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HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT SPECIFICATION

Fire and Explosion Risk Management


DOCUMENT ID
- SP 1075
REVISION
- 2.0
DATE - 15/07/02

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Authorised for Issue by the HSE IC 15/07/02

Document Authorisation
Document Authority
dapo Oguntoyinbo
Ref. Ind: CSM
Date: 15/07/02

Document Custodian
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02

Document Author
Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02

The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
Version No.
Rev 2.0
Rev 1.0

Date
June 2002
July 1998

Rev 0.0

March
1990

Author
Hamad Khalfeen

Scope / Remarks
Editorial changes, new format
Updated to Incorporate Fire & Explosion
Strategies
Original issue as ERD 88-02

User Notes:
The requirements of this document are mandatory. Non-compliance shall only be authorised by CSM
through STEP-OUT approval.
A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference
to this document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is
current. For assistance, contact the Document Custodian.
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of
this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior
written consent of the owner.
Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing
constructive feedback.

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Setting Clear Requirements

Contents
1.0

INTRODUCTION............................................................................5

1.1 PURPOSE...................................................................................................... 5
1.1.1 Objectives............................................................................................ 5
1.2 SCOPE.......................................................................................................... 5
1.3 DEFINITION.................................................................................................... 6
1.4 DELIVERABLES................................................................................................ 6
1.5 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES...........................................................................6
1.6 PERFORMANCE MONITORING.............................................................................6
1.7 REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT..............................................................................7
1.8 REPORTING FORMAT........................................................................................7
2. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS.......................................................8
2.1 BASIS........................................................................................................... 8
2.2 ROLE OF PRE-FIRE PLANNING IN SYSTEM DESIGN.................................................9
2.3 FERM ENGINEERING AND DESIGN PRINCIPLES......................................................9
2.4 APPLICATION OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION STRATEGIES DURING DESIGN.......................10
2.4.1 Modifications to Existing Facilities.....................................................10
2.4.2 Green Field Facilities.........................................................................10
3.0

DETECTION AND PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.............................13

3.1 GENERAL.................................................................................................... 13
3.1.1 Fire Proofing of Supporting Structures...............................................13
3.2 HYDROCARBON HANDLING FACILITIES...............................................................13
3.2.1 Wellheads..........................................................................................13
3.2.2 Oil/Gas Inlet Manifolds.......................................................................13
3.2.3 Gathering, Production Stations & Storage Tanks...............................13
3.2.4 Gas Processing Facilities....................................................................21
3.2.5 Booster Stations................................................................................22
3.3 UTILITY FACILITIES........................................................................................23
3.3.1 Power Stations...................................................................................23
3.3.2 Control and Auxiliary Rooms..............................................................23
3.3.3 Electrical Substations and Switchgear Rooms...................................23
3.4 OFFICE BUILDINGS, RESIDENTIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS....................................23
3.4.1 General.............................................................................................. 23
3.4.2 Plans and Procedures........................................................................24
3.4.3 Office Buildings.................................................................................24
3.4.4 Residential Areas...............................................................................25
3.4.5 Industrial Areas.................................................................................25
3.5 AIRSTRIPS................................................................................................... 26
3.5.1 Aircraft rescue and fire fighting.........................................................26
3.5.2 Mobile Equipment..............................................................................26
3.5.3 Air strip buildings...............................................................................26
4.0

DETECTION SPECIFICATIONS.......................................................27

4.1 DETECTION SYSTEMS.....................................................................................27


4.2 GAS DETECTION........................................................................................... 27
4.2.1 Flammable Gas Detection Philosophy................................................27
4.3 FIRE DETECTION........................................................................................... 28
4.3.1 Optical Flame Detection....................................................................28
4.3.2 Bimetallic Heat Detection..................................................................28
4.3.3 Fusible Plug Heat Detection...............................................................28
4.3.4 Fusible Link Heat Detection...............................................................28
4.3.5 FQB Heat Detection...........................................................................29

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4.3.6 Smoke Detection...............................................................................29


4.4 AUDIBLE, VISUAL AND MANUAL ALARM CALL POINTS...........................................30
4.4.1 Hydrocarbon Handling and Utility Facilities.......................................30
5.0

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS........................................................31

5.1 FIRE WATER SYSTEMS...................................................................................31


5.1.1 Fire Water Network General............................................................31
5.1.2 Fire Water Storage Tank....................................................................32
5.1.3 Fire Water Pumps..............................................................................32
5.1.4 Hydrants............................................................................................ 32
5.1.5 Monitors............................................................................................. 33
5.2 WATER APPLICATION SYSTEMS.........................................................................33
5.2.1 Sprinkler Systems..............................................................................34
5.2.2 Waterspray (Deluge) Systems...........................................................34
5.3 FOAM SYSTEMS............................................................................................ 35
5.3.1 General.............................................................................................. 35
5.3.2 Foam Concentrate.............................................................................35
5.3.3 Foam Proportioning Systems.............................................................37
5.3.4 Foam Application Systems/Equipment...............................................39
5.3.5 Foam Deluge Systems.......................................................................45
5.3.6 Portable Foam Application Equipment...............................................45
5.4 FINE WATER SPRAY SYSTEMS..........................................................................46
5.5 GASEOUS EXTINGUISHING AGENT SYSTEMS........................................................46
5.6 PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS..............................................................................46
5.6.1 General.............................................................................................. 46
5.6.2 Standards for Portable Fire Extinguishers..........................................46
6.0
6.1
6.2

ALARMS AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS..............................................47


GENERAL.................................................................................................... 47
GAS TURBINES............................................................................................. 47

7.0

ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................49

8.0

REFERENCES..............................................................................51

APPENDIX A - RELEVANT STANDARDS, SPECIFICATIONS & CODES.................52


APPENDIX B - ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS RISK DUE TO FIRE AND EXPLOSION. 56
APPENDIX C - FACILITY GROUP CATEGORIES.............................................57
APPENDIX D - TYPICAL ALARMS AND EXECUTIVE ACTIONS...........................59
APPENDIX E - WORKED EXAMPLES..........................................................64

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1.0Introduction
1.1

Purpose
This Specification provides users with a standard specification for the level
of fire and explosion mitigation measures that are tailored to typical
facilities in PDO.
This document incorporates the latest international standards, DEPs and
the EP 95-0000 guidelines dealing with fire protection. In addition, this
Specification incorporates the findings and recommendations from three
fire protection related studies, namely:

The Halon Phase Out Study (Reference 2)


The Fire Protection Study (Reference 3)
Review of Emergency Services at PDO Airfields (Reference 5)

The studies established the actual risk from fires and explosions in PDOs
facilities and have determined the appropriate level of control to mitigate
the consequences in the event of a fire/explosion using QRA and Cost
Benefit Analysis.
This Specification should be used to assist engineers define the
appropriate fire and gas detection and protection equipment, where there
is a wide range of size and criticality of equipment (e.g. shipping pumps
and cone roofed storage tanks) that deviates from the typical. The
Specification describes a simple methodology that is appropriate to the
level of business risk of the facility concerned.
Reference is made in this Specification to the FERM Facility Plan Guideline,
GU 230 (Reference 6), which provides additional information in applying
the standards.
1.1.1

Objectives
This Specification has the following objectives, to:

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Establish the appropriate level of protection against fire and


explosion hazards which are appropriate to the level of business
risk in PDO.
Arrive at consistency in risk classification of similar types of
facilities
Arrive at consistency in equipment Specification for gas/fire
detection and fire fighting equipment
Focus maintenance and pre-fire planning efforts for the most critical
pieces of equipment
Provide an auditable approach to fire and explosion risk
management of individual facilities, which can be readily adapted
when these are modified or when conditions such as production
levels or equipment criticality change

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1.2

Scope
This Specification covers the requirements for fire and gas detection and
protection in PDO facilities. These requirements shall be applied when
making plant modifications and when designing new facilities.
The Specification covers both green field facilities and modifications to
existing plant. Due consideration to cost effectiveness shall be taken into
account when applying these standards to existing facilities, particularly
over the remaining plant life. The scope of the Specification also includes
the preparation of a fire response document pertaining to the facility being
designed or modified and the incorporation of these in the relevant
operational documents. The approach is in line with EP 95-351, Fire
Control and Recovery.

1.3

Definition
This Specification draws upon a number of relevant international sources
to define the requirements for management of fire and explosion risks.
Where a user is referred to another standard, the latest edition of the
relevant standard shall be used. In the event of discrepancies between
sources, the order of precedence shall be:
1.
This Specification & other PDO standards referred to in this
Specification
2.
SIEP DEPs
3.
International Standards
4.
EP95000 series publications
A reference list of all the standards, specifications and codes used
throughout this document is provided in Appendix A.
This Specification also relies on the use of a large amount of acronyms and
abbreviations that may not be familiar to personnel who dont have
experience in fire protection. A glossary of terms is provided in Section 7 of
this Specification to aid in the understanding of personnel unfamiliar with
any terms used within.

1.4 Deliverables
1.4.1 Records
Records produced as a result of the use of this Specification will be
incorporated into design documentation and the FERM Facility Plan.
1.4.2

Reports
PDO Staff: Any non-compliance with this Specification shall be notified,
investigated and reported as per CP 122 HSE Management System Manual,
Part 2, Chapter 6.
Contractors: Any non-compliance with this Specification shall be reported
to the Contract Holder.

1.5

Roles and Responsibilities


Asset Managers
Asset Managers are responsible for ensuring that they do accept new or
upgraded facilities that re not in compliance with this Specification.

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Design Engineers
Design Engineers are responsible for the
requirements provided in this Specification.

implementation

of

the

1.6

Performance Monitoring
Compliance with this Specification shall be monitored through workplace
supervision, periodic site inspection and design reviews such as hazard
and operability (HAZOP) studies.

1.7

Review and Improvement


Any user of this document who encounters a mistake or confusing entry is
requested to immediately notify the Document Custodian using the form
provided in CP 122 HSE Management System Manual, Part 2, Chapter 3.
This document shall be reviewed as necessary by the Document
Custodian, but no less than every four years. Triggers for full or partial
review of this Specification are listed in CP 122 HSE Management System
Manual, Part 2, Chapter 8.

1.8

Reporting Format
There are no routine
Specification.

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reporting

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requirements

pertaining

to

this

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

2. Performance Requirements
2.1

Basis
The risks due to fire and explosions of existing typical assets in PDO were
assessed using a Risk Matrix (see Appendix B). This was used to rank the
relative risk to the various types of facilities and illustrates the rationale of
the decisions taken at that time. Based on this evaluation, four different
strategy levels for addressing fire and explosion incidents within PDO have
been developed. These are defined as:
Strategy 1
Minor Incident Intervention Only
Response limited to trained personnel using portable extinguishers or
other types of first aid fighting equipment (hand-held or mobile). In
addition, in critical areas such as some areas of camps, automatic
detection systems may be provided to provide fast alarm and personnel
escape.
Strategy 2

Dedicated Fixed Fire Protection


System
Automatic actuation of a self-contained extinguishing system for a
specific facility from detection systems.
Strategy 3
Systems/Equipment plus Back-Up
Dedicated fixed fire protection systems and a firewa6ter network with
back up from manual intervention by trained personnel using fire
fighting equipment.
Strategy 4

Systems/Equipment plus Fire


Brigade
Similar to Strategy 3 with back up from a professional fire brigade.
Using these four strategies, typical PDO facilities can be categorised and
grouped together with a common approach for defining fire and gas
detection and protection. For a facility group, e.g. a gathering station, the
applicable strategy has been determined through consideration of the
typical equipment contained within that facility group.
Figure 2.1 shows the four basic strategies and the facility groups contained
in each strategy. The figure also highlights the risk drivers associated with
a facility group. It should be noted that because of the onshore location of
PDO facilities, low manning levels at most facilities and the generally
unconfined layout, life safety is generally not the dominant risk driver.
Although this is a very coarse delineation of required control and recovery
systems, it does provide a high level overview. The prime objective is to
optimise the level of risk contributed by each type of equipment to meet
the FERM requirements.
Due to the variation between PDO gathering and production stations these
have been categorised into different types, (A, B, C etc.) and have been
assigned different strategies. The assigned Facility Group Categories are
shown in Appendix C.
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Figure 2.1: FERM Facility Group/Strategy Matrix


STRATEGY

LIFE
SAFETY

ENVIRONMENT

STRATEGY 1
MINOR INCIDENT
INTERVENTION
ONLY

ASSET

REPUATION

Remote manifolds
Gathering stations Type A
Camps

Camps

STRATEGY 2

Gathering stations Type B

DEDICATED
FIXED FIRE
PROTECTION
SYSTEMS

Production stations Type A


Power stations
Booster stations

STRATEGY 3

Governement gas plant

SYSTEMS/EQPT
PLUS BACK-UP

Production stations Type B & C

STRATEGY 4
SYSTEMS/EQPT
PLUS BRIGADE

2.2

BUSINESS

Mina Al Fahal

Airstrips

Airstrips

Role of Pre-Fire Planning in System Design


Pre-fire planning addresses the nature of contribution from human
intervention and systems as a recovery measure. For the purposes of PDO
these shall be in the form of a FERM facility plan. FERM facility plans
pertaining to the facilities shall be prepared (or updated for existing
assets) as part of the project. Such a plan shall describe the appropriate
fire and explosion strategy, identify the main risk drivers, identify the
station category type (if applicable) and prepare scenario based pre-fire
plans for inclusion in the emergency response documentation pertaining to
the facility.
The content and guidance in the preparation of such plans can be found in
GU 230 FERM Facility Plan Guideline.

