Chapter 9: Trust, Democracy, and Governance: Can Government Policies Influence Generalized Trust?

*
ric !" #slaner

Some years ago the noted novelist E. M. Forster (1965, 70) gave !o "heers #or $emo%ra%y&' ...one (e%a)se it admits variety and t!o (e%a)se it *ermits %riti%ism. !o %heers are

+)ite eno)gh' there is no o%%asion to give three. ,nly -ove the .eloved /e*)(li% deserves that.& 0erha*s there is a reason #or a third %heer. $emo%rati% so%ieties are tr)sting so%ieties. he (ig *ay1o## #rom inter*ersonal tr)st, most %ontem*orary o(servers say, is that it leads to (etter& government and to a *)(li% that is ha**ier !ith government *er#orman%e. ,r may(e good government ma2es *eo*le more li2ely to tr)st ea%h other. ,r *erha*s (oth. "an the state *rod)%e tr)st3and, i# so, are %ertain ty*es o# state str)%t)res more li2ely to (e asso%iated !ith high levels o# tr)st4 Most !ho have !ritten on tr)st and the state assert that governments %an *rod)%e tr)st (-evi, 19956 /othstein, 7001). .)t 8 disagree. $emo%ra%y doesn9t ma2e *eo*le (e%ome more tr)sting. r)st a%ross nations !itho)t a lega%y o# "omm)nism

de*ends largely on long1term %)lt)re (s*e%i#i%ally religio)s traditions) and on e%onomi% e+)ality. r)sting *)(li%s !ill also *rod)%e more res*onsive governments and are more li2ely to ado*t *oli%ies that !ill *romote e%onomi% e+)ality3and th)s %reate more tr)st. 8 shall arg)e that state str)%t)res %an9t *rod)%e tr)st, ()t state *oli%ies %an. Mostly, tr)st has %)lt)ral roots that are resistant to %hange. :o!ever, tr)st does not de*end )*on %)lt)re alone.

he level o# e%onomi% e+)ality in a %o)ntry has a *o!er#)l e##e%t on the level o# inter*ersonal tr)st3and here, government *oli%ies that #oster a more e+)al distri()tion o# reso)r%es %an have a *o!er#)l e##e%t on tr)st. r)st matters' So%ieties !ith higher levels o# tr)st in t)rn have instit)tions that #)n%tion (etter. r)st leads to (etter instit)tions3not the other !ay aro)nd. 8t also *rod)%es higher s*ending #or the sorts o# *oli%ies that #oster e+)ality (more redistri()tion, more #)nding #or ed)%ation). So the %o)ntries !ith the lo!est levels o# tr)st !ill are those !ith the most )ne+)al distri()tions o# !ealth. .)t they are also the %o)ntries that are least li2ely to redistri()te !ealth to %reate the sort o# tr)st that !ill (reed instit)tions that #)n%tion (etter.

he "laims ;(o)t r)st

0oliti%al li#e and tr)st have an )neasy relationshi* !ith ea%h other. Some *eo*le say that the state %an ()ild tr)st. .y ens)ring that *eo*le %an9t get a!ay !ith %heating ea%h other and #lo)ting the la!, the state %an %reate res*e%t #or a)thority. 0eo*le !ill )ltimately %ome to a%%e*t legal di%tates as moral sti*)lation. he state en#or%es *ro*erty rights and %ontra%ts. ; strong legal system !ill red)%e transa%tion %osts, ma2ing tr)st less ris2y. he more e<*erien%e *eo*le have !ith

%om*lian%e, the more li2ely they are to have %on#iden%e in others9 good !ill (.rehm and /ahn, 1997, 10056 -evi, 19956 ,##e, 1999). he state has a *arti%)larly im*ortant role in *rote%ting the rights o# minorities and in *roviding #or the !el#are o# those !ho have #e!er reso)r%es. he most v)lnera(le have the most to lose (y tr)sting others3and th)s !ill (e more rel)%tant to *la%e their #aith in their #ello! %iti=ens. ; 7

strong state %an lo!er the (ar (y em*o!ering those !ith less *o!er thro)gh legali=ing trade )nions or en#or%ing %hild la(or la!s (-evi, 1995). States %an ()ild tr)st in three other !ays. First, honesty in government may *romote inter*ersonal tr)st. "orr)*t governments set (ad e<am*les #or the ty*es o# (ehavior that !ill (e tolerated #rom the %iti=enry. he %orrelation (et!een so%ietal %orr)*tion and inter*ersonal tr)st a%ross 57 %o)ntries is 1.61>.1 he most %orr)*t %o)ntries have the least tr)sting %iti=ens. his is hardly s)r*rising, sin%e 2le*to%ra%ies& send %lear messages to the *eo*le that %rime does *ay. 7 "iti=ens #eel #ree to #lo)t the legal system, *rod)%ing #irmer %ra%2do!ns (y a)thorities and leading to !hat 0)tnam (199>, 115) %alls interlo%2ing vi%io)s %ir%les& o# %orr)*tion and mistr)st. Se%ond3and strongly related to the #irst %laim3demo%ra%y *romotes tr)st (.rehm and /ahn, 1997, 1005). $emo%rati% regimes, -evi (1995, 96) arg)es, may (e *rere+)isites #or inter*ersonal tr)st (%#. M)ller and Seligson, 199?). S)%h *olities %an a%t)ally %hange *re#eren%es (y str)%t)ring the range o# a%%e*ta(le %hoi%es in a so%iety, -evi arg)es. She does not s*e%i#y ho! these %hanges o%%)r, ()t seems to arg)e that demo%ra%y em*o!ers *eo*le !ho don9t %ontrol many reso)r%es. @hen *oliti%al leaders need to rely )*on the mass %iti=enry #or *oliti%al s)**ort, they are not #ree to ado*t *oli%ies that enri%h themselves (%orr)*tion) or the dominant interests in a so%iety (e%onomi% strati#i%ation). hird, strong government *er#orman%e ma2es *eo*le #eel (etter a(o)t government3and )ltimately more !illing to %oo*erate !ith ea%h other (.rehm and /ahn, 1997, 10056 Mis=tal, 1996, 195). here is a dire%t lin2 (et!een tr)st in government and #aith in other *eo*le. /ahn, .rehm, and "arlson (1997, 7?) arg)e that !hen *eo*le tr)st their government, they are more >

li2ely to (elieve that they %an in#l)en%e it. his gro!ing sense o# e##i%a%y ma2es *eo*le more li2ely to tr)st ea%h other. Ea%h o# these %laims is *la)si(le. .)t most are dis*)ta(le3and 8 shall %hallenge many o# them in this %ha*ter. he roots o# tr)st are not instit)tional. hey lie in the dee*er val)es so%ieties hold3 and in the distri()tion o# reso)r%es. Aes, demo%ra%ies are more tr)sting. .)t a !ide variety o# str)%t)ral varia(les #all (y the !ayside to the level o# e%onomi% ine+)ality in a so%iety. So%ieties dont (e%ome tr)sting (e%a)se they are more demo%rati%. hey (e%ome tr)sting (e%a)se they

distri()te their reso)r%es more e+)ally. 0erha*s the logi% !or2s the other !ay aro)nd3more tr)sting %o)ntries !or2 to redress e%onomi% ine+)ality (Bna%2, 1999). hat !o)ld (e ni%e3()t it doesn9t seem to ha**en. So%ieties !ith many tr)sters are more *leasant *la%es to live. Cot only are they more e+)al, ()t they also have (etter *er#orming governments (less red ta*e and more res*onsive D)di%iaries). heir governments *)rs)e *oli%ies that lead to even more e+)ality' a

larger *)(li% se%tor, more trans#ers #rom the ri%h to the *oor, and more s*ending on ed)%ation.

