Presupposition

UCLA, Fall 2007 Philippe Schlenker (UCLA & Institut Jean-Nicod)

Presupposition
! Approximation: A presupposition of S is a condition that
must be met for S to be true or false.

! Presuppositions
a. John knows that he is incompetent. !: John is incompetent. b. Does John knows that he is incompetent? !: John is incompetent c. John doesnt know that he is incompetent. !: John is incompetent.

! Entailments
a. John is French. b. Is John French? c. John isnt French. => John is European. "> John is European. "> John is European.
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Why Study Presupposition ? I. Presuppositions are ubiquitous

! John regrets that he is incompetent.
!: John is incompetent.

! John has stopped smoking.

!: John used to smoke.

! It is John who left.

!: Someone left.

! What John drank was vodka.

!: John drank something.

! She is clever!
!: The person pointed at is female.
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! John too was jailed.

!: Someone other than John was jailed.

! John was jailed again.

!: John was jailed before.

! Only John was jailed.

!: Somebody was jailed.

Why Study Presupposition ? II. Presuppositions and Dynamic Semantics

! Static View of Meaning
Meaning = Truth Conditions

! Dynamic View of Meaning (after the 1980s)

Meaning = Context Change Potential

= potential to change beliefs ! Motivations for the dynamic view

a. Pronouns, e.g. Every man who has a donkey beats it. b. Presuppositions.
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Why Study Presupposition ? III. The Semantics vs. Pragmatics Divide

! Semantics = study of meaning as it is encoded in words
John is an American student => John is a student John is a former student "> John is a student

! Pragmatics = study of the additional information that

can be obtained by reasoning on the speakers motives Mr. Smith is unfailingly polite and always on time => Smith is a bad student

Semantics vs. Pragmatics

Entailments vs. Implicatures

Difference 1: Entailments follow from what is linguistically encoded. Implicatures do not. Difference 2: Entailments satisfy the following test. Implicatures generally don't. ! To check whether p entails q, check whether:
In every conceivable situation in which it is true that p, it is true that q.

Difference 3: Implicatures can be cancelled. Entailments cannot be.

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Scalar Implicatures
!
a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet (B. Schwarz) b. John will leave or Mary will leave. c. Paris is pleasant or London is pleasant.

Hypothesis 1. Disjunction is unambiguously exclusive.

! !

[[ [i or i'] ]] = true iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is true Notational variant (with 1 = true, 0 = false) [[ [i or i'] ]] = 1 iff exactly one of [[i]], [[i']] is equal to 1

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1. a is predicted to be a contradiction; it should have the same status as b. ! a. Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet. In fact, he is both.
b. #Rick is a philosopher or he is a poet but he is not both. In fact, he is both.

2. Incorrect predictions !
a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist. b. Whenever I invite a philosopher or a poet to a party, it ends up being a success.
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! Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist. i1, is a philosopher but not a poet, and he is a socialist. i2, is a poet but not a philosopher, and he is a socialist. i3, is both a philosopher and a poet, but he is not a socialist.

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Hypothesis 2. Disjunction is ambiguous

1. Cross-linguistic morphology 2. The ambiguity theory predicts that a. could be understood as true in the situation we described earlier. 3. Ellipsis (Fox, crediting T. Stephenson) !
John read Chomsky or Montague. Mary did too. In fact, she read both

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General observation about ellipsis

!
John went to the bank. Mary did too. bank is ambiguous: bank1 = slope near the side of a river bank2 = financial institution Ok John went to the bank1. Mary went to the bank1 too. Ok John went to the bank2. Mary went to the bank2 too. * John went to the bank1. Mary went to the bank2 too. * John went to the bank2. Mary went to the bank1 too. Ok John went to the bank1. Mary did go to the bank1 too. Ok John went to the bank2. Mary did go to the bank2 too. * John went to the bank1. Mary did go to the bank2 too. * John went to the bank2. Mary did go to the bank1 too.

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4. Yet another problem... ! a. It is certain that John will read Chomsky or Montague.
b. Every student read Chomsky or Montague.

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Hypothesis 3. Scalar Implicatures

! Hypothesis:(i) or is inclusive disjunction. (ii) an
implicature is responsible for the not and inference.

! S said:

F or G

! <and, or> form a scale: F and G entails F or G. ! If S believed that F and G, it would have been more
cooperative to say: F and G Primary Implicature: NOT S believes (F and G)

! If John is well informed and either believes or disbelieves

(F and G), we also get: Secondary Implicature: S believes NOT(F and G)
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I. Alternatives
! Alt(S) = {S': S' is a sentence obtained from S by replacing
simultaneously any number of occurrences of or by and and any number of occurrences of and by or}.

