Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Index
Federalism Shell..............................................................................................................................................................3
Federalism Shell – Tyranny Impacts...............................................................................................................................4
Federalism Shell – Modeling Impacts............................................................................................................................5
Federalism UQ – General...............................................................................................................................................6
Federalism UQ – Court Rulings......................................................................................................................................7
Federalism UQ – Bush....................................................................................................................................................8
Federalism UQ – Democrats...........................................................................................................................................9
Federalism UQ – Federal preoccupation abroad...........................................................................................................10
Federalism UQ – Energy Policy (1/3)...........................................................................................................................11
Federalism UQ – States leading on Alternatives now (1/2)..........................................................................................14
Federalism UQ – States outspend the FG on energy now............................................................................................16
Federalism UQ – States leading on GHG regulation....................................................................................................17
Federalism UQ – FG not intruding on states now........................................................................................................18
Environmental Federalism Now...................................................................................................................................19
A2: Federalism NUQ....................................................................................................................................................20
Federalism Brink – Supreme Court transition..............................................................................................................21
Federalism Link – Federal Action trades off with States (1/3).....................................................................................22
Federalism Link – Federal Action hurts States’ Rights.................................................................................................25
Federalism Link – Federal Action Preempts the States................................................................................................26
Federalism Link – Electricity Grid is State jurisdiction................................................................................................27
Federalism Link – Transmission Lines.........................................................................................................................28
Federalism Link – Cars.................................................................................................................................................29
A2: State control now steals Federal power..................................................................................................................30
Federalism solves the aff – Innovation.........................................................................................................................31
Federalism solves the aff (1/2)......................................................................................................................................32
Federalism solves Tyranny (1/2)...................................................................................................................................34
A2: Federalism = tyranny by the states.........................................................................................................................36
Judicial Protection is key to preserve Federalism.........................................................................................................37
Federalism key to Economic Growth............................................................................................................................38
US Federalism modeled – Generic (1/2).......................................................................................................................39
Federalist Modeling = Stable Democracies..................................................................................................................41
Federalism stops Global Wars.......................................................................................................................................42
Iraq Models US / Iraqi Federalism Good (1/2).............................................................................................................43
US Model is key to Iraq Federalism.............................................................................................................................45
US Model is key to Iraq Federalism.............................................................................................................................46
Iraq Federalism Good – key to Stability (1/2)..............................................................................................................47
Iraq Federalism Good – US Hegemony........................................................................................................................49
Iraq Instability spreads Region-wide............................................................................................................................50
Iraq Instability causes Regional War.............................................................................................................................51
Iraqi conflict spreads Region-wide (1/2)......................................................................................................................52
Iraq instability = civil war / genocide...........................................................................................................................55
Iraq Terrorism Impacts..................................................................................................................................................56
Iraq instability = nuclear war........................................................................................................................................57
Middle East War = Extinction.......................................................................................................................................58
Iraq War Turns the Aff...................................................................................................................................................59
A2: Modeling – They model locally.............................................................................................................................60
A2: Iraq Federalism – Public rejects.............................................................................................................................61
Afghanistan Models US Federalism.............................................................................................................................62
Afghanistan Federalism Good – Stability.....................................................................................................................63
A2: Afghanistan doesn’t want Federalism....................................................................................................................64
Afghanistan Brink (1/2)................................................................................................................................................65
Afghanistan Terrorism Impacts.....................................................................................................................................67
Afghanistan spills over to Central Asia.........................................................................................................................68
Russia Models US Federalism (1/2).............................................................................................................................69
Russia headed toward Federalism.................................................................................................................................71
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 2
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Russia Federalism Good – Stability..............................................................................................................................72
Russian Instability Impacts (1/2)..................................................................................................................................73
Russia Nuclear Terrorism Impacts................................................................................................................................75
Russia Nationalism Impacts..........................................................................................................................................76
Russia-China Impacts...................................................................................................................................................77
Russian Centralization Bad – Tyranny..........................................................................................................................78
***Aff Answers***......................................................................................................................................................79
Federalism NUQ – Bush is sacrificing federalism........................................................................................................80
Federalism NUQ – Federal Control Now (1/2)............................................................................................................81
Federalism NUQ – Environmental Federalism Low (1/2)............................................................................................83
Federalism NUQ – Court shifting toward FG power....................................................................................................85
Federalism NUQ – It’s Cyclical (1/3)...........................................................................................................................86
Federalism NUQ – Coercive Federalism Now.............................................................................................................89
SQ Environmental Federalism = Race to the Bottom...................................................................................................90
No Link – Federalism is Flexible (1/2).........................................................................................................................91
No Link – Federal/State power are not Zero-Sum........................................................................................................93
Turn – Incentives increase State innovation.................................................................................................................94
Turn – State control over electricity strips Federal power............................................................................................95
A2: Federalism/Constitutional Strike Down.................................................................................................................96
Protecting States’ Rights reduces Individual Rights.....................................................................................................97
Tyranny does not outweigh...........................................................................................................................................98
No one is modeling US Federalism..............................................................................................................................99
US model is not key....................................................................................................................................................100
Federalist Model Bad – Ethnic nationalism/civil war.................................................................................................101
Iraq won’t model Federalism......................................................................................................................................102
Iraq won’t model US Federalism................................................................................................................................103
Iraq Federalism Bad – Civil War.................................................................................................................................104
Imported Federalism Fails in Iraq...............................................................................................................................105
Middle East Conflict Coming Now............................................................................................................................106
Afghanistan Federalism Fails......................................................................................................................................107
Afghanistan Federalism Bad – Ethnic Cleansing (1/2)...............................................................................................108
Russia’s constitution doesn’t support Federalism.......................................................................................................110
Russia Rejects Federalism...........................................................................................................................................111
No Russia Civil War....................................................................................................................................................112
Russia Stable...............................................................................................................................................................113
No impact to Russia Nationalism................................................................................................................................114
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 3
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Federalism Shell
A. State leadership on energy policy is driving United States Federalism
Ennis, Staff writer for Texas Monthly, 08. [Michael, “Bear Market; With the federal government in knots, Texas
and California--the two most powerful megastates--are fighting to lead the country forward. Guess who's winning.,”
Texas Monthly, March 08. Accessed 7/6/08 from Proquest.com]
But evolving most rapidly, and most portentously, is the role megastates like ours play in this federation we
call the United States. We're now seeing the fruition of the "federalism" that conservatives have touted
for decades as the antidote to the smothering nanny state of the New Deal and the Great Society. The
irony, however, is that the notion of states' rights has undergone a radical twenty-first-century
evolution. The erstwhile battle cry of knuckle-dragging Jim Crow segregationists has become the
anthem of progressives of all stripes, from alternative energy entrepreneurs to gay rights advocates.
