Hazard and Operability

Study
(HAZOP)
 INTRODUCTION

 Nama : Nasrullah, ST
 TTL : Jakarta, 17 Juni
 Education : Teknik Metalurgi , FTUI
 Alamat : Kompt Ditjen Moneter Kembangan , Jakarta Barat
 Experience :
– PT Interport Mandiri Utama ( Joint Operational ExxonMobile with Indika
Energi Tbk ,Balikpapan( 2020))
– PT Margo Mulyo, Jakarta (2019)
– PT SMART Tbk ,Jakarta( 2017-2019)
– PT Unelec Indonesia (Joint ventute , GE, ALSTOM and PLN ( 2015-2017))
– PT AKR Corporindo Tbk ( 2005 -2015)
– PT Samudera Indonesia Tbk ( 2000 -2005)

2
 Tujuan

 Memahami apa itu HAZOP

 Bisa mengimplementasikan HAZOP

dalam pekerjaan jika dibutuhkan
 I suppose that I
should have done that
HAZOP Study!

4
 Introduction to HAZOP - Content
 What is a HAZOP Study?
 Origin of HAZOP study
 Objectives of a HAZOP Study
 When to Perform a HAZOP Study
 Benefits of HAZOP Study
 Overall HAZOP Methodology
 A Conceptual Example of HAZOP Study
 HAZOP Terminologies
 References

5
 The Rising Case for Change

 1984 – Bhopal, India – Toxic Material

Released
– 2,500 immediate
fatalities; 20,000+
total HAZARD:
– Many other offsite
injuries Highly Toxic
Methyl Isocyanate
 The Rising Case for Change

 1984 – Mexico City, Mexico –Explosion

– 300 fatalities
(mostly offsite)
– $20M damages HAZARD:
Flammable LPG
in tank
 The Rising Case for Change

1988 – Norco, LA – Explosion

– 7 onsite fatalities, 42 injured
– $400M+ damages

HAZARD:
Flammable
hydrocarbon vapors
 The Rising Case for Change

 1989 – Pasadena, TX – Explosion and Fire

– 23 fatalities, 130 injured; damage $800M+

HAZARD:
Flammable
ethylene/isobutane
vapors in a 10” line
 Enter … Process Safety Management

 Integral part of OSHA Occupational Safety and Health

Standards since 1992

 Known formally as: Process Safety Management of Highly

Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119)

 PSM applies to most industrial processes containing 10,000+

pounds of hazardous material
 What’s Covered by PSM?
 Process Safety Information
 Employee Involvement
 Process Hazard Analysis
 Operating Procedures
 Training
 Contractors
 Pre-Startup Safety Review
 Mechanical Integrity
 Hot Work
 Management of Change
 Incident Investigation
 Emergency Planning and
Response
 Compliance Audits
 Trade Secrets
 Process Hazard Analysis

Simply, PHA allows the employer to:

 Determine locations of potential safety

problems

 Identify corrective measures to improve safety

 Preplan emergency actions to be taken if

safety controls fail
 PHA Requirements
 Use one or more established
methodologies appropriate to the
complexity of the process

 Performed by a team with expertise in

engineering and process operations

 Includes personnel with experience and

knowledge specific to the process being
evaluated and the hazard analysis
methodology being used
 PHA Must Address …

 The hazards of the process

 Identification of previous incidents with

likely potential for catastrophic
consequences

 Engineering and administrative controls

applicable to the hazards and their
interrelationships
 PHA Must Address … (cont’d)

 Consequences of failure of engineering and

administrative controls, especially those
affecting employees

 Facility siting; human factors

 The need to promptly resolve PHA findings

and recommendations
Hazard Analysis Methodologies

 What-If
 Checklist
 What-If/Checklist
 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 Fault Tree Analysis
 An appropriate equivalent methodology

16/49
 A scenario…

Anda dan keluarga Anda sedang dalam perjalanan

dengan menggunakan mobil di tengah malam. Anda
membalas pesan teks saat mengemudi pada kecepatan
100 km / jam dan hujan turun deras. Mobil itu menabrak
lubang yang dalam dan salah satu ban Anda
berhembus.

Anda menginjak rem, tetapi karena jalan yang licin dan

benang ban mobil Anda tipis, mobil tergelincir dan
terlempar keluar dari jalan.

