Necessity Lost Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy Volume 1 Sanford Shieh Full Chapter

Necessity Lost: Modality And Logic In
Early Analytic Philosophy, Volume 1

Sanford Shieh
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/necessity-lost-modality-and-logic-in-early-analytic-phil
osophy-volume-1-sanford-shieh/
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page i — #1

i i
Necessity Lost
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page ii — #2

i i
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page iii — #3

i i
Necessity Lost
Modality and Logic in Early Analytic
Philosophy
Volume I
Sanford Shieh
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page iv — #4

i i
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Sanford Shieh 2019
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018962715
ISBN 978–0–19–922864–5
Typeset by Sanford Shieh
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page v — #5

i i
For Mihaela
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page vi — #6

i i
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page vii — #7

i i
Contents
Preface xiii
Abbreviations xxi
Introduction 1
Necessity Lost: Frege 2
Necessity Lost: Russell 6
Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained 10
Closing Remarks 12
Part I. Frege
1. The Modalities of Judgment 17
1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic 18
1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic 18
1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic 20
1.1.3 Problems of Traditional Logic 27
1.1.4 The Fregean Solution 29
1.2 Frege’s Early Conception of Judgment 33
1.3 Frege against Kant in Begriffsschrift 39
1.4 Modality in Frege’s Begriffsschrift 49
2. Amodalism 57
2.1 Two Interpretations of Frege on Modality 58
2.2 Truth is Absolute 61
2.2.1 Against Hilbert and Korselt 62
2.2.2 Thoughts are not Temporal or Spatial 66
2.3 Amodalism 68
2.4 Early Truth Absolutism and Amodalism 71
2.5 Inadequate Grounds for Amodalism 73
3. From Judgment to Amodalism 77

3.1 Judgment and Truth after the Sense/Reference Distinction 79
3.2 Redundancy against the Predication Analysis 83
3.2.1 More Varieties of Redundancy 87
3.2.2 Doubts about Redundancy 88
3.2.3 Summary 89
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page viii — #8

i i
viii contents
3.3 The Indefinability of Truth 89

3.4 What is a Step to a Truth-Value? 96
3.5 The Recognitional Conception of Judgment 99
3.5.1 The Supervenience of Truth-Predicating Judgments 100
3.5.2 Judgment as Recognition 102
3.5.3 Recognition as Step to the Level of Referents 102
3.5.4 Thoughts (Gedanken) as Representations
(Vorstellungen) 103
3.5.5 The Constitution of the Step to a Truth-Value 108
3.5.6 The Recognitional Conception and Redundancy 111
3.5.7 Nugatio ab Omnia Nævo Vindicatus 113
3.5.8 Two Worries 115
3.5.9 The Recognitional Conception and Object-Relation
Interpretations 119
3.5.10 Recognition and Acknowledgment 120
3.6 Judgment, Judging, and Factivity 124
3.6.1 Against the Factivity of Fregean Judgment 124
3.6.2 For the Factivity of Fregean Judgment 126
3.6.3 Judging vs. Judgment; Holding True vs.
Acknowledgment of Truth 127
3.6.4 The Independence of Truth from
Acknowledgment of Truth 130
3.6.5 A Letter to Jourdain 131
3.7 Apparent Thoughts 133
3.8 The Basic Argument for Truth Absolutism 136
3.9 The Basic Argument before the Sense/Reference
Distinction? 140
3.10 A Concluding Remark 143
4. The Truth in Modalism 145

4.1 Parts of Thoughts 146
4.1.1 Between Begriffsschrift and the Sense/Reference
Distinction 147
4.1.2 After the Sense/Reference Distinction 153
4.1.3 Multiple Analyses 154
4.2 Fregean Accounts of Temporalism 156
4.2.1 Senses expressed as a Function of Time 157
4.2.2 Another Argument against Temporalism 158
4.2.3 Senses presenting Times as Parts of Thoughts 167
4.2.4 Temporal Modal Discourse 169
4.3 Fregean Accounts of Circumstantialism 170
4.3.1 A Parallel to Temporalism 170
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page ix — #9

i i
contents ix
4.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts, I 173

4.3.3 Metaphysical Modal Discourse, I 175
4.3.4 Circumstances as Thoughts, II 176
4.3.5 Metaphysical Modal Discourse, II 182
4.3.6 Concluding Remark 184
4.4 Analyticity, Apriority, and Modality 185
5. The Nature of Logic 192

5.1 Frege’s Main Characterizations of Logic 193
5.1.1 Universality or Generality (Allgemeinheit) 193
5.1.2 Logical Laws are Truths 195
5.1.3 The Justification of Logical Laws 197
5.1.4 Primitive and Dependent Truths 200
5.1.5 Logical and other Sources of Knowledge 201
5.1.6 Primitive Truths, Axioms and Justificational
Independence 203
5.1.7 Self-Evidence and Self-Sufficiency 205
5.2 The Constitution of Justificational Self-Sufficiency 210
5.2.1 Semantics and Soundness Arguments 213
5.2.2 Soundness Arguments as Logicality Arguments 219
5.2.3 Is Frege giving Logicality Arguments? 221
5.2.4 A Problem for Logicality Arguments 226
5.2.5 An Alternative to the Logicality Interpretation? 229
Part II. Russell and Moore

6. From Idealism to Logicism 233
6.1 Bradley’s Theory of Modality 234
6.1.1 Hypothetical Judgments 234
6.1.2 Judgments of Necessity and Possibility 238
6.2 Geometry, Logic, and Necessity 241
6.2.1 Kant on Geometry and the Problem of
Non-Euclidean Geometries 241
6.2.2 Differences with Kant: Syntheticity, Apriority, and
Necessity 244
6.2.3 The Transcendental Justification of Projective
Geometry 246
6.3 The Ultimate Indemonstrability of Necessity 249
6.4 Necessity and Logicism 254
6.4.1 Main Features of Axioms 254
6.4.2 The Logical Calculus and Analysis of Manifolds 257
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page x — #10

i i
x contents
6.4.3
The Main Problem of Russell’s Account of the
Logical Calculus 266
6.5 Concluding Summary 267
7. The Rejection of Modality 270

7.1 The Path to the Rejection of Modality 271
7.2 Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 276
7.3 Moore’s Critique of Bradley’s Theory of Judgment 279
7.4 Moore’s Metaphysics of Judgment, Propositions, and Truth 287
7.5 Russell’s Metaphysics of Propositions 295
7.5.1 Terms, Being, and Existence 295
7.5.2 Things, Concepts, and Modes of Occurrence 296
7.5.3 The Unity of the Proposition 297
7.5.4 Denoting Concepts 299
7.6 Moore’s Critique of Kant’s View of Necessity 300
7.7 Russell’s Amodalism 305
8. Completing the Rejection of Idealism 309

8.1 Russell against Bradley in Principles 309
8.2 Bradley on Metaphysics and the Composition of Wholes 314
8.2.1 The Argument against Psychological Atomism 316
8.2.2 The Regress Argument against the Relations 318
8.3 Bradley’s Regresses, Sufficient Reason, and Modality 322
8.4 Parts and Wholes in Principles 329
8.4.1 Russell’s Doctrine 329
8.4.2 Aggregates 331
8.4.3 Unities 333
9. Logic and Implication 336

9.1 Inference and Formal Implication 337
9.2 The Generality of Logic 344
9.3 Problems of Formal Implication 347
9.3.1 The Composition of Propositions of Formal
Implication 348
9.3.2 The Inferential Justification of Formal Implications 350
9.4 The Materiality and Indefinability of Implication 352
9.5 Whence Material Implication? 361
9.6 Implication in Principia 365
10. The Continuing Banishment of Modality 371

10.1 Moore on Necessity as Logical Priority 371
10.2 Russell on Necessity as Logical Priority 374
10.3 Our “Feelings” of Necessity 376
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xi — #11

i i
contents xi
10.3.1 The Feeling from Apriority 378

10.3.2 The Feeling from Demonstrability 381
10.3.3 The Feeling from Analyticity 382
10.3.4 The Feeling from Generality 385
10.3.5 The Significance of the Feelings 388
10.3.6 The Significance of “Necessity and Possibility” 389
10.4 After “Necessity and Possibility” 391
10.4.1 “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley” (1910) 391
10.4.2 The Problems of Philosophy (1912) 391
10.4.3 “On the Notion of Cause” (1912–13) 393
10.4.4 The Theory of Knowledge (1913) 393
10.4.5 Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) 394
10.4.6 “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918–19) 395
10.4.7 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1919) 400
Postscript 404
Bibliography 409
Index of Names 429
Subject Index 432
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xii — #12

i i
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xiii — #13

i i
Preface
I have found that philosophy often calls on me to solve problems, but, almost
equally often, also to figure out why what I’m trying to solve are problems and
why what I’m doing are attempts at solutions. No doubt others find themselves
facing different demands, but, for me these two aspects of philosophizing have
always been inescapable, indeed, not altogether separable.
This book, ultimately, comes from the second of these demands.
Many of the problems and strategies of solution of recent philosophy in the
analytic tradition live in a background constituted of the concepts of necessity,
possibility, and contingency, often in the striking guise of Leibniz’s possible worlds.
My interest is to figure out how modal notions forms such a crucial framework
for posing and answering philosophical questions. I approach this question by
examining the philosophical history of modality in analytic philosophy.
This book is the first result of this examination.
Philosophical history is, of course, philosophy first and history second. The
secondness of history in philosophical history does not, however, mean that it’s
of secondary importance, especially for my purposes.
It is no secret that anachronism is a danger when one tries to understand texts
from other philosophical traditions. It is equally a danger in reading texts that
one thinks of as belonging to an earlier period of a philosophical tradition that
one would like to call one’s own. This danger need not be fatal. Anachronism
could be philosophically fruitful; many would point to P. F. Strawson’s The
Bounds of Sense as a successful philosophical history in spite of the justice it fails
to do to the Critique of Pure Reason.
However, anachronism in reading Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E.
Moore, C. I. Lewis, or Ludwig Wittgenstein sometimes leads to less inspiring
results: projecting onto them the philosophical concerns we have or turning
them into the heroes and villains of a tale whose happy outcome is the way we
do philosophy now, if not the philosophical positions we hold now. There is,
of course, something to be said for making the writings of these philosophers
simpler for us, now, to understand. One may also take such just-so stories of
how contemporary philosophizing came to be as arguments for contemporary
methods and positions, so that the interest of these stories lies, not in the accuracy
of their historical representations, but in the cogency of the arguments that they
embody.
It’s harder to see how one could really learn something from our philosophical
predecessors by such procedures.
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xiv — #14

i i
xiv preface
Perhaps, as it has been urged, we can never escape ourselves when we attempt
to understand earlier philosophy. But that doesn’t preclude making the attempt to
become conscious of how our assumptions may stand in the way of philosophical
understanding. It is through such an attempt that we can come to learn something,
from our fore-bearers, and about ourselves. The philosophical interest and
fruitfulness that might result are what I hope for, for this book.
In one way, the beginnings of this project really go back to a Ph.D. dissertation
that I did not write, with a supervisor I did not have.
Burton Dreben was to be that supervisor. I had been interested in Frege ever
since I read Foundations of Arithmetic in a tutorial with Jonathan Barnes. However,
the Frege I encountered in that tutorial seemed quite different from the one Burt
urged on me in our long but somehow never conclusive conversations. Burt’s
Frege, as elaborated in Warren Goldfarb’s classes on early analytic philosophy
and the writings of Tom Ricketts and Joan Weiner, was the one inhabiting
Emerson Hall. Warren, my actual Doktorvater, together with Tom, suggested
that I think through the differences between the picture of Frege I found around
me and the massive landmark interpretation of Frege propounded by Sir Michael
Dummett. Ultimately, though, that plan for a dissertation came to naught.
One reason was that I had come to keep company with Riki Heck and Jason
Stanley. I found them, and later, Ian Proops and Jamie Tappenden, expressing
many of the reservations I had about Burt’s Frege. However, the effect of
thinking more about these reservations was that it became harder and harder
for me to pinpoint what exactly are the disagreements between the two styles
of understanding Frege. Both left me dissatisfied in one way or the other, but I
didn’t have much to say beyond these dis-satisfactions.
Another reason was that the time I had spent with Dummett’s writings on
Frege led me to think about Dummett’s anti-realism and critique of classical
logic. This brought the problem-solving side of my philosophical sensibilities
to the fore, and I ended up devising ways of defending Sir Michael’s anti-realism
and, at the same time, of turning aside the critique of classical logic he used it
for.
I did not come back to Frege for over a decade, quite some time after the
project of which this book is the first issue truly began. There were two proximate
causes. One was Peter Momtchiloff’s asking me if I would be interested in writing
something on the role of modality in analytic philosophy. I am sure he did not
expect that nothing would come of that request for over ten years. I thank him
for his patience over all this time and hope to make it up to him by giving him
Volume II in short order. The other cause was Mike Beaney’s request for a
contribution to his magisterial Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. In
the course and then the aftermath of writing that essay, I came gradually to
see that, to do justice to the topic, much more was required than the book I
had outlined to Peter. Some of what was required is the discussion of Frege in
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xv — #15

