1 BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,

LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP

2 John V. Berlinski (State Bar No. 208537)
jberlinski@birdmarella.com
3 Julia B. Cherlow (State Bar No. 290538)
jcherlow@birdmarella.com
4 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561
5 Telephone: (310) 201-2100
Facsimile: (310) 201-2110
6
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
7 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
8 Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
Ioannis D. Drivas (pro hac vice application pending)
9 51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
10 Telephone: (212) 403-1000
Facsimile: (212) 403-2000
11
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants
12 William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC

13
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
14 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT

15

16 WILLIAM B. PITT, an individual, and CASE NO. 22STCV06081

MONDO BONGO, LLC, a California limited
17 liability company, PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER
18 Plaintiffs, RESPONSES AND PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT
19 vs. ANGELINA JOLIE

20 ANGELINA JOLIE, et al., Filed concurrently with Declaration of Tony

Webb and Reply Separate Statement
21 Defendants.
Judge: Hon. Lia Martin
22 Dept: 3
and RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS
23 Date: May 16, 2024
Time: 9:00 A.M.
24 Reservation ID: 257097942103
25 Action Filed: February 17, 2022
Trial Date: Not yet set
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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................5
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ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................................7
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I. The Documents at Issue Are Relevant. ......................................................................7
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II. Jolie Has Failed to Show There Are Any Privacy Concerns to Be Weighed
6 Against Ordering Production of the Requested Documents. ...................................12

7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................14

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 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Page(s)
3 Cases

4 Alch v. Sup. Ct.

5 165 Cal. App. 4th 1412 (2008) .......................................................................................... 12, 14

6 City of King City v. Cmty. Bank of Cent. California

131 Cal. App. 4th 913 ............................................................................................................... 9
7
Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Sup. Ct.
8 65 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2021) .................................................................................................... 12
9 Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct.
31 Cal. 3d 785 (1982) .............................................................................................................. 11
10

11 Davies v. Sup. Ct.

36 Cal. 3d 291 (1984) .............................................................................................................. 11
12
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn.
13 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994)............................................................................................................. 12, 13
14 Kirkland v. Sup. Ct.
95 Cal. App. 4th 92 (2002) ........................................................................................................ 8
15

16 Lipton v. Sup. Ct.

48 Cal. App. 4th 1599 (1996) .................................................................................................... 9
17
Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc.
18 246 Cal. App. 4th 566 (2016) .................................................................................................. 11

19 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc.

231 Cal. App. 4th 471 (2014) .................................................................................................. 13
20
Snibbe v. Sup. Ct.
21
224 Cal. App. 4th 184 (2014) .................................................................................................. 13
22
Williams v. Sup. Ct.
23 3 Cal. 5th 531 (2017)........................................................................................................... 7, 12

24 Statutes

25 Evid. Code
§ 210 .......................................................................................................................................... 9
26 § 786 ........................................................................................................................................ 12
27 § 787 ........................................................................................................................................ 12
§ 1101(a) ................................................................................................................................. 12
28 § 1105 ...................................................................................................................................... 12
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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Other Authorities

2 Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Trials & Ev. Ch. 8E-E ................................................................................ 12

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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 INTRODUCTION

2 Jolie’s Opposition is emblematic of her overall litigation strategy: pivot to allegations of

3 “Pitt’s personal misconduct” to distract from her weaknesses on the merits. Indeed, the only

4 reason this Motion is even before the Court is because of Jolie’s ploy to turn this business dispute

5 into a sideshow about family court matters. Her hook is to allege that she was justified in

6 terminating an imminent deal for Pitt to purchase her interest in Château Miraval, and in doing so

7 breach her obligations not to sell to a stranger without his consent, because Pitt’s lawyers asked

8 for an NDA to be included in the deal papers. Jolie then uses Pitt’s NDA proposal as an excuse to

9 introduce into this case the unfortunate circumstances related to the dissolution of the couple’s

10 marriage, claiming that the proposal engendered an “emotionally devastating” reaction in her that

11 caused her to back out of the deal and sell to Stoli because it would have purportedly silenced her

12 ability to speak about the personal matters.