17
 Points to ponder

Apa penyebab kecelakaan itu?

Apa konsekuensi dari acara tersebut?

Apa yang dapat kita lakukan untuk mencegah semua hal itu terjadi?

Apa kecelakaan lain yang mungkin terjadi dalam perjalanan?

Bisakah kita bersiap sebelum kecelakaan terjadi?

18
 Can we make it more systematic?
Parameter Guideword Possible Consequences Action Safeguard
Causes
Car speed Too fast Rushing Skidded when - Slow down -ABS brake
Too slow emergency brake - Speed up system
-Safety belt
- Air bag
Tire No thread Tire too old, Car skidded - Check frequently
Less thread often speeding - Have spare tire
and emergency
break
Window Low Rain Cannot see the
visibility Very low road

Car light Dim -Stop car

No light -Go to nearest
garage
-Use emergency
signal
Road With holes Breaks the car - Put a signboard
Rocky tire -Street lights
Travel time Night No street light -Travel during
Foggy daylight
19
 What is a HAZOP study?

 Teknik sistematis untuk MENGIDENTIFIKASI potensi

BAHAYA dan masalah operasi
 Melibatkan tim multi-disiplin secara metodis
“brainstorming” desain pabrik
 Teknik kualitatif berdasarkan “guides world” untuk
membantu memprovokasi pemikiran tentang cara
penyimpangan dari kondisi operasi yang dimaksud
dapat menyebabkan situasi berbahaya atau masalah
pengoperasian.

20
 What is a HAZOP study?

 Studi HAZOP adalah prosedur pemeriksaan.

 Tujuannya adalah untuk mengidentifikasi semua
penyimpangan yang mungkin dari cara di mana desain
diharapkan bekerja dan untuk mengidentifikasi semua
bahaya yang terkait dengan penyimpangan ini.
 Ketika penyimpangan muncul yang menghasilkan bahaya,
tindakan dihasilkan yang memerlukan insinyur desain untuk
meninjau dan menyarankan solusi untuk menghilangkan
bahaya atau untuk mengurangi risikonya ke tingkat yang
dapat diterima.

21
 Origin of HAZOP study

 HAZOP awalnya 'diciptakan' oleh ICI di Inggris, tetapi teknik ini

baru mulai lebih banyak digunakan dalam industri proses kimia
setelah bencana Flixborough pada tahun 1974.
 Ledakan pabrik kimia ini menewaskan dua puluh delapan orang
dan melukai puluhan lainnya, banyak dari mereka adalah anggota
masyarakat yang tinggal di dekatnya.
 Melalui pertukaran ide dan personel secara umum, sistem ini
kemudian diadopsi oleh industri perminyakan, yang memiliki
potensi serupa untuk bencana besar.
 Ini kemudian diikuti oleh industri makanan dan air, di mana
potensi bahayanya sama besar, tetapi dengan sifat yang berbeda,
kekhawatirannya lebih berkaitan dengan kontaminasi daripada
ledakan atau pelepasan bahan kimia.

22
Potential Hazard AND Operability
Problems

Why the big AND ?

23
Potential Hazard AND Operability Problems

Karena profil tinggi dari kecelakaan pabrik

produksi, penekanan terlalu sering diberikan pada
identifikasi bahaya untuk mengabaikan potensi
masalah operabilitas.

Namun di bidang yang terakhir inilah manfaat dari

Studi HAZOP biasanya yang terbesar.

24
 Example
 Sebuah studi ditugaskan untuk pabrik baru.
 Sekitar dua tahun sebelumnya, dan untuk pertama kalinya,
penelitian serupa telah dilakukan pada pabrik yang berbeda
di lokasi yang sama yang kemudian dalam proses
perancangan.
 Sebelum peninjauan terakhir dimulai, Manajer Produksi
menyatakan harapan bahwa manfaat yang sama akan
bertambah seperti sebelumnya, menyatakan hal itu
 "Dalam pengalamannya selama dua puluh tahun, tidak
pernah ada pabrik baru yang ditugaskan dengan begitu
sedikit masalah, dan tidak ada pabrik lain yang pernah
mencapai target produksi dan posisi impasnya dalam waktu
yang sangat singkat".

