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How Outlaws
Win Friends and
Influence People
Tereza Kuldova
How Outlaws Win Friends and Influence People
“For many, the current political tumult indicates a renewed struggle for pop-
ular sovereignty against the post-political technocrats who administer neo-
liberalism’s unforgiving market logic. For the excellent anthropologist Tereza
Kuldova, the condottieri of this struggle ride Harley Davidsons at full throttle
to outrun the forces of incorporation. Chock-full of brilliant insights. A must-
read for anyone who wants to understand today’s volatile interface of culture
and politics.”
—Steve Hall, Professor Emeritus of Criminology, Teesside Centre
for Realist Criminology, UK
“How Outlaws Win Friends and Influence People provides an important con-
tribution to our general knowledge of motor cycle clubs and the sociology of
deviance more generally. It is original, creative, and well researched. Specialists
and non-specialists alike will learn a great deal from reading it.”
—Martín Sánchez-Jankowski, Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute
for the Study of Societal Issues, University of California, Berkeley, US
Tereza Kuldova
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Lill-Ann Chepstow-Lusty
(the best friend I ever won, and influenced—and vice versa)
Acknowledgements
vii
viii Acknowledgements
Prologue xi
Epilogue 201
Index 205
ix
Prologue
In March 2016, as part of the official annual book fair in the German
city of Leipzig, the Hells Angels organized a press conference and
a book launch of Jagd auf die Rocker: Die Kriminalisierung von
Motorradklubs durch Staat und Medien in Deutschland or else ‘Hunting
Bikers: Criminalization of Motorcycle Clubs by the State and Media
in Germany,’ a book written by the Hells Angel, photographer and PR
spokesperson of the club, Lutz Schelhorn, in collaboration with sev-
eral journalists (Schelhorn and Heitmüller 2016). As the title suggests,
the book’s aim was to problematize the one-sided, negative, and sensa-
tionalist media portrayal of outlaw motorcycle clubs and challenge the
different measures taken by the state to combat organized crime. The
event was accompanied by a concert and a screening of Lutz Schelhorn’s
movie Ein Hells Angel Unter Brüdern (‘A Hells Angel Among Brothers’,
2015), a film conceived as a counterbalance to the stereotypical media
image of outlaw bikers as ruthless criminals, showing the club in a
positive light, engaging in charity, and riding as a big happy family of
ordinary ‘men with a hobby’ (Koetsenruijter and Burger 2018). During
the book launch, the door to the Hells Angels clubhouse opened to the
public, offering the visitors a glimpse into what the media deem the den
xi
xii Prologue
of evil. ‘We do this for people to make up their own mind, to find out
for themselves what the real truth about the club is,’ an Angel remarked.
Times have changed, the days of Hunter S. Thompson’s Hell’s Angels
(Thompson 2012) are long gone; rowdiness has been progressively trans-
formed into controlled and regulated behavior, dirty clubhouses have
become polished buildings with toilet scent diffusers, young rebels have
been turned into iconic and celebrated criminal heroes selling autobiog-
raphies, movies and starring in TV shows, filthy initiation rites reveling
in sex, shit and piss have become far more casual events, sexual freedom
itself has flipped into its opposite—a reactionary and conservative valori-
zation of family relations vis-à-vis the hated individualist and consumerist
society—and the local American clubs themselves have become powerful
transnational organizations, the only American export criminal organi-
zation as some say (Barker 2010), engaging top lawyers, and running as
many legal fronts as illegal dealings. Over the years, outlaw motorcycle
clubs established recognizable and aspirational brands endowed with a
commodified spirit of the American frontier (Slotkin 1992). Today, out-
law motorcycle clubs are no longer deviants, even if they operate at what
the bourgeois would deem the ‘margins,’ where the legal and the illegal are
intimately bound together (Nordstrom 2008). Contrary to popular imag-
ination, they are well integrated, and they have incorporated, trademarked
their logos, and expanded globally, even to places such as Namibia or
Japan. They are investing great efforts into legitimizing their existence
and informal power, into recruiting new members, gaining supporters,
and expanding their territorial reach (Kuldova and Quinn 2018; Kuldova
2018b). They compete with the state in the business of protection and
engage in vigilante justice as much as ‘providing social welfare.’ They
commodify and sell their own countercultural brand image, and use their
brand power and reputation to voice the anti-establishment resentment of
a significant segment of the population, channeling the rage of these peo-
ple against the state as much as against the capitalist system that has no
use for them any longer, and no respect to offer them either—thus fur-
ther expanding their ranks (Kuldova and Sánchez-Jankowski 2018). The
popularity of outlaw motorcycle clubs is rising, not merely as an object of
fiction and popular culture, but as real, alternative non-state actors gov-
erning ‘from below’ (Lea and Stenson 2007) to which people look up to.
