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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN CYBERPSYCHOLOGY
SERIES EDITOR: JENS BINDER
Non-consensual Image-
based Sexual Offending
Bridging Legal and Psychological
Perspectives
Dean Fido · Craig A. Harper

Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology
Series Editor
Jens Binder
Nottingham Trent University
Nottingham, UK
Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology aims to foster and to chart the scope
of research driven by a psychological understanding of the effects of the
‘new technology’ that is shaping our world after the digital revolution.
The series takes an inclusive approach and considers all aspects of human
behaviours and experiential states in relation to digital technologies, to the
Internet, and to virtual environments. As such, Cyberpsychology reaches
out to several neighbouring disciplines, from Human-Computer Interac-
tion to Media and Communication Studies. A core question underpin-
ning the series concerns the actual psychological novelty of new tech-
nology. To what extent do we need to expand conventional theories and
models to account for cyberpsychological phenomena? At which points
is the ubiquitous digitisation of our everyday lives shifting the focus of
research questions and research needs? Where do we see implications for
our psychological functioning that are likely to outlast shortlived fashions
in technology use?
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14636
Dean Fido · Craig A. Harper
Non-consensual
Image-based Sexual
Offending
Bridging Legal and Psychological Perspectives
Dean Fido Craig A. Harper
University of Derby Nottingham Trent University
Derby, UK Nottingham, UK
Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology

ISBN 978-3-030-59283-7 ISBN 978-3-030-59284-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59284-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Contents
1 An Introduction to Image-Based Sexual Abuse 1
2 Theories of Image-Based Sexual Abuse 27
3 Social Beliefs and Judgements of Image-Based Sexual

Abuse 53
4 Future Directions in Image-Based Sexual Abuse 75
Index 93
v
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Schematic of Finkelhor’s (1984) Four Preconditions

model of sexual abuse (Source Author’s creation based
on Finkelhor [1984]) 32
Fig. 2.2 Ward and Beech’s (2006) integrated model of sexual
offending (Source Author’s creation based on Ward
and Beech [2006]) 34
vii
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Behaviours considered to be ‘non-consensual sexual

image offending’ in this book 3
Table 2.1 Ward and Hudson’s (1998) metatheoretical model
of sexual offence theories 31
Table 2.2 Description of the pathways within Ward and Siegert’s
(2002) model 33
Table 3.1 Examples of rape myths from the Illinois rape myth scale
(Payne et al., 1999) 55
Table 3.2 The beliefs about revenge pornography questionnaire 61
ix
CHAPTER 1
An Introduction to Image-Based Sexual Abuse
Introduction
Welcome to this Introduction to Image-Based Sexual Abuse. This book
summarises much of what we currently know about this relatively new
type of offending behaviour, and guides the reader through key details
relating to:
1. the impact of offending behaviour on victims;

2. variations in related legislation;
3. potential motivations for this type of offending;
4. how the general public views and understands such crimes; and
5. hypotheses related to future research that is needed to be under-
taken in this area.
We have designed this book to be as accessible as possible, regard-

less of the reader’s prior knowledge of image-based sexual abuse, or
psychological research more generally. Although we acknowledge that the
information within will likely be of particular interest to students and
academics in fields of forensic psychology and/or cyberpsychology, we
also recognise that this subject matter is both widely discussed in the
media, studied by legal experts, and, sadly, experienced day-to-day within
the general population. As such, we aimed to ensure that anybody could
© The Author(s) 2020 1

D. Fido and C. A. Harper, Non-consensual Image-based Sexual
Offending, Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59284-4_1
2 D. FIDO AND C. A. HARPER
read the material presented within this book and take something away
from it.
Although much of the existing research and discussion related to
image-based sexual abuse has taken place in the legal realm (via the work
of Professor Clare McGlynn and colleagues, for example), we approach
this subject from a social science perspective, and in particular using a
psychological lens. Moreover, much of the book focuses on offending
behaviour where both the perpetrators and victims are adults. However,
we make clear that image-based sexual abuse can be carried out by and
on anybody—and the experiences of all victims are valid and important.
For further reading about sexual offending involving child victims, for
example, please see the work of Michael Seto, and his book Internet Sex
Offenders .
Delineation of Terms
Before proceeding, it is essential to disentangle and define some of the
terminology featured within the literature. Such knowledge is not only
important for you to fully access and understand the material presented
throughout this book, but more importantly, so that you can start to
critically read and assess the wider literature in this area, as well as articles
and stories presented within the press and through social media.
First, we define what we mean by image-based sexual abuse, which is
a broad label used to describe a range of behaviours, and emerges from
the legal and sociological research domains (see DeKeseredy & Schwartz,
2016; Henry & Powell, 2015a, b; Henry, Powell, & Flynn, 2017;
McGlynn, Rackley, & Houghton, 2017). Although it is quite unusual
to have to define the key terms that appear in the title of a book, we
expect that many of our readers are accessing this material based on their
recognition of the colloquial concepts of ‘revenge porn’ or ‘upskirting’.
Although such offences are important in their own right, and as such
will be discussed throughout this book, and in turn below, ‘image-based
sexual abuse’ acts as the umbrella term that encompasses these individual
offences. We operationalise image-based sexual abuse by drawing upon
McGlynn et al.’s (2017) work, which proposed a continuum of offences
involving the non-consensual generation, taking, and/or distribution of
private sexual images. However, following our recent work, we adapt this
to represent a taxonomic, rather than continuous framework (Harper,
Fido, & Petronzi, 2019). This distinction is important, because it means
1 AN INTRODUCTION TO IMAGE-BASED SEXUAL ABUSE 3
Table 1.1 Behaviours considered to be ‘non-consensual sexual image

offending’ in this book
Behaviour label Description
Revenge pornography The non-consensual distribution of private, explicit

images of an individual without their consent, with the
intention to cause harm through embarrassment and/or
distress
Upskirting The non-consensual and surreptitious capturing of
intimate images under an individual’s clothing
Deepfake media production Using visual editing software to superimpose the
likeness of another onto sexually explicit material
Cyber-flashing Sharing sexually explicit images via digital technologies
(e.g., text messaging, instant social media, or
Bluetooth) to unsuspecting or non-consenting recipients
that we do not imply a hierarchy of image-based sexual abuse offences but

rather see these as a collection of distinct behaviours, each as important
to understand as the next, that gather under this broad legal term. These
behaviours are briefly defined in Table 1.1.
Second, before discussing each offence type in detail we would like
to spend some time breaking down some of the key terminology which
features within the descriptions themselves. The term ‘images’ should
be taken to refer to a range of physical or digital media, including
photographs, videos, and audio recordings (or any combination of these).
Our use of ‘image(s)’ throughout this book is simply a reflection of the
popular discourse related to this type of behaviour at the time of writing.
The term ‘non-consensual’ can refer to the production (upskirting, deep-
fake media), distribution (‘revenge pornography’), or sending (cyber-
flashing) of such media without the consent of the individual depicted
in and/or receiving it. Where the term ‘private’ is used, this relates to
the notion that the media in question would not ordinarily be found
within the public domain. As we will see in the following sections of this
chapter, this distinction of non-consensual production, distribution, or
sending plays a key component in some of the legislation pertinent to
image-based sexual abuse. Finally, where we use the term ‘sexual’ within
this text, we are referring to the person or people depicted in the media
being involved in sexual acts, that the media depicts their genitalia and/or
buttocks (and/or breasts, in the case of women and girls), and/or that
the media is produced or shared for the purposes of sexual gratification.
Although this leads to a rather broad framing of the term ‘sexual’, we

feel this is necessary in order to fully encompass the depth and breadth of
image-based sexual abuse offences, especially as they are often discussed
with brevity within social and national media reports.
Through the following sections, we will be explaining the offences of
revenge pornography, upskirting, deepfake media production, and cyber-
flashing in more detail, and in turn. Moreover, we will be discussing some
of the core areas of law across Europe, the USA, and further afield, which
pertain to these offences.
Revenge Pornography
‘Revenge pornography’ is the most commonly used term when defining
the non-consensual sharing of private sexual images of another person
(Ministry of Justice, 2015). Although motivations to offend will be
discussed in more detail throughout Chapter 2 of this book, historically,
such images were usually uploaded onto dedicated revenge pornography
websites (Franks & Keats-Citron, 2014); commonly following the break-
down of a relationship (Dawkins, 2015) and as a means of damaging
an ex-partner’s social reputation (Henry & Powell, 2014). Such websites
include IsAnyoneUp.com (Visser, 2012), which averaged 150,000–
240,000 unique page views per day (Dodero, 2012), and which raised
over $13,000 in advertising revenue each month. This site was taken
down from the internet in 2012 following a flurry of legal cases being
brought forward against the owner, Mr. Hunter Moore. However, as
a direct result of the internet, and in particular the ubiquity of hand-
held mobile devices facilitating connections between individuals and wider
social groups, such images or media can be shared—and re-shared—
across any social media site at a fast pace. This means that those who
initially distribute private sexual images instantaneously lose control of
the dissemination of these materials. The images are commonly uploaded
to pornographic websites, and/or disseminated alongside personal infor-
mation, such as real names, work and home contact addresses, telephone
numbers, e-mail addresses, and social media profiles. Some victims have
been reported to be as young as 11 years of age (Ridely, 2015).
Although Keats-Citron (2009) suggested that the prevalence of the
distribution of non-consensual sexual images is low, factors such as embar-
rassment or thoughts of not being taken serious by the police, family, and
friends mean that this could be the result of widespread under-reporting
of victimisation. As such, consideration of the impact of revenge pornog-

raphy offences on the victims of this form of image-based sexual abuse is
key. Victims are not only faced with social consequences, such as embar-
rassment and harm to familial and friendship relationships due to their
hampered reputation, but there may be broader consequences such as
having their employment terminated on the grounds of damaging an
organization’s reputation (Bloom, 2014; Citron & Franks, 2014). They
are also likely to experience psychological effects related to their victimisa-
tion, just as those experiencing any form of sexual offending are likely to.
These effects include symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress related
to trust and self-image (Bates, 2017), which, if persistent and severe
enough, could result in elevated rates of suicide attempts and comple-
tions (Dahl, 2013; Stroud, 2014). Moreover, due to the inability to
control the spread and distribution of said media, victims are left unable
to distance themselves from further harassment, neither online nor in real
life (Lichter, 2013), constantly questioning if (or when) they might next
be faced with a re-emergence of their images.
Thus far, we have referred to this offence using the label ‘revenge
pornography’, as we thought it the most suitable to allow the wider
reader base to access and understand the offence and literature related
to it. Further, this is the frequent terminology (alongside the more
colloquial ‘revenge porn’) that is used in academic journals and by main-
stream/social media outlets. However, although this label presents a
convenient means of describing the offence through so-called buzzwords,
it implicitly creates a very narrow conceptualisation of the offence, which
should be considered problematic.
Although motivations to offend will be discussed in more detailed
throughout Chapter 2, the prefix ‘revenge’ suggests that the core moti-
vator for offending in such manner is in response to a misdemeanour
being initially committed by the victim (Franks, 2013a). While it stands
that the most common scenario describing the non-consensual dissemi-
nation of a sexual images involves a heterosexual male sharing images of a
female ex-intimate partner who freely and consensually shared the images
in the first instance (Bloom, 2014; Sioen & Vankersshaever, 2014), this
instantly discounts both the potential for offences to be conducted by an
individual who is not an ex-partner of the victim, as well as a multitude
of other potential motivators such as financial gain, coercion, notoriety,
entertainment, or misogyny (Bartow, 2009; Franks, 2016).
Moreover, the words ‘pornography’ or ‘porn’ are words used in the

discourse surrounding a consensual sexual act between adults that is
captured through images or video, and distributed to a broader audi-
ence (again, consensually). As such, in the context of image-based sexual
abuse, the use of this phrase discounts situations whereby images have
either been captured covertly or in secret, and/or where consensually
produced images have been shared more widely without consent, and/or
where images feature individuals below the legal age of consent. This
rationale mirrors that underpinning the adoption of the term ‘child
sexual abuse material’ over the commonly used phrase ‘child pornog-
raphy’, which formerly featured heavily throughout the Sexual Offences
Bill 2014 (MacGuill, 2014). As such, Franks (2013b) uses the termi-
nology non-consensual pornography to describe this offence, which spans
‘…recording and broadcasting of a sexual assault for prurient purposes
and distributing sexually graphic images obtained through hacking or
other illicit means’ (p. 1), whereby ‘illicit means’ could also include coer-
cion. Case studies of such offending include those of American actors
Jenifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, and Kirsten Dunst (to name a few), who
had their iCloud accounts hacked in 2014 by 26-year-old George Garo-
fano. As a result, private sexual images of said individuals were personally
stored and publicly disseminated.
Nevertheless, underpinning both problematic stances is the potential
for victim blaming attitudes to situate partial responsibility within victims
for their own victimhood (Hall & Hearn, 2017; Starr & Lavis, 2018).
Although in its infancy, current research in this area suggests that even
though victims are not held fully accountable for the actions of others
(Eikren & Ingram-Waters, 2016), perceptions of them and their actions
are being scrutinised as a function of their past [sexualised] behaviour,
much in the same way as people make judgements about the victims
of contact sexual offences. For example, the initial taking of the images
publicly perceived to be ‘reckless’, ‘careless’, and ‘naive’ (Henry & Powell,
2015a) and that individuals should be aware of the risks posed to them
(Henry et al., 2017), but that responsibility lies with the victim to ensure
that any images they sent of themselves to another are erased after the
breakdown of a relationship (Gavin & Scott, 2019).
The key take-home message here is that regardless of how an image
came to exist, or whether it was consensually shared in the first instance,
conversations, reporting, and legalities surrounding ‘revenge pornog-
raphy’ should be based around the non-consensual dissemination of such
images to another source (Henry & Powell, 2015a) with the focus placed
on (or shifted towards) the perpetrator (Henry & Powell, 2016). Indeed,
Franks and Keats-Citron (2014) highlight that consent in the first instant
is often viewed by the public as meaning blanket consent for wider
dissemination, when this is very much not the case (Martinez, 2014).
Deepfake Media Production

