1

ALLAMA
 2

IQBAL OPEN
UNIVERSITY,
ISLAMABAD

ASSIGNMENT No. 2
 3

Course: Pakistan
Studies (9402)
Level: B.S Islamic
Semester: Autumn,
2023
Student
ID:16pkl01918
 4

Student Nam:
Fatima Noorulan
Sayed Abdul
Ghafoor Shah

Question No-1
 5

Q.1. Evaluate the

role of Sir Syed
Ahmad Khan in the
growth of Muslim
nationalism in India.
Asnwer
In the hundred years before 1857, the last
vestiges of the crumbling Moghul power
slowly vanished. When forceful resist- ance
to the British was no longer expedient or
possible, the Muslims, who had been the
rulers, withdrew into a purposive cultural
isolation. Under the leadership of the ulama’
contacts with the British were discouraged
and the introduction of new cultural elements
 6

into Muslim life was severely eschewed. The

result was that while the British were
introducing a new adminis- trative system, a
new language and a new technology into the
Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and the Hindus,
finally released from Muslim rule, were
rapidly adopting the British offerings, the
Muslims chose not to participate in the
professional, governmental or educational
life of the country. While English was the
official language of government, the Muslims
refused to learn it; while science and
technology held promises of great rewards,
Muslim fathers preferred to have their sons
study Arabic and Persian in the traditional
schools. As the gulf widened, the social
status and material well-being of the Muslims
in the subcontinent steadily declined.The
reversal of this policy of Muslim isolation
was largely brought about by Sir Sayyid
Ahmad Khan (1817-1898). Sir Sayyid founded
the Aligarh Muslim University which became
 7

the most important source of diffusion of

Western traits and ideas among the Muslims.
Sir Sayyid's ideas, which were taken over
without much change by his followers, are
still influential in Pakistan; a study of their
genesis and development will illuminate past
history as well as current happenings. This
analysis of his ideas falls into two parts: The
Theory of Nationalism and The Theory of
Progress.Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was a loyal
supporter of the British Empire and asked the
Muslims to keep away from the Indian
National Congress. He regarded the
Congress as an unnecessary organisation
and considered it harmful for the interests of
the Muslims. He thought that the Congress
was dominated by the Hindus, and Muslims
had no place in it. He felt that the Muslims can
protect their economic and political interests
through exposure to western education and
English language. In fact all the influential
 8

Government posts and business

opportunities were linked with western
education. Therefore he asked the Muslims
to show loyalty to the British who would take
care of Muslim interests. He founded
Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in
Aligarh to popularize scientific and western
learning among the Muslims. This college
became the nucleus of a movement popularly
known as the Aligarh Movement. Thus Sir
Syed Ahmed played a key role in the
formation of Muslim League to nurture the
political, social, economic and other
interests of the Muslims.

Question No-2
 9

Q.2. Discuss the

partition of Bengal
1905. How did it suit
the Muslims
interest?
Asnwer
Partition of Bengal
(1905)
The partition of Bengal was the most
important event during the rule of Lord
Curzon. It was carried out mainly for the
convenience of administration. Bengal in
 10

those days was the biggest province of India

extending over 1, 89, 000 square miles with a
population of 80 million. It was comprising of
Bengal, Behar and Orissa and was under the
central of one lieutenant Governor. After Lord
Curzon took charge as Governor General of
India the discussion over the Partition began
due to the following issues:

1. Vastness of Province:
The Province was spread over the area of 1,
89, 000 square miles with the population of
80 million, which was too vast to be managed
by one lieutenant Governor. He could not
make a tour for the whole province due to its
vastness once in his tenure.
 11

2. Limited Sources of
Communication:
The sources of communication in the
provinces were limited due to rivers and
forests. The law and order condition of
the provinces was also worst due to
insufficient police and in-efficient
management. Therefore the need of
partition of province was felt severally.

3.Difference of
Language:
There was also the difference of Languages
and civilization of the natives of West Bengal
and East Bengal. The natives of West Bengal
considered themselves superior in
civilization to the resident of East Bengal.
The Condition demanded for the division of
Provinces.
 12

4. Need of the time: The division

of Bengal was the need of the time to develop
trade in East Bengal and to promote the Port
of Chittagong, which could be done only by
division of the Provinces.