i i
preface xv
this book, and this material, I venture to say, might have formed part of that
dissertation I did not write.
As I worked on this book, I was fortunate to have had the help, encouragement,
and philosophical companionship of many friends, colleagues, and teachers.
A handful of these made a decisive difference in the writing of this book.
I have been philosophizing with Juliet Floyd ever since we shared an office.
We have long talked about the great thinkers at the inception of the analytic
tradition—Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Harry Sheffer, and C. I. Lewis, and
about the generation after them—Carnap and Quine. Our collaboration on
Future Pasts shaped my conception of the history of analytic philosophy and
the fruitful philosophical prosecution of it. But, more recently, she has been a
tremendous influence on my thinking about the role of modality in early analytic
philosophy; above all else, she was willing to confirm my sense of how to read
Frege and Russell on modality, and to give me the courage to follow that sense
to interpretations that seemed outlandish. She also gave me over and over,
opportunities to talk about my views at the Boston Early Analytic Philosophy
Workshop which she organized.
Robert May and I have been talking about Frege for almost as long as I have
been working on this book. He suggested to me, shortly after we met, that for
my project I should consider Frege’s criticisms of Hilbert. This was das erlösende
Wort, pointing the way to my realizing just how deep in Frege’s philosophy lie
the wellsprings of his opposition to modality. Since then I have regularly stolen
Robert’s ideas about Frege; in particular, I got from him the idea of judgment
as factive, that is, as implying truth, which plays a central role in Part I of this
book. I hope that it will be worth Robert’s while repaying the favor.
I met Gary Ebbs when he was junior faculty at Harvard, and we have been
discussing our common preoccupations—anti-realism, early analytic philosophy,
and the dialogue between Quine and Carnap—ever since. I learn something
from every one of our conversations; but, in the case of this book, there were
several pivotal discussions. One was on Russell’s material implication, where his
questions about how the idea made any sense prompted me to a much better
understanding of Russell’s conception of logic. Another discussion sharpened
my view of Russell’s rejection of British absolute idealism. Two others were on
Frege: Gary got me to articulate much more fully why Frege resisted senses
that presented referents relative to contextual factors, and to clarify for myself
what of the conception of judgment I discern in Frege is truly essential.
Ian Proops has been a great friend since graduate school. I have learned a
tremendous amount from his writings on Russell and on the Tractatus, especially
where I disagree. More recently, he has given me expert advice on Kant. Ian
is never doctrinaire in conversation, and his thorough command of the texts
inevitably keeps me on the straight and narrow. If we’ve not had the chance to
talk about Russell over the years, this book would certainly be the poorer.
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xvi — #16

i i
xvi preface
Arata Hamawaki is another friend and longstanding philosophical interlocutor

from graduate school. We have spent countless hours meandering through all
sorts of highways and byways of philosophy; that we never seem to arrive
anywhere is part, indeed the main part, of the illumination, not to mention
the fun, of Arata’s philosophical presence. I was extremely happy that I could
have him as a colleague for a whole year, to indulge at length in this aimless
philosophizing. Most recently, Arata, together with Keren Gorodeisky, got me
over the final impediment to finishing this book, by providing me with a way
out of a sticky point in my interpretation of Frege’s response to Kant’s table of
judgments.
I wish to thank those who generously gave of their valuable time to read and
comment on earlier versions of parts of this book. Max Weiss suffered through
quite a few variations of my ideas about Frege’s conception of logic, and about
modality in analytic philosophy. Mark Textor’s critical replies to my account
of Frege’s conceptions of judgment, thought, and truth enabled me to sharpen
my discussion immeasurably, even if I cannot fully allay all his worries. Jessica
Leech patiently explained to me her view of Kant’s modalities of judgment, and
her insightful questions about my view of Frege’s response to Kant led me to
correct a critical mistake. Cheryl Misak not only helped with my discussion of
Russell and Lewis, but she also shared with me the manuscript of her recent
wonderful book, Cambridge Pragmatism.
I would like to thank two anonymous readers for Oxford University Press
for their responses to the manuscript of this book. One of them certainly went
way beyond the call of duty in furnishing me with extensive helpful comments.
These comments demanded some concentrated reworking and expansion of
my arguments resulting in significant improvements.
I’m grateful for all the questions and criticisms I received at presentations
of my views. In particular, I thank Roberta Ballarin, Paddy Blanchette, Jim
Conant, Cora Diamond, David Hunter, Mike Kremer, Sandra Lapointe, Tom
Stoneham, and Peter Sullivan.
Many others have, in one way or another, wittingly or otherwise, helped to
make this book possible. Chief among these are my other Doktorvater, Charles
Parsons, and my other former office-mate, Nancy Bauer. In addition, I thank
Stewart Candlish, Emily Carson, Philip Ebert, Fan Zhao, Eli Friedlander, Michael
Glanzberg, Michael Hallett, Jeremy Heis, Peter Hylton, Kelly Jolley, Greg Landini,
Bernie Linsky, Tom Lockhart, David Macarthur, Eric Marcus, Jim O’Shea, Mark
Richard, Marcus Rossberg, and Ian Rumfitt.
I have undoubtedly missed others; my apologies and my thanks.
It would be remiss of me not to mention Jean-Philippe Narboux, with whom
I have not discussed the details of the present book, but only of the next volume.
Although I have known him since 2003, it wasn’t until we had occasion to talk at
length in 2011 that I discovered how much he shares my philosophical sensibilities.
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xvii — #17

i i
preface xvii
I’m also grateful for his persistence in finding my conception of early analytic
philosophy intelligible and useful.
I wish to recall two exemplary philosophers who are no longer with us.
Sir Michael Dummett was extremely kind in taking the time to discuss with
me my ideas about what his anti-realism really is. I doubt he was ever fully
convinced, but perhaps that is as much a reflection of his philosophical integrity
as it is of my philosophical shortcomings. No doubt it has always been easier to
place a label on some position one wishes, for some reason, to reject, than it is to
do the work of understanding it. The lesson that I eventually came to learn from
my discussions with Sir Michael is that this has been the fate of his ever-evolving
conceptions of anti-realism. Anti-realism has been stuffed into a pigeonhole
entitled “verificationism,” so that the subtlety of thinking and the courage to
face philosophical difficulties that one would encounter in Sir Michael’s writings
can be that much more easily avoided.
It was a privilege to have gotten to know Ruth Marcus and to have spent time
with her thinking about her work and mine over the course of some three years.
She was, as anyone who knew her or knows her writings would expect, unstinting
in her criticism of what she found wanting. But she was equally unstinting in
her openness to the possibility of perspectives other than her own, so long as
they are, as she puts it, serious about philosophy.
I have also benefited from the support of many institutions.
First among these to which I wish to express my gratitude is the Society for the
Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy. Sandra Lapointe, its founder and
president, has created a truly vibrant intellectual community. The regular annual
conferences and sessions at the American Philosophical Association meetings
have made it possible for all those interested in the philosophical history of the
analytic tradition to present their ideas and receive helpful feedback. I would
like also to thank the host institutions of the annual conferences I attended, and
the philosophers there who provided support: Joan Weiner, Mark Kaplan, and
Kirk Ludwig, in addition to Gary, at Indiana University, Mathieu Marion at
Université de Quebec à Montréal, and Richard Zach at the University of Calgary.
The School of Sociology and Philosophy at Beijing Normal University, under
the leadership of Professor Jiang Yi, has organized several conferences and
workshops that have brought analytic philosophy and its history much more to
the attention of Chinese scholars. Two especially fruitful ones that I attended
were the Beijing International Conference on Wittgenstein and Contemporary
Philosophy, and the workshop on the translation of Mike Beaney’s Handbook
into Chinese. I would also like to thank Professor Jiang for inviting me to give
a course of lectures on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in 2016.
I thank the organizers of two conferences for affording me the occasion to
present my views of on Russell’s conception of logic and C. I. Lewis’s criticism
of it. These are Jean-Philippe, Steeves Demazeux, Quentin Kammer, Timur
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xviii — #18

i i
xviii preface
Uçan, and Henri Wagner for the Colloquium “La relativisation de l’a priori,”
at Université Bordeaux Montaigne, and Eric Loomis, Ted Poston, and Richard
Fumerton for the Orange Beach Epistemology Workshop. In addition, I thank
the European Society for Analytic Philosophy for organizing its 2017 Congress
of Analytic Philosophy, at which I participated in an especially stimulating panel
with Robert May and Mark Textor.
I’m grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for awarding me a
Fellowship Grant, #FB-58111-15, that made possible a year of concentrated work
on this book.
I thank my colleagues, past and present, at Wesleyan University for the
fine intellectual setting they’ve created. I have had interesting philosophical
discussions with Lori Gruen, Steve Angle, Joe Rouse, Steve Horst, and Kent
Bendall. I’m especially grateful to Lori for her steadfast encouragement of my
work. Wesleyan University itself has also played a continuing role in supporting
my research. In particular, I wish to single out two academic deans, Joyce
Jacobsen and Andy Curran, for their timely help.
In preparing this book for publication, I used open-source software written by
volunteers who generously committed their time and expertise without remu-
neration. I’m, in the first instance, grateful to Riki Heck, for writing the original
OUP Royal LATEX document class, and for introducing me to the program LYX,
of whose development team he is a member, and using which I wrote and typeset
this book. I also thank Bennett Helm for making helpful changes to the OUP
Royal class that made my own customizations that much easier to carry out.
In addition, I thank Ivan Valbusa, the author of the biblatex-philosophy LATEX
package, and Alex Ball, the author of the biblatex-oxref package, for helping me
with customizing their code. Finally, I’m grateful to members of the tex.stack-
exchange.org community who patiently answered my seemingly endless series of
questions.
I’m sad that neither my parents nor my parents-in-law lived to hold a copy of
this book in their hands. It is small consolation, but consolation nevertheless, to
feel that they had been happy to know how much I appreciated their unflagging
support throughout the years.
Finally, and most importantly, I could not have finished this book without
my wife, Mihaela Fistioc. She has been vastly patient with my singular lack of
progress over the years, and somehow saw her way to continue encouraging me
to keep going. Although she claims to know little about the parts of philosophy
to which much of this book belongs, the acuity of her questions prompted me to
rethink and rewrite central arguments throughout the book. On Kant, about
which she knows much more than I ever will, her questions and suggestions put
me in possession of the key to my account of Frege’s reaction to the table of
judgment. Her stern editorial advice has significantly improved the readability
of this work, although, it is to be feared, not nearly enough to satisfy her high
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xix — #19

i i
preface xix
standards. But, important though these may be, they are, in the end, secondary.
The warmth of her love, and the humor and the fun with which she has invested
our life, are what make it at all worthwhile.
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xx — #20

i i
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxi — #21

i i
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are for frequently cited primary sources. Full details
of these works are in the Bibliography.
In the following list, I provide English titles for Frege’s works, with the excep-
tion of German collections of his writings and correspondence.
Writings of Frege
BLC “Boole’s Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script,” 1880
BLI Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Vol. I, 1893
BLII Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Vol. II, 1903
BS Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language of Pure Thought modelled on that of
Arithmetic, 1879
CP Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, 1984
CSR “Comments on Sense and Reference,” 1892–5
CT “Compound Thoughts,” 1923–6
FA The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the
Concept of Number, 1884
FGI “On the Foundations of Geometry: First Series,” 1903
FGII “On the Foundations of Geometry: Second Series,” 1906
IL “Introduction to Logic,” 1906
L1 “Logic,” 1879–91
L2 “Logic,” 1897
LM “Logic in Mathematics,” 1914
N “Negation,” 1918–19
NS Nachgelassene Schriften, 1969
PCN “On Mr. Peano’s Conceptual Notation and My Own,” 1897
PMC Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, 1980
PW Posthumous Writings, 1979
SK “Sources of Knowledge of Mathematics and the Mathematical Natural
Sciences,” 1924–5
SR “On Sense and Reference,” 1892
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxii — #22

i i
xxii abbreviations
T “Thought,” 1918–19
WB Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, 1969
Writings of Moore
Nec “Necessity,” 1900
NJ “The Nature of Judgment,” 1899
PE Principia Ethica, 1903
RevFG “Critical Notice of Russell, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry,”
1899
TF “Truth and Falsity,” 1901
Writings of Russell
AEE “Les axiomes propres a Euclide: Sont-ils empiriques?” 1898
AMR “An Analysis of Mathematical Reasoning,” 1898
CR “The Classification of Relations,” 1899
FG An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, 1897
FIAM “The Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics,” 1899
IMP Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 1919
IO “L’idée d’ordre et la position absolue dans l’espace et le temps,” 1901
IPST “Is Position in Time and Space Absolute or Relative?” 1901
MTCA1 “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I),” 1904
MTCA3 “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III),” 1904
NP “Necessity and Possibility,” 1905
NT1 “The Nature of Truth,” 1905
NT2 “The Nature of Truth,” 1906
NT3 “On the Nature of Truth,” 1906
NTF “On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood,” 1910
OKEW Our Knowledge of the External World, as a Field for Scientific Method in
Philosophy, 1914
PLA3 “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: Lectures V & VI,” 1919
PLA4 “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: Lectures VII & VIII,” 1919
PM Principia Mathematica, 1910
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxiii — #23

i i
abbreviations xxiii
PoL A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix of

Leading Passages, 1900
PoM The Principles of Mathematics, 1903
PoMD “The Principles of Mathematics, Draft of 1899–1900,” 1899–1900
PoP The Problems of Philosophy, 1912
RB “Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley,” 1910
TI “The Theory of Implication,” 1906
TK “The Theory of Knowledge,” 1913
Other Primary Sources

PLI Bradley, F. H., The Principles of Logic, 1883
PLII Bradley, F. H., The Principles of Logic, with Commentary and Terminal
Essays, 1922
SAT Bradley, F. H., “On Some Aspects of Truth,” 1911
AR Bradley, F. H., Appearance and Reality: a Metaphysical Essay, 1893
ETR Bradley, F. H., Essays on Truth and Reality, 1914
JL Kant, I., “The Jäsche Logic,” 2004
CPR Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, 1998
KrV Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1956
SSL Lewis, C. I., A Survey of Symbolic Logic, 1918
SL Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H., Symbolic Logic, 1932
NL Wittgenstein, L., “Notes on Logic,” 1913
NB Wittgenstein, L., Notebooks, 1914–1916, 1979
WC Wittgenstein, L., Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents
1911–1951, 2008
A Note on Citation and Translations