Deepfake media production refers to the use of machine learning software
(such as Google’s TensorFlow or FakeApp) and artificial intelligence to
dynamically consolidate and transpose one image (or a series of similar
images) onto a still or motion picture, while maintaining proportions
and spatial arrangements (Rofer, 2016). This then gives the illusion that
those individuals in the initial media are engaging in whatever behaviour
is being depicted in the resultant product. Such media may or may not
then be disseminated without the prior consent of those depicted (or
supposedly depicted) within it (Attwood, 2005). The software to produce
deepfake media is widely available and relatively easy to use; thus ‘low-
ering the technical threshold’ (Delfino, 2019, p. 890) to achieve images
which are considered very difficult to distinguish from real life images
(Gillespie, 2015; Harris, 2019). Although such techniques could be used
to generate harmless media, such as the presence of Princess Leia in Star
Wars: Rogue One, after the death of actress Carrie Fisher (Rense, 2018),
the same techniques mean than virtually anybody who wishes to can
produce deepfake sexualised images of another person. This is particularly
pernicious in our hyper-connected technological context where images of
people can be obtained from a multitude of sources, such as news outlets,
social media, and via private consensual dissemination of images between
known people. This action is also commonly referred to as ‘morph porn’
or ‘deepfake porn’ across literature and popular media (Hickey, 2018).
Although this will be discussed in more detail throughout Chapter 2,
motivations to offend in such a manner might involve humiliation, extor-
tion, the initiation or satiation of sexual arousal, or even to cause distress
or harassment of the individual within the image (Harper et al., 2019;
Harris, 2019).
As described by Delfino (2019), the majority of deepfake videos
involve the superimposition of female celebrities onto the bodies of
individuals who are engaging in sexual acts—all of which gain noto-
riety across the internet as a result of a combination of their sexual
nature and the celebrity status of the individuals they profess to portray.
In the first instance, X-rated videos were generated and posted onto
the Reddit thread ‘r/deepfakes’. After quickly gaining thousands of
subscribers, the media made their way onto pornography websites such as
PornHub.com, which allows for the upload of private sexual videos that
are self-produced by those with accounts. Even though such sites have
previously commented that, in line with their terms of service, they would
remove any non-consensual content—including deepfake media (Cole,
2018)—at the time of writing, deepfake sexualised material of Emma
Watson, Gal Gadot, Taylor Swift, Meghan Markle, and Scarlett Johansson
appear in search engine results. Akin to revenge pornography, deepfake
media appears to primarily target women (mainly celebrities), although
Delfino (2019) describes other scenarios whereby identical digital tech-
niques could be used for nefarious reasons, such as presenting politicians
accepting bribes, behaving unlawfully, or even ‘announcing an impending
terrorist attack’. Nevertheless, although such actions have the potential to
cause great harm both to individuals, as well as democracy more widely,
campaigners posit that the most urgent threat via the use of deepfakes is
through pornography, and not politics (Abram, 2020).
Rather troublingly, recent work that we conducted with one of our
students found that only 5% of a random sample of 800 people were
able to name (or get close to naming) deepfake pornography produc-
tion as a specific offence (Rao, Fido, & Harper, 2020). This suggests that
even though it is becoming more prevalent, this type of behaviour it is
not yet as well-known within the general population that other forms of
image-based sexual abuse (e.g., revenge pornography). Although more
work needs to be conducted into the public perceptions of perpetrators,
victims, or the act of deepfake media production more broadly, Delfino
(2019) highlights the point that unlike revenge pornography, such images
do not depict a person who exists, only their facial likeness to another.
They also raise the issue that most discussion takes place around the
‘victim’ of deepfake media production being the individual whose face
is transposed onto the body of another, however this leads to the indi-
vidual whose body is the subject of the issue being disregarded as a victim.
Some people may argue that the owners of such bodies (most commonly
pornographic actresses) would expect their likeness to be disseminated
and available to view on the internet in such contexts. However, this
negates the issue that they have not consented for this modification to
take place (which in itself may represent a copyright infringement), or the

effects that being depicted in other forms may take in terms of personal
or professional reputation.
Upskirting
‘Upskirting’ is a colloquial term that describes the action or practice of
secretly taking private sexual images underneath the clothing of a non-
consenting (and often unaware) individual. Usually, the victims of these
offences (as with most forms of image-based sexual abuse) are women.
At its core, such behaviour might be conceptualised as being similar to
that of voyeurism, in which individuals covertly observe others who are
in a state of undress, and/or who are engaging in private sexual activities
(Kaplan & Krueger, 1997). Such behaviour in general is typically viewed
as an abnormality of sexual interest (McManus, Hargreaves, Rainbow, &
Alison, 2013). In specific regard to upskirting, the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC, 2019) reported a recent rise in the number of police
reports pertaining to this type of image-based sexual abuse, from 78
between April 2015 and April 2017 to 94 for the single year of 2018. This
indicates that more people are reporting being the victim of upskirting—
possibly due to high-profile campaigns to raise awareness in recent years.
However, it is still possible that such an increase does not reflect the true
rate of victimisation, owing to a combination of the surreptitious nature
of upskirting as a behaviour, and victim under-reporting.
Cyber-Flashing
The term ‘cyber-flashing’ encompasses a number of different behaviours,
from the sending of self-produced sexual media (colloquially, we see
frequent references in modern society to ‘dick pics’ sent by men to
(un)suspecting women; Waling & Pym, 2019) to the non-consensual
transfer of pornographic media via digital technologies such as Blue-
tooth or Apple’s AirDrop feature. It is important to note that we do
not include consensual sexting behaviour within established personal or
romantic relationships as a form of cyber-flashing, as such interactions do
not fit within our specific definition of image-based sexual abuse. Cyber-
flashing is relatively common, with more than 50% of college students
(Drouin & Landgraff, 2012) and 41% of women aged between 18 and
36 years (Thompson, 2019a) reporting having been sent sexually explicit
images or videos. The key feature of cyber-flashing that dictates whether

a behaviour falls under the image-based sexual abuse umbrella is that the
media shared is done so in a non-consensual and/or intrusive manner.
As such, there are links here between cyber-flashing and the existing
literature on exhibitionism, whereby individuals expose themselves to
unsuspecting others.
Sexting and the Normative Use

of Social Media in Relationships
Given the information presented above, it is important at this juncture
for us to note that the use of social media and mobile technologies has
become a normative means of relationship building and maintenance.
That is to say that although images distributed in revenge pornography
have often been produced consensual ‘sexting’ (Hasinoff, 2015), the
sending of sexually suggestive messages, either using explicit language
or nude/nearly nude photos and videos via digital technologies is an
important and common behaviour in many long distance and modern
relationships (March & Wagstaff, 2017; Uhl, Rhyner, Terrance, & Lugo,
2018). A study by internet safety provider McAfee (2013) outlined that,
even nearly a decade ago, more than 50% of adults reported sharing sexu-
ally explicit material through their mobile devices (with 16% of these
sharing private sexual messages or media with strangers). Further, 50%
had also saved their images online using cloud-based storage solutions.
March and Wagstaff (2017) associated sexting predominantly with males
who highly rate their own value as a mate, and who use such actions
as a means of facilitating short-term mating. They also hypothesised that,
based on the notion that women supposedly prefer short-term mates who
take risks, the sending of one’s private sexual images could be a conscious
strategy towards mating success.
However, while adults typically do not report being pressured into
taking and sending private sexual images of themselves to other people
(Lee & Crofts, 2015), we also recognise the potential for such images
(potentially in the case of younger individuals) to be coerced into
such activities (Henry & Powell, 2016; Ringrose et al., 2012). This
is highlighted by a recent study that noted how up to half of young
people believe that there is pressure to engage in sexting (Alonso-
Ruido, Rodríguez-Castro, Lameiras-Fernández, Martínez-Román, 2018).
Sexting prevalence sits at around 15% of the population (Madigan et al.,
2018), with the number of intimate messages sent and received decreasing
among those aged 30 or older (Wysocki & Childers, 2011). Specifi-
cally, Garcia et al. (2016) notes that the likelihood of sending a sexually
explicit image decreases by 6%, and risk-related concerns related to sexting
increase by 4%, for each year after this age. Of interest to the context
of image-based sexual abuse, individuals who have previously engaged
in sexting are less likely to blame victims for any detrimental use of
their images (e.g., via revenge pornography victimisation; Scott & Gavin,
2018). We explore such social attitudes and judgements in Chapter 3.
Legislation
An essential component of any text on offence-related literature is to
contextualise said discussions within a legal perspective. Like many other
offences, however, this becomes troublesome when it comes to image-
based sexual abuse due to the absence of any consensus both between and
within countries regarding definitions, legalities, and punishments, as well
as the range of behaviours encompassing this umbrella label. Moreover,
this area is further complicated by the rapid development of technologies
that facilitate such offending (Moses, 2007). Throughout this section,
we will take the offences of revenge pornography, upskirting, deepfake
media production, and cyber-flashing in turn, and briefly outline some
of the more notable laws, punishments, and deviations from previously
discussion legislation across the world.
Revenge Pornography
Nigam (2018) highlights that to some extent, legislation taking action
against revenge pornography legislation is a feature in many legal contexts
across Europe (e.g., England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Malta,
Germany, France), the USA (e.g., Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin), Australia (e.g., New South Wales,
South Australia, Western Australia, Victoria), Canada, the Philippines,
Israel, and Japan. The following section will outline some of the estab-
lished legalisation in this area and identify key differences, but please see
Beyens and Lievens (2016) for an in-depth account of laws pertaining
to revenge pornography in which they identify a set of minimum stan-
dards that policy makers and legislators should strive to achieve in order
to ensure proportional and adequate provisions are included in legisla-
tion decisions. Such standards included the provision clear definition of
terminology as well as the scope of the laws (i.e., to prevent the exclusion
of selfies or necessitating degrees of nudity within the images), acknowl-
edgement that it is the non-consensual nature of the offence which is the
‘trigger for criminalisation’, the provision of relevant defences and miti-
gating circumstances, and the integration of sufficient repercussions for
the offence in the form of prison sentences and/or monetary fines.
In England and Wales, revenge pornography offences are covered
under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act (2015) and are punishable by
up to 2 years in prison, and/or a fine. Section 34 of the Act defines this
offence as the ‘electronic disclosure of a photograph or film, for example
by posting it on a website or e-mailing to someone. It also includes the
disclosure of a physical document, for example by giving a printed photo-
graph to another person or displaying it in a place where other people
would see it’. There is also a public feature within the legislation, such
that it includes imagery which would not typically be seen within the
public—but importantly, nudity is not a requirement for the image or
media clip to be classed under revenge pornography legislation. Images
are ‘sexual’ if ‘(a) it shows all or part of an individual’s exposed genitals
or pubic area, (b) it shows something that a reasonable person would
consider to be sexual because of its nature or (c) its content, taken as a
whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual’.
Hence, nudity is not a requirement per se. Under Section 35(5) of the
legislation, however, adapting or altering personal images to become sexu-
alised in some way (e.g., using image editing software, such as Photoshop)
is counted as revenge pornography.
One of the most defining (and controversial) aspects of the legisla-
tion is that it requires that the perpetrator acted with the intent to cause
distress to the victim, however this is problematic as it is both diffi-
cult to prove and reduces the sexual agency of victim. Moreover, it is
important to accurately conceptualise the term revenge as this has the
capacity to create a legal loophole whereby a perpetrator might argue an
absence of revenge; thus absolving them of liability for the crime (Lichter,
2013). One such niche, yet notable example of this is the recent case of
former Notts County Football Club owner Alan Hardy who accidentally
shared an intimate image of himself online, via Twitter (Reid, 2019).
Although quickly removed by Hardy, the image was downloaded and
subsequently distributed to much embarrassment and scrutiny (Guardian
Sport, 2019)—effectively placing blame solely on the victim. Moreover,
the ‘reasonable person’ standard within the definition of ‘sexual’ also
opens this possibility, with defendants being able to argue that the media
distributed in lower-level cases of revenge pornography offending might
not be considered sexual by ‘reasonable people’, with this being a stan-
dard that may change over time. In spite of this law being recently passed,
from the roughly 1000 cases reported by police forces in England and
Wales in the latter half of 2015, 61% resulted in no action being taken
against the perpetrator (Sherlock, 2016).
Elsewhere, there is currently no federal law against publishing non-
consensual sexual images of another person that covers the entirety of
the USA. At the time of writing, 46 States have local legislation against
revenge pornography (Glaser, 2019)—seven more states than this time
last year (Harris, 2019). Currently, only Massachusetts, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Wyoming have no legislation in relation to revenge pornog-
raphy. The first state to criminalise revenge pornography was New Jersey
in 2004 (Beyens & Lievens, 2016). Here, revenge pornography offending
represents a third-degree felony, which criminalises the distribution of
images in the absence of consent. This is punishable by a prison sentence
of 3–5 years, and the possibility of a fine of up to $30,000. However,
there is an avenue for defence in the form of if the suspect acted with a
lawful purpose and provided prior notice to the pictured person involved,
such as ‘when a person other than the actual victim reports a case of
non-consensual dissemination of sexual images to the police after having
notified the victim of his or her intention to file the report and has printed
out some of the sexual images from an infringing Facebook account as
proof of the crime committed’. In this case, the person filing the report
will be distributing a private sexual image in a non-consensual way but
would face no punishment for their behaviour.
As summarised by Delfino (2019), many State-level laws pertaining to
revenge pornography (for example, in California, Texas, New York, and
Florida) require an element of intent from the perpetrator. For example,
the legislation within the state of New York (where a conviction can
be met with up to one year in prison and $1000 fine) requires the
individual who shared the image to have done so with the purpose of
‘harassing, alarming, or annoying’ the victim (Glaser, 2019). This means
that not only does one have to prove mens rea (the knowledge of wrong-
doing), but that several cases would otherwise fail to be brought to trial
in the presence of proposed alternative explanations of offending—such
as for entertainment, the achievement of social status, or the perpetra-
tors own personal sexual gratification. Wider motivations to offend will
be discussed throughout Chapter 2. Moreover, many states include a
requirement for harm or emotional distress to feature for the victim,
which in a court setting could lead to further traumatisation as it leads
to victims being required to further expose their private lives to reach an
initial conviction (Delfino, 2019). This requirement also means that the
act of distributing private sexual images is not illegal if the person depicted
in the material remains unaware of this behaviour. Finally, although now
superseded, the original California Senate Bill 255 did not include images
which were taken by the victim themselves (Beyens & Lievens, 2016).
This places further focus on the victim as a contributor to their victim-
isation. We discuss the implications of this type of thinking in relation
to social judgements in Chapter 3. Taken together, much of the existing
legislation places the onus of responsibility on the victim to prove the
impact of their experiences, and relies on a limited range of poten-
tial perpetrator motivations. This is in contrast to viewing perpetrators’
actions of non-consensually disseminating private sexual images as being
criminal in-and-of themselves (Delfino, 2019).
Upskirting
Although upskirting has been illegal in Scotland since 2010 under the
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, whereby it sits under the wider
frame of voyeurism, it has only recently been made illegal in England
and Wales. This occurred after calls for legislation were initiated by a
campaign sparked by the experiences of 27-year-old Gina Martin, who
experienced a man taking pictures underneath her skirt while attending
London’s British Summer Time music festival in July 2017. Reporting the
incident to the police yielded less than helpful results due to said actions
being deemed to not violate any specific offence at that time (BBC,
2019). Previously, such behaviour was addressed through the common
law offence of outraging public decency, or as an act of voyeurism under
the Sexual Offences Act 2003. However, the use of such offences was
limited due to the wording of legislation pertaining to outraging public

