Biocrhics ISSN 0269-9702 Volume 9 N w n h 5 1995

MORAL EXPERTISE: A PROBLEM IN THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICISTS

JAN CROSTHWAITE

ABSTRACT
Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decisionmaking in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the Committeeo f Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology in the UK in 1982-4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects ofjluoridating the public water suppb in 1990; and many o f us are serving on ethics committees o f various sorts. Not only are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential. The i n v o l v m t of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question o f professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosophers own moral perspective or ju&emeni3 play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s h e makes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts rejlection on thc nature o f t h profession, and in a k e moral philosophy to o & . It aLro prompts particular on the expertise we t refleGtion on how processes o f public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper,

1. INTRODUCTION In the Republic, Plato argued that philosophers should rule; that they should make the policy decisions for society because of their superior wisdom, their knowledge of the good. Few philosophers today would go so far. Even though each of us may be convinced we know whats best, we a l l have colleagues whom we would not want as social legislators. However, increasingly philosophers are arguing that philosophy can and should contribute to finding solutions to social problems, particularly where there are ethical issues to be addressed.
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Philosophers have been called to serve on public commissions of s both morally problematic and inquiry into areas which are seen a requiring public policy decisions. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology in the UK (1982 - 4). In NZ, the Bioethics Research Centre at the University of Otago recently produced a report for the Medical Council on ethical issues in reproductive technology and genetics.* In 1990 the Philosophy Department, The University of Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Council to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water upp ply.^ In addition to issues of public policy, it is increasingly expected that ethics committees evaluating health research and innovative treatment proposals should have access to the expertise of a philosophically trained ethicist. The point is not just that philosophers are becoming involved in debating practical ethical issues; many of us would argue for the necessity of a philosophical contribution to such debates. It is then incumbent on us to be clear about the nature of that contribution. I think the involvement of philosophers, particularly ethicists or moral philosophers, in such decision-making also raises an issue of professional ethics for philosopher^.^ The question Im interested in is what role a moral philosophers own moral perspective or judgements should play in the advice she gives, or the contribution she makes to the decision-making, on an ethical problem of public concern. Do the moral judgements of a moral philosopher have a different standing from those of the rest of the community in virtue of her professional expertise? Unless they do, it seems to me it would be unprofessional to put them forward in the context of a professional opinion or consultation; moreover doing so has ethical implications. Here then, is a problem in professional ethics. Like most questions of professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take

The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, reprinted in Mary Warnock, A Qwstion ofLife, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Biotechnology revisited: Ethical and Legal Issues, a report prepared by the Bioethics Research Centre, University of Otago, for the Medical Council of New Zealand. Auckland Uniservices Ltd., Report prepared for the Auckland Regional Council by members of the Philosophy Department, University of Auckland, (unpublished, 1990). I realise that describing philosophy (or any academic discipline) as a profession is tendentious, but I dont think the interesting debates over how to define a profession really affect the issue I am addressing. Even if philosophy is not precisely a profession, the moral issue I am raising is strongly analogous to what are recognisably questions of professional ethics.

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moral philosophers to be offering. I think this paiticular problem also prompts reflection on the processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas. I want to start by considering the expertise that moral philosophers are offering in the area of public decisions about ethical issues. This will bring into focus the question of the role of the philosophers moral views. I will then outline some positions and supporting reasoning with respect to this question, and finally reflect briefly on the process of public decision on ethically problematic issues.

2. T H E EXPERTISE OF T H E MORAL PHILOSOPHER

Philosophers, of course, hold many different views about the nature of their discipline. My concept of philosophy locates me within the analytic tradition, and the problem I a m raising is perhaps most sharply focussed within that tradition, given its emphasis on detached reflection over applied philosophy and its scepticism concerning moral truth. I think that consideration of what it is that we take ourselves to be imparting in teaching philosophy shows that philosophical expertise divides into three categories: skills, knowledge and values. The skills we seek to impart are particularly those

- of clarification and analysis of concepts and problems, and

- of construction and assessment of arguments and viewpoints.

While these skills are common to different specialist areas of philosophy, the knowledge required by different areas may differ. For example, we would not expect an ethicist to be as knowledgeable about theories of the mind as about ethical theories. Generally described, the knowledge component of philosophical expertise consists of:

- knowledge of philosophical problems, questions, positions and theories (e.g. ethical theories, theories of knowledge, views about human nature and society) knowledge of assumptions, consequences and criticisms of different positions or views knowledge of types of argument and likely problems (e.g., fallacies like false dichotomy or ambiguities of scope).