Prologue xiii
However, while the clubs certainly invest much energy into their organi-
zational growth and propaganda, their success would not have been possi-
ble were it not for the structural socioeconomic transformation of the last
three decades—the clubs matured and grew in tact with and enabled by
the increasingly destructive effects of decades of neoliberal policies. Only
under such conditions could they transform into non-state actors that fill
the vacuum created by the neoliberal state, a state that fails to control the
economy to the advantage of the majority of the population, a state that
compensates the failure to regulate the economy by increasing securitiza-
tion and control of individual and ‘anti-social’ behavior (Kapstein 1994;
Hadfield et al. 2009; Wacquant 2009). In 2018, this has manifested itself
in the controversial law expanding police powers in the German Bavaria.1
This law was widely discussed in the biker community as representing a
threat to civil liberties, and indeed, with good reasons. The same law has
seen a lot of resistance from the left as well. However, this critique was
quickly instrumentalized by the PR spokespersons and lawyers affiliated
with the outlaw motorcycle clubs to fuel resentment against the state and
to position the clubs as legitimate opposition and heroes of ‘the people’
in the process. The popularity of outlaw motorcycle clubs is most pro-
nounced among those who are disillusioned, hopeless, and frustrated by
the harmful effects of neoliberal capitalism, and those who feel abandoned
by the state, which they view as, if anything, increasingly curbing their
freedoms as opposed to protecting their real interests.
How Do Outlaws Win Friends and Influence People analyzes in detail
the reasons and motivations that lead people to support, admire, and
affiliate themselves with outlaw bikers. This book investigates the
desires, needs, and longings to which the clubs provide, not a cure, but
a remedy that offers temporary relief. This remedy is necessarily shallow,
attacking the symptoms rather than curing the disease; it uncannily mir-
rors the larger developments in that it does not offer any (utopian) hope
of a better future, any vision of progress, or exit from the very system in
which it thrives—for a simple reason, it depends on this system for its
own success, and thus, its interest lies in the reproduction or even accel-
eration of the harms connected to the system, rather than the opposite
(Kuldova 2018c). The people we encounter on these pages, especially
the supporters, are so disillusioned by the system that they trust and
xiv Prologue
openly venerate the icons of the underworld over any state represent-
ative—a phenomenon we are familiar with from places such as India,
where people willingly support criminal politicians precisely because
they are criminal (Vaishnav 2017). But this phenomenon is becom-
ing increasingly common even in well-established democracies, where
criminal capital becomes an asset and a source of allure, rather than of
delegitimization—as in the case of Andrej Babiš, the Prime Minister
and second richest man in the Czech Republic, investigated for fraud,
which paradoxically added to his popularity among many voters, rather
than diminishing it. This phenomenon should not be taken lightly, as
it is bound to become stronger under the current criminogenic condi-
tions of rising inequality, social injustice, takeover by corporate power,
de-democratization, and decreasing accountability of the elites (Giroux
2004; Hall 2012). It is a phenomenon that goes hand in hand with
the rise of the right, as much as with populist politics (Jupskås 2017;
Brubaker 2017; Winlow et al. 2017)—both of which are effectively
mobilized by the big outlaw motorcycle clubs, irrespective of how apo-
litical they proclaim themselves to be. But we should not assume, as
leading media often do, that this move toward support of either outlaw
motorcycle clubs or right-wing movements comes easy to people. To the
contrary, it is often a result of painful struggle to belong that ends up
in failure, and thus in resignation and proud embrace of self-exclusion
in order to restore meaning. To these people, the biggest enemy here
are not the immigrants, but the liberal left, the hated ‘cultural Marxists’
that brand them as ‘Nazis,’ while claiming their own moral high ground
(Winlow et al. 2017). When people openly proclaim ‘I am not a Nazi,
but if you call me that, then yes, I am a Nazi, and I am proud to be
one,’ such as during the right-wing violent demonstrations in Chemnitz
in August 2018 following the fatal stabbing of a carpenter Daniel H by
Iraqi and Syrian suspects, we are in serious trouble. Unless we take this
dynamic seriously, our fight against organizations such as the outlaw
motorcycle clubs will always take the form of a battle against the mytho-
logical Hydra: When one head is cut off, two more grow. The Herculean
battle ahead of us is a revolutionary one—we must fight the very condi-
tions under which such organizations grow and thrive.
