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Download textbook Advances In Cryptology Asiacrypt 2018 24Th International Conference On The Theory And Application Of Cryptology And Information Security Brisbane Qld Australia December 2 6 201 2 ebook all chapter pdf
Download textbook Advances In Cryptology Asiacrypt 2018 24Th International Conference On The Theory And Application Of Cryptology And Information Security Brisbane Qld Australia December 2 6 201 2 ebook all chapter pdf
Advances in Cryptology –
ASIACRYPT 2018
24th International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Brisbane, QLD, Australia, December 2–6, 2018, Proceedings, Part II
123
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11273
Commenced Publication in 1973
Founding and Former Series Editors:
Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
Editorial Board
David Hutchison
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
Takeo Kanade
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Josef Kittler
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Jon M. Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
Friedemann Mattern
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
John C. Mitchell
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Moni Naor
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
C. Pandu Rangan
Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India
Bernhard Steffen
TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany
Demetri Terzopoulos
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Doug Tygar
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Gerhard Weikum
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/7410
Thomas Peyrin Steven Galbraith (Eds.)
•
Advances in Cryptology –
ASIACRYPT 2018
24th International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Brisbane, QLD, Australia, December 2–6, 2018
Proceedings, Part II
123
Editors
Thomas Peyrin Steven Galbraith
Nanyang Technological University University of Auckland
Singapore, Singapore Auckland, New Zealand
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
ASIACRYPT 2018, the 24th Annual International Conference on Theory and Appli-
cation of Cryptology and Information Security, was held in Brisbane, Australia, during
December 2–6, 2018.
The conference focused on all technical aspects of cryptology, and was sponsored
by the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR).
Asiacrypt 2018 received a total of 234 submissions from all over the world. The
Program Committee selected 65 papers for publication in the proceedings of this
conference. The review process was made by the usual double-blind peer review by the
Program Committee, which consisted of 47 leading experts of the field. Each sub-
mission was reviewed by at least three reviewers and five reviewers were assigned to
submissions co-authored by Program Committee members. This year, the conference
operated a two-round review system with rebuttal phase. In the first-round review the
Program Committee selected the 145 submissions that were considered of value for
proceeding to the second round. In the second-round phase the Program Committee
further reviewed the submissions by taking into account their rebuttal letter from the
authors. The selection process was assisted by a total of 347 external reviewers. These
three-volume proceedings contain the revised versions of the papers that were selected.
The revised versions were not reviewed again and the authors are responsible for their
contents.
The program of Asiacrypt 2018 featured three excellent invited talks by Mitsuru
Matsui, Melissa Chase, and Vanessa Teague. The conference also featured a traditional
rump session that contained short presentations on the latest research results of the
field. The Program Committee selected the work “Block Cipher Invariants as Eigen-
vectors of Correlation Matrices” by Tim Beyne for the Best Paper Award of Asiacrypt
2018. Two more papers, “Learning Strikes Again: the Case of the DRS Signature
Scheme” by Yang Yu and Léo Ducas, and “Tighter Security Proofs for GPV-IBE in the
Quantum Random Oracle Model” by Shuichi Katsumata, Shota Yamada, and Takashi
Yamakawa, were solicited to submit the full versions to the Journal of Cryptology. The
program chairs selected Chris Brzuska and Bart Mennink for the Best PC Member
Award.
Many people contributed to the success of Asiacrypt 2018. We would like to thank
the authors for submitting their research results to the conference. We are very grateful
to all of the PC members as well as the external reviewers for their fruitful comments
and discussions on their areas of expertise. We are greatly indebted to Josef Pieprzyk,
the general chair, for his efforts and overall organization. We would also like to thank
Waleed Alkalabi, Niluka Arasinghe, Mir Ali Rezazadeh Baee, Lynn Batten, Xavier
Boyen, Ed Dawson, Ernest Foo, Mukhtar Hassan, Udyani Herath, Qingyi Li, Georg
Lippold, Matthew McKague, Basker Palaniswamy, Anisur Rahman, Leonie Simpson,
Shriparen Sriskandarajah, Gabrielle Stephens, and Chathurika Don Wickramage, the
VI Preface
local Organizing Committee for their continuous support. We thank Craig Costello,
Léo Ducas, and Pierre Karpman for expertly organizing and chairing the rump session.