25
 Objectives of a HAZOP study
Safety Issues:
– Untuk mengidentifikasi skenario yang akan mengarah pada pelepasan
bahan berbahaya atau mudah terbakar ke atmosfir, sehingga membuat
pekerja mengalami cedera.
– Untuk memeriksa keamanan desain
– Untuk meningkatkan keamanan fasilitas yang ada dan atau yang
dimodifikasi
Operability Issues:
– Untuk memutuskan apakah dan di mana membangun
– Untuk memeriksa prosedur operasi dan keselamatan
– Untuk memverifikasi bahwa instrumentasi keselamatan berfungsi
secara optimal
– Untuk memfasilitasi permulaan yang cepat dan aman
– Untuk meminimalkan modifikasi menit terakhir yang ekstensif
– Untuk memastikan operasi jangka panjang bebas masalah

“Prevention is better than control”

26
 Philosophy – Hazard vs Operability

 HAZOP berkonsentrasi pada pengidentifikasian baik

bahaya maupun masalah pengoperasian. Sementara
studi HAZOP dirancang untuk mengidentifikasi bahaya
melalui pendekatan sistematis, lebih dari 80% dari
rekomendasi studi adalah masalah operabilitas dan
bukan merupakan bahaya.

 Meskipun identifikasi bahaya adalah fokus utama,

masalah operabilitas harus diidentifikasi sejauh
mereka berpotensi menyebabkan bahaya proses,
mengakibatkan pelanggaran lingkungan atau memiliki
dampak negatif pada profitabilitas.

27
 Definition of Hazard & Operability
 Bahaya - operasi apa pun yang dapat menyebabkan
pelepasan bahan kimia beracun, mudah terbakar
atau mudah meledak atau tindakan apa pun yang
dapat mengakibatkan cedera pada personel.

 Operabilitas - setiap operasi di dalam amplop

desain yang akan menyebabkan penutupan yang
mungkin dapat menyebabkan pelanggaran
peraturan lingkungan, kesehatan atau keselamatan
atau berdampak negatif terhadap profitabilitas.

28
 Benefits

 The circumstances when HAZOPs are likely to produce

benefits are:
– selama desain atau pemasangan pabrik atau proses baru, atau
modifikasi besar ke yang sudah ada;
– ketika ada bahaya unik seperti bahaya lingkungan dan masalah
kualitas atau biaya yang terkait dengan operasi;
– mengikuti insiden besar yang melibatkan kebakaran, ledakan,
pelepasan racun dll; dan
– untuk membenarkan mengapa kode praktik tertentu, catatan
pedoman atau kode industri tidak diikuti.

29
 When should a HAZOP be held
 Selama berbagai tahap desain pabrik
 Di awal proyek sebagai 'spesifikasi keselamatan dan lingkungan'
 Menjelang akhir definisi proses, ketika lembar Alur Proses tersedia
sebagai Tinjauan Keselamatan dan Lingkungan
 Saat P & ID berada pada tahap 'Disetujui untuk Desain' (HAZOP desain
akhir)
 Selama inspeksi lokasi konstruksi memastikan bahwa rekomendasi yang
muncul dari HAZOP atau ulasan keselamatan dan lingkungan lainnya
sedang dilaksanakan.
 Studi pra-commissioning meninjau prosedur instalasi dan melakukan
audit keselamatan konvensional
 Setelah operasional, audit pabrik dan prosedur pada interval reguler
memastikan kesadaran keselamatan yang berkelanjutan

30
 HAZOP study of existing plant

 Dapat dilakukan kapan saja

 Terutama digunakan untuk meningkatkan prosedur operasi
atau saat memodifikasi pabrik
 Kadang-kadang digunakan untuk mengidentifikasi
kemungkinan perbaikan di pabrik di mana tingkat kecelakaan
atau insiden abnormal tinggi
 Dapat digunakan bersamaan dengan audit keselamatan
instalasi
 Membutuhkan perawatan luar biasa untuk sepenuhnya
menentukan ruang lingkup dan tujuan penelitian
 Meskipun pengetahuan operasi terperinci, banyak dari
maksud desain asli sering tidak diketahui

31
 Simple Example of a HAZOP Study
Produksi Diammonium Phosphate (DAP)

Asam fosfat dan amonia dicampur, dan produk yang tidak

berbahaya, diammonium fosfat (DAP), dihasilkan jika reaksi
amonia lengkap. Jika terlalu sedikit asam fosfat ditambahkan,
reaksinya tidak lengkap, dan amonia diproduksi. Amonia yang
tersedia terlalu sedikit untuk reaktor menghasilkan produk
yang aman tetapi tidak diinginkan.
Kedua bahan kimia tersebut akan digunakan dalam jumlah
besar dan dalam bentuk pekat. Karena sifat kedua bahan
kimia yang sangat korosif, tim proyek ditugaskan untuk
menyelidiki bahaya yang ditimbulkan kepada staf dari reaksi
yang dihasilkan dari jalur penelitian 1 (jalur pengiriman asam
fosfat).