2.3

FERM Engineering and Design Principles


The business risk due to fire and explosions in PDO shall be determined by
a combination of the following risk drivers:

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Life safety
Damage to the environment
Lost and deferred production
Loss of assets (facility)
Reputation

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Fire and explosion risk reduction measures shall be prioritised in the


following order:
1. Prevention and probability reduction by process selection and
design
2. Detection of gas and fire incidents and alarm to personnel
3. Mitigating measures to prevent escalation of the incident by
shutdown, plant design and layout
4. Damage mitigation by passive protection
5. Damage mitigation by automatic fire protection systems
6. Damage mitigation by manually operated fire protection systems
7. Damage mitigation by manual fire fighting response.
2.4
2.4.1

Application of Fire and Explosion Strategies During Design


Modifications to Existing Facilities
The impact of the planned modifications on the current fire and explosion
strategy shall be determined during the conceptual design phase of the
particular facility modification project. In the event that such modifications
include the addition or removal of equipment which changes the fire and
explosion risk significantly, the requirement to up or down grade the
current station category type and strategy shall be determined.
If a change of category type or strategy is warranted, the impact of the
revised strategy shall be determined on the whole facility. In the event of
uncertainty, the appropriate category type or strategy shall be determined
by QRA studies in accordance with EP95-0352, Quantitative Risk
Assessment. The resulting hardware changes to existing fire protection
equipment, future operational fire response requirements, and
documentation shall be addressed as part of the project and the FERM
Facility Plan amended as required.
A flowchart of the methodology for modifications is provided in Figure
2.4.1.

2.4.2

Green Field Facilities


The appropriate fire and explosion station category type and strategy
pertaining to the facilities shall be determined during the conceptual
design phase of the project. In the event that none of the existing
category types or strategies above are applicable, a new strategy shall be
developed and approved as a variation to this Specification, in accordance
with the technical authorities system, ERD-00-02.
The new strategy shall be supported by QRA studies in accordance with EP
95-0352, Quantitative Risk Assessment.
A flowchart of the methodology for green field facilities is provided in
Figure 2.4.2.

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FIGURE 2.4.1
FIRE PROTECTION STRATEGY
MODIFICATIONS

Assess impact on
existing fire and
explosion strategy

Conceptual
design

yes

Do the
modifications
change the
existing
strategy?

no

Up or down grade
the FERM strategy
Do the
mofications
change the
station
category?

Asses the impact of


revised strategy on
whole facility (use
QRA if appropriate)

yes

Amend FERM
Facility Plan

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no

No Change

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

FIGURE 2.4.2
FIRE PROTECTION STRATEGY
GREEN FIELD FACILITIES

Conceptual design

assess fire risks

Develop fire scenarios

FERM Facility Plan

QRA

Incorporate into
emergency
procedures
Determine strategy level

Is strategy level
covered by
specification?

Obtain approval
from CSM for new
strategy level

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Proceed with
design of fire
protection system

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

3.0Detection and Protection Requirements


3.1

General
This section identifies the requirements for the various types of fire and
gas detection and protection equipment for each of the major types of
location and production facilities.
Appendix D Typical Alarms and Executive Actions, summarises the
general levels of detection and protection for generic equipment types that
are required to meet the fire and explosion strategies for typical facilities.
These tables provide an overview only and the engineer shall determine
the applicability of the standard protection levels proposed in this
Specification when the facilities being designed deviate significantly from
other common PDO facilities.
Specific engineering & design details for the detection and protection
systems are given in Sections 4 and 5 of this Specification.

3.1.1

3.2

Fire Proofing of Supporting Structures


In the event that the design involves elevated process equipment, fire
proofing of supporting structures shall be provided in accordance with DEP
34.19.20.11, General Fire Hazards and Fire Proofing. Fire proofing shall not
be considered as a replacement for active fire protection requirements nor
lead to a relaxation of normal design requirements. The costs for fire
proofing can be significant and therefore each case should be considered
for the assessment of the likely maximum fire duration and possible
escalation.
Hydrocarbon Handling Facilities

3.2.1

Wellheads
Generally, no fire or gas detection shall be provided for wellheads.
However, heat detection shall be provided on wellheads fitted with
actuated ESD valves, SSVs, SCSSVs and ESPs and upon fire detection, the
valves shall close or pumps shutdown.

3.2.2

Oil/Gas Inlet Manifolds


The overall strategy for both remote and on-plot production manifolds is
level 1 - minor incident only.
Generally no fire or gas detection shall be provided for manifolds.

3.2.3

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Gathering, Production Stations & Storage Tanks


The categories for existing production and gathering stations have been
defined in Appendix C, and have been based on the combination of
facilities present at a particular site. Figure 3.2.3 (a) defines the strategy
levels. Gathering stations are generally either level 1 or 2, and production
stations are typically level 2 or 3. The equipment in these facilities
includes: compressors, gas turbine drivers, pressure vessels, fuel gas
skids, fired furnaces, cone and floating roofed tanks, and pumps. The
following sections give the general protection requirements for such
equipment.

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For strategy 3 facilities, consideration shall be given to the installation of


flame detection.

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Production and Test Separators


Generally no detection is required for crude oil separators, gas separators
and compressor surge vessels. They shall however, be provided with relief
and blowdown systems in accordance with the applicable pressure vessel
standards.
Gas Turbine Drivers
Gas turbines shall be fitted with acoustic enclosures generally referred to
as hoods. They shall be designed to provide an H class barrier to fire and
smoke egress to give an equivalent fire rating of H15.
The majority of gas turbines operating in PDO facilities are single fuel, gas
driven. A few are dual fuel, such as those in power stations. The required
detection systems differ slightly depending on the fuel type(s).
Fire and gas detection and protection systems for turbine hoods shall
include:

Flammable gas detection on the combustion and ventilation air inlet


if gas ingestion is possible.
Gas detection on the ventilation outlet and/or oil mist vapour
detection (depending on type of fuel).
Heat detection.
Flame detection.
Fine water spray or CO2 extinguishing system.

It is possible for flammable gas concentrations up to the LEL (Lower


Explosive Limit) to exist in a non-hazardous area by definition of the limits
of classified areas. An example is a large flammable gas cloud in the
vicinity of the combustion air intake and/or ventilation air intake. If such a
possibility exists, then three flammable gas detectors shall be installed.
There is also the possibility for flammable gas to exist within the turbine
hood from a release from the fuel distribution piping. Gas from such a
release should be detected at the ventilation outlet. For this purpose three
flammable gas detectors shall be installed to monitor the ventilation outlet
airflow.
Heat detectors of the bimetallic type shall be installed over bearings. They
shall be used in combination with flame detectors. A minimum of four
flame detectors shall be installed, and at least one heat detector. In large
turbines, e.g. Frame 5 equivalent, additional detectors may be required
and in such cases the turbine manufacturers recommendations shall be
followed.
If IR flame detectors are used, then to prevent false alarms due to IR
detectors responding to hot turbine shafts rotating at certain speeds, the
design shall ensure that the view of any rotating shaft by a detector is
obscured by a casing shield.
The gas turbine manufacturer should be consulted regarding maximum
ambient operating temperatures.

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Electric Drivers
Heat detection of the windings in accordance with DEP 33.66.05.31,
Electric Motors - Cage Induction and Synchronous Type, shall be provided
as an integral part of the electric motor design.
Floating Roof Storage Tanks
The tanks shall be bunded in accordance with ERD 09-02, Spacing of Tanks
and Tank Bunding Requirements.
Basic process protection from primary safety features, such as tank level
measurement with level alarms, an independent high level alarm and trip
and automatic ESD inlet and outlet valves shall be installed in accordance
with ERD 08-11, Isolation of Process Equipment.
Further fire risk reducing measures consist of:

Fire retardant rim seals in accordance with EP 92-1820


Rim seal fire detection
Local self activating one shot foam system to rim sections
Facilities to allow pump out under emergency conditions
Foam distribution headers to tanks with fixed external delivery
piping
Fixed fire water supply, ring main and hydrants
Tank top aspirating foam pourers for connection by a mobile fire
appliance at a safe distance (applicable for those locations which do
not have complete fixed foam systems already installed)
Portable foam appliances for use by fire responders
Fixed cooling water monitors (where fire water supply is readily
available).

Cone (Fixed) Roofed Tanks


The tanks shall be bunded in accordance with ERD 0902, Spacing of Tanks
and Tank Bunding Requirements.
Basic process protection from primary safety features, such as tank level
measurement with level alarms and independent high level alarm and trip
and automatic ESD inlet and outlet valves shall be installed in accordance
with ERD 08-11, Isolation of Process Equipment. Further fire risk reducing
measures consists of:

Fusible plug fire detection and ESD


Tank contents pump out
Base foam injection (top foam injection for heavy crudes) and
internal floaters
Fire water ring main with hydrants
Fire water ring main with monitors.

The appropriate level of protection shall be determined on a case by case


basis. Based on detailed QRA on a range of fixed roof tanks in PDO a
methodology has been developed to screen the economic justification of
each risk reducing option (ref. Quantitative Risk Assessment for Coned

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Roof Tanks and Shipping Pumps, Report no. EWE 63273, 1997). Worked
examples are provided in Appendix E.

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The relative risk reduction of each option has been plotted as a histogram
in Figure 3.2.3 (a).
Each bar of the histogram shows the distribution of damage, which covers
3 damage categories:

loss of 2 tanks causing the loss of 12 months oil production.


loss of 1 tank causing 7 days of total shutdown followed by 12
months of reduced production rates at 70%.
fire damage to a tank causing 4 days of total shutdown followed by
3 months of reduced production rates at 70%.

The Y axis gives the risk index, which can be used to determine the
differential risk reduction factor introduced by the various mitigation
methods.
It can be seen that as the various mitigation methods are introduced not
only is there a reduction in overall risk but that the damage distribution
changes to give less severe consequences.
Figure 3.2.3 (a)
100

Risk Histogram for Cone Roofed


Tanks in PDO Facilities

100%

90

80

71

Fire Damage
71%

70

Loss of 1 Tank
66%

66

Loss of 2 Tanks

RISK INDEX

60

50

Loss of 1
Tank

Loss of 2
Tanks

40

36%

36
33
29

33%
29%

30

20

Fire Damage

Fire Damage

Fire Damage

0.5

Base Case

0.78

+Heat Detection

0.22

0.71

0.2

0.6

0.32

+Heat Det'n & Base


Foam

+Heat Det'n & Pump-out

0.6

+Heat Det'n & Base


Foam & CW Monitors

0.35

0.04

0.08

0.09

0.5

0.05

10

0.68

0.28

+Heat Det'n/Base Foam/


Portable Foam
& CW Monitors

Worked examples are provided in Appendix E.


The relevance of the active risk reducing options for any particular
location, in terms of the amount of capital that can be justified on break
even cost-benefit grounds, can be determined by entering the relevant
values into Table 3.1. From this Table, calculate the present value of the
base case cost of damage for any particular installation which equates to
100 on the risk histogram (Figure 3.2.1).
The methodology described below is suitable for screening the cost
benefits of fire protection to within 25% (50/50). In the event the
economic justification is marginal, other factors such as loss of reputation

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HSE SPECIFICATION

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shall be considered. Alternatively a detailed QRA and cost benefit analysis


may be performed to arrive at the appropriate level of protection.
TABLE 3.1
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA
System Constant
0.18225
based on frequency of damage x days lost:
(3.75x10

-4

x 486 =)
1

Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel


Net Oil Production per pair of tanks in BPD (e.g. for 5
tanks divide the total production by 2.5) For an installation
with a single tank multiply the total production by 1.39 (to
compensate for the loss of total production given the loss
of a single tank)
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Tank =
x Number of tanks covered by Protection
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage for Installation
=
x Design Life of the Installation
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for
Installation =
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the
fire protection facilities together with the average discount
rate. The undiscounted value should be multiplied by the
value at discount rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount
Rate
Years
5%
8%
10%
10
0.772
0.671
0.617
20
0.621
0.490
0.426
25
0.564
0.427
0.362
30
0.512
0.376
0.313
Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation

2
x

$
$

Note 1: The value may be updated from time to time and users shall check
the latest value with the Company's Corporate Economics and Production
Planning Department
The risk differential values (in US$) (justified project cost of mitigation)
may be found by multiplying the percentage difference in risk, taken from
the histogram, by the PV base case cost of damage to give the amount
which can be spent on that mitigation system.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 19

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Shipping Pumps
The installation of shipping pumps shall include basic process protection
from primary safety features, such as dual seals with primary seal failure
detection, vibration monitoring and high temperature detection.
Automatic suction and discharge ESD isolation valves shall be installed in
accordance with ERD-08-11, Isolation of Process Equipment. The design
shall include a defined route for crude oil spill run off such that the ground
surface slopes away from equipment that has the potential to cause
escalation. The direction of the slope shall also consider fire spread and
damage to protection systems and equipment.
Further fire risk reducing measures consist of:
Crude oil vapour detection
Heat switch fire detection
Foam/water sprinkler system
The appropriate level of protection shall be determined on a case by case
basis. Based on detailed QRA on a range of shipping pumps in PDO, a
methodology has been developed to screen the economic justification of
each risk reducing option (ref. Quantitative Risk Assessment for ConedRoof Tanks and Shipping Pumps, Report no. EWE 63273, 1997). A worked
example is provided in Appendix E.
The relative risk reduction of each option has been plotted in the following
histogram Figure 3.2.3 (b).

