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Evaluation of Weak Infeed Tripping Technique On The Eskom Transmission Network Adam Bartylak
Evaluation of Weak Infeed Tripping Technique On The Eskom Transmission Network Adam Bartylak
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1000
Bird Polution
30%
900
800
700
Other
18%
Lightning
25%
600
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
400
1998
500
Fires
27%
Figure 1.2 Transmission fault reasons
Number of occurrences
Over a quarter of all faults on the ESKOM Transmission network are caused by fires under the lines which often
result in very high resistance faults when a flash-over occurs in the mid-span of the line. A very dry winter in
most of the country in South Africa results in difficulties in maintaining tower footage resistance within required
limits and additional fault resistance at the entry point of the fault arc to ground. A histogram of fault resistances
measured over four years on the ESKOM network is shown
in Figure 1.3. 16% of all recorded faults have resistance
above 10 primary ohms, which is a significant value.
10000
The dynamic behaviour of a long arc may also result in
substantial changes in arc resistance during the fault. For
1000
such faults the impedance measured by the relay changes
with time during the fault. As a result, a high enough fault
100
resistance may cause the fault impedance locus not to enter
the tripping characteristic of the relay or to leave the
10
characteristic during the fault. Such faults are difficult to
detect and isolate properly and pose many challenges to
1
protection equipment. One of such problem, which is
relevant to weak infeed tripping, is possibility of impedance
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
locus entering areas of relay characteristics where
Fault Resistance [primary ohms]
appropriate impedance co-ordination is not available. This
issue will be described in more details later in this paper.
Figure 1.3. Histogram of fault resistance
As a result of changes in protection technology over the last few decades a great variety of protection relays are
installed on the ESKOM Transmission system from electromechanical, through electronic, digital to highly
sophisticated programmable Intelligent Electronic Devices.
Feeders are equipped with over twenty different types of
Electronic
impedance relays, each with different options available,
32%
different shapes of characteristics, type of polarisation,
sequence components used, measuring algorithms, starting
quantities etc. As long as both ends of the line are equipped
Digital
with the same vintage of impedance relay the co-ordination
17%
of different functions is fairly straightforward. Problems are
becoming more challenging where different types of relays
have to be co-ordinated with each other. A composition of
Programable
different protection technologies applied on ESKOM's
3%
network is presented in Figure 1.4.
Electromech.
Since the introduction of electronic relays in the early
48%
eighties, ESKOM adopted permissive overreach transfer
tripping scheme as most beneficial for local conditions and
Figure 1.4. Comprosition of protection
weak infeed functionality is utilised since then. Another
technologies on the ESKOM
words, over half of ESKOM Transmission feeders are
Transmission system
presently set to operate using weak infeed facility.
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IfA ~ 0
ZsA >>
IfB >>
ZsB <<
Fault
Figure 2.1. Weak infeed conditions during line fault
In this case the fault will be cleared at the substation B which has sufficient current to operate the protection
relays but at the substation A, the current may be lower than that required to operate the protection.
To ensure correct tripping of the circuit breaker at substation A in the above conditions the following logic has
been applied:
With insufficient current at the substation A to operate the distance relays for fault in the forward direction
the forward looking measuring elements will not pick-up.
If there is a genuine fault on the line in forward direction then at strong substation B, the forward elements of
the distance relays will operate and initiate transmission of permissive carrier to the substation A.
Substation A will receive the permissive carrier with no measuring elements picked up. This could be
sufficient information to trip the breaker in permissive underreach scheme where the underreaching zone
sends permissive signal.
In permissive overreach mode of operation the protection at strong end B will send permissive carrier also for
faults beyond substation A as indicated in Figure 2.2.
To prevent incorrect tripping at end A in case of reverse faults, additional, reverse looking impedance
elements are employed to block unnecessary weak infeed operation in case of reverse faults, in the same way
as for blocking inter trip scheme.
