Complexity and Diversity of

the Regional Architecture in

Latin America and the
Caribbean in the Context of a
Rising Multipolarity

Prof. Dr. Eduardo Pastrana

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
Bogotá-Colombia

1
 Content

The Myth of Sisyphus 1. The ideologization of integration projects

2. The ideological factor in integration processes

3. The failure of closed and open regionalism

4. Post-hegemonic / post-liberal regionalism

5. The unfinished process of state-building

6. The presidentialization and institutional design of

integration organizations in LAC

7. Conclusions: the regional architecture in LAC

2
 The Myth of Sisyphus

Sisyphus has a place in Greek mythology,

because he was condemned by the gods of
Olympus to push a giant rock to the top of a
hill, but, when the stone was about to reach
the top, it escaped him and he had to start
again, and so on for all eternity.

3
 Regionalism in Latin
America and the
Caribbean: Recurrent
Metaphors from the Negative Factors in the Development and
Myth of Sisyphus Sustainability of Regionalism and
Integration in LAC

1. The ideologization of
integration

4
Regionalism/ Region
building Regionalism

• A state-led project to organize a region based on certain

ideological guidelines in political, economic, and social
matters.

• A project through which states and non-state actors

cooperate and coordinate strategies within a given region.

• The set of values, ideas, norms and procedures that guide

the conduct and interaction of the actors who promote this
project.

5
Ideology • Ideology is defined as a set of ideas and beliefs shared by
a group or social class, which guide the action of members of
such groups.

• Ideology is conceived as those ideas that allow the

legitimization of a dominant political power through a
hegemonic discourse.

• Ideologies can be understood as a coherent and integrated

system of symbols, values, and beliefs.

• A set of ideas that are relatively coherent and emotionally

charged.

6
The success and failure of integration projects in LAC have depended The ideologization of
on the ideological convergences of the presidents of the member integration
states.

• The ideology of the presidents has determined the type of

strategies that integration processes have undertaken in terms of:

1. Industrialization strategies

2. Strategies for increasing competitiveness

3. Policies to promote the internal development model of

member states

4. The international insertion strategies of both the blocs and

the member states

7
There is a basic consensus in regional studies that LAC has had three The ideologization of
waves of regionalism. integration
• Each has been inspired by a specific set of ideas or ideology.

Presidents in LAC have built transnational ideological groups based

on shared values and interests.

• This ideological factor can be seen in the ebb and flow of the “pink
tide” between 1999 and 2015.

• This can be verified in the pendulum shifts between right-wing and

left-wing governments in most countries over the past 33 years.

• Currently, there is evidence in LAC of strong internal political

polarization inside the states, which is projected onto the regional
scenarios of concertation.
8
 Ideological
There is an ideological pattern that has permeated the rise, Convergence and
development and fall of Latin American regionalism Regionalism in LAC in
the Last Three Decades
• Presidential ideology and the idiosyncratic factor of presidents in
LAC are concepts that are useful to understand the articulation of
political and economic objectives on autonomy and development.

• Regardless of whether the presidents are from the left or the

right.

• These ideological beliefs have been articulated constantly by

presidents in their speeches on regionalism.

• As a result, ideological polarization has harmed the stability and

development of regionalism and integration in LAC.

9
 2. The Ideological Factor in the
Three Waves of Integration in LAC

10
The first wave of regionalism (1960-1980) was inspired and guided by Waves of regionalism in LAC:
dependency theory and the ECLA/CEPAL:
Developmental or Closed
• The Idea of Endogenous Developmentalism
Regionalism
(emerged in the 60s and
• It tried to foster the development of LAC countries through a specific declined at the end of the
strategy of industrialization. 80s)
• Closed Regionalism proposed the so-called model of Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI).

• Aimed for the creation of a LA common market and the detachment of the
region from the global market, by establishing protectionist barriers.

• Recommended the adoption of industrial complementarity agreements that

would contribute to the creation of networks of regional suppliers.

• It wanted to promote intra-regional trade of industrial products.

• LAC countries could transform their production structures and overcome

their dependence on exporting raw materials.
11
Waves of regionalism
The processes of integration that were constituted within the
in LAC: framework of Closed Regionalism were:
Developmental or
Closed Regionalism • The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA - ALALC) was
founded in 1960.

• Converted in 1980 into the Latin American Integration Association

(ALADI - LAIA).

• The Central American Common Market (CACM) was created in

1960.

• Transformed into the Central American Integration System

(SICA) between 1991 and 1993.

• The Andean Pact (AP) was founded in 1969 and became the
Andean Community (CAN) in 1996.
12
Open Regionalism was inspired by the neoliberal approach of the so-
called “Washington Consensus”.

OR promoted the opening and insertion of regional blocs into the world
Open Regionalism
market. (1990s)
Some objectives of this kind of regionalism were:

1. To make the region's economies more competitive and more

attractive for foreign investment.

