How far would it be correct to describe the 1st Anglo Chinese war as a

‘cultural crusade’ by the British against the old and static civilisation
of China?

John Quincy Adams, immediately after the 1st opium war, asserted that
opium was "a mere incident to the dispute... the cause of the war is the
kowtow- the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China that she will
hold commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind not upon terms of
equal reciprocity, but upon the insulting and degrading forms of the
relations between lord and vassal." The idea of the war as a cultural conflict
was furthered by British and American diplomats and still resonates in
their work on the Opium War. J.F. Fairbank is one of the main proponents
of this view in recent times. Chinese Communist Historians oppose this
rather vehemently, as seen in the volume ‘The Opium War’ and are of the
opinion the opium was the cause of the war. The three theories that are
widely debated even into present day research are the cultural war theory,
the trade war theory and the opium war theory. This essay seeks to
examine the events of and leading up to the opium war in order to assess
the nature of the conflict.

Opium had been introduced to China in the 7th and 8th centuries. Initially
used only for medicinal purposes, it eventually began to be smoked. Over
time, the Portuguese had monopolised opium trade to china, but by 1773,
the British displaced the Portuguese. By 1796, opium had been outlawed in
China. The British East India Company, which held the monopoly till 1833,
got around the official barriers to opium trade by auctioning off the opium
to country ships that had Company licenses. Therefore the company was
no legally involved in the illegal opium trade. The reason for emphasis on
the opium trade was so that the British could tilt the balance of trade in
their favour rather than expend bullion on tea. This was later disproved as
a myth by the East India Company as figures show that the balance of trade
for the cotton trade was not unfavourable, but the opium trade gave way to
massive profits. The opium traders generally bought it on credit in Calcutta
and paid to the Company’s Canton treasury. Therefore the Bengal
government had only registered the opium revenue, which was only
created once it had passed through China via the opium trade and made its
way back to Britain in the form of tea and other goods from China. Tan
Chung describes this as a ‘triangular affair’ which was essentially made up
of exchanges ‘Indian opium for the Chinese, Chinese tea for the Britons, and
British Raj for the Indians’. Therefore the opium trade was seen as a means
of incorporating China into the Empire building activities of the British by
historians like Tan Chung.

Jean Chesneaux points out the Western economies were rapidly expanding
in the post Napoleonic era and that by 1819; the British presence in
Singapore had brought trade and military activities closer to China. The
British had made attempts in the past –in 1793 and in 1816 under Lords
Macartney and Amherst respectively-to improve relations with China to
gain better concessions for economic activities. These negotiations fell
apart due to problems with the idea of Kowtow and the Chinese attitude
towards the Western powers as tributary states. The abolition of the East
India Company in 1833 meant that from the perspective of the home
government, Canton was now open to free trade. The Chinese, however,
thought differently, and this led the free traders to realise in time that
perhaps force of arms might be necessary to open up the Chinese market,
as has been pointed out by Frederic Wakeman. They wanted to destroy the
Chinese bureaucratic limitations on trade. The British government was not
so inclined to declare war to open up the market. Palmerston’s government
wanted to maintain Sino-British Harmony, which was, as Tan Chung points
out, a dichotomy as is visible in his contradictory instructions to Napier.

On the Chinese side, the Hong merchants were held responsible for the
activities of the foreign traders. It was Chinese boats, called ‘fast crabs’ that
actually distributed opium over the rest of China as part of the yao-kao or
opium dealing organisations. Opium addiction was on the rise in China. By
1838-39, 40,000 chests were imported, roughly supplying about 1.1.
million consumers. About 30 percent of the government officials were
opium smokers. Opium was seen to be detrimental to China, both
economically as it led to outflow of silver (though Wakeman argues that the
unfavourable silver copper ratio was not just a result of opium but internal
factors too , like debasement, led to this) and caused a stagnation in the sale
of other commodities as purchasing power was redirected to opium. In the
beginning of the 19th century, China’s balance of trade was favourable with
$26,000,000. Between 1828 and 1836, $38,000,000 left China. Opium was
seen to slow down business and public services. In addition to this, as
Canton was the centre of trade with the Western powers, and the hoppo or
customs officials here were corrupt, Canton was seen as a dissident centre
that had to be brought under imperial control once more according to
Chesneaux. Tan Chung on the other hand saw the Manchu emperor Tao-
Kuang as the Anti Opium emperor who very strongly felt the need to stamp
out the opium trade and instructed his officials as such.

After the British declaration of the end of the monopoly of the East India
Company, the Chinese were worried about the prospect of more free
traders in Canton. In 1834, Napier, Plowden and J.F. Davis were appointed
superintendents of trade in China. As the British government was now
directly dealing with China, British interests were no longer solely
motivated by commerce. The idea of honour had also taken a prominent
place. In fact, Glenn Melacon attributes British aggression in China as an act
of honour. Napier was instructed with the contradictory tasks of reaching
an equal agreement with China but maintaining a conciliatory and friendly
attitude. Napier went directly to Canton without waiting for permission to
enter at Macao, and from there informed the governor general of his arrival
via letter. The governor general asked him to leave, which he did not do
and announced that Britain would resort to aggression if required. The
governor general withdrew supplies and Chinese labour from the factories
of the British, to which Napier responded with the threat of attacks by
frigates on the city. The Chinese saw Napier as the sole culprit, and said his
departure would lead to trade as usual. In Immanuel Hsu’s opinion, this
divide and rule policy worked as the British traders were content to get rid
of Napier in favour of trade. This mission failed because the Chinese could
not understand why Napier should put himself forward more than his
predecessors, while Napier failed to follow instructions.

Napier was followed by J.F.Davis, whose policies were disliked by the free
traders. He was soon replaced by Sir. George B. Robinson. While the
Chinese appreciated Robinson’s inactivity and conciliation, the British
traders did not. Eventually, Captain Charles Elliot was appointed
superintendent. He adopted neither meek conciliation nor
uncompromising aggression. Instead, he followed a confident policy to
extract concessions from Canton while convincing the Chinese that
territorial expansion was not part of the British agenda. His instructions
were to take part on equal official communication with the Chinese, which
he disregarded and used a petition to initiate contact with the authorities,
which was seen as a sign of submission by the Chinese. His subsequent
attempt at finding equal footing was unsuccessful.

In the meanwhile, amongst the Chinese authorities, there was a debate on

the legalization of Opium. One school, led by Hsu Nai Chi, called for the
legalization of opium and exchange by barter to preserve bullion. It also
advocated domestic growth so as to discourage foreign trade. They were
opposed by hardliners, who felt an uncompromising stand against opium
had to be taken, so they fought for strict enforcement of restrictions. The
debate and prospect of legalised opium trade led the foreign traders to
increase their imports of opium into China. Eventually, the hardliners won
the debate. In 1836, Governor General Teng was asked to stamp out opium.
Nine traders, like Jardine, Dent etc, were identified. They were given 4
months to leave. The fast crabs were destroyed, and the Chinese involved
in the trade as well as the opium addicts were punished. As a result of this,
the price of opium fell. In 1838, a chests of Patna opium cost only $450.
This stagnation of opium traffic was harmful to the British trading
interests.

Lin Tse Tsu was appointed imperial commissioner to deal with the trouble
at Canton on 31st December 1838 following his suppression of the opium
situation in Hunan and Hupei, where he had been governor. He conferred
with the emperor an unprecedented nineteen times, an unheard of show of
faith. He adopted a very aggressive policy. Aware of the power of Britain, he
blamed Charles Elliot for the opium situation and wrote to Queen Victoria
seeking her intervention in order to reign in Captain Elliot, whom he
thought was acting against orders. In March, the traders were asked to
surrender all their chests of Opium within 3 days and to sign a bond that
pledged they would not take part in further trade on pain of death. This
bond also brought up the question of extraterritoriality, as Elliot was
reluctant to let the traders sign this bond and therefore be subject to
Chinese jurisprudence which the Westerners regarded barbaric. This was
exacerbated by the British refusal to punish or hand over the suspects in
the Lin Wei-Hsi murder case. The foreigners refused to hand over chests, at
which point he threatened to punish the Hong merchants. Dent was asked
to surrender himself. Elliot too came to join the traders from Macao. Lin
Tse Tsu ordered a halt on trade withdrew the compradors and other
Chinese collaborators and laid siege to the British factories. This lasted for
six weeks, thought he Hong merchants smuggled the English supplies. Lin
said that with the each instalment of opium handed over, privileges would
gradually be restored. Eventually Elliot ordered the handing over of the
Opium chests, promising $9 million in compensation.

Rather than sign the bond with its subjection to Chinese jurisdiction, Elliot
and the British withdrew to Macao. In the meanwhile, other traders,
especially the Americans, took advantage and made windfall profits. This
proved to be serious temptation to some of the British traders. In the
meantime, Elliot encouraged Palmerston to take decisive measures against
the Chinese. It was decided that an expeditionary force would be sent to
China. It was around this tense time that the Lin Wei-Hsi murder took
place. The British were exiled to Hong Kong as a result. The matter of the
bond, with its clause for the death penalty, had worried Elliot and the
British. But some British traders, tempted by trade and the windfalls of the
Americans signed the bond- the Thomas Coutts and Royal Saxon ships’
captains to be precise. An engagement occurred at Chuanpi. The opium war
began in June 1840.

Immanuel Hsu divides the opium war into three stages, the first of which
was from the arrival of George Elliot and the expeditionary force till the
convention of Chuanpi. Admiral Elliott along with Captain Elliot had been
appointed plenipotentiaries. At this stage, they had been instructed to
demand satisfaction for the detention of Elliot as British Superintendent
and the British traders, the return of the opium that had been surrendered,
compensation, territorial gain in the form of an island and the abolition of
the monopolistic trade at Canton. All important Chinese ports were to be
blockaded in a show of military strength. A letter was entrusted to Admiral
Elliot to be delivered to the Chinese court. The British did not attack
Canton, where Lin anticipated them, but headed north, where they
captured Chusan. Palmerston’s letter to the Emperor was delivered via Chi-
shian, the governor of Peiho. The loss of Chusan and Lin Tse Tsu’s
perceived failure to suppress the British led to his dismissal. Hsu also states
that this was also because Palmerston’s letter complained of the actions
taken by him. The Emperor thought at this point that simple redress of the
grievances would be enough. So Chi-shian was sent to negotiate with the
British.
 Chi-Shian negotiated the redress of grievances employing a great deal of
flattery. The British however demanded Hong Kong and an indemnity.
While conciliation and redress were on the agenda, Chi-Shian was aware
that handing over Hong Kong would be unacceptable to the court. Captain
Elliot, who had now risen in rank past Admiral Elliot, attacked Chuanpi and
threatened to take Bogue. The Convention to Chuanpi was negotiated,
which handed over Hong Kong to the British along with a $6 million
indemnity. It promised ineractions on equal footing with Britain and also
negotiated the reopening of Canton for trade by February 1841. But before
the convention was ratified by the imperial authority, the British moved
into Hong Kong. Chi Shian was punished and removed from office. Both the
British and Chinese were displeased with this convention. The Chinese
were against territorial expansion of the British, while the British were
dissatisfied with the indemnity. Also, the British government at home was
upset with Elliots withdrawal from Chusan, which they already controlled
by conquest for the promise of Hong Kong, with Queen Victoria even
remarking in a letter that he seemed to be out to get the ‘lowest possible
terms’. Elliot was subsequently dismissed as plenipotentiary in favour of
Henry Pottinger.

The 2nd phase of the war, according to Hsu, began with the disregarding of
the Chuanpi convention by both the Chinese and the British. I-Shang was
appointed the head of the army to suppress the barbarians, while Elliot,
who was still in charge pending Pottinger's arrival, took the forts ant
Bogue. He captured Canton, for which the prefect of Canton and the Hong
merchants offered a ‘ransom’ of $6million. In May, another agreement was
reached. It called for the evacuation of British troops from Bogue, the
exchange of prisoners of war, the deferral of the question of Hong Kong,
immediate payment of the $6million and withdrawal of the Chinese troops
from Canton.

In August, Pottinger arrived. This marked the 3rd phase of the War for Hsu.
Pottinger’s instructions from the government were to occupy Chusan,
bypassing Canton. He was also to get a strategic foothold along the Yangtze.
He was also asked to reopen negotiations via Peiho if needed. The British
demands remained the same – indemnity, more trading posts and
monetary compensation. Under him, Amoy was conquered on the 26th of
August, Chusan on the 1st of October and Ningpo on the 13th of October. By
August 1842, Woosung, Shanghai and Chinkiang, all important centres, fell
to the British. The superior British forces, who had received additional
support from India, clearly had the upper hand. In order to save face, Ilipu
and I-ching, the general at Canton, were instructed to enter into peace talks.
The Treaty of Nanking was signed on 29th August 1842. Its main provisions
were: an indemnity of $21,000,000 to be paid in instalments; the opening
for trade of the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai;
equal intercourse between officials of corresponding rank; British consuls
at each port; abolition of the Cohong monopoly; a uniformly moderate tariff
to be imposed on both imports and exports; and cession of the island of
Hong Kong to be British territory. More tariff regulations were put in place
by the Treaty of Bogue and the rights of extraterritoriality and the most
favoured nation clause were included. The Americans and French also
signed treaties with the Chinese.

The Cultural war theory has already been mentioned above. In Fairbanks’s
argument, opium was not the ‘sole’ cause. He justifies this by looking at the
terms of the post war treaty settlement, in which opium is not mentioned.
He says that this conflict was imminent and that opium was incidental.
Those who focus on the cultural war theory call it the Anglo-Chinese
conflict rather than the opium war. Fairbank points out the difficulties
created by sinocentrism and the tributary mentality and also the Chinese
opposition to free trade. Also, he emphasises the role of judicial systems,
which he sees as different – the British perceived the Chinese to be
barbaric. The Chinese communist historians reject this, as does Tan Chung
on the grounds that it was fought on the basis of material interests. A
cultural conflict was more likely to have occurred when the Western
powers first came to China, and not belatedly in the 19th century. Other
perspectives emphasise the need to take economic considerations into
account.

The Trade war theory has been propounded by many, such as Michael
Greenberg, Collis, Victor Purcell and Hsin Pao Chung. The argument for
trade as the main factor for the war was that Western Industry and
economy was expanding. In view of this expansion, China was a desirable
addition as it was a large territory with a big population and immense
natural resources. China’s resistance to capitalism and free trade led to
clash with long term trading interests. Historians of this perspective tend to
emphasise the role that Jardine and Matheson (who were large trading
concerns in China) played in providing intelligence to Lord Palmerston,
thereby directing his hand in the matter of China. To quote Purcell, ‘war
was really a product of Britain’s obsession for foreign markets after
industrialisation. Hsin Pao Chung calls the war an ‘X’ war, where ‘x’ stood
for any commodity that could be used by China to open up the Chinese
market. Wakeman points out that the government in Britain was quite
content not to push further into China unless its profits were threatened,
which the Chinese threat to opium was. Hsu too points out that Lin
overestimated the British government’s morality on the matter of opium,
for they would allow the illicit trade so long as profits accrued. So,
returning to Wakeman’s argument, the free traders new that only the
threat to profits by opium, as was posed by aggressive chine reactions to
opium, would persuade the home government to declare war on China,
thereby destroying the resistant bureaucracy of China and opening up her
markets. Maurice Collis is of a similar mindset. The trade war theory sees
the role of opium as incidental. Tan Chung rejects this theory as a
meaningless ‘if’ of history,

