FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Boeing 737 Classic

ENGINEERING
CONTINUATION TRAINING

Module 2 2023
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 INTRODUCTION

2 737 AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

3 737 MAINTENANCE RELATED MOR

4 SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETINS

5 PROCEDURES REVIEW
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

1 Introduction
This module covers aspects identified in the period Q1 & Q2 2023.

2. B737 Classic Airworthiness Directives

The following pages lists the B737 Cl AD’s issued from Dec 2022 to Jun 2023. If a
full listing is required, they can be found on the EASA website
(http://ad.easa.europa.eu) or you can navigate from the Compliance Tab on
TechCom. Some superseded and superseding ADs have not been included as there
is no material change.

UK CAA ADs may be viewed at:

http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?catid=1&pagetype=65&appi
d=11&mode=detail&id=7980

US AD No.: 2022-25-15
Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 57 Wings - Rear Spar Lower Chord - Inspection

Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability (1) This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -
200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500
series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(2) Installation of Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST01219SE
does not affect the ability to accomplish the actions required by this
AD. Therefore, for airplanes on which STC ST01219SE is installed,
a “change in product” alternative method of compliance (AMOC)
approval request is not necessary to comply with the requirements
of 14 CFR 39.17.
Reason: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737-100,
-200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was
prompted by a report indicating that
a crack was found in one of the holes of the wing rear spar lower
chord at the main landing gear (MLG)
aft fitting at a certain wing buttock line (WBL). This AD requires
repetitive open hole high frequency
eddy current (HFEC) inspections or surface HFEC and ultrasonic
(UT) inspections for cracking of the
wing rear spar lower chord at the MLG aft fitting at a certain WBL,
and applicable on-condition
actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition
on these products.
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

US AD No.: 2022-24-09
Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 21 Air Conditioning - Cabin Altitude Pressure

Switches - Functional Test
Manufacturer/s: The Boeing Company

Applicability This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -
200C, -300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes, and Model 737-8, 737-9, and 737-8200 airplanes,
certificated in any category
Reason: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-14-20,
which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 737 airplanes. AD
2021-14-20 required repetitive functional tests of the cabin altitude
pressure switches, and on-condition actions, including
replacement, if necessary. AD 2021-14-20 also required reporting
test results. This AD was prompted by data collected from the
reports required by AD 2021-14-20, which revealed that the
switches were subject to false test failures due to lack of clear
instructions for setup of the test adapters during the functional
tests. This AD retains the repetitive functional tests and on-
condition actions, and specifies certain adapter requirements for
the functional tests. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.

CAAI AD No.: ISR-I-35-2022-12-9

Airworthiness Directives can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

ATA 35 Supernumerary Oxygen System Mask

Replacement
Manufacturer/s: CAAI

Applicability Aircraft serial numbers mentioned in SB 365-35-M058 for

737-300/-400 and SB 365-35-M011 for 737-700/-800
certificated in any category
Reason: Due to the lack of performance data available for oxygen mask P/N
28314-12 currently installed on aircraft, an oxygen mask with TSO
C64a authorization is required to ensure compliance of each
supernumerary oxygen mask & cylinder assembly with the
airworthiness regulations.
 FOR REFERENCE ONLY

3. 737 Classic Maintenance Related MOR’s

The following are maintenance related MOR from Industry regulation sources. As the
Information is protected and strictly controlled; it is respectfully requested that this
information is not circulated.

“No part of the MOR publication may be reproduced or transmitted outside of

the organisation without the express permission in writing from the originating
sources.”

ATA 77 Engine instrument panel became loose on take-off. Aircraft

returned.
On the takeoff roll the main engine EIS panel moved out of its mounting. The motion
stopped as it became lodged at an angle tilting slightly up. All indications were working and
80kts was achieved prior analysis of the occurrence. Takeoff was therefore continued.
Despite the body angle, no further movement occurred, however the panel was not secure.
Once safe to do so I tried to push the panel back in place however due to the panel angle it
would not slide back Maintrol were contacted and the mutual decision was to return to LBA
with an over weight landing authorised, performance allowing. Landing performance was
calculated with a sensible margin. A normal but overweight flap 30 landing was made with
relevant tech log entries.