2. To achieve a strong collective capacity by negotiating and signing

trade agreements with extra-regional actors:

• Especially industrialized countries and rising powers.

3. To improve transport, communication and energy supply

infrastructures in the region.

4. To increase investment in research and development and improve the

skilled workforce in the region.

5. To elevate and enhance intra-bloc trade and create regional chains of

value.
13
THE COMMON MARKET OF
THE SOUTH
 OR Regional Integration Projects in Latin
America
The Central American Common Market- SICA (1991) Andean Community (1996)

15
3. The Failure of
Closed and Open
Regionalism

16
Neither Closed nor Open Regionalism increased intra-bloc trade or
improved the competitiveness the bloc(s).
The Failure of Closed
1. Most foreign trade continued to be outside the bloc(s). and Open
Regionalism
2. Member states of these regional organizations did not achieve
economic complementarity.

3. Nor did they improve deficiencies in transport, communication

and energy supply infrastructure.

4. Member states didn’t execute internally many regional

commitments.

5. They were never able to create regional value chains and carried
on exporting commodities.

Many national economies in the region continued to emphasize

their process of deindustrialization.
17
 MERCOSUR: Intra-bloc vs extra-bloc trade (1989-2020)

800.000.000

700.000.000

600.000.000

500.000.000
Millions of dollars

400.000.000

300.000.000

200.000.000

100.000.000

0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

World MERCOS UR

18
MERCOSUR: Evolution of export types of extra-bloc trade
(2002-2020)

140.000
120.000
Millions of dollars

100.000
80.000
60.000
40.000
20.000
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Food, Beverages & Tobac co Agricultural Raw M aterials Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Products
Minerals & Metals Minerals & Metals Unclassif ied Goods and Operations

19
MERCOSUR: Evolution of import types from outside the bloc
(2002-2020)
240.000
230.000
220.000
210.000
200.000
190.000
180.000
170.000
160.000
150.000
Millions of dollars

140.000
130.000
120.000
110.000
100.000
90.000
80.000
70.000
60.000
50.000
40.000
30.000
20.000
10.000
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Food, Beverages and Tobacco Raw Materials of Ag ricultural Origin Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Produc ts
Minerales y Metales Manufactures Unclassified Goods and Operations

20
Competitiveness index comparison of MERCOSUR members, ASEAN founding members, China,
South Korea and Japan.
MERCOSUR has not been able to improve the competitiveness of its member states

Institutions
100
Capacity for innovation 90 Infrastructure
80
70
60
Business dynamism 50 ICT Adoption

40
30
20
10
Market Size 0 Macroeconomic stability

Financial market Health

Labour market Sk ills

Goods market
MERCOS UR ASEAN ( Founding Members) China South Korea Japan

21
 CAN: Intra-bloc vs extra-bloc trade (1991-2020)

300.000.000

250.000.000

200.000.000
Millions of dollars

150.000.000

100.000.000

50.000.000

0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

World CAN

22
CAN: Evolution of export types outside the bloc (2002-2020)

70.000

60.000

50.000
Millions of dollars

40.000

30.000

20.000

10.000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Food, Beverages & Tobac co Agricultural Raw M aterials Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Products
Minerals & Metals Manufactures Unclassif ied Goods and Operations

23
 CAN: Evolution of import types from outside the bloc
(2002-2020)
110.000.000

100.000.000

90.000.000

80.000.000

70.000.000
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

60.000.000

50.000.000

40.000.000

30.000.000

20.000.000

10.000.000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Ag ricultural Raw Materials Ag ricultural Raw Materials Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Produc ts
Minerals & Metals Manufactures Unclassified Goods and Operations

24
Competitiveness index comparison of CAN members, ASEAN founding members, China, South
Korea and Japan.
The CAN has not improved the competitiveness of its member states

Institutions
100
Capacity for innovation 90 Infrastructure
80
70
60
Business dynamism 50 ICT Adoption

40
30
20
10
Market Size 0 Macroeconomic stability

Financial M arket Health

Labour Market Sk illls

Goods M arket
CAN ASEAN ( Founding Members) China South Korea Japan

25
Open Regionalism 2.0 The Pacific Alliance (PA) has partly continued to implement a second
wave of Open Regionalism since 2012.
(Pacific Alliance-
2012) • It can be understood as a specific international insertion model
based on neoliberalism.

• It has been an attempt to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI):

nation branding

• Originally, the PA member states tried to maintain close ties with

the US and the EU.

• They aimed to project themselves to the Asia-Pacific region

(CPTPP).

Currently, the PA is facing the domestic political changes of its

member states.