In citing texts of Frege and of Wittgenstein, I mostly use standard translations,
with which I do not much disagree. However, I do differ frequently from them
on a number of small points pertaining to the interpretive arguments I’m making
and so I have (mostly slightly) modified the translations. Rather than indicate
all these modifications, I always provide the original texts in footnotes.
Frege’s published works are cited in the text with the published pagination,
which is given in all of the standardly used translations; I give no page reference
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxiv — #24

i i
xxiv abbreviations
for the German text in footnotes. Frege’s unpublished writings and correspon-
dence are cited in the text with the pagination of, respectively, Posthumous Writings
(PW ) and Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (PMC ); the German text
in footnotes are cited with the pagination of, respectively, Nachgelassene Schriften
(NS ) and Briefwechsel (WB).
i i
i i
i i
“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 1 — #25

i i
Introduction
Logic, as many philosophers would agree, consists of the standards of correctness

governing all deductive reasoning. A long tradition, going back to Aristotle,
conceives of these standards in terms of the concepts of necessity and possibility:
a line of reasoning is correct if the truth of its conclusion follows necessarily
from the truth of its premises or, put differently, if it is not possible for the
conclusion to be false when the premises are true.1 While a range of conceptions
of necessity and possibility—the concepts of modality—are of central importance
in contemporary analytic philosophy, and while the philosophy of logic is an
active area of research, there is at present relatively little work on the question
of whether modality is indeed intrinsic to the standards of correctness that
constitute logic.
However, this question of the relationship between modality and logic is the
crux of a controversy which dates back to the beginnings of analytic philosophy,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The founders of analytic
philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, form one side of this controversy.
They were committed to rejecting modal notions. Thus, while they of course
accept that the correctness of deductive reasoning involves truth and falsity, they
also insist that logic has fundamentally nothing to do with modality. It is logic,
rather than modality, that lies at the foundation of their philosophies, and so
they explained away modal concepts in terms of logical ones. The other side of
the controversy consists of replies to Frege and Russell by two of their immediate
successors, C. I. Lewis and Ludwig Wittgenstein. They argue, against Frege
and Russell, that reason, truth, and logic are not conceivable independently of
modality. So for them modality is philosophically prior, and the nature of logic
is explained in terms of necessity and possibility.
The present book is the first of two volumes in which I offer a detailed account
of this controversy over the relative philosophical priority of modality and logic.
The first volume focuses on Frege and Russell’s side of the controversy. The
second volume focuses on Lewis’s and Wittgenstein’s responses to Frege and
Russell. In the next two sections of this Introduction, I will outline my main
interpretive arguments concerning Frege and Russell. I will then briefly sketch
the interpretations of Lewis and Wittgenstein to be presented in Volume II. I
will conclude with a remark on the relevance of this theme in early analytic
philosophy to contemporary analytic philosophy.
1
Aristotle himself puts it thus: “συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ὧι τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν
κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῶι ταῦτα εἶναι” (Prior Analytics: 24b18–20), that is to say, a valid
argument (συλλογισμὸς) is a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something
else results out of necessity (ἐξ ἀνάγκης).
i i
i i
i i

i i
2 introduction
Necessity Lost: Frege

My discussion of Frege begins by showing how his rejection of modality follows
from central philosophical commitments, and ends with an account of his
conception of the nature of logic.
In Chapter 1, I give the philosophical background of Frege’s view of modality in
his first book, Begriffsschrift (1879). The background is Kant’s theory of judgment.
Kant held that in making a judgment a judger forms a representation. Frege
rejects this view, and claims that judgment has nothing to do with the formation
of representations, but consists of taking a representation, however formed, to
be true. A number of commentators have noted this difference between Frege
and Kant, without, however, giving any account of why they differ.2 I show that
Frege’s grounds for this disagreement lie in one of Frege’s great achievements
in Begriffsschrift: the formulation of modern quantificational logic. Frege’s logic
resolves a number of difficulties with the traditional logic of Kant’s time, and
Frege rejects those aspects of Kant’s conception of judgment which depend on
features of traditional logic superseded by Frege’s logic. This disagreement does
not extend to Kant’s view that modality is not a feature of the representations
involved in judgments. In Begriffsschrift, Frege also holds that necessity and
possibility are not aspects of the representation involved in a judgment—the
“content” of a judgment in Frege’s terminology. For Frege, then, the judgment
that necessarily 2 + 2 = 4 has the same content as the non-modal judgment that
2 + 2 = 4. As he puts it, ascribing necessity “has no meaning for us” (BS : §4, 5,
emphasis in original).3
It is widely acknowledged that Frege’s adoption of the distinction between sense
and reference, roughly a decade after Begriffsschrift, is of central importance in his
philosophical development. Indeed, it is reasonable to divide Frege’s philosophy
into an early phase, before this distinction, and a later, post-sense/reference phase.
After the early Begriffsschrift, Frege never discusses modality. However, I show
that Frege’s later philosophy commits him to rejecting a conception of necessity
and possibility prominent in the history of philosophy, down to the present day.
There are two parts to this conception. First, necessity and possibility are modes
of truth and falsity, that is to say, different ways of being true or false. Some
thoughts or propositions are in fact true, but might have been false. Others are
not only actually true, but could not have been false. Others are in fact false,
but might have been true. Yet others are not only false, but could not have been
true. Second, what it means to say that a thought might be true or might be false
is explained in terms of alternatives to the circumstances that actually obtain:
a thought might be true if it is true in alternative, non-actual circumstances,
and might be false if it is false in alternative circumstances. This notion of
2
See, for instance, Longuenesse (1993; 2006) and Wolff (1995).
3
“so hat die Form des apodiktischen Urtheils für uns keine Bedeutung.”
i i
i i
i i

i i
necessity lost: frege 3
alternative circumstances is expressed vividly by G. W. Leibniz’s possible worlds.

In Leibnizian terms, a thought is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds,
and possibly true if it is true in some world. Thus, the concepts of necessity
and possibility require the relativization of truth and falsity: a proposition isn’t
simply true or false; rather, it is true or false relative to a set of circumstances or
a possible world. This two-part conception I call modalism. In Chapter 2, I argue
that Frege is committed to rejecting modalism, because he insists that there is no
relativization of truth and falsity. Truth is absolute, and there is no such thing
as truth in certain circumstances, as opposed to truth simpliciter. Hence there
are no modes of truth, and no classification of truths into actual, possible, or
necessary. Frege’s position I call amodalism.
In Chapter 3, I take up the question of why Frege insists on the absoluteness
of truth. The answer lies in the conceptions of judgment, truth, and thought that
underlie some puzzling and controversial positions of his later philosophy. First,
Frege claims that truth and falsity are two objects, the “truth-values” named “the
True” and “the False.” Frege holds that thoughts in general refer to one of the
truth-values, and that judgment consists in “stepping forth from a thought to a
truth-value” (SR: 35).4 Second, Frege holds that some thoughts don’t refer at all,
and are “apparent thoughts” (Scheingedanke). Third, Frege holds that ascribing
truth to a thought is in some way redundant; for example, a sentence such as
‘the thought that 5 is a prime number is true’ says no more than does the simple
sentence ‘5 is a prime number’ (SR: 34–5).5 Finally, Frege argues that truth is
not definable.
These views appear to be in some tension with one another. If truth is an
object referred to by thoughts, then isn’t it the sentence ‘the thought that Saturn
is a planet is true’ about this object, while the sentence ‘Saturn is a planet’ is
not? So how can these sentences express the same thought? Moreover, can
one not define the truth of thoughts as the property of referring to the True?
Commentators have tended to resolve these tensions by arguing that Frege
either didn’t really or shouldn’t have held one or the other of these positions.6
But I show that, properly understood, these positions reflect a single coherent
conception of judgment, truth, and thought.
The conception is this. For Frege, a thought represents something to be the
case. For example, the thought that Saturn is a planet represents an object,
Saturn, as falling under the concept of being a planet. A judgment is fundamen-
tally the recognition of the obtaining of what a thought represents. To make
4
“Urteilen kann als Fortschreiten von einem Gedanken zu seinem Wahrheitswerte gefaßt werden.”
5
“Man kann ja geradezu sagen: ‘der Gedanke, daß 5 eine Primzahl ist, ist wahr’. Wenn man aber
genauer zusieht, so bemerkt man, daß damit eigentlich nichts mehr gesagt ist als in dem einfachen
Satze ‘5 ist eine Primzahl’.”
6
For example, Heck (2007) holds that Frege should not have accepted the redundancy of truth
ascriptions, while Greimann (2007) questions whether Frege really took truth and falsity to be
objects.
i i
i i
i i

i i
4 introduction
the judgment that Saturn is a planet is to recognize that the object Saturn does
indeed fall under the concept of being a planet. Judgment is primarily knowing
what is the case, and truth is involved in judgment only secondarily: recognizing
the truth of a thought supervenes on recognizing the obtaining of what that
thought represents. By recognizing that Saturn falls under the concept of being
a planet, one thereby also recognizes the truth of the thought that Saturn is a
planet; alternatively, recognizing that this thought has the property of truth is
at bottom just recognizing that Saturn falls under the concept of being a planet.
Thus, truth is not a fundamental property of thoughts, but rather that property
of thoughts which one recognizes in virtue of recognizing the obtaining of what
thoughts represent. Finally, one of the fundamental functions of a thought is
to enable the acquisition of knowledge, which is to say, judgment. This is the
meaning of Frege’s claim that judgment is taking a step from a thought to a
truth-value: making a judgment is going beyond a mere representation of what
is the case to recognizing that what is represented actually obtains.
This conception is incompatible with the view that truth and falsity are relative
to time, space, or circumstance. If truth and falsity were relative, then a thought
would not be determined as true or false except with respect to a time, a
place, or a circumstance. From Frege’s perspective, what this purported thought
represents, by itself, without a time, place or circumstance, is not something that
one can recognize to obtain, or recognize not to obtain. Hence this purported
thought fails to provide what is required for judgment; it fails to fulfill the primary
function of thoughts and so is, at best, a defective thought, if it is a thought at all.
It is an apparent thought. The truth and falsity of genuine thoughts, in contrast,
are absolute.
In Chapter 4, I indicate how Frege explains away certain intuitions that seem to
support the relativity of truth. Intuitively it seems that a sentence like ‘France is a
monarchy’ is false in 2018 but true in 1788. Frege’s opponent would explain this
intuition by holding that this sentence expresses a thought that is false in 2018
and true in 1788. The opponent’s claim, then, is that only given a time is this
supposed thought true or false. Thus, only given a time is there such a thing as
recognizing what is represented as obtaining, or as not obtaining. From Frege’s
perspective, the only way to make sense of this idea is to take what is represented
to be something about 1788. The sentence ‘France is a monarchy’ is true in 1788,
not because it expresses a thought that is true relative to this time, but rather
because it expresses a thought about this time, and that thought is absolutely
true. An analogous account provides a Fregean explanation of sentences that
appear to be true or false relative to alternative circumstances. For Frege, the
reality underlying the purported relativization of truth to time and circumstance
is the embedding of time and circumstance in thought. On the basis of these
accounts, which explain away the appearance of truth-relativization, I show how
Frege would explain sentences that appear to ascribe necessity or possibility to
i i
i i
i i

i i
necessity lost: frege 5
thoughts. The illusion that such sentences describe modal properties is dispelled
using the logical notions of generalization and conditionalization.
What Frege is committed to rejecting is clearly only one conception of modal-
ity. What of other conceptions? What, for example, of historically important
accounts of necessity as analyticity or as apriority? In Chapter 4, I show that
neither analyticity nor apriority is philosophically fundamental for Frege. In The
Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), Frege explicitly formulates his own versions of
Kant’s analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, explaining them
in logical terms. Thus, analyses of modality as analyticity or as apriority are
also at bottom explanations of modality in terms of logical notions. Incidentally,
Frege’s account of the Kantian distinctions allows not only for synthetic a priori
truths, but also for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths.
Now, there are still other analyses of modality, not in terms of truth in al-
ternative circumstances, or analyticity, or apriority. There is, indeed, also the
view that necessity and possibility are primitive, unanalyzable concepts. Frege’s
writings give us no basis for deciding whether he would have accepted or rejected
these conceptions of modality. However, the idea that modality is primitive takes
center stage in Volume II: neither Lewis nor Wittgenstein reject the absoluteness
of truth, but take primitive notions of possibility and necessity to lie at the
foundations of logic.
In Chapter 5, I discuss what logic is for Frege. Apart from displaying the non-
modal nature of Frege’s conception of logic, this account prepares the ground
for understanding Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Frege, to be presented in Volume
II. For Frege, logic consists of standards of correctness governing all reasoning,
and is a system of truths, some of which are primitive and the remainder
of which are justified on the basis of the primitive truths. Frege conceives
of logic as determining the correctness of the justification of judgments by
inference from other judgments. In order to avoid an infinite regress, inferential
justification must rest on judgments that are not themselves inferentially justified.
These endpoints of justification divide into three kinds of judgments: those
justified by sense-perception, those justified by pure intuition of space, and those
justified by what Frege calls “the logical source of knowledge.”7 This last kind of
judgments are the primitive truths of logic. Frege suggests that primitive logical
truths are non-inferentially justified in that, in some sense, they provide their
own justifications—they are self-justifying. The central questions about Frege’s
conception of logic are: what is it for a thought to be self-justifying, and how do
we know which thoughts are self-justifying? On my reading, Frege entertains
the view that a thought is self-justifying just in case it is true in virtue of its
logical structure. However, he also has reasons for holding that there are no
non-circular arguments for demonstrating that a thought is self-justifying. Thus,
7
Frege’s phrase is “logischen . . . Erkenntnisquelle,” and it occurs in a letter to Hilbert written
in 1899 (WB: 63).
i i
i i
i i

i i
6 introduction
there are no justifications by inference for the claim that a thought is a primitive
law of logic. So, if we know that some thought is a primitive logical truth, the
source of this knowledge is not inference, but something like sense-perception or
pure intuition of space.
Necessity Lost: Russell

