Ordillo v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Gutierrez, J.
FACTSJanuary 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for
anOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet,Mountain
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votesin a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 inthe rest
provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population,and as such has the
second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act forthe Region
has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the
provinceof Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for
the President reiteratingCOMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the only province which
voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugaoon first
Monday of March 1991.
-Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued
F e b r u a r y 5 , 1 9 9 0 a memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board andCordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among
othersthat the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices
underExecutive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as theConstitution
and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of morethan one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a.declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
m e m o r a n d u m o f t h e Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and
R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 6 8 6 1 a n d prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and
spending publicfunds for the purpose
b.declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board
a n d t h e Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect until
anotherorganic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and
thesame is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation
of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute suchregion.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.a . T h e k e y w o r d i n s A r t i c l e X , S e c t i o n 1 5 o f t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n
p r o v i n c e s , c i t i e s , municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up
of morethan one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two
ormore provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the
Constitution,as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and thatthe
words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaningexcept where
technical terms are employed.
b.The entiret y of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
R e g i o n i s infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting theRegion.- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitutethe autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation
of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising theirexecutive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is
one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art

V,sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone
and small province [Art XXIsec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming
from different provinces and c i t i e s i n t h e R e g i o n , a s w e l l a s t r i b a l c o u r t s a n d t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o m m o n regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate theletter and intent
of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical andillogical.

AZUCENA B. DON vs. RAMON H. LACSA

G.R. No. 170810
August 07, 2007
FACTS:
A complaint was filed in the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon for grave threats, oppression, grave
misconduct and abuse of authority against Ramon Lacsa, Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon. A
special investigation committee, created to investigate the case, found sufficient evidence for the preventive
suspension of respondent. Accordingly, a resolution was passed recommending his preventive suspension.
Acting on the recommendation, the Mayor slapped a two-month preventive suspension against respondent.
On Mar. 07, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution removing respondent from office. The Mayor
issued an executive order implementing the resolution to remove respondent. Twenty one days after
receiving the order, Ramon Lacsa filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper recourse.

HELD: NO. Respondent should have filed an appeal with the proper body pursuant to Sec. 67 of the Local
Government Code. The conditions that would afford respondent to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court as he did file one before the RTC that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law are not here present.

Private Counsel/Lawyers for Elective Local Officials

SALALIMA VS. GUINGONAFacts:
- NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale, which
theProvince conducted because of NPCs failure to pay real property taxes assessed.
- The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized respondent Governor to
engagethe services of a Manila-based law firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against
NPC.Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite the availability of
theProvincial Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Provinces comment on the NPC petition.
- A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm shall
receiveP50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property subject matter of the case which
isP214 Million.
- The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorneys fees when the COA disallowed
further disbursements for lack of the requisite prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Sol Gen
and thewritten concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.

- An administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice Gov. Azaa, and
other AlbaySangguniang Panlalawigan Members relative to the questioned retainer contract and the
disbursementof public funds in payment thereof.
Issue:
WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer
agreement w i t h A t t y . C o r n a g o a n d t h e C o r t e s & R e y n a L a w F i r m a n d i n m a k i n g
p a y m e n t s p u r s u a n t t o s a i d agreement
Held:
YES. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded
their authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a Supreme Court
doctrine. Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities.
Ratio:

Sec. 481 LGC : requires the appointment of a legal officer to represent the LGU in all
civilactions and specal proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official
capacityis a party
o
EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
partyadverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special
legalofficer may be employed to represent the adverse party

Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok

:
LGUs cannot be represented by private lawyers andit is solely the Provincial Fiscal who
can rightfully represent them

Attendant Irregularities:
o
No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the disbursements were made
o
The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the Governor to sign a retainer contractwith the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago, a different entity
o
The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm despite the fact that it didnt appear as counselfor the
Province in the SC case
o
Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, the P38.5
Millionattorneys fees is unconscionable and violative of (a) COA Circular No. 85-55A prohibitingirregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of funds; and (b)
Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.*** However, it was held that
respondents could no longer be subject to disciplinary action for such administrative
misconduct as it was committed during a prior term

