Engineering procedures in Hazardous Atmospheres in

10/22/2016 Power Plants

Ana María Rubio Martínez

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1. Introduction
While designing an industrial facility, there are two type of entities to be taken into
consideration: tangible or physical elements (structures, piping, raceways, supports, etc.)
and non-tangible or non-physical elements (spaces, areas, safety, etc.) Dealing with
physical elements is easier than dealing with non-tangible elements, since these are
elements that you can touch and you can see. On the other hand, dealing with non-
tangible elements, such as safety areas or reserved spaces, especially during the design
phase is far more complex. The main reason is that you need to take into consideration
spaces that you cannot see and their properties, in order to create a better design and/or
avoid extra-costs, Hazardous atmospheres are one of these non-visible components of a
facility. Dealing with them correctly is challenging due to their physical and chemical
properties, as well as the need to know their exact location already at relatively early stage
of the project. Besides that, hazardous areas include one additional problem: the
environmental conditions may influence a lot, and as a consequence, its chemical
properties determine its behaviour.
Currently, we work with 3D CAD Models. These models offer the great advantage of
allowing us to work with these spaces as if they were tangible entities, and consequently, it
the work procedure with these non-tangible elements has changed.

2. What is a hazardous atmosphere? Definition and types

Prior indtroducing a definition for hazardous atmosphere, it is important to point out that
depending on the country you are located, you might find two terms for the same
concepts: Hazardous Areas or Hazardous Atmospheres or Hazardous locations. For
example: in the USA the term hazardous location is the most commonly used. A
Hazardous Area is where fire or explosion hazards may exist due to flammable gases,
flammable liquid–produced vapours, combustible liquid–produced vapours, combustible
dusts, or ignitable fibers/flyings present in the air in quantities sufficient to produce
explosive or ignitable mixtures. It is any place where an explosive atmosphere may occur
in quantities such as to require special precautions to protect the safety of the workers.
According to Code IEC60079-10 a hazardous area is “a three-dimensional region or
space in which an explosive gas/dust atmosphere is or may be expected to be present, in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use
of equipment.”
Hazardous areas are created by gas or by dust (dust clouds + dust layers). Several
classifications are established, depending, again, on the project and the applied codes and
regulations.

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Based on the type of the substance that creates the hazardous area, the following types
can be established:
 Hazardous gas atmospheres
 Hazardous dust atmospheres
According to the Code IEC60079-0, these two types of hazardous atmospheres can be
sub classified into zones based on the frequency of the occurrence and the duration of an
explosive atmosphere:
 HAZARDOUS GAS ATMOSPHERES ZONES:
o ZONE 0: An explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist, is present
continuously or for long periods or frequently. Example: Interior of a gas
tank
o ZONE 1: An explosive gas atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in
normal operation occasionally.
o ZONE 2: An explosive gas atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of
flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to
occur in normal operation, but if it does occur, will persist1 for a short period
only.
 HAZARDOUS DUST ATMOSPHERES:
o ZONE 20: An explosive atmosphere consisting of a cloud of combustible
dust in air is present continuously or for long periods or frequently.
o ZONE 21: An explosive atmosphere consisting of a cloud of combustible
dust in air is likely to occur, occasionally, during normal operation.
o ZONE 22: An explosive atmosphere consisting of a cloud of combustible
dust in air is not likely to occur, occasionally, during normal operation, but if
it does occur, will persist1 for a short period only.
 NON-HAZARDOUS AREA (safe area): An area in which an explosive atmosphere
is not to be present.
Every electrical equipment or item that must be installed in such classified locations should
be specially designed and tested to ensure that it will not initiate an explosion, due to
arcing contacts or high surface temperature of the equipment or by any electrostatic
charges. Therefore, it is necessary to apply constructive measures to the electrical

1
Persist: the total time for which flammable atmosphere will exist (duration of the release + time to
disperse)

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components of the equipment in order to get a certification that ensures the equipment
suitability.
On the other hand, a mixture of air and hazardous gases may ignite in contact with a hot
surface. An ignition depends on surface area, temperature and the concentration of the
gas. Equipment shall be selected according to its maximum surface temperature, so it
does not reach the ignition temperature of any gas, vapour or dust that may be present.