! a. S1 = Rick is a philosopher or a poet

Alt(S1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a philosopher and a poet} b. S2 = Rick is a philosopher and a poet Alt(S2) = Alt(S1) = {Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a philosopher and a poet} c. S3 = I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet Alt(S3)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet, I doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet}
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II. Ordering and Cooperation

! Ordering
Let S be a sentence and let S' be a member of Alt(S). S' is better than S if: a. S' entails S and S does not entail S' [terminology: we say that S' asymmetrically entails S] b. The speaker believes that S'

! Cooperation
A sentence S is not uttered cooperatively if for some S' in Alt(S), S' is better than S.
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Scalar Implicatures
! a. Rick is a philosopher or a poet
b. Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher or a poet, Rick is a philosopher and a poet} c. __ and __ >> __ or __ a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker believes that Rick is a philosopher and a poet. -Primary Implicature: If the speaker is cooperative, it's not the case that the speaker believes that Rick is both a philosopher and a poet. -Secondary Implicature: If the speaker has an opinion on this matter, it must be that he believes that Rick is not both a philosopher and poet.
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Scalar Implicatures

a. Rick is a philosopher and a poet b. Alt(a)={Rick is a philosopher and a poet, Rick is a philosopher or a poet} c. No member of Alt(a) asymmetrically entails a, so nothing additional is inferred.

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'Scale Reversal'

! a. I doubt that Rick is a philosopher and a poet

b. Alt(a)={I doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet, I doubt Rick is a philosopher and a poet} c. I doubt that __ or __ >> I doubt that __ and __ a. is not uttered cooperatively if the speaker doubts that Rick is a philosopher or a poet. ... hence if the speaker is cooperative, the speaker does not doubt that Rick is a philosopher or a poet (i.e. he believes that Rick is a philosopher or a poet) a philosopher and poet.
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'Scale Reversal'
!

a. Every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist => no additional inference (because the version with and would be less informative) b. Every Italian who is a philosopher and a poet is a socialist. => its not the case that every Italian who is a philosopher or a poet is a socialist, i.e. some Italian who is a philosopher or a poet (but not both) is not a socialist.
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'Scale Reversal'

! a. Whenever John is next to Mary or Ann, he behaves like

an idiot => no additional inference b. Whenever John is next to Mary and Ann, he behaves like an idiot. => It's not the case that whenever John is next to Mary or Ann, he behaves like an idiot.

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Some, Most, Every

! a. Some of my friends are clever
=> Not all of my friends are clever. => A minority of my friends are clever. b. Some of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.

! a. Most of my friends are clever

=> Not all of my friends are clever. b. Most of my friends are clever. In fact, all of them are.

! a. Whenever most of the students come to class, there is a

pleasant atmosphere. b. Every student who read most of the articles on the reading list will get an A.
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Extensions
! <and, or>
<all, most, some> <certain, {probable/likely}, possible> <..., 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1> <boiling, hot, warm> <adore, love, like> <excellent, good, okay>
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Why are Scales Necessary?

! a. John read some book.
b. John read exactly one book. c. (b) is more informative than (a), therefore the speaker was not in a position to assert (b) d. Therefore it is likely that John didnt read exactly one book.

! This is the opposite of the result we want!

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Other Implicatures

! John is in Paris or he is in Rome

=> it is not the case that: a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris. b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris. c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome. d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.

! If John is in Paris, he is there for business.

=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that John is in Paris
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Experiment - Scalar Implicatures (Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland)

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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]

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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]

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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]

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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]

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[Credits: Crain & co-workers, U. Maryland]

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Children and Scalar Implicatures

! Children appear not to compute Scalar Implicatures in

some environments where adults do.

! Paradox: children appear to be 'more logical' than adults!

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Scalar Implicatures Take Time Noveck and Posada 2003

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Three Properties of Scalar Implicatures

! Unlike entailments, they can be cancelled. ! They disappear in certain environments (and appear in
others).

! They are acquired relatively late by children. ! They take time to compute.

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Presuppositions

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Presuppositions vs. Entailments

! Difference 1 (dubious)
If an entailment of S is false, S is false, not weird.

! -John is French.
-No. He is South African.

! -John knows that he is going to be fired.

-No. He doesnt know it. -<#> No. He is going to keep his job.

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Presuppositions vs. Entailments

! Difference 2 (very clear)
Presuppositions project differently from entailments.

! a. Is John French?

"> John is European b. John is not French. "> John is European c. None of these 10 students is French "> Each of these 10 students is European "> Some of these 10 students is European => John is incompetent b. John does not know that he is incompetent => John is incompetent c. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent 43 => Each of these 10 students is incompetent

! a. Does John know that he is incompetent?

Presuppositions vs. Entailments

! a. Does John take care of his computer?
=> John has a computer b. John doesnt take care of his computer => John has a computer c. None of these 10 students takes care of his computer => Each of these 10 students has a computer

! a. Did John stop smoking?