5. Partition:
The Partition of Bengal was thus calculated
to restore efficiency in the Government and
administration on one hand and encouraged
local initiatives for progress and
development on the other. Lord Curzon
partitioned Bengal and formed two new
provinces of manageable size – East and
West Bengal. East Bengal consisted of
Dacca, Mamansingh, Assam, Kaula,
Rangpur, and Bogra district, the Dacca was
capital of East Bengal constituted a majority
MuslimProvince, while the Bihar and Orissa
 13

constituted a separate province to be called

as West Bengal with the capital of Calcutta
and become the Hindu Majority provinces.

East Bengal contained a population of

eighteen million Muslims and twelve million
Hindus. Whereas West Bengal had a
population fifty four million of which 42
million where Hindus and thus was the Hindu
majority province.

Muslims interest:
It received a favorable response from the
Muslims. It was thought that it would bring
the emancipation of Muslims socially and
economically. The Muslims welcomed the
Partition of Bengal for the following reasons:
1. In the majority province of East
Bengal the Muslims would be free from Hindu
 14

dominance in economic field. They would get

opportunities of services and advancement
of agriculture.
2. The city of Dacca, where the Muslims
were in majority was the centre of Muslim
culture. In Dacca Muslims had a great chance
of success for social and cultural
advancement than in Calcutta.
3. The Partition could result in political
uplift and securing represent action in the
Government.
4. The partition of Bengal relieved the
Muslims from competing with Hindus, who
were more advanced in every field of life.

Question No-3
 15

Q.3. How did the

establishment of
Muslim League
contribute towards
the emergence of
Muslim nationalism
in the sub-continent.
Asnwer
Muslim Nationalism:
Muslims of South Asia were classified into
two categories during the time of the Indian
 16

independence movement: Nationalist

Muslims (individuals who opposed the
partition of India) and Muslim Nationalists
(individuals who wanted to create a separate
country for Indian Muslims). The All-India
Muslim League represented the Muslim
nationalists while, the All-India Azad Muslim
Conference represented nationalist Muslims.
The beginning of the Muslim nationalism in
the Sub-Continent is attributed to the first
Indian who accepted Islam. The War of
Independence (1857) was a crushing the
Indian Muslims who were held responsible
for the revolution by the British. The Arab
traders had introduced the new religion,
Islam, in the Indian sub-continent.
Muhammad bin Qasim was the first Muslim
encroacher who conquered some part of
Sindh and after that, Mahmud of Ghazna
launched seventeen attacks and provided
gateway to spread Islam. Qutub-ud-Din Aibuk
 17

permanently established Muslim reign in

India that followed Sultanate and Mughal
dynasties. Thus, a strong Muslim community
had emerged in India who has its own way of
spending life, and had a concept of Akirat
(day of Judgement).

Cultural Issues:
The Political and cultural history of the sub-
continent shows that Muslims often
considered some actions of the Hindu
Leaders unfriendly to Muslim’s benefits.
Whenever, Wherever and in whatever
capacity they got a chance to practice their
authority. This phenomenon increased the
differences between the two nations and the
concept of Muslim nationalism in India was
imposed due to this.
 18

Congress Rule:
The history of Muslim nationalism in India is
mainly in the reaction of the wining of Indian
National Congress. Starting point of the
nationalist movement in India was because,
the Indian National Congress came into
existence. As Congress grew into a political,
nationalist organization, Muslim political
nationalism accelerated Muslim nationalist
thinking.

Language:
Muslim nationalism grew well and did a lot of
work during the Hindi Urdu controversy. On
the very issue, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan
predicted about the unstable future of Hindu
Muslim unity. Hindus struggled strongly to
replace Urdu by Hindi as an official language.
This enhanced the importance of the sense
of Muslim separatism i.e. Muslim
Nationalism. Followers of Sir Syed Ahmed
 19

Khan tried their level best to save Urdu

language, Mr. Mohsin ul Mulk wonderfully
organized the Muslims in defense of Urdu.

