FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Boeing 737 NG
ENGINEERING
CONTINUATION TRAINING

Module 2 2023
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 INTRODUCTION

2 737 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

3 737 UK MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR

4 SAIB

5 PROCEDURES REVIEW
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1. Introduction
This module covers aspects identified in the period since Q1 & Q2 2023 for the
Boeing 737-6/7/8/900 & ER

2. B737 NG Airworthiness Directives

The following pages lists the B737NG AD’s issued from Dec 2022 to June 2023. If a
full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website
http://ad.easa.europa.eu) or you can navigate from the Compliance Tab on
TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there
is no material change.
UK CAA ADs may be viewed at:
http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?catid=1&pagetype=65&appid=11
&mode=detail&id=7980

US AD No: 2022-24-09
ATA 21 Air Conditioning - Cabin Altitude Pressure
Switches - Functional Test
Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability: This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -
200C, -300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes, and Model 737-8, 737-9, and 737-8200 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
Reason: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-14-20,
which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 737 airplanes. AD
2021-14-20 required repetitive functional tests of the cabin altitude
pressure switches, and on-condition actions, including
replacement, if necessary. AD 2021-14-20 also required reporting
test results. This AD was prompted by data collected from the
reports required by AD 2021-14-20, which revealed that the
switches were subject to false test failures due to lack of clear
instructions for setup of the test adapters during the functional
tests. This AD retains the repetitive functional tests and on-
condition actions, and specifies certain adapter requirements for
the functional tests. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

ISR-I-35-2022-12-9
ATA 35 Supernumerary Oxygen System Mask
Replacement
Manufacturer/s: CAAI

Applicability: Aircraft serial numbers mentioned in SB 365-35-M058 for

737-300/-400 and SB 365-35-M011 for 737-700/-800
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certificated in any category

Reason: Due to the lack of performance data available for oxygen mask P/N
28314-12 currently installed on aircraft, an oxygen mask with TSO
C64a authorization is required to ensure compliance of each
supernumerary oxygen mask & cylinder assembly with the
airworthiness regulations.

US AD No: 2023-04-17
ATA 28 Fuel - Auxiliary Power Unit Fuel Line Shroud /
Pressure Switch Wire Clamp - Inspection
Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability: Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series
airplanes, as identified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737-
38A1072 RB, dated February 25, 2022.
Reason: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Boeing Model 737-8 and 737-9 airplanes, and certain Model 737-
600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD
was prompted by reports of damage to the auxiliary power unit
(APU) fuel line shroud located aft of the aft cargo area;
investigation revealed that the placement of the pressure switch
wire clamp assembly and its fastener allowed interference of the
fastener against the APU fuel line shroud. This AD requires
inspecting the APU fuel line shroud for damage, inspecting the
pressure switch wire clamp for correct bolt orientation and
horizontal distance from the APU fuel line shroud, and applicable
on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

US AD No: 2023-06-15
ATA 53 Fuselage - Left and Right Side Station 727 Frame
Inner Chord and S–18A Web - Inspection
Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability: This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700, –

700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes, certificated in any
category, as identified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 737–
53A1402 RB, dated July 2, 2021. (2) Installation of Supplemental
Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE does not affect the ability to
accomplish the actions required by this AD. Therefore, for airplanes
on which STC ST00830SE is installed, a “change in product”
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) approval request is not
necessary to comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 39.17.
Reason: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 737– 600, –700, –700C, –800, –900,
and –900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of
missing shims, a wrong type of shim, shanked fasteners, fastener
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head gaps, and incorrect hole sizes common to the left and right
sides at a certain station (STA) frame inner chord and web. This
AD requires inspecting for existing repairs, inspecting the area for
cracking, and performing applicable on condition actions. The FAA
is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these
products.