In contrast to Frege, there are extensive discussions of modality in Russell’s
writings. One of the most striking is an unpublished lecture, “Necessity and
Possibility,” which Russell concludes by urging that “the subject of modality
ought to be banished from logic” (NP : 520). But Russell was not always so
stridently anti-modal. As I show in Chapter 6, when Russell was an adherent of
late nineteenth-century British idealism, modality played an important role in
his philosophy of mathematics. At the beginning of Russell’s idealist period, he
held a largely Kantian view of geometry as comprising necessary truths that are
not justified either by sensory experience or by formal logic. Their justification
consists in a transcendental argument resting on certain conditions of possibility
of experience. Russell then came to think that transcendental arguments cannot
establish the necessity of judgments. Finally, towards the end of this period,
Russell came very close to adopting a weak version of logicism: the fundamental
axioms of the mathematical theory of classes, a theory which is used in all
mathematics, are logical axioms. So the justification of at least one branch of
mathematics would consist of formal logic. Russell’s move to this logicist view
was motivated by an attempt to account for the necessity of mathematics. Under
the influence of F. H. Bradley’s theory that all necessity lies in the connection
between the premises and conclusions of logical inferences, Russell came to take
the necessity of the fundamental axioms of mathematics to rest on their being
rules of inference. These rules are based on implications among mathematical
concepts, where implication is a necessary inferential relation.
As Russell underwent his conversion away from idealism, however, he came
also to look askance at necessity and possibility. How this took place is the topic
of Chapter 7. It is well-known that the rejection of idealism was a collaborative
enterprise in which Russell was engaged together with G. E. Moore. One of
the central elements of this rejection is Moore’s criticism of Bradley’s theory of
judgment, which Moore presents in “The Nature of Judgment” (1899). Bradley
holds that making a judgment consists of ascribing to reality a concept that is
abstracted from immediate experience, and conceives of this abstraction as the
imposition of a division on an originally unified experience. Moore’s arguments
against this theory have not, in general, been taken very seriously. However, I
show that in fact they present a substantial challenge to Bradley. Moore argues
that nothing abstracted from an originally undivided experience can be part of
i i
i i
i i

i i
necessity lost: russell 7
another originally undivided experience, just a slice cut from one cake cannot
be identical to a slice cut from another cake. So a concept abstracted from
one experience cannot apply to any aspect of reality that appears in the other
experience. It follows that Bradley has no coherent account of the supposed
concepts that he claims to be involved in judgment. Following this criticism,
Moore formulates an alternative theory of judgment according to which the object
of a judgment is not abstracted from immediate experience, but an entity—called
a proposition—composed of mind-independent concepts that the judgment is
about.
On the basis of this conception of proposition, Moore then criticizes Kant’s
theory of necessity. Moore takes Kant to hold that necessity applies only to
strictly universal and non-empirical judgments. Against this Moore argues that
all judgments, even particular empirical ones such as that expressed by the
sentence ‘something red exists now’, are necessarily true if they are true at
all. This argument has received little attention. I show that it begins with an
argument for the absoluteness of the truth of propositions. The premises of
this sub-argument are drawn from the Moore–Russell theory of propositions,
and include in particular the claim that facts are true propositions. From the
absoluteness of the truth of propositions Moore then infers that if any judgment
whatsoever is true, then it is necessarily true.
Russell understands the conclusion of Moore’s argument somewhat differently
from the way Moore does. As Russell sees it, if every true proposition is
necessarily true, then necessity marks no distinction among true propositions.
The same holds for possibility. Hence there is no such thing as necessary truth
or possible truth, distinct from truth tout court. As Russell puts it in The Principles
of Mathematics (1903),
there seems to be no true proposition of which there is any sense in saying that it
might have been false. . . . What is true, is true; what is false, is false; and concerning
fundamentals, there is nothing more to be said. (PoM : §430, 454)
So, at the beginning of his post-Idealist philosophy, Russell, just like Frege,
rejects modality because of the absoluteness of truth, and holds truth to be
absolute on the basis of a central philosophical commitment. While for Frege
the absoluteness of truth is founded on his conceptions of judgment, truth, and
thought, for Russell it rests on the theory of propositions central to his and
Moore’s rejection of idealism.
Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism is not based solely on Moore’s
criticisms of Bradley’s theory of judgment. Another basis is Russell’s argument
against what he takes to be Bradley’s theory of relations. A standard view is that
there is nothing more to Russell and Moore’s rejection of idealism than these
arguments. In particular, it is generally thought that neither Russell nor Moore
made any effort to read Bradley charitably, to try to see how Bradley might
i i
i i
i i

i i
8 introduction
have reasons which at least seem cogent for holding his theories of judgment
and relations. But in fact, as I argue in Chapter 8, Russell offers a diagnosis
of Bradley’s arguments as tacitly relying on a modal principle of sufficient
reason: if, although a situation actually obtains, it is possible for that situation
not to have obtained, then there must be a reason why it does actually obtain.
However, if one rejects, as Russell does, any distinction between what might be
the case and what actually is the case, then Bradley’s modal principle of sufficient
reason collapses, and with it Bradley’s justification for idealism. So Russell’s
opposition to modality doesn’t merely follow from his rejection of idealism, but
also completes his rejection of idealism.
In Chapter 9, I discuss Russell’s conception of logic. For Russell, the axioms
of logic are rules of inference involving the relation of implication. This is a
carryover from Russell’s idealist period, in which he took mathematical axioms
to be rules of inference based on implications. The main difference from the
idealist view is that implication is no longer a relation of necessary connection.
With the banishment of modality, Russell replaces necessary connection with
generality: the axioms of logic are generalizations stating which propositions
stand in a relation called material implication. These generalizations are rules
of inference in virtue of determining which inferences from propositions to
propositions are logically valid.
Material implication is one of the most notorious features of Russell’s view
of logic. Russell accepts a number of counter-intuitive claims about material
implication, for instance, “false propositions imply all propositions, and true
propositions are implied by all propositions” (PoM : §16, 15). Nowadays these
claims are often labeled the “paradoxes of material implication,” and they have
received well-known criticisms from C. I. Lewis and W. V. Quine. I take up
Lewis’s criticisms in Volume II, but in Chapter 9 of this volume I show how
Russell would be able to resist Quine’s criticisms. The ground of this resistance
is Russell’s argument in Principles for the conclusion that implication is not
definable. I claim that this conclusion means that there is no analysis of what
implication consists in. From Russell’s perspective, a criticism like Quine’s
requires an analysis of implication in terms of truth and falsity, an analysis which
Russell’s indefinability argument shows to be viciously circular.
A critical consequence of the unanalyzability of implication is that there is,
ultimately, no non-circular demonstration that propositions stand in the relation
of implication. So, ultimately, we do not attain our knowledge of implication,
which includes our knowledge of the axioms of logic, by inferential justification.
It follows, Russell holds, that our knowledge of which propositions imply what
others is something akin to sense-perception, in that it is non-inferential. Russell
describes it as “acquaintance,” or “perceiving with a mental telescope” (PoM : xv).
He suggests that this mental perception proceeds by reflection on what forms of
inference are indispensable in deductive reasoning. Thus Russell’s acceptance of
i i
i i
i i

i i
necessity lost: russell 9
the “paradoxes of material implication” derives from the fact that he takes these
“paradoxes” to follow from certain indispensable forms of deductive inference.
This account of Russell’s thesis of the unanalyzability of implication points
to an affinity between Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of logic. Both argue that
our identification of which thoughts or propositions are the first principles of
deductive reasoning is not inferentially justified, and so issues from a source that
is like sense-perception or pure intuition.
It may seem that, by the time Russell co-authored Principia Mathematica with A.
N. Whitehead, he no longer accepts the unanalyzability of implication, because
in that work implication is given a definition. However, I argue that definition
in Principia is no longer analysis, as it is in Principles. Rather, definition in
Principia is an ancestor of Rudolf Carnap’s notion of explication: the precise
delineation of some aspect of a pre-theoretical notion for theoretical purposes,
where the result of incorporating the sharpened notion in theory is judged by
pragmatic considerations (see Carnap 1950: 3). Thus, Russell continues to hold
that there is no analysis of what implication consists in. However, reflection on
our practice of deductive reasoning enables us to detect certain indispensable
features of implication and, for the purpose of obtaining a simpler formulation
of logic, we can replace implication with an ersatz that has these features.
In Chapter 10, I discuss an expansion of the grounds of Russell’s opposition
to modality after Principles. In “Necessity and Possibility,” Russell mounts an
argument against an array of what he calls “feelings” about modality. These
are intuitive ideas that we have about necessity and possibility—for instance,
a statement is necessary if it can be shown to be true by logic alone—which
also underlies various analyses of modal notions—in this case, necessity is
analyticity. Russell’s argument is that, when one makes these intuitions and
analyses precise, one finds that not only do they conflict with one another, but
some of them don’t even succeed in drawing a distinction between necessity and
contingency. Moreover, some of the results of making them precise turn out to
be only epistemologically, not logically, significant. With this argument, Russell
goes beyond rejecting the analysis of modality in terms of truth-relativization.
The argument gives us reason to think that our intuitive ideas about necessity
and possibility do not reflect a single coherent pair of concepts. Even if this
evidence is not conclusive, it’s unclear whether anything would be lost to logic
and philosophy if we simply abandoned modal concepts altogether in favor of
any of the reconstructions of modal intuitions that proves useful in logic.
This argument enables Russell to maintain his anti-modal stance even after
a major change in his philosophy: the rejection of Moore–Russell propositions
some time after 1906. One consequence of this rejection is that, since there are
no propositions, one can no longer take facts to be true propositions. So a key
premise of Moore’s argument for the absoluteness of truth is gone. But, given
the argument from “Necessity and Possibility,” the absoluteness of truth is no
i i
i i
i i

i i
10 introduction
longer required. Hence, for the rest of Russell’s career, he continues to banish
modality from logic and philosophy.
Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained

In this section, I sketch the main arguments of Volume II of this book, which
is concerned with Lewis’s and Wittgenstein’s responses to Frege’s and Russell’s
views of modality and logic. Lewis and Wittgenstein do not question the abso-
luteness of truth. However, they also do not require the relativization of truth
to circumstances in order to account for necessity and possibility, because they
take these modal concepts to be primitive and unanalyzable. For Lewis, they
are independent of truth and falsity. For Wittgenstein, truth and falsity are to be
accounted for in terms of possibility. They both argue, in different ways, that
these primitive modal notions are essential to the nature of logic.
Lewis
Nowadays Lewis is best-known for having formulated the first systems of modern
modal logic, which he called systems of strict implication. However, while the
logic of strict implication is well-understood, its philosophical grounding is not.8
The standard account is that the entire basis of Lewis’s rejection of Russell’s logic
consists of the counter-intuitive “paradoxes” of material implication mentioned
above. Lewis’s notion of strict implication is intended to do no more than match
our intuitions about implication.
The problem with this standard interpretation is that the argument it attributes
to Lewis is not effective against Russell. The reason is that the definition of
implication which Russell uses in Principia is intended solely to simplify the
formulation of logic while capturing the most important feature of implication:
no true proposition implies a false one. The justification of this definition of
implication is purely pragmatic, so, the fact that the definition fails to match our
intuitions about implication is beside the point.
On my interpretation, Lewis’s fundamental criticism of Russell is based on a
little-noticed pragmatic element in Russell’s conception of logic. Russell acknowl-
edges that logic has to be useful in reasoning: we have to be able to acquire
knowledge by starting from propositions known to be true and deducing, using
logic, propositions we don’t already know to be true. This requires that the
implications described by the axioms of logic have a kind of apriority: they
have to be knowable without knowing the truth or falsity of the propositions
that they describe as standing in the relation of implication. The problem that
Lewis sees in this Russellian pragmatic requirement is that if one reasoned in
8
The best discussions of the philosophical bases of strict implication are Curley (1975) and
Murphey (2006).
i i
i i
i i

i i
looking ahead: necessity regained 11
accordance with material implication, then one would not be able to demon-
strate that Russell’s logical axioms have the kind of apriority that underlies the
usefulness of logic. In order to account for this apriority, implication has to be
understood in ancient Aristotelian modal terms: a proposition implies another
if it is impossible for the first to be true and the second to be false. This is
Lewis’s notion of strict implication. The upshot is that if Russell is to certify
his supposed logical axioms as having the kind of apriority required by logic,
he would have to reason in accordance with principles other than those logical
axioms. So Russell’s axioms do not govern all reasoning. But logic does govern
all reasoning. So Russell’s axioms have to be supplemented to count as logic,
but the supplementation consists of modal axioms—precisely what Russell is
committed to avoiding.
Wittgenstein
I focus on two aspects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922):9 the
so-called picture theory of propositions, and the criticism of Frege and Russell’s
conception of logic.
In much of the existing work on the Tractatus, it seems to be assumed that
Wittgenstein had already adopted the picture theory in the “Notes on Logic”
that he dictated in the fall of 1913. But this is not so. I show that there is
considerably more philosophical development in Wittgenstein’s thinking than
has been realized. In the “Notes on Logic” manuscripts, we find no more than
the view that propositions are facts which represent facts in the world by the
stipulation of correlations between representing and represented facts. Not
long after formulating this theory of propositions, Wittgenstein realized that it is
defective. Specifically, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of the distinction
between true and false propositions. This realization is recorded in the first of the
notebooks that Wittgenstein kept while serving as an officer of the Austrian army
in World War I. It is in this notebook that Wittgenstein proposed accounting for
false propositions by considering how pictures can be false. However, in the
wartime notebooks, the analogy between propositions and pictures doesn’t solve
the problem of falsity. It is only in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein formulated
a solution, and the solution depends on construing picturing modally: a fact
may function as a picture only if it is the realization of a possibility, where that
possibility is also a possibility for the things pictured. This possibility for the
pictured things may or may not be realized; if realized, then the picture is true,
and if not realized, the picture is false. In this way, possibility finally resolves the
problem of falsity and, in this solution, possibility is a primitive notion which
underlies truth and falsity.
9
I follow the standard practice of citing this book by remark number.
i i
i i
i i

i i
12 introduction
According to a fairly widespread interpretation, Wittgenstein takes Frege and