32
Production of DAP (continuous process)

Valve A

Phosphoric Acid

Study line 1
Phosphoric acid delivery line

Valve C
Valve B

Ammonia
Diammonium
Phosphate
(DAP)

Reactor

33
HAZOP Study Report on line 1 of DAP

34
 Preliminary HAZOP Example

Monomer Lihat sistem reaktor yang ditunjukkan.

Cooling Coils
Feed
Reaksinya eksotermis. Sistem pendingin
disediakan untuk menghilangkan energi
berlebih dari reaksi. Jika fungsi pendingin
Cooling Water hilang, suhu reaktor akan meningkat. Ini
akan menyebabkan peningkatan laju reaksi
to Sewer
yang mengarah ke pelepasan energi
tambahan.

Hasilnya bisa berupa reaksi yang tak terkendali

Cooling dengan tekanan yang melebihi tekanan
Water In ledakan reaktor. Suhu di dalam reaktor
diukur dan digunakan untuk mengontrol
laju aliran air pendingin oleh katup.

TC Perform HAZOP Study

Thermocouple

35
Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor - Example
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO No cooling Temperature
increase in reactor

REVERSE Reverse Failure of water

cooling flow source resulting
in backward flow
MORE More cooling Instruct
flow operators on
procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor Check
product in maintenance
coils procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source
material contaminated
besides
cooling water

36
 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor – Answer
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NO No cooling Cooling water valve Temperature increase Install high
malfunction in reactor temperature alarm
(TAH)
REVERSE Reverse Failure of water Less cooling, Install check valve
cooling flow source resulting in possible runaway
backward flow reaction

MORE More cooling Control valve Too much cooling, Instruct operators
flow failure, operator reactor cool on procedures
fails to take action
on alarm
AS WELL AS Reactor More pressure in Off-spec product Check
product in coils reactor maintenance
procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another Water source May be cooling If less cooling,
material contaminated inefffective and effect TAH will detect. If
besides on the reaction detected, isolate
cooling water water source.
Back up water
source?

37
 HAZOP – The Critical Success Factor
 Proses HAZOP didasarkan pada prinsip bahwa
pendekatan tim untuk analisis bahaya akan
mengidentifikasi lebih banyak masalah daripada ketika
individu yang bekerja secara terpisah menggabungkan
hasil. HAZOP
 tim terdiri dari individu-individu dengan berbagai latar
belakang dan keahlian.
 Keahlian disatukan selama sesi HAZOP dan melalui
upaya brainstorming kolektif yang merangsang
kreativitas dan ide-ide baru, tinjauan menyeluruh dari
proses yang sedang dipertimbangkan dibuat.

38
 HAZOP Terminology - 1
Term Definition

Cause Alasan mengapa DEVIATION dapat terjadi. PENYEBAB

Lebih banyak dapat diidentifikasi untuk satu DEVIATION.

Comments Setiap komentar yang akan diberikan kepada

REKOMENDASI atau yang, dengan cara lain, muncul
selama sesi HAZOP.

Consequence Hasil DEVIATION, jika itu terjadi. KONSEKUENSI dapat

terdiri dari bahaya proses dan masalah pengoperasian,
seperti shutdown pabrik. Lebih banyak KONSEKUENSI
dapat mengikuti dari satu penyebab dan, pada gilirannya,
satu KONSEKUENSI dapat memiliki beberapa PENYEBAB.