Supplementary 22/02/23:

During ******* take-off roll the crew witnessed the engine primary instrument display (EIS)
de-attached from the panel at around 80knots, crew continued and became airborne. Crew
made a maintrol call to say "EIS had de-attached from its panel enclosure and the screws are
loose" Aircraft returned from airborne to LBA. On Arrival I met the aircraft and carried out a
crew debrief. The panel was still sat out its location and not in the panel cradle. The panel
was still operational. Panel was replaced and independent check carried out. The fasteners
are integral part of the panel. They are screw type and not zeus fastners, they screw into the
cradle inserts and on inspection had not stripped. For the panel to come out all four would
need to be unscrewed and in my opinion not possible to pull out. I also noticed that the no.2
fuel gauge adjacent to the EIS panel had been replaced two days ago. Which I suspect the
EIS may have been removed to assist with the fuel gauge replacement, however no tech log
entries to confirm this.

Background: ******** : On 11 February 2023, the following report was raised with the title -
"Air Safety Report - reported by Flight Crew member Loose Engine Instruments Panel"
related to registration ******. This occurred in Leeds Bradford Intl Airport(LBA). ******** :
On 11 February 2023, the following report was raised with the title - "Potential event or
Near Miss - reported by Engineering member EIS PANEL DE-ATTACHED ON TAKEOFF.
RETURN FROM AIBROURNE" related to registration *******. This occurred in Leeds
Bradford Intl Airport(LBA). Root Cause: ********: The following 0 root cause descriptors
have been applied to this occurrence:********: The following 0 root cause descriptors have
been applied to this occurrence: Corrective actions: ****** WON ****** EIS PANEL LOOSE
+ FELL OUT DURING TAKE OFF PRIMARY ENG DISPLAY REPLACED + TESTED IAW AMM
******* INDEPENDENT CHECK OF PRIMARY ENG DISPLAY FOR SECURITY OF FITMENT TBCO
INDEPENDENT CHECK CARRIED OUT IAW MAIN ******* Feb.2023 Conclusions: Outcome
Mitigation Controls: Preventative Actions: *******: [None] ********:
[None]Recommendations:*******: [not yet added] ********: [not yet added.

Supplementary 17/03/23:
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******** WON ******* - 13/03/23 LMWR - ******* EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY - REPLACE
NUTPLATES FOLLOWING RECENT EVENT (11TH FEB 2023/WO********) WHERE THE EIS
PRIMARY DISPLAY PN 312EDP2-2 BECAME DETACHED FROM CTR INSTR. PANEL PN 69-
37305-700. THE EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY WAS REPLACED AS A PRECAUTIONARY
MEASURE.UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF THE EVENT AND SUBSEQUENT FOLLOW UP
INSPECTION OF THE EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY , 4 OFF ATTACHING FASTENERS PN EDP481 WERE
FOUND TO HAVE DAMAGED SCREW THREADS.BASED ON THESE FINDINGS, THE AIRCRAFT IS
TO HAVE THE EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY ATTACHMENT NUTPLATES INSTALLED TO THE CTR
INSTR. (PANEL PN 69-37305-700) REPLACED AT THE EARLIEST MAINTENANCE OPPORTUNITY.
LMWR CARRIED OUT. REMOVE EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY PN 312EDP2-2, SN ******** IAW
AMM TASK ********** `EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY REMOVAL`. EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY REMOVED.
IAW AMM *********. REPLACE EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY ATTACHMENT FASTENER NUTPLATES
ON CTR INSTR. PANEL PN 69-37305-700 IAW ********** DISPLAY ATTACHMENT
NUTPLATES REPLACED.