Temperature Allowable temperature classes

ºC (ºF) of equipment
Code
T1 450 (842) T1-T6
T2 300 (572) T2-T6
T3 200 (392) T3-T6
T4 135 (275) T4-T6
T5 100 (212) T5-T6
T6 85 (185) T6
Table 1: Temperature codes for selecting the appropriate equipment

Certified equipment has been tested by approval agencies using maximum temperature
ratings according to procedures exposed on the legislation.
Apart from the classification exposed above, further sub classifications have been defined
by other international organizations. For example, the code IEC600719-0 has established
the following equipment classification based on the place where they can be used and the
substance creating the hazardous atmosphere:

Group I Electrical equipment form mines susceptible to firedamp.

Electrical equipment for places with an explosive gas
atmosphere, other than mines susceptible to firedamp. It
can be divided into subgroups:
Group II
 Group IIA: typical gas is propane
 Group IIB: typical gas is ethylene
 Group IIC: typical gas is Hydrogen
Electrical equipment for places with an explosive dust
atmosphere. It can be divided into subgroups:
Group III  Group IIIA: combustible flyings
 Group IIIB: non-conductive dust
 Group IIIC: conductive dust
Table 2: Equipment classification according to IEC 60079-0

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On the other hand, the code NFPA 30 establishes a classification for the equipment,
based on a categorization of the liquids handled into flammable and combustible liquids
according to their flashpoint2:

 Flammable liquids: their flashpoint is below 100 ºF (37.8 ºC)

o Class IA: flammable liquids with flash points below 73 °F (22.8 °C) and
boiling points below 100 °F (37.8 °C). Additionally, unstable flammable
liquids are treated as Class IA liquids. Examples: ethylene oxide, methyl
chloride, and pentane.
o Class IB: flammable liquids that have flash points below 73 °F (22.8 °C)
and boiling points at or above 100 °F (37.8 °C). Examples: acetone,
benzene, ethyl alcohol, gasoline, and isopropyl alcohol.
o Class IC: flammable liquids with flash points at or above 73 °F (22.8 °C),
but below 100 °F (37.8 °C). Examples: butyl alcohol, diethyl glycol, styrene
 Combustible liquids: their flashpoint is 100 ºF (37.8 ºC) or more
o Class II: combustible liquids that have a flash point at or above 100 °F
(37.8 °C) and below 140 °F (60 °C). Examples: camphor oil, diesel fuel.
o Class IIIA: combustible liquids that have a flash point at or above 140 °F
(60 °C), but below 200 °F (93 °C). Examples: creosote oil, formaldehyde,
formic acid, and fuel oil.
o Class IIIB: combustible liquids that have a flash point at or above 200 °F
(93 °C). Examples: castor oil, coconut oil, fish oil, and olive oil.

3. Hazardous atmospheres process workwork procedure

The main objective while working with hazardous atmospheres shall be to ensure the
safety of the facility, during its entire life cycle. This includes its construction, operation and
dismantling periods. Currently, the two main tools available to help us to achieve this goal
are:
 Codes and regulations: they set the boundaries of hazardous areas, their
extension, classification, calculating procedures, etc.
 CAD tools: these tools help us calculate and generate documentation about
hazardous areas. One of the most helpful tool is the 3D Model of the facility

2
Flashpoint: the minimum temperature at which sufficient vapour is given off the liquid to form an
ignitable mixture with air

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because it allows you to visualize the hazardous area and the elements affected by
it. It is very useful to help us to decide the most suitable preventive measure.
Next figure summarizes the complete workflow with hazardous atmospheres.

General Extension of
Identify Sources
situation zones

Evaluate
Graphics Locate zones
impacts

Preventive Generate final

measures documentation

Figure 31: Hazardous atmospheres typical workflow

Formatted: Normal, No bullets or numbering

3.1. General situation

Prior to start working and analysing the hazardous atmospheres of a new facility, we should
determine its general situation. This means, to know the general requirements and the
specific characteristics of the facility, which includes:
 Location: country, region and surrounding area
 Environmental conditions
 Type of facility: type of power plant (combined Cycle, Open Cycle,
thermosolar, etc.)
 General process: fluids, design conditions, type of machines and equipment
involved, etc.
 Physical and chemical properties of the potential hazardous fluids
 General arrangement (3D Model)