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 20

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Figure 3.2.3 (b)


100%

100

Risk Histogram for Shipping Pump Sets in PDO Facilities

90

80

Minor
Damage

No Damage

Major Plant
Damage

Fire Damage

70

60
Fire
Damage

RISK INDEX

50

Major
Damage

40

33.1%

33
30

27.3%

27
23
21

23.4%

21.5%

4.3

0.5

Base Case

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

0.28

+Fire Detection

0.69

+Fire Det'n &


Vapour Det'n

Page 21

+Fire Det'n &


Sprinklers

0.524

0.816

+Fire Det'n &


Vapour Det'n &
Sprinklers

0.29

0.2

Day Manning+
Fire Det'n

0.486

0.86

Day Manning+
Fire Det'n &
Vapour Det'n

0.29

0.32

Day Manning+
Fire Det'n &
Sprinklers

0.486

0.064
0.074
0.003

Fire
Damage

Minor
Damage

4.7%

No Damage

0.04
0.097
0.004

Fire
Damage
0.021

Minor Damage

5.6%

No Damage

0.28
0.451

0.083
0.096
0.004

0.02

0.81

0.005

Minor Damage
Minor Damage

0.052
0.127
0.012

7.2%

Fire
Damage

0.017

0.5

0.03

5.6
4.7

Fire Damage

0.002

10

Minor Damage

20

4.3%
0.86

Day Manning+
Fire Det'n &
Vapour Det'n &
Sprinklers

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Each bar of the above histogram shows the distribution of damage that
covers 4 damage categories and includes the no damage category:

Major plant damage causing the loss of 2 months total oil


production followed by 3 months at 50% production.
Fire damage to a pump causing the loss of 5 days total oil
production followed by 3 months at 83% production.
Minor damage to a pump causing the loss of 3 days production
followed by 2 months of reduced production rates at 83%.

The Y axis gives the risk index that can be used to determine the
differential risk reduction factor introduced by the various mitigation
methods.
It can be seen that as the various mitigation methods are introduced not
only is there a significant reduction in overall risk but that the damage
distribution changes to give less severe consequences. The no damage
category does exist for the base case but is not shown for clarity since it
represents a part of the damage distribution common to all the above
conditions. The sections of the bars above shown as no damage are purely
attributable to the introduction of mitigation. It can be seen that vapour
detection and manning give a significant benefit by increasing the no
damage allocation. This is because both can provide leak detection prior
to ignition that results in spill damage, which is considered insignificant in
comparison to fire damage.
The relevance of the active risk reducing options for any particular
location, in terms of the amount of capital which can be justified on break
even cost benefit grounds, can be determined by entering the relevant
values in the Table 3.2. This can be used to calculate the present value of
the base case cost of damage per pump set for any particular installation
which equates to 100 on the previous risk histogram (Figure 3.2.3 (b)).
The methodology described below is suitable for screening the cost
benefits of fire protection to within 25% (50/50). In the event the
economic justification is marginal, other factors such as loss of reputation
shall be considered. Alternatively a detailed QRA and cost benefit analysis
may be performed to arrive at the appropriate level of protection.
A worked example is given in Appendix E.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

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HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

TABLE 3.2
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA
System Constant
0.12402
based on frequency of damage x days lost for 3 pumps:
-4

(3.18x10 x 130 x 3 = )
Pump Type for centrifugal/axial or screw pumps use x 1
for reciprocating pumps use x 10
Number of Pumps in Set for 2 pumps use x 0.6
for 3 pumps use x 1.0
for 4 pumps use x 1.46
for 5 pumps use x 2.0
1

x
x

Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel


Net Oil Production for Pump Set in BPD
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Pump Set =
x Design Life of the Pump Set
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for Pump
Set =
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the
fire protection facilities together with the average discount
rate. The undiscounted value should be multiplied by the
value at discount rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount Rate
Years
5%
8%
10%
10
0.772
0.671
0.617
20
0.621
0.490
0.426
25
0.564
0.427
0.362
30
0.512
0.376
0.313

Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation

X
$
$

Note 1: The value may be updated from time to time and users shall check
the latest value with the Company's Corporate Economics and Production
Planning Department.
The risk differential values (in US$) (justified project cost of mitigation)
may be found by multiplying the percentage difference in risk, taken from
the histogram, by the PV base case cost of damage to give the amount
which can be spent on that mitigation system.
3.2.4

Gas Processing Facilities


Fuel Gas Treatment Skids
Consideration shall be given to the installation of fixed gas detection,
however the effectiveness of such units in generally open type facilities
should be included in the evaluation. In the event that fixed detection is
not effective, a programme for regular gas testing by the operator is
required.
Gas Fired Heaters
Fire and gas detection for gas fired heaters shall be determined on a case
by case basis. Consideration shall be given to the installation of gas

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

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HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

detection, however the effectiveness of such units in generally open type


facilities should be included in the evaluation.
Compression Facilities
Generally, no detection is required for gas separators and compressor
surge vessels. They shall however, be provided with relief and blowdown
systems in accordance with the applicable pressure vessel standards.
Centrifugal Compressors
Centrifugal compressors shall be equipped with heat detectors above each
bearing with a seal or gland. They are intended to detect both gas fires
and lube oil fires.
Reciprocating Compressors
Fire and gas detection for reciprocating compressors shall be determined
on a case by case basis. As a minimum they shall be equipped with heat
detectors above each bearing with a seal or gland as per centrifugal
compressors.
LNG/LPG Vessels
Fire and gas detection for LNG/LPG vessels shall be in accordance with DEP
80.47.10.30 Gen. Section 5.5.1, Pressurised Storage Vessels.
LPG vessels shall be provided with a sloping drain such that the slope is
not directed to protective systems or potential escalation areas.
Use of fixed cooling water spray systems is justified where an existing fire
water system is in place. Where blocking is a problem for water nozzles,
provision of passive fire protection may be considered.
LPG Loading Facilities
Fire and gas detection/protection for LPG loading facilities shall be in
accordance with DEP 80.47.10.30 Gen. Section 5.7.2, Road Car Loading
Facilities.
3.2.5

SP-1075

Booster Stations
The overall strategy for pipeline booster stations is level 2. The fire
protection specifications of the individual equipment in such facilities are
similar to equipment in production and gathering stations.

REVISION 2.0

Page 24

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

3.3
3.3.1

Utility Facilities
Power Stations
Turbine Driven Generation Sets
The overall strategy is level 2 fixed fire systems for the turbine driver
only (see 3.2.3, Gas Turbine Drivers).
Generators shall be provided with heat detection and UV flame detection
over the main areas.
Auxiliary Diesel Generator
The overall strategy is level 2 fixed fire systems.
Auxiliary diesel generators shall be provided with heat detection and an
automatic extinguishing system, typically a self-contained dry powder
system, or a fine water spray system. Installation of such systems
generally require that the engine is enclosed and not subject to any local
air movement, which should be the case when the engine has tripped and
the mechanically driven cooling fan has stopped.

3.3.2

Control and Auxiliary Rooms


Conventional smoke detection shall be installed. Generally these shall be
ceiling mounted. Location of detectors below the floor or above the ceiling
should be avoided. Additionally, detectors should be provided where cables
are located in voids.

3.3.3

Electrical Substations and Switchgear Rooms


Conventional smoke detection using a combination of optical and
ionisation detectors shall be installed. At least one of each type of
detector shall be used in each location.
The detectors should be
connected into two zones such that any incident is likely to activate at
least one detector from each zone (to avoid common mode failures).
Voting logic shall be determined by IPF classification and implementation
methodology.
Note: For critical control and switchgear rooms, containing sophisticated
computerised systems, consideration should be given to the installation of
an incipient smoke detection system which would only be used for very
early alarm purposes.

3.4
3.4.1

SP-1075

Office Buildings, Residential And Industrial Areas


General
The overall strategy for buildings in which people are generally present is
level 1 with some level 2 exceptions as further specified below. The
primary protection for people is to provide fire/smoke detection, alarm and
adequate escape routes. Smoke detection and Manual Alarm Call (MAC)
points connected to a general audible alarm shall be installed in
accordance with ERD 17-02 Building Services Construction Specifications,
Section (D), Fire Detection and Alarm Installation.

REVISION 2.0

Page 25

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

No Smoking signs
No smoking signs shall be clearly displayed in all areas where smoking is
prohibited.
Visual alarms
The main visual alarm interface shall be the fire detection panel. This shall
be located at the main entrance to the building. The panel shall clearly
highlight which detection circuit has been activated and the area of the
building affected.
Audible Alarm
In residential areas the audible alarm shall be in the form of a horn or bell.
Escape Routes
All escape routes and exit doorways shall be provided with emergency
lighting where required. They shall be marked with luminous or illuminated
signs
Fire Wardens
Fire Wardens signs shall be clearly displayed in all critical areas
Fire Extinguishers
A suitable number of hand-held extinguishers shall be provided at strategic
locations. If a fire water system is installed then hose reels shall also be
provided at strategic locations.
Manual Alarm Call-points
Manual Alarm Call (MAC) points shall be installed at the main exits, at all
emergency exits and along corridors at intervals not exceeding 100m. The
design of MACs shall conform to BS 5839 Part 2, and may either be of the
hammer/break glass or push/break glass type.
3.4.2

Plans and Procedures


Plans and procedures shall be put in place for:

Building evacuation and muster points


Fire fighting
Maintenance and testing of fire protection equipment

Guidance in the preparation of such plans can be found in GU 230 FERM


Facility Plan Guideline.
3.4.3

Office Buildings
All flammable liquids, including photocopier toners, cleaning solvents and
draughtsmans sprays shall be stored in metal cabinets away from sources
of ignition such as heat or naked flame.
For locations containing critical computer equipment, consideration should
also be given to the installation of an incipient smoke detection system
which would only be used for very early alarm purposes.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 26

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Materials storage areas shall be provided with fire detection applicable to


the type of material being stored. In areas where the stored materials give
off flammable vapours, e.g. seismic tape stores, the electrical installation
shall be suitable for zone 2.
Where the contents of a building are particularly valuable or critical, such
as some archives and data stores, a total flood system may be justified in
order to minimise the potential loss. Cost Benefit Analysis should be
applied in order to provide the justification. The type of extinguishant used
for total flood systems shall provide minimum environmental impact and
health risk, and shall be approved by the Custodian of this Specification
(CSM).
3.4.4

Residential Areas
Kitchens
In all kitchens serving a residential camp CO 2 or foam extinguishers and a
fire blanket shall be provided. Fire blankets shall be woven glass fibre
tested to BS 476 Parts 4 and 7.
Heat detection shall be installed in the kitchen hood. Activation of the
detector shall:

shutdown kitchen hood ventilation fan


shut off gas supply to the kitchen
initiate audible alarm
shutdown air conditioning system.

On line gas bottles for use in kitchens shall be located outside. If the
bottles are closer than 5 metres from combustible materials a block work
separation wall shall be constructed. Any enclosure for gas bottles shall be
freely ventilated.
3.4.5

Industrial Areas
Laboratories
Fire protection in laboratories shall be designed in accordance with DEP
34.17.10.31. On line gas bottles for use in laboratories shall be located
outside. If the bottles are closer than 5 metres from combustible materials
a block work separation wall shall be constructed. Any enclosure for gas
bottles shall be freely ventilated.
Workshops
In workshops free of dust and vapours, smoke detection shall be provided.
In workshops areas where smoke detectors may become quickly
contaminated due to dust and vapours, heat detection shall be provided
instead of smoke detection. The location of such heat detectors is critical
as a fire can become well established before activating a heat detector.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 27

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

3.5

Airstrips

3.5.1

Aircraft rescue and fire fighting


The overall strategy is level 4. Fire fighting facilities at permanent airstrips
associated with locations in the interior shall meet the requirements of the
applicable ICAO Cat 4/5 specifications within the Airport Services Manual,
including publications ICAO-9137P1, Rescue and Fire Fighting, and ICAO9137P7, Airport Emergency Planning.

