1 Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968

Facts:

A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.

Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond
our jurisdictional function to tax.

Held: NO. Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty. It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

2 Western Mindanao State University Colloge of Law LLB 1C Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2 People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476 G.R. No. L-36409 FACTS: The accuse Loreta Gozo brought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. Then, she was charged by the City Engineers Office for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE:(Whether or not)can be omitted , does the city government has administrative jurisdiction and should enforce its Municipal Ordinance over the US Naval Reservation? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.

The HELD in this case is a good example. It directly answered the issue and then gave a supporting explanation as to why the court said YES

3 Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3) Case: Magallona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476 FACTS: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522. This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. The petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522. ISSUE: W/N RA 9522 (AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) is constitutional. HELD: YES. The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III. The Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough.

4 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS Tondo Medical vs Court of Appeals Facts: Petitioners Tondo Medical filed for the petition , assailing the decision of the Court of appeals after it was denied for the nullification of the Health sector Reform Agenda (HSRA).That such collection would add burden to the economically disadvantaged citizens. Issue: Whether or not the Health sector Reform Agenda run counter to the provisions of the Constitution. Held: The Court denied the petition of the petitioner and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The HELD did not give any explanation as to why the court denied the petition. The HELD should contain the doctrine/ point of the case.

5 Alsam B. Adjilul LLB 1C College of Law WMSU Bases conversion and development authority vs. Comission on election 580 SCRA 295 Facts: On May 22, 1996, State Auditor Nida M. Blanco of the COA, disallowed in audit the Loyalty Service Award for 1995, the Children's Allowance for the period January to December of 1995, the Anniversary Bonus for 1995, and the 8th step salary increase effective January, 1995, for being excessive and/or illegal and not in accordance with the Central Bank benefit package. Petitioner claims that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of the (1) Loyalty Service Award, (2) 8th step increment, and (3) Children's Allowance. Issues: Whether or not the petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Commission On Audit (COA) Decision No. 99-057 dated March 23, 1999 and Resolution No. 2000-89 dated March 7, 2000, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Held: Yes, the petition is partly granted. The assailed Decision No. 99-057 dated March 23, 1999 and Resolution No. 2000-89 dated March 7, 2000 issued by the COA are modified in the sense that the disapproval of the Childrens Allowance is set aside. We hold that respondent COA, in disallowing the Childrens Allowance, committed grave abuse of discretion.

6
FACTS: 1. On November 14,1990, Associate Justice Reynato Puno wrote the Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. As a background, petitioner was first appointed as Assoc. Justice of the Court of Appeals on June 20,1980 and took his oath of office for the said position on November 29,1982. 2. On Jan. 17,1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa 129. Subsequently, the petitioner was appointed as Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the IAC. 3. On Nov. 7,1984, the petitioner accepted his appointment as Deputy Minister of Justice ceasing his membership in the Judiciary.

4. After the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, affecting reorganization in the Judiciary.

5. A Screening Committee recommended the return of the petitioner as AJ of the new Court of Appeals and listed him as number 11 in the roster of Appellate Court Justices. However, when the appointment papers were signed by President Aquino on July 28,1986, Justice Punos seniority ranking changed from No. 11 to No. 26. 6. On Nov. 29,1990, the Court en banc issued a Resolution granting the petitioners request. 7. Later, Associate Justices Jose Campos Jr. and Luis Javellana, two (2) of the justices affected by the ordered correction, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the present CA is a new court and that the courts where the petitioner was previously appointed have already ceased to exist and therefore the petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court nor claim that he was returning to his former court. 8. When the Court asked the petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration, Justice Puno argued that, by virtue of E.O. 33 read in relation to BP 129 and by President Aquinos pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Constitution) that no right provided in the ungratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution , his seniority ranking should now be at number 5. Petitioner likewise claimed that although he power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by EO 33 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law. ISSUE: The main issue is whether or not the present Court of Appeals is now a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority.

HELD: The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and recognized and upheld the seniority ranking of the members of the Court of Appeals, including that of Assoc. Justice Puno, at the time the appointments were approved by President Aquino in 1986.

7 Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani Case no. 7 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan GR no. 104768, July 21, 2003 FACTS: President Aquino issued Executive Order no. 1, creating a Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) task to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinate and close associates. Based on the mandate of EO no. 1, AFP board investigated reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major Josephus Q. Ramas and alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. They confiscated sum of money, communication equipments, jewelries and land titles in a search they conducted at the house of Ms. Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the confiscated items is valid. HELD: No, since the government under Pres. Cory Aquino is a revolutionary government established by the authority of the legitimate sovereign, and established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. The action taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with law. Sec.1 of Art. II provides that The Philippines is a Democratic and Republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

the issue is more relevant to the bill of rights and not to sec. 1 of art 2. The issue MUST be in connection with the provision where it is under

8 Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh 75

PHIL

113

FACT Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government. HELD Yes, civil case filed can be continued since the the government establish during the Japanese occupation is a de facto, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.

Well-done!!!!

ACCFA v CUGCO Facts :( ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers' Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25, 1963 of the CIR en banc..During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA.Trial court agreed with this move. However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted. Issue:Whether or Not the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions Held: The Unions are not entitled. Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include powers none really accorded to nongovernment entities such as tax exemptions, registration of deeds, notarial services, and prosecution of officials. The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise. Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration; a government agency tasked t implement land reform.

10

Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation Vs. Court of Industrial Relations 150 scra 296 Facts: This case is a petition for certiorari, the PHHC seeks a reversal of the resolution of the court of industrial relations ordering the PHHC to pay private respondents wage differentials for work rendered. The PHHC is proposing a self-help project to be undertaken by the squatter families for the construction of two earth dams, roads, drainage and irrigation. In recruiting participants to the program, application forms entitled WFP Self Help Community Project Information Sheet were issued, mentioning the voluntary nature of the work to be rendered. World Food Program (WFP) has been asked to supply the food for a basic ration for the 500 settlers participating in this scheme and for their 2,000 dependents for a period of 560 days. The food ration will supplement a cash incentive of one half peso (.50) per participant per day. Complaining about their work and compensation, the participants went to the department of labor. Praying for the payment of the difference between the minimum wage (which was P6.00 at that time) and the P0.50 paid to them, overtime compensation, and also for reinstatement. Issue: Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over those cases where there exists no employer-employee relationship. Held: The court of industrial relation has no jurisdiction over labor disputes involving government owned or controlled corporations performing government functions.