It is in the area of values and attitudes that there is likely to be most contention about what I a m claiming to be philosophical expertise. I think that part of teaching philosophy is to teach:

- commitment to understanding issues and views

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- commitment to reasoned support and evaluation of beliefs or

claims willingness to question key assumptions and challenge received wisdom interest in finding solutions to philosophical questions and

problem^.^
Such values and attitudes mean that the expertise of a moral philosopher will include not only skills of reasoning and analysis and knowledge of ethical theories and the aigumentation surrounding ethical issues and problems, but also

a critically examined moral perspective

from which some judgements on particular issues are likely to follow. It is this component in particular of philosophical expertise which underlies the issue which concerns me here. Let me make three further comments before proceeding with discussion of that problem. First, Im not claiming that only philosophers possess the skills or knowledge Ive just outlined, though I do want to defend the claim that philosophers are the appropriate specialist consultants if these are the skills and knowledge one wants. Techniques of reasoning, argumentation and analysis are used in all good reflective thinking within any discipline and many professions. Nor is knowledge of philosophical issues and views, either historical or contemporary, restricted to philosophers. But academic philosophy has a particular commitment to fostering and training people in this package of skills and understanding.6 It is arguable also that the values and attitudes I have specified are distinctive of the practice of philosophy, particularly when directed towards philosophical problems and theorising. They, and this practice, may be found outside academic philosophy, but if one is
Very similar descriptions of the fundamental expertise of moral philosophers are given by Peter Singer, Ethical Experts in a Democracy, pp. t53-4, and James Nickel, Philosophy and Policy, pp. 140-4, in Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, David M. Rosenthal and Fadlou Shehadi (eds), University of Utah Press, 1988. In Ethics and Experts Cheryl Noble is critical of the usefulness of philosophers in addressing public policy issues, Hnrtings Crnk Report, June 1982, 7 - 9. In response to the following discussions of her paper (Zbid.: 9- 14) Noble says philosophers have an overblown faith in their techniques of logical and conceptual analysis. On the one hand, they imagine that moral error is in significant degree produced by logical and conceptual obtuseness, and on the other that they are by training more skilled than other scholars as well as lay thinkers in avoiding fdlacies. Neither of these ideas, it seems to me, has much truth to it. (Ibid.: 15) Nobles point is surely a salutary warning against hubris, but I am inclined to think that philosophical training is a better guarantee of such skill, in the sort of areas in question, than other disciplinary training. This is because it is consciously and
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looking for such expertise one would normally look to the profession which explicitly espouses it. One would look to an accredited engineer for engineering advice, even though it is possible for someone outside that profession to have the knowledge and skills required to provide it. Similarly then, society should look to professional philosophers for philosophical expertise. However, wherever someone offers or is consulted on the basis of this package of skills and understanding, the moral issue I am interested in will arise. Having said this, my second comment is to acknowledge that the account of philosophy I am offering here may be thought rather narrowly focussed. Many philosophers would claim a wider understanding and area of reflective thought for the discipline than I have outlined. I have tried to pick what I think might be capacities that most academic philosophers in Australia or New Zealand (and I think also in much of Britain and the USA) who might be involved in moral consultancy would agree to be basic to their discipline. Of course, thinkers within (and outside 00 philosophy might reject the aims Ive outlined, holding them inappropriate or misconceived in some way, but this isnt a dispute I want to enter here. A selfreflective philosopher should also be aware of critiques (for example, from feminism and post-modernism) of the discipline and more generally of the sort of analytic goals and values Im endorsing here. k i l l base I am Awareness of such critiques would improve the s defending by fostering an alertness to the way in which background theories, assumptions and interests can lead to the framing of questions, and to the effect of such frames in directing and circumscribing debate and the possibility of solutions. The third comment I wish to make is about the nature of the critically examined moral per~pective~ which I am claiming to be part of the expertise of moral philosophers. Such a perspective could be a normative ethical theory, or it could be a meta-ethical position i l l have consequences (nihilism, relativism or objectivism), which w for the assessment of both normative theories and particular judgements. I have chosen the vague term perspective in preference to more specific terms like theory or values in order to leave quite open what such a perspective might be and the extent to which it might be individual or shared by others in the profession.
explicitly directed to fostering the ability to detect undarity and fallacious thinking. It is not, of course, a perfect guarantee of skill in this area; nor is it a guarantee of wisdom. I take this term from Nickel, who understands it as having beliefs about values and moral norms which have been critically examined, tested for consistency, and systematised to some degree (Philosophy and Policy, p. 144).
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All I am interested in is considered ethical views which have implications for judgements on particular issues. This brings me to the issue I want to discuss.
3. A PROBLEM FOR CONSULTANT MORAL PHILOSOPHERS