EASA AD No: 2021-0234R1

ATA 46 Information Systems – Electronic Flight Bag
Universal Serial Bus Receptacle – Modification
Manufacturer/s: Fokker Services BV

Applicability: Fokker F27 Mark 050, F28 Mark 3000, F28 Mark 0070 and F28
Mark 0100 aeroplanes; Airbus A318, A319, A320, A321, A330 and
A340 aeroplanes; ATR42 and ATR72 aeroplanes; Boeing 737, 757,
767 and 777 aeroplanes; Bombardier (formerly Canadair) and MHI
RJ Aviation ULC (formerlyBombardier) CL-600 aeroplanes; and De
Havilland Aircraft of Canada (formerly Bombardier) DHC-8
aeroplanes; models and manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) as
identified in Appendix 1 of this AD.
Reason: Several occurrences on various aeroplanes have been reported of
smoke and fumes in the cockpit, due to overheating of an
Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) USB receptacle, which had been
installed by FS modification SB or EB, introducing an STC or minor
modification (Engineering Change Request (ECR) or Compliance
Record Report (CRR), as applicable). Investigation results revealed
that each of these events was caused by a short circuit in the EFB
charging cable.
This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further events of
smoke/fumes in the cabin, possibly resulting in excessive flight
crew workload and/or injury to flight deck occupants.
To address this unsafe condition, the USB manufacturer developed
a modification (change to USB receptacle P/N LS03-05050-B), and
FS published the applicable SB/EB to provide those modification
instructions, installing current limiting and overheat protection.
Consequently, EASA issued AD 2018-0259 (later revised) to
require modification of each affected part. That AD also prohibited
(re)installation of affected parts.
After EASA AD 2018-0259R1 was issued, certain SBs referred to in
that AD in “The applicable SB/EB” list were revised to introduce
additional MSN, also to be modified.
For the reason described above, EASA issued AD 2021-0234,
retaining the requirements of EASA AD 2018-0259R1, which was
superseded, and clarified and expanded the Applicability by listing
all affected MSN in Appendix 1.
Since that AD was issued, certain minor modifications were found
to be inadvertently omitted in the list of affected design changes.
This AD is revised to correct that oversight. This revised AD does
not change the requirements, nor the Applicability.
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2. 737 NG Maintenance Related MOR’s

The following are maintenance related MOR from Industry regulation sources. As the
Information is protected and strictly controlled; it is respectfully requested that this
information is not circulated.
“No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of
the organisation without the express permission in writing from the originating
sources.”
ATA 32 Serious Incident: Wheel on left hand landing gear failed during taxi due
to fatigue cracking. 173 POB, no injuries. AAIB AARF investigation.

Whilst taxiing to the gate after landing, the outboard wheel on the left main gear
failed because of a fatigue crack in the wheel hub. The wheel failure caused a
hydraulic leak from the brake piston and the heat generated by the misaligned wheel,
caused the hydraulic fluid to combust resulting in a fire. The fatigue crack originated
from a corrosion pit in the wheel hub. Following this occurrence, the wheel
manufacturer developed an ultrasonic inspection technique to identify cracks in this
location on the hub and the operator has incorporated the new inspection into their
maintenance programme. AAIB Bulletin: 1/2023, ref AAIB-28074.

ATA 56 Significant arcing occurred on L1 window. L FWD OVERHEAT

illuminated and outer window pane cracked. Aircraft diverted.
On departure at approx 1000ft significant arcing occurred on L1 window. L FWD
OVERHEAT illuminated and outer window pane cracked. NNC 1.16 actioned
resulting in “Continue normal operation”. STN engineering consulted by radio and
aircraft was confirmed to be non dispatchable in MLA. Ops consulted, instructed to
divert to STN. Normal approach and landing into STN (not overweight),subsequently
taxyed to stand without further incident.

Supplementary 12/1/23
Engineering to review, investigate and close with comment accordingly.

RESPONSE
Looking at the recent history of the aircraft, it did have some issues with window
overheating in the end of June /beginning of August at the R2 window, and in the end
of May, at the L2 window. In both cases the problems were solved after replacing the
window assy. The event reported is related to the L1 window and there is no report of
issues with the L1 window over the last year for **. The reliability of the #1 Windows
is a subject that has been worked on by Reliability together with the other Tech
Services teams. Since July/2022, EO 22/081 has been performed to inspect the
sealant conditions in all flight deck windows (as the degradation of the sealant was
traced as the main cause for the issues that causes windows removals) and we are
currently monitoring the removals and defects in order to determine the effectiveness
of this action. We suggest that this ESR should be forwarded to Avionics for deeper
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understanding of the probable root cause of the arcing and the crack in this specific
event.

Correct crew actions. Maintenance actions carried out and confirm workorder
complete, with further inspection subsequently completed. No repeat reports
received. NFA. Close.

