of potential
disclosure is getting wider, and may include the athlete having to provide disclosure
of documents and information to the Anti-Doping Organization. In ITF v Sharapova,
the first instance panel noted:
‘Previously orders for disclosure have not generally been considered in anti-doping
cases but the changes brought into effect by the WADA Code 2015 now require
tribunals to make findings, inter alia, as to whether an athlete has acted intentionally in
taking a substance on the Prohibited List. In the case of this player it was likely that she
would rely on evidence about advice and assistance she had received from a number
of persons. In those circumstances the determination of contested issues of fact and
intention might require the production of all documents relevant to those issues’.2
Any disclosure order can obviously only cover disclosure of documents that are
actually in the party’s possession or control, not documents that are held by third
parties who are outside the control of that party.3 The likeliest source of controversy
is requests for disclosure of the laboratory’s standard operating procedures or other
laboratory documentation.4 In theory at least, a refusal to order disclosure could be
serious enough to amount to an infringement of the athlete’s right to defend himself,
and so give grounds for appeal.5
1 Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 5.140.
2 ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016, para 11, not challenged on appeal,
Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643.
3 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 81 (‘The contractual regime
governing determination of charges of doping offences does not include any obligation on either party
to the contract to make witnesses available to give oral evidence against the will of the witness or the
party asked to produce the witness’). In such circumstances, consideration should be given to seeking
assistance from the courts in the form of a witness summons issued ‘in aid of arbitration’ under the
Arbitration Act 1996: see para D3.86 and D3.87.
4 USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras 36–63 (discussing disputed
disclosure requests by athlete in relation to laboratory data), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.
See also USADA v Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008, para 25 (order granted for
disclosure of laboratory’s Standard Operating Procedures); Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185,
para 3.18 (TD2009LDOC did not preclude production of laboratory’s Standard Operating Procedures),
citing Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 5.152.
5 If it were CAS that refused to order disclosure, the challenge would be in the Swiss courts on the basis
that the athlete’s right to be heard had been infringed. See eg Pechstein v ISU, Swiss Federal Tribunal,
10 February 2010, 4A_612/2009, para 5.1 (rejecting such an argument on the facts).
G Negotiating a consensual settlement of the charge
C4.46 The athlete will also need to note that fighting doping charges can be
prohibitively expensive. Legal aid is not generally available, although CAS can grant
it in particular cases, and both CAS and Sport Resolutions (which acts as Secretariat
to the National Anti-Doping Panel), and CAS both maintain lists of lawyers who
may be prepared to take on cases pro bono. Any Lottery funding the athlete may
normally receive will probably have been suspended pending resolution of the
charges. Under the NADP Procedural Rules and the CAS Rules, there are only very
limited costshifting provisions.1 Therefore, a losing athlete is generally not exposed
to an order to pay the Anti-Doping Organization’s costs, but by the same token he is
unlikely to recover his costs from the Anti-Doping Organization if he is successful
in defending the charge. As a result, unless there are strong reasons to believe that
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the charge(s) made, the athlete may want to
consider admitting the anti-doping rule violation and concentrating his efforts on
securing as much mitigation of the sanction as possible.
1 See 2019 NADP Procedural Rules, Art 11.2: ‘Where the Anti-Doping Tribunal finds that an argument
advanced by a party was frivolous or otherwise entirely without merit, the Tribunal may award costs
as it deems appropriate against that party. Otherwise, however, each of the parties shall bear its own
costs, legal, expert or otherwise, and the Tribunal shall not have the power to order any other party to
pay such costs, or the costs of convening the Tribunal’.
CAS Code R.65.3 provides: ‘The costs of the parties, witnesses, experts and interpreters shall be
advanced by the parties. In the award, the Panel shall decide which party shall bear them or in what
proportion the parties shall share them, taking into account the outcome of the proceedings, as well
as the conduct and financial resources of the parties’. However, it often leaves the costs to lie where
they fall, and even when it decides to order one side to pay the other’s costs, it usually requires little
more than a token contribution: Kutrovsky v ITF, CAS 2012/A/2804, para 11.3 (‘In accordance with
the constant practice of the CAS, any amount granted on the basis of Article R65.3 of the Code is a
contribution towards the legal fees and other expenses incurred by the prevailing party in connection
with the proceedings and not the full amount spent by such party for his/her claim or defence’).
C4.47 In cases where the facts are clear, and support the athlete’s contention that
his use of the prohibited substance was inadvertent (eg it was an ingredient in a
medication he was taking) and in no way intended to enhance his performance, it
may even be possible to ‘plea-bargain’ with the Anti-Doping Organization that has
brought the charge, seeking to negotiate a more lenient sanction in return for a plea
that avoids the expense and burden of a hearing.1 Any such resolution will have to be
transparent and subject to the rights of appeal of other parties that are enshrined in
Code Art 13, to ensure accountability and to avoid decisions favouring ‘home-town’
athletes.
1 Anti-Doping Organizations such as USADA, UK Anti-Doping and the ITF have been following this
practice for several years, and it was codified in a comment to Art 7 of the 2015 Code, which states:
‘Not all anti-doping rule proceedings which have been initiated by an Anti-Doping Organization need
to go to hearing. There may be cases where the Athlete or other Person agrees to the sanction which
is either mandated by the Code or which the Anti-Doping Organization considers appropriate where
flexibility in sanction is permitted. In all cases, a sanction imposed on the basis of such an agreement
will be reported to parties with a right to appeal under Article 13.2.3 as provided in Article 14.2.2 and
published as provided in Article 14.3.2’. In the 2021 Code, Art 10.8 provides explicitly for Results
Management Agreements and Case Resolution Agreements (to which WADA would also be a party).
CHAPTER C5
Burden and Standard of Proof at the

Hearing on the Merits
Contents
. para
1 INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION... C5.1
2 STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING ORGANIZATION
MUST MEET....................................................................................................... C5.2
3 THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF........................... C5.4
4 ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE................................................................................. C5.5
5 REBUTTAL EVIDENCE.................................................................................... C5.9
1 INITIAL BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE ANTI-DOPING

ORGANIZATION
C5.1 Code Art 3.1 provides that ‘the Anti-Doping Organization shall have
the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred’. This
is an important requirement of fairness and means that unless the Anti-Doping
Organization submits sufficient evidence of each of the factual elements of the anti-
doping rule violation with which the athlete is charged,1 the athlete has no case to
answer and is entitled to have the charge dismissed without having to submit any
proof of his innocence.2
1 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 36 (‘The burden remains upon the [Anti-Doping Organization]
to prove each of the constituent elements of the alleged anti-doping rule violations …’); Zubkov v IOC,
CAS 2017/A/5422, para 695 (‘the Panel must carefully consider the ingredients of liability under each of
the relevant provisions of the WADC that the Athlete is alleged to have contravened. It must then consider
whether the totality of the evidence presented before the Panel enables it to conclude, to the requisite
standard of comfortable satisfaction, that the Athlete personally committed the specific acts or omissions
necessary to constitute an ADRV under each of those separate provisions of the WADC’); Legkov v IOC,
CAS 2017/A/5379, para 727 (same).
2 FINA v J, FINA Doping Panel decision 06/01, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA 2006),
p 83 (charge based on alleged presence of 19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where,
among other things, there was no evidence regarding the chain of custody of the sample, ie how it
was transported from the collection site to the laboratory). Such an application was also made, albeit
unsuccessfully, in ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 66–68,
and in ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania) 2007/A1, para 3.
2 STANDARD OF PROOF THAT THE ANTI-DOPING

ORGANIZATION MUST MEET
C5.2 Code Art 3.1 also specifies that the Anti-Doping Organization must establish
the anti-doping rule violation ‘to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing body
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. This standard of
proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt’.1 Thus,
‘the Panel must carefully consider the ingredients of liability under each of the
relevant provisions of the WADC that the Athlete is alleged to have contravened. It
must then consider whether the totality of the evidence presented before the Panel
enables it to conclude, to the requisite standard of comfortable satisfaction, that the
Athlete personally committed the specific acts or omissions necessary to constitute
an ADRV under each of those separate provisions of the WADC’.2
The CAS has been clear that ‘the standard of proof itself is not a variable one’
depending on the nature of the ADRV alleged.3 In other words:
‘this standard of proof is to be applied, irrespective of whether allegations of anti-
doping rule violations are based on Adverse Analytical Findings or other reliable
evidence’.4
However, while the standard remains constant:
‘inherent within that immutable standard is a requirement that the more serious
the allegation, the more cogent the supporting evidence must be in order for the
allegation to be found proven’.5
On that basis, there is some authority for the proposition that, at least in cases where
the allegations are of particularly grave misconduct, ‘the comfortable satisfaction
standard may not be much different from the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”‘.6
However, this proposition was emphatically rejected in the seminal Bellchambers
case.7 Furthermore, various CAS panel have suggested that the application of the
standard ‘must take into account the circumstances of the case’, which include
‘[t]he paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and also
considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation of authorities of the
governing bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities’.8
Nevertheless, where the facts (or, in particular, the scientific issues) are in dispute, and
there is competent and credible evidence on both sides, the ‘comfortable satisfaction’
standard can be decisive.9
1 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 681 (‘This standard is higher than a mere balance of
probabilities, meaning that it is insufficient for the IOC simply to establish that it is more likely than
not that the Athlete committed an ADRV. At the same time, however, a criminal standard of proof is
not applicable and the Panel is not required to be satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt of the Athlete’s
guilt’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 713 (same). This standard comes from the Korneev
case at the Atlanta Olympics, where the CAS panel ruled that the requisite standard of proof under the
Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code ‘is greater than a mere balance of probabilities but less than a
standard which may be expressed as beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, an appropriate expression
of the standard of proof required is that the ingredients must be established to the comfortable
satisfaction of the Court having in mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made. It follows that
the more serious the allegation being considered the greater is the degree of evidence which is required
to achieve the requisite degree of comfortable satisfaction necessary to establish the commission of
an offence. In addition, the nature of the offence is one of strict liability if a prohibited substance is
used. Accordingly, this is a further factor which may require a higher degree of satisfaction than may
otherwise be appropriate’. Korneev and Gouliev v IOC, CAS (Atlanta) No 003-4L, pp 17-18; followed
in N. v FINA, CAS 98/208. See McLaren, ‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint,
[2012] ISLR Issue 4, p77, at p 84 (‘This standard affords athletes protection from unfounded claims
of an anti-doping rule violation as such accusations can have a grave effect on their reputation and
economic well-being while also recognising that the conviction of athletes must not be impossible
since the use of PEDs in sport is unfair to all participants’).
2 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 695; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 727 (same). See
also IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 36 (‘The burden remains upon the [Anti-Doping
Organization] to prove each of the constituent elements of the alleged anti-doping rule violations to
our comfortable satisfaction’).
3 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 674); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 706 (same).
4 WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 9.3; Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/
A/1912-1913, para 125 (rejecting the athlete’s suggestion that ‘the standard of proof must be very close
to “proof beyond reasonable doubt” because of the particular seriousness of the allegation against Ms
Pechstein. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is typically a criminal law standard that
finds no application in anti-doping cases. Obviously, the Panel is mindful of the seriousness of the
allegations put forward by the ISU but, in the Panel’s view, it is exactly the same seriousness as any
Burden and Standard of Proof at the Hearing on the Merits 741
other anti-doping case brought before the CAS and involving blood doping; nothing more, nothing
less’). The athlete went to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that it was a violation of public policy
to apply the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard of proof to a doping charge rather than the ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’ criminal standard, but the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected that argument: see para
C4.17, n 5.
5 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 674; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 706 (same). See
Zubkov, ibid, para 686, and Legkov, ibid, para 718 (‘At the same time, however, the Panel is mindful
that the allegations asserted against the Athlete are of the utmost seriousness. The Athlete is accused of
knowingly participating in a corrupt conspiracy of unprecedented magnitude and sophistication. Given
the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent on the IOC to adduce particularly cogent evidence
of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement in that wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient
for the IOC merely to establish the existence of an overarching doping scheme to the comfortable
satisfaction of the Panel. Instead, the IOC must go further and establish, in each individual case, that
the individual athlete knowingly engaged in particular conduct that involved the commission of a
specific and identifiable ADRV. In other words, the Panel must be comfortably satisfied that the Athlete
personally committed a specific violation of a specific provision of the WADC’); Romanova v IOC,
CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (same). See also IAAF v RusAF and Khanafeeva, CAS 2018/O/5673,
para 61 (‘The Athlete is accused, inter alia, of having used Prohibited Substances and having knowingly
benefited from a doping scheme and system that was covering up her positive doping results and
registered them as negative in ADAMS. Given the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent
upon the IAAF to adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement
in that wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient for the IAAF merely to establish the existence of an
overarching doping scheme to the Sole Arbitrator. Instead, the IAAF must go further and establish, in
each individual case, that the individual athlete knowingly engaged in particular conduct that involved
the commission of a specific and identifiable ADRV’); IAAF v RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675,
para 63 (same); IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, para 86 (‘The gravity of the particular
alleged wrongdoing is relevant to the application of the comfortable satisfaction standard in any given
case. In CAS 2014/A/3625 (para 132), the panel stated that the comfortable satisfaction standard
is “a kind of sliding scale, based on the allegations at stake: the more serious the allegation and
its consequences, the higher certainty (level of proof) the Panel would require to be ‘comfortably
satisfied’”); IAAF v RUSAF & Bespalova, CAS 2018/O/5676, para 63 (‘[…] the Sole Arbitrator is
mindful that the allegations asserted against the Athlete are of the utmost seriousness. The Athlete
is accused, inter alia, of having used Prohibited Substances and having knowingly benefitted from
a doping scheme and system that was covering up her positive doping results and registered them
as negative in ADAMS. Given the gravity of the alleged wrongdoing, it is incumbent on the IAAF
to adduce particularly cogent evidence of the Athlete’s deliberate personal involvement in that
wrongdoing. In particular, it is insufficient for the IAAF merely to establish the existence of an
overarching doping scheme to the comfortable satisfaction of the Sole Arbitrator. Instead, the IAAF
must go further and establish, in each individual case, that the individual athlete knowingly engaged in
particular conduct that involved the commission of a specific and identifiable ADRV. In other words,
the Sole Arbitrator must be comfortably satisfied that the Athlete personally committed a specific
violation of a specific provision of the 2012-2013 IAAF Rules. […] Ultimately, the Sole Arbitrator has
the task of weighing the evidence adduced by the Parties in support of their respective allegations. If,
in the Sole Arbitrator’s view, both sides’ evidence carries the same weight, the rules on the burden of
proof must break the tie’); IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, paras 277-78 (‘In
other words, evidence must be more persuasive as the consequences the allegation carries increase.
Applying these legal principles and this logic to the allegations at hand, and as eventually conceded by
the Athlete at the hearing, it follows that the standard of proof to establish that an ADRV has occurred,
even in a “use” case, remains that of a “comfortable satisfaction”, and not that of beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, IBU’s evidence supporting the charge of aggravating circumstances pursuant to
Article 10.6 IBU ADR and which carries up to a four year period of ineligibility, must be even more
persuasive than the evidence supporting the charge of “use” pursuant to Article 2.2 IBU ADR […]’).
The same approach is taken in English courts. If an event is prima facie unlikely, then under English
law there will need to be good evidence to establish it: see para D1.103 and Re B [2008] UKHL 35.
The principle in that case extends outside care proceedings, which it involved. See for example most
recently Bank St Petersburg PJSC v Arkhangelsky [2020] EWCA Civ 408. For further discussion of
the concept of proof in the context of anti-doping, see UCI v. Alberto Contador Velasco and RFEC
and WADA v. Alberto Contador and RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384 & 2386, which exposes some of the
difficulties. The cyclist was held not to have established ingestion of clenbuterol through contaminated
meat (notwithstanding that it was common ground that he had eaten beef from a farm that had in
the past been convicted of clenbuterol misuse in cattle), and the UCI and WADA were held not to
have established ingestion through blood doping. The CAS panel based its finding on a point not
fully argued by the UCI or WADA, or indeed the cyclist, and which may seem surprising on the
facts, namely that the cyclist had not shown that the substance might not have come into his body
inadvertently but negligently through a supplement (notwithstanding that his team checked all his
supplements and there would have been no reason, and in fact the opposite, for him to have taken an
unchecked one). See further para C18.10.
6 Hamilton v USADA & UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 47, citing USADA v Montgomery and USADA v
Gaines, in which the CAS panel held that ‘in general, the more serious the allegation the less likely it
is that the alleged event occurred and, hence, the stronger the evidence required before the occurrence
of the event is demonstrated to be more probable than not. […] In view of the nature and gravity of
the allegations at issue in these proceedings, there is no practical distinction between the standards
of proof advocated by USADA and the Respondents. […] Either way, USADA bears the burden of
proving, by strong evidence commensurate with the serious claims it makes, that the Respondents
committed the doping offences in question’; USADA v Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, para 36;
USADA v Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, para 36. See to the same effect Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286,
paras 9.13-9.14; and USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 5.1.
7 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 105 (‘The Panel does not accept that there is no
material difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof of comfortable satisfaction.
The dictum in USADA v Tim Montgomery was manifestly and expressly case specific’) and ibid (‘The
Panel does not accept that WADA is obliged to “eliminate all possibilities” which could point to the
Players’ innocence’). See also DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 50 (‘[…] a panel must be
comfortably satisfied with the ambit of the evidence that the allegation is proven beyond the balance
of probability test but the panel does not require the application of the rigorous standard of beyond
reasonable doubt’).
8 Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 110, quoting from other CAS awards; IAAF v RUSAF &
Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, para 84 (‘CAS jurisprudence provides guidance on the meaning and
application of the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof. The test of comfortable satisfaction
“must take into account the circumstances of the case” (CAS 2013/A/3258 para. 122). Those
circumstances include “[t]he paramount importance of fighting corruption of any kind in sport and
also considering the nature and restricted powers of the investigation authorities of the governing
bodies of sport as compared to national formal interrogation authorities” (CAS 2009/A/1920;
CAS 2013/A/3258)’); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (same).
9 As it was, for example, in Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, where the CAS panel found that
the IOC had not sustained its burden of proving to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that
isometheptene was sufficiently similar to any substance expressly mentioned on the Prohibited List to
be treated itself as a prohibited substance: see para C6.23. See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422,
para 687 (‘If, in the Panel’s view, both sides’ evidence carries the same weight, the rules on the burden
of proof must break the tie’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 719 (same).
C5.3 In Code Art 2.1 cases, where the only elements of the violation are the
presence of a prohibited substance in a sample provided by the athlete,1 a laboratory
report that a sample taken from the athlete returned an adverse analytical finding for
that prohibited substance will suffice to make out a prima facie case, if the B sample
analysis confirms that finding (or is waived).2 It will then be up to the athlete to submit
evidence that disturbs that showing.3 It is to be noted, however, that where there is
doubt, for example, as to whether the substance found is a prohibited substance,4
or as to whether it might have been endogenously produced,5 or as to whether a
metabolite found in the sample was derived from a prohibited substance,6 the Anti-
Doping Organization’s obligation to discharge the standard of proof may become
much more significant, even in a Code Art 2.1 case. And in a non-analytical case
under one of the other provisions of Code Art 2, the position may be more difficult
still.7
2 See Code Art 2.1.2. Diane Modahl’s counsel contended that ‘although the burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt is upon the Federation, the certified result of the test goes so far to discharge that
burden that in practice the athlete will have to adduce evidence which raises a reasonable doubt’:
Modahl v BAF Ltd (22 July 1999, unreported), HL (Hoffman LJ). The former President of the
IAAF Arbitration Panel agreed that ‘in practice the burden of proof moves rapidly to the athlete’s
side’: Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at p 66.
3 In the Court of Appeal in Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude (No 2) (26 March 1996, unreported),
Lord Justice Neill ruled that this was not unreasonable: ‘prima facie, scientific evidence establishes
that certain facts exists and it seems not unreasonable, in the context of a code of this kind, that it
should be for the player to rebut the prima facie case against him’. On the other hand, Lord Justice
Neill also said that the athlete’s burden should be sustainable by proof ‘on the balance of probabilities’,
ie the civil standard rather than the criminal standard or something in between. And that is the approach
adopted in the Code: see para C4.17. The establishment of the prima facie case shifts the evidential
burden onto the athlete to refute what it indicates, and if he does that on the balance of probabilities,
the Anti-Doping Organization cannot satisfy its legal burden to the comfortable satisfaction of the
tribunal.

7 See eg French v Australian Sports Commission & Cycling Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, where the CAS
panel held that the non-analytical evidence proffered of knowing use of prohibited substances was
not sufficient to meet the required standard, given the gravity of the charges (para C7.15); and IBU v
Klimina Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 160 (‘Taking into consideration the
whole picture of the above factual circumstances presented to it, the Panel finds that there are some
indications or even a certain likelihood that the Athlete received prohibited infusions of more than 50
mL. A mere likelihood, however, does not meet the standard of comfortable satisfaction […]’).
3 THE ATHLETE’S BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
C5.4 ‘Where the Code places the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other Person
alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to rebut a presumption or
establish specified facts or circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance
of probability’.1 So, for example, where the athlete has the burden to prove that his
ADRV was not intentional (under Art 10.2.1.12) or to show how a substance got into
his system for purposes of a mitigation plea under Code Art 10.2.1.13 or 10.4 or
10.5,4 he must make that showing on the balance of probabilities, ie he must persuade
the hearing panel ‘that the occurrence of the circumstances on which the Athlete
relies is more probable than their non-occurrence’.5
1 Code Art 3.1.
2 See para C17.2(a).
4 See para C18.5.
5 WADA v IWF & Caicedo, CAS 2016/A/4377, para 51; Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124, para 12.1;
WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 & 1844, para 156; IAAF v AFS & Javornik,
CAS 2008/A/1608, para 58; IRB v Keyter, CAS 2006/A/1067, para 6.4. See also ITF v Gasquet,
CAS 2009/A/1926, para 5.9 (‘[…] for the Panel to be satisfied that a means of ingestion is demonstrated
on a balance of probability simply means, in percentage terms, that it is satisfied that there is a 51%
chance of it having occurred. The Player thus only needs to show that one specific way of ingestion is
marginally more likely than not to have occurred’), followed in Van Snick v Federation Internationale
de Judo, CAS 2014/A/3475, para 79, and in Sheikh Al Nahyan v FEI, CAS 2014/A/3591, para 196;
WADA v FIVB & Berrios, CAS 2010/A/2229, para 82 (‘In other words, a panel should simply find the
explanation of an Athlete about the presence of a Specified Substance more probable than not’). See
further para C18.12.
4 ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
C5.5 Code Art 3.2 provides that ‘facts related to anti-doping rule violations may
be established by any reliable means, including admissions’.1 In other words, strict
rules as to admissibility of evidence that might apply in court do not apply in anti-
doping hearings. Instead, objections to evidence in anti-doping proceedings go to
‘weight rather than admissibility’.2 As the CAS panel noted in Hamilton v USADA
and UCI:
‘this rule gives great leeway to […] anti-doping agencies to prove violations, so long
as they can comfortably satisfy a tribunal that the means of proof is reliable. As a
result, it is not even necessary that a violation be proven by a scientific test itself.
Instead, as some cases have found, a violation may be proved through admissions,
testimony of witnesses, or other documentation evidencing a violation’.3
Indeed, entirely circumstantial evidence may be sufficient,4 so long as it comfortably
satisfies the panel of facts from which the requisite elements of the violation charged
may be properly inferred.5 This is particularly so when the wrongdoing alleged
includes alleged covering up of doping activities, since it is to be expected in such
cases that an Anti-Doping Organization, which lacks state powers of search and
seizure, will not have direct evidence but instead will necessarily have to rely on
indirect evidence.6
1 The comment to Code Art 2.2 adds as further examples of reliable means of proving Use ‘witness
statements, documentary evidence, conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling, including data
collected as part of the Athlete Biological Passport, or other analytical information which does
not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish “Presence” of a Prohibited Substance under
Article 2.1. For example, Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis
of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B Sample) or from the analysis of a
B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a satisfactory explanation for the lack
of confirmation in the other Sample)’.
Article 6.1.1 of the 2021 Code has added as further examples of reliable means of proving ADRVs
‘reliable laboratory or other forensic testing conducted outside of WADA-accredited or approved
laboratories’, eg DNA analysis, finger-printing.
2 ICC v Amir, Asif and Butt, Anti-Corruption Tribunal decision dated 5 February 2011, para 29
(construing identical clause to Code Art 3.2 in the ICC Anti-Corruption Code).
3 Hamilton v USADA & UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 48, citing the Montgomery and Gaines decisions
(as to which, see para C7.14).
4 See eg WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 67 (‘The Panel may consider any
evidence, even circumstantial evidence’); WADA v FIBA & Morgan, FIBA AC decision 2005-1, dated
22 June 2005, p 7 (‘[…] both forms of determining the facts (direct evidence and circumstantial
evidence) are, in principle, equal’).
5 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 683 and para 685; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, paras
715 and 717. See eg Kolasa v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 22 May 2014,
para 4.26 et seq (discussing difference between proving intent to evade sample collection directly and
providing it ‘based on the circumstantial evidence of the circumstances in which he left the scene’).
For example, the CAS held that it was enough, to sustain a charge of manipulation, to satisfy the
hearing panel that the athlete was the only person who at the relevant time had the motive, opportunity
and technical skill to manipulate the sample in a manner that would be undetected. Boevski v IWF,
CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.5, citing Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 1998/A/211, para 12.3. In such
circumstances, it would be for the athlete to put forward an alternative theory identifying a plausible
alternative culprit, that is sufficiently supported by evidence to undermine the panel’s satisfaction
on the point. Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.9.6 (‘Once the probability that manipulation
occurred in this phase of the chain of custody [ie when the sample was in the athlete’s control]
becomes apparent then some explanation or plausible hypothesis that the athlete was not involved
must be brought forward to refute the circumstantial evidence as to the probability of the manipulation
either being carried out by the Appellant or with his consent and approval’).
Similarly, a hearing panel may be asked to infer the use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited
method from circumstantial evidence in the form of ‘markers’ of such use found in the athlete’s
sample. See paras C7.1 and C7.9, n 4.
6 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 683 (‘The alleged doping scheme was, by its very nature,
intended and designed to conceal evidence of wrongdoing to the maximum extent possible. As a result,
the more successful the alleged conspiracy was at achieving its objectives, the less direct evidence
of wrongdoing is likely to be available to the IOC. The absence of direct evidence, therefore, is not
necessarily indicative of innocence, but may equally be indicative that serious wrongdoing has been
effectively concealed’) and para 685 (‘In view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and the
IOC’s limited investigatory powers, the IOC may properly invite the Panel to draw inferences from the
established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Panel may accede to that invitation
where it considers that the established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So
long as the Panel is comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the
Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, it may conclude that the IOC has established an ADRV
notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone’); Legkov v IOC,
CAS 2017/A/5379, paras 715 and 717 (same); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 204 (‘the
IOC is not a national or international law enforcement agency. Its investigatory powers are substantially
more limited than the powers available to such bodies. Since the IOC cannot compel the provision of
documents or testimony, it must place greater reliance on the consensual provision of information and
evidence and on evidence that is already in the public domain. The evidence that it is able to present
before the CAS necessarily reflects these inherent limitations in the IOC’s investigatory powers. The
Panel’s assessment of the evidence must respect those limitations. In particular, it must not be premised
on unrealistic expectations concerning the evidence that the IOC is able to obtain from reluctant or
evasive witnesses or other sources’) and (‘in view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and the
IOC’s limited investigatory powers, the IOC may properly invite the Panel to draw inferences from the
established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Panel may accede to that invitation
where it considers that the established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So long as
the Panel is comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has
committed a particular ADRV, it may conclude that the IOC has established an ADRV notwithstanding
that it is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone’).
See also IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, paras 99–100 (‘Second, in considering
whether he is comfortably satisfied that an ADRV has occurred, the Sole Arbitrator will consider all
the relevant circumstances of the case. In the context of the present case, the relevant circumstances
include, but are not limited to, the following. 100. The IAAF contends that the Athlete “was part
of a centralised doping scheme”. The alleged doping scheme was intended and designed to conceal
evidence of wrongdoing. As a result, the more successful the alleged scheme was, the less direct
evidence of wrongdoing is likely to be available to the IAAF. The Sole Arbitrator thus notes that
the absence of direct evidence is not necessarily an indication of innocence, but may equally be
indicative that the wrongdoing has been effectively concealed. 101. The IAAF is not a national or
international law enforcement agency, and its investigatory powers are more limited than the powers
available to such bodies. The Sole Arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence shall take these limitations
into consideration’); IAAF v RUSAF & Bespalova, CAS 2018/O/5676, para 63 (‘Further, when
evaluating whether he was comfortably satisfied that an ADRV had occurred, the Sole Arbitrator did
take into consideration all relevant circumstances of the case. In the context of the present case, and
by analogy to other cases handled by the CAS concerning similar issues relating to similar evidence
(CAS 2017/A/5379 and CAS 2017/A/5422), the relevant circumstances include, but are not limited, to
the following: – the IAAF is not a national or international law enforcement agency. Its investigatory
powers are substantially more limited than the powers available to such bodies. Since the IAAF cannot
compel the provision of documents or testimony, it must place greater reliance on the consensual
provision of information and evidence and on evidence that is already in the public domain. The
evidence that it is able to present before the CAS necessarily reflects these inherent limitations in the
IAAF’s investigatory powers. The Sole Arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence must respect those
limitations. In particular, it must not be premised on unrealistic expectations concerning the evidence
that the IAAF is able to obtain from reluctant or evasive witnesses and other source. – in view of the
nature of the alleged doping scheme and the IAAF’s limited investigatory powers, the IAAF may
properly invite the Sole Arbitrator to draw inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps
in the direct evidence. The Sole Arbitrator may accede to that invitation where he considers that the
established facts reasonably support the drawing of the inferences. So long as the Sole Arbitrator is
comfortably satisfied about the underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed
a particular ADRV, he may conclude that the IAAF has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it
is not possible to reach that conclusion by direct evidence alone. […] – in considering whether the
IAAF has discharged its burden of proof to the requisite standard of proof, the Sole Arbitrator will
consider any admissible “reliable” evidence adduced by the IAAF. This includes any admissions by
the Athlete, any “credible testimony” by third parties and any “reliable” documentary evidence or
scientific evidence […]’).
C5.6 The hearing panel decides whether the party with the burden of proof has
met that burden by considering the ‘cumulative effect’ of all the evidence adduced.1
The CAS panel in Bellchambers explained:2
‘107. In Attorney General for Jersey v Edmond-O’Brien, in a decision of the Privy
Council (2006 1 WLR 1485), Lord Hoffman said this in criticism of the
Jersey Court of Appeal’s judgment, which the Board overturned (para 25):
Although they said they had reviewed the evidence “separately and
together”, there is little indication that they had regard to the cumulative
weight of the various items of evidence, to each of which they had,
sometimes not altogether plausibly, assigned a possible innocent
explanation. It is in the nature of circumstantial evidence that single
items of evidence may each be capable of an innocent explanation but,
taken together, establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
108. Although that statement was articulated in the context of a criminal case,
in the Panel’s view Lord Hoffman’s reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis, to
the situation where a Tribunal is mandated to have ‘comfortable satisfaction’
before it can inculpate a sportsperson of a disciplinary offence, a fortiori
where certain pieces of evidence are themselves suspicious.
109. Wigmore in his classic treatise on the Law of Evidence distinguishes between
two analytical methods in an engineering metaphor: links in a chain and
strands in a cable. ASADA, before the AFL Tribunal, relied exclusively on an
analysis of links in a chain […]
110. By the time of the hearing (as foreshadowed in their skeleton argument),
WADA preferred the strands in the cable analysis. […]
[…]
113. Yet further analogies (jigsaws; Danish arthouse films) were thrown into the
forensic mix. However, metaphor is ultimately no substitute, in the Panel’s
view, for evaluating all relevant and credible items of evidence and asking
itself whether, considered cumulatively, they satisfied the test of comfortable
satisfaction.’
Using the ‘strands in the cable’ analogy, the Bellchambers panel went through the
different strands of evidence submitted by WADA of the athletes’ use of a prohibited
substance, and concluded that taken together they created a cable that was ‘sufficiently
strong’ to satisfy it comfortably of such use.3 The analogy also explained why it
upheld the charge even though it did not rule in WADA’s favour on every single
issue.4
1 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, paras 107-08 (in the context of Anti-Doping
Organization’s burden to prove use of a prohibited substance); Alabbar v FEI, CAS 2013/A/3124,
para 12.3 (in context of athlete’s burden to prove how the prohibited substance got into his system).
See eg cases cited at para C7.14 in the context of the athlete’s burden to prove the source of the
prohibited substance found in the athlete’s system.
2 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, followed in DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937,
paras 51–53, and in IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, para 85 (‘[…] a panel is allowed
to consider the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence. Therefore, even if single items of
evidence may each be inadequate to establish a violation to the comfortable satisfaction of a hearing
panel, considered together they may suffice’). See also Report No. 2 of Professor Richard to WADA,
9 December 2016, pp 35–36 (‘The different types of evidence provided with respect to any individual
athlete are like strands in a cable. It will be up to each Results Management Authority to determine
whether the provided strands of evidence, standing alone or together build a sufficiently strong cable
to support an ADRV in an individual case’). See also Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 212
(‘circumstantial evidence may have some probative value insofar as individual strands of evidence,
which are, taken separately, not sufficient to prove that an ADRV occurred, could, when taken
together, establish such ADRV to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction. However, to do so, such strands
of evidence have nonetheless to be established and in a case such as the present, which concerns
allegations of doping that may entail heavy sanctions for the Athlete, there must be cogent evidence
establishing a personal and direct involvement of the Athlete in the commission of the relevant
ADRV’).
3 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 120 et seq, and see para 139 (‘The Panel does not
find it necessary to resolve this issue. It accepts that there are arguments in favour of each hypothesis.
In its view, were WADA’s analysis to be correct, it would do no more than add another strand to a cable
which was already sufficiently strong’).
4 Ibid.
C5.7 Reliance may also be placed on evidence that was illegally acquired, at least
where the Anti-Doping Organization proffering the evidence was not involved in
the illegality, and the public interest in exposing the wrongdoing in issue outweighs
the interest of the defendant in not having illegally obtained evidence used against
him.1 ‘Under Swiss law […] such evidence can be used, even if it was collected with
violation of certain human rights, if there is an overriding public interest at stake. In
the case at hand, the internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest,
which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr Valverde’s personal rights’.2 It
seems clear that the result would be the same if English law governed.3
1 IAAF v ARAF & Mokhnev, CAS 2016/O/4504, para 72 et seq (use of tape recordings of incriminating
conversations recorded by an athlete with her coach without the permission of the coach, in alleged
breach of Russian law); IAAF v ARAF & Kazarin, CAS 2016/A/4480, paras 76–80 (same).
2 WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 10.5(c). The same principle applies in the
context of anti-corruption cases: see para B4.38(c).
3 Subject to certain narrow exceptions (including privileged documents, confessions, and evidence
obtained by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), evidence obtained ‘unlawfully, improperly
or unfairly is admissible as a matter of law’ in English criminal proceedings (Blackstone’s Criminal
Practice 2021, para F2.1) and in English civil proceedings. See Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v The Queen,
[1955] AC 197, 199 (‘In their Lordships’ opinion, the test to be applied in considering whether
evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible, and the
Court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained’). It is argued by some that there may be
circumstances under English law where probative value is weighed against the extent of the illegality
and the court exercises a discretion to exclude.
C5.8 The person charged may want to test the strength of the Anti-Doping
Organization’s evidence by cross-examination of its witnesses. For example, he may
want to cross-examine members of the sample collection team, or members of the
laboratory’s staff involved in analysis of the sample. If the rules do not entitle him
to do so, or if the Anti-Doping Organization is unable or unwilling to produce the
witnesses required, and the hearing panel lacks the power to enforce their presence,1
and it is not possible to get an English court to issue a witness summons under the
Arbitration Act 1996,2 the basis exists for a challenge to any adverse award on the
ground that the process was unfair because the person charged was denied a proper
opportunity to defend himself.3
1 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 81 (‘The contractual regime
governing determination of charges of doping offences does not include any obligation on either party
to the contract to make witnesses available to give oral evidence against the will of the witness or the
party asked to produce the witness’).
2 As happened, in the anti-corruption context, in England & Wales Cricket Board v Kaneria
[2013] EWHC 1074 (discussed at para B4.28, n 3).
3 See further para E7.65 et seq. However, the panel may seek to pre-empt such a challenge by making
clear that it will give less weight to evidence that has not been subjected to cross-examination: WADA v
Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, paras 117–18 (as a matter of law the panel was entitled to
admit hearsay evidence, and it therefore did not exclude written evidence of witnesses who could
not be compelled to attend and so could not be cross-examined, but it did place less weight on that
evidence than it might otherwise have done); IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11 February
2020, para 398 (‘The contents of the inventory cannot be verified and Dr Rodchenkov has not testified
as to the accuracy or reliability of the information, nor has the Athlete been able to test or challenge
his evidence through the process of cross-examination before the Panel. Therefore, the Panel gives
this evidence little weight’). Cf Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 95 (‘The Appellant claims that
his right to be heard has been violated because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine
Professor Cowan. The Panel observes that there is no inalienable right under the Code for a party to
cross-examine an expert. The Panel is only called upon to ensure that the parties’ right to be heard is
guaranteed. This, however, can be done also through other means than by cross-examination, eg by
an additional round of written submissions’). That last dictum is perhaps surprising, and CAS should
and would probably seek to ensure that such an opportunity should be available. A difficult question
may be where the Anti-Doping Organization wishes to rely on the evidence of anonymous witnesses,
whether with or without anonymous cross examination. On occasion it may be very important for
anonymity to be preserved, but generally, the inability of the athlete to know the identity of the witness
and so effectively to cross examine means that such evidence should carry little weight, at least unless
supported by other, empirical and indisputable, evidence. See further para B4.38.
5 REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
C5.9 Assuming the Anti-Doping Organization’s evidence does establish a prima

facie case to the requisite standard, the athlete’s lawyer will have to consider what
witness evidence may be required to rebut that case, or else to support any defence or
plea in mitigation to be advanced on behalf of the athlete. Depending on the nature of
the case brought and/or the defence or plea in mitigation, fact witnesses (eg character
witnesses) may or may not be necessary. In Art 2.1 cases, it is very likely that an
expert witness will be required to speak to the sufficiency of the analytical evidence
presented against the athlete, and/or to support any theory offered by the athlete, for
example as to how the sample may have got into his system.1 The expert witness will
be able to opine, for example, on the extent to which the results of other drug tests
taken by the athlete may assist his defence;2 although the Anti-Doping Organization
may then offer competing expert evidence to rebut any such opinion.3 WADA’s
stance that employees of other WADA-accredited laboratories because of a conflict
of interest should not give expert evidence against that of the laboratory that has
undertaken the sample analysis poses a significant problem for athletes in securing
an expert.
1 See para C7.14.
2 C v FINA, CAS 2002/A/430, para 9.3.6 (‘[…] the Panel remains unconvinced by the Appellant’s
arguments that the negative result of the samples collected by the Athens laboratory on 10 September
2001 effectively disqualified the positive findings of the “A” and “B” samples analyzed by the Tunis
laboratory during the prior week. A doping procedure such as that initiated on 6 September 2001
following the Appellant’s participation in the 4 × 100 mixed relay event represents only a “snapshot”
of the athlete’s physiological condition at the time the samples were collected. On the basis of this
“snapshot”, the Appellant has no basis upon which to contend that she never used prohibited substances
prior to the taking of the positive samples; nor can she argue that the absence of a prohibited substance
in the samples collected on 10 September 2001 in Athens proves that the testing done on 6 September
2001 was not “credible”‘).
3 Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, para 98 (‘[…] the Panel does not accept that Prof. Franke’s
hypothesis [ie that the elevated levels of nandrolone in the athlete’s sample were a ‘spike’ caused
by contusion of the testicles] is corroborated by the fact that the Appellant did not test positive for
nandrolone in other doping control procedures conducted immediately before and immediately after the
Olympic Games. Professor Cowan testified, and the Panel accepts, that nandrolone and its precursors
are very rapidly metabolised and eliminated from the body. Accordingly, the results of the other doping
control procedures cannot be given any weight in assessing the cause of the elevated concentration of
19-norandrosterone detected in the Appellant’s urine at the Olympic Games immediately after the gold
medal match’).
C5.10 Should the athlete give evidence in his own defence? He is not required
to do so, and cannot be forced to do so,1 but he may have to, in order to dispute the
case presented against him, or to support his own defence and/or plea in mitigation.
There is no ‘right to silence’ in anti-doping proceedings,2 and therefore Code Art
3.2.5 permits an adverse inference to be drawn against an athlete who fails to answer
questions from the Anti-Doping Organization or the hearing panel.3 Even when such
considerations do not apply, however, the authors would suggest that as a general
rule the athlete should testify in any event, if only to drive home to the hearing panel
members the potential impact on a fellow human being of the decisions they have to
make.4
1 USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January 2012, paras 6.21, 6.29.
2 See para B4.38.
3 Code Art 3.2.5 states: ‘The hearing panel in a hearing on an anti-doping rule violation may draw an
inference adverse to the Athlete or other Person who is asserted to have committed an anti-doping rule
violation based on the Athlete’s or other Person’s refusal, after a request made in a reasonable time
in advance of the hearing, to appear at the hearing (either in person or telephonically as directed by
the hearing panel and to answer questions from the hearing panel or the Anti-Doping Organization
asserting the anti-doping rule violation’. For example, adverse inferences were drawn in the BALCO
cases (discussed at para C7.14); and in USADA v Hellebuyck, AAA Panel decision dated 30 January
2012, paras 6.21, 6.29.
4 Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 57 (‘The Panel was not afforded the opportunity to form its
own impression of the athlete. It is difficult for the Panel to identify further mitigating circumstances if
an athlete decides not to appear before the Panel for the hearing of his/her case which may have a very
substantial impact on his/her future professional career. The Panel encourages the athletes in their own
interest to participate in the hearings before the CAS’).
C5.11 On the other hand, an athlete’s direct testimony on a particular issue may not
be enough to satisfy a panel.1 Therefore defence counsel should always be looking
for independent corroboration of that testimony.
1 See eg ASADA v O’Neill, CAS 2009/A/1591, para 57 (‘Mr O’Neill provided no corroborative evidence
as to his asserted research on the substance Phentermine. We do not accept, without such corroborating
evidence, that Mr O’Neill has established he conducted adequate research into the clearance time of
the substance or if he conducted any research at all. In any event we would have to be satisfied that
such research would have allowed the conclusion to be drawn. Further, Mr O’Neill asserted he relied
upon advice from his father, a qualified pharmacist. The father should have been made available to
corroborate Mr O’Neill’s assertion he relied upon such informed advice. No statement, nor record of
opinion, was tendered by the athlete to give credence to his assertion’).
CHAPTER C6
Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a

Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites
or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample
Contents
. para
1 ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE..... C6.4
A Proving a departure from a relevant requirement........................................ C6.10
B Proving that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse
analytical finding.......................................................................................... C6.11
2 ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE LABORATORY’S ADVERSE
ANALYTICAL FINDING................................................................................... C6.19
A Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on ‘procedural’
grounds......................................................................................................... C6.20
B Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on ‘substantive’
grounds......................................................................................................... C6.28
IN FACT PROHIBITED...................................................................................... C6.35
A Is the substance expressly listed on the Prohibited List?............................. C6.37
B If the substance is a ‘threshold substance’, ie one where a certain
concentration has to be shown to be present in the sample in order for
it to be a violation, was the concentration found in the athlete’s sample
over the threshold?....................................................................................... C6.40
C If the substance found in the athlete’s sample may be produced naturally,
can the Anti-Doping Organization prove that the substance in the sample
was exogenous?........................................................................................... C6.42
D Testosterone................................................................................................. C6.44
E Nandrolone................................................................................................... C6.47
F Peptide hormones, growth factors, and related substances.......................... C6.54
G Does the substance fall within a category of substances included on the
Prohibited List?............................................................................................ C6.55
H Is the substance in issue ‘similar’ to a substance on the Prohibited List?.... C6.56
I Is the substance a metabolite or a marker of a prohibited substance?......... C6.61
C6.1 What must the Anti-Doping Organization prove (to the requisite standard) in
order to establish a prima facie case? That depends, of course, on which anti-doping
rule violation is alleged to have been committed. The rules must make the requisite
elements of the violation clear, so that there is no doubt as to what the Anti-Doping
Organization must plead and prove, but there may be room for argument as to exactly
what is required to be proved in a particular case.1 The various elements of each of the
Code anti-doping rule violations are considered in turn below, starting with the Art
2.1 Presence violation. If the Anti-Doping Organization is alleging an Art 2.1 anti-
doping rule violation, it must establish to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
panel ‘the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an
Athlete’s Sample’. This is a ‘strict liability’ offence, meaning that ‘it is not necessary
that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated
in order to establish’ the violation.2 Nor does the Anti-Doping Organization have to
show how the prohibited substance got into the athlete’s sample,3 or indeed that it
went through the athlete’s body first.4 Nor does it have to show that the substance did
in fact enhance the athlete’s sports performance.5
1 Any ambiguity in the rules will likely be interpreted against the Anti-Doping Organization and in
favour of the athlete: see para C4.15, n 3.
2 Code Art 2.1.1. See WADA v Jobson, CAS 2010/A/2307, para 111 (‘As a result [of the FIFA equivalent
of Code Art 2.1.1], the Panel finds that the objective presence of cocaine-metabolites in the Player’s
bodily samples, regardless of the Player’s subjective attitude (ie his possible intent, knowledge, fault
or negligence) constitutes an anti-doping rule violation under article 5 FIFA ADR proven to the
Panel’s comfortable satisfaction bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation’); Meca-Medina and
Mejcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, para 10.17 (‘Strict liability rules do not require
investigation of motive or even consideration of what sensible competitors might have done: it can
indeed be surmised that those who use prohibited substances are by definition risk takers’).
On the other hand, the athlete’s intent (or lack thereof) and/or degree of knowledge, fault or
negligence will be highly relevant as a mitigating factor when it comes to sanction. See Chapters
C17–C20. Therefore, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to be prepared to address the issue, even
in an Art 2.1 case.
3 Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 67 (‘As it is a strict liability offence, the question of how the
Prohibited Substance entered the Player’s sample is not relevant to the commission of an ADRV’);
Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para 141 (‘Because this is a strict liability violation, we find that
the mere presence of BE in the Appellant’s Sample is in and of itself a violation. The manner in which
the BE entered the sample is irrelevant (unless caused by a rule departure […])’); Hipperdinger v
ATP, CAS/A/690, para 55 (‘[…] the principle of strict liability means that an athlete is responsible
for whatever substance is in his body, without having regard to the reasons for such presence and the
degree of any respective fault of the athlete’); Watt v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision
dated 10 March 2015, para 22 (‘Under article 2.1 evidence as to whether or how or when the athlete
used or ingested a prohibited substance is irrelevant; the fact which constitutes the contravention is the
presence of a prohibited substance in the sample’).
The rule could not be otherwise: ‘it would put a definite end to any meaningful fight against doping
if the federations were required to prove the necessary subjective elements of the offence, ie intent or
negligence on the part of the athlete. In fact, since neither the federation nor the CAS has the means of
conducting its own investigation or of compelling witnesses to give evidence, means which are available
to the public prosecutor in criminal proceedings, it would be all too simple for an athlete to deny any
intent or negligence and to simply state that he/she has no idea how the prohibited substance arrived
in his/her system’. Aanes v FILA, CAS 2001/A/317A, p 19 (citations omitted). See also USA Shooting
& Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir, CAS 94/129, para 36 (‘[…] a requirement of intent would
invite costly litigation that may well cripple federations – particularly those run on modest budgets
in their fight against doping’); Gasser v Stinson, (15 June 1988, unreported), QBD Scott J. (‘But
the consequences if the absolute nature of the offence were removed or if the length of the sentence
became discretionary and not mandatory must be considered. Suppose an athlete gives evidence that
he or she did not take the drug knowingly and that it must therefore be inferred that the drug was
ingested unknowingly. How is the IAAF to deal with such an explanation? How can credibility be
tested? Suppose a third party, perhaps a member of the athlete’s team of coaches, perhaps a medical
adviser, perhaps a malicious prankster, gives evidence that he or she administered the drug to the
athlete and that the athlete had no knowledge that this was being done. How is the credibility of that
third party’s evidence to be tested? The pressure for success in international athletics, as well as in
domestic athletics, and the national pride and prestige that have become part of international athletics
have to be borne in mind. Will the credibility of the athlete or the third party vary depending upon
the nation to which he or she belongs? If a competitor or third party from nation A is to be believed,
what will be the position when similar evidence is given by a competitor or third party from nation
B? The lengths to which some people will go in order to achieve the appearance of success for their
nation’s athletes in athletics competitions is in point […]. Cynicism, sadly, abounds. Mr Holt, in his
evidence, said that in his view, if a defence of moral innocence were open, the floodgates would be
opened and the IAAF’s attempts to prevent drug-taking by athletes would be rendered futile. He had,
in my opinion, reason for that fear’), followed in Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude by both Mr
Justice Lightman (19 March 1996, unreported), QBD and the Court of Appeal ((1996) Independent,
26 April, unreported); ITF v Beck, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 February 2006, para 7 (‘It
is a fundamental principle of the WADA Code that this is a strict liability offence for which no intent
on the part of the player needs to be proved. This is an essential principle of the anti-doping regime,
necessary to make the controls effective. As the evidence in this case shows, if it were necessary in
order to prove the offence that a tribunal should be able to form a clear view as to how a prohibited
substance entered the body of a player, where he denies knowing ingestion, then the anti-doping
regime would be practically unenforceable, save in most unusual circumstances’); ARU v Sailor,
ARU Judicial Committee decision dated 20 July 2006, para 61 (Code Art 2.1 ‘is a violation which is
in the nature of an offence of strict liability […]. And that was for good reason, as the ARU argued.
There are many instances in which it is not possible to determine when a player may have ingested
a substance. That may be because, as in the case of cocaine, there is no scientific test available from
Article 2.1 ADRV – The Presence of a Prohibited Substance in an Athlete’s Sample 751
which it can be deduced when the substance was taken. Or it may be that available factual evidence
does not enable a reasonably certain answer to the question to be reached. It may also be that because
of the nature of a particular substance, it may not be possible to tell when it began to take effect or have
any performance enhancing effect’).
4 Code Art 2.1.1 reads: ‘It is each Athlete’s personal duty to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters
his or her body. Athletes are personally responsible for any Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites
or Markers found to be present in their bodily Specimens’. In Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768,
para 15.1, the athlete argued that the second sentence of Art 2.1.1 had to be read in light of the first
sentence, and therefore the FEI had ‘to prove that the substance found in the urine [sample taken from
the horse] was a substance that came from the horse’ (rather than being added after it had passed from
the horse). The CAS panel rejected that argument, holding that the Art 2.1 and Art 2.1.1 language was
clear that ‘Presence indicates offence’. Ibid, para 15.4. ‘The presumption is that what is in the sample
– be it from horses (as here) or athletes (as in other sports) must have been in the body, as will, of
course, be the position in all but exceptional cases. The presumption may be rebuttable; but the burden
of rebuttal lies on the person charged’. Ibid, para 15.5. See also Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312,
para 141 (‘Because this is a strict liability violation, we find that the mere presence of BE in the
Appellant’s Sample is in and of itself a violation. The manner in which the BE entered the sample is
irrelevant (unless caused by a rule departure […])’).
5 Van Snick v Federation Internationale de Judo, CAS 2014/A/3475, para 64 (‘Cocaine falls under
the category of non-specified substances and the Prohibited List does not specify any quantitative
threshold for that substance. The amount of the substance and/or its lack of impact on sporting
performance are therefore irrelevant. Once the presence of the substance in the athlete’s system is
established, including where it is only a small amount, that constitutes an anti-doping rule violation’);
Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para 153 (‘[…] performance enhancement is simply not a factor
that may be considered under the CADP Rules or the WADA Code in determining whether an anti-
doping rule violation has occurred […]’); WADA v FIG & Vysotskaya, CAS 2007/A/1413, para 69
(‘The Respondents contend that Furosemide has no doping effects in the world of athletes and that
its only purpose is loss of weight for aesthetic reasons. The Panel is not convinced this allegation
necessarily corresponds to reality since being a diuretic Furosemide can be used as a masking agent
for other doping products and can be used to lose weight in sports where athletes need to fit into weight
categories. However, in this case that issue can be left open since the intended purpose for using the
substance is irrelevant’); FINA v Kreuzmann & German Swimming Federation, CAS 2005/A/921,
para 32 (‘Once a substance has been put on the List, it is the fact that such a substance has been
detected in the athlete’s body which is deciding. The List and the agreed procedure for its elaboration
and enforcement leave no room for a counter-analysis to determine whether a substance was effectively
used as a masking agent or not’). See also USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September
2007, para 296 (same), appeal dismissed Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.
As to whether lack of performance-enhancing effect is relevant as a mitigating factor when it comes
to sanction, see para C20.11.
C6.2 The importance of the strict liability rule was illustrated in a series of anti-
doping cases brought by the ATP. In ATP v Ulihrach, the ATP confirmed that no
fewer than 30 players on the ATP Tour had tested positive for nandrolone, with
the chromatographic analysis in each case revealing the same ‘unique analytical
fingerprint’, thereby suggesting a common source. The ATP also stipulated that
electrolyte tablets supplied by one of its trainers to Ulihrach at two different ATP
events ‘may have been the source of nandrolone contamination’.1 The hearing panel
found that the ATP had represented by its conduct that the tablets were acceptable for
use under the ATP anti-doping rules, and that the ATP was therefore estopped from
relying on the strict liability rule.2 Instead it was required to show that the anti-doping
rule violation was caused by something other than the tablets. Since the ATP was
unable to meet that burden, the player was exonerated on the basis that the allegations
against him had not been proved. However, that was an unusual (and pre-Code) case
that should (as its author specifically warned) be considered confined to its facts.3
Several subsequent hearing panels have found that as a matter of principle, given the
clear public interest in the effective enforcement of the anti-doping rules, application
of the doctrine of estoppel ‘ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious
of cases’.4
1 ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, reopening and reversing an earlier
decision of the same tribunal dated 1 May 2003.
2 See discussion of doctrine of estoppel/legitimate expectation as a general principle of law at para
B1.36 et seq.
3 The hearing panel in Ulihrach took pains to make clear that it was not seeking to undermine the
basic principle of strict liability, which would continue to apply with full rigour in most cases. See
ATP v Ulihrach, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 7 July 2003, para 30: ‘This situation is, in the
experience of this Tribunal, and we suspect in the experience of the world of sport, a unique set of
circumstances. These reasons should not be read as placing any sort of qualification on the strict
liability principle because of an assertion by an athlete that the analytical results being challenged may
have arisen because of a supplement made available to the athlete by competition sponsors or its sports
federation. […] The principles applied in this case are not to be read as a qualification or refinement
of the principles of strict liability’. The cases against a number of other players were dismissed on the
same basis, with the acquiescence of the ATP in the circumstances.
In the subsequent case of ATP v Rusedski, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2004, the
player argued that his positive test for nandrolone, which bore the same unique analytical fingerprint
as the prior nandrolone positives, must also have been caused by the electrolyte tablets handed out by
the ATP trainers. Even though his test was conducted after the ATP had issued a general alert not to
use the tablets, the player contended that he had not seen that alert and therefore had taken the tablet
just prior to the test. The hearing panel dismissed the charge against him on the basis that the ATP had
not done enough to bring the risk to his attention.
However, the analysis was very different in ATP v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
30 November 2005, the first case considering an estoppel argument after the first Code had come
into effect. An ATP tournament doctor gave a player a salbutamol inhaler to treat his asthma, rather
than the terbutaline inhaler that the player had requested, but did not tell the player, so that the player
believed he was taking a medicine for which he had a TUE. It was argued on the player’s behalf, citing
Ulihrach, that the ATP was estopped from enforcing its rules against the player and the charge against
the player should therefore be dismissed. The ATP for its part accepted that in such circumstances the
player should not be found to have committed a doping offence. However, the Perry hearing panel,
chaired by Professor Richard McLaren, who had also chaired the Ulihrach hearing panel, declined
to apply the Ulihrach reasoning, because the different facts did not meet all of the legal elements of
the doctrine of estoppel (in contrast to Ulihrach, the tournament doctor in Perry was an employee
or a representative not of the ATP, but rather of the tournament organisers; as such, he did not have
actual or apparent ostensible authority to act on behalf of the ATP, and therefore his conduct could
not be deemed to vary the anti-doping rule ‘contract’ between the ATP and the player), but more
fundamentally because ‘the development of principles such as estoppel in sports cases ought to be
restricted to the most extreme and egregious circumstances as they were known at the time’ (para 46).
Professor McLaren explained: ‘In this case before me, there are Anti-Doping Rules of the ATP Tour
including the principle of strict liability that can and were intended to have effect and application to the
facts at hand. The principle of estoppel ought not to be brought into consideration merely to frustrate
the application of a comprehensive Code of harmonised doping rules that the WADA Code represents
and which are the parent derivative rules. Within that Code are rules and remedies dealing with the
situation at hand that are the appropriate rules within which to work out a resolution of this dispute.
The very nature and essence of a Code is to make it comprehensive and to preserve its integrity by
not referring to extraneous principles that upset the intricate balancing of interests reflected in the
achievement of an international agreement to harmonise sport-doping rules in the Code. Therefore,
for all of the foregoing reasons the application of the doctrine of estoppel is rejected as a matter of
principle as well as the facts not being in compliance with the requirements of the doctrine’ (para 49).
Since then, arguments based on estoppel have received short shrift. See eg Taylor v World Rugby,
CAS 2018/A/5583, paras 100–01 (‘The Panel does not consider that the Respondent’s conduct created
prejudice such as would estop the Respondent from pursuing the charge’; even assuming Anti-Doping
Organization misrepresented to the athlete that only DHCMT could be the parent of the metabolite
found in his sample, ‘the Appellant would need additionally to prove his reliance upon it. In the Panel’s
view, the Appellant signally failed to adduce any evidence that his delay in investigating the source
of the M3 at a time when the Alpha Laboratories [which made the supplement he believed caused his
positive test] were still operating was caused by such misrepresentation as distinct from other factors
such as his lack of means or legal advice. In short, the Appellant is unable to show that he could or
would have done anything differently if the initial reference by the Respondent to the substance that
led to the ADRV had been more accurate’); Mohammed Shafi Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190,
para 47 (‘The Appellant cannot rely on the alleged failure of the FEI to inform him as a member of the
FEI community about any problems with the use of Fustex. Such attempted shifting of responsibility
to the governing body is not vouched for in the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”) or in its
derivatives such as the EAD rules, indeed is antithetical to the fundamental principle that the PR’s
responsibility to ensure that his Horse had no prohibited substances in its system on the day of the
Event was his own and no-one else’s’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, paras 206–25 (rejecting
estoppel arguments on the facts); ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision dated 6 June 2016,
para 96 (‘On the facts of this case it is only necessary to state that the ITF did not bring about the
situation in which the player decided to take Meldonium at the 2016 Australian Open. There was no
representation or assurance giving rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the player that
she could safely continue taking Meldonium before matches, a fact of which the ITF was unaware.
The finding as to the player’s deliberate and sustained non-disclosure of her use of Meldonium on
doping control forms precludes any reliance on the principle of good conscience’) and para 97 (‘Even
if, contrary to the findings made above, the ITF had not adequately publicised changes made to the
Prohibited List this would not excuse the serious fault of the player, nor give rise to any estoppel,
by representation or otherwise’), but cf on appeal, Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643, para 92(iii)
(finding that player’s perception of risk from using medication that she had checked against Prohibited
List many times in the past was reduced because ‘no specific warning had been issued by the relevant
organizations (WADA, ITF or WTA) as to the change in the status of Meldonium (the ingredient
of Mildronate). In that respect, the Panel notes that anti-doping organizations should have to take
reasonable steps to provide notice to athletes of significant changes to the Prohibited List, such as
the addition of a substance, including its brand names’); ATP v Rodriguez, Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 18 September 2003, para 49 (rejecting estoppel-based argument on the facts, because
‘there is no pattern of behaviour on the part of the ATP nor any representation by it that would suggest
the positive lab result might be contributed to or caused by the ATP or its employees or agents in the
conduct of their duties’); ITF v Mak, Independent Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2017, para 67
(‘Whatever Mr Mak felt about the ITF’s reasons for allowing or asking him to give a urine sample,
he cannot reasonably have concluded or have had a “legitimate expectation” that the whole of the
previous process of request/refusal was overridden. Nor did he rely on the ITF’s change of position
in the sense of acting to his detriment as the equitable doctrine of waiver/estoppel might require: all
he did was give a urine sample in circumstances where he may have thought that he would be in no
further difficulty but where nevertheless he was maintaining a resolute refusal to give blood’); FEI v
Filho, FEI Tribunal decision dated 25 April 2019, paras 15.15–15.16 (rejecting suggestion FEI was
estopped from charging athlete because he had relied on advice of vet linked with FEI, because the
athlete had his own experience in treating animals, clearly knew what he was doing, and could not
now blame others for his oversight in not wearing gloves and so becoming contaminated with the
drug he was injecting into a horse: ‘The Athlete’s estoppel argument fails because he cannot claim
he is experienced when it suits him and not, when it does not suit him. His estoppel argument is not
convincing given his particular circumstance’).
4 ATP v Perry, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 November 2005, para 46 (‘The development of
principles such as estoppel in sports cases ought to be restricted to the most extreme and egregious
circumstances as they were known at the time’); ITF v Sharapova, Independent Tribunal decision
dated 6 June 2016, para 95 (‘It is not necessary to decide whether that very wide principle is consistent
with English law, which by article 1.8 applies to these rules, or whether such a principle could be
applied to WADA Code provisions, save in the most exceptional circumstances. On the latter point this
tribunal would agree with the comments in ATP v Perry (ATP Tour Tribunal 2015) at paragraph 49’),
not challenged on appeal, Sharapova v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4643; UK Anti-Doping v X., confidential
NADP Tribunal decision dated 3 August 2017, para 98 (same).
C6.3 Where the strict liability rule applies, the Anti-Doping Organization
establishes its prima facie case under Art 2.1 by establishing to the comfortable
satisfaction of the hearing panel:
(a) the identity and integrity of the sample (ie that the sample in question was
collected from the athlete in accordance with the procedures set out in the
International Standard for Testing & Investigations, stored appropriately
between collection and transport, and then transported safely and securely to
the laboratory, such that the identity and integrity of the sample are assured);1
(b) that the adverse analytical finding that the laboratory reported in respect of the
sample is reliable, both ‘procedurally’ (ie the laboratory analysed the sample
in accordance with the procedures set out in the International Standard for
Laboratories)2 and ‘substantively’ (ie the test used is reliable);3 and
(c) that the substance found in the sample is indeed a prohibited substance (or a
metabolite or marker of a prohibited substance).4
Each of these elements is considered in turn below.5
1 See paras C6.4 et seq.
2 See paras C6.20-C6.27.
3 Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 62 (‘[…] an anti-doping rule violation is nevertheless not
established if either (i) the chain of custody is incomplete, ie that the results cannot be attributed to the
Athlete; or (ii) the sample analysis was performed “incorrectly”‘). See paras C6.28-C6.34.
5 Although not strictly an element of its prima facie case, the Anti-Doping Organization should also
be ready to show that the athlete did not have a TUE, or else (if he did have a TUE) that the adverse
analytical finding is not consistent with his TUE. Otherwise, the athlete will have a complete defence
to the charge. See para C4.40.
1 ESTABLISHING THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SAMPLE
C6.4 The first requirement in any Art 2.1 case is to establish that the sample in
question came from the athlete and was not tampered with after collection, so that
the hearing panel can feel comfortably satisfied that he should be held responsible
for what the laboratory subsequently found in the sample. This is done by the Anti-
Doping Organization proving that the sample was properly collected from the athlete
and that there is a clear chain of custody showing that it was transported safely and
securely from the place of collection to the laboratory.1
1 Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 37 (‘The next major issue related to the
chain of custody. It is axiomatic that the links in such chain must be robust; there must be no chance
that the samples which arrive at the doping control centre were not those taken at the doping control
room or that they can have been tampered with en route’); Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 62
(‘[…] an anti-doping rule violation is nevertheless not established if […] the chain of custody is
incomplete, ie that the results cannot be attributed to the Athlete […]’). See para C6.6, n 12.
C6.5 Code Art 5.2 requires Anti-Doping Organizations to collect athletes’

samples in accordance with the procedures set out in WADA’s International Standard
for Testing and Investigations (ISTI). Those procedures are carefully designed to
ensure the identity and integrity of the sample collected, and therefore compliance
with those procedures is deemed to confirm such identity and integrity.1 Lawyers
defending athletes will ask the hearing panel to police such compliance strictly,
on the basis – well-recognised in the CAS jurisprudence – that an Anti-Doping
Organization that is seeking to apply strict liability to the athlete should itself be held
strictly liable for compliance with the prescribed procedures.2
1 The Code provides (at p 136, App One, definition of ‘International Standard’) that ‘compliance with
an International Standard […] shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures addressed in the
Standard were performed properly’.
2 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 147 (‘[…] there is considerable force
to the proposition that, in order to justify imposing a regime of strict liability against athletes for
breaches of anti-doping regulations, testing bodies should be held to an equivalent standard of strict
compliance with mandatory international standards of testing’)’; Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC,
CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 6.11 (‘Doping is an offence which requires the
application of strict rules. If an athlete is to be sanctioned solely on the basis of the provable presence
of a substance in his body, it is his or her fundamental right to know that the Respondent, as the
Testing Authority, including the WADA-accredited laboratory working with it, has strictly observed
the mandatory safeguards. Strict application of the rules is the quid pro quo for the imposition of a
regime of strict liability for doping offences’); USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de
Tir, CAS 94/129, para 50 (‘The Panel nevertheless point out that if the UIT adopts a strict liability test,
it becomes even more important that the rules for the testing procedure are crystal clear, that they are
designed for reliability, and that it may be shown that they have been followed’); dissenting opinion
in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 61 (‘As athletes have strict
liability rules, the laboratories should be held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and
sound scientific practice’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/139. See also discussion at para
C4.15 and cases cited at para C6.21, n 1.
C6.6 Whereas the drug-testing laboratories are WADA-accredited, giving rise to

a presumption that they will carry out their analytical procedures in accordance with
the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories,1 sample collection
agencies are not accredited by WADA, and therefore there is no presumption that the
agency collecting the sample complied with the sample collection procedures set out
in the ISTI. Instead, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to submit affirmative
evidence that those procedures were followed, such that the panel can therefore be
sure of the identity and integrity of the athlete’s sample.2 In particular, in a case
involving a urine sample,3 the evidence should establish the following:
(a) The athlete was offered a selection of collection vessels and lids, chose one
vessel and lid from that selection, and was asked to check to confirm that the
packaging that the selected vessel and lid came in was sealed and had not
been tampered with; the athlete was observed while he passed urine into the
collection vessel;4 if insufficient urine was passed initially, then the partial
sample was retained securely until the athlete was able to produce further urine
to top it up;5 the athlete was then given a selection of transportation kits to
choose from, and checked to confirm that the packaging of the kit he selected
was sealed and tamper-free prior to use; the athlete poured the urine from the
collection vessel into the two bottles in the transportation kit (creating an ‘A’
sample and a ‘B’ sample) and sealed the bottles properly, so that they were
leak-proof and locked (and the Doping Control Officer [‘DCO’] tested them to
check that was the case);6 the athlete checked that the DCO recorded the code
number from the bottles accurately on the doping control form;7 and the DCO
then used urine residue from the collection vessel to test the specific gravity of
the sample to ensure it was within acceptable limits.8
(b) The A and B bottles in which the sample was stored and transported to the
laboratory are tamper-evident, ie it would not be possible to open the bottles
and tamper with the sample without leaving visible signs of doing so.9
(c) From the point of collection of the sample at the doping control station until
the point of its transfer from the doping control station, the sample was stored
in a secure fashion.10 For example, if the sample was left at the collection site
overnight, there should be evidence that the room and/or the fridge in which
it was left was locked, and that during periods when it was unlocked only
authorised personnel had access.11
(d) The sample was transported safely and securely from the doping control station
to the laboratory.12
(e) The sample was inspected upon receipt by the laboratory, and was found to be
in good condition, with the sample bottles properly sealed and with no signs of
tampering.13
1 See para C6.20.
2 Del Pino v UIM, CAS 2015/A/3892 (where athlete put UIM to proof of the identity and integrity of the
sample, UIM met its burden by providing documentation establishing identity and integrity); WADA
& UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007/A/1396 & 1402, para 12 (analysing the sufficiency of sample collection,
storage and transportation procedures in order to satisfy the panel of the identity and integrity of the
sample); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 43 (setting
out evidence of sample storage and transportation at each stage of journey to laboratory); Garcia v
FECNA, CAS 2013/A/3170, paras 68–70 (where there was no DCO evidence and no documentation
evidencing how and by whom a sample was taken or how it was transported to the laboratory, and no
documentation proving the sample was taken from the athlete, ‘the sample collection process was not
proven by the Respondent and the sample was unaccounted for during this three day time period […],
making it uncertain whether the sample and its results can be unequivocally linked to the Athlete. On
these grounds alone this appeal could be allowed and the decision below set aside’).
3 The requirements for collection and transportation of blood samples are broadly similar, but with
important variations relating to (inter alia) the need for qualified technicians to draw blood, the
different equipment required to collect and store the blood, and the need to transport the blood to the
laboratory at a certain temperature. See generally 2019 ISTI Annex E (Collection of Blood Samples)
and Annex K (Collection, Storage and Transport of Blood ABP Samples).
4 There is no requirement to collect the sample under sterile conditions or to store it in cool conditions
(ie in order to avoid contamination with bacteria and microbes that could change the profile of the
substances present in the urine). The laboratory is able to determine if a sample has degraded due to
microbes/bacterial activity; and in any event, such degradation would lead only to false negatives,
not to false positives. Balciunate v LAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2414, paras 9.3.2-9.3.3; Chepalova v
FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 119 (claim that EPO finding could have been caused by degradation of
sample rejected where ‘no signs of sample degradation were observed in the analyses performed: […]
several factors (pH value, steroid profile, stability test, molecular weight) allow the conclusion that
Chepalova’s sample was not degraded’). If the substance found in the sample does not occur naturally,
there cannot be any argument that the adverse analytical finding was due to bacterial degradation
during storage of the sample at room temperature: ATP v Braga, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
May 2004, paras 28, 30 (‘Stanozolol being a purely exogenous steroid cannot be formed by microbial
degradation, unlike some endogenous steroids’); Del Pino v UIM, CAS 2015/A/3892, para 46 (if urine
sample is not refrigerated, cocaine and its metabolites in that urine may degrade and so decrease in
concentration, but they cannot be formed from other, non-prohibited substances); ITF v Hingis, Anti-
Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 51 (‘[…] the substance subsequently detected
– benzoylecgonine – cannot be produced inside the bottle under any storage conditions. It is produced
inside the body when a person ingests cocaine. Nothing in this case turns on the conditions under
which the player’s sample was stored’); Raula v RADA, CAS 2014/A/3668, para 52 (‘[…] there is
no way that EPO can appear in a urine sample, unless the urine sample was spiked with EPO. This
means that the conditions during which the sample has been stored including the temperature during
transportation and handling of the sample could not affect the presence of the Prohibited Substance in
this case’). See also paras C6.7 and C6.17.
5 2019 ISTI Annex F (Urine Samples – Insufficient Volume), discussed in IAAF v CBat & Da Silva,
CAS 2012/A/2779, paras 197-202; UK Anti-Doping v Wilson, National Anti-Doping Panel decision
dated 28 September 2011, paras 37–44.
6 2019 ISTI Art D4.15.
7 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 39–48.
8 2019 ISTI Art D4.16, discussed in Ohlsson v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January
2009, pp 17–18. See ATP v Braga, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated May 2004, para 30 (‘The
purpose of such action is only to determine if it might be desirable to obtain an additional sample at the
time of collection’); B. v FINA, CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002),
pp 255, 259 (purpose of testing specific gravity is ‘to determine if urine is sufficiently concentrated to
enable the sample to be satisfactorily analysed’).
The test for specific gravity is done after the urine has been sealed in the A and B bottles in order to
avoid allegations that use of the same pipette to collect urine from all samples to test for specific gravity
may have caused cross-contamination from one sample to another. See eg V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493,
FINA Doping Panel Judgements 2001–2005 (FINA 2006), p 17.
9 The CAS has accepted, for example, that ‘Berlinger’ bottles, once sealed, cannot be opened and re-
sealed without such tampering being evident. Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, paras 7.4 to 7.8.15;
WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 6.6 and 6.7. See also ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 3 January 2008, para 104 (‘[…] the A and B [Berlinger] sample bottles used to collect
the player’s sample were capable of being properly sealed and were tamper evident provided they were
properly sealed in the present case’). In Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards
Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 255, another CAS panel made the same finding (if a little less
convincingly) in respect of ‘Versapak’ kits.
If the hearing panel is satisfied that the athlete’s urine was put into tamper-evident bottles and that
those bottles were properly sealed (see eg ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January
2008, para 51), and that upon receipt at the laboratory the bottles showed no sign of tampering (Ibid,
para 54; see also para C6.17, n 2), there can be little room for argument as to the identity and integrity
of the sample. WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, discussed at para C6.18.
10 Because sample collection missions can take place in such a wide variety of situations (from a fully
equipped modern stadium to a tent in the desert), the International Standard for Testing & Investigations
is not prescriptive on this point, but rather simply requires the Anti-Doping Organization to define
criteria for storage of the sample that ensure the identity, integrity and security of the sample. See
2019 ISTI Art 8.3.1.
11 ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 30–34, 48–50.
12 See 2019 ISTI Art 9.3, as well as WADA TD2009LCOC, which requires a record of chain of custody
that ‘ensures that the Samples and the results generated by the Laboratory can be unequivocally linked
to the Athlete’.
The need for careful and detailed provisions should be clear. As Lord Justice Neill observed in
Wilander and Novacek v Tobin and Jude (No 2) (26 March 1996, unreported), CA: ‘It will be obvious
that any system which requires an athlete to be subject to tests of body fluids which are then sent away
for analysis requires a very careful arrangement to make certain, first, that the fluids are properly
preserved and, secondly, that there exists no possibility of confusion of one sample with another. It is
for that reason that a chain of custody procedure should be laid down and observed’.
The CAS panel in Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 65, found that this requirement was
met by (inter alia) evidence that the samples were poured into Berlinger bottles, were taken to the
airport by the DCOs, were transported to the laboratory by TNT Express, and were checked on
receipt by the laboratory and found to be intact. See also X v IWF, SFT judgment of 28 February
2018, 4A_576/2012, para 3.2.2 (rejecting argument that there was no sufficient external chain of
custody of the samples, and deciding the results of analysis of the samples ‘can be unequivocally
linked to the Appellant’, where the DCOs explained how the samples were sealed in tamper-evident
Berlinger bottles, placed into a locked suitcase, taken on a plane, then stored in an office, before
being couriered to the laboratory, where the seals and samples were checked upon receipt and
found to be intact); Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, paras 31–33; USADA v Wade, AAA Panel
decision dated 9 November 2005, paras 38–43; Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913,
para 113 (applying same requirements in Art 2.2 use case, where charge was based on analytical
values derived from screening of blood samples taken from the athlete). Cf FINA v J, FINA Doping
Panel decision 06/01, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), p 83 (doping charge
based on alleged presence of 19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where, among other
things, there was no evidence regarding the chain of custody of the sample, ie how it was transported
from the collection site to the laboratory).
The chain of custody only has to start from the time the sample is first moved from the collection
site; contemporaneous documentation of each time the sample was handled while at the collection site
is not required. ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 133–135.
13 2019 ISL Arts 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.1.5 specify that the laboratory must check the integrity of the sample
upon receipt, and proceeds to analysis only if satisfied with the external chain of custody and that
there is no evidence of tampering. See eg UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated
7 June 2011, para 3.4.30 (‘While the Athlete appeared to raise the possibility that his sample could
have been interfered with during transport, this seems to amount to no more than conjecture, not based
on any factual evidence. The Athlete confirmed in his testimony that he had seen the samples himself
in tamper-evident bottles, and the documentation pack for Sample A filled out on receipt of the sample
by the Laboratory confirmed that the sample was received intact and without irregularities’). See also
para C4.34, n 1, for further cases where the hearing panel relied on such evidence in its findings.
C6.7 To prove these facts, the Anti-Doping Organization will need to be ready
to produce the DCO who carried out the mission (and potentially any other person
involved, such as a Doping Control Assistant, or a chaperone) as a witness before the
hearing panel. Clear testimony on the DCO’s part can be enough on its own to satisfy
the hearing panel as to the procedures followed.1 Even where the DCO is not able to
remember the specific mission involving the athlete (which would not be surprising
where it was just one of many missions he has conducted), the hearing panel is entitled to
accept his evidence that he ‘would have’ followed the standard procedures as sufficient,
at least where that is backed up by the mission paperwork, ie the standard forms that are
filled out during or after the mission, which are designed to provide contemporaneous
or near-contemporaneous evidence of compliance with the relevant procedures.2 The
Anti-Doping Organization should therefore also be ready to produce in evidence:
(a) The sample collection form (aka doping control form), which records (among
other things) where and when the sample was collected, whether partial samples
were collected and then ‘topped up’ with further urine passed subsequently to
make up the final sample, and the code number of the transportation bottles into
which the sample was poured for transportation. It also contains boxes for the
athlete to record any medications or supplements that he has taken in the past
seven days, and to record any comments or concerns he has about the sample
collection process just undertaken.3 Crucially, at the end of the process the
sample collection form is signed both by the DCO who collected the sample, to
‘certify that sample collection was conducted in accordance with the relevant
procedures’, and by the athlete himself, to ‘declare that, subject to comments
made in section 4, sample collection was conducted in accordance with the
relevant procedures for sample collection’. The sample collection form is
therefore of great evidential importance, both in establishing the Anti-Doping
Organization’s prima facie case and in respect of any subsequent attempt by
the athlete to cast doubt on the sample collection process.4
(b) The post-mission report (aka the DCO report form), which provides an
overview of the entire mission, including confirming the conditions in which
collected samples were stored at the doping control station prior to transport to
the laboratory.
(c) The ‘chain of custody’ form, reflecting when the sample left the doping control
station, and recording each subsequent transfer of the sample from one person
or place to another thereafter. In particular, there should be contemporaneous
documentation of the transfer of the sample from the DCO to a courier for
shipment to the laboratory.
(d) Thereafter, evidence that the sample was couriered to the laboratory, with
detail of the courier’s tracking log identifying the location of the sample for the
entire time it was in courier’s custody, is sufficient to satisfy the Anti-Doping
Organization’s burden as to that part of the chain of custody.5
(e) Also, the laboratory documentation package should contain a form documenting
the fact that the sample was checked upon receipt at the laboratory and found
to be intact and with no evidence of attempted tampering.6
1 UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.29 (‘Mr Dean
[the DCO] gave evidence of the sample collection procedure and denied any departure from the
International Standard for Testing. Although his recollection as to the exact sequence of notification
was unclear, we did not find that this in any way undermined the credibility of his evidence. Mr Dean
was an experienced DCO, and could clearly demonstrate his methodical and well-practised routine.
Mr Dean’s evidence left us in no doubt that, in the absence of any cogent evidence to question the
integrity of the process, that [sic] the sample was collected properly’); WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah,
CAS 2008/A/1470, para 80 (‘The Panel does not see any reason to doubt their [the DCOs’] testimonies
[as to how they notified the athlete and advised him of his rights and responsibilities] as they are both
experienced USADA agents […]. With such backgrounds, they no doubt have a routine in place where
they identify themselves and tell the notified athlete of his rights and duties’); WADA v Fedoriva,
CAS 2016/A/4700, paras 55–57 (preferring evidence of DCOs to conflicting evidence of coach,
because their evidence was credible, they had ‘no personal interest to fabricate or consort any facts,
or to bring false accusations against the Respondent’, and the coach ‘did not present any evidence to
substantiate such a claim of impartiality, bias or corruptness on the part of the doping control officers’)
and para 58 (‘In cases such as this one, where no other evidence than sworn witness statements from
the doping control officer in charge can reasonably be presented as evidence, the Sole Arbitrator finds
that, indeed, very substantial counter-evidence must be presented to rebut the doping control officer’s
version of the facts’); IAAF v HAA & Kovago, CAS 2012/A/2843, para 76 (‘While the fact that Mr
Holdhaus is an experienced DCO does not mean that his evidence is entitled to any special treatment,
his lengthy and unimpeached service and the absence of any motive whatsoever for concocting his
evidence weigh in favour of accepting it’). Cf UK Anti-Doping v Barlow, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 27 June 2016, para 58 (‘If there are situations where an official’s evidence might appropriately
be cloaked with a “presumption of credibility”, this was not one of them. While the fact he was a DCO
explained why MD attended the property, there is no feature of that occupation or his experience which
in our judgment warranted his evidence being afforded some (unspecified but) elevated status. We
judged his evidence by exactly the same (fair) standards we applied to (for example) the Respondent’s
evidence’), aff’d, Barlow v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 September 2016.
See also WADA v Fedoriva, CAS 2016/A/4700, para 58 (‘In this context, the Sole Arbitrator concurs
fully with the reasoning expressed in the case of Dobud v. FINA (CAS 2015/A/4163 at paragraphs
91-93) in which the statement of facts by a doping control officer was also relied upon as credible and
trustworthy evidence. In cases such as this one, where no other evidence other than sworn witness
statements from the doping control officer in charge can reasonably be presented as evidence, the Sole
Arbitrator finds that, indeed, very substantial counter-evidence must be presented to rebut the doping
control officer’s version of the facts. Thus, the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably satisfied that WADA
carried its burden of proof pursuant to Article 3.1 RUSADA ADR that an anti-doping rule violation
has been committed by the Respondent in her attempt to tamper with the doping control process of
Mr Khasanov’).
2 Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, paras 30-31 (contemporaneous documentation, backed up by
testimony of event doping control manager, who had not been personally involved in the collection of
the sample in issue but was familiar with the steps to be followed and the documentation, was sufficient
to establish that there were no irregularities in the collection or transportation of the sample); ITF v
Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, paras 37–38 (‘37. The lack of detailed
recall on the part of all three witnesses is not surprising, since the [two DCOs involved in the mission]
between them collected some 146 urine samples during the 2007 Wimbledon Championships, while
the player has undergone many doping tests during her career, and all have proved uneventful apart
from this one. In those circumstances, Mr Morton-Hooper, for the player, submitted that we did not
have reliable evidence of what happened during the sample collection process. [The DCOs] could only
say what they believe “would” have happened, based on their standard practice. 38. We do not accept
that argument for the following reasons. First, it was accepted that [the DCOs] were honest witnesses
doing their best to perform their functions at Wimbledon competently and professionally. Secondly,
on the evidence we have, we do not have any reason to find that [the DCOs’] standard practice was
departed from. Thirdly, the following of standard practice is in no way contradicted by, and indeed
is corroborated by, the doping control form which is intended to provide a contemporaneous record
of the process precisely because accurate and detailed recollection is unlikely. Fourthly, the record
of what happened to the sample after it left the doping control station is in no way inconsistent with
the [DCOs’] account’), cited with approval in La Barbera v IWAS, CAS 2010/A/2277, para 4.9,
and followed in Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012,
para 36.4. See also IRB v Hitch, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 10 August 2012, para 56
(‘we are satisfied the Doping Control Officer (Mr Barranco) did not indicate to the Player only
daily medication or supplements should be included (as was suggested). This assertion is contrary
to the established protocol which is printed on the form requiring a declaration of medication and/
or supplements taken during the last seven days. Given Mr Barranco’s experience and evidence we
do not accept he departed from the usual process when he questioned the Player’); UK Anti-Doping
v Wilson, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 September 2011, para 30 (‘Witnesses were called to
establish how the process of testing was conducted in this particular case. It is fair to observe that they
acknowledged that they had little or no direct recollection of the sequence of events. But we do not
accept that that weakens the case that UK Anti-Doping present: on the contrary, our view is that some
of the alleged departures from established procedure would have been so substantial that the witnesses
spoke compellingly when they denied that it could have happened. Their answer, shortly summarised,
was that, if that had happened, such a departure would have been an entirely exceptional event which
they would have remembered’) (emphasis in original), aff’d, Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal
Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012. See also para C6.10, n 3.
3 While declaring a medication on the form does not excuse its use if it turns out to contain a prohibited
substance (Lehtinen v FINA, CAS 95/A/142, para 42: ‘it should be noted that a declaration in the test
form […] is not in itself sufficient to turn a banned substance into a permitted one. If a certain banned
substance has been identified, a prior declaration in the test form still does not justify the use of such
substance’), it may assist the athlete (if he is trying to mitigate sanction under Art 10.4 or 10.5 of the
Code, and therefore has to establish how the prohibited substance came to be in his sample: see para
C16.4 et seq) to establish that he was taking a medication or supplement prior to sample collection
that contained the prohibited substance and therefore caused his adverse analytical finding. Eder v
IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.26 (‘In the Panel’s view, the fact that Pinter did not list Thiogamma
or even inform team officials about it reinforces the likelihood that he was not actually taking this
medication at the time’); FIFA v STJD & CBF & Mr Ricardo Lucas Dodô, CAS 2007/A/1370, para 67
(‘[…] on the occasion of the doping control that yielded Dodo’s adverse analytical finding, neither the
team doctor nor Dodo declared the use of caffeine on the same forms. Therefore, the proof that the
Player did ingest a caffeine capsule on the day of his positive testing is left to the Player’s own words
[…]’); Canas v ATP, CAS 2005/A/951, para 8.4 (failure to note a medication on the doping control
form undermined – albeit not fatally – the player’s claim that such medication was the source of the
diuretic in his sample). See also WADA v Lund & USADA, CAS OG 06/001, para 4.15 (declaration of
finasteride on doping control form did not avoid finding of anti-doping rule violation, but did establish
athlete’s good faith); The Football Association v Armstrong and Kendall, FA Regulatory Commission
decision dated 3 October 2017, para 47 (rejecting the player’s claim that he did not know the ‘fat
burner’ he was taking contained a steroid and so his violation was not intentional, because the name
of the steroid was on the packaging, he was an experienced user of such substances, it takes only a
few minutes to find out what it is, and he did not declare it on the doping control form. ‘That is not
insignificant. A reason why one who was knowingly taking steroids might not declare it, is (1) not
wanting to alert the authorities to the fact you are taking a banned substance (2) in the hope you do not
test “positive”. The explanation he gave (could not recall the name and thought “fat burner” looked
amateurish) was, frankly feeble’).
Similarly, an athlete’s failure to note any concerns about the sample collection procedure in the
space provided on the doping control form will make it very difficult for him to rely on such concerns
later in an effort to prove those procedures were not carried out properly. (See para C6.10, n 3).
5 Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, para 7.8.14; USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November
2005, para 39. See also Ohllson v WSU, NADP Appeal Tribunal award dated 6 January 2009, pp
21–23 (use of DHL satisfies ISTI requirement to use transportation system that ensures samples and
documents will be transported to laboratory safely and securely).
The copy of the doping control form that accompanies the samples to the laboratory does
not identify the athlete, so that the objectivity of the laboratory’s analysis is safeguarded, and the
laboratory is protected against allegations that it acted out of malice towards the athlete. USADA v
Landis, AAA Case No: 30 190 00847 06, decision dated 20 September 2007, para 256 (‘The difficulty
with the theory of conspiracy is that the Lab was conducting the analysis of the Stage 17 sample
without knowing on whose sample they were working’), aff’d Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.
C6.8 Such evidence will be sufficient to establish prima facie the identity and
integrity of the sample, and the burden will then switch to the athlete to try to establish
that there was a departure from the relevant procedures that calls the identity or
integrity of the sample into question. 2015 Code Art 3.2.3 states:
‘Departures from any other International Standard [ie other than the International
Standard for Laboratories1] or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or
Anti-Doping Organization rules which did not cause an Adverse Analytical Finding
or other anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such evidence or results. If the
Athlete or other Person establishes a departure from another International Standard
or other anti-doping rule or policy which could reasonably have caused an anti-
doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping
rule violation, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish
that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis
for the anti-doping rule violation.’
As a first step, then, the athlete must prove, on the balance of probabilities,2 that there
was a departure from a mandatory requirement3 of an International Standard (other
than the ISL) ‘or other anti-doping rule or policy set forth in the Code or Anti-Doping
Organization rules’.4 If he satisfies that requirement, as a second step he must prove5
that that departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the facts on which the alleged
violation is based (eg the adverse analytical finding made in respect of the athlete’s
sample).6 If he satisfies that requirement as well, the burden shifts back to the Anti-
Doping Organization that charged him to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the
hearing panel ‘that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or
the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation’.7
1 Departures from the ISL are addressed by Code Art 3.2.2, which is discussed at paras C6.21 and
C6.22.
2 See Code Art 3.1 (‘Where the Code places the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other Person alleged
to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or
circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability’).
3 Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 82 (‘[…] in order to invalidate the AAF, the alleged departure
must be from a mandatory requirement. Accordingly the rule must use obligatory language (such
as “shall” or “must”) as opposed to optional language (such as “may” or “should”)’) (citations
omitted), and para 102(b)(iv) (‘Regardless, notification in the presence of an adult is not a mandatory
requirement. ISTI Article C4.4 provides that “Athletes who are Minors should be notified in the
presence of an adult […].” (emphasis added). Thus, notification in the presence of an adult is not
a mandatory requirement and therefore failure to notify in the presence of an adult is incapable of
invalidating the AAF’), and para 102(e)(v) (‘Contrary to what the Player seems to suggest, these
Articles make clear that it is entirely up to the Sample Collection Authority, DCO or Chaperone, as
applicable, to decide whether another third party ought to be present where the Minor refuses the
presence of an adult representative. Therefore, even if it cannot be said that Mr Rooney acted as a
third party in observing Mr Panos observe the collection of the Sample from the Athlete, this was
not a breach of a mandatory requirement of the ISTI as it was not even necessary for such a third
party to be present’). See also ibid, para 87 (‘The Player does not point to any International standard
or other anti-doping rule or policy set out in the Code or the TADP that requires certificates to be
provided as to the sterility of water provided in the DCS. Quite to the contrary, ISTI Article 5.4.1(g)
states clearly: “should the Athlete choose to consume food or fluids prior to providing a Sample, he/
she does so at his/her own risk”‘), and para 102(a)(vii) (‘The Panel is satisfied that, through the IPIN
registration process, the parental consent to testing as part of the ITF Tennis Anti-Doping Programme
at ITF Events was secured. There is no separate requirement that parental consent be obtained on each
specific instance of doping control’). See also Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 162 (‘[…]
consideration of the evidence presented by the Parties concerning the circumstances of the doping
control would have to show that violations of mandatory requirements, if any, could have reasonably
caused the ADRV’) and para 179 (‘The Panel also notes that Article 5.4.1(e)(iii) of the ISTI stipulates
“the Athlete should be advised of the possible Consequences of Failure to Comply”. The Panel does
not read “should” as a must”. The word “should” implies some form of recommendation or guideline
and therefore does not impose an obligation on [the DCO]’); Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915,
para 138 (alleged absence of chaperone not material, because ‘the presence of a Chaperone is a
possibility, but is not mandatory according to the IST’, citing ISTI Art H.5.5); WADA v Chernova &
RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, paras 102–103 (although IST says the athlete ‘shall pour’ at least 60
ml of urine into the A sample bottle, the IST itself states that a failure to meet these requirements ‘in
no way invalidates the suitability of the Sample for analysis’, and therefore it follows that there is no
minimum volume required for analysis). See further the cases cited at para C6.10.
4 It is not enough to prove a departure from a requirement of local law (IAAF v CBat v Da Silva,
CAS 2012/A/2779, para 196; WADA v FCL & Villareal, CAS 2011/A/2336, para 89; WADA v FCF and
Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 133 (‘The Athletes suggested that the doping control officer lacked
the proper authorization under Colombian law […]. However, […] Colombian law is irrelevant’)) or
from best practice. ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 135 (‘The
Tribunal agrees that the player must establish a departure from the ISTI, not merely a departure from
best practice’).
Nor is it enough to prove a departure from guidelines that have not been incorporated into the
applicable anti-doping rules: Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458, para 90; WADA v Sun Yang
& FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 227 (‘[…] WADA’s Guidelines are not binding. Such Guidelines are
merely intended to promote best practices, whereas binding provisions are only set out in the ISTI’),
para 258 (‘The Panel notes that the matter is to be assessed by reference to the requirements set out in
the ISTI, since WADA’s Guidelines are not mandatory’); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 199
(‘the Panel agrees with the IIHF that the RMHD Guidelines and the DCO Manual contain guidelines,
not requirements. These guidelines contain guidance as to how best to comply with the mandatory
requirements in the ISTI or the anti-doping rules, but they do not themselves constitute mandatory
requirements’) and para 200 (‘[…] the requirements set out in the WADC (Article 3.2.3), the ISTI
and the applicable anti-doping rules are mandatory while the RMHD Guidelines and DCO Took Kit
manual are instead suggestions for best practice, a distinct matter’).
Instead the athlete must show that there has been a departure from a mandatory requirement that is
set out in an International Standard or in the charging Anti-Doping Organization’s anti-doping rules.
Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458, para 92 (‘The Appellant also testified that she was not
requested by the DCO to wash her hands after the passing of the sample. This has been contested by the
DCO. Again, the Appellant failed to point at a provision in the WADA International Standards which
might have been breached by this conduct’); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 17.3 (rejecting
argument that test result should be rejected because DCO did not permit Person Responsible to witness
her putting on gloves, because ‘[w]e can find nothing in the Manual (or Article 10.18 para 1 of the
Veterinary Regulations) to suggest that the PR has to witness the putting on of the gloves’); Schwazer
v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 65 (ISTI does not require DCO to
leave place of collection of sample blank in order to avoid a laboratory staff member working out that
the sample must have come from the athlete in question) and para 69 (ISTI does not require DCO to
keep sample under personal supervision at all times after collection, and therefore leaving it in locked
car while stopping for a meal is not a departure).
5 Under the 2015 Code, on the balance of probabilities: see Code Art 3.1. However, the comment to Art
3.2.2 in the 2021 Code (comment 21) states: ‘once the Athlete or other Person establishes the departure
by a balance of probability, the Athlete or other Person’s burden on causation is the somewhat lower
standard of proof—”could reasonably have caused”‘.
7 Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, para 109. See para C6.28.
C6.9 Art 3.2.3 has been revised in the 2021 Code to identify more specifically
the requirements that, if departed from, might reasonably cause an anti-doping rule
violation. It reads:
‘Departures from any other International Standard or other anti-doping rule or