If, in looking at the expertise of moral philosophers, we concentrate on skills of clarification and argument, together with knowledge of ethical frameworks and reasoning, then it would seem that their usefulness in social decision-making on ethical issues is largely to do with the forms of ethical debate rather than with the substance of ethical judgement. This suggests their role should be to facilitate moral debate and the making of moral decisions by those who carry responsibility for doing so. Moral philosophers are moral cartographers; they provide a map of the moral terrain for those who need to find a way through it. But is this the extent of their professsional contribution? Let me return for a moment to what we require of students learning philosophy. While comprehension of the layout of the field of debate, the positions, pathways, firm ground and quagmires, is part of what we look for in our students, we take the mark of a distinctively philosophical inquiry to be engagement with the debate itself. We criticise student essays for failing to engage and come to some informed conclusion about the question at issue. Moral philosophers then, as part of their professional competence, will arrive at informed opinions on moral issues. The moral perspective they bring will ground judgements when engaged with issues. But are such judgements, and the perspective which grounds them, merely personal opinion, or are they part of professional expertise? Should a consultant moral philosopher be merely a reporter and facilitator of moral debate, or should she engage in that debate in defence of a particular position? Philosophers can certainly map the moral terrain, but should they also point the way through it? For example, I hold the view that the use of fetal tissue for research and therapy is morally permissible (provided that adequate safeguards against the exploitation of women as providers of such material are in place). This is a contentious view. I support it by reference to a preferred moral framework, one which emphasises assessment of the consequences of a suggested action for overall human wellbeing. I dont think that appeal to a framework of rights is the ultimate ethical tribunal; I -think that rights are subsidiary to questions of utility - though it will usually be better for human wellbeing to maintain and support a framework of human rights.
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My judgement about the use of fetal tissue is supported also by a metaphysical position which denies that a fetus has the same status as an ordinary adult, as a person or bearer of rights and interests. This also is a contentious position, and its ethical implications extend beyond this particular issue. I think this issue presents a genuine moral problem and I am well aware of a range of alternatives to my own views on it. Nonetheless, I am committed to my judgement. My current judgement is not fixed; it could be altered by information which affects my assessment of the likely harms and benefits of using fetal tissue - including harms to women (through potential exploitation) and harms to the community through permitting actions which lead to some change in important values. It could change were I to be given reason to revise my basic moral framework, though this is less likely than being given reason to revise a particular judgement. Suppose as a philosophical ethicist I were to be consulted, or even appointed part of a committee set up to decide about whether to prohibit or permit the use of f e t a l tissue for research and therapy. What should I do? Should I present my views? Should I survey the positions and arguments? With or without indicating my own assessments? I see three options here.

(1) Moral cartography;

I could present explanations of the different positions which have been or could be taken on the issue, outlining their respective rationales, strengths and weaknesses. While providing a neutral evaluation of the various positions, I would not indicate or argue in favour of the one I judge best. This is similar to what we might expect normally of a judge summing up for a jury: a clear indication of the legal issues and possibilities and their bases, but no direction as to what verdict to give. An alternative model is provided by the more usual sort of expert consultation, for example the sort of advice one would expect when consulting an acoustic engineer about the desirability of some structural feature in a concert hall.

(2) Expert judpmmt:

I could present a reasoned argument for the position or judgement I think correct.
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This might, but need not, include an explanation and evaluation of alternative points of view. If we think that it is important not merely to argue for ones preferred position but to present and argue against the alternatives, then we could go instead for a third option.