11

Facts The National Irrigation Authoritys motion for reconsideration, through it solicitor general, maintains on the strength of the PD 552 (which amended certain provisions of RA 3601, the law creating the NIA), and the case of Angat River Irrigation System, et.al versus Angat Rivers Workers Union, et,al, that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions. The motion of NIA is that the responsibilities vested in the said agency concern public welfare and public benefit, and is therefore an exercise of sovereignty. NIAs motion provides that therefore, NIA is not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent, against the Fontanilla spouse. A strong dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, and concurred by JBL Reyes, held the contrary view stating that in the Angat River System case, the same purpose such as public benefit and public welfare may be found in the operation of certain enterprises (those engaged in the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, telephonic, and radio communications, etc.) yet is certain that the functions performed by such enterprises are basically proprietary in nature. Issues 1. Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a Juridical Personality. 2. Whether or not NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary functions. 3. Whether or not NIA is liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver. Held The motion for reconsideration by NIA is DENIED with FINALITY. The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. NIA may be made liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver Hugo Garcia against the Fontanilla spouse.

12 Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A. CASE: People V Gozo GR No. L-36409

GROUP 12

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Lozeta Gozo was charged by the City Engineers Office of the City of Olongapo for violating a municipal ordinance which required residents to secure mayors permit prior to the construction, demolition or repair of a building in the city. Court of First Instance of the said city convicted her. She appealed the decision and argued that the local government unit of the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the Naval Base of Americans where her house was erected. ISSUE: Whether or not the local city government has administrative jurisdiction over naval bases of foreign country located within the city? HELD: Yes. There is no portion in the Philippine territory that is not ours, and beyond our power and control. Within our territory, any statutory powers maybe exercised freely and legally. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses commiteed therein. The consent to the bases of foreign countries were given/ granted on the basis of comity, courtesy and expediency. Military bases are not and cannot be of foreign territory. NICELY DONE. THE FACTS, ISSUE AND HELD ARE RELEVANT

13

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979 Facts: The petitioner, Leovillo Agustin alleged the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos requiring all vehicle owners, users, and drivers to provide early warning devices (EWD) a distance away from such vehicle when it is stalled, parked or disabled. To employ with the letter of instruction, Hon. Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order No. 1 requiring he compliance thereof. The petition assails the lawfulness and constitutionality of the letter as it is violative of due process, equal protection of the law, and undue delegation of police power. Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued are constitutional Held: The Statutes in question are deemed constitutional. These were certainly in the exercise of police power as it is established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, he letter aforementioned is based on the Constitution, Article II Declaration of State Policy and Principles, Section 2 adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The resolutions of the 198 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations are used as the bases and premises for the letter of instruction. The letter was used in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways. The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the problem.

14

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366, October 25, 1983 Facts:

Petitioner, retired Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00-5:00 in the afternoon, starting from Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States embassy. The objective of the rally was to peacefully protest the removal of all foreign military bases and to present a petition containing such to a representative of the Embassy so it may be delivered to the United States Ambassador. This petition was to initially compel the Mayor of the City of Manila to make a decision on the application for a permit but it was discovered that a denial has already been sent through an ordinary mail. It also included a provision that if it be held somewhere else in an enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and general public may be assured, permit may be issued. The respondent mayor alleges that holding the rally in front of the US Embassy is a violation of the resolutions during the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961 and of which the Philippines is a signatory. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines has to comply with such generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the denial of the permit is a violation of the constitutional right of the freedom of speech and expression. Issue: 1. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear and present danger in so far as the terminal point would be the embassy. Held:

The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the former takes higher ground. The right of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.

15 Taada v. Angara 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

FACTS:

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement. The World Trade Organization opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by W orld Trade Organization. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the World Trade Organization agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement.

HELD:

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. The court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. The acts of signing the said agreement is not legislative restriction as World Trade organization allows withdrawal of

membership should this be political desire of member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty world Trade Organization remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice. Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

16

BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 Facts: On June 1, 1999, by approval of senate by a 2/3 vote of its members, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was approved that provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances under which US Armed Forces and Defense Personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence, this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, assailing the constitutionally of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to Respondents in ratifying the agreement. Issue: Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. Held: Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution Art. 7 Sec. 21, which respondents invoke, states that No treaty of international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the senate. Therefore the ratifying of the VFA is constitutional and the court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department as to the power to ratify the VFA.

17

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002 FACTS : Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in Balikatan 02-1. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called Balikatan 02-1, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. ISSUE : Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA. HELD:Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that Balikatan 02 -1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

Mijares v. Ranada Group 5 FACTS:

G. R. No. 139325 Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. ISSUE: Whether HELD: Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of B.P.129 refer to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of B.P.129 reveal that the complaint for13 enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property. THERE IS NO RELEVANCE TO THE PROVISION ON THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTL LAWS or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

19 SHANGRI-LA V DEVELOPERS GR NO.159938 March 31, 2006 Facts: At the core of the controversy are the Shangri-la mark and S logo. Respondent, Developers Group of Companies, Inc (DGCI) claims ownership of the said mark and logo in the Philippines. They filed its registration on October 18, 1982 with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) pursuant to sections 2 and 4 of RA 166. On the other hand, Kuok Group of Companies has used the name Shangri-la in all Shangri-la hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world as well as the S logo. The Petitioner (Shangri-la), contends that they own the Shangri-la mark and S logo for they have been using it since 1962 not in the Philippines but in other parts of the world before the respondent even registered the said mark and logo. ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to protection under both RA 166 (the old trademark law) and Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property HELD: The Petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rule of international law are given standing equal not superior, to national legislative enactments. However, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in the respondents registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement.

20 Pharmaceutical vs. DOH GR 173034

Mangaliman, Aileen P.

Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the pr J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983eambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional; Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

21 Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8 21_INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, 338 SCRA 81 2000 FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned the validity of the order on the grounds that the deployment of Philippine Marines is in derogation of ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy. HELD: No. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the Police force. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed.Correctly done

22 DonitaLouA Bemida Consti class I-C

Lim v Executive Secretary, GR 15445, April 11, 2002 Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by Arthur Lim and Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reye, to bar the holding of Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to send and deploy their troops in the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, mutual military assistance can only be held in case of an armed external attack. However, under the visiting Force Agreement, the US Aimed Forces are allowed to engage in activities but not in combat operations except for self-defense Issue: whether or not the respondents in the case have committed grave abuse of discretion by holding Balikatan 02-1. Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms or the Visiting Force Agreement. The Us Armed Forces can engage in any activity except combat operations.

23 CASE DIGEST: Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

I.

FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

II.

ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III.

HELD

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

Submitted by: ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A. Group 10

24 Summary of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).

Roe vs. Wade Facts: Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county District Attorney Wade (D). A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justifiable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does complaint was not justifiable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as vague and for over broadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted. The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-appealed the district courts judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford. Issue: Whether or not the district court is correct in denying injunctive relief.

Held/Ruling: Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief. The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallfords case for injunctive re lief because once the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.

25 Group 12 Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula Case # 25: Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 US 390 ( 1992 ) Fact : In 1919 Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject in any other language except English. In addition, foreign languages could be taught only after the child had passed the eighth grade. Robert T. Meyer, the Plaintiff, an instructor in Zion Parochial School, who taught in German to a ten-year-old child , was convicted under this law and claiming that his rights and the rights of parents were violated. Issue : Whether or not the law violated people's liberty, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held : Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. The legislative purpose of the law was to promote assimilation and civic development. But such restriction does violence to both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.