$emo%ra%y and r)st

-evi (1995), ,##e (1999), and others ("ohen, 1997, 191706 Mis=tal, 1996, 1956 0agden, 1955, 1>9) arg)e that a state, and *arti%)larly a demo%rati% state, %an *rod)%e tr)st in *eo*le. -evi (1999, 57) maintains that states ()ild tr)st thro)gh the )se o# %oer%ion& and that demo%rati% states may (e even (etter at *rod)%ing generali=ed tr)st than are nondemo%rati% instit)tions...(e%a)se they are (etter at restri%ting the )se o# %oer%ion to tas2s that enhan%e rather than )ndermine tr)st.& /othstein (7001) ela(orates the lin2 (et!een tr)st and %oer%ion' 8# ?

*eo*le (elieve that the instit)tions that are res*onsi(le #or handling Etrea%hero)s9 (ehavior a%t in #air, D)st and e##e%tive manner, and i# they also (elieve that other *eo*le thin2 the same o# these instit)tions, then they !ill also tr)st other *eo*le.& -evi (1995, 57) holds that FtGhe tr)st!orthiness o# the state in#l)en%es its %a*a%ity to generate inter*ersonal tr)st...&. /othstein (in *ress) ela(orates on this lin2age' ...i# yo) thin2...that these...instit)tions Fo# la! and orderG do !hat they are s)**osed to do in a #air and e##e%tive manner, then yo) also have reason to (elieve that the %han%e *eo*le o# getting a!ay !ith s)%h trea%hero)s (ehavior is small. 8# so, yo) !ill (elieve that that *eo*le !ill have very good reason to re#rain #rom a%ting in a trea%hero)s manner, and yo) !ill there#ore (elieve that most *eo*le %an (e tr)sted.&

here is *lenty o# eviden%e that *eo*le are more li2ely to o(ey la!s and *ay ta<es i# they (elieve that la!s are en#or%ed #airly and i# *eo*le tr)st government ( yler, 19906 S%hol= and 0inney, 1995). .)t the lin2 (et!een government and tr)st in *eo*le is ten)o)s. ;%ross ?7 nations, there is ()t a modest %orrelation (r H .15?) (et!een tr)st in *eo*le and %on#iden%e in the legislative (ran%h o# government.> 8# tr)st in *eo*le is a long1standing val)e that %hanges ()t slo!ly and i# tr)st in *eo*le is not largely (ased )*on o)r e<*erien%es (Islaner, 7007, %hs. >1?), then it is hard to see ho! government %an generate #aith in strangers. 8# !e !ithheld tr)st in *eo*le )ntil !e had %on#iden%e that they !ere in #a%t tr)st!orthy, then government might (e a(le to generate #aith in others. -evi and others are %ertainly right !hen they arg)e that tr)st in government is %ontingent )*on o)r eval)ations o# ho! !ell o)r leaders have done their Do(s. ? ;nd they are D)st as 5

ass)redly !rong !hen they arg)e that tr)st in *eo*le rests *rimarily )*on demonstrations o# tr)st!orthiness (see Islaner, 7007, %h. ?). here is little reason to *res)me that government

en#or%ement o# la!s !ill ()ild tr)st. Aes, %oer%ion %an in%rease compliance !ith the la!. ,(eying the la! (e%a)se yo) #ear the !rath o# government !ill not ma2e yo) more tr)sting3no matter ho! e+)ally the heavy hand o# the state is a**lied. 0eo*le !ho tr)st others are less li2ely than mistr)sters to endorse )n%onditional %om*lian%e. 8n the Jeneral So%ial S)rvey in the Inited States, D)st >5 *er%ent o# tr)sters say that yo) sho)ld always o(ey the la!, even i# it is )nD)st, %om*ared to ?5 *er%ent o# mistr)sters (*hi H 1.175, A)le9s K H 1.769). 5 Sim*ly getting *eo*le to o(ey la!s !ill not *rod)%e tr)st. 0erha*s this is a %ari%at)re o# the arg)ment on ()ilding tr)st, ()t it is easy to %on#)se %om*lian%e !ith vol)ntary a%%e*tan%e, to %on#)se the la! a(iding *eo*le o# Singa*ore !ith those o# S!eden (%#. /othstein, 1999). Even in high tr)sting %o)ntries s)%h as S!eden, the lin2age (et!een %on#iden%e in the legal system and the *oli%e and tr)st in *eo*le is not very strong (/othstein, 1999).6 "o)rts %an save )s #rom ras%als only i# there are #e! ras%als (%#. Sit2in and /oth, 199>). -a! a(iding %iti=ens, not rog)e o)tla!s, %reate %onstit)tions that !or2. Ao) may !rite any ty*e o# %onstit)tion that yo) !ish, ()t stat)tes alone !on9t %reate either %om*lian%e or tr)st. Ma%a)lay (196>, 55, 6116>) arg)es that ()siness e<e%)tives and la!yers *re#er transa%tions (ased )*on tr)st3and handsha2e seals the deal3to those (ased )*on %ontra%ts and threats o# legal san%tions. Most e<e%)tives and even la!yers have #aith that other *eo*le !ill 2ee* their end o# a (argain. /esorting to #ormal do%)ments might )ndo the good!ill that )ndergirds ()siness relationshi*s (Ma%a)ley, 196>, 6>). "oer%ion, Jam(etta (1955, 770) arg)es, #alls short o# (eing an ade+)ate alternative to tr)st....8t introd)%e an asymmetry !hi%h dis*oses o# mutual tr)st and *romotes 6

instead *o!er and resentment& (%#. .aier, 1956, 7>?).

Aet, demo%ra%ies are more tr)sting. ; !ide range o# meas)res o# demo%rati=ation sho! that the more democratic the constitutional structure, the more trusting citizens are . 8 sho! %orrelations (et!een tr)st and meas)res o# demo%ra%y in a(le 1. he indi%ators o# demo%rati=ation 8 )se are the meas)res o# *oliti%al #reedoms, %ivil li(erties, and the overall #reedom s%ore develo*ed (y Freedom :o)se and re*orted in Jastil (1991)6 )*dated Freedom :o)se meas)res #or 199>19? and 199519967 a s)mmary meas)re o# Freedom :o)se s%ores that lin2s assigns ea%h %o)ntry a demo%rati=ation meas)re #rom the year %losest to the tr)st meas)re in the @LS (see a(le 1)6 "o**edge9s (1991) indi%ator o# *olyar%hy6 and meas)res o# demo%rati=ation re*orted in .ollen (1991)6 J)rr, Maggers, and Moore (1991)6 Lanhanen (1997), and )*dated s%ores #or the J)rr meas)re #rom -a0orta et al. (1997). he meas)res o# tr)st are the most re%ent availa(le #ig)res #rom the @orld Lal)es St)dy #or 6> %o)ntries over the %o)rse o# the three !aves o# the @LS.5

NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN a(le 1 a(o)t here he %orrelations #or these meas)res o# demo%rati=ation and tr)st range #rom the modest to the more ro()st. 0arti%)larly telling, ho!ever, are the many negative %orrelations (et!een levels o# demo%ra%y and tr)st #or the #ormerly "omm)nist %o)ntries in "entral and Eastern E)ro*e. here is at (est moderate s)**ort #or the arg)ment that demo%ra%y and tr)st go together3and very little eviden%e #or the thesis that democratization leads to greater tr)st (8nglehart, 1999). ;)thoritarian governments that set *eo*le against ea%h other, s)%h as the #ormer "omm)nist regimes in 7