IAW *********. INSPECT EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY (PN 312EDP2-2, SN *********) ATTACHING
FASTENERS (4 OFF) FOR DAMAGE. IF DAMAGED REPLACE ACCORDINGLY REF. ***********
REMOVED EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY INSPECTED, FASTENERS THREADS IN POOR CONDITION
WITH 1X THREADS STRIPPED. NO STOCK OF FASTENERS, EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY TO BE
REPLACED.RE-INSTALL EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY PN 312EDP2-2, SN******** IAW AMM TASK
**********EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY INSTALLATION. EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY REPLACED. IAW
AMM ************.C/O INDEPENDENT INSPECTION OF EIS PRIMARY DISPLAY FOR
CORRECT INSTALLATION IAW MAIN-EP- 013-019. INDEPENDENT CHECK EIS PRIMARY
DISPLAY FORINSTALLATION & MECHANICAL LOCKING C/O. IAW MAIN-*********.

Conclusions: Outcome Mitigation Controls: No Outcome mitigations have been entered at

this time, but this report is logged in the system for statistics. Preventative Actions: Notice
sent to all bases and hangars re-emphasising importance of recording removal of parts. --
Debrief carried out with certifying Engineer to highlight mistake. Recommendations: Thank
you for submitting your safety report. It has been determined that the root cause of this
occurrence was that during a fuel tank gauge replacement two days prior, the maintenance
team possibly did not refit the EIS Panel after it had been removed for access to replace the
tank gauge. Additionally, the team did not record the maintenance actions relating to the
removal of the Primary EIS Display Panel. The opportunity for a verification or check for
correct security of the unit was missed due to the removal not being recorded. As above,
corrective and preventative actions have been put into place to mitigate the risk of further
safety occurrences. The investigation is now closed. Thank you again for bringing this
occurrence to our attention.

ATA 30 Pitot heater stays energized after engine shutdown with thrust
reverser inoperative.

This report is to summarise an issue that was investigated and closed on Friday 18th Nov
2022. Crew reported pitot heat lights remained off after engine shutdown, which indicates
that the heater has remained energised. The aircraft was operating with the RH engine
thrust reversers (T/Rs) locked and inoperative under MEL 78-1-2, which requires certain
thrust reverser circuit breakers to be opened and remain open for flight. Post Boeing SB 737-
30A1064 the engine oil pressure switch is supposed to cause pitot heat to automatically shut
off when engines shut down.
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In the Ref /A/ message *** *** *** (***) reported the datum airplane has a pitot heating
issue. Pitot Static when switched to auto after landing "FO Static 2AUX PS", "L ELEV Pitot"
and all lights associated with pitot static B remained extinguished. As part of the
troubleshooting the engineers carried out the AUTO Air Data Sensor Heating Operational
Test IAW AMM TASK 30-31-00-750-801-001. The test required the following circuit breakers
to be closed:

- ENG 1 T/R CONT SYS

- ENG 2 T/R CONT SYS

- ENG 2 T/R CONT ALTN

- ENG 1 T/R IND SYS

- ENG 2 T/R IND SYS

*** have currently opened two of the circuit breakers mentioned above which are, ENG 2
T/R CONT SYS and ENG 2 T/R CONT ALTN IAW AMM TASK 78-00-00-049-001-C00 - Thrust
Reverser Deactivation for Flight Dispatch, as the No. 2 Eng Thrust Reverser fails to stow and
as a result has been deactivated with reference to MEL 78-1-2.

The aircraft has been modified IAW SB737-30-1068 and YDG cannot find any information
covering this aspect of TR locking. We have reviewed SB737-30-1068, Figure 84 showing the
CBs which have been opened to INOP the No.2 T/R and it shows the relay earthed to the
case which causes the pitot to remain on ground.