This window (S/N: ******) has been installed on **on 08/Feb/2021 due to previous
installed window has been found with spare sensor faulty. Also, it has been installed
since then with no faults reported. Both fault codes given during T/S lead us to a
window fault, which was confirmed due to no further fault codes/reports after window
replacement in 14/Dec/2022. Precautionary, WO** has been raised today to inspect
the windows for condition and installation iaw AMM. After completion of this WO, no
further actions are required.

ATA 23 VHF transceiver plug pins.

*** currently on C-Check at *** has had 2 pins on the 115V plug found bent on the
VHF3 Transceiver (P/N ***) whilst carrying out the Wireless WQAR Mod. The reason
for the pins being bent was due to the Rack connector (D539) having pins installed
into the plug opposed to sockets and the Transceiver pins were in contact with the
pins inside the socket, the VHF Box was working virtue to the fact that the 2 sets of
pins were touching allowing power to the box, but potentially could be a fire hazard
should they arc. Please see attached pics of the VHF Transceiver plug socket and
connector rack. Explanation of each pic as follows: PIC 5223 - Power supply Plug on
Rack Connector D539 shows Sockets 2 & 4 with pin inside socket PIC *** - Pins on
VHF3 Transceiver power supply socket - (were bent but now straightened) PIC ***
Data plate PIC *** - Back of Power supply part of Rack Connector *** showing pins
where sockets should be installed The VHF3 Transceiver will be replaced and
sockets fitted in place of the pins to the power supply plug.
ATA 24 Auxiliary battery charger found incorrectly assembled during
scheduled maintenance.
During ***** modification there is a requirement to remove E3-3 electronics shelf
which includes the Aux Battery Charger. It was noted the the battery charger had
been assembled incorrectly and the nut holding one of the terminals had worked
itself loose. This condition allowed the tag to move about freely on the stud, which
had the potential to cause an arcing condition. The battery charger was inspected
and found to have suffered no damage, so it was refitted.
ATA 72 Forward lug found sheared on number two engine during scheduled
maintenance.
******* is undergoing a C-Check at ******** Engineering at Lasham Airfield. During fan
blade removal for scheduled maintenance under work order ****** Task *****, a
platform forward lug was found sheared on the no2 engine. A defect card 1010 has
been raised for replacement of the part. All parts of the sheared platform were
located so there is no risk of internal damage to the engine. Potential risk for engine
damage. Case has been forwarded to the operator for investigation.
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ATA 21 Equipment cooling alternate supply fan found previously fitted

incorrectly.
During installation of WQAR wiring we removed the Equipment cooling Supply filter
beside Avi rack E4 to gain access to above loom. On removal of filter we noticed that
the Equipment cooling Alternate supply fan (lower one in attached photo) had been
fitted incorrectly with Check valve aft instead of fan impeller aft. Therefore airflow can
just flow around in a circle of the twin fan duct instead of being drawn through the
Avionic units at the correct flow rate. Also if alternate selected it would be flowing in
the incorrect direction. *** raised for fan to be fitted in correct direction as per AMM
***.
ATA 72 Cracked fan blade platform.
*** currently on C Check at *** engineering QLA. #2 Engine was due Fan blade lub
as per WO *REDACTED*. Fan blades were removed for clean and relubrication.
During removal #5 fan blade platform was found with the forward lug cracked.

ATA 27 Uncommanded extension of leading edge flap during maintenance

causing damage.
During hydraulic application of A and B system, L/E Krueger flap #1 actuator had an
uncommanded extension from the full retract position to the extended position whilst
the actuator was disconnected. The actuator made contact with the T/R stow
hydraulic pipe which ruptured. No other contact was made with any of the other 3
actuators.

L/E devices were all deactivated in the UP position in accordance with the AMM
during the start of the check with slat locks installed on slat #1-3 and #6-8 to keep
them extended for access and the krueger flap actuators were disconnected form the
flaps themselves. Hydraulics were reactivated on Feb 15th. Aileron, spoiler and flap
testing had been carried out on 16th and 17th Feb with no occurrences. During the
morning of 18th Feb, the crew had been conducting OPC's of the elevator system
which required movements of flaps. No instances occurred during the movements of
the flaps. After lunch, L/E device locks from slat #1-3 and 6-8 were removed for slat
reactivation. Cruise depressurisation pin was still installed and module lock was
installed on standby module. Flap handle was in position #5. Hydraulics were
activated which caused L/E slat retraction as expected; however, L/E flap actuators
extended. There was a 2 hour period between elevator OPC's being complete and
this instance.