Eastern and "entral E)ro*e,9 %an ma2e tr)st ha=ardo)s. @hen *eo*le #eel %om*elled to t)rn on their #riends lest the state t)rn on them, inter*ersonal tr)st may (e%ome too ris2y. 8n s)%h a !orld, yo) really %an9t (e too %are#)l in dealing !ith *eo*le, even i# everyone !o)ld strongly *re#er to treat others as i# they !ere tr)st!orthy. Even !ith demo%rati% instit)tions in *la%e, *eo*le living in %o)ntries !ith lega%ies o# o**ression !ill neither tr)st their #ello! %iti=ens nor *arti%i*ate in %ivi% li#e. $emo%ra%ies may (e tr)sting or mistr)sting. 8n %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nist r)le, the mean *ro*ortion o# tr)sters in highly demo%rati% regimes is .?11, %om*ared to .717 in the least demo%rati% %o)ntries. (8 shall also re#er to %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nist r)le as demo%ra%ies& #or short, #)lly re%ogni=ing that many o# these nations have not al!ays res*e%ted the rights and #reedoms asso%iated !ith demo%rati% regimes.) $emo%ra%ies are all over the *la%e in tr)st, ranging #rom .0> (.ra=il) to .65 (Cor!ay). Formerly "omm)nist regimes also vary in tr)st, ()t only #rom .06 to .>?. :al# o# all demo%ra%ies have more than >? *er%ent tr)sters. he standard deviation #or demo%ra%ies is .151. 8t is less than hal# that val)e (.067) #or a)thoritarian states. $emo%ra%ies ma2e tr)st *ossi(le. hey don9t ne%essarily *rod)%e it. here is %ertainly little eviden%e that demo%rati=ation in%reases tr)st. he %orrelation (et!een %hange in tr)st in 77 nations #rom 1951 to the early 1990s (a%%ording to the @orld Lal)es S)rvey) and variations in Freedom :o)se s%ores #rom 1975 to 1955 is modestly negative (1.>51). Aet, even this res)lt t)rns o)t to (e largely an ill)sion. @itho)t the o)tlying %ases o# ;rgentina and So)th Borea, the %orrelation dro*s the %orrelation to 1.076. 8nglehart (1997, 1999) #inds that tr)st does not de*end )*on demo%rati=ation, on%e %)lt)ral heritages (0rotestantism and "on#)%ianism) and !ealth are %ontrolled.10 5

;n 8ndian Do)rnalist %ommented on the shar* %leavages that led to a %y%le o# )nsta(le %oalitions, none o# !hi%h %o)ld #orm a government' @e have the hard!are o# demo%ra%y, ()t not the so#t!are, and that %an9t (e (orro!ed or mimi%2ed& ("onsta(le, 1999, ;19). So is a third %heer #or demo%ra%y mis*la%ed4 May(e not. here is some eviden%e that demo%ra%y matters. ;%%ording to 8nglehart9s meas)re o# the years o# continuous demo%ra%y, !e see a *o!er#)l %orrelation (et!een inter*ersonal tr)st and demo%rati=ation (%#. 8nglehart, 1997, 177). ;%ross ?1 %o)ntries the %orrelation (et!een the n)m(er o# years o# %ontin)o)s demo%ra%y and tr)st is .769. ;nd no set o# %ontrols or sim)ltaneo)s e+)ation estimation ma2es the lin2age go a!ay. ,ne %o)ld, o# %o)rse, agree !ith 8nglehart9s (1997, 1501155) reasona(le arg)ment that stable demo%ra%y de*ends )*on a tr)sting *)(li%. /egimes that merely give %onstit)tional *rote%tions against state inter#eren%e don9t need an )nder(elly o# %ivi% res*onsi(ility (M)eller, 1996, 115). 8nter*ersonal tr)st is +)ite sta(le over time a%ross %o)ntries (the aggregate %orrelation #rom the 1951 to 1990 is .907, C H 77). @e %an *redi%t levels o# demo%rati=ation over long *eriods o# time (y %ontem*orary meas)res o# tr)st. So 8nglehart (1997, 1561155) in#ers that tr)st is a 2ey %om*onent o# *ro1demo%rati% attit)des that lay the #o)ndation #or *o*)lar %onstit)tions. Aet, instit)tionalists might arg)e that the logi% goes the other !ay' -ong1standing demo%rati% regimes %an *romote %ontem*orary high levels o# tr)st. 0erha*s they are %orre%t, ()t i# so, their %ase is still !ea2. he demo%rati% mar%h to tr)st is a long and !inding road. 8t ta2es ?6 years o#

%ontin)o)s demo%ra%y to move a %o)ntry #rom !ell (elo! the mean on tr)st to a(ove it. "o)ntries !ith less than ?6 years o# %ontin)o)s demo%ra%y are no more li2ely to have tr)sting %iti=ens than a)thoritarian states (r H .056, C H 77, * O .7>7, one1tailed test). 8# instit)tions 9

matter, their e##e%ts are very slo!3and di##i%)lt to disentangle #rom other %hanges o%%)rring in so%ieties. r)st is neither a *rere+)isite #or nor a %onse+)en%e o# demo%ra%y. he demo%rati% revol)tion that s!e*t Eastern and "entral E)ro*e a de%ade ago3and +)i%2ly s*read thro)gh many o# the !orld9s remaining a)to%ra%ies3did not de*end )*on so%ial tr)st. Eastern (lo% %o)ntries !ith more tr)sting %iti=enries did not (e%ome demo%rati% sooner than nations !hose *o*)lations had less #aith in others. Formerly "omm)nist %o)ntries !ith higher levels o# tr)st didn9t %reate *olities !ith more *oliti%al or *ro*erty rights. h)s, !hatever e##e%ts demo%ra%y has on tr)st

o%%)rs !ithin %o)ntries !itho)t long lega%ies o# a)thoritarianism. Aes, many demo%ra%ies in the sam*le have e<*erien%ed a)thoritarian r)le #rom time to time (and more than #rom time to time)' Jhana, Cigeria, 8ndia, S*ain, 0ort)gal, Jree%e, )r2ey, 0er), and .angladesh are nota(le

e<am*les. ;nd many demo%ra%ies& in #orm have not (een +)ite so #ree&' So)th ;#ri%a, So)th Borea, Me<i%o, ai!an, and the $omini%an /e*)(li% (among others) #it this *attern. $emo%ra%y9s (ene#its seem %on#ined to long1standing demo%ra%ies. he %orrelations (et!een

levels o# demo%ra%y and generali=ed tr)st are almost always higher #or %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nist r)le than #or all %o)ntries (see a(le 1). he maDor e<%e*tion is #or the earlier J)rr et al. inde< !here all "omm)nist %o)ntries had identi%al s%ores at the (ottom o# the demo%rati=ation s%ale. $emo%rati=ation has no a**re%ia(le e##e%t on tr)st #or %o)ntries in Eastern and "entral E)ro*ean that #ormerly !ere a)thoritarian regimes. 8n some %ases the %orrelation (et!een tr)st and demo%rati=ation is even negative (tho)gh never signi#i%ant). he long lag

(et!een demo%rati=ation and tr)st in 8nglehart9s %ontin)o)s demo%ra%y meas)re sho! ho! di##i%)lt it is, i# it %an (e done at all, to generate ne! val)es #rom a str)%t)ral %hanges. 10

r)st ;%ross ")lt)res

@hy, then, are some nations more tr)sting than others4 8nglehart (1999) arg)es that ri%h nations are tr)sting, *oor %o)ntries more distr)st#)l. 0)tnam9s (199>) logi% goes the other !ay aro)nd' r)st (rings e%onomi% gro!th and *ros*erity. @e %an arg)e either !ay aro)nd, ()t there o)ght to (e a %onne%tion (et!een tr)st and !ealth. .eyond sim*le meas)res o# ri%hes, there are several other reasona(le %orrelates o# tr)st' ed)%ation levels, *overty rates, in#ant mortality, 11 li#e e<*e%tan%y, the #ertility rate, ethni% diversity, *ostmaterial val)es, and media e<*os)re. Bna%2 and Bee#er (1997, 177511779) arg)e that ethni%ally diverse so%ieties are more li2ely to develo* shar* %leavages3!hi%h, in t)rn, destroys tr)st. 8 sho! else!here (Islaner, 7007, %h. ?) that *arents !ho !anted their %hildren to hold val)es that em*hasi=e the !el#are o# others are more li2ely to tr)st other *eo*le. 8nglehart (1999) e<tends this logi%' 0eo*le !hose o!n val)es are less materialisti% (or postmaterialistic) sho)ld also (e more tr)sting.17 :e #inds s)**ort #or this arg)ment only in the 15 ri%hest nations. 0)tnam (1995) tra%2s %hanges in tr)st in the Inited States to in%reased vie!ing o# television and a dro* in ne!s*a*er readershi*. Ce!s*a*ers tie )s to other *eo*le, !hile television 2ee*s )s inside o)r homes, a!ay #rom %ivi% engagement. @e might also e<*e%t that %o)ntries that ran2 high on %orr)*tion !ill also have less tr)st (-a0orta et al., 1997, >>5). 8# others are )ntr)st!orthy, !hy sho)ld 8 *lay the #ool, a reasona(le *erson might as24 11