decency. That is, these laws can only be enacted if two or more people
to have witnessed the act—a condition that often cannot be met in the
case of upskirting. Moreover, as upskirting was not then categorised as a
sexual offence, severe or repeated incidents would not lead a perpetrator
to be subject to the same reporting requirements of other individuals with
sexual convictions.
Although a first reading of The Voyeurism (Offences) Bill was initially
blocked by one Member of Parliament (MP) who objected to a lack
of thorough debate about the proposed legislation. However, a second
reading led to upskirting becoming a criminal offence in April 2019 under
an amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. This offence can be dealt
with in both a Magistrates’ Court and the Crown Court, and the punish-
ment for committing such offences is up to two years’ imprisonment,
with a potential for said individuals to be added to the Violent and Sex
Offender Register when the purpose of the offence is for sexual grati-
fication. In law, upskirting occurs when ‘without consent, an individual
operates equipment or records an image beneath a person’s clothing
to observe their genitalia or buttocks, whether covered or uncovered
by underwear garments’ and when the offender ‘has a motive of either
obtaining sexual gratification or causing humiliation, distress or alarm to
the victim’.
At the time of writing, strides are being made to develop and imple-
ment working legislation in relation to upskirting across many European
countries, including France and Germany (Thompson, 2019a). Legisla-
tion has already been implemented more broadly, however (e.g., in the
USA, Australia, New Zealand, and India). For example, in Australia,
upskirting is covered by Section 91L of the Crimes Act 1900, which
makes it illegal if a person ‘for the purpose of obtaining, or enabling
another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification, films
another person’s private parts, in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would reasonably expect the person’s private parts could not be
filmed without the consent of the person being filmed to being filmed for
that purpose, and knowing that the person being filmed does not consent
to being filmed for that purpose’. This legislation, however, means that
police have to prove that the perpetrator acted for the purpose of sexual
arousal or sexual gratification, which, as we will show in Chapter 2, may
not be the only motivation to perpetrate such an offence.
In America, as with revenge pornography there exists no federal law

covering upskirting. In 2014, Massachusetts made it illegal to covertly
record images, videos, or conduct electronic surveillance up a woman’s
skirt or down their neckline. This legislation was implemented after
Michael Robertson was arrested after using a mobile phone camera to
covertly take photographs up the skirts of female passengers on Boston’s
public transportation system. Their appeal was granted two days before
the legislation was passed, as the legislation in place at the time of the
offence required victims to be either nude or semi-nude (Memmott,
2014). Elsewhere, States including New York, Washington, Hawaii, and
Florida have enacted laws that specifically make it criminal to surrep-
titiously photograph or otherwise record images taken of a people’s
‘intimate areas’ without their consent. In general, these statutes define
‘intimate area’ as parts of the body or undergarments covered by clothing,
and/or intended to be protected from public view.
Deepfake Media Production

From the above, there is clear support for Delfino’s (2019) concerns
that the law has not been able to keep up with the many ways in which
image-based sexual abuse might manifest. When turning our attention to
deepfake media production specifically, this becomes especially difficult
due to the use of artificial intelligence making it increasingly hard to tease
apart fact from fiction—a concern which law enforcement has not had to
deal with previously (Bates, 2016; Delfino, 2019).
At the time of writing, there is currently no explicit legislation
pertaining to deepfake media production in England and Wales. The
reason for using the term ‘explicit’, however, is important as disparity
between wording within Sections 34 and 35 of the Criminal Justice and
Courts Act (2015) in relation to the non-consensual dissemination of
one’s private sexual images might cause confusion in relation to deepfakes.
Specifically, when delineating the terms ‘private’ and ‘sexual’ in Section 35
of the act, the legislation suggests that media pertaining to such offences is
not defined as such if said media is only private or sexual as a function of it
being altered. This suggests that digitally altering one’s image to be sexual
(the definition of deepfake media production) would not be classified as
an offence under this Act. However, in Section 34, editing a pre-existing,
non-sexual image into one which is sexually explicit appears to be covered
under the line: ‘photographed or filmed images includes photographed
or filmed images that have been altered in any way’. This contradiction
likely creates unnecessary confusion—especially in the context that much
of the impact for the victim is comparable in that sexualised media of
them is being disseminated to other parties without their consent. There
is clearly a need for specificity regarding legislation relating to deepfake
pornography production.
Despite a recent ‘flood’ of proposals related to deepfake media in rela-
tion to both reporting (Deepfake Report Act) and perpetration (The
Deep Fakes Accountability Act), there currently exists no federal law
which legislates against deepfake media production (Ruiz, 2020). As
such, victims are often forced to rely on existing legislation pertaining
to other related offences, including revenge pornography legislation, to
govern their cases (Delfino, 2019; Harris, 2019). However, much of this
legislation does not appear to be fit for this purpose. For example, the
Communications Decency Act (1996) provides protection only for the
websites which may find themselves unknowingly hosting non-consensual
images (which are often submitted by anonymous users), by the law not
treating these sites as publishers of the media. In reality, this means that
although images can be requested to be removed, recompense cannot be
sought from the website owners themselves—thus, placing the emphasis
on the victim or those working on their behalf to identify the orig-
inal contributor. Focusing on revenge pornography-related legislation,
specifically, Virginia makes it illegal to insert a ‘digital likeness’ into a
pornographic video without the prior consent of the individual depicted
in the likeness. Legislation in North Carolina focuses on the dissemina-
tion of media in such cases where an individual ‘knowingly discloses an
image of another person with the intent to do either of the following:
coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to
the depicted person’.
Harris (2019) highlights a series of potential dangers with such legis-
lation. First, these States, along with twenty-four others at the time of
writing, mention some variant of the intent to ‘harass’, meaning that
perpetrators who claim other motivations for their actions (such as those
discussed within Chapter 2 of this book) may be able to avoid crim-
inal liability. Second, Harris (2019) describes that legislation varies over
the definitions of phrases such as ‘intimate parts’ or being ‘engaged in a
sexual act’, which may not apply to all incidents of deepfake pornography
offending, even though victims would likely face comparable conse-
quences. That is, an individual who is morphed into a pornographic
clip may not have their ‘intimate parts’ displayed, but still face the same
emotional impacts as those who do in revenge pornography cases. Third,
legislation, as well as the majority of the discussion around image-based
sexual abuse, fails to consider the individuals whose bodies feature in
such images. In such cases, Delfino (2019) describes the difficulty in
which such individuals might have in proving that their body is signifi-
cantly identifiable to justify a case of misrepresentation. Finally, it must be
noted that where deepfake-related legislation is in place, these are often
not limited to sexually explicit depictions. For example, legislation in both
Texas and California pertains only to digital interference, such as fraud-
ulently representing politicians to gain political favour, and legislation in
New York is only applicable to the likenesses of deceased individuals.
Strides towards a unified approach to legislate against deepfake media
production in the USA were made when Senator Ben Sasse introduced
the Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018. This Act proposed the
prohibition of creating, with the intent to distribute, fraudulent audio-
visual records, defined as media which had been ‘created or altered in
a manner [which] would falsely appear to a reasonable observer to be
an authentic record or the actual speech or conduct of an individual’.
However, Delfino (2019) argues that even though this is a reasonable step
forward, the Act maintains focus on the implications of political deepfakes
and fake news—and so negates to incorporate any pornographic-specific
outcomes for said victims. This Act has since expired and at the time
of writing, there are no accounts of it being re-introduced for discus-
sion. Moreover, the Deep Fake Accountability Act mentioned earlier in
this section also does little to aid victims of deepfake media production
who have been depicted in a sexualised manner as it only necessitates the
need to include a watermark to indicate that the media is fake (Ruiz,
2020). The penalties for failing to do so is a fine of up to $150,000
and/or imprisonment up to 5 years. Of course, individuals will still see
the sexualised depiction of the victim, and this does not prevent others
from removing the watermark at a later date, once the image has left the
control of the creator.
Cyber-Flashing
Unlike the offences of revenge pornography, upskirting, and deep-
fake media production discussed above, very little legislation worldwide
addressed incidents of cyber-flashing. In Scotland, cyber-flashing falls
under Section 6 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, which

prohibits causing a person to look at a sexual image without their consent,
however no specific cyber-flashing legislation exists in England and Wales.
Here, such behaviour could be dealt with under the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997 (and to a lesser degree, the Sexual Offences Act
2003), but such legislation is extremely inconsistent and does not fully
protect against this niche method of offending (Thompson, 2019a). Else-
where, Griffiths (2019) describes the criminalisation of cyber-flashing as
part of a wider addressing of online sexual harassment within Singa-
pore’s Penal Code. Here, sending unsolicited images containing genitalia
could lead to a custodial sentence of up to two years; with an enhanced
sentence in cases involving victims below 14 years of age. Moreover, in
Australia, the Crimes Amendment (Intimate Images) Bill 2017 implicitly
covers cyber-flashing by disallowing any distribution of sexually explicit
and intimate images without consent. It remains to be seen how other
countries around the world will generate (or adapt existing) legislation to
help tackle this form of image-based sexual abuse.
Chapter Summary and Overview

of Remaining Chapters
Throughout this chapter, we have aimed to delineate working definitions
of revenge pornography, upskirting, deepfake media production, and cyber-
flashing; offences which fall under the umbrella of image-based sexual
abuse. To achieve this, we covered several prominent debates within the
literature, such as the pitfalls of referring to the non-consensual distribu-
tion of sexual images as revenge pornography, and the degrees to which
individuals whose bodies (instead of faces) appear in deepfakes should
be treated as victims of said crimes. Moreover, we contextualised such
discussion within a wider framework of accepting the use of sexting as a
modern-day means of developing and maintaining interpersonal relation-
ships, before setting out to provide an overview of legislation pertaining
to image-based sexual abuse across the globe.
Although there is no scope to cover this as in depth as can be observed
in the works of both Delfino (2019) and Beyens and Lievens (2016),
there appears to be vast disparity in terms of legislation pertaining to
victims of image-based sexual abuse, with culturally differing definitions,
punishments, and caveats to offending all being in operation. Given
that victims of said offences suffer equally, regardless of their nation-

ality or the perpetrators’ motivations to offend, there is a clear argument
for uniformed punishments and legislation to be applied in a globally
connected world.
Looking forward to the remainder of this book, in Chapter 2, we
examine the different motivations for each form of image-based sexual
abuse. In doing so, we seek to situate the academic and theoretical discus-
sion of these behaviours within the forensic psychological literature of
sexual offending. In Chapter 3 we take this one step broader and consider
the psychological characteristics of social judgements about image-based
sexual abuse, paying particular attention to social and cultural beliefs
about these behaviours, their perpetrators, and their victims. Finally, in
Chapter 4, we move away from what is known to what is yet to be known
within the literature; and by doing so, we seek to facilitate discussion
between academics, policy makers, victim groups, and key stakeholders—a
process which is vital in order to ensure that future literature is victim-
focused, empirically driven, and meaningful to the wider international
community.
Discussion Questions
At the end of each chapter of this book, we challenge the reader with
three questions to get you thinking more broadly about the research and
information presented within. Academics are welcome to use these discus-
sion points as a basis for lectures and workshops, but we write these in
the hope of inspiring your engagement in future research to help answer
them in an empirical, research-driven fashion. For non-academics, we also
welcome your opinions and feedback because ultimately these discussions
relate to offences which can be relevant to us all and academia is nothing
without engaging with those that our research proposedly serves. Please
use the following e-mail addresses:
Dr. Dean Fido: deanfido.psych@gmail.com

