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Contents
PART V APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1 What’s Next?
CHOOSING THE BEST COLLEGE OR
UNIVERSITY FOR YOU
APPLYING TO COLLEGE
SUGGESTED HIGH SCHOOL
COURSES
“After working with Steve I was able to crack the ACT and got a 36
composite score! His help made all the difference in getting those
last few points for a perfect score!”
C. S. (Student)
You must register for the ACT in advance. You can’t just show up on
test day with a number 2 pencil and dive right in. The best source of
information for all things ACT is, not surprisingly, the ACT website:
www.act.org. Create an account when you register so that you can
receive updates, scores, etc.
Amy Says:
One important thing about scores is that you don’t have to be
perfect to get a good score on the ACT. The truth is that you can
miss a fair number of questions and still get a score that places
you in the top 1% of all test-takers. In fact, this test is so hard
and the time limit is so unrealistic for most test-takers that you
can get a score that is at the national average (about a 21) even
if you get almost half of the questions wrong.
TESTING IRREGULARITIES
This test will help you to assess your strengths and weaknesses.
Take the test under realistic conditions (preferably early in the
morning in a quiet location), and allow approximately 3.5 hours for
the entire test. Each of the test sections should be taken in the time
indicated at the beginning of the sections, and in the order in which
they appear. Fill in the bubbles on your answer sheet once you have
made your selections.
When you have finished the entire test, check your answers
against the Answer Key. Follow the directions on how to score your
test, and calculate your score using the Scoring Guide that appears
on pages 65 through 67. Then, read the Answers and Explanations,
paying close attention to the explanations for the questions that you
missed.
Your scores should indicate your performance on the individual
test sections, as well as your overall performance on the Diagnostic
Test. Once you have identified your areas of strength and weakness,
you should review those particular chapters in the book.
ACT Diagnostic Assessment Test
Answer Sheet
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such grants should be valid only when there had been a “Yes”
evoked from three fourths of those conventions. If we would realize
the amazing ignorance, during the last five years, shown on these
matters, we must continue the tale of the proposed new Article.
Before the proposed Article had left the Senate for the first time,
what we now call Section 2 read, “The Congress shall have power to
enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.” With the section in
that language, the Joint Resolution was passed and sent to the
House of Representatives on August 1, 1917. (Congressional
Record, Vol. 55, p. 5666.) It was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee and taken up by the House on December 17, with the
proposed Section 2 reading, “The Congress and the several states
shall have concurrent power to enforce this Article by appropriate
legislation.”
Somewhat educated with those Americans whose experience
made them better acquainted with the science of government than
any other people in the world, we realize that only Mark Twain could
do full justice to the nature of this alteration to the proposed Section
2. It was not enough that Congress, because it did not have the
power to make a certain command to its own citizens, should ask
inferior governments, which are not the government of the American
citizens, to make that command. It was not enough that the
American Congress, when asking these inferior governments to
make that command, should ask them to give Congress a future
ability to make commands on that subject on which the citizens of
America had never given any government or governments ability to
make any commands to the citizens of America. The House
alteration in the second suggestion from the Senate would indicate
that the House became jealous of the Senate ignorance of
fundamentals in the relations of governments to one another in
America and in the relation of all governments in America to the
individual American. It is difficult otherwise to explain the House
alteration in the Section 2 of the Amendment which came from the
Senate. As the House reported the two sections back to the Senate,
this is what the two sections proposed. Section 1 embodied a
command (to be made by the inferior state legislatures) which
directly interferes with the individual freedom of the American
citizens on a subject not enumerated in their First Article. Section 2
embodied a grant of future ability to make similar commands on the
same subject, and the grant was to be from the state legislatures to
the Congress and to the very state legislatures who were supposed
to make the grant itself and the command of the First Section.
This is exactly the form in which the Second Section of the
supposed new Amendment was later ratified by these very state
legislatures. That Second Section has been the subject of unlimited
discussion for the past five years. Every one seems to have given it
whatever meaning pleased him at some particular moment. When
the House Chairman of the Judiciary Committee reported this
Section to the House he frankly stated that “We thought it wise to
give both the Congress and the several states concurrent power to
enforce this Article and let that power be set forth and granted in the
Article we propose to submit.” (Congressional Record, Vol. 56, p.
424.) But when Wheeler, counsel for a political organization which
dictated that governments constitute this new government of men,
wrote his briefs to uphold the validity of the new Article which Webb
championed in the House, he explained that this Webb Second
Section “does not add to the power already conferred upon
Congress by Section 1” but that “it does, however, make clear that
the power is reserved to the states to pass legislation in aid of the
acts of Congress.” As in most matters, the various champions of the
supposed Eighteenth Amendment are unable to understand and
agree upon the meaning of plain English. From time to time, in our
education, it will be clear that they do not know and understand what
the American people did in 1788 in their “conventions” but that, while
flatly contradicting one another, they are all satisfied that the
American citizens did give the state legislatures unlimited ability to
interfere with individual freedom of the American citizen. It seems
natural, therefore, to find Webb and Wheeler flatly contradicting one
another as to the plain meaning of Section 2 of the Eighteenth
Amendment. Despite the absurdity of the concept, Section 2 means
exactly what Webb stated it to mean when he brought it from the
House Judiciary Committee which had written it. It means, in the
plainest English, that the state legislatures grant to themselves (as
well as to Congress) ability to make commands of the very same
kind as the same state legislatures make, without the grant, in the
First Section. And it is a remarkable fact that, in all the comment on
that Section 2 for five years, no word has been spoken about this
ridiculous proposal that the state legislatures make a certain
command and then grant themselves the power to make such
commands. However, the absence of such comment has been quite
in keeping with the fact that our modern leaders and lawyers, during
the same five years, have never known or commented upon the fact
that the Eighteenth Amendment depends for its existence upon the
similar and equally absurd concept that the Fifth Article is a grant
from the “conventions” to the “conventions” as well as to the state
legislatures.