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Once we have an overview of the situation, it is necessary to identify the hazardous

atmospheres of the facility. In order to do that, it is necessary to introduce a new concept:
source of release.
According to directive IEC 60079, it is necessary to distinguish between gas or dust source
of release. For gases, source of release is “any point or location from which a flammable
gas, vapour or liquid may be released into the atmosphere in such a way that an explosive
gas atmosphere could be formed”. In general, sources of release are every point of
discontinuity of a pipe or equipment where hazardous fluids are handled. Typical sources of
release are: openings, gaskets, non-welded connections (flanged, threaded or socket),
valves (stem), non-sealed edges of equipment…
For dust, source of release is “any point or location where dust may be released into the Formatted: Font: Italic

atmosphere forming a cloud or depositing a layer”. Sources of dust release are openings of
dust containments, entrance and exit points of particles to equipment and layers of dust
capable of being dispersed to form a dust cloud.
Identifying a source of release (gas or dust) is one of the most sensitive stages of the entire
process, since it needs to be done meticulously in order to detect all sources of release. All
of the information available about the process and layout are essential to do a proper work.
This stage includes two aspects: naming and detecting source of releases.
A complete identification for gas releases includes: determining the fluid that generates the
hazardous atmosphere, the conditions of the fluid (pressure and temperature), its
composition –in order to determine the classification of the equipment used to handle it and
the temperature limitations-, the grade of release (continuous, primary or secondary) to the
determine the type of zone, the location of the release and grade of release.
Dust areas identification includes: dust combustibility, material properties (particle size,
moisture content, cloud and layer minimum ignition temperature and electrical resistivity),
operational and maintenance of the plant (including housekeeping) and equipment
information and grade of release. IEC60079-10 on its part 2 summarizes the main zones and
their ignition sources.

3.4.3.3. Determining extension of the zones

Once you have identified every single source of hazardous atmospheres, the next step is to
calculate the extension of zones. Depending on the normative or regulation you should apply
on the project, the calculation is accomplished on different ways:
 NFPA 30 is applied when you have flammable and combustible liquids

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 API 505 can be used when you have a petroleum facility (or a part of it) or some
petroleum products are handled on the plant.
 IEC 60079-10 shows the general procedure to determine the extension of a
hazardous area produced by a gas release.
 IEC 60079-14 part 2 summarizes main dust zones and their extension.
 INTRODUCIR FIGURAS TABLA NFPA 30, EXTENSIÓN DE ZONAS API 505, Formatted: Font: (Default) Arial, Font color: Black
Formatted: Normal, Indent: Left: 0.25", No bullets or
numbering
Formatted: Centered

Figure 2: Typical classification and extension of the hazardous atmospheres created on a cyclone and filter with clean
outside building (from IEC 60079-14)

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Formatted: Centered
Formatted: English (United States)

Figure 3: Typical classification of the hazardous atmospheres created inside and around of a fixed roof flammable luiquid
storage tank in a nonenclosed or adequately ventilated area (From API 505)

Formatted: English (United Kingdom)

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Formatted: Centered
Formatted: English (United States)

Figure 3: Typical classification of the hazardous atmospheres created inside and around several equipment (From NFPA 30)

Formatted: English (United Kingdom)

Formatted: English (United States)

Sometimes, some type of zones are directly dictated by the codes, but others, you have to
determine the type of zone depending on the frequency of the release, grade of ventilation
available and the time of persistence. For example, next table can be used as a guide to
determine the type of zone according to grade of release and ventilation available.
Ventilation Degree
High Medium Low
Grade of Availability
release Good,
Good Fair Poor Good Fair Poor Fair or
Poor
Zone 0 Zone 0
(Zone 0 NE3) (Zone 0 NE) (Zone 0 NE)
Continuous Zone 0 + + Zone 0
Non-hazardous Zone 2 Zone 1
Zone 2 Zone 1
Zone 1 Zone 1
(Zone 1 NE) (Zone 1 NE) (Zone 1 NE) Zone 1 or
Primary Zone 1 + +
Non-hazardous Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 0
Zone 2 Zone 2
Zone 1
(Zone 2 NE) (Zone 2 NE)
Secondary Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 2 and even
Non-hazardous Non-hazardous
Zone 0
Table 3: Hazardous areas zoning according to grade of release, ventilation degree and ventilation availability (From IEC
60079)