* * *
Prologue xv
resentment toward the government and the state, especially when injus-
tices, ‘criminalization,’ and curbing of citizen rights are brought into the
discussion. This, again, is not necessarily a matter pertaining to knowl-
edge, but rather to the ability to mobilize affects and direct passions—
through populist myths—against an enemy, in this case the ‘impotent
state’ (Citton 2010; Lordon 2014).
People often act in certain ways despite knowing better—psychoanal-
ysis terms it disavowal, a structure connected both to pleasure and to
ideology (Žižek 1989; Pfaller 2014). The structure of disavowal, discov-
ered by the psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni, can be summed up as fol-
lows: ‘I know well, but all the same…’ (Mannoni 2003). This structure
is at the heart of a great deal of our innocent and dirty little pleasures
(Pfaller 2014), but it is also at the core of the most violent excesses of
humanity, as Stanley Cohen vividly documented in his States of Denial
(Cohen 2001). With the time spent in the field, it became more and
more obvious to me that since we are not dealing here with a problem
of knowledge, we cannot simply tell people, as one conference partic-
ipant suggested, ‘look, maybe it is not too smart to support the Hells
Angels, after all, you know, they have been involved in all sorts of crim-
inal activities.’ Likewise, it is problematic to assume that the reverse
move of improving the image of the club by sharing positive narratives,
be it of their charitable work or of their joyful brotherly camaraderie,
would make anyone really believe that this is how they truly are. To
the contrary, knowledge here sustains the very cynical distance which
in turn enables the ideological fantasy to persist and take on real mate-
rial effects. Similarly, despite all the shocking statements and acts, that
would for anyone else amount to political suicide, Donald Trump main-
tains high levels of support. We could rather say, not despite but pre-
cisely because of them. Or as Trump himself put it in his astonishment:
‘I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I
wouldn’t lose any voters, OK? It’s, like, incredible.’ Trump belongs here
to the same order of phenomena where support and endorsement per-
sist despite better knowledge. Trump supporters are not unlike the lady
in 81 Support T-shirt, they also know too well: Misinformation and
ignorance are not the real problem and hence knowledge is not the cure.
The problem is not, as some media psychologists would like to convince
Prologue xix
us, that ‘they’re not smart enough to realize they’re dumb’ (Azarian
2016).
We are dealing here with an ideological fantasy. An ideological fan-
tasy is practically impossible to unsettle by knowledge (Pfaller 2005).
As Robert Pfaller aptly argued, ‘it is precisely our “subversive”, “cynical”
distance towards a certain ideology which subjects us to this ideology
and allows it to exert its social efficiency’ (Pfaller 2005: 115), ‘even if
we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance,
we are still doing them’ (Žižek 1989: 32). Ideology that relies on cynical
distance is widespread today; if we look carefully, it can be observed all
around us—Trump supporters, Indian voters endorsing criminal poli-
ticians, or those idolizing criminal bosses are only some of its extreme
manifestations. Consider for a moment all those consumer activists,
who—in a reverse move to that of the Angels trying to tell us how good
they actually are—inform us about all that labor and environmental
exploitation to which we close our eyes in order to satisfy our consum-
erist desires. All these activists, perceiving awareness raising as the ulti-
mate solution, identify the political problem as ‘one of ignorance and
the role of the activist is to shine light on the darkness and reveal the
true nature of things’ (Duncombe 2012: 362). It is not a coincidence
that they fail time and time again—even here, knowledge is not the
problem.