During reverse faults there is sufficient fault current at substation A supplied from strong substation B (see
Figure 2.2) and reverse, blocking elements will operate reliably.
IfA >>
ZsA >>
Permissive
signal
A
Fault
IfB >>
Z relay
ZsB <<
B
Z relay
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The simplified logic diagram for activation of the weak infeed tripping is shown on Figure 2.3 below.
Reverse looking measuring
elements are NOT operated
Forward looking measuring
elements are NOT operated
Initiate ARC
AND
Number of busbars
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
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ZsA
Zone 2
IfA = 0
Zone 1
Fault
IfB
ZsB
Figure 3.3. Fault beyond zone 1 reach during ARC cycle when remote breaker is open.
In such case the fault can not be rapidly cleared at substation B as it is beyond zone 1 reach. Assuming that
permissive overreach intertripping scheme is employed, weak infeed logic would result in "echo carrier"
transmission from end A to end B speeding up protection operation (ref. Figure 2.3 Simplified weak infeed
tripping logic diagram).
In such a scenario, a very clear benefit could be obtained from
X
the application of weak infeed logic i.e. instantaneous or slightly
delayed fault clearance, as only small co-ordinating timer in
range of 50 milliseconds is necessary to accommodate contact
Zone 2
Zline
racing. Another benefit is better resistive coverage of the
protection scheme. The fault beyond zone 1 due to its high
Zone 1
resistive nature, as illustrated in Figure 3.4, will still be cleared
instantaneously with "echo carrier" transmission. This benefit is
particularly important on short lines where resistive coverage of
R
Rf
zone 1 is often limited unless independent settings of resistive
part of the impedance characteristics are available on the relays
(e.g. quadrilateral characteristics).
With limited resistive
coverage of zone 1 even high current resistive faults, on lines
close to power stations, would have to be cleared in zone 2 time.
Instantaneous trip in ARC cycle, when the breaker is closed onto
Figure 3.4. High resistance fault beyond
a sustained fault is very important also from another perspective.
zone 1 characteristic.
Once the breaker is open after the initial fault clearance, the
relay has lost its memory voltages often used to enhance
polarisation. For a very close up fault, where secondary voltages are very low, there is also a possibility that the
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relay may not detect the fault in directional zone 1 on closing with no fault resistance. Such situations could
have a detrimental impact on the stability margins of the Transmission network as well as stability of auxiliary
plant at the power stations which is not acceptable on highly stressed Transmission networks.
For these reasons, however, a "line check" or "switch-on-to-fault" (SOTF) protection function has been
developed and is successfully utilised world-wide. The SOTF function provides instantaneous operation of the
relay on closing of the breaker by insertion for a short duration either a simple overcurrent relay or a
unidirectional fault detector (starter) to enhance the reliability of tripping on closing onto the fault. On many
relays this functionality can also be inserted during ARC cycle providing more reliable instantaneous fault
clearance than that provided by weak infeed logic, as communication channels are not require for SOTF.
The benefits of weak infeed tripping during ARC cycle are covered by SOTF function if the relay settings allow
to insert this function during short ARC dead time. During manual closing SOFT function is always activated.
4 CO-ORDINATION OF WEAK INFEED TRIPPING FUNCTION
Weak infeed tripping function requires quite sophisticated co-ordination to ensure reliable and, more
importantly, secure operation in all possible, practical system conditions. Focus of this co-ordination should be
on security more than reliability as unnecessary operation of weak infeed function results in the simultaneous
loss of two Transmission circuits instead of one, which in many cases may result in cascading tripping leading to
a major incident with serious, if not catastrophic, consequences. Failure to operate on the other hand may result
only in prolonged fault duration (zone 2 tripping time) for low fault current faults assuming failure of SOFT
function, which in most practical cases will not jeopardise equipment, safety or system stability.
There are three aspects of weak infeed co-ordination that have to be taken care of to ensure adequate
performance:
timing co-ordination;
co-ordination of tripping and blocking impedance polygons;
co-ordination of undervoltage and undercurrent guards.
