8

The Darod clan is generally divided into Ogaden (found in the Lower and Middle Jubba regions in Southern
Somalia), Marehan (found in the Gedo region in South-Central Somalia), and Harti elements. The Harti
Darods are further divided into Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, and Majerteen branches. The Warsangeli and
Dhulbahante kin groups of the Harti confederacy predominantly live within Somaliland's colonial borders;
the Majerteen Somalis dominate the Puntland State of Somalia in politics, economics, and population
figures.
As anyone who has been closely monitoring current events in Somalia can tell, the Majeerteen element
of the Darod clan is the most competitive, domineering, authoritative, and uncompromising political actor in
the current state-building and federalism project. The Majeerteen constituency (or as those who romanticize
the use of collective identity labels would refer to it, the Puntland State) hardly agrees to anything with the
rest of the political actors vis-à-vis the current state-building project. The typical explanation is that clan
elites do not trust each other or that clans disagree on distributing Somalia's scarce resources. But then
greediness alone can never be a satisfactory explanation of why a mere federal proposal for national
education policy and a centralized GCSE exam system sparked a bitter dispute between Puntland and the
FGS – that is, between the Majeerteen and their Hawiye counterparts. Neither can it provide an adequate
explanation why D&H elites have to be eternally deadlocked rather than define their differences and jointly
develop criteria to deal with them. Many who have asked those questions were given the expression that
because Somalia's conflict and clan politics are complicated, there can be no correct answers for those
sorts of questions. Then it feels as if the Somali conflict has become a mystery-shrouded cult wherein
everyone must stop thinking and start believing.
I do not deny that battles for power and resources are rife, however. What needs to be understood is
that these conflicts are rooted in ethnic stratification and status terms rather than being seen merely as, say,
clan-based, motivated by greed, stemming from elite mistrust, or driven by scarcity. Then, for instance, it
would be easy to explain the natural tendency of Puntland's Majeerteen politicians to disagree with everyone
and on everything about the current state-building project. The relative social status of the Majeerteen
Somalis (as seen by the Majeerteen Somalis) vis-à-vis the non-Majeerteen Somalis is a major factor at play
in this regard. The Majeerteen Somalis see themselves as
aristocrats and superior to the rest of the current state-building
and peacebuilding stakeholders.
This perceived superiority by the Majeerteen Somalis
developed due to their involvement with the antagonist Majerteen
and Hobyo Sultanates that had gained them their remarkable
political influence on the Somali Peninsula colonization prior.
Founded respectively by the Osman Mohamud and Omar
Mohamud of the Majeerteen branch of the Harti Darod, these two
Sultanates enabled the Majeerteen aristocrats to assert their
dominance not only on the Harti subclan 1 and the wider Darod
clan but also many subclans of the Hawiye clan. It was most
significantly through treaties entered by these two Majeerteen-led
sultanates that helped the Kingdom of Italy to conquer the entire
Somalia Italia territory. The Majeerteen kin group also dominated
high politics in post-independence civilian government2. It gave
the Majeerteen kin group enormous authority and influence over
governmental and economic institutions and the rest of Somali
society. These historical antecedents and relative achievements
have contributed to the Majeerteen Somalis identity,
distinguishing them as social elites. This status was taken pride
not just by the dominant Majeerteen kin group but also frequently
by the whole of the Darod clan.