3
NE: Negligible extension

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3.5.3.4. Locate zones

The following step on this work procedure is locating the zones. It is very important to do so
as soon as possible for two reasons:
 in order to detect zoning overlaps and solve them, and
 to group single zones into a wider one to simplify several processes.
Zoning overlap is not recommendable. If it happens, zoning classification could be changed
(for example, two zones 1 could turn into a zone 0 due to an increase on the frequency of
the release). Detecting them at the first stages of the design process allows us to make
some changes on the layout or on the piping routing to avoid these overlaps.
Grouping single zones is useful when you have to assign protective measures or when you
need to classify a complete design area. For example, Indoor Fugitive emissions should be
considered as continuous and simultaneous since it can or not form hazardous areas around
sources, increase gas or vapours concentration of hazardous areas and change a non-
hazardous area into a hazardous one. Consequently, if you have a group of piping elements
such as flanges, valves and instruments mounted on a gas line near of an equipment
generating a hazardous atmosphere around it, it usually produces a new hazardous area
equivalent to the sum of them all. Figure XX shows this situation.

3.6.3.5. Graphics
Once we have located every hazardous atmosphere that could be formed at the facility, we
should now draw them to make them visible.
Depending on the type of facility, the client, the contract, the software used for the project
development and other requirements such as economy or the grade of development of the
project, this representation could be done on two different ways:
 2 dimension: it consist on drawing every single hazardous area over a copy of the
layout of the plant, adding sections and details when necessary. Usually, these
general arrangement drawings are a complete representation of the plant, but they
are not updated with the latest changes done on the project. Production of these
drawings is cheap, and can be useful at the first stages of the project.
 3 dimension: it consists on introduce on the 3D model of the plant, a model for every
single hazardous area.. This method is expensive, since you are not producing
directly a drawing of the hazardous area, but creating a model of the hazardous area
instead. In this way, depending on the software used, the changes in the design are
transferred directly to the whole 3D model and, consequently, the hazardous area
representation is always updated. On the other hand, at the first stages of a project,
the 3D Model usually are not very complete, so the information directly extracted
from the model is not complete.

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Many times, the decision of the method to be used on a project is difficult because it
depends on the contract, the type of deliverables, the economy of the project or other
agreements with the client. In any case, a deep evaluation of the method to be used should
be accomplished to avoid extra-costs during the engineering phase.

3.7.3.6. Evaluate impacts and take preventive measures

Once we are able to “see” all of the hazardous areas of the project, we need to evaluate
their impact. The result of this evaluation is translated into the preventive measures that
need to be taken to ensure the safety of the facility and their workers; so both stages of the
procedure should be addressed together.
The evaluation can be achieved automatically or manually:
 Manual evaluation needs to be done by a safety engineer, since it consists on
determining visually all the elements and components of the installation that are
affected by hazardous atmospheres.
 Automatic evaluation is done by a software and the results are translated into a table
of impacts or similar. A safety engineer is then necessary afterwards in order to
interpret the results.
Once all impacts have been recognized, preventive measures shall be taken. These
measures can be:
 Measures to minimize the release of combustible and flammable substances:
welded fittings and connections shall be used whenever possible and flanged or
threaded connections shall only be used when component maintenance or
replacement is necessary (in this case, leak tight certified components are
purchased).
 Prevention of the ignition of the element affected by hazardous atmospheres:
the use of certified equipment or certified components is one of the most extended
prevention measures of this type. Apart from that one, other measures can also be
taken, such as placing a physical barrier over a tray to avoid an impact of any object
that could cause a spark, earthing grids of non-conductor elements, good house-
keeping, providing forced ventilation to indoor areas where hazardous zones are
foreseen or making changes on the design.
 Limiting the area where hazardous atmospheres are produced: the main
preventive measure of this type is building a firewall that completely cut the
hazardous atmosphere to interrupt it and physically separate it from the rest of the
facility. Another preventive measure is routing drains and vents to a safe and/or