Dr. Craig Harper: craigaharper19@gmail.com
1. Compare and contrast your understanding of non-consensual

image-based sexual offences before and after reading this chapter.
How accurate was your knowledge and where you believed other-
wise, what might have been the key contributors to this misunder-
standing?
2. What do you think are some of the most prominent pitfalls of not
having an international and unified legal approach to dealing with
non-consensual image-based sexual offences? Do you think there are
any benefits for having variations in law and why might this be?
3. Using the definitions provided throughout this chapter, how impor-
tant do you think the wording surrounding non-consensual image-
based sexual offences is in both the media, and the manner by which
we discuss and frame victims of such crimes?
Suggestions for Further Reading

1. Beyens, J., & Lievens, E. (2016). A legal perspective on the non-
consensual dissemination of sexual images: Identifying strengths and
weaknesses of legislation in the US, UK and Belgium. International
Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 47 , 31–43.
2. Delfino, R. (2019). Pornographic deepfakes: The case for federal
criminalization of revenge porn’s next tragic act. Actual Problems of
Economics and Law, 14, 887–938.
3. Hall, M., & Hearn, J. (2017). Revenge pornography: Gender, sexu-
ality and motivations. London: Routledge.
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CHAPTER 2
Theories of Image-Based Sexual Abuse
Introduction
While there has been strong public debate surrounding the distribution
of private sexual images (commonly referred to as ‘revenge pornography’
offending), no universal laws currently exist related to either revenge
pornography in a specific sense, or other image-based sexual offences
more broadly (see Hall & Hearn, 2018; see also Chapter 1). This lack of
unified legal framework makes it difficult to understand the various factors
that may predict a likelihood to engage in image-based sexual abuse. In
this chapter, we turn our attention specifically to theoretical models that
may inform our understanding of this type of behaviour.
Most of the existing scholarship on this issue is rooted in discussions
about revenge pornography. Feminist and legal scholars have commented
on the nature—both legal and psychological—of this behaviour in
the context of a so-called ‘continuum of image-based sexual abuse’
(McGlynn, Rackley, & Houghton, 2017, p. 38; see also Henry & Flynn,
2019; Powell & Henry, 2017). This notion suggests that revenge pornog-
raphy is just one type of behaviour related to the non-consensual use of
private sexual images, and is consistent with Kelly’s (1988) and Stanko’s
(1990) sociological theorising of sexual violence. This idea suggests that
a range of behaviours, from subtle everyday interpersonal interactions
between men and women, through low-level acts of harassment (e.g., cat-
calling), to rape offences, all make women feel vulnerable to falling prey
© The Author(s) 2020 27

D. Fido and C. A. Harper, Non-consensual Image-based Sexual
Offending, Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59284-4_2
to male predation (Stanko, 1990). The continuum idea is a construc-

tive first step in broadening the social discussion about sexual offending.
It prevents scholars and legislators from engaging in short-term polit-
ical viewing of high-profile cases (Harper & Hogue, 2014), and instead
focuses on addressing a range of potentially dangerous and harmful
behaviours. However, the idea of a continuum of image-based sexual
abuse begins to break down when all associated behaviours are suggested
to share common motivations, owing to the fact that they are classi-
fied under a single legal category. In this chapter, our aim is to situate
image-based sexual abuse within the context of the established empirical
literature on motivations and theories of sexual offending. In doing so, we
challenge some of the sociological or ideological arguments advanced by
scholars in other disciplines, while simultaneously supporting their argu-
ments that the rightful legislative ‘home’ for such offences is within the
context of sexual crime. Ultimately, we aim to explore the distinct and
overlapping motivations of specific image-based sexual offences, as there
is currently a lack of empirical data into why such offences are committed
(Walker & Sleath, 2017).
Image-Based Sexual Abuse and Sexual Offending

There is a broad consensus (including from ourselves) that the most
appropriate legislative home for image-based sexual abuse behaviours is
within the sphere of sexual crime (Crofts & Kirchengast, 2019; Henry
& Powell, 2015; McGlynn et al., 2017). This is because the categorisa-
tion of criminal offences is dependent upon the mode of the offending
behaviour itself, rather than the motivations of individual perpetrators
of such offences. However, where we diverge from previous authors is
with reference to our understanding of these proposed motivations. For
example, feminist legal theorising has explicitly designated the taking
and/or distribution of such media as ‘sexual offences’ because:
…sexual offending is about power, entitlement, control, punishment and

humiliation. It is harmful whether involving contact or not; whether offline
or online. Sexual offending is not about sexual arousal. (McGlynn, 2018)
2 THEORIES OF IMAGE-BASED SEXUAL ABUSE 29
Feminist and Sociological Explanations of Sexual Offending

The argument advanced by McGlynn (2018) and other legal scholars may
be considered an act of epistemic trespass (whereby they seek to explain
phenomena outside of their area of expertise), leading to false conclusions
about the nature of image-based sexual abuse. Although some authors
like Henry and Powell (2016) have advocated for a range of potential
motivations for image-based sexual abuse (e.g., blackmail, fun, sexual
gratification, status, or monetary gain), the most vocal legal commen-
tators have argued that image-based sexual abuse is rooted in gendered
desires of power and control (Hall & Hearn, 2018; McGlynn, 2018).
This argument was famously set out by Susan Brownmiller (1975/1993)
in her landmark book ‘Against our Will ’. Despite winning many acco-
lades and inspiring more than four decades of sociological work on rape
and sexual violence, this text actually presented only anecdotal evidence
and activism arguments in support of its main thesis, with no empirical
evidence testing its core assumptions being reported. These assumptions
are that imbalances between males and females in terms of sexual victim-
isation and sexual perpetration, reflect sexual aggression being rooted in
male privilege, and in the context of a societal rape culture that encour-
ages male entitlement in relation to the sexual access to and control
over women (Kimmel, 2008). The effects of such a culture are said to
include the condoning (or even encouragement) of male sexual aggres-
sion (DeKeseredy, 1988; Seabrook & Ward, 2019). We turn to this issue
of societal judgements of sexual aggression in the context of image-based
sexual abuse in Chapter 3.
While some scholars argue that the Brownmiller’s ideas do not neces-
sarily reflect the approach of more contemporary feminist thinking about
sexual and intimate partner violence, it was prevalent in the recent
#iwasblamed Twitter campaign on Twitter. This hashtag rose to promi-
nence after feminist activist Jessica Taylor sought to promote a new book
about women’s experiences of victim blaming in the context of sexual
violence. During this campaign, the prominent feminist Julie Bindel spoke
out, stating
… yet the backlash when we talk about MALE VIOLENCE is met with
‘women do it too’ or ‘not all men’. YES all men, because every single male on
the planet benefits from those that do the raping, the beating, the killing, the
trafficking, because it keeps us in fear. (Bindel, 2020; emphasis in original)
This tweet, with its more than 700 ‘likes’ and 150 ‘retweets’
gained before it was removed from Twitter, suggests that Brownmiller’s
(1975/1993) totalitarian notion of male oppression is alive and well in
contemporary feminist thought.
A rape culture, according to this ideological frame, is spread via
everyday expressions, actions, and interactions that scaffolds sexual
violence and leads to the persistence of gendered social structures (Phipps
& Young, 2015). This includes the sexualisation of mainstream advertise-
ments, sexually entitled song lyrics, and the use of sexual aggression as a
punchline in jokes. While cultural influences are indeed important in the
commission of sexual offences, the sociologically based power and control
argument is problematic when authors advocating this view also (but in
our view, rightly) call for acts of image-based sexual abuse to be desig-
nated as sexual offences. In the next section, we explain why this is the
case.
Psychological Models of Sexual Offending

The quote from McGlynn (2018) cited earlier is broad statement about
the nature of both image-based sexual abuse, and sexual offending more
broadly. It takes the legal designation of image-based sexual abuse and
attempts to place it within an empirical context by providing information
about the motivations of those who perpetrate such crimes. McGlynn’s
(2018) final sentence, however, is perhaps most revealing of the epistemic
trespassing alluded to earlier in this chapter, and places legal scholarship
at-odds with established psychological theories of sexual offending. Our
frameworks for understanding the biological, psychological, and socio-
cultural antecedents highlight the importance of each of these aetiological
factors. In turn, they each contribute and interact, accounting for several
complex pathways traversed by individuals who commit sexual offences.
Importantly, they do not downplay the importance of concepts linked
to the rape culture idea (e.g., social environments, learned beliefs about
women, and sexual entitlement). However, they consider these ideas in a
more nuanced way, showing how they interact with other psychological
and sexological factors (e.g., emotional dysregulation and sexual arousal)
in the lead up to sexual offending.
In Ward and Hudson’s (1998) metatheoretical work (see Table 2.1),
these over-arching models are referred to as ‘level one’ multifactorial
theories, which are comprised of specific factors (explained at ‘level two’),
Table 2.1 Ward and Hudson’s (1998) metatheoretical model of sexual offence
theories
Level Description
One—multifactorial Level one theories are large integrated models that

demonstrate a higher-level schematic of how various
individual constructs come together to set an individual on
a trajectory towards sexual offending
Two—single construct Level two theories are the individual constructs that
combine in multifactorial models. Studying at this level
explores how specific constructs (e.g., deviant sexual
interest or emotional congruence with children) come
about, and how they lead to a vulnerability towards
beginning an offending trajectory
Three—offence chain Level three theories are specific explanations about how
specific constructs are demonstrated and play a role in an
individual’s offending. This level is typically discussed at the
idiographic (individual) level, rather than at the generalised
(nomothetic) level of analysis
which can further be explained in terms of their specific offence-chain

behavioural manifestations (explained at ‘level three’). In itself, this
metatheoretical framework highlights the complexity of the causes and
motivations of sexual offending. However, examining some of the estab-
lished psychological theories of sexual offending in more depth allows us
to overcome the simplistic ‘power and control’ argument (a single-factor
level two explanation) that has been advanced within the feminist legal
literature.
One of the earliest level one theories was formulated by Finkelhor
(1984) as a model of understanding the commission of acts of child sexual
abuse (depicted in Fig. 2.1). He suggested that an individual must satisfy
four ‘preconditions’ before committing a child-directed sexual offence.
Initially, an individual must have a motivation to sexually offend. This
is conceptualised in the model as being associated with one or more
factors related to emotional congruence with children, sexual arousal
towards the potential victim, or broader sexual ‘blockage’ or frustra-
tion. These factors lay the foundations for potential sexual abuse to
occur. However, even with such motivations for sexual abuse, an indi-
vidual still needs to satisfy the other three preconditions. This includes
overcoming internal inhibitors to sexual offending (precondition two;
overcome actively through the use of intoxicating substances or indirectly
Fig. 2.1 Schematic of Finkelhor’s (1984) Four Preconditions model of sexual

abuse (Source Author’s creation based on Finkelhor [1984])
through stress or cognitive distortions about children and sex), followed

by external inhibitors (precondition three; overcome by isolating a child
victim from their primary caregiver, or by selecting a victim with no real
supervisory structure in place), and finally overcoming victim resistance
(precondition four; satisfied by the giving of gifts, desensitising the victim
to sexual activity, or direct threats of violence).
While the explanatory range of the Finkelhor (1984) model is some-
what limited by the types of offending it was directed at explaining, it did
outline a range of different factors (e.g., sexual arousal, affect regulation
deficits, cognitive distortions) that may be implicated in the lead up to
a sexual offence. These are constructs that represent theorising at level
two of Ward and Hudson’s (1998) metatheoretical framework. Acknowl-
edging this necessity for nuance, Ward and Siegert (2002) formulated
the pathways model of sexual offending. This framework is based around
four core (level two) mechanisms that feed into specific pathways of
sexual offending behaviour. These pathways relate to ‘intimacy and social
skills deficits’, ‘distorted or deviant sexual scripts’, ‘emotional dysreg-
ulation’, and ‘distorted cognition’. An overview of these pathways is
presented in Table 2.2. According to Ward and Siegert (2002), ‘all sexual
crimes will involve emotional, intimacy, cognitive, and arousal compo-
nents’ (p. 335), though a specific mechanism will be dominant for each
individual convicted of a sexual offence.
According to Ward and Beech (2016), the concepts described in the
preconditions model stem from several ‘interlocking neuropsychological
systems’ (p. 125) identified in more modern neurobiological research
(Pennington, 2002). These systems can be linked to specific neurological
components that are rooted in developmental and evolutionary processes.
Table 2.2 Description of the pathways within Ward and Siegert’s (2002) model
Pathway Description
Intimacy and social skills Adverse experiences in childhood (possible sexual abuse
or neglect) contributes to an inability to form and
maintain functional relationships. Sex comes to be seen
as a way of expressing closeness and love. When an
individual wishes to show affection, they resort to sexual
displays, including coercion and aggression
Deviant sexual scripts Following premature sexualisation (e.g., sexual abuse or
exposure to pornography) sex becomes devoid of
emotion and equated with interpersonal intimacy. This
lack of emotional link to sex leads to difficulties in
forming relationships. Particularly vulnerable groups do
not offer so much of a challenge to the achievement of
sexual gratification, and so become the targets of sexual
aggression
Emotional dysregulation Sex becomes a temporary method of alleviating negative
emotional states. When negative emotion is experienced,
sexual behaviour or aggression may become a default
method of coping. This sexual outlet alleviates the
emotional turmoil and increases self-esteem
Distorted cognition Antisocial beliefs about women (that they are sexual
objects) and male sexuality (that it is controllable) mean
that, upon experiencing sexual desire, an individual may
feel entitled to sexual activity. This leads to sexual
aggression being demonstrated
Multiple deficits A combination of the above pathways, which may
include a deviant sexual interest (sexual scripts) being
justified by an individual (distorted cognition). This can
lead to the person developing intimate relationships
with children, for example (intimacy and emotional
deficits) and act within these contexts in abusive ways
For example, sexual arousal and emotional congruence with children