4.1 Timing Co-ordination
The most important role of timing co-ordination in weak infeed tripping logic is to prevent possible incorrect
tripping for faults on parallel feeder as illustrated on Figure 4.1 below.
ZsA
A Blocking Zone +
Carrier Receive
Zone 2 +
Carrier Sent
ZsB
Fault
Figure 4.1. Possible incorrect tripping due to lack of timer co-ordination.
During fault on feeder 2 as indicated in Figure 4.1 above, at substation B the zone 2 will operate on healthy
feeder 1, and send permissive inter trip signal to substation A. At substation A this signal will be received but
reverse "looking" blocking elements will prevent any unwanted operation. As soon as the breakers open on
faulty feeder to clear the fault, all measuring elements on healthy feeder have to drop off. If the blocking
element at substation A drops off faster than zone 2 at substation B then there will be a situation when all the
requirements of weak infeed tripping are met resulting in incorrect operation and sympathy trip. The weak
infeed tripping has to be therefore delayed by the difference of drop-off times between them. Moreover after the
zone 2 at substation B drops off, the transmission of permissive signal will be maintained for a certain time until
relevant relays in teleprotection equipment drop off at both ends of the telecommunication channel. Finally the
propagation delay of the channel has to be considered plus some safety margin.
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The effective time delay that has to be introduced to prevent overtripping is equal to:
Td = (Td/o Zone 2 - Td/o Blocking Zone) + TTeleprotection + Tpropagation + Tsafety margin
Where: Td
Td/o Zone 2
Td/o Blocking Zone
TTeleprotection
Tpropagation
Tsafety margin
As long as relays at both ends of the line are of the same manufacturers their drop off delays should be
comparable and the first part of the equation (Td/o Zone 2 - Td/o Blocking Zone) becomes negligible. In such cases delay
of 50 - 100 milliseconds seems to be sufficient. Where different relays are installed, however, the drop off
delays have to be carefully evaluated from records of past performance or tested, as from ESKOM's experience
they can be surprisingly long on certain relays. Where high differences are detected, the Td delay has to be
increased accordingly reaching possibly 150 - 200 milliseconds. If such delays are necessary, the whole
application of weak infeed has to be carefully thought through as reduction of zone 2 timer to 200 milliseconds
would give the same result.
The selection of this delay is critical for the security of weak infeed tripping. In cases where the difference in the
drop off delays of the relays at substations A and B are substantial, the application of weak infeed may
jeopardise security of the entire protection scheme unless long co-ordination delays are selected. Long delays on
the other hand make the application of weak infeed function questionable as same results can be achieved by
reduction of zone 2 time delay with much lesser risk.
4.2 Co-ordination of Tripping and Blocking Impedance Characteristics
Co-ordination
of
tripping
and
blocking
characteristics of the relays on the X/R impedance
Forward Zone 2
plain is the most critical to avoid incorrect tripping.
A
B
Many factors have to be considered such as shapes of
the characteristics, types and depths of polarisation,
algorithms used in digital relays, particularly the
dynamic expansion of the resistive part of the
characteristic during earthfaults and impact of series
Figure 4.2 Simple example of tripping and blocking
compensation of the line. There is usually little
elements co-ordination.
explanation in manufacturers' manuals how this coordination should be provided with a few guidelines
recommending that the reverse blocking zone must
overreach the remote end forward zone 2 as indicated
in Figure 4.2. This is to ensure effective blocking for
Reverse
every reverse fault (or fault on parallel line) that can
Forward Zone 2
Blocking
be measured by the remote end zone 2. Such coordination can easily be achieved for the reactive
Zone
A
parts of the characteristics. Where fault resistance
B
reaches significant values, however, the coordination can be lost. A very simplified illustration
Rf
of such a situation on relays with pure mho
characteristics is shown in Figure 4.3. In this
example, due to significant value of fault resistance
Rf , the impedance locus falls outside the blocking
characteristic of the relay at substation A but inside
the forward zone 2 characteristic of the relay at
substation B. In this case the weak infeed function
Figure 4.3 Simplified example of possible lack of cowill result in "sympathy trip" of the line AB for an
ordination during high resistance fault.