26 Case Digested & Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA CASE : Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510

Group 13

June 24, 2013

FACT : Two appellees, non-public schools -Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders. ISSUE : Whether or not the Oregons Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control? HELD :The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

27 Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja CASE # 3.) WISCONSIN V YODER 406 U.S 205 FACTS: Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Amish Church and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried and convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law because they did not enrol their children in a public or private high school. Three Amish students, from different families, ceased to attend New Glarus High School in New Glarus, Wisconsin following completion of 8th grade. The students stopped attending school as per request of their parentseach students parent requested that the youths stop attending school because of their religious beliefs. Issue: Does a state law requiring children to attend school until the age of 16 violate Amish rights under the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment? HELD: After the school district brought a complaint against them, Yoder, Miller, and Yutzy were charged with violating Wisconsins compulsory school attendance law. The Amish argued that the law violated their free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Trial testimony showed the Amish believed that sending their children to high school would not only expose them to censure by the church community but also would endanger their salvation as well as that of their children. The trial court determined that the states law did interfere with the Amish freedom to act in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs but that the requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a reasonable and constitutional exercise of governmental power. The parents were convicted and fined $5 each. They appealed to a Wisconsin Circuit Court, which affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, agreed with the parents First Amendment argument and reversed their convictions. The state then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

28 Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2 Ginsberg v New York 390 U.S. 629 (1968)

Facts: Appellant Sam Ginsberg and his wife operates a Stationary and Luncheonette in Bellmore, Long Island. They have a lunch counter, also sell magazines including girlie magazines, which he personally sold to a 16-year-old boy 2 (two) of the said girlie magazines on each of two dates October 1965, in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law, exposing minors to harmful materials. Because the States exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.

Issue: Weather or not the obscenity of material sold to minors under 17-year-old.

Held:

Appellant was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on both counts. The judge found (1) that the 632*632 magazines contained pictures which depicted female "nudity" in a manner defined in subsection 1 (b), that is "the showing of female buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple ," and (2) that the pictures were "harmful to minors" in that they had, within the meaning of subsection 1 (f) 633*633 "that quality of representation of nudity predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." He held that both sales to the 16-yearold boy therefore constituted the violation under 484-h of "knowingly to sell to a minor" under 17 of " any picture which depicts nudity and which is harmful to minors," and "any magazine which contains and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Term, Second Department, of the Supreme Court. Appellant was denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals and then appealed to this Court.

29 OPOSA V. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993) . FACTS: An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing Timber License agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (sec. 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution).The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their generation as well as for the future generation. The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court for a writ of review issued by a higher court to a lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the minors have a legal standing to file the case?

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility particularly in cases related to ecology and the environment. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

30 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals G.R.No.

120865-71

Facts: The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. Issue: Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency? Held: Yes, The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

31 Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman LLB- 1 C

Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T. Baddiri Subject: Constitutional Law 1

CASE: MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008 FACTS: On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against severalgovernment agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, which was confirmed by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coli form content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200 MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 3490.The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skindiving, and other forms of contact recreation. Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. They also asserted thatthe cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled bymandamus.The CA sustained RTCs decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks outside of their basic functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents; 2. Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. HELD: Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is mandated to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.

32 Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI) 191 SCRA 288 November 1990 FACTS: Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project. ISSUE: Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors without considering the national interest COURT RULING: The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock maintained. The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code. Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.

33 Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab Group 7 1C

Tanada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts: On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective authorities the WTO ( World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO agreement. This petition was filed questioning the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement as it violates Sec.19, Art II of the constitution. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is contrary to the provisions of sec.19, Art. II of the constitution. Held: No, it is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favour of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interest against foreign competition and trade practice that are unfair. Furthermore, the Constitution policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.

34 Pamatong v. COMELEC G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 Petitioner: Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Respondent: Commission on Elections Facts: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the Constitutional Provision Article II, Section 26. Held: The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.

35 Araneta v Gatmaitan Facts: The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue: W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held: VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.

36

64 Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CDO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CDO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar. HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

37 PEOPLE VS.MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid? HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.

38 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA(166 SCRA 533) GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2is a violation of non-delegation of power

HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers .In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

39 Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA, Group 13

June 26, 2013

Tablarin v. Gutierrez GR 78164, 31 July 1987 Facts: TeresitaTablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional. Held: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take

appropriate steps to make quality education accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.

40 Submitted by: Pritzel Ann A. Reyes, LLB 1c Case: G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989 CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) petitioner, vs. SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND CEBU OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA) respondents.

Facts: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. 1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14, 1986 P200 to each covered employee. 2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each covered employee. 3) 3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16, 1988 P300 to each covered employee. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, in sum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to Inspection Authority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Upon completion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and 2. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00).

Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Held: As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640, which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 3 Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory.

41 Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B. Case: Osmea v. Orbos. 220 SCRA 703 Fact: Petitioner John H. Osmea assailed that the delegation of legislative authority to the ERC violates Sec. 28 of Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the appellant appealed that there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB. Issue: Whether or not there is an unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB of the exercise of the power of taxation. Held: No, The SC finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to levy additional amounts on petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised.

42 Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3) Case: Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995) FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress Passed RA 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. Consistent with the authority granted by Article XIX, section 13 or RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion. HELD: No, Congress merely allowed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.

43 RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 309 SCRA 661 Facts: The Petitioner is the Mayor of san Nicholas, who represented the people in an agreement to a construction company that provides electrification of the barangays in the municipality. The ground for notice is there is misrepresentation on the amounts presented in the reports in comparison to the petitioner and the Audit of COA. Petitioners seek reconsideration of the case on grounds that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), received an undue delegation of legislative power. Issue: Whether or not there was invalid delegation of the legislative power to the DBM. Held: No, The court ruled that there was no undue delegation of powers. The rule is that the powers delegated cannot be delegated to another.

44 Alsam B.Adjilul LLB 1C College of Law WMSU

Facts: Vera was the judge of the case The people of the Philippines Islands vs Mariano Cu Unjienget. al, wherein Mariano applied for the probation of the said case (GR 42649). The case (GR 42649) was filed on October 15, 1931 in the court of First Instance in Manila. On January 8, 1934 this court rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months prisioncorreccional to 8 years of prision mayor to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. On March 26, 1935 upon appeal, the court revised its penalty to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6 months of prisioncorreccional to 7 years, 6 months, and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judges in all other respects. The defendant then (Cu Unjieng) filed a motion for reconsideration and several (4) successive motions for a new trial but all of which were denied by the court on December 17, 1935. The final judgment was on December 18, 1935. The defendant sought to file a certiorari to the SC but it was later on denied in November 1936.The SC denied the defendants leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter returned the case to the court of origin for the execution of the judgment. On November 27, 1936 the defendant filed a petition for probation wherein the defendant states that he is innocent, of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The application for probation was submitted to the Insular Probation office referred to by Judge Pedro Tuason who then recommended the denial of application for probation on June 18, 1937. Judge Jose O. Vera then set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937. But then the Fiscal of the City of Manila and the private prosecution filed oppositions on April 2. On June 28, 1937, Judge Vera promulgated a resolution concluding that Cu Unjieng esinocentepordudaracional of the crime of which he stands convicted by the Supreme Court in GR 41200, but denying the latters petition for probation. July 3, 1937 counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for an issuance of an order of execution of the judgment etc. etc. HSBC and the people came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to the very long proceedings of the court of first instance which caused a delay in the execution of the sentence.