13 Jolie’s claims will be found not credible. For starters, the proposed NDA expressly

14 allowed Jolie to discuss the full extent of her personal allegations against Pitt in any court

15 proceeding. Additionally, Jolie’s timeline does not work. Jolie opened negotiations with Stoli

16 weeks before Pitt’s (and his business partner Perrin’s) lawyers proposed the text of the allegedly

17 offending NDA. Then, after entering into a confidentiality agreement with Stoli, Jolie and Stoli

18 reached a tentative agreement on price by late May 2021, weeks before Jolie backed out of her

19 deal with Pitt and disclaimed her obligations to him. Moreover, Jolie’s own counsel made clear in

20 writing that his client understood that the NDA proposal was focused on protecting the business,

21 consistent with Pitt’s position and contrary to Jolie’s “intent to silence” story. Finally, only

22 months after receiving the NDA proposal, Jolie herself went on to request an even broader NDA

23 from Pitt in the family court case that would have limited Jolie’s “freedom to speak” more than

24 Pitt’s NDA would have—a fact the Opposition refuses to engage with, presumably because it is

25 impossible for Jolie to reconcile it with her current litigation position.

26 Nonetheless, Jolie apparently thinks she can gain a tactical litigation advantage if she
27 makes this case about family issues, so she has turned the NDA proposal into “the very heart of

28 this case.” Jolie, not Pitt, has chosen to litigate in this fashion. For so long as she does, Pitt has
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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 the right to obtain evidence in his defense. That evidence includes the documents sought by this

2 Motion, which consist of NDAs that Jolie entered into with third parties and documents setting

3 forth the reasons why she entered into them or forced others to do so. The documents sought are

4 highly relevant to Jolie’s central defense because they help disprove her claim that the proposed

5 NDA was a key reason—indeed, she appears to now contend the only reason—she walked away

6 from the parties’ deal. The documents will show that Jolie had a long history of using NDAs for

7 business purposes and that they are a routine aspect of her professional life, making it likely that

8 she understood Pitt and Perrin’s legitimate business reasons for including it. Moreover, as

9 reflected by the attached declaration of Jolie’s former personal security professional, Tony Webb,

10 the evidence will show that Jolie—not Pitt—is the one who used NDAs to seek to silence third

11 parties from testifying truthfully about the former couple’s family issues. The fact that Jolie has

12 actually used NDAs in the improper manner she (falsely) accuses Pitt of here further undermines

13 Jolie’s claims of shock and dismay upon receiving Pitt’s NDA proposal. The documents at issue

14 in this Motion will almost surely show additional examples undermining Jolie’s core defense.

15 Jolie’s primary argument in Opposition is nonetheless that this Court should accept her

16 blanket assertion that “[n]one of these other NDAs are remotely comparable.” The

17 aforementioned Webb Declaration alone belies this claim and demonstrates why it is not

18 appropriate for a litigant to make unilateral and unsupported relevance determinations to prevent

19 discovery. Regardless, the question at issue here is simply whether any of these documents could

20 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Pitt easily clears that low hurdle. The extent of

21 Jolie’s reliance on NDAs will help establish that Jolie was experienced with NDAs and

22 understood their legitimate business purposes and undermine Jolie’s claim that Pitt and Perrin’s

23 proposal of a standard NDA with a broad carve-out for legal proceedings was “unconscionable”

24 and “against public policy.” Opp. at 13. In other words, the documents at issue here will help Pitt

25 respond to Jolie’s pretextual excuse that the NDA proposal justified her terminating their

26 imminent deal and breaching their contracts, while also putting the lie to Jolie’s
27 “unconscionability” defense.

28 Finally, Jolie’s argument that the documents implicate privacy concerns is equally
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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 unpersuasive. There is a Protective Order in this case, and Pitt has no objection to the production

2 of documents pursuant to a confidentiality designation and/or with appropriate redactions if truly

3 necessary. And while Jolie claims to be advocating for the privacy interests of the counterparties

4 to her NDAs, she has submitted no testimony to support the existence of those interests and the

5 declaration of her former security chief shows that at least one of these counterparties has no such

6 concern. In light of all of this, and given that Jolie’s Opposition offers no evidence of any burden

7 associated with producing the responsive documents, the Motion should be granted.