People tend to consume and even enjoy products that are a result
of exploitation precisely against their better knowledge (Kuldova
2016, 2018a)—not without a dose of perverse pleasure. The simplest
of examples is revealing here—cigarettes: as Klein has nicely shown in
his book Cigarettes Are Sublime, ‘if cigarettes were good for you, they
would not be sublime’ (Klein 1993: 2), and if we did not know they
were bad for us, we would not take pleasure in them either. While not
all of us fall for cigarettes, or the simple ‘I know they are bad, but I
still smoke them,’ none of us exists outside of this ideological structure.
The ‘enlightened’ that suggests one simply informs people and they will
change their behavior (like they do on cigarette packages) that sup-
porting criminals may not be the best idea—can neither see that this
does not work, nor that he himself is not outside of ideology. The naïve
idea that all it takes is simply sharing a bit of knowledge allows the
xx Prologue
cultural pleasure can explain a great deal when it comes to the repro-
duction of existing socioeconomic structures, however, they do little to
explain the particular forms this ideological fantasy may take. In par-
ticular, considering that while some cultural pleasures may be innocent
and playful, and even culturally necessary, underlying all sort of positive
cultural rituals, others are downright harmful and destructive both for
the individuals and for the social body at large—and yet, their structure
is identical.
So far, we have posited that we shall be dealing here with an ideolog-
ical fantasy that is resistant to knowledge, a fantasy that has a structure
that appears universal—and can be a source of fairly innocent pleas-
ures, such as reading a horoscope when we are sure it is bollocks, and
equally a source of utterly perverse pleasure dependent on disavowal of
all sorts of violence, harm, and exploitation. We have also posited that
we are not dealing with people who are necessarily ignorant dupes. It is
precisely here that we must ask the key question underlying this work:
would just about any ideological fantasy that follows this structure do?
And if not, what makes the populist fantasy of the powerful, organized,
heroic, and violent outlaw so efficient for so many at this point in time?
An ideological fantasy must be able to provide us with a certain cultural
pleasure, or relief, in a given cultural and socioeconomic context. To
say that we are dealing with an ideological fantasy does not mean that
there is no material basis to it, precisely to the contrary. As materialism
teaches us, it is in material practice and action that ideology is located
(Althusser 2008). The fantasy would not be effective if there were no
material and phantasmatic, but for that matter no less real, things on
offer when one succumbs to it and derives pleasure from it. There are
plenty of material, pragmatic, and phantasmatic incentives to team up
with the outlaws. This book will attempt to reveal the ways in which
the material structures the imaginary, and vice versa, offering insights
into the complex reasons behind the rising support of outlaw motor-
cycle clubs and similar organizations, as well as into the related rise of
right-wing populism.
* * *
xxii Prologue
Much ink has been spilled on demonizing the outlaws, crafting policing
strategies, and manufacturing public consent about this public enemy
and internal security threat (Katz 2011). But it is time to ask the fun-
damental question: why are the outlaws becoming heroes to so many,
how do they do that, and what enables them to succeed? Each chapter
in this book provides a partial answer to the puzzle. The book does not
claim to be exhaustive. Others may find additional reasons and driving
forces. The task here is to open the question up for debate and further
research.
Chapter 1, Outlaws and Supporters, briefly introduces the phenome-
non of outlaw motorcycle clubs, as well as the methodological tenets of
the study. It argues that scholars have so far ignored the popular support
for these organizations, focusing exclusively on outlaw motorcycle clubs
and full-patch members, as if the clubs were self-enclosed independ-
ent entities existing in a socioeconomic and cultural void. And yet, it
is precisely in understanding the context in which they proliferate that
we can best grasp their nature. Setting the stage for the next chapters, it
points the readers towards the collusion between the destructive effects
of neoliberalism and the transnational expansion of the clubs.