Issues: 1. Is the people of the Philippines through the Solicitor general and the fiscal of Manila a proper party in the case at hand? 2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of authority 3. Questioned probation of Law Held: The people of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is the proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and a substantial interest in the case such that he ha sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221, really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wounds inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

45 Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature.

The petitioners, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Stephen A. Monsanto, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Triestesent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of their drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. The respondents, Metropolitan Manila Authority enacted Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, which gives them authority to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila which whichappear to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.

The said ordinance, as well as Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. However, the flaw in the measure was that they violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature are valid Held: Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene theConstitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is

called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

46 Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani Case no. 46 Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima 562 SCRA 251 FACT: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the legislative power to settle the dispute. HELD: No, although in Sec.1 Art. VI state that The Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum There is a limit in a legislative power, the procedural limits curtail the manner of passing law.

47 Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC United States v. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1 Fact Act no. 2868, "An act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale of the said products and authorizing the Governor General, with consent of the council of state, to issue necessary rules and regulations. On August 1, 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53, which was publish August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tong Ho, a rice dealer, sold ganta of rice at 80 centivos. The said amount was higher than what is prescribed in the EO, the sale was done August 6, 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO, he was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus 500 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is undue delegation of power to the Governor General. Issue Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. Held Yes, the conviction of Ang Tong must be reversed since the act is done prior the EO is published. The law contains no guide for the Governor General in determining if the rise in price is extraordinary and for determining what the price should be, it fails to present conditions to be consider in promulgating the law, lastly the said act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor General.

48

Facts: On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration; so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). ECOP opposed. On October 23, 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No.NCR-01. It provides that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission contending that the board's grant of an "across-the-board" wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing minimum wage rates (up to P125.00 a day) as an alleged excess of authority. ECOP further alleges that under the Republic Act No. 6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not determine "salary ceilings." ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings. On November 6, 1990, the Commission promulgated an Order, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. On November 14, 1990, the Commission denied reconsideration. ECOP then, elevated the case via petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. Issue: The main issue in this case is whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates, as well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum wage rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied the petition of ECOP. The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of

wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. . The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have Congress done it as the need arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years. The fact of the matter is that the Act sought a "thinking" group of men and women bound by statutory standards. The Court is not convinced that the Regional Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true that wage-firing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and in the light of the floor-wage method's failure, the Court believes that the Commission correctly upheld the Regional Board of the National Capital Region.

49 People of the Philippines vs Rosenthal Facts: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. The main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twentypesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer. HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term public interest is not without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . .

50 Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195

Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such law.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.

Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.

51 FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

52 United states vs. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608 FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them.

Case Digested &Submitted by: Jonelle Tom Dua Group 13

53 SUBMITTED BY: NUR-AINA C. WAJA G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008 CASE # 5 SEC v INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION ( 567 SCRA 354) FACTS: On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million. The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on 20 August 1998. It determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. ISSUE: WON ABSENCE OF IRR WOULD INVALIDATE THE PROVISIONS OF LAW HELD: The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. The petition is GRANTED. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations Code. No costs.

54 Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B. Case: Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007 Fact: Petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi assailed the provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A 9136 and Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR be declared unconstitutional. The appellant appealed that there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Issue: Whether or not there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. Held: The SC ruled for the dismissal of the petition that there is no unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERC. Legislative power may be delegated into two exceptions by immemorial practices or by the Constitution itself.

55 PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442 Facts: Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent which showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to conform tothe regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, inresponse to the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed compliancewith the effluent standard in all parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied. Issue: WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative powers. HELD: LLDAs power to impose fines is not unrestricted. It was only after the investigation finding the petitioner failing to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that the LLDA imposed the penalty of P 1,000.00 per day. The P 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984.

56 DonitaLouA Bemida Consti class I-C People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640 Facts: Que Po Lay who was in possession of a $7,000 worth foreign exchange like U.S dollars, checks and money orders, was sentenced to a six month imprisonment with 1,000php fine and subsidiary imprisonment after he was found guilty of violating the Central Bank Circular No. 20. The Solicitor General said that under the Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930, the publication of the circular in the Official Gazette is not required for force and effect Issue: Whether or not circulars should be published for it to become effective. Held: Yes, because circulars prescribe a penalty for violation and should therefore be published before the public sees its content. The people have to be informed of its contents and penalties.

57 People vs. Dacuycuy Group 5

173 SCRA 90 Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid. HELD: NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of judicial powers not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers

58 Carbonilla vs Board of Airllines Representatives 657 SCRA 775

FACTS:

The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No/ 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005) amending CAO 7-92. The Department of finance approve CAO 1-2005 on 9 February on 23 August 2004, CAO 7-92 AND CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to section 3506 in relation to section 608 of the Tariff and Costumes Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005 reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 03 March 2005, the Acting District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CaO 1-2005 on 09 February 2005. As such, the increase in the overtime rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR still requested for an audience with the Secretary of Finance which was granted on 12 October 2005.

On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Eugenio L De Leon, Chief, Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the overtime rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter.

The BOC then sent a letter to BAR's member airlines demanding payment of overtime services to BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BAR's member airlines refused and manifested their intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the Secretary of Finance to suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005. . ISSUES:

Whether or not the CAO 1-2005 in the exercise of such delegated power valid.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner Bureau of Customs is DIRECTED to implement CAO 1-2005 immediate. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same

59 Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 (1994)

Mangaliman, Aileen P.