3.5.2

Mobile Equipment
The principle requirement is rapid response such that in the event of a
crash on landing or take-off a fire engine could reach the plane before
ignition of any spilt aviation fuel, hence the need for four-wheel drive.
For mobile fire fighting equipment reference should be made to DEP
80.47.10.32, General and for fire fighting vehicles, DEP 80.47.10.33.

3.5.3

SP-1075

Air strip buildings


The general specifications as defined in Section 3.4.1 above shall be
applied.

REVISION 2.0

Page 28

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

4.0Detection Specifications
4.1

Detection Systems
The design of fire and gas detection systems for green-field sites shall be
in accordance with DEP 32.80.10.10, General, and if a PLC based system is
used, DEP 32.80.10.30, General. For brown-field sites, the existing system
design philosophy should be followed. Determination of revealed and
unrevealed failure robustness shall be in accordance with DEP 32.80.10.10,
General.
The power supply to the system shall be provided with a battery back up
giving 8 hours duration, 7.75 hours at normal load and 0.25 hours at alarm
load.

4.2
4.2.1

Gas Detection
Flammable Gas Detection Philosophy
It is important that the detectors used are suitable for the type of gas that
they are intended to detect and that the test gas used is as close as
possible to the process gas.
Point type gas detectors shall be used. The use of open path gas detectors
may be considered only when used in conjunction with point type
detectors.
Flammable gas detection shall initiate alarms at alert and danger levels.
Executive actions shall only be initiated from danger level detection. The
location and number of detectors required is a function of the particular
equipment design and layout, however they shall be located over obvious
potential leak points e.g. seals.
It is recommended that the following settings be adopted as a sensible
balance between sensitivity and reliability in terms of avoiding
unnecessary activation.
TABLE 4.2
Location
General process areas
Areas where greater sensitivity is
desirable and any trip action does
not cause a major plant shutdown

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 29

Alert Level
20%LEL
10%LEL

Danger Level
50%LEL
20%LEL

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

4.3
4.3.1

Fire Detection
Optical Flame Detection
Infra-Red (IR) flame detectors are the preferred type for flame detection as
they are not susceptible to spurious trips, they can detect flames from
smoky fires and they can tolerate considerable dirt on the lens. They shall
be solar blind and flicker frequency sensitive for hydrocarbon fires.
Detectors should generally be located in elevated positions and aligned
downwards to gain maximum benefit from the fixed angle of sensitivity.
The use of Ultra Violet detectors in areas where arc welding, flash
photography and NDT X-Ray testing shall be carefully considered.
Detectors should be located in elevated positions looking downwards.
Consideration should be given to the possibility of smoke accumulation
preventing the detector from seeing a flame. UV detectors shall provide an
alarm signal to alert operators when the window is dirty.
Flame detection shall initiate alarms and executive actions.

4.3.2

Bimetallic Heat Detection


Bimetallic heat detectors shall be of the fixed type. They shall have a set
point approximately 25 C higher than the maximum ambient temperature
(to be taken as 55 C). For outside locations the ambient conditions are
defined in ERD 10-04.
For inside locations the maximum ambient
temperatures must be determined.

4.3.3

Fusible Plug Heat Detection


Fusible plugs shall be selected to melt at approximately 25 C higher than
the maximum ambient temperature (to be taken as 55 C). For outside
locations the ambient conditions are defined in ERD 10-04. For inside
locations the maximum ambient temperatures must be determined. The
configuration of fusible plug systems is given in ERD 30-03.
Low-pressure initiator monitoring of air pressure in the system shall be
used for fire detection.

4.3.4

SP-1075

Fusible Link Heat Detection


Fusible links shall be selected to melt at approximately 25 C higher than
the maximum ambient temperature (to be taken as 55 C. For outside
locations, the ambient conditions are defined in ERD 10-04. For inside
locations, the maximum ambient temperatures must be determined. They
should generally only be used when they form part of a vendor
detection/protection package.

REVISION 2.0

Page 30

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

4.3.5

FQB Heat Detection


Frangible quartzoid bulbs shall be selected to break at approximately 25 C
higher than the maximum ambient temperature (to be taken as 55 C). For
outside locations the ambient conditions are defined in ERD 10-04. For
inside locations the maximum ambient temperatures must be determined.
They should generally only be used when they form part of a vendor
detection/protection package.
This type of heat detection is preferred for congested process plant areas
unless the equipment is subject to periodic removal.

4.3.6

Smoke Detection
Smoke Detection
Smoke detectors shall be of the optical type or ionisation type. Where
smoke detection is provided, at least one of each type shall be installed at
each location. The optimum locations for conventional smoke detectors
will be a function of the preferential air flow patterns.
Activation of a single smoke detector shall initiate alarms and executive
actions.
Note: According to BS 5839 Part 1 false alarms from smoke detectors may
be caused by fumes, dusts or condensation. Some types of ionisation
chamber type smoke detectors are highly sensitive to high air speeds and
may give false alarms.
Ionisation type detectors shall be provided with a warning that label
highlights them as a radioactive source.
Incipient Smoke Detection
The use of incipient smoke detection systems (also called VESDA - Very
Early Smoke Detection Alarm) systems) shall be considered for facilities
containing critical control monitoring systems such as control rooms,
equipment panels and substations.
This type of system is capable of detecting fire at the incipient stage up to
4 hours before flame breaks out.
The extremely high sensitivity of these systems may tend to cause alarms
occasionally under transient conditions. They should only therefore be
used to initiate alarms, not executive actions.
Note: None of these devices are suitable for fume contaminated areas
typically including vehicle exhausts or cigarette smoke, and clearly have
limited applicability in inherently dirty or dusty environments.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 31

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

4.4
4.4.1

Audible, Visual and Manual Alarm Call Points


Hydrocarbon Handling and Utility Facilities
Audible Alarms
Audible alarms shall be installed on the outside of the control building as a
minimum. Different alarm sounds shall be used for fire, combustible gas,
toxic gas and all clear. These shall be in accordance with DEP.32.30.20.11,
General. Additional audible alarms shall be located on top of noisy
machinery e.g. gas turbines.
Visual alarms
The main visual alarm interface shall be the
dedicated display on the control system or
mimic layout shall be based on the station
drawings. It shall clearly highlight which
activated and the area of the plant affected.
in accordance with DEP.32.30.20.11, General.

mimic. This shall either be a


a graphic mimic panel. The
fire and gas detector layout
detection circuit has been
Design of the mimic shall be

When H2S detection is provided, visual beacons shall be installed in


accordance with ERD 08-04.
Manual Alarm Call-points
Manual Alarm Call (MAC) points shall conform to BS 5839 Part 2, and may
be either of the hammer/break glass or push/break glass type. They shall
be installed at all plant escape gates, at the plant main gate and at the
control building entrance. If escape routes are clearly defined (i.e. signs
are installed) then they shall be located along them at intervals not
exceeding 100m. They are not required for off plot facilities such as remote
manifolds.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 32

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

5.0Fire Protection Systems


5.1

Fire Water Systems


A fire water network consists of a water supply (usually a dedicated tank),
pumps and a piping distribution network. The network outlets can be
hydrants (for use, generally with hand-held or mobile equipment), fixed
systems such as base foam injection, deluge systems etc. or fixed
monitors.
It is however acceptable to take the firewater supply from a process
system (eg. water injection system) provided that pressure and flow can be
maintained under emergency conditions.
Fire water systems are required for facilities where FERM strategies 3 and 4
have been justified.

5.1.1

Fire Water Network General


Where the FES dictates the need for a fire water system (strategy 3 and 4)
the design shall comply with DEP 80.47.10.31.
The fire water network shall be designed to supply the calculated water
demand at the required discharge points and pressure (reference shall be
made to preplanning documentation for required flow rates).
The pumps should discharge into a ring main with hydrants, fixed monitors
and feeds to fixed foam systems and sprinkler systems.
The fire water distribution piping shall be a ringmain, with adequate loops
and block valves to ensure that a single line break can be isolated safely
with minimum loss of fire protection. Single branch lines shall be avoided.
The piping material may be steel for above or below ground and GRE (in
accordance with ERD 38-12) where mechanical damage is unlikely. Steel
pipe shall be cement lined in accordance with DEP 30.48.30.31, General.
When above ground, the pipe shall be protected by physical barriers where
necessary to reduce the possibility of impact by vehicles.
All valves in the system shall be clearly identified with their function and
normal status. System pipework shall be routed such that wherever
possible it is not exposed to excessive radiation from a fire for which it may
be required. In particular, the following guidelines shall be applied:

Fire water pipework shall not pass through tank bund areas.
Fire water pipework shall not pass through areas where product
spills can accumulate underneath them.
Fire water pipework shall be at least 15m from process facilities.

System isolation valves shall be located such that radiation (based on


FRED calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a
maximum of 5 kW/m2 under any anticipated design conditions. If the
system is such that its user is likely to remain in the area for extended
periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening shall be provided to
ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m2.
SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 33

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

5.1.2

Fire Water Storage Tank


The capacity of the water storage tank shall be in accordance with the
worst case design demand (reference shall be made to pre-planning
documents to assist in determination of total water demands). A minimum
of 6 hours supply shall be provided unless it can be clearly shown that
incident duration will be less than this (e.g. by shutdown and isolation). It
may be necessary to consider the installation of two tanks depending on
size and the location characteristics.
The fire water tank internal lining shall be in accordance with ERD 48-01 to
obviate the generation of corrosion products which could affect the
performance of downstream systems.
A system would typically include a water storage tank (in accordance with
NFPA 22) for those areas without a suitable natural source of water. The
tank may be filled with formation water provided the quality is compatible
with available foam concentrates.
Since the majority of the tank(s) fill is likely to stand for considerable
periods of time consideration shall be given to batch dosing foam
compatible corrosion inhibitor and bactericide.
Where required due to the type of pumps being used, tanks shall be
elevated to provide positive suction when the operating pressure is low.

5.1.3

Fire Water Pumps


Pumps and drivers shall comply with DEP 31.29.02.11, General, DEP
31.29.02.30, General, and NFPA 20, Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps.
Generally two 100% fire water pumps, one electric and one diesel driven,
shall be installed to ensure a reliable supply under all circumstances. The
electric driven pump would normally be selected to start first, either from a
confirmed fire signal as a precursor to fire water demand or due to a fall in
pressure in the ringmain. The diesel driven pump would start automatically
on low ring main pressure after a pre-set time or on failure of the electric
pump.
A jockey pump shall be installed to maintain pressure in the system
(typically 3 barg).
Fire water pumps shall be started weekly and performance tested annually.
The annual performance tests shall incorporate flow tests for the ringmain
itself. Flow and pressure tests shall be performed on the fire water system
to ensure that water demand for the identified scenarios can be achieved.
Pumps shall be selected and installed in accordance with DEP 31.29.02.11,
General, DEP 31.29.02.30, General and NFPA 20.

5.1.4

SP-1075

Hydrants
Hydrants in process areas shall generally have 4 x 65mm instantaneous
coupling outlets in accordance with BS 336. Hydrants at offices, residential
and industrial areas shall generally have 2 x 65mm outlets.

REVISION 2.0

Page 34

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Fire Hoses
All hoses for fire fighting purposes shall conform to the requirements of
DEP 80.47.10.32, General, Section 3.2.
5.1.5

Monitors
Fixed, manually operated water monitors shall be provided for strategy 3
facilities for specific cooling requirements, i.e. storage tanks and congested
areas as justified by risk analysis.
Self Oscillating Type Monitors
Self oscillating type monitors should be considered where identified as
advantageous. Monitors shall be located outside storage tank bund walls.
They shall not be located inside or on top of the bund.
Fixed Monitors
Fixed monitors shall be chosen to provide the stream range required to
cool the equipment for which they are provided at the design operating
pressure. The flow rate shall not be less than 2000 lpm at the design
operating pressure.
Access during a fire should be taken into account where locating fixed
monitors. The effects on firefighters from radiant heat during a storage
tank fire also need to be considered. Monitors shall be located such that
radiation (based on FRED calculations) from fires for which they are
intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2 under any anticipated design
conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to remain in the area
for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening shall be
provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m2.
DEP 80.47.10.32, General, gives information regarding the requirements
for fixed monitors, and DEP 80.47.10.30, General, provides information on
water flow rates. The design of portable water monitors shall be in
accordance with DEP 80.47.10.32, General.