Where once the federal government took an enlightened stand against prejudice and poverty and
dragged the South kicking and screaming into the civil rights era, today Washington stands in the
schoolhouse door while forward-looking states invoke their right to solve problems like global warming
and spiraling health-care costs.
To an extent, this is what Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis was talking about in his famous 1932 opinion: "It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." But the "laboratories of democracy" Brandeis envisioned have clout he couldn't have
foreseen back when the entire national economy was considerably smaller, even in inflation-adjusted dollars, than that of either
California or Texas today. The challenges the two megastates face are commensurate in scale: California and Texas boast the nation's
largest undocumented populations, the most polluted skies, the most residents lacking health insurance, and the most pressing water and
energy demands. Despite the theme of change in the 2008 election, the days of Washington getting the lab results and
formulating national panaceas are probably over; paralyzed by red-state-blue-state gridlock, the
federal government gives every appearance that it no longer has the agility to get the big things done in
a rapidly changing world. So even when we're not firing political potshots at each other, California and
Texas are already in an existential race to arrive at creative solutions to our nation's most intractable
problems. The loser will end up buried beneath those problems. The winner will own the future.
Federalism UQ – General
Congress is deferring to the states in the squo- federalism is high
Edwards, Executive Articles Editor, New York University Annual Survey of American Law, 08. [David B., “OUT
OF THE MOUTH OF STATES: DEFERENCE TO STATE ACTION FINDING EFFECT IN FEDERAL LAW,”
New York University Annual Survey of American Law, 2008. Accessed 7/15/08 from LexisNexis]
There is little question of the power of Congress to forgo reliance on states and create a more uniform
federal law. However, utilization of state action has long been a mechanism through which the federal
government has implemented a significant portion of federal law. Instead of expounding every minute
detail, preempting all state action within its constitutional reach, the federal government has allowed
the states leeway to be laboratories of experimentation. n5 The Supreme Court has readily upheld this
congressional approach even though allowing for state action within a federal statute dredges up many
questions relating to federalism and separation of powers. n6
Specifically, it is fully within Congress's power to decide that states' experience and comprehensive law
should find effect in federal enactments, empowering purely state action to have widespread federal effect. n7
This holds true even when Congress acts prospectively without knowing the details of future state action. n8
Under these types of federal statutes, state action will be given federal effect by courts n9 unless the state
action is repugnant to the [*431] framework of the federal statute, in which case the state action will be per
se invalid. n10
Unlike Congress, which has been willing to rely on state action, the judiciary does not generally defer to
other institutions. It is traditionally the province of the judiciary to interpret the law. n11 However, in
interpreting federal statutes, the judiciary primarily strives to give effect to Congress's meaning and intent. n12
When a statute is ambiguous, the judiciary uses tools of statutory interpretation to determine Congress's most
likely meaning. n13 This is the way the constitutional baseline operates: Congress creates the law, the judiciary
interprets it. However, Congress is often intentionally ambiguous, a necessary byproduct of its utilization of
entities outside itself, such as agencies, to fill in the particulars of a general statutory framework. n14 When
federal administrative agencies are involved, the judiciary is less likely to make itself the sole determiner of
the ambiguity, but is instead open to the possibility that deferring to agency interpretations of federal law
may be the surest route to implementing congressional intent. n15 Under current law, however, this type of
deference by the judiciary, referred to as Chevron deference, [*432] applies only when Congress delegates
to federal administrative agencies n16 and not when it delegates to or relies on state action.
Federalism UQ – Bush
States' rights are on the rise now due to Bush administration's policies
Braun, Writer and Editorial Assistant for Seed Magazine, 06
(Josh, Seed Magazine, "The New Federalism: Is the United States government unburdening itself
of the big science issues and handing those responsibilities to individual states?" 1-19-6,
http://seedmagazine.com/news/2006/01/the_new_federalism.php?page=2, 7-6-8)
Every year kids across the U.S. open their civics textbooks and learn one of the cardinal rules of American
politics: Democrats are for a stronger, more powerful federal government, while Republicans insist on a
leaner one and support states’ rights. But in the past five years, Republicans have set about shattering this
distinction, passing a litany of bills from No Child Left Behind to the Patriot Act, that have expanded the
power of a rightist and growing federal government.
There is, however, an exception to this paradigm shift. “I think it’s clear that on certain pivotal issues in
science and medicine, the Bush administration is using the rhetoric of states’ rights,” says Dr. Glenn
McGee, director of the Alden March Bioethics Institute at Albany Medical College. “In effect, what is
happening is the lawyers for the Bush administration have determined that the easiest way to deal with
controversial problems in these areas is not to deal with them.”
Pundits have insinuated that the federal government’s tendency to avoid the issue of embryonic stem-
cell research is a maneuver aimed at handing expensive, unwieldy and ethically tricky science-funding
issues to industry and individual states.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 9
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Federalism UQ – Democrats
Democrats and populists are beginning to support states' right in new paradigm shift
Braun, Writer and Editorial Assistant for Seed Magazine, 06
(Josh, Seed Magazine, "The New Federalism: Is the United States government unburdening itself
of the big science issues and handing those responsibilities to individual states?" 1-19-6,
http://seedmagazine.com/news/2006/01/the_new_federalism.php?page=2, 7-6-8)
“I think it’s a meeting of two political minds,” says Joanna Weinberg, a professor of law policy and ethics at
the University of California-San Francisco researching the ethical and policy implications of the stem-cell
research initiative passed by California voters. “There’s the very clear right-to-life orientation of this
particular administration and its unwillingness to engage in much debate about that. [Additionally,] one of
the hallmarks of this administration—and most Republican administrations—is that there should be less
power held by the federal government and that the federal government should defer to the states in
regulating activities unless absolutely necessary. It’s two interests that are coming together very
opportunely.”
Whether the reservations of the Bush administration or individual members of Congress have to do with a
pro-life stance, a predilection for smaller government or both, it is clear that the synergy between agendas is
likely to thwart new federal funding for embryonic stem-cell research in the near future. Now, Democrats
find themselves in support of an unfamiliar and perhaps uncomfortable idea: They’re calling for more
states’ rights.