=> John used to smoke. b. John didnt stop smoking => John used to smoke c. None of these 10 students stopped smoking => Each of these 10 students used to smoke
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Presuppositions vs. Implicatures

! An analysis of presuppositions as implicatures
Hypothesis: If pp is a clause described as having presupposition p and assertion p: (i) pp has as its meaning the conjunction of p and p (ii) but <p, pp> forms a scale

! Examples
a. <It is raining, John knows that it is raining> b. <John smoked, John has stopped smoking> c. <John has a girlfriend, John loves his girlfriend>

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Predictions I
! pp
entails p <Ok>

a. John knows that he is incompetent => John is incompetent b. Ill invite John and Mary => Ill invite John or Mary

! not pp

implicates

<Ok>

because (not p) is more informative than (not pp) ! a. John doesnt know that he is incompetent implicates: John is incompetent b. I wont invite (both) John and Mary => Ill invite John or Mary

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Predictions II
! No student PP implicates Some student P
because is more informative than hence the inference that i.e. No student P No student PP not No student P Some student P

! <3 students PP implicates #3 students (not P)

because is more informative than hence the inference that i.e. Less than 3 students P Less than 3 students PP not Less than 3 students P At least 3 students P

! These are the crucial cases to test!

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Presuppositions vs. Entailments: An Experiment (French, Chemla 2007)

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Experimental Conditions
! Triggers
Presuppositions attitude verbs: know, be unaware change of state: start, stop definite descriptions: his computer Implicatures: <all, some>, <and, or>, <excellent, good>

! Environments
-Inferences: universal-like and implicature-like -Operators: John ___, I doubt that John ___, More than 3 of these 10 students ___ , Each of the 10 students ___, None of these 10 students ___, Exactly 3 of these 10 students ____.
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Examples
! Less than 3 of these 10 students know that their father is
about to receive a congratulation letter. =>? The father of each of these students is about to receive a congratulation letter. =>? The father of at least 3 students is about to receive a congratulation letter.

! None of these 10 students read the handout and did an

exercise. =>? Each of these 10 students did (at least) one or the other =>? At least 1 of these 10 students did (at least) one or the other
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Main Results (Chemla 2007)

! Presuppositions display a different a behavior from

scalar implicatures under no: -Non-universal inferences for implicatures -Universal implicatures for presuppositions

! Not all quantifiers behave on a par:

at least 3, more than 3, exactly 3 display an intermediate behavior (universal inferences half the time).

! Not computing a presupposition takes time.

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NO and Universal Inferences

Left, from left to right 1. Every student stopped smoking => every student smoked 2. No student stopped smoking => at least one student smoked 3. No student stopped smoking => every student smoked Right, from left to right 1. Every student did A and B => every student did (at least) one 2. No student student did A and B => at least one student did (at least) one 3. No student did A and B => every student did (at least) one

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NO and Universal Inferences

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Less than three and Universal Inferences

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Universal Inferences for Various Quantifiers

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Reaction Times: Universal Inferences

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Questions

! Triggering Problem
Why do some elementary clauses have presuppositions? a. John knows that it is raining !: It is raining. b. John rightly believes that it is raining !: none, or possibly: John believes that it is raining.

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Questions

! Projection Problem
How do the presuppositions of elementary clauses get transmitted to complex clauses ? a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent. !: John is incompetent b. If John is an idiot, he knows that he incompetent !: none, or possibly: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent
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Questions

! Architectural Question
Where do presuppositions belong in the architecture or language? Are they a semantic or a pragmatic phenomenon?

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The Projection Problem

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Conjunction
! a. John knows that he is incompetent
b. Is it true that John knows that he is incompetent? !: John is incompetent c. I doubt that John knows that he is incompetent !: John is incompetent d. None of these 10 students knows that he is incompetent. !: Each of these 10 students is incompetent.

! a. John is incompetent and knows that he is.

b. Is it true that John is incompetent and knows that he is? !: none c. I doubt that John is incompetent and knows that he is. !: none d. None of these 10 students is incompetent and knows it. 61 !: none

Conjunction
! a. John is depressed and his boss knows that he is
incompetent b. Is it true that John is depressed and that his boss knows that he is incompetent? !: John is incompetent c. I doubt that John is depressed and that his boss knows that he is incompetent.

! a. John is an idiot and his boss knows that he is

incompetent. b. Is it true that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that he incompetent? !: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent (?) c. I doubt that John is an idiot and that his boss knows that 62 he is incompetent.

Conjunction
! p and qq presupposes p ! q
(... to be refined)

! John is incompetent and he knows it / that he is

!: none

! John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent

!: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent

! John is depressed and his boss knows that he is

incompetent Predicted !: If John is depressed, he is incompetent Actual !: John is incompetent Maybe because: the most plausible way to make the conditional true is to assume that its consequent is!

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Conditionals
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Is it true that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is? c. I doubt that if John is incompetent, he knows that he is.

! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.

b. Is it true that if John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent? c. I doubt that if John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.

! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.

b. Is it true that if John is over 65, he knows he cant apply? c. I doubt that if John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.
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Conditionals
! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.
b. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply? c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.

! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he is depressed

b. Is it true that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is depressed? c. I doubt that if John knows that he is overqualified, he is depressed.