8 ARGUMENT

9 The only questions presented by the Motion are (1) whether the documents sought are

10 likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,1 and (2) whether any privacy concerns

11 outweigh Pitt’s interest obtaining these documents. As detailed below, the Requests are clearly

12 relevant, and Jolie fails to establish that there are any cognizable privacy concerns that are

13 implicated—much less any that would justify withholding these documents that will allow Pitt to

14 test the defense that Jolie contends is “at the very heart of this case.”

15 I. The Documents at Issue Are Relevant.

16 Jolie argues that because the Requests seek information about NDAs with “other people

17 and entities, about other matters not in any way connected with” the allegations she has made

18 against Pitt, and thus they are not “comparable” to the proposed Pitt NDA and therefore

19 categorically irrelevant. Opp. at 5. Her argument fails for at least the following reasons.

20 First, Jolie’s overly narrow relevance framing2 is not supported by any evidence. Jolie

21 admits that she possesses responsive NDAs with “studios, sponsors, service professionals,

22

23 1
Jolie’s lip-service arguments as to burden are waived and should be wholly disregarded because
24 she never objected to the Requests on the ground that searching for responsive documents would
impose a burden, and she has not provided any “evidence showing the quantum of work required”
25 to search for the documents, as required to sustain a burden objection even if one existed.
Williams v. Sup. Ct., 3 Cal. 5th 531, 549 (2017) (emphasis added).
26
2
Jolie misstates Pitt’s position with respect to relevance, arguing that Pitt seeks the NDAs only to
27
find out if they include “similar language.” Opp. at 15 (citing Mot. at 14). Despite the quotation
28 marks, that phrase appears nowhere in Pitt’s Motion.
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AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 employees, and independent contractors (among others) over nearly two decades of [her] career.”

2 Opp. at 14. But Jolie offers nothing to back up her argument that there is a “stark and obvious

3 contrast” between these NDAs and the NDA proposed by Pitt and Perrin, on which her defense

4 hinges. Jolie provides no declaration, no information about the terms of these other NDAs, no

5 description of the “others” with whom she has entered into NDAs, and no evidence of what type

6 of conduct these NDAs covered. All Jolie offers is her lawyer’s conclusory statement in a brief

7 that these other NDAs were “not comparable.” Such conclusions are insufficient to meet Jolie’s

8 burden to “justify [her] objection” following the “fact-specific showing of relevance,” made by

9 Pitt in his Motion. Kirkland v. Sup. Ct., 95 Cal. App. 4th 92, 98 (2002).

10 In fact, the limited information currently available to Pitt squarely contradicts Jolie’s

11 position that her use of NDAs is not “remotely comparable” to her allegations that “Pitt was

12 attempting to leverage his purchase of Miraval into silencing Jolie.” Opp. at 15. For example, the

13 concurrently filed Declaration of Tony Webb (“Webb Decl.”) reveals that Jolie is the one who has

14 weaponized NDAs in an effort to prevent an open airing of the couple’s family issues—the very

15 thing that Jolie claims was so sacred to her that Pitt’s proposed NDA caused her to renege on her

16 deal to sell to him.

17 Mr. Webb was the head of Jolie’s security detail for two decades, and he remained in that

18 role for approximately four years after the couple divorced. Webb Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5–6, 9. He explains

19 that Jolie required him and his contractors to sign NDAs relating to various personal and

20 professional details of her, and her family’s, life. Id. at ¶ 4. Mr. Webb avers that after the couple

21 divorced and went to family court, he received multiple calls from Jolie’s representative, who told

22 Mr. Webb to remind his staff that they had entered into NDAs with Jolie and that if they testified

23 in a custody proceeding, Jolie would sue them. Id. at ¶¶ 6–7. When Webb communicated this