policy set forth in the Code or in an Anti-Doping Organization’s rules shall not
invalidate analytical results or other evidence of an anti-doping rule violation, and
shall not constitute a defense to an anti-doping rule violation; provided, however,
if the Athlete or other Person establishes that a departure from one of the specific
International Standard provisions listed below could reasonably have caused an
anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding or whereabouts
failure, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish that
such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or whereabouts failure:
(i) a departure from the International Standard for Testing and Investigations
related to Sample collection or Sample handling which could reasonably have
caused an anti-doping rule violation based on an Adverse Analytical Finding,
in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to establish
that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding;
(ii) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management or
International Standard for Testing and Investigations related to Adverse
Passport Findings which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule
violation, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to
establish that such departure did not cause the anti-doping rule violation;
(iii) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management related
to the requirement to provide notice to the Athlete of the B Sample opening
which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping rule violation based on
an Adverse Analytical Finding, in which case the Anti-Doping Organization
shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse
Analytical Finding;
(iv) a departure from the International Standard for Results Management related
to Athlete notification which could reasonably have caused an anti-doping
rule violation based on a whereabouts failure, in which case the Anti-Doping
Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not
cause the whereabouts failure.’
Therefore, from 1 January 2021 on, departures from requirements in International
Standards and from rules and policies set out in the Code or an Anti-Doping
Organization’s anti-doping rules are irrelevant1 unless the athlete or other person
proves2 that:
(a) the departure is from one of the particular ISTI or ISRM requirements specified
in Code Art 3.2.3.3; and
(b) that departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse analytical finding
or ADRV or whereabouts failure that forms the basis of the charge against the
athlete or other person.3
Only if he satisfies those two requirements does the burden switch to the Anti-Doping
Organization that charged him to prove that the departure did not cause the anti-
doping rule violation charged.4
1 See 2021 Code comment 22: ‘Departures from an International Standard or other rule unrelated
to Sample collection or handling, Adverse Passport Finding, or Athlete notification relating to
whereabouts failure or B Sample opening – eg, the International Standards for Education, Data Privacy
or TUEs – may result in compliance proceedings by WADA but are not a defense in an anti-doping rule
violation proceeding and are not relevant on the issue of whether the Athlete committed an anti-doping
rule violation’.
2 On the standard of proof, 2021 Code comment 21 states: ‘The burden is on the Athlete or other Person
to establish, by a balance of probability, a departure from the International Standard for Laboratories
that could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding. Thus, once the Athlete or other
Person establishes the departure by a balance of probability, the Athlete or other Person’s burden on
causation is the somewhat lower standard of proof—”could reasonably have caused”‘. As to how that
lower standard is to be interpreted and applied, see paras C6.12 and C6.13.
3 Presumably it remains the case that a departure from a provision in the ISTI or ISRM that falls within
one of these categories but is not a mandatory requirement is irrelevant, as per the cases discussed at
para C6.8, n 3.
4 2021 Code comment 23, relating to departures from the ISRM requirement to provide notice to the
athlete of the B sample opening, ie Art 3.2.3(iii), states: ‘An Anti-Doping Organization would meet
its burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding by showing
that, for example, the B Sample opening and analysis were observed by an independent witness and
no irregularities were observed’. This is an attempt to reverse a series of CAS cases that held that a
departure from the requirement to let the athlete and/or his expert observe the B sample opening and
analysis was such a fundamental infringement of the athlete’s rights that it always leads to invalidation
of the adverse analytical finding reported in respect of the A sample, irrespective of the fact that it
could not have caused that adverse analytical finding: see para C6.23, n 2.
A Proving a departure from a relevant requirement
C6.10 Most of the departure cases involve alleged departures from the mandatory
ISTI sample collection and transport procedures. In such cases, the doping control
form for the mission in question is likely to be extremely important evidence. It
contains a box that invites the athlete to document any concern he/she may have
about how the sample collection session was conducted. If the DCO or athlete
notes facts on the doping control form that establish there was a departure from
the mandatory sample collection procedures, the issue will turn to whether or not
that departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding.1 If no
such discrepancy was noted at the time, however, ie if each of the athlete and the
DCO signed the doping control form at the end of the sample collection session
without adverse comment, thereby expressly confirming that sample collection was
conducted in accordance with the relevant procedures,2 it will be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, for the athlete to persuade the hearing panel that in fact there were
material departures from the proper procedures,3 unless the alleged departure was
from the requirements for storage and transport of the sample after its collection from
the athlete4 (and even then most allegations that departures occurred that undermine
the identity or integrity of the sample are resolved by evidence that the sample
arrived at the laboratory intact and without any evidence of tampering5). Speculation
is not enough to sustain a departure claim: the athlete will have to provide specific
evidence that there was a departure from a particular mandatory requirement of the
ISTI.6 If the DCO maintains that there was no departure during the process of sample
collection, the athlete will have to persuade the hearing panel to reject the DCO’s
evidence, which may be hard to do absent specific and cogent reason.7 The athlete
will also need to be ready to show that it was not his own actions that caused the
departure.8
1 See para C6.10. The Anti-Doping Organization will clearly have decided, as part of the results
management process (see para C4.1 et seq), that the departure identified in the paperwork did not
happen, or was not a departure from a mandatory requirement, and/or could not have caused the
adverse analytical finding, or else the charge would not have been brought.
2 See para C6.7(a).
3 For example, in Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, para 7.4,
the CAS panel rejected the athletes’ attack on the procedures that had been followed in collecting
their samples on the basis that each of them had signed the declaration on the doping control form
confirming their satisfaction with the testing procedure, and had not put any comment in the box
provided for noting any discrepancies. It said: ‘In the Panel’s judgment, this effectively estops them
from raising these complaints. The Panel find unconvincing their explanation that they wished to
terminate the procedure as soon as possible. Those competitors who do not make use of opportunities
designed to provide protection for them have only themselves to blame for the consequences of such
failure’. Similarly, in the Butch Reynolds case, the IAAF Arbitration Panel rejected Mr Reynolds’
attack on the reliability of the procedures followed in collecting his sample on the basis of (among
other things) his declaration on the doping control form that he was satisfied with the sample collection
procedures used: Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000), p 121,
para 8. See also p v FINA, CAS 2002/A/399, para 9.4.35 (‘The athlete’s failure to note irregularities
in sample collection on the doping form can result in estoppel’), citing Bunn v FEI, CAS 2000/A/313;
V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/493, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006), p 21 (‘In the
Panel’s view, the Appellant’s plain signature of the doping control records expresses his approval of
the procedure and prevents him – short of compelling evidence of manipulation of the records or fraud
or any similar facts – from raising any such issue at a later stage’).
CAS panels have since taken the same approach in cases decided under the Code. See eg Cooper
& Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418 para 29 (‘It could be argued that the Appellants were
estopped from challenging from the satisfaction recorded in that declaration: but on any view the
declaration required that only subsequent contradictory challenge to be assessed with care’); ITF v
Karatantcheva, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 11 January 2006, para 56 (argument that test was
illegal under local law waived by submitting to test without noting objection in ‘comments’ section of
doping control form), aff’d CAS 2006/A/1032.
In ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 99, the first instance
hearing panel held that the player’s signature of the doping control form, and her failure to comment
adversely on the procedure followed in the box provided on the form for that purpose, did not
amount to a formal waiver of ‘her right to allege later that the requirements of the ISTI had been
breached’. Nevertheless, such signature and lack of adverse comment were said to be ‘of potential
evidential value in determining whether [the relevant sample collection procedures] have been
complied with’, and the hearing panel duly relied on them as ‘corroborative’ evidence that the DCO
followed the standard procedure in that case. Ibid, para 38. See also ibid, para 107 (‘[…] we are
comfortably satisfied that [the DCO] performed these requirements in the collection room with the
player present. [The player’s lawyer] was not in a position to challenge [the doping control officer’s
assistant’s] evidence to that effect, for his client was unable to recall anything untoward in the sample
collection process, as indicated by her contemporaneous comment, “All good!”‘); Arashov v ITF,
CAS 2017/A/5112, para 105 (‘The Player’s signature on the doping control form weighs against a
subsequent claim that there were material departures from proper procedures (CAS 99/A/234 and
235; CAS 2002/A/399; CAS 2003/A/493). This is so regardless of the Player’s comprehension of the
English language. (CAS 2010/A/2277)’); La Barbera v IWAS, CAS 2010/A/2277, para 4.9 (‘While
Mr La Barbera argues that his signature at the bottom of the doping control form cannot be construed
as an acceptance of the way the doping control procedure took place as he does neither speak Dutch,
nor English nor French, such an argument cannot be accepted. In ITF v Hingis, 3 January 2008,
the Anti-Doping Tribunal has correctly made it clear that the doping control form is intended to
provide contemporaneous record of the process precisely because accurate and detailed recollection
is unlikely; while an athlete signature does not amount to a waiver of the athlete’s right to later allege
that the requirements of the ISTI have been breached, such signature is of potential evidential value in
determining whether the procedures set out in the IST have been complied with. Going even further,
the CAS held in V v FINA (CAS 2003/A/493, 22 March 2004) that the appellant’s plain signature
of the doping control records expresses his approval of the procedure and prevents him – short of
compelling evidence of manipulation of the records or fraud or any similar facts – from raising any
such issue at a later stage. As correctly held by the IWAS Tribunal, it was up to Mr La Barbera to ask
for further explanation if he did not understand the form; by having omitted to do so, Mr La Barbera
has to support the consequences of his own negligence’); Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-
1913, para 137 (rejecting challenge to suitability of sample collection procedures where ‘at the time
of collection the Athlete has never protested against any of the blood sampling procedures performed
by the ISU on her. Indeed, the bar code lists shown to the Panel had sufficient space for athletes to
handwrite comments or record objections, if any, but the Athlete has always inserted her signature
without further ado’); Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 16.3 (signature on form confirming
no objection to the way the sample was collected ‘would ensure that subsequent objections were less
frequently made and, if made, less likely to be believed’); UCI v Sohrabi, UCI Anti-Doping Panel
decision dated 17 January 2020, para 50 (‘The Single Judge notes that the Rider is experienced and
that – according to his own accord – he had undergone already several sample collection sessions. The
Rider has been a professional cyclist for 20 years. He successfully took part in many races at national,
continental, WorldTour and Olympic level and was fully aware of the doping collecting procedures
within his sport (see letter of the Rider as of 1 March 2019). It is, thus, obvious, that the Rider has
already filled out DCFs numerous times and was well aware of their content. In addition, the Single
Judge notes that an interpreter is only to be provided if available and only upon the request of the
Rider. There is no indication on file that the Rider requested the presence of an interpreter. In addition,
there were several other people in the room, whose assistance the Rider cold have requested if indeed
he had a language issue. Furthermore, there is no record on file that the Rider requested any additional
information from the DCO on the sample collection procedure. To conclude, the Single Judge finds
that there is nothing on file that would indicate that the Rider’s signature on the DCF does not constitute
a willful and knowledgeable acceptance of the doping control procedure. Consequently, the Rider’s
acknowledgement stands according to which the sample collection procedure was conducted in
conformity with the applicable International Standards’); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal
decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.32 (‘We did not accept the Athlete’s evidence in relation to
signing the declaration form confirming his satisfaction with the sample collection procedure. He
states that he had not realised there were departures until after he had signed it. However, the Athlete
is an experienced athlete who had been tested on nine previous occasions. We therefore find that he
would have been well aware of what was standard collection procedure and what was not, and yet
no adverse comment was made by the Athlete at that time and no refusal was made to accede to the
request to sign the declaration’); Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated
19 January 2012, para 36.20 (rejecting athlete’s argument that no weight should have been put on her
signature of the form because she had no expertise in or special knowledge of such matters).
Most recently, in Romero v IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6319, para 74, the CAS panel held: ‘CAS panels
have consistently held that by signing a DCF, an athlete is estopped from claiming violation of
the ISTI at a later stage, short of evidence of manipulation of the records, or fraud, or any similar
fact (CAS 2003/A/493, para 1.33; CAS 2012/2779, para 202; CAS 201 O/A/2277, para 4.9). Thus,
by signing the DCF, the Appellant confirmed her approval and satisfaction with the ADC process.
The fact that she only raised the allegation of irregularity in this appeal does not lend support to her
allegations of fraud’.
4 Willes v IBSF, CAS 2016/A/4776, para 60 (‘Any retreat from this position [acknowledgment
by signature of DCF that the procedures were carried out correctly] would need to be justified by
reference to some facts undiscovered or undisclosable at the time of signature’).
One such requirement would be the ISTI Art 9.3.2 requirement that the sample be transported
to the laboratory ‘as soon as practicable after the completion of the Sample Collection Session’.
Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 100 (no departure from
that requirement where it took three-and-a-half days to get the sample to the laboratory, at least ‘in
the absence of any evidence from the Appellant to prove that the sample was tampered with during
this period of time’), citing Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit
Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 125; Xuen v OCA, CAS AG 14/03, para 3.24 (transport to
laboratory in 16 hours not a departure from IST Art 9.3.2).
5 Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418, para 37 (‘The next major issue related to the
chain of custody. It is axiomatic that the links in such chain must be robust; there must be no chance
that the samples which arrive at the doping control centre were not those taken at the doping control
room or that they can have been tampered with en route. On the facts of these cases, the second matter
can be swiftly disposed of. The bottles containing the A and B samples arrived at the DCC with seals
unbroken: there were no signs of tampering, and the Appellants produced no evidence to suggest that
it could have – or indeed did – take place en route (any more than before the journey)’). See also para
C6.18.
6 B v FINA, CAS 2002/A/430, para 9.3.7 (‘The mere hypothetical possibility that the samples were
misplaced or manipulated will not satisfy the Appellant’s burden of proof, especially if she is unable to
cite specific procedural error such as gaps in the chain of custody of the bottles, defects in their sealing,
irregularities in the administration of the test, etc’); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal
decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.30 (‘While the Athlete appeared to raise the possibility that
his sample could have been interfered with during transport, this seems to amount to no more than
conjecture, not based on any factual evidence. The Athlete confirmed in his testimony that he had seen
the samples himself in tamper-evident bottles, and the documentation pack for Sample A filled out on
receipt of the sample by the Laboratory confirmed that the sample was received intact and without
irregularities’); World Athletics v Kibarus, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/069/2020 dated 14 July
2020, para 43 (‘Under the currently applicable regulatory framework it is not sufficient for an athlete
to merely argue that there may have been a departure from an International Standard and that this may
have caused the AAF, without providing any concrete evidence to corroborate such allegation. Absent
such particularisation, the presumption set forth in Article 3.2.3 comes into play’).
7 Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, accepting DCO’s insistence that she wore gloves during sample
collection, despite coach’s testimony that she did not, because the DCO’s evidence was clear and
consistent (para 16.5), it was corroborated by her colleagues (para 16.4: ‘We are conscious of the
fact that persons might not willingly admit to a breach of proper procedure, and might close ranks
around a colleague, but we could not conclude this to be so without cogent proof, which was entirely
lacking’), and also because ‘we have to bear in mind [the DCO]’s considerable experience, not least at
Olympic games; the training she and others involved in this vital stage of doping control had received;
the absence of any good reason why on this occasion she would have deviated from proper practice
of a function she performed on up to twenty occasions during the Beijing Games (Ms Kleppe could
only suggest that the collection process was running behind schedule); her natural appreciation of the
importance of the collection process; her intrinsic professional pride and her lack of motivation to
distort or misrepresent the true position’ (para 16.6); Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405
& 1418 para 31 (‘Another allegation relates to the alleged failure to use sealed (and therefore sterile)
equipment for urine sample collection: cf: the qualification on Grant, DCF. The evidence of Mr Jones
was clear that he received the collection vessels in a box, and each one of them is independently sealed
and tamper proof. Kittiwake, the supplier, states that their collection vessels are sterile at source.
I accept this evidence. Regularity in this area can be presumed: and Mr Jones would certainly have
noticed any departure from the norm, and would not sensibly have used non-sterile vessels’). See also
cases cited at para C6.7.
8 WADA v FCL & Villareal, CAS 2011/A/2376, para 88 (‘[…] the fact that the weightlifters were
together in the doping control room was not a condition imposed upon them but occurred at their own
request […]. Something voluntarily done by the weightlifters cannot be used by them to try to contest
the correctness of the sample collection process’) and para 90 (‘[…] the departure of [the athlete]
from the doping control station before the completion of her sample collection process was due to her
decision to answer a phone call and, thus, cannot in any way be used to dispute the accuracy of the
sample collection process’); WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 7.12 (endorsing
first instance decision that ‘[i]t would be somewhat of an anomaly to allow an athlete to contest his/her
refusal to submit to sample collection on the basis that Article 5.4.1 of the International Standards was
not complied with in circumstances where that athlete’s refusal was the cause of the non-compliance’);
UKAD v Bailey, NADP Tribunal decision dated 8 December 2017, para 46 (‘It could perhaps be said
that, if Mr Bailey had been told that he drank water “at his own risk”, he might not have drunk the
water at all and this was what resulted in his refusing to provide the sample. However, the difficulty
with this argument is that the warning in question was on the reverse of the Athlete Selection Order
and Mr Bailey himself declined to read the document because, so he said, he was very familiar with
the testing procedure and had heard it all before’); FIS v Veerpalu, FIS Doping Panel decision dated
21 August 2011, para 44 (where athlete caused delay between analysis of A sample and analysis of
B sample, he ‘waived his argument that the extensions of the time period had a detrimental impact
on the accuracy of the analysis results’); Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee decision dated
7 October 2005, para 2 (‘[…] the Athlete could not behave in a way that made it impossible for the
DCO to comply with procedural guidelines and then use those alleged procedural breaches as grounds
for appeal’); WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 7.12 (endorsing first instance
decision that ‘it would be somewhat of an anomaly to allow an athlete to contest his/her refusal to
submit to sample collection on the basis that Article 5.4.1 of the International Standards was not
complied with in circumstances where that athlete’s refusal was the cause of the non-compliance’)
B Proving that the departure could reasonably have caused the

adverse analytical finding
C6.11 Proof of a departure from the required sample collection procedures is not
enough, on its own, to justify dismissal of an Art 2.1 charge. Rather, Code Art 3.2.3
is clear that the athlete must also show that that departure ‘could reasonably have
caused’ the adverse analytical finding that is the basis of the charge. However, the
CAS has not stuck rigidly to that requirement in all cases.
C6.12 The Code states that an Art 2.1 charge requires an adverse analytical finding
in the A sample and either a confirmatory finding following analysis of the B sample
or else waiver by the athlete of analysis of the B sample.1 Where an athlete has been
denied the right given to him in the Code to attend the opening and analysis of the
B sample,2 two CAS panels have ruled that in such circumstances the athlete suffers
an irreparable prejudice, since the sample is now open and his opportunity to check its
integrity has been lost forever. This means that the B sample results are inadmissible,
and so the evidence that the Code requires to sustain the Art 2.1 charge does not exist,
and therefore the charge must be dismissed, without the athlete having to prove that
the failure to respect his B sample rights could reasonably have caused the adverse
analytical findings reported by the laboratory in respect of his A and B samples.3
C6.13 The CAS panel in Campbell-Brown v IAAF noted that:

‘there is considerable force to the proposition that, in order to justify imposing a
regime of strict liability against athletes for breaches of anti-doping regulations,
testing bodies should be held to an equivalent standard of strict compliance with
mandatory international standards of testing’.1
It also acknowledged:
‘the CAS jurisprudence that recognises the existence of certain international
standards which are considered to be so fundamental to the fairness of the doping
control regime and so central to ensuring the integrity of the sample collection and
testing process that any departure from them will result in the automatic invalidation
of the outcome of the testing procedure’.2
The jurisprudence it was referring to was these B sample cases. It suggested they
‘reflect a position whereby, notwithstanding Rule 3.2.1, certain IST requirements
are considered to be so fundamental to the just and effective operation of the doping
control system that fairness demands that any departure should automatically
invalidate any adverse analytical finding. In other words, certain IST departures
will be treated as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered to
undermine the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that it is impossible for
a reviewing body to be comfortably satisfied that a doping violation has occurred’.3 It
did not explain why it expressed this as a general rule, when the cases cited dealt only
with the special case of denial of B sample rights. Nor did it explain how to reconcile
this supposed per se rule with the clear wording of Code Art 3.2.1 that a departure
is only material if it ‘could reasonably have caused’ the ADRV charged. However, it
declined the invitation of the athlete’s counsel to extend the rule to cover ‘knowing,
systematic and persistent’ departures from the ISTI procedures for partial sample
collection (such as the intentional departure from the partial sample procedures that
took place in her case). Instead it applied the Code Art 3.2.1 test, and decided that
that departure could reasonably have caused her adverse analytical finding, and so
the charge should be dismissed based on Code Art 3.2.1, without the need to resort
to any per se rule.4 As a result, the panel’s comments on ‘fundamental breach’ were
obiter.
1 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, para 147.
2 Ibid, para 148.
3 Ibid, para 152. See also Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 68
(‘[…] certain international testing standards and ADR rules are considered to be so fundamental and
central to ensuring the integrity in the administration of sample collection and the rules that follow
that certain departures therefrom could result in the automatic invalidation of the test results. In other
words, certain departures will be treated as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered
to undermine the fairness of the testing and adjudication process to such an extent that it is impossible
for the Sole Arbitrator to be comfortably satisfied that an anti-doping rule violation occurred’).
C6.14 Subsequent panels have also uniformly rejected arguments that they should
extend the per se rule identified in Campbell-Brown beyond B sample cases to cases
involving departures from other rules:
(a) In Muralidharan, a CAS sole arbitrator did not rule out ‘a situation where an
athlete’s right to a timely and fair hearing in the first instance procedure was so
fundamentally violated that such omissions in the underlying procedure results
in an automatic dismissal of a violation (see for example in cases where an
athlete is not aware at all that a procedure is ongoing […])’, but only if the
athlete could show that as a result of the violation of his rights he ‘lost any
chance to demonstrate that no anti-doping violation took place’. The athlete
could not make any such showing in that case, because ‘at no time did the
delay unduly prejudice his right to obtain evidence, interview witnesses, or
adequately defend the claims brought against him’.1
(b) The CAS panel in Smikle (which included a member of the Campbell-Brown
panel) ruled:
‘Consistent with CAS 2012/A/2779, the Panel declines to establish a per se rule
that non-compliance with IST partial sample collection procedures automatically
invalidates the sample’s test results. It rejects the Appellant’s assertion that JADCO’s
breaches of the IST partial sample collection procedures constitutes a fundamental
breach so serious that it necessarily cannot be comfortably satisfied he committed
a doping violation. Doing so would invalidate a positive test result even if the
possibility of contamination is factually implausible based on the evidence and
conflict with the express language of Article 3.2.2 of the JADCO Anti-Doping Rules
and the 2009 WADC, which requires an athlete to establish a departure from an IST
“could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding.” As the CAS panel
in CAS 2014/A/3487 [Campbell-Brown] observed, “whether or not a particular
event caused a particular outcome is a matter of fact.” CAS 2014/A/3487 at ¶143’.2
(c) The CAS panel in Gorgodze (which included the chair of the Campbell-Brown
panel), cited Smikle and noted:
‘A per se rule that non-compliance with the IST automatically invalidates the
sample’s test results is rejected, because it would invalidate a positive test result
even if the possibility of contamination is factually implausible and because it would
contradict the express language of Art 3.2 of the WADC (and that of its implementing
regulations)’.3
It also noted that the alleged departures in the case before it ‘are not as serious
as to justify the application of a possible strict compliance rule’.4 It therefore
declined to automatically invalidate the adverse analytical finding.5
(d) Similarly, in Ralepelle v World Rugby, a first instance tribunal rejected
another request from an athlete to extend the per se rule purportedly identified
in Campbell-Brown beyond the B sample denial cases to a case where the
B sample was damaged during analysis. The tribunal noted that this submission:
‘[…] begs a number of questions: First, how can [such a rule] exist over and above or
separate from WADC Article 3.2.1 or any Rules or Regulations derived therefrom?
Second, what departure […] will be so fundamental to the just and effective operation
of the doping control system so as to guillotine the process? […] [The statement in
Campbell-Brown that some departures are so serious that by their nature they will be
considered to have undermined the fairness of the testing process to such an extent
that a panel cannot be satisfied that an ADRV has occurred] does not state what
departures will be so serious as to undermine the fairness of the testing process. That
is an inherent ambiguity that we find unhelpful and militates against the efficacy of
any such principle’.6
The hearing panel specifically noted that the only cases applying the per se
rule are cases of an athlete being deprived of the right to attend the opening
and testing of the B sample.7 It considered that the departure at issue before
it did not create more than a fanciful risk of contaminating the sample, and it
declined to hold that such a departure undermined the fairness of the testing
process to such an extent that it could not be satisfied that a violation had been
committed.8
(e) In Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, the athlete cited
Campbell-Brown for the proposition that ‘certain IST departures will be treated
as so serious that, by their very nature, they will be considered to undermine
the fairness of the testing process to such an extent that it is impossible for a
reviewing body to be comfortably satisfied that a doping violation has occurred’.
In response, the CAS panel noted that it follows from the wording of Code Art
3.2.1 (as transposed into the IAAF’s anti-doping rules) that ‘in principle, a
breach of the applicable International Standards as such does not automatically
lead to the invalidation of the analytical results’.9 It also noted that in any event
the alleged departures in that case did not meet the test proposed by the athlete,
and therefore he had failed to demonstrate that the alleged departures might
have reasonably caused exogenous steroids to be present in his sample: ‘The
fairness of the testing process was at no time undermined’.10
(f) Finally, the CAS panel in Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA held that ‘there is
no independent basis, derived from general principles of contract law, allowing
the conclusion that a departure from the rules by the anti-doping organization
prevents per se the finding of an anti-doping rule violation’. The panel accepted
that if an athlete shows ‘a breach of the rules [that] concerns the rights which are
deemed “fundamental” for safeguarding the athlete’s interests in the analysis
of his/her B sample, the causality requirement imposed in Article 3.2.2 of the
WADC shall not be applied and the analysis result shall be deemed invalid
regardless of the actual effect – or any potential effect – of the breach on the
result of the analysis’; but it was clear that if he cannot show a breach of his
B sample rights, then he must show that the departure from the rules ‘could
reasonably have caused’ the violation in issue.11
Therefore, there is no general per se rule, or ‘fundamental breach’ doctrine.12 There is
only (at most) a CAS-made sui generis exception to the general rule requiring proof
that the departure could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding, which
exception is strictly limited to cases where an athlete’s right to attend the opening and
analysis of his B sample has been denied him. In such a case, the B sample evidence
is rendered inadmissible, and therefore the panel by definition cannot be comfortably
satisfied that the ADRV charged has been committed.13 In all other cases, however,
the athlete must show that the departure in question ‘could reasonably have caused’
the factual basis on which he has been charged with an anti-doping rule violation.
1 Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, paras 90-91.
2 Smikle v JADC, CAS 2015/A/3925, paras 111, 114, 116, 118, 127 and 128.
3 Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, para 93. The alleged departures in that case were from the IST
procedures relating to collection of a urine sample from the athlete.
4 Ibid, para 95.
5 Ibid, para 96, cited with approval in UK Anti-Doping v X., confidential NADP Tribunal decision dated
3 August 2017, para 69, in which the panel declined to find that any breach of the requirement to
notify an athlete as soon as practicable that he/she has a case to answer (para 74) or any breach of the
ISTI investigation obligations (para 89) is a fundamental breach of the rules that warrants automatic
dismissal of the charge.
6 World Rugby v Ralapelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16 June 2015, paras 112 and
123. See also ibid, para 89 (‘[…] WADC Article 3.2 does not impose absolute standards from which
any deviation will result in an annulment of the process or of proceedings. It is a question of balance,
between strict liability and the rights of athletes. WADC Article 3.2 (and its derivatives) seeks to strike
that balance’).
7 Ibid, para 123.
8 Ibid, para 125.
9 Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 62.
10 Ibid, para 85.
11 CAS 2017/A/5016 & CAS 2017/A/5036, paras 96, 99, 110. See also Romero v IAAF, CAS 2019/A/6319,
para 76 (‘Finally, the Panel is not convinced by the Appellant’s submission that any irregularity, be
it ever so minor, should invalidate an AAF, nor that the alleged procedural irregularities (which the
Panel does not accept) in the present matter are so fundamental that they should invalidate the AAF.
The Panel notes that several CAS panels have invalidated an AAF for procedural irregularity where
the evidence established significant departures from the ISTI, such as the violation of the athlete’s
right to attend the opening and analysis of his/her B-sample (CAS 2002/A/385; CAS 2008/A/1607;
CAS 2010/A/2161; CAS 2014/A/3487). However, as was stated by the panel in CAS 2014/A/3487,
there must be “an appropriate balance between the rights of the athletes to have their samples
collected and tested in accordance with the mandatory testing standards, and the legitimate interest
in preventing athletes from escaping punishment for doping violations on the basis of inconsequential
or minor technical infractions of the IST’ (CAS 2014/A/3487, para 156). In the Panel’s view, the
facts asserted by the Appellant, even if proved, namely that the identity of the chaperone indicated
on the DCF is wrong, or that the DCO and the chaperone are spouses do not of themselves, and in
the context of the whole of the evidence, constitute a fundamental irregularity to the IST such as
would invalidate the AAF of the Appellant in this appeal’); Phillip v Panam Sports Organisation,
CAS 2019/A/6637, para 110 et seq (by disclosing disqualification of athlete’s results while his appeal
to CAS was pending, the respondent had breached the confidentiality requirements of Code Art 14.3.2
and the ISPPPI, but the CAS panel declined to declare that as a result the entire case against him,
based on an adverse analytical finding, should be declared null and void, because such relief ‘is neither
prescribed nor within its jurisdiction and authority to grant’, since the applicable rules do not identify
any consequences for a breach of confidentiality, and the CAS precedents cited by the athlete ‘mostly
present fundamental departures to doping control procedures or to the right to analyse or be present for
the analysis the B sample, (e.g. CAS 2002/A/385; CAS 2008/A/1607; CAS 2010/A/2161), and not to
premature public disclosure of the disposition of a matter whilst still in the results management process.
116. The right to restrictions to public disclosure and reporting in the course of results management
procedures is not “one of the few rights an athlete has in the course of the sample collection and
test procedures”, as stated in CAS 2002/A/385, ¶ 24 & 27, relied upon by the Appellant. The sample
collection and test procedures are separate from the results management process. 117. In this case,
the Appellant does not dispute the findings of the Respondent’s preliminary review under Article 7.1
of the PASO ADR, to the effect that there were no departures to any International Standard during
the sample collection or analysis procedures which could reasonably have caused the AAF, and has
admitted his anti-doping rule violation. He also does not argue that his any of his rights were breached
in the course of the sample collection, test or analytical procedures. Therefore, logic dictates that the
remedy for the Respondent’s confidentiality breach cannot be the invalidation of the undisputed test
process or sample collection procedure or analytical result which led to the Appellant’s admitted anti-
doping rule violation. 118. While the actions of the Respondent in prematurely reporting the Athlete’s
disqualification for his admitted anti-doping rule violation were erroneous, they cannot be remedied
by invalidating the entire anti-doping rule violation’); UKAD v Bailey, NADP Tribunal decision dated
8 December 2017, para 45 (rejecting request to treat alleged departure as breach of fundamental
requirement mandating dismissal of charge irrespective of lack of causative impact, because ‘[w]e do
not believe it is open to us simply to disregard the explicit provisions of ADR Article 8 [UK equivalent
of Code Art 3.2], however seriously any procedural defects are to be viewed’).
12 Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 83 (‘CAS bodies have confirmed that deviations from
applicable standards do not per se invalidate an AAF. There is no general rule of strict compliance
with International Standards […]’) (citations omitted); Ferreira v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4758, para 38
(‘The Panel finds it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which alleged procedural flaws or even
denial of fundamental rights which could have no bearing on the findings of an ADRV would ever
justify ignoring such findings’).
13 See paras C6.23–C6.26 for discussion of the relevant cases, and of the attempt made in the 2021 Code
to reverse this line of authority.
C6.15 The CAS panel in Campbell-Brown considered the ‘could reasonably have
caused’ wording to be ambiguous:
‘Whether or not a particular event caused a particular outcome is a matter of fact.

The application of the evaluative qualification “reasonably” in that context makes
little sense, as a matter of ordinary English, and tends to impede rather than assist the
determination of the standard of proof required of the athlete […], in order to shift
the burden back to the IAAF. [144] To resolve that ambiguity, it is necessary to have
regard to the underlying purpose of the provision and the reason for introducing the
adverb “reasonably” into Rule 33.3(b)’.1
It concluded that:
‘Rule 33.3(b) requires a shift in the burden of proof whenever an athlete establishes
that it would be reasonable to conclude that the IST departure could have caused the
Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words, the athlete must establish facts from
which a reviewing panel could rationally infer a possible causative link between the
IST departure and the presence of a prohibited substance in the athlete’s sample. For
these purposes, the suggested causative link must be more than merely hypothetical,
but need not be likely, as long as it is plausible. […] 157. […] The mandatory IST are
designed to eliminate the possibility of contamination affecting the outcome of anti-
doping tests. To ensure that anti-doping bodies strictly adhere to those standards, and
to ensure that athletes are not unfairly prejudiced if they failed to do so, IAAF Rule
33.3(b) must be interpreted in such a way as to shift the burden of proof onto the
anti-doping organisation whenever a departure from an IST gives rise to a material –
as opposed to merely theoretical – possibility of sample contamination’.2
Because there was evidence that hydrochlorothiazide (HCT) (the substance found
in the athlete’s sample) was a contaminant of local water sources, and because such
water was available in the waiting room where the athlete sat with her unsealed
partial sample, and there was ‘a more than negligible possibility that water and/or
sweat containing HCT could have entered the Athlete’s sample collection vessel in
the doing control area’,3 a majority of the panel concluded that ‘it cannot exclude the
possibility that environmental contamination arising out of the failure to comply with
the partial collection procedure could have been the cause of the Adverse Analytical
Finding. Accordingly it would be reasonable to conclude that the departures from
the IST could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding’.4 The CAS
panel in Smikle interpreted this to mean the athlete’s evidence ‘must be sufficient
to enable the Panel to reasonably conclude that the Respondent’s breach of the IST
partial sample collection procedures plausibly caused his positive test for HCTZ’,5
and found that that test was not met on the evidence before it because that evidence
did not establish that it was ‘more than a negligible possibility’ that the departure
caused the ADRV.6
1 Campbell-Brown v JAAA & IAAF, CAS 2014/A/3487, paras 143 and 144.
2 Ibid, paras 155-156, followed in Muralidharan v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639,
para 105.
4 Ibid, para 170. See also Morales v Guatemalan National Anti-Doping Association, CAS 2016/A/4694
(finding that departures from required sample collection procedures could have caused mishandling of
sample, and therefore dismissing charge based on presence of prohibited substance in that sample).
5 Smikle v JADC, CAS 2015/A/3925, para 118. See also UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 13 September 2017, para 62 (‘[…] only if the rules were breached severely enough to
plausibly affect the outcome of the analysis is there a need for the Single Judge to examine whether or
not the analysis results should be discarded’).
6 Smikle v JADC, CAS 2015/A/3925, para 128. Cf WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112,
para 85 (‘Therefore, the Panel deems a mere reference to a departure from the ISL insufficient, in the
absence of a credible link of such departure to a resulting Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words,
in order for an athlete to meet his/her burden and thus effectively shift the burden to an anti-doping
organization, the athlete must establish, on the balance of probabilities, (i) that there is a specific (not
hypothetical) departure from the ISL; and (ii) that such departure could have reasonably, and thus
credibly, caused a misreading of the analysis’), followed in IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez
Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, paras 359-360, and in Ruffoni v UCI, CAS 2018/A/5518,
para 86.
C6.16 If the athlete cannot discharge that burden, the departure was clearly
immaterial and is to be disregarded.1 In many cases, it is obvious that the departure
alleged could not plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding,2 eg where
the requirement in issue is designed to prevent the athlete having an opportunity to
adulterate the sample,3 and therefore the argument will end there. If the departure
led to the sample being left unattended for a period, and the athlete’s case is that it
may have been tampered with during that period, he cannot just speculate, but has to
produce evidence as to who could have tampered with his sample, how, and why.4
1 Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, passim; UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
13 September 2017, para 65 (rejecting alleged departures as unevidenced). For example, in Wilson v
UK Anti-Doping, an athlete disputed an Art 2.1 charge on the basis that (inter alia) the partial sample
she initially provided had been left unsealed while the DCOs waited for her to provide further urine.
The NADP tribunal sitting at first instance rejected the submission on the facts, but also ruled that in
any event the athlete had not shown that such departure could reasonably have caused her sample to
become contaminated with the two steroids subsequently found in it. On appeal, the athlete argued
that the tribunal had ‘misdirected itself as to the weight to be given to the evidence of a departure or
partial departure from “standard procedure”. That departure may have led to contamination of a type
or in a way which neither the Appellant nor the Panel recognises or understands and may have led to
an incorrect analysis. It would be inappropriate to expect the Athlete to have submitted in “scientific
detail” a full explanation for or of an incorrect reading which may have resulted from the departure
from “standard practice” in the collection of a urine sample. In this the Panel should have accepted
that UK Anti-Doping had not discharged the burden of proof which fell upon it’. The NADP Appeal
Tribunal rejected that argument by noting that, under IAAF ADR 33.3(b) (the equivalent of Code Art
3.3.2), the burden was on the athlete to show that the alleged departure could have caused the adverse
finding, and ‘it is only if she discharges this burden that the burden switches to UKAD to prove that
the departure did not cause the AAF’(Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision
dated 19 January 2012, para 36.10). See also Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458, para 92
(‘[…] even if a breach of a provision of a WADA International Standard has been committed [by the
DCO not requesting the athlete to wash her hands prior to sample collection, the Appellant failed to
establish […] how such a violation may have reasonably caused the AAF’); WADA v FCF and Garcia,
CAS 2017/A/5315, para 134 (‘The Athletes suggested that mishandling and/or very hot temperatures
during the three-hour journey from Neiva to Ibague could have caused the Adverse Analytical
Findings, but this was nothing more than bare speculation. They offered no evidence supporting these
assertions, such as scientific articles or expert testimony (such as doctors or laboratory scientists or
professors). The Panel is mindful of the Athletes’ financial constraints, but believes that, even within
those financial constraints, they could have, but did not, adduce evidence as to how hot temperatures
or mishandling could have caused boldenone to appear in their samples’); UK Anti-Doping v Edwards,
NADP Tribunal decision dated 7 June 2011, para 3.4.31 (‘[…] even if the Panel had accepted that
there were some departures [from the sample collection procedures set out in the IST], no explanation
was put forward by the Athlete as to how any of the alleged departures could have produced the
adverse findings of exogenous Testosterone and Clostebol metabolites in his sample’); Ohlsson v
WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, pp 19–20 (‘Per Article 6.3.2 the Doping
Control Station was not used solely as such a station for the duration of the Sample Collection Session.
There was no record made of any deviations from this requirement. However, there is no indication
of any interference by any third parties in the sample collection procedure. The Appeal Tribunal
was satisfied that the Judicial Committee was entitled to conclude that such departures as had been
accepted/established did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding’).
2 Willes v IBSF, CAS 2016/A/4776, para 44 (‘[…] erroneous naming of the testing authority in the
DCOR [Doping Control Official Record] could not have affected the test results’) and para 61 (‘That
they [the sample collection personnel] may have chosen the wrong line for their signatures cannot
affect the efficiency of the sample collection’); Gorgodze v IPC, CAS 2015/A/3915, para 104 (‘[…]
a possible notice [of doping control] sent to his coach [before him] or possible lack of information
regarding the rights and responsibilities could not have caused the AAF […]’) and para 108 (‘[…]
the lack of adhesive film [covering the spout of the collection vessel] is irrelevant, because the parties
agree that the urine sample was immediately poured from the collection vessel to the A and B bottles
and was not stocked in the collection vessel’); WADA v FCL & Villareal, CAS 2011/A/2336, para 94
(‘[…] the Second Respondents’ allegations concerning the sample collection and storage procedures
[…] could in no manner cause their adverse analytical findings. Therefore, the Panel must conclude
that the anti-doping tests performed on the weightlifters were properly carried out’); IAAF v AFS &
Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, para 103 (‘[…] the presence of a dog and of naked people at the doping
control station, as well as the fact that Ms Javornik was not offered the use of sterile gloves while
providing the sample, clearly had no impact on the result of the analysis, showing the presence of rEPO
in the sample provided by Ms Javornik’); N’Sima v FIBA, FIBA Appeal Commission decision dated
16 January 2006, para II.2.c (‘Even if there was a procedural error in selecting the First Appellant [not
by lot but by his coach] this can only lead to the result of the analysis being ignored if the procedural
error is able to influence the result of the analysis […]. However, this is obviously not so in the present
case’); Jonsson v IPF, CAS 2007/A/1332, para 56 (even if DCO did not have his official identification
card with him, given that there were no circumstances indicating that this could have affected the
results of analysis of the sample, the IPF was deemed to have discharged its burden of proving that
the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding); RFU v Price, independent panel decision
dated 10 March 2016, para 64 (even if athlete should have been permitted to shower while he waited
to urinate, ‘to do so would not, even on the facts as he was describing them, have cured the issue and
as such it could not possibly be said to undermine the validity of the anti doping procedure’ such as to
vitiate his subsequent departure from the doping control station without providing a sample). In the
Gasser case, a failure to collect more than 45ml of urine was ruled irrelevant, because it did not affect
the laboratory’s ability to test both the A sample and the B sample properly. Gasser and SLV v IAAF,
IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 18 January 1988, in Tarasti Legal Solutions in International
Doping Cases (SEP Editrice 2000) at p 118. See also Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 86 (‘As
a preliminary point, since the Player admits that the departures could not have caused the AAF in this
case, the Panel deems it unnecessary to assess the following alleged departures: (a) Failure to provide
certificates of sterility for the glass Berlinger bottles. (b) Failure to test the Player’s blood sample
for all types of Prohibited Substances and concomitant Metabolites and Markers, not simply for the
isoforms GH, HBOCs, and ESAs (including recombinant epics and analogues. (c) Failure to store
the samples from the tournament in accordance with the applicable guidelines’). Cf Willes v IBSF,
CSA 2016/A/4776, para 51 (absence of warning that consumption of food or drink is at athlete’s own
risk is irrelevant because athlete is under a constant duty to avoid consuming prohibited substances).
3 IAAF v CBAt & Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, para 207 (alleged failure to chaperone athlete irrelevant
because ‘an unchaperoned athlete actually has an advantage in the sense that he or she can interfere
with the sample to his or her benefit’).
4 In a pre-Code case, S v International Equestrian Federation, CAS 91/A/56, Digest of CAS Awards
1986–1998 (Berne 1998), pp 93, 97, a CAS panel ruled that analysis of the B sample could not confirm
the positive result of the A sample analysis ‘unless all of the provisions of Annex III of the Veterinary
Regulations have been scrupulously observed, in such a way as to eliminate any possibility of
manipulation’. The panel accepted the rider’s evidence that the B sample jars had not been sealed in the
manner required by the FEI rules, so that it was ‘not possible to exclude definitely the possibility of
manipulation and thus contamination’. As a result, the CAS panel ruled, ‘doubt exists which must be to
the benefit of’ the rider, and therefore the upholding of the doping charge at first instance was
overturned). However, hearing panels applying rules implementing the Code have taken a more robust
approach, requiring proof not only that departure(s) from the required sample collection procedures
made tampering theoretically possible, but also evidence (rather than mere speculation) that such
tampering might actually have taken place. X. v IWF, SFT judgment of 28 February 2018, 4A_576/2012,
para 3.2.2 (appeal rejected where the athlete ‘gives no explanation which could make plausible a
mistaken manipulation of the samples or a wrongful intervention by a third party who would have been
able to contaminate his samples or substitute them with others with the same identification number
without traces’); Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 101 (‘Again, this allegation of sabotage must
be rejected. The Player has not substantiated it with any evidence as to who would have committed such
an act or why they would have the incentive to do it’); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL &
WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 90 (‘[…] the Appellant’s submission related to sabotage amounts to a
mere hypothesis or speculation. This is not enough to make the Panel satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that the results of the analysis of the January 1 Sample cannot be attributed to the Appellant.
The Appellant did not submit a scenario which “could make plausible a mistaken manipulation” of the
1 January Sample “or a wrongful intervention by a third party who would have been able to
contaminate” his sample or substitute it with another with the same identification number without
traces (see Judgement of the Swiss Federal Tribunal of 28 February 2013, 4A_576/2012). The
Appellant’s case in essence is that it cannot be excluded that there are persons in this world with a
motive and the capacity to sabotage him. The identity of such persons having a motive and the capacity
to conspire against the Athlete, however, was left in the dark as well as the time and place when such
manipulation occurred’) and para 91 (‘[…] the Athlete was unable to submit a plausible scenario how
and when the sabotage of his sample could have occurred’); WADA v FCL & Villereal, CAS 2011/A/2336,
para 90 (‘[…] the departure of [the athlete] from the doping control station before the completion of her
sample collection process was due to her decision to answer a phone call and, thus, cannot in any way
be used to dispute the accuracy of the sample collection process. In any case, no evidence or even
allegation of the manipulation of her sample in her absence has been raised during the proceedings’);
Pechstein and DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 148 (procedures followed provided adequate
assurance of the identity and integrity of the blood samples tested where ‘neither Ms Pechstein nor any
of the experts or witnesses who testified before the Panel gave any clue as to how and why one could
have manipulated the Athlete’s anonymous samples’); La Barbera v IWAS, CAS 2010/A/2277,
para 4.10 (‘Even if the Panel was to accept that there had been any departure from the ISTI, which it
does not, Mr La Barbera has been unable to prove that any alleged departure could reasonably have
caused the adverse analytical finding. Mr La Barbera merely assumes that, due to his attendance to the
medal ceremony, “the chain of custody of the samples was broken and there is no prove [sic] that the
urine examined in the lab is really coming from the athlete”. Mr La Barbera’s line of argument amounts
to mere speculation without any supporting facts. Mr Van Weert [the DCO] made it clear that there had
always been at all times a DCO to supervise and to secure the samples, so that there has never been any
break in the chain of custody. Mr La Barbera does not allege that the samples referred to in the doping
control form were not his own; he even admits that he has no basis to argue that “someone did something
to stitch him up”. No evidence was presented by Mr La Barbera neither that someone could have
tampered with his sample nor how such tampering could have happened. Arguably, nobody knew
precisely when Mr La Barbera has been required to provide a sample and, if they did, nobody would
have known that he had only been able to provide a partial sample and that, assuming that such sample
was left unattended – which the Panel excludes – that Mr La Barbera would leave to attend the medal
ceremony thus providing someone with the opportunity to tamper such sample’); Jonsson v IPF,
CAS 2007/A/1332, para 48 (even if there was a departure from the required procedures in that the
chaperone left before the sample collection was concluded, the claim that the sample could have been
tampered with was pure speculation unsupported by any evidence, where it was not alleged that the
DCO had tampered with the sample, and on the verification protocol from the opening of the B sample
there was no evidence of tampering); WADA v ASSIS & FPF, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 66 (the athlete
‘also suggests that he is the victim of a conspiracy. Such a statement is not credible absent a basis in fact.
He adduced no evidence to ascertain a credible plot hatched against him. In particular, he did not give
any plausible reasons on why and how somebody would try to harm his interests. The alleged
questionable attitude of the CNAD does not explain the positive findings of his samples’); Azevedo v
CBDA, CAS 2003/A/510, paras 4.1-4.2 (rejecting tampering claim as speculative and unsubstantiated);
Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, para 116 (‘With regard to the allegation that the samples were left unattended alone
with the DCO, the Panel observes that the Appellant has never claimed that the samples were not his
own, nor has he provided any evidence whatsoever that the samples were manipulated before the bottles
were sealed. In addition, the Appellant has not provided any explanation as to the motives that would
have induced the DCO to tamper with the samples in order to frame Mr Vroemen, if suspicion had
arisen’); CCES v Lelievre, SDRCC decision dated 7 February 2005, para 34 (‘I am not satisfied that the
Athlete’s sample was, in fact, left unattended as he claims. Even if it was, however, the Athlete has
offered no evidence that could lead me to conclude that his sample was tampered with or that there was
a departure from the Doping Control Rules which caused the adverse analytical finding for cocaine
metabolite. No evidence was presented by the Athlete that someone could have used such an opportunity,
let alone actually took the opportunity, to tamper with his sample. There was no evidence of any
unauthorised persons in the doping control station itself where the sample was said to have been
unattended’); Wilson v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 19 January 2012,
para 36.13 (alleged departures could not have caused the subsequent adverse findings, because no one
had either motive or opportunity to take advantage of the alleged lack of sealing to adulterate the
samples: ‘36.12 In any event, on the basis of the Appellant’s own account, she was in the same room
with DCOs Kelman and Anderson and her partial sample throughout. No one could have touched it
without her seeing them do so (except DCO Anderson momentarily handling it to pick it up and put it
down, behind a wall). 36.13 For adulteration of the sample to have occurred, DCOs Kelman and
Anderson would have had to be involved in a conspiracy. Asked before the Arbitral Tribunal if they had
adulterated the sample, they denied and were not pressed on the matter, and the Appellant disclaimed
any suggestion that anyone at UK Athletics or UKAD might have had motive to harm the Appellant’).
C6.17 If the athlete does establish a departure from the required procedures that
could plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding (or, in non-Art 2.1 cases,
the other factual basis for the violation charged), the burden shifts to the Anti-Doping
Organization ‘to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical
Finding or the factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation’.1 In some cases, expert
evidence may be required to meet this burden.2 If the Anti-Doping Organization does
meet this burden, the departure will again be discounted as a harmless ‘slip’, and the
charge will stand. If it fails to do so, the charge will be dismissed.
1 Code Art 3.2.3. See paras C6.8 and C6.9.
2 For example, if it is proved that a substance could only be added to a urine sample in parent form, and
not as a metabolite, then the fact that the laboratory detected the metabolite in the sample rules out
contamination of the sample after it was provided by the athlete. Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768,
paras 18.1-18.3; ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008, para 51 (‘[…] the
substance subsequently detected – benzoylecgonine – cannot be produced inside the bottle under any
storage conditions. It is produced inside the body when a person ingests cocaine’).
See also IAAF v CBat & Da Silva, CAS 2012/A/2779, para 210 (fact partial sample was not sealed
could not have caused adverse finding because it was always under athlete’s control, and scientific
evidence showed no spiking could have taken place); Nemec v CITA & IAAF, CAS 2016/A/4458,
para 80 et seq (concluding after thorough analysis of evidence produced that athlete had not met her
burden of showing that the DCO who collected her sample had spiked it with EPO when she left it
alone and unsealed with the DCO for a couple of minutes, because there was no direct evidence of
spiking, because the DCO did not know that the IAAF had suggested the sample be analysed for EPO,
because the athlete failed to mention at the time or on the form that the samples were left unattended,
and because it would be very difficult to spike the sample and achieve the same concentration in
the A and B samples, given that they had different volumes); Muralidharan v National Anti-
Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 106 (‘[…] as Dr Botre testified, various delays in the
transportation and testing of the sample would not create bio transformations of the Appellant’s urine
such that MHA would suddenly appear in the sample’); Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032,
paras 64-67 (expert scientific opinion established that alleged departures from the IST could not have
caused the subsequent adverse analytical findings for 19-norandrosterone); WADA v Assis & FPF,
CAS 2006/A/1153, para 60 (stability test proved that delay in sending samples to laboratory had not
led to degradation of sample); WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, para 6.7 (leaving sample unattended
for 45 minutes could not have caused adverse finding because sample was in a sealed and tamper-
evident bottle during that time); ITF v Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008,
para 126 (‘We are confident that the omission to define with sufficient clarity and precision the criteria
needed to ensure that any sealed sample will be stored in a manner that protects its integrity, identity
and security prior to transport from the doping control station, had no causative impact on the adverse
analytical finding in this case. The fact that the criteria were not defined as they should have been does
not mean that [the DCO’s] practices with regard to storage of samples were inadequate or resulted in
any breach of security’); Cooper & Grant v BWLA, CAS 2007/A/1405 & 1418 para 32 (‘A further
allegation from Mr Grant was that something in the air might have contaminated his sample. Evidence
from Professor Cowan and Professor James was clear that even if there was something in the air
arising from the use of the room as a changing room, and even if that something found its way into Mr
Grant’s sample, is highly unlikely to have any effect whatsoever on the measure of HCG. Further, had
some degradation occurred, this would be likely to reduce the level of HCG. Finally Mr Grant’s sample
was not degraded, since none of the signs of degradation were present’).
C6.18 The case of WADA v Wium demonstrates that even a clear departure from the
mandatory sample collection and transport requirements of the International Standard
for Testing & Investigations is irrelevant if it could not have caused the adverse
analytical finding. The DCO collected a sample from an athlete out-of-competition,
but inadvertently left the collection site without the sample, which was therefore
left unattended for at least 45 minutes. The CAS accepted that this was a profound
break in the chain of custody and therefore a clear departure from the requirements
of the International Standard for Testing (as it then was), but nevertheless upheld
the Art 2.1 charge against the athlete because it was comfortably satisfied that such
departure did not cast any doubt on the reliability of the test results, mainly because
of ‘the practical impossibility to destroy a Berlinger bottle and the fact that the seal
was intact at the sample’s arrival at the laboratory’.1
1 WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 6.6 and 6.7, citing Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607, for the
proposition that a Berlinger bottle cannot be opened without it being apparent that it has been tampered
with. See also Azevedo v CBDA, CAS 2003/A/510, para 6.2 (leaving urine sample unattended and
unsealed for about a minute was ‘extremely regrettable […]. However, it does not, of itself, mean
that the chain of custody was broken, and there is no indication of, and there was no evidence which
suggested, any other possible breach of the chain of custody throughout the entire testing process’);
Arashov v ITF, CAS 2017/A/5112, para 99 (‘Nor can this Panel make an assumption that the Berlinger
equipment used was contaminated. Berlinger kits are used in tens if not thousands of drug tests each
year, without problem. For example, Professor Ayotte testified at the hearing before the Tribunal that
her laboratory in Montreal receives 25,000-28,000 samples a year, half of which are collected with
Berlinger equipment and that, therefore, it must have analysed to date hundreds of thousands of such
samples. She has not been aware of any incident involving Berlinger equipment being contaminated
by a substance that could cause an AAF. In such circumstances, specific evidence would be required
as to how the Berlinger equipment used for the sampling of the Player’s urine was contaminated. The
Player has not provided any such evidence’).
2 ESTABLISHING THE RELIABILITY OF THE LABORATORY’S ADVERSE

ANALYTICAL FINDING
C6.19 Assuming that the Anti-Doping Organization is able to establish the identity
and integrity of the sample to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel, it
must then establish that the prohibited substance reported by the laboratory was
present in that sample when the laboratory came to analyse it. To meet that burden,
the Anti-Doping Organization has the analytical report produced by the laboratory,
reporting the presence of the prohibited substance in the sample. If the Anti-Doping
Organization can satisfy the hearing panel that that finding is reliable, it will have
made out its prima facie case on the point.1
1 See Code Art 2.1.2: ‘Sufficient proof of an anti-doping rule violation under Article 2.1 is established by
any of the following: presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in the Athlete’s
A Sample where the Athlete waives analysis of the B Sample and the B Sample is not analyzed; or,
where the Athlete’s B sample is analyzed and the analysis of the Athlete’s B Sample confirms the
presence of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers found in the Athlete’s A Sample;
[…]’. See eg Football Federation of Australia v Hearfield, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 4 June
2013, para 9 (‘In the absence of any issue such as chain of custody, laboratory error or a TUE, the
doping control forms and laboratory analyses are evidence that satisfies the elements of the alleged
ADRV of presence’).
A Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on

‘procedural’ grounds
C6.20 ‘Sample analysis is part of the Analytical Testing process and involves the
detection, identification, and in some cases demonstration of the presence above a
Threshold of Prohibited Substance(s) and/or their Metabolite(s), or Marker(s) of
Use of Prohibited Substances or Prohibited Methods in human biological fluids or
tissues’.1 Sample analysis is governed by the International Standard for Laboratories
(ISL), which ‘sets out the requirements to be followed by Laboratories and WADA-
Approved Laboratories for the ABP that wish to demonstrate that they are technically
competent, operate within an effective Management System, and are able to
produce forensically valid results’.2 Further mandatory requirements are set out in
Technical Documents, which are considered part of the ISL,3 and ‘provide direction
to Laboratories […] on specific technical or procedural issues’,4 and in Technical
Letters, which ‘provide direction to the Laboratories […] on particular issues on the
analysis, interpretation and reporting of results for specific Prohibited Substance(s)
and/or Prohibited Method(s) or on the application of specific Laboratory procedures’,
and again are ‘an integral part of the ISL’.5 There are also laboratory guidelines and
technical notes, but these contain (respectively) best practice recommendations and
guidance, and therefore are not mandatory requirements.6 ‘Any aspect of Analytical
Testing or management not specifically discussed in this document [the ISL] or in the
relevant Technical Documents, Technical Letters or Laboratory Guidelines shall be
governed by ISO/IEC 17025’.7
1 2019 ISL Art 1.3. In relation to the analytical process generally, see Catlin et al, ‘Testing urine for
drugs’, (1992) Clinica Chimica Acta 207, S13–S26.
2 2019 ISL Art 1.1.
3 Code p 136, App One, definition of International Standards: ‘International Standards shall include any
Technical Documents issued pursuant to the International Standard’.
4 2019 ISL Art 1.2.1.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid, Art 1.2.3 and Art 1.2.4.
7 Ibid, Art 5.1.
C6.21 The Anti-Doping Organization will need to show that the laboratory
followed the applicable procedures set out in the ISL and the Technical Documents
and Technical Letters when it analysed the sample in question.1 It is greatly assisted
in this task by Code Art 3.2.2, which provides that ‘WADA-accredited laboratories,
and other laboratories approved by WADA, are presumed to have conducted Sample
analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard
for Laboratories’. This ‘presumption of regularity’2 means that the Anti-Doping
Organization, ‘in the establishment of an anti-doping rule violation, is not called
to give evidence of the application of the relevant rules concerning the conduct of
the analysis and the custodial procedures’.3 Instead, as long as the Anti-Doping
Organization can show that the laboratory that carried out the analysis was WADA-
accredited,4 and that that accreditation covers the analytical procedures used in the
case in question,5 the presumption arises under Code Art 3.2.2 that the analytical
procedures were carried out by the laboratory in accordance with the ISL, and
therefore that they were carried out properly, and so the adverse analytical finding
reported by the laboratory is reliable.6
1 See Code p 136, App One, definition of ‘International Standards’ (‘Compliance with an International
Standard (as opposed to another alternative standard, practice or procedure) shall be sufficient
to conclude that the procedures addressed in the Standard were performed properly. International
Standards shall include any Technical Documents issued pursuant to the International Standard’);
ISL Art 1.2. See also Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753,
para 5.15 (‘A WADA-accredited laboratory such as the Beijing Laboratory must conduct sample
analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the International Standard of Laboratories in
order to justify the burden of strict liability and the severe penalties which are imposed by the IOC
ADR 2008 on an athlete’) and at para 6.10 (‘Doping is an offence which requires the application
of strict rules. If an athlete is to be sanctioned solely on the basis of the provable presence of a
prohibited substance in his body, it is his or her fundamental right to know that the Respondent,
as the Testing Authority, including the WADA-accredited laboratory working with it, has strictly
observed the mandatory safeguards’); dissenting opinion in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision
dated 20 September 2007, para 61 (‘As athletes have strict liability rules, the laboratories should be
held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and sound scientific practice’), aff’d, Landis v
USADA, CAS 2007/A/139.
2 Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, para 41 (‘[…] the Panel reminds itself of the principle “omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta” – the presumption of regularity. In the context of the sensitive area of
drug testing in sport, the presumption is codified in Article 3.2 of the WADC […]’).
3 IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, para 56.
4 WADA v FPF & Costa Fernandes, CAS 2012/A/2922, para 142 (‘Given […] the revocation of the
LADETEC’s WADA accreditation, the Panel cannot reasonably rely on the presumption set forth in
article 14 ADR’ (the equivalent to Code Art 3.2.2).
The laboratory that reported the presence of testosterone in Diane Modahl’s sample was IOC-
accredited (this was the pre-WADA era), but had failed to notify the IOC that it had moved the site of
its facilities, and had carried out the analysis of Modahl’s sample at the new site. Modahl’s argument
that it therefore did not qualify as an IOC-accredited laboratory received short shrift in the House
of Lords: Modahl v BAF Ltd (22 July 1999, unreported) (Hoffman LJ). See also Landis v USADA,
CAS 2007/A/1394, para 51 (rejecting athlete’s submission that laboratory and/or method it used to
detect testosterone in athlete’s sample were not accredited, and therefore holding the laboratory was
entitled to the presumption that it conducted sample analysis in accordance with the ISL).
See also Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, paras 43-45 (‘The Appellant’s challenge is based on
the contention that the Sochi Laboratory was not registered in Russia as a legal entity, and according
to the Appellant, such an unregistered organization is not authorized to carry out any activity in Russia,
indeed did not even exist in a point of law. […] The Panel notes that the Appellant’s approach to this
issue is a very formalistic one. While it might have been preferable for all the formal requirements of
local laws to be strictly observed, the Panel emphasizes that, in the context of international sport, the
competence of laboratories to carry out analysis of doping samples is defined in the WADC. The Panel
had no expert evidence from either side as to the consequences of non-registration in Russian law but,
in its view whatever those consequences might be matters not. The Sochi Laboratory was a satellite
facility of the WADA accredited laboratory in Moscow. Before the Sochi Games, the World Anti-
Doping Agency (“WADA”) had evaluated the capability of the Sochi Laboratory in due course and
issued its official accreditation for the Sochi Laboratory for the time period running from 27 January
2014 to 15 April 2014. The accreditation certificate confirms that the Sochi Laboratory was properly
recognised as such by the President of the WADA’).
On the other hand, the accreditation procedures for laboratories include provisions for penalty
points for laboratories that have reported false positives or false negatives, and for suspension or even
revocation of accreditation in cases of serious non-conformity. See 2019 ISL Art 7.3. In Anderson
Luis de Souza v CBG & FIFA, CAS 2013/A/3395, the footballer Deco challenged the reliability of
the Brazilian laboratory’s report that HCT and tamoxifen were present in his sample on the ground
that a few months after reporting that finding, the laboratory had had its accreditation revoked by
WADA. The case was closed after the Lausanne laboratory re-tested the sample and returned a
negative finding, and so the argument in relation to revoked accreditation was not addressed in that
case. A similar argument was addressed, however, in UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision
dated 13 September 2017, para 57, where the sole arbitrator ruled as follows: ‘The starting point
of the analysis is Article 3.2.2 ADR. According thereto “WADA-accredited laboratories, and other
laboratories approved by WADA, are presumed to have conducted Sample analysis and custodial
procedures in accordance with the International Standard for Laboratories.” The Laboratory where
the analysis of the Rider’s blood sample was conducted is WADA-accredited. Thus, the presumption
contained in Article 3.2.2 ADR applies. The Rider submits that on 24 June 2016 the accreditation of
the laboratory had been withdrawn by WADA. However, this allegation does not change the fact that at
the time when the analysis was performed the Laboratory was accredited. In fact, all samples included
in the Rider’s ABP were analysed at a time when the Laboratory was validly accredited. The Rider
has not submitted why the withdrawal of the accreditation in June 2016 would also affect the analysis
of a sample in September 2015. The only argument advanced by the Rider is that “any irregularities
[on which the withdrawal of the accreditation on 24 June 2016 is based] must have occurred prior to
that period”. However, the Rider did not explain when the (alleged) irregularities occurred and to what
kind of analysis they related. Thus, the Single Judge sees no reason not to apply Article 3.2.2 ADR to
the case at hand. Contrary to the Rider’s submission, it is, therefore, not up to the UCI to establish that
“the testing and analytical process did reliably and validly demonstrate the presence of a prohibited
substance.” In addition, there is no evidence on file that the analysis of the sample by the Laboratory
produced any incorrect values to the detriment of the athlete’). See also IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP
decision dated 11 February 2020, para 298 (accepting that after a site visit to the Moscow laboratory,
WADA reported a departure from the ISL requirements relating to chain of custody, and imposed
a corrective action that required the Moscow laboratory to review and evaluate its entire chain of
custody system, nevertheless ‘[a] signalled corrective action does not cast sufficient doubt on the
appropriateness of the Laboratory’s chain of custody nor does it cast sufficient doubt on the integrity
of all samples analysed at the time so as to invalidate the Athlete’s analytical results within the LIMS
data’, in circumstances where other evidence exists that adequately identifies the athlete’s sample,
and given that ‘the fact that no Chain of Custody Forms are available is likely to result from the many
efforts undertaken to hide and manipulate data at the time’) and para 324 (‘The Panel accepts that
every single assessment, either by an ISO body or by WADA, identifies some room for improvement
of the laboratory procedures. The laboratory must react by adjusting its procedures and implementing
corrective actions to improve the processes within the laboratory. Because the Moscow Laboratory
was not suspended after these assessments but rather remained fully operational before and during the
2014 Olympic Winter Game (ie the time frame of the samples in question), there is no evidence that
WADA’s recommendations after the site visit invalidated any of its analytical data or caused the PAAF
[presumptive adverse analytical finding]’).
In addition, the CAS panel in WADA v Chernova & RUSADA, CAS 2013/A/3112, at para 90, noted
that ‘WADA-accredited laboratories must also maintain their accreditation under the international
“ISO/IEC 17025” standard, through accreditation with a relevant nationally recognized body for
accreditation of laboratories (Article 4.4.1)’, and required proof that such accreditation had been
maintained in order to accept that ‘the Laboratory was duly accredited during the testing of Ms
Chernova’s sample’. On the other hand, it also found that ‘even if the Laboratory were not accredited
to the international “ISO/IEC 17025” standard, quod non, this would itself be insufficient for a finding
that such a departure could reasonably have caused an Adverse Analytical Finding, in particular in
light of the Laboratory’s WADA-accreditation during the testing period’. Ibid, para 92.
5 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 110 (‘[…] not only must the Laboratory that conducts the
analysis be accredited but the Test method used must also be validated and covered by the Laboratory’s
accreditation’). The CAS panel in Veerpalu rejected the athlete’s argument that the laboratory was not
accredited to carry out the analytical technique it had applied to detect hGH in his sample. Ibid, paras
111–112.
See also Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, para 147 (‘The Panel is of the opinion that a CAS panel cannot place in question
whether an ISO accreditation was correctly attributed to a laboratory, because this would render the
whole international standardization and certification system meaningless and because, notoriously,
compliance with ISO accreditation requirements is regularly checked by external auditors. However,
a CAS panel may certainly verify whether a given method used by a laboratory is covered by the
accreditation or not’).
6 Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 9.12 (‘[…] the presumption under the rules is that WADA-
accredited laboratory results are reliable’); Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, paras 77–78 (‘[…]
The Appellant is of the opinion that it is the onus of the IOC to prove that no departure from the
ISL occurred. 78. Contrary to the Appellant’s view and according to Article 3.2.1 IOC ADR, it is
not the IOC’s but the Athlete’s burden to establish “that a departure from the International Standard
occurred which could reasonably have caused” the AAF’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated
9 November 2005, paras 34–35 (‘WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have conducted
testing and custodial procedures in accordance with the appropriate standards. […] Therefore,
USADA met its initial burden of proving Mr Wade’s doping violation based on producing Mr Wade’s
positive test results from a WADA-approved laboratory’); IBAF v Luque, IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 13 December 2010, para 4.4 (‘According to the definition of “International Standard”
in the IBAF ADR, if that [adverse analytical] finding is a product of procedures that complied with
the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories, then that is sufficient to conclude that
the procedures were sound (and therefore the findings are reliable). And IBAF ADR Art 3.2 provides
that WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to have complied with the International Standard
for Laboratories and that it is for the athlete to prove otherwise. In other words, it is presumed that
adverse analytical findings issued by WADA-accredited laboratories are reliable, and the burden is on
the athlete to adduce evidence that suggests otherwise’).
An adverse analytical finding by a WADA-accredited laboratory is not undermined by a negative
finding by a non-accredited laboratory; the latter is to be disregarded. WADA v FMF & Carmona,
CAS 2006/A/1149, paras 49–50.
C6.22 However, the Code Art 3.2.2 presumption of regularity is rebuttable. Code
Art 3.2.2 states:
‘The Athlete or other Person may rebut this presumption by establishing a departure
from the International Standard for Laboratories occurred which could reasonably
have caused the adverse analytical finding’.
According to the case law, this means the athlete must first show, on the balance
of probabilities,1 facts that demonstrate a departure from one of the mandatory
requirements2 of the International Standard for Laboratories3 or one of the supporting
WADA Technical Documents.4 It is not enough to show a departure from any other
rule or standard,5 or from a requirement of national law.6 However, the athlete cannot
stop there: as well as showing a departure from a mandatory ISL/TD requirement, the
athlete must also show (in a change introduced by the 2009 Code) that the departure
‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse analytical finding7 (or, following
Campbell-Brown, could plausibly have caused the adverse analytical finding8). The
athlete will need evidence to discharge this burden, not just speculation.9
1 Code Art 3.1.
2 It is not enough to show that (for example) the laboratory technicians involved in the analysis
did not seem to have full training or experience on particular instruments, unless that showing
demonstrates a departure from the requirements of the ISL: USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision
dated 20 September 2007, para 311, aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also NADA v
Sinkewitz, CAS 2012/A/2857, para 183 (‘The difference between the ratios found in kit 1 of the A-
and B-sample, respectively, was claimed to be beyond the intra-assay variability of 10% provided
in the hGH Guidelines. However, this figure is not a requirement provided in the ISL but a mere
recommendation formulated in the hGH Guidelines and, according to the expert witnesses heard at the
hearing, an exceeding of this figure cannot reasonably cause a false AAF’).
In addition, it is not enough to show that the laboratory did not do something that the ISL states it
‘should’ do, because ‘should’ is not mandatory (see para B1.56 n2). Instead, the athlete must show
that the laboratory did not do something that the ISL states it ‘shall’ or ‘must’ do: USADA v Landis,
AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 240 (‘Had the drafters intended that matrix
interference be avoided it would require wording such as “shall” or “must”‘) and para 267 (‘The
actual language of the document is not obligatory. The word “should” would have to be replaced by
mandatory language such as “shall” or “must” had the draftsperson intended this to be an obligatory
requirement’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also WADA v FMF & Cermona,
CAS 2006/A/1149, para 42 (ISL provision that analysis of B Sample ‘should be completed within
30 days’ of notice of the A sample result ‘simply states a best standard to be applied if the analysis
of the ‘B’ sample is requested; it does not suggest that if the analysis takes place more than 30 days
after notification of the result of the ‘A’ sample analysis, the result of the ‘B’ sample analysis must
be disregarded’); E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 42 (‘[…] the language in this section is
permissive and while it may be ideal to have the results reported within that timeframe, it is not
always possible, or even advisable. There is, therefore, no departure from the 2008 ISL, such that it
could have caused the AAF, or even contributed to it’); WADA v Sundby & FIS, CAS 2015/A/4233,
para 126 (‘[…] the timeline set by Article 5.2.6.5 of the ISL expresses the intent of the rule that the
laboratories should proceed without undue delay, especially when taking in consideration the wording
of the provision (“should”) rather than, for example, “must”). See further cases cited at para C6.8, n 3.
3 The athlete will need to produce evidence of such a departure, not just speculation. Lei Cao v IOC,
CAS 2017/A/4974, paras 77-78 (‘[…] The Appellant is of the opinion that it is the onus of the IOC
to prove that no departure from the ISL occurred. 78. Contrary to the Appellant’s view and according
to Article 3.2.1 IOC ADR, it is not the IOC’s but the Athlete’s burden to establish “that a departure
from the International Standard occurred which could reasonably have caused” the AAF’) and para 81
(‘The mere allegation that departures of whatever kind might have occurred does not meet the standard
of proof necessary under Article 3.2.1 IOC ADR to rebut the presumption that WADA-accredited
laboratories have conducted the sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the ISL’);
UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, para 61 (‘Mr Landaluce may not simply indicate that
“something could potentially be wrong”, but must indeed prove that there was a violation of the ISL’);
UCI v Forde, CAS 2006/A/1057, para 62 (‘The Panel, based on objective criteria, must be convinced
of the occurrence of alleged errors to put into question the reliability of the GC/C/IRMS. In the present
case, the exculpatory evidence required could have been disclosed in the form of an expertise enabling
to question the entire testing and reporting process, by indicating different indices of inconsistencies
in the LNDD testing process, such as errors during transmittal of electronic data to paper, poor record-
keeping processes, inaccuracies of the testing procedures and reporting procedures. The contentions
made by the Respondents [ie that ‘according to scientific literature, the GC/C/IRMS analysis is a very
complex method, which has been proven to be faulty’ (para 61)] were not substantiated by anything
concrete. As a result, the Panel considers that their allegations are not established and do not suffice to
put into question the quality of the GC/C/IRMS test itself or to reverse the presumption implemented
by Art 18 of the Anti-Doping Rules, according to which WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed
to have conducted sample analysis in accordance with the international standards for laboratory
analysis’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 46 (‘Mr Wade next
argues that third-party gross negligence or tampering must have occurred. However, Mr Wade provides
no evidence in support of this assertion. The Barcelona Laboratory, a WADA-credited laboratory,
is “presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the
International Standard.” IAAF Rule 33.4(a). Since Mr Wade has not presented any evidence to rebut
this presumption, the Panel must reject this argument’); UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 28 June 2017, para 72 (‘The Single Judge finds that the Rider’s allegations are simply
not sufficiently substantiated within the above meaning. The Rider does not refer to a single provision
of the ISL that has allegedly been breached. This, however, is the very first condition that must be
fulfilled in order for the Rider to discharge his burden of the presentation of facts. Since the Rider
wants to derive his legal position from a rule that requires a deviation from the ISL, the Rider must
explain which provision of the ISL and how it has been breached. It is simply not sufficient to dump a
bucket of generic allegations with no link to the applicable provisions on the table of the Single Judge
and expect the latter to make any sense out of it. This is all the more true, considering that the Rider is
assisted by legal counsel’). See also by way of analogy the cases cited at para C6.10, n 4; and pre-Code
case Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/A/156, para 12.3.2.6 (‘[…] the general suggestion that laboratory error
is always a possibility and more likely than commonly believed is no evidence that a laboratory error
was made in this particular case’).
The athletes satisfied this requirement in Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and
CAS 2009/A/1753, paras 5.52–5.59 (variances in values reported from IRMS analysis of A and
B samples constituted a departure from the ISL requirement that results must be reproducible),
para 5.124, and para 5.137 (departure from requirement to document quality control procedures
properly). Cf Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 81 (rejecting a similar argument on the facts).
4 USADA v Landis AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras 154–157 (noting that the
ISL incorporates the WADA Technical Documents and – where the ISL itself makes no specific
provision on a particular point but ISO 17025 does – ISO 17025 as well, so that ‘violations of the
ISO 17025 or of WADA Technical Documents can be violations of the ISL for purposes of rebutting
the initial presumption favouring the Lab that an AAF has been established’), aff’d, Landis v USADA,
CAS 2007/A/1394.
5 Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 53 (‘[…] the Panel must take the ISL as it is written
and reasonably construed and not proceed by expanding or raising the ISL and then judging the
performance of the LNDD by that revised more stringent standard. […] Proving some other alternative
standard and its breach is of no consequence in attempting to rebut the presumption favouring the
laboratory’); UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 72 (‘Insofar
as the Rider refers – inter alia – to (alleged) violations of the ISO 17025 this is of no avail in the present
context and within the scope of the ADR 2012’).
For example, it is irrelevant to show that a scientific research laboratory or a criminal analysis
laboratory might be required to comply with higher standards; all that matters is whether the WADA-
accredited laboratory met the requirements of the ISL on the point in question. USADA v Landis,
AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 151 (‘[…] the Rider may only successfully
rebut the presumption favouring the Lab by showing a deviation or departure from an [International
Standard]. This is the only relevant evidence to determine if the Athlete’s attempt to rebut the
presumption of Art 18 may be successful. Proving some other procedure, practice or alternative
standard is of no consequence in rebutting the presumption favouring the Lab’), para 240 (‘[…] only
a deviation or departure from the ISL is relevant. Therefore, evidence of scientific or criminal labs
and their standards and practises is of no consequence in rebutting the presumption favouring an anti-
doping Lab’) and para 273 (same), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also USADA v
Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008, para 110 (‘[…] the purpose and scope of the
ISL preclude an adjudicative body or panel from imposing a higher or other standard on a USADA-
accredited laboratory in order to establish the laboratory’s compliance with the rules’).
6 WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 130 (‘Even though Ms Barragan, Ms Gonzalez
and Ms Toscano were independent contractors, the Panel agrees with WADA that Article 5.4.2.1 of the
ISL specifically contemplates that laboratory staff includes both employees and those “under contract
to” the laboratory and, as such, there was no departure from the ISL. The Athletes and FCF refer
to Colombian law in an effort to distinguish Ms Barragan, Ms Gonzales and/or Ms Toscano from
laboratory staff and argue that they were not authorized staff. However, the Panel notes that the ISL are
international standards intended to achieve harmonization across WADA-accredited laboratories, and
interpreting them based on national law would defeat this purpose’).
7 Devyatovskiy & Tsikham v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and CAS 2009/A/1753, para 4.10 (‘[…] in
addition to being charged with the burden of showing that a departure from the ISL has occurred as
required under the WADC 2003, the athlete is now forced to bear the burden of proof to establish that
the departure had not only occurred, but also that it had reasonably caused the Adverse Analytical
Finding. This is a substantial change from the burden of proving the mere fact of a departure from
the ISL. As before, the IOC bears the burden of disproving reasonable causality’); Liao Hui v IWF,
CAS 2011/A/2612, para 68 (confirming requirement on athlete to prove not only departure from
required procedures but also that that departure ‘could reasonably have caused the AAF’); Veerpalu
v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 98 (‘[…] the standard to rebut a presumption of ISL compliance is to
show that there was an ISL violation and that it is more likely than not that this non-compliance led
to a false positive. If this is shown, the relevant respondent would then have to establish that the non-
compliance did not cause the AAF’), para 99 (‘[…] given that the Test was performed by a WADA-
accredited laboratory, the Appellant has to show that it is more likely than not that any deviation from
the ISL could have caused a false positive finding. Only if the Appellant can establish this would
the burden of proof shift to the Respondent’), and para 134 (rejecting argument that finding should
be disregarded because delay between collection and centrifugation of blood sample was longer
than the 36 hours recommended by the WADA Guidelines for Blood Sample Collection, because
the evidence was that that delay would if anything cause a false negative finding rather than a false
positive finding); IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, paras
359-360 (‘IAAF Rule 33.3(b) provides as follows: “Methods of Establishing Facts and Presumptions
[…] The following rules of proof shall be applicable in doping cases: […] (b) Departures from any
other International Standard or other antidoping rule or policy which did not cause an Adverse
Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such results. If the Athlete
of other Person establishes that a departure from another International Standard or other antidoping
rule or policy has occurred which could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding or
other anti-doping rule violation, then the IAAF, the Member or other prosecuting authority shall have
the burden of establishing that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding or the
factual basis for the anti-doping rule violation.” The Panel [citing WADA v Chernova & RUSADA,
CAS 2013/A/3112, para 85] also recalls the CAS jurisprudence: “therefore, the Panel deems a mere
reference to a departure from the ISL insufficient, in the absence of a credible link of such departure to
a resulting Adverse Analytical Finding. In other words, in order for an athlete to meet his/her burden
and thus effectively shift the burden to an anti-doping organization, the athlete must establish, on the
balance of probabilities, (i) that there is a specific (not hypothetical) departure from the ISL; and (ii)
that such departure could have reasonably, and thus credibly, caused a misreading of the analysis.
Further, the Panel remarks that such athlete’s rebuttal functions only to shift the burden of proof to
the anti-doping organization, which may then show, to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction, that the
departure did not cause a misreading of the analysis”‘); World Athletics v Marimuthu, Disciplinary
Tribunal decision SR/287/2019 dated 26 May 2020, para 132 (‘According to Articles 3.2.2 and
3.2.3 IAAF ADR quoted above, an athlete must establish a specific departure(s) from ISL and/or ISTI
and to demonstrate that such a departure could have reasonably caused an AAF. Crucially, in this case
all arguments put forward by the Athlete did not satisfy this condition – not only she did not indicate
a certain rule of the ISL and/or the ISTI from which an alleged departure occurred, she did not even
try to demonstrate a possible scenario, mentioning concentrations of 19-NA, that could have possibly
caused the presence of 19-NA in her samples which, as evident from the relevant LDPs, were all
sealed, with Sample numbers matching’).
See eg De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.16 (‘[…] the Appellant does not
indicate a particular part of the chain of custody where a mixing up of samples (and not just the
documents issued for the various samples) could have occurred. He generically contests its validity,
without giving any explanations other than the notification of a wrong Adverse Analytical Finding on
6 October 2009. However, this does not cast doubt on the reliability of the chain of custody. Therefore,
the Panel does not follow the Athlete’s arguments that the tested sample was possibly not his’); UCI v
Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 82 (endorsing first instance
panel’s conclusion that athlete had shown departures but had not proved on the balance of probabilities
that the departures caused the analytical results now under challenge); Ohlsson v WSU, NADP Appeal
Tribunal decision dated 6 January 2009, pp 27–28 (endorsing first instance panel’s finding that a
failure to include list of lab staff involved in test in test documentation package was a departure from
TD2003LDOC but did not cause the adverse analytical finding); IBU v Yaroshenko, IBU Doping
Hearing Panel decision dated 11 August 2009, paras 55–56 (‘The alleged irregularities, submitted
by the Athlete, however, are not of a kind to be able to cause a false positive. Furthermore, the expert
testimony of Dr Gmeiner confirmed to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that the errors which
were corrected later do not affect the original results of the analysis and, hence, the adverse analytical
finding. Moreover, these corrections pertain to the A sample analysis, exclusively’).
In Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, the athlete, whose sample had tested positive for DHEA,
alleged that the laboratory had departed from the requirements of the ISL by failing to run negative
controls during IRMS analysis, and because a deviation between the etio and andro values in the
athlete’s A and B samples showed that the laboratory had departed from the ISL requirement for
robust and reproducible results. He also argued that the 2009 version of Code Art 3.2.1, requiring
the athlete to show the ISL departure ‘could reasonably have caused’ the adverse finding, should not
apply in his case, because his sample was collected in December 2008. He noted that the amended rule
‘imposes a much heavier burden on the athlete because he now has to prove a causal link between the
ISL violation and the AAF. This burden is rendered all the heavier by the fact that the evidence of such
a link will often be in the possession of the laboratory or no longer in existence. [6.1.1.3] Further, the
Appellant argued that ISL 5.4.4.2.1 and 5.4.7.3 are unique, because they speak to the reliability of the
laboratory’s results. A breach of these ISLs means that it can never be known if the analysis that results
in the AAF was performed properly or if the results are reliable. This renders any requirement on the
athlete to prove a causal link between the ISL violation and the AAF inapplicable’. Ibid, paras 6.1.1.2-
3. The CAS panel found that neither alleged failing amounted to a departure from the requirements of
the ISL (Ibid, paras 9.4 and 9.5), and therefore did not have to address that argument.
The requirement of proof that the alleged departure could have caused the adverse analytical
finding originates in pre-Code case law such as SLV and Gasser v IAAF, IAAF Arbitration Panel
decision dated 18 January 1988, reported in Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases
(SEP Editrice, 2000), pp 117–119, where the hearing panel held that mere proof by the athlete of
departures from the guidelines was not enough; the athlete also had to show that the failures ‘affected
or could have affected the finding on the analysis of his or her urine of a doping substance therein’.
Gasser took her argument to the English High Court, where she argued that a failure to follow the
procedural guidelines for the collection and testing of samples ‘in any material respect’ renders the
result of the test inadmissible as a basis for the suspension of the athlete concerned. Mr Justice Scott
rejected this submission, accepting instead the submission of the IAAF that the defect in procedure
must have ‘rendered the result of the test unreliable or unfair to the athlete’. He did not specify who
should bear the burden on this point, but he did say: ‘If important safeguards for the athlete provided
by the Guidelines have not been observed, prima facie at least it seems to me that the failure would
require a conclusion that the testing procedure adopted could not be regarded as reliable or fair […]’.
On the facts, however, he found that the failures did not render the test results unreliable in Gasser’s
case. See Gasser v Stinson (14 June 1988, unreported), QBD (Scott J).
In Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 15, the CAS panel affirmed ‘consistent CAS case law
which makes clear that deviations from the testing procedures prescribed by the relevant federation
rules will only invalidate the results of an analysis where they are sufficiently material as to call into
question the reliability of the test’.
However, the athlete was not required to prove that the departure could have caused the adverse
analytical finding in the 2003 Code, but only from the 2009 Code on.
8 See para C6.15.
9 Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, para 131 (‘In the Panel’s view, the degradation of the samples due either to the
temperature at which they were transported or to freezing/thawing is only a speculative assumption
made by the Appellant’s experts, respectable as such in general terms, but uncorroborated in any
manner by scientific evidence concerning the actual samples analysed by the Cologne Lab. Mere
speculation that something might have occurred is not probable proof that it did actually occur’);
Liao Hui v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2612, para 137 (‘[…] the Appellant has not demonstrated that any
shortcomings or violations of the ISL in the pre-analytical handling, alleged or otherwise could
have led to a false positive finding. Although the Appellant argues that the alleged deviations from
the ISL increased the chance of false positive results, the Appellant has not provided evidence to
indicate that the particular departures at stake in these proceedings could reasonably have led to an
AAF’); USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, para 46 (‘Mr Wade next argues
that third-party gross negligence or tampering must have occurred. However, Mr Wade provides
no evidence in support of this assertion. The Barcelona Laboratory, a WADA-credited laboratory,
is “presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the
International Standard.” IAAF Rule 33.4(a). Since Mr Wade has not presented any evidence to rebut
this presumption, the Panel must reject this argument’).
C6.23 Under the 2003 Code, once the athlete established there had been a
departure from the requirements of the ISL, the burden immediately switched to
the Anti-Doping Organization to show that that departure did not cause the adverse
finding reported by the laboratory.1 However, CAS panels stretched the analysis in a
number of cases to find that charges should be dismissed where the athlete had not
been given a fair opportunity to attend the analysis of his B sample,2 or where the
laboratory had allowed the same staff member to be involved in the analysis of both
the A sample and the B sample,3 even though there was little or no evidence that these
clear departures from the requirements of the ISL could have caused the laboratory’s
adverse analytical findings in respect of those samples. In effect, the CAS was
adapting a per se rule, saying that the rights of the athlete are so limited in respect of
analysis of samples that any failure to respect such rights should lead to dismissal of
the charges, irrespective of whether or not that failure could have had any impact on
the analytical results. In response, the Code was changed in 2009 so that the athlete
must show not only a departure but also that the departure could reasonably have
caused the adverse finding. In addition, the requirements of the ISL in respect of
B sample analysis were diluted.4 However, a CAS panel was persuaded in 2010 to
maintain the per se doctrine notwithstanding this express language (perhaps because
it does not appear to have been made aware of the change).5 In 2017, the CAS panel
in Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA noted that:
‘CAS jurisprudence […] developed a distinction according the nature of the breach
of the relevant rules affecting an athlete’s rights with respect to the B sample
analysis: in “normal deviations”, the principle imposed in Article 3.2.2 of the
WADC […] applies, and therefore departures which could not have caused the AAF
do not invalidate the test result; however, if the breach of the rules concerns the
rights which are deemed “fundamental” for safeguarding the athlete’s interests in
the analysis of his/her B sample, the causality requirement imposed in Article 3.2.2
of the WADC shall not be applied and the analysis result shall be deemed invalid
regardless of the actual effect – or any potential effect – of the breach on the results
of the analysis. [100] In such context, this Panel would be called to verify whether
any departure from the ISL occurred when the Athlete’s samples were analysed by
the Laboratory, and, if so, whether it constituted a “fundamental breach”, before
examining the existence and relevance of any impact on the AAF’.6
The 2021 Code attempts to limit this CAS-made doctrine by giving the Anti-Doping
Organization the opportunity to prove that the lack of notice could not reasonably
have caused the adverse analytical finding, although it remains to be seen whether
this attempt fares any better than the previous attempt, in the 2009 Code.7 Where the
exception does not apply, however, the athlete will have to show that the departure
could reasonably have caused the adverse analytical finding.8
1 Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 162 and passim.
2 There were two pre-Code cases on this issue, and one case under the 2003 Code:
(a) In Tchachina v FIG, CAS 2002/A/385, para 15, the athlete argued that the analytical results in
respect of his sample should be ignored because the FIG had breached the requirement in its own
rules to give the athlete notice of and an opportunity to attend the confirmatory analysis of the
B sample. The panel noted (paras 24–25): ‘The Appellant argues that the Respondent’s failure to
communicate the relevant information to her federation violated one of the few rights an athlete
has in the course of the doping test procedure. […] In order to assess the consequences of the
Respondent’s breach of its own rules, the Panel has to examine the importance of this provision.
It must take into account the reasons for which an athlete should ordinarily be informed of the
time and date of the opening of the B-sample. As a matter of principle, the Panel is of the opinion
that, even if a procedural error is unlikely to affect the result of a B-sample analysis, such error
can be so serious as to lead to the invalidity of the entire testing procedure’. The panel noted
that the purpose of the requirement to give notice of and an opportunity to attend the B sample
analysis was to enable the athlete to confirm for himself ‘that the correct container with the
number of the athlete’s urine sample is being opened and that at the time of opening the seal was
intact; in addition the representative may also check the state of the urine sample at that time. In
the event that at this stage variations or irregularities are apparent then these can be noted and can
be used later to challenge the test results’. The panel said it was ‘inclined to view the procedural
error committed in this case as compromising the limited rights of an athlete to such an extent
that the results of the analysis of the B sample and thus the entire urine test must be disregarded’,
but expressly noted that it could leave the issue undecided, because other evidence in the case
established the ADRV to the required standard of proof.
(b) See also Beaton and Scholes v Equestrian Federation of Australia, CAS 2003/A/477, paras 27–
30 (dismissing charge where riders were not given opportunity to attend B sample analysis).
(c) In Varis v IBU, CAS 2008/A/1607, para 108, the athlete’s sample tested positive for rEPO. This
was her second violation and therefore the IBU Executive Board imposed a life ban. However,
the CAS panel found that the IBU had departed from the requirement in the ISL to make
reasonable attempts to accommodate an athlete’s preferred dates for analysis of the B sample.
The panel noted that the departure did not render the adverse analytical finding invalid, but rather
put the burden on the IBU to show that the departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding.
Ibid, para 112. However, it decided on a different test: ‘In our view, the issue is not whether the
IBU can prove that presence of the Appellant’s representative would have made no difference
to the outcome. The issue is whether the IBU’s failure to follow the applicable rules by failing
to make reasonable attempts to accommodate the Appellant’s request for a different testing date
invalidates the “B” sample result’. Ibid, para 115. It noted: ‘Because of the significance of the
consequences for an athlete facing a life ban as a result of an alleged anti-doping rule violation,
it is important that procedures are followed correctly and that information concerning the rights
and remedies of an athlete is communicated clearly’. Ibid, para 107. Noting that ‘athletes’ rights
during the course of the sample collection and testing process are relatively limited. This makes
it even more important that those rights are respected and adhered to’, the CAS panel ruled that
the B sample analysis ‘should not be accepted as part of the IBU’s case against the Appellant’.
Ibid, para 119. It therefore upheld her appeal against the finding she had committed a second
violation, and so vacated the lifetime ban that had been imposed on her.
3 In a pre-Code case, B v FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, para 54, a CAS panel found that, contrary to the
requirements of FINA’s doping procedural rules, the same laboratory staff member had analysed both
the athlete’s A sample and his B sample, but concluded that this departure had not influenced the
reliability of the analytical results. See also Wang Lu Na & others v FINA, CAS 98/A/208 (upholding
sanction where same analyst who analysed the A sample was involved in at least testing the controls
in the analysis of the B sample). Cf FINA v J, FINA Doping Panel decision 06/01, FINA Doping
Panel Judgements 2001–2005 (FINA 2006), p 83 (doping charge based on alleged presence of
19-norandrosterone in athlete’s sample dismissed where, among other things, B sample was analysed
by same personnel as had analysed A sample).
In a 2003 Code case, UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, the laboratory acknowledged
that the same analyst who conducted the B sample analysis had been materially involved in the A sample
analysis (ie actually touching the sample, not just performing instrument set-up, or performance
checks, or verifying results), which was therefore a clear departure from the requirements of ISL Art
5.2.4.3.2.2. In a split decision, a majority of the CAS panel found that the UCI had not demonstrated
that this departure ‘was not at the origin of the adverse finding’ (it had simply asserted that the athlete
had not established a departure that could have caused the finding, which was not enough, in the
panel’s view), and therefore the CAS was required to exonerate the athlete. The majority distinguished
Wang Lu Na v FINA, on the facts, and noted:
‘109 Although aware of the imperatives of costs and organisation faced by laboratories, the Panel
must watch over the respect of fundamental rules, considering the implications that its decision
could have on the reputation, and therefore, the career of the athlete, if a disciplinary sanction
were to be pronounced against him. […]
111 It is virtually impossible to prove a negative fact, in this case that the involvement of the same
analyst in both analyses did not affect the result. Therefore certain laboratory directors consider
this rule too rigid; in reality, sufficient protection of the athletes is already ensured in that the
system of identification of samples by codes ensures that their identity is not known to the
analysts.
112 This reasoning, although rational and plausible, fails before the CAS for a very simple reason:
the arbitrators do not create the rules, they apply them. This is all the more true because the
authors of the antidoping regulation kept the rule which requires another analyst for the analysis
of the B sample, even though they had heard the comments of the laboratory directors. The rules
can certainly be modified or refined, but such is not the role of CAS.
113 The applicable rule is clear and devoid of flexibility. The CAS arbitrators’ mission is not to
modify the rules nor is their mission to appropriate discretionary power when no text allows them
to do so.
114 Note in passing that if cases are rare where the CAS exonerated the athlete based on the
hypothesis that a laboratory failed to respect the protocols, this is explained by the fact that
the disciplinary authorities know how strict the arbitrators are in this domain and do not charge
athletes – even in very suspect cases – when the analyses have not been done according to the
rules.
115 The Panel does emphasise the LNDD’s Staff’s good faith, which is not in question. …
117 In any case, the present decision does not constitute a declaration of innocence of Mr Landaluce
with regard to the antidoping rules. Mr Landaluce merely benefits from a rule that is formal and
yet fundamental, which aims to guarantee the rights of persons subject to doping control tests’.
This reasoning is open to question. Proof of a departure from the mandatory requirements of the
ISL does not mandate automatic dismissal of the charge. Instead, Code Art 3.2.2 (or Code Art 3.2.1,
as it then was) requires the hearing panel to determine whether such departure caused the adverse
analytical finding in question. The implicit reasoning of the hearing panel in Landaluce appears to be
that, because the Anti-Doping Organization is looking to apply a rule of strict liability, it must be able
to show clearly that it has followed its own rules, whether or not non-compliance has any material
effect. See cases cited at para C6.21, n 1; and the dissenting opinion in USADA v Landis, AAA Panel
decision dated 20 September 2007, para 61 (‘As athletes have strict liability rules, the laboratories
should be held strictly liable for their failure to abide by the rules and sound scientific practice’), aff’d,
Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/139.
Two first instance hearing panels followed Landaluce in dismissing doping charges based on
adverse analytical findings where the same analyst was materially involved in analysis of both the
A and B samples. FINA v Oliva, FINA Doping Panel decision dated 18 January 2007; USADA v
Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008. In Jenkins, the AAA Panel found there had been
a departure in that the same analyst had ‘handled the sample in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ sample procedures’.
Ibid, para 45 (rejecting USADA argument that there was no departure because the analyst conducted
a different part of the procedures in respect of the B sample to those he had conducted in respect of
the A sample). The panel ruled (ibid, para 136): ‘In view of the grave implications for athletes, such
as Ms Jenkins, who are held strictly to account for any transgression of applicable anti-doping rules,
testing laboratories must also be held strictly to account for any non-compliance with those same
rules. Failure to comply with the mandatory standard contained in ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 cannot be viewed
as a mere technicality. The strict liability regime which underlies the anti-doping system requires
strict compliance with the anti-doping rules by everyone involved in the administration of the anti-
doping regime in order to procure the integrity of fair and competitive sport’. The panel noted that
that departure in itself did not invalidate the test results, but USADA had the burden of showing that
the departure did not undermine the validity of the test results, and it did not discharge that burden
by showing that IRMS analysis at another laboratory had confirmed the positive finding, because the
second laboratory had made the same departure from the ISL, and ‘[t]wo wrongs do not make a right’.
Ibid, 155. The AAA Panel therefore dismissed the charges, even while noting that ‘the Panel has not
found that the violation of the ISL caused the Respondent’s test results; nor has it determined whether
the Respondent did or did not use a prohibited substance such as to account for the test results at issue’.
Ibid, para 162.
Cf Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland,
CAS 2010/A/2296, paras 137–143 (analyst only prohibited from involvement in the B sample analysis
where she came into direct physical contact with the A sample while it was open).
4 Version 6.0 of the International Standard for Laboratories, which came into force on 1 January 2009,
abolished the ‘same analyst’ prohibition. See discussion at E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 21
et seq and at Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 3.21.
5 Wen Tong v IJF, CAS 2010/A/2161, para 9.8. The CAS panel followed Varis and Tchachina (see para
C6.23, n 2) in ruling that the Anti-Doping Organization’s failure to observe the athlete’s ‘fundamental’
rights in respect of analysis of the B sample meant the results of the analysis ‘must be disregarded
[…] even if denial of that right “is unlikely to affect the result of the B sample analysis”‘, quoting
Tchachina at para 26 and citing Varis at para 123. It appears from the decision that the IJF did not
argue sufficiently or persuade the panel that the 2009 Code amendments effectively overturned Varis
and Tchachina.
Cf Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 167 (ruling that athlete only has right to attend ‘the
performance of those analyses which are required to confirm the initial adverse analytical finding’);
IOC v Chicherova, IOC Disciplinary Commission decision dated 4 October 2016, para 220 (right of
athlete to attend B sample analysis were respected when IOC made several attempts to accommodate
her and her representatives before going ahead with the analysis).
6 Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & 5036, paras 99-100. The panel did not challenge
the doctrine so developed but avoided having to apply it by finding on the facts that the athlete’s
B sample rights had been materially respected. Ibid, paras 102–110. The panel did not detail the CAS
cases that created this doctrine but they are Varis, Tchachina, and Wen Tong.
Similarly, the CAS panel in Guinez v UCI et al, CAS 2016/A/4828, para 3, accepted that ‘according
to well-established CAS jurisprudence, the athlete’s right to attend the opening and analysis of the
B Sample is of fundamental importance and if not respected, the B Sample results may be disregarded’,
making the analytical results for both samples inadmissible to establish an Art 2.1 presence violation.
It continued: ‘That conclusion does not, however, apply to article 2.2 of the UCI ADR. Indeed it
equally follows from the CAS jurisprudence, that the fact that the analytical results of a B Sample
cannot be used to establish an ADRV for “Presence” of the prohibited substance because it was
obtained in breach of the athlete’s fundamental right to attend the opening and analysis of said sample
does not preclude the competent authorities to take this sample into account for a “Use” violation. In
such a situation, the sample in question must be regarded with particular care and cannot by itself be
sufficient to establish a “Use” violation (CAS 2015/A/3977, WADA v Belarus Athletic Federation &
Mr Vadim Devyatovskiy, para 173)’. The panel decided that the results of the urine analysis indicating
the presence of FG-4592 were sufficiently corroborated by variations in the athlete’s blood profile
that ‘are fully consistent, on temporal, physiological and scientific bases, with the use of FG-4592’, to
comfortably satisfy it that the athlete used FG-4592, in violation of Art 2.2.
Attempts to extend this per se rule/doctrine of fundamental breach to departures from requirements
of the ISTI have been rejected: see para C6.14.
7 2021 Code comment 23, relating to Code Art 3.2.3(ii), relating to departures from the ISRM requirement
to provide notice to the athlete of the B sample opening, states: ‘An Anti-Doping Organization would
meet its burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding by
showing that, for example, the B Sample opening and analysis were observed by an independent
witness and no irregularities were observed’.
8 Abdelrahman v WADA & EADA, CAS 2017/A/5016 & 5036, para 110, and see para 111 (‘[…] any
departure that may have occurred because the seal of the sample was partially broken when the
director of the Laboratory was still completing the Sample Inspection Form cannot have caused the
AAF. In fact, it is common ground, and cannot be disputed, that no (metabolites of a) substance
(corresponding to those detected in the A sample) could have entered a closed bottle, properly sealed
(as verified, at least visually, by all attending the test) up to the moment the process of the breaking
the seal was started. In any case, the Athlete failed to establish how such departure could reasonably
have caused the AAF. Therefore, the Athlete’s contentions, based on the allegedly untimely partial
breaking of the seal of the bottle containing the B sample, have to be dismissed’) and para 115iii (‘[…]
the alleged breach of the rules on confidentiality and public disclosure, in the same way, cannot have
caused the AAF, not least because they occurred after the AAF had been reported by the Laboratory’);
WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 131 (rejecting suggestion laboratory scientists
mishandled the samples and caused them to become contaminated, because the evidence showed they
were properly trained, and the athlete provided no evidence to doubt their abilities).
C6.24 Hearing panels have confirmed that the same ‘plausibility’ test developed
by the CAS panel in Campbell-Brown for assessing departures from the IST also
applies to the assessment of departures from the ISL,1 ie (assuming that it is not
a case where the athlete was denied the right to attend analysis of the B sample,
and so the per se rule does not apply) the athlete ‘must establish facts from which
a [panel] could rationally infer a possible causative link between the ISL departure
and the presence of a prohibited substance in his/her sample’.2 In this regard, it is
important to bear in mind that ‘it is likely to be relatively rare for an ISL departure
itself to directly cause an AAF. Instead, it appears that the rule is principally intended
to tackle situations where an ISL breach creates the opportunity (for example) for
accidental contamination or deliberate sabotage to compromise the integrity of the
sample’.3 Where either is asserted, ‘to evaluate that risk one needs to look at the
evidence of what happened in this case and the scientific findings’.4
1 See para C6.22.
2 World Rugby v Ralepelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16 June 2015, paras 90-91. See
also ibid, para 97 (‘The suggested causative link must be more than merely hypothetical. It need not
be likely but it must be more than fanciful; it must be plausible’). See UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping
Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 74 (‘[…] the Rider […] did not explain how the individual
breach of a provision of the ISL could have reasonably caused the AAF. The allegations of the Rider
are generic in nature, speculative and completely insufficient to establish or even to demonstrate
a link between the individual breach of a provision in the ISL and the AAF’); Klemencic v UCI,
CAS 2016/A/4648, para 131 (‘[…] a mere reference to a departure from the ISL is insufficient in the
absence of a credible link of such departure to the resulting Adverse Analytical Finding’).
3 World Rugby v Ralapelle, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 16 June 2015, para 96.
4 Ibid, para 97. The panel went on to explain carefully by reference to the evidence why it did not accept
that the fact that the B sample bottle broke and the frozen B sample thereby came momentarily into
contact with laboratory equipment could plausibly have caused the sample to become contaminated
with drostanolone.
C6.25 If the athlete makes the required showing, the burden shifts back to the
Anti-Doping Organization to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
panel that the departure established by the athlete did not in fact cause the adverse
analytical finding in question.1 If the Anti-Doping Organization makes such a
showing, the departure will be discounted as a harmless ‘slip’, and the charge based
on the alleged adverse analytical finding will stand.2 If it fails to do so, the charge
should be dismissed.3
1 Code Art 3.2.2: ‘If the Athlete or other Person rebuts the preceding presumption by showing that a
departure from the International Standard for Laboratories occurred which could reasonably have
caused the Adverse Analytical Finding, then the Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden to
establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding’.
2 UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119, para 94 (although the athlete established a departure
from the requirements of the ISL, in that the A sample results were not reported within 10 working days
of receipt of the sample, and the B sample analysis was not carried out within 30 days of notification of
the adverse analytical finding in respect of the A sample, the Panel noted that ‘such a demonstration,
however, has only a purely theoretical effect, since the group of experts present at the Hearing observed
that the departure observed could not be at the origin of the positive results of the A and B sample
analysis’); WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 13–15 (even assuming there had been a departure
from the ISL in relation to the conditions in which the sample was stored and transported, which
could in theory have led to microbial activity in the sample, the IRMS analysis confirmed that the
testosterone found in the athlete’s urine was exogenous); USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated
20 September 2007, paras 201, 225 (even assuming athlete could show a departure from the ISL in
producing the IRMS results relied upon to support the charge of presence of exogenous testosterone,
the record reflected that such departure did not cause the adverse analytical finding and therefore
the charge stood) and para 289 (same), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394; Muralidharan
v National Anti-Doping Agency et al, CAS 2014/A/3639, para 106 (‘[…] as Dr Botre testified,
various delays in the transportation and testing of the sample would not create bio transformations
of the Appellant’s urine such that MHA would suddenly appear in the sample’); Chicherova v IOC,
CAS 2016/A/4839, para 334, a re-analysis case where the sample had been stored for almost eight
years (‘One caveat to that is where samples could be affected by time (so substances are naturally
broken down or are created over time). However, the evidence of Prof. Ayotte was that turinabol is an
exogenous anabolic steroid that would not be created naturally in the sample of an athlete. The Panel is
satisfied that any delay in re-analysis or potential changes regarding the samples’ temperatures during
that timeframe did not result in the AAF’); Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, para 62 (even if there
was a departure from the ISL in that a manual change in the lab doc pack from negative to positive had
not been properly signed and dated by all relevant staff, so that ‘the burden of proof shifts pursuant to
article 3.2.1 of the WADC to the IOC to prove that such departures from the ISL were not material,
the Panel is persuaded that such burden is discharged for four main reasons. First, the charts in the two
documentation packages clearly demonstrate the presence of a prohibited substance. Second, the fact
that the same analyst (Mr Grigory Dudko) who first concluded the sample was negative has signed the
final conclusion that the sample was positive. Third, the absence of any challenge of equivalent kind to
the B sample documentation. Fourth, the Appellant has not provided any expert evidence to challenge
the analytical findings’).
As the last case just cited indicates, where the departure from the ISL relates solely to the A sample
analysis, the Anti-Doping Organization may seek to establish that departure could not have caused
the adverse finding by showing that the analysis of the B sample (which involved no such departure)
produced the same adverse finding. USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007,
para 268 (‘[…] the fact that the “B” sample confirms the existence of testosterone means that the
technical breach of the [Chain of Custody] with respect to the “A” sample did not cause or contribute
to the AAF. Therefore, the technical breach ought not to have legal consequence’) and at para 270
(same), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also IBU v Yaroshenko, IBU Doping Hearing
Panel decision dated 11 August 2009, para 56 (alleged irregularities could not have caused adverse
analytical finding for rEPO, since they pertained to A sample analysis only, and B sample also tested
positive for rEPO).
For examples of departures held immaterial in pre-Code cases, see N v FEI, CAS 92/63, Digest of
CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne, 1998), pp 115, 121 (‘[…] the legal presumption of guilt of the person
responsible will be destroyed only if the alleged and proved flaw is of a nature to call into question the
result of the analysis’); SLV and Gasser v IAAF, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 18 January
1988, reported in Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000),
pp 117–119 (use of defective ether during the B sample analysis did not cast any significant doubt on
the correctness of the laboratory’s findings); Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, para 36 (rejecting efforts to
impugn laboratory procedures based on missing documentation); B v FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, para 54
(contrary to the requirements of FINA’s doping procedural rules, the same laboratory staff member had
analysed both the athlete’s A sample and his B sample, but neither party contended that this departure
had influenced the reliability of the analytical results). Cf USA Triathlon v Smith, CAS 99/A/241,
paras 68–70 (giving athlete benefit of doubt regarding reliability of test procedure).
3 Garcia v FECNA, CAS 2013/A/3170, paras 74–75 (inadequate laboratory chain of custody
documentation ‘suggests that there may well have been open Aliquots the possession of which by
various Lab personnel is unknown. Therefore, the suggestion that something happened to the urine
sample in the Lab is a real possibility. 75. Such violations of the TD2009LCOC are a violation of
the [ISL], which when it could affect the analytical result such as where and with whom an open
Aliquot might be, means that the burden shifts to the Respondent FECNA to prove that the violations
in the Lab did not cause the AAF. In failing to appear and call a witness from the Lab to potentially
provide explanations and having had its Answer brief disallowed, the Respondent has no possibility of
satisfying this burden. […] These grounds alone could permit the Panel to grant the appeal and set aside
the decision of the FENCA DC below’); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC, CAS 2006/A/119 (case dismissed
where athlete established a departure from the ISL – same analyst as performed A sample analysis was
also improperly involved in B sample analysis – and Anti-Doping Organization could not demonstrate
to hearing panel’s comfortable satisfaction that this departure did not cause the adverse analytical
finding); FINA v Oliva, FINA Doping Panel decision dated 18 January 2007 (same); USADA v Jenkins,
AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008 (same), which cases are discussed at para C6.23, n 3.
See also USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 172 (where athlete
established that the laboratory had failed to follow the procedures for select ion monitoring specified
in TD2003IDCR, the burden switched to USADA to show that that departure did not cause the adverse
analytical finding of an elevated T:E ratio; USADA could not meet that burden, and the hearing panel
therefore dismissed the charges against the athlete based on that elevated T:E ratio), aff’d, Landis v
USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.
C6.26 The comment to 2021 Code Art 3.2.3(iii), relating to departures from the
ISRM requirement to provide notice to the athlete of the B sample opening, states:
‘An Anti-Doping Organization would meet its burden to establish that such departure
did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding by showing that, for example, the
B Sample opening and analysis were observed by an independent witness and no
irregularities were observed’.
This is an attempt to reverse the CAS-created doctrine that the athlete’s right to attend
the opening and analysis of his B sample is so fundamental that any denial of that
right leads per se to an invalidation of the adverse analytical finding made in respect
of that sample, even though that denial cannot have caused that adverse finding.1
1 That doctrine is discussed at para C6.23, n 2.
C6.27 Query whether any reliance could be placed on the ‘anti-technicality’