Russell to be wrong in holding that the propositions of logic are true in virtue
of being correct representations of the world. I read Wittgenstein’s criticism
differently. His worry concerns a point I establish in Chapters 5 and 9 of the
present volume: Frege and Russell hold that our identification of thoughts or
propositions as primitive logical axioms has no inferential justification, but
rather is grounded in a non-inferential source analogous to sense-perception.
The problem, from Wittgenstein’s point of view, is that it is unclear how non-
sensorily perceiving that a proposition is objectively logical is distinguishable
from being determined by one’s subjective psychological makeup to find this
proposition logical. To escape this problem, Wittgenstein holds that logic does
not fundamentally consist in a set propositions at all.
For Wittgenstein, logic consists fundamentally of how propositions in general
represent. Propositions in general are truth-functions of other propositions.
What this means for Wittgenstein is that certain necessities and impossibilities
govern how a proposition pictures in relation to how the propositions of which
it is a truth-function picture. For example, if a proposition R is a disjunction
of propositions P and Q, then it’s impossible for R to picture correctly at the
same time that both P and Q picture incorrectly. And, if either P or Q pictures
correctly, then it is necessary that R pictures correctly as well. This latter necessity
makes it correct to infer a disjunction from either of the disjuncts. In this way,
necessity is restored to the logical standards of correctness of all reasoning.
These necessities and impossibilities also mean that a proposition is not
fully distinct from those propositions of which it is a truth-function. Thus the
disjunction R wouldn’t be the proposition that it is if it were possible for it to be
true and both disjuncts P and Q false, or for it to be false and either disjunct P
or Q true. Hence the standards of correctness of all reasoning lie in the natures
of the propositions involved in the reasoning, not in other, logical, propositions.
Logic is not concentrated in a special set of propositions, but pervades all
propositions. This is not to deny that there are such things as propositions of
logic. It is, rather, to claim that the nature of propositional picturing is primary
and the truth of logical propositions derivative. Hence, as Wittgenstein puts it,
“we can get on without logical propositions” (6.122).10
Closing Remarks
In contemporary analytic philosophy modal concepts, especially the Leibnizian
notion of possible worlds, play a central role. The metaphysics and semantics of
modality—the nature and reality of possible worlds and the truth conditions of
modal discourse—are core philosophical subjects and topics of ongoing research.
10
“wir . . . ohne die logischen Sätze auskommen können.”
i i
i i
i i

i i
closing remarks 13
Moreover, modal concepts furnish a widely used framework for approaching

philosophical problems and arguments: causation, intentionality, and normativity
are analyzed in modal terms, claims in aesthetics are formulated in modal
language, and arguments in political philosophy are given in terms of states of
affairs in other possible worlds.
Many contemporary analytic philosophers with an interest in the history of
their tradition accept that this has not always been the case; before the 1970s
the default attitude towards modality among analytic philosophers was one
of some degree of suspicion. According to an entrenched view, the logical
positivists were responsible for this anti-modal attitude.11 They are taken to
have rejected necessity and possibility on the basis of two doctrines. First, their
anti-metaphysical empiricist criterion of significance: a sentence is meaningful
only if it can be verified or falsified on the basis of sensory experience. Second,
sense-perception informs us only of what is the case in the world, not of what
must be or might have been the case. It follows that sentences which purport to
describe necessary or merely possible states of affairs are not verifiable by sensory
experience and so have no cognitive meaning.12 On this view, the justification of
modal concepts in face of this positivist argument has two components. First,
ordinary thought and discourse are permeated with modal notions, hence, in
the absence of any argument against their coherence, there is no reason to
distrust our intuitive acceptance of these concepts. Second, the criterion of
cognitive significance faces serious difficulties. Hence the doubts about modality
manufactured by the positivists evaporated, and so we are justified in resting
with our intuitive acceptance of modal concepts.
The early analytic controversy over modality shows, to begin with, that the
positivists were not the only, or the first, analytic philosophers to argue against
modal concepts. It shows, more importantly, that objections to modality may
turn on considerations entirely different from those attributed to the positivists.
From the perspective of this controversy, the legitimacy of modal concepts has
nothing to do with whether we have sensory evidence for modal statements,
but rather it turns on the relativization of truth, the usefulness of logic, and the
nature of propositional representation of the world. Thus, the significance of
the early analytic controversy for contemporary philosophy is that it provides a
11
For a particularly clear expression of this view, see Rosen (2001). See also Brandom (2008)
for a fuller elaboration.
12
This view of positivism and the rejection of modality is in fact flawed in a number of ways. For
one thing, Rudolf Carnap, one of the most prominent thinkers of logical positivism, not only took
modality seriously, but was one of the first logicians to formulate a system of quantified modal logic.
The most important critic of modality in mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy was actually
Quine, but Quine was also a critic of positivism, and his rejection of modal notions had nothing
to do with the criterion of cognitive significance. As I show in Shieh (2013), Quine’s rejection of
modality is closely intertwined with the conception of modality in Carnap’s logical empiricism; both
Carnap’s conception and Quine’s critique are far more complex and philosophically subtle than
the argument against modality standardly attributed to the positivists.
i i
i i
i i

i i
14 introduction
fresh perspective on how the legitimacy of modal concepts is to be attacked and

defended. Such a perspective, it is to be hoped, would improve our philosophical
understanding of the nature of necessity and possibility, and their relation to the
foundations of logic.
i i
i i
i i

i i
PART I
Frege
i i
i i
i i

i i
i i
i i
i i

i i
1
The Modalities of Judgment
The only explicit discussion of necessity and possibility in Frege’s writings occurs
in §4 of his first book, Begriffsschrift. My aim in this chapter is to spell out, from
that discussion, Frege’s views about modality in Begriffsschrift. I begin with the
philosophical context required for fully understanding Begriffsschrift §4.
One part of this context, outlined in §1.1, consists of the view of judgment
informing Kant’s philosophical conception of the logical theory of his time. Kant
conceives of making a judgment as involving the formation of a representa-
tion and the adoption of an attitude towards that representation. There are,
Kant claims, certain fundamental ways of forming representations, ways that
correspond to the logical structures of judgments. In addition, Kant holds that
there are three attitudes one can adopt towards a representation; each of these
attitudes determines a modality of judgment.
The other part of this context derives from Frege’s greatest achievement in
Begriffsschrift: the formulation of modern higher-order quantificational logic
to replace the traditional logic of his time, which remained largely what Kant
took to be logic.1 As we will see in §1.1, Frege’s logic overcomes a number of
shortcomings of traditional logic. His solutions to the problems of traditional
logic, I show in §1.3, rule out Kant’s view that judgment involves the production
of a representation. As a result, Frege holds that the formation of representations,
which he calls contents, is not required for judgment. Rather, judgment consists
fundamentally of acknowledging the truth of a representation, however formed.
1
Frege was not the first to attempt to go beyond traditional logic. In the nineteenth century,
George Boole formulated an algebraic approach to interpreting and solving problems in logic—see in
particular The Laws of Thought (1854). Among the logicians who worked on Boole’s algebra of logic
program is Charles S. Peirce, who, starting in his “Description of a Notation for the Logic of Relatives”
(1870), also moved towards a version of quantification theory. There is no evidence in Begriffsschrift
that Frege had thought much, if at all, about the Boolean tradition. However, Begriffsschrift received a
critical review by Ernst Schröder (1880), one of the most prominent members of the Boolean school,
claiming that Frege’s logic is no more than a version of a part of Boole’s logic. This prompted
Frege to a study of the Booleans, culminating in a long essay, “Boole’s Calculating Logic and
the Begriffsschrift” (1880), in which Frege pointed out a number of difficulties for Boolean logic
that Frege’s logic resolves. Frege’s reaction to Boolean logic is discussed in §4.1 below. For more
information on Peirce, see Brady (2000) and Hilpinen (2004); for more on the algebra of logic
tradition, see the references in note 2 of §4.1.
My rendering of the title of this essay reflects the convention I adopt of using ‘Begriffsschrift’
to refer to the book, and ‘Begriffsschrift’, unitalicized, to mention the (closely related) languages
defined and used in that book and in Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893). The language(s) are
sometimes called ‘concept-script’ in English.
i i
i i
i i

i i
18 the modalities of judgment
Moreover, Frege holds, in contrast to Kant, that acknowledgment of truth is the

only attitude towards a content involved in judgment. This position is founded
on the difference between making an assumption and judging. The notion of
acknowledging the truth of a content is central in Frege’s philosophy, and, in §1.2,
I discuss it together with some other features of Frege’s conception of judgment
in Begriffsschrift and other writings of this period.
As we will see in §1.4, this philosophical context shows that what Frege
is doing in Begriffsschrift §4 is examining Kant’s classification of judgments,
in order to determine which of Kant’s distinctions among judgments remain
viable from the perspective of Frege’s view of judgment. The final part of this
examination focuses on Kant’s account of modal distinctions among judgments.
Frege accepts Kant’s claim that modal distinctions have no significance for
the logical structures of contents. But, given his non-Kantian conception of
judgment, Frege is precluded from adopting Kant’s view that the modalities
of judgment specify types of judgment determined by the attitudes adopted by
a judger towards a representation. So, for Frege, modal distinctions are not
objective, logically relevant features of judgments. The account of modalities
of judgment in Begriffsschrift is in fact a theory of what utterances of sentences
containing modal expressions communicate; I use the notion of implicature from
recent philosophy of language to clarify this account.2
A key assumption of the Begriffsschrift conception of modality is the Kantian
claim that modal distinctions are not features of the logical structures of contents.
Frege does not say why he accepts this assumption, but in Chapter 2 I will show
that it derives from a central commitment about truth present in Frege’s thought,
early and late.
1.1 Frege against Traditional Logic

1.1.1 A Brief Sketch of Traditional Logic
What Kant took to be logic consists of Aristotle’s theory of syllogisms together
with certain non-syllogistic forms of inference of what nowadays would be called
truth-functional or propositional logic. I will call this traditional logic.
The basic framework of Aristotle’s logic is laid out in chapter A of Prior
Analytics.3 A syllogistic argument consists of three assertions (ἀπόφανσις), two
of which are the premises and the third of which is the conclusion. Assertions
are composed of terms: a subject term and a predicate term. Terms are either
individual or universal. Individual terms hold of only one thing; universal
2
This notion originated with H. P. Grice, see Grice (1991). For a survey of theories and
controversies surrounding implicature, see Davis (2014).
3
This sketch follows the excellent introductory account Smith (1989). See also Kapp (1975),
W. Kneale and M. Kneale (1984: chapters 1–2), and Beaney (1996: chapter 1).
i i
i i
i i

i i
frege against traditional logic 19
terms hold of many things. Subjects may be either individual or universal, but
predicates can only be universals. An assertion either affirms or denies the
predicate of the subject. Moreover, if the subject of an assertion is a universal
term, then the predicate may be affirmed of the subject either universally or in
part. Similarly, a predicate may be denied either universally or in part. Thus,
there are four types of assertions: universal affirmations—‘all S is P ’, universal
denials—‘no S is P ’, particular affirmations—‘some S is P ’, and particular
denials—‘some S is not P ’. We can think of each of these types as assertions
having a common logical form, since whether a syllogistic argument is valid or
not is determined by the types of assertions that are its premises and conclusion.
The two premises of a syllogistic argument have exactly one term—called
the middle term—in common. The other two terms in the premises are called
the extreme terms, and the conclusion of the syllogistic argument is composed
of the extreme terms. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term
and the subject of the conclusion the minor term. The premise containing the
major term is the major premise, and the premise containing the minor term is the
minor premise. Clearly there are three ways in which the middle term can occur
in the premises of a syllogistic argument: as subject terms of both premises, as
predicate terms of both premises, or as subject of one and predicate of the other.
Each of these arrangements of the middle term is a figure (σχῆμα) of syllogistic
argument.
We can illustrate this terminology by reference to what is perhaps the most
familiar example of a valid form of syllogistic argument, the one named Barbara
by medieval logicians:
All As are Bs.

All Bs are C s.
Therefore, all As are C s.
In Barbara, all the premises and the conclusion are universal affirmations, the
middle term is B, the major term is C , the minor term is A, the first premise is
minor, and the second premise is major.
Aristotle’s theory of logic consists of a systematic specification of those com-
binations of the four types of assertions in each of the figures that constitute
valid syllogistic arguments. This specification begins from an identification of
those forms of syllogistic argument whose validity requires no proof, and then
provides proofs of the validity of the remaining valid forms. In the course of
these proofs Aristotle makes use of conversions: inferences from three types of
assertions to assertions with subject and predicate interchanged; for example,
from “no B is an A” to “no A is a B.” In so doing, Aristotle appears tacitly to
acknowledge valid non-syllogistic forms of argument.
By Kant’s time, logic was generally recognized as including more than Aristo-
tle’s syllogistic theory. In Kant’s courses on logic, for example, four non-syllogistic
i i
i i
i i

i i
20 the modalities of judgment
forms of inference—traceable to the logical theory of the Peripatetics and the

Stoics4 —are regularly presented. Two of these are called hypothetical inferences or
hypothetical syllogisms. In the Jäsche Logic Kant describes these as having a “hypo-
thetical proposition [hypothetischen Satz]” as major premise, where a hypothetical
proposition, Kant explains, “consists of two propositions, (1.) an antecedent
proposition (antecedens) and (2.) a consequent proposition (consequens)” (JL:
622). The two forms of hypothetical inference differ on whether the minor
premise affirms the antecedent or denies the consequent of the major premise.
They are called:
• Modus ponendo ponens—if p then q, p, therefore q.

• Modus tollendo tollens—if p then q, not q, therefore not p.
The other two forms of inference are called disjunctive inferences or disjunctive
syllogisms. These have a “disjunctive proposition” (disjunktiver Satz) as major
premise, where the disjunction is understood exclusively, so that the propositions
disjoined are represented as mutually incompatible and jointly exhaustive. The
two forms of disjunctive inference differ on whether the minor premise affirms
or denies one of the disjuncts. They are called:
• Modus ponendo tollens—either p or q, p, therefore not q.