39
 HAZOP Terminology - 2
Term Definition
Deviation Suatu cara di mana kondisi proses dapat berangkat dari INTENSI
mereka.
Intention / Design Deskripsi tentang bagaimana proses diharapkan untuk
intent berperilaku di Garis Studi. Ini dijelaskan secara kualitatif
sebagai aktivitas (mis., Umpan, reaksi, sedimentasi) dan / atau
secara kuantitatif dalam parameter proses, seperti suhu, laju
aliran, tekanan, komposisi, dll.
Keyword/ Sepatah kata singkat untuk menciptakan imajinasi
Guideword PENYELESAIAN INTENSI. Set Guidewords yang paling banyak
digunakan adalah: TIDAK, LEBIH, LEBIH KURANG, SERTA
BAGIAN, DARI LAINNYA DARI DAN KEMBALI. GUIDEWORDS
diterapkan, pada gilirannya, untuk semua PARAMETER, untuk
mengidentifikasi DEVIASI yang tak terduga dan kredibel dari
INTENTION.

40
 HAZOP Terminology - 3

Term Definition

Parameter Parameter yang relevan untuk kondisi proses, mis.,

Tekanan, suhu, komposisi, dll.
Study Line/ Node Lokasi spesifik dalam proses di mana (penyimpangan)
niat proses dievaluasi. Contohnya mungkin: pemisah,
penukar panas, scrubber, pompa, kompresor, dan pipa
yang saling terhubung dengan peralatan
Recommendation Kegiatan yang diidentifikasi selama studi HAZOP untuk
tindak lanjut. Ini dapat terdiri dari perbaikan teknis dalam
desain, modifikasi dalam status gambar dan deskripsi
proses, langkah-langkah prosedural yang akan
dikembangkan atau studi mendalam lebih lanjut yang
akan dilakukan.

41
 HAZOP Terminology - 4
Term Definition
Fasilitas yang membantu mengurangi frekuensi kemunculan
Safeguard DEVIATION atau untuk mengurangi KONSEKUENSI-nya. Pada
dasarnya ada lima jenis SAFEGUARDS:
Fasilitas yang mengidentifikasi DEVIATION. Ini terdiri, antara
lain, instrumentasi alarm dan deteksi operator manusia.
Fasilitas yang mengkompensasi DEVIATION, mis., Sistem
kontrol otomatis yang mengurangi umpan ke kapal jika terjadi
pengisian berlebih (kenaikan level). Ini biasanya merupakan
bagian terintegrasi dari kontrol proses.
Fasilitas yang mencegah DEVIATION terjadi. Contohnya
adalah gas selimut lembam dalam penyimpanan zat yang
mudah terbakar.
Fasilitas yang mencegah eskalasi DEVIATION lebih lanjut,
mis., Dengan perjalanan (total) kegiatan. Fasilitas-fasilitas ini
seringkali saling terkait dengan beberapa unit dalam
prosesnya, seringkali dikontrol oleh komputer logis.
Fasilitas yang membebaskan proses dari DEVIATION
berbahaya. Ini termasuk misalnya: katup pengaman tekanan
(PSV) dan sistem ventilasi. 42
 HAZOP Terminology - 4
Term Definition
Action – Jika penyebab yang dapat dipercaya menghasilkan
konsekuensi negatif, harus diputuskan apakah beberapa
tindakan harus diambil. Pada tahap inilah konsekuensi dan
perlindungan terkait dipertimbangkan. Jika dianggap bahwa
tindakan perlindungan memadai, maka tidak ada tindakan yang
perlu diambil, dan kata-kata untuk efek tersebut dicatat dalam
kolom Tindakan.
– Tindakan terbagi dalam dua kelompok:
–Tindakan yang menghilangkan penyebabnya.
–Tindakan yang mengurangi atau menghilangkan konsekuensi.
– Sedangkan yang pertama lebih disukai, itu tidak selalu
mungkin, terutama ketika berhadapan dengan kerusakan
peralatan. Namun, selalu selidiki menghapus penyebabnya
terlebih dahulu, dan hanya jika perlu mengurangi
konsekuensinya. 43
 HAZOP Methodology - Content

 HAZOP Study Planning and Preparations

 HAZOP Study Team - Role and Responsibilities
 Meeting Arrangements
 Reporting and Follow-up
 HAZOP Guidewords;
 Possible Causes & Consequences
 Plant; Safeguards & Action Required
 Working Session 2: Chemical Plant

44
HAZOP Planning and Execution
CLOSE OUT
Record/File
Completed
Actions
TRACK
ACTIONS
HAZOP
Review
Meeting
REPORT
Action List
HAZOP
Report
TEAM
System
Assessment
Team Activity
PLAN
Select Team
Examine System
Keywords