! a. if p, qq presupposes p ! q
b. if pp, q presupposes p
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Disjunctions
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.

! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.

b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.

! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.

b. Either John isnt over 65, or he knows he cant apply

! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.

b. Either John doesnt know that he is over qualified, or he wont apply.

! a. p or qq presupposes (not p) ! q
b. pp or q presupposes p
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Stalnakers Pragmatic Analysis

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A Pragmatic Analysis
! p and qq presupposes p ! q
... when a speaker says something of the form A and B, he may take it for granted that A (or at least that his audience recognizes that he accepts that A) after he has said it. The proposition that A will be added to the background of common assumptions before the speaker asserts that B. Now suppose that B expresses a proposition that would, for some reason, be inappropriate to assert except in a context where A, or something entailed by A, is presupposed. Even if A is not presupposed initially, one may still assert A and B since by the time one gets to saying that B, the context has shifted, and it is by then presupposed that A. Stalnaker, Pragmatic Presuppositions, 1974 68

Assumptions
! Assumption 1: Sentences may be true, false or # ! Assumption 2: A sentence S is a presupposition failure if it
has the value # with respect to at least one of the states of affairs compatible with what the speech act participants take for granted. Definition 1: Common Ground = what the speech act participants take for granted. Definition 2: Context Set = set of worlds compatible with what the speech act participants take for granted.

! Assumption 3: The Context Set is updated incrementally

in discourse and in conjunctions.
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Possible Worlds
! A possible world w = a complete specification of what is
going on. It determines for every sentence S whether [[ S ]] w = true, [[ S ]] w = false, or [[ S ]] w = #.

! Different clauses give rise to different functions, e.g.: The President of France is Chirac w1 " false w2 " true w3 " # w4 " # ... The US President is Bush w1 " true w2 " false w3 " true w4 " # ... Two plus two is four w1 " true w2 " true w3 " true w4 " true
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Further Conditions
! Non-Contradiction
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is true in no world of C.

! Non-Triviality
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is true in every world of C.

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Stalnakers Analysis
! John knows that he is incompetent is:
-true in w if John is incompetent and believes that he is -false in w if John is incompetent and doesnt believe he is -# in w if John is not incompetent.

! Suppose that the speech act participants do not know

whether John is or isnt incompetent. Suppose further that the Context Set C is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4} w1 : John is incompetent and believes that he is w2: John is incompetent and believes he isnt w3: John is not incompetent but believes he is w4: John is not incompetent and believes he isnt
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Stalnakers Analysis
! T = John knows that he is incompetent uttered in C is a
presupposition failure because this sentence is # in w3 and w4, which both belong to C

! Suppose that the speech act participants do not know

whether John is or isnt incompetent. Suppose further that the Context Set C is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4} w1 : John is incompetent and believes that he is w2: John is incompetent and believes he isnt w3: John is not incompetent but believes he is w4: John is not incompetent and believes he isnt
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Stalnakers Analysis
! S = John is incompetent is:
-true in w if John is incompetent in w. -false in w in all other cases (i.e. the sentence does not have a presupposition)

! a. Acceptability
Clearly, John is incompetent uttered in C is not a presupposition failure. b. Update -Initially, the Context Set was C = {w1, w2, w3, w4} -After S is uttered, the new Context Set is: C = {w1, w2} (i.e. only the worlds compatible with S are retained)

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Stalnakers Analysis
! John is incompetent. He knows it.
= S. T.

! Step 1.
-The initial Context Set is -After the first sentence is uttered, the new Context Set is C = {w1, w2, w3, w4} C = {w1, w2}

! Step 2.
-The second sentence is evaluated with respect to C -By construction, in each world in C, T has a value different from #. So T is not a presupposition failure in C.

! Step 3.
C is updated to C = {w1}.
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Stalnakers Analysis
! Conjunction
a. Treat S and T in the same way as the discourse S. T: the assertion of a conjunction is a succession of two assertions. b. Beautiful analysis of presupposition projection: every world in C that satisfies S must satisfy T. In other words: C |= S ! T

! Limitations
a. How does the analysis extend to other operators? b. How does the analysis extend to embedded conjunctions? e.g. None of my students is rich and proud of it.

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Heims Semantic Analysis (following in part Karttunen 1974)

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Karttunen I: The Limits of Brute Force

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Karttunen II: Admittance Conditions

! a. Brute Force Method
define recursively the (complex!) rules by which the presuppositions of complex sentences are computed on the basis of the presuppositions of their parts. b. Admittance Conditions (i) take as primitive the notion of a context satisfying the presuppositions of an elementary clause. (ii) extend recursively the notion of satisfaction.

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Heims Synthesis
! Karttunen
Separate specification of: (i) admittance conditions (ii) truth-conditional (assertive) content. Gazdars critique (of Karttunen & Peters): this is not explanatory!