“It’s been argued that we’re seeing the emergence, for the first time since the Kennedy administration,
of a kind of federalism embraced by populists because they themselves see advantages in a federalist
structure,” says McGee. “If you have no influence on federal policy, but can make a difference at the
state level, the state level may be a better option.”
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 10
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Status quo has a good balance of government and state policy on energy. Federal
government does not need to undermine states.
US Fed News, 2007, (April 25, Accessed July 7, 2008)
The bottom line is that sound energy policy is, and should continue to be, a significant priority of both
the States and the Federal Government. Reliable and affordable energy is a key component of economic
development. However, opportunities for innovation and conservation cannot be ignored. It is appropriate
to require that solutions, such as demand side management and conservation be part of the package of
alternatives considered when planning for expected energy needs. It is also important that the Federal
Government not needlessly usurp the longstanding authority and role of the states on this issue. The 2005
Energy Policy Act understood and shared this goal. I hope that we can leave here today with a better understanding of the way that the
Federal Government can work with states to solve energy congestion problems, while still respecting state autonomy.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of today's witnesses and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Federalism is high- states are exercising the ability to pass energy policy and experiment with
alternative energy concepts
Fialka, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal, 06. [John, “States Power Renewable-Energy Push,” Wall Street
Journal, June 14 2006. Accessed 7/7/08 from http://www.cleanenergystates.org/press/States_Power_Renewable-
Energy_Push-WSJ-6.14.06.pdf]
Twenty-two states have passed laws requiring that a growing percentage of electricity come from
renewable-energy sources, such as wind and solar power. The effort has helped launch $475 million in
energy projects.
A study prepared by the University of Michigan calls it a "classic case in federalism" with states
experimenting with new and usually nonpolluting energy sources. Barry Rabe, a professor of public
policy and author of the study, said the movement reminds him of state experiments in the 1920s that
eventually led to the federal Social Security Act and other New Deal programs in the 1930s.
"These states have had very little contact with federal officials. There's this disconnect," he explained,
noting that both the Bush administration and Congress have rejected a federal program.
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The state government has a key say in the future of alternative energy.
Fry, Professor of Political Science and Endower Professor of Canadian Studies Brigham
Young University, 2004
(Earl, The Impact of Federalism On the Evolution of the North American Energy Sector, accessed July 9,2008)
Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the capacity of state, provincial, and local governments in
North America to influence the course of future continental energy relations. Among the 200 nation-
states in the world today, 3 U.S. states would rank in the top10 measured by GDP, 22 states within the
top NAFI – EGAP – Comexi: Forging North American Energy Security 5
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States spend three times as much money on alternative energy than the federal
government.
Staff Writers, St. Petersburg, 2007
(Progress Energy Florida Signs Contract for Second Waste Wood Plant, Dec 20)
California, Connecticut and Vermont were in a tie for the top ranking on the scorecard, followed by
Massachusetts and Oregon to make up the top five. Washington state, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island
and Minnesota round out the top 10.
States spend about three times as much on energy efficiency programs as does the federal government,
and are leading the way on efficiency gains in many areas, such as building codes and appliance
standards, ACEEE said. With Congress considering legislation on numerous energy issues and state
regulators looking to trim electricity demand, "we're entering a new era" in the energy industry and "the age
of cheap energy is over," said Bill Prindle, acting executive director of ACEEE and co-author of the
scorecard report.
At a time when states' rights are dominant in the political landscape, "it is important to document best
practices and recognize leadership among the states so that other states follow, and to encourage
federal action to catch up," ACEEE said in the report. "The message that comes from the states'
patchwork approach to energy efficiency standards and practices is that the time is long overdue for
the federal government and the nation to get moving to close the gaps in our nation's energy policy
through which our energy security and our efforts to curb global warming are undermined," Prindle
said.
So what is wrong with letting states chart their own course on energy and efficiency matters? Nothing,
if a majority followed the leading states, Prindle said. But the bottom 26 in the ACEEE rankings "have
done far too little to advance energy efficiency," and given the stakes of global warming and spiraling
energy costs, "it is not sufficient to let some lead while others lag," Prindle said.BC Monitoring South
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The role of communities is increasing presently and in the future as environmental policies
begin to mature.
Collin, Writer for Environmental Law, 2008,
(Robert, Environmental Justice in Oregon: It’s the Law, Spring, accessed July 7, 2008)
As environmental policy matures and includes more citizen monitoring and involvement, the role of
communities will increase. Those communities most affected by past, present, and future
environmental impacts will need monitoring before any type of sustainability assessment, evaluation,
or policy can begin. The strength of the environmental justice mantra "We Speak for Ourselves" lies both in
its authentic voice and in the needs for future global, domestic, state, and local environmental policies to be
based on accurate and complete information.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 20
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Federal energy incentives reduce state policy action in 2 ways- perception of irrelevance
and reduction of net benefits
Adler, associate professor, Case Western University School of Law, 06. [Jonathan, “WHEN IS TWO A CROWD?
The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation,”Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies
Working Paper, May 2006 p. 1-65 Accessed 7/6/08 from ssrn.com]
Just as federal action may indirectly encourage greater state regulatory activity, federal action may
discourage state regulatory action. This can occur in at least two ways. First, the adoption of a federal
regulatory standard may “signal” that more stringent state regulations are unnecessary. In effect, the
federal standard may be seen as evidence that a given level of regulatory protection is sufficient to
safeguard relevant public interests, and more stringent scientific research insofar as different entities
pursue different research methodologies to address emerging environmental problems. measures are
unnecessary. As a result, the adoption of federal regulation may induce state policymakers to lower
comparable state protections. In addition, the adoption of a federal regulation may “crowd out” state
regulatory measures by reducing the net benefits provided by additional state measures. As a result, the
existence of federal regulation may discourage the adoption of additional state-level regulatory protections in
the future.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 23
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Federal regulation crowds out state action- prevents states from going above and beyond federal
regulations
Adler, associate professor, Case Western University School of Law, 06. [Jonathan, “WHEN IS TWO A CROWD?
The Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation,”Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies
Working Paper, May 2006 p. 1-65 Accessed 7/6/08 from ssrn.com]
A second potential negative indirect effect of federal regulation on state regulatory choices is “crowding
out.” This occurs because federal regulation may serve as a substitute for state-level regulation, and
thereby reduce the benefits of adopting or maintaining state-level protections. Insofar as voters in a
given state demand a certain level of environmental protection, there is no reason to expect states to
duplicate federal efforts insofar as a federal program is satisfying that demand, particularly if a state has
not already created such a program. If the federal “floor” is greater than or equal to the level of
environmental protection demanded by a state’s residents, there is no reason for a state to adopt
environmental regulations of its own once the federal government has acted. Insofar as this effect occurs,
it is separate from – perhaps even in addition to – the signaling effect described above.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 24
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Federalism decreases the likelihood of federal tyranny and enhances democratic rule.
Imas, Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, University of
Southern California, McGeorge Law Review, 2001 (McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific, Spring, accessed July 7, 2008)
A striking, but often overlooked aspect of the Supreme Court's federalism decisions is the unquestionable
importance of the laws that were invalidated. Cleaning up nuclear wastes, requiring background checks for
gun ownership, keeping guns away from schools, creating a remedy for women who suffer gender-motivated
violence, and allowing recovery for infringements of patents, all are compelling government interests. The
key question is why safeguarding states is more important than these objectives.
Justice O'Connor (and the Court), never answers this question. Most Supreme Court decisions protecting
federalism say relatively little about the underlying [*888] values that are being served. When the
Court does speak of the values of federalism, it usually does little more than present conclusions that
federalism is desirable because it decreases the likelihood of federal tyranny, n92 enhances democratic
rule by providing government that is closer to the people, n93 and allows states to be laboratories for
new ideas. n94
US role in Iraqi federalism is key to preventing ethnic conflict and instability in the Middle
East
Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, 04. [Dawn,
“Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” The Washington Quarterly 27:2 pp. 7–21. SPRING 2004. Accessed 7/8/08
http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_brancati.pdf]
For its part, the United States must take a more active role in advising Iraqi leaders to adopt a federal
system of government along these lines. Such a system will help the United States not only to build
democracy in Iraq but also to prevent the emergence of a Shi‘a-dominated government in the country.
Without this form of federalism, an Iraq rife with internal conflict and dominated by one ethnic or
religious group is more likely to emerge, undermining U.S. efforts toward establishing democracy in
Iraq as well as the greater Middle East.
Strong regional powers in the Iraqi federalist system are critical to the system’s success
Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University, 04. [Dawn,
“Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?” The Washington Quarterly 27:2 pp. 7–21. SPRING 2004. Accessed 7/8/08
http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_brancati.pdf]
First and foremost, federalism must be extensive in Iraq to ensure that the regional governments have
considerable political and financial powers— an essential component for ensuring governmental
protection for Iraq’s various ethnic and religious groups and for preventing ethnic conflict and
secessionism. Federalism has failed in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria precisely
because it did not go far enough in granting regional autonomy. If regional governments are granted
certain powers in principal but denied these powers in practice or given only modest powers in the first
place, federalism is guaranteed to fail.
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A federalist Iraq is necessary to prevent further sectarian violence and instability in the
region
Al-Rubaie, Iraq's national security adviser, 08. [Mowaffak, “Federalism, Not Partition; A System Devolving
Power to the Regions Is the Route to a Viable Iraq,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2008. Accessed 7/15/08 from
Lexis]
BAGHDAD -- Iraq's government is at a stalemate. As in the United States, there is much discussion here
of the need for political reconciliation. What does that mean? That the majority Shiites and the minority
Sunnis and Kurds must find a way to govern collectively at the national level. As national security
adviser to the head of Iraq's governments since March 2004, I have participated in the development of
democracy in my country. I strongly support the government and applaud its achievements. But I understand
that the political objectives of Iraq's three main communities are unrealizable within the framework of
a unitary, centralized state.
It has been impossible to maintain a political consensus on many important issues. For one thing, the U.S.-dominated coalition, which
has its own objectives, must be accommodated. The regional "superpowers" (Iran and Saudi Arabia) meddle in Iraq's affairs, and their
own sectarian tensions are reflected in the violence here. The absence of truly national political parties and leadership that reach the Iraqi
people exacerbates the problem.
Overall, Shiites see their future based on two fundamental "rights": Power must be exercised by the political majority through control of
governmental institutions, and institutional sectarian discrimination must be eliminated. Kurds see their future bound to their "rights" of
linguistic, cultural, financial and resource control within Kurdistan. Sunni Arabs are driven by resistance to their loss of power, as well
as fear of revenge for past wrongs and the potential for reverse discrimination.
The current political framework is based on a pluralistic democratic vision that, while admirable, is
entirely unsuited to resolving this three-way divide. It ignores underlying issues and expects that a
consensus will emerge simply by enacting a liberal constitutional legal order.
Pluralistic democracy will not take root unless the national political compact recognizes and
accommodates the fears and aspirations of Iraq's communities. Resolution can be achieved only
through a system that incorporates regional federalism, with clear, mutually acceptable distributions of
power between the regions and the central government. Such a system is in the interest of all Iraqis and is
necessary if Iraq is to avoid partition or further civil strife.
Only through a new political compact among Iraq's main communities will a viable state emerge. A
key condition for success is that the balance of power should tip decisively to the regions on all matters
that do not compromise the integrity of the state. The central institutions must earn their legitimacy from the power that
the three main ethnic groups are prepared to give them. Iraq needs a period during which the Shiites and the Kurds achieve political
control over their destinies while the Sunni Arab community is secure from the feared tyranny of the majority.
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The Middle East is interconnected- war in one area spirals into a regional war
Ward, Staff Writer, 07 (Olivia, The Toronto Star, Feb 3, “Domino effect worries analysts: Three hotspots
could flare up at once, boosting Iran’s influence; Amerd foes stalk streets of Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, leaving them
on the brink of civil war”, http://www.thestar.com/comment/columnists/94633, 7/16/08)
Troops are on the streets of Lebanon. Blood is flowing in Gaza. And few question that a catastrophic
civil war has come to Iraq.
In the Middle East, with three hotspots threatening to flare up simultaneously, analysts say the sparks
could spread in a region where few major events are unconnected for long.
Months after President George W. Bush promised a radical makeover of the region - and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described
the war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon as "the birth pangs of a new Middle East" - the landscape that is emerging
is a dark and smouldering one.
"Right now in the Middle East, we have three different places that are failed or failing states, either in,
or on the brink of civil war," says Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution. "Even one would be
enough. The danger to the region is increasing."
The danger is also boosted by a looming conflict between the United States and Iran - the country that
joins the dots among the three hotspots.