Manifestos of Muslim
Nationalist:
1. Rule of Law, socio-economic justice,
equity and fair play.
2. Equality of opportunity to all citizens
irrespective of caste, sect, religion, or
region.
3. Religious and Cultural tolerance.
4. Respect for human dignity and rights.
5. Protection of the rights and interests of
non-Muslims and freedom to practice
their beliefs and religions.
 20

Conclusion:
In conclusion, I would like to say that there
were many major factors that led to the rise
of Muslim nationalism in India. The language,
the cultural gap, Congress’s Hinduism
centered policies, and furthermore the
historic collapse of the economy of the
qasbah, did not allow the Muslims to get
modernized and compatible to era, putting
them behind the Hindus who flourished and
developed in their own socio-political region
of ganjs. This led to Muslims develop a
feeling of a need to protect their rights and
interests through loyalty towards British, an
exclusive approach. Also, various bad
political moves of British government- Lord
Curzon’s decision of partitioning Bengal and
then again re-uniting it in 1906, added with
the rise of Hindu extremism and the growing
influence of extremist Hindu political parties
such as Hindu Mahasabha on the congress
 21

and congress’ own ideals of ‘one nation, one

party’, all jointly combined to fuel the rise of
Muslim nationalism .

Question No-4
Q.4. Did the British
accept the Muslim
demand for separate
electorate. Discuss
with reference to the
act of 1909.
Asnwer
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In October 1906 the Viceroy Lord Minto

received the Simla Deputation consisting of
Muslim leaders from all over India. They
demanded separate electorates from the
British and representation in excess of their
population. This was in the most immediate
sense triggered by the divergent Hindu and
Muslim reactions to the Partition of Bengal of
1905 and the promise made in July 1906 by
the new Liberal British government for
constitutional reforms of a representative
nature. Minto in his reply stated that he
understood the Deputation’s demand that
Muslims must be represented as a
community, but that he was not sure how that
representation could be achieved. This last
point is crucial and we will revisit it later in
the article.On 21st March 1907, the
Government of India’s despatch gave four
seats to the Muslims n the Viceroy’s Council.
Two to be filled by nomination and the other
two by election through separate electorates
 23

The Secretary of State John Morley sent out

his own despatch on 17th May 1907 affirming
separate representation. In August of the
same year, a circular was issued to the local
governments in India for their opinion.
Interestingly, while they approved of the
concept of Muslim representation, they
differed on how the representative would be
selected. One option was through electoral
colleges, other was through recognised
Muslim associations and yet another was
through nominations. Thus, the demand of
Muslim representation through voting by
exclusively Muslim electorates was still in
the air.The Muslim League, formed a few
months after the Simla Deputation,
responded by pointing out this ‘marked gap’
in thinking . The League demanded ten
electives seats, all to be filled by exclusive
Muslim electorates, with no nominations. It
sent its suggestions to the government in
March 1908.
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However, things turned for the worse for the

League when Morley began to change his
mind under the influence of Lord MacDonnell
and some Hindu pressure . His Council’s
Reform Committee proposed electoral
colleges which was conveyed in his
despatch on 27th November 1908 .This
despatch did not envisage separate
electorates and advocated the use of joint
electorates which would return a fixed
proportion of Hindus and Muslims (the
college), who would then go on to elect the
legislature for the provinces. This system
already existed in the District Boards and
Municipalities. The Muslim League response
came on 31st December 1908, in the Amritsar
session presided over by Ali Imam, through a
resolution warning the government of a ‘first
breakdown of…implicit faith’ reposed on the
government by Muslims. Sir Shafi wrote a
series of letters to the Viceroy’s Private
Secretary Dunlop Smith conveying Muslim
 25

concern over Morley’s reform scheme . The

London Branch of the League, created in May
1908, applied pressure in Britain through its
president Ameer Ali, the veteran Bengali
leader. They sent a Memorial to the Viceroy
and published pamphlets. The Times gave
space for a debate to proponents and
opponents of separate electorates with the
newspaper agreeing with the Muslim demand
[9]. Ameer Ali met Morley but he was not
successful. The Muslim press applied
pressure too: Paisa Akhbar, Watan and
Zamindar were joined by Lahore’s The
Observer. In addition Indian Muslims, not just
of the League, held protest meetings all over
India and sent resolutions to the government.
Viceroy Lord Minto too became convinced
that Morley’s scheme was a bad idea
informing him that ‘though the Mahommedan
is silent he is very strong’ [10]. In the month
of January of 1909 it seems Ali Imam was
won over to the side of joint electorates by a
 26