26
The Pacific Alliance- PA

27
 PA: Intra-bloc vs extra-bloc trade (2002-2020)

1.400.000

1.200.000

1.000.000
Millions of dollars

800.000

600.000

400.000

200.000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

World AP

28
 PA: Evolution of export types outside the bloc (2002-2018)

90.000

80.000

70.000

60.000
Millions of dollars

50.000

40.000

30.000

20.000

10.000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Food, Beverages & Tobac co Agricultural Raw M aterials Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Products
Minerals & Metals Manufactures Unclassif ied Goods and Operations

29
 PA: Evolution of import types from outside the bloc
(2002-2020)
500.000

450.000

400.000

350.000
Millions of dollars

300.000

250.000

200.000

150.000

100.000

50.000

0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Food, Beverages & Tobacco Ag ricultural Raw Materials Fuels, Mineral Lubricants and Related Produc ts
Minerals & Metals Manufactures Unclassified Goods and Operations

30
Competitiveness index comparison of PA members, ASEAN founding members, China, South
Korea and Japan.
The PA has also failed to increase the competitiveness of its member states

Institutions
100
Business dynamism 90 Infrastructure
80
70
60
Business dynamism 50 Infrastructure

40
30
20
10
Market Size 0 Macroeconomic stability

Financial market Health

Labour market Sk ills

Good mark et
Pacific A lliance ASEAN ( Founding Members) China South Korea Japan

31
 4. The Rise and Fall of
Post-Hegemonic or Post-
Liberal Regionalism

32
 This kind of regionalism emerged in the context of the “pink tide” between
1999 and 2015:
Post-Hegemonic / • The Idea of Autonomism
Post-Liberal
Regionalism • The arrival of leftist governments to power, especially in South America.

• Left-wing governments pushed for the creation of new regional

organizations and the reform of existing ones.

1. The purpose was the exclusion of the US from regional affairs (post-
hegemonic approach)

2. Leftist leaders downplayed trade issues on the regional agenda (post-liberal

approach):
• They rejected neoliberalism and open regionalism and reduced the
role of the market

3. New issues were included in the regional agenda such as social policies,
security and defense, regional infrastructure development, etc.

4. South-South cooperation in regional affairs was stimulated

33
Organizations and Forums of Post-
Hegemonic/Post-Liberal
Regionalism

1. ALBA-TCP: Bolivarian Alliance of Our

America-Peoples' Trade Treaty (2004)

2. UNASUR: Union of South American

Nations (2008)

3. CELAC: Community of Latin American

and Caribbean States (2011)

4. MERCOSUR: Buenos Aires Consensus

(2003)
34
Post-Liberal/Post-Hegemonic Regionalism reached its twilight.
Post-Hegemonic /
• Due to the return of right-wing and far-right governments in South Post-Liberal
America. Regionalism
• Also, a consequence of the end of the commodity boom between
2000 and 2014.

It has suffered from a structural condition called: the paradox of

autonomy.

• Autonomism inspired the emergence of regional projects that

promoted collective autonomy from the US and other great powers.

• Nevertheless, the national elites used autonomy to not fulfil and

reject the commitments made in the ROs.

• The quest for regional autonomy was blocked by demands for

national autonomy.
35
5. The Presidentialization and
Institutional Design of
Integration Organizations in
LAC

36
 Presidents in LAC have a great margin of autonomy vis-à-vis
Presidentialization of the other branches of power.
Integration
• Presidential diplomacy dominates the integration agenda
in the framework of repeated summits of presidents.

• In contrast to the EU, the cession of sovereignty to ROs

does not increase the room to manoeuvre of presidents.

• In contrast to European states, states in LAC have

historically had weak internal sovereignty.

• This has been compensated by endemic phenomena such

as:
• authoritarianism (caudillismo), populism and strong
presidentialism.
37
The institutional design of regional organizations in LAC is
characterized by excessive intergovernmentalism.
Weakness of the
1. The Presidentialization of integration has weakened the
institutional design of
institutional stability and effectiveness of ROs. regional integration
organizations LAC
2. Member states have been reluctant to transfer sovereign
competences to ROs.

3. Member states have permanently avoided the adoption of

decision-making mechanisms involving different types of
majorities:

• Decisions are regularly taken unanimously (unanimity)

4. The ROs have failed to develop a binding legal system of

integration.

5. They also lack effective mechanisms for the resolution of

disputes. 38
 Weakness of the
Frequently, national elites ideologically defend their interests, thus institutional design of
affecting the development of integration processes. regional integration
organizations in LAC
• National elites justify their rejection of decisions of the ROs that
may affect their political and economic interests.

• This has been a constant practice of oligopolistic groups,

including:

• Rentier business groups that are afraid of competition in an

open market.

• Trade unions and peasant farmers have also been hostile to

liberalization processes and the adoption of common
standards.