Geronga vs. Varela

546 SCRA 429
February 22, 2008 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari
FACTS

Sojor, an Engineer IV at General Services Department of Cadiz, was involved in 2

admin cases:
1) Administrative Case No. 96-04[5] for Unjust Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination,
Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Alarm and Scandal; and
2) Administrative Case No. 96-05[6] for Grave Misconduct and Engaging in Partisan
Political Activity
*City Legal Officer (for investigation): recommended DISMISSAL FOR GRAVE
MISCONDUCT (2 cases) and for partisan politics. City Mayor approved both
recommendations, issued Memo addressed to Geronga meting him with the penalty
of dismissal. Geronga filed w/ CSC a NOTICE OF APPEAL (w/o counsel), and further
filed a Joint Memo in w/c he discussed only 1 of the 2 admin cases against him (still
w/o counsel)
*CSC: Appeal granted. Petitioner (and the 2 others) reinstated. Varela filed MR,
pointed out that Geronga could no longer be reinstated as he failed to appeal the
other civil case (w/c dismissed Geronga), thus it became final.
*CSC on MR: partly granted, reversing earlier CSC decision on Geronga (thus
Geronga would NOT BE REINSTATED). MR (by both) DENIED. Appeal w/ CA.
*CA: DENIED. MR by Geronga. DENIED.
ISSUES AND RULINGS
1. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission acted properly and
within the bounds of its own rules and regulations in
entertaining the motion for reconsideration of Mayor Varela
from its Resolution No. 990714 dated March 25, 1999;
YES. W/ CSC v. Dacoycoy, even decisions exonerating an employee may be
appealed by the appointing authority who has disciplinary power over said
employee.
Sections 37(a) and 39 of PD 807 (Philippine Civil Service Law) and
Section 47 of EO 292 (Admin Code):
Section 37. (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
*penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
*fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
*demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
*removal or dismissal from office x x x.
Section 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days x x x.
Section 47, Admin Code: CSC may entertain appeals only from: (same as
Section 37(a))
SC IN PREVIOUS DECISIONS:
>cannot appeal decision EXONERATING EMPLOYEE
>only said employee who is party adversely affected could appeal; other
persons, such as the appointing or disciplining authority, CANNOT APPEAL

BUT NOW: As was held in CSC v. DACOYCOY, a judgment of exoneration in

an administrative case is appealable by CSC and/or the appointing authority
who exercises the power to discipline or remove an erring employee.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
dismissal of the petitioner (related: WON dismissal of petitioner
became final for failure to appeal)
YES. CSC and CA merely declared that the decision dismissing Geronga is
FINAL AND EXECUTORY for the latters failure to seasonably appeal. They
failed, however, to see that what Geronga was appealing was in fact the
Memo of Varela which sought to implement the decision of both admin
cases where Geronga was sentenced to be dismissed. So GERONGA DID
NOT FAIL TO APPEAL.
RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS VS. ADMIN DECISION/RESOLUTION
SENTENCING TO DISMISSAL:
Recommendation to Dismiss

Decision/resolution sentencing Dismissal

-That contained in a formal investigation report

issued by a hearing or investigating officer,
submitted to the disciplining authority for
approval
-merely states the findings of probable cause
that petitioner is guilty of the admin charges
filed against him and recommendation that he
be dismissed
-not a proper subject matter of an appeal

-rendered by the disciplining authority after

receipt of the recommendation of the
investigating/hearing officer and on the basis of
his independent assessment of the case
-while it may incorporate by reference the
recommendation, it goes further by
categorically declaring petitioner guilty of the
administrative charges and imposing penalty of
dismissal.
-appealable or subject of execution if already
final

Ulit:
-there are 2 admin cases, 2 decisions
-1 memo from Varela enforcing the decisions which sentenced Geronga to dismissal
-Geronga appealed the MEMO, not the decisions, so he effectively included in his
appeal BOTH ADMIN DECISIONS.
BUT: Geronga failed to raise an issue or argument against the failure of both CSC
and CA to look into the merits of the decision. So he is deemed to have waived it.
BUT ULIT: Apply equity where the security of tenure of labor is at stake. Should
there be doubt in the legality of either cause or mode of dismissal, public interest
demands the resolution of the doubt wholly on its substance, rather than solely on
technical minutiae.
>>>Geronga was UNAIDED BY LEGAL COUNSEL when he appealed so he may have
omitted to raise specific grounds against the decision.

3. WON Geronga was denied due process

YES. Resolution as for 1st admin case void.

2 fundamental requisites of due process:
a. Duly informed of the charges against him
b. Cannot be convicted of an offense or crime w/ w/c he was not charged
>>>BUT GERONGA WAS DISMISSED FOR AN ACT W/C WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE FILED AGAINST HIM
-Charges concerned his refusal to comply with several orders issued by Varela and
Mateo for the filing of daily time records and his having challenged Mateo to a
fistfight (NO GRAVE MISCONDUCT CHARGE). BUT RECOMMENDATION pertains solely
to the alleged defamatory statements which Geronga made in his Letter-Answer to
the sworn complaint.
*As for the other admin case, leave prerogative to the primary disciplining authority
(incumbent mayor of Cadiz)
DISPOSITION. Grant petition. Reverse and Set Aside CA Joint deci insofar as Geronga
is concerned. Annul CSC Resolution. Remand admin case to mayor.