(3) A charted path:

I could present the different moral positions on the issue, outlining their respective rationales, strengths and weaknesses, and indicate the conclusion I draw from this about what is right together with the reasoning which supports it.
To return to the cartography metaphor, this is a map which marks both the position of the treasure and the route to it. Which of these options one chooses may depend on the manner of the moral philosophers involvement in the moral debate. Moral philosophers could be involved either: (i) as external consultants or (ii) as members of bodies making decisions, or recommendations to policy makers, on ethical issues. What is appropriate for the philosopher qw member of a decision-making body will depend on the nature of, and the proper procedures for, such decision-making, and whether their membership is as a professional ethicist or not. For the moment, let me focus on the simpler case of professional consultation. Suppose a committee established to decide whether or not to permit the use of fetal tissue for therapeutic research consults me in the capacity of moral philosopher. What form of response is professionally appropriate? Surely how I report depends on what the committee wants of me? Those consulting usually specify what it is that they want from their consultants. The committee should specify what it wants from me clarification of the issues, principles and arguments appealed to (what I have called a map of the moral terrain), or the answer to their problem, an authoritative pronouncement on the rightness or wrongness of such use of fetal tissue. Being asked for the right answer is something moral philosophers resist: we spend a lot of time dissuading those who consult us from thinking that ethicists can be asked for the answer to a moral problem in the way a mathematician might be asked for the answer to a difficult equation. But some still have such expectations, and this highlights the point I want to make here that what the committee expects as a professional opinion is a function of its view of the professional expertise it is engaging. It is, by and large, up to philosophers to determine and specify the nature of the professional expertise they are claiming for
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moral philosophy and professional ethicists. We can say that moral judgements are a proper part of the professional competence of moral philosophers, or that this competence is restricted to explaining issues, arguments and positions. So we cannot at this point simply leave it to the committee to determine its own requirements.

4.

PROS AND CONS

So which of options (l), (2) and (3) should we go for? I should make clear that in raising this question, I a m not assuming that there is a unique right answer to each moral problem. Nor a m I assuming that every moral philosopher will make a moral judgement about what is the right course of action for each such social problem. (Though it is worth remembering that views like there is no significant moral difference to be discerned between these two suggested courses of action or the committee must itself decide which of the following arguments carries most weight are themselves moral judgements l l I am assuming at the moment within such a context of inquiry.) A is that the sort of basic professional expertise we credit to moral philosophy is Zihh to result in moral philosophers both having a moral perspective and making judgements in particular situations. Given this, the question about what to do in such cases arises. Deciding that moral judgement is properly within the professional competence of moral philosophers will invite the further question of whether it may be incumbent on us to provide such judgements when professionally consulted. But I dont wish to tackle that here. Let me start with option (2) - expert judgement. It would clearly be wrong when consulted as a moral philosopher to offer only my judgement that using fcetal tissue is morally permissible. I cannot say simply, In my judgement as a professional ethicist the use of fcetal tissue for therapeutic purposes is morally right. I must at least provide the reasoning by which I arrive at this assessment. In general, expert opinions should be supported by reasons, to allow for peer review at least. In the case of moral consultation though, there are additional bases for this requirement, partly practical considerations to do with clarity and understanding, but more significantly issues connected to how we should conceive of the process of moral deliberation. The significance of a moral claim may not be clear or fully understood without understanding the reasoning behind it. Particular moral judgements are rarely a simple matter of X is wrong , but
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370 JAN CROSTHWAITE usually involve some reference to how X is to be understood or interpreted, to the context in which it occurs (the intentions behind the action or its likely consequences), perhaps to the values of the society within which the judgement is being made, and maybe to the force or meaning with which wrong is to be understood. In explaining my position on the use of fetal tissue earlier, I felt the need to include a proviso that the possibility of exploiting women was ruled out. Why this should be included is hard to understand without appeal to more about the social context in which the suggested use of fcetal tissue would occur and the ethical relevance of consequentialist concerns. Further, in the area of moral debate it is often difficult to be clear precisely what the issues are; problems requiring policy decisions usually involve a complex mixture of issues and questions, some factual, some political and some ethical, and there are usually conflicting interests and points of view. Sorting out what are the real issues of contention or difference is important, as well as establishing which are questions of fact, which of interpretation, and which of value. In arguing for the need to provide reasons however, I am assuming that moral judgement is a reason-governed activity. If one were to hold an extreme subjectivism about moral judgement that anyones opinion was as good as anyone elses on moral questions - then one would see no ground for providing reasons. But neither would one see any grounds for consulting a moral philosopher. Moral decision-making at the social level could be no more than counting votes. I think that recognition of the importance in some way of reasoning to moral judgement is consistent with many different meta-ethical positions. It is also fundamental to the idea of the possibility of moral expertise, and to any advocacy of a role for moral philosophy in such deliberation. To the extent that moral judgements are reasoned, and hence open to evaluation, expert judgements should include their reasoning. But then we must turn to the obvious objection, not only to (2) but to (3), that there is no notion of an expert moral judgement. This is a widely held view, and one shared by some moral philosophers. C.D. Broad says, for example: It is no part of the professional business of moral philosophers to tell people what they ought or ought not to do . . . Moral
It might be that some forms of intuitionism could recognise the possibility of moral expertise - in the form of especially sensitive consciences, for example without recognising a role for reason in moral judgement. One could perhaps argue for a role for philosophical training in sensitising conscience, but I think i t
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philosophers, as such, have no special information not available to the general public about what is right and what is wrong.g