Analysis / follow up: The link between the pitot heat system and the oil pressure switch
occurs in the wiring adjacent to the thrust reverser control Engine Accessory Unit (EAU). It is
theorised that with the EAU power CB pulled, there is an alternate path to earth that can
trick the pitot heat control into thinking the engine oil pressure switch is still closed.

ATA32 Landing gear disagree during flight.

During the climb passing approximately FL200, all three-landing gear, suddenly came down,
with the gear lever in the off position. We had 3 green and 3 red lights, and the associated
noise and drag of the gear. Not long after, considering the situation and the startle effect,
made a PAN call to ATC and requested stop climb at FL210. Speed at the time of the gear
dropping was around 270KIAS. NNC 14.6 was actioned, and speed reduced to 230. The gear
came up and the lights went out. We then cycled the gear to confirm it was safe. PAN was
cancelled and the flight continued to ABZ without further incident. Post-flight crew review
We discussed the possibility of the gear lever not being in the OFF position, but we couldn’t
confirm 100% whether this was the case. QAR download performed. Landing gear overspeed
sensed. AMM 05-51-47-212-006 inspection scheduled. Permit-to-fly, and *****, requested
to permit gear-down ferry to base maintenance location.
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ATA 35 During a routine check found the wrong passenger oxygen

mask part number installed.

During a routine check to confirm the chemical oxygen generators fitted to the 737-
300 fleet, it was found that P/N E717300-00 was fitted on *** at position 15ABC.
This is a 3-masks generator (CMM 35-21-50). The remaining passenger positions at
the aircraft are P/N E71740-00, which is a 4-masks generator. Aircraft AIPC showed
that P/N E717300-00 is not effective. Oxygen generator P/N E717300-00 S/N ***
was fitted on 11.Nov.2017 (WO***), as part of a scheduled replacement. The non-
effective generator has been replaced on WO***.

ATA 72 Suspected engine surge.

Captain PF. Cruise level for flight FL350. Cleared when ready to FL200 to be level ROGBI.
Started decent approx 6nm from FMC TOD. At approx FL320 FMA read RETARD and thrust
began reducing to idle as expected. Almost immediately two bangs heard “Duff Duff” sound.
Captain suspected an engine surge but as the levers were reducing to idle anyway it was
impossible to see which engine had surged. Crew started “Engine limit, Surge or stall”
memory action which were in place as thrust on both engines were now at idle for descent.
Auto throttle disconnected. Crew then ran the QRH which led us to checking engine
parameters. As the aircraft was in descent crew brought each thrust lever to 50% separately
briefly to check engine parameters remained the same. Engine parameters were normal.
Crew then ran a DODAR and discussed heightened engine parameter monitoring for
remainder of flight. Crew also considered a PAN call but as we were now direct to BKY with
no other traffic and both engines were operating normally we decided not to but could do
so if the situation changed. Engine parameters remained normal for the rest of the flight.
After landing crew reviewed OMA 11 and decided this did not justify a serious incident. Tech
log entry made. LMC and STN engineer informed. Other report inform. Analysis / follow up
ENGINE INSPECTIONS IAW 71-00-43/101 & 72-00-00-216-062-C00 PARA N. ALL
COMPRESSOR STAGES VISUALLY EXAMINED BY BORESCOPE. STAGE 1-5 APPEAR
UNDAMAGED HOWEVER STAGE 6-9 SHOW PROGRESSIVELY WORSE DAMAGE, SUGGESTING
ENGINE SURGE AS CAUSE OF HPC DAMAGE.

4. Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins

Information Bulletins can be viewed at http://ad.easa.europa.eu/

No SAIB’s for this period.

5. Procedures Review
Due to time to print differences between this publication and current published
technical matter, it has been decided to no longer reference changes to individual
operators’ technical notices and procedures. This information will of course still be
readily available via the Portal or the individual operators’ systems. If you are having
difficulty in accessing any of this information, please contact your local supervisor
or STN tech library.

END