;ll o# these arg)ments are reasona(le and none o# them hold. Lario)s meas)res o# ethni% diversity, in%ome, ed)%ation, and !ell1(eing all #all to insigni#i%an%e in m)ltivariate analyses. 1> ;t (ivariate levels, most o# these varia(les (ed)%ation, +)ality o# li#e, in#ant mortality) matter at least in %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nist r)le. 0ostmaterialist val)es, as determined (y aggregate s%ores in the @LS, are modestly asso%iated !ith inter*ersonal tr)st. here are stronger relationshi*s !ith ne!s*a*er readershi* in demo%ra%ies (r H .656), television vie!ing (r H .597), and listening to the radio (r H .5?5). "orr)*tion is more strongly related to tr)st in (ivariate relationshi*s (r H 1.7?9). Aet again, none is a signi#i%ant *redi%tor in m)ltivariate models. @hat, then, ma2es some so%ieties more tr)sting and others less so4 he ans!er is neither

str)%t)ral (demo%rati% instit)tions) nor ethni% (the diversity o# gro)*s). Cor is it sim*ly !ealth. 8t is, in *art, how resources are distributed in society. he more e+)ita(le the distri()tion o# !ealth in a %o)ntry, the more tr)sting its *eo*le !ill (e. For %o)ntries !itho)t a lega%y o# "omm)nism, the sim*le %orrelation o# generali=ed tr)st and the Jini inde< is 1.65?. E%onomi% ine+)ality is strongly related to tr)st, and this %onne%tion does not vanish in m)ltivariate tests. 8t does go a!ay in the #ormerly "omm)nist nations o# Eastern and "entral E)ro*e (!here the %orrelation #alls to 1.7>9). he dynami% o# e%onomi% ine+)ality and tr)st %learly !or2s di##erently in demo%ra%ies and a)thoritarian so%ieties. Bna%2 (1999) arg)es that the %a)sal arro! r)ns #rom tr)st to ine+)ality in his %ross1national analysis. o test this %laim, 8 estimate sim)ltaneo)s1e+)ation models to see !hether tr)st is (oth the %a)se and e##e%t o# e%onomi% ine+)ality. r)st may #lo)rish in 0rotestant so%ieties (e%a)se the 0rotestant %h)r%h has histori%ally (een more egalitarian than the "atholi% %h)r%h (-i*set, 1990, %h. 56 0)tnam, 199>, 175). More egalitarian so%ieties are more li2ely to (e tr)sting (see 17

Islaner, 7007, %hs. 7,6,5). ;dditionally, many M)slims #ind @estern %)lt)re threatening and are th)s less li2ely to tr)st *eo*le )nli2e themselves3es*e%ially sin%e @esterners had %oloni=ed many M)slim nations and tried to %onvert M)slims to "hristianity. M)slims also see themselves as a %omm)nity a*art' Con1M)slims, a%%ording to 8slami% la!, (elong to a se%ond %lass& o# %iti=ens, !ho m)st a%2no!ledge the s)*rema%y o# 8slam and !ho stand a*art #rom the maDority o# M)slims (Es*osito, 1991, 791). he e+)ation #or ine+)ality in%l)des tr)st, as !ell as a meas)re o# %orr)*tion (the log o# the (la%2 mar2et %)rren%y val)e #or 1955), the *o*)lation gro!th rate (high rates o# *o*)lation gro!th ma2e it more di##i%)lt to redistri()te !ealth), and the *er%entage o# M)slims in a so%iety. "o)ntries !ith more M)slims may (e less tr)sting, ()t they are more egalitarian (%#. Es*osito and Loll, 1996, 75). ;s 0rotestantism has stressed individ)al a%hievement, 8slam has *la%ed greater em*hasis on %olle%tive goals, es*e%ially on one9s e%onomi% res*onsi(ility to the larger %omm)nity (as re#le%ted in the *rohi(ition on %harging interest on loans). he model #or tr)st and ine+)ality the larger sam*le, !ith >> %ases and )sing D)st the most re%ent meas)re o# tr)st, o##ers less ho*e #or a dire%t lin2 (et!een *)(li% *oli%y and e%onomi% ine+)ality. ;nd it on%e more s)ggests that (oth %)lt)ral #a%tors and real e%onomi% %ir%)mstan%es sha*e tr)st. 8 *resent the res)lts in a(le 7. NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN a(le 7 a(o)t here

he Jini inde< has the greatest im*a%t on tr)st o# any inde*endent varia(le. Moving #rom the least to the most e+)al nation in the sam*le, tr)st D)m*s >5 *oints. ;s e<*e%ted, 0rotestant 1>

so%ieties are more tr)sting and M)slim ones less so. ; standard ass)m*tion *eo*le ma2e in in#ormal dis%)ssions a(o)t tr)st is that the S%andinavian %o)ntries ran2 highest on generali=ed tr)st (%#. /i%e and Feldman, 1997) (e%a)se it is easy to tr)st other *eo*le in a homogeno)s so%iety. ,# %o)rse, most *eo*le %an (e tr)sted. hey loo2 and thin2 D)st li2e yo) do. ;nd, yes, the S%andinavian %o)ntries are more homogeno)s,1? ()t they are more egalitarian and es*e%ially more heavily 0rotestant.15 ;nd, overall, ethni% diversity does not sha*e tr)st3or, even, indire%tly, e%onomi% ine+)ality. So S%andinavian so%ieties are so tr)sting (e%a)se they are more e+)al and more 0rotestant, not D)st (e%a)se they are all (lond !ith (l)e eyes. 8n demo%rati% nations, the single (iggest (arrier to inter*ersonal tr)st is e%onomi% ine+)ality. .oth over time in the Inited States and a%ross >> demo%ra%ies, tr)st goes do!n as ine+)ality goes )* (Islaner, 7007, %h. 6). .eyond its %)lt)ral #o)ndations, tr)st re#le%ts an o*timisti% vie! o# the !orld3the e<*e%tation that tomorro! !ill (e (etter than today. ;nd this m)st have some #o)ndation in reality. he

meas)re that 8 have )sed in this st)dy, !hether yo) %an %o)nt on s)%%ess in li#e (#rom the @orld Lal)es St)dy), e<*resses !ell o*timisti% ass)m*tions a(o)t the #)t)re. E<*e%tations #or s)%%ess do not tra%2 levels o# ine+)ality a%ross %)lt)res (r H 1.>7> #or demo%ra%ies, 1.7?9 #or all %o)ntries). .)t they are strongly related to the overall !ealth o# a so%iety, as meas)red (y the log o# the gross national *rod)%t (r H .660) and a meas)re o# the total +)ality o# li#e& o##ered (y $iener (1995) (r H .65>). 8n addition to these meas)res, e<*e%tations o# s)%%ess also vary !ith the in#ant mortality rate (r H 1.667, C H 7>), ho! many years o# s%hool the average *erson has had (r H .5>>), and li#e e<*e%tan%y (r H .56>). "learly, there are a *lethora o# *ossi(le determinants o# (oth tr)st and e%onomi% ine+)ality. ;nd these so%ioe%onomi% and *oliti%al varia(les D)st as s)rely are related to ea%h other. Sorting o)t 1?