Finally we thank Shai Halevi for letting us use his nice software for the paper
submission and review process. We also thank Alfred Hofmann, Anna Kramer, and
their colleagues for handling the editorial process of the proceedings published in
Springer’s LNCS series.
General Chair
Josef Pieprzyk CSIRO, Data61, Australia
Program Co-chairs
Thomas Peyrin Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Steven Galbraith University of Auckland, New Zealand
Program Committee
Martin Albrecht Royal Holloway University of London, UK
Prabhanjan Ananth MIT, USA
Lejla Batina Radboud University, The Netherlands
Sonia Belaïd CryptoExperts, France
Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago, USA
Chris Brzuska Aalto University, Finland
Bernardo David Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
Nico Döttling Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany
Léo Ducas CWI, The Netherlands
Jens Groth University College London, UK
Dawu Gu Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Goichiro Hanaoka AIST, Japan
Viet Tung Hoang Florida State University, USA
Takanori Isobe University of Hyogo, Japan
Jérémy Jean ANSSI, France
Stefan Kölbl Technical University of Denmark, Denmark
Ilan Komargodski Cornell Tech, USA
Kaoru Kurosawa Ibaraki University, Japan
Virginie Lallemand Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
Gaëtan Leurent Inria, France
Benoît Libert CNRS and ENS de Lyon, France
Helger Lipmaa University of Tartu, Estonia
VIII ASIACRYPT 2018
External Reviewers
Advisors
Lynn Batten Deakin University, Australia
Ed Dawson QUT, Australia
Members
Waleed Alkalabi QUT, Australia
Niluka Arasinghe QUT, Australia
Mir Ali Rezazadeh QUT, Australia
Baee
Xavier Boyen QUT, Australia
Ernest Foo QUT, Australia
Mukhtar Hassan QUT, Australia
Udyani Herath QUT, Australia
Qingyi Li QUT, Australia
Georg Lippold Mastercard, Australia
Matthew McKague QUT, Australia
Basker Palaniswamy QUT, Australia
Anisur Rahman QUT, Australia
ASIACRYPT 2018 XIII
Symmetric-Key Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis of MORUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Tomer Ashur, Maria Eichlseder, Martin M. Lauridsen, Gaëtan Leurent,
Brice Minaud, Yann Rotella, Yu Sasaki, and Benoît Viguier
Side-Channels
Signatures
Learning Strikes Again: The Case of the DRS Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . 525
Yang Yu and Léo Ducas
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
Danping Shi1,2 , Siwei Sun1,2,3(B) , Patrick Derbez4 , Yosuke Todo5 , Bing Sun6 ,
and Lei Hu1,2,3
1
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information
Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
{shidanping,sunsiwei,hulei}@iie.ac.cn
2
Data Assurance and Communication Security Research Center,
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
3
School of Cyber Security,
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
4
Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, Rennes, France
patrick.derbez@irisa.fr
5
NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, Tokyo, Japan
todo.yosuke@lab.ntt.co.jp
6
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences,
National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China
happy come@163.com
1 Introduction
Cryptanalysis of block ciphers is a highly technical, time consuming and error-
prone process. On the one hand, the attackers have to perform a variety of
cryptanalytic techniques, including differential attack [1], linear attack [2], inte-
gral attack [3–5], etc., to see which technique leads to the best attack. On the
other hand, the designers need to repeat all these different attacks again and
again to identify the optimal choices of parameters and building blocks which
meet the security and implementation requirements. Therefore, automatic tools
are indispensable to the community, which significantly reduce the manual work
and make a thorough exploration of the design/analysis space possible.
One paradigm for automatic symmetric-key cryptanalysis getting increasing
popularity in recent years is to model the problem by means of constraints, which
includes the methods based on SAT/SMT (satisfiability modulo theory) [6–8],
MILP (mixed-integer linear programming) [9–13], and classical constraint pro-
gramming [14,15]. In this paper, these methods are collectively referred to as
the general constraint programming (CP) based approach, or just CP based app-
roach for short. So far, the CP based approach covers a wide range of symmetric-
key cryptanalysis techniques. For instance, we can determine the minimum num-
ber of differentially or linearly active S-boxes of a block cipher with MILP [9]; we
can search for actual differential characteristics, linear characteristics, and inte-
gral distinguishers with SAT/SMT, MILP or classical constraint programming
[8,10,11,14]; and we can search for impossible differentials and zero-correlation
linear approximations [12,16] in a similar way.