"Now, we not only have three wars with spillover, but they are also creating opportunities for Iran to
expand its influence," Pollack says, adding that American policies have fuelled, or failed to prevent,
conflicts, opening the way for Iran's new power in the region. And for a new battlefront with Tehran that many
predict will explode by the end of this year.
In Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War, Pollack and co-author Daniel Byman, of the Brookings
Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, focus on Iraq, but caution that it is only one ingredient in a regional recipe for disaster.
They say the conflict "could easily spiral into one that threatens not only Iraq, but also its neighbors
throughout the oil-rich Persian Gulf region with instability, turmoil and war."
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Pollack says Washington has badly underestimated the spillover effect of such events.
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in coming weeks after the opium poppy crop has been planted. With fighting seemingly poised to escalate, one major worry for the coalition is civilian
casualties, which spiked during combat last spring. At that time, human rights groups charged that Western troops sometimes too readily called in airstrikes when under attack, obliterating
village compounds that might not have contained only insurgents, if any. Coalition commanders, in turn, have expressed continued frustration with what they describe as insurgents' willful
endangering of civilians by launching attacks from within their midst, combined with what they say is the common practice of reporting their own battle dead as civilians. During the winter
months, with harsh weather bringing a relative lull in fighting, the coalition has made a concerted effort to hunt down Taliban field commanders, either capturing them or killing them in
pinpoint airstrikes. They describe the mid-level to upper leadership ranks as having been decimated by this campaign. But senior Western military officials acknowledge that many of these
"It's a new generation we are seeing, capable of
leaders have been swiftly replaced, in some cases by younger and even more ruthless commanders.
the worst kind of atrocities," said Brig. Gen. Carlos Branco, spokesman of the NATO-led force. Last week, insurgents
slaughtered 17 Afghan road workers in neighboring Zabol province. In response, Afghan and coalition
forces hunted down and killed two dozen Taliban blamed for the attack, military officials said Saturday. Part of the
Western alliance's overall strategy is to turn more of the fighting and policing over to the long-troubled Afghan security forces. American
trainers believe they are turning a corner. Recruitment, pay and morale are all up, they say. But although Afghan security forces
have played a more prominent role in policing and battlefield engagements over the last year, serious
problems remain. For example, Afghan forces are assigned whenever possible for house searches, an intimate
and culturally charged encounter that has inflamed resentment when carried out by foreign troops.
However, commanders acknowledge that without careful monitoring, looting sometimes occurs during
such Afghan-conducted searches. Moreover, the Taliban find Afghan police a "softer" target than coalition
troops and have killed scores in suicide strikes. Senior police officials matter-of-factly say they believe the insurgents have marked them
for death. "The Taliban have warned me so many times to leave this job," said Haji Saifullah, the district police commissioner in Maywand, a district of
Kandahar province that borders Helmand and has become an insurgent stronghold. "They want to plant a roadside bomb, or send a suicide bomber, or shoot me,"
he said. "So far they haven't succeeded." Longtime observers of the conflict say that even if the insurgents' strength is flagging, a protracted battle probably lies
ahead. "I think the Taliban are not as strong as in the past," said Haji Dad Mohammad, a Kandahar-based former militia leader who sometimes serves as an
intermediary between the government and insurgents. "But still, the fighting will go ahead."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 66
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Federalism in Russia is extremely fluid and easily impacted because of the lack of a
concrete constitutional definition of federalism
Lynn and Nivokov, Center for the Study of Federalism, 97, [Nicholas and Alexie, “Refederalizing Russia: Debates
on the idea of federalism in Russia,” Publius, Spring 1997, Vol. 27 Issue 2, p187. Accessed 7/10/08 from
ProQuest.com]
The idea of federalism in Russia remains dominated by a focus on the constitutional importance of central
state power and the political and economic importance of regional and local governments. Although the
Russian president has a great deal of responsibility for making and enforcing the law, which can impinge on
the decision-making authority of regions and republics, the organization of federal functions is also
complex, and there is a great deal of confusion over central, regional, and republican spheres of
responsibility.49 Crucially, federation in Russia is based on a series of treaties and agreements between
the center and its constituent units rather than on an effective constitution that binds the center and
regions together, which has produced a bureaucratic and asymmetrical system.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 71
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Russian rejection of democracy can lead to dangerous nuclear alliances with Iran, Syria,
and China
Frum, Senior Editor at The American Prospect, Previously a Senior Writer at The Washington
City Paper, 07
(David, National Post, "Russian democracy is dying," 3-10-7, LexisNexis, 7-15-8)
But this explanation goes only so far. Even in the mid-1990s, only 25% of Russians regarded Western
democracy as the ideal system for Russia. Russians have been debilitated by 70- plus years of
communism into feelings of personal helplessness that leads them to crave a strong boss. Virtually every
Russian surveyed, 94%, said they felt they had zero influence on events in their country; 82% felt they bore
no responsibility. It's as if they are saying: Let Putin kill his enemies -- there's nothing we can do, and so it's
not our fault. As an institution, Russian democracy is dying. Inside the minds of the Russians, it is already
dead. We have no shortage of things to worry about in our troubled world: Islamic extremism, Chinese
aggression, European weakness, American isolation. Now add one more. A potentially great power,
endowed with vast energy wealth and inheriting a vast nuclear arsenal, is deliberately and with the
approval of the majority of its people turning its back on democracy and freedom. Instead of joining
the West, Russia is finding its way to dangerous alliances with Iran, Syria, China, and who knows what
other sinister forces. This grouping of anti-democratic states is extending its reach around the world --
even perhaps to the suburbs of Washington D.C.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 73
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Russian civil war causes nuclear proliferation and spread, causing the greatest threat
David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, 99. [Stephen R., Jan/Feb 1999, “Saving
America from the Coming Civil Wars,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 78, Issue 1 npg.]
Most alarming is the real possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control
over its nuclear arsenal. No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear
precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000 nuclear weapons and the raw
material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the
government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however,
Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a
wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the
greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this
threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.
Threats to territorial integrity result in launch of Russian nukes- the threshold is very low
now and instability lowers that threshold further
Alden, research analyst, The American Partisan columnist, 00. [Diane, “Russia on the razor's edge,”
entetstageright.com, January 10, 2000. Accessed 7/16/08 from
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0100russia.htm]
In a recent article in the Army publication Parameters, Dr. Walter Parchamenko, an expert on the Russian
military maintains that: " The poor state of Russia's conventional forces necessarily means a greater
reliance on strategic nuclear forces and, consequently, a much lower nuclear threshold for Russia."
Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev outlined the new reality in late October 1998. While speaking at the
National Defense Academy in Beijing, he stressed that the role of nuclear deterrence has grown, given the
virtual collapse of Russia's conventional forces. The declaratory policy enunciated explicitly: "In case
of direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state owing to an external aggression
against Russia, [it would be] possible and legitimate to use all available means, up to and including
nuclear weapons, to counter this threat." Put simply, this means that nuclear deterrence has now
become the backbone of Russia's defenses and that nuclear weapons might be used to counter any
threat to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a very serious development."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 74
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
Nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to American national security- a detonation could
kills hundreds of thousands
Sneider, Mercury News, 04. [Daniel, “Our biggest threat: nuclear terrorism,” ransac.org, 9/12/2004. Accessed
7/16/08 from
http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/2004/914200493946AM.html#2]
Three years after 9/11, there is no consensus on whether we are safer. But presidents and would-be
presidents, along with a raft of experts, agree on one thing. The greatest danger is that Islamic
terrorists will steal or acquire a nuclear warhead or the highly enriched uranium to construct a crude
device. They would smuggle the weapon into a city and explode it, potentially killing hundreds of
thousands of people. Given that threat, I posed a question to a wide range of experts on nuclear terrorism,
some of whom have served in senior government posts. Imagine, I said, that terrorists set off a nuclear
weapon in some Western city. The president immediately convenes a national security council meeting and
asks, before any hard data is in, what are the most likely sources for the weapon. Two suspects topped all
lists -- Russia and Pakistan. Others making most lists included North Korea and former Soviet republics
such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Russia's vast arsenal of nuclear weapons and its scattered
stores of bomb-quality uranium and plutonium are vulnerable to theft and terrorist assault. Two years
ago I investigated Russia's arsenal of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. These are smaller bombs to blow
up bridges or fit in artillery shells, many of them portable enough to fit in the trunk of a compact car.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 76
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Russia-China Impacts
Russia civil war would provoke an attack by China, spillover fighting, environmental
destruction, and creates the possibility of a tyrannical Russian regime
David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, 99. [Stephen R., Jan/Feb 1999, “Saving
America From the Coming Civil Wars,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 78, Issue 1 npg.]
Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be
severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An
embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China.
Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia
could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants,
would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be
even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet
communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.
Russia and China are working together to counteract US hegemony in the squo but
Russian devolution disrupts this partnership
Roberts, Institute for Defense Analyses, United States Department of Defense, 00. [Brad, “Nuclear Multipolarity
and Stability,” Institute for Defense Analyses Document D-2539, November 2000. Accessed 7/16/08 from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2000/d2539dtra.doc]
Russia similarly values partnership with China as a counterweight to U.S. influence. But it too is
ambivalent. China’s rise is threatening to Russia’s stature in Eurasia and globally. China is seen by some in
Moscow as ready to pounce should some further devolution of the Russian state put Siberian resources
within its reach. Politically, the two are neither adversaries nor allies. They are neighbors with a growing
appreciation of some common interests and who act in parallel when it serves their interests. Their primary
common interest is in mutually reinforcing their efforts to react to the preeminent role of the United
States. In many public and private statements the impression comes through that the two share a
common view of the United States as exploiting its singular status at their expense. Their cooperation
particularly intensified in the wake of NATO’s campaign in Kosovo. They find Washington’s commitment to
gain “freedom from attack...and freedom to attack” (as elaborated in the U.S. defense strategy) as signifying
its attempt to escape the restraints of the balance of power and promising punitive interference by the United
States in their domestic affairs in service of America’s human rights ethic.20 These perspectives are not mere
sloganeering of the kind to which Americans became accustomed in the Cold War—they convey something
more palpable in their political convictions.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 78
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***Aff Answers***
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 80
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Congress trounces the balance of powers through issues like the Marriage Protection Act
Morgan, Professor at New York Law School from 1995-2006, 06
(Denise C., New York Law School Law Review, "A Tale of (At Least) Two Federalisms," Accessed 7-7-8)
Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum offers a critical examination of the proposed Marriage Protection Act (MPA),
which would strip the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over any [*633]
case challenging or interpreting the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). n95 Kroll-Rosenbaum first
examines the two pieces of legislation in question. n96 She finds that DOMA, which provides that no state
shall be required to recognize same-sex marriages performed out-of-state, does little to change existing
law. n97 Historically, states have been free to decline to recognize out-of-state marriages that are inconsistent
with their own policies. n98 Given the limited legal impact of DOMA, Congress could easily have
concluded that the MPA was unnecessary. n99 Kroll-Rosenbaum contends that members of Congress
were driven to consider the MPA by their fear that federal courts will require all states to accept same-
sex marriages. n100 As it is currently drafted, the legislation would not, however, bar all same-sex marriage-
related claims from the federal courts. n101 Kroll-Rosenbaum then argues that the MPA is unconstitutional.
n102 She contends that even if Article III gives Congress the power to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
over a category of constitutional claims, and even if it also gives Congress the power to strip the lower
federal courts of jurisdiction over those claims, "Congress does not have the constitutional authority to
simultaneously strip both the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over DOMA-related cases or controversies because constitutional
rights are at stake." n103
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(Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known
as Superfund, was enacted by Congress on December 11, 1980. This law created a tax on the chemical and
petroleum industries and provided broad Federal authority to respond directly to releases or threatened
releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment.)
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 84
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Historically, the US shifts between two models of federalism; one limiting the federal
government and the other empowering it
Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, 06
(Erwin, Stanford Law Review, "Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor," 4-06, Accessed 7-7-8)
Part I of the Article argues that, throughout American history, the Supreme Court has shifted between
two models of federalism: (1) federalism as empowerment and (2) federalism as limits. The former
seeks to empower government at all levels to deal with society's problems. A core feature of federalism as
empowerment is that it broadly defines the scope of federal power to equip the federal government with
authority to take socially desirable actions. Initially articulated by John Marshall, n8 this was the vision of
federalism during the nineteenth century and from 1937 until the 1990s. The alternative vision sees
federalism as a means of limiting federal power, especially to protect the authority of state
governments. This was the vision of [*1765] federalism from the late nineteenth century until 1937.
Part II argues that, until its last few years, the Rehnquist Court followed the latter vision of federalism as
limits. This was manifest in three sets of doctrines. First, the Court limited Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the Court revived the Tenth
Amendment as a limit on federal power by holding that Congress may not compel state legislative or
regulatory activity. Third, the Court greatly expanded state sovereign immunity by limiting Congress's power
to authorize suits against state governments and by holding that states may not be sued in state courts or
federal agency proceedings.