Chapter 2, Sublime and Power, focuses on the most immediate and
obvious form of seduction exploited by the outlaw bikers: the aesthet-
ics of power. It asks: How is the aesthetics of brutal force capable of
mobilizing passions and directing affects of the supporters? The chap-
ter explores the mythology of the outlaw and the idea of the American
frontier, (re)produced by the clubs themselves, media, movies, men’s
adventure magazines, and TV shows. And looks at how the phantas-
matic becomes activated in the actual encounters between the admirers
and the real one percenters. It argues that the key to understanding the
seduction of the outlaw bikers lies in the intoxicating ‘sublime experi-
ence’ of an encounter with a powerful threat. Taking Edmund Burke’s
investigation into the sublime as a point of departure, the chapter
explores this form of power and the desire for participating in and tak-
ing on the empowering properties of the charismatic outlaws. However,
sublime power, as the analysis shows, cannot be thought without con-
sidering the role of the human desire for ‘sovereignty,’ connected to vio-
lence, transgression, and the ultimate act of killing.
Prologue xxiii
Note
1. See for instance: https://www.dw.com/en/bavaria-passes-controversial-law-ex-
panding-police-powers/a-43799696, accessed June 10, 2018.
Prologue xxv
References
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Like the State”. Theory & Event, 15(1), 1–14.
Azarian, B. (2016). The Psychology Behind Donald Trump’s Unwavering
Support. Psychology Today. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/
mind-in-the-machine/201609/the-psychology-behind-donald-trumps-un-
wavering-support. Accessed July 3, 2018.
Barker, T. (2010). Biker Gangs and Organized Crime. Newark, NJ: Elsevier
Science.
Barker, T. (2011). American Based Biker Gangs: International Organized
Crime. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 36(3), 207–215.
Brubaker, R. (2017). Why Populism? Theory and Society, 46(5), 357–385.
Citton, Y. (2010). Populism and the Empowering Circulation of Myths. Open
Cahiers, 20(1), 60–69.
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Books.
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Eclipse of Democracy. London: Routledge.
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Today’: Policing and Regulating the Night-Time Economy. Criminology &
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Struggle Over the Concept of Harm. In J. Kotzé & A. Boukli (Eds.),
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1
Outlaws and Supporters
the love of motorcycles and riding, and that few bad apples are bound
to appear in any organization (Koetsenruijter and Burger 2018).
Outlaw motorcycle clubs repulse people as much as they attract
them. On the route from the rebellious American postwar biker
clubs to transnational criminal empires, the outlaws have made not
only a great deal of enemies, but also many friends. The number of
friends and supporters of the outlaws increased dramatically over the
last three decades. The big outlaw motorcycle clubs have today their
own organized support clubs, such as the Red & White Warriors
and AK81 support crews of the Hells Angels, Black & White Crew
for Outlaws, or Mexican Teamwork and X-team for Bandidos—and
many others. Thousands of supporters across the globe are keen to
affiliate with them, display admiration and commitment, dress in sup-
port merchandize, and cheer the bikers both online and offline. The
clubs, be it in reality or imagination, fill a certain lack many people
experience in their lives today. Lack and absence are considered here
as productive forces, constitutive of desire—be it lack or absence of
solidarity, sovereignty, sacred, power, control, equality, justice, pur-
pose, hope, values, security, or order. Outlaw motorcycle clubs have
successfully managed to produce an alternative transnational culture
that attempts to fill these fundamental lacks, feeding off their pro-
liferation and intensification under neoliberalism. The clubs can be
imagined as cultural alternatives or parallel alternative social orders to
the unsatisfying consumer culture with its endless manufacturing of
new desires and oppressive socio-symbolic competition and aggres-
sion (Hall et al. 2012), and to what many see as the weakening state
unable to control the economic forces beyond the control of the indi-
vidual, obsessed instead with curbing of individual freedoms, pater-
nalism, and securitization. This alternative adaptive cultural and social
function of the clubs has remained unnoticed and ignored in existing
research that favors narrow perspectives on the crimes committed by
the clubs. This book, while in no way denying the crimes and harms
associated with the outlaw biker milieu, attempts to take a step back
and look at these larger cultural and social functions of the clubs, con-
sidering them as a response to the fundamental lacks and desires that
people experience.