(precondition one) can be linked to motivational and emotional systems.
That is, children can be seen as a source of emotional comfort (associated
with the emotional system) and are thus sought out (linked to the motiva-
tional system). Having generally high levels of disinhibition or impulsivity
(e.g., via alcohol use, or a propensity to stress; precondition two) is associ-
ated with dysfunction in action selection and behavioural control systems,
with behaviours not being considered fully in terms of their potential
effects or implications prior to enactment. The active overcoming of both
external inhibitors (precondition three) and victim resistance (precondi-

tion four) requires the enactment of specific behavioural strategies that
are chosen via an interaction of the perceptual and memory system and
action selection system.
These interlocking functions, rooted in brain activity but comprised
of different functions, call into question the notion that sexual offending
(and associated clinical symptoms, such as distorted cognition and deviant
arousal patterns) is purely motivated by a patriarchal striving to maintain
power and control over women and girls, a male sense of entitlement, a
socialised rape culture, or male privilege (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975/1993;
Kimmel, 2008; Seabrook & Ward, 2019) (Fig. 2.2).
It is important to highlight that these established theories of sexual
offending were predominantly directed towards explaining either child
sexual abuse (Finkelhor, 1984; Ward & Siegert, 2002) or contact sexual
offending behaviour more broadly (e.g., Ward & Beech, 2006, 2016).
Nonetheless, recent work has applied such level one models to online
sexual offending, and the cross-over from using child sexual exploita-
tion material (CSEM) to contact sexual offending against children
(Babchishin, Hanson, & VanZuylen, 2015). Seto’s (2019) motivation-
facilitation model asserts that sexual offending (broadly defined) is driven
Fig. 2.2 Ward and Beech’s (2006) integrated model of sexual offending (Source
Author’s creation based on Ward and Beech [2006])
by two classes of predictors: ‘motivators’ and ‘facilitators’. Motivators are

those factors which act as a catalyst for an interest in sexual offending
behaviour. In earlier iterations of the motivation-facilitation model, the
aim was to explain child sexual abuse (Seto, 2008). As such, motivators
were geared primarily around paraphilic interests related to paedophilia.
However, Seto (2019) has since described how this model can be used
to explain other forms of sexual offending, with motivations including
specific deviant sexual interests (e.g., biastophilia, paedophilia), high
libido, a lack of available outlets for sexual satisfaction, and a preoccupa-
tion with sexual variety. While motivations to sexually offend are necessary
for the commission of an offence, they are not sufficient when considered
in isolation. Offence-related facilitators are also required. These can take
the form of psychological factors, such as impulse control deficits or dark
tetrad (i.e., Machiavellian, narcissistic, psychopathic, and sadistic) person-
ality traits (Book et al., 2016). These facilitators assist a perpetrator in
overcoming their internal inhibitors to offending behaviour, leading to
an increased chance of an offence being committed. Further, facilitators
can be situational in nature, stemming from low mood or intoxication. As
such, the motivation-facilitation model represents a parsimonious fusion
of Finkelhor’s (1984) and Ward and Beech’s (2006) earlier theorising.
None of this discussion is to suggest that existing models of sexual
offending are directly applicable to image-based sexual abuse. Nor is it
even to suggest that they explain every sexual offence in a comprehen-
sive way. However, what these frameworks do highlight is that there are
various interacting mechanisms and explanations for all forms of sexual
offending—including image-based sexual abuse.
In acknowledging this multiplicity of explanations, it is clear that those
engaging in specific behaviours along the continuum of image-based
sexual abuse may do so for a variety of reasons. In this regard, we describe
these theoretical models as offering clear empirical frameworks within
which to consider the nuanced motivations and pathways into image-
based sexual abuse. These models highlight various level two theories
that may be important in understanding image-based sexual abuse. These
constructs include deviant sexual interests and behaviours, emotional
dysregulation, intimacy and relationship difficulties, and distorted cogni-
tions about sexual relationships and inter-sexual relations. In the sections
that follow, we begin to unpack to the potential motivations of specific
forms of image-based sexual abuse.
Legal vs. Psychological Classifications

The divergence between psychological explanations for sexual offences
(e.g., Seto, 2019; Ward & Beech, 2016) and sociological alternatives
(e.g., DeKeseredy, 1988; DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2016; McGlynn et al.,
2017) may be reflected in epistemological or disciplinary differences
between those advancing either framework. These differences then spill
over into the arena of new forms of sexual offending, such as image-based
sexual abuse. That is, much of the existing theorising in relation to image-
based sexual abuse has emerged from the feminist legal sphere. These
scholars (e.g., Clare McGlynn, Erica Rackley, Anastasia Powell, Walter
DeKeseredy, Asher Flynn, and Nicola Henry) have done an excellent job
in highlighting the emergent social scourge of image-based sexual abuse,
and elevated its profile to a point whereby legislative steps are being taken
to address such behaviours.
As has been highlighted by these scholars, the grouping of offences
that look similar in terms of their behavioural manifestations, as the
different forms of image-based sexual abuse do, makes sense from a
legislative standpoint. This is not uncommon, and this approach has been
taken elsewhere, chiefly within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 where a
wide variety of behaviours are similarly labelled due to their shared mode
of offending. As such, we are supportive of the practice of grouping
image-based sexual abuse behaviours for this legal purpose.
However, it does not logically follow that behaviours grouped together
into coherent legal categories for the purposes of legislation always neces-
sarily share common underlying psychological motivations. Similarly, (as
we have demonstrated above in our discussion of theoretical explana-
tions of sexual offending) it does not mean that individual behaviours
can necessarily be explained by univariate causal mechanisms, as advo-
cated by social scholars in non-empirical disciplines, such as feminist legal
studies. That is, the level one theoretical models of sexual abuse show
us how sexual offending is a complex and multivariate phenomenon,
with multiple interaction constructs playing a part in the lead up to an
offence. As such, it may be useful to explore specific causal mechanisms
that may be at play in relation to each of the forms of image-based sexual
abuse described in Chapter 1. In doing so, we demonstrate how this
constellation of offences could be explained in numerous ways from a
psychological perspective. The ideas that follow should not be viewed as
conclusions, but as stimulation for future research. We present our ideas

as hypotheses, setting out their theoretical basis and rationale.
Revenge Pornography Offending