An internal investigation has commenced (*********). At this point, root cause of the
uncommanded motion is unknown, As no movement of L/E devices had happened
during movement of flaps and all other flight controls during the previous 3 days of
testing.
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ATA 35 Passenger oxygen mask door latch actuator/solenoids PSU row 1 CBA
test fail.
DURING FUNCTIONALLY CHECK THE PASSENGER OXYGEN SYSTEM
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF THE PASSENGER SERVICE UNIT AND
ATTENDANT SERVICE UNIT DOOR LATCH ACTUATOR/SOLENOIDS PSU ROW
1 CBA TEST FAIL - AFTER FORCE OPENING THE DOOR, IT TURNED OUT
THAT THEY WERE LOCKED BY TWO PIECES OF A WOODEN STICK. THE
SPRING LOCKING THE DOOR ON THE ACTUATOR IS DAMAGED.
ATA 32 Landing gear retraction actuator pin installed incorrectly.
During landing gear operational test (retraction, extension) a loud noise comes from
RH leg. After investigation found retraction actuator pin nut crossbolt chafing with
panel support J beam due to incorrect orientation.

Investigation on going report to be updated with final analysis and actions taken.
Investigation on going port to be updated with final analysis and actions taken. Minor
damage to panel support beam and unlikely to occur.

Supplementary 22/03/23:

During landing gear operational test, a loud noise was heard from RH leg.
Investigation found actuator pin nut cross bolt chafing with panel support beam to
incorrect orientation. Gouge blended, retraction actuator pin removed and installed in
correct orientation. Engineering Advisory Mar.23.01 was shared s ****** group to
raise awareness of occurrence.

Technical query was raised as it was identified that manual wasn't clear. ****** have
agreed to update manual and include reference to the direction of installation as "aft
side “Minor damage to panel support beam and unlikely to occur.

ATA 80 Sheared bolts found in number one engine during scheduled

maintenance.
During daily check, sheared bolt found in #1 ENG fan cowl drain hole. On further
investigation #1 ENG pneumatic starter casing had x4 sheared bolts missing from x9
that should be fitted. Starter replaced with item pre loaded for another a/c, EGR's
carried out with nil further issues. see******** for further details.

Supplementary 03/03/23:

******* W/O ******* (02/03/23) ENG 1 AIR STARTER BOLTS FOUND SHEARED
ENG #1 ENG STARTER BOLTS FOUND SHEARED, AIR STARTER TO BE
REPLACED IAW MM ********** #1 AIR STARTER REPLACED IAW MM **********
AND EGR CARRIED OUT WITH NIL FURTHER DEFECTS.

INSPECTION OF ABOVE WORK STEP CARRIED OUT ******* Outcome Mitigation

Controls: No Outcome mitigations have been entered at this time, but this report
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is logged in the system for statistics. Preventative Actions: No Preventative Controls