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following: 1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. 2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. 3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. 4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" provisoin the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

60 Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8 JUANITO MARIANO, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 (1995) FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854, An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional on the ground that Sec. 52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates Art.VI Sec.5(4) and not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art. VI. ISSUE: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional. HELD: No. The reapportionment of the legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than general reapportionment law. The petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art.VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said Section provides that a city with population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

61 SUBMITTED BY: CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO(GROUP 9)

CASE 61 : Sema v COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008 FACTS: On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly by merits of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Thus,COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). ISSUE: Whether: 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces is constitutional. 2. That affirms, whether a province created by ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives, and Comelec Resolution 7902 HELD: 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL in granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; 2. MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is VOID and COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

62 Submitted by: Peaflor, Rijan C. LLB 1 Section C Case: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008 FACT: Cagayan de Oro City has only 1 Legislative District and so R.A. 9371 also known as AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE LONE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO was passed increasing the Citys Legislative District into two. Resolution No. 7837 was then promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) implementing the said Law. According to Petitioner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, the said Resolution cannot be implemented without a Plebiscite. Petitoner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the grounds that it is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary for the implementation of the Law which provides for apportionment of a legislative district. HELD: Conduct of a Plebiscite is no longer required since Cagayan de Oro City constitutionally remains a single unit and its administration is not distributed along territorial lines. Its zone remains fully intact; there is only the addition of one more legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purpose of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.

63 Aquino v. COMELEC GR No. 189793

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment. Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

64 Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula Case # 64 : Aldaba V. Comelec, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010 Fact : On May 01, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City, by creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223, 069. The population of Malolos City on May 01, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254, 030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Issue : Whether or not the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250, 000 for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos? Held : Whereas the Supreme Court declaring Republic Act 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitutio. Because it did not satisfy the 250, 000 population requirement.

65 Submitted by : Johnny D. Mendoza Group 13 Case : Ocampo versus HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15 2004

WMSU ConsLaw 1 Case # 65

FACTS : On May 23, 2001, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the14 May 2001 elections.On 31 May 2001, Ocampo filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest against Crespo with the following complaints: (1) misreadingof votes garnered by Ocampo; (2) falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of electionreturns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written byone person or two persons (HRET Case 01024).Ocampo alleges he be proclaimedthe duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.On 27 March2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying anddisqualifying him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. ISSUE : Whether or not Ocampocan be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman. HELD : No. A second place among the remaining qualified candidates in the election cannot be proclaimed as the winner. xxxJurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective officexxx

66 Pritzel Ann A. Reyes LLB 1c Case No.66 Ang Bagong Bayani Vs Comelec, 359 SCRA 698 (2001) FACT: Ang Bagong Bayani and Akbayan citizens party filed before the comelec a petition under the rule 65 of the rule of the court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.3785 issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seek the disqualification of private respondent, requiring mainly that the party-list system was intended the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties. The none marginalized and overrepresented. ISSUE: Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution No.3785 is constitutional. HELD: YES! Political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list election. under the constitution and R.A 7941. Private respondent cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties.

67 Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B. Case: VC Candangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009 Fact: Petitioner filed a petition for registration as sectoral organization under R.A 7941. Further, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution denying the petitioners petition for registration. Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC in denying the petition for registration gravely abused its discretion. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion for denying their petition for registration. Held: The COMELEC En Banc ruled for the dismissal of the petition. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such unreliable and fanciful exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that the COMELEC, through the questioned issuances, gravely abused its discretion.

68

Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C Case: VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP) VS. COMELEC

Facts On June 1998, COMELEC proclaimed thirteen party list representatives from 12 parties and organizations. Petitioner assailed ordering the proclamation of additional thirty-eight previously defeated parties to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RE 7941, The party -list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list

Issue Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

Held No, the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is merely a ceiling and not mandatory. This is to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list representatives.

However, it is necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions to have obtained at least two percent of the total cast votes for the party-list system in order to be entitled a party-list seat. Those who obtained more than two percent will have additional seats but not more than three seats

Note:
The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list, computed as follows: No. of party-list = No. of District representatives To be elected .80 representatives

x .20

Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide, formula shown below: % of cast votes = Votes Cast for the Party Total Cast Votes Nationwide

x 100

(The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list system)

69 Donita Lou A. Bemida Consti Law I-C Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2013 Facts: A Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation was filed on June 22, 2004 by petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil together with CIBAC against the respondent Commission en banc, asking for the proclamation of new elected members and an additional seat for each party. On July 31 of the same year, the Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011failing to resolve the petitioner's issue. Petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil filed an immediate petition on August 18, 2004, seeking for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec en banc can apply the November 23, 2009 resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani case. Held: No. Because in the November 20, 2003 Resolution, the Court granted an additional seat to BUHAY because it has obtained more than 4% of the entire votes.

70 Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman

Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T, Baddiri

72 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. vs. COMELECT G.R. Nos. 179431-32 Facts:In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;[16] and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBACs withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBACs second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).[17] He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.[18] the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokins proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.

Issues: (a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy; (b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping; (c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and (d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature. Held: The petitions are granted.

71 Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula Case # 71 : Aquino V. Comelec, 243 SCRA 400 ( 1995 ) Facts : Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman. Issue : Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for Congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution? Held : Yes, what is required is not just temporary residence but domicile as this has been defined in jurisprudence. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

72 Sub. By: Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab Case # 72: Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 ( 1995)

Facts: On March 8,1995 petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Officer, providing the information in item number 8: RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHER I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ---- years and seven months. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position filed a petition for the Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that the petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995 petitioner filed an amended/ corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry seven months to since childhood. On April 24, 1995, the second division of the commission on election ( COMELEC) by a vote of 21, came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious, striking out the petitioners corrected/amended certificate of candidacy of March 31,1995 and cancelling her original certificate of candidacy. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner had complied the residency requirement as provided for in Art VI, Sec. 6, of the 1987 Constitution. Held: Yes, the petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. A perusal of the resolution of the COMELECs Second Division reveals a starting confusion in the application settled concepts of Domicile and Residence in election law. In Co vs Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution adhere to the definition given to the term residence in election law regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.

73

Domino v. COMELEC July 19, 1999 (310 SCRA 546) Petitioners: Juan Domino Respondent: Commission on Elections, Grafilo, Java, et. al. Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani but the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified for lack of the one-year residency requirement. Domino filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections. Held: No. He did not meet the residency requirement. The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, Domino still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the constitution.

74

Facts: This case is a petition against Juan Borra, Cesar Miraflor, and Gregorio Santaanaseeking RA 4421, requiring all candidates for national, provincial city and municipal offices to post a surety bond equivalent to salary or emoluments to which he is a candidate. Leon Maquera, petitioner claimed that this violated security of tenure. Petitioner was incumbent commissioner of the National Police Commission whenRepublic Act. No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 took effect. Section 8 of Republic Act. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of theincumbent commissionerwere deemed expired. Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional Held: The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an extended decision, to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is unconstitutional and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin respondents herein, as well as their representatives and agents, from enforcing and/or implementing said constitutional enactment.The Court granted the petition as it is inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same for said political system is premised upon the tent that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them and this in turn implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice pre supposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike and that accordingly no person shall by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.canonizado.

75 Fact: On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing Sec. 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002paragraphs (c), which is applicable to students of secondary and tertiary schools, (d),which is applicable to officers and employees of public and private offices, (f),which is applicable to all persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day, and (g),which is applicable to all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government,on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. Issues

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Consequently, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and (2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power? Held: The provision no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The Court resolves to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. No.157870 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

76 Dimaporo v. Mitra

FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened: 1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. 2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4. Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position

HELD: No. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.