Compared with search algorithms implemented from scratch in general pur-
pose programming languages [17–24], the CP based approach allows the crypt-
analysts to state the problem very naturally, and at a high level without having
to say how it should be solved. The resolution of the problem is delegated to
generic solvers, and therefore decoupled from the formulation of the problem.
As Eugene C. Freuder stated [25]: Constraint programming represents one of the
closest approaches computer science has yet made to the Holy Grail of program-
ming : the user states the problem, the computer solves it.
However, the Demirci-Selçuk meet-in-the-middle attack (DS-MITM) attack
[26], introduced by Demirci and Selçuk at FSE 2008 to attack the famous
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [27], is one of the cryptanalytic tech-
niques which has not been automated with general constraint programming due
to its extraordinary sophistication. After a series of improvements of the attack
with various creative techniques [28–32], the DS-MITM attack reaches the best
known attack on 7-round AES-128, 9-round AES-256 and 10-round AES-256
Programming the Demirci-Selçuk Meet-in-the-Middle Attack 5
in the single-key model. The attack has been applied to several specific block
ciphers [33–36] as well as on generic balanced Feistel constructions [37]. Most
recently, Guo et al. show generic attacks on unbalanced Feistel ciphers based on
the DS-MITM technique which penetrate a large number of rounds of some spe-
cific class of unbalanced Feistels [38]. Note that despite sharing the same name
with the traditional MITM attacks in some literature (the attacks on some block
ciphers [39,40] and on a number of hash functions, e.g. [41,42]), the DS-MITM
attack concerned in this paper follows a different and a more complex strategy.
Related Work and Our Contribution. In [30,31], Derbez and Fouque presented
a tool implemented in C/C++ for finding the DS-MITM attack with dedicated
search algorithm. In this paper, we present the first CP-based tool for finding
the DS-MITM attack automatically. Our approach is based on a novel modelling
technique in which we introduce several different types of variables for every
input/output word of all operations, and impose constraints on these variables
such that from a solution of these variables satisfying all the constraints we can
deduce a DS-MITM distinguisher or DS-MITM attack.
Compared with Derbez and Fouque’s tool [30,31] which was implemented
in the general purpose programming language C/C++, the CP based method
allows the cryptanalysts to state the problem at a high level very naturally,
without considering how to maintain the relationships between the variables
explicitly with dedicated algorithms. Therefore, our tool should be very useful
in fast prototyping in the process of block cipher design.
In [43], Lin et al. modeled the problem of searching for DS-MITM distin-
guishers as an integer programming model. However, their integer programming
model is incomplete and is solved by a dedicated search algorithm. Secondly,
Lin et al. ’s work only focuses on the distinguisher part. Our CP based approach
can not only enumerate distinguishers but also partly automate the key-recovery
process of the attack. Moreover, by applying our CP based approach to LBlock,
the same cipher targeted in [43], we show it finds better distinguishers as well
as better attacks. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we apply
it to SKINNY [44], TWINE [45], and LBlock [46]. We produce so far the best
DS-MITM attacks on these well-known ciphers automatically.
For LBlock, we can not only find an 11-round DS-MITM distinguisher
which is 2 rounds longer than the one(s) presented in [43], but also construct
the first DS-MITM attack on 21-round LBlock. We also rediscover the same
attack on TWINE-128 given in [34], and identify the first DS-MITM attack on
20-round TWINE-80. In addition, we report the first concrete DS-MITM analysis
of SKINNY. A remarkable fact is that our tool identify an 10.5-round DS-MITM
distinguisher in a few seconds, while its designers expect an upper-bound of 10
rounds against such distinguishers in [44]. A summary of these results are given
in Table 1.
We also show how helpful our tool can be in the block cipher design process
by searching for the best choices of block shuffles in LBlock and TWINE. We
scan over 40320 variants of LBlock, and 887040 variants of TWINE. We iden-
tify permutations which are potentially stronger than the permutations in the
original designs. We make the source code of this work publicly available at
6 D. Shi et al.
https://github.com/siweisun/MITM.