45
 HAZOP study team
 Independent leader (e.g., not from plant studied)
– Preferred but complete independence not essential
 Project engineer
– Provide engineering input
 Operations representative
– Plant operation
 Discipline engineers
– Process
– Instrument/ electrical
– Mechanical/ maintenance
 HAZOP minute recorder
– One of the above

46
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP leader - The leader should be independent (i.e. has no

responsibility for the process and/or the performance of operations)
•Plan sessions and timetable
•Control discussion
•Limit discussion
•Encourage team to draw conclusion
•Ensure secretary has time for taking note
•Keep team in focus
•Encourage imagination of team members
•Motivate members
•Discourage recriminations
•Judge importance issues
47
 Checklist for HAZOP Leader

 Always prepare study program in advance.

 Agree on the format or form to be used.
 Prepare follow up procedures.
 Brief members about HAZOP during first meeting.
 Stop the team trying to redesign the process.
 HAZOP is a team exercise. Do not let anybody (including
the leader himself to dominate).

48
 Checklist for HAZOP Leader

 If conflict arises, handle with care.

 Avoid long discussions by recording areas which need to be
resolved outside meeting.
 Leader must be strong, yet diplomatic.
 Speak clearly. Make you point.
 Better have experience working as team member previously.
 Do not skip anything….some time small things may cause big
accident.

49
Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

HAZOP Secretary

• Take adequate notes

• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing
• Produce interim lists of recommendations
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report

50
Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members
Process Engineer

• Provide a simple description

• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions

51
Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members

Mechanical Design Engineer

• Provide specification details

• Provide vendor package details
• Provide equipment and piping layout information

Instrument Engineer

• Provide details of control philosophy

• Provide interlock and alarm details
• Provide info on shutdown, safety features

52
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members
Plant Engineer or Manager
• Provide information on compatibility with any existing adjacent plant
• Provide details of site utilities and services
• Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on maintenance access and
modifications
Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor
• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an operating
experience view point
• Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant stability at the
specified control parameters
• Provide information on experienced operability deviations of hazard
potential

53
Responsibility of HAZOP Team Members
Chemist

• Provide details of process chemistry

• Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations, byproducts,
corrosion etc)

Project Engineer

• Provide details of cost and time estimation and also budget constraints.
• Ensure rapid approval if required

54
 Questioning Techniques
 Open questions
– Help person being asked to think – use words how,
what and why.
 Closed questions
– To focus on an issue or problem. Start with words
who, when, where.
– Required answer yes or no only.
 Question mix
– Mix between open and closed questions.

55
 Questioning Techniques

 Things to avoid
– Ambiguous or vague questions.
– Double barelled/multiple questions.
– Long complicated questions.
– Interrogation type of questions.
– A loaded questions – implied judgement.

56
 Required information

 P & IDs
 Process flow diagrams
 Heat and Material Balances
 Layouts
 Logic Diagrams
 Equipment Data Sheets
 Material Hazard Data Sheets
 Hazardous area Layouts

57
 Modes of operation to consider

 The following modes of plant operation should be considered

for each node:
– Normal operation
– Reduced throughput operation
– Routine start-up
– Routine shut-down
– Emergency shutdown
– Commissioning
– Special operating modes

58
 HAZOP meeting
 Proposed agenda:

•Introduction & presentation of participation

•Overall presentation of the system/operation to be analyzed
•Description of the HAZOP approach
•Presentation of the first node or logical part of the operation
•Analyze the first node/ part using the guide-words and
parameters
•Continue presentation and analysis (steps 4 & 5)
•Coarse summary of findings

Focus should be on potential hazards as well as potential

operational problems.

59
 Sequence for conducting a HAZOP Study
Flow diagram for the HAZOP analysis – The parameter-first approach

PHASE 1: DIVIDE SECTION Divide section into Study line

Specify the section or stage to be examined

PHASE 2: SELECT A LINE
PHASE 3: Describe & discuss the step/ operation; determine the design envelope.
ANALYSIS Develop & record the design intention

From the description and the design intention select a parameter

Combine this parameter with a guideword to develop a meaningful deviation

Seek a possible cause of the deviation and identify the consequences

Evaluate the safeguards and decide if they are adequate of if a change

or further study is needed.