have been entered at this time, but this report is logged in the system for statistics.
ATA 53 Significant corrosion in aft bilge, keel chord. Investigation found a
leaking water feed hose from aft lavatory.
The *** aircraft is currently on C-Check at ***. During routine maintenance, several
areas of corrosion were found on the internal keel chord S-27L (****), initially
between ***. Following further investigation, it was confirmed that the corrosion
affected seven (7) areas between ***. The corrosion was removed, and the reworked
areas were inspected and mapped. The results were submitted to Boeing via SR
REDACTED. Rectification IAW instructions from *** is currently ongoing at *** (ref
NRC REDACTED, WO REDACTED), which includes a reinforcing repair of the keel
chord and several part replacements of corroded structure in the aft cargo
compartment and bilge (LH side). The evaluation of the corroded areas revealed that
these areas had been affected by a significant leak/spill from an aft lavatory, as
evidenced by extensive blue water stains (ref ***) on the internal surface of the
fuselage skin, stringers, and the keel chord. Due to the geometry of the aft fuselage,
liquid originating from an aft lavatory would flow forward from below the lavatory to
the area where the corrosion was found. While there are bilge drain valves in the
area, spilled corrosive substances may not be fully removed from the airframe during
normal operation. Previous maintenance records show that multiple in-service aft
lavatory leak events occurred in 2019 and 2021 (see attachment '***aft lavatory leak
events'). It appears that each defect was eventually closed. However, there appears
to be no evidence of any conditional inspections IAW AMM *** or any investigation
and clean-up of spilled liquid below the lavatory, or in the aft cargo compartment and
bilge. Therefore, it is likely that corrosive substances were allowed to contaminate
and remain in the area for an extended amount of time, leading to extensive
corrosion. During the ongoing C-Check, as leak checks were carried out, Lavatory D
(aft LH side) was found to have a leak from a water feed hose into the aft cargo
compartment. Rectification is currently ongoing at *** (ref NRC REDACTED, WO
REDACTED). From the perspective of the structural maintenance programme, this
corrosion finding is considered Level 1 (ref MPD *** Section 2) "Corrosion occurring
between successive inspections that exceeds allowable limits but can be attributed to
an event not typical of operator usage of other aircraft in the same fleet;" and as such
does not require a programme adjustment. The structural maintenance programme,
which includes the corrosion prevention and control programme (CPCP), assumes
that leaks/spills occurring in service are thoroughly investigated and rectified IAW the
appropriate AMM tasks. In contaminated areas that are not cleaned up, corrosion
can develop rapidly to an extent that it exceeds allowable limits even if inspection
intervals were reduced to a reasonably practicable minimum. The most recent
structural/CPCP inspection of the affected area (MPD item ***) was done also at ***
during the *** input of the datum aircraft in 2019. No evidence of any leak/spill or
corrosion was noted at the time. In summary, the finding described above illustrates
the importance of thoroughly investigating and rectifying all leaks/spills that occur in
service, including following any flow paths and cleaning up all contaminants. Failure
to do so can make scheduled maintenance tasks ineffective and contribute to
significant hidden structural damage that may develop into an unsafe condition and
result in lengthy ground time and high cost for repairs.
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ATA 24 Circuit breaker terminal washer found displaced during maintenance

inspection.
Ref attached photos, During CB inspection found "********" CB Bus terminal had
washer that had not been installed on screw correctly and was wedged to the side of
ring tag of Bus link wire to "Right USB" CB.

********* raised to reassemble CB terminal screw and washer arrangement ********.

Supplementary 16/03/23:

******* W/O ******** (09/03/23) ******* "********" CB TERMINAL WASHER

INCORRECT FIT Conclusions: Outcome Mitigation Controls: No Outcome
mitigations have been entered at this time, but this report is logged in the system for
statistics. Preventative Actions: No Preventative Controls have been entered at this
time, but this report is logged in the system for statistics.

ATA 28 Centre tank fuelling check valve found defective during scheduled
maintenance.
During removal of the refuel manifold for defect rectification, it was found that the
Centre Tank fuelling check valve (P/N 2670137-101) was incomplete with the
flappers detached from the central spindle. This check valve is the new version which
supersedes P/N 2670137 which was known to suffer flapper detachment which
resulted in them being found in the CTR tank on previous occasions. It appears the
new version is also suffering from similar failure mode. No1 & No2 tank check valves
were inspected and found to have no damage. Manifold supplier to be made aware
of valve failure.

Supplementary 22/03/23:

****** W/O ******** (07/03/23) ******* FUELING ADAPTER FAILS WEAR CHECK.
FUELING ADAPTER FAILS WEAR CHECK FUELLING RECEPTACLE REMOVE
FUELLING RECEPTACLE REMOVED IAW AMM 28-21-11 ON REMOVAL, SCREW
SHEARED IN MANIFOLD. MANIFOLD REQUIRES REPLACEMENT.
RECEPTACLE SLAVE FITTED TO EXISTING MANIFOLD WITH WARNING TAG
WORK STEP RAISED TO ALLOW COMPONENT CHANGE ON AMOS ** PN OFF
2670150-7 PN ON FUELING MANIFOLD IN POSITION RH WING 5638 SN OFF
4930 SN ON FUELING MANIFOLD REMOVE FUELING MANIFOLD REMOVED
IAW AMM 28-21-21 REV 80 PN 2670150-7 SN **FUELING MANIFOLD REPLACE
FUELING MANIFOLD REPLACED IAW AMM 28-21-21 REV 80 TORQUE WRENCH
AA4278 CAL 05 OCT 2023 M1B-KIT SN AA4153 CAL 14 NOV 2023. BONDING
TEST BETWEEN REFUELING MANIFOLD AND AIRCRAFT BONDING TEST
BETWEEN REFUELING MANIFOLD AND AIRCRAFT STRUCTURE AND FUEL
SHUT OFF VALVE AND STRUCTURE BONDING TEST CARRIED OUT BETWEEN
REFUELING MANIFOLD AND A/C STRUCTURE RESISTANCE 0.451MILLIOHMS.
BONDING TEST CARRIED OUT BETWEEN FUEL SHUT OFF
VALVE AND A/C STRUCTURE RESISTANCE 0.487 MILLIOHMS. RESISTANCE
BETWEEN BONDING JUMPER AND SPAR MEASURED 0.484MILLIOHMS. MIKIT
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