1 Warsangeli had their own Sultanate, the Maakhir Sultanate. However, an internal power struggle has led to the demise of the Warsangeli
sultanate; their numbers dwindled and since then, they have lost influence..
2 Take the nation’s two highest offices as an example. From 1960-1969 Somalia had seen one Hawiye president, one Majeerteen president,
two Majeerteen prime ministers, and one Isaaq prime minister.
 9
But then the military coup and Barre's coming to power enabled the Mareehan subclan to ascend into
the top, replacing the Majeerteen group. The implications for the military coup were clear for the Majeerteen
kin group, who felt that they had actually lost not just substantial advantages over or relative to the
Mareehaan and the others, but their identity, sense of self, renown, and superiority over the rest of the
Somalis as well. From day one, the Majeerteen kin group knew that they must regain their status – hence
the attempted coup and formation of the first armed opposition movement – Somali Salvation Democratic
Front (SSDF) by the Majeerteen officers. Equally, here originates the antagonism that has been the hallmark
of the Majeerteen attitude toward the Mareehaan for the last 50 years. Like their Majeerteen predecessors,
the twenty years of Mareehaan rule under Siyaad Barre forged an extremely strong sense of self. The
Mareehan subclan occupying the highest rank of this hierarchical society has become the true power elite.
Regardless, the Darod clan had dominated Mogadishu and disproportionately benefited from both the
civilian and military regimes in large part because, at the time, the Hawiye was somewhat unassuming,
nonforceful, and less aggressive relative to the Darod and Isaaq clans and therefore did nothing to protest
being unfairly dominated in their own lands. It was also due to this relatively peaceful nature of the Hawiye
clan that allowed the Majeerteen's Hobyo Sultanate to take control of central Somalia and not D&H but
Darod and Isaaq to occupy the nation's top two offices during the last civilian administration.
But not anymore. Immediately upon the collapse of Barre's regime, Hawiye's USC militia hunted down
Darod clans and subjected them to maximum violence, the magnitude of which some western authors, such
as Lidwien Kapteijns, described as "acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing 3." They expelled Darod Somalis
from all Hawiye-dominated regions and territories, particularly Mogadishu, where Darod groups have
dominated politics since Somalia's birth. And so 1991 marked the end of not just Hawiye's peacefulness
and tolerance but willingness to compromise as well. It likewise marked the end of any prospect of Darod
domination in Hawiye's cities and lands.
On the other hand, Mogadishu has lost its status as the nation's capital, at least in the eyes of the
Darod Somalis. Hence 1991 onward, the Darod groups have seen and referred to Mogadishu as Hawiye's
capital. As noted earlier, this perception is one of the biggest challenges facing the current state-building
project (and to be further elaborated on).
--- --- ---
A quick background will improve. We have the Majeerteen kin group, who once claimed superiority over
Harti subclans and the rest of Somali society but lost their status to the Mareehaan subclan. The latter
enjoyed higher social status than the rest of Somali society for twenty years, during which time their
acquired status forged an inextricable part of their identity. That Mareehaan's acquisition of power
represented Majeerteen's loss of status notwithstanding, all elements of the Darod clan collectively prided
themselves on their political astuteness and their ascendency over the non-Darod Somalis. But then, in the
wake of Barre's defeat, the Mareehaan lost its influence and authority over the others.
As noted earlier, promotion of political injustice, exclusionary power structures, racial inequality (e.g.,
nobles vs. commoners), and violence and coercion were among the most effective tools to maintain their
dominance. In addition, the privileged Darod clan relied on propagandizing based on inflated numerical
strengths and exaggerated and distorted clan histories to create legitimacy for their domination and justify
their relatively higher shares in state power and public resources. The famous saying, "Majeerteen iyo inta
madax-madow baa siman," equates the Majeerteen population to the rest of the world combined.
Repeated enough and over an extended period, such lies became the truth. The Darod clan, being scattered
in the largest (but the least densely populated) geographic territories across the country, their claim to
numerical superiority and, by implication, their claim to political and military supremacy 4, was never
questioned by the unlettered Somalia Italia's masses.
Nevertheless, different patterns of thinking had emerged from 1989 onwards when Barre's government
could not defeat the Isaaq's Somali National Movement (SNM) despite being at war for almost two years.
For instance, between 27-31 May 1988, the SNM captured large portions of Hargeisa - Somalia's second
capital and then-most heavily militarized city - and wholly took over Burao5. After this, it had become clear