external fault. The area of lack of co-ordination has
been shaded in Figure 4.3. To ensure that proper co-ordination is maintained for high resistance faults, the
blocking characteristic of the relay at end A must cover the entire part of the forward zone 2 at end B that can
Reverse
Blocking
Zone
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operate for faults beyond substation A. This part of forward zone 2 characteristic is indicated with bold line in
Figure 4.3.
In practice, many factors influence shape of the area
where co-ordination may be lost. Let's consider the
more realistic situation with cross-polarised relays
as indicated on Figure 4.4 below.
In order to ensure appropriate co-ordination, the
polarisation of the blocking characteristic at
substation A should be much stronger than that of
the tripping characteristics at substation B.
Assuming that the same relays are installed at A and
B, with the same type and percentage of
polarisation
for
blocking
and
tripping
characteristics, the areas where the co-ordination
requirements are not met (shaded on Figure 4.4) are
much smaller but they are still there. Such areas are
exposing the protection scheme to overtripping.
Forward Zone 2
Reverse
Blocking
Zone
A
Some impedance relays use negative sequence voltages and currents to enhance their operation. Co-ordination
of such relays with relays that measure positive sequence only creates another challenge. One of such
application was examined on the ESKOM Transmission network and due to different profiles of positive and
negative sequences along the network for a variety of faults and system configurations, co-ordination was not
possible.
Quadrilateral characteristics with well-defined
borders of resistive reach are much easier to check
for co-ordination of weak infeed functionality.
Reverse Blocking
Zone
Forward Zone 2
A
The real characteristics are often carved to avoid load encroachment, which introduces another complication and
may expose certain areas on the X/R impedance plain for maloperations. One such example is shown in Figure
4.6, where characteristics of the relays installed at both ends of the line are plotted together to highlight required
overlapping areas.
Relay characteristics at end A of the line are indicated by continuous line and characteristics of the relay
installed at end B are rotated 180 deg. and indicated by dotted line. On this particular application, digital relays
are installed which use the reverse reach of fault detector (FDR) characteristics for blocking in the weak infeed
logic.
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Only zone 2 and fault detector characteristics are plotted to make the picture more readable. The following
abbreviations were used:
FDA - Forward reach of fault detector at end A;
100
X [sec ohms]
FDRA - Reverse reach of fault detector at end A;
FDB - Forward reach of fault detector at end B;
FDA
80
FDRB - Reverse reach of fault detector at end B;
FDRB
Z2A - Zone 2 at end A;
Z2
B - Zone 2 at end B;
60
Z2A
The four shaded squares indicate areas where co40 B
ordination has not been achieved.
Max loadA
The above picture, although complex and difficult to
20
read, is still a simplification of real values of
Max loadB
R
impedances that the relays measure during faults,
A
-20
particularly high resistance faults, when load plays
0
-60
20
40
-40
60
significant role.
For precise evaluation, the
Z2B
impedances
measured
at end A and B should be
-20
plotted on separate X/R planes. The Figure 4.6 is just
for illustration of required overlapping in no load
FDRA
-40
condition on "homogenous" system.
FDB
-60
Reverse Blocking
Zone
Forward Zone 2
A
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In summary, to ensure acceptable security of weak infeed tripping function co-ordination has to be achieved on
the entire X/R plain with sufficient security margins of 20%. Proper co-ordination on the reactive axis alone is
sufficient for low resistance faults. High resistance faults move fault impedance locus away from line
characteristics into the insecure areas.
Over the past ten years ESKOM has experienced six incorrect operations of the weak infeed function due to lack
of proper co-ordination, all with potentially series consequences. Four of them were due to incorrect coordination of relays using different sequence components for their impedance measurements (positive and
negative). One was as a result of long drop off delay of measuring elements. In one case "blind spots" on relays
using quadrilateral characteristics, as described in this chapter, caused sympathy trip.