protection of Code Art 3.2.2 in advance of the departure from the requirements of
the ISL. In an unreported Jockey Club case from several years ago, the jockey’s
A sample tested positive, at an extremely low level, for cocaine. Under the (non-
Code-compliant) rules, he was entitled to have his B sample tested at a second
‘UK accredited’ laboratory. A second laboratory was agreed, but the Jockey Club
cancelled the test when it found out that the second laboratory’s equipment was
not sensitive enough to test down to the concentration found by the first laboratory.
The Jockey Club appears to have discovered that in fact, no other UK-accredited
laboratory could test down that far, because it sought to have the B sample tested
at a second laboratory outside the UK, which would have been a departure from
the requirements of the Jockey Club rules. The jockey objected on the basis that
an anti-technicality rule cannot protect knowing departures from the rules before
they happen, only unknowing ones after the event. The B sample was duly tested at
the agreed second UK-accredited laboratory, and was negative, so that the charges
against the jockey had to be dismissed.1
1 The case would not have arisen if Code-based rules had applied, because ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.2 specifies
that the same laboratory must analyse both the A sample and the B sample, precisely to avoid this sort
of outcome.
B Challenging the reliability of the adverse analytical finding on

‘substantive’ grounds.
C6.28 ‘It is a basic principle that methods for the detection of prohibited substances
need to be validated; only methods which are scientifically “Fit-for-purpose” can be
applied to analyse samples in the fight against doping. The validation of the method
is indeed a guarantee for the athlete and only the adherence by the laboratory to
the validated method can justify an anti-doping rule violation based on the detected
presence of a prohibited substance in an athlete’s sample’.1 Therefore, in addition to
establishing that it followed the mandatory procedures for analysis of the sample, the
Anti-Doping Organization must stand ready to prove to the comfortable satisfaction
of the hearing panel that the analytical method that it used to detect the substance in
question is reliable.2
1 Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 97.
2 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 95 (‘[…] the Respondent bears the burden of providing to
the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction that the Test is reliable, including that it is scientifically sound.
This is in line with previous CAS jurisprudence, namely that “methods for the detection of prohibited
substances need to be validated. Only methods which are scientifically “fit for purpose” can be applied
to analyze samples in the fight against doping”‘), quoting Vroemen v Koninklijke Nederlandse Atletick
Unie & Anti-Doping Autorieit Nederland, CAS 2010/A/2296, para 146 (‘[…] methods for the detection
of prohibited substances need to be validated. Only methods which are scientifically “fit for purpose”
can be applied to analyse samples in the fight against doping. In this regard, the Panel notes that the
Cologne Lab is a WADA-accredited laboratory. In order to obtain such accreditation, laboratories
must obtain, among other conditions, the ISO17025 accreditation for the quality system and methods
used and must comply with the ISL and the related technical documents’) and para 147 (‘The
Panel is of the opinion that a CAS panel cannot place in question whether an ISO accreditation was
correctly attributed to a laboratory, because this would render the whole international standardization
and certification system meaningless and because, notoriously, compliance with ISO accreditation
requirements is regularly checked by external auditors. However, a CAS panel may certainly verify
whether a given method used by a laboratory is covered by the accreditation or not’).
C6.29 The ISL requires laboratories only to use analytical techniques that are
‘fit for purpose’.1 An analytical technique that is included within the scope of the
laboratory’s ISO accreditation is presumed to be fit for purpose; a technique that is
not yet within the scope of that accreditation has to be proved to be fit for purpose, by
providing validation documentation or performance data.2
1 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.2 (‘Standard methods are generally not available for Doping Control analyses.
The Laboratory shall select, validate and document Analytical Testing Procedures, which are Fit-for-
Purpose for the analysis of representative target Analytes of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited
Methods’).
The ISL defines ‘Fit for Purpose’ as: ‘Suitable for the intended purpose and in conformity with
the ISO/IEC 17025 or ISO 15189, as applicable, the ISL and relevant Technical Document(s) and
Technical Letter(s)’.
2 2019 ISL Art 4.4.2.2.1 (‘Inclusion of an Analytical Testing Procedure within the Laboratory’s Scope of
ISO/IEC 17025 Accreditation establishes that the Analytical Testing Procedure is Fit-for-Purpose, and
the Laboratory shall not be required to provide Analytical Method validation documentation or EQAS
performance data in support of an analytical finding. Laboratories are expected to include Analytical
Testing Procedures within their Scope of ISO/IEC 17025 Accreditation prior to application to the
analysis of Samples. Under exceptional circumstances, a Laboratory may apply an Analytical Testing
Procedure (excluding any new or WADA-specific Analytical Testing Procedures, as defined above),
which has been validated in accordance with applicable Technical Document(s), Technical Letter(s) or
Laboratory Guidelines, to the analysis of Samples before inclusion into the Laboratory’s Scope of ISO/
IEC 17025 Accreditation. However, in such cases, the Laboratory does not automatically benefit from
the presumption that the Analytical Testing Procedure is Fit-for-Purpose, as would otherwise be the
case if the Analytical Testing Procedure is included within the Laboratory’s Scope of ISO/IEC 17025
Accreditation. Consequently, any Adverse Analytical Finding reported by applying an Analytical
Testing Procedure, which is not within the Laboratory’s Scope of ISO/IEC 17025 Accreditation, may
require the Laboratory to provide Analytical Method validation documentation or EQAS performance
data in support of that Adverse Analytical Finding’).
See Strahija v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, para 7.5.5 (‘[…] the suitability of this screening method
is evidenced by the fact that the Barcelona Lab has been awarded the ISO accreditation 17025 for
precisely this method of detection’).
C6.30 Theoretically, therefore, it is always open to the athlete to attack the

adverse analytical finding reported by the laboratory in respect of his sample on
the basis that the test used to detect the prohibited substance reported in the adverse
finding was not fit for purpose, ie it cannot reliably determine the presence of the
substance in question in the type of sample collected from the athlete. In practice,
however, the burden on an athlete seeking to challenge the science behind an
adverse analytical finding reported by a WADA-accredited laboratory is a heavy
one. For example, the ‘direct urine test’ method for detecting the presence in a
urine sample of recombinant erythropoietin, which was first introduced at the
Sydney Olympics in 2000, was the subject of a series of attacks, but ultimately
none of them was successful:
(a) Erythropoietin (‘EPO’) is a hormone that is produced mainly in the kidneys
and liver. It stimulates the production of red blood cells in bone marrow, which
cells carry oxygen around the body in the bloodstream. Recombinant EPO
(‘rEPO’) is synthetically produced to treat conditions such as anaemia. Where
the kidneys are diseased and so do not produce EPO, rEPO is used to stimulate
bone marrow production of red blood cells artificially. However, it is also
notoriously abused by athletes to boost production of red blood cells so as to
increase their oxygen uptake and so to improve endurance.
(b) A test is therefore required that distinguishes reliably between endogenous
EPO and exogenous rEPO. The ‘direct urine’ test ‘relies upon the fact that
EPO and rEPO, because of their components, have different electrical charges.
This means that EPO and rEPO respond differently when placed in an electric
field: because rEPO has predominantly positive charges, it will move to the
more basic area of a pH field, while endogenous EPO, having a majority of
negative charges, will move predominantly to the acidic area of the pH field.
To test a urine sample for EPO, a multi-staged laboratory process is conducted,
in which the EPO hormones from the sample are preserved, concentrated and
applied to a gel, which operates as an electric field once cathodes are attached.
The resulting distribution of the EPO hormones through the electric field is
specially photographed and developed as a computer image’.1 Therefore the
different stages of the laboratory process are:
(i) immunopurification of the urine sample to capture all forms of EPO and
eliminate other urinary proteins;
(ii) isoelectrical focusing in a pH2-6 gradient to separate the EPO isoforms;
(iii) a double immunal blotting procedure that transfers the EPO from the gel
onto a membrane, which is then probed with a specific anti-human EPO
antibody, and then transfers the antibody to a second membrane, which
is probed with a sequence of antibody conjugates; and lastly
(iv) the generation of chemiluminescence, captured by a highly sensitive
camera, which reveals the original position of the separated EPO
isoforms as a series of discrete bands.2
The resulting image is then assessed by reference to:
(i) acceptance criteria, which define the conditions that the image has to
fulfil to allow the application of the identification criteria;
(ii) identification criteria, which define the conditions that the image has to
fulfil to find the presence of rEPO; and
(iii) stability criteria, which are intended to confirm that no interference has
affected the adverse analytical finding.3
(c) In both Meier v Swiss Cycling and UCI v Hamberger, the athlete’s urine samples
were tested using this ‘direct urine’ method, and the laboratory reported an
adverse analytical finding for rEPO. In each case, the athlete argued that
the method was not developed sufficiently and therefore could not be relied
upon to produce valid results. Both CAS panels ruled that an international
federation is free to choose whatever method it wishes to test for rEPO, so long
as the method chosen can be shown to be reliable. It does not have to require a
blood test as well as a urine test, and nor does it have to apply a threshold for
concentrations of rEPO, even if that is what other federations (or the IOC) may
do.4 The CAS panels also accepted that the ‘direct urine’ test that the UCI had
chosen to use was reliable, if properly applied,5 and if reliable and verifiable
criteria were used to determine whether the sample should be declared positive
or negative for rEPO. The CAS panel in Meier v Swiss Cycling duly upheld the
anti-doping rule violation findings made by the hearing panel at first instance;
while the CAS panel in UCI v Hamberger only dismissed the charge against
the cyclist because the B sample results did not meet the criterion that had been
applied in respect of the A sample results (ie a ‘basic area percentage’ of 80 per
cent).6
(d) In Lazutina v IOC,7 the laboratory reported that, using the IOC’s combined
blood and urine test for rEPO, it had found darbepoetin, aka ‘Aranesp’ (an
improved form of rEPO) in the athlete’s sample. The athlete disputed that a
test to find rEPO could be properly and reliably used to detect the presence of
darbepoetin. The CAS panel ruled that the burden was on the athlete to prove
either that the analysis of the sample was not conducted in accordance with the
laboratory’s customary practices, or that the laboratory’s customary practices
were not in accordance with prevailing standards of scientific practice and
were therefore unacceptable. It was not enough for the athlete simply to claim
that the methodology had not been validated by publication and discussion in
medical circles. The fact that it had been discussed and approved at meetings of
those involved in carrying out anti-doping procedures was ruled to be sufficient
validation.8 Furthermore, the laboratory had received ISO certification for the
test, which ‘establishes that the laboratory is capable of performing the test,
and that the test performs in the manner expected’.9 The CAS panel therefore
concluded that using the combined blood and urine test for rEPO to test for
darbepoetin was scientifically sound, and that the results produced were
reliable.
(e) In Muehlegg v IOC, the reliability of using the test for rEPO to detect
darbepoetin was again challenged, in particular in respect of the last stage of
the test, namely the ‘visualisation’ stage.10 The CAS panel held that the fact
that the laboratory was not accredited for the isolectric focusing test until after
it had analysed the athlete’s sample did not mean that it was not competent
to conduct the test, but it shifted the burden to the laboratory to show that
the method used was reliable. More specifically, ‘what must be established
to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel is that the testing procedure as
carried out was in accordance with the prevailing standards and practices of the
scientific community’.11 Based on the published studies on the validity of the
test, the scrutiny to which the test had been subjected at scientific meetings, the
demonstrated inter-laboratory reproducibility of test results, and the acceptance
of the reliability of the test in previous CAS cases, the CAS panel ruled that
that requirement had been met:
‘The fact that ISO accreditation had not yet been obtained is not fatal. The
Panel finds that the testing was in accordance with the scientific community’s
practices and procedures, indeed the SLC Lab was leading in the establishment
of those very practices and procedures. Therefore, the Panel rejects the
contention that the SLC lab was not capable of conducting the r-EPO test. The
absence of accreditation does not affect the results’.12
(f) The CAS panel in IAAF v Boulami followed Muehlegg in accepting the
validity and reliability of the ‘direct urine’ test for rEPO (including accepting
that a 80 per cent basic area percentage, or ‘BAP’, is a reasonable cut-off that
largely eliminates the risk of false positives), based in particular on the wide
international acceptance of the test. It also followed Muehlegg in holding that
the laboratory’s lack of specific accreditation to conduct rEPO testing was
not fatal to the validity of its results. Like the Muehlegg panel, however, it
held that the lack of accreditation meant that the burden shifted to the Anti-
Doping Organization to show that the laboratory had conducted its testing in
accordance with the scientific community’s practices and procedures, and that
the laboratory had satisfied itself as to the validity of the method before using
it. The CAS panel held:
‘Such a burden-shifting rule provides the necessary balance between the needs
of IOC laboratories to implement new, reliable testing methods as quickly
as possible, on the one hand, and the interests of athletes and the sporting
community in ensuring trustworthy test results, on the other’.13
(g) In Bergman, the cyclist’s A and B samples did not meet the 80 per cent BAP
criterion for an rEPO positive, but the CAS nevertheless upheld the adverse
analytical finding reported by the laboratory on the basis that the data met the
‘more discriminating’ criteria (the two-band ratio analysis and the location of
the most intense band analysis) set out in WADA’s new Technical Document on
the subject, TD2004EPO, ‘Harmonisation of the Method for the Identification
of Epoetin Alfa and Beta (EPO) and Darbepoietin Alfa (NESP) by IEF-Double
Blotting and Chemiluminescent Detection’.14
(h) In 2005, the media reported that Flemish triathlete Rutger Beke had had an
adverse analytical finding for rEPO in his urine thrown out as a ‘false positive’
on the basis that: (1) intense exercise can lead to leakage of high concentrations
of various natural proteins in the urine (‘exercise-induced proteinuria’); and
(2) the antibodies used in the test employed by WADA-accredited laboratories
are not able to distinguish between those proteins and exogenous EPO, and
they therefore report the presence of exogenous EPO when in fact only those
natural proteins (including endogenous EPO) are present.15 Shortly afterwards
two other triathletes (Virginia Berasategui and Iban Rodriguez) reportedly
had their respective adverse findings for rEPO thrown out on the same
basis.16 Unhelpfully, however, the decisions themselves were not made public.
A scientific paper was published that identified the alleged lack of specificity in
the antibodies used in the ‘direct urine’ test,17 but the paper was quickly rebutted
by the scientists who had developed the test.18 In CCES v Sheppard, the athlete
used the media reports of Beke’s ‘false positive’ to challenge the reliability
of the Montreal laboratory’s finding of rEPO in his own urine sample. The
hearing panel held that the athlete had the burden of proving that it was more
likely than not that ‘the test procedure in its overall operation is not reliable and
raises a risk of a false positive’. The Panel held that he had not discharged that
burden, due to the fact that the Flemish tribunal in Beke’s case had refused to
release its findings or its reasoning, and in light of the testimony of the director
of the Montreal laboratory that she had determined there were no ‘effort’ urine
patterns in the athlete’s results, and that she had sent her findings to the Paris
laboratory for a second opinion, which had confirmed her own. The hearing
panel held that the criteria in TD2004EPO had been applied correctly and that
the rEPO finding was therefore reliable.19 Subsequent attempts to argue that
the rEPO test is unreliable because it has produced ‘false positives’ have been
rejected at CAS, which has consistently upheld the validity and reliability of
the rEPO test.20
(i) In 2007, WADA produced a revised Technical Document for EPO
(TD2007EPO), codifying the ‘direct detection method’. In IAAF v AFS &
Javornik, a CAS panel undertook a detailed analysis of TD2007EPO, and
upheld the adverse analytical finding for rEPO reported by the laboratory in
that case because the laboratory results met all of the criteria set out in that
Technical Document.21
(j) In E & A v IBU,22 the CAS panel noted that TD2007EPO was based on a method
to detect EPO-α, EPO-β, and NESP, but the expiration of the patents for these
products had led to the development of many ‘biosimilar’ products, necessitating
the writing of a new Technical Document, TD2009EPO (‘Harmonization of the
Method for the Identification of Recombinant Erythropoietins (ie Epoetins) and
Analogues (eg Darbepoietin and Methoxypolyethyline Glycol-Epoetin Beta’).
The new Technical Document updated and codified the analytical procedures
constituting the rEPO test, including the quality, identification, and stability
criteria used to evaluate and interpret the results of the test. It confirmed the
ability to use SDS-PAGE analysis to confirm results in specific cases, and
the requirement to obtain a second opinion from one of the authors of the
Technical Document before declaring an adverse analytical finding for rEPO
or its analogues.23 The main change from the 2007 version of the Technical
Document was that ‘the scope of application of TD2007EPO was limited to
the forms of EPO commercially existing at the time of the document’s release:
the identification criteria it established, therefore, were considered by WADA
not to be adapted to identify the new forms of EPO (biosimilars or copies),
which appeared on the market after the release of TD2007EPO. As a result,
while the application of the IEF-DB Method did not change from TD2007EPO
to TD2009EPO, new evaluation criteria were included in TD2009EPO to
address, as “Other Epoetins”, the new types of EPOs’.24
(k) On 17 November 2012, WADA updated the Technical Document again, to
TD2013EPO, and renamed it ‘Harmonisation of analysis and reporting of
recombinant erythropoietins (ie epoetins) and analogues (eg Darbopoietin,
pegserpoetin, peginesatide, EPO-Fc) by electrophoretic techniques’. This
version was discussed and applied in the case of Athletics Ireland v Colvert,
where criticisms of the IEF and SAR-PAGE analytical techniques were again
rejected.25
(l) The rEPO testing methodology was again updated in TD2014EPO, and in
2016 an athlete was sanctioned for rEPO use after a sample that had tested
negative following TD2009EPO was re-tested using the updated methodology
set out in TD2014EPO and tested positive for rEPO.26
1 IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, paras 63–64. See also Nicholls, ‘Scoping for Doping’
(2004) Chemistry World, October, pp 54, 56. In short, the sugars carried by rEPO are more alkaline
than natural EPO. They can therefore be distinguished based on their isoelectric points – the pH
at which a protein has an equal number of positive and negative charges. See also interview with
Christian Bartlett, Certifying Analyst at Drug Control Centre, KCL, selectscience.net, 7 June 2012
(‘Erythropoietin is a glycoprotein hormone molecule composed of an amino acid backbone with
carbohydrate chains attached. Endogenous EPO and recombinant EPO differ slightly in the overall
charge of the molecule. This is because recombinant EPO is produced by hamster cells, and the
carbohydrates attached during post-translational modification are slightly different in hamster vs
human cells, leading to a difference in the molecular charge. This subtle difference means the isoform
bands of recombinant EPO focus in a different region of the pH gradient during IEF, allowing us to
distinguish between a naturally occurring endogenous EPO isoform pattern and recombinant EPO
isoform pattern’).
2 Interview with Christian Bartlett, Certifying Analyst at Drug Control Centre, KCL, selectscience.net,
7 June 2012.
3 USADA v Bergman, CAS 2004/O/679, para 5.1.6.5, discussing TD2004EPO, ‘Harmonisation of
the Method for the Identification of Epoetin Alfa and Beta (EPO) and Darbepoietin Alfa (NESP)
by IEF-Double Blotting and Chemiluminescent Detection’. The current version of that document
is TD2014EPO (‘Harmonization of Analysis and Reporting of Erythropoiesis Stimulating Agents
(ESAs) by Electrophoretic Techniques’). See also Muehlegg v IOC, CAS 2002/A/374, para 5 (‘EPO
in all its different forms produces an image or picture at the visualisation stage, which look like the
rungs of a ladder without the side rails. Each rung or band as it is known in science is the visual
isoform of electrically charged molecules. Through the isoelectric focussing process, the molecules
migrate to their location on the electropherogram depending upon the substance that they constitute,
ie EPO, r-EPO or Aranesp. The bands or isoforms can be in the acidic, neutral or basic areas of the
electropherogram. To use the analogy of the ladder, the rungs may be high up on the ladder, in the
middle, or toward the bottom of the ladder. These images of the ladder have been created by the
emission of light, which has then been photographed by a special digital camera. It is this visual
image which is used to evaluate the results of the lab analysis. Essentially, at the end of the process
an image is created that contains “fingerprints” of the proteins in the analysed urine. This allows the
laboratory to compare the protein “fingerprint” of an athlete’s urine to fingerprints of control samples.
In so doing the laboratory is able to assess what types of proteins are in an athlete’s urine. […] When
viewing an image various characteristics are considered to determine what protein is depicted by the
isoforms: position of the isoforms on the gel; width of the isoforms; density of the isoforms; shape
of the isoforms (meaning the shape surrounding the perimeter of a group of bands); and number of
isoforms’); IAAF v Hellebuyck, CAS 2005/A/831, para 7.2.
4 UCI v Hamberger, CAS 2001/A/343, para 27 (‘As long as there is no single, uniform test method
accepted by every federation, it is at the discretion of each federation to lay down whichever (reliable)
test method it sees fit to determine the presence of rEPO’); Meier v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345,
para 32 (same).
5 UCI v Hamberger, CAS 2001/A/343, para 28; Meier v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345, para 33. In
these cases, the CAS accepted the method had only recently been applied and not all laboratories could
use it. However, it did not accept that the method was at the trial stage, and it noted that validation
studies had been successfully carried out for the method. UCI v Hamberger, CAS 2001/A/343 at
para 30; Meier v Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345 at para 36. See also O v RFEC, CAS 2002/A/358,
para 17.
6 CCES v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, fn 10 (‘The basic area percentage
(“BAP”) method of interpreting the EPO test was described as follows in IAAF v MAR and Boulami
CAS 2003/A/383: “One of the 100% r-EPO control samples is used to establish a horizontal dividing
line … drawn at the bottom of the most acidic rung of the 100% r-EPO sample. … The EPO ladder
of the athlete urine sample in question is then examined relative to the horizontal baseline. … [A]
machine then measures what percentage of the surface area of these rungs appears above the horizontal
baseline in the basic area of the gel. This percentage figure is the BAP. It is one of several methods
of interpreting the isoelectropherograms although in the early testing days it was the predominate
method”‘).
7 Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2002/A/370. See also Danilova v IOC, CAS 2002/A/371. The CAS decisions in
those cases were upheld by the Swiss Federal Tribunal upon challenge by the athletes: Lazutina and
Danilova v IOC, 4P_267/2002 (27 May 2003).
8 Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2002/A/370, para 29.
9 Ibid, para 57.
10 Muehlegg v IOC, CAS 2002/A/374, para 5.
11 Ibid, para 10. See further ibid, para 26 (‘It may well be that the Inter-Laboratory Report of the IOC
raised various areas of study that should be continued with respect to r-EPO testing. However, the fact
that the laboratories wish to improve their testing methods, and further improve the r-EPO test, does
not result in the test being invalid. For example, it may be that through further studies the IOC Medical
Committee will be able to lower the threshold test for when an r-EPO positive will be found. Such
work in progress does not make the use of the test in current circumstances invalid’).
12 Ibid, para 11.

13 IAAF v Boulami, CAS 2002/A/452, para 56. See also USADA v Sbeih, AAA Panel decision dated
March 2004 (accepting reliability of analytical test for rEPO, including scientific validity of 80 per
cent BAP criteria).
14 USADA v Bergman, CAS 2004/A/679, para 5.1.5.3 (accepting that a basic area percentage of 80 per
cent is not a prerequisite; other criteria may be relied upon to rule out a false positive).
15 ‘EPO test flaws may be failing athletes’, Guardian, 20 September 2005. See discussion in CCES v
Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, paras 61–62.
16 ‘EPO test flaws may be failing athletes’, Guardian, 20 September 2005.
17 M Buellens, J R Delanghe, M Bollen, ‘False-positive detection of recombinant human erythropoietin
in urine following strenuous physical exercise’, Blood 107, 4711–13 (2006). See also J R Delanghe,
M Bollen, and M Beullens, ‘Testing for recombinant erythropoietin’, Am J Hematol 83:237–
241, 2008.
18 F Lasne, ‘No doubt about the validity of the urine test for detection of recombinant human
erythropoietin’. Blood 108, 1778-79; author reply 177901780 (2006); D Catlin, G Green, M Sekera,
P Scott, B Starcevic, ‘False-positive Epo test concerns unfounded’, Blood 108, 1778; author reply
177901780 (2006).
19 CCES v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, paras 61–62, 67.
20 IAAF v Hellebuyck, CAS 2005/A/831, para 7.2.5 (reviewing in detail and rejecting evidence – including
Beke decision – offered to suggest that EPO testing procedure used by WADA-accredited laboratories
was unreliable, and that adverse analytical finding for rEPO reported in respect of athlete’s sample
was a false positive); Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 104 (‘[…] exercise can induce a shift
of the endogenous bands towards the basic field, but […] in effort urine profiles the endogenous bands
never completely disappear from the profile; and the percentage in the basic bands are never over 85%
of the total band intensities’); Tysse v Norwegian Athletics Federation & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2353,
para 815 (‘[…] the evidence submitted by the Respondents establishes that the IEF method is both
valid and has a high degree of specificity. In making this finding the Panel relies on the evidence
of Dr. Lasne regarding the extensive work that went in to establishing the test, and the steps taken
to ensure the method was specific for CERA. Dr. Lasne’s statement that no sample ever returned a
positive finding for CERA where there was no CERA is compelling, as is the fact that prior to the
development of CERA no analysis of a sample ever had results where bands appeared in the basic
area of the CERA reference’) and para 816 (‘Dr. Franke and Heid’s evidence about the possibility of
cross-reacting proteins from the IEF double blotting method cannot at this stage be considered reliable
evidence. The Appellant’s experts cannot point to one scientific study generally accepted within the
applicable scientific peer group supporting this theory. For this reason, the Panel must reject this
theory as implausible’). See also USADA v Leogrande, AAA Panel decision dated 1 December 2008,
paras 24, 47 and 70 (based on expert evidence, AAA Panel rejected contention the adverse analytical
finding for EPO may have been a false positive due to antibody binding to proteins other than rEPO
and/or due to exercise-induced proteinuria).
21 IAAF v AFS & Javornik, CAS 2008/A/1608, paras 60–95.
22 E & A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 11.
23 Ibid, para 13 (‘[…] the application of the method to detect rEPO has not changed from TD2007EPO
to TD2009EPO. The direct urinary test description of the method in the two TDs is substantially
the same. The method involves four procedures: sample preparation; isoelectric focusing; double
blotting; and chemiluminescent detection. Therefore, the description of the laboratory method as
described in CAS 2002/A/397, CAS 2002/A/370 and CAS 2002/A/374 cases with the refinements
discussed in CAS 2005/A/679 are still applicable. The test for rEPO is valid and reliable there being
no change regarding the application of the method for REPO in comparison to the test when used for
the detection of other forms of EPO such as darbepoetin (Aranesp)’).
24 Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 84. The panel went on to explain: ‘In this regard, the
peculiarity of the identification criteria for “Other Epoetins” refers to the relevance given to the
relative amount of the basic band areas: an adverse analytical finding for “Other Epoetins” can be
reported if the sum of the intensity of all bands in the basic area account for approximately 85%
or more” of the total intensity of the bands within the window of the sample lane’. Ibid. It noted,
however, that ‘“Additional Evidence” can be adduced to confirm the presence of rEPO in a sample,
even though, for instance, the condition concerning the relative amount of the basic band areas is not
satisfied’. Ibid, para 85. One example of possible ‘Additional Evidence’, which is complementary to
the IEF-DB Method and not mandatory, is the SDS-PAGE Method. Ibid, paras 86–89. See also E &
A v IBU, CAS 2009/A/1931, para 14 (discussing the application of the new identification criteria for
biosimilar rEPO introduced in TD2009EPO).
25 Athletics Ireland and Irish Sports Council v Colvert, Irish Sports Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 16 July 2015, para 2.15 (‘The A sample was subjected to IEF and SAR-PAGE testing.
According to Mr Reihlen, each of these tests is capable of differentiating between endogenous EPO
and recombinant EPO; in the case of IEF recombinant EPO has a different isoform. SAR-PAGE
(and SDS-PAGE) distinguishes recombinant and endogenous EPO by mass, recombinant EPO having
a higher molecular mass than endogenous EPO’), para 2.3.2 (‘[…] the Panel is satisfied that the
analysis of the results of IEF and SAR-PAGE testing is not a subjective analysis although, of course,
it is an analysis that can only properly be carried out by suitably qualified and experienced experts.
The determination of whether a sample, including controlled samples, contains rEPO is not simply a
question of determining whether any part of the signal appears above or below the blue line but is also
related to the shape of that signal. The Panel is also satisfied that not only were the various tests on
the A and B samples properly carried out but that they establish the presence of rEPO in Mr Colvert’s
A and B samples’).
26 Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648.
C6.31 Moving from one form of blood-doping to another, in Hamilton v USADA

and UCI1 the athlete challenged the finding at first instance that he had used a
prohibited method (homologous blood transfusion, or HBT) on the ground that the
HBT test used by the Lausanne laboratory (using flow cytometry to identify mixed
populations of three different blood cell markers) was unreliable. He pointed out it
was a ‘brand new test’ that had only been introduced for the 2004 Athens Games
(he was tested in autumn 2004) and that had never been considered by any previous
hearing panel. He argued that there had been insufficient validation of the test method
for use in an anti-doping context. The CAS panel started from the proposition that
under Code Art 3.2, ‘facts relating to anti-doping violations may be established by
any reliable means’. It said:
‘It is important to note that this rule gives great leeway to USADA and other
anti-doping agencies to prove violations, so long as they can comfortably satisfy
a tribunal that the means of proof is reliable. […] One consequence of this rule
is that WADA need not designate a specific test to prove that a doping violation
has occurred. Rather, WADA and its accredited laboratories are free to develop
tests based on appropriate scientific principles to demonstrate the existence of a
prohibited substance or the use of a prohibited method. This flexibility necessarily
provides WADA and other anti-doping organisations with the means to combat new
forms of doping’.2
The CAS panel recalled, however, that if the laboratory is not specifically accredited
for the test in question, the presumption of regularity created by Code Art 3.2.13
does not apply, and it is therefore up to the laboratory to show that its new testing
methodology is ‘in accordance with the scientific community’s practices and
procedures, and that it satisfied itself as to the validity of the method before using
it’.4 If the laboratory can make such a showing, ‘the presumption mentioned above in
Art 3.2.1 returns, and the athlete must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the testing was not conducted in accordance with international standards’.5 The
CAS panel found that USADA had met its burden of showing that the HBT test was
in accordance with the scientific community’s practice and procedures, in that it ‘has
been used for many years for important medical purposes and has been scientifically
reliable’, the methodology ‘was published in peer reviewed articles’ that provided
‘proof of principle’, and the test methodology used was ISO-validated in the relevant
laboratory and was fit for purpose.6 Meanwhile the athlete had not shown ‘that the
specific testing on his samples was not performed in accordance with international
standards’. The CAS panel therefore found that the HBT test was reliable and that
the athlete’s sample did contain two different red blood cell populations, which was
proof of blood doping by homologous blood transfusion.7 Several years later, the
athlete admitted that he had indeed undergone homologous blood doping.8
1 Hamilton v USADA and UCI, CAS 2005/A/884.
3 As it then was, now Code Art 3.2.2. See paras C6.22 and C6.34.
4 Hamilton v USADA and UCI , CAS 2005/A/884, para 52, citing IAAF v Boulami, CAS 2003/A/452,
which itself cited Muehlegg v IOC, CAS 2002/A/374, at para 7.1.8.
5 Hamilton v USADA and UCI, CAS 2005/A/884, para 54.
6 Ibid, para 64.
7 Ibid, para 65.
8 Hamilton & Coyle, The Secret Race (Random House, 2012).
C6.32 The ISL requires a laboratory that has developed and validated a new
analytical method or procedure to submit details to WADA, and to get WADA’s
agreement that the new method of procedure is fit for purpose, ‘prior to implementation
by any laboratory’.1 For example, the new ‘marker method’ for detecting recombinant
human Growth Hormone in blood samples was not introduced until the summer of
2012, once WADA had confirmed that it agreed the test was fit for purpose.2 The
question became, does WADA’s ‘pre-validation’ of the test limit the ability of an
athlete who subsequently fails the test to challenge its reliability? Put another way,
would the CAS accept WADA’s validation as dispositive, or would it still want to
satisfy itself as to the soundness of the science underlying the test?3
1 This requirement was first introduced in version 5.0 of the ISL, effective 1 January 2008 (see Art
4.4.10), and appears at Art 4.4.2.2 of the 2019 ISL, which states: ‘Any Analytical Testing Procedure,
which is new to the field of anti-doping analysis, shall be approved as Fit-for-purpose by WADA prior
to implementation by any Laboratory. WADA shall use whatever means deemed appropriate, including
formal consultations with scientific expert working groups, publication(s) in peer-reviewed scientific
journal(s), or participation in an inter-laboratory collaborative study or WADA-organized EQAS round
to evaluate whether the test is Fit-for-Purpose prior to providing approval. Before applying such a new
Analytical Testing Procedure to the analysis of Samples, a Laboratory shall obtain an extension of the
Scope of ISO/IEC 17025 Accreditation by the relevant Accreditation Body and may be required to
successfully participate in a WADA EQAS, if available’.
2 See para C6.34, n 12.
3 Another question is whether any test can be used now if it has not been validated by WADA. In CONI
& WADA v Petacchi, CAS 2007/A/1362, para 6.23, a CAS panel declined to disregard the results of
an enantiomer test that indicated that salbutamol found in the athlete’s sample had not been inhaled,
even though the enantiomer test was ‘not specifically a WADA-accredited test’, because the lack of
WADA-accreditation was ‘simply because the method is not routinely used and so it was considered
an unnecessary expense to include it in ISO 17025. The test was, however, reported in a leading
scientific journal (and has been used and approved of since its publication)’.
C6.33 Initially, it appeared that the CAS might simply accept WADA’s validation as
dispositive. In UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, when the cyclist’s
expert attacked the validity of the Athlete Biological Passport system as a means of
‘indirectly’ detecting the use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method,1 the
CAS panel relied on the fact that WADA had approved the system as justification for
rejecting that attack:
‘The CAS panel is not called to adjudicate on whether some other or better system of
longitudinal profiling could be created. WADA has approved the use of ABP and this
has been codified in the current UCI rules. The CAS panel must respect and apply
the rules as they are and not as they might have been or might become’.2
1 As to the Athlete Biological Passport system, see para C7.4 et seq.
2 CAS 2010/A/2235, para 81.
C6.34 However, a different CAS panel took the opposite approach in 2013, when
called upon to resolve a challenge to the reliability of a test that WADA had validated
in 2008 for detecting the presence of recombinant human Growth Hormone (or hGH)
in a blood sample.1 The test uses isoform differential immunoassays to distinguish
between the proportions of hGH isoforms found under normal physiological
conditions and those found after injection of recombinant hGH.2 In February 2009,
the first athlete to test positive for hGH based on the isoform test, Terry Newton,
an English rugby league player, admitted the charge and accepted a two-year ban.3
However, a Finnish skier who also tested positive for hGH using the isoform test
challenged its validity in FIS v Veerpalu, on the basis that:
‘(a) the stability of the ratio of GH isoforms was not proven,
(b) the method was not sufficiently validated (especially since the validation
did allegedly not involve elite athletes in different conditions and since the
validation was based on a too small population), and
(c) the genetic background of the athlete could have affected the test results’.4
At first instance, the FIS Doping Panel held that it was ‘not the responsibility of
the FIS Doping Panel to question the applied testing method as long as a method
which is validated and admitted by the WADA and documented by the respective
Technical Document has been used’.5 On appeal, however, the CAS panel ruled that
the fact that WADA had said the test was fit for purpose was not dispositive. Rather,
the FIS still ‘bears the burden of proving to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction
that the Test is reliable, including that it is scientifically sound’.6 If it discharges
that burden, then if the laboratory that carried out the test is WADA-accredited, it is
presumed to have conducted the test in accordance with the ISL, and it is up to the
athlete to show that the laboratory departed from the required procedures in a manner
that could reasonably have caused the adverse finding,7 or else to show exceptional
physiological factors that caused a ‘false positive’ in his case.8 But if the Anti-Doping
Organization does not prove that the test is reliable, then its case falls. The CAS panel
then reviewed in detail the various arguments advanced by the athlete as to why the
hGH isoform test was not a reliable method of distinguishing between endogenous
and exogenous hGH in a blood sample, and rejected all of them9 bar one: having
reviewed the supporting statistical analysis, it decided it was not comfortably satisfied
that the decision limits used to exclude false positives (a rec/pit ratio exceeding 1.81
for Kit 1 and 1.68 for Kit 2) would (as WADA claimed) exclude false positives in
99.99 per cent of cases. It noted:
‘This is not to say that the Panel believes that the Test is necessarily unreliable or that
the current decision limits are necessarily wrong. It only means that Respondent has
not met the applicable standard of proof with respect to the procedure followed to set
the aspects of the decision limits explained above. It may well be that new procedurally
correct studies will confirm the current decision limits, or even set them at a lower or
higher level; however, the procedural flaws that the Panel found in the statistical side
of the WADA studies do not allow the Panel to conclude to its comfortable satisfaction
that the Test as a whole is reliable with regard to its decision limits’.10
As far as the authors are aware, this was the first time (and to date the only time) that the
CAS has not upheld the reliability of a WADA-endorsed test in its entirety.11 WADA
responded by commissioning a new study that resolved the issues raised by the CAS
panel in Veerpalu,12 and also by adding the following provision to the 2015 Code:
‘3.2.1 Analytical methods or decision limits approved by WADA, after consultation

within the relevant scientific community and which have been the subject of peer
review are presumed to be scientifically valid. Any Athlete or any other Person
seeking to rebut this presumption of scientific validity shall, as a condition
precedent to any such challenge, first notify WADA of the challenge and the basis
of the challenge.13 At WADA’s request, the CAS panel shall appoint an appropriate
scientific expert to assist the panel in its evaluation of the challenge. Within 10 days
of WADA’s receipt of such notice, and WADA’s receipt of the CAS file, WADA,
shall also have the right to intervene as a party appear amicus curiae or otherwise
provide evidence in such proceeding’.
This provision was considered at length by a CAS panel in consolidated cases arising
out of the re-testing of samples stored after previous Olympic Games, using a new
method developed for the detection of a long-term metabolite of DHCMT (aka
turinabol). The CAS panel ruled that the athletes had not met their burden of proving
that the method was not scientifically valid. In particular, they had failed to show
that the method used might falsely identify other, non-prohibited substances as a
DHCMT metabolite.14 Art 3.2.1 has been amended in the 2021 Code to:
(a) provide that consultation within the relevant scientific community and peer
review are alternative means of giving rise to the presumption of validity; and
(b) allow for the fact that the athlete or other person may also (or alternatively)
challenge whether the conditions for such presumption have been met.15
1 As explained by the CAS panel in Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 83: ‘HGH is a hormone
that is synthesised and secreted by cells in the anterior pituitary gland located at the base of the brain.
It is naturally produced by humans and necessary for skeletal growth. However, hGH is also available
artificially and is believed to be abused by athletes on a wide scale in order to increase performance’.
2 See WADA Guidelines, ‘hGH Isoform Differential Immunoassays for Anti-Doping Analysis’,
version 2.1 (June 2014), p 5 (‘The method is essentially based on the established principle that the
normal composition of hGH in blood is a mixture of different isoforms, present at constant relative
proportions. In contrast, recGH is comprised almost exclusively of monomeric 22-KDa molecular
form. The administration of exogenous recGH not only leads to an increase in the concentration of
the 22-KDa isoform but also causes a reduction of the non-22-KDa concentrations, thus altering the
natural ratios established between these hGH isoforms’). See also Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566,
para 175 (‘[…] artificially inserted hGH only comes in the 22 kDa form, while human blood naturally
contains a relatively constant relative proportion of 22 kDa isoforms to other isoforms, so that the Test
measures whether the balance between these isoforms is at natural or artificially enhanced levels’)
and para 83 (‘The major challenge in developing a doping test for hGH is the fact that the level of
total concentration of hGH in a human’s blood will naturally vary substantially in the course of time.
HGH is naturally released in a rhythmic, pulsatile manner, so that the total hGH concentration level
may vary as much as 500-times between the pulses and the basal periods. Normally there are around
ten hGH pulses during any 24-hour period, so the total hGH concentration will differ significantly
depending on the time of measurement. For this reason, developing a test based merely on the
measurement of the total hGH concentration is, in practice, impossible. However, the administration
of exogenous hGH changes the proportional shares of various HGH isoforms in a human’s blood
by increasing the proportional share of one hGH isoform compared to other isoforms. Accordingly,
the Test has been designed to detect hGH administration by looking at the ratio between two types
of isoforms of hGH. Even though the levels of total hGH concentration will vary substantially, it is
assumed that the ratio between the relevant types of hGH isoforms measured by the Test will naturally
remain relatively stable. The administration of exogenous hGH can thus be detected from an elevated
ratio of the relevant hGH with two different combinations of antibodies, which are referred to as Kit
1 and Kit 2 […]. The so-called decision limits determine the thresholds needed to assess whether an
athlete’s blood contains natural or doped levels of hGH’).
3 ‘Newton gets 2 years for world-first hGH positive finding’, UK Anti-Doping press release,
22 February 2010.
4 FIS v Veerpalu, FIS Doping Panel decision dated 21 August 2011, para 58, reversed on appeal,
Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566.
5 FIS v Veerpalu, FIS Doping Panel decision dated 21 August 2011, para 59 (‘In the present case,
the FIS Doping Panel is satisfied that: (a) The Laboratory in question is accredited by WASA for
the application of the method for detection of doping with hGH (the hGH isoform differential
immunoassays) which has been used since 2008 on approximately 3400 analyses performed with
‘kit 1’ and 1050 analyses with ‘kit 2’ on athletes from different sports and under different conditions.
(b) The Laboratory Documentation Report of the Laboratory contains all data which are required by
WADA as sufficient evidence of an adverse analytical finding. This has been confirmed by WADA.
(c) The FIS Doping Panel is not prepared to initiate investigations about the testing method based on
general criticism and hypotheses submitted by the Athlete’s experts or because of the allegation that
the documents available do not contain all data desired by the Athlete’s expect. The FIS Doping Panel
therefore declines to review the factors which could, in the eyes of the Athlete’s experts, affect the
reliability of the hGH test such as the ‘stability of the ratio of GH isoforms’, ‘the validation of the GH
testing method’ and the ‘statistical validation of the WADA GH test’’).
6 Veerpalu v FIS, CAS 2011/A/2566, para 95.
7 Ibid, applying Code Art 3.2.1, which is discussed at paras C6.22 and C6.34.
8 Ibid para 82. The athlete’s attempts to show that his adverse finding was caused by his unusual genetic
disposition, by his strenuous exercise prior to the test, and/or by his being at altitude prior to the test,
were rejected by the CAS panel. Ibid, paras 138–148.
9 Ibid, para 183 (‘The Respondent has shown to the comfortable satisfaction of this Panel that the
hGH Test is a reliable testing method for hGH abuse in professional sports that is based on scientifically
correct assumptions and methods. Furthermore, the Panel agrees with the Respondent that even if the
Appellant had established a minor flaw in the reliability and validation of the Test (quod non), the
Appellant did in any event not show to the required standard of proof that this could have caused the
AAF (as a false positive finding)’).
10 Ibid, para 206. See also ibid, para 203 and para 234 (‘The Panel reiterates its view that the Respondent
has proven that the Test itself is reliable, but that, as a matter of procedure, it has not proven the same
in respect of the decision limits. The Panel notes that there are many factors in this case which tend to
indicate that the Athlete did in fact himself administer exogenous hGH, but that for the reason that the
decision limits have not been proven as reliable in the course of this proceeding, the violation of the
FIS ADR cannot be upheld on appeal’).
11 Instead challenges to the reliability of testing methods have been rejected. In NADA v Sinkewitz,
CAS 2012/A/2857, and WADA v Lallukka, CAS 2014/A/3488, the athletes did not challenge the reliability
of the hGH test per se, but instead challenged the scientific reliability of the decision limit for the ratio of
recombinant hGH to pituitary hGH used in the hGH Guidelines to distinguish between endogenous and
exogenous hGH, on the basis that the data on which the decision limit was based were inadequate, and
insufficient account had been taken of confounding factors such as ethnicity, age, and physical exercise
prior to sample collection, so that there was a significant risk of false positives. Both CAS panels rejected
the challenge on the grounds that the hGH guidelines were not mandatory, but rather simply guided the
laboratories in determining when to report the detected presence of hGH as an adverse analytical finding,
and therefore ‘the reliability of the DL as such is not a mandatory precondition in order to prove that the
ratios found on the Respondent’s samples show the presence of exogenous rec hGH’, but rather a means
of evidence to prove an ADRV (Sinkewitz at para 193). The Sinkewitz panel found based on the expert
evidence before it that the confounding factors cited might affect the amount of hGH secreted, but not
its isoform composition, and therefore the ratio remained stable. It also found that the criticisms of the
data set used to determine the decision limit did not lead to any doubt that the ratio found in the athlete’s
sample reflected use of exogenous hGH. Ibid, paras 212–215.
See also IAAF v RusAF & Firova, CAS 2018/O/5666, para 91 (‘the Athlete has not even alleged
that she has followed the procedure set out in Rule 33.3(a) of the 2016-2017 IAAF Rules. Therefore,
the analytical method must be considered scientifically valid pursuant to Rule 33.3(a) of the 2016-
2017 IAAF Rules’) and para 92 (‘The Sole Arbitrator further notes that the validity of the analytical
method to detect long term DHCMT metabolites was confirmed by the CAS subsequent to the
proceedings invoked by the Athlete (CAS 2016/A/4803, CAS 2016/A/4804, and CAS 2017/A/4983,
arbitral award rendered on 25 July 2018). In brief, the CAS Panel found that the athletes in said cases
had been unable to prove that the testing methods for long-term metabolites of DHCMT adopted
by the laboratories, which led to the positive findings for DHCMT in Beijing Olympic Games and
London Olympic Games, were not scientifically valid’).
12 See discussion in WADA v Lallukka, CAS 2014/A/3488, para 83 et seq. The CAS panel in that case
concluded that the subsequent studies had addressed the concerns raised in Veerpalu and established
the reliability of the decision limits used in its hGH test. Ibid, para 98.
In 2012, just before the 2012 Paralympic Games in London, WADA approved a new test for hGH,
the ‘biomarker test’, which detects unnatural increases in two markers in the blood of human Growth
Hormone (insulin-like growth factor-1 and the N-terminal peptide of pro-collagen type III), and has a
longer detection window than the isoform test. The test quickly proved its worth, catching two Russian
Paralympian weightlifters in out-of-competition tests conducted just before the Games. Upon being
confronted with the findings, each of them admitted injecting the substance, thereby providing their
own confirmation of the reliability of the new test. ‘Two Russian Paralympians admit to injecting
human growth hormone’, The Australian, 11 September 2012.
13 CAS panels will disregard any challenge to the validity of a method where this condition precedent
is not satisfied: Lovchev v IWF, CAS 2016/A/4632, para 49 (‘Insofar as Dr Faber argued that the
MU forms part of a proper validation also for qualitative assays, the Panel notes that this amounts
to a challenge of the analytical method that requires observance of specific procedural rules (see
Article 3.2.1 WADC/IWW ADP), which are not fulfilled in the case at hand’).
14 Gnidenko v IOC & UCI, CAS 2016/A/4803, Abakumova v IOC, CAS 2016/A/4804, and Lebedeva v
IOC & WADA, CAS 2017/A/4983, paras 104 and 139. In Freibergs v IOC, CAS 2014/A/3604, para 50,
an earlier CAS panel had ruled in respect of the same analytical method that ‘there was no need
separately to validate the technique used for the Appellant’s sample since it was a mere development
of the long time ago validated mass spectrometry method and not something completely different’.
See also Zemliak v Ukrainian Athletic Federation & WADA, CAS 2018/A/5654, para 67 (‘If the
Method does not fall within IAAF Rule 33.1(a), the consequence in the athletes’ favour is that it is
not deemed scientifically valid. They may still be proved as such and the fact that resulting procedural
provisions in Rule 33.1(a) do not apply carries no inherent prejudice’).
15 2021 Code Art 3.2.1 reads: ‘Analytical methods or Decision Limits approved by WADA after
consultation within the relevant scientific community or which have been the subject of peer review
are presumed to be scientifically valid. Any Athlete or other Person seeking to challenge whether the
conditions for such presumption have been met or to rebut this presumption of scientific validity shall,
as a condition precedent to any such challenge, first notify WADA of the challenge and the basis of
the challenge. The initial hearing body, appellate body or CAS, on its own initiative, may also inform
WADA of any such challenge. Within 10 days of WADA’s receipt of such notice and the case file related
to such challenge, WADA shall also have the right to intervene as a party, appear as amicus curiae or
otherwise provide evidence in such proceeding. In cases before CAS, at WADA’s request, the CAS
panel shall appoint an appropriate scientific expert to assist the panel in its evaluation of the challenge’.

IN FACT PROHIBITED
C6.35 If the hearing panel is satisfied that the laboratory’s adverse analytical finding
is reliable, the last element of the Art 2.1 charge that the Anti-Doping Organization
has to establish is that the substance that the laboratory found in the sample is in
fact prohibited. A ‘Prohibited Substance’ is defined as ‘any substance, or class of
substances, so described on the Prohibited List’,1 but this seemingly straightforward
definition conceals a number of potential traps for the unwary. In particular, while a
substance that is specifically named on the Prohibited List is obviously prohibited,2
more work will be required if that substance is a ‘threshold’ substance, ie one for
which the Prohibited List requires proof of a minimum concentration in the sample,3
or if the substance is one that can also be produced naturally (‘endogenously’), in
which case the Anti-Doping Organization will have to prove the substance found
in the sample is ‘exogenous’.4 Meanwhile, if the substance is not expressly named
on the Prohibited List, the Anti-Doping Organization will have to show that it falls
within one of the general categories of prohibited substance included on the List,5 or
that it has ‘a similar chemical structure or similar biological effect(s)’ to a prohibited
substance,6 or that it is a metabolite or marker of a prohibited substance.7
1 See Code, Appendix One (Definitions), p 139. See also CONI, CAS 2005/C/841, para 58 (‘[…] the
use of pharmaceutical substances which are not expressly prohibited by sports law, and which are not
similar or related substances to those expressly prohibited, cannot be considered as an anti-doping rule
infringement and in that respect cannot, therefore, be the object of disciplinary sanctions’).
2 See paras C6.37–C6.39. Its inclusion on the Prohibited List cannot be challenged on the basis that
it does not meet the criteria for inclusion specified in Code Art 4.3. See Code Art 4.3.3 (‘WADA’s
determination of the Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods that will be included on
the Prohibited List, the classification of substances into categories on the Prohibited List, and the
classification of a substance as prohibited at all times or In-Competition only, is final and shall not be
subject to challenge by an Athlete or other Person based on an argument that the substance or method
was not a masking agent or did not have the potential to enhance performance, represent a health risk
or violate the spirit of sport’); Willes v IBSF, CAS 2016/A/4776, para 74, following FINA v Kreuzmann
& German Swimming Federation, CAS 2005/A/921, para 32 (‘Once a substance has been put on the
List, it is the fact that such a substance has been detected in the athlete’s body which is deciding. The
List and the agreed procedure for its elaboration and enforcement leave no room for a counter-analysis
to determine whether a substance was effectively used as a masking agent or not’) and Calle Williams
v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, para 2.4 (‘The inclusion of a substance on the List is made after a thorough
evaluation by the so-called “List Committee”, a group of specialists in the field of doping substances
representing all stakeholders in the fight against doping. It is thus justified to exempt the decision to
put a substance on the List from challenge by the athlete’).
3 See paras C6.40–C6.41.
5 See para C6.55.
C6.36 In such cases, therefore, the Anti-Doping Organization will require expert
scientific evidence to support the charge it is bringing. For that reason, ISL Art
5.4.10.1 specifically makes the laboratory responsible for ‘providing evidence and/or
expert testimony on any test result or report produced by the Laboratory as required
in administrative, arbitration, or legal proceedings’. In certain cases, however, it may
also become necessary to obtain evidence from an independent expert. And that is
likely to be a necessity for an athlete seeking to defend an Art 2.1 charge.
A Is the substance expressly listed on the Prohibited List?
C6.37 The first question is whether the substance in question is expressly

mentioned on the Prohibited List. The issue arose in the Baxter case during the
2002 Winter Olympic Games, where the skier’s urine sample tested positive for
levmethamfetamine after he had used a Vicks nasal inhaler bought in the US that,
unknown to him, included an additional ingredient not contained in the version of the
same inhaler on sale in the UK. The IOC Prohibited List in place at the time referred
to ‘methamphetamine’ as an example of a banned stimulant. Methamphetamine is
a commonly abused stimulant that is a dextro rotatory isomer. Levmetamfetamine,
a separate substance, is a lelo rotatory isomer. Although chemically similar to

methamphetamine, the latter is only a nasal decongestant, with no performance-
enhancing effects. In US military/workplace drug-testing programmes, a test for
methamphetamine is not deemed positive unless it has been shown, by isomer
separation analysis, that the results have not been caused by levmethamfetamine.
Baxter argued before the IOC Disciplinary Commission that the IOC had to make the
same showing in order to discharge its evidential burden of establishing the presence
of a banned stimulant in his body. The IOC Disciplinary Commission rejected that
argument, saying that methamphetamine was banned, and methamphetamine was
what had been found in Baxter’s sample; levmethamfetamine was banned just as
much as methamphetamine; there was no need to go on to establish which was present,
and there was no need to go further and show that what had been found in the sample
was performance-enhancing. Baxter appealed to CAS on the basis (among others)
that the IOC had not established that levmethamfetamine was a prohibited substance
or related to a prohibited substance. The CAS rejected Baxter’s appeal, finding
that the term ‘methamphetamine’ encompasses both isomers of methamphetamine,
ie including levmethamfetamine, and that in any event the Prohibited List includes
amphetamines, and levmethamfetamine is an amphetamine.1
1 Baxter v IOC, CAS 2002/A/376, para 3.13. As a result, the skier lost his Olympic medal when he had
not acted deliberately and when on no basis could he have gained any advantage. It might be argued
that such inflexibility in the system arguably does not serve it well, at least to the extent that the
sanction that flows is mandatory.
C6.38 Even if the substance in issue is expressly mentioned in the Prohibited

List, it is important to remember that certain substances on the Prohibited List are
only banned in-competition, not out-of-competition. In such cases, the question of
whether the test in which the sample was collected was an in-competition test or an
out-of-competition test becomes crucial. And that can vary from sport to sport.1 In
ITF v Gasquet,2 the player tested positive for cocaine (a substance banned only in
competition) in a test that was triggered by his withdrawal from competition. The
relevant provisions of the Tennis Anti-Doping Programme specified that a test on
withdrawal was to be considered an ‘in-competition’ test, and therefore the ITF
charged the player with a Code Art 2.1 violation (presence of a prohibited substance
in a sample). He argued in response that the Programme should not be construed
so as to prohibit him from having a substance in his system that was only banned
in-competition at a time when he had withdrawn from that competition, and so the
charge against him should be dismissed. The hearing panel held that, on a proper
construction of the Tennis Anti-Doping Programme, the intent was clear that a
test conducted on a player who was withdrawing from a competition was an in-
competition test (because its purpose was to ensure dopers could not evade detection
by withdrawing from competition when they discovered testing was taking place),
and therefore an adverse analytical finding for cocaine was evidence of an anti-
doping rule violation under Code Art 2.1.3 However, it then mitigated the sanction
imposed4 on the basis that it could not have been intended that the player would
get a two-year ban in such circumstances.5 On appeal, the CAS panel upheld the
ruling that the test in question was an in-competition test and therefore the player
had committed the violation charged, but avoided dealing with the mitigation point
by finding the player bore no fault or negligence for the presence of the cocaine in
his system, having been inadvertently contaminated by a girl he kissed in a nightclub
who had just taken cocaine.6
1 The 2015 Code provided a default, which is that if not otherwise defined in the rules of the international
federation or other anti-doping organization, In-Competition means ‘the period commencing twelve
hours before a Competition in which the Athlete is scheduled to participate through the end of
such Competition and the Sample collection process related to such Competition’. Code App One
(Definitions), p 135. In the 2021 Code, the default is turned into a general rule starting at 11.59pm
on the day before the competition and ending as above, and Anti-Doping Organizations have to seek
WADA’s approval to depart from it.
2 ITF v Gasquet, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2009.
3 Ibid, para 65.
4 Some might say rather contrarily; others might say in an attempt to do justice.
5 Ibid, para 116.
6 ITF v Gasquet, CAS 2009/A/1926, para 5.5. See further para C18.19(m). An element in this finding
may have been the perceived injustice of a person being banned in circumstances where it was common
ground that the amount of cocaine in his body was miniscule, that it could not have been deliberately
ingested, and that there was no prospect of performance enhancement, not only because the amount
was miniscule, but because it was clear on the evidence that the player was injured and had only gone
out that night because he would not be participating in the event the next day, although the withdrawal
technically took place the next morning. Again, it might be argued that the system is not well served by
such inflexibility in such circumstances, at least to the extent that the sanction that flows is mandatory.
C6.39 On the other hand, if the substance found in a sample is banned in-
competition, and the test pursuant to which the sample was collected was an in-
competition test, it is not going to avail the athlete, in an Art 2.1 ‘presence’ case, to
submit scientific evidence suggesting that the substance for which the sample tested
positive was ingested well before the in-competition period, ie when the athlete was
‘out of competition’.1 However, it will likely be relevant to mitigation of sanction.2
1 See commentary to Code Art 2.2.2: ‘the presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites
or Markers in a Sample collected In-Competition is a violation of Article 2.1 regardless of when
that substance might have been administered’. See also USADA v R, CAS/2008/A/1577, paras
37–47 (although marijuana was ingested out of competition, its presence in a sample collected in
competition constitutes an anti-doping rule violation); Adams v CCES, CAS 2007/A/1312, para 151
(‘[…] an athlete caught smoking marijuana at a party by a CCES employee would not be found to
have committed an anti-doping rule violation because the use of marijuana is not prohibited Out-of-
Competition. However, if that same athlete participated in a competition the next month and was tested
In-Competition, his Out-of-Competition use would no longer be relevant. If the presence of marijuana
was detected in his urine, he would be found in violation of CADP Rule 7.16 for the presence of
a Prohibited Substance notwithstanding the time of ingestion or use’); ARU v Sailor, ARU Judicial
Committee decision dated 20 July 2006, paras 5–65 (‘The plain and unambiguous text of clause 5.2.1
[the equivalent of Code Art 2.1] stands in the way of this argument […] That violation is nominated
as being one comprised of having the “presence” of the Metabolite in the player’s bodily sample
[collected during an ‘in competition’ period]. […] Whether Sailor took the drug one hour or 10 hours
or 100 hours before the game is entirely irrelevant […]. All that is required is that the Metabolite is
present in the sample. […] The phrase “in competition” in the By-Law encompasses, not the time at
which the drug was ingested, but rather the time at which the process of Doping Control took place’).
See also WADA v USADA & Ryan, CAS 2019/A/6180, paras 106–107 (‘presence’ violation takes place
when sample is collected, not when substance later found in sample is ingested); Watt v UK Anti-
Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2014, para 22 (same).
2 See paras C17.5 n 10, C17.6 n 2(f) and C18.6(g).
B If the substance is a ‘threshold substance’, ie one where a

certain concentration has to be shown to be present in the
sample in order for it to be a violation, was the concentration
found in the athlete’s sample over the threshold?
C6.40 According to Code Art 2.1.3, ‘the presence of any quantity of a Prohibited
Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample shall constitute an
anti-doping rule violation’,1 ‘excepting those substances for which a quantitative
reporting threshold is specifically identified in the Prohibited List’.2 Such a threshold
might be introduced, for example, to ensure that positives are not reported as a result
of the use of headache tablets.3 Or the concentration of a substance in the sample
may be used as the criterion established under Code Art 2.1.4 to determine whether
the substance was naturally produced by the athlete’s body (and so not prohibited)
or exogenous (and so prohibited).4 In such cases, it is not enough for the Anti-
Doping Organization to prove that the substance is present in the sample. Instead,
the analytical data must also show that the concentration of the substance found in
the sample is greater than the specified threshold, or rather, more accurately, that
the concentration of the substance found in the sample is greater than the specified
‘Decision Limit’, which is the threshold plus a ‘guard band’ to take account of
measurement uncertainty.5 Decision limits are not to be confused with Minimum
Reporting Performance Levels,6 or with Limits of Detection,7 or with reporting
limits.8
1 Purevdolj v UWW, CAS 2019/A/6190, para 100 (‘The Panel notes that the WADA 2018 Prohibited
List does not establish quantitative thresholds for Stanozolol. Its presence in the Athlete’s Sample is
therefore sufficient to establish an anti-doping rules violation, irrespective of the concentration found.
(CAS 2016/A/4465, para 89)’); Chepalova v FIS, CAS 2010/A/2041, para 142 (‘[…] rEPO is not a
“threshold substance”; as a result, the mere identification of the substance is sufficient to report an
adverse analytical finding’); IAAF v RFEA & Onyia, CAS 2009/A/1805 & 1847, para 80 (‘While
a limited number of substances contained in the Prohibited List can only be reported as an adverse
analytical finding when they are found at concentrations exceeding a defined threshold, clenbuterol is
not a “threshold substance”. It falls in the category of nonthreshold substances, the detection of any
amount of which must be reported by laboratories as an adverse analytical finding, and considered by
the testing authority as a potential anti-doping rule violation’).
2 In fact, the 2020 Prohibited List only identifies certain of the substances that are Threshold Substances.
Instead WADA TD2019DL (‘Decision Limits for the Confirmatory Quantification of Threshold
Substances’) contains the definitive list: Carboxy-THC; Salbutamol; Formoterol; Morphine; Cathine;
Ephedrine; Methylephedrine; Pseudoephedrine; and Human Chorionic Godatophin (hCG).
3 In the 2020 Prohibited List, cathine is prohibited when its concentration in urine is greater than five
micrograms per millilitre; while pseudoephedrine is prohibited when its concentration in urine is
greater than 150 micrograms per millilitre.
4 See para C6.42 et seq. See Saugy, Viret & Giraud, ‘The WADA Code 2015: The Most Relevant
Changes. Pt 2: The View of the Laboratory and the Scientist’, in Michele Bernasconi (Ed) Arbitrating
Disputes in a Modern Sports World (Weblaw, Bern 2016), pp 23–24 (‘[…] a Threshold level cannot
be scientifically designed to reach a zero percentage of normal population falling above the Threshold.
The choice as to what percentage (3.g. 95%, 99.9%) of the population should lie below the Threshold,
respectively what residual percentage of population should be accepted above the Threshold, is one
with a strong policy-making and legal component, rather than a purely scientific one. For example,
for endogenous Threshold Substances, at some point a determination must be made what residual
risk the anti-doping system is willing to tolerate that a few Athletes with a naturally elevated level
of the substance might be reported as an AAF, as a compensation for avoiding to open the door to a
percentage of doping Athletes with a naturally low level of the substance going free’).
5 The 2019 ISL defines a ‘Threshold Substance’ as ‘an exogenous or endogenous Prohibited Substance,
Metabolite or Marker of a Prohibited Substance for which the identification and quantitative
determination (eg concentration, ratio, score) in excess of a pre-determined Decision Limit, or, when
applicable, the establishment of an exogenous origin, constitutes an Adverse Analytical Finding’.
See ISL Art 5.3.4.5.7.6 (‘For Threshold Substances, Adverse Analytical Finding or Atypical Finding
decisions for the “A” Sample results shall be based on the confirmed identification (in accordance with
the TD IDCR, applicable to Confirmation Procedures based on chromatography-mass spectrometry)
of the Threshold Substance and/or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) and their quantitative determination
in the Sample at a level exceeding the value of the relevant Decision Limit, which is specified in
the TD DL or other applicable Technical Document(s) (eg TD GH) or Laboratory Guidelines. By
determining that the test result exceeds the Decision Limit, the quantitative Confirmation Procedure
establishes that the Threshold Substance or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) is present in the Sample at
a level greater than the Threshold, with a statistical confidence of at least 95% (for more information,
refer to the TD DL)’); WADA TD2019DL (‘Decision Limits for the Confirmatory Quantification
of Threshold Substances’), p 6: ‘Where a T[hreshold value] has been established for a Prohibited
Substance, the DL is the value of the result for that Prohibited Substance in a given Sample obtained
using a validated measurement procedure above which it can be decided that T[hreshold] has been
exceeded with a statistical confidence of at least 95%, and hence that an AAF is justified’. See also
Sinkewitz v UCI, CAS 2011/A/2479, para 49, fn 1 (decision limits are ‘a set of limits intended for
application in connection with the quantitative determination of a Threshold Substance, in order to
determine whether the test results indicate an adverse analytical finding: in other words, an adverse
analytical finding for a prohibited (threshold) substance is to be reported[ed] in the event the values
detected exceed the defined DL’).
6 Minimum Required Performance Levels (MRPLs) are the sensitivity that WADA requires in the
analytical methods used by WADA-accredited laboratories, ie they must be able to detect a substance
at a concentration as low as [X]. See WADA TD2019MRPL (‘Minimum Required Performance Levels
for Detection and Identification of Non- Threshold Substances’), p 1 (‘The MRPL is the minimum
concentration of a Prohibited Substance or Metabolite of a Prohibited Substance or Marker of a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method that Laboratories shall be able to reliably detect and identify in routine
daily operations. • The MRPL is not a Threshold (T) nor is it a Limit of Detection (LOD). Adverse
Analytical Findings may result from concentrations below the established MRPL values; […]’). See
FIFA v SOAC et al, CAS 2016/A/4596, para 114 (‘[…] the Panel considers that section 4.0 of the Technical
Document does not establish a binding prohibition against reporting the presence of amphetamine at
levels below 50% of the MRPL. An obligation of that nature would effectively transform amphetamine
from a non-threshold substance to a threshold substance. This would collapse the distinction between
threshold and non-threshold substance in the WADA Code. Moreover, the language of section 4.0 (which
uses the expression “should” rather than “shall”) is consistent with the creation of a recommendation,
rather than a mandatory direction’); Eremenko v UEFA, CAS 2017/A/5078, para 72 (‘The circumstance
that the concentration was lower than 50% of the MRPL for Cocaine is irrelevant. In fact, Cocaine is a
non-threshold substance and the finding of any quantity in an athlete’s sample constitutes an antidoping
rule violation, whatever the laboratory reporting obligations are. In fact, as made clear by Section 1.0 of
TD2015MRPL “the MRPL is not a threshold … nor is it a Limit of Detection” and therefore “Adverse
Analytical Findings may result from concentrations below the established MRPL values”. Such rule
is consistent also with the purpose and meaning of MRPL, which are not intended to provide for
quantitative limits to adverse analytical findings, but only to set a standard for laboratories, so that they
operate at least at a common level and are able to report the presence of prohibited substances according
to minimum detection and identification capabilities’); IAAF v RFEA & Onyia, CAS 2009/A/1805 &
1847, para 82 (rejecting argument that basing an adverse analytical finding on a concentration below the
MRPL violates the principle of equality of treatment: ‘The argument that an athlete should be allowed
to escape the consequences of having a prohibited substance in his or her body because only a few of
the accredited laboratories could have detected it at the levels at which it was present is akin to arguing
that a thief should be let off because if he had not been chased by the quickest policeman in the force he
would have escaped. WADA-accredited laboratories are simply required to report as adverse analytical
findings, the presence of any prohibited substance or methods in an athlete’s sample within the range
of their detection capability (which admittedly varies from one laboratory to another). This is supported
by the decision in Jerson Anes Ribeiro v UEFA TAS 2005/A/958: see paras 70 to 72. To hold otherwise
would be to align all 35 WADA-accredited laboratories with the least capable one’); WADA v FMF &
Carmona, CAS 2006/A/1149, para 51, also citing Ribeiro v UEFA, CAS 2005/A/958, and para 52 (‘[…]
it is the bad luck for an offender if his sample happens to be analysed in a state-of-the-art laboratory – and
of course, by the same token, the good luck of the general mass of non-offenders who are thus protected
from the distortion of competition’); Begaj v IWF, CAS 2015/A/4049, para 95 et seq (rejecting similar
arguments).
7 A ‘Limit of Detection’ (LOD) is the minimum concentration of the analyte that the laboratory’s
method can detect with reasonable certainty in the urine during initial screening, which must be lower
than 50% of the MRPL for that analyte: WADA TD2019MRPL, p 5.
8 Reporting levels are applicable to certain non-threshold substances that are prohibited in-competition
only. See WADA TD2019MRPL, pp 5–6 (‘A confirmed identification of a Non-Threshold Substance
at any concentration shall be reported as an Adverse Analytical Finding, with the following exceptions:
• Non-Threshold Substances in classes S6, S7, S8, and P1, which are prohibited In-Competition only,
should not be reported below 50% of the MRPL; • Glucocorticoids (S9) should not be reported at levels
below the MRPL of 30 ng/mL; • Salmeterol and higenamine should not be reported at levels below 10 ng/
mL (ie 50% of the MRPL for beta-2 agonists); • Meldonium should not be reported at levels below 100
ng/mL (ie 50% of the MRPL); • Octopamine should not be reported at levels below the MRPL of 1000 ng/
mL’); ISL Art 5.3.4.5.7.5 (‘For Non-Threshold Substances without reporting limits, Adverse Analytical
Finding or Atypical Finding decisions for the “A” Sample results shall be based on the identification
of the Non-Threshold Substance or its characteristic Metabolite(s) or Marker(s), as applicable, in
compliance with the TD IDCR and/or other relevant Technical Document (eg TD MRPL), Technical
Letter or Laboratory Guidelines. For Non-Threshold Substances with reporting limits as specified in
the TD MRPL, Adverse Analytical Finding decisions for the “A” Sample results should be based on
the identification of the Non-Threshold Substance or its characteristic Metabolite(s) or Marker(s), in
compliance with the TD IDCR, at an estimated concentration greater than the reporting limit, unless there
is further evidence justifying the reporting of the finding at levels below the reporting limit (eg declared
use of the Prohibited Substance or if the analysis forms part of an ongoing investigation)’. See also
Saugy, Viret & Giraud, The WADA Code 2015: The Most Relevant Changes. Pt 2: The View of the
Laboratory and the Scientist, in Michele Bernasconi (Ed) Arbitrating Disputes in a Modern Sports World
(Weblaw, Bern 2016) (arguing, at p 21, that legal predictability and equal treatment argue for consistent
non-reporting of substances that are present at less than the reporting level).
2021 Code comment 20 (the comment to Art 3.2.1) states: ‘For certain Prohibited Substances, WADA
may instruct WADA-accredited laboratories not to report Samples as an Adverse Analytical Finding
if the estimated concentration of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers is below a
Minimum Reporting Level. WADA’s decision in determining that Minimum Reporting Level or in
determining which Prohibited Substances should be subject to Minimum Reporting Levels shall not be
subject to challenge. Further, the laboratory’s estimated concentration of such Prohibited Substance in
a Sample may only be an estimate. In no event shall the possibility that the exact concentration of the
Prohibited Substance in the Sample may be below the Minimum Reporting Level constitute a defense
to an anti-doping rule violation based on the presence of that Prohibited Substance in the Sample’.
C6.41 In such cases, the calculation of the concentration of the substance in

the sample becomes all-important,1 and can provide a new target for attack by the
athlete’s defence team.2 For example, there may be arguments about the way the
concentration of the substance in the sample was calculated, including how the
possibility of measurement error should be addressed.2 In such cases, CAS panels
have declined to rule on arguments reflecting divided scientific opinion as to which
methodology should be used, instead simply requiring the Anti-Doping Organization
to show that the laboratory used the methodology for which it has been accredited.3
1 In the Merlene Ottey case, a mistake in applying a correction calculation intended to compensate for
the high concentration of the athlete’s urine led to the erroneous conclusion that the concentration
of nandrolone in the athlete’s sample was below the 5 ng/ml threshold that was used at the time to
distinguish between endogenous and exogenous nandrolone: see para C6.47, n 1.
2 For example, in Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, the swimmers
sought to cast doubt on the reliability of the adverse analytical findings of nandrolone metabolites in
their samples on the basis that the concentration of the metabolites found in the different aliquots of
the sample tested by the laboratory varied. However, the CAS panel rejected that argument, ruling that
‘quantitative discrepancies are not uncommon in cases involving the substance and such discrepancies
do not necessarily put a question mark over the results. Examples of such discrepancies are not
uncommon and have not been accorded significant weight by other Tribunals’. Ibid, para 8.9. Now see
2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.14 (‘For endogenous Threshold Substances, Adverse Analytical Finding or
Atypical Finding decisions for the “B” Sample results shall be based on the confirmed identification
(in accordance with the TD IDCR, applicable to Confirmation Procedures based on chromatography-
mass spectrometry) of the Threshold Substance or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s) and their quantitative
determination in the Sample at a level exceeding the value of the relevant Threshold as specified in
the TD DL or other applicable Technical Document(s) or Laboratory Guidelines. The mean value
determined in the “B” Sample does not need to be identical to the mean value determined in the “A”
Sample’).
3 Poll v FINA, CAS 2002/A/399 (nandrolone); ATP v Rodriguez, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
18 September 2003, para 37 et seq (caffeine). See also B v FINA, CAS 2001/A/337, para 64 et seq (so
long as it was clear that the concentration of nandrolone in the athlete’s sample was greater than the 2
ng/ml reporting threshold, it was not necessary to quantify the concentration exactly).
C If the substance found in the athlete’s sample may be