CASE: NAZARENO VS DUMAGUETEFACTSPetitioners were all bona fide employees of the City Government
of Dumaguete. They were appointed to various positions by the City MayorFilipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. some time in June
2001, shortly before the endof his term. On July 2, 2001 the newly elected City Mayor Agustin Perdices announced during a
flag ceremony held at the City Hall that he was not recognizing the appointments by former Mayor Remollo, which include
thepetitioners. Thereafter, City Administrator Dominador Dumalag, Jr. issued aMemorandum dated July 2, 2001 directing
Assistant City Treasurer Erlinda Tumongha to "refrain from making any disbursements, particularlypayments for
salary differential[s]" to those given promotional appointments by former Mayor Remollo. Thus, petitioners filed with the RTCa
Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction againstrespondents City Mayor Perdices and City Officers Dumalag, etc.
ISSUE Are petitioners entitled to compensation for services actually rendered bythem while the disapproval of their
appointment was pending with CSC?
HELD
While it is true that it is the ministerial duty of the government to pay forthe appointees' salaries while the latter's appeal of the
disapproval of theirappointments by CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO is still pending before the CSCProper, however, this applies only
when the said appointments have been disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil servicelaw. Such is
not the case in the instant Petition. Until the Court resolves thePetition in G.R. No. 181559 (issue on whether petitioners'
appointmentsshould be disapproved for having been made in violation of CSC ResolutionNo. 010988 dated 4 June 2001),
reversing the disapproval of petitionersappointments or declaring that the disapproval of the same was not ongrounds which
constitute violation of civil service law, the Court cannot rulein the instant Petition that it is the ministerial duty of the City
Governmentof Dumaguete to pay petitioners' salaries while disapproval of theirappointment was pending with CSC. Thus,
there is yet no ministerial dutycompellable by a writ of mandamus.

OCAMPO III V. PEOPLE

GR Nos. 156547-51 February 4, 2008

Facts: During the administration of President Corazon Aquino, the province of Tarlac was chosen as a test area for
decentralization. Thus, the Department of Budget and Management made an allocation amounting to P100 Million for
the support of the said local government unit. Ocampo III, who was the incumbent Governor of the province at that
time, loaned out to Lingkod Tarlac Foundation Inc. the amount of more than P56 Million for various livelihood projects.
As a consequence, Governnor Ocampo, representative of the Provincial Government and Executive Director Andres
Flores, representative of Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, executed a Memorandum of Agreement. Ocampo was then the
1st chairperson of Lingkod Tarlac Foundation. Nevertheless, before the MOA was given effect by its signing, he gave
up the position.
Consequently, the nonpayment of a portion of the loaned amount gave rise to 25 criminal charges against Governor
Ocampo. It was claimed that Ocampo is guilty of malversation of public funds. The Sandiganbayan convicted him
with such but Ocampo insisted that the loan was private in character since it was a loan executed with the Lingkod
Tarlac Foundation Inc.
Issue: Whether or not the amount loaned out was private in nature, thus holding Governor Ocampo not guilty of
malversation of public funds.
Ruling: Yes, the loan was private in nature because Art. 1953 of the New Civil Code provides that a person who
receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay the creditor
an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
The fact that the petitioner-Governor contracted the loan, the public fund changed its nature to private character, thus
it is not malversation which is the subject of this case, instead it must be a simple collection of money suit against the
petitioner in case of non payment. Therefore, the petitioner is acquitted for the crime of malversation.

Municipality of Jimenez vs.

Hon. Vicente Baz, Jr.
Posted on September 11, 2012

G.R. No. 105746

December 2, 1996
Facts:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio
Quirino, pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a
portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and

Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription in E.O. No. 258. The claim was
filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of
Jimenez.
While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the Municipality of
Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77
dated February 18, 1950, fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and
Jimenez.
On October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part
of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in
Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134.
The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.
On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against Sinacaban, the
Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on
Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and
the Executive Secretary.
Issues:
1. Whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim
2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.
3. If it has legal personality, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258
or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which
should be used as basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial claim.
Held:
1. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a
municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the
creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the
Municipality of Sinacaban. However, where a municipality created as such

by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are

accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporationwhere its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced
publicly and officially.
A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within 5 years from the act complained of was
done/committed. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years, yet the validity
of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was
only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had
laid claim to an area that is apparently desired for its revenue. The State and
even the Municipality of Jimenez itself has recognized Sinacabans corporate
existence. Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of
the establishment of MTCs in the country. Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their
common boundary.
The Municipality of Sinacaban attained a de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts
throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District
of Misamis Occidental.Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of
Sinacaban since it states that:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code
shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances/executive orders and
which have their respective set of municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be regular municipalities.
2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de
facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite
requirement for the creation of municipalities applies only to new municipalities
created for the first time under the Constitution it cannot be applied to
municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now
barangays) therein mentioned. What it says is that Sinacaban contains those
barrios. The reason for this is that the technical description, containing the

metes and bounds of a municipalitys territory, is controlling. The trial court

correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the
boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the
barangays in question belong.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law is not the
carrying into effect of the law but its amendment and a resolution of a
provincial Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality
that is contrary to the technical description of the territory of the municipality is
not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is
contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be
used by Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacabans claim.
In case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be
elevated to the RTC of the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly
brought to the RTC for review the Decision and Resolution of the Provincial
Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983, the governing law when
the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is Secs.
118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160).
Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case within 1 yr from the
start of the proceedings as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983 and the 90day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the
validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period
prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only
makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction.