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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

Epistemic Democracy
and Political Legitimacy
Ivan Cerovac
Palgrave Studies in Ethics and Public Policy

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Thom Brooks
Durham Law School
Durham University
Durham, UK
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 Ivan Cerovac

Epistemic Democracy
and Political
Legitimacy
Ivan Cerovac
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
University of Rijeka
Rijeka, Croatia

Palgrave Studies in Ethics and Public Policy

ISBN 978-3-030-44601-7 ISBN 978-3-030-44602-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44602-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
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For the Fellowship of Public Reason
 Acknowledgements

The work on this book was supported by the Department of

Humanities at the University of Trieste and the Faculty of Humanities
and Social Sciences at the University of Rijeka. Its first draft was com-
pleted within my interdisciplinary research project “Identity, Values and
Democracy” funded by DIANET—Danube Initiative and Alps Adriatic
Network and the European Social Fund (FP1345500001). The final ver-
sion was completed during my collaboration within the research project
“Well-being, Affiliation and Social Justice” funded by the Croatian Sci-
ence Foundation (UIP-2017-05-3462).
I would like to thank my colleagues at both universities for inspiring
many valuable ideas and greatly improving my work. I benefited a lot
from collaboration and discussion with fellow political philosophers, but
also with colleagues specializing in other branches of philosophy, as well
as with political scientists, sociologists and economists. Special acknowl-
edgement goes to my doctoral supervisor at the University of Trieste,
Pierpaolo Marrone, who proved to be an excellent mentor and a valuable
advisor, but also a great philosopher and a good friend.

vii
viii Acknowledgements

For the past ten years I have had a great pleasure to be a member of the
“Fellowship of Public Reason”, an informal group of researchers based at
the University of Rijeka. Apart from numerous meetings and discussions,
the Fellowship has organized more than twenty international conferences
with some of the leading experts in the area of public justification, which
has given me the opportunity to present my work to many philosophers
whose positions I critically engage in this book. I would like to thank
Elvio Baccarini, a dear friend and the head of our Fellowship, for contin-
uous support, stimulating criticism and insightful comments that have
greatly helped shape not only this book, but my entire philosophical
work. I am also indebted to Nebojša Zelič and Snježana Prijić-Samaržija
whose work continually inspires and stimulates my own, and who have
unconditionally supported me for the past ten years. Luca Malatesti has
greatly helped in the latter stages of my work, offering invaluable sug-
gestions and recommendations that I have tried to follow to the best of
my abilities. I would also like to thank the remaining members of the
Fellowship, including Andrea Mešanović and Aleksandar Šušnjar, who
have kept me motivated and with whom I have spent many wonderful
moments. Finally, though not actually a member of the Fellowship of
Public Reason, Boran Berčić frequently attended many of our meetings
and contributed with excellent comments and suggestions, reminding us
that philosophy has to be kept as simple, clear and comprehensible as
possible.
It has been a pleasure and a privilege to have my work com-
mented by great philosophers and participants of various events
organized all around Europe. I have learned a lot from Richard
Arneson, Richard Bellamy, Thom Brooks, Emanuela Ceva, Simone
Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Rutger Claassen, Chiara Destri, David
Estlund, Miranda Fricker, Gerald Gaus, Chandran Kukathas, Jose Marti,
Ana Matan, David Miller, Ivan Mladenović, Martin O’Neill, Fabienne
Peter, Jonathan Quong, Kai Spiekermann, Steven Wall, Leif Wenar, An-
drew Williams and Jonathan Wolff. There are many others whom I have
undoubtably forgotten for which I apologize.
Julija Perhat and Mirela Fuš had done a great job of proofreading and
formatting the first draft of the manuscript, but also provided some valu-
able comments and suggestions.
 Acknowledgements ix

Finally, special thanks go to my virtue-friend Mia Biturajac, for re-

minding me to live and love philosophy.
While there is a lot of new material here, a few chapters draw from
some of my previously published papers. Of course, they have been sub-
stantively modified, updated and improved to fit this publication.
Chapter 2 is partly based on “How the Principle of Public Equality In-
troduces Substance in Democratic Proceduralism”, Annals of the Croatian
Political Science Association 12, no. 1 (2015): 3–16.
Chapter 4 is partly based on “Plural Voting and J. S. Mill’s Account
of Democratic Legitimacy”, Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 46
(2016): 91–106.
Chapter 6 is partly based on “The Role of Experts in a Democratic
Society”, Journal of Education, Culture and Society 7, no. 2 (2016): 75–
88.
 Praise for Epistemic Democracy and
Political Legitimacy

“With increased attention to the quality of democratic decisions, po-

litical philosophers have recently been exploring anew what role exper-
tise and public deliberation might properly play. Ivan Cerovac provides
an excellent critical survey of these live debates around epistemic democ-
racy, and proposes his own nuanced view. Cerovac argues that on epis-
temic grounds what is required is a more thoroughly egalitarian society
than many other accounts have proposed, and his original arguments
should be confronted by all those interested in recent developments in
democratic theory.”
—David Estlund, Lombardo Family Professor of Philosophy, Brown
University, USA

“This carefully argued book provides a helpful overview of a wide

range of theories of democratic legitimacy, covering pure deliberative
approaches, pragmatist approaches and different versions of epistemic
democracy. It also introduces its own version of deliberative epistemic
democracy. What is particularly compelling about Cerovac’s own account

xi
xii Praise for Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy

is its broad understanding of political deliberation, which is sensitive to

epistemic injustices resulting from social and economic inequalities.”
—Fabienne Peters, Professor of Philosophy, University of Warwick, UK
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 The Truth Tenet 19

3 The Knowledge Tenet 73

4 The Authority Tenet 113

5 Epistemic Democracy 157

6 Institutionalizing Epistemic Democracy 197

Index 237

xiii
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Political legitimacy: monistic and non-monistic accounts 6

Fig. 5.1 Voter dependence 173
Fig. 6.1 Division of epistemic labor 206
Fig. 6.2 Inequality and increased level of political participation 223

xv
 List of Tables

Table 1.1 The three tenets 10

Table 1.2 Plan of the book 13
Table 2.1 Social epistemology 35
Table 2.2 Procedures, outcomes and political legitimacy 49
Table 2.3 Leveling-down objection 55
Table 5.1 Binary choices 174
Table 5.2 Arrow’s paradox of voting 175
Table 6.1 Leveling-down objection 218
Table 6.2 Estlund’s voucher system 221

xvii
 1
Introduction

Can political decisions we make be right or wrong, or true or false? Are

they just the expression of our personal interests, and consequently have
no truth value? If they can be true or false, are there people who are
better at getting it right or wrong? And if there are, does this imply that
those who are better in making correct decisions should have political
authority over others? These are some of the key questions I try to
answer in this book.
Though democracy is highly valued and widely accepted as a collective
decision-making procedure with legitimacy-generating potential, there is
little clarity regarding the grounds of the value of democracy or its legit-
imacy-generating potential. The general idea is that the democracy is a
good thing and that is should be a part of a just society. This, however,
does not enable us to evaluate different democratic systems and proce-
dures, as well as to improve the democratic decision-making process. In
order to be able to do that, we need to understand what grounds the
democratic legitimacy. This book represents an inquiry into the source
of legitimacy-generating potential of democratic procedures.
In this book I defend the standard account of epistemic democracy,
a position that grounds democracy’s legitimacy-generating potential

© The Author(s) 2020 1

I. Cerovac, Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy,
Palgrave Studies in Ethics and Public Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44602-4_1
2 I. Cerovac

both in its moral and in its epistemic qualities. Though the very idea
of an epistemic justification of democratic legitimacy might evoke very
high expectations regarding its epistemic value, I argue no such thing:
democracy does not have to be epistemically the best possible decision-
making procedure. All it has to do is to perform better than other
procedures that can meet the same moral requirements as democracy
can (e.g. procedural fairness). Democracy’s epistemic value is nonetheless
an important part of its legitimacy-generating potential, and increasing
its epistemic value is a good way to generally improve the democratic
decision-making process.
Apart from some considerations in the final chapter, I do not offer
an account how existing democratic practices can be improved. What
I am concerned with are fundamental values that ground the legiti-
macy-generating potential of democratic procedures. Though this book
represents a theoretical framework, it does not imply that the ideas
presented here cannot be implemented into contemporary politics. This,
however, represents a separate task, probably one more appropriate for
political scientists than political philosophers.

1.1 Political Legitimacy

1.1.1 Introduction

This part of the chapter gives a brief clarification of the central con-
cepts in the discussion, as well as an overview of different accounts of
political legitimacy. I briefly discuss the difference between political
authority and political legitimacy, as well as the difference between the
descriptive and the normative account of political legitimacy. I proceed
by sketching two basic (monistic) accounts of political legitimacy, and
argue that we should adopt the third, non-monistic account (one that
combines legitimacy-generating elements from both basic accounts).
Finally, I briefly discuss and endorse the liberal criterion of legitimacy
as a basic standard against which various decision-making procedures
will be evaluated—in order to have legitimacy-generating potential, a
decision-making procedure has to meet this standard. Furthermore,
 1 Introduction 3

all other qualities of a procedure that could be considered as potential

sources of legitimacy-generating potential have to be able to meet the
liberal criterion of legitimacy.

1.1.2 Political Legitimacy

A discussion on political legitimacy lasts for more than 2500 years, and
many prominent thinkers and philosophers have contributed with their
own theories and accounts to this ongoing debate. However, an impor-
tant turn in the debate took place several decades ago: John Rawls (1993,
see also Peter 2011) shifted the discussion from the legitimacy of states
and governments typical for the nineteenth and early twentieth century
(Weber 1964) to the legitimacy of the decision-making process. It is also
important to emphasize that Rawls started the debate on justice in 1970s
with his book A Theory of Justice, and he shifted the debate to legitimacy
in the 1990s with his book Political Liberalism. Political legitimacy is
nowadays one of the central topics discussed within political philosophy
and political theory, so it is important to make some specifications and
define what kind of political legitimacy is this book about.

1.1.2.1 Political Authority and Political Legitimacy

Authority and legitimacy are connected by nonetheless distinct concepts.

Authority is the moral power of one agent (e.g. the state) to morally
require or forbid actions by others through commands. The state thus
lacks authority if its requiring you to pay taxes has no tendency to make
you morally required to do so (Estlund 2008, 2). A particular political
decision is authoritative if one is morally obliged to follow it.
Legitimacy, on the other hand, is the moral permissibility of one agent’s
(e.g. the state’s) issuing and enforcing its commands owning to the pro-
cess by which they were produced. The state acts illegitimately if it puts
you in jail for not paying taxes when it is morally wrong for it to do so
(Estlund 2008, 2). A particular political decision is legitimate if the one
who issued and enforced it had the moral right to do so.
4 I. Cerovac

This book focuses primarily on political legitimacy since it analyzes

different processes of making political decisions and tries to answer
which qualities a decision-making process has to have in order to be able
to make legitimate decisions.

1.1.2.2 Descriptive and Normative Concept of Political

Legitimacy

Like many other ideas, political legitimacy can be understood as a

descriptive as well as a normative concept. Its descriptive concept focuses
on people’s beliefs about how the right to rule is exercised, as well as on
people’s beliefs about the acceptability of a certain political decision. A
particular political decision is thus legitimate if people see it as legitimate,
and a decision-making procedure has a legitimacy-generating potential if
people tend to accept the decisions produced by that procedure as legit-
imate. As Max Weber (1964, 130) puts it, political regime is legitimate
when its participants have certain beliefs or faith in regard to it. Social
and political scientists often use and analyze this concept of political
legitimacy.
The normative concept focuses on a binding reason (or reasons) to
support and not to challenge the coercive power of the state. Political
decisions are seen as legitimate regardless of what other people think of
them, as long as these decisions have certain legitimacy-generating quali-
ties. When we try to assess whether a particular decision is legitimate, we
do not analyze what other people think about it, but instead we analyze
its moral and epistemic qualities, as well as the qualities of a decision-
making procedure that has produced it.
The normative concept is primarily used by political philosophers, and
it is the concept I use throughout this book. I do not write about the
legitimacy of particular states in the real world, but instead on the nor-
mative conditions a decision-making procedure has to meet in order to
have legitimacy-generating potential.
 1 Introduction 5

1.1.3 Accounts of Political Legitimacy

According to the definition given earlier, in order to be legitimate a deci-

sion has to be a product of a legitimacy-generating procedure. The state
can legitimately enact and enforce political decisions owing to the pro-
cedure by which these decisions were made. What are these legitimacy-
generating qualities that a decision-making procedure needs in order to
be able to produce legitimate decisions?
The procedure’s legitimacy-generating qualities can generally be
divided into two important groups: purely procedural qualities and
instrumental qualities. Following these two groups of legitimacy-
generating qualities, two basic positions of political legitimacy can be
distinguished. These two accounts—pure proceduralism and instru-
mentalism—can be regarded as basic or monistic (Christiano 2004)
positions since each appeals to only one group of legitimacy-generating
qualities when determining the legitimacy-generating potential of a
decision-making procedure (Fig. 1.1).

1.1.3.1 Pure Proceduralism

Pure proceduralism focuses only on purely procedural qualities of a

decision-making procedure when determining its legitimacy-generating
potential. These purely procedural (sometimes called intrinsic) qualities
are defined regardless of the procedure’s ability to produce a certain goal
or outcome—a decision-making procedure has legitimacy-generating
potential because it embodies some important moral (or epistemic)
qualities. Procedural fairness (i.e. giving every citizen an equal chance to
participate in the decision-making process) can be one such purely pro-
cedural quality. A collective decision is thus legitimate if (and only if ) it
was produced by a fair decision-making procedure. Positions developed
by Hannah Arendt (1967), Thomas Christiano (2008), Gerald Gaus
(1996), Fabienne Peter (2011), Iris Marion Young (2000) and Robert
Dahl (1989) are some examples of pure proceduralism.
6 I. Cerovac

Fig. 1.1 Political legitimacy: monistic and non-monistic accounts

1.1.3.2 Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism, on the other hand, focuses only on the instrumental

qualities of a decision-making procedure when determining its legiti-
macy-generating potential. These instrumental qualities are defined by
the procedure’s ability to reach a desired aim or outcome—a decision-
making procedure has legitimacy-generating potential because of its abil-
ity to generate decisions with some substantial, procedure-independent
quality. The ability to produce correct, true or just decisions can be one
such instrumental quality. A collective decision is thus legitimate if (and
only if ) it was produced by a decision-making procedure that has a ten-
dency to produce correct or true decisions. Positions developed by Steven
Wall (2007) and Richard Arneson (2003), but also by Robert Talisse
(2009), Cheryl Misak (2000) and John Stuart Mill (1977), are some
examples of political instrumentalism.
 1 Introduction 7

Though these two basic positions use very different argumentation

and appeal to completely different qualities when assessing the proce-
dure’s legitimacy-generating potential, they still have one thing in com-
mon—they both rely only on one group of the procedure’s qualities.
Pure proceduralists completely disregard the instrumental qualities of a
decision-making procedure, while instrumentalist completely disregard
the purely procedural (intrinsic) qualities of a decision-making proce-
dure. In this book I argue against both monistic positions—I claim that
a decision-making procedure has to have both purely procedural and
instrumental qualities in order to have legitimacy-generating potential.

1.1.3.3 Non-monistic Accounts of Political Legitimacy

Having rejected both pure proceduralism and instrumentalism as

inadequate accounts of political legitimacy, non-monists try to incor-
porate both the procedural fairness of the process and the procedure-
independent quality of outcomes into a single account of political
legitimacy. These accounts are often referred to as rational procedu-
ralist positions in order to differentiate them from pure proceduralist
positions.1 Accounts developed by Kenneth Arrow (1984), John Rawls
(1993), Philip Pettit (1999), John Dewey (1987), Fabienne Peter
(2012) and David Estlund (2008) are some examples of non-monistic
approach to democratic legitimacy. Following Estlund, in this book I
develop a non-monistic account that emphasizes both the fairness of the
decision-making process and its ability to produce correct decisions.

1.1.4 The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy

The central principle of political legitimacy that I endorse and against

which I evaluate all other qualities of a procedure that could be consid-
ered as potential sources of legitimacy-generating potential is the liberal
principle of legitimacy.

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in

accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free
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Title: Puzzles and oddities

Found floating on the surface of our current literature,
or tossed to dry land by the waves of memory

Compiler: Mary A. A. Dawson

Release date: November 14, 2023 [eBook #72129]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: Russell Brothers, 1876

Credits: Debrah Thompson and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PUZZLES

AND ODDITIES ***
 PUZZLES AND ODDITIES:
Found Floating on the Surface of our Current
Literature,
OR

TOSSED TO DRY LAND BY THE WAVES OF MEMORY.

GATHERED AND ARRANGED

BY

M. A. A. D.
New York:
RUSSELL BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
17, 19, 21, 23 ROSE STREET.

1876.
 COPYRIGHTED BY
RUSSELL BROTHERS,
1876.
 It is related of St. Aloysius Gonzaga that while, at the usual time
of recreation, he was engaged in playing chess, question arising
among his brother novices as to what each would do were the
assurance to come to them that they would die within an hour, St.
Aloysius said he should go on with his game of chess.
If our recreations as well as our graver employments are
undertaken with a pure intention, we need not reproach ourselves
though Sorrow, we need not fear though Death surprise us while
engaged in them.
Addison, N. Y., January, 1876.
 INDEX.

PART I.

CHARADES.
Nos. 1, 10, 25, 43, 44, 53, 88, 91, 110, 152, 153, 154, 155, 167,
176, 177, 182, 183, 192, 193, 201, 217, 279, 281, 285, 290, 291,
297, 316, 331, 332, 333, 345, 350, 354, 357, 368, 371, 372, 374.

CONUNDRUMS.
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
46, 47, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98,
106, 108, 109, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 159,
160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 196, 197, 198,
199, 200, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 214, 252, 253, 254, 257,
258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270,
274, 275, 278, 280, 286, 294, 299, 300, 301, 303, 318, 319, 320,
321, 322, 323, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 359, 360, 361.

FRENCH AND LATIN RIDDLES.

Nos. 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78.

MATHEMATICAL.
 Nos. 48, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 346, 362, 373.

NOTABLE NAMES.
Nos. 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122,
123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135,
136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142.

POSITIVES AND COMPARATIVES.

Nos. 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229,
230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 336, 337, 338, 339,
340, 341, 342, 343, 344.

POSITIVES, COMPARATIVES AND

SUPERLATIVES.
Nos. 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250.

ELLIPSES.
Nos. 307, 308, 309, 312, 313, 352, 355, 365, 366.

NUMERICAL ENIGMA.
No. 306.

SQUARE WORD.
No. 304.

XMAS DINNER.
 No. 315.

DINNER PARTY.
No. 360.

UNANSWERED RIDDLES.
Pp. 77, 78.

UNANSWERABLE QUESTIONS.
P. 78.

PARADOXES.
P. 79.

OTHER VARIETIES OF PUZZLES.

Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 54, 55, 64, 65, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 89,
90, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 151, 156, 157, 178,
179, 180, 182, 194, 195, 202, 203, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216,
251, 255, 256, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288,
289, 292, 293, 295, 296, 298, 302, 305, 310, 311, 314, 317, 324,
328, 334, 335, 347, 348, 349, 351, 353, 354, 358, 363, 364, 367,
369, 370.