!hat matters is mostly a theoreti%al matter, ()t there are *lenty o# %om*eting theories that m)st also (e given their d)e. hirty1three %ases are hardly s)##i%ient to %onstit)te a %riti%al test o#

any arg)ment, es*e%ially !hen many o# the varia(les are related to ea%h other. :o!ever, the #inal models seem very ro()st. Ea%h model !as tested in%l)ding alternative s*e%i#i%ations !ith the varia(les dis%)ssed a(ove (as !ell as others). heoreti%ally im*ortant varia(les (ethni%

diversity, levels o# demo%ra%y, and in%ome) !ere tested in a variety o# models and ea%h model !as s)(De%ted to (ootstra**ing (to ens)re that the res)lts did not de*end )*on the *arti%)lar set o# %o)ntries). So the #inal model not only is (ased on strong theoreti%al ass)m*tions, ()t also on e<tensive sensitivity testing. he only meas)re o# demo%ra%y that remained signi#i%ant in a

sim*le ordinary least s+)ares regression *redi%ting tr)st !as the n)m(er o# years o# %onse%)tive demo%ra%y. .)t, as 8 arg)ed a(ove, %ontin)o)s years o# demo%ra%y dis*lays a highly nonlinear relationshi* to tr)stPand in%l)ding this varia(le red)%es the sam*le si=e to D)st 75 %ases. he

model 8 *resent here th)s seems (y #ar the (estPand it is not at all *lag)ed (y %ollinearity among the *redi%tors. r)st is essentially %)lt)ral, ()t, li2e %)lt)re itsel#, is sha*ed (y o)r e<*erien%es. @hether s*e%i#i% individ)als tr)st other *eo*le is largely divor%ed #rom their *ersonal histories (Islaner, 7007, %hs. 71?). .)t !hether a so%iety is %om*osed o# many tr)sters de*ends )*on its %olle%tive e<*erien%es. Bno!ing !hether someone is ri%h or *oor hel*s relatively little in *redi%ting !hether they !ill tr)st others. Bno!ing !hether a so%iety is ri%h or *oor doesn9t hel* that m)%h either. .)t 2no!ing ho! a so%iety9s reso)r%es are distri()ted3a %olle%tive o)t%ome that %annot (e red)%ed to any individ)al9s #ate3!ill tell yo) a lot a(o)t tr)st in that %)lt)re. 8n %ontrast to 8nglehart9s (1997, 1999) model, ine+)ality matters more than sim*le !ealth. .oth are highly 15

%orrelated !ith tr)st, ()t the *artial %orrelation o# tr)st !ith in%ome ()sing the log o# *er %a*ita *er %a*ita gross domesti% *rod)%t adD)sted #or *)r%hasing *o!er in 1950, #rom the 0enn @orld a(les) is lo!er (.?>5) than the *artial %orrelation !ith ine+)ality (1.606). 8ne+)ality and !ealth are related, ()t they are hardly the same thing (r H 1.?17). here is a (it o# good ne!s here'

redistri()ting reso)r%es so *eo*le (e%ome more o*timisti% and #eel a sense o# %ommon #ate !ith others is !ithin the %a*a%ity o# state a%tors. $oes e+)ality lead to tr)st or does tr)st *romote more e+)ality4 he dire%tion o# %a)sality is, o#

%o)rse, di##i%)lt to esta(lish !ith %ross1se%tional data. ;nd there are no good time series data on tr)st a%ross nations. :o!ever, there is a %lear %onne%tion (et!een tr)st and e+)ality in the one %o)ntry #or !hi%h there are good time series data on tr)st, the Inited States. %orrelation (et!een tr)st and ine+)ality #rom 1960 to 1995. here is a strong

he (ivariate r 7 is .5?7 (see Fig)re

1) ;s in this analysis, a sim)lateno)s e+)ation model sho!s that the relationshi* goes #rom ine+)ality to less tr)st, not #rom tr)st to more e+)ality (see Islaner, 7007, %h. 1 #or a dis%)ssion o# the so)r%es o# data on tr)st, and %h. 6 #or the statisti%al models). Fig)re 1 a(o)t here /e*rise

r)sting so%ieties have (igger governments that redistri()te !ealth #rom the ri%h to the *oor, s*end more on ed)%ation, and *)rs)e *oli%ies that !ill stim)late e%onomi% gro!th. h)s, !hile there is no dire%t %onne%tion #rom tr)st to e%onomi% e+)ality, tr)sting so%ieties in demo%rati% regimes *)rs)e *rograms that indire%tly !ill (oost #aith in others. r)sting nations s*end a more o# their total in%ome on governmental *rograms in general and on ed)%ation in *arti%)lar. hey 16

also have a larger share o# their total *o*)lation em*loyed (y the government. 8n *arti%)lar, tr)sting so%ieties are more li2ely to devote a higher share o# their national !ealth to trans#er *rograms that assist the *oor. Finally, tr)sting so%ieties are more !illing to rea%h o)t to o)tsiders (%#. @ool%o%2, 1995, 155)' :igh tr)st goes hand1in1hand !ith o*en e%onomies and #e!er restri%tions on trade. ;nd trade *romotes e%onomi% gro!th. Jovernments that redistri()te in%ome, s*end money on ed)%ation, trans#er !ealth #rom ri%h to *oor, have large *)(li% se%tors, and maintain o*en e%onomies do not generate tr)st. r)st seems to %ome #irst. @ell, almost. E%onomi% e+)ality is a strong determinant o# tr)st. ;nd tr)st leads to *oli%ies that %reate !ealth and red)%e ine+)alities. :ere !e #ind !hat 0)tnam !o)ld %all a virt)o)s %ir%le.& he e+)al (e%ome more e+)al. Aet, there is also a vi%io)s %ir%le' Misanthro*y and ine+)ality #eed on themselves. Aes, yo) %an in%rease tr)st indire%tly (y *)rs)ing *oli%ies that red)%e e%onomi% ine+)ality' Ea%h o# the *)(li% *oli%ies 8 have %onsidered leads to more e%onomi% e+)ality, tho)gh the %orrelations are moderate (ranging #rom .? to .5) e<%e*t #or one3 ho! o*en the e%onomy is (!here the %orrelation a**roa%hes .7). ;nd, yes, yo) %an ado*t these *oli%ies !itho)t a tr)sting %iti=enry. .)t a *)(li% that is *)(li% s*irited gives some %o)ntries advantages over others in red)%ing ine+)ality and (oosting tr)st. 8t is easier to ma2e the hard *oliti%al de%isions !hen there is tr)st in the land. @e th)s %ome #)ll %ir%le to the ne<)s (et!een tr)st in government and tr)st in *eo*le. 0eo*le have %on#iden%e in their leaders !hen government is !or2ing !ell. heir D)dgements a(o)t

government *er#orman%e re#le%t their eval)ations o# s*e%i#i% *ersonalities, instit)tions, and *oli%ies. .)t ea%h o# these a%tors m)st !or2 in, and *erha*s %ontri()te to, an atmos*here o# %om*romise or %on#rontation. ;nd *oliti%al leaders are )ltimately res*onsi(le and res*onsive to 17

the *)(li% and its ho*es and #ears. Jovernment %annot *rod)%e tr)st in *eo*le. 0eo*le %an *rovide government o##i%ials !ith the latit)de to !or2 on maDor so%ial *ro(lems3and there(y indire%tly in%rease tr)st in government. @e need to (e %are#)l a(o)t the in#eren%es !e dra!, sin%e many *eo*le !ill loo2 at the range o# *oli%y o*tions that tr)st in *eo*le ma2e *ossi(le and de%ide that they !o)ld rather o*t o)t. S)%h divisions are inevita(le, (e%a)se *oliti%s is all a(o)t %hoosing )* sides (ased )*on ideas o# !hat government sho)ld or sho)ldn9t do. .)t !hatever government does, a tr)sting environment ma2es it *ossi(le #or government to a%t. M)eller (1996, 106) arg)es that !e oversell the (ene#its o# demo%rati% government' $emo%ra%y is...an e<tremely disorderly m)ddle in !hi%h %ontending ideas and #or%es do )n2em*t, i# *ea%e#)l, (attle and in !hi%h ideas o#ten are red)%ed to slogans, data to distorted #ragments, eviden%e to gest)res, and arg)ments to *oses.& Aes, ()t. 8# 8nglehart (1997, 1501155) is %orre%t, then demo%ra%ies that are sta(le and that !or2 !ell rest )*on %)lt)ral #o)ndations, es*e%ially so%ial tr)st. $emo%rati% str)%t)res %annot (e dismissed, ()t overall they are generally less *o!er#)l determinants o# ine+)ality than tr)st and )s)ally sin2 to insigni#i%an%e in m)ltivariate analyses. 8n the end, demo%ra%y is !orth t!o %heers. Save the third #or tr)st.