Table 1. A summary of the results. Though the focus of this paper is the DS-MITM
attack, we also list other types of attacks which achieve currently known best results
against the ciphers targeted. For the DS-MITM attack, the number of rounds attacked
is presented in the form of a + b, where a shows how many rounds are covered by the
underlying DS-MITM distinguisher, while b is the number orouter rounds added when
performing a key-recovery attack. Therefore, b = 0 indicates a distinguishing attack.
2 Notations
An n-bit state state with n = cnc is alternatively regarded as a sequence
(state[0], state[1], · · · , state[nc − 1]) of nc c-bit words. Let A = [j0 , j1 , · · · , js−1 ]
be an ordered set of integers such that 0 ≤ j0 < · · · < js−1 < nc . Then state[A]
is used to represent state[j0 ]|| · · · ||state[js−1 ], where state[j] is the j-th c-bit word
of state and || is the operation of bit string concatenation.
Programming the Demirci-Selçuk Meet-in-the-Middle Attack 7
Plaintext
state0
Ā NL
state1
L
k0
E0
state2
(0 → · · · → r0 − 1)
..
. Involved Key: kE
0
state2(r −1)
0
NL
state2(r −1)+1
0
L
kr −1
A 0
state2r
0
NL
state2r +1
0
L
kr 0
E1
state2(r +1)
0
(r0 → · · · → r0 + r1 − 1)
..
.
state2(r +r −1)
0 1
NL
state2(r +r −1)+1
0 1
L
kr +r −1
0 1
state2(r +r )
0 1
B
NL
state2(r +r )+1
0 1
L
kr +r
0 1
state2(r +r +1) E2
0 1
.. (r0 + r1 → · · · → r0 + r1 + r2 − 1)
. Involved Key: kE
2
state2(r +r +r −1)
0 1 2
NL
state2(r +r +r −1)+1
0 1 2
L
kr +r +r −1
0 1 2
state2(r +r +r )
0 1 2
Ciphertext
Fig. 1. An r-round SP block cipher E = E2 ◦E1 ◦E0 with r = r0 +r1 +r2 , whose round
function consists of a layer of nonlinear operation and a layer of linear operation. A
DS-MITM key-recovery attack is performed based on a DS-MITM distinguisher placed
at E1 . A more detailed explanation of this figure will be given in Sect. 3.2.
Q ⊕ Q (state2k ) with the knowledge of Q(state2k+1 [I]) and Q ⊕ Q (state2k+1 [I]).
In other words, we can derive the value of the output/input differences if we
know the value of input/output values and differences at the active positions.
Finally, we guess the secret key information kE2 ∈ Fe22 involved in E2 with which
we can determine the sequence
ΔE1 (Qδ(A) , B) = [C 0 ⊕ C 1 (state2(r0 +r1 ) [B]), · · · , C 0 ⊕ C N −1 (state2(r0 +r1 ) [B])]
by partial decryption with E2 , where C j = E(P j ).
If the resulting sequence is not one of the possible ΔE1 (Qδ(A) , B) sequences
which can be determined with the DegE1 (A, B) = d c-bit parameters, the guesses
of kE0 and kE2 are certainly incorrect and therefore rejected. Similar to [52], we
adopt the notion of |kE0 ∪ kE2 | to represent the log of the entropy of the involved
secret key bits in the outer rounds from an information theoretical point of view.
• Introduce a type-M variable for each word of the states state0 , · · · , state2r0
involved in E0 , and impose a set of constraints over Vars(M ) to model the
backward differential. Note that there are both type-X and type-M variables
for state2r0 . We require that the corresponding type-X and type-M variables
for each of the nc words of state2r0 are equal.
• Introduce a type-W variable for each word of the states state2(r0 +r1 ) , · · · ,
state2(r0 +r1 +r2 ) involved in E2 , and impose a set of constraints over Vars(W )
to model the forward determination relationship. Note that there are both
type-Y and type-W variables for state2(r0 +r1 ) . We require that the corre-
sponding type-Y and type-W variables for each of the nc words of state2(r0 +r1 )
are equal.