Revenge pornography is perhaps the most well-known and widely
discussed behaviour that can be classified as image-based sexual abuse,
within the general population, in popular media outlets, and by
academics. The labelling of this behaviour specifically as ‘revenge pornog-
raphy’ is controversial, as there are undertones of victim blame that
suggest an initial wrongdoing on the parts of those subjected to
the offence. Indeed, a seminal qualitative review on motivations of
those engaging in revenge pornography offending documented multiple
instances of perpetrators wanting to enact vengeance upon an ex-partner,
either for halting or ending a relationship, and/or because of their
misdeeds or sexual shortcomings during a past relationship (Hall &
Hearn, 2019). However, it is important to note that throughout this
work, the authors also presented accounts of individuals who dissemi-
nated private sexual images of other people as a means of evidencing
their own sexual prowess, and their ability to gain attractive mates. In
this sense, sharing images may be a method of engaging in intrasexual
competition (Buss, 1988; Buunk & Fisher, 2009). It may be a boastful
act to prove one’s ability to compete in the mating market. With this
in mind, the designation of ‘pornography’ may be problematic, as the
function of the material is not necessarily sexual. Instead, it is the sharing
aspect of behaviour (and the associated ‘entertainment’ associated with
the sharing of the sexual image) that makes the material pornographic
in nature (Franks, 2016). As such, although perpetrators of these types
of behaviours may have the desire to harm their victims (Hall & Hearn,
2018; Walker & Sleath, 2017), the use of the term ‘revenge’ may wrong-
fully distort our understanding of the possible range of motivations that
lead to this type of offending.
There is a raft of evidence suggesting an important link between nega-
tive affective states (e.g., anger, anxiety, or loneliness) and the use of
sexual behaviours as a means of coping (Cortoni & Marshall, 2001;
Marshall & Marshall, 2000; Walton, Cantor, Bhullar, & Lykins, 2017).
Applied to the context of ‘revenge pornography’, these kinds of affec-
tive states are commonly experienced by those experiencing a relationship
breakdown (Field, Diego, Pelaez, Deeds, & Delgado, 2009). In these
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was sie konnte, um die Sinne des Mannes aufzustacheln. Sie wollte
ihn reizen, bis er ihr verfallen war. Wie alle die andern, deren Liebe
sie ersehnt hatte.
Felix Altwirth kämpfte tapfer gegen den Zauber, mit dem ihn
Sophie umgarnte. Und mehr als einmal widerstand er den
Lockungen der Sirene. Er wollte sich überwinden und seinem Weibe
die Treue halten.
Trotz allen seinen Launen, trotz allen Vorwürfen, mit denen er
Adele in schweren Stunden gequält hatte, war er sich ihres Wertes
vollkommen bewußt. Hing mit achtungsvoller Liebe an ihr. War ihr
dankbar für die Nachsicht, die sie mit ihm hatte.
Jedoch mit der sensibeln Empfänglichkeit des Künstlers war Felix
Altwirth schon in ganz kurzer Frist dem Sinnenreiz erlegen, den Frau
Sophie Rapp auf ihn ausströmte. Ihre Gegenwart wirkte auf ihn wie
schwerer Wein, der ihm die Sinne zu umnebeln drohte.
Sie fühlte sein Beben und wußte, daß er sich nur mit dem
Aufgebot seiner ganzen Kraft bezwang, um sie nicht an sich zu
reißen. Und je stärker er sich zeigte, desto heißer entflammte sie,
desto mehr begehrte sie ihn zu besitzen.
Es war ein stummer Kampf zwischen den beiden. Ein Kampf, in
dem das Weib mit Bestimmtheit wußte, daß der Mann unterliegen
würde ...
Wie Frau Sophie jetzt nachlässig in dem Lehnstuhl saß, öffnete
sie ab und zu leicht die Augen und sah hinüber zu dem Manne, der
anscheinend ganz vertieft in seine Arbeit war und nur den prüfenden
Blick des Künstlers für sie übrig hatte. Aber Sophie sah die hektische
Röte in seinem Gesicht und sah die leise bebenden Lippen, die er
fest wie im Schmerz aufeinander preßte. Seine großen blauen
Augen leuchteten in unnatürlichem Glanz, und das Herz klopfte ihm
zum Zerspringen.
Da plötzlich dehnte sich Sophie langsam und müde. Dehnte die
halb entblößten, vollen Arme und reckte ihre Glieder weich und
biegsam und mit den geschmeidigen Bewegungen eines schönen
Raubtieres.
„Ach, Felix, wenn nit Sie’s wären ...“ sagte sie dann träge, „ich tät’
wirklich nit so lang da herhalten. Es wird wirklich schon a bissel fad’.
Gehen’s, kommen’s zu mir da her a bissel! Gönnen’s mir a Ruh!“ bat
sie mit leiser Stimme.
Felix warf seinen Pinsel beiseite und kam zögernd näher.
„Wir müssen das Licht ausnützen, gnädige Frau ...“ sagte er
stockend und sah sie mit unsicherem Blick an.
„Ja, freilich! Ich weiß schon.“ Sophie tat, als ob sie schlafen
wollte, und schloß die Augen. Dann sagte sie weich: „Ich will auch
gleich wieder brav sein. Nur ein bissel plauschen!“ bat sie. „Ich
schlaf’ sonst ein.“
Felix holte sich einen Hocker, den er in der Nähe stehen hatte,
und setzte sich in einiger Entfernung der jungen Frau gegenüber.
Da richtete sich die Sophie empor, sah Felix mit einem seltsam
aufleuchtenden Blick in die Augen und lächelte. „Daß Sie mir ja nicht
zu nahe kommen ...“ sagte sie fast flüsternd.
Der laue Wind vom offenen Fenster her bewegte das weiße
Spitzengeriesel, das den Ausschnitt ihres Kleides leicht verhüllte. Sie
trug ein hellblaues Seidenkleid, das Hals und Nacken offen ließ. In
feinem Farbenton vermischte sich das zarte Blau mit ihrer
sametweichen braunen Haut.
Felix Altwirth biß sich auf die Lippen. Sophie sah, wie er leicht die
Farbe wechselte. Sie lehnte sich noch behaglicher zurück, wandte
ihm ein wenig ihr Gesicht zu und schloß dann abermals die Augen.
„Felix ...“ sagte sie leise über eine Weile.
Der Maler hatte die Blicke gewaltsam auf den Boden gerichtet,
um sie nicht ansehen zu müssen.
„Gnädige Frau!“
„Wie wollen Sie mich denn dann eigentlich malen? Dann ...
wissen Sie, wenn dieses Bild fertig ist.“ Sie legte eine eigene
Betonung auf das Wort „dann“.
„Ich will Sie gar nicht malen!“ stieß Felix erregt hervor. Seine
Stimme erschien ihr etwas heiser.
„So? ...“ sagte Sophie mit einem raschen Blick auf Felix.
„Ich k a n n Sie nicht malen. Ich ...“
„Nicht, Felix? ...“ frug sie weich.
„Nein!“ kam es rauh zurück.
„Felix! ...“ bat das Weib, und ihre Stimme hatte einen
schmelzenden Klang. „Und wenn ich Sie bitte, wenn ich ...“
„Sophie ... spiel’ nicht mit mir!“ sagte der Maler drohend. Er hatte
sich, seiner Erregung kaum mehr mächtig, erhoben und war wieder
zu seiner Staffelei gegangen.
Auch Sophie war von ihrem Sitz aufgesprungen. Blitzartig, wie
eine Natter, schnellte sie empor und hinüber zu dem Mann. Mit
festem Druck ergriff sie seine beiden Hände. Sie drängte sich an ihn
... so nahe, daß ihr heißer Atem ihm wie eine verzehrende Flamme
entgegenschlug. Ihre Augen senkten sich verlangend in die seinen,
und ihr üppiger, nach Küssen lechzender Mund näherte sich dem
seinen.
„Ich spiel’ nit mit dir, Mann!“ stieß sie erregt hervor. „Ich liebe
dich!“
„Sophie!“ Wie ein Schrei kam es über die Lippen des Mannes.
„Sophie!“
„Felix!“
„Du ... du ...“ stöhnte er.
Da umschlang sie ihn mit ihren kräftigen Armen.
„Ich hab’ dich ja gern ... du ...“ jubelte sie. „So gern!“
Seiner Sinne nicht mehr mächtig riß Felix Altwirth das Weib mit
so rasender Glut an sich, daß es aufschrie vor Schmerz.
Sophie küßte ihn in wilder, gieriger Freude. Und unter seinen
ungestümen Küssen, die ihr fast weh taten, flüsterte sie keuchend:
„Ich hab’ dich lieb, Felix! Noch nie hab’ ich einen Mann so gern
gehabt.“ Die Glut ihrer Leidenschaft loderte auf ihn über. Entfesselte
seine Sinne, wie sie niemals entfesselt worden waren ...
Nun folgten selige Wochen für Felix und Sophie. Ein schönes,
mächtiges Gefühl zufriedenen Glückes erfüllte den Künstler. Wie in
einem Taumel lebte er. Lebte nur für Sophie und in Sophie. Sie war
sein ganzes Denken und Empfinden, sein Begehren und seine
Leidenschaft. Und in diesem Gefühl, das ihn zur höchsten
Arbeitskraft anspornte, schuf er, wie er noch nie geschaffen hatte in
seinem Leben.
Gleich einer Siegerin, stolz und frei und glückselig betrat Frau
Sophie Rapp jetzt täglich am frühen Nachmittag das kleine
Häuschen droben bei der Weiherburg. Auch in ihr war eine
Wandlung vorgegangen. Was sie zum Spiel angezettelt hatte als
einen neuen Zeitvertreib, das ergriff sie nun übermächtig. Erweckte
ein neues, nie gekanntes Gefühl in ihr und erfüllte sie mit stillem,
seligem Glück.
In dem Egoismus der Glücklichen, die nur noch für einander
lebten, achteten Felix und Sophie nicht darauf, daß Adele und ihr
Töchterchen jetzt stets das Haus verlassen hatten, noch ehe Sophie
zu Besuch kam.
Die einsame blonde Frau begleitete nun oft stundenlang den
alten Rat Leonhard auf seinen stillen Wegen. Er sprach nicht viel mit
ihr, der alte Herr. Aber er gab sich alle Mühe, gut und freundlich zu
sein. Es berührte ihn ganz eigentümlich, daß er, der wunderliche alte
Junggeselle, in dem Leben eines andern Menschen noch so viel
bedeuten sollte. Er fühlte es, daß er der jungen, fremden Frau ein
Halt geworden war. Der einzige Halt in ihrer Not.
Ruhig und anscheinend zufrieden schritt die hohe blonde Frau
neben dem kleinen alten Herrn. Sie achtete nicht auf seine
Schrullen, tat, als bemerke sie dieselben gar nicht. Sie war nur
zufrieden darüber, daß sie einen Menschen gefunden hatte,
schweigsam wie sie selber war und doch voll warmer, echter
Teilnahme.
Adele erzählte dem alten Herrn nichts von den täglichen
Besuchen der Frau Sophie Rapp, und sie sprach ihm nichts von dem
Kummer, der sie drückte. Nur einmal sagte sie ihm, daß sie daran
denke, fortzuziehen. Sie und die kleine Dora. Fort nach München.
Sie würde sich glücklicher fühlen in der alten Heimat, meinte sie.
Da blieb der Rat Leonhard plötzlich stehen auf seinem Weg und
stieß die Spitze des grauen Regenschirmes heftig in die von der
Sonne erweichte Erde.
„So? Fort wollen Sie?“ fragte er, und sein Gesicht bekam einen
ganz verbissenen Ausdruck. „Davonlaufen!“ Er sah die junge Frau
scharf an. „Davonlaufen ist keine Kunst. Das kann a jed’s. Aber
aushalten, das ist die Kunst. Das kann nit a jed’s!“
Adele Altwirth war noch ein wenig bleicher geworden, als sie
sonst war. Sie wußte es nun, der alte Herr erwartete von ihr, daß sie
um ihres Kindes willen bei dem Gatten bleibe. Nicht ihr Glück stellte
er voran, sondern das Glück des Kindes.
Der Rat Leonhard hatte ihr öfters aus den Erfahrungen seiner
gerichtlichen Praxis erzählt. Sie kannte die hohen moralischen
Anforderungen, die er an ernste Menschen stellte. Für ihn gab es
nur eines: die Pflicht, Pflichterfüllung bis zum äußersten.
„A Kind, das ohne Vater aufwachst, ist für die Gesellschaft halb
verloren!“ hatte er einmal gesagt. „Es braucht den Vater und die
Mutter. Der Zusammenhang muß da sein. Sonst ist’s g’fehlt.“
Nach reiflicher Überlegung mußte Adele dem alten Rat
beistimmen. So sehr sich auch ihr Innerstes aufbäumte, so sehr sie
sich gedemütigt und entehrt fühlte, sie mußte aushalten ... aushalten
um ihres Kindes willen.
Vierzehntes Kapitel.
D ie materielle Lage bei den Altwirths hatte sich schon nach ganz
kurzer Zeit gebessert. Sophie Rapp hatte recht behalten. Das
Porträt, das Felix von ihr gemalt hatte, war zur Ausstellung
gekommen und fand bei der Kritik und beim Publikum so viel Beifall,
daß es seinem Schöpfer gleich einige neue Aufträge brachte.
Daß das alles so rasch gegangen war, dazu hatte allerdings
Sophie das Wesentlichste beigetragen. Sie verstand es meisterhaft,
eine Sache zu vertreten, deren sie sich einmal angenommen hatte.
So sprach sie neben andern auch mit Max Storf und äußerte ihm
den dringenden Wunsch, daß er und seine Frau sich gleichfalls bei
Felix malen ließen. Nicht ohne Ironie fragte sie der Arzt, woher denn
plötzlich ein so reger Kunstsinn bei ihr komme?
„Das will ich dir schon sagen!“ hatte die Sophie ihm ohne die
geringste Verlegenheit geantwortet. „Ich versteh’ nix von Kunst. Da
hast recht!“ meinte sie. „Aber was ich versteh’, ist das, daß man
einem Menschen aufhelfen soll, wenn er strebsam ist, nicht ihn noch
niederdrücken!“
Max Storf war mit dieser Antwort zufrieden. Er lebte noch zu sehr
unter dem Einfluß dieser Frau, als daß er ihr einen Wunsch hätte
versagen können. Noch dazu, wo es sich um eine so vernünftige
Sache handelte. Der Argwohn, der in ihm aufgetaucht war, verlor
sich rasch wieder.
Der Arzt glaubte nicht an die unbedingte Treue von Sophie. Er
verlangte sie auch nicht. Er wußte genau, daß es wider ihr Naturell
war, einem Manne Treue zu halten. Er liebte sie, hing an ihr, weil sie
ihm das bot, was er so lange entbehrt hatte. Mehr wollte er nicht von
ihr und gab ihr auch nicht mehr.
Sophie hatte dem Arzt alles, was sie von Felix Altwirth wußte,
erzählt. Und Max Storf fühlte ein gewisses Schuldbewußtsein gegen
den einstigen Freund, um den er sich in den letzten Jahren so gut
wie gar nicht mehr gekümmert hatte. Er empfand es nun als eine
Ehrensache, den Künstler wenigstens jetzt überall zu fördern, wo er
konnte. So kam es, daß sich nicht nur der Arzt und dessen Frau,
sondern auch seine Verwandten und Bekannten bei dem plötzlich in
Aufnahme geratenen Maler um ein Porträt bewarben.
Felix Altwirth hatte bald so viel zu tun, daß ihm sein
bescheidenes kleines Atelier nicht mehr genügte und er sich nach
einer größeren Wohnung umsehen mußte. Die neue Wohnung
müsse elegant und schön sein, riet ihm Sophie. Denn nur dann
könne er darauf rechnen, daß ihm die Gunst des Publikums erhalten
bleibe.
„Weißt, Felix, jetzt geht’s ja. Jetzt kommst du in die Mode. Das
muß ausgenützt werden. Ich kenn’ meine Leut’. Wenn die merken,
daß du noch immer ein armer Teufel bist, dann ziehen sie sich
zurück von dir. Aufdrahn heißt’s da! Zeigen, daß du zu an Geld
kommen bist!“
Sophie hatte recht geraten. Mit dem Einzug in das neue Heim
kehrte auch der Wohlstand bei den Altwirths ein. Aber nicht das
Glück. Wenigstens nicht für Frau Adele. Sie blieb die einsame,
fremde Frau, die sie stets gewesen war. Und blieb es jetzt durch ihre
eigene Schuld.
Die Damen der Gesellschaft, die nun nach und nach alle zu Felix
Altwirth kamen, um sich von ihm malen zu lassen, waren wie
umgewandelt in ihrem Benehmen gegen des Künstlers Frau. Adele
empfand jedoch keine Zuneigung zu den Frauen, die sie einmal aus
ihrem Kreis gestoßen hatten. Jetzt wollte sie nicht mehr eine von
ihnen sein, wollte allein bleiben und nur sich und ihrem Kinde leben.
Mit der Familie des Doktor Storf hatte sich in dieser Zeit wieder
ein mehr herzlicher Verkehr angebahnt. Die kleine Dora kam oft, um
mit Fritz und Klara, den beiden Kindern des Arztes, zu spielen.
Dadurch kamen auch die beiden Frauen einander näher und lernten
sich besser kennen, als bei den kühlen Anstandsbesuchen, die sie
früher einander abgestattet hatten. Frau Adele fühlte es, daß sie in
der kleinen verschüchterten Arztensgattin eine Leidensgefährtin
besaß.
Freundliche Menschen hatten es Frau Hedwig zugetragen, daß
ihr Gatte sie mit der Frau des Advokaten Rapp hinterging. Und ihre
Schwester, die Frau Baurat Goldrainer, war mit aller Energie bei dem
Arzt vorstellig geworden. Das hatte den Erfolg gehabt, daß Doktor
Storf sich jede Einmischung in seine Privatangelegenheiten verbat
und drohte, mit den Verwandten seiner Frau gänzlich zu brechen,
wenn so etwas noch einmal geschehen sollte.
Frau Goldrainer hatte der ruhige Ernst ihres Schwagers einen
ganz gewaltigen Respekt eingeflößt. Am meisten imponierte es ihr,
daß sich Max gar nicht aufs Leugnen verlegte. Ihr eigener Mann
pflegte in solchen Fällen stets so lange zu lügen, bis er überführt
war. Da Max Storf gar keinen Versuch zu seiner Rechtfertigung
unternahm, war die Frau Baurat fast geneigt zu glauben, daß alles
wirklich leeres Gerede von den Leuten sei.
Schließlich hatte man bis jetzt weder den Arzt noch Sophie
ertappen können. Kein Mensch hätte es beschwören können, ob die
Beziehungen, in denen diese beiden zueinander standen, mehr als
ein bloßer Flirt waren.
In diesem Sinne sprach die Frau Baurat auch zu ihrer Schwester.
Sie sprach gut zu ihr und vernünftig. „Weißt Hedwig,“ meinte sie,
„mach dir nix draus, wenn er auch a bissel außigrast, dein Mann.
Solang er gut ist mit dir und den Kindern, geht’s schon. Laß ihm jetzt
sei’ Ruh’! Er kommt schon wieder zu dir z’rück. Kümmer’ dich nit!“
riet sie ihr. „Was du nit weißt, macht dir nit heiß.“
Die Frau Baurat sprach aus dem Schatze einer reichen
Erfahrung, nur daß sie jene Weisheit, die sie jetzt der Schwester
vortrug, selber nicht befolgt hatte. Aber auch Frau Hedwig tat nicht,
wie ihr die Schwester riet.
Etwas wie Eifersucht war in der kleinen Frau rege geworden.
Jetzt, nachdem sie den Gatten verloren hatte, nachdem sie es
wußte, daß er nicht mehr ihr, sondern einer andern zu eigen war,
empfand sie den brennenden Schmerz eines erlittenen schweren
Unrechtes. Sie forschte nicht der Ursache nach, die Max Storf in die
Arme einer andern Frau getrieben hatte. Sie dachte nicht mehr an
sein ehrliches Streben, ihr nahe zu kommen, sondern sie fühlte nur
die Kränkung, die für sie in seiner Untreue lag.
Und aus diesem Gefühl heraus tat sie wiederum das Gegenteil
von dem, was sie hätte tun müssen. Sie verfolgte den Gatten mit
ihrem Argwohn. Sie schlich ihm nach, heimlich in der Nacht, bis an
die Villa des Rechtsanwaltes. Dort sah sie, wie er durch die
unverschlossene Gartentür ging, wie die Haustür leise von innen
geöffnet wurde und sich hinter ihrem Gatten ebenso unhörbar wieder
schloß ...
Nun hatte Frau Hedwig die Gewißheit, und sie trug ihr Leid nicht
aufrecht und schweigend wie Adele Altwirth, sondern weinte um ein
Glück, das sie in Wahrheit nie besessen hatte.
Aus der schüchternen kleinen Frau Hedwig war eine