! Heim
a. The context change potential of an expression cannot be derived from its assertive content. b. But its assertive content cannot be derived from its context-change potential. (... once one has the right context change potential!!!)
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Heims Synthesis
! Heim vs. Stalnaker
a. Keep from Stalnakers analysis -the idea of an update -the analysis of presupposition projection in conjunctions b. Drop the pragmatic derivation of Stalnakers analysis.

! Heim vs. Karttunen

-In Karttunens system, admittance conditions are specified separately from the assertive content of expressions. -For Heim, Context Change Potentials do double duty.

! The Dynamic Conception of Meaning

-Old conception: meanings as truth conditions -New conception: meanings as Context Change Potentials, 81 i.e. as functions from Context Sets to Context Sets.

Heims Synthesis
! Notation: C[F] = update of the Context Set C with F ! Elementary Clauses
a. C[John is incompetent] = # iff C = # = {w#C: John is incompetent in w} otherwise b. C[John knows that he is incompetent] = # iff C=# or for some w#C, John is not incompetent in w = {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}, otherwise

! Truth
If C[S] " # and w#C, then: S is true at w iff w # C[S]

! Conjunction
C[F and G] = C[F][G]
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Heims Synthesis
! Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = # = C - C[F] otherwise

F ! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.

b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is not incompetent in w = C - C[F] otherwise, i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
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Heims Synthesis
! Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = # = C - C[F] otherwise

This means that not(pp) presupposes that p F

! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.

b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is not incompetent in w = C - C[F] otherwise, i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
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Heims Synthesis
! Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = # = C - C[F] otherwise

F ! a. not F = John doesnt know that he is incompetent.

b. C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #, iff for some w#C, John is not incompetent in w = C - C[F] otherwise, i.e. = C - {w#C: John believes he is incompetent in w}
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Heims Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = # = C - C[F][not G], otherwise

Worlds that refute if F, G

G
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Heims Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = # = C - C[F][not G], otherwise

This means that if pp, q presupposes that p, and that if p, qq, presupposes if p, q
Worlds that refute if F, G

G
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Heims Synthesis
! Conditionals (analyzed as material implications)
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = # = C - C[F][not G], otherwise

Worlds that refute if F, G

G
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Heims Synthesis
! if F, G = If John is incompetent, he knows it ! C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = #
But C[F] " # and furthermore C[F] = {w#C: John is incompetent in w} C[F][not G] = # iff C[F][G] = #, which is not the case (by construction). Furthermore, C[F][not G] = {w#C: John is incompetent in w}[not G] = {w#C: John is incompetent in w} - {w#C: John is incompetent in w and John believes he is incompetent in w} = {w#C: John is incompetent but doesnt believe it in w} C[if F, G] = C - {w#C: John is incompetent but doesnt believe it in w}

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Summary
! Meaning of an elementary clause = a CCP ! Conjunction
C[F and G] = C[F][G]

! Negation
C[not F] = # iff C[F] = #; = C - C[F] otherwise

! Conditionals
C[if F, G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[F][not G] = # = C - C[F][not G], otherwise

! Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = # = C[F] $ C[not F][G], otherwise
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Disjunctions
! a. If John is incompetent, he knows that he is.
b. Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.

! a. If John is realistic, he knows that he is incompetent.

b.Either John is not realistic,or he knows he is incompetent.

! a. If John is over 65, he knows he cant apply.

b. Either John isnt over 65, or he knows he cant apply

! a. If John knows that he is overqualified, he wont apply.

b. Either John doesnt know that he is over qualified, or he wont apply.

! a. p or qq presupposes (not p) ! q
b. pp or q presupposes p
91

Heims Analysis
! Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = # = C[F] $ C[not F][G] otherwise.

G
b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #, i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case. Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] $ C[I][K] 92

! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.

Heims Analysis
! Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = # = C[F] $ C[not F][G] otherwise.

This means that pp or q presupposes that p, and that p or qqpresupposes if (not p), q

! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.

b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #, i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case. Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] $ C[I][K] 93

Heims Analysis
! Disjunction
C[F or G] = # iff C[F] = # or C[not F][G] = # = C[F] $ C[not F][G] otherwise.

G
b. C[not I or K] = # iff C[not I] = # or C[not not I][K] = #, i.e. iff C[I] = # or C[I][K] = #, which is never the case. Thus C[not I or K] = C[not I] $ C[I][K] 94

! a. John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.

Heims Analysis
! Definition of Truth
If w#C, a. F is # in w relative to C iff C[F] = # b. If " #, F is true in w relative to C iff w#C[F]

! John is incompetent. He knows it.

= S. T. C = {w1, w2, w3, w4} C[S] = C = {w1, w2} C[S][T] = C = {w1}.