produced naturally, can the Anti-Doping Organization prove
that the substance in the sample was exogenous?
C6.42 Several of the substances that are on the Prohibited List because they
are abused by athletes in synthetic form for performance-enhancing purposes
are also produced naturally by the body, in small quantities, without any doping
being involved. For example, every urine sample will test positive for testosterone,
because every athlete produces testosterone naturally in his or her body.1 The same
is true of nandrolone, boldenone, human Growth Hormone, EPO, and several other
prohibited substances. Such natural production is entirely innocent and cannot be
allowed to give rise to an anti-doping rule violation. Instead, where the prohibited
substance found in the sample is one that is naturally produced by the body, the
Anti-Doping Organization will have to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the
hearing panel that the substance found in the athlete’s sample is in fact exogenous
(ie externally administered) rather than endogenous (ie naturally produced).2 As
explained below, the methods used to do so have developed considerably over the
years.
1 See para C6.44.
2 Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull, Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Tribunal decision
dated 26 October 2006, para 5.2 (‘As the Prohibited Substance allegedly found in Mr Turnbull’s urine
is endogenously produced, it is not sufficient for AAI simply to establish the presence of such substance
in Mr Turnbull’s urine’); USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, at para 299
(same), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394. See also Bernhard v ITU, CAS 98/222, para 25
(requiring sports body to prove clearly and indisputably that nandrosterone was not endogenously
produced).
C6.43 2015 Code Art 2.1.4 provides that ‘the Prohibited List or International
Standards may establish special criteria for the evaluation of Prohibited Substances
that can also be produced endogenously’. ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.7 states:
‘For endogenous Threshold Substances, Markers of the “steroid profile”, or any
other Prohibited Substance that may be produced endogenously at low levels,
Adverse Analytical Finding decisions for the “A” Sample results may also be based
on the application of any Fit-for-Purpose Confirmation Procedure that establishes
the exogenous origin of the Prohibited Substance or its Metabolite(s) or Marker(s)
(eg GC/C/IRMS)’.
And WADA TD2018EAAS (‘Endogenous Anabolic Androgenic Steroids
Measurement and Reporting’), TD2019IRMS (‘Detection of Synthetic forms of
Endogenous Anabolic Androgenic Steroids by GC-C-IRMS’), and TD2019NA
(‘Harmonization of Analysis and Reporting of 19-Norsteroids Related to
Nandrolone’) contain detailed provisions for distinguishing between an anabolic
androgenic steroid in its endogenous form and its exogenous forms.
D Testosterone
C6.44 Testosterone is an anabolic steroid that is produced naturally in the body

but can also be taken in synthetic form to build muscle and strength artificially.
The concentration of endogenous testosterone found in a urine sample is highly
variable, depending on factors such as time of day, state of hydration, and natural
variation in secretion. As a result, it is not possible to identify a standard ‘cut-off’
concentration of testosterone in the urine, above which it can safely be said that
the testosterone found in a sample is exogenous rather than endogenous.1 However,
in most (non-doping) individuals the natural ratio of testosterone (T) to another
natural hormone, epitestosterone (E), is approximately 1:1, and administration of
exogenous testosterone does not affect natural levels of epitestosterone.2 Therefore,
if the T:E ratio moves above from 1:1, that is a potential marker of the ingestion of
exogenous testosterone. As explained below, a particular trigger for further action is
a T:E ratio of 4:1 or greater.
1 Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull, Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Tribunal decision
dated 26 October 2006, paras 3.10 and 3.54.
2 USADA v Collins, AAA Panel decision dated 9 December 2004, para 4.18. The reliance on the T:E ratio
means that a cheating athlete could mask the use of testosterone by also taking epitestosterone to keep
the T:E ratio normal (as did the BALCO athletes with their use of ‘the cream’: see para C7.14), which
explains why epitestosterone is also a prohibited substance.
Females have such low levels of natural testosterone that it is questionable whether the T:E ratio is
as useful a marker for them.
C6.45 Originally, a T:E ratio above 4:1 was treated as presumptive evidence of
exogenous use, sufficient for the charge to be upheld if the athlete did not rebut
the presumption by establishing that the testosterone was in fact endogenous.1 Now,
however, it is simply an indicator of possible exogenous use, not sufficient, in itself,
to raise a presumption or otherwise to support a charge,2 but rather triggering further
testing (‘IRMS testing’) to try to confirm exogenous or endogenous origin.3
1 Originally, the IAAF Arbitration Panel accepted a 6:1 T:E ratio as the upper limit for endogenous
production, based on scientific evidence that ‘very few’ out of ‘thousands’ of athletes tested had
T:E ratios above 6:1. See Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000),
p 80; Decker Slaney, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 25 April 1999, in Tarasti, Legal Solutions
in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000), p 155 (T:E ratio of 9.5:1 so exceeded range
of values normally found in humans as not to be consistent with normal endogenous production);
Mitchell case, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision, in Tarasti, Legal Solutions In International Doping
Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at 167 (‘Since the threshold ratio of 6:1 includes a large margin of safety
in relation to the normal value it is irrelevant to which extent the T/E ratio found in a specific case
exceeds the ratio 6:1; Mr Mitchell’s case [7.3:1] is not a borderline case’). That ratio was accepted by
the CAS: Susin v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002),
pp 389, 397 (T:E rule is ‘one method for proving the exogenous administration of testosterone […]
[A T:E ratio of greater than 6:1] constitutes presumptive evidence of an exogenous administration of
testosterone’). See also Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 580, 593 (7th Cir 2001) (‘According to the parties,
proving the presence of exogenous testosterone in the body by scientific tests is not possible at the
present time. Therefore, the IAAF has adopted the rebuttable presumption of ingestion from a high TE
ratio in an athlete’s urine. […] Were the IAAF not to make use of the rebuttable presumption, it would
be nearly impossible, absent eyewitness proof, to ever find that an athlete had ingested testosterone’).
Decker Slaney blamed the abnormal T:E ratio in her sample on her contraceptive pills, alcohol
consumption, her menstrual cycle, and/or the ageing process. Mitchell blamed dietary supplements,
alcohol and/or stress caused by sexual activity and lack of sleep the night before the test. US Track
& Field accepted these explanations and acquitted the athletes. However, the IAAF referred those
acquittals to the IAAF Arbitration Panel, which ruled in each case that the evidence submitted by the
athlete had failed to establish to the requisite standard that his/her elevated T:E ratio was caused naturally,
by innocent pathological or physiological conditions. Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping
Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at pp 155–164 (Decker Slaney) and pp 165–170 (Mitchell). Prior to the
IAAF Arbitration Panel’s ruling, Slaney filed suit in federal court in Indiana against the US Olympic
Committee and the IAAF for failing to investigate possible innocent explanations for the level of
testosterone found in her urine, but her case was dismissed: Slaney v IAAF, 244 F 3d 80 (7th Cir 2001).
In Susin v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 389,
after the athlete’s sample was found to have a T:E ratio of almost 7:1, her national federation conducted
a medical investigation, including a longitudinal hormonal study of the athlete, concluded that her
elevated T:E ratio ‘can be due to a pathological condition’, and therefore decided not to sanction her.
FINA referred that decision to a FINA Doping Panel, which overturned the decision and banned the
athlete for four years (the standard ban for a first offence under the FINA rules at that time) on the
basis that it was her burden, once a T:E ratio in her sample of more than 6:1 had been established,
to show that the elevated testosterone ‘is due to a physiological or pathological condition’, and that
burden could not be satisfied by an ‘unverified hypothesis’ that the finding ‘may’ have been caused
by a pathological condition. The CAS panel rejected the athlete’s appeal. It agreed with FINA that
the presumption of exogenous use arising from the elevated T:E ratio had not been rebutted, relying
principally on direct evidence, from IRMS analysis (see para C6.46), that the testosterone had been
administered exogenously. It also found that such IRMS analysis could be relied upon as proof of
exogenous administration of testosterone even if the T:E ratio was less than 6:1, and that if such proof
existed, it was conclusive, and therefore it was not open to the athlete to seek to rebut it by claiming
that the elevated testosterone was endogenously produced as a result of a physiological condition.
However, this 6:1 T:E ratio was criticised as encouraging testosterone abuse among men (most of
whom have a natural T:E of 1.3 to 1 or lower) and especially women. See Bamberger and Yaeger,
‘Over The Edge: Special Report’ Sports Illustrated (May 1997); Pound, Inside the Olympics (Wiley,
2004), p 59 (‘The scientists, in an effort to lean over backwards and not to be criticised by their peers,
established essentially arbitrary levels or ratios. For example, it was decided that the T:E ratio, the ratio
of testosterone to epitestosterone, would be set at 6 to 1, despite the fact that there was no empirical
evidence of such a level ever being achieved naturally. Knuckles would be virtually dragging on the
ground at that level, but at least there was felt to be no way to challenge such a ratio. Limits of this
nature have allowed people to play with the ratio, keeping it below 6 to 1, but likely far greater than
any natural process could ever produce. It is a simple matter to ingest testosterone and to experiment
right up to the limit’). Accordingly, in 2006 the threshold was reduced to 4:1. See Athletic Association
of Ireland v Turnbull, Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 26 October 2006,
para 6.7 (‘There was some argument made on behalf of Mr Turnbull that in assessing whether or
not the sample contained a Prohibited Substance, the Panel ought to have regard to the fact that the
adoption of the four to one ratio has given rise to some controversy and in particular to some pressure
for a reversion to the six to one ratio. However, it is clear that the Panel should not be affected by any
such controversy, if it exists. The Panel’s obligation under Art 4.1 of the rules is to apply the standards
specified by WADA and the said Art[icle] expressly excludes a challenge by an athlete or any other
person to WADA’s determination of what is a Prohibited Substance to be included in the Prohibited
List’). The Turnbull hearing panel noted with concern the lack of any clear scientific consensus as
to the range of values of testosterone normally found in humans. It rejected any suggestion that the
T:E threshold ratio of 4:1 identified in the Prohibited List reflected an upper limit of the range normally
found in humans, on the basis that the previous rule of 6:1 suggested that a higher ratio could be found
in humans, and that ratio had been lowered as a trigger for further investigation due to ‘a desire to
ensure better detection and […] not as a result of a conclusion that the range of six to one is outside the
range normally found in humans’. Ibid, para 6.6. See generally Coleman and Levine, ‘The burden of
proof in endogenous substance cases. A masking agent for junk science’, in Doping and Anti-Doping
Policy in Sport, Ethical, legal and social perspectives (Routledge, 2011).
The Turnbull hearing panel held that it was comfortably satisfied that the concentration of
testosterone in the athlete’s urine sample was not consistent with normal endogenous production,
given that the T:E ratio was well above 4:1, the concentration of testosterone was higher than the
lab director had seen in more than 10,000 samples, and both measures were far higher than in the
athlete’s other urine samples. Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull, Irish Sport Anti-Doping
Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 26 October 2006, para 6.19. It also ruled, however, that the athlete
had succeeded in proving that it was more likely than not that the testosterone found in his sample
was natural testosterone driven up in concentration by consumption of significant amounts of alcohol
six to eight hours before his sample was collected. Ibid, para 7.23 (scientific evidence on its own not
conclusive, but in combination with assessment of truthfulness of athlete’s denials, and ‘the other
unusual scientific features of the present case’, it discharged the athlete’s burden ‘in the particular
and very unusual circumstances of the present case’). See also SRU v Macleod, SRU press release
dated 24 November 2008 (analysis of the athlete’s B sample confirmed the elevated T:E ratio found
in respect of his A sample, but also confirmed the presence of ethanol, which had not been tested for
in his A sample, and so supported the athlete’s explanation that the elevated ratio was caused by acute
ingestion of alcohol, warranting dismissal of the charge).
2 See eg Devyatovskiy & Tsikhan v IOC, CAS 2009/A/1752 and 1753, para 5.5 (‘When the laboratory
has reported after GC/MS analysis a Testosterone/Epitestosterone (T/E) ratio which exceeds the ratio
of four to one, the WADA 2008 Prohibited List requires that the exogenous source of the steroid be
confirmed by another “reliable analytical method” such as Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry (IRMS)’);
USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 105 (‘[…] a T/E ratio of 4:1 or
higher is the threshold ratio established by WADA that will either trigger further testing of an athlete’s
sample (using IRMS) or will be used along with longitudinal studies to support an [adverse analytical
finding]’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394; Athletic Association of Ireland v Turnbull,
Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 26 October 2006, at para 6.12 (‘[…]
on its own a T/E ratio greater than four to one should not be the basis of a laboratory concluding that
the testosterone level is unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous production […]’); Nose v
Slovenian Cycling Federation, CAS 2007/A/1356, para 7.3.2.2.
3 See WADA TD2018EAAS, pp 13-17.
In fact, not only is a T:E ratio of 4:1 not sufficient to prove exogenous origin; it is not even necessary
to prove exogenous origin. WADA TD2019 IRMS is clear that an Anti-Doping Organization is
entitled to ask the laboratory to run IRMS analysis on any sample, even if the ratio of testosterone to
epitestosterone in that sample is well below 4:1, and if that IRMS analysis indicates exogenous use,
the fact that the T:E ratio was less than 4:1 will not help the athlete. See eg IAAF v Bulgarian Athletics
Federation & Stambolova & Veneva, CAS 2007/A/1348, para 7.4.6 (IAAF had right to request IRMS
testing on samples even in absence of elevated T:E ratio or abnormal steroid profile); Schwazer v
IAAF & NADO Italia & FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 13 (steroid profile established that
athlete’s T:E ratio was normally about 1:1, triggering IRMS testing of a sample with a T:E ratio of
3.54:1, which found that the testosterone in the sample was exogenous). Indeed, it does not even matter
if there are no reliable data on the T:E ratio in the sample. See USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision
dated 20 September 2007, para 146 (citing CAS cases to that effect) and para 174 (finding based on
IRMS analysis that the cyclist had applied testosterone exogenously, notwithstanding that the analysis
that led to a finding of an elevated T:E ratio had to be disregarded for failure to follow the requirements
of the International Standard for Laboratories), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394.
However, IRMS analysis is expensive, as well as time-consuming, which mitigates against its use
in all cases. Instead, a marker is required to identify which samples are suspicious and should be
submitted to IRMS analysis. The T:E ratio is one such marker, though by no means the only one.
Others are identified in WADA TD2018EAAS.
C6.46 Isotopic Ratio Mass Spectrometry (or IRMS), which is described in detail
in WADA TD2019IRMS, is an analytical technique that is capable of distinguishing
exogenous testosterone from endogenous testosterone based on differences in their
respective molecular structures (in broad terms, by comparison of the carbon isomers
of the testosterone found in the urine with the carbon isomers of a reference steroid
found in the sample that is known to be endogenous).1 The CAS has repeatedly upheld
the reliability of the IRMS test to identify exogenous steroids.2 Therefore, the results
of the IRMS analysis are a sufficient basis to find that an anti-doping rule violation
(eg presence of exogenous testosterone) has occurred.3 In such circumstances, pleas
by the athlete that the testosterone detected in his sample was caused by physical
stress, endocrinal disorders, hormonal imbalances, etc will be rejected, because they
cannot explain why exogenous testosterone was found in his sample.4 Similarly, IRMS
analysis demonstrating that a substance is exogenous forecloses any suggestion that
bacterial degradation is the cause of the adverse analytical finding.5
1 The IRMS test relies on the fact that the carbon isotope ratio (the C12:C13 ratio, sometimes referred to
as the isotopic signature or δ13C value) of a synthetic steroid will be relatively C13-depleted, because
the plant phytosterols from which the steroid is synthesised are relatively C13-depleted (eg, synthetic
nandrolone preparations and 19-NA metabolised from such preparations have historically been found
to have δ13C values in the range of approximately -27 ‰ to -32 ‰). In contrast, endogenous steroids
are relatively C13-enriched (from -26 ‰ up to -20 ‰ in certain populations), because they originate
from the mixture of plants eaten by the subject (or by animals eaten by the subject) that have more C13
than the single source plant sterols from which the synthetic steroid is made. Therefore, the IRMS test
measures (a) the δ13C value of a steroid hormone in the urine sample that is known to be endogenous
(the endogenous reference compound, or ERC), usually pregnanediol; and (b) the δ13C value of the
target compound. WADA TD2019IRMS Art 2.3 and Art 3 specify when the results indicate exogenous
origin, when they indicate endogenous origin, and when they are considered inconclusive.
See generally Nicholls ‘Scoping for Doping’ (2004) Chemistry World, October, pp 54, 55; Ayotte,
‘Current Anti-Doping Realities, Specific Scientific Issues: Anabolic Androgenic Steroids’, in Book
of Proceedings of the 2006 IAAF World Anti-Doping Symposium, Effectiveness of the Anti-Doping
Fight (Lausanne, 2006) (‘Steroids contained in pharmaceutical preparations or commercial products
[…] are synthetic compounds prepared by chemical reactions from the crude material, plant sterols.
As such, their backbone being made of carbon atoms, the ratio of two carbon isotopes, 13C/12C will
reflect their single vegetal origin. The human urinary steroids possess a different carbon isotopic
“signature” since they are produced by internal biotransformation of precursor steroids, such as
cholesterol, coming from the diet and reflecting their mixed origin. Notwithstanding individual
differences that could be attributed to different environmental factors and diets, the human steroids
are found at values which differ significantly from those of “synthetic” steroids’). See also Blanco v
USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 3.6 (‘IRMS identifies the presence of exogenous testosterone or its
precursors by comparing the carbon-13 to carbon-12 ratio of testosterone metabolites to the carbon-13
to carbon-12 metabolites of an endogenous reference compound (“ERC”) that would not be affected
by testosterone administration. The method is based on the fact that there are two groups of plants
which contain either more or less carbon-13 as a fixed carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Usually,
the different compounds in a person’s body have roughly the same carbon-13 content, established by
diet and metabolism. However, when a person exogenously administers testosterone or its precursors,
the carbon composition of the testosterone metabolites differs markedly from the carbon composition
of the rest of the body’); USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, para 111
(‘Synthetic compounds have less [carbon-13 isotopes] than their endogenous homologues. The IRMS
instrument measures the ratio of [carbon-13 isotopes to carbon-12 isotopes] in a target analyte. In the
case of doping, the IRMS test compares the 13C/12C ratio of a testosterone metabolite that is believed
to be affected by exogenous testosterone to the 13C/12C ratio of an endogenous reference compound
that is known not to be affected by exogenous testosterone. […] Pharmaceutical testosterone contains
less carbon-13 than natural testosterone. If the difference between the delta values of the exogenous
testosterone metabolites exceeds 3 delta units per mil or more an adverse analytical finding is
reported’), aff’d, Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 54 et seq (describing analytical steps
in IRMS process); UCI v Landaluce & RFBC CAS 2006/A/119, para 67 et seq (discussing the
IRMS procedure in the context of alleged departures from the requirements of WADA Technical
Document TD2004EAAS); USADA v Jenkins, AAA Panel decision dated 25 January 2008, para 39
(‘[…] the IRMS method effectively measures the relative abundances of the two stable isotopes of
carbon: carbon 12 (12C) and carbon 13 (13C). The relative abundance of one isotope with respect
to the other is the difference or delta (δ), expressed in parts per thousand. This isotopic difference
determines whether a steroid, detected in an athlete’s urine sample, is of natural or synthetic origin.
The IRMS method measures the ratio of 13C to 12C molecules, such as nandrolone, its precursors
and its metabolites. Synthetic compounds have less 13C than their endogenous homologues’). For a
description of how the test is conducted, see ibid, para 40, or Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185,
para 3.7.
2 IAAF v Bulgarian Athletics Federation & Stambolova & Veneva, CAS 2007/A/1348, para 7.2.2.2
(‘[…] the Panel concurs with those panels which have dealt with this issue in the past and finds that the
IRMS analysis is an independent and sufficient basis upon which to determine that an anti-doping rule
violation has occurred with respect to the exogenous administration of testosterone’), citing various
cases, including Susin v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer,
2002), p 389 (IRMS analysis is scientifically reliable, and therefore the results of such analysis may
be relied upon as ‘direct and conclusive scientific evidence of the presence of exogenous testosterone’,
even if the T:E ratio was less than 6:1, and therefore it was not open to the athlete to seek to rebut
that evidence by claiming that the elevated testosterone was endogenously produced as a result of
a physiological condition); USADA v Landis, AAA Panel decision dated 20 September 2007, paras
146 and 174 (finding based on IRMS analysis that the cyclist had applied testosterone exogenously,
notwithstanding that the analysis that led to a finding of an elevated T:E ratio had to be disregarded
for failure to follow the requirements of the International Standard for Laboratories), aff’d, Landis
v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394; Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 9.1.2 (IRMS analysis
reliable); Balciunaite v LAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2414, 30 March 2012, para 9.4.4 (same).
3 As did the CAS panel, for example, in Landis v USADA, CAS 2007/A/1394, para 266. Cf Nose v
Slovenian Cycling Federation, CAS 2007/A/1356, para 7.3.2.4 (rejecting Art 2.1 charge where IRMS
analysis did not confirm that testosterone found in sample was exogenous).
4 Balciunaite v LAF & IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2414, section 10; Susin v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, Digest of
CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 389.
5 The T:E ratio in a sample provided by Diane Modahl, the English 800-metre runner, was 42:1. Her
appeal against her doping ban was upheld on the basis that the British Athletics Federation had not
discharged its burden of establishing to the requisite standard (which, under the then-applicable
rules, was proof beyond reasonable doubt) that the sample contained an abnormal T:E ratio at the
time it was collected from the athlete. Specifically, the Appeal Panel accepted the expert scientific
evidence submitted on behalf of Modahl that it was possible that ‘the samples had become degraded
owing to their being stored in unrefrigerated conditions and that bacteriological action had resulted
in an increase in the amount of testosterone in the samples’. Modahl v British Athletic Federation,
Independent Appeal Panel decision dated 26 July 1994 (1994) 3(2) SATLJ 6. Modahl’s ban was
therefore lifted and she was reinstated with immediate effect. She subsequently launched a claim for
damages against the British Athletics Federation that went to the House of Lords once and the Court
of Appeal twice before being dismissed. See paras E7.13 and E7.14.
The argument that a testosterone concentration is due to bacterial activity in the sample after
collection will necessarily fail, however, if IRMS analysis establishes that the testosterone in the
sample is exogenous in origin. WADA v Wium, CAS 2005/A/908, paras 6.11 to 6.14 (where the
athlete claimed that the lengthy storage and transportation of his sample at room temperature prior
to analysis made it possible that the elevated T:E ratio found in the sample was caused by bacterial
activity after the sample was collected, WADA noted in response that IRMS analysis had confirmed
that the testosterone in the athlete’s sample was exogenous, and ‘scientifically, there is no possibility
that bacterial contamination and activity could transform the endogenous to exogenous origin of a
substance’, and the CAS panel agreed, and on that basis ruled that an anti-doping rule violation had
been committed). That ruling followed a similar decision in Susin v FINA, CAS 2000/A/274, Digest
of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 755, and was itself followed in Balciunaite v LAF
& IAAF, CAS 2011/A/2414, para 9.3.3. Cf BWLA v B, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 August
2007 (Art 2.1 charge upheld where T:E ratio from original sample was 10.04, IRMS analysis was
inconclusive, but longitudinal study indicated no naturally elevated testosterone levels, and athlete’s
suggestion of possible bacterial metabolism in the sample after collection was rejected for lack of
supporting evidence); BWLA v T, Disciplinary Panel decision dated 20 August 2007 (same).
E Nandrolone
C6.47 Nandrolone is another anabolic steroid that is present naturally in the body
but can also be taken in synthetic form to build muscle and strength artificially. It
came sharply into public focus in the late 1990s, when there was a spate of positive
findings, including against some very high-profile athletes.1 In the UK alone, in
1999 and 2000, four leading British track athletes – Linford Christie, Doug Walker,
Gary Cadogan, and Mark Richardson – all tested positive for nandrolone (or, more
accurately, for 19-norandrosterone, or ‘19-NA’, a metabolite of nandrolone that is
readily excreted in urine and so detectable by GC-MS).2
1 It was reported that there were 343 positive tests for nandrolone across all sports in 1999, including
Merlene Ottey of Jamaica and Dieter Baumann of Germany: Associated Press, 8 February 2000.
2 There are three particular metabolites of nandrolone that are excreted into the urine, but it is enough to
find only one, 19-norandrosterone, to support an adverse analytical finding; it is not necessary to find
all three. Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, paras 88–91; Melinte v IAAF, CAS OG 00/015, para 8(d).
C6.48 In the face of this rash of nandrolone positives, people looked for an innocent
explanation. Claims were made that the nandrolone found in the athletes’ samples
had been produced naturally in the body, or had been ingested by eating the flesh
of animals that had been injected with steroids,1 or of non-castrated animals who
produced the nandrolone endogenously,2 or by taking contaminated supplements.
1 In ITF v Korda, CAS 99/223/A, para 50, the athlete’s expert witness suggested that the metabolites of
nandrolone found in his sample could be explained by either his endogenous production of nandrolone
or his consumption of meat of animals injected by steroids. However, the CAS panel accepted the
ITF’s evidence that endogenous production and/or consumption of tainted meat would only explain
trace amounts of nandrolone metabolites and could not explain concentrations as large as those found
in the athlete’s sample. See discussion of similar cases in Beloff, ‘Drugs, Laws and Versapaks’ in
Drugs and Doping in Sport (Cavendish, 2001), p 52.
2 Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and CAS 99/A/235, para 10.12 (accepting
uncastrated pigs may produce endogenous nandrolone but rejecting claim for lack of evidence that
eating the meat of such animals could produce urinary levels of 19-NA greater than 2 ng/mL).
C6.49 It was quickly confirmed that the body does produce small amounts of
nandrolone naturally, and the debate moved to fixing a threshold concentration to
be used to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous nandrolone. Initially, the
IOC established a laboratory reporting cut-off for 19-NA at 2 ng/ml for men and 5 ng/
ml for women.1 However, certain CAS decisions in 1999 suggested that there was a
‘grey area’ between 2 ng/ml and 5 ng/ml, where tests on samples from male athletes
should not be declared positive without further investigation.2
1 See IOC guidance document for accredited laboratories, ‘Analytical Criteria for Reporting Low
Concentrations of Anabolic Steroids’ (August 1998), appended to Nandrolone Review, Report to
UK Sport (January 2000). See also McLaren, ‘WADA Drug Testing Standards’ (2007) 18(1) Marquette
Law Review 14–15.
2 Bernhard v ITU, CAS 98/222, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 330; UCI v
Mason, CAS 98/212, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 274; and B v FIJ,
CAS 98/214, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), para 40, p 308. See generally
Young, ‘Survey of Major Issues in CAS Doping Cases’, paper presented to CAS seminar (Lausanne,
December 1998).
C6.50 In March 2000, FIFA announced that research it had commissioned suggested
that physical and mental stress could raise the level of nandrolone occurring naturally
in the body above the IOC-specified 2 ng/ml cut-off for male endogenous production.1
An expert committee commissioned by UK Sport rejected that suggestion in January
2000,2 but in July 2000 a Nandrolone Working Party convened by UK Athletics
concluded, based on ‘preliminary results’, that a ‘combination of exercise and dietary
supplements, none of which appears to contain a prohibited substance, can result in
a positive’.3
1 Garroson and Harverson, ‘IOC warned over steroid’, Financial Times, 2 March 2000. As a result,
according to the same report, FIFA had been advised that the IOC’s rules regarding nandrolone were
‘not legally sustainable’.
2 Nandrolone Review, Report to UK Sport (January 2000).
3 Report of the UK Athletics Nandrolone Working Party, 25 July 2000, relying on research undertaken
at the University of Aberdeen.
C6.51 Linford Christie, Doug Walker, Gary Cadogan and Mark Richardson
were therefore cleared by UK Athletics disciplinary tribunals, on the basis that
it could not be proved to the satisfaction of the tribunals that the nandrolone in
their respective samples was exogenous rather than endogenous. However, the
IAAF referred the cases to the IAAF Arbitration Panel, which rejected the various
innocent explanations offered for the positive findings. The IAAF Arbitration Panel
accepted the IOC-established cut-offs of 2 ng/ml for men and 5 ng/ml for women,
rejecting as scientifically unreliable the research upon which the UK Athletics
Nandrolone Working Party based its contrary view. It found that the levels of
19-NA found in the samples of Walker (12.59 ng/ml), Christie (181.8 ng/ml) and
Cadogan (9.8 ng/ml), being well over that threshold, so exceeded the range of
values normally found in humans as to be inconsistent with normal endogenous
production.1 Subsequent CAS panels followed the IAAF Arbitration Panel in
accepting the IOC thresholds,2 and in August 2004 WADA issued a Technical
Document confirming that the 2 ng/ml reporting threshold should be used for both
men and women.3
1 Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000). In the case of Merlene
Ottey, the IAAF Arbitration Panel accepted that the IAAF had not proved that a level of 4.53 ng/ml
could not have been produced endogenously, because it fell below the 5 ng/ml threshold specified for
women. IAAF v Ottey, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 3 July 2000, para 22. See generally Kerr,
‘Doped or Duped? The Nandrolone Jurisprudence’ [2001] 3 ISLJ 97. Note, however, the suggestion
that the 4.53 ng/ml calculation was erroneous, because a correction calculation applied to compensate
for the high concentration of the athlete’s urine sample was erroneously applied to reduce the
concentration found in the sample, not to increase the threshold. If it had been applied correctly, Ottey
would have been over the threshold: McLaren, ‘Revised or New Test Procedures: What CAS Requires’
(2006) ISLJ 36, 38.
2 Meca-Medina and Mejcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and 99/A/235, paras 2.11 and 10.1 (accepting
IOC cut-off, rejecting any ‘grey area’ between 2 and 5 ng/ml); FLCP v IWF, CAS 99/A/252,
para 7.5.6 (same); Lazutina v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, paras 65–74, 80–81 (accepting reliability of
IOC cut-off of 2 ng/ml, even while noting the scientific evidence in support of the cut-off ‘appears
less than overwhelming’, because sport faces ‘an extremely difficult task in attempting to keep pace
with the imagination and resources of cheats who seek to obtain an unfair competitive advantage in
the increasingly lucrative world of sport. The Panel recognises that the IOC and sports federations
must enact doping control rules based upon the best available scientific information and even if this
information is, at times, rather limited’); Jovanovic v USADA, CAS 2002/A/360, para 36 (accepting
that a finding of 19-norandrosterone above the 2 ng/ml threshold established that the athlete had
exogenously ingested the substance, and rejecting the suggestion that the finding can only be upheld if
in addition 19-noetiocholanolone at a concentration of about 60 per cent of the 19-norandrosterone is
found in the sample).
3 See WADA TD2004NA (Aug 2004), ‘Reporting Norandrosterone Findings’, and WADA
TD2004MRPL (Feb 2004), ‘Minimum required performance limits for detection of prohibited
substances’, as applied in (for example) Karatantcheva v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 76; WADA v
Portuguese Football Federation and Nuno Asis Lopes de Almeida, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 63; Depres
v CCES, CAS 2008/A/1489, para 2.3; and USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November
2005, para 14 (‘Under the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules, the presence of 19-norandrosterone above the
2 ng/ml cutoff establishes ingestion of prohibited substances nandrolone, 19-norandrostenediol, or
19-norandrostenedione’). See also World Athletics v Marimuthu, Disciplinary Tribunal decision
SR/287/2019 dated 26 May 2020, para 134 et seq (rejecting exercise and PCOS as explanations for
levels of 19NA well above the 2 ng/ml cut-off).
C6.52 WADA TD2019NA explains how laboratories should test to discriminate

between nandrolone produced naturally, or by microbial activity in the sample bottle
after the sample has been collected,1 or by consumption of offal of non-castrated
pigs,2 and nandrolone of exogenous source. In short, if the main urinary metabolite
of nandrolone (19-NA) is found in the sample at a concentration greater than 15 ng/
mL, it is deemed to be exogenous, without more.3 If the concentration is lower than
15 ng/mL, IRMS testing4 is conducted to determine exogenous or endogenous origin
in the following circumstances:
• Samples in which the concentration of 19-NA is estimated between
2.55 and 15 ng/mL, except in cases of pregnancy or in the presence of
tetrahydronorethisterone.6
• In cases of pregnancy, when the estimated 19-NA concentration is greater than
15 ng/mL.
• Furthermore, IRMS analysis may be performed on samples containing 19-
NA at estimated concentrations not greater than 2.5 ng/mL. In such cases, a
positive IRMS analysis showing the presence of 19-NA of exogenous origin is
sufficient evidence to report an adverse analytical finding.
1 TD2019IRMS Art 3.3.2 explains: ‘[…] rarely, 19-NA may be produced in urine Samples, in small
concentrations, by in-situ 19-demethylation of androsterone (A). The reaction being more efficient
with the 5β-isomer (ie 19-NE), such Samples show a lower than usual ratio of 19-NA to 19-NE
(ie ≤ 3), which is also less than the ratio of their respective urinary precursors androsterone(A)/
etiocholanolone(Etio). This possible in-situ formation of 19-NA can be verified by GC/C/IRMS
analysis’.
WADA first identified this issue in an Explanatory Technical Note, ‘Stability of 19-norandrosterone
finding in urine’, 13 May 2005, and set out a ‘stability test’ to rule it out in a particular case. Four years
earlier, in B v FINA, the athlete had blamed the finding of nandrolone in his sample in a concentration
greater than 2 ng/ml on bacterial activity caused by a two-week delay in analysis of the sample, during
which it was stored at room temperature. The CAS panel accepted that in theory a urine sample
could degrade but held that such degradation would depend on the level of bacterial activity, which
could only be determined indirectly, by examining pH, steroid profile, colour and smell. Furthermore,
the Panel did not accept that any increase in bacterial activity could have led to an increase in the
level of nandrolone. It held: ‘a pathway from testosterone or androsterone to 19-norandrosterone
outside the human body may be theoretically conceivable but that absent any scientific evidence to
this effect it remains pure speculation on which the Panel is unwilling to base its decision’. B v FINA,
CAS 2001/A/337, para 41 et seq.
In USADA v Wade, AAA Panel decision dated 9 November 2005, paras 30, 49, an AAA Panel
rejected the athlete’s argument that his nandrolone positive was due to ‘unstable urine’, because the
finding did not meet any of the criteria for ‘unstable urine’ set out in WADA’s Technical Note. The
athlete’s argument that the 10 ng/ml cut-off for urine to be classified as ‘unstable’ was arbitrary was
not accepted by the AAA Panel. Similarly, in WADA v ASSIS & FPA, CAS 2006/A/1153, para 60, a
CAS panel accepted that the stability test ruled out the possibility of degradation of the sample post-
collection.
See also WADA Technical Letter TL19, dated 23 September 2019, explaining how laboratories
should address the possibility of in situ microbial transformation of cortisone and cortisol into
(respectively) prednisone and prednisolone.
2 Experiments have established that uncastrated pigs and uncastrated wild boar produce 17α- or
β-isomers of 19-norsteroids naturally, and that as a result eating those animals can result in the excretion
of 19-NA and 19-NE in the urine. See eg Claudiane Guay, Danielle Goudreault, Wilhem Schänzer,
Ulrich Flenker and Christiane Ayotte, ‘“Excretion of norsteroids” phase II metabolites of different
origin in human’ Steroids 74(3), 350-358.2009; Meca-Medina and Majcen v FINA, CAS 99/A/234 and
CAS 99/A/235, para 10.8. This was the explanation proposed, for example, by Tyson Fury and Hughie
Fury for the presence of 19-NA in their urine at levels above the endogenous threshold in samples
collected in 2015.
In UCI v De Negri, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 January 2020, para 43, the panel
accepted expert evidence that IRMS results establishing the 19-NA was of exogenous origin ruled
out meat of intact pigs or wild boar as an explanation (because the 19-NA in such livestock would
be endogenous in origin) and also accepted that alcohol is not a potential confounding factor for an
IRMS test.
3 TD2019 IRMS, p 6, and see Art 3.3: ‘In cases when the estimated concentration of 19-NA is shown to
be greater than 15 ng/mL in a Sample collected from a male or a non-pregnant female Athlete, the “B”
Sample Confirmation Procedure requires the identification of 19-NA only’.
4 See para C6.46.
5 This reflects the original 2 ng/mL threshold value, but with the Decision Limit at 2.5 ng/mL to allow
for measurement uncertainty.
6 TD2019 IRMS Art 3.3.1 explains: ‘19-NA is excreted during pregnancy and as a minor Metabolite of
norethisterone, a progestogen agent of permitted use present in some oral contraceptives. Therefore,
when the estimated concentration of 19-NA exceeds 2.5 ng/mL in the urine Sample of a female
Athlete, the Laboratory shall perform: • an analysis for the use of norethisterone-based contraceptives
(eg detection of tetrahydronorethisterone), and if negative • an analysis for pregnancy [eg based on the
measurement of urinary human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (hCG)]’).
See also ITF v Karatantcheva, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 11 January 2006, where
Bulgarian tennis player Sesil Karatantcheva sought to establish that the 19-norandrosterone found in her
urine sample at a concentration of 12.6 ng/ml was endogenously produced as a result of her pregnancy.
To avoid charges of discrimination, instead of presuming that the level of 19-norandrosterone in her
sample was an abnormal concentration that a physiological condition (pregnancy) might explain, the
first instance hearing panel decided that the correct question was whether the concentration found in
the athlete’s sample ‘so deviates from the range of values normally found in normal pregnant humans
that it is unlikely to be consistent with normal endogenous production’. Ibid, para 59. The panel found
that it did so deviate and therefore upheld the charge against the athlete and banned her for two years.
On appeal, the CAS panel re-stated the question as whether the athlete could demonstrate ‘that the
concentration levels of 19-NA found in her Paris samples do not deviate from the values of 19-NA
normally found in pregnant women in a range that makes it unlikely for the concentrations of 19-NA to
be consistent with the normal endogenous production of 19-NA for pregnant women’. Karatantcheva
v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1032, para 79. It found against her on the issue, since none of the scientific
evidence indicated levels of endogenous nandrolone at above the 2 ng/ml threshold in the 10th week
of pregnancy (ie the stage of her pregnancy when she gave the sample in question). Ibid, para 111. The
Panel also rejected (as lacking in scientific foundation) the athlete’s submissions that her endogenous
19-NA levels were elevated by stress or physical exercise and (as lacking in factual foundation) her
submission that they were elevated by the ingestion of legal nutritional supplements such as zinc,
magnesium and vitamin B6. Ibid, paras 82–99.
C6.53 IRMS analysis can also be used to ascertain whether other potentially
endogenous anabolic steroids found in an athlete’s sample are endogenous or
exogenous in source.1
1 WADA TD2019IRMS (March 2019), pp 2-3 (providing for use of IRMS to confirm that low
concentrations in urine of formestane or boldenone are exogenous). See Liao Hui v IWF,
CAS 2011/A/2612, para 73, and WADA v FCF and Garcia, CAS 2017/A/5315, para 143 (‘[…]
boldenone is a naturally occurring substance, and, as such, WADA technical documents recommend
additional tests for Samples with concentrations of boldenone between 5ng/mL and 30 ng/mL to
confirm their exogenous origin. […] the Panel finds that the boldenone in the Samples exceeded
the threshold for naturally occurring boldenone and that the Athletes have not demonstrated that
the boldenone detected in their Samples was naturally occurring’). See also IAAF v Czech Athletic
Federation & Z, CAS 2002/A/362, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 3 2001–2003 (Kluwer, 2004), p 265,
where the CAS panel found a violation had been committed based on analysis of the athlete’s sample
that showed a concentration of dehydroepiandrosterone (‘DHEA’) (a steroid prohormone) that greatly

exceeded the concentration that might result from endogenous production, and IRMS analysis
confirming that the DHEA detected in the sample was exogenous.
F Peptide hormones, growth factors, and related substances

C6.54 The substances in category S2 of the Prohibited List (Peptide Hormones,
Growth Factors, Related Substances, and Mimetics) may also be present naturally
in the body. Again, therefore, methods have to be identified to determine whether
the substance found in the athlete’s sample is endogenous or exogenous. The
‘direct urine’ test (aka the ‘IEF test’) is used to distinguish between endogenous
EPO and recombinant EPO and its analogues;1 and the ‘isoform’ test and the
‘marker method’ test are used to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous
human Growth Hormone.2 Meanwhile, human Chorionic Gonadotrophin (HCG)
and Luteinizing Hormone (LH) are hormones that stimulate natural production of
testosterone in men, and therefore may be abused in synthetic form to elevate natural
testosterone production artificially. Determining the concentration of HCG in urine
does not discriminate exogenous HCG from endogenous HCG, because men with
‘familial hCG’, an apparently physiological and non-pathological anomaly of hCG
secretion, have consistently elevated concentrations of hCGβ in serum and urine.
Instead, therefore laboratories are directed to use assays that are specific for the
α/β heterodimer of hCG, and to report an adverse analytical finding if those assays
confirm the presence of the α/β hCG heterodimer at concentrations greater than the
DL of 5.0 IU/L (immunoassays) or 2.0 IU/L (chromatographic-mass spectrometric
assays), but at the same time to advise the Anti-Doping Organization to advise the
Athlete to undergo clinical investigations to exclude any pathological cause for the
elevated urinary hCG. Meanwhile, the laboratory is directed to report an adverse
analytical finding for LH when testing determines that the total LH concentration
(after adjustment if urine SG is greater than 1.018) is greater than 60 IU/L, and the
laboratory also detects in the sample the presence of gonadotropin-releasing factors,
anti-estrogenic substances and aromatase inhibitors.3
1 See para C6.30.
2 See paras C6.32 and C6.34.
3 WADA TD2019CG-LH (‘Reporting & Management of Urinary Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin
(HCG) and Luteinizing Hormone (LH) Findings in Male Athletes’).
See ibid, p 1 (‘Elevated concentrations of total LH in urine of male Athletes may also be an
indication of the administration of this Prohibited Substance for doping purposes or of the Use of
other Prohibited Substances that induce the release of endogenous LH, such as gonadotropin-releasing
factors (ie gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) and its synthetic analogs) or estrogen blockers
(anti-estrogens, aromatase inhibitors). On the other hand, suppressed urinary concentrations of LH in
male Athletes may be an indication of, or corroborative finding for, the Use of androgens.
In Strahija v FINA, CAS 2003/A/507, a case decided under different rules, a CAS panel found
that a concentration of hCG of 27.0 mlU/ml in the male athlete’s urine sample was abnormal where
a reference population of more than 1,000 urine samples yielded an average HCG concentration in
male samples of 0.51 mIU/ml, with 96 per cent having a value of less than 2.01 mIU/ml and 99 per
cent having a value less than 3.22 mIU/ml. In the absence of any evidence from the athlete that such
abnormal concentration of hCG was due to a physiological or pathological condition (such as, for
example, trophoblastic disease), the CAS panel upheld the first instance finding that the HCG found in
the athlete’s sample was exogenous and therefore a prohibited substance.
G Does the substance fall within a category of substances

included on the Prohibited List?
C6.55 In some cases, the Prohibited List prohibits all substances falling within a
specified category;1 and in other cases it lists certain substances, but on the basis that
they are not a comprehensive list of the substances in the specified category.2 In such
cases, there could in principle be a scientific argument about whether a particular
substance falls within the category in question, eg is it a ‘stimulant’ for these
purposes.3 Similarly, category S2.2 prohibits ‘peptide hormone and their releasing
factors’, and therefore there could be an argument about whether a substance found
in a sample is a releasing factor of HCG or LH, corticotrophins or HGH.4
1 For example, category S1 prohibits ‘anabolic agents’; while category S3 prohibits ‘all selective and
non-selective beta-2 agonists’, category S6 prohibits ‘all stimulants’, and category S9 prohibits ‘all
glucocorticosteroids’ (when administered by oral, intravenous, intramuscular or rectal routes).
2 Thus, category S1.1 is ‘ANABOLIC ANDROGENIC STEROIDS (AAS) when administered exogenously,
including but not limited to [a list of specifically named substances]; and category S1.2 is ‘other anabolic
agents, including but not limited to clenbuterol, selective androgen receptor modulators [SARMs,
eg andarine, LGD-4033 (ligandrol), enobosarm (ostarine) and RAD140], tibolone, zeranol and zilpaterol’.
3 In Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, paras 2.5.1.3 and 2.6, a CAS panel ruled that the
‘stimulants’ category of the 2004 Prohibited List was not an ‘open list’, ie it was not enough to show
simply that isometheptene is a stimulant for it to be prohibited; the Anti-Doping Organization must
also identify at least one substance expressly included on the Prohibited List to which isometheptene
has ‘a similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s)’ (as to which, see para C6.56).
But in International Canoe Federation v Sterba, CAS OG 12/07, a different CAS panel ruled that it is
enough to show that a substance is a stimulant for it to be prohibited; it is not necessary also to show
that it has a similar chemical structure or biological effect to a listed stimulant. The ICF’s internal
appeal panel had upheld the athlete’s appeal against a finding he had violated the anti-doping rules on
the basis thatB-methylpheylethylamine had a similar chemical structure to one of the non-specified
stimulants listed in section S6a of the Prohibited List, but while the list of specified stimulants in
section S6b of the Prohibited List was open (because it referred to ‘other substances with a similar
chemical structure or similar biological effect(s)’), the list of non-specified stimulants in section S6a
was closed (because it did not). The ICF disputed that construction of the Prohibited List on appeal,
but the CAS panel did not deal with the point in its award.
In WADA v EADO & Abd ElSalam, CAS 2016/A/4563, para 42, a different CAS sole arbitrator said:
‘Given the fact that the Prohibited List is not to be regarded as an exhaustive listing of all anabolic
agents and other prohibited substances under the S1.2 category, the Sole Arbitrator finds from the
evidence that there can be no doubt that Ractopamine is indeed a non-speciifed substance falling under
the category of Other Anabolic Agents’).
See also by way of analogy Hansen v FEI, CAS 2009/A/1768, para 12.1 (‘It was only faintly
argued that Capsaicin was not a prohibited substance at all [under the FEI’s equine anti-doping rules].
It is true that it was not listed as such at the material time, although we heard and accept evidence
that this omission is likely to be corrected for the future, but such express mention is not a sine qua
non of a substance achieving prohibited status; were it otherwise there would always be a risk, to the
obvious detriment of sport, that science could outstrip the law by discovery or invention of potentially
performance-enhancing drugs hitherto not captured in the catalogue of the banned substances. We
accept the evidence […] that Capsaicin falls within the definitions of prohibited substance Medication
Class A in Annex III and as a pain relieving substance […]’) and para 12.3 (‘[…] the HKJC laboratory
had a special capacity to detect Capsaicin […]. Dr Tobin suggested that in consequence in advance of
the Beijing games it would not have been appreciated generally in the equine world that use of such
substance was forbidden. Even assuming this to be correct, it seems to us that the only conclusion
would be that previously participants in jumping events may have had advantages over their
competitors which had not been detected. It cannot mean that the substance, if otherwise satisfying the
criteria for prohibition, should as a result be deemed not to do so; it is has the appropriate properties,
it is prohibited, whether hitherto detectable or not. Nor can we accept that as Dr Tobin also suggested
“horsemen should be allowed to adopt their practices to what are effectively new and [unanticipated]
rules”. At most a participant might seek to plead in mitigation his ignorance of the effects of Capsaicin
because of the state of knowledge (or rather lack of it) at the time it was administered to his horse’).
See also Al Rumaithi v FEI, CAS 2015/A/4190, para 47 (‘The Appellant cannot rely on the alleged
failure of the FEI to inform him as a member of the FEI community about any problems with the use of
Fustex. Such attempted shifting of responsibility to the governing body is not vouched for in the World
Anti-Doping Code or in its derivatives such as the EAD rules, indeed is antithetical to the fundamental
principle that the PR’s responsibility to ensure that his Horse had no prohibited substances in its
system on the day of the Event was his own and no-one else’s’).
4 In Lei Cao v IOC, CAS 2017/A/4974, para 70, a CAS sole arbitrator held that Growth Hormone
Releasing Peptide was prohibited in 2008 despite not being mentioned by name on the 2008 Prohibited
List, because it is a releasing factor for human Growth Hormone and the 2008 Prohibited List said: ‘The
following substances and their releasing factors are prohibited: […] Growth Hormone (hGH) […]’).
H Is the substance in issue ‘similar’ to a substance on the

Prohibited List?
C6.56 In certain of the categories included in the Prohibited List, in addition to
listing named substances that are expressly included in that category, the list then
includes catch-all language, sweeping up ‘other substances with a similar chemical

structure or similar biological effect(s)’ to one or more of the substances listed by
name in the category.1 Its purpose is to create ‘the capacity to identify and sanction
the use of substances not expressly listed as prohibited substances but nevertheless
related to a prohibited substance by its pharmacological actions or chemical
structure. […]. If that were not so, an athlete would be able, without risk, to use a
drug that was only slightly different in make-up or formulation from the drug that
appeared in the WADA Prohibited List, and so escape sanction’.2 If a case is brought
relying on that catch-all, the Anti-Doping Organization will have to establish to the
comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel that the substance at issue, although
not expressly mentioned on the Prohibited List, has a ‘similar chemical structure or
similar biological effect(s)’ to one or more of the listed substances in the category in
question. Expert evidence is likely to be required on the point.3
1 This catch-all provision appears in the Prohibited List in relation to anabolic androgenic steroids
(category S1.1), peptide hormones, growth factors, related substances, and mimetics (category S2),
diuretics (category S5), and stimulants (category S6b).
2 Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, para 2.2.2.5 (submissions on behalf of the IOC). See also
Professor Arnold Beckett, ‘The Problem of Drugs in Sport’ in Dictionary of Medical Ethics, 2nd
Edn (Darton, Longman and Todd, 1981), p 41 (open list approach is considered ‘essential because
otherwise compounds not intended as drugs but with the desired pharmacological effect would be used
to circumvent the control based upon a comprehensive list of drugs’); IOC, ‘Doping: An IOC White
Paper’ (Lausanne, 1999), p 24 (‘The rationale for prohibiting related substances is to prevent
unscrupulous chemists or persons from promoting new drugs or chemicals that act like prohibited
substances but are not specifically named. The term “designer drug” refers to a drug that is nearly
identical to a prohibited drug yet possesses a slight difference which enables cheaters to argue that the
drug is not on the prohibited list. Thus, the use of the phrase “and related substances” is a very helpful
way of preventing the introduction of new drugs’); Korneev and Gouliev v IOC, CAS Arbitration
(Atlanta) NO 003–41, p 18 (‘The ongoing fight against the use of drugs in sport would be severely
hampered by there being an exclusive list of substances being the only substances whose use was
prohibited’).
In a pre-Code case under the IAAF rules, where the prohibited list encompassed substances that
were ‘chemically or pharmacologically related’ to substances expressly mentioned on the list, UK
athlete Dougie Walker argued that the phrase ‘chemically or pharmacologically related’ was unclear
and therefore could not be relied upon to bring a charge. The UKA Disciplinary Committee rejected
the contention that the phrase was unclear, but also said that any lack of clarity would not mean the
phrase should be disregarded, because this would ‘amount to a charter for systematic steroid drug
abuse. If a drug had to be specifically listed in order to be prohibited, that would be an open invitation
to devise compounds which differed chemically in some minor respect only from those listed but
which had substantially the same pharmacological effects, and for athletes to use such products
at will until a test at some point led to their disclosure to the athletics authorities’. UKA v Walker,
decision of UKA Disciplinary Committee, 25 January 2000, para 30. Subsequently, each side in the
Walker case effectively proceeded on the basis that ‘chemically related’ meant ‘having substantially
the same chemical structure’ and ‘pharmacologically related’ meant ‘having substantially the same
pharmacological effect by the same means’.
3 Cf Tarasti, Legal Solutions In International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at p 83 (in ‘related
substance’ cases, ‘it is the claimant’s duty to show that this substance has the same impact on the
athlete and his/her performance as the substance mentioned in the list, ie that a near relation exists
between these substances’).
C6.57 In various pre-Code cases, athletes had some success challenging for lack
of evidentiary support the Anti-Doping Organization’s assertion that the substance
found in their urine was ‘related to’ a banned substance (the IOC Prohibited List
banned named substances ‘and related substances’). For example:
(a) In September 1992, East German athletes Katrin Krabbe, Grit Breuer and
Manuela Derr all tested positive for clenbuterol. It was found that they had
each systematically taken a medication containing clenbuterol from April
1992 to August 1992. Clenbuterol was not mentioned on the IOC Prohibited
List but it was said to be pharmacologically related to anabolic steroids that
were named on the List, and on that basis all three athletes were banned from
competition for four years. The Legal Committee of the German Athletic
Association revoked that ban on the ground (among others) that it had not been
properly shown that clenbuterol was ‘related to’ banned anabolic steroids.1
(b) A Russian swimmer and a Russian wrestler tested positive at the 1996 Atlanta
Olympics for Bromantan. Bromantan was not mentioned at that time on the
IOC List but the IOC concluded that it had stimulant properties and the athletes
were therefore charged on the basis that Bromantan was ‘related to’ stimulants
that were on the IOC List. A CAS panel rejected the charges on the basis that
objective evidence of ‘the actual chemical composition and qualities’ of the
substance was required, and the scientific evidence submitted by the IOC
was not sufficient to establish ‘to the relevant and high degree of satisfaction
necessary’ that Bromantan should be treated as a banned stimulant.2
(c) In UKA v Walker, the UKA Disciplinary Committee found that UK Athletics
had not met its burden of showing that either 19-norandrostenedione or
19-norandrostenediol was chemically or pharmacologically related to
nandrolone. It was overturned on that point, however, by the IAAF Arbitration
Panel.3
(d) In UKA v Chambers,4 UK Athletics charged English track athlete Dwain
Chambers with an anti-doping rule violation after his sample tested positive for
tetrahydrogestrinone (‘THG’), the designer steroid produced by Victor Conte
at BALCO.5 THG was not specifically named as one of the anabolic agents in
the relevant Prohibited List, but Chambers was charged on the basis that THG
was ‘chemically or pharmacologically related’ to one or more substances that
were named on that list. The UKA hearing panel ruled that the phrase should
be construed by reference to its context and purpose:
‘The reason for the drafting of the list in the form of example substances is
derived from the complexity of the subject matter, the continuing advances in
scientific understanding and the need for a rule which is comprehensive, fair
and clear. It would be impracticable to identify all forms of steroids in the list
of prohibited substances, and it is always possible for new substances to be
synthesised. It would be unfair to some athletes, and detrimental to the health
of others, to permit athletes to experiment with novel forms or derivations of
steroids until such time as the rule makers detected the new compounds and
moved to add them to the list of identified substances’.6
The hearing panel determined, based on the scientific evidence, that THG is ‘a
steroid which is both chemically and pharmacologically related to gestrinone’,
a substance specifically mentioned on the Prohibited List. Chambers was
therefore banned for two years.
1 The Legal Committee did impose a one-year ban on each athlete for misconduct (taking a prescription
drug purchased on the black market without medical need). In August 1993, the IAAF Council
unilaterally and without a hearing extended that ban for a further two years, and the IAAF Arbitration
Panel rejected the German Athletic Association’s appeal: Breuer, Derr, Krabbe case, IAAF Arbitration
Panel decision dated 20 November 1993, reported in Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping
Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000), pp 129–131. Krabbe took her challenge to the German civil courts, which
in March 1996 upheld the Legal Committee’s one-year ban but ruled the IAAF’s additional two-year
ban illegal on the grounds (among others) that the disproportionate sanction and the lack of a hearing
infringed Krabbe’s constitutional rights. See High Regional Court of Munich judgment dated 28 March
1996, Sport und Recht, 4/96, pp 133 et seq. In 2001, a Munich court awarded Krabbe damages of
DM 1.2m plus interest from 1994. The IAAF appealed but subsequently, in a 2002 settlement, agreed
to pay Krabbe damages to compensate her for lost earnings while banned. See Observer, 5 May 2002.
2 Korneev and Gouliev v IOC, CAS Arbitration (Atlanta) 96/003-4L, p 19.
3 See para C6.63.
4 UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004.
5 See para C7.14.
6 UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision dated 24 February 2004, para 31. The
decision continues (at para 30): ‘In this context the rule is actually clearer and fairer by being widely
drafted. All athletes are warned that they should not take drugs. No athlete who intended to comply
with the rules would consider taking any form of steroid on the grounds that its formulation was
different from that of a named steroid on the prohibited list. The principle of legal certainty, that is that
a person should know with clarity the legal consequences of his action, is thus advanced by the form in
which the rule is drafted. Nor can it be argued that the principle against doubtful penalisation has any
realistic application in a case where the athlete is disavowing any deliberate decision to take any form
of steroid’.
C6.58 The CAS panel considered the same point after the World Anti-Doping
Code came out, in the case of Calle Williams v IOC,1 where the athlete challenged
the IOC Executive Board’s decision to disqualify the bronze medal she had won
in the track cycling competition at the 2004 Olympic Games, on the basis that the
isometheptene found in her sample was not a prohibited substance, because it was
not listed by name on the Prohibited List and it did not have a ‘similar chemical
structure or similar biological effect(s)’ to any substance on the List. The CAS panel
flatly rejected the IOC’s argument that a decision by WADA’s Science Director that a
substance is ‘similar’ to a substance on the Prohibited List is equivalent to a decision
that a substance should be included on the Prohibited List and therefore is immune
from challenge by athletes, in accordance with Code Art 4.3.3:
‘The inclusion of a substance on the List is made after a thorough evaluation by the
so-called “List Committee”, a group of specialists in the field of doping substances
representing all stakeholders in the fight against doping. It is thus justified to exempt
a decision to put a substance on the List from challenge by the athlete.
On the other hand, the classification of a substance as “similar” to one of the listed
substances is made by the WADA administration (at least in the case in hand)
without the benefit of the input from experts from all interested groups. To exclude
any challenge of such a decision would give too much responsibility to WADA
alone. […]
The Panel is, thus, of the view that, in contrast to a decision to include a particular
substance on the Prohibited List, a WADA determination to treat a substance as
“similar” to a listed substance can be challenged by athletes […]’.2
The CAS panel therefore required the IOC to establish, to its comfortable
satisfaction, and in the face of the challenge by the athlete, that isometheptene had a
similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s) to one or more of the
stimulants expressly identified on the Prohibited List.3 Because the IOC was unable
to sustain this burden, the athlete’s appeal against the disqualification of her result
was allowed. However, in a part of its decision that was strictly obiter (because it had
already found that the athlete’s appeal must be upheld on other grounds), the panel
stated that even if the IOC had established that isometheptene had a similar chemical
structure or similar pharmacological effects to a substance expressly identified on
the Prohibited List, it would still have to show that isometheptene satisfies two of
the three criteria in Code Art 4.3 for including a substance on the List, because ‘it
would be absurd to put less stringent requirements on the determination of a ‘similar
substance’ than are necessary for the decision to put a substance on the list’. But it
added that ‘this may be a theoretical consideration if the term “similar” is narrowly
construed: in these instances a substance which passes the test of similarity will
almost definitely meet at least two of the above criteria’.4
1 CAS 2005/A/726.
2 Ibid, para 2.4.
3 As to this requirement, the CAS panel ruled that the ‘stimulants’ category of the 2004 Prohibited List
was not an ‘open list’, ie it was not enough to show simply that isometheptene is a stimulant; the Anti-
Doping Organization must also identify at least one substance expressly included on the Prohibited
List to which isometheptene has ‘a similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s)’.
Ibid, paras 2.5.1.3 and 2.6. Because the evidence of the pharmacological experts differed on the point,
and the burden of proof lay with the IOC, the CAS panel ruled that the athlete’s appeal had to be
upheld. Cf International Canoe Federation v Sterba, CAS OG 12/07 (ruling that it is enough to show
that a substance is a stimulant for it to be prohibited; it is not necessary also to show that it has a similar
chemical structure or biological effect to a listed stimulant).
4 Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, para 2.5.3.
C6.59 In 2019, in Scott v ITF, an athlete who was charged with an Art 2.1 ADRV
based on a substance found in his sample that was not mentioned expressly on the
Prohibited List argued based on that obiter dictum in Calle Williams that the ITF had
to show not only:
(1) that the substance had a similar chemical structure or similar biological effect
to a substance mentioned by name on the Prohibited List; but also
(2) that the substance met at least two of the three criteria set out in Code Article 4.3
for inclusion on the Prohibited List; ie
(a) potential performance enhancement;
(b) health risk; and/or
(c) violation of the spirit of sport (the ‘Criteria Test’).
The CAS panel rejected this submission, holding:
‘In order to be prohibited, a substance must either be specifically listed on the
Prohibited List or must have a “similar chemical structure or similar biological
effect” as one of the listed substances. The Panel does not, however, endorse the
decision in Calle Williams, according to which the Criteria Test must also be met
in order to qualify a substance as prohibited. The Panel notes that the Criteria Test
advocated in Calle Williams was only set out as an obiter dictum and disagrees
with the Calle Williams majority. Whether or not a (new) substance shall be
listed on the Prohibited List is the result of an expert determination applying the
list criteria (through a worldwide consultation process) that cannot be challenged
in a CAS proceeding (TADP Article 3.2). If, therefore, WADA determines that a
specific substance (including all variants having a similar chemical structure or
having similar biological effects) should be included on the Prohibited List, it is
not for any adjudicatory bodies (including CAS) to dispute this. Instead, the power
of any adjudicatory body is limited to determine whether or not the substance in
question is either specifically listed or has a “similar chemical structure or similar
biological effect” as one of the substances listed by name. By qualifying a substance
as “chemically similar” the Panel does not amend the Prohibited List and does not
question or undermine the determination of the experts of what shall be considered
prohibited or not. Instead, a Panel deciding on the factual/legal question of whether
or not a substance is “chemically similar” merely applies whatever the list experts
have previously (in their expert determination) agreed to – no more, no less.
Therefore, the Criteria Test is of no relevance to this Panel’.1
1 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 112.
C6.60 The athlete in Scott v ITF also argued that the ‘similar chemical structure
or similar biological effect’ formula contravened the doctrines of legal certainty
and foreseeability,1 because it did not enable athletes to know whether taking a
particular substance was or was not prohibited. He argued that ‘to the extent WADA
is aware of a substance that is “chemically similar” in structure to another prohibited
substance(s), then WADA must be obliged to name this “chemically similar”
substance on the Prohibited List. The Appellant relies on CAS 2016/A/4371 (“Lea”)
and UEFA Disciplinary Case 29251 – UEL – 2015/16 (“Sakho”) to establish that an
athlete must have “clear notice” that his actions could possibly lead to an ADRV’.2
The CAS panel did not agree:
‘118. […] [T]he Panel disagrees with the Appellant’s broad “clear notice”
interpretation of Lea. The Prohibited List is not a closed list and does not provide
an exhaustive enumeration of substances, but it does establish the principle that all
steroids are prohibited. The list expressly identifies examples of various steroids
and clearly states that substances of similar chemical structure or similar biological
effects are also anabolic steroids and agents prohibited within the scope of class S1.
The Panel notes that there are virtually an unlimited number of potential variances
of the Testosterone compound. It would be impractical to require the identification
of all forms of steroids and there is always the possibility for a nefarious scientist
to synthesize a new substance before it becomes detectable. The Appellant rightly

concedes, and the Panel in any event finds, that there is a need, in principle, for a
catch-all clause in the form of a “related substance” clause in order to establish a
level playing field for all athletes.
‘119. The Panel is not prepared to follow the Appellant’s argument that once
WADA is aware of a substance that is “chemically similar” in structure to another
prohibited substance(s), then WADA must include the name of this “chemically
similar” substance on the Prohibited List. Imposition of such an obligation would
be impractical. It would have the effect that a “chemically similar” substance
would in principle be covered by the Prohibited List initially and then depart from
it as and when at some unidentifiable time WADA fails to name it expressly. The
creation of such a mechanism would provoke endless disputes on when WADA
would become “aware” of a “chemically similar” substance and what the time line
would be for WADA to comply with its obligation to put it on the Prohibited List.
This would lead to unequal treatment of the various athletes depending on the sheer
coincidence when the “chemically similar” substance is detected in an athlete’s
system. In addition, it would completely undermine the principle of legal certainty.
When would a stakeholder know whether or not WADA was aware of the chemically
similar substance within the above meaning?’3
The panel ruled that the substance found in the athlete’s sample was chemically
similar to DHCMT, a steroid listed by name in Section 1.1 of the Prohibited List, and
therefore upheld the Art 2.1 ADRV charge brought against him.4
1 As to which, see para B1.19 et seq
2 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 117. See UEFA v Sakho, UEFA Control, Ethics and Disciplinary
Body decision dated 7 July 2016, para 21 (‘[…] it is not enough for WADA to simply state in its
prohibited list that all substances that might possibly fit a very general description (eg all Beta-2
Agonists) are prohibited. This is not specific enough’) and para 34 (‘there must be legal certainty as to
the substances on WADA’s prohibited list. Any uncertainty must be interpreted in favour of the accused
and, based on the foregoing discussion of Higenamine, there is clearly considerable uncertainty in this
case about the categorisation of Higenamine as a Beta-2 Agonist on WADA’s prohibited list’), para 46
(‘[…] the CEDB must be mindful of what it could reasonably expect the Player (and his club and
personal trainer) to have been able to learn about Higenamine from publicly available sources, given
the fact that it does not appear by name in WADA’s prohibited list, that WADA does not appear to
have made a firm determination itself, that WADA has not formally communicated any determination
to its accredited laboratories and that some (if not all) WADA accredited laboratories are uncertain of
Higenamine’s status on the prohibited list’), and para 49 (therefore dismissing charge that presence of
Higenamine in player’s sample constituted an anti-doping rule violation).
The other case cited in Scott by the athlete – Lea v USADA, 2016/A/4371 – was not a case about
the Prohibited List. Instead, the panel in that case ruled the athlete’s fault was less (and therefore
his sanction was mitigated) because WADA and Anti-Doping Organizations had failed to give clear
warnings that certain prohibited substances contained in medications might remain detectable in the
system for several days following ingestion. Ibid, para 93, citing WADA v Anthony West and FIM,
CAS 2012/A/3029, para 64 (‘while this factor is not exculpatory in a regime based on strict liability’,
a lack of information and warnings from WADA and an international federation that ‘may have
contributed to a relative deficit of proactiveness in raising the awareness of riders and team leaders to
the importance of active and informed surveillance of what competitors ingest’ is appropriately given
some weight in determining an athlete’s objective degree of fault).
3 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768. See also UK Athletics v Chambers, Disciplinary Committee decision
dated 24 February 2004 (‘30. The reason for the drafting of the list in the form of example substances is
derived from the complexity of the subject matter, the continuing advances in scientific understanding
and the need for a rule which is comprehensive, fair and clear. It would be impracticable to identify all
forms of steroids in the list of prohibited substances, and it is always possible for new substances to
be synthesised. It would be unfair to some athletes, and detrimental to the health of others, to permit
athletes to experiment with novel forms or derivations of steroids until such time as the rule makers
detected the new compounds and moved to add them to the list of identified substances. […] 31. In
this context the rule is actually clearer and fairer by being widely drafted. All athletes are warned that
they should not take drugs. No athlete who intended to comply with the rules would consider taking
any form of steroid on the grounds that its formulation was different from that of a named steroid
on the prohibited list. The principle of legal certainty, that is that a person should know with clarity
the legal consequences of his action, is thus advanced by the form in which the rule is drafted. Nor
can it be argued that the principle against doubtful penalisation has any realistic application in a case
where the athlete is disavowing any deliberate decision to take any form of steroid’); IAAF v Walker,
IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 20 August 2000, paras 18–19 (rejecting athlete’s argument that
charging him with a doping offence based on the presence in his sample of a substance that was not
mentioned expressly on the list of prohibited substances breached ‘the principles of legal certainty and
legal clarity’, because the list stated that not only substances mentioned expressly on the list but also
substances that were ‘chemically or pharmacologically related’ to substances mentioned expressly on
the list were prohibited, and the substance found in his sample fell into that latter category).
See also CCGS v Shulga, SDRCC decision dated 20 September 2013, para 87 (‘The Athlete testified
that he is not competent to determine whether a given substance is similar in “chemical structure” or
“biological effect” to those substances that are identified by name in Category S6.b. This is reason
alone to wonder why, despite his awareness of the applicable rules, he did not seek medical or other
advice before purchasing a product that, he also testified, he was interested in using precisely because
of what can only be called – non scientifically – its stimulant effect, that is, its efficacy in boosting focus
when his occasional insomnia caused him to feel sleepy during the day, affecting his swimming’).
4 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 115. Similarly, in IAAF v RFEA and Onyia, CAS 2009/A/1805,
the CAS upheld a two-year ban imposed based on the presence of methylhexaneamine in the athlete’s
sample, even though methylhexaneamine was not at the time mentioned expressly on the Prohibited
List, based on expert evidence establishing its similar chemical structure to tuaminoheptane, a
stimulant that was identified by name on the List. See also WADA v ASADA, AWF & Karapetyn,
CAS 2007/A/1383, para 5 (in 2006, benzylpiperazine was not specifically listed as a stimulant, but
would have fallen into ‘catch all provision’, ie ‘other substances with a similar chemical structure or
similar biological effect’).
I Is the substance a metabolite or a marker of a prohibited

substance?
C6.61 Metabolism is the chemical process by which complex substances are

broken down in the body and converted into metabolites of the substance originally
ingested or administered. For example, if cocaine is ingested, after a very short period
little or no cocaine is found in the urine; instead its metabolite, benzoylecoginine,
is found.1 To take account of this, Code Art 2.1 provides that the ‘Presence of a
Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers in an Athlete’s Sample’ is an
anti-doping rule violation. It defines a metabolite as ‘any substance produced by
a biotransformation process’; and it defines a marker as ‘[a] compound, group of
compounds or biological variable(s) that indicates the Use of a Prohibited Substance
or Prohibited Method’.2
1 There are three particular metabolites of nandrolone that are excreted into the urine, but it is enough
to find only one, 19-norandrosterone, to support an adverse analytical finding for nandrolone; it is not
necessary to find all three. L v IOC, CAS 2000/A/310, paras 88–91; Melinte v IAAF, CAS OG 00/015,
para 8(d).
2 Code App One (Definitions), p 136.
For an example of a marker, see Calle Williams v IOC, CAS 2005/A/726, where the laboratory
had found heptaminol in the cyclist’s urine sample. The IOC did not argue that heptaminol was itself
a prohibited substance, but asserted that it was a marker for isometheptene, because isometheptene
metabolises into desmethyl-isomepheptene, which is converted chemically during the laboratory
analytical process into heptaminol. While the CAS panel accepted this submission by the IOC, the
athlete’s appeal was allowed because the CAS panel found that isometheptene was not a prohibited
substance at the relevant time either: see para C6.58.
Another example of ‘markers’ of a prohibited substance would be insulin-like growth factor-1 and
the N-terminal peptide of pro-collagen type III, each of which is considered to be a marker of the
use of human Growth Hormone. See para C6.34, n 12. Meanwhile, the ratio in urine of testosterone
to epitestosterone has long been used as a marker of potential use of synthetic testosterone. See para
C6.44. And the entire Athlete Biological Passport programme is based on treating blood levels of
certain substances as markers of blood doping: see para C7.4.
C6.62 If the substance found in a sample might be a metabolite of one of several

different potential parent substances, the Anti-Doping Organization has to show
either:
(a) that all of the potential parent substances are prohibited substances (either
because they are named on the List or because they have a similar chemical
structure or similar biological effect to a named substance;1 or
(b) (if not) that the substance found in the sample metabolised from a parent that
is a prohibited substance.2
1 Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 112 (‘[…] the ITF bears the burden of showing that any of the
possible parent compounds that may produce the M4 metabolite are a Prohibited Substance within the
meaning of the WADA Prohibited List’) and para 115 (upholding charge based on the expert evidence
that ‘all parent compounds of the M4 metabolite are either specifically listed on the Prohibited
List (eg DHCMT) or variants of DHCMT that have a similar chemical structure (ie the androstane
backbone, a methyl group in the C-17 position, a chlorine atom in C-4, an oxygen in C-3)’).
2 Ime Akpan, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 10 April 1995, in Tarasti, Legal Solutions in
International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000), pp 135–136 (when metabolite could have come
from nandrolone but could also have come from norinyl, a non-prohibited contraceptive declared by
the athlete on her doping control form, the IAAF had the burden of proving that it was nandrolone
and not norinyl that caused the presence of 19-nandrolone). Cf BAF v Jason Livingston, BAF Appeal
Panel decision (1993, unreported) (dismissing defence based on speculation that metabolite might
possibly have derived from an unidentified non-prohibited substance, where no scientific evidence was
adduced to support the speculation). But see the dissent in that case: ‘In view of the fact that, albeit in
only one known example, the main metabolite of a prohibited substance, nandrolone, has been found
to be identical with a metabolite of a non-prohibited substance, namely progesterone, I believe that
corroboration is required in the case where only a single principal metabolite of a prohibited substance
is found. This corroboration may be from the presence of at least one other metabolite recognised as
being characteristic of the prohibited substance, or from conventional non-scientific evidence, such as
a confession or observance by a third party’.
C6.63 The case of British athlete Dougie Walker is on point. Walker provided
a urine sample that tested positive for 19-norandrosterone. It was accepted
that the 19-norandrosterone had metabolised from one of the 19-norsteroids
(ie nandrolone, 19-norandrostenedione, or 19-norandrostenediol). It could not be
shown, however, from which of those substances it had metabolised. Therefore, the
UKA Disciplinary Committee ruled, UK Athletics had to show that each of those
substances (nandrolone, 19-norandrostenedione and 19-norandrostenediol) was a
prohibited substance. At the time, only nandrolone was expressly mentioned on the
IOC List. Therefore, UK Athletics had to show that each of 19-norandrostenedione
and 19-norandrostenediol was ‘chemically or pharmacologically related to’
nandrolone, which it failed to do to the satisfaction of the UKA Disciplinary
Committee. This meant that the 19-norandrosterone in Walker’s urine could have
metabolised from a substance that had not been shown to be prohibited. As a result,
the UKA Disciplinary Committee found that UK Athletics had not shown beyond a
reasonable doubt that a metabolite of a prohibited substance was present in Walker’s
sample.1 The IAAF Council referred that decision to the IAAF Arbitration Panel,
contending that a substance qualifies as a ‘metabolite of a prohibited substance’ if
it could be derived from a prohibited substance, even if it could equally be derived
from other, non-prohibited substances. UK Athletics contended that such a showing
would not be proof to the requisite standard of the presence of a prohibited substance
in the sample. Instead, to meet that standard, the prosecutor would have to show
that the metabolite could only have derived from a prohibited substance. The
IAAF Arbitration Panel avoided ruling on that issue by finding, on the scientific
evidence before it, that 19-norandrostenediol and 19-norandrosterone were both
chemically and pharmacologically related compounds of nandrolone.2 Nevertheless,
in the authors’ view it is to be doubted that an anti-doping rule violation could be
established on the basis of the presence of a metabolite that could have come from a
non-prohibited substance, simply because it could also have come from a prohibited
one.3
1 UKA v Walker (25 January 2000, unreported), UKA Disciplinary Committee.
2 Walker case, IAAF Arbitration Panel, 20 August 2000, para 19, [2001] 4 ISLR 264. In other words, the
subsequent addition of those substances to the IOC List (as of 31 January 1999) had been redundant,
simply confirming the position that had existed all along.
3 One example is morphine, which metabolises from codeine, as to the treatment of which, see para
C18.19(h) and (i).
CHAPTER C7
Article 2.2 ADRV – An Athlete’s Use

or Attempted Use of a Prohibited
Substance or a Prohibited Method
Contents
. para
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION......................... C7.1
2 PROVING ‘USE’................................................................................................. C7.2
3 PROVING ‘USE’ BY REFERENCE TO ANALYTICAL DATA....................... C7.3
4 PROVING ‘USE’ BY MEANS OF THE ATHLETE BIOLOGICAL PASSPORT. C7.4
5 PROVING ‘USE’ BY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL DATA...... C7.14
6 ‘ATTEMPTED USE’ OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR METHOD......... C7.20
7 DEFENCES......................................................................................................... C7.22
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION
C7.1 The elements of the Code Art 2.2 anti-doping rule violation (ADRV) of
‘Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method’ are as follows:
(a) ‘Use’ is defined as ‘the utilization, application, ingestion, injection or
consumption by any means whatsoever of any Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method’.1
(b) The ‘Use’ must be personal use by the athlete who is charged, rather than
by someone else (eg a co-conspirator). For example, the Prohibited Method
of urine substitution ‘is principally intended to apply to the substitution of
urine by an athlete at a doping control station’, and if the allegation is that the
athlete’s urine was substituted by another person:
‘the Athlete must have committed an act or an omission that was intrinsically
linked to the substitution of his urine in order to be guilty of the ADRV of using a
prohibited method. In other words, the Athlete must have done something, or not
done something, that directly contributed to the substitution of his urine sample by
another person’.2
(c) ‘Prohibited Substance’ is ‘any substance, or class of substances, so described on
the Prohibited List’.3 As noted above, however, this simple definition conceals
a multitude of issues, including the fact that whether or not a substance is
prohibited can depend on when it is used: if a substance is only prohibited in
competition, then its ‘Use’ out of competition ‘would not constitute an anti-
doping rule violation’.4 Therefore, to establish the Art 2.2 violation in respect
of a substance that is not prohibited out of competition, the Anti-Doping
Organization would have to prove that the substance was ‘Used’ during a
period that the sport defines as ‘in competition’.5
(d) A ‘Prohibited Method’ is ‘any method so described on the Prohibited List’.6
(e) ‘Use’ is a strict liability offence, ie ‘it is not necessary that intent, Fault,
negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated in order
Article 2.2 ADRV – An Athlete’s Use or Attempted Use of a Prohibited Substance 823
to establish an anti-doping rule violation for Use of a Prohibited Substance

or a Prohibited Method’.7 This is straightforward enough where the ‘Use’ is
proved by analytical data (eg an Athlete Biological Passport case). In a ‘non-
analytical’ case, however (ie one where the evidence is something other than
analytical data from a laboratory relating to a sample), it is more difficult to see
how ‘Use’ of a prohibited substance could be established without having proof
of intent or at least knowledge on the part of the athlete.8 For example, the CAS
panel in Zubkov held that the strict liability rule applies when the allegation is
‘direct personal use of a prohibited method or prohibited substance […]. The
Panel does not consider, however, that this principle of strict liability applies in
an identical fashion where the Athlete is alleged to have committed an act or
omission that contributed to the substitution of the Athlete’s urine by another
person. Were it otherwise, then any athlete who provided a urine sample as
part of normal doping control procedures would automatically commit an
ADRV if a third party who is entirely unconnected with the athlete, and in
respect of whom the athlete has no knowledge or control, later substitutes the
content of the athlete’s sample. Consequently, logic and fairness both dictate
that strict liability under Article 2.2 of the WADC cannot automatically extend
to everything that is done to an athlete’s sample after he/she has provided it
in accordance with a normal doping control procedure. [713.] In the Panel’s
view, an athlete can only be held liable under Article 2.2 of the WADC for the
substitution of their urine by another person if (i) the athlete has committed
some act or omission that facilitates that substitution; and (ii) they have done
so with actual or constructive knowledge of the likelihood of that substitution
occurring’.9
(f) The Anti-Doping Organization does not have to prove the source of the
Prohibited Substance ‘Used’ by the athlete.10
(g) The Anti-Doping Organization does not have to prove that the ‘Use’ of the
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method did in fact enhance the athlete’s
performance. Code Art 2.2.2 states: ‘The success or failure of the Use […] of
a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method is not material. It is sufficient
that the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method was Used […] for an anti-
doping rule violation to be committed’.
2 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 709–711; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, paras 795-–797
(same).
3 Code App One (Definitions), p 139. Therefore, a ‘Use’ case may feature the same arguments as arise
in ‘Presence’ cases about whether a substance should be classified as a prohibited substance: see
Chapter C6.
4 See commentary to Code Art 2.2: ‘An Athlete’s Use of a Prohibited Substance constitutes an anti-
doping rule violation unless such substance is not prohibited Out-of-Competition and the Athlete’s
Use takes place Out-of-Competition’.
5 As to which, see para C6.39. On the other hand, if that ‘Use’ out of competition led to the presence of
the substance in the athlete’s sample collected in competition, that would amount to a violation of Art
2.1. See para C6.38, n 1.
6 Code App One (Definitions), p 139. The 2020 Prohibited List identifies four types of Prohibited
Method: (1) manipulation of blood and blood components (ie administering or reintroducing blood
or red blood cell products into the circulatory system; artificially enhancing the uptake, transport or
delivery of oxygen; and intravascular manipulation of the blood or blood components by artificial or
chemical means); (2) tampering or attempting to tamper, in order to alter the integrity and validity of
Samples collected during Doping Control (eg urine substitution and/or adulteration); (3) intravenous
infusions and/or injections of more than 100 mL per twelve hour period; and (4) gene doping (ie the
use of nucleic acids or nucleic acid analogues that may alter genome sequences and/or alter gene
expression by any mechanism, and the use of normal or genetically modified cells).
For example, Michelle de Bruin, the Irish swimmer, was held to have committed the anti-doping
rule violation of use of a prohibited method where the urine sample she provided was found to contain
a level of whisky that would have been fatal if digested, and therefore must have been added to the
sample (as a masking agent) after it had passed from her body. The CAS upheld the four-year ban
imposed on her by FINA. See Smith de Bruin v FINA, CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2
1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 255. See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422 (urine substitution);
Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607 (urine substitution).
7 Code Art 2.2.1. See eg Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 119 (‘[…] the ISU
does not have to prove the intent or the fault of the Athlete in using a prohibited method such as blood
doping’); Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.33 (proof of intent to enhance performance not
required to sustain an Art 2.2 charge of use of a prohibited method); IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP decision
dated 11 February 2020, para 383 (‘While the Athlete has adamantly denied knowledge of using
prohibited substances, the Panel need not find that the Athlete knew she was doping, or intended to,
because intent or even knowledge of the use of prohibited substance is not necessary to establish that
an ADRV occurred under Art 2.2 ADR. Pursuant to Art 2.2.1 IBU ADR, the mere use of a prohibited
substance is sufficient’). See also Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.33 (‘[…] to impose upon the
IOC the burden of proving that an athlete had a subjective intent to enhance his or her performance
would be counterproductive to the fight against doping’).
If it were not for this express statement in the Code, an athlete might try to argue that proof of intent
or knowledge is required to establish a ‘Use’ charge, on the basis that the word ‘Use’ connotes active,
knowing conduct. The ruling in N. v FINA, CAS 98/202, para 15, would support such an argument. On
the other hand, in C v FINA, CAS 95/141, Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Berne, 1998) pp 215,
219–220, the CAS panel held that a definition of doping based on ‘use’ is ‘unequivocal. It admits
only the strict liability of the athlete and does not allow the concepts of fault or intent to intervene’.
See also Jovanovic v USADA, CAS 2002/A/360, para 21 (same). And pre-Code charges of ‘use’ of a
prohibited method (ingestion of a masking agent, such as epitestosterone or finasteride) were upheld
without any requirement to prove intent. See Tarasti, Legal Solutions in International Doping Cases
(SEP Editrice, 2000) at p 70.
8 See Pobyedonostsev v IIHF, CAS/2005/A/990, para 17, where the athlete argued that ‘the term “use”
required an action on the part of the Player and cannot be extended to a situation where he was
injected with a (prohibited) substance without his will and knowledge’ (because he was unconscious
and receiving emergency medical treatment). The CAS panel ruled that it did not have to resolve
that issue because the evidence established the separate anti-doping rule violation of presence of a
prohibited substance in the athlete’s specimen. Ibid, para 33. Cf the pre-Code authority of the Breuer,
Krabbe, Moller case, IAAF Arbitration Panel decision dated 28 February 1992, reported in Tarasti,
Legal Solutions In International Doping Cases (SEP Editrice, 2000) at pp 125–128, in which samples
purportedly collected from three different female athletes were found to be from the same person. The
IAAF Arbitration Panel ruled that ‘the offence of using or taking advantage of a prohibited technique
[…] is not one of strict liability. It requires proof that an athlete actively and knowingly used or took
advantage of the technique. Obviously a body such as the DLV [the German Athletic Association] in
taking procedures to investigate and establish such an offence needs evidence from which the athlete’s
involvement can be clearly established or inferred’. In that case, the panel thought the DLV was right
to have pressed such charges and questioned whether the rejection of those charges by the first instance
hearing panel was correct, but did not have to come to a view because the case was dismissed on other,
unrelated grounds: see para C6.57(a).
9 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 712-13. It noted that such knowledge could be inferred from
the athlete’s ‘self-evidently irregular actions’, such as providing clear urine outside of the normal
doping control process, deliberately not closing sample collection bottles to the maximum extent, or
transmitting images of his doping control form to third parties after completing a doping control test.
Ibid, para 717. See also Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, paras 798-799, 803 (same)
10 WADA v Bellchambers et al, CAS 2015/A/4059, para 142 (‘It is not an essential link (or indeed strand)
in a case of a violation of Article 2.2 of the WADC that the source of the product used can be identified.
It has never been so stated in any of the relevant case law, is not required on the face of the article itself
or the commentary, and would be a significant bar to the fight against doping’).
2 PROVING ‘USE’
C7.2 The Anti-Doping Organization may prove ‘Use’ of a prohibited substance

or a prohibited method by ‘any reliable means’,1 including analytical data2 or non-
analytical data (whether combined with analytical data, or on its own).3 If it does not
have direct evidence of use, it may rely on circumstantial evidence, provided that
circumstantial evidence is strong enough to overcome the lack of direct evidence
and justify the inference that the athlete used the prohibited substance or method as
alleged.4
1 Code Art 3.2. See commentary to Code Art 2.2: ‘It has always been the case that Use or Attempted
Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method may be established by any reliable means […]’.
See also Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 793 (‘Whereas the presence of a prohibited substance
can and must be established exclusively by laboratory analysis, the use of a prohibited substance may
be established by any reliable means, including, but not limited to witness evidence, documentary
evidence and conclusions drawn from analytical information other than proving the actual presence of
a prohibited substance’).
2 Klemencic v UCI, CAS 2016/A/4648, para 119 (rejecting argument that the ‘reliable means’ by which
an Art 2.2 violation could be established did not include analytical data); IAAF v RUSAF & Shkolina,
CAS 2018/O/5667, para 91 (‘A “Use” violation may also be established through “other analytical
information which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish” an ADRV based on
presence of a prohibited substance’, quoting comment to Code Art 2.2).
3 See commentary to Code Art 2.2: ‘[…] unlike the proof required to establish an anti-doping rule
violation under Article 2.1, Use or Attempted Use may also be established by other reliable means
such as admissions by the Athlete, witness statements, documentary evidence, conclusions drawn
from longitudinal profiling, including data collected as part of the Athlete Biological Passport, or other
analytical information which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish “Presence”
of a Prohibited Substance under Article 2.1. For example, Use may be established based upon
reliable analytical data from the analysis of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a
B sample) or from the analysis of a B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a
satisfactory explanation for the lack of confirmation in the other Sample’. See also IBU v Sleptsova,
ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, para 307 (laboratory documentation pack and information
relating to laboratory’s quality management system not required to prove ‘Use’ of a prohibited
substance, provided other reliable means exist to prove such ‘Use’); Hamilton v USADA & UCI,
CAS 2005/A/884, para 48 (‘[…] this rule gives great leeway to […] anti-doping agencies to prove
violations, so long as they can comfortably satisfy a tribunal that the means of proof is reliable. As
a result, it is not even necessary that a violation be proven by a scientific test itself. Instead, as some
cases have found, a violation may be proved through admissions, testimony of witnesses, or other
documentation evidencing a violation’), citing the Montgomery and Gaines decisions (as to which, see
para C7.14).
4 IAAF v RusAF and Khanafeeva, CAS 2018/O/5673, para 61 (‘Since the IAAF cannot compel the
provision of documents or testimony, it must place greater reliance on the consensual provision of
information and evidence that is already in the public domain. The evidence that it is able to present
before the CAS necessarily reflects these inherent limitations in the IAAF’s investigatory powers. The
Sole Arbitrator’s assessment of the evidence must respect those limitations. In particular, it must not
be premised on unrealistic expectations concerning the evidence that the IAAF is able to obtain from
reluctant or evasive witnesses and other sources. In view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme
and the IAAF’s limited investigatory powers, the IAAF may properly invite the Sole Arbitrator to
draw inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Sole
Arbitrator may accede to that invitation where he considers that the established facts reasonably
support the drawing of the inferences. So long as the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably satisfied about the
underlying factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, he may
conclude that the IAAF has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that
conclusion by direct evidence alone’); Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 761-782 (inferring
from physiologically impossible levels of salt in urine found in the athlete’s Sochi sample, which urine
was proven by DNA analysis to belong to the athlete, that the athlete must have previously provided
clean urine that was later swapped in, with salt added to give it the same specific gravity as the dirty
urine that was swapped out, as recorded on the DCF, and that since there was no proper reason to
provide urine outside normal doping control and medical procedures, the athlete must have known
it was to be used to carry out urine substitution at the Sochi Games) and para 811 (‘Accordingly,
the fact that the Panel has found that the Athlete knowingly facilitated the swapping of his urine
samples provides compelling inferential evidence that he also committed an ADRV consisting of
the use of a prohibited substance. In simple terms, the Athlete’s use of a prohibited substance is the
only explanation for the Athlete’s use of the prohibited method of urine substitution in this case’). Cf
Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, where there was no such salt evidence, at para 829 (‘In particular,
the Panel concludes that the probative value of the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to overcome
the absence of direct evidence that the Athlete committed an ADRV of use of a prohibited method’).
3 PROVING ‘USE’ BY REFERENCE TO ANALYTICAL DATA
C7.3 Given that ‘Use’ is defined in the Code as the ‘utilization, application,
ingestion, injection or consumption by any means’ of a prohibited substance or
prohibited method, logically the presence of a prohibited substance in an athlete’s
sample must have been preceded by its ‘Use’ by the athlete, even if this ‘Use’
happened entirely inadvertently and unknowingly on his part.1 As a result, the same
analytical data that support an Art 2.1 charge of ‘Presence’ logically also support an
Art 2.2 charge of ‘Use’,2 albeit that in most cases levelling the two charges together
will not add much if anything to the case.3 On the other hand, the data from the
analysis of the athlete’s sample may support an Art 2.2 ‘Use’ charge even if they are
insufficient to sustain an Art 2.1 charge.4 Importantly, however, if the analytical data
derive not from an adverse analytical finding or from an adverse passport finding
generated in accordance with the WADA standardised requirements,5 but rather from
another source, eg longitudinal profiling of blood samples in accordance with non-
standardised requirements, the Code Art 3.2.2 presumption that WADA-accredited
laboratories are presumed to have conducted sample analysis and custodial procedures
in accordance with the International Standard for Laboratories6 does not apply, and
therefore the Anti-Doping Organization seeking to rely on that data will have to
adduce specific evidence proving not only that (a) the blood samples were properly
taken, and (b) there is a reliable chain of custody from the place of collection to the
laboratory, but also (c) that the method used to analyse the blood samples was a
reliable means of recording accurate haematological values.7
1 See eg CCES v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, para 40 (‘The human body does
not normally produce rEPO, and its presence in the body of an athlete is therefore indicative of the
intentional administration of an external substance’).
2 See commentary to Code Art 2.2 (emphasis added): ‘unlike the proof required to establish an anti-
doping rule violation under Article 2.1, Use or Attempted Use may also be established by other reliable
means […]. For example, Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the analysis
of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B Sample) or from the analysis of a
B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a satisfactory explanation for the lack
of confirmation in the other Sample’. A fortiori, ‘Use’ may be proved by an adverse analytical finding
made in respect of the A sample that is confirmed by analysis of the B sample, ie by the same analytical
data as is sufficient to establish the presence of the substance in the sample for purposes of Code Art
2.1: see para C6.23. For example, in Blanco v USADA, CAS 2010/A/2185, para 7.5, based on an
adverse analytical finding for testosterone precursor DHEA in the athlete’s sample, USADA charged
the athlete with both presence and use of DHEA.
3 This is because two separate anti-doping rule violations are treated as one single violation for
sanctioning purposes if both take place before the first is notified to the athlete. See Code Art 10.7.4.1,
applied in (for example) CCES v Galle, SDRCC Doping Tribunal decision dated 23 April 2009, p 1;
and UK Anti-Doping v Kruk, issued decision dated 11 July 2012, para 19.
One case in which charging not only with presence under Art 2.1 but also with ‘Use’ under Art 2.2
might have made a difference was UK Anti-Doping v Edwards, NADP Tribunal decision dated 7 June
2011. The athlete’s sample tested positive for testosterone and clostebol, but he argued that he had
retired from the sport the day before the test, and so was no longer required to comply with the anti-
doping rules from that point, so that the presence of prohibited substances in his sample the next day
was not a violation. UK Anti-Doping therefore added a charge of ‘Use’ of testosterone and clostebol
in violation of Art 2.2, on the basis that the data from analysis of his sample indicated he had taken
the testosterone and clostebol several days if not weeks before the sample was taken, ie the adverse
analytical finding reported by the laboratory evidenced ‘Use’ (and so a violation of the rules) prior to
his alleged retirement. In the event, the NADP Tribunal rejected the athlete’s argument that he had
retired the day before the test (see para C4.13, n 2), so found that the presence of the two substances
in the sample collected at that test was a violation of Art 2.1, and therefore did not have to address the
separate ‘Use’ charge.
Charging not only with presence but also with use might also make a difference when it comes to
sanction. If the data establish not just the presence of the substance in the sample passed on a particular
date, but also use of the substance for a definable period after the date of sample collection, that could
lead to the disqualification of more results, in accordance with Code Art 10.8: see para C23.6.
4 The commentary to Code Art 2.2 states that a ‘Use’ charge may be sustained by ‘analytical information
which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish “Presence” of a Prohibited Substance
under Article 2.1. For example, Use may be established based upon reliable analytical data from the
analysis of an A Sample (without confirmation from an analysis of a B sample) or from the analysis
of a B Sample alone where the Anti-Doping Organization provides a satisfactory explanation for the
lack of confirmation in the other Sample’. For example, a ‘Use’ charge might be appropriate where
a B sample was lost or dropped before it could be analysed (see para C4.33, n 6); or because it had
been disposed of as part of standard procedures when the A sample initially tested negative (because
the substance in question, a stimulant not named on the Prohibited List at the time of the first test, was
therefore not at the time of the first test a target substance in the laboratory’s screening procedure):
see WADA v ASADA, AWF & Karapetyn, CAS 2007/A/1383, para 12. See also WADA TD2014EPO,
p 9: ‘Provisions 3.2 and 6.2 of the Code allow the use of results to establish profile of doping by
Athletes. Thus, even if the results of EPO analysis are reported as negative by a Laboratory on the
basis of IEF and/or SDS/SAR-PAGE analysis, information contained in the analysis combined with
other information (eg blood variables, longitudinal profiles, testimonies) may remain relevant in a
more general context to establish anti-doping rule violations’. Alternatively, analytical data may be
corroborative of other evidence of use, even if the data would not be sufficient on their own to establish
use. See para C7.14 et seq.
7 Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, paras 113-114, citing CONI, CAS 2005/C/841,
para 84 (‘[…] in anti-doping proceedings other than those deriving from positive testing, sports
authorities do not have an easy task in discharging the burden of proving that an anti-doping rule
violation has occurred, as no presumption applies’). However, that also means the Anti-Doping
Organization does not have to show that the ISTI and ISL procedures were followed; rather, ‘any
reasonably reliable practice of sample collection, post-test administration, transport of samples,
analytical process and documentation would suffice’. Ibid, para 116.
4 PROVING ‘USE’ BY MEANS OF THE ATHLETE BIOLOGICAL