I am not claiming that philosophers possess special information about what is right or wrong. Rather I am suggesting that they
bring special skills and background information which are appropriate and helpful to deliberation on such issues. They usually bring also experience of reflecting on such issues in a context of professional debate which encourages awareness of the implications of and connections between lines of thinking, and of the possible significance of various features of morally problematic situations. I am also arguing that the sort of skills and knowledge that are part of the expertise of moral philosophy foster informed moral judgement. People other than philosophers may be as able to make reasoned and informed moral judgements, though there is surely a difference between what the general public is able to say about complex moral issues and what professional philosophers are able to say (as is evident in the professional journals).I0 Of course, this professional competence does not issue always in uniform shared professional judgements. Neither moral perspectives nor particular judgements are uniform within moral philosophy. But this does not mean either that professional philosophical competence is irrelevant to moral judgement nor that such perspectives and judgements should not be included within the professional competence of moral philosophers. Other professionals also disagree on issues within their professional competence. The fact that there is disagreement amongst experts (about both perspectives and particular judgements) is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of a professional expert judgement, though it makes it important that such judgements be themselves open to debate.
implausible and prefer to rest my case on the relevance of reason to moral judgement. C.D. Broad, Ethics and llrc Hislory OfPhilosophy, (cited and discussed by Singer in Moral Experts, Amlysis, 32:115-117, 1972, and again in his Ethical Experts in a Democracy, p. 149). lo Peter Singer makes this point in Ethical Experts in a Democracy. The extent of disagreement in moral judgement is often exaggerated, and its nature often misunderstood. Moral philosophers will often agree on the relevant issues and even values with respect to a particular area, though they may differ on the relative weight they assign to these. I suspect that it is often easier to get agreement, particularly in the situation of committee decision-making, on specific moral judgements about a particular issue than to get agreement on the background perspective from which to derive these. It is important to realise here the influence on the resulting judgement of the need for a social decision, as opposed to the contemplation of moral issues in isolation from the necessity of action or policy decisions.
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But an informed moral judgement is not the same as having the right answer. Moral judgements are both disputed and fallible. There is no independent verification of their correctness, as one would have were two engineers to disagree on the load-bearing capacity of a particular structure. The only validation for moral judgements is in the reasoning which supports them. They should neither be accepted nor offered for acceptance on the basis of the professional standing of the moral philosopher, but only on the basis of the reasoning s/he provides in their defence. Moreover, given disagreement within professional moral philosophy on moral perspectives as well as particular judgements, it is also important that the alternative perspectives which are being rejected in advancing a particular judgement should be made clear. Where judgements are validated largely by the reasoning which supports them, it is particularly important that they be presented in the context of all the options or alternatives. Some further reasons support the requirements both that moral philosophers survey the options on a given problem or issue and that .they provide the reasoning behind any judgement they might offer. O n e is the nature of their expertise. I am not claiming that making reasoned moral judgements comlitutes the expertise of moral philosophers. I a m saying that their professional expertise indudes the capacity to make such judgements. This capacity derives from the primary constituents of philosophical expertise: the skills, knowledge and values I first outlined. Any notion of expert judgement is warranted by this primary expertise and should be offered as grounded in it. Further, the profession does not want to give the impression that it is claiming moral wisdom as its competence. I think that moral wisdom is distinct from the moral expertise I have been outlining, and that neither implies the other.'? Providing only judgements, however ably reasoned, would imply a claim to moral wisdom. Finally, offering the other components of our professional expertise is also important in the context of the sort of decisionmaking involved in socially problematic ethical i s s u e ~ . The ' ~ social processes of moral judgement should involve the informed decisions
Precisely what moral wisdom is, I am unsure, but the notion seems to me to allow for an understanding of moral issues and right action which need not be reflective in the way that I am interpreting moral judgements which flow from the philosophical moral expertise. It is my experience that the usefulness of philosophers on ethics committees and similar bodies is not restricted to their moral expertise (however defined). The general argumentative and clarificatory skills of philosophy can be used on other than directly moral matters to help committees see and sort out issues.
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of appropriate bodies, not simply of professional ethicists; and these decisions should themselves be moral judgements, not simply the citing of the moral judgements of others, however expert. One cannot make moral judgements without information about and consideration of the moral options. Hence, I think we should reject option (2) - expert judgement, and that the choice lies between (1) and (3) - a neutral or a guided map. How then to choose? Options (I) and (3) agree that if I am consulted as a philosopher and ethicist I should make clear the different views about the morality of this practice and their grounds. I should provide for the committee what of my expert knowledge is relevant to their concerns. But what about the crucial difference between them? What should I say about my own viewpoint? Two considerations may weigh against option (1). Surely ones considered viewpoint (particularly where this is a preferred theoretical framework) will affect the way in which one views, and presents, the various alternatives. If so, then the objective, neutral presentation of alternatives envisaged in (1) is not a real possibility, and the pretence of it is positively misleading and dangerous to adequate ethical deliberation. Of course, it is part of the training and values of phdosophers to fairly present opposing viewpoints. But there remains a legitimate doubt about the degree to which this can be done in a genuinely neutral fashion. Given this doubt, one should at least make ones own position clear so that others can be aware and wary of a possible slant in the presentation and evaluation of positions.* This could be done perhaps without going so far as option (5); for example, by stating ones moral perspective (and any particular judgements one has made on the issue) but not arguing for or defending these. I think such a compromise is unsatisfactory however, because it leaves such views with the aura of authority but without defence or location in the process of argumentation being set out. There is something evasive about saying: The alternatives here are A and B. Personally, I think B is right but I wont say why. Rather, here are some things one might say for and against both alternatives . The second argument for (3) in preference to (1) derives from the nature of the sorts of opinions or judgements at issue. The moral
I A similar issue arises in the context o f teaching philosophy - to what extent should one make clear to students ones own position on an issue or problem to which they are being introduced? Views vary between teach them the truth as you see it and never let them know where you stand. I think it is important that students be aware of the possibility that the neutralpresentation of positions may be contaminated by personal perspectives, and that they cannot assess this without some indication of where the presenter comes from.