5.2

Water Application Systems


Water application systems can be used to control fire spread or to provide
cooling of radiation exposed facilities and, in certain circumstances, can
extinguish fires.
Water application systems will not generally extinguish fires caused by
hydrocarbon flammable liquids with flash points below ambient
temperature or flammable liquids heated above their flash points. Foam
systems are required for this application.
Water application systems consist of a valve in a take-off from the fire
water network, distribution pipework and discharge nozzles.

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There are two basic types of discharge nozzle:

5.2.1

(i)

Sprinkler nozzles - where each nozzle has a frangible bulb or fusible


link preventing water flow through the nozzle. At a preset
temperature the bulb or link breaks and releases water. Thus, only
the nozzles subjected to heat discharge water. Typical applications
of sprinkler systems include offices and hazardous material
warehouses. They should not normally be used in computer rooms
or electrical equipment rooms.

(ii)

Waterspray (deluge) nozzles - where all nozzles are open and, on


opening of the valve, will all discharge simultaneously. Deluge
systems can be automatic or manually operated according to
specific hazard requirements.

Sprinkler Systems
Reference shall be made to DEP 80.47.10.31, Section 2.3.
Sprinkler systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 13 or BS
5306, Part 2.
Sprinkler system hydraulic calculations shall be carried out using approved
software rather than by manual calculations.
Sprinkler systems shall normally be of the wet pipe type. Where the
protected area contains critical equipment and water damage from
sprinkler nozzle leakage would have major consequences, consideration
may be given to the installation of a pre action system, typically consisting
of dry pipe, requiring confirmation of fire from another source before the
valve is opened.
All system sprinkler valves and nozzles shall be approved by the Loss
Prevention Council (LPC), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual
(FM).
Sprinkler system inspection and testing shall be in accordance with NFPA
25 or BS 5306, Part 2.

5.2.2

Waterspray (Deluge) Systems


Waterspray systems shall be designed
80.47.10.31, Section 2.2 and NFPA 15.

in

accordance

with

DEP

Automatic deluge valves and nozzles shall be approved by Loss Prevention


Council (LPC), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM).
Deluge system valves shall be located such that radiant heat levels from
the incident for which they are provided shall be located such that
radiation (based on FRED calculations) from fires for which they are
intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2 under any anticipated design
conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to remain in the area
for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes) then screening shall be
provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m2.
Automatic deluge valves shall be actuated by the relevant detection
system but shall also include a manual operation capability. The preferred
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method of operation of automatic deluge valves is by fusible plug


detectors. Water deluge valves in pipe work shall be locked in the open
position. Special consideration shall be given to the locking of ball valves
such that they cannot be closed with the lock in place. Ideally, the valves
should be purchased with a lock as part of the design.
Testing and inspection of deluge systems shall be in accordance with NFPA
25. Regular maintenance of the system shall be performed, and in
particular the deluge nozzles shall be checked for blockage. Regular
flushing of the nozzles shall be performed.
5.3
5.3.1

Foam Systems
General
Foam systems consist of 3 basic parts:
(i)
Foam concentrate - the liquid used to foam
(ii)
Foam concentrate proportioning system - where the foam
concentrate is
mixed, at a specific proportion, with water to make foam solution.
(iii)
Foam maker (foam generator, foam application device) where air is
mixed with foam solution to make foam.
Foam makers can be further subdivided into aspirating types which use a
venturi nozzle system to draw air into the foam solution and non-aspirating
devices which rely on impinging jets of foam solution or turbulence as the
foam solution leaves the nozzle to generate bubbles of foam.
In any system, it is important to ensure that the right combination of foam
concentrate, proportioning system and foam generating devices are
selected for the particular application. The following sections deal with
specific requirements for these components for PDO facilities.
Reference shall be made to the following standards for relevant aspects of
foam system design and foam concentrate specification:
DEP 80.47.10.31 - Gen., June 1992, Section 2.4
DEP 80.47.10.10 - Gen., March 1991, Section 2.1
DEP 80.47.10.33 - Gen., Fire Fighting Vehicles and Fire Stations,
June1993
NFPA 11 - Standard for Low Expansion Systems
NFPA 16 - Deluge Foam - Water Sprinkler and Foam Water Spray
Systems, 1995
ISO 7203 - 1 Fire Extinguishing Media, Foam Concentrates, 1995
UL 162, Seventh Edition - Foam Equipment and Liquid
Concentrates, 1994
For airport applications, reference shall be made to ICAO, CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes, 1990.

5.3.2

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Foam Concentrate
Wherever possible, the number of different foam concentrates on site shall
be limited to one. If this is not possible, measures shall be in place to
minimise the possibility of mixing the different types.

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All foam concentrates used shall be 3% grade


concentration in proportioning systems).

(i.e. to be used at 3%

The foam concentrate for hydrocarbon flammable liquids (e.g. crude or


condensate) shall be either fluoroprotein, film-forming fluoroprotein or
multipurpose (alcohol resistant) fluoroprotein or synthetic based type and
shall conform to the requirements of Underwriters Laboratories UL 162 7th
Edition test requirements, or ISO 7203-1 Class IIA or higher.
The foam concentrate for water soluble flammable liquids (e.g. methanol)
shall be a multipurpose type and shall conform to the requirements of
Underwriters Laboratories UL 162 7th Edition test requirements or ISO
7203-1 Class IIA or higher.
The foam concentrate for airstrip use shall be AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming
Foam), FFFP (Film Forming Fluoroprotein) or a fluoroprotein type
conforming to the requirements for level B type foams of CAP 168
(multipurpose types of the same generic type are permissible).
Foam concentrates whether in systems, drums or vehicles shall be stored
such that they are not exposed to direct sunlight.
Calculations shall be performed in order to establish the minimum quantity
of foam required for each application. In addition, and in accordance with
NFPA, 100% of the calculated quantity shall be available within 24 hours.
For foam concentrate at airstrips, certification shall be available on site
demonstrating full conformity with CAP 168. This shall include results of
the extinguishing test on the original foam concentrate batch as well as
the following physical properties with measurement tolerances:

Specific gravity @ 20C


pH @ 20C
Sediment
Viscosity @ 20C

For foam concentrate for use at facilities other than airstrips,


manufacturers type certification shall be available on site demonstrating
full conformity with either UL 162 or ISO 7203-1, Class IIA or higher.
This shall also include information on the following physical properties with
measured tolerances:
Specific gravity @ 20C
pH @ 20C
Sediment
Foam Concentrate Testing
Representative samples of all foam concentrates used at PDO facilities
shall be subjected to the following tests to determine whether or not they
continue to conform to original manufacturers specifications. The test can
either be carried out by the original manufacturer or on-site to written
procedures.
(i)

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On an annual basis, the following physical properties shall be

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measured:

(ii)

5.3.3

Specific gravity @ 20C


pH @ 20C
Viscosity @ 20C (for foam concentrate used at airstrips)
Sediment

Every 10 years, the foam concentrate used at airstrips shall be


subjected to a fire test in accordance with CAP 168 to ensure
continuing conformity with level B type fire fighting performance.

Foam Proportioning Systems


The foam proportioner is the device that is used to inject foam concentrate
into the water line to make foam solution. It is vital that the proportioner is
such that it ensures that the foam solution has the correct amount of foam
concentrate in it (nominally 3%) under all system operating conditions and
flow requirements, including potential blockage of one or more outlets.
Various types of proportioner are available as described in NFPA 11. This
section defines the type that shall be used for different applications at PDO
facilities.
General
All foam proportioning systems shall be capable of providing acceptable
concentrate proportioning (3-3.6%) under all operating conditions of the
equipment, including blockage of some outlets.
Foam concentrate tanks shall be high-density polyethylene, GRP or
stainless steel 316L construction, approved for use by the concentrate
manufacturer.
Internal tank linings shall not be used in foam concentrate tanks.
Proportioning Systems for Fixed Foam Systems
Foam application systems as described in 4.6.4 can be either fixed or semifixed. In the case of fixed systems, the proportioner and foam concentrate
tank are permanently connected to the fire water ring main so that no
additional connection of foam concentrate supply is required for system
operation.
FERM strategy 3 sites and strategy 4 sites shall have fully fixed systems.
Semi-fixed systems may be added at sites with a professional fire response
nearby. In such a case the fire responders shall be trained and regularly
practice the use of such equipment (see Proportioning Systems for SemiFixed Foam Systems below).
All proportioning stations shall be provided with a clear indication of the
facilities to which they relate and clear operating instructions including
identification of valves. Minimum and maximum operating pressures shall
also be clearly identified.
All proportioning stations shall be located in safe locations (i.e. areas not
having hazardous area classification).

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All proportioning stations shall be located such that radiation (based on


FRED calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a
maximum of 5 kW/m2 under any anticipated design conditions. If the
system is such that its user is likely to remain in the area for extended
periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening shall be provided to
ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m2.
Standard inductors (line proportioners, eductors) shall not be used.
Fixed proportioning systems shall be of the balanced pressure type (See
NFPA 11). The preferred type is one having a foam concentrate pump
although diaphragm tank (bag tank, bladder tank) types are acceptable
where the quantity of foam concentrate in them does not exceed 1500
litres.
For pumped balanced pressure proportioning systems, the pump can be
water, electric or diesel driven. In all cases the pump shall be of the
positive displacement type (i.e. not centrifugal).
All proportioning stations shall be provided with isolation valves and
pressure gauges at their inlet and outlet. In the case of pumped balanced
pressure proportioning systems, pressure gauges will also be provided in
the foam concentrate line downstream of the foam pump prior to the
proportioner. Gauges shall be provided to demonstrate that foam
concentrate pressure and water pressure are balanced at the point of
concentrate injection.
The flow range of the proportioner and operating pressure range shall be
clearly marked on the proportioner.
Pumped balanced pressure proportioning systems shall be provided with
the facility to test the foam concentrate and circulate foam concentrate
back to the concentrate tank without discharging concentrate into the
foam solution discharge line. Valves in the system specifically provided to
allow this function shall be provided with a lock so that they can be locked
during normal status.
Pumped balanced pressure proportioners shall have manual over ride
capability to be used in the event of failure of the automatic balancing
system.
All foam concentrate tanks shall be provided with a sight glass with
isolation valves. In the case of diaphragm tanks the isolation valves will be
provided with locks.
In areas where specialist fire vehicles are available (strategy 4 in FERM), a
pumping in connection shall be provided downstream of the proportioning
skid to allow back up of a fixed proportioning system by use of the
proportioning system on the vehicle.
In the case that hand held equipment outlets are served by the
proportioning station as well as fixed systems, the outlets shall be such
that pressure is limited to a maximum of 7 barg.

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Proportioning Systems for Semi-Fixed Foam Systems


Semi-fixed foam application systems are those that require connection of a
mobile proportioning system (usually on a fire truck). They are, therefore,
only applicable where strategy 4 of FERM is adopted.
The foam system shall conform to the requirements of DEP 80.47.10.33,
General.
Proportioning systems on specialist vehicles shall be pumped balanced
pressure type. The system shall be such that each vehicle outlet can
provide foam solution or water as required (i.e. the system must not be
such that when foam solution is being produced at some outlets, it is not
possible to have water only at others).
The flow rate capability of the proportioning system shall take due account
of other items, such as foam monitors or hand lines, which may be fed
from it.
The proportioning system shall have the manual over ride, drain and return
to tank facilities as described for the pumped proportioning systems for
fixed systems in the previous section.
Note: The above comments should not be regarded as a detailed
specification for foam systems for fire trucks. They cover only the
necessary requirements to serve semi-fixed systems at PDO facilities.
Proportioners for Hand Held Foam Nozzles
Standard line proportioners (eductors, inductors) shall be used for providing
foam solution to hand held nozzles which are not fed from a specialist fire
vehicle (see Proportioning Systems for Semi-Fixed Foam Systems) or a fixed
proportioning system. Proportioners for hand held nozzles shall conform to
the following requirements:

Fires

The proportioner setting shall be fixed at 3%.


The proportioner shall be provided with a translucent pick up tube.
The line proportioner shall incorporate a non-return valve to prevent
back flow of water into the foam concentrate supply.

Proportioners for One Shot Foam Systems for Floating Roof Tank Rimseal
Proportioners for one-shot foam systems for floating roof tank rimseal fires
are considered to be an integral part of a package unit (see previous
section).
Testing of Proportioning Equipment
On an annual basis all proportioning systems and equipment shall be
tested under credible operational flow conditions to check that the
percentage of foam concentrate being proportioned is within the range 33.6%.
At 6 monthly intervals, foam concentrate tanks shall be inspected for signs
of sediment.