! a. Relative to w1, C, the discourse is true, since w1#C[S][T]

b. Relative to w2, C, the discourse is false , since w2%C[S][T]
95

Heims Explanatory Problem

! Problem: is the account explanatory? (Soames 1989)

C[F and G] = (C[F])[G] C[F and* G] = (C[G])[F] When F and G are not presuppositional, C[F and G]=C[F and* G]={w#C: F is true in w and G is true in w}

96

Heims Explanatory Problem

! There are many ways to define the CCP of or...
C[F or1 G] = C[F] $ C[G], unless one of those is # C[F or2 G] = C[F] $ C[not F][G], unless one of those is # C[F or3 G] = C[not G][F] $ C[G], unless one of those is #

G
97

Gazdars Account

98

Reminder 1: Non-Triviality
! Non-Contradiction
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is true in no world of C.

! Non-Triviality
A sentence S uttered in a Context Set C is deviant if S is true in every world of C.

99

Reminder 2: Other Implicatures

! John is in Paris or he is in Rome

=> it is not the case that: a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris. b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris. c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome. d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.

! If John is in Paris, he is there for business.

=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that John is in Paris
100

An Explanatory Account ?
! Step 1: Compute the various implicatures of a sentence ! Step 2: Keep only those presuppositions that are
consistent with all implicatures.

! John is incompetent and he knows that he is. ! a. Implicature:

If John is incompetent is uttered, it cannot be trivial that John is incompetent, i.e. C |" John is incompetent b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggers the potential presupposition that John is incompetent. c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it is inconsistent with the implicature. 101

An Explanatory Account ?
! John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetent. ! a. Implicature:
If John is depressed is uttered, it cannot be trivial that John is depressed, i.e. C |" John is depressed b. Potential Presupposition: the second conjunct triggers the potential presupposition that John is incompetent. c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because it is consistent with the implicature. Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent. Most examples go in Gazdars direction.

102

An Explanatory Account ?
! If John is incompetent, he knows it. ! a. Implicature:
The speaker cannot utter If F, G felicitously if he knows that F is true. If we represent as S the set of worlds compatible with what the speaker believes S |" John is incompetent from which it follows that C |" John is incompetent. b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the potential presupposition that John is incompetent. c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it is inconsistent with the implicature.
103

Reminder: Other Implicatures

! John is in Paris or he is in Rome

=> it is not the case that: a. the speaker believes that John is in Paris. b. the speaker believes that John is not in Paris. c . the speaker believes that John is in Rome. d. the speaker believes that John is not in Rome.

! If John is in Paris, he is there for business.

=> the speaker takes it to be possible but not certain that John is in Paris
104

An Explanatory Account ?
! Either John is not incompetent, or he knows that he is.
a. Implicature: The speaker cannot utter F or G felicitously if he believes that F is false S |" John is incompetent from which it follows that C |" John is incompetent. b. Potential Presupposition: the second clause triggers the potential presupposition that John is incompetent. c. Filtering: The presupposition is filtered out because it is inconsistent with the implicature. Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent.
105

An Explanatory Account ?
! If John is depressed, he knows that he is incompetent. ! a. Implicature:
S |" John is depressed from which it follows that C |" John is depressed b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the potential presupposition that John is incompetent. c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because it is consistent with the implicature. Note: Gazdar thus predicts that the entire sentence presupposes that John is depressed. Stalnaker and Heim predict: if John is depressed, he is incompetent. Most examples go in Gazdars direction - but not all do!
106

Problem for Gazdars Account

! If John is French, he must know that he can travel within
the European Union without a passport. a. Gazdars prediction: ! = John can travel within the European Union without a passport. b. Actual presupposition: probably none.

! a. Implicature:

S |" John is French from which it follows that C |" John is French b. Potential Presupposition: the main clause triggers the potential presupposition that John can travel within the European Union without a passport. c. Filtering: The presupposition is not filtered out because it is consistent with the implicature!
107

! If John has twins, then Mary will not like his children.

A Very Partial History

! 1973-1974
-Stalnakers analysis: pragmatics + local contexts. -Karttunens analysis: recursive admittance conditions + local contexts.

! 1970s
-Karttunen & Peters -Gazdars recursive pragmatics

! 1980s
-Heims theory of presupposition projection -Overgeneration problem (Soames, Rooth).

! 1990s
van der Sandt & Geurtss critique of Heim. DRT analysis 108

Back to Heims Account! Accommodation

109

Global Accommodation
! My sister is pregnant. ! '... it's not as easy as you might think to say something that
will be unacceptable for lack of required presuppositions. Say something that requires a missing presupposition, and straightway that presupposition springs into existence, making what you said acceptable after all.' I said that presupposition evolves in a more or less rule-governed way during a conversation. Now we can formulate one important governing rule: call it the Rule of accommodation for presupposition If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then - ceteris paribus and within certain limits 110 presupposition P comes into existence at t."

Local Accommodation
! a. The king of France is not wise because there is no king of
France. b. None of my students takes good care of his car because none of my students has a car! c. John doesn't know that he is incompetent because he just isn't incompetent!

! a. It's not the case there is a king of France and he is wise

because ... b. None of my students has a car and takes good care of it because... c. It's not the case that John is incompetent and knows it ...