• Modus tollendo ponens—either p or q, not p, therefore q. (Kant 1800:
§§75–8, 142–4)5
One final aspect of what Kant takes to be logic consists of what he calls “immedi-
ate inferences” (see JL: 17ff, 231ff, 383ff, 544ff, 609ff). These are descendants in
medieval logic of Aristotle’s conversions, and consists of valid arguments from
one premise to a conclusion.
1.1.2 Kant on Judgment and Logic

I turn now to discuss one aspect of Kant’s philosophical conception of logic,
namely his view of judgment. Kant took the premises and conclusions of
arguments to be judgments, and the logical forms of traditional logic to be part
of a classification of judgments. Among the many characterizations of judgment
in Kant’s writings, the one most directly relevant to our purposes is from the
first chapter of the Analytic of Concepts of the Critique of Pure Reason: “All
judgments are . . . functions of unity among our representations [Vorstellungen],”
where a function is “the unity of the action [Handlung ] of ordering different
4
For more information on post-Aristotelian traditional logic, see O’Toole and Jennings (2004)
and Bobzien (2016).
5
It is reasonably clear that Aristotle did not consider these forms of inference. For an account
of their historical development in the logic of the Peripatetics, see Bobzien (2002), who notes that it
is not known how these forms of inference received these names.
i i
i i
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
geluk mocht hebben, kwamen ook de tijgers, die van de kleine tot de
groote hetzelfde deden en … eindelijk de slangen, die, na ook met haar
tong haar plicht gedaan te hebben, langzaam wegkropen. Met dit alles
ging geruimen tijd voorbij, en eerst met het aanbreken van den dag was
aan den optocht een einde gekomen, zoodat de man met zijn
geweeklaag kon ophouden.
Toen het goed dag was geworden, zag hij een vreemde gestalte naar
zich toekomen. Het was Wau-oeta, die een vreemdsoortigen pijl in de
hand had. „Zoo, waart gij het”, zei ze, „die al dat lawaai van nacht
maakte en mij uit den slaap hield?” „Ja”, antwoordde de man, „ik was
het”. „Wel”, zei Wau-oeta, „kijk eens langs je arm, van je schouder tot je
hand”. Hij keek, en zag dat hij met een soort schimmel 82 bedekt was. Hij
keek ook naar zijn anderen arm en zag precies hetzelfde. Toen hij van
Wau-oeta gehoord had, dat het deze schimmel was, die hem zoo
ongelukkig op de jacht maakte, wreef hij zijn armen goed af.
De pijl van Wau-oeta zag er, zooals ik zei, zeer vreemd [161]uit. Hij was
in drie of vier stukken gebroken 83 en ieder stuk was gespleten. Wau-
oeta ruilde dezen pijl voor den zijnen en verzocht hem, den hare te
willen probeeren om naar een lange liaan te schieten, die op grooten
afstand naar beneden hing, en .… ja, de pijl trof doel. Toen hij weêr den
pijl op den boog zette, vroeg Wau-oeta hem in de lucht te willen
schieten, en .… onbegrijpelijk, in welke richting hij ook zijn pijl
wegschoot, telkens als hij de aarde bereikte, raakte hij een dier: eerst
een Doroquara, en zoo voort in dezelfde volgorde, als waarin de vogels
hem aan zijn voet hadden gepikt, tot den powies* toe. En het vreemde
was, dat als hij schoot, hij zelf den pijl niet kon zien.
Toen hij nu met schieten op den grond begon, raakte de pijl

achtereenvolgens een rat, een Acouri enz. tot hij eindelijk een
prachtigen tapir schoot. Eindelijk kwamen de tijgers en de slangen aan
de beurt, in de volgorde waarin zij hem gelikt hadden.
Toen al dit wild bijeen was, schonk Wau-oeta hem voor goed den
merkwaardigen pijl, in ruil voor den zijne, doch op uitdrukkelijke
voorwaarde, dat hij tegen niemand zou zeggen, wie hem een zóó
zeldzamen pijl had gegeven. Ze zei hem daarop vaarwel en vertrok.
Onze vriend keerde nu naar zijn twee vrouwen terug, en natuurlijk werd
nu zijn naam, dien hij reeds wegens het dooden van Tobe-horo-anna
had, nog veel grooter. Iedereen werd echter nieuwsgierig, om te weten,
waar hij die kennis vandaan had gekregen en probeerde hem uit te
hooren, maar hij weigerde, trouw aan zijn gegeven woord, iets te
zeggen. Zijn schoonbroêrs dachten: laten wij onzen tijd afwachten, en
toen er een groot paiwarri-feest zou plaats hebben, haalden zij hem
over, dit bij te wonen; en … het is al weêr dezelfde geschiedenis: drank
werd zijn verderf. Zijn tong kwam los en hij vertelde alles wat er
gebeurd was. Den [162]volgenden morgen, toen hij weêr geheel was
bijgekomen, wilde hij, als gewoonlijk, zijn pijl grijpen, die Wau-oeta hem
gegeven had, maar zijn vroegere pijl lag er weêr voor in de plaats—en
van dat oogenblik was hij al zijn geluk weêr kwijt.
No. 38. De Legende van Letterhoutstomp.
Penalo ame weipiompo. Eertijds, voor nog de grootvader van mijn

grootmoeder geboren was, kwamen de Indianen veel talrijker voor dan
thans. Zij leefden tevens gelukkiger, wijl de macht der toenmalige
piaimannen de booze Geesten overal in bedwang hield. Paiwarri
ontbrak nooit; kinderen gehoorzaamden hunnen ouders; nimmer
doofden de barbakot-vuren uit, wijl het wild altijd in overvloed
voorhanden was en de visschen in de kreken krioelden.
Maar dit aardsche paradijs veranderde, toen aan onze kusten schepen
vol strijders verschenen, aan wier hoofd stond een man, genaamd
Paira-oende of Paira-oendepo, d.w.z. Letterhoutstomp. Hij was een
blanke, die de algemeene opmerkzaamheid tot zich trok door zijn
vreemd uiterlijk; zijn mond bevond zich nl. ter plaatse, waar bij gewone
menschen de borst moet zijn. 84
Letterhoutstomp was een menscheneter. Moordend en roovend trok hij

langs onze kusten. Wee! den Indianen, die in zijne handen vielen, want
levend werden ze verbrand of gevild en opgegeten!
Overal waar Paira-oende verscheen, vluchtten de roodhuiden naar alle

richtingen, doch hij vervolgde hen onmeêdoogend, tot zij ten einde raad
besloten zich te vereenigen, om aan het geweld een einde te maken.
[163]
Bij de beraadslagingen, die volgden, voerden de verschillende

piaimannen het hoogste woord. En nadat zij door hunne bezweringen
den slangengeest bekoord hadden, gaven zij te kennen, dat de Geest
van Twee Lichamen 85 bevolen had, dat alle Indianen zich moesten
terugtrekken op een bepaald tabbertje* (of tabbetje) in de nabijheid
eener groote savanne*. Daar herhaalden de gezamenlijke piaimannen
hunne bezweringen, met het gevolg, dat toen Stomp, die, het gebeurde
hoorende, in kokende woede naderde, het tabbertje begon te
bewegen 86 en acht dagen lang zich niet liet zien.
Paira-oendepo zocht overal naar de verdwenen Indianen, doch hen niet

vindende, kon hij hen ook niet dooden, integendeel was hij verplicht tot
den terugtocht, waarna de Roodhuiden weder uit het tabbertje te
voorschijn kwamen. Maar nauwelijks had Letterhoutstomp dit
vernomen, of hij vervaardigde een vreeselijken kaaiman als vaartuig,
om daarmede met één slag de Roodhuiden uit te roeien. Deze gingen
toen kampen maken in de nabijheid van een rots, genaamd Kaiwiri-
oendepo, of Skroertjes stomp 87. Daar hielden de gezamenlijke
piaimannen weêr een geweldige bezwering, ten einde den Dubbelgeest
te bekoren en van hem te verkrijgen, dat hij den Kaaiman 88 [164]zou
inslikken. Dagen lang duurden de ceremoniën en van zulk een invloed
waren de smeekbeden op het hart van den Slangegeest, dat deze
beloofde alles te zullen doen, wat zijne roode kinderen verlangden.
Letterhoutstomp naderde Kwaloe (Akaloe der Franschen?), het riviertje,
waar de Indianen zich verzameld hadden, van uit de plaats waar thans
de Fransche gevangenen verblijven (St. Laurent). Trotsch stevende hij
in zijn vreemd vaartuig de Marowijne op, ten einde de Roodhuiden
onverhoeds op het lijf te vallen. Maar ziet, eensklaps verhief zich een
Geest van Bekoring uit het water op, en Paira-oendepo werd met huid
en haar ingeslokt, terwijl zijn vaartuig van den oever (van de Kwaloe)
dreef tot een plaats, waar het nog te zien is als een steenen kaaiman,
die op een anderen steen rust.
Een verschrikkelijk gejubel weerklonk van alle zijden. Duizenden met

veeren versierde Caraïben dansten den overwinningsdans en te
midden der algemeene feestvreugde werd de gebeurtenis vereeuwigd
op den Temere-rots 89, die thans nog in de Marowijne staat.… [165]
In ’t stroomgebied der Marowijne,

Bezongen door het golfgeklots,
Staat, prijkende in al haar glorie,
D’wijd vermaarde Temere-rots,
Die eeuwen lang reeds heeft gedragen
Het teeken van den zwaren strijd,
Toen Paira-oende werd verslagen
Door Piai van den ouden tijd.
Die blanke in zijn Kaaiman-vaartuig,

Had aan zijn borst een grooten mond,
Waarmede hij in koelen bloede
Rood menschenvleesch als prooi verslond.
Maar ziet, het water rees verbolgen,
De Worgslang der Piai verscheen,
En Houten Stomp, hij werd verzwolgen;
Zijn Kaaiman werd een dubb’le steen.
Victorie! juichten duizend kelen,

Alom weerklonk de zegezang:
Ons bloed is weêr in bloed gewroken
Aan U de eer, o, Geest der Slang!
Toen naderde een oude Piaiman
En grifte in het hard graniet,
Paira-oende en zijn Kaaiman,
Zooals gij dien nog heden ziet.
No. 39. De Legende van Arimoribo en Jorobodie. (C.)
Lang geleden, voor nog Paramaribo was gesticht 90, bevond zich ter
plaatse, waar nu het Fort Zeelandia ligt, de hoofdplaats der
Arowakken 91. Een zekere Arimoribo was hun opperhoofd; hij woonde
op de plaats van het tegenwoordige Gouvernementshuis. Een in de
nabijheid in de Suriname-rivier mondende kreek werd Parimoribo
genoemd (d.i. kreek van Arimoribo 92).
Het ontbrak Arimoribo niet aan krijgsvolk. Op zijn wenk greep heel de
stam naar de wapenen. Dit mocht [166]echter niet gebeuren, wanneer
niet de piaiman was geraadpleegd en de beschermgeesten goed
gestemd schenen. Tijdens een groot feest nu begon onder de
bedwelming der feestvreugde de gebruikelijke schildwacht, een op een
staak gestoken houten raaf 93, eensklaps te weeklagen, welk
onheilspellend teeken de vreugde voor een onbeschrijfelijk misbaar
deed plaats maken. Allen sprongen op en ziet .… op de rivier naderden
schepen met zeilen van ongekende grootte. Zulke dingen hadden de
Indianen nog nooit gezien. Meer verbaasd dan bevreesd vroegen zij
zich af, wat voor wezens dat wel konden zijn, die met zulke reusachtige
vleugels zich over het water heen bewogen. Het moesten reusachtige
vleermuizen zijn, besloten ten slotte de wijzen onder hen. Maar die
vleermuizen naderden en spoedig bleek het, dat zij soldaten en ook
vuurwapenen met zich meevoerden. Voor de eerste maal maakten de
Indianen met blanke menschen kennis.
Het sprak van zelf, dat de piaimannen onmiddellijk aan het werk gingen,
want er was immers geen krachtiger middel van tegenweer dan de piai-
kunst. Vóór alles moest deze worden aangewend; en zóó krachtig
slaagde deze, dat drie schepen tot zinken werden gebracht. Hoewel de
Indianen ook van hun pijlen gebruik maakten, moesten zij zich, toen
hun voorraad verschoten was, in de bosschen terugtrekken. Van dien
tijd dagteekent het, dat de Indianen zich in onderaardsche woningen
gingen verschuilen, zooals er nog heden ten dage te Onoribo en Topibo
aan de Para 94 bestaan. Deze woningen bestonden echter reeds in oude
tijden, toen de vaderen hunner [167]vaderen het land bewoonden 95 en
de seizoenen niet waren zooals zij thans zijn 96. Want telkens als de
droge tijd intrad, heerschte er een zóó ontzettende koude over de
wereld, dat iedereen er van bibberde en de voorvaderen der Arowakken
zich genoodzaakt zagen, bedoelde holen te graven, teneinde zich tegen
de koude te beschermen 97. Wat kwamen deze nu aan het nageslacht
als kostbare schuilplaatsen te stade!
Omtrent dezen tijd werd de zoo beroemde Jorobodie geboren, een

Arowak, die zich zou onderscheiden door zijn onverzoenlijken haat
tegen de blanken, en wiens beeltenis, zooals zijn nazaten beweren, nog
boven het Gouvernementshuis in Paramaribo 98 prijkt.
Jorobodie was een dracht van niet meer dan drie weken, die zich
wonderbaarlijk snel ontwikkelde, en wiens optreden algemeen ontzag
inboezemde. Hij toog ten strijde tegen de blanken, die niets tegen hem
vermochten, en versloeg hen. Geen vuur deerde hem, geen staal trof
hem, geen gewicht was zwaar genoeg, om hem te doen zinken. Alle
banden werden door hem verbroken en toen de blanken hem eindelijk
in een vat hadden gesloten, en hem aan het water hadden
prijsgegeven, deed hij een tijger tot [168]zich naderen, stak hem door
een gaatje zijn staart toe en zoo werd hij overal heengesleept, waar hij
maar wilde. Nooit werd een zonderlinger vaartuig door zulk een dier, en
nog wel onbeteugeld, voortgetrokken.
Zooals het mannen betaamt, wien men een buitengewone roeping
toedicht, was ook Jorobodie in ieder opzicht een wonder van kracht en
slimheid 99. Zijn voedsel bestond uitsluitend uit krabben, en dit sober
voedsel maakte hem tot den man van kracht, den trots zijner natie.
Wee! den Caraïb, die hem aandurfde! Wie slechts de hand uitstak, was
een man des doods! Zijn groote verdienste voor de Arowakken bestond
echter hierin, dat hij de schrik der blanken was. Deze toch waren
toenmaals hunne grootste vijanden 100, die hen niet alleen tot slaven
maakten, maar hen ook naar zee voerden, waar zij, na met teer
bestreken te zijn, levend verbrand werden.
Maar deze wreedheden zouden niet ongewroken blijven. Tot nu toe

hadden de Indianen steeds een rustige zee gekend. De booten voeren
zonder roeiriemen of parels* door eigen kracht op zee en rivier. De Boa
constrictor* diende als ankertouw en loopplank tevens. Zelfs meerde
deze de boot aan strand en oever vast.
Dit alles hield echter op, toen de menschen slecht werden. Geen kwaad
toch kan ongestraft blijven. Toen bijv. eens een Indiaan van den kapitein
een boot had geleend en deze niet terug bracht, werd hij gestraft. Hij
veranderde n.l. in een duizendpoot*, en werd vader van die millioenen
veelbeenige stekelige dieren, die nu door iedereen zoozeer gevreesd
worden. [169]
Op hetzelfde oogenblik veranderde alles in de natuur. Tot nu toe

hadden de rivieren, evenals de zee, onveranderlijke stroomingen. Eb en
vloed kende men te voren niet. Nadat de ongehoorzaamheid in de
wereld was gekomen, kwam er eb en vloed; de bruisende baren
kwamen opzetten, waartegen de booten niet langer bestand waren.
De vaartuigen moesten verbeterd worden en het varen vorderde