The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

77 EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE Farinas vs Executive Secretary GR No.147387December 10,2003 Facts: Before the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA9006 (The fair election act) insofar as it expressly repeals Sec.67 of BP 881(The Omnibus Election Code) filed by Farinas et al, minority members of the minority bloc in the HR. Impleaded as respondents are the Executive sec, Speaker of the House etal.

Issue/s:1. WON the effectivity clause which states .This Act shall take effect upon its approval (Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution Held:1. An effectivity clause which provides that the law shall take immediately upon its approval is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect fiftten day safter its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: The clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself.Publication isi ndispensable in every case

78 Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009 FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid. HELD: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

79 Case No. (3) Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002 Facts: Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Fileda Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation, stating there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the petitioner is undoubtedly guilty of the chargesfor indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. To which the petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against Locsins 53,447 votes. Instead By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. And issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead proclaimed ruled on in favor of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin. After granting the petition of the petitioner to declare as null and void the proclamation, the petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en bancresolution annulling the proclamation of Rep. Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.[ Issue: 1.Whether or not the petitioner is not guilty of violation Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. Whether or not Petition for Mandamus and Memorandum[59] dated October 8, 2001 for Speaker De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated be compelled. Held: 1. Affirmative, Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner was denied of due process during the entire proceedings. 2. Affirmative. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. Thus, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.

80

82 TOLENTINO V COMELEC FACTS: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper. HELD: The propose amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the entire constitutionmust be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitutionwould ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entiredocument. This is the Doctrine of Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

81 No. L-25554. October 4, 1966 Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., petitioner, vs. Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, respondents Facts: The Philippine Constitution Association has filed a suit against the Auditor General of the Philippines, Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No.4131 (approved June 10, 1964) to the speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. Republic Act No.4131 authorized the increase in salary of Senators and members of the House of Representatives. Section 1 of the said Act expressly provides that the salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Section 7 of the same Act provides that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectively of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators. Issue: Whether or not Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House of Representatives but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective. Held: The court granted the Writ of prohibition. In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature.

82 FACTS:

While serving his sentence at the New Bilibid prison, Muntinlupa City. Romeo Jalosjos was reelected as Congressman for the first District of Zamboanga Del Norte.

Jalosjos filed a motion asking that he will be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance of legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of non-bailable offense. And his confinement was depriving his constituents of their voice in congress.

ISSUES: 1.) Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which will apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?

2.) Are articles VI and VIII valid to support his motion?

RULING:

Election to high government office does not give you the freedom from the common command of general law.

Section2, Article 6 & Article 8 of the constitution state: A member of the House of representative is privilege from arrest during his attendance at its sessions only if offense is punishable by more than 6 year imprisonment . In his case, confinement of a Congressman charged with crimes punishable by more than 6 years has constitutional foundation.

83 Alsam B. Adjilul LLB 1C College of Law WMSU Nicanor T. Jimenez VS Bartolome Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 FACTS: Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang member of the House of Representatives and wrote the letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendantCongressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines . A civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for recovery of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive political build up; 2. There is a planned coup dtat; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General Arellano. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication. 2. Whether or not it is libelous. HELD: 1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication: a. was an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was not a discharge of an official function or duty. 2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order appealed is confirmed.

84 86 ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70) The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation with the duties of a Member of the Congress. FACTS: Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP candidateto the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and Communicationsto the independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia sabotaged and double-crossed the LP, its official candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works and Communications in connection with acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of the formal request was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon Valencias appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press release was issued by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on the front pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then filed the present civil action against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release and that they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband as plaintiff-appelle. ISSUE: Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as a qualified privilege communication? HELD: Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where malice in law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers. Defendant-appellants claim of defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had

been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is based upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antoninos act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a privileged communication because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed privately and officially to the Senate and Commission on Appointments. Judgment affirmed

85 Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani 85 Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago AC no. 7399, August 25, 2009 FACT: Senator/Atty. Mirriam Defensor Santiago crossed the limit of decency and good professional conduct due to the rejection of her nomination as Chief Justice of the Phil. Supreme Court made by the JBC. She uttered humiliating words to the Philippine Chief Justice in her privilege speech at the House of Senate, she was quoted as stating I want to spit in the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts of the Supreme Court, and calling the Supreme Court as Supreme Court of Idiots. ISSUE: Whether or not Senator Mirriam Defensor Santiago be criminally liable or be subjected to disciplinary actions. HELD: No, as Art. VI, Sec. 11of the Constitution provides that A Senator or member of the House of the Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be question nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. The Constitution enshrined parliamentary immunity over the lady Senator, but as being a lawyer she violated Canon 8 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

86 Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC

Liban v. Gordon GR. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

Fact Dante Liban filed a petition to the supreme court declaring Richard Gordon has having forfeited his seat in the Senate. Respondent incumbency as member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the Board of Governors, petitioner allege accepting the Chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Issue Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC. Held No, PNRC is a private organization performing a public functions/services, PNRC Chairman is elected by Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat or function, when he was elected as Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

87 Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 June 26, 2013 CASE: Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. 113 SCRA 31 March 25, 1982 FACTS: Justice Istanislao Fernandez, a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero group to which the petitioner Puyat group objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec.II Art.VIII (Now Sec.14 Art.VI) of the Constitution. HELD: No. Assemblyman Fernandez could not be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of the matter in litigation.

88

90 Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. 134577 November 18, 1998 Facts: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines had its first regular session of the eleventh Congress. That days agenda was the election of officers, where Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate leaving Sen. Fransisco S. Tatad as the losing nominee. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." However, on July 30, 1998, the Senate President declared Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate after majority leaders receipt of letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators stating that they had elected Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. The following day, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition forquo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. Issue: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution? Held: The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby define who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. Thus, Defensor-Santiagos petition is dismissed.

89 91 (par.1) Avelino v Cuenco 83 PHIL 17 (1979)

Facts: On February 21, 1949, shortly before the opening of the Senate session Senator Tanada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then petitioner Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation. Sufficient number of senator were at the session hall to constitute a quorum at the appointed time, the petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall and requested instead from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Tanada and Salidad and in the presence of the public he read the said resolution slowly and carefully, ordered the arrest of any senator who would speak without being recognized by the petitioner and banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair deliberately. In order to continue the session and not to paralyze the session Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco was voted and took the oath to be the Senate President of the Philippines.

Issue: Weather or not, the Resolution of declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate.

Held: In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

As, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

90 Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A. CASE: People v Jalosjos GR. No. 132875-76

GROUP 12

June 26, 2013

FACTS: The accused-appellant Romeo F. Jalosjos, a full pledged member of the Congress who was confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of the house of representatives, including attending at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant be allowed to attend Congressional sessions and committee hearings despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense. HELD: No. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years, is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundation.