Record
PHASE 4: RECORDING
PHASE 5: REEVALUATE Have all causes of this deviation been considered? NO

YES

Does any other guideword combine with this parameter to give a meaningful deviation? YES

NO

Are there further parameters to consider? YES

NO

Examination of the steps/ stage is complete

60
 How to be a good HAZOP participant

 Be active! Everyone contribution is important

 Be to the point. Avoid endless discussion of details
 Be critical in a positive way – not negative, but
constructive
 Be responsible. He who knows should let the other
know

61
 HAZOP recording
 The findings are recorded during the meeting(s) using a
HAZOP work-sheet, either by filling in paper copies, or by
using a computer connected to a projector
(recommended).

 The HAZOP worksheet may be different depending on the

scope of the study – generally the following entries
(columns) are included
• Ref. no.
• Guidewords
• Deviations
• Possible causes
• Consequences
• Safeguards
• Actions required (or, recommendations)
• Actions allocated to (follow up responsibility)

62
 Process HAZOP worksheet
Hazards and Operability Review
Project Name: Date: Page of
Process :
Section: Ref.
Drawing:
Item Study Process Deviations Possibl Possible Action
node Parameter (guide words) e consequences Required
causes

63
 Guidewords/ Keywords
The basic HAZOP guide-words are:
Guide-word Meaning
No (not, none) None of the design intent is
achieved
More (more of, higher) Quantitative increase in a
parameter
Less (less of, lower) Quantitative decrease in a
parameter
As well as (more than) An additional activity occurs
Part of Only some of the design
intention is achieved
Reverse Logical opposite of the design
intention occurs
Other than (Other) Complete substitution – another
activity takes place
Example
No flow when production is
expected
Higher temperature than desired
Lower pressure than normal
Other valves closed at the same
time (logic fault or human error)
Only part of the system is shut
down
Back-flow when the system
shuts down
Liquids in the gas piping
64
 Additional guidewords

Guide-word Meaning
Early/ late The timing is different from the intention

Before/ after The step (or part of it) is effected out of sequence

Faster/ slower The step is done/not done with the right timing

Where else Applicable for flows, transfer, sources and

destinations

65
 Process parameter

 Process parameter may generally be classified into the

following groups:
– Physical parameters related to input medium properties
– Physical parameters related to input medium conditions
– Physical parameters related to system dynamics
– Non-physical parameters related to batch type process
– Parameters related to system operations
These parameters are not necessarily used in conjunction with guide-words
• Instrumentation
• Relief
• Startup/ shutdown
• Maintenance
• Safety/ contingency
• Sampling

66
 Examples of process parameter

Flow Composition pH
Pressure Addition Sequence
Temperature Separation Signal
Mixing Time Start/stop
Stirring Phase Operate
Transfer Speed Maintain
Level Particle size Service
Viscosity Measure Communication
Reaction Control Absorb

67
 Examples of process parameter -2

Isolate Corrode Drain

Vent Erode Purge
Inspect Separate (settle, Maintain
filter, centrifuge

Start-up Reduce (grind, Shut-down

crush, etc)

68
 Guidewords + Parameter

Some examples of combinations of guide-words and parameters:

 NO FLOW
– Wrong flow path – blockage – incorrect slip plate – incorrectly fitted return
valve – burst pipe – large leak – equipment failure – incorrect pressure
differential – isolation in error
 MORE FLOW
– Increase pumping capacity – increased suction pressure – reduced
delivery head – greater fluid density – exchanger tube leaks – cross
connection of systems – control faults
 MORE TEMPERATURE
– Ambient conditions – failed exchanger tubes – fire situation – cooling
water failure – defective control – internal fires

69
 Causes of Deviations – 3 Types

 Human error - which are acts of omission or commission by an operator,

designer, constructor or other person creating a hazard that could
possibly result in a release of hazardous or flammable material.
 Equipment failure - in which a mechanical, structural or operating failure
results in the release of hazardous or flammable material.
 External Events - in which items outside the unit being reviewed affect the
operation of the unit to the extent that the release of hazardous or
flammable material is possible. External events include upsets on
adjacent units affecting the safe operation of the unit (or node) being
studied, loss of utilities, and exposure from weather and seismic activity.