SN ** CAL 14 NOV 2023 PRESSURE FUELING SYSTEM TEST CARRY OUT

PRESSURE FUELING SYSTEM

TEST CARRIED OUT UP TO STEP (31) FILL CTR TANL WITH FUEL TO MAX IAW
AMM 28-21-00-700-801 CARRY OUT PRESSURE FUELING SYSTEM TEST FROM
STEP 2 E 31 TO FINISH PRESSURE FUELING SYSTEM TEST PERFORMED
FROM STEP 2.E..31 TO FINISH IAW AMM 28-21-00-700-801 TRANSFER FUEL
FRO LH & RH WING TANKS TO CTR TANK FOR TEST TRANSFER FUEL FRO LH
& RH WING TANKS TO CTR TANK READY FOR REFUELLING TEST FUEL
TRANSFERRED FROM LH & RH WING TANKS INTO CENTRE TANK IAW AMM
28-26-00

Conclusions: Outcome Mitigation Controls: No Outcome mitigations have been

entered at this time, but this report is logged in the system for statistics. Preventative
Actions: Reliability was made aware of this defect and advised that there are no
further actions required at this time. -

Boeing notified the supplier Parker regarding this defect so that they can carry out
their own investigation and engineering evaluation. - Recommendations: The root
cause of this occurrence is due to component failure of the check valve flappers. This
issue has been rectified by replacing the fuelling manifold on this aircraft with no
further issues identified at this time. The aircraft was release for service. To mitigate
future recurrences, Reliability department and TBC were made aware of this issue to
control and manage occurrences such as this. Due to the history of check valve
flapper detachments, the unit was requested to be sent to the supplier, *** to conduct
their own engineering evaluation. The safety investigation is now considered to be
concluded and the data in your report will be used to monitor for further occurrences.
ATA 72 Nr1 engine accessory gearbox turnbuckle found loose and out of
safety.
On carrying out NO1 engine accessory gearbox mount inspection won: REDACTED
*** taskcard: *** and *** to ***, the accessory gearbox lower mount turnbuckle
assembly (P/N: ***) and link end (P/N: ***) was found to be loose and out of safety.

ATA 24/80 APU starter generator blank left in.

APU starter generator replaced on ***** during Monday dayshift due to no part
history on ******. Starter Generator replaced iaw relevant AMM, and tested with no
fault found. Later that day, nights were tasked to carry out some maintenance on the
IFE system. On first APU start attempt, 'no APU rotation shutdown' message
occurred. Subsequent start attempts also unsuccessful. FIM ***** task ***** carried
out. First three steps found no defects, next step was replacement of APU starter
generator. APU declared INOP due to nil spares. At next maintenance opportunity
starter generator was replaced. When the starter generator was removed it was
found to still have a transportation blank fitted in the small oil pressure hole at the top
of the mating face. (see attached photo). New starter generator fitted, with particular
attention paid to ensure removal of all blanks.

APU starter generator installation test carried out with no faults found. Report raised
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

to highlight potential to miss the smaller of the blanks, as from discussions with other
engineers who have worked in other companies it appears this problem has occurred
before. Also raised as reminder to self to check components completely for
transportation blanks.

ATA 32 Starter motor was found to have six bolts with sheared heads during
maintenance inspection.
******* Currently on C-Check at Dublin Aerospace. On inspection of No.2 Engine the
Starter Motor was found to have 6 of the 9 bolts that hold the 2 halves of the casing
together with sheared heads This could possibly be due to over torquing of the bolts
The Starter was still operational and no history of starting faults

4. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins

Information Bulletins can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

No new SAIB’s noted for this period.

5. Procedures Review
Due to time to print differences between this publication and current published
technical matter, it has been decided to no longer reference changes to individual
operators’ technical notices and procedures. This information will of course still be
readily available via the Portal or the individual operators’ systems. If you are
having difficulty in accessing any of this information, please contact your local
supervisor or STN tech library.
END