promise of power from Minto. His letter to the

Viceroy dated 4th February 1909 is proof of
this change. Nevertheless several Britishers
took the side of the League. These included
Sir A.T. Arundel, the Prince of Wales, Sir A.H.
Fraser and Sir George Clarke (described by
Minto as anti-Muslim). The British press was
divided, with The Times siding with separate
electorates and Manchester Guardian
opposing it. Morley in his speech on 23rd
February 1909 conceded that the Muslim
demands would be met ‘in full’ [11]. Hindu
leaders such as Malaviya and S. Banerjea
vehemently denounced the scheme.On 1st
April 1909, Under-Secretary of State
Buchanan gave two opposite schemes. First
he stated that the demand of Muslims were to
be met. This was backed by the Prime
Minister H.H. Asquith. Then he unfolded the
government’s plans to achieve Muslim
representation: by election through separate
electorates, nomination or electoral colleges
 27

through joint electorates. The League was

infuriated at this about-turn. They now
demanded that the 12 seats in the Imperial
Legislative Council be filled by separate
electorates and applied more pressure on the
government. All provincial branches were
instructed to enlist Muslim ‘Anjumans’ and
associations external to League. Hence,
between April and May of 1909 protest
meetings were held all over India. In Lucknow
and Dacca Muslim shopkeepers went on
voluntary strikes. The Lucknow meeting was
attended by around 12,000 Muslims. Morley
was alarmed and the British Opposition
Conservative Party (coached by the London
Branch of the League) also applied pressure
pointing out the inconsistency between
Morley and Buchanan’s statements . The
incumbent Liberal Party wanted its reforms
to achieve political success. On 26th April
1909 Buchanan, on behalf of Morley,
conceded separate electorates for the
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Muslim community.The Congress-owned or

inspired press in India had vehemently
rejected the concession. Minto was also
unhappy and created trouble when rules and
regulations regarding the councils were
being drafted. He first got Ali Imam on his
side (whom he met directly in Simla) to press
the League to accept mixed electorates too.
This came to no avail as the League was not
interested. It may also be said that what the
British (particularly Minto) had in mind by
‘separate representation’ was always
different from what the Muslim League
understood. Razi Wasti (1964, p. 183)
suggests that Sir Charles Lyall, who at the
India Office was responsible for advice on
separate representation, failed to do his job
properly. Either way, the Government of India
on 22nd July 1909 spelled out the rules and
regulations: six reserved seats for Muslims
from six provinces in Imperial Legislative
Council, plus two more seats by nomination
 29

if Muslims failed to get these seats in the

general election. Despite Muslim protests
throughout June and July, the government
did not budge. Morley had carried both the
Muslims and his ‘Hindu parcels’ . Both he and
Minto became rather annoyed with Muslim
pledges and the latter remarked: ‘I consider
that the Muhammadans are fairly and
liberally dealt with…we can wisely refuse to
negotiate with them further.’ On 15th
November 1909 the India Councils Act
became effective.Interestingly, the Muslim
demand for separate electorates is called
undemocratic by some authors (Jaffrelot,
2015). However, the Father of Indian
Constitution, B.R. Ambedkar also demanded
separate electorates for Dalits. So did the
Sikhs and every minority in India that wanted
to safeguard their representation. Even
Congress leaders such as G.K. Gokhale had
accepted separate electorates and Gandhi,
who so vehemently denied the right to Dalits
 30

in 1932, asked in May 19”7 for necessity of

acceptance from at least two-thirds of Hindu
minority in Bengal for any government Act to
pass . Therefore, minorities asking for
reservation or separate register should not
be taken as undemocratic.The struggle of the
Muslim League for separate electorates, the
maneuvering and double-talk of the British,
and their efforts to balance the two
communities clearly shows that they were
not in favour of either Hindus or Muslims in
entirety. They sought their own gain first and
foremost.

Question No-5
 31

Q.5. How did the act

of 1999 affect the
Muslim interests in
the body politics of
India?
Asnwer
The stereotype of Muslim Indians has long
been that they are a relatively quiescent
minor- ity that has made its peace with the
larger non-Muslim context of contemporary
India. Non-Indian Muslims may sometimes
scoff at the perceived tameness of the
Muslim voice in India or the assimilation of
and into the wider secular but Hindu-
influenced culture, They will at times profess
 32