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philosopher who has conscientiously considered an issue and arrived at a view of what action is right should surely be concerned that the deliberating committee makes the right decision. At the very least, she must be seriously concerned that it not make the wrong decision and advocate something she judges morally wrong. Doesnt this mean she should try to influence the committees decision to move it in the right direction? I think the answer to this is yes, but that it must be done in a way which respects the proper processes of ethical deliberation and the role of decision making bodies. Hence I want to come down in favour of option (3) - one should survey the ethical terrain, and where one feels judgements are warranted one should give these and ones reasons for them. But there are problems with option (3). First, there is the point that a moral judgement on a particular issue does not flow directly from moral theorising alone. It usually requires factual information, including information about social consequences and frameworks and sometimes about social values. A consultant moral philosopher is not always in possession of such relevant information. Without it, she is not in a position to make a considered professional judgement. But one cannot even present moral perspectives helpfully without indicating the impact of factual issues. Hence these must be taken into account in the presentation of options, even if only in a hypothetical manner. (The fact that moral assessments, and indeed the presentation of moral options and perspectives, is not independent of other information suggests that it may be better to have philosophers as committee members rather than merely external consultants. In this way they have full access to what information the committee has and can obtain.) But whether consultant or committee member, there is a further problem with the idea that a moral philosopher should make available her own moral judgements. That one particular view is the considered opinion of a professional moral philosopher is likely to add weight to it. (This is also a problem with the compromise mentioned above, of acknowledging but not arguing for ones position.) Busy committee people faced with a problem on which they have consulted an expert are likely to go straight to the conclusions or recommendations in the report, rather than wade through the reasoning which backs them. This is particularly likely where people are uncomfortable about dealing with moral problems, and where a lot of the rest of the report seems to be careful consideration of wrong views! Why bother? This possibility means that option (3) may work against the sort of process of moral assessment and evaluation that philosophers support, though not so strongly as option (2).
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This may not be such a great problem for the ethicist who is convinced that hers is the right view (though one might still have concerns about contributing to right action for the wrong reasons). If ones ethical concern is to see right done, then how much does the means of achieving it matter? But note that this line of reasoning would tend towards an even more professionally problematic suggestion that the moral philosopher should simply respond in whatever way she thinks most likely to be effective in moving the committee in the right direction. One could appeal sophistically to the prejudices or, more charitably, the moral perspectives of the committee to lead them to a conclusion one thinks correct though for reasons one thinks they would not accept. But this is hardly consistent with professional integrity, particularly given the emphasis on reasoning in moral judgement that I have been advocating. I do not think that moral philosophers should assume that their own judgements are authoritative and should carry the day. Moral judgements are insecure, and moral theorists fallible. We stand the best chance of right judgements when the process of generating them is a matter of informed and careful debate amongst many different people. No matter how carefully I derive my final judgement from the understanding and evaluation of all the options, someone who simply takes my judgement on trust, rather than engaging in this process of reasoned justification with me, has missed an important part of the process of ethical deliberation and judgement. (This too is an argument for the involvement o f a moral philosopher in the committees deliberating and decision making, rather than simply as an outside consultant providing a written report to be considered.) The interactive process of debate is extremely important to the understanding and evaluation of moral argument, and it is hard to do on ones own. Behind what I have been saying about these alternatives are two main claims. The first, that moral judgement essentially involves reasoning, I have already discussed. The second is that public bodies deliberating on ethical issues must themselves engage in the process of making moral judgements. Id like now to briefly address this second claim.