24 message to the two security contractors, both of them confirmed that they had planned to testify if

25 subpoenaed, and one of them told Webb that “he would testify about statements he overheard that

26 Ms. Jolie made to the children, encouraging them to avoid spending time with Mr. Pitt during
27 custody visits.” Id. at ¶ 6. The two security contractors both testified notwithstanding Jolie’s

28 threats, and shortly thereafter Jolie fired Mr. Webb’s company. Id. at ¶¶ 8–9.
8
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Jolie’s use of NDAs to silence her security detail and attempt to prevent them from

2 testifying truthfully in court about what actually happened behind closed doors bears a striking

3 resemblance to Jolie’s (false) allegations in this case that Pitt improperly used an NDA to

4 “silenc[e]” her. Yet, without presenting any evidence, Jolie asks this Court to find that “[t]here is

5 no connection between them at all—none,” Opp. SSUF at 4, and in doing so, deny Pitt’s Motion.

6 This unsupported and clearly incorrect conclusion is not credible, and Pitt should be entitled to

7 obtain the additional evidence at issue here to further undermine Jolie’s NDA defense.

8 Second, whether this discovery ultimately makes it more likely or less likely that Jolie is

9 telling the truth about why she abandoned the sale of her interest in Miraval to Pitt is not a

10 determination to be made on a motion to compel—because either way, the NDAs and related

11 documents at issue here are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence about that

12 disputed issue. Under California’s broad discovery standards, the documents and information

13 sought by this Motion are relevant and therefore discoverable because they have “any tendency in

14 reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

15 action.” Evid. Code § 210; Lipton v. Sup. Ct., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1599, 1612 (1996) (“The scope of

16 permissible discovery is one of reason, logic and common sense.”).

17 More specifically, if Jolie intends to rely on the proposed NDA as a defense to the breach

18 of her obligations and her decision to abandon the transaction she and Pitt had been negotiating,

19 that is an ultimate question for the finder of fact to decide based on its own assessments and

20 conclusions (assuming arguendo that Jolie’s defense is legally viable at all). City of King City v.

21 Cmty. Bank of Cent. California, 131 Cal. App. 4th 913, 936 (“Any evidence refuting [party’s]

22 claims as pleaded was not only material, but potentially dispositive—and eminently

23 discoverable,” emphasis original); X-C ¶ 39 (“Why this non-disparagement clause was so

24 important to Pitt—and an abusive and controlling deal-breaker for Jolie—goes to the very heart of

25 this case.”); Opp. at 5:6–8 (“[W]hat happened in the intervening months” between February and

26 June 15, 2021 “is hotly disputed,” and “[a]t trial, the jury will have to resolve this important
27 factual dispute.”). And for Pitt to present this additional evidence to the ultimate finder of fact, he,

28 of course, needs to first obtain it from Jolie.

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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Moreover, even to the extent that “Jolie sought NDAs from third parties to protect her own

2 business interests,” Opp. at 16, these documents are relevant in assessing whether this NDA was

3 “unconscionable.” Jolie argues otherwise, repeating her refrain that “[t]hese are other contracts

4 with other parties about other matters.” Id. But for public figures, the line between business

5 interests and personal conduct is often blurred. Public figures often seek or sign non-disclosure

6 and non-disparagement agreements with terms that may appear onerous to others, in large part, to

7 protect their personal brands and businesses with which they are closely affiliated from costly

8 reputational harm. Indeed, Jolie’s counsel stated in correspondence that Jolie understood that “the

9 primary if not sole concern” that Pitt and Perrin expressed when they allegedly stepped back from

10 deal negotiations was “how this situation might affect a business.” Cherlow Decl., Ex. 8 at 2

11 (emphasis added). Likewise, while Jolie asserts that NDAs with sponsors can never be relevant,

12 Opp. at 14, if those NDAs also contained provisions related to her personal conduct—particularly

13 in connection with a morality clause—it would be probative of the extent to which Jolie truly

14 perceived the proposed NDA at issue in this case as unconscionable or whether she in fact

15 understood that Pitt and his business partner Perrin were seeking the NDA to protect the value of

16 the business that they were buying in full.