‘The Opium War’ by the Chinese communist historians evidently sees

opium as the cause of the war. Trade in the drug adversely affected Chinese
economy. The Chinese communist historians show that the ratio of silver
and copper was adversely affected (though Wakeman contradicts this by
providing evidence for internal crisis as well). The bureaucracy was
corrupt and inefficient as a result of the opium smoking of the officials, and
the Chinese markets had stagnated. Also, in some respects, opium violated
moral codes. They saw opium as the sole cause for the war. Tan Chung
prescribes to this perspective. He says that the British did not need a
pretext to enter China, for the Cohong system was already quite weak by
the 1830s due to internal crises of political and economic considerations.
He also said that the argument for the British wanting a more favourable
balance of trade was bogus as the cotton yarn trade had already
accomplished this. The British desired to continue to opium trade for the
massive profits it made. For Tan Chung, the Chinese had adopted an anti
opium policy, and he termed the British reaction to this the Anti Anti
Opium war. The Chinese emperor’s attempts to stop the trade led to the
clash.
 In the opinion of Chesneaux, the class was not one of western dynamism
versus Chinese stagnation. It was what he terms a ‘Conjunction of crises’.
Internally, China faced monetary and political crises, while the Western
powers railed against the closed door policy of China. It was essentially a
contradiction of commercial capitalism against the state machinery, which
was becoming increasingly inefficient. On the other hand, Glenn Melancon,
the British decision of aggression was in order to protect honour. The
British had sought redress on many grievances, many stemming from
unequal treatment and actions such as the detention of the British traders.
Though Elliot had pledged compensation for opium handed over to the
Chinese officials without government mandate, the British could not let the
insult pass. It essentially became a matter of British honour at a time when
the ministry needed to save face in the house of commons. Immanuel Hsu
also mentions the changing nature of Sino-British relations with the end of
the East India Company’s monopoly. The involvement of the British
government took the matter into the realm of political standing.

For Immanuel Hsu, Opium was the immediate cause of the war. He says
that differing outlooks on jurisprudence, international relations, the
Chinese claim to ‘universal overlordship’, i.e., the idea of Chung Kuo versus
Western ideas of sovereignty were all ultimately going to lead to conflict.
China’s self sufficient agrarian economy was in contrast with the Western
Industrial economy that was rapidly expanding.

While culture appears to have been grounds for mutual misunderstanding

between the west and China, the western presence in China was largely
motivated by trade. In the 19th century, with imperialism on the rise, trade
and flag became one. Therefore the ideas of commerce, now which now
depended on the British government became inextricably linked with
international relations. Equal footing and the elimination of China’s
tributary mentality were now no longer just matters of trade, but also of
government pride. It should also be pointed out that though the trade in
opium was technically illicit, the British government was not morally
inclined to shut down this avenue of super profits. To the Chinese emperor,
opium seemed to cause great damage to society. It was linked to the
western presence in Canton. Therefore, it is impossible to relegate opium
to the merely an aspect of larger cultural and trade related issues. While
other factors were at play also, the opium trade was the manifestation of
these differences.

BIBILOGRAPHY

Immanuel C.Y. Hsu The Rise of Modern China, 1983

Tan Chung Triton and Dragon: Studies in 19th Century China and
Imperialism, 1986

Tan Chung China and the Brave New World, 1978

Glen Melancon Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War in China

1839-1840, The International History Review xxi, 4, December 1999

Frederic Wakeman , The Canton Trade and the Opium War in John Fairbank
and Dennis Twitchet The Cambridge History of China, volume 10 part 1:Late
Ching 1840-1911, 1978

Jean Chesneaux, Marianne Bastid and Marie-Claire Bergere China from the
Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, 1976