PASSPORT
C7.4 Blood doping (whether the use of erythrypoiesis-stimulating agents such as

rEPO, or infusion of synthetic haemoglobin-based oxygen carriers, or ‘autologous’
or ‘homologous’ blood transfusions) is not easy to detect directly through testing
of urine or blood.1 WADA and its stakeholders therefore developed the Athlete
Biological Passport (ABP) as a means of detecting blood doping indirectly, by
monitoring changes over time in parameters in the athlete’s blood that would
ordinarily be expected to remain relatively stable, but that would deviate from
the norm in predictable ways in the event of blood doping (eg use of rEPO will
change the levels of hematocrit, haemoglobin, and reticulocyte cells in the blood
in predictable ways).2 The basis of the ABP is that in appropriate circumstances the
proper inference to draw from changes in the parameters over time is that the athlete
has Used a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method.
1 The urine test for rEPO (discussed at para C6.30) is very expensive, and only detects rEPO that was
administered a few hours or days before sample collection. Historically, therefore, first an athlete’s
blood sample was tested to see if the markers that would be disturbed by rEPO use were abnormal, and
if so a urine sample would immediately be collected from the athlete and tested for rEPO. There are
also direct tests for use of HBOCs and homologous blood transfusions by analysis of blood samples,
but there is no validated test for the direct detection of autologous blood transfusions. In addition, new
types of ESA are developed all the time by the pharmaceutical industry, and it takes significant time
and money to validate a new detection method for each one.
2 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 7 (‘While direct detection
methods aim to detect the doping agent itself, the focus of the ABP is not on the detection of prohibited
substances but rather on the effect of these substances on the body. Designed, as they are, to create
physiological enhancements, biological markers of disease are used in medicine to detect pathological
conditions. Biomarkers of doping are used to detect doping’).
For examples of other use of biomarkers to establish doping, see para C7.8.
C7.5 WADA has issued standardised technical ABP protocols for the collection,
storage, transport and analysis of blood samples, in order to limit variability in the
measurement of biomarkers in the samples due to variances in pre-analytical and
analytical conditions, and so to enable valid comparison against each other of the
values from each of the samples in the profile.1 Blood samples are collected from
the athlete over time in accordance with those protocols, and various parameters in
those samples are measured, including concentration of haemoglobin (HGB) and
percentage of new red blood cells (reticulocytes, or RET), which combined together
produce an OFF-score.2 The longitudinal data are fed into a standardised Bayesian
statistical model (the Adaptive Model) that uses an algorithm that takes into account
both variability of blood values reported in a large population and factors affecting
the variability of individual factors (such as gender, age, and sport), the possibility
of experimental errors in measuring values, and potentially confounding factors such
as exposure to altitude, in order to predict the upper and lower limits within which
the athlete’s future values would normally be expected to fall, assuming the athlete
is healthy and not blood doping.3 The model starts with data derived from a general
population of athletes, but over time is adapted to adjust to the values obtained
from samples taken from the individual athlete, so that his different physiological
circumstances are taken into account.4 In other words, the tool allows the Anti-Doping
Organization to move from relying on inter-individual (ie population) limits to intra-
individual (ie person-specific) limits. In effect, the athlete becomes his/her own point
of reference.5 As further values from further samples collected from the athlete are
entered into his profile, the Adaptive Model calculates the likelihood that any of
them falling outside the predicted range would be observed in a healthy, non-doping
athlete. If that likelihood is less than 1 in 100 (or, in the case of sequence variations,
1 in 1000), an ‘Atypical Passport Finding’ is reported and referred to scientists with
relevant expertise (eg haematologists, endocrinologists) for review.6
1 See WADA’s Athlete Biological Passport Operating Guidelines, the first version of which was issued
on 1 December 2009. References below to the ‘ABP Operating Guidelines’ are to version 7.1, dated
June 2019.
For example, the ABP Operating Guidelines provide (p 27 et seq) that:
(a) The athlete is required to sit down with his feet on the floor for at least ten minutes prior to
providing an ABP blood sample (because the athlete’s posture during sample collection can vary
plasma volume, and so haemoglobin concentration, due to changes in vascular pressure).
(b) To safeguard the stability of the biomarkers, the blood sample has to be collected in a 3ml
tube containing an anti-coagulant, then stored and transported to the laboratory in refrigerated
conditions (maintaining a temperature of between 2° and 12° C).
(c) Analysis must take place at the laboratory within a certain number of hours of collection of the
sample, depending on the temperature at which the sample is stored between collection and
analysis (the lower the temperature, the more time permitted).
(d) To avoid the problem of ‘intermethod bias’, ABP samples may only be tested using analyzers
with comparable technical characteristics. The CAS has confirmed that the same brand of
machine must be used throughout, and that any values obtained using different machines must
be disregarded. Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 152 (‘[…] in general,
the Advia Machine tends to yield higher reticulocyte values than the Sysmex Machine. Given
this difference between the two machines and the importance for blood profiling that the same
technology is always used, the panel will disregard any Athlete’s hematological values deriving
from a Sysmex machine and will only take into account values deriving from analyses performed
by the Advia Machine. In this way, the Panel is comfortably satisfied that the values are all
comparable between themselves […]’). As a result, WADA will only approve a laboratory to
conduct ABP testing using a Sysmex machine.
(e) To address ‘intra-method’ variability, ie variability between different Sysmex machines, each
laboratory must follow the same mandatory procedures in calibrating its machine (with the same
internal quality checks, and a common external quality control assessment that is carried out on a
monthly basis) and analysing the samples (with each sample analysed twice and with the results
required to be within specified tolerances).
See generally Sottas et al, ‘The Athlete Biological Passport’ (2011) 57(7) Clinical Chemistry 969–
976; Robinson et al, ‘Time and Temperature Dependant Changes in Red Blood Cell Analytes Used for
Testing Recombinant Erythropoietin Abuse in Sports’ Clin Lab 2004: 50:317–323.
2 HGB is a molecular carrier in red blood cells transporting oxygen from the lungs to the muscles and
other body tissues; the greater the concentration of HGB in the blood, the more oxygen the blood
carries to the muscles and other tissues. RET% is a quantitative marker of recent red blood cell
production of the bone marrow.
When an athlete comes ‘off’ a course of rEPO, his HGB concentration will be high (due to the rEPO
having stimulated production of extra red blood cells) and his RET% will be low (because his body will
react to the high HGB concentration by producing fewer new red blood cells), leading in combination to an
abnormally high ‘OFF-score’. Since a high HGB and a low RET% would not be expected at the same time
in normal physiological conditions, an abnormally high OFF-score is a potential indicator of blood doping.
See IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou, CAS 2012/A/2773, para 114 (‘[…] association of high haemoglobin
with low reticulocytes is a strong evidence of artificial inhibition of reticulocyte formation caused by the
suspension of an ESA [erythropoietic stimulating agent] (or, less likely, by reinfusion of multiple blood
bags). It is an indicator of the so-called OFF phase, which is seen when an ESA has been suspended on[e]
to three weeks before, such as is observed in doped athletes before important competitions. When the
ESA is stopped, hemoglobin remains high for at least two to three weeks, depending on the dosage, while
reticulocytes are reduced because the high hemoglobin inhibits endogenous EPO production’).
3 See Pottgiesser and Schumacher, ‘Biomarker monitoring in sports doping control’ Bioanalysis,
2012;4(10): 1245–1253, at 1247 (‘The model […] is based on a global Bayesian inference approach
for the detection of abnormal values over time. In such a Bayesian network, the causal relationship
between a doping activity and the induced modification in the blood markers is represented as
probabilities where every causal relationship is itself a model represented by a conditional probability
density function’). See generally Sottas et al, ‘The Athlete’s Biological Passport and Indirect Markers
of Blood Doping’, in Doping in Sports (Springer, 2010, Thieme and Hemmersbach eds), pp 317–
324; Sottas et al, ‘A forensic approach to the interpretation of blood doping markers’ (2008) 7 Law,
Probability and Risk, 191–201.
4 UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2014, para 3 (‘The athlete
biological passport involves regular monitoring of biological markers to enable indirect detection of
the use of prohibited substances or methods, which may not be in use at the time when any particular
sample is taken. The passport constructs a profile of the athlete’s blood collated from a number of
blood tests. The parameters taken into account include blood haemoglobin concentration, which is
an indicator of the capacity of the blood to transport oxygen, and reticulocyte percentage, which
indicates the recent red cell production from the bone marrow. There is a formula used to combine
those two values to produce an OFF-score which is sensitive to changes in the process of red cell
production, erythropoiesis. Over time the model, based on data derived from a general population of
athletes, is adapted to adjust to the values obtained from samples taken from the individual athlete, so
that his different physiological circumstances are taken into account. The purpose of the longitudinal
profile generated is to provide reference data against which abnormalities in samples can be assessed
by the adaptive model’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.8 (‘The basic values
for the calculation are based on the average values of the population which are part of the specially
designed software. With the first ABP values entered in the software this corridor basically reflects the
individual specificities of the person being tested’).
5 IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, para 10.
This ‘individual limit’ contrasts with normal drug testing, where the values found in the analysis of
an athlete’s samples are tested against the average values of the population at large (the ‘population
limit’), as in the case (for example) of the threshold concentration of nandrolone in urine that is used to
distinguish exogenous from endogenous nandrolone: see para C6.47 et seq. Measuring results against
the athlete’s own ‘individual limit’ is a much more sensitive approach, helping to avoid false negatives.
6 ‘Once the software registers a variation which […] with a probability of 99.9% or more […] is the
result of a non-physiological or abnormal cause, the second step, ie the interpretation of the data by a
panel of experts, is triggered’. De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.8.
C7.6 The fact that there is only a 1 in 100 or 1 in 1,000 chance (for example)
that the values (or value1) flagged by the Adaptive Model in an athlete’s ABP profile
would be observed in the absence of a medical condition2 or other confounding
factor3 does not mean that the cause of those values is almost certainly blood
doping. That is a well-known logical fallacy (sometimes referred to as ‘the inversion
fallacy’, or ‘the prosecutor’s fallacy’) that mistakes the probability of seeing the
abnormal values if the athlete is innocent (ie the probability of the evidence given the
hypothesis) for the probability that the athlete is innocent given the abnormal values
(ie the probability of the hypothesis given the evidence), or (put slightly differently)
that deduces automatically from the fact that the probability of seeing the abnormal
values if the athlete is innocent is low is that the probability of doping is high.4 The
Adaptive Model presents only the first probability, not the second, and therefore the
probability of seeing the abnormal values if the athlete is innocent has to be weighed
against the probability of seeing those values if the athlete is blood doping.5 As a
result, an Atypical Passport Finding (unlike an Adverse Analytical Finding) is not
itself a basis for a charge. Instead, it is merely the trigger for expert interpretation.6
‘The Adaptive Model focuses on highlighting cases that are too far from the expected
normality. In the expert review, by contrast, the focus is on evaluating the abnormality
and its potential causes’.7 If one expert’s assessment is positive, two more experts
are shown the athlete’s (anonymised) profile as well, and each assesses the profile
independently of the other two. First they review the documentation for each sample
(doping control form, chain of custody form, etc) to assess whether the abnormal
values could be due to failure to comply with the mandatory pre-analytical and
analytical requirements.8 If that is ruled out, they then consider the likelihood of all of
the potential explanations for the abnormal value(s), including exposure to altitude,
recent exercise, a medical condition, and simple chance (normal variation). They
‘balance all possible causes for a given blood profile and provide a likelihood for
potential scenarios (pathology, normal variation, doping) that might have caused the
pattern. […] [Their role] is therefore comparable to a forensic scientist who evaluates
different pieces of evidence and provides opinions on possible crime scenarios in any
criminal case’.9 If (but only if) they conclude that it is highly likely that the abnormal
values are due to blood doping, and that any other explanation is unlikely to be
correct, will they declare an ‘Adverse Passport Finding’.10 In this context, ‘highly
likely’ is ‘synonymous with “comfortable satisfaction” on its face; because of its
use of the adverb “highly” is posited a higher standard than one of mere probability,
ie likelihood’.11
1 It may only be a single value in the sequence that is abnormal, and that single value may be the first
value in the sequence. UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2014,
para 47 (‘It is argued by Mr Unsworth that this case in unprecedented in that it is the only case in
which a contravention has been alleged under the ABP programme based on a single sample, and the
sample relied upon is the first sample taken under the programme. That may be so, but it does not
call into question either the reliability of the ABP model in general, or the validity of relying upon a
single sample to prove a contravention. The purpose of establishing the ABP programme is to build a
longitudinal profile providing parameters which, to a very high degree of probability, serve to detect
results which are abnormal and call for explanation. Because blood doping may be transient, and its
effects very quickly cease to be evident in blood or urine, it is essential to have a programme which
can detect an isolated outlier. There is no logical difference between an abnormal value detected in the
first of a series of tests, and an abnormal value detected at the end of series of tests, by which time the
model will have been fully adapted. In each case the abnormality will be assessed against a reliable
series, and to a very high degree of probability. In this case there is no issue that the abnormalities
shown in the sample would constitute compelling evidence of the use of a prohibited substance or
method, unless explained by some other cause’).
2 Possible medical explanations for abnormal variations observed in an athlete’s profile include a
congenital or acquired hematologic disorder (such as a form of anemia, or polycythemia) or a
pathological condition (such as blood loss from gastro-intestinal bleeding, or dehydration from gastro-
intestinal infection). See eg Parisotto R, Ashenden MJ, et al, ‘The effect of common hematologic
abnormalities on the ability of blood models to detect erythropoietin abuse by athletes’ Haematologica.
2003 Aug;88(8):931-40 (‘[…] it is conceivable that the hematologic disturbances associated with
blood disorders may give rise to elevated model scores, which could be mistakenly interpreted as
evidence that an individual had used rHuEPO’) and (‘[…] because the parameters included in our
models are not a sufficient foundation for establishing the presence of a hematologic abnormality, in
the event of a blood profile exceeding a cut-off score, medical evaluation and subsequent classification
of a hematologic disorder by a hematologist should constitute persuasive evidence that the unusual
blood profile was not caused by rHuEPO use’); K Sharpe, MJ Ashenden, YO Schumacher, ‘A third
generation approach to detect erythropoietin abuse in athletes’ Haematologica January 2006 91: 356–
363 (‘For an athlete who provides a blood sample showing suspicious changes from historical values,
a subsequent step may be to conduct an in-depth hematologic evaluation to identify any congenital
or acquired hematologic disorders. We support the notion presented by Malcovati et al whereby a
careful hematologic evaluation is undertaken, consisting of at least a blood cell count and iron status
evaluation. The addition of more extensive testing proposed by Malcovati, including bilirubin, lactate
dehydrogenase, serum iron, total iron binding capacity, serum ferritin, soluble transferrin receptor and
serum erythropoietin levels, is in our opinion a logical and well-founded extension of this evaluation’).
See also McLaren, ‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint’ [2012] ISLR, Issue 4, p 21
(noting that in ABP cases it is ‘crucial to understand how medical conditions can affect blood markers’)
and p 89 (‘Fluid loss from extensive bleeding or digestive conditions has been suggested to cause
abnormal blood values. […] A loss of fluid results in dehydration, a decrease in plasma volume and
consequently an increase in the level of all concentration-based markers in blood markers, including
haemoglobin’).
CAS panels have accepted expert evidence that menstruation is unlikely to lower HGB significantly,
while missing periods is unlikely to increase it significantly: IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva,
CAS 2018/O/5822, paras 145-147; IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras 120–123.
3 See UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 88 (‘In principle, such explanation could fall into
one or more of five categories: (i) pure chance; (ii) incorrect analysis; (iii) breaches in the chain of
custody both to and in the laboratory which tested the samples; (iv) medical condition, physiological
or psychological; (v) manipulation of blood’). See eg Sharpe, Hopkins, Emslie, Howe, Trout,
Kazlauskas, Ashenden, Gore, Parisotto, Hahn, ‘Development of reference ranges for markers of altered
erythropoiesis’ Haematologica, 2002; 87:1248–1257 (‘the erythropoietic-dependent parameters
included in our models could potentially be confounded by a number of factors. These include
biological factors such as disease, physiological factors such as exercise, environmental factors such
as altitude exposure and also the biological variation of blood parameters over time. Consequently
identifying rHuEPO users amongst the elite athlete population will entail differentiating between the
fluctuations associated with exposure to such influences, and the atypical variation of hematologic
parameters caused by rHuEPO use’); MJ Ashenden, CJ Gore, R Parisotto et al, ‘Effect of altitude on
second-generation blood tests to detect erythropoietin abuse by athletes’ Haematologica, January 2003
88: 1053-1062 (‘In addition to inter-individual variability, factors such as ethnicity, type of sport and
residence at altitude also influence blood model scores. […] it would seem judicious for antidoping
agencies to seek information concerning recent altitude exposure before instigating any consequences
for an athlete with elevated OFF model scores’); Ashenden, ‘A strategy to deter blood doping in sport’
Haematologica, March 2002 87(3): 225–232, at 227–28 (‘Altitude/training/genetic factors may also
be associated with a transient increase in erythropoiesis (albeit of a much smaller magnitude) which
might lead to mistakenly accusing an athlete when no drug was taken’). CAS panels have ruled that
living/training at altitude will only be a factor if the athlete can prove he was at a significant altitude
for a sustained period (eg IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822, paras 136-140; IAAF v
ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras 102-110) (whereabouts filings or answers on doping
control forms may become a factor here, if they show the athlete was not at altitude when they claimed
they were: See eg Ibid, para 111); and that intense exercise can reduce HGB.
The WADA ABP Operating Guidelines attempt (at p 27 et seq) to control for certain of these
potential confounding factors:
(a) Every time a Doping Control Officer collects an ABP sample, he is required to gather from the
athlete and record the following information on the doping control form, and get the athlete to
sign the form to confirm that the information collected is accurate: any blood loss or gain by the
athlete due to pathology or transfusion (with estimated volume) in the three months preceding
the test; any exposure the athlete has had to altitude in the two weeks preceding the test; and
any recent exposure to extreme heat conditions or participation in any multi-stage intensive
endurance event (because dehydration could cause haemoconcentration).
(b) Importantly, the WADA ABP protocols also require the DCO not to collect the sample unless
at least two hours have passed since the athlete last trained or competed, because strenuous
exercise leads to a decrease of plasma volume for up to two hours, thereby increasing HGB
concentration even though there is no increase in red blood cells, and so causing false positives.
In short, red blood cells (which are 95 per cent haemoglobin) normally make up 45 per cent of
the total blood volume. Plasma (a water, sugar, fat, protein and salt solution) makes up about
55 per cent of the total blood volume. During prolonged exercise, plasma volume can decrease
by 10–20 per cent, for several reasons. In particular, contraction of muscles as well as higher
blood pressure in the arteries forces plasma out of the capillary vessels and into the tissues.
In addition, much of the water and electrolytes within the plasma is lost through the pores as
sweat. That reduction in plasma automatically increases the concentration of haemoglobin in the
blood, even though no extra red blood cells have been produced. See eg Parisotto, Gore, Emslie,
Ashenden et al, ‘A novel method utilizing markers of altered erythropoiesis for the detection of
recombinant human erythropoietin abuse in athletes’ Haematologica, 2000; 85:564–572 (‘[…]
hemoconcentration could cause false positives by artificially elevating blood markers such as
sTfr and Hct. Hemoconcentration can be caused by dehydration associated with prolonged
exercise or by posturally-induced shifts in plasma volume, and may be in the order of 10-20%’);
Schumacher et al, ‘Diurnal and exercise-related variability of haemoglobin and reticulocytes in
athletes’, In J Sports Med 2010;31;225–30 (‘The most relevant confounder is physical exercise,
which significantly increased Hb. This increase can be explained by exercise induced plasma
volume concentration. Many previous investigations have highlighted this issue. The data of
our investigation demonstrates that Hb returns to values around pre-exercise baseline within
approximately 2h after the cessation of physical activity’).
Another possible explanation for the ‘abnormal’ values is simply natural variation, ie there will be
athletes who will have values above the thresholds simply as a matter of natural biological variability.
C. Gore, R Parisotto, MJ Ashenden et al, ‘Second-generation blood tests to detect erythropoietin abuse
by athletes’ Journal of Hematology, vol. 88(03), March 2003, p 343. Even if this is only 1 in 1,000
athletes (for example), it cannot be ruled out as a possible cause of the ‘abnormal’ variation observed.
‘With the large number of tests being performed as result of the ABP there will certainly be some
profiles flagged incorrectly due to chance’. McLaren, ‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical
Viewpoint’ [2012] ILSR, Issue 4, p 88.
4 Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press, 2016), para 11.3.3,
pp 761–762, giving as an example Kreuziger v Czech Cycling Federation, decision of COC Arbitration
Committee dated 22 September 2014, para 6.4; New Scientist, Chance (Profile Books, 2017), p 117;
Mlodinow, The Drunkard’s Walk (Penguin, 2008), pp 117–121; Sottas et al, ‘The Athlete’s Biological
Passport and Indirect Markers of Blood Doping’, in Thieme and Hemmersbach (Eds), Doping in
Sports (Springer, 2010), pp 319–320. See IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 150,
quoting Viret, p 774 (‘[…] a pitfall to be avoided [in the context of the ABP] is the fallacy that if
the probability of observing values that assume a normal or pathological condition is low, then the
probability of doping is automatically high”. Concretely this has been said in legal literature to mean
that “if the ADO is not able to produce a ‘doping scenario’ with a minimum degree of credibility
(‘density’), the abnormality is simply unexplained, the burden of proof enters into play and the ADO’s
case must be dismissed since there is no evidence pleading in favour of the hypothesis of ‘doping’ any
more than for another cause’).
5 Coccia, ‘The Athlete Biological Passport: Legal and Scientific Aspects’ [2013] ISLR, Issue 1, p 9,
pp 15-16 (the fact that an OFF-score is flagged as abnormal by the Adaptive Model ‘does not mean
in itself that there is a probability of doping but only that the profile differs from what would be
expected in a clean athlete; an atypical profile as such is not evidence of doping. An atypical blood
profile may actually have different explanations: pure chance (which is statistically possible if many
tests have been performed); instrument malfunction or inappropriate storage or transport of some
blood samples; pathological or medical condition that has caused an abnormal change in blood
variables; and doping in the form of blood manipulation. Therefore, no definite conclusions may be
drawn at this stage. The Adaptive Model is only a filter that excludes normal profiles and triggers the
expert review of any atypical blood profile’); McLaren, ‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical
Viewpoint’ [2012] ISLR, Issue 4, pp 83–84 (‘Currently the recommended level of variation required
to initiate a review based on the ABP is a blood marker outside the 99.9th percentile. This means
that the probability that the same value would be observed in a similar healthy, non-doping athlete
is approximately one in every thousand times tested. This threshold is referred to as the specificity
of the test. This part of review should not be confused with the probability of doping. The profile
only establishes the likelihood of observing certain values assuming that the athlete is healthy and
not doping. […] The profile cannot establish the probability of doping. An abnormal outcome on
the profile does not automatically mean doping occurred, because the abnormality is not based on
the true probability of doping. Rather, the decision is based on “how the profile differs from what
is expected in clean athletes”. The panel of experts therefore plays a crucial role in evaluating the
profile to eventually deciding whether or not the athlete has doped. The expert panel is composed
of blood doping experts such as haematologists and exercise physiologists with expertise in blood
doping. Their task is to consider whether there is an explanation other than blood doping for the
values recorded in the athlete’s profile. The experts will also try to determine which doping scenario
the athlete is engaged in. As a general principle, the more certain experts are in the suspected
doping method, the more confident they can be in their assertion of doping’’) and p 93 (‘A blood
marker outside the acceptable levels cannot establish that an athlete has engaged in blood doping.
It is only after experts have reviewed the profile and discounted all other possible explanations for
the values of the markers that a likelihood of doping can be determined. The three-step process set
out for expert panels to use when reviewing abnormal profiles recognizes this fact. The reasoning
in CAS cases also needs to ensure this fact is taken into consideration. Otherwise sanctions will be
delivered based on the faulty reasoning earlier referred to as the prosecutor’s fallacy’), and pp 85 and
88 (warning against confusing the likelihood of the abnormal values found if doping has occurred
(which is within the expert’s remit) with the likelihood that doping has occurred given the abnormal
values found (which is solely within the hearing panel’s remit)), and p 93 (suggesting that ‘experts
must focus on possible explanations for the abnormal values rather than the guilt or innocence of the
accused’). See also Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser
Press, 2016), para 11.3.3 (‘[…] the contribution of the Experts consists of expanding the value of
the evidence for the panel by integrating additional quantitative or qualitative evidence that goes
beyond the profile values. They then put into the balance various hypotheses that could explain the
abnormality in the profile values’).
See also IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 163 (prosecutor’s fallacy avoided
where experts ‘did not only consider the probability of the abnormal results being caused by a doping
scenario, but indeed also considered whether the arguments advanced by the Appellant (eg miscarriage,
surgeries, iron supplements, hypoxic devices/training, menstrual bleeding) could explain the
abnormalities or whether it is the result of a normal physiological or pathological condition’).
6 IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 146; Coccia, ‘The Athlete Biological Passport:
Legal and Scientific Aspects’ [2013] ISLR, Issue 1, p 9, pp 15–16 (‘The Adaptive Model is only a filter
that excludes normal profiles and triggers the expert review of any atypical blood profile’).
7 Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press, 2016), p 757.
8 These points are crucial to the scientific accuracy of the values recorded in respect of each sample,
and to the fairness of comparing the values of different samples in the same profile. The experts
therefore have to review the sample collection forms, the chain of custody forms, and the laboratory
documentation packages (including the blood results, the scattergrams, the internal chain of custody,
and the internal and external quality controls) in order to ascertain compliance with the mandatory
standards. If any departures are found from the mandatory sample collection, transportation and
analysis requirements set out in the WADA ABP protocol, then the values from the sample or samples
in question are deemed unreliable and generally have to be disregarded, which may mean the profile is
no longer abnormal.
9 Schumacher & d’Onofrio, ‘Scientific Expertise and the Athlete Biological Passport: 3 Years of
Experience’ Clinical Chemistry 58:6, 979-985 (2012), at 979. This process is described in IAAF v ARAF
& Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 153, and IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822,
para 89, as follows: ‘the deviations in the ABP are to be interpreted by experts called to put in the
balance various hypotheses that could explain the abnormality in the profile values, ie a distinction
is made between a ‘‘quantitative’’ and a ‘‘qualitative’’ assessment of the evidence’. See also IAAF v
ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 157 (‘a charge filed on the basis of an ABP is not based
only on statistical information but is indeed only pursued following a qualitative assessment of all the
information available’).
10 ABP Operating Guidelines, p 61.
11 IAAF v Kiptum, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/95/2019, para 84, cited and followed in World
Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/078/2020 dated 10 September 2020, para 71.
C7.7 An Adverse Passport Finding ‘does not in itself justify a conclusion that
an anti-doping rule violation has occurred but rather calls for an explanation by the
athlete’ of the abnormalities in his profile.1 Instead, the athlete is sent a complete
ABP Documentation Package that includes the documentation for each sample as
well as the experts’ opinion, is warned that the matter is under consideration as a
potential anti-doping rule violation, and is invited to provide any explanation he
might wish the experts to consider for the abnormal values seen in his profile. If
the athlete provides an explanation for his abnormal values (eg a diagnosis from his
medical file of a potentially relevant condition), he will not be charged with an anti-
doping rule violation unless the experts unanimously consider that explanation to be
implausible, and remain of the view that his abnormal values are highly likely to be
caused by blood doping.2
1 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, paras 14–15.
2 ABP Operating Guidelines, p 62. See De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2142, para 9.8 (‘The
condition precedent for this third and final step of the procedure is that all members of the panel of experts
separately and unanimously come to the conclusion that all other causes but doping can be excluded
to be the source of the abnormal values’). See eg IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou, CAS 2012/A/2773,
para 126 (‘All three Experts as well as Dr. Sottas agree that Ms. Kokkinariou’s ferritin level was highly
irregular, and was likely the result of iron supplements taken to boost the efficacy of an ESA regimen.
Prof. Schumacher concluded “it is unlikely that the cause for [Ms. Kokkinariou’s] ferritin levels is
primary hemochromatosis. It is more likely that the levels have been induced by repeated, uncontrolled
iron application.” Dr. d’Onofrio stated “the finding of high ferritin in an athlete is an indirect clue
which supports the suspect of a doping program based on ESA intake”‘).
A good example of such a joint expert report is reproduced in IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina,
CAS 2016/O/4464, at para 99.
See however the criticism in Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law
(Asser Press, 2016), p 755, of what is being asked of the experts at this final stage: ‘The final opinion
requested from the Expert Panel […] might be seen as creating more confusion that clarification.
We would suggest that what is expected from the experts here is the probability a posteriori in
favour of the doping hypothesis (P(Hdoping/ABP) versus the probability a posteriori in favour of
the hypothesis medical (P/Hmedical?ABP)), or the hypothesis [that the athlete is] clean&healthy
(P(Hclean&healthy/ABP). While this does not correspond to the typical division of tasks between
experts and hearing panels, this interpretation at least has the merits of complying with the logic of
evaluation of evidence and approaches what is being done in practice. The point to retain is that the
Expert Panel expresses its opinion on the probability a posteriori of the various hypotheses of the
case, which in effect considerably restricts the ability of the hearing panels to control or depart from
the expert conclusions’).
C7.8 An Anti-Doping Organization that charges an athlete with ‘Use’ of a

Prohibited Substance (specifically, an erythropoiesis-stimulating agent, such as
rEPO) or a Prohibited Method (specifically, the physical manipulation of blood, such
as transfusion of autologous, homologous or heterologous blood or red blood cell
products of any origin) based on abnormalities in the athlete’s Athlete Biological
Passport will have to demonstrate, to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing
panel,1 that:
(a) Tracking changes over time in particular haematological biomarkers is
a reliable means of proving blood doping.2 The Anti-Doping Organization
can rely here on comments to Code Art 2.2 and Code Art 3.2 that conclusions
drawn from data in the athlete’s Athlete Biological Passport are reliable means
of determining that the athlete has Used a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited
Method,3 and on a long line of constant CAS jurisprudence accepting the
reliability of the Athlete Biological Passport as a means of providing blood
doping, and rejecting athlete arguments to the contrary.4
(b) The specific biomarker values reported in the athlete’s ABP are reliable.5
To prove this, the Anti-Doping Organization will have to show that the blood
samples from which those values were derived were collected properly from
the athlete and transported to the laboratory safely and promptly, and that the
laboratory analysed the samples properly, all in accordance with the mandatory
WADA protocols.6 In relation to the laboratory’s work, it can rely on the Code
Art 3.2.2 presumption that analytical results produced by WADA-accredited
laboratories are valid and reliable.7 Given this presumption, and the fact that
the experts will have confirmed compliance with the protocols during the
results management phase, in practice the burden will quickly shift to the
athlete to show there was a departure from the required standards that could
have affected the values reported for the sample(s) in question. If he meets that
burden, it will then be up to the Anti-Doping Organization to show that none
of the relevant values were affected by the departure, or else that removing the
affected values from the profile does not remove the values that are the basis
of the charge and does not affect the conclusion that those values are highly
abnormal.8
(c) The variations in the athlete’s values are highly abnormal. Here the Anti-
Doping Organization can rely on the very small likelihood calculated by the
Adaptive Model of seeing the flagged values if the athlete was in normal health
and not doping.9
(d) In addition (since ‘abnormal values are (for the purposes of the ABP) a necessary
but not a sufficient proof of a doping violation’10), blood doping explains the
abnormal values, and there is no other plausible physiological explanation
for those values, such as a pathological condition.11 Here the Anti-Doping
Organization will rely heavily on the unanimous view reached by the experts
during the results management stage that the abnormal values are highly likely
to have been caused by blood doping and that any alternative explanation
offered by the athlete is not plausible. However, the experts’ opinion is not
binding on the hearing panel. Instead, the Anti-Doping Organization has to
persuade the hearing panel that they should have the same opinion.12 To do so,
it is likely to be important (if not technically necessary) to provide a convincing
‘doping scenario’ to the hearing panel, such as showing that the abnormal
values (eg elevated HGB values) coincided with competition periods.13 In any
event, it will be important to put forward a positive case as to the period during
which the athlete is said to have doped, not only to help persuade the panel of
the merits of the charge, but also to provide a clear basis for disqualification of
results if the charge is upheld.14 The Anti-Doping Organization will also need
to be ready to explain (again, with the help of the experts) why it does not
accept that any hypothesis put forward by the athlete is a plausible explanation
for the abnormal values in the profile.15 Again, expert evidence is likely to be
important point, as may be evidence from the doping control forms and/or
whereabouts forms provided by the athlete that contradicts the athlete’s current
claims.16
1 All attempts by athletes to elevate the standard of proof in blood doping cases to the criminal standard
of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (eg on the basis that the allegation is one of wilful manipulation of blood)
have been rejected. See eg Pechstein v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912 & 1913, para 125 (‘[…] the Panel does
not agree with the Athlete’s contention that the standard of proof must be very close to “proof beyond
reasonable doubt” because of the particular seriousness of the allegation against Ms Pechstein. The
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is typically a criminal law standard that finds no application
in anti-doping cases. Obviously, the Panel is mindful of the seriousness of the allegations put forward
by the ISU but, in the Panel’s view, it is exactly the same seriousness as any other anti-doping case
brought before the CAS and involving blood doping; nothing more, nothing less’); UCI v Valjavec,
CAS 2010/A/2235, paras 76 and 77 (‘Insofar as the Athlete, by invoking the principle “in dubio pro
reo” and in seeking to quantify the requisite standard in terms of an equal to or a less than 1 in 1000
chance, seeks to depart from the language of the rules, the CAS rejects his approach’); IAAF v TAF and
Yanit, CAS 2013/A/3373, para 128 (‘With respect to the applicable standard of proof in an ABP case,
the Panel agrees with the IAAF that it is the “comfortable satisfaction” standard. This is consistent with
the decisions of UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia CAS 2010/A/2235 and Pechstein
v International Skating Union CAS 2009/A/1912. The decision referred to by the Athlete’s Counsel
in his Answer Brief, namely UKAD v Tiernan-Locke, is not an authority which supports in any way
the Athlete’s submission that a higher burden of proof is required in an ABP case’); IAAF & WADA v
RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, para 262 (‘[…] the Panel will apply the
“comfortable satisfaction” standard as provided in the IAAF Rule 33.1, and consistently applied in
many cases concerning allegations of blood manipulation or other serious form of doping’); IAAF v
Rutto, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2019, para 90 (‘[…] while the Tribunal has no
hesitation in accepting that the stakes are high for athletes accused of doping, this factor alone cannot
provide cause for elevating the standard of proof to a criminal standard. Such an exception would
swallow the rule, since almost all anti-doping disciplinary proceedings affect, or threaten to affect,
the continued livelihood of athletes. To proceed in this way would render the underlined portion of
Article 3.1 [ie its last sentence] without effect’).
2 Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913, para 113.
3 The comment to Code Art 2.2 notes that an Art 2.2 ‘Use’ violation can be proved by ‘any reliable
means’, including ‘conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling, including data collected as part of
the Athlete Biological Passport’, while the comment to Code Art 3.2 (‘Methods of Establishing Facts
and Presumptions’) gives as an example of ‘reliable means’ of establishing the facts establishing an
Code Art 2.2 violation ‘conclusions drawn from the profile of a series of an Athlete’s blood or urine
Samples, such as data from the Athlete Biological Passport’. See UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235,
para 7 (‘Biomarkers of doping are used to detect doping. The comment to article 3.2 of the WADA Code
which refers to “conclusions drawn from the profile of a series of the Athlete’s blood or urine samples”
gives an authoritative imprimatur to the principle of using such evidence’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI,
CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.5 (‘[…] the use of the newest and most scientific methods in order to
uncover anti-doping rule violations is perfectly legitimate, provided that these techniques […] can
be considered as a “reliable means” by virtue of […] Article 3.2 of the WADC’). See also McLaren,
‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint’, [2012] ISLR Issue 4, p 77, at p 80 (‘The
profile displays changes in biological markers, demonstrating “how the profile differs from what is
expected in clean athletes”. The information from the ABP, therefore, constitutes at law what is known
as circumstantial evidence. It requires an inference that the abnormal biological markers were caused
by doping with an undetected prohibited substance or method. In the past circumstantial evidence
has been enough to prove a doping offence if the ADO can meet the applicable standard of proof,
which is the comfortable satisfaction of the court having in mind the seriousness of the allegation
which is made. However, past cases based on circumstantial evidence usually dealt with apparent
manipulation or contamination of samples given by an athlete. The ABP is a new development from
both a legal and scientific standpoint. Article 3.2 of the WADC states that the “facts related to anti-
doping rule violations may be established by any reliable means”. To establish the inference that the
athlete has used a prohibited substance or method, the ABP must constitute a “reliable means”. The
WADC specifically mentions “conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling” as a reliable means for
establishing an anti-doping offence. Including longitudinal profiling directly in the WADC ensures
the ABP is prima facie a “reliable means”. This is an attempt in the WADC to preclude challenges
to the conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling programmes, namely the ABP. The result of
this construction is that individual profiling is an acceptable evidentiary method if implemented in
a manner that produces scientifically accurate results and therefore satisfies both the reliable means
standard and the burden of proof set out in Art. 3.1 of WADC. The rules have been constructed to
ensure that the ABP is able to produce evidence that will withstand legal challenges to the method’).
At pages 231–232 of its report dated 9 November 2015, a WADA Independent Commission
explained that before the introduction of the WADA ABP protocols in 2009, blood profiling was not
considered reliable evidence of doping because ‘there were no standard protocols regarding how
blood was collected; what constituted proper handling in the circumstances; what equipment should
be used for measurements; the appropriate variables and how they should be defined; or, what were
the applicable pre-testing conditions and how relevant comparisons should be made’. See also Gusev
v Olympus SARL, CAS 2008/O/1643, paras 43-44, 84, 92-93, 122 (declining to place reliance on
variations over time in the (pre-2009) blood values of a cyclist as a ‘serious indicator’ that cyclist
had taken rEPO or CERA); UCI v Contador & RFEC, CAS 2011/A/2384, paras 367-69 (rejecting
invitation to rely on pre-2009 blood values as evidence that cyclist had blood-doped in 2010: ‘The
Panel is not convinced that the comparison conducted by Dr Ashenden is a sufficiently secure method
of establishing inconsistencies in Mr Contador’s ABP. More specifically, after considering the
positions of all the parties and the expert reports of Dr Ashenden and Mr Scott, the Panel finds that the
inconsistencies that Dr Ashenden sees in Mr Contador’s ABP are not conclusive and are deducted from
too many uncertain blood parameters and comparisons, making them too speculative and insufficiently
secure to rely on as convincing supporting evidence that an athlete underwent a blood transfusion’).
4 See eg Caucchioli v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2178, para 44 (‘[…] la présente Formation estime que
l’application rigoureuse de l’ABP mis en place par l’UCI peut être considérée comme un moyen fiable
pour le dépistage indirect d’actes de dopage’) (informal translation: ‘the tribunal considers that the
rigorous application of the Athlete Biological Passport set up by the UCI can be considered a reliable
means for the indirect detection of acts of doping’); Pellizotti v CONI & UCI, TAS 2010/A/2308,
paras 43 and 50 (same); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.8 (‘As for the probative
value of the ABP, the Panel is of the view that it provides a satisfactory level of reliability (and, thus,
has to be considered a “reliable means” in the sense of Article 23 of the UCI ADR and of Article 3.2
of the WADC’); IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou, CAS 2012/A/2773, para 13 (‘Systems which make
use of these longitudinal profiles have evolved to become widespread and highly effective means of
detecting EPO doping’); IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561,
para 279 (‘Therefore, following a consideration of the written and oral testimonies of the Parties’
experts, the Panel is convinced that the ABP model is a reliable and valid mean of establishing an
ADRV’); IAAF v ARAF & Chernova, CAS 2016/O/4469, para 137 (‘The Sole Arbitrator is satisfied to
accept that the ABP is a reliable and accepted means of evidence to assist in establishing anti-doping
rule violations […]’); IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 148 (‘the ABP has been
generally accepted as a reliable and accepted means of evidence to assist in establishing anti-doping
rule violations’) and para 149 (‘This is not to say that no criticism on the ABP is permitted or that the
reliability of the evidence provided by the ABP in a specific case cannot be reproached, it is however at
least indicative that the credibility of the ABP system as a whole is not to be mistrusted easily. The Sole
Arbitrator hence finds that the ABP system is to be presumed valid, unless convincing arguments are
made that a specific element of the system does not operate satisfactorily’); IAAF v ARAF & Ugarova,
CAS 2016/O/4463, para 91 (same); IAAF v RusAF & Kirdyapkina, CAS 2017/O/5398, paras 88-89
(same); IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822, para 86 (‘[…] the Sole Arbitrator accepts
that the ABP is a reliable and accepted means of evidence to assist in establishing anti-doping rule
violations’).
6 Sottas et al, ‘The Athlete’s Biological Passport and Indirect Markers of Blood Doping’, in Thieme and
Hemmersbach (Eds), Doping in Sports (Springer 2010), p 311 (‘A biological passport is valid only
if the conditions under which samples are collected, transported and analysed obey strict rules. Such
compliance is necessary to reduce pre-analytical and analytical uncertainties’); McLaren, ‘Athlete
Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint’ [2012] ISLR Issue 4, p 8 (‘Only after longitudinal
profiling is standardized across organizations can there be legal certainty’) and p 10 (‘The result of
this construction is that individual profiling is an acceptable evidentiary method if implemented in a
manner that produces scientifically accurate results […]’).
See IAAF v Chepchirchir, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 28 November 2019, para 150-154
(rejecting attack on validity of one sample in ABP profile based on temperature increase during transport
to the laboratory, because the temperature increase did not take the sample outside the WADA limits,
and because in any event a high temperature would have assisted the athlete by decreasing the RET%
in the sample); IAAF v Ryzhova, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 29 August 2019, para 146 (panel
declined to ignore values from sample alleged to have been stored at too low a temperature, because
‘Professor d’Onofrio was of the opinion that the sample was never frozen, and the red blood cells in
Sample 6 would not have ruptured. Professor d’Onofrio also stated that in any event, the method of
testing for haemoglobin involves a reagent that ruptures red blood cells, so even if the sample had been
frozen, it would not have resulted in an incorrect haemoglobin reading’).
7 As happened, for example, in Pellizotti v CONI & UCI, TAS 2010/A/2308, para 56, Caucchioli v
CONI & UCI, TAS 2010/A/2178, para 55, and UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 83. Cf the
(pre-ABP) case of Pechstein, DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-1913 at paras 113–14 (presumption of
regularity set out in Code only applies to adverse analytical findings and not to other analytical data,
such as biomarker values from blood testing). For a discussion of the Code presumption, see paras
C6.21 to C6.27.
8 ABP Operating Guidelines para L.2.1.6.1 (‘If there is a departure from WADA ABP requirements for
Sample collection, transport and analysis, the biological Marker obtained from this Sample affected by
the non-conformity shall not be considered in the Adaptive Model calculations (for example, RET%
can be affected but not HGB under certain transport conditions)’) and para L2.1.6.2 (‘A Marker result
which is not affected by the non-conformity can still be considered in the Adaptive Model calculations.
In such case, the APMU shall provide the specific explanations supporting the inclusion of the result(s).
In all cases, the Sample shall remain recorded in the Athlete’s Passport. The Experts may include all
results in their review provided that their conclusions may be validly supported when taking into
account the effects of the non-conformity’). See also Pechstein and DESG v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912-
1913, para 144 (rejecting allegation of transportation under improper temperature conditions on the
facts, but also because ‘the Panel heard persuasive expert evidence at the hearing explaining that a
degradation of the Athlete’s samples can be safely excluded because all her mean cell volume (MCV)
values were at the bottom of the normal range and that any delay in the process would be in favour of
the Athlete because the reticulocytes would decrease’).
9 Even if it is shown that the values from analysis of particular samples in an ABP are not reliable and
therefore must be discounted, that makes no difference if the Adaptive Model would still flag the same
abnormalities after those samples are excluded. IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822,
paras 122–126. See also IAAF v ARAF & Chernova, CAS 2016/O/4469, para 128 (‘[…] if Sample
1 would be excluded, quod non, Sample 2 would have been flagged as an individual outlier as the
reference range of the Athlete’s ABP would have been different due to exclusion of Sample 1.
Excluding Sample 1 would therefore not lead to the consequence that no abnormal values would have
been flagged in the Athlete’s ABP’).
Query whether the values have to be outside the predicted parameters, and therefore trigger an
Atypical Adverse Finding, ie whether an Atypical Adverse Finding is a necessary condition to an
ABP Use case. The contrary proposition (that an Atypical Adverse Finding is not a prerequisite) was
not ruled out in Kreuziger v Czech Cycling Federation, decision of COC Arbitration Committee,
22 September 2014, para 86, and is supported in Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of
Science and Law (Asser Press 2016), para 11.3.3, on the basis that the longitudinal data (perhaps in
combination with other evidence) may nevertheless constitute reliable evidence of an anti-doping rule
violation. The ABP Operating Guidelines now expressly provide (at p 58) that a passport may be sent
for expert review ‘in the absence of an ATPF where the Passport includes other elements otherwise
justifying a review’. A fortiori, if the experts consider that the values are highly likely to be due to
blood doping, and that any other explanation (including any explanation offered by the athlete when
invited to do so) is unlikely to be the cause, the values may be offered as proof of blood doping.
10 See eg IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 96; World Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary
Tribunal decision SR/078/2020 dated 10 September 2020, paras 90–91 (‘There is no presumption of
guilt or a strict liability principle based on the abnormalities in the Athlete’s ABP. Accordingly, there is
no shift in the burden of proof to the Athlete to prove that the abnormalities are caused by a non-doping
related explanation. 91. It is up to the AIU to discharge its burden of proof that the abnormalities
are caused by the Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method, rather than by non-doping
explanations. This is the qualitative aspect of the Expert Panel’s analysis’).
There must be a sufficient number of values in the profile to make any inference of blood doping
reliable: IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 160 (finding that a reliable inference
can be made based on many fewer than 13 samples); World Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary Tribunal
decision SR/078/2020 dated 10 September 2020, para 108 (agreeing with expert that an abnormal ABP
finding may be arrived at with only one sample, and noting that decisions have been made based on
4 or 5 samples).
Values of biomarkers in non-ABP samples cannot be relied on, either by the Anti-Doping
Organization to prove abnormality, or by the athlete to prove no abnormality, because there is no
guarantee that any of the necessary protocols were followed in their collection, transport, and/or
analysis. Farnasova v IAAF & ARAF, CAS 2017/A/5045, para 91 (‘[O]nly samples collected for anti-
doping purposes from the Athlete and that comply with the respective protocols should be included
in the ABP in order to ensure that the data is reliable and reflects the true profile of an athlete. Only
standardized sample-taking and quality control ensure fair and comparable testing results […].
Thus, the Panel is not prepared to include private test results whose origins and conditions in which
they were taken are unknown and undocumented’); IAAF v ARAF & Chernova, CAS 2016/O/4469,
para 135 (private samples excluded from the analysis, because ‘the Athlete failed to prove under
which circumstances the samples were taken from the Athlete and that such process complied with the
applicable standards’), followed in IAAF v Ryzhova, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 29 August
2019, para 142 (‘[…] the Athlete relies on the private test to prove that the haemoglobin concentration
in her blood generally is high due to her medical problems. If such a test is to be given any importance
in the evaluation of evidence the athlete must prove the circumstances under which this sample
was taken. The Athlete has not given any detailed information about the testing, such as collection,
conditions of transport, conditions of storage, and testing process. The athlete has also not produced
any of her doctors, or any person connected with the laboratory that tested the private sample. […]
144. […] The Panel’s conclusion is that the blood report from the private laboratory cannot be given
any weight in the evaluation of evidence’). See also UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke, NADP Tribunal
decision dated 15 July 2014, para 45 (‘the experts are only permitted under the WADA operating
guidelines to take into account results obtained from analyses conducted under the ABP programme,
which comply with strict criteria’).
11 UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 86, followed in IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464,
para 151, IAAF v RusAF & Kirdyapkina, CAS 2017/O/5398, para 94, and IAAF v RusAF &
Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822, para 88.
12 See UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 79 (panel’s task is to ‘determine whether the Expert
Panel’s evaluation (upon which UCI’s case rests) is soundly based in primary facts, and whether
the Expert Panel’s consequent appreciation of the conclusion [to] be derived from those primary
facts is equally sound. It will necessarily take into account, inter alia, the impression made on it by
the expert witnesses in terms of their standing, experience, and cogency of their evidence together
with that evidence’s consistency with any published research’); UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke,
NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2014, para 13 (‘In UCI v Valjavec CAS 2010/A/2235 it was
argued by the UCI that given the lack of scientific expertise of the Court of Arbitration for Sport
panel it should confine itself to checking whether the expert panel had considered the correct issues
and reached its decision in a manner which was not apparently arbitrary or illogical, and should not
substitute the panel’s subjective interpretation for that of the experts. That surprising submission,
which appears implicitly to rule out the ability of the athlete to adduce expert evidence in his own
defence, was soundly and properly rejected at paragraph 79’).
The expert panel will nevertheless be key witnesses at the hearing on the charge. UK Anti-Doping v
Tiernan-Locke, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2014, para 12 (‘Charges based on abnormalities
detected under an ABP programme are fundamentally different from cases based on direct evidence
from an adverse analytical finding. An adverse analytical finding is, in general, an objective fact,
whereas the conclusions to be drawn from deviations from a longitudinal profile require scientific
judgement as to the significance of observed abnormalities. That is why the WADA Operating
Guidelines require that each stage following the detection by the model of an atypical value should
be the subject of expert review. A single expert reviews the atypical value against the passport to
decide whether the abnormality is unlikely to be the result of a normal physiological condition or a
pathological condition. A panel of three experts is then required to consider whether it can reach a
unanimous opinion that it is highly likely that a prohibited substance or method has been used. The
athlete is then asked for his explanation, following which the panel of three experts is required to
consider whether it remains of the unanimous opinion, taking into account the explanation from the
athlete, that it is highly likely that the athlete used a prohibited substance or method. So proof of an
anti-doping contravention in ABP cases depends critically on expert evidence’).
Where the views of the parties’ respective experts conflict, the hearing panel will have to decide, by
considering the relative standing and experience of the parties’ experts, the cogency of their evidence,
and the consistency of that evidence with published research, whose views it prefers. In Valjavec,
conflicts of expert evidence were resolved in favour of the UCI’s experts ‘because of their (for the
most part) greater experience and expertise, and because of the weight of published literature which
supported it’. UCI v Valjavec, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 104(iii). See also De Bonis v CONI & UCI,
CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.4 (‘This Panel is in a position to evaluate and assess the weight of a (party-
appointed) expert opinion submitted to it. It does so by evaluating the facts, on which the expert
opinion is based and by assessing the correctness and logic of the conclusions drawn by the experts.
In fulfilling this task, the Panel takes into account the statements and opinions of (all) the parties. It
is on the basis of this evaluation and balancing of the various submission that the Panel will form its
own opinion on the facts and consequences that follow thereof’); IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou,
CAS 2012/A/2773, para 121 (‘The arguments of the Experts are thoughtfully constructed and well
grounded, and no evidence has been presented to or found by the Sole Arbitrator that places the
conclusions of any of the Experts in doubt. Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the opinions
of the Experts, taken together, indicate to his comfortable satisfaction that Ms Kokkinariou used a
Prohibited Substance or engaged in a Prohibited Method on more than one occasion’); UK Anti-
Doping v Tiernan-Locke, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 July 2014, para 46 (‘This tribunal has
reached the very clear conclusion that the expert opinions expressed by Professor Schumacher and
Professor D’Onofrio were cogent and supported by the scientific evidence, whereas the suggestions
advance by Dr Hampton were not persuasive as to the mechanism suggested, and not supported by the
scientific papers on which he relied. We are clear that the explanation advanced for the rider does not
explain the abnormal values of Hb and %RET shown in the sample taken on 22 September 2012. As
Dr Hampton accepted, in order for his hypothesis to be valid it is necessary to accept his explanation
for both abnormalities. We have accepted neither, and in combination the inference to be drawn from
the abnormalities in both Hb and %RET is overwhelming’); IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez
Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, para 255 (‘First, the First Respondent’s experts’ professional
expertise (by their own explanations) – which the Panel has utmost respect of – essentially centres
around methodology of clinical testing and oncology. Professor Belda has published over 80 papers
regarding biomarkers, and Professor Peña over 100 papers on data analysis. According to their
statements at the Oral Hearing, none were published specifically in relation to doping. The Appellant’s
experts – Professor Schumacher, Dr. Sottas, and Dr. Pralong – are renowned and leading experts (with
numerous publications) specifically on the issues at hand. Their leading expertise and contributions
thereof were also repeatedly recognized by the First Respondent’s experts’), and para 304 (‘At the
outset, the Panel observes that Dr. de Boer’s explanations and conclusions regarding the impact of
alleged menstrual issues on the ABP at hand are often speculative in nature, using a wording such as
“[it] is speculative”, “may have been”, or “it cannot be excluded”), para 339 (‘Accordingly, the Panel
agrees with Prof. Pralong that the claimed impact of subclinical hypothyroidism on Ms. Domínguez
Azpeleta’s ABP variables is purely speculative’);
13 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 102 (‘Although it is not
necessary for the UCI under the UCI ADR to establish a reason for blood manipulation, the CAS panel
does note the coincidence of the levels with the Athlete’s racing programme. As Dr Sottas convincingly
explained, in the same way as the weight of DNA evidence said to inculpate a criminal is enhanced
if the person whose sample it matches was in the vicinity of the crime, so the inference to be drawn
from abnormal blood values is enhanced where the ascertainment of such values occurs at a time
when the Athlete in question could benefit from blood manipulation’); IAAF v ARAF & Chernova,
CAS 2016/O/4469, para 138 (‘[…] a pitfall to be avoided is the fallacy that if the probability of
observing values that assume a normal or pathological condition is low, then the probability of doping
is automatically high’) and para 140 (‘[…] from the mere fact that an athlete cannot provide a credible
explanation for the deviations in his or her ABP it cannot automatically be deduced that an anti-doping
rule violation has been committed. Rather, the deviations in the ABP are to be interpreted by experts
called to put into the balance various hypotheses that could explain the abnormality in the profile values,
ie a distinction is made between a ‘‘quantitative’’ and a ‘‘qualitative’’ assessment of the evidence’) and
para 141 (‘[…] the Sole Arbitrator needs to be convinced that the abnormal values are caused by a
‘‘doping scenario’’, which does not necessarily derive from the quantitative information provided by
the ABP, but rather from a qualitative interpretation of the experts and possible further evidence’);
IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 164 (same); IAAF v RusAF & Ponomareva,
CAS 2018/O/5822, para 91 (same); IAAF v ARAF & Ugarova, CAS 2016/O/4463, para 98 (same).
See also Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press 2016), pp
769-770 (even if presenting a doping scenario is not strictly required under the applicable rules, it is
important to present it to allow a proper assessment of the probability of the different hypotheses, and
to avoid the prosecutor’s fallacy that a low likelihood of innocent causes automatically translates into
a high likelihood of doping) and p 774 (‘If the ADO is not able to produce a “doping scenario” with a
minimum degree of credibility (“density”), the abnormality is simply unexplained, the burden of proof
enters into play and the ADO’s case must be dismissed since there is no evidence pleading in favour of
the hypothesis of “doping” any more than for another cause’).
See UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 13 September 2017, para 83 (‘The Single
Judge understands this CAS jurisprudence to mean the following: Even if all scenarios other than
doping can be excluded, the use of a prohibited substance or method must be a plausible explanation of
the values obtained for the Single Judge to positively assume doping. Such assessment must be made
based on all evidence before the Single Judge’).
It is therefore almost always going to be important to produce a competition schedule, so that
it can be assessed whether patterns of blood doping take place in advance of major competitions
(See eg the increase in HGB and high OFF scores during the competition season noted in IAAF v
ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, paras 165-170), and HGB levels drop during the off season
(albeit that during an off-season an athlete might take rEPO to boost his HGB and then withdraw the
boosted blood so that he can transfuse it later, just before competition). Whatever its form, a strong
‘doping scenario’ can provide ‘convincing evidence that the Athlete engaged in blood doping practices
throughout the period’ in issue. IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 169; IAAF v
RusAF & Ponomareva, CAS 2018/O/5822, para 154 (‘the Sole Arbitrator holds that the IAAF has
established to his comfortable satisfaction a ‘‘doping scenario’’ regarding the Athlete’s ABP profile’).
Cf UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke, National Anti-Doping Panel decision dated 15 July 2014,
para 48 (‘There was no dispute that the abnormalities in the sample were consistent with the use of an
erythropoietic stimulant which had been discontinued approximately 10 to 14 days before the sample
was taken. There were some further submissions from Mr Taylor for UKAD directed to the point
that the rider had both the motive and the opportunity to commit a doping offence at this stage in his
career, given the importance to him of obtaining a remunerative contract with Team Sky. This tribunal
declines to take those points into account. The facts of the case, as set out above, are relevant only to
the issue whether the rider has produced a plausible explanation for the abnormalities in the sample.
Whether that explanation is plausible must be decided on the basis of the scientific evidence alone, and
cannot be influenced by circumstantial evidence as to the motive or opportunity for the rider to have
used a prohibited substance or method’).
15 Technically it remains the Anti-Doping Organization’s burden throughout to persuade the hearing
panel that there is no other plausible explanation for the abnormal values in the athlete’s ABP profile.
UK Anti-Doping v Tiernan-Locke, National Anti-Doping Panel decision dated 15 July 2014, para 14
(‘The role of the tribunal is to determine whether, on the basis of all the expert evidence adduced both
by UKAD and by the defence, it is satisfied, to the required standard, that UKAD has proved that the
results derived from the ABP programme demonstrate that a doping contravention was committed.
The athlete does not have to prove that his explanation for the abnormalities disclosed in the sample
is more likely to be the true explanation, for the burden of proof rests entirely on UKAD to disprove
that explanation’) and para 41 (‘It is right to note that there is no scientific paper produced which
explains the effect on the blood of healthy fit adults of an acute absorption of alcohol at the levels
assumed by Dr Hampton. That does not give any support to his thesis, but on the other hand it does
require that Professor Schumacher and D’Onofrio produce compelling evidence, derived from study
of analogous situations, which establish that the explanation advanced for the abnormal levels of
Hb and %RET cannot be established. This tribunal needs to be satisfied either that the mechanism
suggested is scientifically implausible, or that the relevant scientific literature clearly provides
evidence to contradict the effects suggested’); UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
13 September 2017, para 68 (‘[…] the mere fact that the Rider’s hematological values are abnormal
is no proof of doping. In order to establish the “use” of a prohibited substance or method it does not
suffice that the UCI demonstrate that doping is a plausible source for these values. Instead, the UCI
must establish – in principle – that all other alternative explanations for these values can be excluded’)
and para 69 (‘difficulties in proving “negative facts” result in a duty for the party not bearing the
onus of proof to cooperate in establishing the facts. That party – ie the Rider – must cooperate in
the investigation and clarification of the facts of the case. It is up to him to submit and substantiate
other plausible sources for the abnormal values. It will then be up to the UCI to contest those other
alternatives and, ultimately, for the Single Judge to evaluate the evidence before him in relation to
the various scenarios. Nonetheless, the burden of proof, ie the risk that a certain scenario cannot be
established or discarded, remains with the UCI’).

In practice, however, if the hearing panel is persuaded by the Anti-Doping Organization’s evidence
that the explanation for the abnormal values is highly likely to be blood doping, the burden of
persuasion will quickly shift to the athlete to establish another plausible explanation. Viret, Evidence
in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press, 2016), p 773. See eg IAAF v Rutto,
Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2019, para 129 (‘[…] only a careful, qualitative
assessment of an athlete’s sample results, combined with an effective counter-narrative demonstrating
why such results plausibly stem from innocuous causes, will constitute the competent and credible
evidence capable of calling into question a unanimous expert finding of a likely ADR violation’);
IAAF v Ryzhova, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 29 August 2019, para 73 (‘[…] so far as the
abnormalities in the ABP are sought to be explained through the Athlete’s defence, the burden of
proving that the abnormalities were caused by the factors mentioned above lies on the Athlete’).
16 IAAF & WADA v RFEA & Domínguez Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3614 & 3561, para 306 (‘Moreover,
as highlighted by Professor Audran, Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta did not declare an important blood
loss on the DCFs for Sample 18 and Sample 20. Hence, the allegations of a significant blood loss
simply do not match the record’), para 327 (‘The Panel observes that the First Respondent’s claim
does not fit the contemporaneous record’), para 336 (‘First, Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta did not mention
the subclinical hypothyroidism diagnosis and/or treatment with Levothyroxine on any of the DCFs in
2012 following her alleged diagnosis on January 19 and February 14, 2012. This strikes the Panel even
more when at the same time Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta listed other, arguably less severe, medications
such as ibuprofen. Also, the Panel is particularly mindful that Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta was a senior
high-profile athlete well aware of the importance of DCFs and any disclosure therein. Second, Ms.
Domínguez Azpeleta likewise failed to mention this diagnosis during the initial evaluation by the
Expert Panel. Again, this appears striking when at the same time she made an extensive submission (40
pages) challenging the Expert Panel’s review on various grounds, including more minor ones’), and
para 349 (‘The Panel emphasises that Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta attested on the DCF’s dated August
13, 2009 (Sample 2) and July 27, 2010 (Sample 9) that she had not used hypoxic devices in the period
of 2 weeks prior to the sample collection. The Panel again stresses that Ms. Domínguez Azpeleta was
a senior high-profile athlete well aware of the importance of DCFs and disclosures therein’).
C7.9 On the other hand, the Anti-Doping Organization will not have to prove that
a prohibited substance (rEPO or another blood doping agent) was actually detected
in the athlete’s sample;1 or that the values reported from analysis of the athlete’s ABP
samples were confirmed by analysis of B (reserve) samples;2 or that the athlete’s
performance was enhanced by his alleged blood doping.3 Furthermore, as long as the
Anti-Doping Organization persuades the hearing panel that the athlete manipulated
his blood values either by use of an erythropoiesis-stimulating agent or by physically
manipulating his blood (eg homologous or autologous blood transfusion), it does not
have to prove which of those methods of blood doping he used.4 Nor (technically)
does the Anti-Doping Organization have to prove that the athlete intended to cheat,
but (again) it will likely be required to prove to the satisfaction of the hearing panel
that the values in the athlete’s sample fit a ‘doping scenario’, which may amount to
much the same thing.5 6
1 Comment to Code Art 2.2 (‘[…] unlike the proof required to establish an anti-doping rule violation
under Article 2.1, Use or Attempted Use may also be established by other reliable means such as […]
conclusions drawn from longitudinal profiling, including data collected as part of the Athlete Biological
Passport, or other analytical information which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to
establish “Presence” of a Prohibited Substance under Article 2.1’); ABP Operating Guidelines, p 5
(‘Through changes in biological Markers of doping collated over an Athlete’s career, the ABP can
be used to establish “Use” per Code Article 2.2 without necessarily relying on the detection of a
particular Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method’). See eg Pechstein v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912 &
1913, para 186 (‘The Panel remarks that it is uncontested that none of the tests which were performed
on Ms Pechstein ever revealed the presence of a prohibited substance. However, on the basis of the
evidence examined, the panel notes that the presence of exogenous rEPO can normally be detected
by an anti-doping test only for a couple of days after the treatment, and in no case after four days.
When an increased red blood cell production is identified by a high %retics count, the rEPO which
may have triggered the increased production of red blood cells is likely to already have disappeared.
Therefore, not only a simultaneous adverse analytical finding for rEPO is not a necessary consequence
of finding high %retics values but, in fact, it would be a rather extraordinary occurrence. The Panel
is also aware of sophisticated dosage plans which provide for the frequent administration of very
small doses of rEPO, which make it increasingly difficult to detect it in urine samples at all. Hence,
the panel does not consider the absence of a positive finding of rEPO to be evidence which could
exclude blood manipulation’); De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.21 (‘The Panel
is of the view that – in the end – the results obtained from the laboratories in Lausanne and Paris [an
adverse analytical finding for CERA] are not necessary to reach the conclusion that the Appellant
committed an anti-doping rule violation in the form of “Use of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited
Method” (Article 21.2 of the UCI ADR). This violation is already clearly established by the evaluation
of the data reported in the Appellant’s ABP’); UCI v Diniz, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated
13 September 2017, para 86 (‘Finding a specific prohibited substance in an athlete’s bodily specimen
is – depending on the substance in question – difficult because the detection window might be of
very short duration. This is particularly true for blood manipulation. It is for this very reason that
the Anti-Doping Organizations have reverted to longitudinal profiling. Thus, the mere fact that no
prohibited substance was detected in the Rider’s samples is no evidence that he has not doped. This
fact is also reflected in the structure of the ADR. If the Rider’s allegations were true, Article 2.2 ADR
would be completely superfluous. The very existence of this provision confirms that doping occurs
with or without the presence of a prohibited substance having been established in the athlete’s bodily
specimen’); World Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/078/2020 dated 10 September
2020, para 118 (‘The Athlete’s negative testing history is irrelevant because the negative urine tests do
not preclude the administration of a Prohibited Substance such as an ESA or EPO. The very purpose
of the ABP and of “Use” charges are to add to expand the reliable means available to establish the
commission of ADRVs’).
2 Because ABP samples are not analysed to detect the presence of prohibited substances, but instead
simply to measure certain biomarker values. See De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.6;
ABP Operating Guidelines, p 27 (‘Although a single blood Sample is sufficient within the framework
of the ABP, it is recommended to collect an additional “B” Sample for a possible subsequent analysis
of Prohibited Substances and Methods in whole blood […]’).
3 See para C23.2. See also World Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/078/2020 dated
10 September 2020, para 126 (‘The Panel finally also rejects the Athlete’s argument that his results on
the races, when he should have benefited from the EPO use or transfused blood, were worse than his
usual results. Such an argument is never compelling in doping cases and does not disprove the prior
use of performance enhancing substances or methods’).
4 Coccia, The Athlete Biological Passport: Legal And Scientific Aspects [2013] ISLR, Issue 1, p 9, p 18.
See eg IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou, CAS 2012/A/2773, para 121 (‘All three Experts as well as Dr.
Sottas concluded unequivocally that Ms. Kokkinariou used a Prohibited Substance or engaged in a
Prohibited Method on multiple occasions. These findings are not contested by any of the Respondents.
The arguments of the Experts are thoughtfully constructed and well grounded, and no evidence has
been presented to or found by the Sole Arbitrator that places the conclusions of any of the Experts in
doubt. Accordingly. the Sole Arbitrator finds that the opinions of the Experts, taken together, indicate
to his comfortable satisfaction that Ms. Kokkinariou used a Prohibited Substance or engaged in a
Prohibited Method on more than one occasion’).
5 See para C23.2. See also Pechstein v ISU, CAS 2009/A/1912 & 1913, para 119 (‘[…] the ISU does
not have to prove the intent or the fault of the Athlete in using a prohibited method such as blood
doping’), para 120 (the Code ‘adopt[s] a strict liability principle in relation to the prohibition to “use”
a prohibited method or substance, whereas intent must be proven in cases of “attempted use” (which
is not relevant here)’), and para 122 (‘Accordingly, the Panel rejects the Appellants’ contention that
the ISU bears the burden to also prove the Athlete’s fault or intent to use blood doping’). See also (in
the context of sanction) IAAF v ARAF & Sharmina, CAS 2016/O/4464, para 78 (‘[…] in case of an
ABP anti-doping rule violation there can be hardly any circumstances under which an athlete is able
to establish that the violation was committed unintentionally’); World Athletics v Chani, Disciplinary
Tribunal decision SR/078/2020 dated 10 September 2020, para 139 (‘The Panel thus agrees with the
AIU that engaging in blood doping is necessarily intentional and that the Athlete fails to establish to
the requisite standard that his ADRV was not intentional. The Use of injections or blood transfusions,
the offence the Panel considers established, cannot occur unintentionally’).
6 Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press, 2016), p 769.
C7.10 The CAS first considered an Article 2.2 ‘Use’ charge based on longitudinal
profiling evidence in 2009, in a case brought by the International Skating Union
(‘ISU’) against German speedskater Claudia Pechstein. Technically, this was not
an ABP case: the ISU had followed its own procedures, rather than the procedures
set out in WADA’s ABP guidelines. However, the ISU approach was based on the
same fundamental principles as the WADA ABP guidelines, and therefore the CAS
analysis remains pertinent. The ISU alleged that Ms Pechstein had used a prohibited
method (blood doping) in violation of Code Art 2.2 based on the fact that:
(a) the percentage of reticulocytes in three blood samples taken from her over two
days was considerably higher than the normal range; and
(b) the reticulocyte percentage in a sample collected from her 10 days later was
substantially lower than the reticulocyte percentage in those three samples.
An ISU Disciplinary Commission upheld the charge, and Ms Pechstein appealed
to CAS on the grounds that (inter alia): she had been tested many times, and never
tested positive for any prohibited substance or method; the ISU’s view of the range
of ‘normal’ reticulocyte values was not generally accepted in sports physiology and
medical practice; the data derived by the ISU from testing her blood ‘are unreliable
and not suitable for statistical or medical evaluation’ for various reasons (eg time and
place of collection, method of transportation, errors in data transfer); the machine
used to measure the data was not reliable; and her values (if they were abnormal)
were likely caused by ‘a chronic blood disorder and/or a genetic abnormality’. The
CAS panel rejected each of these arguments. First, it rejected the challenges to the
reliability of the sample collection and analysis procedures followed by the ISU.1 Then
it noted the substantial expert consensus that Ms Pechstein’s values were abnormal
for a healthy person, including a healthy athlete, and indeed were abnormal even
compared to her own previous values (based on 17 tests over 15 months), and were
consistent with the use of rEPO, while the sharp decrease in reticulocyte percentage
in the sample collected 10 days later was also consistent with use of rEPO.2 The
CAS panel held that the reliability of the results was not undermined by the fact that
Ms Pechstein had never tested positive for rEPO, because rEPO is only detectable
for a maximum of four days after administration, whereas its effects on biomarkers
continue for several weeks.3 The CAS panel therefore held that it was comfortably
satisfied that the athlete’s values were abnormal.4 It considered and rejected on the
facts each of the physiological explanations that Ms Pechstein offered for such
abnormal values, concluding that those values ‘cannot be reasonably explained by
any congenital or subsequently developed abnormality. The Panel finds that they
must, therefore, derive from the Athlete’s illicit manipulation of her own blood,
which remains the only reasonable alternative source of such abnormal values’.5 Ms
Pechstein continued to fight her case in the courts – in Switzerland, in Germany, and
in Strasbourg – but ultimately to no avail.6
2 Ibid, paras 172–177, 178–183, and 184.
3 Ibid, para 186.
4 Ibid, para 190.
5 Ibid, para 210.
6 In Pechstein v ISU, No.4A_612/2009, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the athlete’s claim that
the CAS award should be annulled on the basis that the CAS was not an independent and impartial
tribunal. In Pechstein v ISU, No.4A_144/2010, it ruled that new diagnostic methods and fresh expert
evidence were not a sufficient ground to revoke the CAS award. She then sued the ISU for €4 million
in the German courts. The Munich Court of Appeal found the CAS awards to be unenforceable in
Germany, because the CAS was not independent (sports federations dominated its composition) and
therefore it was an abuse of a dominant position for sports bodies to require athletes to agree to submit
disputes to CAS. Oberlandesgericht München, Az. U 1110/14 Kart, Claudia Pechstein v/ International
Skating Union (ISU), 15 January 2015. The German Federal Court of Justice overturned that judgment
on the grounds that the CAS was sufficiently independent and therefore it was not an abuse of a
dominant position to require athletes to submit to CAS. Bundesgerichtshof, Az. KZR 6/15, Pechstein
v International Skating Union (ISU), 7 June 2016. Finally, in Mutu and Pechstein v Switzerland,
Applications 40575/10 and 67474/10, judgment dated 2 October 2010, para 194, the European Court
of Human Rights rejected her claim that the CAS was not an independent arbitral body. It did rule
that the CAS had infringed her right to a fair hearing by not granting her request to have her case held
in public, but rejected her claim for damages for pecuniary loss on the basis there was no reason to
believe the CAS award would have been different if she had been given a public hearing.
C7.11 WADA’s ABP programme was first implemented in January 2008, by

the UCI, as a pilot programme. The first cases brought based on ABP data were
announced in June 2009, and reached CAS in 2010:
(a) In June 2009, the Italian anti-doping authorities charged cyclist Pietro Caucchioli
with use of a prohibited method (enhancing oxygen transfer, ie blood doping)
based on values in his blood samples that departed from his normal profile as
established by his athlete biological passport. The CONI Anti-Doping Tribunal
ruled that the procedures and principles underlying the ABP programme were
a valid means of establishing use of prohibited substances and methods. It
further found that the cyclist had failed to show that his abnormal results were
caused by a pathological condition or by departures from the sample collection
and analysis guidelines. It therefore upheld the charge and banned the cyclist
for two years. In March 2011 the CAS dismissed his appeal. It reviewed in
detail the UCI’s ABP programme and found that ‘the rigorous application of
the Athlete Biological Passport set up by the UCI may be considered a reliable
method for indirect detection of acts of doping’.1 It found that the irregularities
in sample collection and analysis alleged by the athlete could not have affected
the results in question. It agreed with the first instance tribunal that the
variations in the haemoglobin concentration values between April and October
2008 could not be considered as physiological but rather were characteristic of
blood doping. It therefore upheld the first instance tribunal’s finding that the
athlete had used a prohibited method in violation of the anti-doping rules and
so was liable to a two-year ban.2
(b) In October 2010, in Pellizotti v UCI, the CONI Anti-Doping Tribunal again
upheld the validity of the principles and procedures underpinning the UCI’s
ABP programme, but dismissed the charge of use of a prohibited method
(enhancement of oxygen transfer) that relied on values from the cyclist’s blood
sample that deviated abnormally from the profile established by his ABP, due
to expert evidence that there could be innocent explanations for these abnormal
values. On appeal, however, the CAS annulled that decision on the facts, upheld
the charge of Use, and banned the cyclist for two years.3
(c) In UCI v Valjavec,4 the UCI appealed against a first instance panel’s dismissal
of a use charge based on a Slovenian cyclist’s blood values that deviated
abnormally from the profile established by his ABP. The charge had been
brought based on the UCI expert panel’s view that the values were convincing
evidence of the cyclist’s use of the prohibited method of enhancement of
oxygen transfer (either autologous blood transfusion or a combination of such
transfusion with use of rEPO), and that the cyclist’s alternative explanations
(he claimed the results were due to a combination of his poor health, cortisone
treatment for a wasp sting, and periods spent at altitude) were not credible.
The first instance panel dismissed the charge on the ground that the statistical
model underlying the ABP Guidelines was flawed, and that the cyclist had
adequately explained the values found in his samples. The CAS panel upheld
the UCI’s appeal, found the cyclist had used a prohibited method, and banned
him for two years, on the following grounds:
(i) The CAS panel did not accept that its role was limited to determining
whether the UCI’s expert panel had considered the correct issues and
whether its view was arbitrary or illogical, saying this would be to ‘abdicate
its adjudicative role’. On an appeal CAS has ‘full power to review the
facts and the law’ under CAS Code Art R57.5 Instead it considered that its
function was ‘to determine whether the Expert Panel’s evaluation (upon
which UCI’s case rests) is soundly based on primary facts, and whether the
Expert Panel’s consequent appreciation of the conclusion [to] be derived
from those facts is equally sound. It will necessarily take into account,
inter alia, the impression made on it by the expert witnesses in terms of
their standing, experience, and cogency of their evidence together with
that evidence’s consistency with any published research […]’.6
(ii) The CAS panel quickly rejected the criticisms made by the athlete’s
expert of the ABP system and the markers used in it: ‘The CAS Panel
is not called to adjudicate on whether some other or better system of
longitudinal profiling could be created. WADA has approved the use of
ABP and this has been codified in the current UCI rules. The CAS Panel
must respect and apply the rules as they are and not as they might have
been or might become’.7
(iii) The cyclist’s abnormal values therefore demanded explanation, which
the CAS panel found could fall into any of the following categories:
‘pure chance’; ‘breaches in the chain of custody both to and in the
laboratory which tested the samples’; ‘incorrect analysis’; or the athlete’s
physiological condition.8
(iv) The CAS panel agreed with the first instance panel that the cyclist had
failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the abnormal values
relied upon by the UCI had been caused by irregularities in the sample
analysis procedures.9
(v) Taking each of the physiological explanations offered by the cyclist in
turn, the CAS panel decided it was comfortably satisfied that the UCI’s
expert panel had been right to discount each of them.10
(vi) The CAS panel noted that the athlete’s values were consistent with blood
removal and then EPO administration or blood transfusion or both.
And ‘although it is not necessary for the UCI under the UCI ADR to
establish a reason for blood manipulation, the CAS panel does note the
coincidence of the levels with the Athlete’s racing programme. As Dr
Sottas convincingly explained, in the same way as the weight of DNA
evidence said to inculpate a criminal is enhanced if the person whose
sample it matches was in the vicinity of the crime, so the inference to be
drawn from abnormal blood values is enhanced where the ascertainment
of such values occurs at a time when the Athlete in question could benefit
from blood manipulation’.11
(d) In June 2011, another CAS panel dismissed an appeal brought by Italian
cyclist Francesco De Bonis against the CONI Anti-Doping Tribunal’s finding
that his ABP showed that he had used a prohibited method (enhancement of
oxygen transfer) and upheld the two-year ban that the tribunal had imposed
on him. In doing so, the CAS panel ruled again that the biological passport
‘provides a satisfactory level of reliability (and, thus, has to be considered a
‘reliable mean[s]’ in the sense of Article 3.2 of the WADC)’, and rejected the
pathological explanations offered by the cyclist for his abnormal results.12
1 Caucchioli v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2178, para 44.
2 Ibid.
3 Pellizotti v UCI, CAS 2010/A/2308 and CAS 2011/A/2335.
4 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235.
5 See para D2.98.
6 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 79.
7 Ibid, para 81. Note however that the CAS panel in Veerpalu v FIS took a different view in the context
of the ‘isoform’ method of testing for human Growth Hormone, ruling that it was for the CAS to
decide whether the method was reliable, irrespective of any sign-off from WADA: see para C6.22, n 7.
8 UCI v Valjavec & Olympic Committee of Slovenia, CAS 2010/A/2235, para 88.
9 Ibid, para 82.
11 Ibid, para 102.
12 De Bonis v CONI & UCI, CAS 2010/A/2174, para 9.8 and para 9.10 et seq.
C7.12 The IAAF quickly followed the UCI in adopting the ABP programme. Its
first case was resolved in May 2012, when a first instance panel upheld a charge of
use of a prohibited substance or method based on biomarker values in the athlete’s
sample that were inconsistent with the athlete’s normal profile (as established by
the ABP) and that could not be explained other than by the use of a prohibited
substance or prohibited method.1 The panel also decided that there were aggravating
circumstances (in that the same longitudinal profile evidence showed the athlete had
used the prohibited substance or method for more than ten months) that warranted
increasing the ban from two to four years under 2009 Code Art 10.6.2 The athlete
did not appeal to CAS. In July 2012, the IAAF announced that four Russian athletes
had admitted charges of violation of Code Art 2.2 based on suspicious profiles
identified by the IAAF ABP programme, and had accepted two-year bans, while
a Moroccan athlete had been banned for four years, and a Greek athlete had been
banned for two years, which the IAAF was appealing to CAS on the basis that
aggravating circumstances were present and therefore a four-year ban should have
been imposed.3 The CAS upheld the IAAF’s appeal. It accepted the validity of the
ABP concept, noting that ‘systems which make use of these longitudinal profiles
have evolved to become widespread and highly effective means of detecting EPO
doping’.4 It found that the abnormal values in the athlete’s sample compared to her
normal blood profile were conclusive evidence of the repeated use of blood doping
over a protracted period of time as well as her engagement in a carefully planned
doping scheme, and therefore banned her for four years under 2009 Code Art 10.6.
The IAAF has subsequently brought many ABP cases successfully against Russian
athletes and has obtained aggravated sanctions in several of them.5
1 Portuguese Athletic Federation v Ornelas, Case 4/2011, Disciplinary Council of Portuguese Athletic
Federation decision dated 13 January 2012.
2 See Chapter C19.
3 ‘Six new athletes sanctioned under the IAAF Athlete Biological Passport programme’, 25 July
2012, worldathletics.org/news/press-release/six-new-athletes-sanctioned-under-the-iaaf-at [accessed
6 December 2020].
4 IAAF v SEGAS & Kokkinariou, CAS 2012/A/2773, para 13. Similarly, in IAAF v Shobukhova, the
IAAF appealed the two-year ban imposed on Russian athlete Liliya Shobukhova for her ABP offence,
and secured an increase in the ban to three years and two months. (WADA statement regarding Liliya
Shobukhova’s sanction, 24 August 2015). In IAAF v Çakir-Alptekin, CAS/2014/A/3498, the IAAF
appealed against the decision of the Turkish Disciplinary Board to exonerate Turkish middle-distance
runner Asli Çakir-Alptekin of the ABP blood doping charge, and ultimately secured an eight-year
ban of the athlete (this was her second offence). Similarly, in IAAF v RFEA & Marta Dominguez
Azpeleta, CAS 2014/A/3561, the IAAF appealed against the decision of the RFEA domestic tribunal
to exonerate Spanish middle-distance runner Marta Dominguez Azpeleta of an ABP doping charge,
and got the decision overturned and a three-year ban imposed on the athlete. Meanwhile, in IAAF v
Yanit, the IAAF appealed to CAS to increase the two-year ban that the Turkish Disciplinary Board had
imposed on Turkish hurdler Nevin Yanit after she tested positive for steroid use, on the basis (among
others) that her ABP profile showed that she had also been blood-doping during the relevant period.
The CAS upheld the IAAF’s appeal and increased her ban to three years. IAAF v TAF and Yanit,
CAS 2013/A/3373.
5 See paras C19.8(aa) to (dd).
C7.13 As a result of this clear and consistent CAS case law, it is safe to say that the
CAS has accepted in principle the robustness and reliability of the Athlete Biological
Passport programme as an indirect means of proving ‘use’ of blood doping under
Code Art 2.2.1 There is now also a steroidal module of the ABP program, which
is designed in particular to identify samples that have abnormal levels of steroids
and therefore should be targeted for IRMS analysis to determine if the steroids are
exogenous in origin.2 In addition, an endocrine module measuring the levels of
steroids in athletes’ blood has been upheld as a reliable means of establishing use of
exogenous steroids.3
1 Although see Viret, Evidence in Anti-Doping at the Intersection of Science and Law (Asser Press,
2016), para 11.2.1 (‘[…] this review generally amounts to little more than describing the different
phases of the process involved in reaching an Adverse Passport Finding and tacitly approving of this
process, without serious attempts to actually assess the scientific validity of the tool itself. […] A true
test of these foundations would require reassessing the Adaptive Model – both its initial parameters,
the merits of the blood Markers selected and the values used as reference – as well as the mathematical
formulas for updating the profile and adjusting the reference range. On these elements, CAS panels
tend to trust the experts intervening on behalf of the ADO that all relevant factors have been duly taken
into account in order to make the system valid and reliable’).
There remain critics of the programme. See eg Hailey, ‘A false start in the race against doping
in sport: concerns with cycling’s biological passport’ [2011] 61 Duke Law Journal 393; McLaren,
‘Athlete Biological Passport: The Juridical Viewpoint’ [2012] ISLR Issue 4, p 77, at p 87 et seq
(reviewing criticisms of ABP concept).
2 See ABP Guidelines and TD2018EAAS. In relation to IRMS analysis, see para C6.46.
3 Zemliak v Ukrainian Athletic Federation & WADA, CAS 2018/A/5654, para 61 (‘As for the reliability
of the Method in measuring testosterone in blood serum, there can be no doubt on the evidence in
these appeals that it is scientifically valid’); IAAF v TAF and Yanit, CAS 2013/A/3373, para 106-107
(evidence of athlete’s blood endocrine profile used to prove that her use of steroids extended beyond
the time they were found in her urine sample).
5 PROVING ‘USE’ BY EVIDENCE OTHER THAN ANALYTICAL DATA
C7.14 It was cases arising out of the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO)
scandal that first established that an Art 2.2 violation of ‘Use’ of a prohibited
substance does not require analytical evidence of such use (eg an adverse analytical
finding) but instead may be based, in whole or in part, on non-analytical evidence.
A joint investigation between federal law enforcement agencies and the US Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) uncovered a conspiracy to distribute various prohibited
substances, including a new designer steroid, tetrahydragestrinone (THG, aka ‘the
clear’), to elite athletes in the US and other countries. A new test for the substance
was rapidly developed that was successfully deployed to catch various athletes,
including Dwain Chambers, with the prohibited substance(s) in their systems,1 but
other athletes who were implicated in the scheme were not caught by such testing.
USADA therefore charged them instead with Code Art 2.2 ‘Use’ violations based
on non-analytical evidence (bolstered by analytical evidence) uncovered during the
BALCO investigation:
(a) In USADA v Collins, USADA charged sprinter Michele Collins with using
THG, rEPO, and a testosterone/epitestosterone cream for more than a year,
even though there had never been any adverse analytical finding of any
of those substances in samples collected from her. Under the applicable
(pre-Code) IAAF rules, USADA had to prove intentional use to sustain its
charge. It relied on emails sent between Collins and Victor Conte, BALCO’s
President, which contained statements by her amounting to admissions of use
of various prohibited substances and methods, as well as the results of blood
and urine tests (some conducted by laboratories retained by BALCO) ‘that
together provide solid evidence of a pattern of doping’ (in particular, elevated
hematocrit levels consistent with use of rEPO, and variations in her T:E ratio
consistent with use of testosterone). That evidence of use was corroborated by
other documents, including Fedex airbills showing shipments to Collins from
BALCO, a cheque written by Collins to Victor Conte in the amount of $480,
and evidence from fellow athlete Kelli White. Collins denied the charges but
declined to testify in her own defence and did not offer any other evidence.
Based on this evidentiary record, the AAA hearing panel found the charge of
‘Use’ proved beyond reasonable doubt (the applicable standard of proof under
the pre-Code rules in force at the time).2
(b) In USADA v Montgomery, USADA charged Tim Montgomery with use of
THG, again despite the fact that there was no analytical finding that THG had
been present in his samples at any stage. The CAS panel upheld the charge
based solely on admissions made by Montgomery to Kelli White about his
use of THG, which admissions were recounted in evidence by White that was
uncontroverted by Montgomery (who declined to testify). The CAS panel
thereby avoided having to address whether the other evidence relied on by

USADA – the results of blood and urine tests conducted by various laboratories,
as well as documents and statements derived from the federal investigation into
BALCO – was sufficient to sustain the charge (although it expressly noted it
was not suggesting ‘that such other evidence could not demonstrate that the
Respondent is guilty of doping’).3 It banned Montgomery for two years.4
(c) In USADA v Gaines, the same CAS panel upheld similar charges brought
against Chrystie Gaines, on basically the same grounds (ie Kelli White’s
evidence that Gaines had admitted using THG to her, which evidence was
uncontroverted by Gaines), and also banned her for two years.5
1 See para C6.57(d).
2 USADA v Collins, AAA Panel decision dated 9 December 2004, para 4.26. Ms Collins subsequently
got her eight–year ban reduced by providing substantial assistance to USADA: see para C21.5, n 2.
3 USADA v Montgomery, CAS 2004/O/645, para 45 (‘The Panel has wrestled with the question
whether, in the circumstances, it should address in this Award each element of USADA’s case
against Mr. Montgomery, including each of what USADA calls its “7 types of evidence” of doping
by the Athlete. On balance, the Panel has determined not to do so for the simple reason that it is
unnecessary. This is because the Panel is unanimously of the view that Mr Montgomery in fact
admitted his use of prohibited substances to Ms. White, as discussed in more detail below, on which
basis alone the Panel can and does find him guilty of a doping offence. The fact that the Panel
does not consider it necessary in the circumstances to analyse and comment on the mass of other
evidence against the Athlete, however, is not to be taken as an indication that it considers that such
other evidence could not demonstrate that the Respondent is guilty of doping. Doping offences can
be proved by a variety of means; and this is nowhere more true than in “nonanalytical positive”
cases such as the present’).
4 Ibid, para 60.
5 USADA v Gaines, CAS 2004/O/649, para 45. See also USADA v Trafeh, AAA decision dated
2 December 2014, and cases cited therein at para 9.4.
C7.15 Where there is neither analytical evidence nor admission of ‘use’ by the
athlete, however, proving the charge to the requisite standard may be a difficult
task. In December 2003, a waste bucket in a room used by Australian cyclist Mark
French and others was found to contain used syringes and empty phials of various
substances, some of them prohibited and others not prohibited. French was charged
with possession and use of, and trafficking in, two prohibited substances (cortisone
acetate, a glucocorticosteroid, and equine growth hormone, or ‘EGH’), in breach
of the (pre-Code) ASC Anti-Doping Policy. The first instance hearing panel upheld
the charges and banned French for two years. On appeal, however, the CAS panel
overturned that decision, on the basis that:
(a) there was insufficient evidence to prove to the required standard that the
one substance that French admitted injecting (‘Testicomp’) contained a
glucocorticosteroid (despite the leaflet in the packaging saying it did; the phials
found in the waste bucket were not tested, and although another sample from
the same batch was tested, no cortisone acetate was found in it – there was said
to be no scientific test that could detect it at the low concentration in which it
appeared in that product);1 and
(b) there was insufficient evidence to prove any use by French of EGH to the
required standard.
The scientific evidence established that phials in the waste bucket contained EGH,
but French denied any knowledge of that fact. There was no direct evidence of use by
French; he denied using it, or being aware of anyone else using it; and the CAS panel
declined to infer such use from DNA evidence that he had touched the contents of the
bucket and had had the opportunity to use its contents, because:
(a) others had access to the bucket over a period of time;
(b) there were many gaps in the chain of custody of the bucket once it became
evidence, so undermining its integrity and probative value as evidence; and
(c) there was evidence of cross-contamination of the items in the bucket.2