1 Outlaws and Supporters
3
I have loved him as a father since I was a teenager. 81 is the only true and
loyal family. I support everything Sonny and the club stands for. I am
proud to have been a loyal supporter most of my life.1
Harris 1985; Dulaney 2005; Barker 2011; Bain and Lauchs 2017).
Nonetheless, a brief historical note is in order. There is possibly no bet-
ter account of the beginnings of the subculture than Maz Harris’ Bikers:
Birth of Modern Day Outlaw (Harris 1985). Maz Harris was a member
and spokesperson of the Hells Angels in England, who received his PhD
in sociology with a thesis on the biker subculture from the University of
Warwick in 1986 (Harris 1986).2 In his book, he sums up the origins as
follows:
The outlaw bike culture was born at the end of the Second World War.
It grew in the rundown quarters of Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco
and the many grey urban sprawls dotted along the Pacific Coast.
California’s golden dream did not reach far into the ghetto. Life there had
progressively worsened during the immediate post-war years. Thousands
of rural workers, weary of decades of trying to scratch a living from
unproductive land, flocked to the towns in search of a piece of America’s
massive industrial expansion. The already seething mass of human misery
was swollen to unbearable proportions by this influx. They constituted a
massive new workforce to be ruthlessly exploited in factories and sweat-
shops… Families were split up and traditional ties of mutual support and
dependence severed… This first generation of poor-white slum dwellers
was quite unlike its much more experienced and culturally better adapted
black and Mexican counterparts. It had yet to realize that there was no
room for the sober, decent, individualistic human being in the new cut-
throat world. The parents were anxious to maintain a sense of decency
and clung to the values of their rural forefathers. Not so their offspring
who, brought up in the ghetto, quickly learned to adopt the methods of
defense and resistance of their black contemporaries… They fully real-
ized the hopelessness of the situation they were in and understood only
too well the gulf between their parents’ aspirations and material real-
ity… What emerged, as one form of ‘solution’ to the problems faced by
these disaffected first-generation white immigrants, was the arrival on the
American scene of what was probably the first national post-war ‘delin-
quent’ subculture: the world of the motorcycle outlaw. Here was a way of
life distinct and different from both the black culture of the ghetto and
the parents’ working-class culture. It was a way of life which owed noth-
ing to the straight world of Middle-America, yet it transcended the tene-
ments and warehouses of downtown Oakland. (Harris 1985: 12–14)
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¹ Hebrew daughters. ² In Joshua xvi. 7, Naarah.
30‒40.
The Genealogy of Asher.
31. Heber, and Malchiel] The antiquity of these two names seems
to be attested by the mention of “Habiri and Malchiel” in the Amarna
tablets (circa 1400 b.c.).
Birzaith] probably the name of a place, “The well of the olive-
tree.”
34, 35. Shemer ... Helem] Read perhaps Shomer ... Hotham, to
agree with verse 32.
who built Ono and Lod] the subject is not Shemed, but Elpaal;
“built,” i.e. entered into possession of. Ono and Lod (= Lydda), some
seven and eleven miles respectively south of Jaffa, are referred to in
Nehemiah vii. 35, xi. 35, and Ezra ii. 33. The Targum adds, which the
sons of Israel laid waste and burnt with fire, when they made war in
Gibeah with the tribe of Benjamin.
31. and Zecher] Read with ix. 37, and Zechariah, and Mikloth.
32. with their brethren, etc.] i.e. with some of their brethren in
Jerusalem over against other of their brethren in Gibeon and other
places. “They” would seem to refer to Mikloth and Shimeah, but the
clause is far from clear, and it may be noted that verse 32b looks like
the heading of a list that has been lost.
33. begat Kish] here and in ix. 39, read begat Abner—as in 1
Samuel xiv. 51, etc.
the ruler of the house of God] This title could perhaps be borne
by the high-priest (2 Chronicles xxxi. 10, 13), but in any case it was
not confined to him (2 Chronicles xxxv. 8, where several such
“rulers” are mentioned; compare also Jeremiah xx. 1; Acts iv. 1).