voortaan stuurmanskunst. De toestanden waren dus sedert Jorobodie’s
leven wel heel erg veranderd. Nochthans waarborgden verschillende
onthoudingen 101 de Indianen voor verdere onheilen. Wanneer zij bijv.
maar zorgden, op zee niet den naam te noemen der dingen, wier daarin
huizende geest zij hadden te vreezen, zouden zij steeds voor
stormweer gevrijwaard blijven. Het woord „krab” mocht o.a. volstrekt
niet genoemd worden, want anders zou de Geest opeens duizenden
krabben uitbraken.
Het ergste van alles voor de Indianen was wel, dat die ellendige
blanken zich aan dit alles niet storen wilden, zoodat zij het laatste
overblijfsel van den gelukstaat verloren deden gaan. Welk een schat
was voor hen in die omstandigheden een man van zulk een overwicht
als Jorobodie was!
Maar helaas! hij kwam ten val en wel door een vrouw, die hij geschaakt
had 102 en waardoor hij den haat zijner natie op den hals haalde. Het
aannemen van een spin, hem door zijn vrouw aangeboden, richtte
Jorobodie ten gronde, want nauwelijks had hij deze met de woorden
„zoek uwen weg”, door haar uitgesproken, aangenomen of Jorobodie
was niet meer.
De held was gevallen 103. [170]
No. 40. Uitdrijven van een priester uit den Indiaanschen hemel.
Penalo ame weipiompo. Eertijds enz. voor nog de grootvader van mijn
grootmoeder geboren was, werden de oevers der Boven-Marowijne
door talrijke Indianen bewoond. Maar hun aantal slonk bij den dag, wijl
zij veel te lijden hadden van allerlei booze geesten, die zich niet door
piaien lieten verdrijven. Vele Roodhuiden verlieten dan ook de behekste
streken, ten einde zich te begeven naar Mazwano, een plaats, die zij
reeds menigmaal in hunne droomen hadden bezocht. Ontelbare
Roodhuiden woonden daar in kampen, die elken morgen schitterend
verlicht werden door de morgenzon.
In het midden stond het wonderkamp van Tamoesi*. De [171]grond was
wit als het glinsterende witte kwartszand der savanne. Wit was ook de
kleur van de wateren, die door dit aardsche Paradijs vloeiden.
De Indiaansche God zag er geweldig uit. Zijn huid had, zooals van zelf
spreekt, een roode kleur. Hij was versierd met vederen, franjes en
kralen. In zijn hand hield Hij een ongehoord groote malaka*, waarin zich
de geesten bevonden van alle wezens; de steel was als een Boa
bewerkt.
Wanneer Tamoesi aan het piaien was, kon het geluid dagreizen ver
gehoord worden. Priesters en andere Booze Geesten vluchtten dan
ijlings naar de duistere wateren, zoodat de omtrek der Mazwano steeds
rein en wit bleef. Daar toch heerschte slechts gelukzaligheid. Men dronk
en danste er den geheelen dag. Overal liepen beeldschoone vrouwen
den mannen achterna. Ziekten en sterfgevallen kwamen er nooit voor,
terwijl Tamoesi van tijd tot tijd nederdaalde, ten einde met zijn geliefde,
roode kinderen feest te vieren. Geen wonder, dat de Indianen, die na
het doorstaan van vele duistere gevaren dit lustoord wisten te bereiken,
geen lust gevoelden tot hun familie terug te keeren.
Door de piaimannen werd het losbreken der Booze Geesten

toegeschreven aan een Pater, aan wien het gelukt was, vele Indianen
tot het Christendom te bekeeren. En, zeiden zij, zoo dit niet ophield, zou
de Marowijne geheel ontvolkt worden, wijl alle Indianen zich naar het
Paradijs zouden begeven.
De Priester, die van zijn volgelingen vernomen had, wat de Roodhuiden

tot de Mazwano aantrok, besloot een bezoek aan de plaats te brengen.
Zulk een stoutmoedig plan verbaasde den Indianen ten zeerste. Ga
niet, waarschuwden zij, want Paters worden niet in de Mazwano
toegelaten. De Priester luisterde echter niet, doch vertrok, [172]vergezeld
van eenige zijner bekeerlingen, in een boot. De reis duurde drie weken.
De piaimannen in de Mazwano waren door den Dubbelgeest in kennis
gesteld, dat er gevaar naderde in den vorm van een Pater. Tamoesi was
juist afwezig, en men besloot eens te probeeren, den stoutmoedige
zedenprediker te bekeeren tot een piaiman. Alle slangenpriesters togen
aan het werk. Zij piaiden de wateren, zoodat het vaartuig met groote
snelheid naar de Mazwano werd aangetrokken. Nauwelijks hadden
echter de Priester en zijn volgelingen voet aan wal gezet, of de wateren
liepen terug, het vaartuig met zich sleurende.
In het Paradijs der Roodhuiden werd lustig feestgevierd. De lucht

daverde van het geroffel der samboela’s* en het eentonig geluid der
kwama’s*. Het aantal vrouwen was zóó groot, dat de Indianen, die in
hunne hangmatten lagen, slechts de hand behoefden uit te strekken,
om een wonderschoon meisje te grijpen. Niemand voelde ooit honger,
doch slechts een voortdurenden dorst naar paiwarri*.
Bij het aanschouwen van dit, in zijn oogen zoo vreeselijk Paradijs, kon
de Priester niet nalaten een zucht te slaken. De piaimannen lieten hem
evenwel geen tijd tot bedenken. „Welkom vriend, in de Mazwano”,
riepen zij hem toe, „gij zult hier een heerlijk leventje hebben”.
Verscheidene beeldschoone meisjes naderden thans met kalebassen

vol drank. De Priester weigerde echter. „Wat”, riepen de piaimannen uit,
„drinkt gij niet?” „Ja”, antwoordde de Pater, „maar slechts met mate”.
„Danst gij?” „Neen”. „Hebt gij geen vrouwen?” „O! Neen”.
„Dan”, schreeuwden de piaimannen gebelgd, „moet gij nog de

genoegens van het leven leeren kennen”. Zij wierpen zich nu op den
weerloozen Pater, rukten hem de kleeren van het lijf, besmeerden zijn
leelijk, wit lichaam [173]met mooie, roode koesoewé*, trokken hem een
kamisa* aan en versierden hem met vederen, koralen en franjes. Toen
werden hem opnieuw kalebassen met drank aangeboden.
„Drink”, riepen de piaimannen. De Priester weigerde echter, doch toen

hij de dreigende aangezichten en de opgeheven apoetoe’s* om zich
heen zag, dronk hij achtereenvolgens drie kalebassen leeg. „Braak”,
werd hem toegebulderd. En hij braakte, waarna hem wederom drank
werd aangeboden. Toen moest hij dansen en zingen, totdat hij van
uitputting neêrviel en in een hangmat werd gelegd, om zijn roes uit te
slapen.
Toen hij den volgenden morgen wakker werd, voelde de Pater iets
naast zich in de hangmat. Hij keek en daar lag een beeldschoon
Indiaansch meisje. Vlug (volgens de verteller uiterst vlug) sprong hij op
en wilde hij wegvluchten. Maar de piaimannen grepen hem aan, en
riepen hem toe: „Nu kent gij de genoegens van het Paradijs; wilt gij hier
blijven?”
„Neen”, antwoordde de Pater.
Weder togen nu de piaimannen aan het werk; de wateren stroomden nu

opwaarts en brachten de boot van den Pater met zich mede. Maar toen
de Priester instapte, zag hij slechts één zijner volgelingen, een blanke,
aan het roer staan. De overigen, alle Roodhuiden, waren voor de
verleiding bezweken en hadden zich voor goed in de Mazwano
gevestigd.
Weder keerde nu de koers van het water. Het vaartuig schoot

stroomafwaarts, en eerst na een langen vermoeienden tocht gelukte het
beide mannen het dorp der bevriende Indianen aan de Marowijne te
bereiken.
Eenige vrouwen waren er juist bezig, cassave-brood te bakken, toen

een harer toevallig opkeek en een gil van ontzetting slaakte. „In de verte
komen witte Indianen”, riep [174]zij. Allen vluchtten dadelijk in de hutten,
waar zij door de paloeloe*-bedekking heen naar de komenden
gluurden.
De mannen van het dorp liepen hen echter tegemoet, en den Pater
herkennende, riepen zij uit: „Wij hebben U wel gewaarschuwd, niet naar
de Mazwano te gaan; maar gij hebt ons niet willen gelooven”.
„Gij hebt gelijk”, antwoordde de Priester, en hij vertelde alles wat hem
daar was overkomen; toen hij eindelijk was gekomen aan het
Indiaansche meisje, dat hij bij zijn ontwaken in de hangmat gevonden
had, barstten zij allen in een schaterlach uit. Hun verstand ging het te
boven, dat iemand z o o i e t s kon weigeren.
De verteller begreep echter zeer goed, dat in een dergelijk Paradijs de

Paters, die juist matigheid en kuischheid prediken, niet kunnen geduld
worden.
No. 41. Uitdrijving der Indianen uit den Hemel der Paters.
Penalo ame weipiompo. Eertijds, voor nog mijn grootvader geboren was
enz. was een Roodhuid bezig, boomen om te hakken, teneinde een
kostgrond aan te leggen. Het werk vermoeide hem, zoodat het zweet
hem langs het lichaam liep, en de mooie roode koesoewe*, waarmede
hij zich had ingesmeerd, geheel werd weggewasschen. Hij zuchtte luide
en verwenschte zijn ongelukkig lot. Doch ziet, als uit de lucht
verschenen twee mannen, die hem medelijdend aanzagen. „Waarom
zucht gij zoo”, vroegen zij hem. „Ach”, luidde het antwoord, „ziet gij niet,
hoe hard ik moet werken? En als ik des nachts wil uitrusten, gonzen de
muskieten mij om de ooren; ik ben de ongelukkigste Indiaan van mijn
stam.”
„Wel”, zeiden de vreemdelingen, „we zijn met uw lot begaan, kom met
ons meê; want we zijn juist op weg naar een plaats, waar niemand
behoeft te werken.”
De Roodhuid stemde toe en vertrok met zijn beide [175]geleiders.

Maanden duurde de reis. Vele gevaren hadden zij te overwinnen, maar
eindelijk stonden de drie reizigers voor een groote poort. Zij klopten
aan. „Wie daar?” klonk het van binnen. „Roodhuiden, goede menschen,
zonder toelala.” 104
De poort werd ontsloten door een grooten, krachtigen Pater, die de
Indianen welkom heette in het paradijs der Blanken.
De drie Roodhuiden traden schoorvoetend binnen en keken om zich

heen. Voor zoover het oog reikte, zagen zij niets dan zwartgerokte
Priesters, die hen toeriepen, dat elke Indiaan maar één vrouw mocht
hebben, en dat er geen jenever, brandewijn enz. te drinken viel.
Zij werden gedoopt en herdoopt. Eindelijk bereikten zij den zetel van
den Tamoesi der Blanken. Hij was zóó oud als de Roodhuiden nog nooit
een mensch hadden gezien. Een lange, witte baard hing tot aan zijn
voeten, maar Zijn hoofd was kaal. Hij zat op een soort van hobbelstoel,
prachtig versierd met tijger-, boa- en stinkvogelkoppen. Aan Zijn zijde
lag een groot kruisbeeld. Zijn lichaam was gehuld in een langen rok,
zooals de Paters ze thans dragen.
De Indianen traden eerbiedig nader. Tamoesi glimlachte en zei:

„Welkom, mijne roode kinderen, gij zijt zeker vermoeid van den langen
tocht, laten we ververschingen gaan gebruiken”. Hij stond op en den
Roodhuiden bij de hand nemende, leidde Hij hen rond in het Paradijs.
Overal langs de straten waren prachtige kerken, waar den geheelen
dag psalmen werden gezongen. Slechts hier en daar liep een blanke
met zijn vrouw. Toch was hun aantal zeer gering, in aanmerking
genomen de ontelbare Paters, die overal, waar Tamoesi zich vertoonde,
voor Hem nederknielden. [176]
Tusschen de kerken in zagen de Indianen eenige herbergen, waar

limonade, sodawater, kassiri enz. gratis werd geschonken aan een
ieder, die er om vroeg. Een dezer plaatsen traden zij binnen, en toen zij
er weêr uitkwamen glommen hunne aangezichten van genoegen. Vol
vreugde zeiden zij tot Tamoesi: „Wij willen altijd bij U blijven”.
Zij gingen verder. Langs den weg lagen eenige Indianen te slapen. De
Roodhuiden knikten elkander veelbeteekenend toe, doch zwegen. Zij
kwamen vervolgens bij plaatsen, waar visschen van zelf uit de
masoewa’s* aan de barbakot gingen hangen. Pijlen, door niemand
afgeschoten, snorden door de lucht en troffen wegvluchtende Tapirs en
Agoeti’s, die, na hun eigen vleesch in stukken te hebben gesneden,
zich zelf kookten en roosterden. Enkele Indiaansche vrouwen lagen
naast de matapi’s*, maar de cassave-wortels schrapten zich zelf,
persten zich zelf uit, en sprongen dan in de pannen, om gebakken te
worden.
De Indianen waren verrukt; en dat vooral, toen Tamoesi aan elk een
mooie vrouw schonk, en hij op staanden voet een huwelijk voltrok. Af en
toe gingen zij herbergen binnen; en elken keer kwamen zij er vroolijk
weêr uit. Eindelijk begon een der Roodhuiden met onvaste schreden te
loopen, daarbij onbetamelijke liedjes zingende en probeerende,
Tamoesi op heel familiare wijze te omhelzen.
Tamoesi keek den slingerenden Indiaan achterdochtig aan. Maar, toen

bij den tweeden en derden zich dezelfde verschijnselen begonnen te
vertoonen, begreep hij alles. Bulderend riep hij uit: „Dronken Indianen in
het Paradijs; dat is iets ongehoords.” En de Roodhuiden, die zoo zalig
langs den weg lagen uit te rusten, sliepen inderdaad hun roes uit!
Alle Indianen in het Paradijs verzamelden zich nu om Tamoesi. Zij