1 French v Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, para 50. Similarly, in
WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 & 1844, para 198, the CAS panel dismissed
a charge of use where the only evidence was that the athletes had ingested tablets given to them by
a trainer and other athletes given the same tablets had subsequently tested positive for a prohibited
substance, because ‘there is no evidence that the actual pills individually used by each of the Other
Players contained a prohibited substance. Indeed some players took the pills, were subsequently tested
and there was no adverse analytical finding’. Ibid, para 199.
2 French v Australian Sports Commission and Cycling Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, paras 71–82.
C7.16 In Leogrande, the athlete purported to cite French for the proposition that
a charge of ‘Use’ could not be upheld based on an admission of use alone; instead,
there also had to be analytical evidence that the substance the athlete had admitted
using did indeed contain a prohibited substance.1 However, the AAA hearing panel
distinguished Leogrande from French on the basis that the ‘Respondent here actually
admitted the use of a Prohibited Substance to Sonye, namely EPO, testosterone and
Ventalin. [Whereas] French admitted to taking a drug named “Testicomp”, not the
taking of a Prohibited Substance’.2 The AAA panel acknowledged that ‘proof of Use
without positive lab results, ie a “non-analytical positive” such as we have here, is
more difficult to prove’ than an Art 2.1 ‘presence’ charge based on an adverse analytical
finding. Nevertheless, it upheld USADA’s Code Art 2.2 charge on the basis that
‘Respondent’s clear and repeated admissions of doping, which in and of themselves
may be sufficient to establish an anti-doping rule violation, are corroborated by a
significant amount of circumstantial as well as scientific evidence, including but not
limited to, drug tests that were not reported positive but which reveal the presence
of recombinant EPO in the Respondent’s samples’.3 The distinction from French
drawn by the Leogrande panel was subsequently endorsed by another AAA panel in
USADA v O’Bee,4 which therefore also upheld a charge of use of EPO based solely
on admissions of such use in emails written by the athlete, notwithstanding the lack
of any analytical evidence confirming that what he had used was indeed EPO.5 The
same distinction was also accepted and followed by the UK’s National Anti-Doping
Panel in UK Anti-Doping v Burns.6
1 USADA v Leogrande, AAA Panel decision dated 1 December 2008, para 73.
2 Ibid, para 72.
3 Ibid, para 71.
4 USADA v O’Bee, AAA Panel decision dated 1 October 2010, para 10.6 and n 26.
5 Ibid, section 9 and para 10.7 (relying on non-analytical data, including athlete’s admissions, as
establishing use of rhEPO on multiple occasions over several years, notwithstanding that the athlete
was tested several times during this period without any rhEPO being found). See also UK Anti-Doping
v Windsor, NADP Tribunal decision dated 30 April 2013 (athlete banned for 45 months based, inter
alia, on admissions he made in electronic messages sent via Facebook that he possessed two prohibited
substances and was using one of them in the weeks leading up to a fight).
6 UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December 2012, paras 18–21 (‘The
Respondent does not dispute that the substances he said he purchased and used are prohibited at all
times from use in sport. […] In our judgment there is no further requirement of analytical evidence
confirming that the substances are indeed what the Respondent says they are [citing Leogrande and
O’Bee]. […] Here the Respondent has specifically admitted using actual Prohibited Substances
which he has named, rather than medications that might or might not contain Prohibited Substances.
Therefore, the absence of analytical evidence confirming that the substances he has admitted using
were the Prohibited Substances he thought they were is irrelevant’).
In Nose v Slovenian Cycling Federation, CAS 2007/A/1356, para 7.3.3.3, the CAS panel upheld an
Art 2.2 charge where the athlete disclosed that he applied a medication called Testoviron on a regular
basis, the active ingredient of which was testosterone.
C7.17 It is also clear from the jurisprudence that a charge of use of a prohibited
method may be upheld based solely on non-analytical evidence of such use. In UCI v
Ullrich, the CAS upheld a charge that the cyclist had engaged in blood doping based
on evidence arising out of Operation Puerto that:
(a) Dr Eufemiano Fuentes provided doping services to athletes;

(b) Ullrich travelled in the vicinity of Dr Fuentes’ operations on many occasions,
and evidence in Dr Fuentes’ possession suggested that Ullrich was in personal
contact with him on certain of those occasions;
(c) Ullrich paid Dr Fuentes very substantial amounts of money for services that
were never explained; and
(d) a DNA analysis confirmed that Ullrich’s genetic profile matched the blood
in blood bags found in Dr Fuentes’ possession that appeared to have been
collected for doping purposes.1
The CAS panel in Valverde upheld a similar charge against another cyclist, again
based on evidence coming out of Operation Puerto (although it also had before it
analytical evidence that a bag of blood matched by DNA to the cyclist actually had
rEPO present in it).2
1 UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, paras 65, 67. On the other hand, in IBU v Klimina Ussanova,
ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, a hearing panel rejected charges of use and possession of a
prohibited method even though the athletes admitted using IV infusion equipment that had been on the
team bus, because use of IV infusions is only prohibited where more than 50 mL of liquid was infused
per six-hour period (after 2019, more than 100 mL per 12-hour period), and the IBU failed to prove
that the equipment was used or intended to be used to infuse such amounts.
2 WADA & UCI v Valverde, CAS 2007A/1396 & 1402.
C7.18 In 2012, USADA built on these foundations by bringing a case against

Lance Armstrong for repeated use of multiple prohibited substances and methods
based entirely on non-analytical evidence (albeit that it contended that certain data
from his test results corroborated its allegations of use).1 Armstrong did not contest
the charges brought by USADA, and so was banned for life. In January 2013 he
publicly admitted that USADA’s charges were true: he had used blood transfusions,
as well as EPO, testosterone and other prohibited substances, during each of his
seven Tour de France victories.
1 USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility dated
10 October 2012, p 139.
C7.19 More recently, the IAAF successfully brought a series of Use cases against
Russian athletes based on various non-analytical materials, including materials
contained in the evidence documentation packages (EDP) published by Professor
Richard McLaren alongside his December 2016 report on the Russian doping
scheme.1 In Pyatykh, the IAAF charged the athlete with Use of prohibited substances
based on a ‘washout schedule’ provided to McLaren by Moscow lab director Grigory
Rodchenkov, on which were recorded the results of testing of the athlete that was
conducted prior to the 2013 IAAF World Championships. Noting that ‘facts related
to an ADRV may be established by any reliable means including but not limited
to expert reports and documentary evidence […]. It follows that such facts need
not to comply with the ISTI, the ISL or other laboratory requirements […]’, and
noting further the athlete had not challenged the credibility of the McLaren report,
and had not provided a credible explanation as to why her name was on the washout
schedule, the CAS sole arbitrator upheld the charge and found that the athlete was
using turinabol and other steroids in the summer of 2013 to prepare for the World
Championships.2 Subsequent CAS panels followed the same reasoning in upholding
Use charges based on similar evidence from the McLaren EDPs, including but not
limited to washout schedules.3 Meanwhile, based on detailed evidence from forensic
data experts, the IBU Anti-Doping Hearing Panel accepted the reliability of, and
upheld use charges based in part or in whole on, the presumptive adverse analytical
findings recorded in the ‘hidden’ section of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory’s
Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) database, and the raw
analytical data and chromatograms reflecting those findings (including raw data that
had been forensically recovered after being deleted by the Russian authorities in an
effort to cover up the doping).4
1 Report to WADA of Richard H. McLaren, O.C., Independent Person, 9 December 2016.
2 IAAF v RusAF and Pyatykh, CAS 2017/O/5039, paras 100-104.
3 IAAF v RusAF & Firova, CAS 2018/O/5666, para 109 et seq (evidence indicated that negative results
reported by Moscow laboratory for athlete’s samples in WADA’s ADAMS database were unreliable,
and indications of positive results in washout schedule provided by Rodchenkov were reliable; that
evidence included metadata showing washout schedule was created contemporaneously to the facts
recorded therein, as well as the cover emails sending them internally at the time, as well as the fact
that re-testing of samples corroborated information on washout schedules); IAAF v RusAF and
Khanafeeva, CAS 2018/O/5673, para 61 (‘In view of the nature of the alleged doping scheme and
the IAAF’s limited investigatory powers, the IAAF may properly invite the Sole Arbitrator to draw
inferences from the established facts that seek to fill in gaps in the direct evidence. The Sole Arbitrator
may accede to that invitation where he considers that the established facts reasonably support the
drawing of the inferences. So long as the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably satisfied about the underlying
factual basis for an inference that the Athlete has committed a particular ADRV, he may conclude that
the IAAF has established an ADRV notwithstanding that it is not possible to reach that conclusion
by direct evidence alone’) and para 62 et seq (accepting the reliability of the evidence of Richard
McLaren and Grigory Rodchenkov, and of the ‘washout schedule’ showing that samples collected
from the athlete that were reported negative in ADAMS actually contained prohibited substances)
and para 81 (‘the London Washout Schedule must be read in the context of the McLaren Reports as
a whole and constitute evidence that an athlete whose name appears on the said Washout Schedule
used the prohibited substance(s) listed as having been found in his or her sample(s)’); IAAF v
RusAF & Yushkov, CAS 2018/A/5675, paras 62–63 (same). See also IAAF v RUSAF & Bespalova,
CAS 2018/O/5676, para 75 (McLaren evidence and washout schedules reliable and sufficiently
weighty to establish Use of prohibited substances to the panel’s comfortable satisfaction); IAAF v
RUSAF & Shkolina, CAS 2018/O/5667, paras 94–96 (discussing other cases arising out of Russian
doping system where non-analytical evidence was held sufficient to uphold use charge), para 122
(accepting reliability of electronic documents from Rodchenkov’s hard drive contained in Evidence
Documentation Packages published by Professor McLaren alongside his second report), para 141
(accepting reliability of washout schedules, including due to Rodchenkov’s corroborating evidence);
IBU v Glazyrina, IBU Anti-Doping Hearing Panel, decision dated 24 April 2018, para 169 (‘save’
emails provided by Rodchenkov and published in McLaren EDPs ‘can be considered reliable within
the meaning ascribed to it in article 3.2 IBU ADR’) and para 169 (emails and corroborating LIMS
data confirming presumptive adverse analytical findings for samples in question and other evidence
are sufficiently reliable to uphold charge of use of prohibited substances presumptively found in
those samples) and para 177 (‘This is a situation where the Panel is asked to make a finding on
a very compelling combination of evidentiary elements which, it has been established above, are
reliable, credible and of significant probative value and quite convincingly dovetail into and factually
corroborate each other’).
4 IBU v Sleptsova, ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, para 331 to 367 (upholding Use charge based
on data in LIMS and underlying raw data that had been forensically recovered following deletion);
IBU v Ustyugov, ADHP decision dated 11 February 2020, paras 381-417 (same). Both decisions were
appealed to CAS, and the appeals were still pending at the time of writing.
6 ‘ATTEMPTED USE’ OF A PROHIBITED SUBSTANCE OR METHOD
C7.20 Code Art 2.2 proscribes not only ‘Use’ but also ‘Attempted Use’ of a
Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method. The elements of an ‘Attempted Use’
anti-doping rule violation are as follows:
(a) ‘Attempt’ is defined as ‘purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission
of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation’.1
(b) Therefore, to establish ‘Attempted Use’ of a Prohibited Substance or a
Prohibited Method under Code Art 2.2, the Anti-Doping Organization must
establish ‘conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in’ the ‘Use’ of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited
Method.2
(c) The commentary to Code Art 2.2 is clear that Attempted Use is not a strict
liability offence: ‘Demonstrating the ‘Attempted Use’ of a Prohibited Substance
requires proof of intent on the Athlete’s part’. But intent to do what? The CAS
panel in Gibilisco stated that this meant ‘proof of the athlete’s intent to attempt
to use prohibited substances’,3 but that does not take matters much further. The
reference to ‘purposely’ in the definition of ‘Attempt’ means the Anti-Doping
Organization must prove that the athlete intended to engage in the conduct
that is said to ‘constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to
culminate in’ the use of a prohibited substance or method.4 But is it enough to
show that he intended to commit acts that together constitute the anti-doping
rule violation, or must it also be shown that he knew that the acts he intended
to commit would constitute an anti-doping rule violation? The wording of the
definition of ‘Attempt’ (‘conduct planned to culminate in the commission of
an Anti-Doping Rule Violation’) tends to suggest the latter option is correct.5
However, one CAS panel has ruled that the offence of ‘Attempted Use of a
Prohibited Substance’ is established by proof that the athlete knew that the
product he was ordering over the Internet contained the prohibited substance in
question, even if he did not know at the time that that substance was prohibited.6
(d) Code Art 2.2.2 states: ‘The success or failure of the […] Attempted Use of a
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method is not material. It is sufficient that
a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method was […] Attempted to be Used
for an anti-doping rule violation to be committed’. Therefore, if an athlete
orders over the Internet a product containing a Prohibited Substance, it does
not matter that he never received the product,7 or (if he did receive it) that the
product did not in fact contain the Prohibited Substance as advertised.8 He has
still attempted to use that substance for purposes of Code Art 2.2.
1 Code App One (Definitions), p 132. This is ‘an autonomous definition of the concept of “Attempt”
that shall be applied in the assessment of any conduct eventually leading to such violation’. Gibilisco v
CONI, CAS 2007/A/1426, para 48. This comment was made in apparent reaction to a ruling in earlier
proceedings in the case in Italy, in which a domestic tribunal had thrown out an Art 2.2 charge of
Attempted Use because the acts alleged did not amount to an attempt as that term was defined in Italian
criminal law.
2 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, paras 73, 78. This burden is discharged, for example, by proof
that the athlete deliberately ordered a product in the belief that it contained the substance in question,
paid for the product, arranged for its delivery from overseas to his home address, and intended to use
the product personally when he received it. Ibid, para 79. See also ASADA v Wyper, CAS A4/2007,
para 36 (‘[…] a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an
anti-doping rule violation’ does not mean the athlete has to have taken possession of the substance;
he must do more than merely research the substance and its performance-enhancing effects, but it is
enough if he orders the substance, arranges for it to be posted to him, and pays for it; if he intends
to use it once it is delivered, then clearly that conduct was ‘planned to culminate in the commission
of an’ anti-doping rule violation); ASADA v Allen, Athletics Australia Doping Control Tribunal
decision after hearing on 13 October 2008, para 32 (‘The agreed facts reveal Mr Allen investigated
the substance Testosterone; considered the benefit of the substance, Testosterone; arranged for the
acquisition of it by a third party and for its delivery into Australia; and admitted the plan was to use
the substance. Accordingly, I am persuaded Mr Allen acted purposefully. I further find each step taken
was substantial. I accept Mr Allen engaged in a course of conduct that was planned to culminate in
him being able to use the Testosterone’); DFSNZ v Stewart, Sports Tribunal of New Zealand decision
dated 16 February 2011, para 4(a) (ordering, purchasing and arranging for delivery of prohibited
substances constitutes attempt to use those substances); Willmott v RFU, Appeal Panel decision dated
11 January 2016, para 3.18 (‘[…] a single “substantial step” suffices, so long as that step is part of a
“course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping rule violation”. There is
no requirement that the “course of conduct planned” should all be undertaken by one person’).
3 Gibilisco v CONI, CAS 2007/A/1426, para 56.
4 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 73.
5 The hearing panel in RYA v Johnston, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 May 2007, clearly read
them as requiring proof that the athlete knew the acts she intended to commit would constitute an anti-
doping rule violation. The athlete in that case admitted using an eczema cream that she thought might
contain a prohibited substance (although in fact it did not). She also believed (also mistakenly) that
she had retired from her sport and so was no longer subject to the anti-doping rules. The hearing panel
rejected a charge of Attempted Use under Art 2.2 on the basis that ‘this is certainly not a case where the
Athlete knowingly sought to take a prohibited substance. In circumstances where the Athlete believed
herself not to be subject to the anti-doping regime, she used a cream which she knew might contain
a Prohibited Substance. It does not seem to us to constitute an attempt to commit an anti-doping

offence for Miss Johnston, at a time when she genuinely believed that the anti-doping regime did not
apply to her, to take a cream which she was aware might (as opposed to would) contain a Prohibited
Substance’. Ibid, para 3.1.5. With respect, however, the fact that the cream did not contain a prohibited
substance appears to be a red herring. While she intended to buy a cream that she thought contained
(or might contain) a substance prohibited in the sport, the crucial fact is that she thought she had retired
from the sport, so was no longer subject to the rules, so could not intend to violate them. On this basis,
if the panel were right that an Art 2.2 Attempted Use charge requires proof of intent to do certain acts,
knowing that they will put you in violation of your sport’s anti-doping rules, then she would not have
committed an offence even if the cream had in fact contained a prohibited substance.
6 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, paras 75, 77, followed in Australian Rugby League v Law,
Leagues Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 23 May 2013, paras 23–24. See also UK Anti-Doping v
Kendall, NADP Tribunal decision dated 9 January 2015, paras 4.14-4.15 (where the issue was whether
the athlete had committed his attempted use of a prohibited substance ‘knowingly’ for purposes of
triggering the Art 10.6 discretion to impose aggravated sanctions, the hearing panel held that it was
enough for these purposes that the athlete knowingly ordered a product on the Internet that in fact
contained a prohibited substance, and it did not matter that he was unaware that by ordering the
product he was committing an anti-doping rule violation.
7 See ASADA v Wyper, CAS/A4/2007, para 36.
8 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 84 (‘Unlike the judicial committee of the ARU and
the submissions of the Respondent, we do not see it as essential, for the purposes of proving an
ADRV in the form of an Attempt to Use Prohibited Substances, that the substances are in fact proven
to be Prohibited Substances. There is nothing in the language of the By-Law which suggests this
to be the case. Indeed the language of the By-Law is inconsistent with such a requirement. The
definition of “Attempt” does not require that the conduct constitutes a substantial step in the course of
conduct which would culminate in the commission of an ADRV. Rather it only requires the relevant
conduct to be “planned to culminate” in the commission of such an offence. This use of language
strongly suggests that it is irrelevant that the plan to commit the ADRV may fail because the product
ordered may not, contrary to the belief and intention of the Respondent, contain, in fact, Prohibited
Substances’) (emphasis in original); followed in UK Anti-Doping v Kendall, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 9 January 2015, para 4.12, and in Willmott v RFU, Appeal Panel decision dated 11 January 2016,
para 3.20.
C7.21 In Gibilisco, the CAS panel found that the athlete had visited a doctor on
several occasions, even after becoming aware of the doctor’s involvement in doping
matters; the athlete and the doctor had talked about prohibited substances on at least
one occasion at the doctor’s office; the athlete did not reveal his visits to the doctor
to his team’s doctors or to his military superiors; his testimony about his relationship
with the doctor and the purpose of his visits to the doctor was contradictory; and he
gave no clear explanation for entries in his calendar that CONI alleged were notations
of use of prohibited substances as part of a doping programme.1 However, while the
CAS panel considered that those facts indicated ‘that the Appellant may have been
involved in doping practices’, it held that without more (in particular, proof that the
doctor prescribed prohibited substances to the athlete, or conclusive evidence linking
the letter entries in the athlete’s calendar to doping substances, and evidence to
rebut the athlete’s consistent denial of any intent to take prohibited substances) they
‘cannot, in the Panel’s opinion, be considered as conduct constituting a substantial
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of an anti-doping
rule violation’.2
1 Gibilisco v CONI, CAS 2007/A/1426, para 52.
2 Ibid, para 55.
7 DEFENCES
C7.22 An athlete charged with ‘Use’ may have a defence. For example, the
Prohibited List says that intravenous infusions are a prohibited method ‘except
for those legitimately received in the course of hospital admissions or clinical
investigations’, and so a charge of ‘Use of a Prohibited Method (intravenous
infusion)’ will be dismissed if the athlete can prove the infusion was a legitimate
medical treatment for a medical emergency.1 Meanwhile, if the charge is ‘Attempted

Use’, the definition of ‘Attempt’ states that ‘there shall be no anti-doping rule
violation based solely on an Attempt if the Person renounces the Attempt prior to
it being discovered by a third party not involved in the Attempt’. The CAS has said
this ‘affords an escape mechanism for a player who orders a particular substance, not
knowing at the time the substance is prohibited, but who subsequently ascertains its
prohibited nature prior to discovery by a third party’.2
1 For example, in Eder v Ski Austria, CAS 2006/A/1102, the athlete was a member of the Austrian
cross-country skiing team at the Torino Games. The team’s rooms were searched by the Italian police
following a tip-off, and a used infusion bottle and needle were found under the athlete’s bed, along
with the remnants of a saline solution. The athlete claimed that the day before competition he had
suffered an attack of acute diarrhoea, and the team doctor had not been available, so he had called his
personal doctor, who had advised him to inject himself with saline solution by infusion. As a guideline
to interpretation of the ‘legitimate acute medical treatment’ exception, the CAS panel chose to follow
the following tests for legitimate medical treatment identified in Mayer v IOC, CAS 2002/A/389-393:
(a) the medical treatment must be necessary to cure an illness or injury of the athlete in question; (b)
there must be no valid alternative treatment available; (c) the medical treatment must not be capable
of enhancing the athlete’s performance; (d) the medical treatment must be preceded by a medical
diagnosis of the athlete; (e) the medical treatment must be diligently applied by qualified medical
personnel in an appropriate medical setting; and (f) adequate records of the medical treatment must
be kept and must be available for inspection. The CAS panel in Eder found that the athlete’s infusion
of a saline solution did not meet those criteria and so did not qualify as a legitimate medical treatment
because the athlete administered it himself, he was not examined first by a medical doctor, there were
no medical personnel present when he set the infusion, and no records of any kind were kept. Eder v
Ski Austria, CAS 2006/A/1102, para 63. However, it accepted that he acted with No Significant Fault or
Negligence and so did not disturb the first instance panel’s reduction of the standard two-year sanction
down to 12 months. (See para C20.6, n 12). See also Hoch v FIS & IOC, CAS 2008/A/1513, para 8.7
(rejecting on the facts the coach’s claims that the medical items found in his possession were intended
for permitted purposes, rather than for blood doping and manipulation of blood samples by his cross-
country skiers); Ganaha v Japan Professional Football League, CAS 2008/A/1452, para 38 (‘The
conditions under which a certain medical treatment, which would otherwise fall under the definition
of doping, may be justified are truly exceptional and as a general rule must therefore be demonstrated
by the athlete or other person performing such treatment’), applying the six Mayer criteria, and para 43
(‘[…] the decision of the treating physician cannot pre-empt any decision or review on the Appeal by
this Panel although the treating doctor’s opinion must be accorded significant weight’).
2 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 77. See also ASADA v Allen, Athletics Australia Doping
Control Tribunal decision following hearing on 13 October 2008, para 36 (athlete who retired from
sport after prohibited substances he had ordered were intercepted by Customs could not rely on
proviso); Willmott v RFU, Appeal Panel decision dated 11 January 2016, para 3.21 (attempt to rely on
proviso rejected because ‘[t]here is no evidence at all that Mr Willmott took any steps to contact Mr.
X and withdraw the permission [to send a parcel to his home for onward delivery to Mr X] at all. It is
clear that Mr. Willmott had the means of contacting Mr X if he wished to. The notion that having “…
avoided speaking with, seeing or meeting Mr. X in the hope that Mr. X would not be tempted to use
the address after all” could amount to a renunciation is clearly wrong’).
CHAPTER C8
Article 2.3 Charge – Refusing or

Failing to Submit to or Otherwise
Evading Sample Collection
C8.1 Obviously, drug-testing will not act as an effective deterrent if athletes can
simply avoid the testing without adverse consequences.1 Therefore 2015 Code Art
2.3 makes the following an anti-doping rule violation:
‘Refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection

after notification as authorized in applicable anti-doping rules, or otherwise evading
Sample collection’.
Art 2.3 has been amended in the 2021 Code to read:
‘Evading Sample collection, or refusing or failing to submit to Sample collection

without compelling justification after notification by a duly authorized Person’.
1 Azevedo v FINA, CAS 2005/A/925, para 68, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005 (FINA, 2006),
p 258 (‘No doubt, we are of the view that the logic of anti-doping tests and of the DC Rules demands
and expects that, whenever physically, hygienically and morally possible, the sample be provided
despite objections by the athlete. If that does not occur, athletes would systematically refuse to provide
samples for whatever reasons, leaving no opportunity for testing’); NZRL v Tawera, SDTNZ decision
dated 6 May 2005, para 33 (‘[…] as a general principle, it is proper to treat a failure to supply a sample
as seriously as the provision of a sample which returns a positive result; otherwise, athletes would have
an incentive to cheat’). In Tawera, the hearing panel imposed a one-year ban, notwithstanding that the
athlete’s refusal to provide a sample was only due to ‘a momentary lapse in judgment’, because of ‘the
seriousness of the breach of which he is guilty’.
C8.2 Thus, in a Code Art 2.3 case the Anti-Doping Organization has to establish
to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel that:
(a) in a refusal or failure case:
(i) the athlete was notified that he was required to provide a sample ‘as
authorized in applicable anti-doping rules’. This language is not clear:
does the Anti-Doping Organization only have to show that it had
authority to test the athlete’,1 or does it also have to prove that the
notification of the athlete that he was required to submit to a test was
carried out exactly in accordance with the notification procedures set out
in the International Standard for Testing & Investigations (‘ISTI’)?2 The
amendments to Art 2.3 in the 2021 Code suggest it is the former only, but
athletes’ counsel will still likely seek to defend a case on the basis that
there were departures from the ISTI requirements that caused the refusal
or failure;3 and
(ii) the athlete refused4 or failed5 to submit to such sample collection; and
(iii) the athlete’s refusal was intentional,6 or his failure was intentional or
negligent;7 or
(b) in an evasion case:
(i) the athlete ‘evaded’ sample collection;8
(ii) it is not necessary to prove the athlete was given formal notice that he
was required to provide a sample;9
Article 2.3 Charge – Refusing or failing to submit to or evading sample collection 855
(iii) nor is it necessary to prove that he had a reason why he wanted to evade
sample collection;10
(iv) but it is necessary to prove that he intended to evade the sample
collection,11 which means proving that he was aware that an Anti-Doping
Organization wanted to conduct a test on him, and took steps that were
intended to avoid being tested.12
1 For the principles determining an Anti-Doping Organization’s jurisdiction to test, see paras C3.3 to
C3.4 and Code Art 5. The CAS panel in Annus v IOC, CAS 2004/A/718, para 62, rejected the athlete’s
argument that WADA had no authority to perform doping tests during the Olympic Games; while
in WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 64, the CAS panel rejected the Egyptian
athlete’s argument that USADA did not have authority to test him while he was in the US. Meanwhile,
in a third CAS case, WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 7.5, the CAS panel
considered whether or not the DCO had authority to conduct an out-of-competition test on the athlete
as ‘a preliminary issue’ to the charge of refusal or failure to submit to the test.
If the sample collection agency is not an Anti-Doping Organization but rather a private company
contracted to collect samples on behalf of an Anti-Doping Organization, it will have to show that it is
authorised by that Anti-Doping Organization to collect samples from athletes who are under the testing
jurisdiction of the Anti-Doping Organization, and at the time of the test its DCO will have to be ready
to produce evidence of the sample collection agency’s authority and that he works for that sample
collection agency. WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, paras 233, 256--64; Salmond v
IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, paras 170-71 (ISTI Art 5.3.3 requirements met where DCO showed letter
from international federation, confirming IDTM had been appointed as a sample collection agency
for the international federation and its DCOs were authorised to collect samples on behalf of the
international federation, as well as his electronic IDTM identification card, bearing his name and
photograph).
2 ISTI Art 5.4.1 sets out what the athlete should be told when he is notified that he is required to give a
sample. An arbitrator held in UKAD v Canaveral, decision dated 7 October 2019, para 32, and then
again in IAAF v Kendagor, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 22 October 2019, para 11, that the Anti-
Doping Organization must prove both that the testing was authorised under the rules and that the athlete
was properly notified of the requirement to provide a sample. See also B v FEI, CAS 2007/A/1415,
para 24 (requirement satisfied where athlete was notified in accordance with the requirements set out in
the IST; notifying him 15 minutes after he had finished competing was not too late); UKAD v Clabby,
NADP decision dated 20 December 2016, para 33 (‘For violations involving a “refusal” or a “failure to
submit”, formal notification (ie, by UKAD DCP) is a prerequisite. Once notified by DCP (in accordance
with the International Standard for Testing and Investigations), if an athlete refuses to provide a Sample,
or fails to do so, he or she will commit either a refusal or a failure to submit’); IRB v Nelo Liu, Board
Judicial Committee decision dated 24 April 2007, paras 50, 75 (charge of refusal dismissed because
player not notified properly). Cf WADA v Pop, CAS 2005/A/964 (rejecting athlete’s argument that he
had not received proper notification that he had been selected for testing where the relevant rules made
it clear that it was the athlete’s responsibility to establish, in particular by checking the lists posted by
the UCI at the event, whether he had been selected for testing).
On the other hand, it does not appear to be necessary to run through the entire list of points that
the ISTI says must or should be stated to the athlete when he is notified of the test. WADA v FILA &
Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 84 (‘Once Mr Richard Brooks and Mr Tommy Nevill validly
identified themselves as official USADA agents, the Wrestler had no ground to refuse to submit to
the sample collection session’), paras 79–81 (rejecting on the facts the athlete’s argument that the
DCOs whose test he refused had not properly identified themselves or properly informed him of his
rights and responsibilities), and para 87 (presentation of letter of authority to test ‘does not breach
the requirement of article 5.4.1 b ISTI and does not call into question the validity of the notification
process or the sample collection process’). In WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558,
para 4.4.15 et seq, the athlete argued that he could not be held to have refused to submit to sample
collection because he had not been notified in the manner required by the International Standard for
Testing: the letter of authority presented was defective, and in particular he was not clearly warned of
the disciplinary sanctions that would be imposed if he refused or failed to submit to the test, and if he
had been so advised he would not have refused to take the test. The CAS panel rejected this argument,
holding that even assuming the allegations were true, ‘the Panel nevertheless would not consider that
these departures caused Mr Gertenbach’s refusal to submit to sample collection, particularly as the IST
placed no obligation on the DCO to advise Mr Gertenbach of the precise consequences of his refusal
to comply, or to advise him of what specific sanction he was likely to incur’.
Arguing the notification was fatally incomplete is especially difficult when it is the athlete himself
who prevents the notification taking place in full: WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, ibid, para 7.12
(endorsing first instance decision that ‘it would be somewhat of an anomaly to allow an athlete to
contest his/her refusal to submit to sample collection on the basis that Article 5.4.1 of the International
Standards was not complied with in circumstances where that athlete’s refusal was the cause of the
non-compliance’).
In an attempt to avoid these difficulties, the WADA template doping control form includes the
following statement that the athlete makes when he signs the form to acknowledge notification:
‘I hereby acknowledge that I have received and read this notice, including the athlete rights and
responsibilities text on the overleaf of copy 4, and I consent to provide sample(s) as requested
(I understand that failure or refusal to provide a sample may constitute an anti-doping rule violation)’.
If the athlete signs that acknowledgement, any denial of proper notification would seem doomed to
fail. See eg Troicki v ITF, CAS 2013/A/3279, para 9.29.2 (signature of form meant athlete could not
argue he was unaware of consequences of a failure to provide sample, and therefore he was at fault
for that failure, although DCO was also partly at fault for not doing more to make position absolutely
clear to him); UKAD v Canaveral, NADP decision dated 7 October 2019, para 34 (signature on form
taken as proof of proper notification).
3 For example, there is some authority for the proposition that it is a material departure from the ISTI
notification requirements not to warn the athlete of the consequences of refusing or failing to submit
to sample collection. WADA v CONI, FIGC & Cherubin, CAS 2008/A/1551, para 66 (‘[…] in the
particular circumstances of this case […] liability under article 2.3 has not been established because
it has not been proven to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction that the Player actually refused or failed
in the meaning of article 2.3 to give his sample at 22.25; but rather that he left the station without
having been told not to do so in terms he could readily understand as being a formal injunction linked
to a possible sanction and in circumstances enabling him to believe that if he immediately returned
after taking a shower rather than waiting around while his teammate was being tested that would be
sufficient’); and the obiter remarks in the context of an athlete’s No Significant Fault or Negligence plea
in Brothers v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4631, para 116 (‘[…] the Panel is indeed troubled by the adequacy
of the DCO’s answer to the Appellant regarding the nature of the sanctions which would result from
his denial. It is clear that a mere statement, “the Federation will be in touch regarding repercussions”,
is not sufficient and may indeed constitute a breach of the DCO’s duties and responsibilities. […]
117. The Appellant is, however, an international-level athlete who had been urine-tested “between 6
and 12 times” since 2013, and blood-tested twice. Even if he had not undergone “formal education”
with regard to the provisions of the FINA Doping Control Rules, he could not realistically have
assumed that his refusal would be without consequence’). See also WADA v CONI, FIGC & Cherubin,
CAS 2008/A/151, para 66 (‘[…] liability under article 2.3 has not been established because it has not
been proven to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction that the Player actually refused or failed in the
meaning of article 2.3 to give his sample at 22.25; but rather that he left the station without having been
told not to do so in terms he could readily understand as being a formal injunction linked to a possible
sanction and in circumstances enabling him to believe that if he immediately returned after taking a
shower rather than waiting around while his team-mate was being tested that would be sufficient’).
However, ISTI Art 5.4.1 says only that the athlete ‘should’ be advised of possible consequences
(ISTI Art 5.4.1(ed)(iii), ie it is not a mandatory requirement. Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885,
para 179 (‘The Panel also notes that Article 5.4.l(e)(iii) of the ISTI stipulates “the Athlete should be
advised of the possible Consequences of Failure to Comply”. The Panel does not read “should” as a
“must”. The word “should” implies some form of recommendation or guideline and therefore does not
impose an obligation on [the DCO]’) (emphasis in original).
ISTI Art 5.4.3 provides that ‘the Chaperone/DCO shall, if possible, inform the Athlete of the
Consequences of refusing or failing to comply’, but that obligation (which is still only ‘if possible’)
is only triggered if the athlete refuses to sign the doping control form to acknowledge he has been
notified, presumably because that form contains an express acknowledgement that a refusal or failure
to submit to sample collection after notification may be pursued as an anti-doping rule violation (n
3, above), and therefore no further warning is required if he signs that form. See eg Troicki v ITF,
CAS 2013/A/3279, para 9.29.2 (signature of form meant athlete could not argue he was unaware of
consequences of a failure to provide sample); Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 190 (‘[…]
since [the athlete] signed the doping control form, there was no mandatory requirement under the ISTI
to give him any further warning’); UK Anti-Doping v Bird, NADP Tribunal decision dated 9 January
2019, para 63 (same).
In WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 4.4.15 et seq, the athlete alleged that he
could not be held to have refused to submit to sample collection because he had not been notified in the
manner required by the International Standard for Testing: in particular he was not clearly warned of
the disciplinary sanctions that would be imposed if he refused or failed to submit to the test, and if he
had been so advised he would not have refused to take the test. The CAS panel rejected this argument,
holding that even assuming the allegations were true, ‘the Panel nevertheless would not consider that
these departures caused Mr Gertenbach’s refusal to submit to sample collection, particularly as the
IST placed no obligation on the DCO to advise Mr Gertenbach of the precise consequences of his
refusal to comply, or to advise him of what specific sanction he was likely to incur’. See also ITF v
Mak, Independent Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2017, para 72 (‘Nor do we find any substance
in [the athlete’s] complaint that the probable consequences of failing to provide a blood test were not
adequately explained. On the contrary, we find that he was told that there would be “consequences”
and that such consequences clearly extended beyond participation in the particular tournament. To be
blunt, if Mr Mak did not know that players who refuse to give a blood sample risk being banned for
more than a tournament or two, then he had no business entering as a competitor’); Sport Ireland v
Miele, Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel decision dated 13 December 2019, para 3.2 (‘It is
unnecessary to decide whether a reference was made to a possible sanction of three months or more;
what is relevant is the potential commission of an anti-doping rule violation rather than the sanction
applicable thereto’).
4 Whether or not the athlete did in fact refuse to take the test may be in dispute. The hearing panel
in IRB v Nelo Liu, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 24 April 2007, para 38, found that
the procedural guidelines for sample collection ‘inform a discussion of whether […] the Player’s
conduct in response [to the DCO’s efforts] constituted a “refusal” for purposes of’ the applicable
anti-doping rules, ie if he was not properly informed then he may not have refused. The CAS panel
in WADA v FILA & Abdelfattah, CAS 2008/A/1470, para 94, rejected on the evidence the athlete’s
argument that his departure without providing a sample ‘was the result of a misunderstanding or
miscommunication between him and the USADA agents’. And the CAS panel in WADA v IIHF &
Busch, CAS 2008/A/1564, paras 90–92, held that the athlete had refused the test, within the meaning
of Art 2.3, where he initially declined to be tested, but then remained in his apartment, on the telephone,
until another DCO was sent to test him several hours later that afternoon. See also para C8.3 for
different forms of refusal to submit to sample collection. In Turner V BEF, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 1 August 2014, a showjumper had just ridden on a ‘catch’ ride (ie a ride based on an informal
agreement on the day with the horse’s owner). The tribunal found that she had not refused to have the
horse sampled when she referred the DCO to the horse’s owner, since she was going to another ride.
5 See para C8.3 for different forms of failure to submit to sample collection.
6 See commentary to Code Art 2.3: ‘A violation of “failing to submit to Sample collection” may be
based on either intentional or negligent conduct of the Athlete, while “evading” or “refusing” Sample
collection contemplates intentional conduct by the Athlete’. Two cases suggest that a refusal or failure
is presumptively intentional or at least negligent, and therefore proof of the refusal or failure alone
is enough to establish the offence, unless the athlete can show that he took all reasonable steps to
avoid liability and that his conduct was not negligent or intentional. Fazekas v IOC, CAS 2004/A/714,
para 20; CCES v Zardo, SDRCC DT-05-0023, decision dated 6 September 2005, para 151 et seq.
However, the more orthodox view, and one followed in all of the other cases, is that the Anti-Doping
Organization must prove the refusal or failure is intentional (or that the failure is negligent).
The comment to Art 2.3 does not define what ‘intentional’ means in this context, and therefore
some panels have used the natural and ordinary meaning of the word. UK Anti-Doping v Bird,
NADP Tribunal decision dated 9 January 2019, paras 60, 62 (‘[…] in the context of Article 2.3,
“intentional” is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning’, ie ‘deliberate’); UK Anti-Doping v
Bailey, NADP Tribunal decision dated 8 December 2017, para 36 (‘conscious and deliberate’); IAAF v
Bett, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 19 November 2018, para 62 (‘While the comment to Code
Article 2.3 requires that the refusal is intentional, without defining what is meant by the term in this
context, the natural and ordinary meaning of the term is that the athlete deliberately declined to provide
a Sample and it is clear that Mr Bett had such intent. His decision to refuse to provide a Sample was
on his own admission deliberate in full knowledge that there would be consequences for so-doing, in
particular because that Mr Bett confirms that the DCO so informed him’). However 2015 Code Art
10.3.1 states that the ban for an Art 2.3 violation is four years ‘unless, in the case of failing to submit
to Sample collection, the Athlete can establish that the commission of the anti-doping rule violation
was not intentional (as defined in Article 10.2.3), in which case the period of Ineligibility shall be two
years’, which suggests that an ‘intentional’ refusal or failure must also be ‘as defined in Art 10.2.3’,
ie it is ‘meant to identify those Athletes who cheat. The term, therefore, requires that the Athlete or
other Person engaged in conduct which he or she knew constituted an anti-doping rule violation or
knew that there was a significant risk that the conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping rule
violation and manifestly disregarded that risk’. See eg Sport Ireland v Miele, Irish Sport Anti-Doping
Disciplinary Panel decision dated 13 December 2019, para 4.8 (finding no intent within meaning of
Art 10.2.3 where ‘Mr Miele cooperated fully and took the decision to leave after many attempts to
provide a complete sample (and having provided a partial sample). Thus, while Mr Miele was aware
that in leaving without providing a full sample he was potentially committing an anti-doping rule
violation, the failure to provide the sample (after a two-hour period) was driven by Mr Miele’s desire to
be with his family and daughter [who had fallen] and does not in the opinion of the Panel constitute a
manifest disregard of the potential anti-doping rule violation’); UKAD v Burrell, NADP decision dated
7 February 2018, para 134 (upholding refusal charge on the basis that ‘the Athlete’s evidence was that
he was aware he was liable to be tested, knew there were consequences for not providing a Sample and
was expecting to be targeted. The Tribunal accordingly found that the Athlete, at the very least, knew
that there was a significant risk that, by leaving his home without providing a Sample, his conduct
might constitute or result in an Anti-Doping Rule Violation, and that he then manifestly disregarded
that risk’); UKAD v Canaveral, NADP decision dated 7 October 2019, para 43 (considering, obiter,
that Art 10.2.3 definition of ‘intentional’ should be followed in an Art 2.3 case). Cf UK Anti-Doping
v Bird, NADP Tribunal decision dated 9 January 2019, para 60 (‘That definition [of “intentional” in
Art 10.2.3] is expressly limited to Article 10.2 and 10.3. It does not apply to Article 2.3. Therefore, in
the context of Article 2.3, “intentional” is to be given its ordinary and natural meaning’); ITF v Mak,
Independent Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2017, para 55 (upholding refusal charge even though
‘[…] we find as a fact that although he refused to provide a blood sample, Mr Mak was not intending
to cheat. We find support for that conclusion in that he did offer to provide a urine sample’).
The comment to 2021 Code Art 10.2.3 states: ‘Article 10.2.3 provides a special definition of
“intentional” which is to be applied solely for purposes of Article 10.2’. Therefore, an Anti-Doping
Organization looking to establish a refusal case or an intentional failure case under 2021 Code Art 2.3,
basing itself on the natural and ordinary meaning of the word ‘intentional’ (see para B1.56), should
seek to prove that the athlete knowingly and consciously did not proceed with the test, in order to avoid
having to provide a sample.
One unusual case suggests that proof of intent is not always necessarily required in a refusal case. In
Brothers v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4631, para 95, a CAS panel justified its acceptance of a No Significant
Fault or Negligence plea in a refusal case by finding that, despite the wording of the comment to Art
2.3, that Article should not be construed as deeming any refusal to be intentional, with the refusing
athlete therefore being denied any possibility of elimination or reduction of sanction for No (or No
Significant) Fault or Negligence). Instead, the panel decided, a failure to provide a sample (which, the
comment to Art 2.3 says, ‘may be based on either intentional or negligent conduct’, ‘more properly
serves as an “umbrella” concept to describe all types of actions or situations which result, for whatever
reason, from the objective fact of not having submitted to the test. Viewing the objective refusal to
submit to a test as being a sub-category of the broader category of “failing to submit” would also
facilitate a better understanding of the commentary’s use of the term “contemplates intentional
conduct”. If “refusal” to submit to a test merely “contemplates” the presence of intent or the intention
to cheat, it does not inexorably follow that intent will always be present; it may or may not be present
at all or may or may not be present in significant degree in the given set of facts’.
On the other hand, the refusal or failure must be a ‘conscious’ one on the athlete’s part. In USADA v
Page, AAA Panel decision dated 4 February 2009, paras 9.6, 9.10, it was ruled that an athlete had
not consciously refused or failed to submit to sample collection after a race where he was concussed
from a crash during the race, and unable to focus or concentrate, there was no evidence he knew he
had been selected for drug testing, and there was no evidence that he was trying to evade testing. In
WADA v CONI, FIGC & Cherubin, CAS 2008/A/151, para 66, the CAS panel rejected a charge that
the athlete had violated Code Art 2.3 on the basis that, although he had clearly been notified that he
had to attend the doping control station, it was not clear that he had been told, once he arrived there,
that he could not leave to take a shower before he had given his sample unless he was accompanied by
a chaperone. The CAS panel ruled: ‘liability under article 2.3 has not been established because it has
not been proven to the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction that the Player actually refused or failed in the
meaning of article 2.3 to give his sample at 22.25; but rather that he left the station without having been
told not to do so in terms he could readily understand as being a formal injunction linked to a possible
sanction and in circumstances enabling him to believe that if he immediately returned after taking a
shower rather than waiting around while his team-mate was being tested that would be sufficient’. Ibid,
para 66. Similarly, in WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, paras 6.21-
6.23, ‘when the Players stopped off in the changing room for somewhere between 10 and 25 minutes
before proceeding to the control station they were not conscious of the fact and could not know that
despite the circumstances (losing the game and being summoned by the coach and President) this
delay and loss of visual control would according to the rules be deemed a failure or a refusal to submit
to the doping control. [6.23] Therefore, the Panel concludes that the Players cannot be deemed to have
refused or failed to submit to sample collection under Article 2.3’.
7 See comment to Code Art 2.3: ‘A violation of “failing to submit to Sample collection” may be based
on either intentional or negligent conduct of the Athlete […]’. Given this, and given further that every
refusal to submit to sample collection is also presumably a failure to submit to sample collection, an
Anti-Doping Organization may consider pleading a failure to submit as an alternative charge in every
Art 2.3 refusal case.
8 The comment to Code Art 2.3 says: ‘For example, it would be an anti-doping rule violation of
“evading Sample collection” if it were established that an Athlete was deliberately avoiding a
Doping control official to evade notification or Testing’, as happened, for example, in IAAF v ARAF
& Dyldin, CAS 2016/O/4702 and in IAAF v HAA & Kovago, CAS 2012/A/2843. In Annus v IOC,
CAS 2004/A/718, para 63, the CAS held that making oneself unavailable for testing for three days in a
row, despite knowing of an Anti-Doping Organization’s desire to conduct a test by a certain deadline,
amounted to evading sample collection for purposes of Art 2.3. Meanwhile, ISTI Articles I.3.4, I.3.4
and I.4.3(b) state that filing failures (ie intentionally providing inadequate or inaccurate whereabouts
information, or failing to update that information when your plans change, so that you cannot be found
for testing out-of-competition) or missed tests (ie not being available for testing at the place and time
that you specified in your whereabouts filing) could ‘in appropriate circumstances’ also amount to
evading sample collection for purposes of Code Art 2.3. See USADA v Trafeh, AAA decision dated
2 December 2014, paras 9.9 and 10.1 (athlete found to have committed the Art 2.3 violation of evading
Sample collection where he failed to update whereabouts information from Morocco to the US ‘to
ensure he could be located for testing while in the United States’, and instead ‘deliberately withheld
information from USADA regarding his planned travel to the United States and then after arriving in
the United States knowingly provided USADA with false information regarding his whereabouts, all
for the purpose of evading notification or testing for a period of time upon his arrival in the United
States from Morocco in February 2014’).
9 Annus v IOC, CAS 2004/A/718, para 61 (‘This version of committing an anti-doping rule violation,
that is, evading a doping control, does not require a notification. Thus, there is no need for the
Panel to express any conclusion on whether the notification of the Bucsu-doping-test was correctly
performed by the IOC’), followed in WADA v Jamaludin et al, CAS 2012/A/2791, p 10; Raula v
RADA, CAS 2014/A/3668, para 42 (‘To establish that the Athlete has violated the rule in Article 2
paragraph 2 letter c) it is not necessary to find that she was notified of the Sample collection but it is
enough to establish that she was “otherwise evading Sample collection”‘). See also UK Anti-Doping
v Tiler, NADP Tribunal decision dated 19 February 2019, para 50ii (‘Notification is not an element of
the ADRV of evasion. An athlete does not have to have been notified of their requirement to submit to
Sample collection for the ADRV of evasion to be made out. As notification is not required, it cannot be
said that a failure to notify the athlete is causative of the factual basis of the ADRV of evasion’).
10 Dobud v FINA, CAS 2015/A/4163, para 94 (‘The Panel recognizes the force of the point that there
is no evidence that the Appellant had any motive to evade a test. Tested many times before, he had
an unblemished record as a clean athlete. Furthermore, albeit unbeknown to him on the morning of
21 March 2015, his test the night before proved also to be negative, as he could have anticipated if
then drug free. However, the regulations governing test evasion do not require the governing body
to establish why an athlete may have evaded a test; only that he had in fact done so. A number of
scenarios can be constructed as to why the Appellant rationally feared to be tested on the morning in
question, the least hurtful of which is that after a prolonged celebration in which on his own admission
much alcohol was consumed, he may have been apprehensive that he had inadvertently ingested some
substance that would have involved breach of the anti-doping rules (of whose detail he appeared
unhappily not well versed). So while his clean record undoubtedly weighs in his favour, it cannot by
itself outweigh other inculpatory evidence’).
11 See comment to Code Art 2.3: ‘“evading” […] Sample collection contemplates intentional conduct
by the Athlete’. See eg WADA v Jamaludin et al, CAS 2012/A/2791, para 8.1.3 (‘Athlete 3 however
did hear about the doping test from the Coach during the day of 24 May 2011 and also stated that
he had planned to bring to the medical test the urine of another person. Furthermore, he joined the
other Athletes during the meeting at the Restaurant in the afternoon/evening and, despite learning
that ADAM wanted him and the others to undergo another doping test, which took place on 26 May
2011, he left for Bulgaria on 25 May 2011. For the foregoing reasons, the Panel finds that Athlete
3 also intentionally evaded sample collection’); Raula v RADA, CAS 2014/A/3668, para 47 (‘the
Sole Arbitrator is satisfied that the Athlete was aware of the upcoming doping control test – both
when she left the training camp to go to her father’s home in the evening of 30 July 2013 and on
the next day when she spoke to the Secretary General on the telephone. With this knowledge she
intentionally evaded the sample collection, which she knew would take place at the training camp’). In
July 2012, the Hong Kong Anti-Doping Committee announced that its Disciplinary Panel had found
two bodybuilders, Ms Luk Pak Yu and Mr Pan Tong Fung, guilty of evading an in-competition drug
test, on the basis that they ‘deliberately absconded and evaded sample collection’: HKADC press
release dated 31 July 2012.
12 UKAD v Clabby, NADP Tribunal decision dated 20 December 2016, para 61 (upholding evasion
charge on basis athlete knew that he had been selected to provide a sample, and deliberately avoided
the doping control personnel in order to avoid being tested); Kolasa v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal
Tribunal decision dated 22 May 2014, para 4.16 (‘The violation of “otherwise evading Sample
collection”, like that of tampering, is an offence of specific intent, in that there must [be] a deliberate
intention to avoid being tested. That is inherent in the verb “evading”. The Tribunal described this
requirement as one of “bad faith”, which we regard as another way of saying the same thing’) and
para 4.26 (‘the violation of “otherwise evading Sample collection” also requires mens rea, as we have
already observed. There must be a deliberate attempt to avoid being tested’).
C8.3 A refusal or failure to submit to sample collection may take different

forms. For example, Article 5.4.1(e) of the International Standard for Testing &
Investigations requires an athlete who has been notified that he is required to undergo
a drugs test to ensure that he remains within sight of the person that notified him
(or the person to whom that person hands him over at the doping control station)
until he has provided a sample. This is obviously to prevent any opportunity for
the athlete to manipulate or tamper with the process.1 As a result, an athlete will be
held to have refused or failed to submit to sample collection, for purposes of Code
Art 2.3, if he does not allow himself to be chaperoned continuously from the time
he is notified he has been chosen for a drugs test to the time he submits the sample,
even if he subsequently provides a sample and it turns out to be negative.2 For a
charge to be upheld on these facts, however, there must be clear evidence that the
athlete was aware of the chaperoning requirements and consciously chose to ignore
them.3
1 WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 62 (a failure to permit
chaperoning had to be deemed a failure to submit to sample collection within the meaning of Code
Art 2.3 because ‘any other interpretation of the meaning of the word “failing” to submit to sample
collection under Article 2.3 would prevent achieving the purpose of the anti-doping rules with
regard to In-Competition sample collection, which is to avoid giving athletes who want to cheat an
opportunity to do so between the point in time of the notification and their arrival at the doping-control
station. Indeed, it would be all too simple for cheaters if athletes were afforded the possibility of being
absolved of a violation by merely invoking the fact that a sample was ultimately provided, albeit late,
and in particular if they were to hide behind the behaviour of their coach or any other person in their
entourage as an excuse for submitting a sample late without having remained under visual control of
the DCO/Chaperone’).
2 In WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, a CAS panel held that two
footballers had failed to submit to sample collection, in violation of Code Art 2.3, when they were
notified in the tunnel immediately after a match that they had been selected for doping control,
understood they had to report to doping control without delay, but instead went into the dressing
room for an urgent team meeting called by their coach and club president, leaving the doping control
officer outside and unable to see them for up to 25 minutes, notwithstanding the fact that they then
reported to the doping control station and provided samples that turned out to be negative. Based
on the ISTI Article 5.4.1 requirement of constant chaperoning from the moment of notification, the
CAS panel held that ‘under the meaning of Article 2.3 any behaviour whereby an athlete expressly
refuses, or de facto fails to report to the doping control station without delay and remains without
chaperone during such delay, must be deemed a refusal or a failure to submit a sample, unless there
is “a compelling justification”. [61] In other words, the refusal or failure is constituted by any delay
in providing the sample after having been notified to do so, where the delay is not authorized by
the control personnel and during which the athlete is not chaperoned, irrespective of whether the
athlete submits a sample at some subsequent point in time. Thus, in cases where an athlete ends up
submitting a sample, what is relevant in finding a violation is not so much the exact period of time
which lapses between the notification and the submission of the sample, as the fact of not submitting
the sample forthwith upon being officially notified to do so, ie the fact of submitting the sample
late, and simultaneously not being within sight of the DCO/Chaperone’. Ibid, paras 60–61. In such
circumstances, there is no need to prove ‘that the athlete actually attempted to manipulate his or her
sample in order to mask the use of a prohibited substance during an unauthorized delay’, and nor is the
fact the athlete subsequently submitted to sample collection a defence. Ibid, paras 63–64.
CAS jurisprudence also confirms that the provision of one sample by an athlete, having previously
refused to give another, does not serve as a withdrawal from an effort to refuse the first sample collection
(even if the second test is negative and the relevant sample was collected very shortly after the refusal).
See WADA v IIHF & Busch, CAS 2008/A/1564, paras 91 and 92 (‘There were two separate orders for
tests, even if the same anti-doping testing agency and the same doping control officer was performing
the two tests […]. The first test was refused […]. The Panel holds that the arguments of Mr Busch
and DEB at the hearing that the result of the second test was negative and that the time since 12:30
until 5:14pm was too short in order to mask the intake of a prohibited substance or to hinder that such
substance taken before could be revealed, are of no legal relevance for the issue of refusal to sample
collection’). See also WADA v Bhupender Singh and NADA, CAS 2014/A/3868, para 52 (‘The offence
was committed when the Athlete chose to run away rather than submit to the test. The fact that he
thought better of his actions the next day after he had consulted his coach cannot be said to reduce his
fault or negligence in failing to submit to the test in the first place’) and para 56 (‘Either way, the fact
that he gave a sample the following day and there was no adverse analytical finding is of very little
assistance to the Athlete because the offence had already been committed and his subsequent actions
cannot affect the extent of his fault or negligence in committing the offence. At best it gives some
assistance to the Athlete in suggesting that his running away from the test was caused by naivety and
panic rather than as part of some premeditated plan’).
3 WADA v CONI, FIGC & Cherubin, CAS 2008/A/151, para 66; WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini &
Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, paras 6.21–6.23.
In Cherubin, the CAS panel rejected a charge that the athlete had violated Code Art 2.3 on the basis
that, although he had clearly been notified that he had to attend the doping control station, it was not
clear that he had been told, once he arrived there, that he could not leave to take a shower before he
had given his sample unless he was accompanied by a chaperone. The CAS panel ruled: ‘liability
under article 2.3 has not been established because it has not been proven to the Panel’s comfortable
satisfaction that the Player actually refused or failed in the meaning of article 2.3 to give his sample at
22.25; but rather that he left the station without having been told not to do so in terms he could readily
understand as being a formal injunction linked to a possible sanction and in circumstances enabling him
to believe that if he immediately returned after taking a shower rather than waiting around while his
team-mate was being tested that would be sufficient’. Ibid, para 66. It is clear, however, that if he had
been given such a warning, then the CAS panel would have held that departure from the doping control
station without a chaperone would have amounted to a refusal or failure to submit to sample collection.
The one-year ban imposed on the athletes in Mannini caused a political storm in Italy, and in football
generally, that subsided only when the CAS re-opened the case due to ‘new evidence’ (namely that
the players, through no fault of their own, were under the impression that the tests in question were
treated as ‘advance notice’ tests, and were not aware that they were responsible for ensuring that they
remained in sight of the doping control officer from the time they were notified they had to provide
a sample to the time they provided the sample) and ruled in consequence of that new evidence that
‘when the Players stopped off in the changing room for somewhere between 10 and 25 minutes before
proceeding to the control station they were not conscious of the fact and could not know that despite
the circumstances (losing the game and being summoned by the coach and President) this delay and
loss of visual control would according to the rules be deemed a failure or a refusal to submit to
the doping control. [6.23] Therefore, the Panel concludes that the Players cannot be deemed to have
refused or failed to submit to sample collection under Article 2.3’. WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini &
Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, paras 6.21-6.23. It was expressly noted in the award, however, that ‘[i]
n reaching this conclusion the Panel does not question the validity of Article 2.3 or its strict conditions
of application as determined in the First Award […]’. Ibid, para 6.24.
To similar effect is WADA v CONI, Slay & Diaz, CAS 2009A/1892, para 52 (‘WADA has not
succeeded in establishing to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel when and in what form the
Athletes were made aware that they were told let alone directed not to leave the anti-doping station
in a manner which enabled them to understand that they would be in breach of their duties if they did
so. Although both Mr. Consalvi and Dr, Cordoni testified that they urged the Athletes not to leave the
doping control station, they did not clearly state that they spoke directly to the Athletes in a manner
which enabled the Athletes to understand. Mr. Consalvi testified that, after the Athetes had shown their
intention to leave the doping control station, Dr. Cordoni had invited Dr. Stranges to tell them that
they could take a shower in the doping control station and that someone should bring their clothes.
Mr. Consalvi further testified that the Athletes then decided to go to the changing room and that he
and Mr. Cordoni immediately warned Dr. Stranges that this was forbidden. Dr. Cordoni testified that
Mr. Consalvi had tried to make clear to the Athletes that they were not allowed to leave the doping
control station. According to Dr, Cordoni, Mr. Consalvi addressed the Athletes in English. However in
his testimony to the Panel, Mr. Consalvi testified that he speaks only little English. Further, it has to be
noted that whereas Mr. Consalvi testified that he and Dr. Cordoni addressed the Athletes in English, Dr.
Cordoni testified that he does not speak English. The Panel takes the view that the evidence submitted
is not sufficient to establish that the Athletes were told in an unequivocal and understandable manner
not to leave the doping control station to take a shower in their changing room’) and para 54 (‘Even if
it had been established that the Athletes left the doping control station despite an unequivocal refusal
of permission to do so, the Panel’s findings would not be different. It is undisputed that Dr. Stranges
went after the Athetes and instructed them to return to the doping station. It is further undisputed that
the Athletes followed this instruction at 23:32 and submitted themselves to sample collection. The
samples of both Athletes were tested, and the test results were negative. Neither party contended that
the Athletes were doing something other than taking a shower in an open, accessible and monitorable
changing room during their absence from the doping control station. It is further undisputed that the
Second Respondent started to submit himself to sample collection before he left the doping control
station to take a shower, although the quantity of urine provided was insufficient. For these factual
reasons, the Panel is not satisfied that even if it were established that the Athletes left the doping
control station despite an unequivocal instruction not to do so, the behaviour of the Athletes would
constitute a “refusal” or a “failure” or an “otherwise evading” under Article 2.3 of the CONI Anti-
Doping Rules’).
C8.4 It is still a refusal if the athlete offers to come back later to provide a sample.
‘The requirement on [the athlete] is to submit to testing there and then. […] Testing
is not conducted on notice. […] If it were not thus, and an Athlete could simply
defer testing, it would drive the proverbial coach and horses through the efficacy of
the testing programme. A cheating Athlete could simply defer testing to enable the
Prohibited Substance(s) to pass through and out of their system’.1
And it is still a refusal or failure if the athlete provides a partial sample but then leaves
without providing a full sample,2 because a sufficient volume of urine is required for
the laboratory to carry out all of the analysis required, both in terms of the full menu
of prohibited substances, and in terms of confirmatory testing of the reserve (B)
sample.
1 UK Anti-Doping v Bird, NADP Tribunal decision dated 8 January 2019, para 56.
2 In Fazekas v IOC, CAS 2004/A/714, para 67, the athlete reported to the doping control station but
was only able to provide a partial sample despite numerous attempts, and then refused to continue,
saying he did not feel well, and declined an offer to continue the sample collection at a clinic where
he could get medical assistance. The CAS panel found that there had been a failure for purposes of
Art 2.3. Subjective considerations such as motivation and (lack of) intent were to be considered not
in relation to the issue of whether there had been a failure, but instead in relation to the question of
‘exceptional circumstances’. See also Klein v ASADA & Athletics Australia, CAS A4/2016, para 164
(Art 2.3 violation to leave having only given a partial sample); Sport Ireland v Miele, Irish Sport Anti-
Doping Disciplinary Panel decision dated 13 December 2019 (same).
C8.5 Article 2.3 states that the refusal or failure to submit to sample collection
must have been ‘without compelling justification’.1 The CAS has ruled that it is the
athlete who bears the burden of showing that there was compelling justification for
his refusal or failure (rather than the Anti-Doping Organization having to show a
lack of any compelling justification).2 It has also ruled that whether an athlete has
compelling justification for failing to provide a sample ‘needs to be determined
objectively. The question is not whether the Athlete was acting in good faith, but
whether objectively he was justified by compelling reasons to forego the test’.3 It
has also held that the phrase ‘compelling justification’ is to be narrowly construed,
because otherwise the testing programme would become impossible to enforce.4 In
short, the athlete has to show that his refusal or failure to submit to sample collection
was ‘unavoidable’.5 ‘If it remains “physically, hygienically and morally possible” for
the sample to be provided, despite objections by the athlete, the refusal to submit to
the test cannot be deemed to have been compellingly justified’.6 As a result, the plea
has been rejected in the vast majority of cases.7
1 As a result of the punctuation of the original Code Art 2.3, which referred to ‘refusing, or failing without
compelling justification, to submit to Sample collection’, some of the early Code cases proceeded on
the basis that the offence is (a) refusal; or (b) failure without compelling justification, ie there is no
opportunity to try to justify a refusal. See eg IRB v Nelo Lui, Board Judicial Committee decision dated
24 April 2007, para 44. Cf CCES v Zardo SDRCC DT-05-0023, decision dated 6 September 2005,
para 136 (permitting athlete to plead compelling justification for refusal). Art 2.3 was amended in the
2009 Code to read ‘refusing or failing without compelling justification to submit to Sample collection’,
in order to ensure that compelling justification could be offered not only as to a failure but also as to
a refusal. In the 2015 Code, the phrase used is ‘without compelling justification, refusing or failing
to submit to Sample collection […]’. In the 2021 Code, it is ‘refusing or failing to submit to Sample
collection without compelling justification’.
2 Brothers v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4631, para 76 (‘If the athlete can prove on the balance of probability
that his act was compellingly justified, his rejection of the test will be excused’); WADA v CONI,
FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 73; Fazekas v IOC, CAS 2004/A/714, para 68.
See also A v FINA, CAS 2005/A/925, para 68 (‘These admissions demonstrate prima facie a failure
by Ms A to submit to a sample collection unless Ms A. establishes a “compelling justification” fornot
undergoing the test’); UK Anti-Doping v Six, NADP Tribunal decision dated 26 September 2012,
para 21 (athlete bears burden of proving compelling justification for his refusal to take test); IAAF v
Bett, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 19 November 2018, para 58 (‘This interpretation flows from
the language of the relevant provision and is fortified by the consideration that the athlete alone is
likely to be aware of any facts which could amount to such justification’).
3 Troicki v ITF, CAS 2013/A/3279, para 9.15, endorsed and followed in WADA v Sun Yang & FINA,
CAS 2019/A/6148, para 313. In Troicki, the DCO had warned the athlete that he faced sanctions if
he failed to give a sample, and therefore objectively there was no justification for failing to provide
a sample, even if the athlete on good faith misunderstood her and thought that she had said he
could skip the test without consequences. Troicki v ITF, CAS/2013/A/3279, para 9.16. However,
that misunderstanding did lead the CAS panel to accept the athlete’s plea of No Significant Fault
or Negligence and so to reduce his sanction down to 12 months. Ibid, para 9.27. In ITF v Mak,
Independent Tribunal decision dated 7 November 2017, the hearing panel found that the athlete had
‘a genuine anxiety – perhaps properly characterised as a “phobia” – about giving blood’, and that ‘he
genuinely feared it might be harmful to his health if he gave blood’. However, it also noted that he
had not sought medical advice about the condition, and ‘it is just such a record [ie corroboration of
his condition by a doctor] that a responsible player ought to have obtained if he or she was hoping to
have and to provide a good reason for not performing a blood test’. The hearing panel noted the ruling
of the CAS panel in Troicki that it is not enough, for a plea of compelling justification, that a player
genuinely believes they cannot give a sample; instead there must be an objective basis for that belief
(paras 62–63). And it held that ‘for such circumstances to be established in a case such as the present,
the player needs to go well beyond having and expressing a genuine fear that he might be ill if he
has to provide a sample in a particular form. All those who are subject to doping control must realise
that, from time to time, they may be required to give urine or blood according to the requirements of
the particular anti-doping programme. Players who fail to prepare themselves for such an eventuality
accordingly place themselves at obvious risk of committing anti-doping rule violations’ (para 64).
The hearing panel noted: ‘it is possible to envisage ways in which, measured objectively, a player
might have been able to make out such compelling justification in circumstances such as those arising
here. We do not suggest this is an exhaustive list but he might, for example, have ensured that he
sought treatment for the condition previously in preparation for entering in a tournament as opposed
to what has happened here, well after the event. He could (and, we consider should) have gone to the
trouble not only of seeking treatment but bringing with him a clear medical certificate stating in terms
that he was physically or mentally incapable of giving blood and that it was contra-indicated from a
medical perspective that he should do so’ (para 63), cited with approval in IAAF v Bett, Disciplinary
Tribunal decision dated 19 November 2018, para 64(ii). See also UKAD v Bailey, NADP Tribunal
decision dated 8 December 2017, para 40 (‘The great preponderance of authority is to the effect that
the existence of a “compelling justification” is to be judged objectively rather than by reference to a
given athlete’s own perception. […] The subjective state of mind and thoughts of the athlete may come
into play when considering a question of fault or negligence. But in our view, compelling justification
is used in ADR Article 2.3 as a matter of objective fact. On that basis, there can be no question of
compelling justification here [where the athlete refused to provide a sample based on an unwarranted
fear that water provided to him by the DCO may have been contaminated]. There was no valid reason
for Mr Bailey not to have taken the test’).
4 WADA v CONI, FIGC, Mannini & Possanzini, CAS 2008/A/1557, para 80 (‘By using the qualification
“compelling”, the wording of Article 2.3 underscores the strictness with which the justification
needs to be examined’). See Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee decision dated 7 October
2005, para 3 (‘an efficient out-of-competition testing programme can only work if the boundaries of
“compelling justification” are kept extremely narrow. Only truly exceptional circumstances should be
allowed to justify refusal to submit to testing’).
5 USADA v Page, AAA Panel decision dated 4 February 2009, para 10.5 (compelling justification
‘means that the evidence of failure to submit to sample collection must be […] of such a nature
that the Respondent was forced, drawn or constrained by the factual circumstances to not submit to
sample collection’); Jones v WRU, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2010, para 57 (‘The
phrase “compelling justification” connotes that the reason for an athlete refusing must be exceptional,
indeed, unavoidable’), cited with approval in UK Anti-Doping v Six, NADP Tribunal decision dated
26 September 2012, para 37. See also CCES v Boyle, SDRCC No 07-0058, decision dated 31 May
2007, para 53 (‘even if I accept that the Athlete was taken suddenly, violently and horribly ill while
training, I cannot accept that there was a reasonable, let alone compelling, justification for her failure
to submit to Sample collection. To be compelling, her departure would have to have been unavoidable.
In fact, her departure was voluntary and intentional. Even if she was sick, she knew that no sample
had been taken when she left the Centre’); CCES v Gerhart, SDRCC No DT 13-0192, decision dated
18 April 2013, para 25 (agreeing with Boyle analysis and conclusion); RFU v Price, Independent
Tribunal decision dated 10 March 2016, para 72 (rejecting on the facts the athlete’s plea that a side
effect of the pain killers he had taken was urine retention that meant he could not provide a sample:
‘Mr Price simply refused to provide a sample of urine. This was not a case of “could not” but “would
not”‘).
6 Azevedo v FINA, CAS 2005/A/925, para 68. The CAS panel in that case ruled that the fact that the
sample would have been sent for analysis to a laboratory that the athlete was at that time suing for
erroneous analysis of her previous sample did not amount to compelling justification to refuse to provide
a sample, because the athlete could have provided the sample under protest and then subsequently
raised the objection as the basis for sending her sample elsewhere. The Panel said: ‘No doubt, we
are of the view that the logic of anti-doping tests and of the DC Rules demands and expects that,
whenever physically, hygienically and morally possible, the sample be provided despite objections
by the athlete. If that does not occur, athletes would systematically refuse to provide samples for
whatever reasons, leaving no opportunity for testing’. It also rejected the athlete’s alternative attempted
justification, namely that the procedure and the kit to be used for sample collection did not comply
with international standards, on the basis that that allegation was unsupported, and was not credible
given that neither the athlete nor the witness to her refusal had noted any problem with the sample
collection procedure or kit. Ibid, para 71.
This very strict test was endorsed in WADA v Buitrago & GCD, CAS 2013/A/3077, para 42, in WADA v.
Contreras & COC, CAS 2013/A/3341, para 116, in WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148,
para 206, and in Brothers v FINA, CAS 2016/A/4631, para 79 (‘After due consideration, the Panel
chooses to follow the precedent set in the Azevedo, Troicki and Boyle decisions cited above. If it
remains ‘‘physically, hygienically and morally possible”, for the sample to be provided, despite
objections by the athlete, the refusal to submit to the test cannot be deemed to have been compellingly
justified’) and has now become the accepted test. Applying that test, the Brothers panel suggested that
an athlete would not be physically able to provide a sample, and so would have compelling justification
for his failure to do so, ‘[78.] […] if the athlete were to faint unconscious on the floor upon seeing the
DCO’s needle, or if he were stone drunk or would experience an epileptic fit at the time of the test.
Even a refusal to submit to the test because the athlete must rush his expectant wife to hospital might
qualify as a “compelling justification”. [79.] Examples of this kind in which it is established that an
athlete is deprived of his rationality and cognitive senses will, in most cases, be sufficient to ground the
excuse of “compelling justification”. These situations present physical and moral hindrances to going
ahead with the test’). However, it rejected the athlete’s submission that his depression and anxiety,
triggering a ‘panic attack’, constituted compelling justification to refuse to provide the sample, on the
grounds that his symptoms were not so severe that he was physically or cognitively unable to provide
the sample: ‘82. The Panel prefers not to label the Appellant’s mounting fear and anxiety with the
term “panic attack”. Panic implies the inherent loss of judgment and ability to discern, a situation
characterised by a loss of voluntary control over one’s cognitive faculties and actions. 83. As the
anxiety developed, however, the Appellant retained his rationality to the degree that he was still able to
identify and converse with his father on the mobile telephone which Ms. Derks placed in his hand. He
maintained his ability to understand and to contemplate what his father was saying to him. As during
his many past illnesses and health crises, he listened closely to his father’s advice. 84. In the view of
the Panel, the Appellant’s decision to refuse the test (alternatively, his decision to acquiesce in his
father’s decision to refuse the test) were made under mounting stress, perhaps under extreme stress. It
is even possible that the Appellant experienced the onset of “panic” in the classical sense of that term.
But the Panel is unwilling to find a situation in which the Appellant experienced a complete loss of his
cognitive senses, being unable to think and to rationalize with a concomitant loss of control. […] 86.
The Panel is unable to find any physical, hygienic or moral circumstances which would have justified
the Athlete’s refusal to provide the blood sample. The refusal was not unavoidable. There was no
thought given, neither by the Appellant nor his father, as to how the “anxiety attack” might have been
assuaged in order to let the test proceed, eg by a 15-minute pause on the couch’).
7 Doubts about DCO or sample collection procedure or laboratory to be used: Fazekas v IOC,
CAS 2004/A/714 (alleged inappropriate behaviour by sample collection personnel does not amount
to compelling justification); V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/459, FINA Doping Panel Judgments 2001–2005
(FINA, 2006), para 8.8 (failure by the doping control officer to follow prescribed procedures – not
notifying the athlete promptly, and therefore not chaperoning the athlete from the time she finished
competition – could not justify a refusal to submit to doping control); WADA v Contreras & COC,
CAS 2013/A/3341, para 121 (concern about hole in plastic packaging containing collection vessel that
was not shared by DCO did not constitute compelling justification not to provide a sample: ‘the Athlete
should have proceeded with the urine sample collection process using the remaining urine collection
equipment, while documenting on the available forms that he was proceeding “under protest”, so to
speak, based on his view that the remaining equipment did not meet minimum applicable standards’);
IAAF v Bett, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 19 November 2018, para 66 (athlete’s alleged doubts
about the authenticity of the DCO irrelevant because that explanation ‘does not evidence unavoidable
circumstances that made it physically, hygienically or morally impossible for him to provide a
Sample’); Azevedo v FINA, CAS 2005/A/925, para 68 (the fact that the sample would have been sent
for analysis to a laboratory that the athlete was at that time suing for erroneous analysis of her previous
sample did not amount to compelling justification to refuse to provide a sample, because the athlete
could have provided the sample under protest and then subsequently raised the objection as the basis
for sending her sample elsewhere).
Need to go to work: In Wium, a desire to go to church and a need to go to work were held not
to justify a refusal to provide a sample. Wium v IPC, IPC Management Committee decision dated
7 October 2005 at para 3 (‘If work pressure were an adequate justification for athletes to refuse to
provide a sample then numerous athletes would be able to avoid testing’). In Jones v WRU, a need to
go to work was ruled not to amount to compelling justification even though the player was basically
an amateur player, and failing to report to work after the match could have had serious financial
consequences for himself and for the family business. Nor did it help the player that a club director
had advised him to abandon the test and go to work, since the DCO had made it clear to the player that
if he did so he risked being held liable for an anti-doping rule violation. Jones v WRU, NADP Appeal
Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2010, paras 59–69. See also BBSA v Howe, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 4 May 2009 (need to get to work not compelling justification where on the facts there had been
time for athlete to try to provide a sample, he could have phoned in and explained he would be late
and cover would have been arranged, and in fact he just chose not to take the test); AFLD v Rodrigues,
decision dated 21 February 2008 (fact athlete made to wait for 90 minute to provide sample, and had
to go to work, not compelling justification for refusal to provide sample);
Orders of coach or other third party: See also WADA v Jamaludin et al, CAS 2012/A/2791,
para 8.1.5 (‘Generally speaking, the Panel finds that the fact of an athlete feeling obliged to avoid an
anti-doping test due to having received instructions to do so from a coach and/or a manager and/or
another member of his/her entourage and/or an official whose authority he/she must normally respect
– under the threat that any disobedience would lead to reprisals affecting the athlete’s rights to train
and compete in a normal manner – cannot, in principle, be deemed a compelling justification, since
an athlete will normally be able to and should take the responsibility of denouncing any such threats
to a superior authority at national and/or international level’) and 8.1.6 (‘The anti-doping system
codified by the World Anti-Doping Code is predicated on the personal responsibility of individual
athletes, which encompasses the responsibility of understanding anti-doping rules and resisting any
undue pressures to violate them in any manner. If this personal responsibility of athletes were not
systematically and strictly enforced, it would leave room for persons in their entourage and/or dishonest
officials to attempt exercising undue pressures, which ultimately would harm the athletes and encroach
upon their freedom, and would also risk inciting unscrupulous athletes to attempt using members of
their entourage or other persons as scapegoat for undue actions of their own’) and 8.1.7 (‘The Panel
understands that for cultural reasons athletes may react to authority in different manners. However,
differences in attitude towards authority stemming from cultural diversity may not stand in the way
of a uniform application of anti-doping rules, since the rules represent a worldwide international
system for regulating and fighting doping in sport that cannot afford to account for national or regional
particularities. Allowing the contrary would lead to differences of treatment between sports and/or
athletes that would undermine the level playing field, which is one of the fundaments of fairness in
sporting competitions’), endorsed and followed in WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148,
para 341; WADA v CONI, FIGC, Maninni and Possanzani, CAS 2008/A/1557, paras 76-80 (order
by team coach and President to players to delay reporting to doping control station so that they could
attend a team meeting was not compelling justification: there was no evidence that the athletes insisted
that they should report for doping control first, and they could have ignored direction to attend the team
meeting without repercussion); CCES v Zarboni-Berthiaume, SDRCC DT 09-0114, decision dated
11 February 2010 (parental pressure – minor athlete was ordered by her mother to leave the doping
control station with her – this is not compelling justification to refuse to provide a sample. The tribunal
noted (at para 19) that the athlete ‘appeared to be obeying her mother, and showed no reluctance
considering the consequences that her departure could have on her status as an active Athlete’).
Mistaken belief of retirement: RYA v Johnston, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 30 May
2007, para 3.1.4 (mistaken belief that athlete was retired and so not subject to sample collection is
not compelling justification); UKAD v Canaveral, NADP decision dated 7 October 2019, para 48)
(athlete’s belief he had retired did not amount to compelling justification not to submit to sample
collection, because ‘there is no evidence that he was deprived of his rationality and cognitive senses,
thereby presenting physical and moral hindrances to going ahead with the test (see Brothers). On the
contrary, it is clear from the DCF that he was fully cognitively engaged with the process, and there was
no physical reason for him not to go ahead with the test’).
Sick child: UK Anti-Doping v Six, NADP Tribunal decision dated 26 September 2012, para 35
(desire to get home to assist wife with sick children was not compelling justification, because ‘even
if he [the athlete] agreed to race only at the last minute and under pressure, the fact of the matter is
that, if he had time to compete in a cycle race, he had to make time to take the test. If, as was later
the case, he wished to put his family first, then the time to do that was before he agreed to race rather
than when he came to be tested’); Sport Ireland v Miele, Irish Sport Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel
decision dated 13 December 2019, paras 3.8 and 3.9 (plea based on fact wife had called to say child
had hit her head and was being taken to hospital disbelieved where player went home not to hospital
when he left the sample collection session, and rejected an offer from the DCO to go to the hospital
with him). Cf the obiter dictum in B v FEI, CAS 2007/A/1415, para 33, that an athlete ‘must be said to
have compelling justifications’ to refuse to provide a sample if ‘he/she is informed by a phone call that
his/her children have been very seriously injured in an accident and have been carried to hospital’).
On a different point, see ibid, para 37 (rejecting plea of compelling justification where the athlete
wanted to avoid the test results revealing that he had taken alcohol and a medication that might contain
prohibited substances).
Compelling justification plea accepted based on justified concerns about family members: The
authors are aware of only two cases where an athlete’s plea of compelling justification was upheld. In
IRB v Nelo Liu, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 24 April 2007, para 76, the hearing panel
ruled there was no refusal or failure because there had been no proper notification. But it also said,
obiter, that even if there had been a failure, there was ‘compelling justification’ for it, namely that
the player had not been notified that he might be tested at home, was contacted by telephone and so
could not check the DCO’s credentials, and did not want to provide his home address to a stranger
because his wife was home alone. And in Greek Swimming Federation v Xynadas, Board of Hellenic
Swimming Federation decision dated 5 June 2009, the athlete’s plea of compelling justification for
leaving the doping control station before he had provided his sample was accepted, since ‘the reason of
his leaving and going to Mpodosakeio Hospital of Ptolemaida was most serious and had to do with the
health of his father, the life of which was threatened. As a result, the duty towards the above condition
of his father, was stronger than his duties as an athlete to submit to doping control’.
C8.6 In WADA v Sun Yang & FINA,1 a DCO, a doping control assistant (DCA),
and a Blood Collection Officer (BCO) came to the athlete’s home out of competition
to collect a urine sample and a blood sample. They presented their credentials and
he signed the doping control form to confirm he had been properly notified, and
a blood sample was collected from him. The athlete then objected to the DCA on
the basis that he had taken photographs of the athlete on his phone, and the DCO
agreed this was inappropriate and so the DCA should leave, which meant no urine
sample could be collected (because the DCO and BCO were both female and so
could not witness the athlete passing urine). However, the athlete then insisted on
re-inspecting the credentials of the DCO and BCO, decided that the documentation
they had presented did not properly establish their identity and/or their authority to
collect a blood sample from him, and therefore tore up the doping control form, and
instructed one of his security guards to smash the glass container in which his blood
sample was contained, so that he could keep the blood sample while returning the
smashed glass container to the DCO to take away with her. The athlete was charged
with violations of both Art 2.3 (refusal or failure to submit to sample collection) and
Art 2.5 (Tampering with Doping Control). The FINA Doping Panel rejected both
charges, on the basis that the DCA and BCO had produced no official documentation
evidencing their authorisation to participate in the collection of samples from the
athlete, so that the athlete was not properly notified, and the sample collection session
was invalid and void; and on the basis that the DCA’s behaviour and the BCA’s lack
of evidenced qualifications amounted to compelling justifications for the athlete to
refuse to provide samples; and also on the basis that the DCO had failed to warn
the athlete of the consequences of a failure to comply.2 On appeal, the CAS panel
rejected WADA’s arguments that an athlete could never prevent a sample collection
from taking place. There might be ‘compelling justification’ for the athlete to do so:
‘In the view of the Panel, it cannot be excluded that serious flaws in the notification
process, or during any part of the Doping Control process, could mean that it might not
be appropriate to require an athlete to subject himself to, or continue with, a sample
collection session. Rather, they could invalidate the sample collection process as a
whole, so that an athlete might not be perceived as having tampered with the Doping
Control, or as having failed to comply with the sample collection process. In the view
of the Panel, this could only be in the most exceptional circumstance. On the other
hand, the Panel is conscious that as a general matter, athletes should not take matters
into their own hands, and if they do they will bear the risk of serious consequences.
The proper path for an Athlete is to proceed with a Doping Control under objection,
and making available immediately the complete grounds for such objection’.3
The panel went through in detail each of the athlete’s complaints about the sample
collection process, and rejected them all, ruling that:
(a) the identification and authorisation documentation presented by the members
of the sample collection team complied with the mandatory requirements of
the ISTI:
(i) the DCO had identified herself and her authority to take a sample from
the athlete in accordance with the mandatory requirements of the ISTI
by showing him a letter from FINA authorising IDTM (the company she
worked for) to collect samples on behalf of FINA, and an IDTM-issued
identification card with her name and photograph on it, confirming that
she was authorised to collect samples on behalf of IDTM;4
(ii) the DCA (who was acting as a chaperone, not as a DCO) and BCO had
identified themselves in accordance with the mandatory requirements of
the ISTI by showing government-issued ID cards;5 and
(iii) the BCO met the ISTI requirement of being properly qualified to draw
blood, and was not required under the ISTI to produce evidence of such
qualification at the sample collection session;6 and
(b) the athlete did not have any other compelling justification to fail to comply
with the sample collection process:
(i) The DCA/chaperone had acted inappropriately in taking photographs
when there was no need to do so (eg to gather evidence or for record-
keeping purposes), and therefore the athlete was entitled to object to his
involvement and the DCO was right to exclude him. The consequence
– that no urine sample could be collected from the athlete (because the
DCO and BCO were both female and so could not witness the athlete
passing urine) – could not be blamed on the athlete.7
(ii) However, the DCA/chaperone had no role to play in blood collection,
and a blood sample had already been collected from the athlete. Even if
the DCA’s unauthorised photography meant the athlete lost trust in the
sample collection team and therefore wanted to check their identification

and authorisation documentation again, that documentation was all
proper, and any concern he might have genuinely held about it could not
constitute a compelling justification for the Athlete’s failure to proceed
with the blood sample collection process (still less for his having a
security guard smash the container holding the blood sample, tear up the
doping control form, and make the DCO leave without the blood sample),
because it did not meet the Azevedo test, ie it did not make it physically,
hygienically or morally impossible for the athlete to provide the sample.8
‘The correct course of action, in the view of the Panel, would have been
for the Athlete to record his objection as to the entire process, at the time
(and, if necessary, subsequently), and to allow the DCO to leave with the
blood samples already collected’.9
(iii) The DCO properly warned the athlete of the possible consequences of a
failure to comply with the sample collection process, so that (following
the Troicki approach) there was no objective justification for failing to
comply, no matter what the athlete’s subjective belief might have been.10
The panel ruled the FINA Doping Panel had been wrong to say the
DCO was required to go further and tell the athlete that she was treating
his conduct as a failure to comply and that the specified consequences
therefore would apply, because ‘as a matter of law, it was not for the
DCO to decide whether or not there was a failure to comply’.11
(iv) The panel rejected on the evidence the athlete’s suggestion that the DCO
had aborted the sample collection session and that it was the DCO who
suggested he destroy the container and keep the blood sample.12
On 23 December 2020, it was announced that the Swiss Federal Tribunal had upheld
Sun Yang’s appeal against the CAS award based on evidence of partiality on the part
of the CAS panel chair, and had remitted the proceedings back to the CAS to be re-
considered. WADA noted in response that the SFT’s ruling did not impugn the CAS
decision on its merits, and indicated it would pursue a similar ruling in the ensuing
proceedings.13
1 WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148.
2 The FINA Doping Panel’s decision is reproduced at para 25 of the CAS award, CAS 2019/A/6148.
4 Ibid, paras 233, 256–64. The panel rejected the athlete’s argument that the DCO was required to
produce a specific and individual authorisation letter from FINA (as the Testing Authority), evidencing
that each of the DCO, DCA and BCO had individual authority to collect a sample from that athlete
at that time, on the basis this was not required under ISTI Art 5.3.3, properly interpreted. The panel
noted that an individualised letter might be suggested in WADA’s Sample Collection Guidelines as
best practice, but only the ISTI was mandatory, not the Guidelines. Ibid, paras 223-31, 247-54. See
also Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, paras 170–71 (ISTI Art 5.3.3 requirements met where
DCO showed letter from international federation, confirming IDTM had been appointed as a sample
collection agency for the international federation and its DCOs were authorised to collect samples on
behalf of the international federation, as well as his electronic IDTM identification card, bearing his
name and photograph).
5 Ibid, paras 273, 285. The panel rejected the athlete’s argument that the DCA/chaperone and BCO had
to produce an IDTM-issued ID card or be mentioned in a specific and individual authorisation letter,
on the basis that this was not a requirement of the ISTI in respect of chaperones, but rather simply a
best practice suggestion in the WADA Sample Collection Guidelines. Ibid, paras 271, 285.
6 Ibid, para 291.
7 Ibid, para 306.
9 Ibid, para 310.
10 Ibid, paras 311–315.
13 ‘WADA statement following Swiss Federal Tribunal decision to uphold Sun Yang’s application for
revision of CAS award’, 23 December 2020, wada-ama.org/en/media/news/2020-12/wada-statement-
following-swiss-federal-tribunal-decision-to-uphold-sun-yangs [accessed 2 January 2021].
CHAPTER C9
Article 2.4 ADRV – Three