3 (Kapteijns, 2013)
4 The Darod's desire to maintain their myth of numerical superiority explains why an accurate count of the Somali population was never
completed or published by any of the Somali governments—military or civilian; before or after independence.
5
(Richards, 2009; BBC, 2001; Baumann, 2011)
 10
for the Southern Somalis that no clan was a formidable force; not even the Somali government was. To his
downfall, late in that year, Barre also attacked the Hawiye clan, the truly largest clan family in Somalia and
the dominant clan in Mogadishu and South and Central Somalia. Emboldened by the progress the SNM
had made in the Northern regions, Hawiye fought against and defeated Barre's army in Somalia's South and
Central regions.
With the defeat of Barre's army, law and order in Somalia has collapsed, and so did the old social
hierarchies. The traditional means of ascendancy and power dynamics that governed social relations
between the Darod and the Hawiye have now changed, creating a level playing field for all Hawiye and
Darod competing groups. As noted earlier, the Hawiye militias took up arms against the Darod and expelled
them from Mogadishu and all Hawiye-dominated regions and territories. The Darod groups moved to
Somalia's southern regions, wherein the retreating Darod and pursuing Hawiye militias devastated the
riverine and the inter-riverine communities, as noted elsewhere in the document. The dynamics of conflict
now have changed to increased fighting between clan and sub-clan militias primarily for domination but
obviously over control of land and resources both as a proof of dominance and an economic lifeline. With
Mogadishu and Mogadishu's port now under Hawiye's control, the city of Kismayo has become the center
of power struggles within various Darood subclans and between the Darod and Hawiye clans due to its
strategic location and deep seaport.
Kismayo is the capital city of the Lower Jubba region, home to more than 40 Somali
subclans/community groups. Among the major groups in this region are Darod, Hawiye, Dir subclans, Digil
& Mirifle, Jareer Weyn, and many other Somali communities; Figure 1 below see a Kismayo city conflict
timeline. Between the Darod groups, the Mareehaan was the dominant subclan in 1977 prior, followed by
the Ogaden. But then, the Mareehaan-Majeerteen subclan balance shifted in favor of the Ogaden by the
influx of Ogaden refugees who fled to Somalia in the aftermath of Barre's 1977 war with Ethiopia. Barre
dismissed his Ogaden minister of defense, Mr. Aden Gabiyo, and purged the Ogaden officers from all
sensitive posts to reduce the Ogaden's growing influence6. In May 1989, this led to a revolt among the
Ogaden soldiers in the Kismayo base, and the Ogaden kin group formed an armed opposition group, the
Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)6 The central point to underscore is that the struggle between the
Mareehaan and Ogaden subclans over the control of Kismayo and the region predates the collapse
of the central government. Thus, by the time Barre's government collapsed, both the Majeerteen and
Ogaden kin groups had already had a case against the Mareehaan subclan. And after the collapse, the
Majeerteen and Ogaden fought Mareehaan; Hawiye fought with Mareehaan against allied Majeerteen and
Ogaden militias.
Fast forward to the end: the Ogaden Figure 1: Kismayo Conflict Timeline - source: Somalia CEWERU
subclan persevered, establishing the Jubbaland
administration was established, which
comprises not just of Kismayo or the Lower
Shabelle, but the Gedo region and the
Mareehaan's heartland as well. Neither the
Mareehaan nor the Hawiye approves of the
Ogaden control of Jubbaland. Finally, the
Mareehaan lost its status to Ogaden subclan.
After all, it is not difficult to understand why
politics in today's Somalia are a zero-sum game
when Mareehaan's acquisition of status entails
Majeerteen's loss; Ogaden's acquisition entails
Mareehaan's loss, and Hawiye' political
ascendency entails Darod's loss.