15

;.-E 1 "orrelations .et!een Meas)res o# $emo%ra%y and Jenerali=ed r)st !easure .ollen demo%ra%y s%ore Lanhanen demo%ra%y s%ore Jastil %ivil li(erties s%ore (1955)QQ Jastil *oliti%al rights s%ore (1955)QQ Jastil %om*osite #reedom s%ore (1955)QQ Freedom :o)se %om*osite #reedom s%ore (199>19?)QQ Freedom :o)se %om*osite #reedom s%ore (1995199)QQ Freedom :o)se %om*osite #reedom s%ore (Aear %losest to s)rvey)QQQQ J)rr et al. demo%rati=ation s%ore (1975) J)rr et al. demo%rati=ation s%ore (199?)QQQQQ "o**edge *olyar%hy s%oreQ -a0orta et al. *ro*erty rights s%ore $ll countries .>75 (67) .?>9 (57) .501 (55) .>61 (55) .?7? (55) .>77 (65) .>57 (69) .>9> (67) .60? (50) .?>9 (57) .>11 (67) .5>0 (55) %on&Communist .5>0 (79) .575 (>7) .617 (?0) .>69 (?0) .?97 (?0) .600 (?1) .6>9 (?1) .655 (?1) .5>0 (79) .575 (>7) .>75 (?0) .677 (>6) 'ormerly Communist Q .11? (71) .1>9 (19) 1.079 (17) 1.100 (17) 1.070 (17) 1.155 (15) 1.?07 (71) 1.?66 (19) .000 (71)QQQ .1>0 (19) 1.009 (71) 1.05> (19)

Q "hina is e<%l)ded. QQ S%ores re#le%ted #rom original %oding. QQQ S%ores re#le%ted #rom original %oding6 !hen s)rvey is #rom 1990, 1955 Freedom :o)se s%ores )sed6 !hen s)rvey is #rom 1995 or 1996, 199>19? Freedom :o)se s%ores are )sed. QQQ "orrelation is =ero (e%a)se there is no variation in the %oding o# demo%rati=ation. QQQQQ So)r%e' -a0orta et al. (1995)

19

;.-E 7 !o1Stage -east S+)ares Estimation o# r)st and E%onomi% 8ne+)ality #or "o)ntries @ith Co "omm)nist -ega%y' Model 88 Gini Inde( )uation Includin* Trust "oe##i%ient Equation for Trust Jini inde< o# ine+)ality 0er%ent M)slim 0er%ent 0rotestant "onstant Equation for Gini index r)st in *eo*le -og (la%2 mar2et %)rren%y val)e 0er%ent M)slim 0o*)lation gro!th rate "onstant .0?1 .516QQQ 1.01>QQQQ .077QQQ .771QQQQ Standard Error t /atio .ias Gini Inde( )uation (cludin* Trust "oe##i%ient Standard Error t /atio .ias

/7 H .7>> /MSE H .05? 1.905QQQQ 1.00?QQ .00>QQQQ .676QQQQ .197 .007 .001 .077 /7 H .619 .166 .1?5 .00> .075 .076 1?.7>5 17.067 ?.96> 5.175 /MSE H .066 .7?5 >.?91 1?.??> 7.951 >.569 .067 .10> .0000> .006 .?90QQQQ 1.017QQQQ .069QQQ .759QQQQ .100 .007 .070 .070 ?.91? 15.7>> >.?57 1?.5?7 .>77 .0007 1.00> /7 H .6?7 /MSE H .06> .00? 1.007 .00007

QQQQ * O .0001 QQQ * O .01 QQ * O .05 Q * O .10 C H >>

70

71 F8JI/E 1 r)st and E%onomi% 8ne+)ality #or the Inited States, 196011995

Trust = 1.097 - 1.720 GINI r = 0.542 RMSE = 0.043 n = 28 Most Peop e !"n #e Truste$ .*
*8 ** *0 *4 71 7372 80 74 7* 79 75 78 81 83 84 92 89 88 87 91 90 8* 98 93 9* 95 94

.5

.4

.3 .35 .4 G%n% %n$e& o' %ne(u" %t) .45

71

77

+ ' + %C , .aier, ;nnette. 1956. r)st and ;ntitr)st,& Ethi%s, 96'7>1160. .ian%o, @illiam . 199?. r)st' /e*resentatives and "onstit)ents. ;nn ;r(or' Iniversity o# Mi%higan 0ress. .ollen, Benneth. 1991. 0oliti%al $emo%ra%y' "on%e*t)al and Meas)rement ra*s.& 8n ;le< 8n2eles, ed., ,n Meas)ring $emo%ra%y. Ce! .r)ns!i%2, CM' ransa%tion. .rehm, Mohn and @endy /ahn. 1997. R8ndivid)al -evel Eviden%e #or the "a)ses and "onse+)en%es o# So%ial "a*ital,R ;meri%an Mo)rnal o# 0oliti%al S%ien%e, ?1'5551107>. "ohen, Mean -. 1997. ;meri%an "ivil So%iety al2.& "ollege 0ar2, M$' Cational "ommission on "ivi% /ene!al, @or2ing 0a*er S 6. "onsta(le, 0amela. 1999. 8ndia9s $emo%ra%y 8n In%ertain :ealth,& @ashington 0ost (;*ril 71)' ;17, ;19. "o**edge, Mi%hael and @ol#gang :. /eini%2e. 1991. Meas)ring 0olyar%hy.& 8n ;le< 8n2eles, ed., ,n Meas)ring $emo%ra%y. Ce! .r)ns!i%2, CM' ransa%tion. $iener, Ed. 1995. ; Lal)e .ased 8nde< #or Meas)ring Cational K)ality o# -i#e,& So%ial 8ndi%ators /esear%h, >6'1071177. $iener, Ed, Marissa $iener, and "arold $iener. 1995. Fa%tors 0redi%ting the S)(De%tive @ell1 .eing o# Cations,& Mo)rnal o# 0ersonality and So%ial 0sy%hology, 69'551156?. Easterly, @illiam and /oss -evine. 1997. R;#ri%aTs Jro!th ragedy' 0oli%ies and Ethni% $ivisions,R K)arterly Mo)rnal o# E%onomi%s, 117'170>11750. ( he) E%onomist. 1990. he E%onomist .oo2 o# Lital @orld Statisti%s. Ce! Aor2' imes .oo2s. Es*osito, Mohn -. 1991. 8slam and 0oliti%s, third ed. Syra%)se' Syra%)se Iniversity 0ress. Es*osito, Mohn -. and Mohn ,. Loll. 1996. 8slam and $emo%ra%y. ,<#ord' ,<#ord Iniversity 0ress. Fenno, /i%hard F., Mr. 1975. :ome Style. .oston' -ittle, .ro!n. Forster, E.M. 1965. !o "heers #or $emo%ra%y.& 8n E.M. Forster, !o "heers #or $emo%ra%y. Ce! Aor2' :ar%o)rt, .ra%e and @orld. Jam(etta, $iego. 1955. "an @e r)st r)st4& 8n $iego Jam(etta, ed., r)st. ,<#ord' .asil .la%2!ell. Jastil, /aymond $)n%an. 1991. he "om*arative S)rvey o# Freedom' E<*erien%e and S)ggestions.& 8n ;le< 8n2eles, ed., ,n Meas)ring $emo%ra%y. Ce! .r)ns!i%2, CM' ransa%tion. J)rr, ed /o(ert, Beith Maggers, and @ill :. Moore. 1991. he rans#ormation o# the @estern State' he Jro!th o# $emo%ra%y, ;)to%ra%y, and State 0o!er Sin%e 1500.& 8n ;le< 8n2eles, ed., ,n Meas)ring $emo%ra%y. Ce! .r)ns!i%2, CM' ransa%tion. 8nglehart, /onald. 1997. Moderni=ation and 0ostmoderni=ation. 0rin%eton' 0rin%eton Iniversity 0ress. 7>