Remark 2. Every solution of Vars(M ) and Vars(W ) helps us to identify the infor-
mation that needs to be guessed in the outer rounds, which will be clearer in
the following.
M X, Y, Z W
E0 E1 E2
Fig. 2. A high level overview of the modelling method for DS-MITM attack
S x3 y3
S x2 y2
L
AK
S x1 y1
S x0 y0
– Conditions for state4 (the starting point of the backward differential, which
is also the output of round 1): ∀j ∈ A, X4 [j] = 1 and ∀j ∈
/ A, X4 [j] = 0
– Conditions for rounds (1 → 0): Xi [j] = 0 (0 ≤ i < 4, 0 ≤ j < nc ) if and only
if ∀Qk ∈ Qδ(A) , Q0 ⊕ Qk (statei [j]) = 0
state0
NL
state1 Round 0
state2
NL
state3 Round 1
L
A
state4
NL
state5 Round 2
state6
NL
state7 Round 3
state8
NL
state9 Round 4
state10
Let us give a concrete example. Let A = [3] and Qδ(A) = {(0, 0, 0, x) ∈ (F82 )4 :
x ∈ F82 }. Then the set of variables Xi [j] with 0 ≤ i ≤ 6 and 0 ≤ j < 4 shown in
Fig. 5 models forward differential of Qδ(A) in rounds (0 → 1 → 2) if we impose
the following constraints on Xi [j]. Since the values in Qδ(A) are active at the
third byte, we have X0 [0] = X0 [1] = X0 [2] = 0, X0 [3] = 1. For the S-layers in the
toy cipher, we have X2i [j] = X2i+1 [j], 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j < 4. For the linear layers,
we enforce 3X2(i+1) [j] − X2i+1 [j + 1] − X2i+1 [j + 2] − X2i+1 [j + 3] ≥ 0 to ensure
that X2(i+1) [j] will be equal to 1 when any one of X2i+1 [j + 1], X2i+1 [j + 2],
X2i+1 [j + 3] is 1. We also add the constraint
X2i+1 [j + 1] + X2i+1 [j + 2] + X2i+1 [j + 3] − X2(i+1) [j] ≥ 0
to dictate that X2(i+1) [j] must be 0 when all of X2i+1 [j + 1], X2i+1 [j + 2],
X2i+1 [j + 3] are 0, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j < 4 and the indexes are computed
modulo 4. With these constraints, the Xi [j] variables propagate in a pattern
depicted in Fig. 5.
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donneront des secours immédiats aux blessés; enfin elles
prépareront à nos braves soldats la soupe et le café.
«Dans le corps de fonctionnaires militaires chargés de
l’administration et de la comptabilité de la guerre on pourrait, au
grand bénéfice de nos effectifs, substituer les femmes aux
hommes.
«Il faut que les sauvages Allemands qui veulent nous faire la
guerre sachent bien que derrière les hommes de France, ils
trouveront à la frontière les femmes prêtes à combattre, prêtes à
mourir pour garder à la patrie française sa gloire et son
intégralité.»
Hubertine Auclert.
H. Auclert.
C’est la loi sur la tutelle[9] qui pour exclure les femmes—hormis les
mères et les ascendantes—de la tutelle et des conseils de famille, n’hésite
pas à les classer avec les repris de justice et les fous.
C’est la loi humiliante qui, pour attestation civile verbale ou écrite,
assimile les femmes aux hommes imbéciles et aux hommes déchus de
leurs droits. Les femmes ne seront reçues à témoigner, ni dans un acte de
naissance, ni dans un acte de mariage, ni dans un acte de vente. Que dis-
je? Une femme n’est pas même admise à certifier l’identité d’une autre
femme pour la légalisation d’une signature[10].
Si les femmes avaient été présentes dans les assemblées législatives,
elles ne se seraient pas vu attribuer, en même temps que la qualification
de mineures, le plus de charges, le moins de droits.
Par affranchissement civil de la femme, en un mot, on entend
l’abrogation de toutes les lois d’exception qui dégagent les hommes des
responsabilités et chargent les femmes des plus lourds fardeaux.