17 Documents regarding the circumstances of Jolie’s NDAs with third parties are also highly

18 relevant for so long as Jolie is permitted to raise this defense. For example, if Jolie signed NDAs

19 with third parties that limited her (or others’) ability to speak about actual or potential misconduct

20 similar to what she alleges against here against Pitt, and she signed those NDAs after the conduct

21 occurred, a jury would be less likely to credit her purported justification for breaching the parties’

22 agreement not to sell their interests without the other’s consent. Again, this is not mere

23 speculation: After Jolie sold her interests in Miraval to Stoli claiming that the NDA proposed by

24 Pitt’s counsel was ““emotionally devastating,” her divorce lawyer proposed an even broader NDA

25 in connection with resolution of the family court proceeding that would have further limited her

26 freedom to speak.” But if Jolie gets her way, Pitt will never even discover whether such NDAs
27 exist, let alone present them to a jury.

28 Third, Jolie’s blanket “nothing is comparable” argument has been rejected in several
10
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 analogous cases. In one such case, an accident victim sought state records concerning other

2 accidents on a highway that he contended was dangerous. The state argued that the data was not

3 relevant absent a showing that the other accidents were caused by the allegedly dangerous

4 condition. The Court of Appeal rejected this “extraordinary” position, explaining that the “data

5 itself may reveal other accidents of a sufficient number [such] that, although the other accidents

6 have been attributed to other causes or are unexplained, the evidence suggests that a highway

7 defect may be a common contributory factor” and is therefore “relevant to the subject matter of a

8 lawsuit arising out of another accident at the same location, and may aid in the parties’ preparation

9 for trial.” Davies v. Sup. Ct., 36 Cal. 3d 291, 301 (1984). In another case, the Court of Appeal

10 affirmed an order to produce a list of “other insureds whose claims were negotiated by” the same

11 employee as plaintiff’s claim over the insurer’s “patently meritless” objections. Colonial Life &

12 Accident Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790–91 (1982) (because plaintiff could establish a

13 claim by showing that the acts at issue were a general business practice, “[d]iscovery aimed at

14 determining the frequency of alleged unfair settlement practices is therefore likely to produce

15 evidence directly relevant to the action”); see also Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of

16 New York, Inc., 246 Cal. App. 4th 566, 593 (2016) (“[T]he fact that the other . . . incidents may

17 have been different from the one that allegedly occurred here does not mean the other perpetrator

18 evidence was not discoverable.”). In other words, because the documents deal with a subject of

19 consequence to the determination of the action, and one which Jolie herself has injected into the

20 matter, the question of “comparability” is not for Jolie to decide, and Jolie’s subjective position on

21 the issue should not bar production here.

22 In short, establishing that NDAs are a commonplace feature of Jolie’s personal and

23 professional life, and entirely routine for her, goes directly to the credibility of her defense—

24 regardless of the precise terms or subject matter of any one particular NDA.3

25
3
Jolie also claims that “Pitt refused to limit his demands in any way” and “never backed down”
26 from his Requests as drafted. Opp. at 14. The parties meet-and-confer correspondence shows that
in reality, it was Ms. Jolie who refused every offer to negotiate. Cherlow Decl., Ex. 4 at 4 (“Ms.
27
Jolie stands on the objections and limitations on her production.”); Ex. 6 at 1 (“I’m not sure why
28 we are continuing to discuss this issue.”).
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AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Fourth and finally, Jolie’s argument that “specific past instances of Jolie’s conduct to

2 prove her conduct on this occasion is . . . barred by Evidence Code sections 786, 787, and

3 1101(a)[,]” Opp. at 18 n.2, misses the mark. None of those provisions are applicable here—

4 section 786 deals only with “[e]vidence of traits of [] character,” section 787 deals only with

5 “evidence of specific instances of [] conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of []

6 character,” and section 1101(a) deals only with “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his

7 or her character.” Jolie’s use of NDAs plainly is not evidence of her “propensity or tendency to