4.3 Effectiveness of undervoltage and undercurrent guards
Monitoring of voltage and currents as supervising quantities can provide additional security in weak infeed
tripping algorithms and most manufacturers of protection relays include such supervision. To evaluate
effectiveness of undervoltage and undercurrent guards again two situations should be considered:
Fault on the Transmission feeder where one substation is not able to deliver sufficient fault current - genuine
weak infeed, and
weak infeed as a result of closing the feeder onto the fault during ARC cycle or manual closing
During the low resistance fault on the line on which one
A
B
end is a weak infeed end the voltage and current
ZsB<<
IfB>>
ZsA>> IfA~0
distribution is highlighted in Figure 4.8. The following
observations can be made:
~
~
At strong substation B, where source impedance is low
(ZsB<<), voltage during the fault on the line remains
Rf~0
VfA~0
significant
(VfB>0) unless fault is very close to the
VfB>0
busbars B, and the fault current is high (IfB>>). At the
weak substation A, where source impedance is high
(ZsA>>), the fault current is very low and assumed to be
Figure 4.8. Current and voltage distribution during
insufficient to operate protection relays (IfA~0).
low resistance fault
Voltage during the fault on the line is close to zero
(VfA~0).
The weak infeed conditions at substation A can be easily detected by monitoring of the level of voltage and/or
current. Undervoltage and undercurrent supervision therefore is a very effective method to differentiate between
strong and weak conditions to improve security of the weak infeed function. Setting level of 10-15% would be
appropriate for both undervoltage and undercurrent relays.
A
ZsA>> IfA+IL>0
B
IfB>
ZsB<<
~
Rf>>
VfA>0
Vf>0
VfB>>0
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A
ZsA
B
IfB>
IfA=0
ZsB
~
Rf>>
VfA>0
Vf>0
VfB>>0
For secure operation of weak infeed facility overlapping of the zone 2 characteristic has to be provided by
reverse blocking zone on the entire X/R plain and for all possible system configurations that influence
shapes of the dynamic characteristics of the relays. Co-ordination of the reactive components alone is
insufficient to avoid overtripping during high resistance faults.
On relays where resistive reach of blocking zone can not be set independently from tripping zones used in
weak infeed logic, very careful studies have to be conducted to ensure acceptable security via undervoltage
and undercurrent guards.
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Weak infeed should not be used on relays that are not compatible in terms of measuring principals unless
performance of such relays is well known and co-ordination well studied. In some cases it may not be
possible to co-ordinate positive sequence measuring relays with relays that are equipped with zero and/or
negative sequence directional overcurrent measuring elements.
To ensure proper time co-ordination of weak infeed function, the drop off time of impedance relays at both
ends of the line should be known, either from tripping records or tests, for adequate time delay settings.
Wherever deterioration of drop off time is detected, the co-ordination time setting should be increased or
weak infeed function disabled.
Undercurrent and undervoltage guards provide only limited security improvements during high resistance
faults.
In well-interconnected areas of Transmission networks where genuine weak infeed does not occur, benefits
of weak infeed tripping / echo carrier transmission are very limited once switch-onto-fault function is
inserted during ARC dead time.
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] M. J. Mackey "Optimisation of Protection Performance during System Disturbances" CIGRE WG B5.09 Final Report
[3] IEEE Special Publication, Application of Fault and Disturbance Recording Devices
for Protective System Analysis, IEEE Publication No. 87TH-0195-8 PWR,
Operations Center, Piscataway, NJ, 1987.
[2] Adam Bartylak Application of Disturbance Recorders as near real time information
support for National Control in ESKOM - IEE Conference Developments in Power
System Protection, (Amsterdam, April 2001).
[4] Protective Relays Application Guide, GEC Alsthom, Stafford 1990.
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