Even if there have been tradeoffs between state and federal authority in the past, there is now a
more fluid dynamic between states and the federal government which isn’t a zero sum game
Rabe, Professor of Environmental Policy, University of Michigan, 06. [Barry, “STATE COMPETITION AS A
SOURCE DRIVING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION,”NYU Environmental Law Journal, Volume 14, February
1st 2006 p1-53. Accessed 7/7/08 http://www.law.nyu.edu/journals/envtllaw/issues/vol14/1/v14_n1_rabe-roman-
dobelis.pdf]
The federal/state choice in environmental regulation is not an “either/or” proposition as it was
sometimes cast in the environmental federalism debate of the mid-1990s.137 Those studying
environmental law and policy today must contemplate a fluid system of relationships, in which
influence can pass from the federal to the state level, from the state to the federal level, or from state to
state, via mechanisms ranging from the political process to the legal process. The inter-state competition
framework developed here should be useful in this study, and also for those seeking to influence U.S.
environmental law and policy. For both scholars and practitioners, dynamics such as those observed above
may form helpful guideposts.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 94
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Courts empirically rule unpredictably between supporting federal versus states' rights
Morgan, Professor at New York Law School from 1995-2006, 06
(Denise C., New York Law School Law Review, "A Tale of (At Least) Two Federalisms,"
Accessed 7-7-8)
Professor Lynn Baker's piece, The Future of Federalism?: Pierce County v. Guillen as a Case Study, uses the Supreme Court's decision in
Pierce County v. Guillen n42 as a jumping-off point in her attempt to make sense of the Court's recent Spending Clause jurisprudence.
n43 The Spending Clause gives Congress its most substantial powers to impinge upon state autonomy, and South Dakota v. Dole gives
Congress considerable leeway in conditioning federal spending on state compliance with federal regulations. n44 But, despite the fact
that the broad scope of Congress's Spending Clause authority "does not provide Congress an eternally available means of circumventing
those limitations on Congress's other Article I powers that the Court has recognized," the Court has yet to attempt to more strictly police
that power. n45 The Guillen case, in which the Supreme Court of Washington struck down a federal statute that conditioned the states'
receipt of federal highway safety monies [*627] upon their agreement to shield certain accident reports and highway safety data from
discovery and introduction into evidence in state court proceedings, offered the Court an opportunity to bring its Spending Clause
jurisprudence more in line with its Commerce Clause and Section 5 case law. n46 Professor Baker's article asks the question: "Why did
the States' Rights Five forego this rare opportunity to strengthen or re-affirm the significance of existing spending power doctrine which
is so central to any meaningful 'federalist revival?'" n47 The Guillen case is indeed intriguing. As Professor Baker
points out, "each member of the States' Rights Five was on record as having been willing to invalidate
a federal statute under the doctrine set out in Dole." n48 Indeed, the amicus brief Professor Baker and her
colleague Mitch Berman submitted in the case argued that the statute violated both the Spending and
Commerce Clauses. n49 Given the Federalism Revolution, it seemed to her a slam dunk that the Court
would use the opportunity presented by the Guillen case to further trim Congressional authority. n50
The Court, however, unanimously upheld the federal statute under the Commerce Clause and chose
not to reach the Spending Clause issue. n51 Professor Baker attributes the Guillen decision to the fact
that the Justices employed categorical federalism, n52 attempting to discern whether the core activity
at issue was a traditional and appropriate area of federal or state regulation. n53 Indeed, she contends
that "the recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the States' Rights Five, like their spending power
jurisprudence, is driven by a (sometimes) unstated inquiry into whether the federal statute would
regulate an area 'where States historically have been sovereign,' or whether it instead involves a
traditional and appropriate federal function." n54 Since the Court viewed the Guillen statute as
[*628] regulating highway safety - an area traditionally regulated by the federal government - and not
state court rules of evidence, it upheld the statute under the Commerce Clause. n55 In closing, Professor Baker notes the
irony of the fact that the Court appears to have revived sub rosa the late Justice Rehnquist's traditional function test from National
League of Cities v. Usery n56 that the Court subsequently declared unworkable in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.
n57
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 97
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Preventing tyranny and preserving states as laboratories are ineffective values when
determining the issues regarding federalism
Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, 06
(Erwin, Stanford Law Review, "Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor," 4-06, Accessed 7-7-8)
Part III argues that the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions rest on a series of unsupported
assumptions. In particular, I identify seven assumptions: 1. It is for the judiciary to impose limits on Congress in the name of
protecting federalism and the authority of state governments; the political process, with minimal judicial review, is not adequate for this
purpose. 2. There is a meaningful and desirable distinction between economic and noneconomic activities in terms of Congress's
authority to regulate commerce among the states. 3. Federal laws that compel state and local governments to comply with federal
mandates undermine accountability by confusing voters as to whom to hold responsible. 4. Congressional expansion of rights is not
"enforcement" of rights within the meaning of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5. Sovereign immunity is a constitutional
principle beyond the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, and it outweighs in importance government accountability as a constitutional
principle. 6. The desire to protect the authority of state governments does not require a narrow preemption doctrine. 7. The social
desirability of federal legislation does not matter in evaluating whether laws violate principles of federalism. These assumptions have
many striking characteristics. All are reasonable, but the opposite assumptions are equally reasonable. In fact,
the prior era of Supreme Court decision-making largely rested on the opposite assumptions. Moreover,
none of these assumptions provides a sound basis upon which to rest federalism decisions. Some are
empirical in nature, yet they lack an empirical foundation. Some are based on definitions. Others are based
on value judgments that are not justified. Part IV argues that getting past these assumptions requires a
different approach to federalism, one that reasons from the underlying goals of federalism. Part of the
reason for the heavy reliance on assumptions is that the traditional values asserted for federalism -
preventing tyranny and protecting states as laboratories for experimentation - are not useful and have
nothing to [*1766] do with the actual decisions. Two values should be key: advancing liberty and
enhancing effective government. Other values include: efficiency, as sometimes it is more efficient to have action at the
national level and sometimes at the local; participation, as sometimes national action better engages involvement and other times
localism does so; community empowerment, which is sometimes a benefit of decentralization; and economic gains, as sometimes
national action is needed to deal with externalities. Constructing a meaningful theory of federalism must be based on these values and
not on unsupported assumptions. My goal in this Article is not to construct such a theory, but rather to point to what its foundation must
be.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 99
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
No US modeling now
Stepan, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, 99. [Alfred, “Federalism and Democracy:
Beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4 (1999) pp. 19-34. Accessed 7/8/08 from
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/6_7_Stepan_1999_Federalism_J_of_Dem.pdf]
Finally, many of the new federations that could emerge from the currently nondemocratic parts of the
world would probably be territorially based, multilingual, and multinational. For the reasons spelled
out in this article, very few, if any, such polities would attempt to consolidate democracy using the U.S.
model of "coming-together," "demos-constraining," symmetrical federalism.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 100
Lacy/Symonds/Bowen Federalism DA
States that base their model off the United States have to start off as autonomus.