7? NNNNNNNNNNNNNN. 1999. r)st, @ell1.eing and $emo%ra%y.& 8n Mar2 @arren, ed., $emo%ra%y and r)st. "am(ridge' "am(ridge Iniversity 0ress. 8nglehart, /onald, Mig)el .as=ne=, and ;leDandro Moreno. 1995. :)man Lal)es and .elie#s' ; "ross1")lt)ral So)r%e(oo2. ;nn ;r(or' Iniversity o# Mi%higan 0ress. Bna%2, Ste*hen. 1999. So%ial "a*ital, Jro!th, and 0overty' ; S)rvey o# the "ross1"o)ntry Eviden%e.& "enter #or 8nstit)tional /e#orm and the 8n#ormal Se%tor (8/8S), Iniversity o# Maryland3"ollege 0ar2. Bna%2, Ste*hen and 0hili* Bee#er. 1997. $oes So%ial "a*ital :ave ;n E%onomi% 0ayo##4 ; "ross1"o)ntry 8nvestigation,& K)arterly Mo)rnal o# E%onomi%s, 117'175111755. -a0orta, /a#ael, Floren%io -o*e=1Silanes, ;ndrei S%hlei#er, and /o(ert @. Lishney. 1997. r)st in -arge ,rgani=ations,& ;meri%an E%onomi% /evie! 0a*ers and 0ro%eedings, 57'>>>1>5. NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN. 1995. he K)ality o# Jovernment.& In*)(lished man)s%ri*t, :arvard Iniversity. -evi, Margaret. 1995. ; State o# r)st.& 8n Margaret -evi and Lalerie .raith!aite, eds., r)st and Jovernan%e. Ce! Aor2' /)ssell Sage Fo)ndation. NNNNNNNNNNNN. 1999. @hen Jood $e#enses Ma2e Jood Ceigh(ors' ; ransa%tion "ost ;**roa%h to r)st and $istr)st.& Ce! Aor2' /)ssell Sage Fo)ndation @or2ing 0a*er S1?0. -i*set, Seymo)r Martin. 1990. "ontinental $ivide. Ce! Aor2' /o)tledge. Ma%a)lay, Ste!art. 196>. Con1"ontra%t)al /elations in .)siness' ; 0reliminary St)dy,& ;meri%an So%iologi%al /evie!, 75'55167. Mis=tal, .ar(ara ;. 1996. r)st in Modern So%ieties. "am(ridge, IB' 0olity 0ress. M)eller, Mohn. 1996. $emo%ra%y, "a*italism, and the End o# ransition.& 8n Mi%hael Mandle(a)m, ed., 0ost1"omm)nism' Fo)r 0ers*e%tives. @ashington' "o)n%il on Foreign /elations. M)ller, Ed!ard C. ;nd Mit%hell ;. Seligson. 199?. "ivi% ")lt)re and $emo%ra%y' he K)estion o# "a)sal /elationshi*s.& ;meri%an 0oliti%al S%ien%e /evie!, 55'6>51657. ,##e, "la)s. 1999. r)st and Bno!ledge, /)les and $e%isions' E<*loring a $i##i%)lt "on%e*t)al errain.& 8n Mar2 @arren, ed., $emo%ra%y and r)st. "am(ridge' "am(ridge Iniversity 0ress. 0agden, ;nthony. 1955. he $estr)%tion o# r)st and its E%onomi% "onse+)en%es in the "ase o# Eighteenth1%ent)ry Ca*les.& 8n $iego Jam(etta, ed., r)st ,<#ord' .asil .la%2!ell. 0)tnam, /o(ert $. 199>. Ma2ing $emo%ra%y @or2' "ivi% raditions in Modern 8taly. 0rin%eton' 0rin%eton Iniversity 0ress. NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN. 1995. )ning 8n, )ning ,)t' he Strange $isa**earan%e o# So%ial "a*ital in ;meri%a.& 0S' 0oliti%al S%ien%e and 0oliti%s ($e%em(er)' 66?165>. 7?

/ahn, @endy M., Mohn .rehm, and Ceil "arlson. 1997. Cational Ele%tions as 8nstit)tions #or Jenerating So%ial "a*ital.& 0resented at the ;nn)al Meeting o# the ;meri%an 0oliti%al S%ien%e ;sso%iation, ;)g)st1Se*tem(er, @ashington, $.". /i%e, om @. and Man Feldman. 1997. "ivi% ")lt)re and $emo%ra%y #rom E)ro*e to ;meri%a,& Mo)rnal o# 0oliti%s, 59'11?>11177. /othstein, .o. 1999. So%ial "a*ital in the So%ial $emo%rati% State' he S!edish Model and "ivil So%iety.& 8n /o(ert 0)tnam, ed., he $e%line o# So%ial "a*ital4 0oliti%al ")lt)re as a "ondition #or $emo%ra%y. NNNNNNNNNNNNN. 8n *ress. r)st, So%ial $ilemmas, and "olle%tive Memories' ,n the /ise and $e%line o# the S!edish Model,& Mo)rnal o# heoreti%al 0oliti%s. Sa%hs, Me##rey $. and ;ndre! M. @arner. 1997. Cat)ral /eso)r%e ;()ndan%e and E%onomi% Jro!th.& "enter #or 8nternational $evelo*ment and :arvard 8nstit)te #or 8nternational $evelo*ment, :arvard Iniversity )n*)(lished man)s%ri*t. S%hol=, Mohn . and Ceil 0inney. 1995. $)ty, Fear, and a< "om*lian%e' he :e)risti% .asis o# "iti=enshi* .ehavior,& ;meri%an Mo)rnal o# 0oliti%al S%ien%e, >9'?901517. Sit2in, Sim .. and Can%y -. /oth. 199>. E<*laining the -imited E##e%tiveness o# -egalisti% E/emedies9 #or r)stU$istr)st,& ,rgani=ation S%ien%e, ?' >671>97. yler, om /. 1990. @hy 0eo*le ,(ey the -a!. Ce! :aven' Aale Iniversity 0ress. Islaner, Eri% M. 7007. he Moral Fo)ndations o# r)st. Ce! Aor2' "am(ridge Iniversity 0ress. Lanhanen, at). 1997. 0ros*e%ts o# $emo%ra%y. Ce! Aor2' /o)tledge. @e(er, Ma<. 1955. he 0rotestant Ethi% and the S*irit o# "a*italism. ranslated (y al%ott 0arsons. Ce! Aor2' "harles S%ri(ners9 Sons. ,riginally *)(lished in 19>0.