39
 6. Unfinished Modern concept of the State: Weberian conception
Process of
Variables:
State-Building
and Transfer 1. The legitimate monopoly of the use of force
of Sovereignty
2. The presence and control over a territory and
domination over a population

3. The extension of an administrative bureaucracy

40
 Measures vulnerability in pre-conflict, active conflict and
The Fragile post-conflict situations.
States Index 12 indicators:
(FSI) Security apparatus Factionalized elites
Group grievance Economic decline
Uneven economic development Human flight and brain drain
State legitimacy Public services
Human rights and rule of law Demographic pressures
Refugees and IDPs External intervention

The higher the value of the index, the more "fragile" the
country is.
The average for 2023 based on 177 countries was 65.53 index
points.
41
42
 Considers the security threats to a state, including:
The Security
Apparatus Bombings and attacks Battle-related deaths
Rebel movements Mutinies and coups
Indicator Terrorism

It also takes into account serious criminal factors, including:

Organized crime Homicides

Perceived trust of citizens in domestic security

The higher the value of the indicator, the more the threats in
the state.
The average for 2023 based on 177 countries was 4.98 index
points.
43
44
 The State Considers the representativeness and openness of
Legitimacy government and its relationship with its citizenry.

Indicator It looks at the population’s level of confidence in state

institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where
that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public
demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of
armed insurgencies.

The higher the value of the index, the lower the country's
legitimacy.

The average for 2023 based on 177 countries was 5.72 index
points.
45
46
The Public Refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the
people, including the provision of basic services like:
Services Health Education
Indicator Water and sanitation Transport infrastructure
Electricity and power Internet and connectivity

On the other hand, it may include the state’s ability to protect

its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through
perceived effective policing.

The higher the value of the indicator, the worse the public
services in the country.

The average for 2023 based on 177 countries was 5.43 index
points.
47
48
 LAC states still have more territory than statehood
The Unfinished State-
• State-building has been a major domestic challenge.
Building Process
• This institutional fragility implies a structural weakness for the
exercise of internal sovereignty.

• The low level of state capacity has the effect of scarce or total
institutional absence in many parts of the territory.

• Thus, the full exercise of internal sovereignty remains deficient, and

States should give priority to domestic affairs.

• This reduces capacity and reinforces the reluctance of LAC states to

make commitments:

• Especially in terms of ceding sovereign powers that remain

precarious in the internal sphere.
49
 Conclusions:
The literature offers a variety of characteristic features of regionalism
The Complexity and and integration in LAC:
Diversity of the Regional
Architecture in LAC • There is an excessive proliferation of forums for consultation and
cooperation in LAC.

• This reflects a diverse and complex regional architecture.

• There are diverse patterns of regionalism in LAC, which diverge on

ideological options, goals and fields of action.

• The regional and sub-regional projects in LAC have a very low level
of institutional commitment and a strong emphasis on national
sovereignty.

50
7. Conclusions

51
The changing and volatile regional architecture has been described
as a period of transition. Conclusions:

1. This scenario could produce an exhaustion of integration. The Complexity and

Diversity of the Regional
2. Consequently, it could lead to decentralized subregionalism and Architecture in LAC
hemispheric disintegration:

• There are multiple and overlapping memberships of states in

different subregional organizations.

• This produces clashes within and between the different

integration projects.

• The effects of this could structurally weaken integration

efforts and discourage the objectives of regional unity for a
long time.

This scenario is defined as the lowest common denominator.

52
 Conclusions: In contrast, this variable geometric structure of regional
governance could facilitate intra-regional cooperation.
The Complexity and
Diversity of the Regional • The governance architecture in LAC is characterized by
Architecture in LAC overlapping intraregional cooperation.

This reflects a regional governance complex with elements of:

• Competition

• Cooperation

• A tendency towards segmentation.

This scenario can be outlined as a growing disintegration or

segmentation.
53
 Is LAC heading towards a fragmentation or segmentation rather
than integration?
What is going on in
the 21st century? • The CAN began to disintegrate in 2006 and is stagnant.

• MERCOSUR does not advance qualitatively and there are

periodic tensions between Brazil and Argentina

• ALBA-TCP is paralyzed due to Venezuela's structural crisis

• UNASUR became a “zombie” organization because most of its

Member States have left it

• CELAC is a simple forum for political dialogue

• The Pacific Alliance is stagnant due to the lack of interest of

the current presidents of the member states

54
 Conclusions: LAC's present has been defined as critical and its future is uncertain,
because the region faces:
The Complexity and
Diversity of the Regional 1. A double crisis of regionalism and multilateralism
Architecture in LAC
2. A considerable economic contraction

3. A high level of political-ideological polarization at both the

domestic and regional levels

4. A growing erosion of democracy

All this, within the framework of a power transition in the

international system:

• That is manifested in the tensions and clashes between China,

Russia and the US.
55