schwermütige Kranke geworden. Und wie eine Kranke behandelte
sie auch ihr Gatte. Er hörte geduldig und mit Nachsicht auf ihre
Klagen und auf die sich fortwährend wiederholenden bitteren
Vorwürfe. Hörte sie an ohne Widerrede, wie der Arzt die
Stimmungen seines Patienten erträgt.
Max Storf ließ sich nicht auf Erörterungen ein. Er wußte, daß sie
zu nichts anderem führen würden, als zu peinlichen Auftritten. Frau
Hedwig aber weinte ... weinte und litt. Sie sehnte den Tod herbei, der
sie von einem Leben befreien sollte, das für sie nie einen wirklichen
Wert gehabt hatte.
Einmal war es zur Aussprache gekommen zwischen Hedwig und
Adele. Das geschah, als Adele die kleine Dora vom Spiel abholte.
Da traf sie wie jetzt fast immer die Arztensfrau mit verweinten und
ganz verschwollenen Augen.
Mit warmem Mitleid ergriff Adele die Hand der kleinen Frau und
drückte die zarte Gestalt mit sanfter Energie auf die weichen Kissen
einer Ottomane, die in dem behaglich eleganten Wohnzimmer des
Arztes stand. Dann setzte sie sich neben Hedwig. Der matte Schein
einer großen Hängelampe, die mit einem rosafarbenen
Seidenschirm verhüllt war, fiel auf die blassen Gesichter der beiden
Frauen. Färbte ihre Wangen mit zartem Rot, machte das fahle
Gesicht Frau Hedwigs lebhaft und milderte die ernsten, fast strengen
Züge der blonden Adele.
„Frau Hedwig,“ fing Adele nun mit ihrer vollen, weichen Stimme
zu reden an, „ich will nicht aufdringlich sein, will Sie nicht fragen um
den Kummer, der Sie drückt. Aber ich will und muß einmal reden mit
Ihnen. So oft ich Sie sehe, haben Sie verweinte Augen. Immer
weinen Sie. Das ist nicht recht! Und mag Ihr Leid auch noch so groß
sein, Frau Hedwig, glauben Sie mir, auch das schwerste Leid gibt
Kraft, macht stark! Man k a n n es tragen, wenn man nur will.“
Hedwig Storf hatte bei der Rede Adelens leise und still in sich
hinein geweint und ihr Gesicht mit beiden Händen verdeckt.
„Ich kann mir nicht helfen!“ sagte sie jetzt schluchzend. „Ich muß
weinen, es drückt mich so! Wie eine Zentnerlast drückt’s mich!“
gestand die kleine Frau zaghaft.
„Was drückt Sie so?“ frug Adele und fuhr ihr mit leichter Hand
über das dunkle Haar.
Es lag etwas mütterlich Liebkosendes in der Art, wie sie die
kleine, schüchterne Frau zu trösten versuchte. Sie hatte das
bestimmte Gefühl, daß es Frau Hedwig gut tun würde, wenn sie sich
einmal aussprechen könnte. Und deshalb frug sie.
Hedwig schluchzte laut auf. „Es ist das Schlimmste, das eine
Frau treffen kann, wenn der Mann keine Lieb’ nit hat!“ stieß sie
erregt hervor.
„Hat er das nicht, Frau Hedwig?“ frug Adele weich.
„Nein!“ Hedwig schüttelte traurig den Kopf. „Die andere, die
Sophie Rapp, die Person ...“ fing sie jetzt in krankhafter Erregung zu
schimpfen an, „die ist’s! Ich hab’ ihn selber zu ihr gehen sehen. Ich
...“
Da nahm Adele die Hand der kleinen Frau tröstend in die ihrige.
Die beiden so ungleichen Frauen saßen jetzt ganz eng aneinander
gedrückt. Hedwig blaß und schüchtern und trostsuchend. Die andere
gerade und aufrecht, selbstbewußt und voll Würde. Eine lange,
lange Pause entstand. Keine der beiden Frauen sagte ein Wort. Und
so still war es in dem dämmerig beleuchteten Zimmer, daß es
Hedwig vorkam, als könnte sie von der Frau, die ihr zur Seite saß,
den lauten, kräftigen Schlag des Herzens hören.
Da plötzlich frug Adele, und ihre Stimme klang leise, fast
flüsternd: „Glauben Sie, daß nicht auch andere Frauen das gleiche
Leid erdulden müssen?“
Frau Hedwig sah erstaunt zu ihr auf.
„Sie sagen das so seltsam, Frau Altwirth ...“ sprach sie. Dann
über eine Weile fuhr sie nachdenklich fort: „Ich hab’ g’hört ... sollt’ es
wahr sein ... daß die Frau Rapp ...“ Mit großen, fragenden
Kinderaugen sah sie zu der blonden Frau auf. „Aber das kann ja nit
wahr sein. Da müßten Sie ja schrecklich unglücklich sein!“ sagte
Hedwig naiv.
Und wieder herrschte tiefes Schweigen in der dämmerigen
Stube.
„Wer sagt Ihnen, daß ich es nicht bin?“ frug Adele kaum hörbar.
„Ja ... aber ... aber ...“ stotterte Frau Hedwig verwirrt. „Ich begreif’
nit ... Ich begreif’ Sie nit ...“
„Begreifen nicht, daß ich nicht auch weine und mich aufreibe wie
Sie?“ sagte Adele mit wehmütigem Lächeln. „Nicht wahr?“
Frau Hedwig nickte stumm und sah noch immer ganz verwundert
und bekümmert zu der andern empor.
„Weil ich mehr Lebensmut besitze, als Sie, Frau Hedwig!“ fuhr
Adele in bestimmtem Ton fort. „Mehr Mut und ... verzeihen Sie ...
mehr Stolz!“
„Stolz?“ frug Frau Storf verständnislos.
„Ja, auch das merken Sie sich, Frau Hedwig! In dem Augenblick,
wo die Frau aufgehört hat, für den Mann als Weib zu existieren, in
jenem Augenblick muß ihre Würde einsetzen. Man weint und bettelt
nicht um eines Mannes Liebe. Man trägt es ... fügt sich drein, und
dann steigt man im Wert. Und das ist auch etwas, Frau Hedwig!
Glauben Sie mir!“
Frau Hedwig Storf ließ ihr zierliches, schön geformtes Köpfchen
hängen. Wie ein kleines, trauriges Vogerl, so kam sie der jungen
blonden Frau vor. Es war etwas Rührendes, kindlich
Vertrauensvolles in dem Wesen der kleinen Frau, als sie zu Adele
aufblickte in stummer Bewunderung.
Sie konnte den Sinn der Rede nicht ganz erfassen. Dafür war sie
innerlich zu unklar und zu verwirrt. Aber fortwährend hatte sie nur
den einen Gedanken ... wenn die Sophie wirklich den Maler Altwirth
liebte, dann ... dann ... konnte doch noch alles gut werden in ihrer
Ehe. Dann konnte ihr eigener Mann wieder zurückfinden zu ihr.
Dann ... Und aus diesem Gedankengang heraus bat sie jetzt Adele,
sie möge die Vermittlerrolle übernehmen zwischen ihr und dem
Gatten.
„Denn wissen’s, Sie sind g’scheit. Sie packen die Sach’ sicher
besser an wie meine Schwester ...“ bat sie leise.
Es lag so viel vertrauensvolle Zuversicht in ihrer Bitte, daß Adele
nicht ablehnen mochte. Sie freute sich über den guten Erfolg, den
ihre Worte bei der jungen Arztensfrau gehabt hatten. Und sie
bemerkte es auch mit Befriedigung, daß Frau Storf von jener Zeit an
mehr an sich hielt und viel ruhiger und gefaßter wurde ...
Frau Adele Altwirth zerbrach sich nicht lange den Kopf darüber,
auf welche Art sie die übernommene Mission zur Ausführung
bringen sollte. Sie überließ es dem Zufall. Der würde ihr schon
helfen.
Felix Altwirth und Max Storf waren einander auch etwas näher
gekommen. Der Arzt suchte den ehemaligen Jugendfreund auf, so
oft er konnte. Er zeigte sich bei jeder nur möglichen Gelegenheit
öffentlich mit ihm und versuchte es redlich, das alte, innige
Freundschaftsverhältnis, das die beiden einmal vereint hatte, wieder
herzustellen.
Aber trotz aller Bemühungen schien es, als ob der Riß, den diese
Freundschaft erlitten hatte, nicht wieder gut zu machen sei. Felix
konnte es nicht verwinden, daß auch Storf zu jenen gehört hatte, die
ihn in den Zeiten der Not ruhig seinem Schicksal überließen. Dann
war noch ein Grund vorhanden, der ein vollständiges Vertrauen bei
Felix nicht aufkommen ließ. Und dieser Grund war Sophie.
Max Storf hatte sich in seinem Innern schon längst damit
abgefunden, daß er nicht der einzige war, der sich Sophiens Gunst
erfreuen durfte. Ihm war es gleichgültig, ob Felix oder ein anderer
ihre Liebe genoß. Er hegte deshalb auch keinen Groll gegen Felix,
und Sophie war rasch in seinen Gedanken vollständig
ausgeschaltet, wenn er sich in Gesellschaft des Malers befand.
Bei Felix Altwirth jedoch stand die Sache anders. Er wußte es
noch immer nicht mit Bestimmtheit, wie die Beziehungen zwischen
Sophie und Max Storf eigentlich beschaffen waren.
Als er Sophie einmal deswegen zur Rede stellte, lachte sie ihn
aus. „Aber Felix, Schatz! Was glaubst du denn? Jetzt, wo ich dich
hab’!“ sagte sie und nestelte sich zärtlich an ihn. „Da gibt’s doch
überhaupt keinen andern Mann mehr für mich auf der Welt!“ log sie
ihm dreist ins Gesicht.
Felix jedoch, der mißtrauisch geworden war, gab nicht nach. Für
ihn war Sophie bald wieder zu jenem hohen Ideal geworden, das sie
in seinen Jugendjahren gewesen war. Er hörte wohl das Gerede der
Leute. Aber alles in ihm sträubte sich, daran zu glauben. Nur ab und
zu tauchten Zweifel über ihre Treue in ihm auf. Der Gedanke, daß
dieses Weib, das er mit so verzehrender Glut liebte, auch einem
andern zu eigen sein könnte, machte ihn rasend.
„Du darfst niemandem gehören, Sophie, nur mir!“ forderte er im
drohenden Tone. „Ich ertrag’s nicht. Hörst du?“
„Aber Schatz!“ lachte die Sophie ausgelassen. „So eifersüchtig
bist du! Da könnt’ man sich ja völlig fürchten vor dir!“ sagte sie
schmeichelnd und zog ihn mit sanfter Gewalt zu sich nieder.
In dem Atelier des Malers standen jetzt weiche Polstermöbel,
tiefe Lehnsessel, in die man sich versenken konnte. In einem dieser
wohlig weichen Sessel hatte Sophie Platz genommen und Felix
zärtlich zu sich gezogen, so daß er vor ihr auf den Knien zu liegen
kam. Dann bettete sie seinen Kopf in ihren Schoß und zauste ihm
mit ihren beiden Händen spielerisch das volle blonde Haar.
Felix machte sich gewaltsam los von ihr. „Fürchten, ja, das
kannst du dich auch, wenn ...“ rief er leidenschaftlich.
„Wenn? ...“ frug sie innig und hielt ihm ihre vollen Lippen zum
Kusse hin.
„Weib!“ sagte Felix schwer atmend. „Du ... du hast mich ja ganz
in deiner Hand! Du ...“
Sophie hielt nun den Kopf des Malers in ihren Armen, so daß er
das erregte Klopfen ihres Herzens hören konnte.
„Ich mach’ mit dir, was ich will ...“ sagte sie leise und flüsternd.
„Du bist mein ... ganz mein!“ Fest und innig hielt sie den Mann
umschlungen und küßte ihn lange und mit heißer Glut.
Völlig betäubt erhob sich Felix über eine Weile. Er hatte das
bestimmte Gefühl, Wachs zu sein in den Händen dieses Weibes ...
alles tun zu müssen, was sie wollte ... als Sklave ihrer Liebe, als ein
unfreier Mensch in seinen Handlungen.
„Sophie, spiel’ nicht mit mir ...“ bat er sie jetzt fast schüchtern. „Es
könnt’ ein Unglück geschehen. Du bist mir alles! Mein Gott und mein
Schicksal! Mein Leben und meine Kunst!“
Und Sophie verstand es, ihn so zu beruhigen, daß er alle seine
Zweifel über Bord warf und auf ihre Treue geschworen hätte.
In den Stunden, in denen sich Felix der Verwirklichung seiner
großen Arbeiten widmete, da war es immer und immer wieder
Sophie, die ihm den Ansporn gab. Sie war ihm Modell geworden.
Ohne sie konnte er sich keines seiner Werke denken.
Er malte sie so, wie e r sie kannte. Ihre Glut, ihre Leidenschaft
und die Rätsel ihres Wesens, die sie ihm auferlegte, alles fand sich
in seinen Studien wieder. Und wenn er eine blonde, helle Frau malte,
so gab er den Augen die zehrende, verlockende Sehnsucht ihres
Blickes. Es war sie, ihr Körper, ihr Gesicht und ihre Seele, die ihn
stets aufs neue fesselten ...
Doktor Storf war wieder einmal zu Felix gekommen und hatte
diesen nicht angetroffen. Das Dienstmädchen führte ihn, wie sie das
stets zu tun pflegte, in das Atelier des Malers. Herr Altwirth müsse
bald kommen, sagte sie.
Der Arzt hatte Platz genommen und blätterte interessiert in den
zahlreichen Skizzenbüchern, die verstreut auf den Tischen
herumlagen. Max Storf sah, daß es fast durchwegs dieselbe
Frauengestalt war, die den Künstler begeistert hatte. Er glaubte
diese Frau gut zu kennen, und unwillkürlich mußte er lächeln über
die schwärmerische Bewunderung für sie, die ihm aus den
künstlerischen Entwürfen entgegenglühte.
Max Storf saß bequem mit übereinander geschlagenen Beinen in
einem der weichen Polsterstühle und hatte sich so sehr in ein
Skizzenbuch vertieft, daß er es gar nicht bemerkte, wie Adele
Altwirth schon seit einiger Zeit das Atelier betreten hatte und ihn mit
ruhigem Blick beobachtete.
Als er zufällig aufschaute, sah er die junge Frau in der Mitte des
Raumes stehen. Der fahle Schein des Tageslichtes fiel durch die
hohen Fenster, fiel auf ihre schlanke Gestalt und ließ ihr weiches,
aschblondes Haar hell aufleuchten.
Adele Altwirth trug ein schlichtes, weißes Kleid, das, so einfach
es auch war, doch so sonnig und freudig wirkte, daß Doktor Storf
einen Augenblick wie geblendet auf die junge Frau starrte. Dann
erhob er sich leicht verwirrt, um sie zu begrüßen.
Frau Adele und Doktor Storf kannten sich nur ganz flüchtig.
Wenn sie sich sahen, war die Begegnung bloß oberflächlich
gewesen. Max Storf hatte sich auch nie sonderlich für die junge
Künstlersfrau interessiert. Sie war ihm zu ernst und zu gemessen. Er
liebte nicht die stolze Würde bei den Frauen. Seiner Ansicht nach
sollten die Frauen heiter sein; denn sie waren dazu ausersehen, den
Ernst des Mannes mit ihrem Frohsinn zu vertreiben.
Auch Adele hatte für den Arzt erst seit ihrer Unterredung mit
Hedwig mehr Interesse gewonnen. Und eingedenk der Zusage, die
sie Hedwig gegeben hatte, wollte sie jetzt die Gelegenheit benützen,
um mit Doktor Storf zu sprechen. Vielleicht würde ein solcher Anlaß
nicht so bald wiederkehren.
Sie trat mit raschem, leichtem Schritt auf den Arzt zu und bat ihn,
Platz zu behalten, Felix müsse jeden Augenblick kommen,
versicherte sie. Einstweilen müsse Max Storf sich eben mit ihrer
Gesellschaft begnügen.
Ein feines Lächeln begleitete ihre Worte. Adele erriet es mit dem
sichern Empfinden der sensitiven Frau, daß Max Storf nicht viel von
ihr hielt. Daher lächelte sie jetzt, da sie seinen verwunderten Blick
bemerkte, und dieses ironische Lächeln verwirrte den Arzt und
machte ihn unsicher in seiner Haltung gegen sie.
Mit erzwungener Höflichkeit, die nicht ohne Verlegenheit war,
sagte er daher: „Aber ich bitte, gnädige Frau, es ist mir doch eine
Auszeichnung.“
Adele lehnte sich leicht in den Stuhl zurück, auf dem sie sich
ihrem Gast gegenüber niedergelassen hatte, und meinte in
gleichgültigem Ton: „Ich habe Sie eigentlich bei einer großen
Unterhaltung gestört, Herr Doktor. Nicht wahr? Sie sahen vorhin so
vergnügt aus, als ich ins Atelier kam.“
Max Storf schaute überrascht zu der jungen Frau hinüber, und
sein schönes, stark gebräuntes Gesicht verfinsterte sich für einen
Augenblick.
„Wie meinen gnädige Frau?“ frug er höflich. Er hatte ein
unbehagliches Gefühl, als ob sich Adele über ihn lustig machen
wollte.
„Ich meine, daß Sie das Original dieser Studien eigentlich gut
kennen müßten ...“ steuerte nun Adele geradewegs auf ihr Ziel los.
„Allerdings, die meisten dieser Damen scheinen Bekannte zu
sein ...“ antwortete Storf ausweichend.
„Scheinen, Herr Doktor? Nur scheinen ...“ fragte Adele mit leisem
Spott.
Doktor Storf hatte sich ärgerlich erhoben und machte ein paar
Schritte gegen eines der beiden Fenster, das offen stand.
Die schöne Wohnung der Altwirths lag jetzt droben in Wilten, in
der Nähe der beiden großen Kirchen, deren ernstes Glockengeläute
Adele damals in den ersten Tagen ihres Innsbrucker Aufenthaltes so
traurig gestimmt hatte. Von den beiden Fenstern des geräumigen
Ateliers hatte man den Blick auf einen großen, parkähnlichen Garten
und über die Bäume der Gärten hinweg auf das Mittelgebirge mit
seinen dichten Bergwäldern, verstreuten Wiesen und Häusern und
auf den dicken, behaglichen Kugelkopf des Patscherkofels.
Max Storf sah hinaus auf die kleine Straße, die unten vor dem
Park vorüber führte. Dann wandte er sich plötzlich um und richtete
seinen forschenden Blick auf Frau Adele ... Was wollte diese Frau
eigentlich von ihm? Warum machte sie sich lustig über ihn? ... frug er
sich selbst in unangenehmer Stimmung.
„Sie kennen Frau Doktor Rapp doch sehr gut ...“ fuhr Adele nach
einer Weile ungezwungen zu plaudern fort. „Und sie ist so
unverkennbar in allen diesen Skizzen, so meisterhaft in der
Wiedergabe ...“
„Ja, meisterhaft ist das richtige Wort!“ stimmte jetzt Doktor Storf
eifrig bei. Er war froh, daß er einen Ausweg gefunden hatte, um sich
geschickt aus der Affäre zu ziehen. „Ganz richtig, es ist seltsam, wie
viele feine Details Felix an dieser Frau entdeckt hat. Mit ganz andern
Augen sieht man sie da auf einmal ...“
„Künstler idealisieren!“ unterbrach ihn Adele schroff. „Sie sehen
vieles anders als wir.“
Durch ihren kalten, abweisenden Ton aufmerksam gemacht, kam
Doktor Storf, der sich, während er sprach, mit dem Rücken gegen
das Fenster gelehnt hatte, wieder näher und sah interessiert auf die
blasse, schlanke Frau mit den strengen Zügen.
„Das heißt,“ widersprach er scherzhaft, „die gnädige Frau räumen
dem Gatten mehr Recht ein ... weil er Künstler ist?“
Adele fühlte den Stachel, der trotz des scherzhaften Tones in
dieser Rede verborgen war.
„Es liegt eine gewisse Rechtfertigung in diesem Titel!“ sagte sie
ernst. „Man kann eine Sache, die unbegreiflich scheint, eher
verstehen.“
„Und diese ...“ frug Max Storf zögernd, „diese erscheint Ihnen
unbegreiflich, gnädige Frau?“
Adele neigte zustimmend ihr Haupt. „Ja!“ sagte sie einfach und
sah ihm dabei fest in die Augen.
Max Storf hatte sich wieder auf seinen Platz gesetzt und blätterte
nachdenklich in den Skizzenbüchern. „Warum sprechen Sie so zu
mir?“ frug er dann über eine Weile, ohne Adele anzusehen.
„Weil ich Mitleid habe mit Ihrer Frau!“
„Und Sie ... Haben Sie mit sich selber kein Mitleid?“ frug der Arzt
sehr ernst.
„Nein!“ sagte sie leise. „Ich kann es tragen. Das ist anders.“
Nun trat eine große Pause ein. Adele saß schweigend da, in ihrer
leichten, nachlässigen Haltung, den Kopf gesenkt und die Arme auf
die Knie gestützt. Max Storf betrachtete sie jetzt mit einer Art
neugierigen Interesses. Sie kam ihm mit einem Male anders vor.
Nicht kalt und verschlossen, sondern weich, nachsichtig und
verstehend.
„Dann lieben Sie Felix nicht!“ unterbrach Max Storf unvermittelt
das Schweigen. Er sagte es in einem so bestimmten Ton, als gebe
es keinen Widerspruch.
Adele war jäh zusammengezuckt. Wie ein plötzliches Erkennen
kam es über sie. Sie gab keine Antwort und starrte fest vor sich hin.
Max Storf sah, daß sie noch blässer geworden war und daß sie ihre
schmalen, streng geschlossenen Lippen noch mehr aufeinander
preßte.