Quels sont ceux qui peuvent abroger les lois iniques qui oppriment les
femmes dans la vie civile?
Ce sont les électeurs et les législateurs, c’est-à-dire, ceux-là seuls qui
font ou qui commandent de faire les lois. Voilà un point bien établi.
Maintenant, qu’est-ce que l’affranchissement politique de la femme?
C’est l’avènement de la femme au droit qui confère le pouvoir de faire
les lois, par soi-même si l’on est élu député, par délégation si l’on est
électeur.
Donc il est de toute évidence que le droit politique est pour la femme la
clef de voûte qui lui donnera tous les autres droits.
Quand les femmes pourront intervenir dans les affaires publiques, leur
premier soin sera de réprimer l’injuste législation. Leur premier acte sera
d’user du droit qu’elles auront de changer leur sort.
Mais tant que la femme n’a pas le pouvoir d’infirmer les lois qui
l’oppriment, sur qui compterait-elle pour le faire?
Sur l’homme?
Eh! c’est l’homme qui a établi les lois actuelles et ces lois ne le gênent
pas, bien au contraire. Elles lui donnent toutes facilités pour nous gêner.
Aussi, au lieu de supprimer ces lois qui rendent la femme esclave,
l’homme s’occupe d’en créer qui élargissent encore son horizon. Dans ce
pays où l’on compte dix-neuf millions de souverains—les hommes—et dix-
neuf millions et plus d’esclaves—les femmes—les réformes que les
hommes regardent comme essentielles sont des réformes qui leur
octroient de nouveaux privilèges.
Ceci fait, qu’il est hors de doute pour nous, que tant que la femme ne
possédera pas cette arme—le vote—elle subira le régime du droit
masculin. Tous ses efforts seront vains pour conquérir ses libertés civiles
et économiques.
Ce qu’il faut aux femmes pour s’affranchir de la tyrannie masculine—
faite loi—c’est la possession de leur part de souveraineté; c’est la qualité
de citoyenne française; c’est le bulletin de vote.
La femme citoyenne, c’est-à-dire la femme investie des plus hauts
droits sociaux, aura par la liberté, sa dignité rehaussée, par le sentiment
de sa responsabilité, son caractère augmenté.
La femme citoyenne se relèvera promptement de sa fâcheuse situation
économique. L’Etat et la législation ne l’inférioriseront plus. L’instruction de
la femme étant comme celle de l’homme essentiellement utilitaire, toutes
les carrières, toutes les professions lui seront accessibles, et, quelque soit
son travail, la femme ne le verra plus déprécié sous le prétexte ridicule
qu’il émane d’une femme.
La femme investie des plus hauts droits sociaux, la femme citoyenne
quintuplera l’efficacité de son influence maternelle; elle aura le pouvoir de
doter les générations d’une si grande hauteur de vues morales, que dans
les rapports humains, la fraternité se substituera à l’égoïsme, et dans la
société—l’harmonie—aux tiraillements actuels.
Tant que la femme n’aura pas le pouvoir d’intervenir partout où ses
intérêts sont en jeu pour les défendre, un changement dans la condition
politique ou économique de la société ne remédierait pas à son sort. Nous
pouvons appuyer cette allégation par des faits. Depuis un siècle, plusieurs
révolutions politiques ont eu lieu. Les femmes s’y sont plus ou moins
mêlées. Elles ont partagé les dangers de la bataille, mais elles n’ont eu de
la victoire ou de la défaite des opinions qui divisent les hommes, aucun
avantage.
Un changement de l’ordre social économique n’affranchirait pas la
femme, car bien que tous les jours la question économique soit résolue
pour un petit nombre de personnes, la condition de la femme est chez les
favorisés de la fortune, le lendemain, le même que la veille. Il y a en
France des femmes pauvres et des femmes millionnaires. Eh bien! les
femmes millionnaires sont soumises aux mêmes lois tyranniques que les
femmes pauvres. Toutes les femmes souffrent ou peuvent souffrir de la
législation actuelle.
Donc toutes les femmes de quelque opinion et de quelque condition
qu’elles soient, toutes les femmes sont intéressées à posséder le pouvoir
d’abroger les lois qui les infériorisent et les asservissent.
La puissance du vote
Cri d’alarme