By reason of our education, we have many natural questions to
ask about that Section 2 and the unique House addition to its
supposed grant. While some of those questions may be academic,
inasmuch as we know that the new Article is not in the Constitution,
the thoughts which suggest the questions are strikingly pertinent to
our general query, “Citizen or Subject?”
In the first place, we recall the opening words of Section 4 of the
Fourth Article of the Constitution. Those words are, “The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government.” These words immediately precede the Fifth
Article. Moreover, the Supreme Court has decided that it is the
particular duty of Congress to see that this particular guarantee of
the Fourth Article is strictly fulfilled. (Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1;
Pacific Telephone Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118.) In the light of
these facts, we wish to know whether the Congress, which proposed
the change in Section 2, so that state governments outside a
particular state might give to the state government of that state new
power to interfere with its citizens, understood that the Fifth Article
was meant to enable Congress to originate any desired breach of
the guarantee in the Fourth Article. From our education, we know
that, so long as any state has a republican form of government, its
legislature can have no power to interfere with the individual freedom
of the citizens of a state except by the grant and continued consent
of those citizens themselves. We know that the citizens of each
state, in 1776, gave its legislature power to interfere with their
freedom in the matter which is the subject of the Eighteenth
Amendment. We know that, then or at any time since then and now,
the citizens of each state could take back that power so given. But, if
the governments of thirty-six states outside any given state, by the
Second Section of the Eighteenth Amendment, have granted the
legislature of that particular state a new and second power to
interfere with the individual freedom of the citizens of that state, in
the matter which is the subject of the Eighteenth Amendment, what
has become of the republican form of government in that state? No
republican form of government ever exists where governments,
outside a state, give to its legislature any power to interfere with the
individual freedom of its citizens.
The case of Rhode Island or Connecticut makes our point clear,
although the question is equally apt for any state, if the Eighteenth
Amendment is in the Constitution. Neither the American citizens in
Rhode Island nor the legislature of Rhode Island, which speaks only
for its citizens and not for any citizens of America, have ever said
“Yes” to the grant to the legislature of Rhode Island of this new
power to interfere with the individual human freedom of the citizens
of Rhode Island. The other power to interfere with that freedom, on
the same subject, which the citizens of Rhode Island gave to their
legislature, is a power which the citizens of Rhode Island can take
back from that legislature at any time. But, if the Eighteenth
Amendment is in the Constitution, the legislature of Rhode Island
has a power to interfere with the citizens of Rhode Island in the
exercise of their human freedom, which power has been granted by
governments outside of Rhode Island, and which power cannot be
taken away from that legislature by the citizens of Rhode Island.
We average Americans again ask whether the Congress, chosen
to fulfill the guarantee of the Fourth Article, understood the meaning
of the Fifth Article to be that it could suggest and originate any
desired breach of that guarantee?
In the second place, we would like to ask another question of the
Congress which proposed that Second Section and of all who uphold
the validity and the sanity of the Eighteenth Amendment. This other
question is about the two distinct powers, in relation to Prohibition,
which the legislature of every state must have, if the Amendment is
in the Constitution? The question is simple. When such legislature
passes an act like the Mullan-Gage Law in New York, who
determines which of the two distinct powers the state legislature
exercises? Is it the power granted by the citizens of that state and
revocable by them? Or is it the power granted by governments
outside that state, over which the citizens of that state have not the
slightest control? The query is a pertinent one. It is not beyond
reasonable assumption that the citizens of New York may amend
their state constitution and forbid their legislature to enact any
statutes interfering with the freedom of the citizens of New York, in
any way, on the matter which is the subject of the Eighteenth
Amendment. Such a step on the part of the citizens of New York
would be absolutely valid. It is not forbidden even by the remarkable
Eighteenth Amendment. Such a step would immediately deprive the
legislature of the State of New York of any power from New York
citizens to pass such law. Moreover, it would end that Law itself, if
that Law was passed in the exercise of the power, in such matters,
granted by the citizens of New York. If it were determined, however,
that the Mullan-Gage Law had been passed by the New York
legislature in the exercise of power delegated to it by governments
outside of New York, the Mullan-Gage Law would still remain a valid
statute. This would mean, of course, that the republican form of
government guaranteed to the citizens of New York, by the Fourth
Article, had come absolutely to an end. Our particular query, at this
point, is obviously one of considerable importance to us American
citizens, each of whom happens to be also a citizen of some state to
which the citizens of America made the guarantee of the Fourth
Article and imposed on the very Congress, which originated the
Eighteenth Amendment, the duty of having that guarantee fulfilled.
There are other equally pertinent questions which we might ask
about this unique Section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment. We will
leave them for the present, so that we may continue the story of the
travel of the proposed new Article through the two Houses of the
Congress which suggested that governments exercise and give
government ability to exercise this new power over American
citizens, not enumerated in the First Article. We come now to the
days on which the House of Representatives and the Senate
discussed the Joint Resolution. In the recorded eloquence of the
advocates of the proposal, we shall find much to remind us of the
prevailing attitude in the British Parliament toward us in 1775. But, in
that eloquence, we shall look in vain for any echo of the Philadelphia
of 1787 or of the “conventions” in which Americans once assembled
and gave their only government its only enumerated powers to
interfere with their individual freedom.
CHAPTER XVII
THE TORY IN THE HOUSE