solidarity with the trials of Muslim Indians. At

other times they will note with satisfaction
the Indian Muslim willingness to stand in
solidarity with pan- Islamic causes such as
Palestine. But they will rarely think of Muslim
Indians as a force to be reckoned with in the
ummah (the worldwide Muslim community).
It was not always so. And Muslim Indian
thinkers see themselves in a larger context.
They are heirs to a millennium-long
civilization, one of the greatest in modern
history, replete with the highest
philosophical, architectural, artistic, and
literary accomplishments. For much of
Islam's history in India, Indian Muslim
civilization was regarded by Muslims
throughout the world as one of the jewels of
Islamic civilization. And until the divisi”n of
the subcontinent’s Muslims into at first two
and then three nations, there would have
been little question that this was one of the
 33

great national traditions within Islam, if not

the greatest.
The sense of geographical, historical,
intellectual, and cultural unity that Muslim
Indians share with Muslims in Bangladesh
and Pakistan, common heirs of the same
civilization, is politically delicate. It is
vulnerable to the ready Hindu chauvinist
(Hindurva) charge that Muslim Indians are
"anti-national” because they secretly
sympathize with the Pakistani enemy,
because their Muslim identity is more
important than their Indian one. But at the
level of culture and religious thought, ”heir
South Asian Muslim heritage is a source of
pride; theirs is a distinct and liberal version
of Islam which draws on the particular char-
acteristics of their geographical location and
historical experience. South Asian Muslims
constitute by far the largest regional and
cultural group of any in the world of Islam.
 34

The heritage of Islam and of Persian and

Central Asian cultures remain an inextricable
part of the fabric of the wider Indian national
history, culture, and civilization. India’s
Muslims have been integral to the freedom
struggle, to the articulation of a
multireligious politi- cal and cultural identity
for India, and to the cultural and intellectual
life of India today. Muslim Indians struggle
with a difficult balance: on the one hand, they
take pride in their religious-cultural heritage
and in the larger national culture that it has
formed; on the other, Islam was the basis in
1947 for the division of their homeland.
Muslim Indians also take pride in being
Indian. They are the ones who chose to
remain in a multireligious India rather than
migrate to the new Muslim nation of Pakistan
Yet, despite individual successes, Muslims
as a group have not prospered in
independent India. Recently, both in India
 35

and outside it, there has emerged an

inchoate concern that the existence of a large
population of economically, socially, and
culturally marginalized citi- zens is an
Achilles heel of national unity, as well as a
source of potential political and social
instability. Some have feared that
burgeoning anti-state pan-Islamist
ideologies based on a sense of grievance,
and the violent groups inspired by those
ideologies, will also in the future seek to
recruit disaffected Muslim Indians.
Even though the Muslim Indian population
(160 million) is almost as large as the entire
population of Pakistan (180 million), equal to
the population of Bangladesh, and greater
than the total populations of major
predominantly Muslim nations such as Egypt
(80 mil- lion), Muslim Indians remain
relatively ill understood and understudied.
Their preoccupa- tions and predicament are
 36

little known among non-Muslim Indians, let

alone non-Indians There is even a sense
among Muslim Indians themselves that they
do not have a handle on what is happening in
the very varied Muslim communities
throughout India.Quite apart from the
question of numbers, the complexity of the
Muslim position in India arises from the fact
that, although a minority in contemporary
India, they are heirs to a political history of
powerful Muslim kingdoms that long
dominated India, and to cultural traditions,
indigenous and of Central Asian origin, that
have influenced the quintessential features
of modern Indian identity. And as recently as
the mid-20th century, before the separation
of Pakistan, Muslims constituted
approximately a third of the population of
undivided India.
Thus Muslim Indians do not see themselves
as a minority in the way that other minorities
 37

do. India is theirs, and they feel a sense of

ownership and belonging shared by few
minori- ties elsewhere. Yet, there is also a
growing sense of unease with the rise of anti-
Muslim right-wing Hindu chauvinism, along
with a growing incomprehension of Muslims
on the part of ordinary Hindus. Indian
Muslims are increasingly subjected to
chronic ”reju’ice based on ignorance and
stereotypes.

