STUDY KASUS

KEGAGALAN PROTEKSI KELISTRIKAN

PLTP UNIT-1 TRIP AKIBAT DIFFERENTIAL
RELAY GENERATOR AKTIF

Oleh: R. Anton Purwakusuma

Bandung, November 2021

POKOK PEMBAHASAN
• PENDAHULUAN
• DAMPAK
• ANALISA PERMASALAHAN
• LANGKAH PERBAIKAN
• KESIMPULAN

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Executive Summary
• On Friday 26 Feb 2021 at 09.22 pm, generator differential protection (87G) was activated causing Unit-1 Wayang
Windu turbine and generator were tripped by the lockout relay while it was exporting 107 MW.

• The protection relay log showed that the differential current was detected at phase T while the DCS measurement
reading showed the unbalance current measured at phase S.

• Based on the insulation resistance test result, there was no indication of the real phase fault on the stator winding.

• There was a finding on the cable of CT circuit of phase T. The cable insulation had broken and its conductor was
exposed to the wye (neutral) bus bar connection of generator stator winding.

• Corrective action was immediately done by wrapping up with the new insulation and rerouting the cable to prevent
reoccurring problem

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Background
On Friday 26 Feb 2021 at 09.22 pm, generator differential protection (87G) was activated causing Unit-1 Wayang
Windu turbine and generator were tripped by the lockout relay while it was exporting 107 MW.

Failure Description
There was an unbalance current indication at Phase S on DCS screen. There are possible causes of a trip based on
historical events:
1. Generator winding internal failure
2. Instrumentation failure (Generator Current Transformer or its sensing wiring problem)
3. Generator Protection Relay malfunction

Protection System
No Protection System Function Performed Status
1. 87G1 S/D if active Exist and active

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Investigation
Fact Finding and Observation Result
Based on DCS trending and Relay log list event, IC&E team has done several of action such as: LOTO application to
perform troubleshooting, Generator winding insulation resistance test, Generator end winding visual inspection, cable
damage replacement and re-routing the existing CT cable.

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Sequence of Event
Factual Chronological Information

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Sequence of Event
Factual Chronological Information
Date: 26 Feb 2021
 21:22Call maint team and collect related documents
 23:45 Discuss and visual inspection
 
Date: 27 Feb 2021
 06:00Apply LOTO
 09:00 Open generator terminal, open connection to generator terminal, check winding condition and test .
 10:00 Perform generator winding internal , instrumentation (Generator Current Transformer or its sensing
wiring) , generator Protection Relay.
 13:00 Generator visual inspection
 14:00 Perform CT test
 18:00 Generator termination
 19:00 Monitoring U1 due to shut down condition
 20:30Found CT cable broken.
 21:00Repair CT cable completed.
 22:00 Generator protection relay inspection (Log Event Relay)
 23:00 Startup preparation

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Analysis of Suspected Cause
Based on the as-found finding and data trending, it was expected that the possible cause of the 87G1 failure were
1. Generator winding internal failure,
2. Instrumentation failure (Generator Current Transformer or its sensing wiring problem)
3. Generator Protection Relay malfunction.

During the event, several inspection and test was carried out in generator winding resistance test. Visual inspection then
conducted and found cable to CT was broken (burnt out) on cable section that attached to wye connection of neutral bus bar
(wye connection) of generator stator winding.

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Why Tree Analysis

Improper CT Cable Installation:

Verification:
It was found that CT cable insulation surface at phase T had broken. The
conductor of the CT cable was attached and undergo excessive friction with
the neutral bus bar (wye connection) of generator stator winding
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Why Tree Analysis
• Main contributing factor and the only cause is CT cable insulation surface at phase T had broken. The conductor of the CT cable was
attached and undergo excessive friction with the neutral bus bar (wye connection) of generator stator winding.
• After cable replacement completed, current transformer test, insulation test (megger test) was conducted and considered safe to start the
turbine. (Note : Fail to start U-1 on was due to another failure event occurrence on Condenser Level A1_LIT 1020)
• U-1 could start up normally and reach full load on 28 Feb at 17.16 hrs.

Verification Of Potential Cause

1. Maintenance issue :
No corrective action where DCS data show abnormal condition.
There is no outstanding W/O or 87 G1 Relay issue prior accident.
2. Installation Issue :
It was found that CT cable insulation surface at phase T had
broken. The conductor of the CT cable was exposed and
touched (closed) the neutral bus bar (wye connection) of
generator stator winding The conclusion withdrawn is improper
installation were obviously main contributor for this accident.
4. Fabrication Issue :
it was found that all material used and equipment are aligned
with spec in drawing and instrument data.
5. Design Issue :
By evaluating Cable size, based on AWG standard to design
intent and electric current applied. Team found that the cable
size is 2.5 mm and considered adequate. .
6. Process Condition Issue :

3. Operation Issue :
SOP Implementation during start up after plant S/D due to 87 G1
relay activated where clarified to operation team. From DCS data
and information given during RCA discussion it was found that
anomalies in 87 G1 relay prior to S/D were identified by
operation team by DCS alarm. SOP for start up (PRD-3.0-GEL-
OP-203-SOP Turbine Start Up) also followed as well.
Focused on CT cable usage whether it exceed lifetime limit that
might have contributing factor to this event. Generator design
lifetime is ~ 25 years. Team also found that cable installation
nearby still have good condition.
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Corrective Action, Conclusion and Recommendation
Corrective Action:
IC&E Maintenance team performed corrective action by replacing the damage cable and re-routing all the CT cable with
proper way, then proceed to start up the turbine successfully which also confirm that the problem is related to current
transformer cable that touch the generator wye connection bus bar.

Conclusion:
RCA team had come up with conclusion that the root cause of failure of Protection Relay (87G1) active was the problem on
current transformer cable that touched (closed) to the generator wye connection bus bar. This problem might be come from
improper installation and surroundings that triggered the cable touching the generator wye connection bus bar.

Recommendation:
• Perform Relay test on next SDTA (both Unit 1 and Unit 2).
• Check the CT and PT cable installation of the generator protection relay on the next SDTA, compare and update the
existing drawing if needed (both Unit 1 and Unit 2).
• Share this incident to other assets (Salak and Darajat) for lesson learned.
• Install the Digital Fault Recorder(DFR) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 for further analysis.
.

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