5. THE NATURE OF PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO ETHICAL PROBLEMS

I have been talking about the contribution of moral philosophers to social decision-making on ethical issues. But surely the appropriateness of any philosophical contribution will be a function of the nature of the process to which it contributes. So how should we
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understand the processes of social decision-making involved here? (I am assuming a context of committees or commissions which have been authorised to make either recommendations or decisions about action or policy in areas of moral concern.) There are basically two models for understanding the deliberations of such bodies. Which of these provides the better account of the nature of social deliberation on moral issues is a contentious question in the intersection of moral and political philosophy, and not one I will address here. What I want to argue here is that on either model, it is important that a body engaging in such deliberation must carry out a process of moral analysis and reasoning which involves access to the kind of contribution I am claiming a moral philosopher can provide. The first model is provided by scientific investigation, such as a research team trying to discover the cause of AIDS. The assumption here is that there is an answer to be discovered, the existence of which is independent of the process of discovery. The role of the ethics committee/commission is to discover what is the morally right action or policy in a given situation. How it should do this is a question of what are the best procedures or processes for ascertaining moral truths (a question whose answer is not independent of ones theory about the nature of moral truth). The second model is provided by political processes, such as the use of voting in a democracy to decide the answer to the question Who should govern? On this model, there is no truth about who should govern that exists independently of the process of decision; the procedure determines the answer to the question. That a judgement about right action or policy is the result of the properly conducted deliberations of a properly constituted body makes i t correct. The difficult questions of justification concern claims about what are the proper processes and constitution for such bodies. One thing which may be significant here is exactly what is taken to be the question such committees are answering. Is it a question like Is the therapeutic and research use of fetal tissue morally right? Or the different, though connected, question Should this society permit the therapeutic and research use of fetal tissue? One could adopt the second, process-oriented, approach to the latter question while still thinking that there is a deliberation-independent answer to the former. Addressing the former question should be part of what goes into a decision on the latter (provided one is not a moral sceptic), but the latter is a wider question. For example, it may involve costhenefit analyses which extend beyond the morality of the procedures being assessed; it will involve views about the relationship between social instutitons and morality - for example,
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we may think that society should permit what some hold morally unacceptable (as in the case of abortion) because of wider concerns about the social imposition of values to the detriment of individuals, or we may think that what activities are socially sanctioned should lag behind enlightened moral thinking in order to reflect majority views. These are themselves difficult issues in the overlap of moral and political philosophy. Even in a morally cohesive community, there may be a gap between morally right action and what a community should enforce, but in a pluralist community, the problem of disagreement on what is morally right makes even more complex the question of when and why to impose right action or prohibit wrong action. On the first model, the scientific model, it might be tempting to think that the appropriate mode of ascertaining the right answer to an ethical problem is to consult experts. But for the reasons I indicated in my discussion of the expert judgement approach above, I reject the idea that such consultation is simply a matter of finding out what the experts think the right answer is. Because of the room for dispute in matters of moral judgement, it is important that any body trying to determine the right answer must engage with the reasoning offered in support of any view. The committee needs to evaluate such reasoning, and to do this with respect to moral conclusions is to enter into moral deliberation. No deliberative procedures will guarantee a correct decision, but processes of analysis, reasoning, and informed critical appraisal of options and views, are the best guide we have to moral truth. On this understanding then there is a need for the contribution a moral philosopher can make to such deliberations. It seems to me also, that the moral philosopher should be part of the committee, rather than an outside consultant. As part of the deliberating body, a philosopher