Religious and National

Identity
Although Muslims have always constituted a
minority in the subcontinent as a whole, the
India that was gradually taken under British
control was largely ruled by Muslim elites;
Muslims of various ethnicities (Turkic and
Persian) and dynasties had ruled most of
northern India for six or seven centuries in
the form of the Delhi Sultanate and the
 38

Moghul Empire. In many areas (largely those

that became Pakistan), Muslims came to
constitute the majority, and the cultures of
Hindus in those areas bore a particular stamp
of Muslim intellectual and cultura” influence.
Even areas not directly under Muslim control
showed a Muslim influence in the presence
of individual Muslims among elites, Muslim
minorities among their popula- tions, and
syncretic culture in food, arts, architecture,
and even religious thought.
The issue of religious identity has been a
divisive one in India for a century. No consid-
eration of India’s current external security
challenges can ignore the role of Islam in the
formation of the nations that today divide
South Asia. Yet Muslims have been present
in force on both sides of the debate between
Muslim separatism and inclusive
nationalism. The development of a national
movement for independence from Britain
 39

posed the ques-Muslims committed to a

wider Indian sense of nationality were an
integral part of the independence movement.
After partition, they provided leadership and
representation for Muslims within the context
of a secular mass politics of coalitions of
distinct interests. Their diminished numbers,
and the association of separate Muslim
organizing with the violence of partition and
the trauma of Muslim families divided,
fostered the practice of coalition politics.
However, over the course of time, the
intermediaries between the state and Muslim
citizens came increasingly to articulate the
distinct elements of Muslim inter- ests and
aspirations in terms of cultural identity, such
as a separate family and inheritance law,
rather than those social and economic
interests that Muslims shared with non-
Muslim Indians.
 40

For many decades after independence, the

Indian National Congress party was
dominant, and the historical association of
nationalist Muslims with the secular
traditions of Con- gress kept them in the fold.
There was always a rumble of discontent
about the Muslims being treated as a “vote
bank” by Congress. Muslims felt taken for
granted and felt that they received only token
concessions, while elements of Hindu
opinion within and outside Congress saw
appeasement and special treatment. With the
dissolution of the Congress political
monopoly, Muslim voters and leaders
explored the prospects of coalitions for the
purpose of maximizing Muslim power and
influence. However, the instability of party
politics has, if anything, divided and
weakened Muslim leadership and
representation.The exception to these long-
standing patterns has been found in
Communist-ruled states and those where
 41

Communist parties are a powerful presence,

such as West Bengal and Kerala. While
Communist parties and governments have
accommodated Muslim interests more
effectively than others, recent discourse has
noted that senior Muslim leaders have not
appeared in mainstream politics in
commensurate proportions, and that
Communists have practiced the politics of
tokenism just like other Indian politicians. In
recent years Communists have been
accused of seeking electoral advantage by
flirting with extreme religious, antisecular,
and divisive Muslim political movements and
leaders, such as Abdul Nasser Madani of the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Kerala.
Others note that the situ- ation is more
complex, and that religious extremists are
also more willing to form radical alliances
with other economically and socially
disadvantaged Indians. Madani’s PDP, for
example, claims to be an alliance of Muslims,
 42

Dalits (the most disfavored caste), and the

so-called “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs),
reflecting Madani’s evolution from his origi-
nal founding of the Islamic Sewa Sangh, a
radical Islamist movement based on the
model of the right-wing Hindu Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh .
The results of the 2009 elections are
instructive about contemporary Muslim
political behavior. Whereas there has been a
significant and sustained trend of Muslims
“coming back to the Congress fold,” Muslim
political behavior has varied across India
according to circumstances. Where the
political competition is essentially between
the right-wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and Congress-as in Delhi, Gujarat,
Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh the Muslim
vote has generally been consolidated against
th In states with more multifaceted political
competition such as Uttar Pradesh
 43

Maharashtra-Muslim votes are divided

among several parties reflecting va class
interests and coalitions.

Political Paticipation:
Muslims committed to a wider Indian sense
of nationality were an integral part of the
independence movement. After partition,
they provided leadership and representation
for Muslims within the context of a secular
mass politics of coalitions of distinct
interests.
Their diminished numbers, and the
association of separate Muslim organizing
with the violence of partition and the trauma
of Muslim families divided, fostered the
practice of coalition politics. However, over
the course of time, the intermediaries
between the state and Muslim citizens came
increasingly to articulate the distinct
elements of Muslim inter-ests and
 44