verzekerden Hem, dat het niet hun schuld was, maar dat de Blanken
hen den drank hadden geschonken. [177]„Dat is niet waar”, zei Hij, „want
nog nooit heb Ik hier in den hemel een dronken Pater of Blanke gezien”.
Tamoesi gaf nu bevel, alle sodawater, limonade, kassiri enz. bij Hem te
brengen. Van alles dronk hij een kalebas vol, maar, daar Hij geen
verstand van zulke dingen had, verklaarde Hij, dat alles in orde was, en
dat de ververschingen zeer goed smaakten! En toch, zoowel het
sodawater als de limonade en de kassiri waren even rijk aan alkohol als
zuivere jenever. Geen wonder dan ook, dat de Roodhuiden zich
bedronken; de verleiding was te groot voor hen. De Priesters en andere
Blanken dronken met mate, zoodat zij nooit dronken werden.
Tamoesi gebood daarom den Roodhuiden, dat zij onmiddellijk den
Hemel moesten verlaten. Alle Caraïben, Arowakken, Warrau’s enz.
vertrokken, en aan de poort riep Tamoesi hen nog na: „Door uw
dronkenschap hebt gij het Paradijs verloren; thans zult ge werken en
het zweet, dat uit uw lichaam stroomt, zal wegwasschen de koesoewé*,
waarmeê ge u besmet. Maar, als ge niet meer drinkt, zal de poort weêr
voor u geopend worden.”
Alle Indianen keerden nu ontmoedigd tot hunne stamgenooten terug,

aan wien zij hunne ondervinding vertelden, en menigmaal verschijnt in
hun droom het Paradijs der Priesters en Blanken aan de verrukte
blikken van den Roodhuid, vooral als hij bezig is boomen te kappen en
het werk zoo nu en dan door een dutje onderbreekt. Bij zijn ontwaken
zucht hij dan luide. Maar niemand verschijnt weêr, om hem den weg te
wijzen naar het voor hem onbereikbare Paradijs. En klagend neemt hij
weêr zijn bijl op en hakt woedend in den stam der omliggende boomen,
totdat het zweet hem uit de poriën vloeit en de koesoewé, waarmeê hij
zijn lichaam insmeert, wegwascht, zooals Tamoesi voorspeld had. [178]
No. 42. Bezoek van Caraïben aan Macoesiland. (C.)
In oude tijden kwamen de Indianen veel talrijker voor dan thans. Zij
leefden tevens gelukkiger, want er was overvloed van wild, terwijl het in
de rivieren en kreken krioelde van visschen.
Van de Indianenstammen, met welke de Caraïben in die tijden in

betrekking stonden, werden vooral de Macoesi’s als goede vrienden
beschouwd. Deze stam woonde ver over de Corantijn naar den kant der
Orinoco.
Om hun land te bereiken, moesten de Caraïben van Suriname weken

lang reizen en allerlei gevaren doorstaan. Dit hield de treklustigen niet
terug, en toen nu eens een aantal Macoesi’s een Surinaamsch
Caraïben-dorp hadden bezocht, besloten een twintigtal Kalienja’s* aan
Macoesiland een tegenbezoek te brengen.
De piaiman riep den Dubbelgeest op en deze voorspelde, dat de tocht

goed zou afloopen. Vroolijk vertrokken onze jongelieden dan ook en na
een voorspoedige reis bereikten zij de plaats hunner bestemming.
Zij vonden daar alles in rep en roer, daar Kenaima’s* zich in den omtrek
vertoond hadden.
De Macoesi’s ontvingen hunne vrienden met open armen en stonden

hun zelfs de beste en grootste hut van het dorp af. Zij waarschuwden
hen echter niet te gaan slapen, daar het zou kunnen gebeuren, dat de
Kenaima’s nog dien zelfden nacht een aanval op het dorp zouden doen.
Maar de Caraïben, vermoeid van hun langen tocht, hadden rust noodig
en de piaiman gelastte, dat, terwijl tien man sliepen, de overigen
zouden waken. Daartoe moesten zij langwerpige kijkgaten in de
wanden der hut maken.
Om negen uur des avonds verschenen werkelijk de Kenaima’s 105.

Onhoorbaar als slangen kropen ze over den [179]grond. Het gelukte hen
echter niet, de Kalienja’s te verrassen. Integendeel, toen zij de hut
genaderd waren, werden zij van uit de kijkgaten door een hagelbui van
pijlen begroet, zoodat zij genoodzaakt waren, zich in allerijl in het bosch
terug te trekken. De Caraïben achtervolgden hen en slaagden er in,
velen te dooden.
De piaiman, die onmiddellijk geraadpleegd werd, vond evenwel, dat,

hoe goede vrienden de Macoesi’s ook waren, hun land veel te
gevaarlijk voor een Kalienja was, zoodat tot den terugtocht besloten
werd.
Maar nauwelijks op weg, bleek het, dat de Kalienja’s door talrijke

Kenaima’s achtervolgd werden. De piaiman gelastte onmiddellijk, dat
allen zouden beginnen te zingen, te lachen en pijlen af te schieten, om
de vervolgers in den waan te brengen, dat zij met een groot leger te
doen hadden. Deze list gelukte uitstekend en zingende en lachende
bereikten de Kalienja’s de Corantijn. Toen eerst konden zij uitrusten,
want de Kenaima’s waren niet in staat—waarom weet men niet—de
Corantijn over te steken 106, en nu nog, zoo besluit de legende, kunnen
deze Kenaima’s het hollandsche grondgebied niet binnendringen,
omdat allen ongedoopte heidenen zijn!
No. 43. Legende van Paramaribo.
Penalo ame weipiompo. Eertijds, voor nog de grootvader van mijn

grootmoeder geboren was, werden de oevers der Suriname-rivier door
talrijke Caraïben bewoond, die gelukkig en tevreden met elkander
leefden tot op een [180]goeden dag een schip de rivier binnenzeilde en
het anker liet vallen vóór de plaats, waar thans het fort Zeelandia staat.
De kapitein kwam aan wal en werd vriendelijk door de Indianen
ontvangen. „Ik ben door mijn Koning gezonden”, zei hij, „om U in zijn
naam om dit land te verzoeken”. „Neen”, antwoordde de hoofdman,
„laat hem zelf komen, want wij onderhandelen niet met
ondergeschikten”.
Wat de kapitein ook deed, het Indiaansche opperhoofd liet zich niet
bepraten. Hij vertrok dan ook en keerde na eenigen tijd met den koning
terug. Deze begon niet terstond met de Indianen te onderhandelen,
doch liet hen eerst flink drinken. Toen allen dan ook smoordronken
waren, vroeg hij hun: „geef mij dit land ten geschenke”. En zij
antwoordden: „Neem het vriend, maar geef ons drank”.
Toen de Roodhuiden, na hun roes te hebben uitgeslapen, beseften, wat

ze hadden gedaan, kregen zij berouw. Maar het was te laat, het
eenmaal gegeven woord mocht niet verbroken worden.
De koning bouwde nu een huis naast de plaats, waar thans de
Sommelsdijksche kreek, die bij de Caraïben Paramoeloe heet, in de
Suriname-rivier uitloopt. Later kwamen er meer blanken en zoo
ontstond de stad Paramaribo. 107
No. 44. De Legende van Post Sommelsdijk.
Eertijds werden de negerslaven door de blanken gruwelijk mishandeld,

zoodat zij in menigte naar de bosschen vluchtten, waar zij de
bescherming inriepen van Konokokoeja*, de Geestmoeder der wouden.
Deze verhoorde [181]hunne smeekbeden en kwam tot hen in de
gedaante van een Indiaanschen piaiman. „Ik zal u uit de handen der
blanken redden,” sprak zij, „maar gij moet mijne bevelen trouw
opvolgen.”
De negers stemden toe. De geestenbezweerder piaaide toen den

omtrek op zoodanige wijze, dat er overal vergiftige pijlen te voorschijn
kwamen, die allen met hunne punten naar ééne richting toewezen.
Vervolgens trok zij naar de plantage Asati en bevrijdde veertig negers.
De blanken waren woedend. Onder commando van een kapitein

zonden zij soldaten, om de weggeloopen slaven te achterhalen, die
echter door den Piaiman veilig voorbij de vergiftigde pijlen waren geleid.
Toen nu de soldaten verschenen, trad deze te voorschijn en schoot met
een swaroedaroe* den kapitein dood.
Onder de blanken ontstond nu een hevige paniek. Zij vluchtten naar alle
richtingen; overal floten onzichtbare pijlen 108, door onzichtbare strijders
afgeschoten, door de lucht, waardoor vele soldaten gedood werden.
De negers en hunne bondgenooten namen nu alles wat de blanken

hadden achtergelaten, mede, en daaronder bevond zich ook een groote
pot. Onmiddellijk togen piaiman en obiaman* nu gezamenlijk aan het
werk en bereidden uit de lichamen der gevallen blanken een obiapiaai*
van zulk een sterkte als nog nooit te voren was bereid. Met dit
toovermiddel vulden zij den pot, die vooraf met den naam Konoko-
dakodwada* gedoopt was.
Negers en Indianen trokken nu naar Saloewa, een arm der

Mapanakreek, en zetten daar den pot zóó neêr, dat de opening naar de
monding der kreek wees, zoodat al de tooverij den blanken zou
toestroomen, wanneer zij het zouden wagen, hier binnen te dringen.
[182]
Het gebeurde werkelijk zoo, want toen de blanken, vol woede over den
dood hunner kameraden, de kreek wilden opvaren, werden hunne
oogen verduisterd door het toovermiddel, zoodat zij de monding van het
kreekje niet konden zien.
Konokokoeja leidde daarop de negers naar Pramaka, waar de blanken

hen nimmer hebben kunnen bereiken, maar alvorens zich weêr in het
bosch terug te trekken, zei de Geestmoeder der wouden tot de
Indianen, die de slaven zoo goed geholpen hadden: „Alle menschen,
die in huizen wonen, van den Gouverneur tot den laagsten neger, zijn
slaven. Alleen zij, die in kampen in het woud en op de savanne* wonen,
zijn vrije, onafhankelijke menschen.” 109
Dit is de reden, waarom de Indianen nimmer huizen hebben gebouwd,

maar zich met eenvoudige hutten vergenoegen.
No. 45. Einde van den Indiaanschen broederoorlog. (A.)
Wij, Arowakken hebben in den strijd met de Kalienja’s het laatste woord
gehad. Eens was het, dat wij onze vijanden in een hinderlaag wisten te
lokken. Boven een waterval hadden wij drijvende boomstammen
geplaatst, waarachter een deel onzer strijders verborgen was, terwijl de
overigen zich langs den oever verscholen hadden.
Toen nu de Caraïben, na met veel moeite hunne booten langs den

waterval naar boven te hebben gesleept, de vaartuigen weêr te water
lieten, zagen zij opeens tot hunne verbazing boomstammen aandrijven,
en wel met zulk een geweld, dat de booten zonken. Woeste kreten
weerklonken op hetzelfde oogenblik van den oever, gevolgd door een
[183]hagelbui van vergiftige pijlen. Wie niet getroffen werd, geraakte in
den bruisenden waterval.
Slechts een gewonde jongeling ontsnapte. Tot zijn stamgenooten

teruggekeerd, gaf hij hun den raad, den strijd op te geven. Den
volgenden dag trokken de overgebleven Caraïben met omhoog
gehouden pijlen den Arowakken tegemoet, en er werd vrede gesloten.
En zoo eindigde de laatste der Indiaansche broederoorlogen. 110
No. 46. De groote bloedzuigende vleermuis. (A.)
Op een lange reis naar het land der steenen bijlen* kwam een groote
boot, geheel gevuld met Indianen, van een landingsplaats. Deze
bevond zich in het gebied van den vleermuizenstam, zoodat de oude
man, die het gezelschap leidde, zijn bende op het hart drukte, hunne
hangmatten niet tusschen de boomen op te hangen (zooals de Indianen
in den drogen tijd gewoon zijn te doen), omdat de vleermuizen er
buitengewoon groot waren. Hij ried den mannen daarom aan, een
gesloten tijdelijke hut te bouwen, dus een aan alle kanten gesloten
banab*. Een der jongeren, die wat vadsig was uitgevallen, had er geen
lust in, de anderen met den bouw van de schuilplaats te helpen. Hij
beweerde, dat hij het niet geloofde, dat de vleermuizen, al waren zij ook
nog zoo groot, hem vóór het aanbreken van den dag iets zouden doen.
Tegen de redeneeringen van den ouden man in, weigerde hij in de hut
te kruipen, en nadat hij zijn hangmat tusschen twee boomen had

Necessity Lost Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy Volume 1 Sanford Shieh Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Necessity Lost Modality and Logic in Early Analytic Philosophy Volume 1 Sanford Shieh Full Chapter

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Necessity Lost: Modality And Logic In

Early Analytic Philosophy, Volume 1

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page i — #1

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page ii — #2

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page iii — #3

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page iv — #4

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page v — #5

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page vi — #6

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page vii — #7

3. From Judgment to Amodalism 77

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page viii — #8

3.3 The Indefinability of Truth 89

4. The Truth in Modalism 145

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page ix — #9

4.3.2 Circumstances as Thoughts, I 173

5. The Nature of Logic 192

Part II. Russell and Moore

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page x — #10

7. The Rejection of Modality 270

8. Completing the Rejection of Idealism 309

9. Logic and Implication 336

10. The Continuing Banishment of Modality 371

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xi — #11

10.3.1 The Feeling from Apriority 378

Index of Names 429

Subject Index 432

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xii — #12

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xiii — #13

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xiv — #14

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xv — #15

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xvi — #16

Arata Hamawaki is another friend and longstanding philosophical interlocutor

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xvii — #17

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xviii — #18

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xix — #19

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xx — #20

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxi — #21

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxii — #22

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxiii — #23

PoL A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an Appendix of

Other Primary Sources

A Note on Citation and Translations

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page xxiv — #24

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 1 — #25

Logic, as many philosophers would agree, consists of the standards of correctness

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 2 — #26

Necessity Lost: Frege

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 3 — #27

necessity lost: frege 3

alternative circumstances is expressed vividly by G. W. Leibniz’s possible worlds.

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 4 — #28

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 5 — #29

necessity lost: frege 5

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 6 — #30

Necessity Lost: Russell

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 7 — #31

necessity lost: russell 7

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 8 — #32

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 9 — #33

necessity lost: russell 9

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 10 — #34

Looking Ahead: Necessity Regained

“Necessity-Lost” — 2019/2/27 — 13:29 — page 11 — #35