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Non-consensual Image-based Sexual

Offending: Bridging Legal and

Dean Fido · Craig A. Harper

More information about this series at

Palgrave Studies in Cyberpsychology

1 An Introduction to Image-Based Sexual Abuse 1

2 Theories of Image-Based Sexual Abuse 27

3 Social Beliefs and Judgements of Image-Based Sexual

4 Future Directions in Image-Based Sexual Abuse 75

Fig. 2.1 Schematic of Finkelhor’s (1984) Four Preconditions

Table 1.1 Behaviours considered to be ‘non-consensual sexual

An Introduction to Image-Based Sexual Abuse

1. the impact of offending behaviour on victims;

We have designed this book to be as accessible as possible, regard-

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Table 1.1 Behaviours considered to be ‘non-consensual sexual image

Behaviour label Description

Revenge pornography The non-consensual distribution of private, explicit

that we do not imply a hierarchy of image-based sexual abuse offences but

Although this leads to a rather broad framing of the term ‘sexual’, we

of victimisation. As such, consideration of the impact of revenge pornog-

Moreover, the words ‘pornography’ or ‘porn’ are words used in the

Deepfake Media Production

take place (which in itself may represent a copyright infringement), or the

images or videos. The key feature of cyber-flashing that dictates whether

Sexting and the Normative Use

limited due to the wording of legislation pertaining to outraging public

In America, as with revenge pornography there exists no federal law

Deepfake Media Production

under Section 6 of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, which

Chapter Summary and Overview

that victims of said offences suffer equally, regardless of their nation-

Dr. Dean Fido: deanfido.psych@gmail.com

1. Compare and contrast your understanding of non-consensual

Suggestions for Further Reading

Bartow, A. (2009). Internet defamation as profit center: The monetization of

McAfee. (2013, December). Love, relationships, and technology: How we expose

perceptions of seriousness and responsibility. Journal of Criminal Psychology,

Theories of Image-Based Sexual Abuse

© The Author(s) 2020 27

to male predation (Stanko, 1990). The continuum idea is a construc-

Image-Based Sexual Abuse and Sexual Offending

…sexual offending is about power, entitlement, control, punishment and

Feminist and Sociological Explanations of Sexual Offending

Psychological Models of Sexual Offending

One—multifactorial Level one theories are large integrated models that

which can further be explained in terms of their specific offence-chain

Fig. 2.1 Schematic of Finkelhor’s (1984) Four Preconditions model of sexual

through stress or cognitive distortions about children and sex), followed

For example, sexual arousal and emotional congruence with children

external inhibitors (precondition three) and victim resistance (precondi-

by two classes of predictors: ‘motivators’ and ‘facilitators’. Motivators are

Legal vs. Psychological Classifications

conclusions, but as stimulation for future research. We present our ideas

Revenge Pornography Offending

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