aspirations in terms of cultural identity, such

as a separate family and inheritance law,
rather than those social and economic
interests that Muslims shared with non-
Muslim Indians.
For many decades after independence, the
Indian National Congress party was
dominant, and the historical association of
nationalist Muslims with the secular
traditions of Con- gress kept them in the fold.
There was always a rumble of discontent
about the Muslims being treated as a “vote
bank” by Congress, Muslims felt taken for
granted and felt that they received only token
concessions, while elements of Hindu
opinion within and outside Congress saw
appeasement and special treatment. With the
dissolution of the Congress political
monopoly, Muslim voters and leaders
explored the prospects of coalitions for the
purpose of maximizing Muslim power and
 45

influence. However, the instability of party

politics has, if anything, divided and
weakened Muslim leadership and
representation.
The exception to these long-standing
patterns has been found in Communist-ruled
states and those where Communist parties
are a powerful presence, such as West
Bengal and Kerala. While Communist parties
and governments have accommodated
Muslim interests more effectively than
others, recent discourse has noted that
senior Muslim leaders have not appeared in
mainstream politics in commensurate
proportions, and that Communists have
practiced the politics of tokenism just like
other Indian politicians. In recent years
Communists have been accused of seeking
electoral advantage by flirting with extreme
religious, antisecular, and divisive Muslim
political movements and leaders, such as
 46

Abdul Nasser Madani of the People’s

Democratic Party (PDP) in Kerala. Others
note that the situ- ation is more complex, and
that religious extremists are also more
willing to form radical alliances with other
economically and socially disadvantaged
Indians. Madani’s PDP, for example, claims to
be an alliance of Muslims, Dalits (the most
disfavored caste), and the so-called “Other
Backward Classes” (OBCs), reflecting
Madani’s evolution from his origi- nal
founding of the Islamic Sewa Sangh, a radical
Islamist movement based on the model of the
right-wing Hindu Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS).
The results of the 2009 elections are
instructive about contemporary Muslim
political behavior. Whereas there has been a
significant and sustained trend of Muslims
“coming back to the Congress fold,” Muslim
political behavior has varied across India
 47

according to circumstances. Where the

political competition is essentially between
the right-wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and Congress-as in Delhi, Gujarat,
Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh the Muslim
vote has generally been consolidated against
the former. In states with more multifaceted
political competition such as Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, and Maharashtra-Muslim votes are
divided among several parties reflecting
varied local or class interests and coalitions.
The results of the 2009 elections are
instructive about contemporary Muslim
political behavior. Whereas there has been a
significant and sustained trend of Muslims
“coming back to the Congress fold,” Muslim
political behavior has varied across India
according to circumstances. Where the
political competition is essentially between
the right-wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and Congress as in Delhi, Gujarat,
 48

Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh-the Muslim

vote has generally been consolidated against
the former. In states with more multifaceted
political competition-such as Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, and Maharashtra-Muslim votes are
divided among several parties reflecting
varied local or class interests and coalitions.

In Assam, where not only are Muslims a

substantial percentage of the population, but
where many state legislative assembly
constituencies have Muslim majorities,
pluralities, or significant presence, the
Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF) has
had significant presence as a new and
specifically Muslim political party. Kerala
remains sui generis, in that Kerala Muslims
constitute a steady quarter to a third of the
population and have an established political
presence and a party-the Indian Union
Muslim League (IUML)- which has been an
 49

essential partner to whichever of the other

two major parties in the state (Congress or
the Communists) wishes to lead a
government. Other well-established Mus- lim
political parties include the Majlis-e-Ittehad-
ul-Musalmeen (MIM) in Andhra Pradesh.
A notable recent development in Muslim
politics is the proliferation of new Muslim
politi- cal parties throughout India, though
many have not lasted long. In the most
populous and politically most competitive
northern state of Uttar Pradesh alone are
found half a dozen. Although the precise
political significance of this development
remains unclear, it does appear to
demonstrate a fracturing of Muslim
ideological and political consensus in ways
that reflect the variegated character of
Muslim communities across India. This
develop- ment notwithstanding, Muslims do
find themselves increasingly aware of
 50

common inter- ests in the emerging and hotly

contested discourse about the nature of
Indian national iden- tity, and the place of
Muslim ideas and culture within that.
As important has been the development of
deep divisions within long-established
Muslim political parties and movements,
such as the MIM, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-c-Hind
(JUH), and the IUML. In each instance, the
split has been the result largely of personal
rivalry or disputes over dynastic succession
or family monopoly (the Owaisi family in the
MIM or the Madani family in the JUH),
evidence of the quasi-feudal nature of
established Muslim political leadership.