8 act in a certain way under certain circumstances.” Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Trials & Ev. Ch. 8E-E

9 (emphasis original); cf. Evid. Code § 1105 (evidence of a person’s “habit or custom” is

10 admissible). The evidence sought here goes to the merits of Jolie’s factual contention that she

11 viewed Pitt and Perrin’s request for an NDA as “an abusive and controlling deal-breaker for

12 Jolie,” X-C ¶ 39, not her character.

13 II. Jolie Has Failed to Show There Are Any Privacy Concerns to Be Weighed

14 Against Ordering Production of the Requested Documents.

15 Jolie also contends that even if the documents sought are relevant, it would be improper to

16 order production because “[b]y their nature,” the Requests “seriously invade Jolie’s privacy and

17 the privacy rights of third parties.” Opp. at 17. But “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must

18 establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in

19 the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” Williams v. Sup. Ct., 3 Cal.

20 5th 531, 552 (2017); Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Sup. Ct., 65 Cal. App. 5th 621, 645 (2021) (a

21 “serious” intrusion is one that is “an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy

22 right”). Jolie cannot meet that burden here, particularly given that the operative Protective Order

23 in this case allows her to designate the information as confidential and thereby avoid its improper

24 distribution or filing to the public docket. Alch v. Sup. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1432 (2008)

25 (finding error where trial court “failed to give any real consideration to the effect of the protective

26 order in assuaging privacy concerns”).

27 Moreover, Jolie has not “specifically identified” a constitutionally protected privacy

28 interest for herself or for third parties, as she is required to do in the first instance. Hill v. Nat’l
12
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 37 (1994). She offered no declaration or actual evidence

2 concerning what information exists in these NDAs, let alone identified what specific legally

3 protected privacy rights would be implicated by their disclosure. To the extent that Jolie purports

4 to be concerned about disclosure of the names of the individuals who signed these NDAs, Jolie

5 has likewise produced no evidence to support that concern. Clearly, Mr. Webb—one of the parties

6 to a responsive Jolie NDA—is not concerned about such a disclosure. Webb Decl. ¶ 4. And as

7 for Jolie’s claim for the first time in Opposition that the NDAs may “include Jolie’s compensation

8 or compensation she paid to third parties,” Opp. at 17, Jolie does not cite a single case showing

9 that she (or the third parties) have a privacy right to such information—which is routinely

10 produced in commercial disputes, which would here be subject to a strict protective order, and

11 which Jolie could have asked during the parties’ meet-and-confer negotiations to produce in

12 redacted form, but chose not to.4

13 Further, even if Jolie had satisfied her burden to establish that the requested documents

14 contain information that would pose a serious intrusion upon legally recognized privacy rights if

15 produced pursuant to the operative Protective Order—and she did not—Jolie would also have to

16 “show[] that the [documents] cannot successfully be redacted” to eliminate that risk of “serious”

17 invasion. Snibbe v. Sup. Ct., 224 Cal. App. 4th 184, 195 (2014); Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman

18 Sachs Grp., Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 471, 508 (2014) (approving of redaction to protect privacy

19 rights). Jolie has not even tried to do this—indeed, when Plaintiffs suggested during meet-and-

20 confer negotiations that Jolie may redact personally identifying information of third parties (at

21 least in the first instance, and then the parties can meet and confer, if necessary, about such

22 redactions), Jolie rejected that offer too. See Cherlow Decl., Ex. 5 at 2, n.1; id. Ex. 6 at 1.

23 Because Jolie has not “specifically identified” a “serious invasion” of privacy rights at

24 stake, let alone explained why redactions and the protective order would not resolve any concern,

25 she cannot withhold the documents based on privacy rights. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 37; Snibbe, 224

26
27
Indeed, “Jolie’s compensation or compensation she paid to third parties” would be relevant here
4

28 to the extent that it was paid as consideration for agreeing to sign the NDA.
13
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 Cal. App. 4th at 194–96; Alch, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 1427.

2 CONCLUSION

3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant the Motion.