91 Submitted by: CymerMohamad Arroyo VS De venecia 277 SCRA 268 Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionallymandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chaircalled out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chairand Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled billwas signed into law by President Ramos. Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasureof the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

92 Pritzel Ann A. Reyes LLB 1c Case No.92 Osmea vs Pendatum 109 PHIL 863 (1960) FACTS: Osmea filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary junction against Congressman Pendatum and 14 others in their capacity as a member of the Special Committee created by the House of Resolution #59. Osmea filed the abatement of the Resolution #59, requiring the petitioner to establish by proof or evidence his charges against the President. Osmea was suspended for 15th months for the serious disorderly behaviour. ISSUE: Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its member. HELD: For unparliamentarily conduct, members of the congress have been or could be censured, committed to prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

93 FACTS:

The case arose from complaints filed by the group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) where she then acted as the CID Commissioner.

The court is called upon to review the act of Sandigan bayan and how far it can go in ordering the preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for violation of Republic Act 3019 as amended otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt practices Act.

On May 24,1992 Senator Miriam Santiago filed a petition to review on certiorari of a decision with prohibition and preliminary injunction before the court and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment .

ISSUE: If the authority of Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA no 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support and certiorari will be granted by the Court relative to this case.

RULING:

On Jan 31, 1992 the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner proved unvailing.

In issuing the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law , as well as the jurisprudence in which the court has. Section13 of RA 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is allegedly to have committed the acts with which he has been charged

The court suspends the accused from her position as Senator of the republic of the Philippines and from any government position she may be holding at present. Her suspension shall be holding 90 days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.

95 Donita Lou A. Bemida Consti Law I-C Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963) Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, on July 1, 1959, imposed a 25% uniform margin fee for foreign transactions and issued a memorandum declaring the exemptions of charging. Petitioner Casco Philippine Commercial Co., manufacturer of synthetic resin glues, in November and December 1959 paid a sum of P33,765.42 for the margin fee of the imported urea and formaldehyde. Upon Resolution No. 1529, the petitioner asked for a refund of the amount. The Central Bank refused to grant the reimbursement and said that what was exempted was urea Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempted from payment. Held: No. Because urea and formaldehyde are raw materials for glues and urea formalhyde is a synthetic resin.

96 Astorga vs. Villegas Group 5

56 SCRA 714 (1974) Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.

97 Philippines Judges Association vs. Prado G.R. No.105371, November 11,1993 FACTS: THE PHILIPPINES JUDGE ASSOCIATION, President , BERNANDO P ABISAMIS NATIONAL CONFIDERATION OF THE JUDGES OF THE PHILIPPINES ,petitioner vs. HONORABLE PETE PRADO Secretary of DOTC, respondent. Petitioners assailed that statute violates Article VI section26 of the constitution with the presumption the Bill have not undergone a careful study among the legislature and executive branch. The most serious challenging of petition of RA 7354 specifically sec 35 violates the EQUAL PROTECTECTION CLAUSE of the constitution Article III section I However, respondent assert we are complying the contention of the petitioner as far as the procedure of deliberation is concern. Accordingly requiring every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to express in its Title could not only be unreasonable but would actually renders legislation impossible

ISSUES: Whether the R.A. 7354 specifically SECTION 35 repealing clause violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

DECISION: The petition partially GRANTED and SECTION 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE privilege shall be RESTORED. Temporarily restraining order dated June 02, 1992 is made permanent. SO ORDERED

98 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 Facts:

Mangaliman, Aileen P.

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

99 Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C 99_PIMENTEL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, 644 SCRA 741 FACTS: Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706. It was on the ground that the rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI Sec.16(2) of the Constitution. HELD: No. The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner, the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. And as Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.

100 Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 Case: Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63PHIL134 1936

June 26, 2013

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. ISSUE: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over Electoral Commission and the subject of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative? HELD: Yes, the Electoral Commission has just acted within its legitimate exercise of its constitutional Prerogative. Therefore the petition for a writ of probation against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

101 Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil 192) August 31, 1946 Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero, petitioners Jose A. Avelino et al., respondents

Facts: 1. On May 25, 1946, a pendum resolution was submitted ordering the following candidates: Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero to their seats as members of chamber. Furthermore, they should not swear into office for their success on the elections was proposed to be invalid. The resolution was passed by their constituents who questioned the validity of the votes they garnered. 2. It was reported that during the National Elections, provinces Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac and Bulacan was under terrorism. Moreover, the election returns of the said provinces were null or void for they believe that the great majority of voters were coerced or intimidated suffered from the paralysis of judgment, the people were deprived of their right to suffrage. 3. The ballot boxes from Nueva Ecija were stolen by armed bands in the barrios of municipalities of Bongabon, Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba. 4. Many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home towns to avoid being victimized or losing their lives. Moreover, bodies were found with notes attached to their necks Bumoto kami kay Roxas after the election. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the powers to intervene with the petition

2. Whether or not the petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Vera should be deferred to seat as members of the chamber

Held: 1. No. The Supreme Court refused to intervene with the petition. According to the constitution, there should be separation of powers with the three branches namely: the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. Each is independent from each other and each has specific roles to perform. The role of judiciary is to foresee that the laws are properly delivered to the society and that these laws are constitutional. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court held that the case was not a contest and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. 2. Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for as mentioned above, the legislative has the power to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Also, no man or group of men be permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice.

102

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the election of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first District of Pampanga. On May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, the petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELECT a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assumed office on June 30, 1987. On Sept. 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on Jan. 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELECs revocation of petitioners proclamation. On Feb. 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an election protest, docketed as case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET rules. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by the respondent.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not private respondents protest had been seasonably filed. (2) Whether or not Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable or, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable.

HELD: The power of the HRET, as the soul judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to

promulgate rules and regulations relative to the matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filling election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature. Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. The power granted to the Court includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Art. VIII, Sec. 1). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with HRETs judgment. There is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. respondents Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. Private

103 SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A Group 6 CASE: Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

104 Submitted by: CymerMohamad FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 166 SCRA 377 Facts:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed. Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary. Issue: WON the SET can function without the Senator members. Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.

105 Case No. (2) Bondoc v. Pineda,201 SCRA 792 (1991) Facts: Petitioner Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidate of Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Who lost the elections held on May 11, 1987. Filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. of LDP is one of the members in the Tribunal, insisted on a re-appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts which lead the petitioner to won over the respondent by 23 votes. Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP be granted. Held: Negative. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal was declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution. And Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure.