! Question: can we do without Local Accommodation by

appealing to meta-linguistic uses of various operators?
111

Global vs. Local Accommodation

! C[not F]= # iff C[F]=#
= C - C[F], otherwise.

! Global Accommodation:
C' = {c#C: France is a monarchy at the time and in the world of c}. We then compute C'[the king of France is not powerful].

! Local Accommodation: Instead of computing

C - C[F] (which wouldn't even be defined, since C[F]=#), we compute: C - C'[F], where C'={c#C: France is a monarchy at the time and in the world of c} (as in A.)
112

Directions
! Allow for local accommodation whenever global
accommodation would contradict a. the literal meaning of a sentence b. or an implicature of a sentence [or possibly: certain types of implicatures, e.g. primary implicatures]

! In effect, this allows us to capture the good properties of

Gazdars system within Heims dynamic semantics.

113

Summary
! Presuppositions cannot be analyzed as implicatures. ! The dilemma of dynamic semantics
a. Stalnakers approach is explanatory but not general Update the context set in time as you process a sentence. b. Heims approach is general but not explanatory The meaning of words is dynamic from the start, i.e. their lexical entries specify how they change the context set.

! Gazdars account was explanatory and general but

incorrect (i) Compute the implicatures of a sentence. (ii) Project those potential presuppositions that dont contradict the entire sentence or one of its implicatures.

114

The Proviso Problem

! a. If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it.
b. John knows that if the problem was easy, someone solved it (Geurts 1999)

! Predicted presupposition of (a) and (b):

If the problem was easy, someone solved it Actual presupposition of (a) Someone solved the problem Actual presupposition of (b) If the problem was easy, someone solved it
115

The Proviso Problem

! John is an idiot and he knows that he is incompetent
!: if John is an idiot, he is incompetent

! John is depressed and he knows that he is incompetent

Predicted !: If John is depressed, he is incompetent Actual !: John is incompetent Maybe this is because the most plausible way to make the conditional true is to assume that its consequent is! ... but this kind of reasoning fails to address the minimal difference between: -If the problem was easy, it is not John who solved it -John knows that if the problem was easy, someone solved it (Geurts 1999).

116

The Proviso Problem

! Direction 1 (van der Sandt 1992, Geurts 1999)
-This problem refutes the standard dynamic approaches as well as all approaches that make similar predictions. -A different analysis must be proposed, in which presuppositions are treated in a more syntactic fashion (Discourse Representation Theory) This is a major contender among current theories.

! Direction 2 (still promissory)

With enough pragmatic reasoning, we can stick to Heims predictions - which in any event seem to be correct in other cases, e.g. If John is over 65, he must know that he is too old to apply
117

Back to Heims Account! Quantification

118

Replacing Worlds with Contexts

Example1. An amnesiac gets lost...
An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library. He reads a number of things in the library, including a biography of himself, and a detailed account of the library in which he is lost... He still wont know who he is, and where he is, no matter how much knowledge he piles up, until that moment when he is ready to say, This place is aisle five, floor six, of Main Library, Stanford. I am Rudolf Lingens. [Perry 1977] It seems that the Stanford library has plenty of books, but no helpful little maps with a dot marked location of this map. Book learning will help Lingens locate himself in logical space. (...) But none of this, by itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the world he is. He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but 119 also in ordinary space. [Lewis 1979 p. 138]

Standford

Harvard

120

Standford

Harvard

121

Example 2. 'My pants are on fire' ! If I see, reflected in a window, the image of a man whose
pants appear to be on fire, my behavior is sensitive to whether I think, His pants are on fire, or My pants are on fire, though the object of thought may be the same' (Kaplan)

122

123

Referential Uncertainty
! Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knows
everything there is to know about the world. I wear a coat. My coat is black.

! [Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is to

know about the world; but he does not know whether he is Alfred, who is having a conversation with Berenice, or Charles, who is having a conversation with Denise. Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did] Compare: Did you stop smoking? You are Berenice. Did you stop smoking?
124

Referential Uncertainty
! Situation: Lingens, who is lost in the Stanford library, knows
everything there is to know about the world. I wear a coat. My coat is black.

! [Lingens, a well-read amnesiac, knows everything there is to

know about the world; but he does not know whether he is Alfred, who is pointing towards Berenice, or Charles, who is pointing towards Denise. Berenice used to smoke but Denise never did] Compare: Did she stop smoking? She is Berenice. Did she stop smoking?
125

Static Account with worlds

! [[ it is raining ]] w = false
[[ PS is in Los Angeles ]] w = true, [[ the British President is happy]] w = #

! Rule
[[ Pro VP ]] w = true if and only if [[ Pro ]]w # [[VP ]]+ w where [[VP ]]+ w is the set of things of which VP is true in w [[ Pro VP ]] w = false if and only if [[ Pro ]]w # [[VP ]]- w where [[VP ]]- w is the set of things of which VP is false in w [[ Pro VP ]] w = # in all other cases!
126