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5.3.4

Foam Application Systems/Equipment


Base Injection Systems
Reference should be made to DEP 80.47.10.31, General, Paragraph 2.4.1.1.
Base injection (sub-surface) systems are used to protect cone roof (fixed
roof) atmospheric storage tanks that do not have an internal floating cover.
They are designed to inject foam at the base of a tank above any water
and allow the foam to float to the fuel surface. Base injection foam
systems are not suitable for water-soluble fuels such as methanol.
A variation of this system, known as semi-subsurface, includes a flexible
tube that is released into the product on system actuation. Foam flows up
the tube so that it does not actually come into contact with the product.
Semi-subsurface can be used for water soluble fuels or for crudes with a
very high water content where the water base in a tank can be very high
and base injection is not practical.
Base injection systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 11 in
terms of application rate, running times, foam discharge velocities and
number of foam application points. Base foam injection is limited for use
with hydrocarbons that have a viscosity less than 440 centistokes at the
minimum storage temperature. Above this, top entry for the foam should
be used.
Base injection systems shall be used in preference to semi-subsurface
systems wherever possible. At manned facilities, actuation of a base foam
injection shall be manual. At unattended facilities where manual actuation
would result in a delay of more than 30 minutes following confirmation of a
fire alarm, actuation of base foam systems shall be automatic.
Each tank nozzle associated with a base injection system shall be provided
with a normally locked open shut off valve and a non-return valve.
Bursting discs shall be provided upstream of the non return valve in the
foam discharge line to act as a positive seal preventing product entering
the foam line under normal operations. The bursting discs shall be of the
differential pressure type, rated and located such that where there is more
than one disc in a system, the bursting of one disc will not relieve pressure
throughout the system and prevent the bursting of all other discs.
Valved test connections shall be provided in a base injection system on
each system outlet. These shall be of the same diameter as the system
foam outlets in order to be representative of the actual system. The valve
of the test connection outlet shall be normally locked closed. Normally
locked open valves shall be provided as necessary in the foam discharge
outlets. These valves shall be closed during testing to prevent bursting
discs being subjected to high pressure.
Foam generators for the base injection system shall be of the type that can
generate foam of the required expansion and drainage time properties
(see NFPA 11) against backpressure caused by product head and
downstream frictional losses. The preferred type is one that can operate
against at least 40% backpressure. The generators shall be provided with
pressure gauges showing upstream and downstream pressures so that

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operating conditions can be checked during testing. The generators shall


incorporate a non-return valve in the air inlet to prevent backflow of
product through the inlet after system shutdown.
All foam generators shall be located outside the bund wall.
In the case of semi-fixed systems requiring connection to a firefighting
vehicle, any valves or controls needed for system actuation shall be
outside the bund and such that radiation levels during credible scenarios
meet the radiation level limits described for fixed proportioning systems as
detailed above.
In semi-fixed systems, the foam solution inlets shall be clearly marked with
their purpose, the tank numbers to which they relate, the minimum
operating pressure and flow rate.
Each foam generator shall be clearly labelled with its minimum operating
pressure and the flow rate at this pressure.
The foam outlet inside the tank shall be such that it does not become
easily clogged by sediment. In crude tanks this means that the end of the
outlet pipe should be cut at an angle so that any sediment in the crude
does not accumulate in the pipe.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests
shall include proportioning accuracy (see Testing of Proportioning
Equipment), foam expansion and drainage time. Results shall be compared
with system specification and manufacturers' data.
Top Pourer Systems - Cone Roof Tanks and Internal Floating Roof Tanks
Top pourer systems are foam systems that consist of one or more foam
generator/pourer assemblies positioned around the tank just below the
roof to shell seam. On system actuation foam is fed through the generator
to the inside of the tank shell to flow onto the fuel surface. They can be
regarded as an alternative to base injection systems for cone roof tanks
but are not the preferred option because there is a high probability that the
equipment will be damaged prior to system actuation.
They are, however, the system of choice for internal floating roof tanks and
may be considered for cone roof tanks where base injection or semisubsurface (see Base Injection Systems) are not considered practical.
Top pourer foam systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 11 in
terms of application rate, running times, foam discharge velocities and
number of foam application points.
Top pourer foam systems for internal floating roof tanks shall be designed
to cover the complete fuel surface at application rates for standard cone
roof tanks unless it can be shown that the internal floating roof will
maintain its integrity in a fire incident.
Each foam pourer assembly will comprise a foam generator, a vapour seal
(to prevent vapours from the tank migrating through the foam system
pipework) and a pourer assembly inside the tank to direct foam against the
inside wall of the tank.

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The foam pourer assembly shall be designed such that a full flow foam
discharge test can be carried out without breaking the vapour seal and
without discharging foam into the tank.
A separate foam solution riser shall feed every foam pourer assembly.
Every foam pourer assembly shall be clearly marked with operating
pressure and flow rate.
Foam solution system pipework shall incorporate valves such that
individual risers to foam pourer assemblies can be isolated in the event of
damage to an assembly. The valves shall be located such that radiant heat
levels as predicted by FRED, do not exceed 5 kW/m2 under credible fire
scenarios (nb. full surface fires in internal floating roof tanks are not
generally considered credible scenarios - fires burn at the vents only).
The foam solution pipework shall be provided with pressure gauges at
convenient locations to check operating pressures. The minimum operating
pressure required shall be clearly identified at the pressure gauge.
The system shall be fully fixed for FERM strategy 3 & 4 facilities. They can
be supplemented by semi-fixed. In the case of semi-fixed systems the
inlets shall be positioned such that the radiation level limits given for
proportioning systems for fixed foam systems are met.

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In semi-fixed systems, the foam solution inlets shall be clearly marked with
their purpose, the tank number to which they relate, the minimum
operating pressure and flow rate.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests
shall include proportioning accuracy, foam expansion and drainage time.
Results shall be compared with system specification and manufacturers'
data.
Extended Discharge Foam Systems for Protection of Rimseal Areas on
Floating Roof Tanks
Reference should be made to DEP 80.47.10.31, General, Paragraph 2.4.1.3.
In this case, the term extended discharge refers to a system having a
discharge time in accordance with a recognised standard such as NFPA 11
(i.e. it is not a one shot system providing a short duration application of
foam as provided in the following section).
The extended discharge system shall be considered as the primary
protection system even when a one shot system is also in place. Thus a
one shot system is not considered to be an alternative to the extended
discharge system.
The system shall comply with the requirements of NFPA 11 in terms of
foam solution application rate, run time and number of foam application
points.
The systems shall not be automatically actuated from a detection system.
The system shall be designed such that it can be actuated manually, either
locally or remotely, within 10 minutes of a confirmed fire. If this cannot be
achieved, a one-shot foam system shall also be provided as detailed in the
following section.
For new facilities, the system application devices shall be of the top pourer
type because it allows easy inspection and testing. The system consists of
a number of foam generators and pourers mounted around the top of the
tank fed with foam solution from the proportioning unit. Each pourer
assembly shall be provided with a foam generator (i.e. a single foam
generator feeding several pourers shall not be permitted).
The alternative of a "Coflexip" system, consisting of a number of foam
generators mounted on the roof fed from an array of pipework that
includes a flexible pipe internal to the tank, may be maintained if already
installed on existing plant.
The primary systems shall be fully fixed but may be supplemented by
semi-fixed systems when there is ready access to a professional fire
brigade. When semi-fixed systems are installed, the system inlets shall be
outside the bund and clearly marked with their purpose, the tank to which
they relate and minimum operating pressure and flow rate.
All foam generators shall be clearly marked with their minimum operating
pressure and the flow rate at that pressure.

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A foam dam shall be installed on the tank to contain the foam over the
seal area. This dam shall be designed and provided with drain holes in
accordance with NFPA 11. The fitting of the foam dam to the roof shall be
such that leakage of foam or foam solution cannot occur except at the
designated drainage points (i.e. there will be a dam tank roof seal or
continuous weld except at drainage points).
Hydrant outlets fed with foam solution shall be provided at the top of the
tank at wind girder level to allow use of foam hand lines to supplement the
fixed system. The maximum distance between foam solution hydrants
shall be 60m around the walkway.
A pressure gauge shall be provided on the foam system pipework along
with clear identification of the minimum operating pressure at this point.
A cabinet including 2 x 20m x 65mm hoses and a 450 lpm foam nozzle
shall be provided at each hydrant outlet on the walkway.
Foam application devices shall be of the aspirating type.
Drain facilities shall be provided in the system to allow the complete
system to be drained after operation.
Foam application devices shall be designed or provided with screens so as
to minimise the possibility of blockage from external sources such as birds
nesting.
Foam pourers shall be designed and mounted on the tank shell so that
foam is directed to flow down the inside wall of the tank without disruption
from the tank structure or fittings.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests
shall include proportioning accuracy (see 4.6.3.6), foam expansion and
drainage time. Results shall be compared with system specification and
manufacturers' data.
One Shot Foam Systems for Floating Roof Tank Rimseals
A one-shot foam system for floating roof rimseals is a self contained
detection and protection system intended to provide a fast response to
rimseal fires by early detection and automatic discharge of foam into the
rimseal area. It must be emphasised that one-shot systems are regarded
as a first strike system that should detect and extinguish a rimseal fire
before it spreads significantly around the tank circumference. They should
not be regarded as an alternative to the extended discharge system
described in the previous section, which should be regarded as the primary
protection method.
One shot systems shall be a totally integrated package comprising linear
heat detection, alarm/control facilities, foam concentrate storage, water
storage (or premix storage - see below), foam solution discharge pipework
and discharge nozzles.
The detector system shall comprise a continuous heat detector mounted
around the entire circumference of the tank at a distance of 50mm

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maximum from the top of the seal assembly. Each foam solution module
shall have its own dedicated detector in the segment it protects.
The heat detector shall be either of the fusible plastic tube type (see DEP
32.30.20.11 - General, November 1995, Paragraph 3.9.4.2) or digital
electrical cable type. Frangible bulbs mounted on a ring of pressurised
pipework shall not be acceptable.
On detection of the fire, a dedicated alarm will sound in a permanently
manned location and at the tank area. Visual alarms shall be clearly
identified with the number of the tank to which they refer (all detectors
from individual modules on a tank can be connected to a common alarm).
All electrical components shall be suitable for the classification of the area
in which they operate, recognising that the roof area should be regarded
as Zone 1.
Foam solution application rate shall be 20 lpm/m 2 around the seal area and
shall be discharged for a minimum period of 30 seconds.
Foam application nozzles shall be positioned such that the areas of the
rimseal affected are blanketed with foam within a period of 15 seconds
from the system actuation.
Aspirated foam nozzles are preferred in order to provide a more effective
blanket than non-aspirating nozzles.
The circumference of the tank shall be split into segments of
approximately 40m. The foam application nozzles in each segment shall
be fed with foam solution from a dedicated supply module. The discharge
pipework and detector for neighbouring modules shall overlap by at least
one nozzle spacing distance.
Foam solution discharge pipework shall be stainless steel or other material
that reduces maintenance requirements on the tank roof.
The foam solution shall be supplied from modules which contain either
premix (i.e. foam concentrate and water already mixed) in a pressure
vessel or a separate foam concentrate and water storage.
On actuation of the detector, automatic discharge of the relevant tank
segment module shall automatically occur by pressurisation of the unit.
The pressurisation cylinder shall be external to the premix (or water)
vessel for easy inspection and maintenance.
A sunshade to prevent direct exposure to sunlight shall protect each
storage module.
In cases where the foam concentrate and water are stored in separate
vessels, the proportioner shall be of a type that can still function correctly
with 3 nozzles blocked.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests
shall include proportioning accuracy, foam expansion and drainage time.
Results shall be compared with system specification and manufacturers'

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data. In addition, rimseals on the system shall be fully discharged and


replenished on an annual basis.

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5.3.5

Foam Deluge Systems


Foam deluge systems comprise an array of open headed discharge nozzles
located around or above the hazard. They are all operated simultaneously
and fed from a fixed proportioning system. Semi-fixed systems are not
practicable because the intention of a foam deluge system is to provide
very rapid response to contained spill fire situations and develop a foam
blanket to prevent re-ignition. Connection of a proportioning system at the
time of the fire would give unacceptable delays.
Foam deluge systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 16 using
an area foam solution application rate of 6.5 lpm/m 2 and a minimum of 10
minutes application time, followed by water for a total time of 60 minutes
at an application rate of 6.5 litres/m 2/min. With an increased application
rate the operating time may be reduced proportionally, but not less than 7
minutes.
Foam deluge systems shall be fed with foam solution from a fixed
proportioning system.
Foam deluge system nozzles shall be of the aspirating type.
The foam deluge system nozzle shall be such that following foam
application, continuing water application for a period of 20 minutes will
provide a cooling spray capability without significant damage to the foam
blanket.