106

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order assailing the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City. Robles was declared as the winner. In return, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET alleging that the elections were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the canvassing of the election returns. Petitioner filed his answer to the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest. Subsequent actions were filed by both the petitioner and the respondent. According to Robles, resolutions issued by HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion and that he was deprived of due process. Issue: Whether or not the resolutions issued by HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. Held: Petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless overlooks the essence of a public office as a public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate not perceived entitlement to the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by technicalities or procedural play of words. ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

107 Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C Case: Case Digest on Arroyo vs. HRET, Syjuco GR. No. 118597 July 14, 1995

Facts Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed an election protest before public respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) five days after the Makati board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo the duly elected congressman for the lone district of Makati in the May 11, 1992 national and local elections. Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of ballots then resulted to declaring Protestant Augusto l. Syjuco, jr. as the duly elected Representative, Lone District of Makati. Tasked by public respondent HRET to investigate on the matter, now retired Supreme Court Justice Emilio Gancayco confirmed the irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and personnel, they found out that Arroyo votes were consistently reduced at the revision and the deducted votes were found and included in the stray ballots, while Syjuco was always constant and there were instances where ballots were deducted from the protestee (Arroyo) and that another modus operandi is to falsify the revision reports by intercalation, false entries or simply switching of true results of the counting. Issue Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Whether or not the Supreme Court can intervene the creation of the Electoral Tribunal. Held Yes, the Supreme Court can intervene, Section 17, Art VI. The Supreme Court granted Makati Cong. Joker Arroyos petition to declare that public respondent HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it proceeded to decide in favor of his rival Augusto Syjuco, Jr.s election protest based on the latters precinct level document based anomalies/evidence theory. On this basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote tally made by the Electoral Tribunal.

108 Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002

On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect which deals on promoting proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives. On May 11, 1998, national elections were held for the first time through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations. 14 party-list representatives were proclaimed winners of the election. After the elections, the party-list groups did not nominate any of their representatives to the HRET and the CA which then became composed solely of District representatives belonging from different political parties. Senator Pimentel then wrote two letters addressed to Senate President Blas F. Ople, Chairman of CA, and a letter to Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A.R. Melo, chairman of HRET, requesting them for reconstruction of the CA and the HRET to include partylist representatives to conform with Sec 17 and Sec 18, Art VI of the Constitution. On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus and injunction, to HRET chairman and members, and to CA chairman and members, charging them with grave abuse of power. Issue Whether or not the present composition of the HRET violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET. Whether or not the present membership of the house in the Commission on Appointments violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the CA. Whether or not the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives constitute grave abuse of discretion. Held The consolidated petition for prohibition and mandamus are dismissed. Because a new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to the house on May 14, 2001, the court now cannot resolve the issue of proportional representative in the HRET and the CA as based on present composition

109

Facts:

This case is a petition for certiorari that seeks to annul and set aside as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion resolution no. 7233 of the comelec and the proclamation of private respondent Anthony Miranda as Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.

Petitioner Aggabao and private respondent Anthony miranda were trivial congressional candidates for the 4th district of Isabela. During the canvassing of Gordon and San Agustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under duress; different from other authentic copies and contained manifest errors.

On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7233 directing the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates in Isabela. Petitioner filed with the comelec an urgent motion to set aside the Notice of proclamation with prayer for the issuance of TRO. On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected congressman for the 4th district of Isabela. Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition assailing Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

No. In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling, modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioners remedy was an

electoral protest before the HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

110 SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A Group 6 CASE: Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 17883

June 26, 2013

FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs dad. . About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter. HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

111 Sub. By: Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab Case #111: BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No: 177508 August 7, 2009 FACTS: The Congress passed a bill and signed into law as RA 9369 less than four months before the May 14, 2007 local elections. On May 7, 2007, petitioner filed a petition alleging that RA 9369 violated Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the Constitution, assailing among others the constitutionality of the provisions contained in Sec. 37. I SSUE: Whether or not Sec. 37 of RA 9369 violates Sec. 17, Art.VI, of the Constitution. HELD: No, it does not violate Sec. 17, Art. VI, of the constitution. The Congress and COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal) and SET ( Senate Electoral Tribunal), since the powers are exercised in different occasion and for different purpose.

112 Drilon, et al v. Speaker GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009 Petitioner: Franklin Drilon et al Respondent: Jose de Venecia et al GR No. 183055, July 31, 2009 Petitioner: Sen. Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal Respondents: Sen. Manuel Villar et al Facts: The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on Appointments. The petitioner went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for Liberal Party in the CA. Because the LP was not represented in the CA, it spawned the filing for prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether the House of Representatives respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in constituting the Commission on Appointments in contravention of the required proportional constitution by depriving Liberal Party of its constitutional entitlement to one seat in the CA. Held: The first petition GR No.180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. As for the second petition GR no. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that her party was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer on he/ it locus standi. The constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Thus, even assuming that party list representative comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not of this Court.

113 Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 June 26, 2013 CASE : Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004 July26, 200 FACT: Guillermo Ruiz sough to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. On may 8, 1998, Farinas filed his Certificate of Candidacy substituting Chevylle Farinas who widrew on April 3, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HOUSE OF Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction.

114 CASE DIGEST: Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999 I. FACTS On May 29, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against private respondent. The petition attacked the ineligibility of private respondent to hold office as Member of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required filing fee. On June 10, 1998, the HRET dismissed the petition for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. Thereafter, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the cash deposit on June 26, 1998, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal. The HRET, however, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. II. 1. 2. ISSUES whether or not HRET can take cognizance of the petition, and whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto and in refusing to reinstate the same even after payment of the required cash deposit.

III. HELD Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar the Supreme Court from entertaining petitions which charge HRET with grave abuse of discretion. That the Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal. The cash deposit required in quo warranto cases must be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. In the case at bar, petitioners paid the required cash deposit after the dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET, which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. Therefore, the Court found that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition for certioraricannot prosper. Submitted by: ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A. Group 10

115

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the election of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first District of Pampanga. On May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, the petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELECT a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assumed office on June 30, 1987. On Sept. 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC resolution before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on Jan. 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELECs revocation of petitioners proclamation. On Feb. 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an election protest, docketed as case No. 46. Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondents protest on the ground it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET rules. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by the respondent.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not private respondents protest had been seasonably filed. (2) Whether or not Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable or, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable.

HELD: The power of the HRET, as the soul judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to

promulgate rules and regulations relative to the matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filling election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. Our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature. Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. The power granted to the Court includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Art. VIII, Sec. 1). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with HRETs judgment. There is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. respondents Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED. Private

116 Case Digested and submitted by: Jingle B. Puasa Group:12 June 26, 2013 Daza vs Singson 180 SCRA 496 (1989) Facts: Daza was removed from the Commission on Appoinments and assumed by Singson On December 5, 1988, after the chamber elected a new set of representatives.

Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional.

Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

117 Submitted by: CymerMohamad COSETENG VS MITRA 187SCRA 377 Facts: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal a request backed by nine congressmen. Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added RoqueAblan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP). Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority. The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the proportional representation clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority. Issue: W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation. Held: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation. The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA. Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap. There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House. Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in DazavsSingson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.