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contained location, at such far distance as to be considered a secure one (For

example, vent discharge should be 15 m away from any opening of a building)
The choice of the best preventive measures is mainly conditioned by how advanced the
project is at the time of the location and analysis of the hazardous areas and the economy of
the project. At the basic design stage, it is easy to foresee firewalls to avoid hazardous
atmospheres spreading to other areas, to assign the type of certified prevention equipment
to be purchased or to change part of the design of the project. On the other hand, once the
construction stage of the power plant has begun, solutions are not easy to be implemented
ad-hoc and they use to be more expensive, since they mainly consist on isolating the
affected element with a tight barrier or redesigning the affected area.
Sometimes, preventive measures require imagination due to building barriers is difficult and
not cost-effective or the equipment bought is not certified, and many other technical
problems… As a consequence, the amount of preventive measures you can apply get as far
as your imagination can get; but keep in mind that the solution shall be feasible, as cheap as
possible and it needs to comply with regulations.

3.8.3.7. Generation of the final documentation

The generation of the hazardous atmospheres documentation is the last step of this
workflow. Usually, it is comprised of the hazardous area drawings and a report.
The hazardous areas report shall identify the fluids which produce releases, summarize,
identify and quantify all of the release sources of hazardous areas of the project and all of
the preventive measures taken to reduce the risk.
Frequently, preventive measures require changes on the design or to build tight barriers that
modify the content of the hazardous drawings; therefore, the drawings obtained on previous
stages will need to be updated according to these changes.
The combination of both documents shall provide a wide and comprehensive study of the
hazardous atmospheres of the project and their impact.
This documentation will be used by the local authorities to concede the necessary permits
for the operation of the plant. Also, it will be part of the safety documentation that the
insurance company will employ to evaluate the total risk of the plant, and as a direct
consequence, the price of the insurance.

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4. Hazardous areas work procedure impacts on project development.

Strategies to minimize impacts.
The way the work with hazardous areas is accomplished could have a great influence on the
project development, mainly impacting on costs and timing.
As mentioned previously, hazardous areas documentation identifies, quantifies and locates
every hazardous area. The two first aspects are the theoretical ones, but for the third one, it
is required that the design process is complete. If hazardous areas documentation is
produced before the design stage has finished, some part of the information contained on it
will be PRELIMINARY or PENDING, since another part could end up being rearranged.
These inconsistencies will have the following consequences:
 Identification of impacts won’t be done properly: some of the impacts couldn’t be
identified and other ones could be considered as impacted and later on stop being
affected.
 Preventive measures adopted as a consequence to minimize the impact of
hazardous areas couldn’t be the most adequate ones.
 It could be necessary to take additional preventive measures.
 Equipment, instruments or piping components located within hazardous areas could
not be properly specified, so they might not be suitable to work under the given
conditions.
 A new edition of hazardous areas documentation will be required once all information
is available.
As a consequence of the previously exposed paragraphs it seems to be clear that,
hazardous areas documentation might be produced at the end of the engineering phase.
On the other hand, it is necessary to know hazardous areas impacts at the beginning of the
project, when equipment, instrument, piping components or cabling are specified, because
intrinsically protective measures and certified are required.
This scheduling contradiction can be solved with at least two editions of hazardous areas
documentation: one at the first half of the engineering design phase and one at the end of it.
The first edition should be arranged by an experienced engineer:
 Piping design of hazardous areas generator systems (in Power Plants it will be
auxiliary systems) won’t be concluded, so it will be necessary to suppose piping
routing and to establish design limitations.
 It will be necessary evaluate some not yet visible impacts, so previous experience
and knowledge will be required to assign protective measures and modify some
areas or buildings design.

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A good scheduling of hazardous areas is essential to avoid reeditions, do proper risk

evaluations and reduce engineering costs. This timing should take into account all of the
inputs needed and the previous activities required for locating in the project timeline the best
fitting spot for the generation of the two editions of the hazardous areas documentation.
One of the easiest and cheapest preventive measures against hazardous areas impact is a
good design. For example, many times, evaluating only the location of the release sources,
a tight barrier can be design to avoid hazardous areas spread, limiting their impact; the first
consequence is an important costs reduction because non-certified equipment or
components are required.
Final evaluation of hazardous areas impacts shall be communicated to every discipline of
the project, to ensure that safety requirements and prevention measures are implemented
and equipment, instruments and items are bought certified when is required.

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