PART II.
ACROSTICS: PAGE.
Adelina Patti 145
Emblematic 131
Spring 146
ALLITERATION:
Siege of Belgrade 144
Example in French 145
ALPHABET, THE, in One Sentence 133
AMERICANS, Characteristic Sayings of 113
ANAGRAMS 131, 133
ANN HATHAWAY 140
AN ORIGINAL LOVE STORY 126
BEHEADED WORDS 133
BOOKS, Fancy Titles of 83
CLUBS 85
CONCEALED MEANINGS 129
CONCEITS OF COMPOSITION:
When the September eves 152
Oh! come to-night 153
Thweetly murmurth the breethe 154
CONTRIBUTION TO AN ALBUM 125
DIALECTS:
Yankee 116
London Exquisite’s 116
Legal 118
Wiltshire 118
ENEID, The Newly Translated 122
EPIGRAM 129
ETIQUETTE OF EQUITATION 88
EXTEMPORE SPEAKING 147
FACETLÆ 84, 105
FRENCH SONG 139
GEOGRAPHICAL PROPRIETY 102
GEORGE AND HIS POPPAR 121
HISTORY 133
INSTRUCTIVE FABLES 141
LATIN POEM 139
MACARONIC POETRY:
Felis et Mures 137
 Ego nunquam audivi 138
Tres fratres stolidi 138
The Rhine 138
Ich Bin Dein 139
In questa casa 140
MACARONIC PROSE 136
MEDLEYS:
I only know 159
The curfew tolls 160
The moon was shining 161
Life 162
NAMES:
Fantastic 98
Ladies’, their Sound 100
“ their Signification 101
ODE TO SPRING 127
OTHER WORLDS 86
OUR MODERN HUMORISTS 148
PALINDROME 132
PARODIES:
Song of the Recent Rebellion 89
Come out in the garden, Jane 91
Brown has pockets running over 93
When I think of him I love so 94
Never jumps a sheep that’s frightened 95
How the water comes down at Lodore 96
Tell me, my secret soul 97
PRINTER’S SHORT-HAND 119
PRONUNCIATION 142
RHYME 122
RHYTHM 127
SECRET CORRESPONDENCE 130
SEEING IS BELIEVING 97
SOUND AND UNSOUND:
See the fragrant twilight 151
Brightly blue the stars 152
SORROWS OF WERTHER 84
STANZAS from J. F. CRAWFORD’S Poems 128
STILTS 87
ST. ANTHONY’S FISH-SERMON 135
THE CAPTURE 103
THE NIMBLE BANK-NOTE 154
THE QUESTION 144
THE RATIONALISTIC CHICKEN 158
WORD PYRAMID 132
PART I.
 PUZZLES AND ODDITIES.

1.

My FIRST the heats of July pack

With rows of milk-pans down the back;
September fills them all with starch,
And, though they neither drill nor march,
Each has a warlike name:
October plucks my honors off,
And down I’m thrown to floor or trough:
Perchance the mill to powder turns
Or smouldering fire to ashes burns
My rough and useless frame.

A weaver’s loom my SECOND fills

In dozens of tall cotton mills,
Before the shuttle, o’er and through,
Has thrown the filling straight and true,
And made each ending fast.
My WHOLE a house in corners set,
Has swung as long as time, and yet
A trap for foolish folk shall swing,
And lessons to the wiser bring,
As long as time shall last.

Answer

2.
What is that which we often return, but never borrow?
Answer
 3.
Can you tell me of what parentage Napoleon the First was?
Answer

4.
What was Joan of Arc made of?
Answer

5.
Why ought stars to be the best Astronomers?
Answer

6.
What colors were the winds and the waves in the last violent
storm?
Answer

7.
In what color should a secret be kept?
Answer
 8.
How do trees get at their summer dress without opening their
trunks?
Answer

9.
Why am I queerer than you?
Answer

10.

Mr. Premium took my FIRST, and he wrote to Captain Smith,

And said: “Sir, do my SECOND to my THIRD, forthwith.”
Now, Mr. P., you see, though a millionaire he be,
Could not, without my WHOLE, have sent Captain Smith to sea.

Answer

11.

Two pronouns find, but mind they suit,

And then between them “a—t” put:
The combination quickly yields
What may be seen on Scotland’s fields.
Now, for the first word, substitute
Another pronoun that will “suit;”
When this is done, ’twill bring to view
 What every day is seen by you.

Answer

12.

Me the contented man desires,

The poor man has, the rich requires,
The miser gives, the spendthrift saves,
And all men carry to their graves.

Answer

13.

A BUSINESS ORDER.
“J. Gray:
Pack with my box five dozen quills.”
What is its peculiarity?
Answer

14.
Those who have me not, do not wish for me; those who have me,
do not wish to lose me; and those who gain me, have me no longer.
Answer
 15.
Although Methusaleh was the oldest man that ever lived, yet he
died before his father.
Answer

16.
If Moses was by adoption the son of Pharaoh’s daughter, was he
not, “by the same token,” the daughter of Pharaoh’s son?
Answer

17.
What is the best time to study the book of Nature?
Answer

18.
What is the religion of Nature in the spring?
Answer

19.
There is an article of common domestic consumption, whose
name contains six letters, from which may be formed twenty-two
nouns, without using the plurals. What is it?