6
(Baumann, 2011, p. 30)
 11
III

<< put all the above into perspective>>

1. Between Majeerteen (in federalist jargon, Puntland state) and everyone else
▪ Puntland's Majeerteen kin group identifies itself and distinguishes itself from others as
Somalia's aristocrats and leaders. Through their two sultanates, the Majeerteen established
themselves not just as rulers of the Harti but also as rulers of the wider Darod and Hawiye.
Owing to their superior skill in governance, superior education, and urban experience but also
owing to large measures of written and oral propaganda they adopted to secure the obedience
of the masses, they easily dominated power and privilege in the independent state of Somalia,
towering supremely over all Somali clans and communities.
▪ In the aftermath of the 1969 military coup, they have lost their privileges and power to the
Mareehaan subclans. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the civil war, Hawiye became intolerant
to be dominated in their own lands. Because of Mareehaan's ascendency into power elitism,
Majeerteen kin groups have zero chance to reassert their dominance over the entirety of the
Darod clan. Similarly, because Hawiye reclaimed control over Mogadishu and expelled the
Darods who dominated it for forty years, Majeerteen politicians have no prospect of
reasserting their own identity as the ruling class, neither over Hawiye nor over Darod clans.
They could, however, reclaim their (pre-colonial, sultanate-era) superiority over Harti subclan,
and did they do so. In part, this explains why Puntland politicians have advocated federalism
and decentralization in Somalia. But this has not been without challenge since two of the three
Harti branches live in Somaliland's colonial borders. But they did it anyway.
▪ In 1998, Majeerteen politicians formed the Puntland semi-autonomous state of Somalia, with
its borders covering all the territories inhabited by the Harti confederacy. Even though it has
no influence within Somaliland's colonial borders, Puntland defined itself as the land of the
Harti/Daarood clan confederation, of which Majeerteen is the main sub-clan.
▪ And although rhetorically it identifies itself as a federal member state, Puntland operates as an
independent nation-state. It has its own foreign policy; it cooperates with foreign countries and
legislates and governs security, citizenship, natural resources, and foreign relations. Even
more worrying is that Puntland's Majeerteen leaders have no intention of changing the status
quo of doing business.
▪ The unanswered questions are many, but none is more important than why Puntland leaders
cannot agree on anything regarding the current state-building project. They believe that,
because of their history and political astuteness, they deserve higher status than the rest of
the political actors; but they cannot have it. In other words, they cannot agree on anything vis-
à-vis the current state-building affairs because they are seeking a more privileged status of
theirs and their administration. And because they cannot have such a more privileged status,
they have no interest in the entire federalism project. Simply put, they want to maintain the
status quo of running Puntland as an independent nation-state within an independent nation-
state.

2. Btween Mareehaan and Ogaden

▪ The Mareehaan, as Somalia's leaders for 20 years, has lost their status to Ogaden subclan.
▪ In the context of the current state-building quagmires, this manifests itself in the difficulties of
holding elections and the tensions between Madobe and Farmajo.
▪ Farmajo, as the last chance of Mareehaan's return to the political scene, cannot vacate the
office of the president without negotiating improved Mareehaan role in the Jubbaland
administration. He doesn't want the Gedo region and the Mareehaan subclan to remain under
the rule of Ogaden or occupy a lower rank than Ogaden Somalis. Farmajo will not leave the
office before justice has been done for the Gedo region and Mareehaan subclan.
▪ Ahmed Madobe (Ogaden) cannot allow any of the above to happen.
 12
▪ In this specific matter, Hawiye supports Farmajo and the Mareehaan position because they
themselves are laying claim of ownership over Kismayo and many other parts of the Jubbaland
administrative boundaries – besides, they don't think that Jubbaland should be Darod's. By
contrast, the Majeerteen supports Ahmed Madobe and the Mareehaan position because (1)
they are extremely antagonistic toward the Mareehaan to whom they have lost their status, (2)
they can control the Ogaden but not the Mareehaan, and (3) contrary to Hawiye, they think
that Jubbaland must be Darod's.
▪ This issue is inherently a zero-sum game.

3. Between Hawiye and Darod

▪ From the perspective of Darod politicians: With three Hawiye-controlled polities - Mogadishu,
Galmudug, and Hirshabelle - Hawiye has unfairly dominated politics in Somalia. It is a shame
for the Darod to accept Hawiye's domination. Because Hawiye controls Mogadishu (politically,
economically, and administratively), they should have only one FMS covering all central
Somalia regions. Equally, the Darod should have Puntland and Jubbaland. The FGS
(Mogadishu) is an instrument for promoting Hawiye's interest. Hence, FGS should never
possess more political or economic powers than do FMSs. We cannot allow Hawiye to
dominate us (Darod).

▪ From the perspective of Hawiye politicians: Mogadishu is the country's capital city, not
Hawiye's FMS. Kismayo belongs to all clans and communities and should never be under
Darod control. Regardless, Darod has two FMSs – PL and JL – and Hawiye has two FMSs –
GSM and HSH. Darod's skepticism and grievances are unfounded. Darod cannot be happy
without creating a social hierarchy structured in terms of inequality in which it occupies at the
top. We cannot allow Darod to dominate us (Hawiye).