70
 Consequences & Safeguards
 All consequences of any credible causes of a release that
are identified by the group must be determined in order to:
– help to determine a risk ranking in HAZOPs where multiple hazards are uncovered
by the group so that priority can be established in addressing the hazard.
– help make the determination as to whether a particular deviation results in an
operability problem or hazard.
 If the team concludes from the consequences that a particular
cause of a deviation results in an operability problem only, then
the discussion should end and the team should move on to the
next cause, deviation or node.
 If the team determines that the cause will result in the release of
hazardous or flammable material, then safeguards should be
identified.

71
 Consequences & Safeguards

 Safeguards should be included whenever the team

determines that a combination of cause and consequence
presents a credible process hazard.

 What constitutes a safeguard can be summarized based on

the following general criteria:
• Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are
designed to prevent a catastrophic release of hazardous or
flammable material.
• Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning
following the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or flammable
material.
• Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the
consequences of a release of hazardous or flammable material.

72
 HAZOP Study Reporting
 The report must be placed with the HSE Assessment and Control of Work and will largely consist
of the record sheet(s), however, the following information should be included:  

– An outline of the terms of reference and scope of the study.

– A very brief description of the process which was studied
– The procedures and protocol employed.  The Keyword combinations applied should be listed,
together with the explanatory meanings given to the team at the start of the study.  Also the
fact that Action Sheets have been produced and responses will be recorded should be
explained.  A brief description of the Action File (described in the following section) should be
included.
– General comments.  If, for example, the team were assured that high point vents and low point
drains would be universally provided, mention that statement and its source.  If certain details
of vendor packages were not available, explain and list the items which were not reviewed.
– Results.  This usually states the number of recommended actions.
– Appendices:
• Master copies of the drawings studied.
• Copies of technical data used.
• Cause and Effect charts (i.e. matrices showing the executive action of safety related instruments
and trips).
• Any calculations produced.
• Relevant correspondence between departments, from contractor to vendor, or client to contractor.
– HAZOP study record sheets

73
 HAZOP Study Action Follow-up

 An addendum to the HAZOP report, to be

issued when the actions have been completed
 Deviations from the original intent should be
noted
 Major changes may require a follow-up
HAZOP study

74
HAZOP Exercise

75
Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat Exchanger

 Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

76
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 1

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

Less Less flow of Pipe blockage Temperature of High
cooling process fluid Temperature
water remains constant Alarm
More More cooling Failure of Temperature of Low
flow cooling water process fluid Temperature
valve decrease Alarm
More of More Failure of Bursting of tube Install high
pressure on process fluid pressure alarm
tube side valve
Contamination Contaminati Leakage of Contamination of Proper
on of tube and process fluid maintainance
process fluid cooling water and operator
line goes in alert
Corrosion Corrosion of Hardness of Less cooling and Proper
tube cooling water crack of tube maintainence

77
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger – Answer 2
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action
NONE No cooling Failure of inlet Process fluid Install
water flow cooling water temperature is not Temperature
valve to open lowered indicator before
and after the
accordingly process fluid line
Install TAH
MORE More cooling Failure of inlet Output of Process Install
water flow cooling water fluid temperature Temperature
valve to close too low indicator before
and after process
fluid line
Install TAL
LESS Less cooling Pipe leakage Process fluid Installation of flow
water temperature too low meter

REVERSE Reverse Failure of process Product off set Install check valve
process fluid fluid inlet valve (whether it is
flow crucial have to
check?)

CONTAMINATIO Process fluid Contamination in Outlet temperature Proper

N contamination cooling water too low maintenance and
operator alert
78
 Some References
 Frank P. Lees (1980). “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard
Identification, Assessment and Control.” Volume 1. Butterworth & Co
(Publishers) Ltd.
 Frank P. Lees (1980). “Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard
Identification, Assessment and Control.” Volume 2. Butterworth & Co
(Publishers) Ltd.
 Frank Crawley, Malcolm Preston & Brian Tyler (2000). “HAZOP: Guide to
best practice. Guidelines to best practice for the process and chemical
industries”. Institution of Chemical Engineers, UK.
 Risk Management Group (1992). “Hazard & Operability Studies. Basic 2-
day Training Course Notes.” ICI Australia Engineering Pty Ltd.
 Marvin Rausand (2004). “HAZOP. Hazard and Operability Study.”
Department of Production and Quality Engineering, Norwegian University
of Science and Technology.

79