Whereabouts Failures in Twelve
Months
C9.1 Drugs that only have a short-term effect (eg stimulants) are only effective
to enhance performance if taken during or just before competition, and therefore
they can usually be detected by in-competition testing. However, there are many
drugs that can be taken out of competition that will confer long-lasting performance-
enhancing effects but will not be detectable when the athletes return to competition.
As a result, a credible anti-doping programme also requires significant unannounced
out-of-competition testing as well as in-competition testing for drugs banned at all
times.1 Such testing cannot be conducted unless the athlete’s whereabouts are known.
Therefore, to protect the integrity of sport and ensure the credibility of the fight
against doping, the World Anti-Doping Program includes a detailed system requiring
high priority and high risk athletes to provide information as to their whereabouts
when they are out of competition, so that they can be located for testing.2 The
2003 Code did not attempt to harmonise such ‘whereabouts’ requirements, instead
leaving it to each sport and each nation to define them for itself for athletes under
its jurisdiction.3 Because the resulting inconsistencies were perceived to be unfair,
the 2009 Code introduced a new, standardised, mandatory whereabouts regime, set
out then in Article 11 of the International Standard for Testing (as it then was), and
now in Annex I of the International Standard for Results Management. In short,
international federations and NADOs are required to establish ‘registered testing
pools’ of high priority and high risk athletes athletes4 who must provide specified
information about their whereabouts at specified times (or else suffer a ‘filing
failure’),5 and must be available for testing each day during the ‘one hour window’
they have specified in their whereabouts filing at the place they have listed on their
filing (or else suffer a ‘missed test’).6 Code Art 2.4 specifies that ‘any combination
of three missed tests and/or filing failures, as defined in the International Standard
for Testing and Investigations, within a twelve-month period’ shall constitute an anti-
doping rule violation’.7 While these requirements are undoubtedly very burdensome
on athletes, clearly interfering with their right to privacy, legal challenges have been
rejected on the basis that the requirements are necessary and proportionate to the
underlying objective of keeping sport clean.8
1 See eg Pound, ‘The World Anti-Doping Agency’ [2002] ISLR 53 (‘If athletes are able to “disappear”
for two, three or four weeks, doping programs may be administered that produce residual performance-
enhancing effects’); UK Anti-Doping v C, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 May 2018, para 41
(‘Before us there was no dispute as to the importance of the Out-of-Competition testing regime. It is
important to maintain the integrity of sport. It is important that the world can be confident that sport
is drug-free. It is important to other athletes to be confident that their colleagues are not gaining an
improper advantage over them by drug use. It is also important to athletes because if sport is riddled
with drug use it has the potential to taint all who are elite athletes in the sport. We are all familiar with
efforts made by a minority of athletes to evade or avoid doping control and the need for the sport to take
stringent precautions to ensure this does not occur’); Malisse, Flemish Doping Tribunal, Case 2009-03,
decision dated 5 November 2009, para 11.2 (‘Out of competition tests belong to the core of an effective
anti-doping programme, to which the Flemish decree issuer, followed by the FTV, have subscribed.
In order to be able to provide for effective tests of this nature, it is of vital importance that athletes
make accurate whereabouts information available, so that they can be tested by surprise’); Wickmayer,
Flemish Doping Tribunal, Case 2009-04, decision dated 5 November 2009, para 11.2 (same).
Article 2.4 ADRV – Three Whereabouts Failures in Twelve Months 869
2 DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, paras 20 and 21 (‘The whereabouts regime […] represents
a powerful and effective means of deterring and detecting doping in sport. In order to ensure the
efficiency and effectiveness of anti-doping testing, it is crucial to know where athletes are located at
any particular time. In an arbitration concerning an athlete’s failure to provide accurate whereabouts
information and the consequences of such failure, CAS has emphasised that, while the obligations
imposed on an athlete by the whereabouts regime are onerous, the regime is “necessarily strict”. CAS
panels take the provision of whereabouts information “extremely seriously as [it] is a vital part in
the on-going fight against drugs …”’); UK Anti-Doping v C, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 May
2018, para 40 (‘While the Whereabouts requirements are undoubtedly onerous, they are necessary in
order to facilitate “no Advance Notice” Out-of-Competition testing, and so to allow tennis players to
claim with credibility that they are subject to testing at any time and so the public can have confidence
that they are clean’); FINA v Donath, FINA Doping Panel decision dated October 2012, para 5.1
(‘Unannounced testing is an essential part of the anti-doping policy of FINA. Competitors belonging
to the RTP have the obligation and responsibility to strictly follow the procedures as described in
DC 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 and the ISTI. The rules exist to deter doping, help ensure a level playing field and
promote confidence in the integrity of swimming competitions. Withholding whereabouts information
and failing to be at the location specified in the swimmer’s whereabouts filing has to be regarded as a
serious obstruction of the necessary control of the use of prohibited substances and/or methods’). See
also whereabouts cases cited at para C9.2.
3 CAS panels considered the pre-2009 whereabouts rules of different sports in Lobello v ISU,
CAS 2007/A/1318 (confirming that the ISU had the burden of proving each filing failure under its
whereabouts rules), and in Ohuruogu v UK Athletics and IAAF, CAS 2006/A/1165 (upholding finding
by UKA Disciplinary Committee of whereabouts violation based on three missed tests and rejecting
challenge to proportionality of one-year fixed ban required under IAAF rules for any Art 2.4 offence).
See also British Triathlon Association v Don, Tribunal decision dated 29 September 2006 (triathlete
banned for three months for not being where he had said he would be, three times in eighteen months,
unintentionally but without compelling justification in each occasion, including being delayed with
his coach at an athletics meeting on one occasion); USADA v Mortenson, AAA Panel decision dated
25 September 2006, para 25 (triathlete banned for two years for simply ceasing filing his whereabouts
information and, on the one occasion he filed it, not being where he said he would be when the
DCO came to test him, amounting to three violations in 18 months: ‘Though the panel sympathises
with Mr Mortenson’s explanation of his failure to file the required forms, the rules are clear and
straightforward. He is competing with other cyclists who are also required to comply with USADA
rules, and it would not be fair to hold that he is not subject to testing while other athletes are’).
4 For a discussion of how registered testing pools should be constituted, see ISTI Arts 4.8.3 and 4.8.4,
and WADA Guidelines for Implementing an Effective Testing Program, Version 1.0 (October 2014),
sections 7 and 8.
ISTI Art 4.8.3 provides that Anti-Doping Organizations may also establish other pools of athletes
to whom lesser whereabouts requirements apply. A failure to comply with those requirements will
not be a Code anti-doping rule violation, but may lead to the athlete in question being moved up to
a registered testing pool. For example, UK Anti-Doping has established a ‘Domestic Testing Pool’,
whose members must provide all of the whereabouts information that a Registered Testing Pool
athlete must provide except the one-hour daily time-slot, and if they commit three filing failures in
12 months they are moved up to the National Registered Testing Pool (as discussed in Dry v UKAD,
NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 25 February 2020).
5 ISTI Article I.3.1 and Article I.3.2 provide that before the beginning of each quarter an athlete in the
Registered Testing Pool must file a whereabouts filing that contains (among other things) ‘for each
day during the following quarter, one specific 60-minute time-slot between 5 a.m. and 11 p m. each
day where the Athlete will be available and accessible for Testing at a specific location’; ISTI Article
I.3.4 states that ‘the Athlete must provide sufficient information to enable the DCO to find the location,
to gain access to the location, and to find the Athlete at the location’; and ISTI Article I.3.5 states
that where a change in circumstances means that the information in a whereabouts filing is no longer
accurate or complete, the athlete must update the filling so that it becomes accurate and complete
again. A failure to comply with any of these requirements is a ‘Filing Failure’. See para C9.2 for the
requisite elements of a ‘filing failure’ under Code Art 2.4.
6 ISTI Article I.4.1 states: ‘While […] every Athlete must submit to Testing at any time and place upon
request by an Anti-Doping Authority with Testing jurisdiction over him/her, in addition an Athlete in a
Registered Testing Pool must specifically be present and available for Testing on any given day during
the 60-minute time slot specified for that day in his/her Whereabouts Filing, at the location that the
Athlete has specified for that time slot in such filing. A Failure to Comply with this requirement shall
be pursued as an apparent Missed Test’. See para C9.3, which sets out the requisite elements for a
‘missed test’ under Code Art 2.4.
7 Code Art 2.4. Under the 2009 Code, the relevant period was 18 months. See eg USADA v Jelks,
AAA Panel decision dated 23 May 2012 (two-year sanction imposed based on two filing failures and
one missed test between first quarter 2009 and second quarter 2010). See also cases cited at C9.5, n 2.
Because the three whereabouts failures must all fall within the 12-month period, it is important for
everyone to be clear when a failure occurs. That is straightforward for a failure to file the quarterly
whereabouts filing: it takes place on the first day of the quarter that filing was supposed to cover. For filing
failures that emerge during the quarter, however (eg because they are only discovered when an attempt
is made to test the athlete), rather than leave the date of the failure to be argued about in each case, the
comment to 2019 ISTI Art I.1.3 states that it is deemed to have taken place on the first day of the quarter.
Moving the date of the failure back in this way can hurt an athlete by effectively meaning he could
commit a third filing failure almost 15 months after the first, and it would be deemed to have taken place
within 12 months of the first, so triggering an Art 2.4 violation; but it can also help an athlete, by pushing
the date of the first strike back, so that the third strike is deemed to take place more than 12 months
later, as happened in the case that USADA brought against Chris Coleman in 2019, but was forced
to drop when the comment to ISTI Art I.1.3 was pointed out to it. See USADA statement posted on
usada.org on 2 September 2019, ‘Whereabouts violation case against US Track & Field athlete Christian
Coleman withdrawn’. This has been changed in the 2021 International Standard for Results Management
(to which the whereabouts provisions have been moved, from the ISTI), Art B.1.3 of which states that
a filing failure is deemed to have occurred ‘(i) where the Athlete fails to provide complete information
in due time in advance of an upcoming quarter, on the first day of that quarter; and (ii) where any
information provided by the Athlete (whether in advance of the quarter or by way of update) transpires to
be inaccurate, on the (first) date on which such information can be shown to be inaccurate […]’.
8 See whereabouts cases cited at para C9.2.
C9.2 ISTI Art I.3.6 provides that an Anti-Doping Organization asserting a ‘filing
failure’ within the meaning of Code Art 2.41 will have to show that:
(a) the athlete in question was duly notified:
(i) that he was designated for inclusion in a Registered Testing Pool;
(ii) of the consequent requirement to make whereabouts filings; and
(iii) of the consequences of a failure to comply with that requirement;
(b) the athlete or his delegate2 failed to comply with that requirement by the
applicable deadline (either by simply failing to make any filing, or by making an
incomplete or inaccurate filing, or by making an accurate filing but then failing
to update it as soon as possible when a subsequent change in circumstances
renders it inaccurate or incomplete);3
(c) (if it is a second or third filing failure in the same quarter) the athlete was given
notice of the previous filing failure, and (if a filing had been made but was
deficient) failed to rectify that filing failure by the deadline specified in that
notice; and
(d) the athlete’s failure to comply ‘was at least negligent’. For these purposes, the
athlete will be presumed to have committed the failure negligently upon proof
that he/she was notified of the requirement but failed to comply with it. That
presumption may only be rebutted by the athlete establishing (by a balance of
probability4) that no negligent behaviour on his/her part caused or contributed
to the failure.5
1 The Anti-Doping Organization with authority to declare a ‘filing failure’ is the Anti-Doping
Organization that receives the athlete’s quarterly whereabouts filings. See ISTI Art I.5.1. That will
be either his international federation or his NADO. If each of them puts that athlete in its registered
testing pool, they have to agree which of them will receive the athlete’s whereabouts filings (and so
will have authority to declare his ‘filing failures’). ISTI Art I.2.2. The information is filed in the central
‘ADAMS’ database and is made available to any Anti-Doping Organization that has testing authority
over the athlete, including the NADO of any country to which the athlete travels to train, to compete,
or otherwise. ISTI Art 4.8.5.
2 Or any third party to whom the athlete delegated responsibility to file whereabouts information on his
behalf, because ISTI Art I.6.4 states that the athlete remains ultimately responsible for making accurate
and complete whereabouts filings, and therefore it is no defence to an alleged filing failure (including
an alleged failure to update a previous filing) for the athlete to show that he delegated responsibility to
a third party and it was the third party that failed to comply. See eg Gaber v UWW, CAS 2015/A/4210,
paras 8.2, 8.3; Subirats v FINA, CAS 2011/A/2499, para 26 (athlete was responsible for his national
federation’s failure to forward his whereabouts filings to FINA: ‘[…] it is important that the athlete
that delegates such assignments to a third party makes sure that such third party effectively forward
the whereabouts information to the anti-doping organisation on time. The rationale of such rule is
quite obvious: no athlete shall be in position to somehow “hide” behind a third party, chosen by the
athlete himself as a kind of personal “courier”’). Cyclist Yoann Offredo was banned for one year under
Code Art 2.4 even though he blamed one of his three filing failures on his team. See ‘Offredo finds
whereabouts ban too strict’, cyclingnews.com, 9 December 2012.
3 Gaber v UWW, CAS 2015/A/4210, para 8.6 (‘Mr Gaber did not meet the standards required under
Article I.3.4 of a whereabouts filing. Mr Gaber did not provide sufficient information in his whereabouts
filing to enable the DCO to locate him at the private club where he was supposedly staying, and failed
to change his whereabouts information once his coach made him prolong his stay in New York at a
different accommodation’) and para 8.7 (‘the athlete must provide sufficient information to enable the
DCO to find the location, to gain access to the location, and to find the athlete at the location. Indicating
a location which the DCO cannot access, such as a restricted-access club, is likely to result in a filing
failure’). Cf ASADA v Bannister, CAS A1/2013, para 60 (‘In the case of an hotel an Athlete would not
know, in advance of booking the hotel and checking in, which precise room would be allocated to him
or her. The obligations [to provide a full address] could therefore be satisfied by giving the full address
of the hotel. Likewise the comment to Article 3.6 providing for identification of the location for testing
indicates that the location can be the athlete’s place of residence, training or competition or in other
locations such as work. It does not, on its face, require, or indicate to, the athlete to identify precisely
where at the training venue or work location the athlete will be at the nominated time’).
In World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/009/2020 dated
24 June 2020, para 210, the hearing panel ruled that if an athlete’s plans changed so that they had to be
in place A during their designated one-hour period rather than the place B they had designated for that
period, and it took more than five hours to drive from place B to place A, it was negligent for the athlete
to update their whereabouts for that hour only 80 minutes before the hour started.
4 Code Art 3.2; USADA v Arias, AAA Panel decision dated 27 March 2012, para 3.8.
5 In USADA v Arias, AAA Panel decision dated 27 March 2012, the athlete sought to meet that burden
by showing that he had tried to upload online his whereabouts filing in the last day or two of the quarter
(ending 31 December), had had a problem with his password, had called USADA to re-set the password,
but the message on the phone said that the USADA office was closed until 2 January. The hearing panel
held this was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from his failure to comply with
the filing requirement. The fact that he had been busy that quarter with meetings about whether to turn
professional ‘cannot be found either to excuse him from his whereabouts filing obligation, nor obviate his
negligence in not meeting it. To accept such excuses would be not only to favor him over his competitors
but to open the door for other athletes to avoid their filing obligations’. Ibid, para 3.13. ‘By waiting to
almost the end of the filing period to attempt to contact USADA, even assuming that he had difficulty
logging in and required a new password to do so, Respondent assumed the risk of a filing violation by
choosing to focus on other matters’. Ibid, para 3.14. He was banned for one year. Ibid, para 4.2. See also
Wickmayer, Flemish Doping Tribunal, Case 2009-04, decision dated 5 November 2009, para 10.1 (‘The
athlete erroneously attempted to hide behind her successive and protracted stays in different locations
abroad resulting from an unpredictable competition schedule. In order to attend to this, the athlete can
take the necessary measures amongst which appointing and authorising a person to receive (registered)
letters. Nor can the athlete claim ignorance of the rules. As a top athlete she is considered to be aware of
and to be in compliance with the obligations arising from this charter’).
C9.3 ISTI Article I.4.3 provides that an Anti-Doping Organization seeking to

establish a ‘missed test’ for purposes of Code Art 2.41 will have to show that:
(a) when the athlete was given notice that he was being included in the registered
testing pool, he was warned that he would be liable for a ‘missed test’ if he could
not be found where he said he would be during the one hour ‘missed test’ time-slot
that he had specified in his quarterly whereabouts filing for the day in question;
(b) during the 60-minute ‘missed test’ time-slot identified in his whereabouts filing
for the day in question, the DCO ‘did what was reasonable in the circumstances
(ie given the nature of the specified location) to try to locate the Athlete, short
of giving the Athlete any advance notice of the test’, at the specified location,
but was unable to locate him;2
(c) (if it is not his first missed test) he was given notice of the previous missed test
before this attempt was made;3 and
(d) his failure to be available for testing at the specified time and place ‘was at least
negligent’. Such negligence will be presumed upon proof of the other elements
of the missed test, and that presumption ‘may only be rebutted by the athlete
establishing that no negligent behaviour on his/her part caused or contributed
to his/her failure:
(i) to be available for Testing at such location during such time slot; and
(ii) to update his/her most recent whereabouts filing to give notice of a
different location where he/she would instead be available for testing
during a specified 60-minute time-slot on the relevant day’.4
1 Under the 2009 Code, the Anti-Doping Organization with authority to declare a ‘missed test’ against
an athlete for purposes of Code Art 2.4 was the Anti-Doping Organization that commissioned the
drug-testing attempt that resulted in the missed test. Under the 2015 Code, it is the Anti-Doping
Organization that receives the athlete’s whereabouts filing that has that right and duty, which will
be either his international federation or his NADO. If it was another Anti-Doping Organization that
commissioned the test, it must provide the Unsuccessful Test Report to the Anti-Doping Organization
with results management responsibility, and thereafter must provide it with any further information
required to support the alleged missed test. See ISTI Art I.5.2(a).
2 What is deemed reasonable will depend on the circumstances of the case at hand, including in particular
‘the nature of the specified location’. ISTI Art 11.4.3(c). However, the comment to that Article makes it
clear that, once the DCO has arrived at the location specified by the athlete for the 60-minute time-slot,
he should stay there until the end of the hour, and should spend that time doing what is reasonable in
the circumstances to try to locate the athlete. For a further discussion of what constitutes ‘reasonable
efforts’ in this context, see WADA Guidelines for Implementing an Effective Athlete Whereabouts
Program, Version 2.0 (December 2008), section 4B; DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 63
(emphasising the need not to give advance notice of the testing to the athlete), para 86 (‘The test as to
what was reasonable in the circumstances must therefore be considered on the basis that one puts to
one side any kind of advance notice of the test’), and para 88 (emphasising the need to give weight to
‘the legal obligation of the athlete to make himself available for testing during the specified time, which
he or she has specified. […] [T]he athlete had chosen the latest possible time for a test. Therefore, he
needed to take steps to ensure that he was in a position to hear a knock at the door’). See also UK Anti-
Doping v C, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 May 2018, para 71 et seq (majority found DCO did
not do what was reasonable to locate the athlete in apartment building after athlete did not answer
the buzzer to let the DCO in the building, because the DCO wrongly assumed that the buzzer was
working properly, and failed to ask any of the three different neighbours who left the building during
the hour in question to help the DCO contact the athlete); UK Anti-Doping v X, CAS 2016/O/4712,
para 94 et seq. (alleged missed test rejected on the basis that the DCO did not do what was reasonable
to try to locate athlete during the hour the athlete had designated at the hotel where the athlete was
staying, where the receptionist did not have the athlete’s room number, the DCO repeatedly called
the athlete during the hour, but he did not ask any of the members of the team who were outside the
hotel preparing for a training session if they knew where the athlete was, he did not ask anyone in the
breakfast room whether they knew how to contact anyone from the athlete’s team, and he did not make
any real effort with the receptionist to see if the athlete’s room number could be located or if the team
manager could be found, and did not make clear the importance of his locating the athlete); USADA v
Rollins, AAA decision dated 14 April 2017, para 7.3 (where the athlete was not at home when she said
she would be, but instead had left for the airport, the DCO’s attempt to meet the athlete at the airport
‘was more than was required under the circumstances’); FINA v G, FINA Doping Panel 04/17, p 20
(‘What constitutes a reasonable attempt to locate an Athlete for Testing during the 60-minute time-slot
cannot be fixed in advance, as it will necessarily depend on the particular circumstances of the case
in question, and in particular on the nature of the location chosen by the Athlete for that timeslot. The
only truly universal guideline is that the DCO should use his/her common sense. He/she should ask
him/herself: “Given the nature of the location specified by the Athlete, what do I need to do to ensure
that if the Athlete is present, he/she will know that a DCO is here to collect a Sample from him/her?”)
and fn 1 (‘The FINA Doping Panel considers that what was reasonable under the circumstances may
be dramatically impacted by evidence establishing the actual location of the athlete. In other words,
had the FINA Doping Panel found it had been proved that Ms G. was not at the Chula Vista Training
Center on 26 March then the FINA Doping Panel would have been prepared to find that a whereabouts
failure could be declared on a less thorough investigation by the DCO because the extent of the DCO’s
investigation would then have been irrelevant’), and p 21 (where there was no evidence whether the
DCO asked the coach on the telephone for the athlete’s room number, or questioned other residents, or
tried to find someone who could have determined the athlete’s room number, eg a security office or an
after-hours number, the panel found there was not sufficient evidence to establish that the DCO made a
reasonable attempt to find the athlete at the training centre location she had specified for her hour that
day); ASADA v Bannister, CAS (Oceania) A1/2013, para 28 (‘[…] what is “reasonable” for the DCO to
do depends, of course, on the nature and extent of the whereabouts filing information which has been
provided by the Athlete’); IAAF v Ahye, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 7 January 2020, para 48
(‘In summary, the Tribunal accepts Mr Thomas’s evidence. We accept that he saw at least one other
person (a lady with a dog) in the vicinity but chose not to speak to any such person as, understandably,
he considered that doing so would be unlikely to have helped him to gain access to the building or
otherwise enhance his chances of contacting the Athlete (given that the Athlete had her own front door
and that he already had the two telephone numbers she had provided)’).
The FINA Doping Panel also suggested in FINA v G that if the ADO had shown that the DCO had
made reasonable attempts to locate the athlete, the burden would have switched to the athlete to show
that she was present where she had said she would be (para 6.2), but there is nothing in the Code or
the ISTI that says that such proof would be a defence to an alleged missed test. If the DCO made
reasonable attempts to find the athlete at the location she had specified, in the hour she had specified,
there is a missed test, even if the athlete was in fact where she had specified she would be.
It is still a missed test if the athlete is found after the hour and provides a sample. See comment to
ISTI I.4.3(b); Gaber v UWW, CAS 2015/A/4210, para 8.5 (‘’Due to the fact that the DCO had to call
the athlete who was located in another city, several hours of travel away from where his whereabouts
file said he should be in order to conduct the test, [this] constitutes a missed test as the DCO was unable
to conduct the test within the specified 60-minute period. Additionally, the distance and time between
the phone call of the DCO in Cairo, and the athlete in Alexandria, also constitutes a missed test as
advance notice of the test was given to the athlete in contravention of Article 4.6.2(b) of the ISTI. This
requires that save in exceptional and justifiable circumstances, all out-of-competition testing shall be
no advance notice testing’).
3 Mechaal v IAAF & Agencia Española de Protección de la Salud en el Deporte (AEPSAD),
CAS 2017/A/4967, para 146 (where NADO could not show that athlete received notice of first
missed test before second missed test happened, first missed test was discounted and therefore charge
dismissed for failure to show three whereabouts failures in 12 months).
4 USADA v Rollins, AAA decision dated 14 April 2017, para 7.3, fn 3 (‘[…] this provision of Article
I.4.3 conflates a missed test and a failure to update a filing as interchangeable in the violation. Thus,
negligence in failing to update is actionable under the rubric of “missed test”, whether or not it would
also be actionable under “filing failure”’), para 7.4 (‘Respondent’s burden of proof under WADA Code
Article 3.1 is to show by a balance of probability that there was no negligent behavior on her part
that caused or contributed to her failure to be available and to update her whereabouts filing. […]
We interpret “negligence” in its normal meaning, as a failure to observe the duty of care expected of
a reasonable person similarly situated’), para 7.5 (athlete’s duty of care is to provide all whereabouts
information accurately and in sufficient detail to allow ADO to locate her for testing, and if she does not
know precisely where she will be then to provide her best information based on where she expects to
be, and then update it as necessary later), para 7.5 (‘We find that the level of care that is expected from
a person such as Respondent [an elite professional athlete] is at the very least the athlete’s compliance
with the rules requiring accurate whereabouts information, and the athlete’s being available for testing
where she has declared she would be in her Whereabouts Filing’), para 7.8 (‘[…] she knew she was
required to update the record with a new time slot, and she neglected to do so. As discussed below, it
does appear that the anti-doping agencies and other authorities could have done more to help her; but
the duty to comply remained hers. Due to her failing to make any effort to update, as she knew the rules
required, Respondent has not met and cannot meet her burden to show by a balance of probability that
no negligent behavior on her part at least contributed to her failure to be available and her failure to
update her whereabouts filing’).
In DFSNZ v Gemmell, CAS 2014/A/2, para 92, a first instance CAS panel ruled that ‘[…] athletes
that place themselves in a position whereby they cannot hear or see a DCO who attends a specified
location during the time they have nominated for testing defeat the purpose of the rules and cannot
be considered to have made themselves “available”’ (para 92), and that ‘having chosen the latest
possible time for a test (10:00pm – 11:00 pm) the Athlete was consciously running the risk that he
might be asleep when a DCO arrived. Prudence, in such circumstances, would have dictated that he
ensure that he was in a position to be able to hear someone knocking on the front door or that there
was some system in place whereby someone else could notify him of such an occurrence’). Similarly,
in UK Anti-Doping v C, NADP Tribunal decision dated 15 May 2018, para 80, the panel said, obiter,
that the athlete had clearly been negligent for failing to check on returning to their apartment that
their intercom had been fixed, as they had arranged to happen before they left; and in IAAF v Ahye,
Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 7 January 2020, para 65, the panel decided similarly when the
athlete failed to get the doorbell fixed and failed to do anything else to make sure she would hear
if someone knocked on the front door in her designated hour (‘[…] bearing in mind the particular
circumstances that she was an athlete already on two missed tests, she should have ensured that she
was available for testing. In short, she took the risk that she was not available and there can be no good
excuse for that. This means that the Athlete has not rebutted the presumption in Art I.4.3 (e) that she
has been negligent’.
In FINA v Donath, FINA Doping Panel decision dated October 2012, a swimmer admitted not being
available during her appointed hour three times in six months. She explained that her first failure was
due to having lost her job and needing to find a new job and a new place to live; her second failure was
due to having to help her partner get to the hospital; and her third failure was due to her having worked
until 5am the night before, and so sleeping through and not hearing the DCO knocking at the door
and telephoning her. The Panel rejected these defences: ‘[4.9] […] It appears that the difficulties in her
sports career and changes in life have seriously troubled her, possibly causing a kind of indifference or
carelessness towards her duties as an athlete. [4.10] On the other hand, there are no sufficient grounds
for the conclusion that during this period she was not able at all physically and psychologically to
comply with her ongoing responsibilities as an athlete and be available for unannounced testing. Her
behaviour from 13 December 2011, the date of the first missed test, shows she continuously neglected
her duties during a period of half a year, although she was repeatedly warned of the consequences of
her conduct through letters from FINA in conformity with the notice requirements of Section 11.6.3
of the IST. [4.11] The explanations Ms Donath has given for the missed tests in a period of half a
year do not convince the FINA Doping Panel of her serious intention to be available for unannounced
testing. On the contrary, her behavior has shown a degree of negligence and a lack of interest, which
are underscored by her remark in the written defense, “But even now I cannot completely make sure
that every knock on the door or phone will be heard”. The FINA Doping Panel is of the opinion that
such an approach to the requirements of the IST is unacceptable because an athlete must be specifically
present and available for testing, as stated in the IST’.
Cf ASADA v Bannister, CAS A1/2013, para 62 (‘it was not the Athlete’s fault, or at least not entirely
his fault that the hotel informed the DCO that the Athlete had booked out of the hotel. […] In my view,
the Athlete was entitled to assume that the hotel would know not only when he checked in as a matter
of fact but also when he checked out as a matter of fact. He was entitled to assume that it would know
in which room he was staying. The Athlete’s missed test, in my opinion, is to some extent excused or
justified also by these deficiencies in the hotel record keeping and booking in and booking out process
of which he could not be reasonably expected to know’).
See also the following cases under pre-2009 whereabouts rules: UK Athletics v Ohuruogu,
UKA Disciplinary Committee decision dated 15 September 2006, para 9 (‘A very high standard of care
is generally imposed upon athletes in respect of compliance with their obligations under anti-doping
provisions. If, therefore, an athlete is not available for testing at a declared location at a declared time
then he will be presumed to be at fault and is liable to have a ‘missed test’ recorded against him. Only
the most compelling exceptional factors are likely to excuse a failure to notify. A force majeure event,
such as a road accident on the way to a declared location, would serve as an excuse, if it prevented both
attendance at the declared location and prompt notification to the relevant body before the relevant
time’), aff’d, CAS 2006/A/1165. See also British Triathlon Association v Tim Don, Tribunal decision
dated 29 September 2006 (no compelling justification for missing tests – or failing to update previous
whereabouts filing – when the athlete was out of the country or delayed at an athletic meeting).
C9.4 In UCI v Rasmussen & DIF,1 the athlete admitted committing two
whereabouts violations but disputed the third alleged whereabouts violation, a missed
test. He accepted that all of the prima facie elements of a missed test were present (he
was in the UCI registered testing pool, he had been informed of his responsibilities
under the rules, and on the day in question a UCI doping control officer could not
locate him despite visiting the location he had specified for the time-slot indicated in
his whereabouts filing for that day), but nevertheless denied the third violation on the
basis that the UCI had not sent him notice of the alleged missed test until long after
the 14-day deadline for doing so that was specified in ISTI Article 11.6.3(b) (now
ISTI Art I.5.2(d)). The CAS panel ruled that this did not invalidate the missed test,
because ISTI Art 11.6.3 made it clear that there was a missed test if the elements set
out in ISTI Art 11.4.3 were met, and did not suggest that meeting the 14-day deadline
specified in ISTI Art 11.6.3(b) for notifying the athlete of the missed test was also
an essential element of the offence.2 In World Athletics v Kiprotich, the Disciplinary
Tribunal got to the same result by a different route, finding that a failure to notify
the athlete of a missed test until 97 days after the missed test was a departure from
the rules but it did not cause and therefore it did not invalidate the missed test.3 In
the same case, World Athletics notified a different apparent missed test to the athlete
within the 14-day deadline, but when he replied by contesting the missed test, it took
almost seven months to respond that his explanation was not sufficient to show his
conduct was not negligent. The hearing panel agreed with the athlete that the late
reply was undesirable but ruled that there was no deadline fixed in the ISTI for such
reply that World Athletics had failed to meet, and therefore the missed test could not
be declared inadmissible on the grounds that the AIU had responded too late.4
1 UCI v Rasmussen & DIF, CAS 2011/A/2671.
2 Ibid, para 71. It found the purpose of the 14-day requirement was to give the athlete an opportunity to
offer an explanation before any missed test was recorded, and in this case the athlete was given that
opportunity, albeit later than the 14-day deadline. Ibid, para 72. And it found that the departure from
the 14-day deadline did not cause the anti-doping rule violation, and so was a technical issue only that
could be disregarded in accordance with the UCI’s equivalent of Code Art 3.2.2 (now Code Art 3.2.3)
(as to which, see para C6.8). Ibid, para 74. The CAS panel did note, however: ‘Whether in another set
of circumstances a non-respect of the notice period would make impossible for an athlete to state the
reasons for his/her failure and whether such impossibility could have an impact on the acceptance of
the existence of a failure is an issue that, for the above reasons, can be left open in this case’. Ibid.
In Subirats v FINA, CAS 2011/A/2499, para 27, a CAS sole arbitrator ruled that FINA was
responsible for the national federation’s failure to forward to the athlete FINA’s notifications that he
had committed a filing failure: ‘the anti-doping organisation is responsible for making an accurate
notification to the athlete. If it decides to notify the filing failure communication to the athlete’s
national federation instead of directly to the athlete, it has to make sure that the athlete receives
such communication from the national federation. If the athlete does not receive the filing failure
communication from the national federation, he or she may not be declared to have committed any
filing failure. Again, the rationale of this is also quite obvious: the athlete must be informed adequately
so that he or she has a true opportunity to correct the filing deficiencies that have emerged’. However,
the CAS sole arbitrator missed the point identified by the CAS panel in Rasmussen, and therefore
proceeded (mistakenly) on the basis that notification within 14 days was an essential element of each
filing failure, failure to satisfy which meant automatic dismissal of the Art 2.4 charge.
3 World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/009/2020 dated
24 June 2020, para 104.
4 Ibid, para 84.
C9.5 Finally, ISTI Art I.5.4 states that if an Anti-Doping Organization fails to
charge an athlete with an Art 2.4 anti-doping rule violation within 30 days of WADA
receiving notice of the athlete’s third whereabouts failure in 12 months, ‘the ADO
shall be deemed to have decided that no anti-doping rule violation was committed,
for purposes of triggering the appeal rights set out at Article 13’. A hearing panel
rejected an athlete’s claim that this established a 30-day statute of limitations for the
bringing of such a charge, finding instead that the purpose of the provision is simply
to trigger the third-party appeal rights under Code Art 13 where an ADO fails to
bring forward a case as an ADRV.1
1 World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/009/2020 dated
24 June 2020, para 109.
CHAPTER C10
Article 2.5 ADRV – Tampering or

Attempted Tampering with Any Part of
Doping Control
C10.1 Code Art 2.5 prohibits ‘Tampering or Attempted Tampering with any part
of Doping Control’. This offence may be committed by an athlete, an athlete support
person, or (from the 2021 Code on) any other person bound by the Code, ‘including
board members, directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of
Signatories, and Delegated Third Parties and their employees’.1 The offence consists
of ‘conduct which subverts the Doping Control process but which would not
otherwise be included in the definition of Prohibited Methods’.2 Breaking this down
into its four constituent elements:
(1) Conduct:
(a) In the 2015 Code, ‘Tampering’ is defined as ‘altering for an improper
purpose or in an improper way; bringing improper influence to bear;
interfering improperly; obstructing, misleading or engaging in any
fraudulent conduct to alter results or prevent normal procedures from
occurring’. Art 2.5 states: ‘Tampering shall include, without limitation,
intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping
Control Official, providing fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping
Organization or intimidating or attempting to intimidate a potential
witness’. And the comment to Art 2.5 gives further examples: ‘altering
identification numbers on a Doping Control Form during Testing,
breaking the B bottle at the time of B Sample analysis, or altering a
Sample by the addition of a foreign substance’.
(b) In the 2021 Code, the key wording is moved to the definition of
‘Tampering’, which is changed to:
‘intentional conduct which subverts the Doping Control process but which
would not otherwise be included in the definition of Prohibited Methods.
Tampering shall include, without limitation, offering or accepting a bribe
to perform or fail to perform an act, preventing the collection of a Sample,
affecting or making impossible the analysis of a Sample, falsifying
documents submitted to an Anti-Doping Organization or TUE committee
or hearing panel, procuring false testimony from witnesses, committing
any other fraudulent act upon the Anti-Doping Organization or hearing
body to affect Results Management or the imposition of Consequences,
and any other similar intentional interference or Attempted interference
with any aspect of Doping Control’.
(c) Based on the Code definition of ‘Attempt’,3 ‘Attempted Tampering’
is ‘purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a
course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of’ the offence
of Tampering. This means that the attempt to subvert the Doping Control
process does not have to be successful.4 However, ‘there shall be no anti-
doping rule violation based solely on an Attempt if the Person renounces
the Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not involved in
the Attempt’.5
Article 2.5 ADRV – Tampering or Attempted Tampering with Any Part of Doping Control 877
(2) which subverts: ‘Subvert has its ordinary meaning: “to undermine the
authority (of an established institution)” (Oxford dictionary) […]’.6
(3) any part of the Doping Control process: ‘The behaviour must be such
that it possibly impacts on the “Doping Control process”’.7 According to the
Code definition, ‘Doping Control’ encompasses ‘[a]ll steps and processes
from test distribution planning through to ultimate disposition of any appeal
including all steps and processes in between such as provision of whereabouts
information, Sample collection and handling, laboratory analysis, therapeutic
use exemptions, results management and hearings’.8 The definition ‘is intended
to have a wide ambit and cover any circumstance relating to any violation of
the rules of anti-doping up to the finality of all appeals provisions’.9 It therefore
covers:
(a) The provision by athletes of whereabouts information that will assist
Anti-Doping Organizations to find them for testing when they are
out of competition.10
(b) Applications for therapeutic use exemptions (TUEs) permitting
use of prohibited substance or prohibited methods for therapeutic
purposes.11
(c) The sample collection process. For example:
(i) Art 2.5 states that ‘Tampering shall include, without limitation,
intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping
Control official […]’.12 An athlete who offered money to a DCO
to cancel a test was sanctioned for Tampering,13 and ‘offering or
accepting a bribe to perform or fail to perform an act’ is included
in the definition of ‘Tampering’ in the 2021 Code.
(ii) A basketball player who stated falsely on a doping control form
that he was the player who had been selected to undergo an in-
competition drug-test was sanctioned for Tampering;14 as was a
coach who sought to persuade the DCOs that an individual at the
doping control station was the athlete who had been notified by a
chaperone that he was required to give a sample, when the coach
was well aware that the individual was not that athlete but had
switched with that athlete when the DCOs were distracted.15
(iii) One panel upheld Tampering charges against athletes who provided
urine belonging to someone else rather than their own urine,16
although technically such urine substitution should probably be
prosecuted as an Art 2.2 Use of a Prohibited Method rather than
under Art 2.5 (see sub-paragraph (d), below).
(iv) The 2021 Code also mentions ‘preventing the collection of a
Sample’ as an example of Tampering. For example, a coach who
instructs an athlete not to provide a sample is guilty of Tampering;17
as is an athlete who intentionally moves her arm during attempts to
draw blood from her so that those attempts are unsuccessful;18
(v) The comment to 2015 Code Art 2.5 provides the following further
examples: ‘altering identification numbers on a Doping Control
form during Testing, […] or altering a Sample by the addition of a
foreign substance’,19 although again the latter should probably be
prosecuted under Art 2.2 as Use of a Prohibited Method (see again
sub-para (iv), below).
(vi) Deliberately dropping the sample collection vessels on the floor, so
that they could not be re-used and there was no further equipment
to conduct the test, would amount to Tampering.20
(vii) Instructing athletes not to declare on their doping control forms
the infusions they have had and instructing them to deny they had
infusions if asked during drug testing (in the mistaken belief that
such infusions may be an anti-doping rule violation) amounts to

intentional and fraudulent conduct designed to prevent normal
procedures from occurring, and therefore to Tampering.21
(viii) In Sun Yang, a CAS panel ruled that an athlete’s conduct in
insisting that the DCO could not leave with the blood sample the
athlete had just provided, ripping up the doping control form, and
breaking the sealed glass container to retrieve the blood sample
so that the DCO was forced to leave empty-handed, constituted
prevention of the normal sample collection procedures, and
therefore subversion of the Doping Control process in violation
of Art 2.5. The panel also found that ‘the Athlete might not have
been found to have violated Article 2.5 FINA DC if he could have
established, on a balance of probability, a compelling justification
that entitled him to act to prevent the Doping Control process from
proceedings (“compelling justification” is within the meaning of
Article 2.3 FINA DC (Evading, Refusing or Failing to Submit to
Doping Control)’,22 but it ruled that there was no such compelling
justification on the facts of that case.23
(ix) A domestic hearing panel ruled that an athlete’s withdrawal of
his consent to the processing of his Doping Control-related data,
namely the sample he had provided to a DCO under the applicable
anti-doping rules, was a subversion of the Doping Control process
and therefore Tampering.24
(d) Sample analysis: The International Standard for Laboratories provides
that any interference with analysis of the B sample by an athlete or his
representative may be considered Tampering for purposes of Code Art
2.5.25 The comment to Code Art 2.5 gives as an example breaking the
B Sample bottle during analysis of that sample, while the 2021 Code
expands the example to cover anything ‘affecting or making impossible
the analysis of a Sample’.
(e) Whistle-blowing/providing anti-doping evidence: 2021 Code
comment 63 (the comment to Art 2.11) states: ‘Conduct that is found
to violate both Article 2.5 (Tampering) and Article 2.11 (Acts by an
Athlete or Other Person to Discourage or Retaliate Against Reporting
to Authorities) shall be sanctioned based on the violation that carries
the more severe sanction’. Art 2.11 prohibits ‘any act which threatens
or seeks to intimidate another Person with the intent of discouraging
the Person from the good-faith reporting of information’ and retaliation
against a Person who, in good faith, has provided evidence or information’
that ‘relates to an alleged anti-doping rule violation or alleged non-
compliance with the Code to WADA, an Anti-Doping Organization, law
enforcement, regulatory or professional disciplinary body, hearing body
or Person conducting an investigation for WADA or an Anti-Doping
Organization’.
(f) Investigations: The International Standard for Testing and
Investigations and the CAS jurisprudence are clear that investigations
of potential ADRVs are part of the Doping Control process (whether the
investigation was triggered by an incident during testing or by something
else) and so subverting the investigation process (eg by ‘providing
fraudulent information to an Anti-Doping Organization or intimidating
or attempting to intimidate a potential witness’: Code Art 2.5) may
constitute Tampering.26
(g) Results management. For example, an athlete telling an official that
unless the doping charge that had been brought against him was resolved
in favour of the athlete, the athlete would release a telephone conversation
with the official that he had secretly recorded, was a criminal act intended
to improperly influence the Doping Control process and therefore
constituted Attempted Tampering in breach of Art 2.5.27
(h) Hearings (first instance and appeal):
(i) The NADP Tribunal was clear in UK Anti-Doping v Skafidas:
‘Deliberately misleading an anti-doping panel does constitute
tampering contrary to rule 32.2(e). The purpose and intended
effect of such conduct is to subvert the doping control process
by persuading the panel to proceed on a false basis’.28 While
technically that proposition might extend to a respondent athlete
as well as to witnesses, it may be argued that it would be unusual,
and potentially unreasonable, for an Anti-Doping Organization
subsequently to charge a respondent found by a panel to have
committed a substantive ADRV, with an additional ADRV in
respect of their evidence before that panel. The circumstances
would likely have to be unusual.
(ii) In IAAF v Jeptoo, a CAS panel similarly agreed that ‘tampering
can also cover an athlete’s behaviour in the course of a first
instance or appeal hearing’.29 It noted, however, that ‘an athlete
must have done more than put the prosecuting authority to proof
of its case’.30 An athlete has a right to make ‘any submissions that
he or she deems appropriate to defend him or herself […] [and] to
concentrate on or advance in particular arguments that are beneficial
to his cause. Exercising these procedural rights, therefore, does not
constitute tampering […]’.31 To avoid interfering with these rights,
‘any behaviour of the athlete in the judicial proceeding before a
first instance tribunal must meet a high threshold in order to be
qualified as tampering’.32 ‘[T]he threshold of legitimate defence
is trespassed and, thus, a “further element of deception” is present
where the administration of justice is put fundamentally in danger
by the behaviour of the athlete. This is the case where a party to the
proceedings commits a criminal offence designed to influence the
proceedings in his or her favour’.33
(iii) The Jeptoo panel found that that threshold had been crossed, and
so upheld the IAAF’s Tampering charge, where the athlete had
committed the criminal offence of forging a document for use in
judicial proceedings, namely a medical record that falsely suggested
that the rEPO found in her sample had been administered to her as
part of emergency treatment for injuries from a car accident.34
(iv) The Jeptoo award is not clear whether the conduct has to be a
criminal offence in order to exceed the boundaries of legitimate
defence and so constitute Tampering. A subsequent decision by
the arbitrator who chaired the Jeptoo panel suggests that it does,35
but other panels may not follow, because (A) Art 2.5 does not say
the interference has to be criminal to amount to Tampering; (B)
there are examples of interference that clearly subvert the hearing
process even if they are not criminal; and (C) criminal laws vary
from nation to nation, and therefore maintaining the requirement
of criminal conduct means that the same conduct would amount to
Tampering if it takes place in country X but not if it takes place in
country Y, which is of course inimical to the basic Code principle
of equal treatment for all, wherever they practise their sport.36
(v) The 2021 Code removes this debate to some extent, by including
in the definition of Tampering ‘falsifying documents submitted
to an Anti-Doping Organization or TUE committee or hearing
panel, procuring false testimony from witnesses, committing

any other fraudulent act upon the Anti-Doping Organization or
hearing body to affect Results Management or the imposition of
Consequences,37 and any other similar intentional interference
or Attempted interference with any aspect of Doping Control’.
There is no mention of any requirement that the interference must
amount to a criminal offence. The comment to the definition states:
‘Tampering includes misconduct which occurs during the Results
Management and hearing process. See Article 10.9.3.3. However,
actions taken as part of a Person’s legitimate defense to an anti-
doping rule violation charge shall not be considered Tampering’.
One can therefore posit a situation where an athlete might
plead non-deliberate use, fail to establish that on the balance of
probabilities, but evidence might later come to light that they had
in fact deliberately used the prohibited substance. On the coming
to light of that evidence, but not before, they might be charged
with a second offence. That said however, it would be unusual,
and potentially unreasonable, dependent on the circumstances, for
them to be so charged.
(4) and which does not fall within the definition of Prohibited Methods: The
2020 Prohibited List lists the following as Prohibited Methods: ‘Tampering, or
Attempting to Tamper, to alter the integrity and validity of Samples collected
during Doping Control. Including, but not limited to: Sample substitution and/
or adulteration eg addition of proteases to Sample’. Such conduct should be
charged as Use of a Prohibited Method in violation of Art 2.2 rather than as
Tampering in violation of Art 2.5.38
1 See 2021 Code, Introduction (p 12). 2021 Code comment 6 confirms that ‘such Person would […] be
subject to discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.5 (Tampering) […]’.
2 This wording appeared in 2015 Code Art 2.5 itself; in the 2021 Code, it is moved to the definition of
‘Tampering’, but remains the core concept.
4 UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 93 (‘Article 2.5 ADR 2015
does not require the act of tampering to be successful. Instead, the provision clearly states that also an
attempt falls within the scope of application of Article 2.5 ADR 2015’).
5 Code App One (Definitions), definition of Attempt, p 132. See also IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128,
para 153 (‘In application of the above general principles to the case at hand the Panel finds that
the Athlete has committed tampering (within the meaning of the ADR) when submitting the forged
document in the CAS 2015/A/3978. It cannot be upheld in the favour of the Athlete that she at this
moment in time no longer relies on the forged Medical Report. This does not constitute withdrawal
from the criminal attempt to alter or impact the Doping Control process, since the Athlete did not
withdraw the forged document in these proceedings voluntarily, but only when she was confronted
with overwhelming evidence by the IAAF that her whole defence was totally made up’); UCI v
Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 93 (The fact that the Rider
today regrets having sent the email by qualifying the latter as “inappropriate” and ambiguous is of no
avail. It surely does not constitute a voluntary withdrawal from an ADRV’).
6 DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 127.
7 IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 147.
9 DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 128. This calls into question the (surprising) decision
of one CAS panel (Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 823) that the provision of clean urine
in advance of an event, to be swapped for dirty urine collected during doping control at an event, is
not subversion of the Doping Control process if the test distribution plan for the event has not been
produced when the clean urine is provided.
10 ISTI Art I.3.5 states: ‘Where a change in circumstances means that the information in a Whereabouts
Filing is no longer accurate or complete as required by Article I.3.4, the Athlete must file an update
so that the information on file is again accurate and complete. In particular, the Athlete must always
update his/her Whereabouts Filing to reflect any change in any day in the quarter in question (a) in the
time or location of the 60-minute time slot specified in Article I.3.2; and/or (b) in the place where he/
she is staying overnight. The Athlete must file the update as soon as possible after the circumstances
change, and in any event prior to the 60-minute time slot specified in his/her filing for the day in
question. A failure to do so may be pursued as a Filing Failure and/or (if the circumstances so warrant)
as evasion of Sample collection under Code Article 2.3, and/or Tampering or Attempted Tampering
with Doping Control under Code Article 2.5’. See also comment to ISTI Art I.3.4 (specifying a
location that a DCO cannot access ‘should be pursued as an apparent Filing Failure, and/or (where
the circumstances warrant) as an evasion of Sample collection under Code Article 2.3, and/or as
Tampering or Attempting to Tamper with Doping Control under Code Article 2.5’).
In UKAD v Dry, NADP Appeal Panel decision dated 25 February 2020, paras 32, 37, the panel
confirmed that if a national anti-doping organization takes up the invitation in ISTI Art 4.8 to create
a ‘domestic whereabouts pool’ below the national registered testing pool, that domestic testing pool
and all of the processes related to it constitute part of the Doping Control process, and therefore an
athlete who lies in an effort to avoid having a filing failure declared against him commits an Art 2.5
Tampering violation.
11 FA v Johnson, FA Regulatory Commission decision dated 20 January 2020 (doctor admitted Tampering
charge based on his provision of a ‘fraudulent’ letter in support of an application for a retroactive TUE
that stated falsely that he had submitted and filed an application for the TUE in advance of use). See
ibid, para 41 (finding sanction should not be reduced based on prompt admission, because (inter alia)
‘[…] fraudulent information of this type is seriously undermining of the WADA anti-doping regime,
which heavily relies upon the honesty and integrity of professionals such as Dr Johnson in positions
of responsibility’) and para 44 (‘The fact that a retroactive TUE could have been obtained if he had
not panicked and lied and fraudulently submitted a document’, even if true, does not downgrade the
seriousness of the offence and so is not relevant to sanction).
12 See eg UK Anti-Doping v Barlow, NADP Tribunal decision dated 27 June 2016, para 63 (the
athlete calling the police to arrest a DCO who tried to test the athlete at home was Tampering,
because it obstructed the DCO in taking the test and preventing him from carrying out the normal
testing procedures), aff’d, Barlow v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated
6 September 2016.
The comment to 2015 Code Art 2.5 (in the 2021 Code, the comment to the definition of Tampering)
states: ‘Offensive conduct towards a Doping Control official or other Person involved in Doping
Control which does not otherwise constitute Tampering shall be addressed in the disciplinary rules
of sport organizations’. In RFU v Armitage, RFU Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 20 January
2011, a rugby player pushed a UK Anti-Doping DCO and used threatening and/or abusive or obscene
language when the DCO tried to notify him after a match that he had been selected to undergo a drug
test. The RFU did not charge the player with an Art 2.5 Tampering violation, but instead charged him
with ‘conduct prejudicial to the interests of the Union’, in breach of its general misconduct rules. The
tribunal banned him for eight weeks, on the basis that ‘[a] fine alone would fail to reflect the gravity
of the misconduct nor would it adequately underpin the Game’s support for Doping Control Officers.
[…] Doping Control Officers are entitled to expect to work without fear of abuse or threats. They must
be treated with respect at all times’. Ibid, paras 23 and 25. There is no discussion in the decision of
why a charge of Tampering was not brought. However, the evidence was that the player remained in
sight of the Doping Control Officer at all times and went with him to the doping control station after a
delay of only about two minutes, that he continued to swear at the Doping Control Officer when asked
for information to complete the doping control form but then he calmed down and cooperated with the
process and provided a sample that subsequently tested negative. It may be therefore that the conduct
in issue was not felt to rise to the level of ‘subvert[ing] the Doping Control process’. In the authors’
view, however, it must have been a close call, and the facts would not have to be very different for a
Tampering charge to be appropriate.
13 South African Institute for Drug-Free Sport v Leballo, Independent Doping Hearing Panel decision
dated 19 July 2017, paras 7.1, 9.2.
14 In UK Anti-Doping v Danso and UK Anti-Doping v Offiah, NADP Tribunal decision dated 20 July
2012, an athlete who was registered with one club played for another club, pretending to be another
athlete who was registered with the second club. When the athlete registered with the second club was
selected for drug testing after a match, the athlete who was pretending to be him did not disclose his
true identity, but instead submitted to the test and signed the doping control form, pretending to be
the other athlete. The team captain also signed the doping control form, confirming (falsely) that the
athlete submitting to the test was the athlete registered with the second club. The fraud was discovered
when the athlete’s sample tested positive for marijuana, and both he and the team captain were charged
with Tampering in violation of Art 2.5 in that they had provided fraudulent information to UK Anti-
Doping about the identity of the athlete being tested. Both charges were upheld, and one athlete was
banned for two years, the other for one year (having made a successful plea for mitigation based on
his prompt admission of his violation when confronted with it: see para C21.7, n 5). See also IRB v
Lytvynenko et al, Board Judicial Committee dated 29 May 2013 (rugby players who swapped shifts
so one could give sample pretending to be the other were both banned for Tampering, while the team
manager was banned for four years for facilitating the deception).
15 WADA v Fedoriva, CAS 2016/A/4700, paras 55-57.
16 The women’s 1500 metres final at the IAAF 2005 World Championships in Helsinki, on 14 August
2005, was won by Tatyana Tomashova of Russia, with her compatriots Yuliya Chizhenko-Fomenko,
Olga Yegorova and Yelena Soboleva coming 2nd, 3rd and 5th respectively (although Chizhenko-
Fomenko was subsequently disqualified for obstructing another runner and so Yegorova and Soboleva
were moved up to 2nd and 4th respectively). Blood samples taken from those athletes on the day of
the final produced OFF-scores of 129 (Tomashova), 140 (Chizhenko-Fomenko), 124 (Yegorova) and
136 (Soboleva). The IAAF therefore collected urine samples from them but those samples tested
negative for EPO. When subsequent samples from these athletes continued to test negative for EPO,
the IAAF suspected the testing had been manipulated. It therefore submitted urine samples that it had
collected from all four athletes out of competition in April-May 2007 for DNA analysis, alongside
samples collected from the same athletes in competition. When the results revealed that the samples
collected out of competition did not come from the four Russian athletes but instead came from other
(unidentified) persons, the IAAF charged all four athletes (and three others caught in the same way)
with fraudulent manipulation of their urine samples. A special commission convened by the Russian
federation upheld those charges and banned all four athletes for two years each, but the IAAF appealed
to the CAS and got the bans on each athlete increased to two years and nine months, and their results
disqualified back to April/May 2007. IAAF v Yegorova et al, CAS 2008/A/1718-1724. At para 172, the
CAS panel acknowledged that the tampering at issue in that case could also be analysed as use of a
prohibited method. See also Boevski v IWF, CAS 2004/A/607 (urine substitution).
17 As in Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, although that case was charged instead as complicity in the
athlete’s consequent refusal to submit to sample collection.
18 UCI v Fernandes, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 20 December 2019, para 95 (‘The Rider
disputes that the arm movement was intentional, asserting that it was “neurological disturb[ances]
clinically prove[n], that led to the absences of total intentionality of the Athlete in pulling their hand
away from the control”. For the reasons set forth above, the Single Judge does not accept that the arm
motions were made in the absence of intentionality on the part of the Rider. As set forth above, the
Single Judge is comfortably satisfied that the Rider did in fact voluntarily move her arm (or attempt
to move her arm) during the Doping Control process, ie during four separate Sample Collections.
Moreover, it cannot be seriously suggested that the Rider did not know that voluntarily moving her arm
would interfere with the Doping Control process. Moreover, as a professional rider knowledgeable in
doping control procedures and by virtue of her own experience and admission, she was well aware that
after three attempts, the Sample collection would be called to an end’).
19 WADA v FPC & Cabreira, CAS 2009/A/1873 (after the Madrid lab had reported that the usual active
urine test could not be carried out, the sample had been sent to the Cologne laboratory, which reported
the presence of Bacillolysin, an exogenous form of protease available in powder form, to explain the
fact that the sample did not show an usual protein pattern; CAS panel upheld tampering charge and
imposed two year ban).
In USADA v Leogrande, AAA Panel decision dated 1 December 2008, an athlete was charged with
Tampering based on an allegation that he had put soap onto his wrist before going into the doping
control station and had put some of the soap into the stream of his urine during sample collection, in
order to interfere with the test. The charge was not upheld, for lack of evidence, but the facts alleged
clearly constituted Tampering (or Use of a Prohibited Method). Similarly, Michele de Bruin, the Irish
swimmer, was held to have committed the anti-doping rule violation of Use of a Prohibited Method
where the urine sample she provided was found to contain a level of whisky that would have been
fatal if ingested, and therefore must have been added to the sample as a masking agent after she had
provided it. The CAS upheld the four-year ban imposed on her by FINA. See Smith de Bruin v FINA,
CAS 98/211, Digest of CAS Awards Vol 2 1998–2000 (Kluwer, 2002), p 255.
TD2018EAAS, pp 6-7, states: ‘In cases when a Sample is not consistent with human urine (eg SG
≤ 1.001, creatinine ≤ 5 mg/dL, non-physiological salt concentration, abnormal pH values, absence or
abnormally low levels of endogenous steroids, corticosteroids, proteins), the Laboratory shall: • report
the finding as an AAF for Tampering or Attempted Tampering (class M2.1 of the Prohibited List) if
the Laboratory can unequivocally identify the nature of the liquid (eg water, liquor, synthetic urine)
provided as the adulterated Sample; or • report the finding as an AAF for Tampering or Attempted
Tampering if the Laboratory has reason to believe that the Sample could have been altered in any
manner, improperly interfered with, or potentially been the subject of any fraudulent conduct that
could alter the results of Analytical Testing; or • inform the Testing Authority about the suspicious
finding and request further information which may support the reporting of this finding as an AAF for
Tampering or Attempted Tampering (eg longitudinal “steroid profile” data for the Athlete); or • report
the finding as an ATF for Tampering or Attempted Tampering and include a comment in ADAMS
advising the Testing Authority to perform further investigations (eg additional analyses on the Sample,
Target Testing the Athlete) in order to establish whether Tampering of the Sample has occurred and the
finding be treated as an Anti-Doping Rule Violation’.
20 WADA v Contreras & COC, CAS 2013/A/3341, para 130, although the panel in that case decided
it was not comfortably satisfied that the athlete had dropped the containers deliberately in order to
frustrate the attempt to collect his sample.
21 USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 314.
22 As to which, see para C8.5, n 1.
23 WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 205. For discussion of those facts, see para C8.5.
24 RFU v McIntosh, NADP decision dated 13 April 2017.
25 2019 ISL Art 5.3.4.5.4.8.8. Bribing a laboratory director not to report an adverse analytical
finding would constitute Tampering in breach of Art 2.5, although in IAAF v ARAF & Mokhnev,
CAS 2016/O/4504, para 108, the CAS panel found there was insufficient evidence to prove that charge
to its comfortable satisfaction.
26 See ISTI Art 12.3.5 (‘Athletes and Athlete Support Personnel are required under Code Article 21
to cooperate with investigations conducted by Anti-Doping Organizations. If they fail to do so,
disciplinary action should be taken against them under applicable rules. If their conduct amounts to
subversion of the investigation process (eg, by providing false, misleading or incomplete information,
and/or by destroying potential evidence), the Anti-Doping Organization should bring proceedings
against them for violation of Code Article 2.5 (Tampering or Attempted Tampering’). See eg UK Anti-
Doping v Skafidas, NADP Tribunal decision dated 22 February 2016, para 39 (upholding charge of
Tampering based on lies told during an investigation interview, because ‘[t]he tribunal is satisfied that
the statements to the contrary made by Dr Skafidas in his interview were false and designed to mislead,
and thus prevent the normal process of doping control from operating properly’); USADA v Brown,
AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.231 (upholding Tampering charge where
doctor had altered athletes’ records after receiving notice of USADA’s investigation, ‘and apparently
intended that those changes would appear as if they were contemporaneous notes in the file at the
time of administration of the infusion, rather than the later-occurring alterations that they were’) and
para 5.231 (‘[…] the alteration of the records appears to have been directed to ensuring that records
existed to substantiate a position to be taken in the course of these proceedings, and in the view of the
panel that constitutes tampering under the WADA Code’).
In DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 128, the CAS panel held that Art 2.5 ‘purposely
construed covers the investigation period and an allegation of fraudulently misleading an investigation
requires an intent to subvert the investigation’. A majority of the panel found that lies told in answer
to questions at interview had ‘so negligible’ an influence on the investigation ‘as to arguably amount
to having had no effect on the investigation at all, much less result in “subverting” the process. This
is especially so where DFSNZ revealed that through Mrs B’s statement and texts it was already aware
of a potential Rule Violation and held some evidence in support of that view at the time Mr Murray
made his denials’ (para 145). The majority was not satisfied that the lies were made ‘with the intent to
fraudulently mislead the doping control process ie to undermine the power or authority of DFSNZ in
its investigation’ (para 146), and therefore dismissed the Tampering charge (para 147). This surprising
analysis was severely criticised by the panel in UK Anti-Doping v Dry, NADP Appeal Panel decision
dated 25 February 2020, para 33: ‘We have concerns as to some of the dicta in the Murray decision
which seem to suggest that a lie which has no or negligible effect on the doping process cannot be
the basis for a violation. We would accept that it is not every lie told during the doping process which
amounts to an ADR violation, but if the athlete makes a statement in the course of the process which
is a lie, it seems to us that it is not precluded from being an ADR violation merely because (to take an
example) UK Anti-Doping has irrefutable documentary evidence from the outset that the statement
was a lie and therefore ultimately the lie has no causative effect. We do not think causation can be a
relevant test. To the extent that Murray suggests the contrary at 145 we do not agree with those dicta’.
The Dry panel dealt with a case where UK Anti-Doping was investigating an apparent filing
failure by an athlete in the domestic testing pool. In an attempt to avoid UK Anti-Doping declaring
a whereabouts failure against him (which would have led, if followed by two other failures in the
same 12 month period, to him being elevated to the national registered testing pool, and so exposure
to a potential Art 2.4 anti-doping rule violation if he again failed to comply with the whereabouts
requirements), the athlete knowingly lied, telling UK Anti-Doping that he had been where he said he
would be in his whereabouts filing, when in fact he was in another country. He also got his partner to
agree with his lie. The panel found that this amounted to ‘the deliberate provision of false information
[…] with the intention of evading the operation of the ADR’, and so to Tampering with the Doping
Control process, in violation of Art 2.5 (ibid, para 40(d)).
27 UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 95, and see para 80 (‘[…]
the “Acceptance of Consequences” phase […] is covered by the term “Doping Control” within the
above meaning as it happened after the “test distribution planning” but before the “ultimate disposition
of any appeal”’) and para 95.
28 UK Anti-Doping v Skafidas, NADP Tribunal decision dated 22 February 2016, para 36 (‘Dr Skafidas
did not himself tell a direct lie to the panel but he knew that the case advanced by him on behalf
of the athlete was founded on a false premise, namely that the athlete had not herself taken or had
administered to her the prohibited substances found in her sample. He knew that in fact the athlete
had ingested or been injected with those substances under his direction. The argument advanced by
him at the hearing that the sample collection process had been defective, and the questions he asked of
the doping control officers in support of that argument, were designed to further the falsehood in the
defence that the cause of the positive test result was not the ingestion or administration of prohibited
substances. This was misleading conduct designed to prevent the panel from reaching the correct
decision, thus subverting the doping control process’).
A rugby league coach who provided false testimony at a hearing to support an athlete’s plea of No
Fault or Negligence was also banned for Tampering, as was the CEO of the club who conspired with
the coach and the player in the provision of that false testimony. UK Anti-Doping v Cooper, decision
dated 22 November 2011 (two-year ban); UK Anti-Doping v Rule, Consent Order dated December
2011 (two-year ban). See also USADA v Zajicek, USADA press release dated 10 June 2011 (athlete
accepted life ban for ADRVs that included ‘a third doping offense for providing false testimony at an
American Arbitration Association (AAA) panel hearing, as well as encouraging other witnesses to
provide false testimony’).
29 IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 146. Such actions ‘constitute behaviour well within the
boundaries of legitimate defense’. UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June
2017, para 81.
30 IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 150, quoting Bekele Degfa v TAF & IAAF, CAS 2013/A/3080,
para 70. See also UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 85
(‘A mere nuisance, extra work or a waste of time caused by a rider to the detriment of the prosecuting
authority does not meet this threshold’); USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September
2019, para 520 (noting, based on Bekele and Jeptoo, that ‘the Panel is required to find that the Respondent
did more than require USADA to prove its case’), para 306 (rejecting allegation that depicting another
person as the instigator of the L-carnitine infusion programme, and asking doctor to write a letter about
the volume of L-carnitine infused, was done in order to create a ‘false narrative’ that would ‘mislead’
USADA, and therefore constituted subverting the Doping Control process; all the respondent had done
was what the CAS panel in Jeptoo said was permitted – ‘to make any submission that he or she deems
appropriate to defend him or herself’ and ‘to concentrate on or advance in particular arguments that
are beneficial to his cause’, which, the AAA panel noted, was ‘allowed in any adversarial proceeding’),
and para 516 (‘Simply discouraging witnesses from testifying is not subverting the Doping Control
process. These witnesses did in fact testify, as they were able to make their own decisions and were
not “intimidated”’). The Salazar panel noted that it was ‘loath to discourage persons in the position of
Respondent from advancing the most aggressive positions to defend their cases. It would be a form of
preventing due process if Respondent or others similarly situated were not able to defend their cases in
the way they deem most appropriate under the circumstances, both at the investigation stage and during
the hearing itself. Respondent’s actions with respect to these facts do not rise to the level required by
the Tampering rule, ie he did not interfere improperly, or obstruct, mislead or engage in any fraudulent
action, to alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring, by aggressively asserting his
defense and protecting his rights, seeking to protect information and making legal distinctions’ (ibid,
para 308). ‘There was no evidence of a fraudulent submission nor disruptive activity directed to the
Panel or the proceedings, beyond what was otherwise permitted by accepted law and common legal
practice in the United States’ (ibid, para 523). ‘Simply put, USADA did not meet its burden to establish
that the legitimate, even if uncooperative and aggressive, effort by the Respondent to put USADA to its
proof, and to defend himself, constituted anything more than simply that. The Panel finding otherwise
on these facts would chill, unfairly and inappropriately, an accused’s efforts to put on the best lawful
defense possible, an outcome that would be unfortunate for all participants’ (ibid, para 524).
31 IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, para 147.
32 Ibid, para 148, and see para 149 (drawing support from the fact that ‘the CAS jurisprudence displayed
reticence when treating an athlete’s procedural behaviour as an aggravating behavior, since the sword
of Damocles of an increased sanction in a case where a panel is not prepared to accept the athlete’s
submission would render his or her defense, and thus, access to justice disproportionately difficult.
This is all the more so since a comparable sanction is not foreseen for the sports organization charging
the athlete with an ADRV’), citing Bekele Degfa v TAF & IAAF, CAS 2013/A/3080, para 70 et seq.
33 IAAF v Jeptoo, CAS 2015/O/4128, paras 151, 153.
34 Ibid. It also noted (para 151) that ‘whether lying as party in a proceeding constitutes a criminal offence
can be left unanswered here’.
See also IAAF v Sumgong, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 17 January 2019, para 94 (endorsing
Jeptoo reasoning) and para 99 (‘As to the law the Athlete’s supply of a false explanation for the
presence of r-EPO before and the submission of the false medical documents by her to the Kenyan
Tribunal can only be analysed as a deliberate attempt to prevent the administration of justice in her
case and improperly to affect the outcome of the hearing in respect of the AAF for r-EPO. Perjury and
forgery inevitably go beyond the bounds of legitimate defence under any civilized system of law’);
and World Athletics v Wilson Kipsang Kiprovich, Disciplinary Tribunal decision SR/009/2020 dated
24 June 2020, para 255 (following Jeptoo and Sumgong in finding an athlete guilty of Tampering by
providing knowingly false evidence in support of submissions designed to persuade World Athletics
and/or the hearing panel that they had not committed whereabouts failures).
35 UCI v Kocjan, UCI Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 28 June 2017, para 86 (‘[…] the threshold
is clearly exceeded where a party to the proceedings commits a criminal offense with the intent of
obstructing justice in his or her favour. Such level of criminal energy displayed exceeds the level of
a mere nuisance’) and especially para 87 (‘The Single Judge, thus, has to determine whether or not
the Rider in the case at hand stepped outside the boundaries of legitimate defense within the above
meaning. As mentioned above such boundaries are defined by criminal law. Since the Doping Control
process in the case at hand is under the authority of the UCI and considering that the UCI is domiciled in
Switzerland, the Single Judge will look first and foremost at the Swiss Criminal code for determining the
boundaries of legitimate defense’). In that case, the athlete told a UCI official that if a more favourable
resolution of the anti-doping charge that the UCI had brought against him was not offered, he would
publish a recording that he had secretly made of a telephone call that the athlete had had with the official.
Recording a phone call without the other person’s consent is a crime in Switzerland. Although the athlete
later said that in fact he had not recorded the call, he made the UCI official think that he had, and
thereby tried to intimidate him and so improperly influence the Doping Control process in a manner
that was ‘clearly outside the boundaries of legitimate defense’. (Ibid, paras 91–92). Cf USADA v Brown,
AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.291 (based on the Jeptoo and Bekele decisions,
‘the Panel would be required to find that the Respondent did more than require USADA to prove its
case, and acted in a manner that was illegal or unethical’, which it declined to do on the facts); IAAF v
Sumgong, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 17 January 2019, para 99 (‘Perjury and forgery inevitably
go beyond the bounds of legitimate defence under any civilized system of law’).
36 Foschi v FINA, CAS 96/156, para 10.2.4 (‘Moreover an international federation deals with national
federations and athletes from all over the world and it has to treat them on an equal basis. It therefore
has to apply the same law to all of them. It is unacceptable that based upon the same facts, a different
result might be reached depending on the law applied’).
37 This very explicit language mitigates against the potential argument (discussed at para C19.6, n 1) that
the lex specialis for Tampering that affects the results management or hearing process is 2021 Code
Art 10.4 (Aggravating Circumstances).
38 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 702–704 (‘Article 2.2 of the WADC, in conjunction with
M2.1 of the Prohibited List, constitutes a more specific rule in relation to the more general provision
of Article 2.5 of the WADC’; and the statement that Art 2.5 ‘prohibits conduct which subverts the
Doping Control process but which would not otherwise be included in the definition of Prohibited
Methods’, means that ‘Article 2.5 of the WADC does not apply with respect to the alleged urine
substitution’) and para 818 (‘Article 2.5 of the WADC is only applicable insofar as it relates to acts
that are not already included within the definition of prohibited methods under Article 2.2 WADC.
Therefore, Article 2.5 of the WADC covers types of tampering other than urine substitution and of a
few other methods defined under section M of the Prohibited List’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379,
paras 789–791, 833 (same); Romanova v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5435, para 195 (‘The Panel concurs with
the view of the panels in the Other Proceedings (CAS 2017/A/5422) according to which Article 2.5
of the 2009 WADC is only applicable insofar as it relates to acts that are not already included within
the definition of prohibited methods under Article 2.2 of the 2009 WADC. Therefore, Article 2.5 of
the 2009 WADC covers types of tampering other than urine substitution and of a few other methods
defined under section M of the Prohibited List’).
C10.2 In all cases alleging Tampering or Attempted Tampering, the Anti-Doping

Organization must prove not only that the athlete or other person subverted the
Doping Control process but also that they intended to do so.1 This is made explicit in
the 2021 Code definition of Tampering, which refers to ‘intentional conduct which
subverts the Doping Control process’.
1 Code Art 2.5 itself refers to ‘intentionally interfering or attempting to interfere with a Doping Control
official’, and the other examples given also connote conscious or deliberate misconduct. Furthermore,
the comment to 2015 Code Article 10.5.2 (the No Significant Fault or Negligence provision: see para
C18.2) states that ‘Article 10.5.2 may be applied to any ADRV, except those Articles where intent is an
element of the anti-doping rule violation (eg, Article 2.5, 2.7, 2.8 or 2.9) […]’. See WADA v Contreras
& COC, CAS 2013/A/3341, para 128 (‘All of the actions specified in the definition of Tampering
require intent and certain actions also require fraudulent conduct, or the intent to deceive, on the part
of the person involved’).
See also WADA v Sun Yang & FINA, CAS 2019/A/6148, para 337 (‘It is not in dispute that the
element of intent is required in order to conclude that a tampering violation under FINA DC has been
established’), para 339 (the Panel is comfortably satisfied that the Athlete did “intentionally interfere”
with the Doping control process. Despite the DCO’s repeated warnings, the Athlete persisted in
demanding that the sealed blood samples be returned to him, so as to allow him to prevent her from
leaving with them. The evidence before the Panel clearly establishes that he intentionally sought
to interfere with the process by (i) destroying an external container and (ii) tearing up the Doping
Control Form, with the intention to prevent the DCO from leaving the premises with the blood samples
that had already been collected. The Panel finds that such actions necessarily comprise intent’) and
para 340 (rejecting suggestion athlete had legitimate doubts about validity of test); DFSNZ v Murray,
CAS 2017/A/4937, para 129 (‘an allegation of fraudulently misleading an investigation requires an
intent to subvert the investigation’); UK Anti-Doping v Dry, NADP Appeal Panel decision dated
25 February 2020, para 35 (charge of Tampering based on provision of fraudulent information requires
proof of deliberate provision of false information with intention of evading the operation of the anti-
doping rules); UK Anti-Doping v Barlow, NADP Tribunal decision dated 27 June 2016, para 59 (‘[…]
the central issues were whether UKAD had proven (namely made us comfortably satisfied) that the
Respondent (1) By his conduct “tampered” with the doping control process; and (2) Did so with
the intention of subverting the doping control process’) and para 68 (‘Having rejected his “burglar”
explanation, and he advanced no other, we can see no other reasonable or sensible explanation for his
conduct but that it was intended to subvert that process. We do not have to conclude why he did it’),
aff’d, Barlow v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Tribunal decision dated 6 September 2016.
CHAPTER C11
Article 2.6 ADRV – Possession of a

Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited
Method
Contents
. para
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.6 (POSSESSION)
VIOLATION........................................................................................................ C11.1
2 DEFENCES TO AN ART 2.6 CHARGE............................................................. C11.5
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.6 (POSSESSION)

VIOLATION
C11.1 Code Art 2.6 prohibits ‘Possession of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited

Method’, but then goes on to specify that this only covers:
(a) ‘Possession by an Athlete In-Competition of any Prohibited Substance or any
Prohibited Method, or Possession by an Athlete Out-of-Competition of any
Prohibited Method or any Prohibited Substance which is prohibited Out-of-
Competition’; and
(b) ‘Possession by an Athlete Support Personnel In-Competition of any Prohibited
Substance or any Prohibited Method, or Possession by an Athlete Support
Personnel Out-of-Competition of any Prohibited Method or any Prohibited
Substance which is prohibited Out-of-Competition in connection with an
Athlete, Competition or training’.
Once again then, if the substance in issue is only banned in competition, it becomes
crucial to know which periods are ‘in competition’ and which periods are ‘out-of-
competition’. The Code allows this to be determined sport by sport, so that it can
differ from case to case.1 There could also be argument as to whether the possession
of a prohibited substance or prohibited method by an Athlete Support Personnel was
‘in connection with an Athlete, Competition or training’.2
2 As there was in USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 375, where
the AAA panel held that the fact that a coach had testosterone with him while he was staying in
an apartment with his athletes during training was not enough to prove the possession was ‘in
connection with an Athlete, Competition or training’, because there was evidence he had it to treat his
hypogonadism. Mere physical proximity of the prohibited substance to the athletes is not enough for
these purposes (ibid). ‘The simple presence of the Prohibited Substance, which the evidence clearly
indicated was for Respondent’s personal use, is not a use “in connection with training”. They were all
staying there for training, but the condo itself was not a training location. The Panel finds there needs
to be a greater nexus between the Possession and the training in order for the Possession to be “in
connection with” training’ (ibid, para 377).
The panel also found that conducting an experiment on non-athletes (wiping testosterone gel on
them after exercise to see if it would trigger a positive test, because of a concern about post-race
sabotage) was not Possession ‘in connection with an Athlete, competition or training’, because to meet
the test ‘there would necessarily need to be an Athlete involved’ (para 427).
Article 2.6 ADRV – Possession of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method 887
C11.2 According to the Code definition,1 ‘Possession’ can be established in any

one of four different ways:2
(1) Actual physical possession – by proof that the prohibited substance or method
was in the ‘actual physical possession’ of the person charged. The CAS panel
in Troy noted that this ‘emphasises the need for the possession to be not only
“actual” but also “physical”’, and relied on Australian case law to find that this
meant ‘the complete present personal physical control of the property to the
exclusion of others not acting in concert with the accused’.3 It held that proof
that the athlete ordered the substances over the Internet, paid for them by credit
card, and had them imported into Australia, did not meet the requirement of
physical control or custody: ‘The seller had such control over the property until
the goods were put in the postal system. Then the postal authorities had such
control and, finally, Customs had such control. The goods were destroyed by
Customs before they ever came under the control, in the relevant sense, of the
Respondent’.4
(2) ‘Constructive’ possession (1) – by proof that the person charged had ‘exclusive
control over the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method or the premises in
which a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method exists’.5
(3) ‘Constructive’ possession (2) – by proof that, although the person charged did
not have exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method
or the premises in which the Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method were
located, he ‘knew about the presence of the Prohibited Method or Prohibited
Substance [at that location] and intended to exercise control over it’.6 For these
purposes, proof of actual ‘control or dominion’ is not required, and nor is proof
of intent to exercise exclusive control; instead, it is enough to prove knowledge
of the presence of the prohibited substance or method at a specific location,
and intent to exercise control over it.7 However, the panel in Wyper rejected a
charge that an athlete had constructive possession of prohibited substances that
were shipped to the athlete from overseas but intercepted by customs before
they reached him, on the basis that:
(a) he did not have exclusive control over the substances while they were in
transit; and
(b) while he ordered and paid for them, he owned and/or had an interest in
them while they were en route, and intended to take delivery of them
when they arrived, and so clearly intended to exercise control over them,
on the evidence he did not know about the presence of the prohibited
substances for purposes of the definition of constructive possession,
because he never knew that they were ‘at a particular place or a less
generalised location’ than a country or state.8
Furthermore, there is no offence of ‘Attempted Possession’, and therefore the
CAS panel in Troy held that, to establish that the athlete knew of the presence
of a prohibited substance (and so was in constructive possession of it), it is
not enough to prove that the athlete believed that the product over which he
intended to exercise control contained a prohibited substance. Instead, there
must be proof that the product did in fact contain a prohibited substance.9 Query
whether it is sufficient that the athlete knew that the product in his constructive
possession contained certain substances (whether or not he knew that those
substances were in fact prohibited substances), or rather whether he must have
known as well that those substances are prohibited.10
(4) Possession by purchase – by proof that the athlete purchased the prohibited
substance or method, whether by electronic means (eg online) or otherwise.
This fourth method of establishing possession was brought in with the 2009
Code. The intent was apparently to close a loophole exposed by the Troy and
Wyper rulings (ie that substances ordered by the athlete and posted to the
athlete but never delivered to the athlete were not in the actual or constructive
possession of the athlete for purposes of the 2003 Code). This must mean that
proving that the athlete placed an order for the substance is enough to establish
‘possession by purchase’; it does not have to be shown that the substance ever
reached the athlete.11 But if the substance does not have to reach the athlete
(eg it could have been seized and destroyed by the Customs authorities), it
follows that proof cannot be required that the product that the athlete ordered
did in fact contain a prohibited substance.12 It must be enough that it was
advertised as containing a prohibited substance, and/or that the athlete bought
it in that belief.13
1 Code App One (Definitions), p 138: ‘The actual physical Possession, or the constructive Possession
(which shall be found only if the Person has exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method or the premises in which a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method exists);
provided, however, that if the Person does not have exclusive control over the Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method or the premises in which such Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method exists,
constructive possession shall only be found if the Person knew about the presence of the Prohibited
Method or Prohibited Substance and intended to exercise control over it. […] Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in this definition, the purchase (including by electronic or other means) of
a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method constitutes Possession by the Person who makes the
purchase’.
2 UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December 2012, para 12.
3 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, paras 51–52.
4 Ibid, 53. The CAS panel, again relying on English and Australian case law, also suggested that, an
Anti-Doping Organization alleging actual physical possession would have to prove that the athlete
knew that he had the goods in his custody or control. It raised but did not decide the issue of whether
the knowledge required was knowledge of the identity or nature of the goods or knowledge that those
goods were prohibited substances. Ibid, paras 49–50.
5 It is not obvious how this type of ‘constructive’ possession is different from ‘actual’ possession, given
the need for proof of control to establish actual possession (see nn 3 and 4, above). See IRB v Troy
& ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 56. The Code commentary to the definition (Code Appendix One,
p 139) states that ‘[…] steroids found in an Athlete’s car would constitute a violation unless the Athlete
establishes that someone else used the car […]’. Where the prohibited substances in question were
found in boxes in a house that the athlete shared with his girlfriend, but she said she did not know
what was in the boxes and never went near them because they were ‘none of my business’, an NADP
hearing panel found they were in the athlete’s exclusive possession for purposes of IAAF 32.2(f)) (the
equivalent of Code Art 2.6). UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December
2012, para 38 (‘It was the clear understanding between the Respondent and his partner that these boxes
and indeed the other Prohibited Substances which he admitted were present in the house were the
Respondent’s and his partner was not to move them or exercise any control over them. The possibility
of Ms Homer moving the boxes to clean underneath them is not inconsistent with the Respondent’s
exclusive control of the boxes. Further we agree that since Ms Homer did not know of the existence
of the other Prohibited Substances in the house and which are the subject of the Possession charges
that the Respondent was in exclusive control of those also’). See also UK Anti-Doping v Tinklin
and Tinklin, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 May 2014, paras 7.1 to 7.9 (upholding charge that
respondent had constructive possession of prohibited substances that her father was having delivered
to the family home in order to distribute on to customers, because the quantity of substances delivered
was such that she cannot have been unaware of their existence, and in fact she took the parcels to the
Post Office and sent them on to customers, thereby exercising control over them).
6 See eg IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 55. Thus, the Code commentary to this definition
states (Code Appendix One, p 139): ‘[…] steroids found in an Athlete’s car would constitute a
violation unless the Athlete establishes that someone else used the car; in that event, the Anti-Doping
Organization must establish that even though the athlete did not have exclusive control over the car,
the Athlete knew about the steroids and intended to have control over the steroids. Similarly, in the
example of steroids found in a home medicine cabinet under the joint control of an Athlete and spouse,
the Anti-Doping Organization must establish that the Athlete knew the steroids were in the cabinet and
that the Athlete intended to exercise control over the steroids’.
This definition of ‘constructive possession’ tracks a ruling of a CAS panel sitting at first instance
and construing pre-Code anti-doping rules. ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania) A1/2007, para 34.
That panel held that, where a prohibited substance is found in a coach’s room in a house that the
coach is sharing with another person, the Anti-Doping Organization must prove that the coach knew
that the substance was in the room and was able to exercise control over the substance. Ibid, para 36
(‘Occupation of the room is not sufficient alone to establish possession of the substances found in
that room. Knowledge that the substances are in the room and the ability to exercise control over the
substances in the room is required. Exclusive control is not necessary. A person can have the ability
to exercise control over the substances even though he or she is not physically present in the room at
all times and temporary absence may not matter’). It upheld the possession charge ‘based on a finding
that the respondent knew that the packets were on the shelf in the wardrobe in his bedroom, that he
knew the packets contained prohibited substances, and that he had the power and ability to remove
them or have them removed from his possession, and accordingly was possessing them and holding
them’. Ibid, 78. See also Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.37 (where athletes were sharing living
quarters, each was found to be in constructive possession of items that were in the personal possession
of one or other of those athletes at those quarters); IAAF v QAF & Balla, CAS 2018/A/5989, para 243
(‘In the case at hand there is no direct evidence that the Appellant had constructive possession, but only
circumstantial evidence. However, the Panel finds that – comparable to a puzzle – there are abundant
tiny pieces of reliable and corroborated evidence and information that add up to a clear picture
of an Athlete that tried persistently to divert from the search of his room, because he was hosting
and controlling a system of storage and waste disposal for medical products (including Prohibited
Substances) in his room and, thus, had constructive possession of the Nike bag and the Prohibited
Substances contained therein’).
7 IOC & WADA v Pinter & FIS, CAS 2007/A/1434, para 94. Cf ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania)
A1/2007, para 69 (‘[…] for the purpose of the 2002 ADP it is possible for a person to have joint
possession of a substance because the power or ability to have custody or control of an item does not
have to be exclusive power or ability’).
In Pinter, the athlete was a member of the Austrian men’s 4x10km ski relay team for the 2006
Winter Olympics. The Italian police raided the apartment where the team was staying and found him
in possession of a bag containing four used syringes with traces of blood, as well as five unopened
boxes of syringes. His explanations for the syringes changed over time. IOC & WADA v Pinter &
FIS, CAS 2007/A/1434, para 101. Based on the other materials seized by the police at the house,
the CAS found that blood infusions had taken place there (Ibid, para 112) and that the equipment
found had been used to manage and control haemoglobin levels. Ibid, para 114. It ruled: ‘The Panel
is comfortably satisfied that Mr Pinter knew about the items seized from the others and intended to
exercise control or use them to ensure that his haemoglobin level was just below and did not reach 17
g/dl’. Ibid, para 115. It therefore upheld the possession charge against him.
See also Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.43 (rejecting contention that an athlete personally
had to possess all of the materials required to carry out the Prohibited Method, holding instead that
‘Possession is proved where it can be shown to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that, in all
the circumstances, an athlete was in possession, either physical or constructive, of items which would
enable that athlete to engage in a Prohibited Method’); Diethart v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1290, paras
67–68 (finding athlete had constructive possession of haemoglobinmeter on bedside table in other
athlete’s room where he had to pass through that other athlete’s room to get to his room, and where he
had four jars of microcuvettes on him in order to test his HGB values using that meter).
In ASADA v Wyper, CAS A4/2007, para 26, a first instance CAS panel held that ‘intent to exercise
control’ for purposes of a ‘possession’ violation under Code Art 2.6 was ‘clearly made out’ where the
athlete ‘ordered the substances over the net, paid for them and intended to take delivery of the package
when it arrived in the post addressed to him. This is sufficient to establish that he intended to exercise
control over the substances once they had arrived in Inverell. No one else was involved in their purchase
or apparently knew of their impending arrival. The parcel was addressed to Mr Wyper and he intended
to take control over it after its arrival. As a matter of the ordinary meaning of the words used, there is
no temporal requirement that he knew of the presence of the package and intended to exercise control
over it then and there’. However, knowledge of the presence of the substance was not established,
because the athlete knew that the seller was in Indonesia but did not know where the substances were
when he ordered them. ‘When the Anti-Doping Policy requires knowledge “about the presence of”
the prohibited substances something more is required than in a country or a state. There must be
knowledge of where it was and what it was. Knowledge of the presence of the prohibited substances at
a particular place or a less generalised location would be necessary to establish knowledge ‘about the
presence of’ an article’. Ibid, para 27. Cf ASADA v Allen, Athletics Australia Doping Control Tribunal
decision following hearing on 13 October 2008, para 33 (‘As to the assertion Mr Allen held constructive
possession of the banned substance, the Statement of Facts reveals Mr Allen knew about the presence of
Testosterone in a parcel at a specific location, namely, his post office box, and intended to exercise and
did in fact exercise “control” over it by arranging for the package to be collected from his post office box
and, under his instruction, to be forwarded to a second address interstate where he planned to collect the
package. Mr Allen knew where the package was, where it had originated from, what it contained and
had provided the specific instruction as to where the package would be delivered for later collections.
I accept Mr Allen, by this conduct, held constructive possession of the substance, Testosterone’).
8 See ASADA v Wyper, CAS A4/2007, paras 24–30. See also IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664,
para 56 (no ‘exclusive control’ over a substance, and therefore no constructive possession over it,
while it is in transit from overseas supplier).
9 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 70. In that case, the CAS panel decided, relying on
an Australian customs law ruling, that ‘the description of the contents of the packages containing
produced seized contained in the two [Australian Customs] seizure notices is not, of itself, sufficient
to prove that the products, in fact, contained testosterone and/or DHEA’. Nor was the fact that the
athlete ordered the products believing they contained testosterone and/or DHEA. Ibid, paras 66–68.
Cf ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania) A1/2007, paras 75–76, where a CAS first instance panel found
that the coach knew that the packets on the shelf in the cupboard in his room contained prohibited
substances because they were clearly labelled ‘Deca Durabol’ and ‘Ilium Stanabolic’ and he knew that
these substances were prohibited (although in that case there was analytical evidence: the products had
been tested and found to contain prohibited substances).
10 IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, paras 49–50.
11 UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December 2012, para 12.3 (‘[…] with
that change to the 2009 Code […], “Possession” of an item for purposes of IAAF 32.2(f) may now
be established simply by proof that the item was ordered and paid for; proof is not required that the
items purchased were ever actually delivered to the athlete’). The 2015 Code confirmed this by adding
the following comment to the definition of ‘Possession’ (Code Appendix One, p 139): ‘The act of
purchasing a Prohibited Substance alone constitutes Possession, even where, for example, the product
does not arrive, is received by someone else, or is sent to a third party address’.
12 As has been held in certain Art 2.2 (Use) cases: see paras C7.15 and C7.16.
13 UK Anti-Doping v Burns, NADP Tribunal decision dated 10 December 2012, para 23 (‘In the present
case there is physical evidence of the nature of the substances in issue, as well as the Respondent’s
own clear admissions of their prohibited nature. And as a result, this case is clearly distinguishable
from Troy on the facts. More fundamentally, however, Troy was decided under the previous (2003)
version of the Code, not the current (2009) version of the Code. And the 2003 version of the Code was
amended in the 2009 version (by adding a fourth way of establishing “Possession”, ie by providing
“purchase”) specifically to deal with the Wyper ruling that an item that an athlete had ordered and that
was in transit to him was not within his constructive possession as defined under the 2003 Code. As
a result of that change, a Possession charge can be sustained merely on proof that the athlete ordered
and paid for Prohibited Substances. No evidence is required that he actually took possession of such
substances. A fortiori, analytical evidence is not required that the products the Respondent ordered
were in fact Prohibited Substances’).
Further support for this proposition can be derived from Drug Free Sport New Zealand v Newman,
Sports Tribunal of New Zealand decision dated 31 January 2012. In that case, NZ Customs had
intercepted a package addressed to the athlete, containing 150 white tablets labelled ‘Test Susp’.
Customs destroyed the tablets and so they were never delivered to the athlete and could not be tested
to confirm their contents. However, a witness testified that ‘Test Susp’ is an abbreviation for the
prescription medicine testosterone, in suspension form. On that basis, the tribunal uphold charges of
possession, use, and/or attempted use of testosterone. Ibid, paras 6, 27, 48 and 53. There was other
potentially corroborative evidence in the record before the tribunal, including the fact that various
substances had been found in the athlete’s house, which had been analysed and confirmed to be various
prohibited substances (including testosterone). However, the only direct evidence of the nature of the
tablets intercepted en route to the athlete was non-analytical evidence, ie that the name on the label
indicated it was testosterone, and that was held to be enough to establish ‘Possession’ by ‘purchase’.
C11.3 In terms of the mental element of the violation:

(a) In cases of actual physical possession or constructive possession by exclusive
control, proof of intent to possess or knowledge of possession is not required.1
(b) In cases of constructive possession where there is no exclusive control, however,
it must be shown that the athlete knew of the presence of the prohibited
substance and intended to exercise control over it.2
(c) In cases of possession ‘by purchase’, it must be shown that the athlete ordered
the item in the knowledge (or at least the belief) that it was or contained a
prohibited substance.3
Query in each case whether the athlete had to know that the substance was in fact
prohibited, or whether it is enough that it was in fact prohibited, whether or not he
knew it.4 On the other hand, it does not have to be proved in an Art 2.6 case that the
athlete intended to use the prohibited substance or prohibited method in question,5
or indeed that he did use it (but if there is such evidence, it is likely that he will be
charged with attempted use and/or use as well as possession).6 If on the other hand the
athlete (or athlete support person) charged can be shown to have intended to supply
the prohibited substance or prohibited method that was in his or her possession to a
third party, he or she may be charged (in addition or in the alternative) with the Art
2.7 violation of trafficking or attempted trafficking.7
1 See para C11.2.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. See also RFU v Peters, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 3 March 2014 (majority declined
to infer from the evidence that the respondent knew that transfers of money he made on behalf of
his son were for prohibited substances, and therefore declined to upheld charges of possession and
trafficking).
4 See IRB v Troy & ARU, CAS 2008/A/1664, para 75, where a CAS panel held that a charge of Attempted
Use was proven even if the athlete did not know that the substances he was ordering were prohibited.
5 See Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.43 (‘First, this anti-doping violation is proved simply
by possession. Secondly, the necessity of proving intent would render Art 2.6 nugatory’); USADA v
Drummond, AAA panel decision dated 17 December 2014, p 19 (‘The Panel rejects Drummond’s
contention that actual possession requires his specific intent to have under his custody and control a
particular banned substance whose characteristics were fully known to him’).
6 IOC & WADA v Pinter & FIS, CAS 2007/A/1434, para 118 (athlete’s claim that he wanted to use the
equipment found in his possession to inject a non-prohibited substance (Thigamma) was irrelevant:
‘Even if the presence of Thiogamma were established, it would not exclude Mr Pinter’s constructive
possession of equipment that could be used for blood doping. Likewise, and as Mr Pinter is found
guilty of constructive possession of a Prohibited Method, the fact that DNA-profile found on the
evidence seized by the Italian Police could not be assigned to him, is irrelevant. If his blood would have
been identified on the items seized, Mr Pinter would have been hit with the additional charge of “Use
or Attempted Use of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method”, as defined under article 2.2 of
the FIS ADR’).
7 Because the Code definition of Trafficking includes ‘selling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering
or distributing (or Possessing for any such purpose) a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method’. See
para C12.1 et seq.
C11.4 Where a person is charged with having possessed a prohibited method, it

is not enough just to prove that he had IV infusion equipment in his possession. It is
only prohibited to use IV infusion equipment to infuse liquids of more than 100 mL
every 12 hours. Therefore, the charge may not be upheld unless there is evidence that
the athlete actually received, or intended to receive, IV infusions of more than 100
mL of liquid in a 12-hour period.1
1 IBU v Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 168.
2 DEFENCES TO AN ART 2.6 CHARGE
C11.5 ‘Possession’ of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method may be

excused if that ‘Possession’ is consistent with a properly-granted TUE,1 ‘or other
acceptable justification’.2 In Eder v IOC, the CAS panel decided that ‘other acceptable
justification’ was ‘intended to cover situations in which emergency medical treatment
is required, so that there is no opportunity to apply for a TUE’.3 The commentary to
Code Art 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 states:
‘Acceptable justification would not include, for example, buying or Possessing a
Prohibited Substance for purposes of giving it to a friend or relative, except under
justifiable medical circumstances where that Person had a physician’s prescription,
eg buying insulin for a diabetic child’.
It also states: ‘Acceptable justification would include, for example, a team doctor
carrying Prohibited Substances for dealing with acute and emergency situations’.4
1 See para C4.12.
2 Code Arts 2.6.1 and 2.6.2.
3 Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.44.
4 The 2021 Code amends this to: ‘Acceptable justification may include, for example, (a) an Athlete
or a team doctor carrying Prohibited Substances or Prohibited Methods for dealing with acute and
emergency situations (eg an epinephrine auto-injector), or (b) an Athlete Possessing a Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method for therapeutic reasons shortly prior to applying for and receiving a
determination on a TUE’.
The panel in Belarus Canoe Association et al v International Canoe Federation, CAS 2016/A/4708,
para 59, accepted that the Belarus team doctor had legitimate medical reasons to have in her possession
at a training camp transfusion equipment, needles and medical equipment of the same design that
would be used for blood doping, as well as Actovegin and Cytoflavan, and ruled that the ICF had not
satisfied it that these materials were to be used for illegitimate purposes).
C11.6 On this basis, it appears that an Athlete Support Personnel commits an