75

76 C, ES Q 8 grate#)lly a%2no!ledge the s)**ort o# the Jeneral /esear%h .oard o# the Iniversity o# Maryland11"ollege 0ar2 and the Everett M%Binley $ir2sen "enter #or the St)dy o# "ongressional -eadershi*. Most o# the data 8 em*loy !ere o(tained #rom the 8nter1 Iniversity "onsorti)m #or 0oliti%al and So%ial /esear%h, !hi%h is a(solved #rom any res*onsi(ility #or my %laims. 8 o!e de(ts o# gratit)de #or %omments and %onversations to Ja(riel .ades%), $ennis "hong, Baren $a!isha, 0a)l $e22er, Mar% :ooghe, /onald 8nglehart, Margaret -evi, Mane Mans(ridge, Me##rey Monda2, Mohn M)eller, Moe ,**enheimer, /o(ert 0)tnam, .o /othstein, ara Santmire, $ietlind Stolle, Shi(ley elhami, Mar2 @arren, and Aael Aishai. his %ha*ter is ta2en #rom "ha*ter 5 o# Islaner (7007).

76

. he data (ase are the %o)ntries that have @orld Lal)es S)rvey +)estions on inter*ersonal tr)st in either 1951157 or 199019>. For %o)ntries !ith s)rveys in (oth years, the #ig)re #or tr)st is the average. 8 eliminated "hina, sin%e its tr)st s%ore is s)s*i%io)sly high. ( he %orrelation is re#le%ted, sin%e higher s%ores on the %orr)*tion inde< indi%ate honesty in government.) -ater in the %ha*ter, 8 shall analy=e tr)st data #or %o)ntries !itho)t a lega%y o# "omm)nism. 8 sim*ly note here that the %orrelation rises to 1.7?9 !hen 8 restri%t the analysis to these >? nations. he data on %orr)*tion (#or 1995) %ome #rom the glo(al organi=ation rans*aren%y 8nternational and are #o)nd on its !e( site, at htt*'UU!!!.trans*aren%y.deUdo%)mentsU%*iUinde<.html. 7 . he %orrelation (et!een the meas)res o# %orr)*tion and ta< evasion in the -a0orta et al. (1995) K)ality o# Jovernment data set are .619. > .8 #o%)s the legislative rather than the e<e%)tive (ran%h sin%e most demo%rati% governments are *arliamentary systems. he %orrelation is not m)%h di##erent #or nations !ith and !itho)t a lega%y o# "omm)nist r)le (r H .1?> and .159, res*e%tively). ? .Fenno (1975) and .ian%o (199?) *rovide %om*elling arg)ments that mem(ers o# "ongress m)st e<*end m)%h e##ort to develo* tr)st among their %onstit)ents. 5 . he +)estion !as as2ed in 1955, 1990, and 1996. 6 . he %orrelation (et!een tr)st in *eo*le and %on#iden%e in the legal system in the @orld Lal)e S)rvey is modest (ta)1% H .069, gamma H .177). ;nd the %o)ntry (y %o)ntry %orrelations tend to (e higher !here tr)st in *eo*le is higher. 7 . hese )*dated meas)res !ere o(tained #rom the !e( site' htt*'UU!!!.#reedomho)se.org Uran2ings.*d#. he Freedom :o)se !e( site %ontains s%ores #or (oth *oliti%al and %ivil li(erties. hey !ere very highly %orrelated, so 8 s)mmed the t!o (%#. 8nglehart, 1997, >57). 5 .8 am grate#)l to /onald 8nglehart #or *roviding )*dated data #or the third !ave (1995196) o# the @orld Lal)es S)rvey, !here availa(le. hese #ig)res are not averages (see (elo! #or some analyses that )se the mean tr)sting shares #or the #irst and se%ond !aves). he nations and the years #or !hi%h 8 have tr)st data are' ;rgentina (1996), ;rmenia (1995)Q, ;)stralia (1995)Q, ;)stria (1990),Q ;=er(aiDan (1995)Q, .angladesh (1997)Q, .elar)s (1996)Q, .elgi)m (1990), .ra=il (1996), .)lgaria (1990)Q, "anada (1990), "hile (1996), "hina (1995)Q, "olom(ia (1996), "roatia (1996)Q, "=e%h /e*)(li% (1990)Q, $enmar2 (1990), $omini%an /e*)(li% (1996), East Jermany (1996)Q, Estonia (1996)Q, Finland (1996), Jeorgia (1996)Q, Jhana (1995), Jree%e (1990), :)ngary (1990)Q, 8%eland (1990), 8ndia (1996), 8reland (1990), 8taly (1990), Ma*an (1995), -atvia (1996), -ith)ania (1996)Q, -)<em(o)rg (1990), Me<i%o (1996), Moldova (1996)Q, Montenegro (1996)Q, Corthern 8reland (1990), the Cetherlands (1990), Cigeria (1995), Cor!ay (1996), 0er) (1996), the 0hili**ines (1996), 0oland (1996)Q, 0ort)gal (1990), /omania (1990)Q, /)ssia (1995)Q, So)th ;#ri%a (1996), So)th Borea (1996), Ser(ia (1996), Slova2ia (1990),Q Slovenia (1995)Q, S*ain (1996), S!eden (1996), S!it=erland (1996), ai!an (1995), )r2ey (1996), the Inited Bingdom (1990), the Inited States (1996), the I2raine (1996)Q, Ir)g)ay (1996), Lene=)ela (1995), and @est Jermany (1996). "o)ntries mar2ed !ith an asteris2 either #ormerly had "omm)nist governments or are still "omm)nist regimes ("hina). See the dis%)ssion in the te<t (elo!. 8 generated some aggregate res)lts dire%tly #rom the @LS and in other %ases )sed the %om*endi)m (y 8nglehart et al. (1995). 9 ."omm)nist governments still e<isting else!here, as !ell as other tyranni%al regimes #it the *attern as !ell. :o!ever, 8 omit "hina #rom all dis%)ssions (elo!. 8t has a very high (57) *er%entage o# generali=ed tr)sters. 8nglehart (1999) attri()tes this to its "on#)%ian %)lt)re, %om*aring it !ith ai!an (!here ?7 *er%ent o# *eo*le say most *eo*le %an (e tr)sted) rather than !ith other %o)ntries !ith lega%ies o# "omm)nist r)le. :o!ever, 8 see the "hinese #ig)re as a li2ely o)tlier that might re#le%t the ha=ards o# %ond)%ting s)rvey resear%h in a %o)ntry that Freedom :o)se ran2s at the (ottom o# its ran2ings on (oth *oliti%al and %ivil li(erties. 10 . My model #or tr)st (see (elo!) also in%l)des 0rotestantism. .)t it does not in%l)de "on#)%ianism6 to get a signi#i%ant %oe##i%ient #or "on#)%ianism, one has to in%l)de "hina in the e+)ation. "hina9s

very high tr)st s%ore (.57) is a(normally high. @ang Shaog)ang (no! o# the "hinese Iniversity o# :ong Bong, then o# Aale Iniversity) said that his s)rveys indi%ate that tr)st is no higher than >> *er%ent (*rivate e1mail, $e%em(er 6, 1999). 11 .8 o!e this s)ggestion to my %olleag)e ed /o(ert J)rr. 17 .0ostmaterial val)es in%l)de *)tting more em*hasis on #reedom o# s*ee%h and having more say on the Do( (and in government) rather than maintaining order and #ighting *ri%e rises (8nglehart, 1997, %h. ?). 1> . o %onserve s*a%e, 8 do not re*ort the data so)r%es in this %ha*ter, nor do 8 *resent the #)ll s*e%i#i%ations o# some o# the regression e+)ations. For details on ea%h, see Islaner (7007, %h. 5). 1? . he mean s%ore #or the S%andinavian nations on the Easterly1-evine (1997) meas)re o# ethni% #ra%tionali=ation is .067, %om*ared to .770 #or other %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nism (!hi%h only rea%hes signi#i%an%e at * O .17, one1tailed test). 15 . he average Jini inde< in S%andinavian %o)ntries is .>5> %om*ared to .>1> #or other %o)ntries !ith no lega%y o# "omm)nism (* O .10). .)t the #ive S%andinavian %o)ntries have an average o# 55.6> *er%ent 0rotestants, %om*ared to 15.7> *er%ent in other %o)ntries (* O .0001).