5 DATED: May 9, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

6

7 By: /s/ John V. Berlinski

John V. Berlinski
8
BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW,
9 LINCENBERG, DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
10 John V. Berlinski (State Bar No. 208537)
Julia B. Cherlow (State Bar No. 290538)
11
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
12 Jonathan M. Moses (admitted pro hac vice)
Adam L. Goodman (admitted pro hac vice)
13 Jessica L. Layden (admitted pro hac vice)
14 Ioannis D. Drivas (pro hac vice application pending)

15 Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants

William B. Pitt and Mondo Bongo, LLC
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PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES
AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE
 1 PROOF OF SERVICE

2 Pitt v. Jolie
Case No. 22STCV06081
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4
At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am
5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1875 Century
Park East, 23rd Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561.
6
On May 9, 2024, I served the following document(s) described as PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY
7 IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT ANGELINA JOLIE on the interested parties in this
8 action as follows:

9 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

10 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the document(s) to be

sent from e-mail address kminutelli@birdmarella.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed
11 in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any
electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.
12
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
13 foregoing is true and correct.

14 Executed on May 9, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.

15

16 /s/ Karen M. Minutelli

Karen M. Minutelli
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PROOF OF SERVICE
 1 SERVICE LIST
Pitt v. Jolie
2 Case No. 22STCV06081

3 Paul D. Murphy Laura W. Brill

Daniel N. Csillag Daniel Barlava
4 MURPHY ROSEN LLP Matthew Bernstein
100 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP
5 Santa Monica, CA 90401 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1725
Telephone: (310) 899-3300 Los Angeles, CA 90067-4013
6 Email: pmurphy@murphyrosen.com Telephone: (310) 556-2700
Email: dcsillag@murphyrosen.com Email: lbrill@kbkfirm.com
7 Counsel for Defendant and Cross- Email: dbarlava@kbkfirm.com
Complainant Angelina Jolie Email: mbernstein@kbkfirm.com
8 Counsel appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
9 Roland Venturini and Gary Bradbury

10 Joe Tuffaha Keith R. Hummel

Prashanth Chennakesavan
11 LTL ATTORNEYS LLP
300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 1400
12 Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 612-8900
13 Email: joe.tuffaha@ltlattorneys.com
Email:
14 prashanth.chennakesavan@ltlattorneys.com
Counsel for Defendant and Cross-
15 Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Defendant
Tenute del Mondo B.V., and specially
16 appearing to challenge jurisdiction on behalf
of Defendants Yuri Shefler and Alexey
17 Oliynik
18
19 Mark Drooks
Debbie Throckmorton
20 Assistant to Mark Drooks
BIRD, MARELLA, RHOW, LINCENBERG,
21 DROOKS & NESSIM, LLP
1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
22 Los Angeles, CA 90067-2561
Telephone: 310 201-2100
23 Email: mdrooks@birdmarella.com
Email: dthrockmorton@birdmarella.com
24 Counsel appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
25 Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et
26 Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine, and
SAS Distilleries de la Riviera
27
Justin C. Clarke
Jonathan Mooney
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP
Worldwide Plaza
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
Telephone: (212) 474-1000
Email: khummel@cravath.com
Email: jcclarke@cravath.com
Email: jmooney@cravath.com
Counsel for Defendant and Cross-
Complainant Nouvel, LLC and Defendant
Tenute del Mondo B.V., and specially
appearing to challenge jurisdiction on behalf
of Defendants Yuri Shefler and Alexey
Oliynik
S. Gale Dick
Phoebe King
Randall Bryer
COHEN & GRESSER LLP
800 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 707-7263
Email: SGDick@CohenGresser.com
Email: PKing@CohenGresser.com
Email: rbryer@cohengresser.com
Counsel appearing specially to challenge
jurisdiction on behalf of Cross-Defendants
Marc-Olivier Perrin, SAS Miraval Provence,
Familles Perrin, SAS Petrichor, Vins et
Domaines Perrin SC, SASU Le Domaine,
and SAS Distilleries de la Riviera

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PROOF OF SERVICE