5.3.6

Portable Foam Application Equipment


Hand held foam nozzles shall be aspirating nozzles of the type requiring
foam solution to be fed to them (i.e. they shall not be the type that
incorporates a proportioner).
Foam nozzles for use on small spill fires (e.g. minor bund incidents) at
FERM strategy 3 facilities shall have approximately 200-250 lpm
throughput at 7 barg inlet pressure. Their throughput shall be matched to
that of the proportioners used with them (see Proportioners for Hand Held
Foam Nozzles).
Foam nozzles for use at FERM strategy 4 facilities shall have a throughput
up to 1000 lpm at 7 barg inlet pressure.
Hand held foam application equipment shall be provided in fire cabinets at
strategic locations adjacent to hydrants at FERM strategy 3 and 4 facilities.
The number and location of fire cabinets shall be determined from hazard
identification and pre-fire planning studies for minor incidents taking into
account manning levels.
Each fire cabinet shall contain 1 x foam nozzle (200-250 lpm), 1 x water
nozzle (450 lpm at 7 barg jet/spray type) 2 x 20m x 65mm hose lengths
and 6 x 20 litre drums of foam concentrate.
FERM strategy 3 and 4 facilities shall be provided with portable foam
monitors for use by the fire fighters for larger spill incidents and
supplementing fixed systems.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 49

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

The number of units shall be based on the requirements of any tanks that
are not protected by a fixed or semi-fixed system. In the event that all
tanks are provided with a system, a single unit shall be provided.
Each foam monitor shall have a throughput of at least 2500 lpm at 7 barg
inlet pressure. Monitors shall be provided with a self-inducing proportioning
capability but in general shall actually be operated from a specialist
vehicle proportioning system.
5.4

Fine Water Spray Systems


These systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 750.

5.5

Gaseous Extinguishing Agent Systems


The design of and type of extinguishant used in these systems requires the
approval of the custodian of this specification. Halon shall not be used.
Reference should be made to DEP 80.47.10.10, General, and NFPA 2001.

5.6

Portable Extinguishers

5.6.1

General
Portable extinguishers shall be suitable for the type of fuel involved in
accordance with BS EN 2. There are four classes of fire, namely Class A
involving solid materials, Class B involving liquids, Class C involving gases
and Class D involving metals.

5.6.2

Standards for Portable Fire Extinguishers


All fire extinguishers shall be manufactured, tested and certified to
conform to BS 5423 or equivalent (such as CEN-EN 3.1/2/3/4/5, NFPA 10,
Din 14406).
Additionally, the extinguisher body, filling nozzle and cap shall be made
from material having rigidity, durability and resistance to electrochemical
corrosive effects of the extinguishing media. Non metallic materials are
not acceptable for these parts or the moveable nozzle.
Fire extinguishers shall be selected,
accordance with BS 5306 Part 3.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 50

installed

and

maintained

in

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

6.0Alarms and Executive Actions


6.1

General
The table in Appendix D gives typical alarm and executive action
requirements for the different types of detection and facilities. This table
provides only an overview and the engineer shall fully review the
requirements of this specification to define specifics for any piece of
equipment.

6.2

Gas Turbines
The required shut down logic associated with turbine hoods is dictated by
the sequence of a limited number of possible events:

SP-1075

Given the ingestion of gas into the combustion or ventilation air


intakes, the turbine shall be tripped and the hood ventilation
system shall be shutdown.
Given a sufficiently large release of flammable gas under the hood,
the turbine shall be tripped together with a remote fuel gas ESDV,
but the hood ventilation system shall be allowed to run to minimise
the possibility of gas concentration build up and result in a possible
explosion or flash fire.
Given a confirmed flame detected under the hood, the turbine and
ventilation system fans will be tripped together with closure of fire
damper(s).

REVISION 2.0

Page 51

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

FIGURE 6.2

Flammable >=1 at ALERT


Flammable any 1 at
(per
DANGER
compartment
Flammable >= 2 at
under-hood)
DANGER
Gas
Flammable >=1 at ALERT
Detection
Flammable any 1 at
(at Air Intakes if
DANGER
HL gas
Flammable >= 2 at
possible)
DANGER
Fire
>= 1 Heat activated
Detection
Any 1 UV/IR activated
>= 2 UV/IR activated
Loss of Hood Ventilation Air Flow*
Loss of Hood Ventilation Air Flow>= 20
secs*

REVISION 2.0

Page 52

Disable Trip from Heat Switches (if total flood system installed)

Inhibit re-start of Turbine

Close Ventilation Dampers

Hood ventilation Fan Trip

Trip turbine lube oil / seal oil systems

Remote Field Gas ESDV Closure

Trip Turbine

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Notes:
1.
Alert and danger are defined in section 4.2
2.
HL refers to high level

SP-1075

De-energise non-explosion proof electrical accessories

EFFECT

CAUSE
Gas
Detection

(& local panel if applicable)Remote Alarm in Control Centre

A generic cause and effect diagram follows:

X
X

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

7.0Abbreviations

SP-1075

AFFF

Aqueous Film Forming Foam

AFP

Active Fire Protection

API

American Petroleum Institute

BPD

Barrels Per Day

BS

British Standard

CBA

Cost Benefit Analysis

CFDH

Corporate Functional Discipline Head

CSN

Committee European de Normalisation (for Standardisation)

DEP

Design Engineering Practice

EN

Europaische Norm

EP

Engineering Practice

ESD

Emergency Shutdown

ESDV

Emergency Shutdown Valve

FES

Fire and Explosion Strategy

FERM

Fire & Explosion Risk Management

FFFP

Film Forming FluoroProtein

FM

Factory Mutual (Certifying Authority in USA)

FQB

Frangible Quartzoid Bulbs

FRED

Fire, Release, Explosion and Dispersion

FWS

Fine Water Spray

GRP

Glass reinforced Plastic

HSE

Health, Safety and Environment

ISO

International Organisation for Standardisation

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organisation

IPF

Instrumented Protective Function

IR

Infra Red (the frequency of light used for fire detection and gas detection)

LEL

Lower Explosive Limit (Synonymous with LFL)

LFL

Lower Flammable Limit (Synonymous with LEL)

LNG

Liquefied Natural Gas

LPC

Loss Prevention Council

LPG

Liquefied Petroleum Gas

MAC

Manual Alarm Callpoint

NDT

Non Destructive Testing

NFPA

Nation Fire Protection Association

REVISION 2.0

Page 53

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

SP-1075

PDO

Petroleum Development Oman

PLC

Process Logic Controller

ppm

parts per million (a ratio by volume or mass of one substance in another)

PV

Present Value (some future value discounted to todays value)

QRA

Quantified (or Quantitative) Risk Analysis

SIEP

Shell International Exploration and Production

SSV

Sub Surface Valve

SCSSV

Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve

UEL

Upper explosive Limit (synonymous with UFL)

UFL

Upper Flammable Limit (synonymous with UEL)

UL

Underwriters Laboratories Incorporated

UV

Ultra Violet (the frequency of light used for fire detection)

VESDA

Very Early Smoke Detection Apparatus (VESDA is a trade name)

REVISION 2.0

Page 54

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

8.0References
1. Report No. HSE/97/07 (1997) Fire and Explosion Risk Management (FERM)
Summary Report. Petroleum Development Oman
2. Report No. EWE-28107.1 (1996) Halon Phase-out Studies, Quantified Risk
Assessment & Cost-benefit Analysis. Electrowatt Engineering
3. Report No. EWE-63273.1/1 (1997) Quantified Risk Assessment for Shipping
Pumps and Cone roofed Tanks. Electrowatt Engineering
4. Fire Protection Study Report. Resource Protection International
5. Review of Emergency Services at PDO Airfields, TSE/R/01, 1995
6. FERM Facility Plan Guideline, GU230, 2002.

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

Page 55

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

APPENDIX A - Relevant Standards, Specifications & Codes


The following standards, specifications and codes can provide further information
if required.
PDO Standards

SP-1075

ERD 00-01

ERD 00-02
ERD 08-04

ERD 08-11

ERD 09-02

ERD 10-04

ERD 17-02
ERD 30-03
ERD 38-12

ERD 48-01

REVISION 2.0

Title
PDO Guide to Technical Standards and
Procedures
Technical Authorities System
Safety Aspects of Plant Design for
Sour Service
Isolation Process Equipment

Spacing of Tanks & Tank Bunding


Requirements
General Specification for Detail Design
and Engineering of Oil & Gas Facilities

Fire Detection and Alarm Installation


Instrumentation Standard Drawings
Requirements
GRE
Pipes/fittings
Painting and Coating Systems

Page 56

Referred to
in Section
General
2.4.2
4.4.1
3.2.3
3.2.3
3.2.3
3.2.3
3.2.3
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.3.4
4.3.6
3.4.1
4.3.3
5.1.1
5.1.2

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Relevant Standards, Specifications & Codes (continued)


SIEP Standards

SP-1075

Gen

Gen

Gen

DEP 30.48.30.31-

Gen

Gen

Gen

Gen

Gen

Gen

Gen

DEP 32.30.20.11-

Title

DEP 34.17.10.31-

Cement Linings in New Pipelines (1990)


MFEC/1
Pumps - Selection, Testing and
Installation (1983) MFEE/1
Centrifugal Pumps
(Amendments/Supplements to API Std.
610) (1990) MFEE/1
Fire, Gas and Smoke Detection Systems
MFTX/51
Classification and Implementation of
Instrumented Protected Functions
PLC Based Instrumented Protective
Systems
Electric Motors-Cage Induction and
Synchronous Type (1995) MFEE/3
Laboratories (1983) MFEC/1

DEP 80.47.10.10-

Fire-fighting Agents (1991) MFEO/1

DEP 80.47.10.30-

Assessment of the Fire Safety of


Onshore Installations (1995) MFEO/1

Gen

DEP 80.47.10.31-

Active Fire Protection Systems and


Equipment for Onshore Facilities (1992)
MFEO/1

Gen

DEP 80.47.10.32-

Movable Fire Fighting Equipment for


Onshore Applications (1997) MFEO/1

Gen

DEP 80.47.10.33-

EP95-0352

Fire-fighting Vehicles and Fire Stations


(1993) MFEO/1
Shell Report: Fire Retardant Rim Seal
Materials for Floating Roof Tanks. SIEP
EPO/61
HSE Manual: Quantitative Risk
Assessment SIEP

DEP 31.29.02.11DEP 31.29.02.30-

DEP 32.80.10.10DEP 32.80.10.30DEP 33.66.05.31-

EP92-1820

REVISION 2.0

Page 57

Referred to
in Section
5.1.1
5.1.3
5.1.3

5.3.4
4.1
4.1
3.2.3
3.4.5
5.3.1
5.5
3.2.4
3.2.4
5.1.5
5.1.1
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.3.1
5.3.4
5.3.4
3.5.2
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.3.1
5.3.3
3.2.3

2.5.1

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Relevant Standards, Specifications & Codes (continued)

SP-1075

International
Standards
BS 336

BS 476 Parts

BS 5306 Part

BS 5423

BS 5839 Part

BS 5839 Part

NFPA 10

NFPA 11

NFPA 13

NFPA 15

NFPA 16

NFPA 20

BS 476 Part

BS 5306 Part

BS EN 2

Title
British Standards:1989: Specification for Fire
Hose Couplings and Ancillary Equipment. BSI
Publication
British Standards:1984: Non-combustible test
for materials. BSI Publication
British Standards:1993: Method for
classification of the surface spread of flame
of products. BSI Publication
British Standards:1990: Specification for
Sprinkler Systems
British Standards:1985: Code of Practice for
the Selection, Installation and Maintenance of
Portable Extinguishers. BSI Publication
British Standards:1995: Specification of
Portable Fire Extinguishers. BSI Publication
British Standards:1988: Fire Detection and
Alarm Systems for Buildings. Part 1 Code of
Practice for System Design, Installation and
Servicing. BSI Publication
British Standards:1983: Specification for
Manual Alarm Call Points. BSI Publication
British Standards:1992: Classification of Fires
(replaces Code of Practice for Classification of
Fires:1972) BSI Publication
National Fire Codes: Portable Fire
extinguishers. Vol.1. National Fire Protection
Association.
National Fire Codes: Standard for LowExpansion Foam. Vol.1. National Fire
Protection Association.