Static Account with contexts

! A context = <world, speaker, addressee, denotation of pro1, ... > ! [[ I smoke ]]
<w, PS, YOU, John, Mary, ...>

= true if and only if PS smokes in w = false if and only PS does not smoke in w

! [[ She2 smokes]]

<w, PS, YOU, John, Mary, ...>

= true if and only if Mary smokes in w = false if and only Mary does not smoke in w

! [[ She2 stopped smoking]]

<w, PS, YOU, John, Mary, ...>

= true if and only if Mary used to smoke but doesnt now in w = false if and only Mary used to smoke and still does in w = # if and only if Mary didnt use to smoke. 127

Dynamic Account with contexts

! The rules are exactly the same as before, replacing
worlds with... contexts!

! Elementary Clauses [now C is a set of contexts]

We write as cw the world of c, as c(1) the denotation of pro1 a. C[John is incompetent] = # iff C = # = {c#C: John is incompetent in cw} otherwise b. C[John knows that he is incompetent] =# iff C = # or for some c#C, John is not incompetent in cw = {c#C: John believes he is incompetent in cw}, otherwise. c. C[she2 stopped smoking] = # iff C = # or for some c#C, c(2) didnt smoke in cw = {c#C: c(2) doesnt smoke in cw}, otherwise.

128

Quantification in a Static Setting

! [[ [no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes]]

<w, PS, YOU, John, Mary, ...>

" # iff for every d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 smokes ]] " #. If " #, = true iff for no d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 smokes]] = true. = false iff for some d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 smokes]] = true.

129

Quantification in a Static Setting

! [[[no x1: x1 student] x1 stopped smoking]]<w, PS, YOU, John,...>

" # iff for every d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 stopped smoking]] " #. If " #, = true iff for no d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 stopped smoking ]] = true. = false iff for some d which is a student in w, <w, PS, YOU, d, Mary, ...> [[x1 stopped smoking ]] = true.

130

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! Notations
c[i " d] = that context which is exactly like c except that proi denotes d C[i " d] = {c[i " d]: c#C}

! C[[no xi: xi NP] xiVP] = # iff

C = # or {c[i"d]: c#C and d is an object}[xi NP] = # or {c[i"d]: c#C and c[i"d] # C[i"d][xi NP]} [xi VP] = #. If " #, C[[no xi: xi NP] xi VP] = {c: c#C and for no object d, c[i"d] # C[i"d][xi NP] and c[i"d] # C[i"d][xi NP][xi VP]}

! C[[every xi: xi NP] xiVP]: same thing as for no ..., replacing

no with every.
131

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! [no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes
Let us assume that C " #. Then: C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes] " # because C = #, {c[1"d]: c#C and d is an object}[x1 student] " #, and {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student]} [x1 smokes] " #. Furthermore, C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes] = {c: c#C and for no object d, c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student] and c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student][x1 smokes]} = {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cw and d smokes in cw}
132

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! [no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes
Let us assume that C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} and for each i, ci = <wi, PS, YOU, John>, with: w1 : All students used to smoke. All students still smoke. w2: All students used to smoke. One doesnt any more. w3: One student didnt use to smoke. No student smokes. w4: One student didnt use to smoke. One student smokes. C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes] = {ci: i # {1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, <wi, PS, YOU, d> # {<wi, PS, YOU, d>: i # {1, 2, 3, 4}}[x1 student] and <wi, PS, YOU, d> # {<wi, PS, YOU, d>: i # {1, 2, 3, 4}}[x1 student][x1 smokes]} = {ci: i # {1, 2, 3, 4} and for no object d, d is a student in wi and d smokes in wi} = {c3} 133

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! [no x1: x1 student] x1 stopped smoking
Let us assume that C " #. Then: C[[no x1: x1 student] x1stopped smoking] = # iff {c[1"d]: c#C and d is an object}[x1 student] = #, or {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student]} [x1 stopped smoking] = #, iff {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student]} [x1 stopped smoking] = # iff for some c#C, for some d, d is a student in cw and d didnt use to smoke in cw. If " #, = {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cw and d stopped smoking in cw} 134

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! [no xi: xi student] xi stopped smoking
Let us assume that C = {c1, c2, c3, c4} (with c1, c2, c3, c4 defined as before) C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 stopped smoking] = # because {c[1"d]: c#C and c[1"d] # C[1"d][x1 student]} [x1 stopped smoking] = {<wi, PS, YOU, d>: i # {1, 2, 3, 4} and d is a student in wi} [x1 stopped smoking] = # because in w3 and w4 there are students who didnt use to smoke.
135

Quantification in a Dynamic Setting

! [no xi: xi student] xi stopped smoking
Let us now assume that C = {c1, c2} (with c1 and c2 defined as before) It can be shown C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 smokes] " #. Furthermore, C[[no x1: x1 student] x1 stopped smoking] = {c: c#C and for no object d, d is a student in cw and d stopped smoking in cw} = {c1}

136