New Vision, Africa News, 2008, (May 14, Uganda: Intercultural Dialogue Can Iron Out
Our Fears, accessed July 8, 2008)
In constitutional language, however, emphasis is not on ordinary definitions but on models and formulations.
Thus, for example, we have the American federal model which was based on the 11 independent colonies
which came together under a compact they called a constitution to form the United States of America under
one federal government to which they surrendered segments of their independence.
All states which have followed the American model have been previously autonomous starting with the
five Australian colonies which formed the Australian union. Likewise, the provinces of Canada, India
and South Africa which formed those countries' federal statehood had been autonomous.
The original states of Nigeria became self-governing in 1949 before they formed the federal union in 1960
and the Malaysian union was formed by the autonomous British territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawaka
and Sabah although Singapore left two years later. The same formula was followed in the federal unions of
Germany, Switzerland and Brazil, among others.
This means that if we are to introduce the American model of federalism in Uganda, parliament will first
have to grant autonomy to the regions which want it before those regions as autonomous units formed a
union with Uganda. This is what was done in 1962 when the British government granted independence to
Buganda on October 8, 1962, before Buganda as a federal state pursuant to its 1961 agreement with the
British formed a union with independent Uganda on October 9, 1962.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 101
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Empirically, the use of the federal model in emerging democracies is bad- ethnic conflict
Stepan, Wallace Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University, 99. [Alfred, “Federalism and Democracy:
Beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4 (1999) pp. 19-34. Accessed 7/8/08 from
https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/fesnic/fspub/6_7_Stepan_1999_Federalism_J_of_Dem.pdf]
For those of us interested in the spread and consolidation of democracy, whether as policy makers,
human rights activists, political analysts, or democratic theorists, there is a greater need than ever to
reconsider the potential risks and benefits of federalism. The greatest risk is that federal arrangements
can offer opportunities for ethnic nationalists to mobilize their resources. This risk is especially grave
when elections are introduced in the subunits of a formerly nondemocratic federal polity prior to democratic
countrywide elections and in the absence of democratic countrywide parties. Of the nine states that once
made up communist Europe, six were unitary and three were federal. The six unitary states are now five
states (East Germany has reunited with the Federal Republic), while the three federal states--Yugoslavia,
the USSR, and Czechoslovakia--are now 22 independent states. Most of postcommunist Europe's
ethnocracies and ethnic bloodshed have occurred within these postfederal states.
Russia rejects the US's call for democracy, citing hypocrisy in foreign relations regarding
energy and peace
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8
("Russian ministry source sees hypocrisy in words of USA's new envoy to Moscow," 6-21-8, LexisNexis, 7-16-8)
Text of report by Russian state news agency RIA Novosti Moscow, 21 June: The Russian Foreign Ministry
hopes that the work of new US ambassador to Russia John Beyrle will help to strengthen bilateral relations
without any prior conditions imposed by the USA, a source in the ministry has told RIA Novosti. During a
hearing in the US Senate on Thursday [19 June] to confirm his appointment to the diplomatic posting, Beyrle
said that the USA recognized Russia's important role in the world as a great power and had an interest
in cooperating with Russia, but at the same time would trust Russia more if it became a democratic
country. "We work from the assumption that the new ambassador, in line with the duty of any
ambassador, will work to help US-Russian relations to develop positively, which will help increase mutual
trust between us. But at the same time there should be no 'if - then' type conditions," said the source.
"Frankly, it grates to hear reproaches from Mr Beyrle that the USA would trust Russia more if it were a
democratic and market country," he added. "Several issues immediately come to mind," he said. "That's
to say, one can understand that trust is made dependent on the American assessment of our democracy and
market. One way or the other, one gets the sense that the view of these issues is distorted by a negative
prism," he added. "But if we consider some of Mr Beyrle's advice that Russia should use its influence so
as 'not to heighten regional tension, and make a contribution to peace and stability,' or 'make energy
deals on a transparent, market-based and mutually advantageous basis', then that cannot help but
provoke certain associations," said the source. The USA is hardly an ideal model of this for us, he said.
"We do not think, for example, that the military campaign in Iraq against which we offered honest
warnings was a 'contribution to regional stability'. The way US firms win energy contracts there can
hardly serve as a model of transparency," he added. He continued: "And of course, we are developing
democracy and a market based on our own national interests and the needs of our country and society,
certainly not for the sake of various assessments imposed from abroad. We hope that objective reality will be
visible - it's clearer in Moscow than from Capitol Hill."
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 112
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Russia Stable
No political instability now
AP, 3/6
Russia's Medvedev May Be Junior Partner,
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j2bSjcmcLkpFUqyZRt7DVjILmyKwD8V842803
Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Center believes the Medvedev-Putin administration could work
smoothly, with Putin serving in the short-term as a "regent-cum-mentor-cum-tutor," giving Medvedev
on-the-job training. Neither does he think that Medvedev needs to imitate Putin in order to be a successful
president. "Where Putin was in some ways a man of war, the new guy is more of a man of peace,"
Trenin said. "Putin had to fight against those snakes and dragons in the marshes of Chechnya and the
oligarchy." The analyst said Medvedev's challenges — which include restoring the independence of the
courts, parliament and political parties, all brought to heel by Putin's Kremlin — may take a different form of
leadership.
No instability- Medvedev
Indian Express, 3/3
HE WHO HOLDS THE KREMLIN, lexis
Dmitry Medvedev's election as president opens an era of political partnership in Russia - though for the
time being, Vladimir Putin will serve as senior partner. The arrangement ensures that Russia will remain
politically stable, at least for the near term, and that its economy will continue to expand, generating
more opportunities for foreign investors.
Gonzaga Debate Institute 2008 114
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