National Fire Codes: Standard for the


Installation of Sprinkler Systems. Vol.1.
National Fire Protection Association
National Fire Codes: Standard for Waterspray
Fixed Systems for Fire Protection. Vol.1.
National Fire Protection Association
National Fire Codes: Standard on Deluge
Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray
Systems. Vol.1. National Fire Protection
Association
National Fire Codes: Standard for the
Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps. Vol.1.
National Fire Protection Association

REVISION 2.0

Page 58

Referred to
in Section
5.1.4

3.4.4
3.4.4

5.2.1
5.6.2

5.6.2
4.3.7

3.4.1
4.4.1
5.6.1

5.6.2

5.3.1
5.3.3
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.4
5.3.4
5.2.1

5.2.2

5.3.1
5.3.5

5.1.3

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

SP-1075

NFPA 22

NFPA 750

NFPA 2001

ICAO-9137 Part
1

ICAO-9137 Part
7

ISO 7203-1

UL 162

National Fire Codes: Standard for Water Tanks


for Private Fire Protection. Vol.1. National Fire
Protection Association
National Fire Codes: Standard on water mist
fire suppression systems. National Fire
Protection Association
National Fire Codes: Standard on Clean Agent
Fire Extinguishing Systems. National Fire
Protection Association
Airport Services Manual, Rescue and Fire
Fighting. ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Authority)
Airport Services Manual, Airport Emergency
Planning. ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Authority)
Fire Extinguishing Media, Foam Concentrates
Foam Equipment and Liquid Concentrates, 7th
edition

REVISION 2.0

Page 59

5.1.2

5.4

5.5

3.5.1

3.5.1

5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.1
5.3.2

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

APPENDIX B - Assessment of Business Risk Due To Fire and


Explosion
The risks due to fire and explosions of existing typical assets in PDO have been
assessed and plotted onto a Risk Matrix as shown below.
This matrix gives an overview of the risk level of typical equipment to provide an
indication of the level of protection that may be justified in the form of a fire and
explosion strategy.
The individual equipment risks are positioned to denote the worst case frequency
and consequences. Some equipment appears twice, e.g. a floating roof tank fire
has occurred in SIEP with minor (rating 2) consequences but elsewhere in the
industry with very serious (rating 5) consequences.
Probability of Occurrence

No Impact

No Effect

Slight injury

Slight Damage

Slight Effect

Slight Impact

Slight Effect

Minor injury

Minor Damage

Minor
Effect

Limited Effect

Minor Local
Effect

Major injury

Local Damage

Localised
Effect

Considerable
Impact

Major Local
Effect

Single
Fatality

Major Damage

Major Effect

National
Impact

Massive
Effect

International
Impact

Total
Extended
Effect

Multiple
Fatality

Extensive
Damage

Massive Effect

Incident:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

SP-1075

incide n t
h ap p e n s seve ra l
tim e s a ye a r in
S IE P
in cid e n t
h a p p en s
seve ra l tim e s a
ye ar a t lo ca tion

No Effect

incide n t h a s
o ccurre d in
S IE P

No Damaage

in cid e n t h a s
o ccurre d in E & P
in d u stry

No injury

n o t h ea rd o f bu t
cou ld o ccu r in
E & P in d u stry

P rod u ction

A sse ts

P eo p le

R e pu tatio n

R a tin gs

E n viro n m e n t

Consequence

1
2

4
2

Strategy:

Small Incidents
Pump Seals
Compressors
Turbine Enclosures
Pressure Vessels

6.
7.
8.
9.

REVISION 2.0

Cone Roof Tanks


Floating Roof Tanks
Aircraft
Camps

Page 60

Strategy 1

Strategy 3

Strategy 1/2

Strategy 4

Strategy 2

Strategy 3/4

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

APPENDIX C - Facility Group Categories


Production and gathering stations have been categorised according to the
facilities and
level of risk as follows:.
Production Stations
Category A: Typical facilities include:
Manifolds
Small cone roof tanks
Compressors and turbine enclosures
Pumps
Substation
Control room
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category A production stations
without a firewater network (strategy level 2).
Category B: Typical facilities include those on Category A stations but also have
larger cone roof tanks and pressure vessels.
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category B production stations
with a firewater network (strategy level 3).
Category C: Typical facilities include those on Category B stations but also have
floating roof tanks.
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category C production stations
with a fire water network (strategy level 3).
CATEGORY
B
C
C
C
B
A
B
B
A
A
A
A

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

AREA
Lekhwair
Yibal
Fahud
Qarn Alam
Rima PS
Sayyala PS
Nimr PS
Marmul
Anzauz
Suwaihat
Zauliyah
Ghubar

Page 61

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Gathering Stations
Category A: Typical facilities include:
Manifolds
Separators
Pumps
Small cone roof tanks
Substation
Control Room
First aid fire protection is only to be provided at Category A stations (strategy level
1).
Category B: Typical facilities include those on Category A stations but also
compressors and turbine enclosures.
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category B stations without a
fire water network (strategy level 2).
CATEGORY
B
A
B
B
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
A
A
B
A
B
B

SP-1075

REVISION 2.0

AREA
Al Huwaisah
Lekhwair B
Yibal B
Yibal C
Yibal D
Fahud B
Fahud C
Fahud D
Fahud E
Fahud F
Natih
Qarn Alam
Barik
Burhaan
Ghaba North
Qarat Al Milh
Saih Rawl
Bahja

Page 62

CATEGORY
B
A
A
B
A
B
A
A
A
A
B
A
A
A
A
B
A
By passed

AREA
Marmul A
Marmul B
Marmul C
Marmul D
Marmul E
Marmul G
Qaharir
Rahab
Thamoud
Thuleilat
Birba
Nimr C
Nimr B
Nimr A
Amal
Saih Nihayda
Sadad
Hasirah

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

APPENDIX D - Typical Alarms and Executive Actions


Hazard

Fire

Type of
Detecto
r

Heat

Flame

Smoke

Gas

Comb
Gas

Equipment Type

Crude oil/ condensate


shipping pumps
Compressors
Fixed roof tanks
Floating of tanks
Turbine enclosures
Diesel generator
Fuel gas skid
Fired heater skids
Crude pumps
Compressors
Turbine enclosures
Control rooms
Auxiliary rooms
Electrical rooms
Computer rooms
Turbine hall
Offices
Turbine enclosure (air
intake)
Gas compressors

SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 63

Facility Type

Gath
Station
X

Prod
Station
X

Booster
Station
X

Power
Station
N/A

MAF

GGP

X
X
N/A
X
N/A
X

X
X
X
X
N/A
X

N/A
N/A
N/A
X
X
X

N/A
N/A
N/A
X
X
X

N/A
X
X
N/A
N/A
X

X
N/A
N/A
X
Alarm & ESD
Alarm & ESD

X
X
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
X
X

N/A
N/A
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
X
X

X
N/A
X
X
X
X
N/A
X
X
X

X
N/A
N/A
X
X
X
X
N/A
X
N/A

X
X
X
X
X
X
N/A
N/A
X
X

N/A

N/A

N/A

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Fuel gas skid

SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 64

N/A

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Typical Alarms and Executive Actions (continued)


Type of Detection

Heat

Alarm/Action
Gath
Station
X
Note 2
X

Prod
Station
X
Note 2
X

Booster
Station
X
Note 2
X

Power
Station
X
Note 2
X

MAF

GGP

X
Note 2
X

X
Note 2
X

Area sirens/bells
ESD associated equipment
Blowdown associated
equipment (Note 4)
Station ESD

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Initiate AFP (Note 3)


Alarm to SCADA
Alarm to fire brigade
GFS panel alarm

X
X

X
Note 1
X
X

X
X

X
Note 1
X
X

X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

X
Note 1
X

X
Note 1
X

GFS panel alarm


Mimic panel alarm

Flame

Mimic panel alarm


Area sirens/bells
ESD associated equipment
Blowdown associated
equipment (Note 4)
Station ESD
Initiate AFP (Note 3)

SP-1075

Facility Type

REVISION 1.0

Page 65

X
Note 2
X
X
X
X

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Smoke

Alarm to SCADA
Alarm to fire brigade
GFS panel alarm
Mimic panel alarm
Area sirens/bells
Isolate associated non
essential power supplies
Alarm to SCADA
Alarm to fire brigade
Associated AC trip

SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 66

X
Note 2
X
X
X

X
X
X
Note 2
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X
X

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Typical alarms and executive actions (continued)


Type of
Detection

Alarm/Action

Comb Gas Alert

Comb Gas
Danger

SP-1075

Facility Type
Gath
Station
X
Note 2
X

Prod
Station
X
Note 2
X

Booster
Station
X
Note 2
X

Power
Station
X
Note 2
X

MAF

GGP

X
Note 2
X

X
Note 2
X

X
Note 2

X
Note 2

X
Note 2

X
Note 2

X
Note 2

X
Note 2

Mimic panel alarm


Area sirens/bells
ESD associated equipment
Blowdown associated equipment
(Note 4)
Station ESD

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Isolate non essential power


supplies
Alarm to SCADA

X
Note 1
X

X
Note 1
X

GFS panel alarm


Mimic panel alarm
Area sirens/bells
ESD associated equipment
Blowdown associated equipment
(Note 4)
Station ESD
Alarm to SCADA
Alarm to fire brigade
GFS panel alarm

REVISION 1.0

Page 67

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Toxic (H2S)

Manual call
Point

AFP activated

Alarm to fire brigade


GFS panel alarm
Mimic panel alarm
Area sirens/bells
Alarm to SCADA

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

GFS panel alarm

X Note 2

X Note 2

X Note 2

X Note 2

X Note 2

X Note 2

Mimic panel alarm


Area sirens/bells
Station ESD

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
Note 2
X
X

X
X
X
Note 1
X
Note 2
X
X

X
X

GFS panel alarm

X
X
X
Note 1
X
Note 2
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X

X
Note 2
X
X

Mimic panel alarm


Alarm to SCADA
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.

SP-1075

X
Note 2
X
X

Station ESD not required if station is permanently manned.


Alarm required on GFS panel if no mimic provided, typically for control/auxiliary buildings.
Initiate AFP on relevant equipment where installed.
Where blowdown facility is provided.

REVISION 1.0

Page 68

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Appendix E - Worked Examples


The Specification provides a methodology for determining the levels of fire
and explosion protection for what are seen as critical items of equipment,
ie. cone roofed tanks and shipping pumps.
This approach is based on a detailed QRA (Reference 3) which was
performed, and enables the user to apply a cost benefit analysis in order to
justify the protection level specified.
Some worked examples are provided below.
Cone Roofed Tanks
Suppose we are installing 2 new oil storage tanks at Marmul, and wish to
establish what levels of fire protection can be justified. The production
rate for Marmul is 63000 BPD, and using the pro-forma on page 18 of this
Specification:
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA
System Constant
0.18225
based on frequency of damage x days lost:
(3.75x10

-4

x 486 =)
1

Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel


Net Oil Production per pair of tanks in BPD (e.g. for 5
tanks divide the total production by 2.5) For an installation
with a single tank multiply the total production by 1.39 (to
compensate for the loss of total production given the loss
of a single tank)
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Tank =
x Number of tanks covered by Protection
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage for Installation
=
x Design Life of the Installation
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for
Installation =
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the fire
protection facilities together with the average discount rate. The
undiscounted value should be multiplied by the value at discount
rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount
Rate
Years
5%
8%
10%
10
0.772
0.671
0.617
20
0.621
0.490
0.426
25
0.564
0.427
0.362
30
0.512
0.376
0.313
Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation

2
x 63000

$ 22964
2
$ 45927
20
$ 918540

0.490
$ 450085

The risk reduction by installing heat detection and base foam injection is
provided on the risk histogram (Figure 3.2.3), and works out as 64% (ie,
100-36). Therefore, 0.64 x 450085 = US$288054 can be spent installing
SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 69

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

heat detection and base foam. If the cost of installing the fire protection is
less that US$288054, then installation is justified.

SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 70

HSE SPECIFICATION

Setting Clear Requirements

Shipping Pumps
Suppose we are installing 3 additional centrifugal shipping pumps at Yibal
A and wish to establish the levels of fire protection that can be justified.
Assuming that the 3 pumps have a combined capacity of 23000 BPD, and
using the pro-forma on page 18 of this Specification:
BASE CASE COST OF DAMAGE CALCULATION PRO-FORMA
System Constant
0.12402
based on frequency of damage x days lost for 3 pumps:
-4
(3.18x10 x 130 x 3 = )
Pump Type for centrifugal/axial or screw pumps use x 1
x1
for reciprocating pumps use x 10
Number of Pumps in Set for 2 pumps use x 0.6
x1
for 3 pumps use x 1.0
for 4 pumps use x 1.46
for 5 pumps use x 2.0
1
2
Cost of Deferred Oil = 2US$ per barrel
Net Oil Production for Pump Set in BPD
x 23000
= Base Case Annual Cost of Damage per Pump Set =
$ 5705
x Design Life of the Pump Set
20
= Undiscounted Design Cost of Damage for Pump
$ 114098
Set =
Discount Factor takes into account the design life of the
fire protection facilities together with the average discount
rate. The undiscounted value should be multiplied by the
value at discount rate taken from the following table below.
Value at Discount Rate
Years
5%
8%
10%
10
0.772
0.671
0.617
20
0.621
0.490
0.426
25
0.564
0.427
0.362
30
0.512
0.376
0.313
0.490
Base Case PV of Cost of Damage for Installation

$ 55908

The risk reduction by installing fire detection is provided on the risk


histogram (figure 3.2.3) and works out as 67% (ie. 100-33). Therefore,
0.67 x 55908 = US$37459 can be spent installing fire detection. If the cost
of installing the fire protection is less than US$ 37459, then installation is
justified.

SP-1075

REVISION 1.0

Page 71

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