Art 2.6 ADRV if they have in their possession during an in-competition period any
substance that is on the prohibited list, including substances that are found in many
medicines. It appears that there is no need for the Anti-Doping Organization to show
that the Athlete Support Personnel had the substance in their possession in order
to give it to an athlete during the competition. It also appears that it is not enough
for the Athlete Support Personnel to prove that (for example) the substance was the
active drug in a medication that was for their own use, because they were sick. While
there may be good reasons to doubt such a story, if it is proved to the satisfaction of
the hearing panel, it is not easy to understand why such possession should constitute
an ADRV.
C11.7 Finally, the Code definition of ‘Possession’1 states:
‘there shall be no anti-doping rule violation based solely on Possession if, prior to
receiving notification of any kind that the Person has committed an anti-doping rule
violation, the Person has taken concrete action demonstrating that the Person never
intended to have Possession and has renounced Possession by explicitly declaring it
to an Anti-Doping Organization’.
By analogy to the cases interpreting the same proviso in connection with an Art
2.2 violation of ‘Use’, this ‘affords an escape mechanism for a player who orders a
particular substance, not knowing at the time the substance is prohibited, but who
subsequently ascertains its prohibited nature prior to discovery by a third party’.2
1 Code Appendix One, p 138.
2 See para C7.20. See also ASADA v Allen, Athletics Australia Doping Control Tribunal decision
following hearing on 13 October 2008, para 36 (athlete who retired from sport after prohibited
substances he had ordered were intercepted by Customs had no basis to rely on proviso).
CHAPTER C12
Article 2.7 ADRV – Trafficking

or Attempted Trafficking in Any
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method
C12.1 Code Art 2.7 prohibits ‘Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking in any

Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method’. For these purposes,1 ‘Trafficking’ is
defined as:
‘selling, giving, transporting, sending, delivering or distributing (or Possessing for

any such purpose) a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method (either physically
or by any electronic or other means) by an Athlete, Athlete Support Personnel or
any other Person subject to the jurisdiction of any AntiDoping Organization to any
third party’.2
This definition, which appears to be focused primarily on a commercial transaction,3
makes it clear that the trafficking does not have to be to an(other) athlete in order
for the violation to be committed, even if supply to another athlete or athletes is the
likeliest scenario.4 However, it also contains two important exclusions:
(1) it excludes ‘the actions of “bona fide” medical personnel involving a Prohibited
Substance used for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other acceptable
justification’;5 and
(2) it excludes ‘actions involving Prohibited Substances which are not prohibited in
Out-of-Competition Testing unless the circumstances as a whole demonstrate
such Prohibited Substances are not intended for genuine and legal therapeutic
purposes or are intended to enhance sport performance’.6
1 2015 Code Appendix One (Definitions), p 142. In the 2021 Code, the word ‘jurisdiction’ is changed to
‘authority’, but otherwise the definition is the same.
2 The Introduction to the 2021 Code (p 12) confirms that such ‘other Persons’ include ‘board members,
directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories, and Delegated Third Parties
and their employees’. 2021 Code comment 6 confirms that ‘[…] such Person would […] be subject to
discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.7 (Trafficking) […]’. Under the 2015 Code, which did
not have that explanation, it is not clear who would be covered by the phrase ‘other person’.
3 In USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 8.9, an AAA panel held that
the words ‘trading’ and ‘trafficking’ and ‘distributing’ or ‘selling’ ‘are synonymous and should all
be treated as having the active commercial element of “selling”’. In UK Anti-Doping v Tinklin and
Tinklin, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 May 2014, para 6.4, the NADP tribunal upheld a charge
against one respondent that he not only possessed but also intended to traffick prohibited substances,
one reason being that ‘the quantity and values of the substances discovered, in combination with the
documentation seized, further supported the contention that the items were destined to be trafficked for
commercial gain’. It also (para 7.9) upheld a Trafficking charge against the second respondent, on the
basis that she took the prohibited substances to the Post Office and posted them to third party customers.
But cf IRB v Evile Telea, Board Judicial Committee decision dated 18 August 2010 (athlete, a rugby
player who was also a pharmacist, carried salbutamol tablets in his medication bag, and admitted a
charge of trafficking based on the fact that he had supplied two salbutamol tablets to one player and
gave another player unsupervised and unrestricted access to his bag, resulting in the other player
taking two salbutamol tablets); USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019,
para 460-461 (upholding trafficking charge where coach gave his personal testosterone to his two sons
as part of a test of a potential sabotage scenario, and rejecting the suggestion that there had to be a
commercial benefit obtained) and para 462 (‘there is no requirement in the Code that a commercial
benefit be obtained by Respondent in order to be found to have violated the Trafficking provision.
That said, the Panel is troubled by the distinction or lack of distinction between administration and
trafficking in these cases – they must have different meanings to have effect, but it appears that every
administration is trafficking under the current rules, but not vice versa as Trafficking does not require
an Athlete’).
4 The definition quoted above, which states that the Trafficking may be ‘to any third party’, was first
introduced in the 2009 Code, and was a material amendment from the 2003 Code, which had specified
that the recipients of the prohibited substances that the defendant was alleged to have trafficked had
to be other athletes. In USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 8.10, an
AAA Panel noted that under rules implementing the 2009 Code no proof was required of distribution
of prohibited substances to an athlete to sustain an Art 2.7 charge: ‘The IAAF Anti-Doping Rules and
all other anti-doping rules do not have as their object preventing simply the sale or distribution of
prohibited substances to athletes. Rather, rules like this exist, by their own terms, to prevent distribution
or involvement in the chain of distribution of prohibited substances by the individuals prohibited from
doing so under the rules’. See also USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019,
para 458 (‘[…] nor does this Article require that the trafficking involve an Athlete – rather it simply
requires a “third party”’); NRL v Wicks, decision dated 23 May 2011 (banning athlete for four years
for supplying stimulants – methamphetamine and ecstasy tablets -- to third parties who were not
athletes); RFU v Willmott, Anti-Doping Panel decisions dated 13 April 2015 and 2 June 2015 (banning
athlete for five years for attempting to supply HGB to a third party who was not an athlete), reduced
by consent on appeal to four years, CAS 2016/A/4475.
Cf USADA v Brown, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.165 (‘The Panel agrees
with Respondent’s position that trafficking requires giving or providing a prohibited substance or
method to a third party that is not an athlete, and further, that USADA failed to present any evidence
that Respondent attempted to provide an over-limit infusion to a non-athlete’).
5 USADA v Brown, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.46 (rejecting Trafficking
charge against doctor who supplied testosterone to a coach to treat his hypogonadism). In USADA v
Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 464, the panel rejected the suggestion that
someone who is not a ‘bona fide’ medical personnel could rely on the ‘other acceptable justification’
proviso (so that it would not apply to a coach conducting an experiment).
6 A version of the first proviso applies to an Art 2.6 (Possession) violation (see para C11.1), and both
provisos apply to an Art 2.8 (Administration) violation (see para C13.1). Any cases interpreting the
provisos in those contexts will potentially also be relevant in an Art 2.7 case, and vice versa.
C12.2 The actions that are said to constitute trafficking all connote conscious and
deliberate conduct.1 In addition, the comment to Code Art 10.5.2 expressly refers to
Code Art 2.7 as one of the anti-doping rule violations ‘where intent is an element’.
Therefore the Anti-Doping Organization should proceed on the basis it has to prove
that the person charged intended to commit the acts alleged to constitute trafficking
or attempted trafficking. However, there is at least some authority that the Anti-
Doping Organization does not have to prove that the person charged knew that the
acts alleged would constitute an anti-doping rule violation.2
1 See ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, para 58(c)
(‘The other anti-doping rule violations referred to in the 2015 note (Articles 2.5, 2.7 and 2.9 of the
2015 WADA Code) all explicitly or by inference require an element of intent (‘intentional interference’,
‘trafficking’, and ‘intentional complicity’, respectively)’), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva
v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697.
2 USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, paras 465-66 (holding coach liable
for Trafficking where he gave testosterone to his sons in a manner that he mistakenly believed was not
an anti-doping rule violation, because ‘unfortunately for him, under the plain meaning of the relevant
Code provision, as an Athlete Support Person, Respondent is strictly prohibited from trafficking
in testosterone by giving it to third parties’); USADA v Drummond, AAA panel decision dated
17 December 2014, pp 19–20 (suggesting the person charged does not have to know and specifically
intend that the products he is supplying to another contain substances that are prohibited under the
anti-doping rules). Cf UK Anti-Doping v Tinklin and Tinklin, NADP Tribunal decision dated 28 May
2014, para 7.4 (‘In any event, regardless of the Second Respondent’s knowledge of the content of
those packages or otherwise, intent is not a requisite element for the Anti-Doping Rule Violation of
Trafficking’).
C12.3 Attempted trafficking is also a violation of Art 2.7.1 Based on the Code
definition of ‘Attempt’,2 attempted trafficking is ‘purposely engaging in conduct
that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the
commission of’ the offence of trafficking. This means that the attempt does not have
Article 2.7 ADRV – Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking 895
to be successful. The hearing panel in RFU v Willmott upheld a charge of Attempted

Trafficking against an athlete who said he had allowed a third party to order Human
Growth Hormone (HGH) to be delivered to his house, and intended to deliver it to
that third party when it arrived. The package was intercepted before delivery, and was
found not to contain HGH, but the panel, relying on (among other authorities) IRB v
Troy,3 found the athlete:
‘guilty of attempted trafficking a substance though the contents of the vials did not in
fact contain the substance that Mr Willmott believed or knew they were to contain.
In other words, the fact that the supplier took the money for HGH, yet filled those
vials with something else, does not absolve those involved in trafficking a substance
that they anticipated to be HGB. This conclusively disposes of the legal defence
mounted for Mr Willmott, relying upon the fact that the vials contained something
other than HGH. This is not a defence to the charge. On his own evidence, Mr
Willmott knew that Mr X wished to have HGH delivered to him. That is sufficient
for that element of the offence to be established to our comfortable satisfaction’.4
The hearing panel also found that giving Mr X his address to use to take delivery
of the HGB was a plan in which the athlete was involved and in which he took a
substantial step.5 The panel considered it irrelevant that the evidence was not clear
as to what was intended to be done with the HGB when it arrived: ‘the fact that one
piece of the jigsaw remained to be slotted into place does not cast doubt in the Panel’s
view that the course of conduct was planned to culminate in the commission of an
ADRV’.6
1 A charge of attempted trafficking will rely on the same Code definition of ‘Attempt’ that applies to
Code Art 2.2, 2.5, 2.8 and 2.9 violations (see para C7.20, for example), and therefore cases interpreting
the definition in those contexts would also be of potential relevance in an Art 2.7 case, and vice versa.
2 Code Appendix One (Definitions), p 132.
3 See para C7.20.
4 RFU v Willmott, Anti-Doping Panel decision dated 13 April 2015, para 33, upheld on appeal, Willmott
v RFU, Appeal Panel decision dated 11 January 2016, para 3.20.
5 Ibid, para 34.
6 Ibid, para 35.
C12.4 To date, there have not been very many reported cases involving a trafficking
charge, either pre-Code1 or based on the Code provisions.2 However, trafficking was
one of the charges levelled by USADA against Lance Armstrong in 2012 that he
declined to defend, leading to a life ban.3
1 Gardiner et al, Sports Law, 3rd Edn (Routledge-Cavendish, 2005), p 313, state that when Chinese
swimmer Yuan Yuan and her coach Zhou Zhewen were discovered trying to smuggle large quantities
of synthetic human growth hormone into Australia for the 1998 World Championships, each of them
was found guilty of trafficking in a prohibited substance and banned from participation in the sport for
15 years.
A charge against Australian cyclist Mark French for trafficking in glucocorticosteroids and equine
growth hormone, in breach of the ASC Anti-Doping Policy and the Cycling Australia doping rules,
based on circumstantial and physical evidence in the form of a bucket of syringes, athlete testimony
and DNA tests, was dismissed as unproved in French v Australian Sports Commission & Cycling
Australia, CAS 2004/A/651, para 90 (discussed at para C7.15). And similarly an AAA hearing panel
rejected trafficking charges against US athletes Michele Collins and Tim Montgomery for lack of
evidence that they sold prohibited substances to other athletes: see para C7.14.
2 In ASADA v Marinov, CAS (Oceania) A1/2007, a charge of trafficking was upheld after police found
large quantities of anabolic steroids in the athlete’s room; and in CCES v Haack, SDRCC decision
dated 22 May 2012, a sole arbitrator upheld a charge that an athlete had violated the Canadian domestic
equivalent of Code Art 2.7, based on his conviction, following a guilty plea, of possession of anabolic
steroids for purposes of trafficking contrary to the Canadian Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and
banned him for four years. See also RFU v Peters, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 3 March 2014
(majority declined to infer from the evidence that the respondent knew that transfers of money he made
on behalf of his son were for purchase of prohibited substances, and therefore dismissed charges of
possession and trafficking); UK Anti-Doping v Colclough, NADP Tribunal decision dated 30 January
2014 (upholding trafficking charge and imposing eight year ban on the basis that the violation involved
multiple prohibited substances sold over a not insignificant period, but there was mitigation in that
the person charged was not targeting athletes and warned those subject to drug testing not to buy his
products); UK Anti-Doping v Bridge, issued decision dated 26 September 2012 (four year ban imposed
pursuant to Code Art 10.3.3 for trafficking in clenbuterol, human growth hormone, oxymetholone,
testosterone and trenbolone); ARU v Bourke, ASADA press release dated 30 May 2012 (player banned
for four years for possession and attempted trafficking of growth hormone releasing peptide-6);
UK Anti-Doping v Fletcher, issued decision dated 29 November 2011 (four-year ban imposed for
trafficking in human growth hormone and various steroids); NRL v Wicks, decision dated 23 May 2011
(banning athlete for four years for supplying stimulants – methamphetamine and ecstasy tablets – to
third parties who were not athletes); USADA v Stewart, AAA Panel decision dated 24 June 2010
(lifetime ban for track and field coach who supplied performance-enhancing drugs to his athletes that
endangered their health).
3 USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility, dated
10 October 2012.
CHAPTER C13
Article 2.8 ADRV – Administration

or Attempted Administration of a
Prohibited Substance to an Athlete
C13.1 Code Art 2.8 prohibits:

(a) ‘Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete In-Competition of
any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method’; and
(b) Administration or Attempted Administration to any Athlete Out-of-Competition
of any Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method that is prohibited Out-of-
Competition’, unless (in either case) the administration is by ‘bona fide medical
personnel […] for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or other acceptable
justification’.1
It also prohibits administration or attempted administration to any athlete of:
‘Prohibited Substances which are not prohibited in Out-of-Competition Testing
[ie which are only prohibited In-Competition] unless the circumstances as a whole
demonstrate that such Prohibited Substances are not intended for genuine and legal
therapeutic purposes or are intended to enhance sport performance’.2
Again, therefore, the way the athlete’s international federation defines ‘in competition’
is very important.3 For the purposes of Art 2.8, ‘Administration’ is defined as
‘providing, supplying, supervising, facilitating, or otherwise participating in the
Use or Attempted Use by another Person of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method’.4 However, for the administration to be a Code Art 2.8 anti-doping rule
violation, the recipient must be an athlete.5 The 2021 Code specifies that the offence
may be committed ‘by an Athlete or other Person’, meaning that the person charged
may also be an athlete,6 but alternatively it could be a coach or doctor or other
member of an athlete’s entourage, provided they are subject to the anti-doping rules
in question,7 and (from the 2021 Code on) it could also be ‘board members, directors,
officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories, and Delegated Third
Parties and their employees’.8
1 Code Appendix One (Definitions), p 130, definition of ‘Administration’. A similar proviso applies to Art
2.7 Trafficking cases: see para C12.1. If the conditions for grant of a TUE are met, then the administration
will be covered by the TUE and therefore there will be no violation: Code Art 4.4.1. Therefore, this
proviso presumably extends protection to the administration of a prohibited substance that does not meet
the criteria for grant of a TUE but its administration was nevertheless genuinely therapeutic in purpose.
Some support for this interpretation comes from Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.44, where the
CAS panel construed ‘other acceptable justification’ as being ‘intended to cover situations in which
emergency medical treatment is required, so that there is no opportunity to apply for a TUE’, and from
the commentary to Code Art 2.6.2 (relevant here by analogy), which states: ‘Acceptable justification
would include, for example, a team doctor carrying Prohibited Substances for dealing with acute and
emergency situations’ (although if the treatment otherwise meets the criteria for grant of a TUE, the fact
of the medical emergency would justify granting a TUE retroactively: see para C4.21).
2 Ibid.
3 See para C6.39.
4 Code Appendix One, p 130. See USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019,
para 186 (term as defined ‘is clearly broader than the simple actual administration, ie, giving or
providing’) and paras 187 and 191 (Administration found where respondent ‘specifically and
aggressively facilitated and otherwise participated in’ athlete’s use of a prohibited method, by directing
that he infuse L-carnitine: ‘without Respondent’s facilitation, Mr Magness would not have done the
infusion. Mr Magness worked for Respondent and it was in his interest to do what he was instructed’).
There is a clear potential overlap with the Art 2.7 offence of trafficking. See UK Anti-Doping v
Skafidas, NADP decision dated 22 February 2016, para 44 (‘Literally Dr Skafidas’ conduct in giving
or delivering prohibited substances to Bernice Wilson does fall within the definition of Trafficking
contained in the IAAF Rules, but the real vice of his conduct lies in the act of administering prohibited
substances to the athlete. This is a most serious offence because it places the athlete in jeopardy of
losing her right to participate in the sport and exposes her to the risk of taking substances, without
medical advice, from undisclosed sources the physiological effect of which is unknown to the athlete’).
5 See Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.55 (‘In the Panel’s view, […] the proper interpretation of
Article 2.8 is that the first part, “administration or attempted administration of a Prohibited Substance
or Prohibited Method to any athlete” is limited to actions with respect to athletes’); USADA v Salazar,
AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 181 (‘Article 2.8 (of both the 2009 and 2015
Codes) also requires that the Prohibited Method be administered to an Athlete’).
See also Code Art 10.3.3, which provides that if an Article 2.8 anti-doping rule violation is
‘committed by Athlete Support Personnel for violations other than for Specified Substances, [it] shall
result in lifetime Ineligibility for Athlete Support Personnel’.
6 But an athlete may only be charged for administering a prohibited substance or prohibited method to
another athlete; self-administration is a violation of Art 2.2 (Use) but not a violation of Art 2.8: Zubkov
v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 828, 842; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 841 (same).
7 See para C3.9.
8 See 2021 Code, Introduction, p 12. 2021 Code comment 6 confirms that ‘such Person would […] be
subject to discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.8 (Administration) […]’.
C13.2 What is the mental element of the Art 2.8 violation? If the case involves
administration out of competition of substances that are only banned in competition,
the second proviso to the definition of ‘Administration’ means that the Anti-
Doping Organization must show that the prohibited substances in question ‘are not
intended for genuine and legal therapeutic purposes or are intended to enhance sport
performance’. But in other cases is proof of illicit intent required, or is negligence
enough? The language of Code Art 2.8 and of the definition of ‘Administration’ are
(at most) neutral on the point,1 and a purposive approach would mitigate against
construing that language as requiring proof of intent.2 There are also some older cases
that suggest negligent administration is enough.3 However, the comment to 2015
Code Article 10.5.2 refers to an Art 2.8 violation as an example of ‘where intent is an
element of the anti-doping rule violation’. If this is interpreted as meaning that intent
must be proved in all Art 2.8 cases,4 the following questions arise: must the person
charged know that the person he is administering a product to is an athlete,5 and must
he know that the product that he is administering to the athlete contains a prohibited
substance, or is it sufficient that he is on notice that the person is an athlete and that
the product may contain a prohibited substance, and manifestly disregards that risk?
At least one hearing panel has ruled that in the latter case, the person charged is to be
taken to have intended that result, and so to be liable for an Art 2.8 violation.6
1 One hearing panel has suggested that the wording of Art 2.8 indicates the violation is a strict liability
offence. See ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, para 54
(‘By its terms, an Anti-Doping Rule Violation under that Article [2.8] is committed irrespective of any
element of intent, fault or negligence on the part of the respondent to the charge. It is, by its terms a strict
liability offence, committed where the elements of an Article 2.8 offence are committed and established
– in this case “Administration” to “a Player In-Competition” of “any Prohibited Substance that is only
prohibited In-Competition”‘), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697.
2 Given the obviously compelling imperative for all doctors, coaches and other athlete support personnel
to take great care in what they recommend and/or give to athletes in their care, and given the drastic
consequences for the athlete when such care is not taken, it would create a significant loophole, and
so undermine significantly the fight against doping in sport, if a person could avoid liability simply by
pleading he had not known that the product he was recommending contained a prohibited substance,
and so had acted negligently rather than intentionally.
3 WADA & FIFA v CFA, Eranosian et al, CAS 2009/A/1817 & 1844, para 183 (Art 2.8 administration
charge upheld even though the defendant, the team doctor, apparently had not been aware that the tablets
he gave to the athletes contained a prohibited substance, and a No Significant Fault or Negligence plea
was rejected because ‘Mr Eranosian administered pills he had obtained from a source unrelated to the
producer; he did not ask questions or conduct further investigations with a doctor or another reliable
specialist; he did not have the pills tested by an official laboratory. Those circumstances show that Mr
Eranosian was extremely negligent under the alleged circumstances’); FISA v Gryhchenko, FISA Anti-
Article 2.8 ADRV – Administration of a Prohibited Substance 899
Doping Hearing Panel decision dated 9 February 2005, p 6 (‘As the team doctor at the Olympic
Games responsible for the athletes, Dr Ganna Gryschenko is expected to know the IOC Anti-Doping
Rules applicable to the Games, in particular the list of prohibited substances defined by the Rules.
The athletes of the team, including Ms Olena Olefirenko, relied on the expertise and experience of Dr
Ganna Gryhchenko and had no reason not to trust her doctor and to follow her advice and direction
on what medication was appropriate and not prohibited in the context of competing at the Olympic
Games. In spite of this, Dr Ganna Gryhchenko provided to the athlete Ms Olena Olefirenko, Istenon,
a medication containing the prohibited substance Ethamivan, which was subsequently found in the
athlete’s urine, resulting in disqualification of the athlete and her crew and the loss of an Olympic
medal. Even if Doctor Ganna Gryhchenko had probably no intention to violate any anti-doping rules,
her negligence in that case is significant and it had disastrous consequences for the athletes. Therefore,
a four year ban is appropriate and shall apply’).
4 It could fairly be argued that it would be surprising if this cross-reference to Art 2.8 in a comment
to Art 10.3.3 was intended to introduce intent as a necessary element in all cases of an Art 2.8
‘Administration’ violation. One would not expect such a material change to be introduced, without any
fanfare, by the backdoor, rather than in Art 2.8 itself.
One possibility is that the reference to Art 2.8 in the comment to Art 10.3.3 was simply a mistake, as
was held in ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, paras 58
and 59 (’58 (a) The ITF was unable to identify any decision involving Article 2.8 of the WADA Code
or its equivalent in international sporting regulations (whether before or after 2015) in which it was
contended or accepted that intent was required. (b) The predecessor WADA Code (in force throughout
2014, and beforehand) contained no such note as is to be found in the 2015 Code. (c) The other anti-
doping rule violations referred to in the 2015 note (Articles 2.5, 2.7 and 2.9 of the 2015 WADA Code)
all explicitly or by inference require an element of intent (‘intentional interference’, ‘trafficking’, and
‘intentional complicity’, respectively). (d) The 2014 Programme provides for a Period of Ineligibility
in Article 10.3.3 of four years minimum “unless the conditions specified in Article 10.5 are met”.
These conditions include Article 10.5.2 (No Significant Fault or Negligence). This condition is also
reflected in the WADA Code in operation in 2014 (see Article 1.3.2 of that Code). I note however
that the cross-reference to Article 10.5 in Article 10.3.2 is not present in the 2015 WADA Code. (e) It
cannot sensibly be argued that WADA would have intended in 2015 to transform the elements of an
Article 2.8 violation so as to introduce such a fundamental requirement as one of intent by such indirect
means as a note (as opposed to by the inclusion of express language of intent in Article 2.8 itself. 59.
In the light of the above, and the terms of Article 2.8 of the 2014 Programme, I have concluded that
the reference to Article 2.8 of the 2015 WADA Code in the 2015 note, and the lack of reference to
Article 10.5 in Article 10.3.3, were likely to have been errors on the part of the authors of that edition
of the Code’), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697.
A second (less radical) possibility is that the reference to Art 2.8 in the comment to Art 10.3.3
should be read to mean that where an Art 2.8 charge is upheld based on proof that the person charged
intended to administer a prohibited substance to the athlete (as opposed to proof that he/she recklessly
or negligently administered the prohibited substance to the athlete), a plea of No Significant Fault or
Negligence is not available to the person charged.
5 An AAA panel has held that there is no requirement to prove ‘specific intent by knowing that [the
person who is the subject of the Administration] was considered an Athlete and as such would be
committing an anti-doping rule violation (ie to have actual knowledge that [the person] was subject to
the provisions of the Code) […]’. USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019,
para 181 (proposition not supported by any Code provision ‘and is inconsistent with the strict liability
provisions reflected throughout the Code’). See also ibid, para 184 (‘With respect to the charge of
Administration under that same Article 2.8, there is no requirement that Respondent needs to know
that the Administration is to an Athlete, but rather the determining factor is whether the Administration
is to an Athlete, as defined under the Code’).
6 ITF v Dorofeyeva, Independent Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 9 June 2016, paras 63 and 64
(if intent is required to sustain an Art 2.8 charge, on the basis of CAS case law (Qerimaj v IWF,
CAS 2012/A/2822 and Lapikov v IWF, CAS 2011/A/2677), which establishes that ‘indirect intent’ is
sufficient to establish intent, that intent is clearly established by the evidence that shows that there were
numerous red flags that the product contained a prohibited substance, which red flags the person charged
manifestly disregarded), appeal upheld on other grounds, Dorofeyeva v ITF, CAS 2016/A/4697. See
also Patrugan v Romanian Anti-Doping Agency, CAS 2017/A/5209, para 103 (‘[…] the Appellant, a
medical doctor supporting athletes of the RKCF, had to know that the treatment she was administering
was a prohibited method, thus constituting an anti-doping rule violation. Whether or not an anti-
doping rule violation occurred is not dependent on the name used by the Appellant for her treatments.
The Appellant should have known that what she calls “ozone therapy” falls under the category M1.
Manipulation of Blood and Blood Components on the Prohibited List’).
C13.3 Attempted Administration is also a violation of Art 2.8. Based on the Code
definition of ‘Attempt’,1 Attempted administration is ‘purposely engaging in conduct
that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in
the commission of’ the offence of administration. However, ‘there shall be no anti-
doping rule violation based solely on an Attempt to commit a violation if the Person
renounces the Attempt prior to it being discovered by a third party not involved in
the Attempt’. A first instance panel therefore rejected an attempted administration
charge where, after USADA advised that infusing more than 50ml of any substance
was a violation, the coach instructed the doctor not to infuse the athletes with more
than 50 ml of L-cartinine.2
CHAPTER C14
Article 2.9 ADRV – Complicity or

Attempted Complicity by an Athlete or
Other Person
C14.1 2015 Code Art 2.9 prohibits ‘assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting,
conspiring, covering up or any other type of intentional complicity involving an
anti-doping rule violation, Attempted anti-doping rule violation or violation of
Article 10.12.1 by another Person’.1 Article 2.9 of the 2021 Code adds the words
‘or Attempted complicity’ after ‘other type of intentional complicity’, making the
wording even more far-reaching. This offence may be committed by an athlete, an
athlete support person, or (from the 2021 Code on) any other person who is bound
by the Code, including ‘board members, directors, officers, and specified employees
and volunteers of Signatories, and Delegated Third Parties and their employees’.2
However, the fact that the anti-doping rule violation in which the person is complicit
must be a violation ‘by another Person’ means the Article ‘does not capture a
situation where an athlete covers up his own ADRV’.3 The ‘other Person’ (ie the
person with whom the perpetrator of the Art 2.9 violation is complicit) may or may
not be an athlete.4 There is no requirement to show that the person charged received
a commercial benefit for that complicity.5
1 There is a clear possibility of overlap here with other violations, including Art 2.5 Tampering. See
eg WADA v Jamaludin et al, CAS 2012/A/2791, para 8.1.15 (coach who instructed athletes to bring
urine of other persons to test and then not to take part in test violated IAAF equivalent of Code Art 2.8).
subject to discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.9 (Complicity) […]’.
3 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 847; Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 858 (same). Cf
USADA v Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 8.2 (charge upheld that athlete had
covered up an anti-doping rule violation, and so been complicit in that violation, by providing false
testimony to USADA and to the Panel ‘as part of his efforts to cover up the conspiracy with [Victor]
Conte [of BALCO] both in the early stages of discovery and up to and including his testimony at the
hearing’, when he said, falsely, that he did not recall to what ‘the clear’ and ‘the cream’ (BALCO
code words) referred) and para 8.2 (rejecting athlete’s argument that ‘the covering up offense refers to
covering up the conduct of others and not oneself’).
4 In this respect, the text of Code Art 2.9 codifies the way that previous Code versions were interpreted.
See eg Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.55 (’In the Panel’s view, […] the proper interpretation
of Article 2.8 is that […] “assisting, encouraging, aiding and abetting, covering up or any other type of
complicity involving an anti-doping violation or any attempted violation,” is intended to be very broad
and to cover any ADR violation by any person bound by the ADR, including a coach or a support staff
member, and is not limited to ADR violations of fellow athletes’).
C14.2 What constitutes ‘assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting’ etc. in this

context was considered at length, and interpreted very broadly, by the CAS panel
in Eder v IOC.1 It ruled that physical assistance would be sufficient to sustain a
complicity charge (eg ‘providing equipment to [an athlete] that is necessary for the
administration of that Prohibited Method’2) but so would ‘psychological assistance’
(ie ‘any action that had the effect of encouraging the violation’3). It also ruled that
such ‘psychological assistance’ might include ‘one athlete’s own involvement in the
practice or possession of items necessary for the practice of a Prohibited Method’,
since that ‘can have the effect of making other athletes more comfortable about their
own use of a Prohibited Method’.4 It noted that the involvement of each member of
the team ‘had the effect of making routine the practice within the team, so that the
Appellants were far more comfortable with, and less likely to reject, the practice.
This effect is likely to be particularly compelling in a small, close-knit team such as
that of the Austrian cross-country skiers’.5 It held that:
‘an athlete may not positively know which other athletes are also engaging in
ADR violations, but by his or her common utilisation of the coach or support staff
for improper means, an athlete is complicit in the ADR violations of those other
athletes and also of the coach or support staff. In this context, the Panel observes that
although “complicity” is likely to involve some degree of knowledge on the part of
the person alleged to be complicit, it is not necessary that that person knew all of the
people involved or all of the Prohibited Methods being used or possessed’.6
It therefore upheld complicity charges based on evidence demonstrating ‘a broad

pattern of cooperation and common activity, with the other athletes and with the
coaches, in the possession of the Prohibited Method of blood doping’.7 This analysis
was fully endorsed by a different CAS panel in IOC & WADA v Pinter & FIS,8
and followed by the CAS panel in Zubkov.9 The 2021 Code echoes it, stating that:
‘Complicity […] may include either physical or psychological assistance’.10
1 Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, paras 9.54 to 9.66 (‘The Panel is required to construe the phrase
“assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an
anti-doping rule violation or any attempted violation.” However, this construction is not difficult,
as the words are commonly used English words with well-established meanings. The language of
Article 2.8 is broad in order to capture any form of complicity’).
2 Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.56. See also Hoch v FIS & IOC, CAS 2008/A/1513, para 8.4.1
(‘The provision covers numerous acts, which are intended to assist another or a third party’s anti-doping
rule violation. The assistance can constitute assistance provided in the preliminary stages before an
offence is committed. However, it also covers acts, which are supposed to prevent an anti-doping rule
violation from being discovered after it has been committed. The rule does not expressly stipulate
how substantial the assistance has to be in order to fulfil the elements of Art 2.8 FIS ADR. However,
the standard is probably low because according to the wording even just “any type of complicity” is
sufficient’) and para 8.6 (where the athletes had committed blood doping and blood manipulation,
‘merely disposing of the medical items [the athletes used for that purpose] for the benefit of the
athletes […] already exceeds the threshold for – objective – assistance within the meaning of Art
2.8 FIS ADR’); USADA v Brown, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.71 (‘[…]
under Hoch, the level of assistance required to trigger a complicity violation is “probably low because
according to the wording even just ‘any type of complicity’ is sufficient.” Hoch, para 16’); USADA v
Block, AAA Panel decision dated 17 March 2011, para 8.4, where an AAA Panel upheld a charge
that Mark Block had ‘assisted or incited’ others to use a prohibited substance, in breach of a rule
analogous to Code Art 2.9, on the basis of his admission that he had assisted his athlete wife in her use
of modafanil, and on the basis that he had paid for doping substances supplied by BALCO, ‘thereby
providing Conte with additional resources by which he could expand his trafficking’; and USADA v.
Drummond, AAA panel decision dated 17 December 2014, p 21, where a different AAA panel said a
complicity charge covered ‘conduct that makes it easier to dope’, and included sending an athlete to a
doctor, knowing that that doctor had recommended another athlete use products containing prohibited
substances, and endorsing the doctor’s explanation that the products were ‘100% natural’ and did not
contain prohibited substances, despite a contrary statement on the label.
3 Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.57.
4 Ibid, para 9.61.
5 Ibid, para 9.64.
6 Ibid, para 9.67.
7 Ibid, para 9.62.
8 IOC & WADA v Pinter & FIS, CAS 2007/A/1434 & 1435, paras 120 and 121 (‘[…] in the absence
of physical assistance or covert conduct such as concealment, complicity in a violation of the Anti-
Doping Rules as required under Article 2.8 may be established by actions such as encouragement and
exhortation’).
9 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, paras 834-838, although in that case the CAS panel found that there
was no evidence of cooperation with or provision of assistance or encouragement to other athletes
committing ADRVs (para 848).
10 2021 Code Art 2.9, comment 14.
C14.3 The CAS jurisprudence is inconsistent as to whether there can be an Art

2.9 complicity violation if the conduct in which one was complicit ultimately does
Article 2.9 ADRV – Complicity or Attempted Complicity by an Athlete or Other Person 903
not result in an anti-doping rule violation.1 One CAS panel hearing two related cases
held that liability for complicity:
‘is necessarily conditional upon the existence of a freestanding ADRV under

Articles 2.1 to 2.7, which the individual charged with violating Article 2.8 of the
WADC either “assist[ed], encourage[d], aid[ed], abet[ted], cover[ed] up” or was
otherwise “complicit” in’.2
However, the CAS panel in Salmond did not follow that precedent, ruling instead that:
‘no underlying ADRV is required as Article 2.9 WADC specifically provides it is a

violation if “… encouraging, … abetting, … involving an anti-doping rule violation,
Attempted anti-doping rule violation … by another Person”. It is enough if the
encouragement “involves” an ADRV or an “Attempted” ADRV. In fact, the act of
encouraging an anti-doping rule violation necessarily occurs before any commission
of the ADRV that has been encouraged’.3
The Salmond panel was influenced by the fact that accepting the contrary argument
would have led to the absurd result that a person would not be liable under Art 2.9
if he compelled an athlete not to provide a sample, and the athlete avoided Art 2.3
liability on the basis that that compulsion constituted compelling justification for not
providing the sample.4 The 2021 Code arguably resolves the debate by expanding Art
2.9 to encompass ‘Attempted Complicity’, so that an Art 2.9 violation is committed
by ‘purposely engaging in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of
conduct planned to culminate in’ complicity in another’s anti-doping rule violation or
Attempted anti-doping rule violation, even if that other violation never takes place.5
1 One alternative option set out expressly in Code Art 2.9 is that the Anti-Doping Organization may
prove complicity in a violation of the Code Art 10.2.1 prohibition (Art 10.4.1 in the 2021 Code)
against an athlete or other person participating in sport while ineligible. See in this regard 2015 Code
Art 10.12.3 (’Where an Athlete Support Person or other Person assists a Person in violating the
prohibition against participation during Ineligibility, an Anti-Doping Organization with jurisdiction
over such Athlete Support Person or other Person shall impose sanctions for a violation of Article 2.9
for such assistance’).
2 Zubkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5422, para 829, and see para 830 (‘Therefore, a violation of Article 2.8
of the WADC cannot be committed in isolation. Rather, it is parasitic upon the existence of one or
more freestanding ADRVs under Articles 2.1-2.7. The gravamen of the ADRV under Article 2.8 is
the deliberate facilitation of the commission or concealment of another type of ADRV, ie an ADRV
falling under one or more of Articles 2.1 to 2.7, committed by another person, ie someone other than
the person charged with an ADRV under Article 2.8’); Legkov v IOC, CAS 2017/A/5379, para 843
(same). See also IBU v Ussanova, ADHP decision dated 9 September 2019, para 173 (since there was
no conclusive evidence that the athletes were going to use the IV infusion in a prohibited manner,
ie to infuse more liquid than permitted by the rules, ‘[a]s a further consequence, the Athlete did not
act in a way that could have constituted an act of complicity in the sense of Article 2.9 IBU ADR’);
USADA v Brown, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.68 (‘Under the WADA Code
Art 2.9, a complicity violation is conditioned upon the commission of an anti-doping rule violation
by a third party’); USADA v Salazar, AAA Panel decision dated 30 September 2019, para 272 (fact
athletes infused less than 50 ml of liquid means there was no use of a Prohibited Method and therefore
no ADRV in which the respondent could have been complicit).
3 Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 235.
4 Ibid, para 240.
5 See Code App One (Definitions), p 132 (definition of ‘Attempt’).
C14.4 What is the mental element of a Code Art 2.9 violation? Again the actions
said to constitute complicity connote deliberate and conscious acts, but no requirement
of intent was specified in pre-2015 versions of the Code, and at least one CAS panel
suggested that negligence could be enough.1 However, another CAS panel was clear
that ‘knowledge and intent’ are required to establish a complicity violation.2 It held
that ‘an act of assistance for the purposes of Art 2.8 FIS ADR requires that the person
concerned is aware of the anti-doping rule violation committed by another party
because otherwise there is no intent to assist a third-party act in the first place’,3
and stated that where it has been established that other athletes committed anti-
doping rule violations, ‘the only question that needs to be answered is whether the
Appellant – knowingly – supported said anti-doping rule violations by the athletes’.4
The 2015 Code settled the point definitively by referring to ‘assisting, encouraging,
aiding, abetting, conspiring, covering up or any other type of intentional complicity’
(emphasis added).5 On the other hand, ‘intent in the context of the Complicity article
refers simply to the intent to act, but not necessarily the intent to achieve the result or
to commit an anti-doping rule violation’.6 In other words:
‘it is not an element of this Article that Respondent specifically intended that [the
other person] commit an anti-doping rule violation. Rather, the Article requires that
he engage in one or more intentional acts, such as “assisting, encouraging, aiding,
abetting, covering up or any other type of intentional complicity” which involve an
anti-doping rule violation’.7
1 Eder v IOC, CAS 2007/A/1286, para 9.6.1 (an athlete who did not know that other athletes were
involved in the blood doping network would still be liable for giving them psychological assistance
if his actions were negligent) and para 9.6.6 (‘[…] assistance contributing to the violations of other
athletes, even if negligently provided, will trigger joint liability’).
2 Hoch v FIS & IOC, CAS 2008/A/1513, para 8.7, cited with approval in USADA v Brown, AAA Panel
decision dated 30 September 2019, para 5.70, and see paras 5.79-5.80 (finding doctor complicit in
coach’s giving of testosterone to sons to test sabotage theory, where he was aware of the experiment
and encouraged the coach to continue with it).
3 Ibid, para 8.4.1.
4 Ibid, para 8.4.2.
5 See also the comment to 2015 Code Article 10.5.2, which states that Article 10.5.2 (the No Significant
Fault or Negligence provision) ‘may be applied to any ADRV, except those Articles where intent is an
element of the anti-doping rule violation (eg, Article […] 2.9) […]’.
6 Salmond v IIHF, CAS 2018/A/5885, para 228. See also ibid, para 231 (‘While Mr Salmond may
have believed that the ultimate decision not to provide a sample to [the DCO] could not amount
to an ADRV by [the athlete], the Panel is of the opinion that such assertion is not a valid defence.
Even if, due to his ignorance of the rules, Mr Salmond thought that not providing the sample would
not be ruled an ADRV, that is not enough to escape his own liability’) and at para 230 (‘Indeed, the
act of encouragement itself constitutes sufficient intent for the purposes of Article 2.9 WADC as the
reference to “or any other type of intentional complicity involving an anti-doping rule violation”
means literally (and purposively) that encouragement must itself be one type of intentional complicity
of which the italicized phrase cited contemplates other types’ (emphasis in original)).
CHAPTER C15
Article 2.10 ADRV – Prohibited

Association – and Article 2.11 ADRV –
Retaliation
Contents
. para
1 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.10 VIOLATION....................... C15.1
2 THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF AN ART 2.11 VIOLATION....................... C15.2
C15.1 Code Art 2.10 prohibits:
‘association by an Athlete or other Person subject to the authority of an Anti-Doping

Organization1 in a professional or sport-related capacity with any Athlete Support
Person who:
(1) If subject to the authority of an Anti-Doping Organization, is serving a period
of Ineligibility;
(2) If not subject to the authority of an Anti-Doping Organization, and where
Ineligibility has not been addressed in a results management process
pursuant to the Code, has been convicted or found in a criminal, disciplinary
or professional proceeding to have engaged in conduct which would have
constituted a violation of anti-doping rules if Code-compliant rules had been
applicable to such Person. The disqualifying status of such Person shall be in
force for the longer of six years from the criminal, professional or disciplinary
decision or the duration of the criminal, disciplinary or professional sanction
imposed; or
(3) is serving as a front or intermediary for an individual described in Article 2.10.1
or 2.10.2’.
No definition is given of ‘association’ for these purposes, but the comment to 2015
Code Art 2.10 gives the following examples:
‘obtaining training, strategy, technique, nutrition or medical advice; obtaining

therapy, treatment or prescriptions; providing any bodily products for analysis; or
allowing the Athlete Support Person to serve as an agent or representative. Prohibited
association need not involve any form of compensation’.2
Code Art 2.10 provides that the Anti-Doping Organization must prove:
(a) that ‘the Athlete or other Person has previously been advised in writing by an
Anti-Doping Organization with jurisdiction over the Athlete or other Person,
or by WADA, of the Athlete Support Person’s disqualifying status and the
potential Consequence of prohibited association’,3 and
(b) that ‘the Athlete or other Person can reasonably avoid the association’.4
If it does so, the burden shifts to the person charged ‘to establish that any association
with Athlete Support Personnel [who have a disqualifying status] is not in a
professional or sport-related capacity’.
1 The 2021 Code specifies that the ‘other Person’ may be from the following categories: ‘board members,
directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories, and Delegated Third Parties
and their employees’1 See 2021 Code, Introduction (p.12). 2021 Code comment 6 confirms that
‘such Person would […] be subject to discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.10 (Prohibited
Association) […]’.
2 The comment to 2021 Code Art 2.10 adds: ‘This also prohibits association with any other Athlete who
is acting as a coach or Athlete Support Person while serving a period of Ineligibility’.
3 The 2021 Code simplifies this to a requirement to ‘establish that the Athlete or other Person knew of
the Athlete Support Person’s disqualifying status’.
4 The 2021 Code shifts the burden to the athlete or other person to show ‘that such association could not
have been reasonably avoided’.
C15.2 The 2021 Code has added a new Art 2.11 anti-doping rule violation, namely:
‘Acts by an Athlete or Other Person to Discourage or Retaliate Against Reporting to
Authorities’. This new violation – which may be committed by an athlete, an athlete
support person, or any other person who is bound by the Code, including ‘board
members, directors, officers, and specified employees and volunteers of Signatories,
and Delegated Third Parties and their employees’1 – covers the following conduct:
‘Where such conduct does not otherwise constitute a violation of Article 2.5:
2.11.1 Any act which threatens or seeks to intimidate another Person with the intent
of discouraging the Person from the good-faith reporting of information that
relates to an alleged anti-doping rule violation or alleged non-compliance
with the Code to WADA, an Anti-Doping Organization, law enforcement,
regulatory or professional disciplinary body, hearing body or Person
conducting an investigation for WADA or an Anti-Doping Organization.
2.11.2 Retaliation against a Person who, in good faith, has provided evidence or
information that relates to an alleged anti-doping rule violation or alleged
non-compliance with the Code to WADA, an Anti-Doping Organization,
law enforcement, regulatory or professional disciplinary body, hearing
body or Person conducting an investigation for WADA or an Anti-Doping
Organization. For purposes of Article 2.11, retaliation, threatening and
intimidation include an act taken against such Person either because the act
lacks a good faith basis or is a disproportionate response.’
These provisions appear to have been inspired in large part by concerns about alleged
retaliation and attempted witness intimidation in the Lance Armstrong case,2 and
over threats made to Yuliya Stepanova, a Russian former 800 metre runner,3 and to Dr
Grigory Rodchenkov, the former director of the Moscow anti-doping laboratory,4 after
they Russia (Stepanova in 2014 and Rodchenkov in 2015), and separately revealed
details of the systematic doping scheme and cover up within Russian sport in the
period 2011 to 2015. Comment 16 to the 2021 Code states: ‘This article is intended
to protect Persons who make good faith reports, and does not protect Persons who
knowingly make false reports’; while comment 17 states: ‘Retaliation would include,
for example, actions that threaten the physical or mental well-being or economic
interests of the reporting Persons, their families or associates. Retaliation would not
include an Anti-Doping Organization asserting in good faith an anti-doping rule
violation against the reporting Person. For purposes of Article 2.11, a report is not
made in good faith where the Person making the report knows the report to be false’.
subject to discipline for a violation of Code Article […] 2.11 (Retaliation) […]’.
2 USADA v Armstrong, reasoned decision of USADA on disqualification and ineligibility dated
10 October 2012, section 6 (‘Evidence of Armstrong’s efforts to suppress the truth about his anti-
doping rule violations’).
Article 2.10 ADRV – Prohibited Association – and Article 2.11 ADRV – Retaliation 907
3 David Walsh, The Russian Affair: The True Story of the Couple who Uncovered the Greatest Sporting
Scandal (Simon & Schuster, 2020).
4 ‘Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold’, 12 May 2016, nytimes.
com/2016/05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html [accessed 4 November 2020].
Rodchenkov’s story was the subject of an Oscar-winning documentary, ‘Icarus’, that was subsequently
distributed by Netflix (netflix.com/gb/title/80168079) [accessed 6 December 2020.
CHAPTER C16
Code Sanctions: Overview of Approach

to Periods of Ineligibility
C16.1 The purposes of imposition of a period of ineligibility (ie a ban) from

future participation in sport are to punish the transgressor and so vindicate compliant
athletes, to protect clean sport by preventing the risk of his re-offending during the
period of the ban, to deter him and others from cheating1 (or indeed from failing
in their responsibility to do everything in their power to keep themselves clean of
prohibited substances and methods2), and above all to maintain public confidence
in the integrity of sport and in the readiness, willingness and ability of its governing
bodies to keep sport clean.3 During any period of ineligibility, the athlete or other
person concerned may not:
‘participate in any capacity in a Competition or activity (other than authorized

anti-doping education or rehabilitation programs) authorized or organized by any
Signatory, Signatory’s member organization, or a club or other member organization
of a Signatory’s member organization, or in Competitions organized or authorized
by any professional league or any international- or national-level Event organization
or any elite or national-level sporting activity funded by a government agency’.4
As a result, the athlete cannot compete either in his sport or in any other sport during
his ban,5 or even participate in organised training sessions (at least until near the
end of the ban).6 Nor (since he is banned from participating in the sport in any
capacity) can he act as coach or other athlete support person to other athletes.7 And
athlete support personnel and other persons may not participate in any manner in the
governance or administration of sport or in the provision of support to competing
athletes.8 If these prohibitions are not respected, further sanctions will follow.9
1 See para C20.18.
2 See para C18.14.
3 Bolton v Law Society, [1994] 2 All ER 486 [CA] at 518H (‘To maintain this reputation and sustain
public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious
lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission. […] Otherwise, the whole profession, and the
public as a whole, is injured. A profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the
confidence which that inspires’). For a discussion of the Bolton principle in the context of match-
fixing, see para B4.41, n 10.
4 Code Art 10.12.1, discussed and applied in Hosseinpoor v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 13 January 2017.
5 The comment to Code 10.12.1 states that ‘Ineligibility imposed in one sport shall also be recognized
by other sports (see Article 15.1, Mutual Recognition)’. Code Art 15.1 requires all Code signatories
to ‘recognize and respect’ a period of ineligibility imposed under the Code. As a result, an athlete
banned from one Code-compliant sport is automatically precluded from competing in any other Code-
compliant sport. For example, there were reports that Martina Hingis wanted to compete in equestrian
events during her two-year ban imposed under the ITF’s Tennis Anti-Doping Programme (see ITF v
Hingis, Anti-Doping Tribunal decision dated 3 January 2008), but the FEI confirmed that it would
recognise the ITF’s ban and so not permit Hingis to participate in FEI-sanctioned events.
6 See comment to Code Art 10.12.1 (‘subject to Article 10.12.2, an Ineligible Athlete cannot participate
in a training camp, exhibition or practice organized by his or her National Federation or a club which
is a member of that National Federation or which is funded by a governmental agency’); and Code
Art 10.12.2 (‘As an exception to Article 10.12.1, an Athlete may return to train with a team or to use
the facilities of a club or other member organisation of a Signatory’s member organization during the
shorter of: (1) the last two months of the Athlete’s period of Ineligibility, or (2) the last one-quarter
of the period of Ineligibility imposed’). The comment to Code Art 10.12.2 explains: ‘In many Team
Sports and some individual sports (eg ski jumping and gymnastics), an Athlete cannot effectively train
Code Sanctions: Overview of Approach to Periods of Ineligibility 909
on his/her own so as to be ready to compete at the end of the Athlete’s period of Ineligibility. During
the training period described in this Article, an Ineligible Athlete may not compete or engage in any
activity described in Article 10.9.1 other than training’.
7 Drug Free Sport New Zealand v Newman, New Zealand Sports Tribunal decision dated 31 January
2012, para 11. This has been clarified in the 2021 Code. Comment 77 (the comment to 2021 Code
Art 10.14.1) states: ‘An Athlete or other Person serving a period of Ineligibility is prohibited from
coaching or serving as an Athlete Support Person in any other capacity at any time during the period
of Ineligibility, and doing so could also result in a violation of 2.10 by another Athlete’.
8 See comment to Code Art 10.12.1: ‘The term “activity” also includes, for example, administrative
activities, such as serving as an official, director, officer, employee, or volunteer of the organization
described in this Article’.
See also DFSNZ v Murray, CAS 2017/A/4937, para 59, rejecting a ruling by a domestic panel
in Russell v CCES, SDRCC DT 12-0177, decision dated 24 October 2012, that Art 10.12.1 only
prohibited a coach from coaching an athlete in direct connection with and just prior to the days
of a competition, but not otherwise. The Murray panel said: ‘the provision does not require […] a
finding that the assistance had a temporal or physical connection to a particular event or competition.
The provision has a broader reach. The ineligible person cannot participate “in any capacity” in an
event or activity authorized or organised by a Signatory during the full period of activity. Further, the
provision is applicable to any participation by an ineligible person in any of a signatory’s competition
and activities. We therefore reject the proposition, as opined in Russell, that the participation ban is
disjunctive and only applies to a referenced organization’s activities not their organised competition.
An athlete serving a period of ineligibility is therefore prevented from having any involvement with
sport which involvement impacts on clean athletes who are members of a signatory organisation. [60.]
It is the involvement (ie “participation”) while sanctioned that is the breach and the provision read as
a whole does not require a measure of how close or how far from an organised competition or activity
to be the relevant consideration’.
9 Under Code Art 10.12.3, which provides that an athlete who ‘violates the prohibition against
participation during Ineligibility described in Article 10.12.1’ shall have any results so obtained
disqualified ‘and a new period of Ineligibility equal in length of the original period of Ineligibility
shall be added to the end of the original period of Ineligibility. The new period of Ineligibility may be
adjusted based on the Athlete or other Person’s degree of Fault and other circumstances of the case’.
In Plotniy v ITF, CAS 2010/A/2245, paras 9.2 to 9.4, a CAS panel rejected an athlete’s plea that he
bore No Significant Fault or Negligence for violating the prohibition on participation while ineligible,
because the athlete ‘made, on his own admission, no enquiry into the nature and extent of his sanction
other than asking his own representative. […] He abdicated this fundamental responsibility in respect
of the nature of the sanction to his own agent, not because he considered that she had a technical or
scientific expertise that he did not, but rather because he considered that he had no responsibility as
a player to inform himself of this’. Cf USADA v Williams, USADA decision dated 5 August 2010
(‘After consideration of all of the circumstances in your case, including that this is the first application
of Article 10.10.2 involving a United States athlete, your lack of awareness of the extent of the rule,
your pre-race inquiry that led you to believe that participation in the race was not prohibited, and your
post-race conduct, including your prompt acceptance of responsibility, all of which point to a non-
intentional violation and a lack of significant fault or negligence, USADA has determined that you
should receive the maximum period of reduction of your increased period of ineligibility available
under Article 10.5.2 of the Code which is one half the otherwise applicable period of increased
ineligibility’). In June 2012, FIS announced that Estonian skier Andrus Veerpalu had violated his
three-year ban for testing positive for human growth hormone (see para C6.34) by helping test skis for
the Estonian team at a World Cup event in his home town of Otepaa in January 2015, and as a result his
ban, which originally would have ended on 23 February 2014, would now run until 21 January 2015.
See ‘Olympic great Veerpalu’s doping ban extended’, AFP release dated 5 June 2012.
C16.2 The Code respects the fundamental legal principle that there should be no
punishment without fault (nulla poena sine culpa).1 This includes in relation to a
Code Art 2.1 or Art 2.2 ‘strict liability’ violation (presence or ‘Use’ of a prohibited
substance),2 which is presumed to have been the fault of the athlete,3 unless the
contrary is proven. The starting-point is a fixed ban of four years under Art 10.2.1 (if
the panel is satisfied that the violation was intentional) or two years under Art 10.2.2
(if the panel is satisfied that the violation was not intentional),4 but if the violation
was not intentional the athlete is also given the opportunity to establish that the two-
year ban should be eliminated entirely, because he bears no fault or negligence for
the violation,5 or that it should be materially reduced, because he bears no significant
fault or negligence for the violation.6 This approach is justified, and respects the
principle of no punishment without fault, on the basis that an athlete controls his
environment and what goes into his body, and only he can establish how a substance
got into his system (and therefore only he can establish that it got there without fault
or negligence on his part).7 Similarly, in relation to the other violations, which are not
strict liability offences but instead require proof of a specified degree of fault (at least
negligence, but sometimes intent) for liability to be established, where the charge is
upheld the Code provides for imposition of a period of ineligibility within a specified
range, with the possibility (in cases not involving intent) to reduce that range based
on no significant fault.8 And in all cases there are further mitigation possibilities
based on certain factors not related to the fault that the perpetrator bears for the
violation found.9
1 ‘Fault’ in this context is by no means confined to intentional wrongdoing: ‘The fact that the Player did
not take the substance in question in order to enhance his sport performance does not mean that he was
not at fault. To the contrary, if a prohibited substance is in an athlete’s system while he is competing,
then it taints the integrity of the competition – and prejudices his opponents – in just the same way no
matter how it got there. The athlete is only innocent of this harm he has caused if the substance got into
his system through No Fault or Negligence of his own’. IBAF v Luque, IBAF Anti-Doping Tribunal
decision dated 13 December 2010, para 6.8. See also ITF v Pous Tio, ITF decision dated 23 December
2008, para 3.13.1(c) (‘If this responsibility is not respected, even if out of ignorance rather than in an
effort to cheat, it means that players are competing with substances in their systems that are prohibited
under the Programme, and therefore the results obtained are tainted. If the player involved happens not
to be tested after the match in question, then this will remain undetected and the results will be allowed
to stand when they should have been Disqualified under the Programme’).
In other words, ‘fault’ encompasses not only intent but also recklessness and also negligence. This
is because the question is not whether the athlete intended to cheat, but rather (since clean sport is the
aim) how far the athlete departed from the standard of care imposed on him by the Code to stay clean
of doping substances. See paras C18.14, n 2, C18.29, n 2 and C18.32, n 7.
2 See paras C6.1 and C7.1 respectively.
3 Kaufman-Kohler et al, ‘Legal opinion on the conformity of certain provisions of the draft World Anti-
Doping Code with commonly accepted principles of international law’, 26 February 2003, para 129
(‘Under Article 10.2 and 10.5, there is a clear presumption of fault on the part of the athlete. This
presumption is rebuttable, ie this presumption can be overcome if an athlete proves No Fault or
Negligence or No Significant Fault or Negligence’). See eg Van Snick v Federation Internationale de
Judo, CAS 2014/A/3475, para 58 (‘Articles 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 of the WADC and IJF ADR and the consistent
jurisprudence of CAS establish that the athlete is responsible for the presence of doping substances
in his/her system. Therefore, where the presence of a prohibited substance is established, the athlete’s
intention to dope and his/her culpability are presumed. The athlete benefits from a presumption of
innocence as long as the presence of a prohibited substance in his/her system is not established’)
(unofficial translation from French original); WADA v Daiders, Daiders & FIM, CAS 2014/A/3615,
para 51 (‘Furthermore, given that prohibited substances are generally either themselves performance
enhancing or masking agents of other substances which have that propensity, the scheme established
provides for the inference that such substances were ingested for one of those two purposes. […]
The person charged must, by establishing the source to the relevant standard of proof, show that
the plausible inference cannot be drawn in his case’); WADA v NSAM & Cheah, CAS 2007/A/1395,
para 88 (no mitigation permitted ‘since the Athletes did not rebut the presumption that they have
ingested the prohibited substance to enhance their performance’); WADA v Stauber & Swiss Olympic
Committee, CAS 2006/A/1133, para 30 (‘As far as the application of sanctions is concerned, […] the
World Anti-Doping Code is not a system of strict liability but a system based on presumed fault (intent
or negligence) on the part of the athlete found to have a prohibited substance in his sample’); USADA v
Gatlin, AAA Panel decision dated 1 January 2008, para 8.10 (‘Simply stated, this Panel does not know
with any degree of confidence how the testosterone entered Mr Gatlin’s system; transdermally or by
pill or injection. Mr Gatlin’s expert, Dr Black, testified that certain food supplements given to him
for analysis did not contain any prohibited substances. Based on this absence of evidence, Mr Gatlin
argued that he eliminated anything that he self-administered which could have resulted in the positive
test. The Panel finds this kind of argumentation for an inference from the absence of evidence not
probative of anything and singularly unhelpful. That would not establish that Dr Black had the right
supplements to test in the first place, nor that the testosterone was not administered by shot, pill or
otherwise. Dr Black admitted that he could not say how the testosterone entered Mr Gatlin’s system.
Most significantly, Mr Gatlin testified that Dr Black did not test any creams, including Volteran cream,
whether obtained from Mr Gatlin’s trainer or otherwise. Since Mr Gatlin’s theory of sabotage relied
upon application of a topical cream, that might have proved more helpful. In this regard, USADA
makes a strong argument. If Mr Gatlin cannot prove how the testosterone entered his system, and he
did not, he cannot prove two significant facts. First, that it was the physical therapist that placed the
testosterone in his system transdermally; and second, that he did not intentionally take testosterone’),
appeal dismissed, Gatlin v USADA, CAS 2008/A/1461-62. See also IWBF v UK Anti-Doping & Gibbs,
CAS 2010/A/2230, paras 12.19–12.20 (‘If the Athlete fails to provide an explanation, with supporting
evidence, that satisfies the Tribunal, then it cannot guess, or speculate, but must proceed on the basis
that there is no “credible, non-doping explanation” for the presence of the stimulant in his system. […]
Where (as here) Mr Gibbs’ claim that his drink was spiked has not been established, then he has fallen
at the crucial first hurdle and his claim to innocent use cannot be considered any further, he has simply
not laid the ground for an intelligible assessment of his degree of fault’). See also the discussion of the
presumption of intentional use under Code Art 10.2 at para C17.2(a).
4 See para C17.2.
7 WADA v Daiders, Daiders & FIM, CAS 2014/A/3615, para 50 (‘It is this disparity between the
parties in terms of access to relevant information which justifies the imposition of the burden of proof
on the person charged rather than on the person charging’); Eder v Ski Austria, CAS 2006/A/1102,
para 52 (‘The shifting of the burden of proof to the athlete to demonstrate that he or she acted without
(significant) fault does not conflict with the presumption of innocence. Athletes have a rigorous duty
of care towards their competitors and the sports organisation to keep their bodies free of prohibited
substances. Anti-doping rule violations do not “just happen” but are, in most cases, the result of a
breach of that duty of care. This justifies (i) to presume that the athlete acted with fault or negligence
and (ii) to shift the burden of proof from the sanctioning body to the athlete to exonerate him- or
herself. On the other hand, to impose on the sanctioning body to demonstrate that the athlete acted
with fault or negligence would make the fight against doping extremely difficult or impossible’). See
also Kaufman-Kohler et al, ‘Legal opinion on the conformity of certain provisions of the draft World
Anti-Doping Code with commonly accepted principles of international law’, 26 February 2003,
paras 135–136 (‘135. There is little doubt that the presumption of fault can led to some injustice
in cases where an innocent athlete is unable to prove an absence of fault or negligence because he
or she truly does not know how the prohibited substance ended up in his or her body. 136. On the
other hand, it would be both very difficult and very costly for a sports federation to prove the fault
of the athlete. An athlete is undoubtedly in a better position than a sports federation to explain why
a specific substance was detected in his or her body. In this regard, it should be emphasised that
sports federations are private bodies that lack the powers of coercion necessary to undertake the
type of investigation required to discharge such a burden. From this point of view, it is clear that
the presumption of fault and resulting reversal in the burden of proof is not only appropriate but
also essential in order to pursue an efficient anti-doping policy’); Aanes v FILA, CAS 2001/A/317,
pp 19–20 (‘[…] it would put a definite end to any meaningful fight against doping if the federation
were required to prove the necessary subjective elements of the offence, ie intent or negligence on
the part of the athlete. In fact, since neither the federation nor the CAS has the means of conducting
its own investigation or of compelling witnesses, means which are available to the public prosecutor
in criminal proceedings, it would be all too simple for an athlete to deny any intent or negligence
and to simply state that he/she has no idea how the prohibited substance arrived in his/her system.
For this reason, the Panel believes that, with regard to the subjective elements of a doping offence,
when weighing the interests to combat doping and those of the athlete not to be punished without
fault, the scales tip in favour of the fight against doping. In fact, doping only happens in the sphere
of the athlete: he/she is in control of his/her body, of what he/she eats or drinks, of who has access
to his/her nutrition, of what medication he/she takes, etc. In these circumstances, it is appropriate to
presume that the athlete has knowingly or at least negligently consumed the substance which has led
to the positive doping test. Therefore, if the federation is able to establish the objective elements of a
doping offence, there is a presumption of guilt against the athlete’, citations omitted); Foschi v FINA,
CAS 96/A/156, paras 12.2 (‘In doping cases it would be practically impossible for a sports federation
to prove how a banned substance arrived in an athlete’s body or that the athlete had knowingly
ingested the banned substance. Any such requirement would be the end of any meaningful fight
against doping. This approach may seem harsh on a morally innocent athlete found to have a banned
substance in his/her body but in order to ensure fairness towards all competitors and to protect
their health and well-being, sports federations must have strict and workable doping regulations.
Otherwise, as was stated in the case of Chagnaud vs. FINA (CAS 95/141) (see Appellant’s Exhibit
1.26) “if for each case the sports federations had to prove the intentional nature of the act (desire
to dope to improve one’s performance) in order to be able to give it the force of an offence, the fight
against doping would become practically impossible.” The floodgates would be opened and the fight
against drug-taking in sport would become futile’); UK Anti-Doping v Songhurst, NADP Tribunal
decision dated 8 July 2015, paras 28-29 (’28. It was submitted for Mr Songhurst that the tribunal
were entitled to assess his credibility in the round, and in the light of his oral evidence, and decide
whether they believed his firm denial that he had taken the prohibited substance deliberately, and,
if they did, to hold that he had satisfied the burden of proof. Otherwise the rule would have the
draconian effect of ruining the career of someone who was innocent of intentional wrongdoing but
did not know how the prohibited substance came to be found in his body. The practical effect of Art
10.2 is that the athlete has to prove a negative. 29. The problem with this submission is that in the
normal course it is not to be expected that prohibited steroids are found in the body of an athlete. In
any normal case knowledge concerning how the substance came to be in the body is uniquely within
the knowledge of the athlete and UKAD can only go on the scientific evidence of what was found in
the body. The scientific evidence of a prohibited substance in the body is itself powerful evidence,
and requires explanation. It is easy for an athlete to deny knowledge and impossible for UKAD to
counter that other than with reference to the scientific evidence. Hence the structure of the rule’),
quoted with approval in Blair v UK Anti-Doping, NADP Appeal Panel decision dated 30 July 2018,
para 27.
8 See para C20.3.
9 See Chapter C21.
C16.3 The Code also states expressly that it respects the fundamental legal principle
that any punishment must be proportionate to the offence committed.1 That means
going no further than is reasonably necessary to achieve the underlying sporting
purposes described above; but equally it also means going as far as is reasonably
necessary to achieve those objectives.2 One of the main purposes of the Code is
harmonisation of doping sanctions not only within a sport (a basic facet of equal
treatment) but also across different sports and different nations.3 Cheating by doping
does the same fundamental harm to each sport, in all nations, and all of them have
the overriding need to demonstrate the most robust of stands against such cheating.
Therefore, the starting point is that the same sanction should apply, no matter which
sport the athlete competes in, and no matter which country he comes from. There
must be sufficient flexibility to reflect the specific circumstances of the particular
case, but not so much flexibility that ‘home-town’ decisions can be made, imposing
inappropriately light punishments just so that national heroes can return quickly to
the sport.4 The Code therefore establishes a tightly constrained sanctioning system,
specifying fixed periods of ineligibility for particular violations, or else a range of
periods but with a specified minimum.5 The discretion of the hearing panel to depart
from those prescribed periods of ineligibility is strictly limited:
(a) the hearing panel has no discretion unless certain specified pre-conditions are
satisfied;6
(b) it then has limited discretion, within carefully specified constraints; and
(c) it is also limited as to the factors that may be taken into account in exercising
that discretion.7
The rights of appeal afforded under the Code to WADA and to the international
federation or NADO enable those limits to be policed and enforced.8 While the
necessity of these limits on discretion in sanctioning is readily apparent, they may
risk leading to anomalous decisions on breach, where panels have sought to do what
they perceive as justice.
1 See 2021 Code p 8 (‘The Code has been drafted giving consideration to the principles of proportionality
and human rights’) and p 12 (Code-compliant anti-doping rules ‘are intended to be applied in a
manner which respects the principles of proportionality and human rights’). For a discussion of the
proportionality principle generally, see para B1.31. Arguments that the Code-mandated sanctions (or
range of sanctions) are disproportionate and therefore unlawful have been routinely rejected, with very
rare exceptions. See para C4.17, n 5 and para C20.16 et seq.
2 IAAF v ARAF, Zaripova, & RUSADA, CAS 2015/A/4006, para 38(vi).
3 See 2015 Code p 8 (one purpose of the Code is ‘to ensure harmonized, coordinated and effective
anti-doping programs at the international and national level with regard to the prevention of doping’);
and see 2021 Code comment 56: ‘Harmonization of sanctions has been one of the most discussed
and debated areas of anti-doping. Harmonization means that the same rules and criteria are applied
to assess the unique facts of each case. Arguments against requiring harmonization of sanctions are
based on differences between sports including, for example, the following: in some sports the Athletes
are professionals, making a sizable income from the sport and in others the Athletes are true amateurs;
in those sports where an Athlete’s career is short, a standard period of Ineligibility has a much more
significant effect on the Athlete than in sports where careers are traditionally much longer. A primary
argument in favor of harmonization is that it is simply not right that two Athletes from the same
country who test positive for the same Prohibited Substance under similar circumstances should
receive different sanctions only because they participate in different sports. In addition, flexibility in
sanctioning has often been viewed as an unacceptable opportunity for some sporting organizations
to be more lenient with dopers. The lack of harmonization of sanctions has also frequently been
the source of jurisdictional conflicts between International Federations and National Anti-Doping
Organizations’.
4 See eg Rigozzi, Kaufmann-Kohler and Malinverni, ‘Doping and fundamental rights of athletes:
comments in the wake of the adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code’ [2003] 3 ISLR 39, 66-67
(‘These practical problems demonstrate that, if some flexibility is required in order to comply with the
principle that the sanction must be proportionate with the offence, the scope of this flexibility must be
carefully defined and limited. To this end, we recommend that the only possible basis for exercising
flexibility in the setting of sanctions should be the existence of fault or negligence, or lack thereof, on
the part of the athlete’).
6 See eg Puerta v ITF, CAS 2006/A/1025, para 11.7.8 (‘The WADC contains some flexibility to enable
a Panel to satisfy the general legal principle of proportionality. However, the scope of flexibility is
clearly defined and is deliberately limited so as to avoid situations where a wide range of factors
and circumstances, including those completely at odds with the very purpose of a uniformly and
consistently applied anti-doping framework are taken into account. The period of ineligibility may be
reduced or eliminated only in the case of exceptional circumstances […]’); IRB v Van Staden, Post-
Hearing Review Body decision dated 11 February 2011, para 34 (‘No general discretion is granted
to a tribunal dealing with a doping violation covered by the IRB Regulations to reduce or suspend
the ineligibility period, except where one of the circumstances which are specified as justifying such
reduction are found to exist’).
7 In the words of the CAS panel in Knauss v FIS, CAS 2005/A/847, para 7.5.2: ‘The WADC does not
provide that the athlete’s personal history [is] also to be taken into account when fixing the penalty.
The same applies to the question of how severely the penalty impacts upon the athlete in his personal
life. The athlete’s age, the question of whether taking the prohibited substance had a performance-
enhancing effect or the peculiarities of the particular sport are not – according to the WADC – matters
to be weighed when determining the period of ineligibility. To be sure, the purpose of introducing the
WADC was to harmonise at the time a plethora of doping sanctions to the greatest extent possible
(amateur or professional, old or young athlete, etc) as well as from circumstances relating to the
specific type of sport (individual sport or team sport, etc)’. See further para C20.3.
8 See WADA v SANEF & Gertenbach, CAS 2008/A/1558, para 5.21 (referring to ‘CAS caselaw which
holds that in order to create a “level playing field” and ensure equity in international competition, it is
essential that international federations have a right of appeal against the decisions of national federations
in cases involving anti-doping rule violations’); UCI v Landaluce & RFEC, CAS 2006/A/1119, para 42
(‘This right of oversight of the UCI’s, which manifests itself by the ability to appeal the decisions of
national federations before the CAS, is there to reduce the risk that an international competition would
be biased by a national federation that would refrain from sanctioning its members’); IAAF v RFEA
& Fernandez-Palaez, CAS 2011/A/2678, para 186 (same); WADA v FIBA and Morgan, FIBA Appeal
Commission decision AC 2005-1 dated 22 June 2005, p 5 (‘This [appeal] right was granted to the
Appellant [WADA] […] so as to work towards globally uniform standards in the fight against doping’).
See also V v FINA, CAS 2003/A/459, para 8.4 (policy underlying appeal mechanism to CAS is ‘to
secure uniformity of interpretation and practice across member federations, and to avoid the possibility
of “home town decisions”’).
C16.4 The appropriate period of ineligibility in a given case is determined in a

sequence of steps. In summary:1
(a) Initially the hearing panel has to decide what the basic applicable period of
ineligibility (or range of possible periods of ineligibility) is for the Art 2 ADRV
in question.2 It does this by applying the provisions set out in Code Arts 10.2
and 10.3. This will include determining whether the ADRV was committed
intentionally, recklessly, or negligently (if that has not already been determined
at the liability stage). This first step is addressed in Chapter C17.3
(b) Next, if the determination is that the ADRV was not committed intentionally,
the hearing panel has to decide whether the athlete or other person satisfies
the threshold requirements of a plea of no fault or negligence, which would
eliminate the otherwise applicable ineligibility period (2015 Code Art 10.4;
2021 Code Art 10.5), or else of No Significant Fault or Negligence, which
would trigger a discretion to reduce the otherwise applicable ineligibility
period by an amount within a specified range (2015 Code Art 10.5; 2021 Code
Art 10.6). This step is addressed in Chapter C18.
(c) Next, under Art 10.4 of the 2021 Code, in appropriate cases (meaning
in particular, where the determination is that the ADRV was committed
intentionally, and not in cases where No Significant Fault or Negligence has
been established), the Anti-Doping Organization may argue that aggravating
factors are present that trigger a discretion on the part of the hearing panel to
increase the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility. This step is addressed
in Chapter C19.
(d) Next, if the foregoing steps have identified a range of possible periods of
ineligibility (either because that is what the Code provides, or because the
person charged has met the threshold Art 10.5 requirements and so has triggered
a discretion to reduce the otherwise applicable ineligibility period on grounds
of No Significant Fault or Negligence, or – in cases under the 2021 Code –
because the Anti-Doping Organization has established that aggravating factors
exist that trigger a discretion to increase the otherwise applicable ineligibility
period), the hearing panel must fix the applicable period of ineligibility within
that range, which it does by reference to the degree of fault of the athlete or
other person or by reference to the nature and extent of the aggravating factors.
This step is addressed in Chapter C20.
(e) Next, the hearing panel establishes whether there is a basis for suspension or
reduction of the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility pursuant to 2015
Article 10.6 (2021 Code Art 10.7), based on factors unrelated to the fault of the
athlete or other person. This step is addressed in Chapter C21.
(f) Finally, the hearing panel decides on the date that the period of ineligibility
should run from, by applying 2015 Code Art 10.11 (2021 Code Article 10.13).
This last step is addressed in Chapter C22.
1 Cf comment to 2015 Code Art 10.6.4, which combines the first two steps below into one initial step
with two elements.
2 It has been argued that since Art 10.2 intent and No (or No Significant) Fault or Negligence are
properly to be considered mutually exclusive, it is most efficient for the panel to consider any plea of
No (or No Significant) Fault or Negligence first. If that plea is accepted, necessarily the violation was
not intentional within the meaning of Art 10.2; but if the plea is rejected, the athlete may still argue his
violation was not intentional within the meaning of Art 10.2. Rigozzi et al, ‘Breaking down the process
for determining a basic sanction under the 2015 World Anti-Doping Code’, (2015) 15 ISLR 3–48,
p 19.
3 For clarity, this is discussed in the chapters that follow on the basis that the ADRV in question is a first
offence. If the person charged committed one or more previous doping offences within ten years of the
Code violation under consideration, the period of ineligibility for the new violation will be increased
to reflect the fact that it is a second (or subsequent) offence: see Code Art 10.7 (Multiple Violations).
However, the previous violation may be disregarded (a) if the same facts would not have amounted to
a violation under current rules (UCI v Ullrich, CAS 2010/A/2083, paras 72–77: first offence involving
use of amphetamines out of competition ignored for purposes of Code Art 10.7)); or (b) if the athlete
or other person was found to bear No Fault or Negligence for it (Code Art 10.7.3).
CHAPTER C17
Basic Period of Ineligibility (1):

Applying Code Articles 10.2 and 10.3
Contents
. para
1 OVERVIEW......................................................................................................... C17.1
2 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.1 VIOLATION
A The basic rule: four years if the ADRV was intentional, two years if it
was not......................................................................................................... C17.2
B The special meaning of ‘intentional’ in the context of Art 10.2.................. C17.3
C Is proof of origin required in order to prove intent/lack of intent?.............. C17.4
D Proving lack of intent in the context of Art 10.2: the test is subjective, not
objective....................................................................................................... C17.7
E Proving lack of intent in the context of Art 10.2: the second limb
(‘indirect’ intent).......................................................................................... C17.8
3 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.2 VIOLATION........................ C17.12
6 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR ART 2.5 VIOLATION............................... C17.16
11 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.10 VIOLATION...................... C17.24
12 PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.11 VIOLATION...................... C17.25
1 OVERVIEW
C17.1 The starting point in determining the applicable period of ineligibility for an
Article 2 ADRV is to refer to Code Articles 10.2 and 10.3. Between them, these two
Articles set out the basic period of ineligibility for each ADRV:
(a) A violation of Art 2.1 (presence of a prohibited substance in an athlete’s
sample), Art 2.2 (Use or Attempted Use), or Art 2.6 (Possession), attracts a
four-year basic sanction if the violation is found to be intentional, and a two-
year basic sanction if it is not. The violation is presumed to be intentional if
the substance in question is not a Specified Substance (as defined in Code Art
4.2.2), and therefore a ban of four years will apply unless the athlete or other
person rebuts the presumption by persuading the panel that the violation was
not intentional (in which case the ban would go down to two years). On the
other hand, if the violation involves a Specified Substance, it is presumed to be
unintentional, and therefore a two-year ban will apply unless the Anti-Doping
Organization proves that the violation was intentional (in which case it would
go up to four years).1
(b) For a violation of Art 2.3 (refusal or failure to submit to or other evasion of
sample collection), the basic sanction is again a four-year ban, because the
violation will have been proved to be intentional in order for the charge to be
upheld. The only exception is where an athlete’s Article 2.3 failure to submit
to sample collection is found to have been negligent rather than intentional,2 in
which case a two-year ban will apply prima facie.3
(c) For a violation of Art 2.4 (three whereabouts violations in a 12-month period),
a ban of two years will apply (because the athlete must have been ‘at least
negligent’ in committing the three filing failures and/or missed tests), ‘subject
to reduction down to a minimum of one year, depending on the Athlete’s degree
of fault’.4
(d) For a violation of Art 2.5 (Tampering or Attempted Tampering), the basic
sanction is again a four-year ban, because the violation will have been proved
to be intentional in order for the charge to be upheld.5
(e) For a violation of Art 2.7 (Trafficking or Attempted Trafficking) or Art 2.8
(Administration or Attempted Administration), each a serious intentional
violation, the basic sanction is a ban of ‘a minimum of four years up to lifetime
Ineligibility’.6
(e) For a violation of Art 2.9 (complicity), another intentional violation, the basic
sanction is a ban of ‘a minimum of two years, up to four years, depending on
the seriousness of the violation’ (2015 Code Art 10.3.4).7 The 2021 Code has
raised, the upper limit of the permitted range to a lifetime ban.8
(f) For a violation of Art 2.10 (Prohibited Association), the basic sanction is a ban
of ‘two years, subject to reduction down to a minimum of one year, depending
on the Athlete or other Person’s degree of Fault and other circumstances of the
case’ (without any explanation of what such ‘other circumstances’ might be).9
(g) For an Article 2.11 violation (Retaliation), the basic sanction will be ‘a minimum
of two years, up to lifetime Ineligibility, depending on the seriousness of the
violation’.10
1 Code Art 10.2. See para C17.2 et seq.
2 See para C8.2(a)(iii).
3 Code Art 10.3.1. See para C17.13.
6 Code Art 10.3.3. See para C17.21 and C17.22.
7 See para C17.23.
8 2021 Code Art 10.3.4.
9 2021 Code Art 10.3.5.
10 2021 Code Art 10.3.6.
2 THE PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR AN ART 2.1 VIOLATION
A The basic rule: four years if the ADRV was intentional, two
years if it was not
C17.2 Code Art 10.2 provides1 that:

(a) an Art 2.1 violation involving a non-Specified Substance is presumed to be
intentional,2 because such substances (eg anabolic agents, rEPO) are notorious
doping substances with significant potential to enhance sports performance,3
and therefore the basic period of ineligibility is four years, unless the athlete
establishes (on the balance of probabilities) that the violation was unintentional,
in which case the basic period of ineligibility is reduced to two years;4 whereas
(b) an Art 2.1 violation involving a Specified Substance, ie a substance that is
‘more likely to have been consumed or used by an Athlete for a purpose other
Basic Period of Ineligibility (1): Applying Code Articles 10.2 and 10.3 917
than the enhancement of sport performance’,5 is presumed to be unintentional,

and therefore the basic period of ineligibility is only two years, unless the Anti-
Doping Organization establishes (most likely, to the standard of comfortable
satisfaction of the hearing panel6) that the violation was intentional, in which
case the basic period of ineligibility goes up to four years.7
Article 10.2.4.1 of the 2021 Code introduced an exception to the above rules where
the substance found in the athlete’s sample is a ‘Substance of Abuse’, ie it is one
of ‘those Prohibited Substances which are specifically identified as Substances of
Abuse on the Prohibited List because they are frequently abused in society outside
of the context of sport’.8 In such cases, if the athlete can establish that the ingestion
or use occurred out of competition ‘and was unrelated to sport performance’, the ban
will be three months (with a possible reduction to one month if the athlete completes
an appropriate treatment programme); whereas ‘if the ingestion, Use or Possession
occurred In-Competition, and the Athlete can establish that the context of the
ingestion, Use or Possession was unrelated to sport performance, then the ingestion,
Use or Possession shall not be considered intentional for purposes of Article 10.2.1
[…]’.9
1 2021 Code Art 10.2 reads: ‘10.2.1 The period of Ineligibility, subject to Article 10.2.4, shall be four
years where: 10.2.1.1 The anti-doping rule violation does not involve a Specified Substance, unless the
Athlete or other Person can establish that the anti-doping rule violation was not intentional. 10.2.1.2
The anti-doping rule violation involves a Specified Substance and the Anti-Doping Organization can
establish that the anti-doping rule violation was intentional. 10.2.2 If Article 10.2.1 does not apply,
subject to Article 10.2.4.1, the period of Ineligibility shall be two years’.
2 FEI v Filho, FEI Tribunal decision dated 25 April 2019, para 11.3 (‘When a Prohibited Substance
such as Boldenone [an anabolic agent] is found in an athlete’s sample, a clear and unequivocal
presumption arises under the ADRHA that it was used or administered deliberately in an attempt
to enhance his/her performance’’); Scott v ITF, CAS 2018/A/5768, para 128 (it follows from the
language of Art 10.2.1.1 that Art 10.2.1 ‘presumes in cases involved non-Specified Substances that
the Athlete acted intentionally’) and para 131 (‘It clearly follows from TADP Article 10.2.1 that
the burden of proof is on the Athlete to convince the Panel that he did not act intentionally because
the provision presumes intention on the part of the Athlete’); Schwazer v IAAF & NADO Italia &
FIDAL & WADA, CAS 2016/A/4707, para 101 (where the substance found in the athlete’s sample is
testosterone, ‘[t]he burden of proof to demonstrate and to rebut the legal presumption of having acted
intentionally lies with the Appellant’); IAAF v Adekoya, Disciplinary Tribunal decision dated 18 July
2019, para 92 (‘Where the Athlete is unable to establish the origin of a non-specified Substance there
is a presumption of intentional doping […]’). Cf UK Anti-Doping v Graham, NADP Tribunal decision
dated 27 August 2015, para 28 (‘We do not consider that it is necessary or helpful to characterise
Article 10.2.1 as creating any such “presumptions”. Rather, in our view Article 10.2.1 simply identifies
two circumstances in which the period of Ineligibility will be four years unless the specified party
establishes the requisite intent or lack of it’).
3 Rigozzi et al, ‘Breaking down the process for determining a basic sanction under the 2015 World Anti-
Doping Code’, 15 ISLJ 3-48, p 29 (‘[…] certain substances will require greater evidentiary efforts
from the Athlete to establish that a violation was not intentional. The concept of Fault and cheating in
anti-doping may vary along several different axes, including the type of substance involved’); WADA v
Daiders, Daiders & FIM, CAS 2014/A/3615, para 51 (‘Furthermore, given that prohibited substances
are generally either themselves performance enhancing or masking agents of other substances which
have that propensity, the scheme established provides for the inference that such substances were
ingested for one of those two purposes. […] The person charged must, by establishing the source
to the relevant standard of proof, show that the plausible inference cannot be drawn in his case’);
IOC v Lysenko, IOC Disciplinary Commission decision dated 6 October 2016, paras 52-54 (‘[…] the
Disciplinary Commission notes that the Athlete makes no attempt to explain the source of [DHCMT]
(turinabol). [DHCMT] (turinabol) is a substance directly used as a performance enhancing doping
substance. There is therefore a simple and straightforward explanation for the fact that [DHCMT]
(turinabol) was present in the Athlete’s sample, ie its use as a doping agent for the purpose of
performance enhancement’).
The presumption is particularly strong when the nature of the substance makes it difficult to see
how it could get into the athlete’s system inadvertently, eg it is not a substance found in common
medicines or supplements. Muehlegg v FIS, CAS 2002/A/400, para 9 (‘In this case the Appellant has
not provided any explanation for how the Prohibited Substance found its way into his system and in
fact did not even appear before the Panel to be questioned on the matter. The Panel has no explanation
whatsoever as to how the analytical positive lab result occurred. In the absence of such an athlete
explanation, there is no alternative, given the nature of Aranesp and its very effective performance
enhancing effect, but for this Panel to conclude that there is no other explanation than deliberate
use’); CCES v Sheppard, SDRCC decision dated 12 September 2005, para 40 (‘The human body
does not normally produce rEPO, and its presence in the body of an athlete is therefore indicative of
the intentional administration of an external substance’); USADA v Youngquist, AAA Panel decision
dated 28 February 2005, para 5.2 (‘[…] as dictated by common sense, an athlete who tests positive for
r-EPO cannot contend that she was unaware of, or simply negligent in, how that happened. This is not
a substance found in over-the-counter supplements or that occurs naturally. Youngquist had to know
that she was taking a banned substance, or was grossly negligent in not knowing’); Guinez v UCI et al,
CAS 2016/A/4828, para 5 (the fact that the substance used at the time of the ADRV was still in clinical
trial and, thus, not available on the market, precludes the athlete to demonstrate that the prohibited
substance could have unintentionally entered his body’).
4 Code Art 10.2.1.1.
5 Comment to Code Art 4.2.2 (‘The Specified Substances and Methods identified in Article 4.2.2
should not in any way be considered less important or less dangerous than other doping substances
or methods. Rather, they are simply substances and methods which are more likely to have been
consumed or used by an Athlete for a purpose other than the enhancement of sport performance’).
The distinction in treatment makes it vital, of course, to know what is and what is not a ‘Specified
Substance’. 2015 Code Art 4.2.2 states: ‘For purposes of the application of Article 10, all Prohibited
Substances shall be Specified Substances except substances in the classes of anabolic agents and
hormones and those stimulants and hormone antagonists and modulators so identified on the Prohibited
List. The category of Specified Substances shall not include Prohibited Methods’; and 2021 Code Art
4.2.2 states: ‘For purposes of the application of Article 10, all Prohibited Substances shall be Specified
Substances except as identified on the Prohibited List. No Prohibited Method shall be a Specified
Method unless it is specifically identified as a Specified Method on the Prohibited List’.
In contrast, Art 10.3 of the 2003 Code provided that Specified Substances would be identified by
exception on each year’s Prohibited List, on the basis that they were ‘substances which are particularly
susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rules [sic] violations because of their general availability in
medicinal products or which are less likely to be successfully abused as doping agents’. Because of
the much greater potential for mitigation of sanction in the case of Specified Substances that was
introduced by the 2009 Code, many athletes tried to argue that the substance found in their sample,
though not classified in the Prohibited List as a Specified Substance, was equivalent to and therefore
should be treated for sanctioning purposes as if it were a Specified Substance, on the basis that it was
also ‘particularly susceptible to unintentional anti-doping rule violations’, and/or ‘generally available
in medicinal products’, and/or ‘less likely to be successfully abused as doping agents’. However, CAS
panels consistently rejected those attempts on the basis that they were bound by the classification of
substances set out in the Prohibited List. WADA v Lund & USADA, CAS OG 06/001, para 4.8 (‘If
International Federations or anti-doping Organizations are unhappy with the contents of the Prohibited
List, they must persuade WADA to change the list. It is not within the jurisdiction of this CAS panel
to make that decision’); Squizzato v FINA, CAS 2005/A/830, para 10.2.8 (rejecting an argument that
a substance that was not classified as a Specified Substance should be treated as if it was a Specified
Substance: ‘Nothing exists in the legislative history of DC 10.3 to indicate that the Panel can apply this

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Sport: Law and Practice

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

ISBN: PB 978 1 52650 926 0

Typeset by Evolution Design & Digital Ltd (Kent)

• As a politician in the early to mid-1990s and now a Member of the House of

no fault or negligence or no significant fault or negligence for the violation (Chapter

Part G (Liability Arising out of Participation in Sport) describes the circumstances

Adam Lewis QC Jonathan Taylor QC

PART A GOVERNANCE OF THE SPORTS SECTOR 1

CHAPTER A2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SPORTS

CHAPTER A3 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE SPORTS

CHAPTER A4 DATA PROTECTION AND SPORT (Emma Drake) 171

CHAPTER A5 BEST PRACTICE IN SPORTS GOVERNANCE

3 PUTTING THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE INTO PRACTICE 270

PART B REGULATING SPORT 291

CHAPTER B2 SELECTION (Elizabeth Riley and Christopher Stoner QC) 391

CHAPTER B3 MISCONDUCT (Kendrah Potts, Stuart Tennant, and

CHAPTER B4 MATCH-FIXING AND RELATED CORRUPTION IN

CHAPTER B5 REGULATING FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY (Nick Craig,

CHAPTER B6 SAFEGUARDING (Kate Gallafent QC and Richard Bush) 642

PART C ANTI-DOPING REGULATION AND

CHAPTER C2 THE ANTI-DOPING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER C3 PARTIES (Jonathan Taylor QC and Adam Lewis QC) 687

CHAPTER C4 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS IN BRINGING

CHAPTER C5 BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF AT THE

CHAPTER C6 ARTICLE 2.1 ADRV – THE PRESENCE OF A

CHAPTER C7 ARTICLE 2.2 ADRV –AN ATHLETE’S USE OR

CHAPTER C8 ARTICLE 2.3 CHARGE – REFUSING OR FAILING TO

CHAPTER C9 ARTICLE 2.4 ADRV – THREE WHEREABOUTS

CHAPTER C10 ARTICLE 2.5 ADRV – TAMPERING OR ATTEMPTED

CHAPTER C11 ARTICLE 2.6 ADRV – POSSESSION OF A

CHAPTER C12 ARTICLE 2.7 ADRV – TRAFFICKING OR

CHAPTER C13 ARTICLE 2.8 ADRV – ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER C14 ARTICLE 2.9 ADRV – COMPLICITY OR

CHAPTER C15 ARTICLE 2.10 ADRV – PROHIBITED ASSOCIATION

CHAPTER C16 CODE SANCTIONS: OVERVIEW OF APPROACH TO

CHAPTER C17 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (1): APPLYING

CHAPTER C18 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (2):

2 THE FIRST THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT FOR BOTH NO FAULT OR

CHAPTER C19 BASIC PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY (3):

CHAPTER C20 DETERMINING THE LENGTH OF THE

CHAPTER C21 SUSPENDING OR REDUCING SANCTIONS FOR

CHAPTER C22 DETERMINING THE START DATE OF THE

CHAPTER C23 DISQUALIFICATION OF RESULTS AND FINANCIAL

PART D DISCIPLINARY AND ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS 1101

CHAPTER D2 THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR COURT

CHAPTER D3 ARBITRATION IN SPORT (Ian Mill QC and

PART E CHALLENGES TO THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS

CHAPTER E2 THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS GOVERNING

7 ACTIONS AFFECTING COMMERCIAL PARTNERS 1284

CHAPTER E3 IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND

CHAPTER E4 CHOICE OF FORUM FOR THE CHALLENGE

CHAPTER E5 PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? (Nick De Marco

CHAPTER E6 THE VARYING DEGREES OF REVIEW

CHAPTER E7 GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ARISING OUT OF

CHAPTER E8 CONTRACT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

CHAPTER E9 TORT (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

CHAPTER E10 COMMON LAW RESTRAINT OF TRADE

CHAPTER E11 EU AND UK COMPETITION LAW RULES AND

CHAPTER E12 EU FREE MOVEMENT RULES and SPORT

CHAPTER E13 THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 AND SPORT

CHAPTER E14 DISCRIMINATION IN SPORT (Emily Neill and

CHAPTER E15 REMEDIES (Nick De Marco QC, James Segan QC,

PART C ANTI-DOPING REGULATION AND

PART E CHALLENGES TO THE ACTIONS OF SPORTS

PART F RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CLUBS AND

PART G LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF PARTICIPATION