has easier access to relevant information and is also able to assist in the processes of deliberation and of evaluating reasons and judgements which that body must carry out. (There is also less risk in this situation of a judgement the philosopher may offer being simply accepted as expert and right without engagement with the reasoning behind it.) But what about the second model? There seem to be two main reasons for adopting such a model: scepticism about the existence or knowledge of moral truth, or a view that political values (democratic and egalitarian in particular) require certain kinds of decisionprocedures in areas of social disagreement or uncertainty of this kind. A full-fledged moral scepticism is unlikely to hold that what decision a committee arrives at is the morally right one, but might accept that it is right in the sense of being the appropriate basis for
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action. But on either view, the procedures for decision and the constitution of the body making them are crucial. Thinking of social decisions on moral problems on this model might suggest taking a moral vote, that is, a head count of the views in the society about what is right. (The moral sceptic is going to have to take this as an expedient move, rather than as justified by moral considerations.) But on either basis for adopting such a model, it is unlikely that moral experts would be accorded a special role. While I think that views within a society are significant for decisions about policy, I want to reject the idea that moral decisions should be reached by counting heads, even given democratic values. The reasoning behind a mora! judgement is relevant to the weight it should be accorded in determining social policy. (I dont mean that a moral judgement has to be without flaw to merit consideration, but it should at least be informed, consistent and not grounded in obvious falsehood.) Moreover, in the sort of issues likely to be ethically problematic there is often great risk that endorsing a majority view will be unjust to minority values and interests, and can promote oppressive (and hence unethical) policy and actions. Even if a committee ultimately reaches its own decision by a vote, I think that the processes which lead up to this must involve the sort of deliberation to which I am suggesting philosophers can usefully contribute. In the sort of democratic framework which is the source of such a procedural approach to ethically problematic social issues, it is important that any decision-making body be able to justify the decisions it takes; part of the authority of its decisions as a basis for social action or policy is through its own deliberative process. Issues, possible positions and their grounds need to be laid out and assessed. Philosophers are often better able to articulate and provide rationales for moral views than lay persons who hold them, and this seems to me an important contribution that a moral philosopher can make to such deliberations. And in making any decision about social policy, considerations must be addressed which amount to moral deliberation. The harms and benefits consequent on an action or policy, its impact on the framework of rights recognised by the society and its coherence with the values of the society as a whole and its constituent groups, are as significant for
It is interesting that ethics committees and similar bodies often prefer consensus decision-making to decision by vote. One can discern both moral and political reasons behind such a preference. Jonathan D. Moreno has an interesting discussion of consensus in this context in his Ethics by Committee: The moral authority of consensus, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 13:411-432, 1988.
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pragmatic and political decisions as for judgements about moral rightness. The expertise of moral philosophy is an aid to such deliberation.

6. CONCLUSION
Decisions about what actions or policy should be adopted in an ethically problematic situation cannot be taken in the absence of understanding the reasoning behind different moral assessments of a practice, action or issue. Hence, engagement in moral deliberation about the rightness of something is a preliminary to and component of any decision about social policy with respect to it. The sorts of information on which such deliberation must proceed are at least in part the appropriate province of moral philosophers. Moreover, where moral philosophers make particular judgements or endorse moral perspectives in the light of their expertise, I think it is appropriate that these should be made available to the deliberating body. This is not so that such judgements can carry the day, but because they provide both an example of and an aid in the process of deliberation in which the committee must engage. In one sense what Ive been saying is that ethics committees must do, for political reasons, what moral philosophers are trained to do; they should hence be able to make full use of that professional training.

Philosophy Department University o f Auckland

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