WaterPollution

SummaryOfChapter19TomTietenberg
1. Waterpollutioncontrolhastwouniquecharacteristics:
a. Recreationbenefitsaremoreimportantthanforairpollution.
b. LargeeconomiesofScaleintreatingsewerageandotherwastescreatethe
possibilityforlargecentralizedtreatment,whileforairpollutiononsite
treatmentisstandardapproach.
2. Typesofwastereceivingwater
a. Surfacewaterrivers,lakes,oceansusedasasourcefordrinkingwater,
swimming,boating,fishing.
b. Vastreservesofgroundwaterbeneathawatertableinsoilsorrocks,
whichisusedprimarilyforirrigationandasasourceofdrinkingwater.
3. Sourcesofcontamination.
a. Pointsources,whichdischargewasteataspecificlocationthroughapipe
orditchintolakesorriversoroceans.Commonpointsourcesare
municipalsewageandindustrialsources.
b. Nonpointsourcesaffectthewaterinamoreindirectanddiffuseway.
Thesesourcesincludeagriculturalactivity,urbanstormwaterrunoffs,
forestryactivity.Contaminationfromagriculturalincludeserodedtopsoil,
pesticidesandfertilizer;urbanrunoffscontainsanumberofpollutants
includinghighquantitiesoflead.Thecontaminationofgroundwater
usuallyresultsinthemigrationofsubstancesfromsiteswherehigh
concentrationofchemicalscanbefound.Theseincludeindustrialwaste
storagesites,landfillsandfarms.Frompolicystandpointnonpoint
sourcesaremoredifficulttocontrolandhavereceivedlittlelegislative
attention.Nonpointsourcesnowcomposeoverhalfofthewasteborneby
thenationswaters.
4. OceanPollution.
Oilspillsandoceandumping.
5. Fundpollutants.
Thesepollutantsincludedegradablepollutants,whicharenormallyorganic
residuals,whichareattractedandbrokendownbybacteria.Thisprocessbywhich
organicwastesarebrokendownintoitscomponentsconsumesoxygen.Asall
higherlifeformsinwatercoursesareaerobic,theyrequireoxygen.Ifthewaste
loadislarge,thelevelofoxygenwillfallandthelesstolerantfishwilldiefirst.If
theoxygenlevelbecomesverylow,thebacteriadieandthestreambecomes
anaerobic.Suchastreambecomesdarkandstinks.Onemeasureofthecondition
ofabodyofwateristhelevelofdissolvedoxygen(DO).
Oxygensagisalocationalongastreamwherethelevelofdissolvedoxygenis
low.Demandplacedonastreambyaparticularvolumeofeffluentiscalled
biochemicaloxygendemand(BOD).Pollutionchargesmightbeimposedonthe
BODofaneffluent.

Somedischargesbyheatingthewatercausethermalpollution.Thispollution
lowerstheoxygencontentofthewaterandcauseecologicalchanges.
Nitrogenandphosphorousarepollutantswhichareplantnutrients.These
pollutantsstimulatethegrowthofalgaeandwaterweeds.Alakewithexcessive
nutrientsisatrophic.Persistentpollutantsarenoteffectivelybrokendownbythe
streamandaccumulateinthewaterandinthefoodchain.Infectiousorganisms
suchasbacteriaandvirusesarecarriedintosurfaceandgroundwatersby
domesticandanimalwastes.
Stockpollutantsarenondegradablepollutants,whichaccumulate.Themost
dangerousarelead,cadmiumandmercury.InanincidentinJapan200people
eitherdiedorsufferedbraindamagefrommercuryaccumulatedinthetissuesof
fisheatenfrequentlybylocalresidents.Fundpollutantsaredifficulttomonitor.
6. USwaterqualitylegislation.
Until1972federallegislationwaslimited.InthatyearCongresspassedthe
FederalWaterPollutionControlAct.Nationalgoalsweredefined.
7. Policyobjectives.
a. Thezerodischargegoalcalledfortheeliminationofallpollutingeffluents
intonavigablewatersby1985.Thefisableswimmablegoalwaswrittenas
aninterimobjectiveunlikethezerodischargegoalcouldbeachieved.The
notoxicsamountsgoalprohibitsthereleaseoftoxicsubstancesintoxic
amountsintoallwaterresources.
b. Usedesignation.Amongtheissuestheyshouldconsiderarepublicwater
supplies,propagationoffishandwildlife,recreationalactivitiesand
agriculturalpurposes.Atminimumdesignatedusesmustbesufficientto
supportswimmingandsomefishing.
8. Waterqualitycriteria.
ToinsurewaterusesareachievedEPAmustestablishcriteriaexpressedas
concentrationsofpollutantsorinqualitativestatements(narrativecriteria)orin
termsoftheconditionofanaquaticsystem(biocriteria).
9. Classificationofusesupport.
Tosustaintheuse
FullySupportingmeetscriteriaanddesignateduses
Treatenedmeetingstandardsbutthereareconcernsaboutdegradationinthe
nearfuture
PartiallySupportingmeetsstandardsmostofthetime
NoSupportsfailsstandards
10. Improvingwaterquality:controllingpointandnonpointsources.
Thefollowinginstrumentswereestablishedbythecleanwateract:
a. Efficientlimitationsandpermitstocontrolpointsources.
b. Fundingprogramsforpubliclyownedtreatmentworks(POTW)
c. Nonpointinitiatives.
Thechiefcontrolinstrumentsaretechnologybasedeffluentlimitationsasthe
mostimportantconsiderationsinsettingtheselimitationsastechnological
limitations.Thisisacommandandcontrolapproachbutaspollutersareallowed

tochoosethemethodbywhichthelimitisachieved,makingtheselimitations
moreaccuratelytermedperformancebasedstandard.
Allpointsourcesaresubjecttoeffluentlimitations,whichdifferforvarious
groups,suchaspubliclyownedtreatmentworks(POTW),indirectindustrial
pollutersthatreleaseeffluentstoPOTWsanddirectindustrialdischargesthat
releasepollutiondirectlytosurfacewaters.However,withinanydesignated
group,standardsareapplieduniformly.Fordirectindustrialdischargesthe
standardsareindustryspecificandvarybytheageofthefacilityandthetypeof
contaminantreleased.
Notethedistinctionbetweennewandexistingindustrialfacilities.Asforair
qualitystandardsnewsourcesmustmeetmorestringentlimitsthanexisting
sources.
Newsourcesaresubjecttobestdemonstratedcontroltechnology(BADCT)
Existingsources.Forconventionalpollutantsbestconventionalcontrol
technology(BCT)andfornonconventionalandtoxicpollutantsbestavailable
technology(BAT).ForBCTthestandardsincludetheconsiderationforthe
relationshipbetweenassociatedbenefitsandcosts.
11. Permitsystem.
Oncedeterminedpollutionlimitsarecommunicatedthroughapermittingsystem
calledNationalPollutantDischargeEliminationSystem(NPDES).Thepermits,
whichareadministeredthroughthestates,indicatepreciselywhattheeffluent
limitationsare.
12. Analysisofeffluentlimitation.
Thetechnologybasedeffluentlimitshavebeenblamedforthelackofprogress
towardsachievingnationalobjectives.
13. Imprecisestatutorydefinitions.
Thestandardsarebasedonwhatistechnologicallyfeasible,asopposedtowhatis
necessarytoachievewaterquality.Butthesearewatersforwhichtheeffluent
limitsareinsufficient.Theseareconsideredtobewaterqualitylimitedand
requirethesettingofmorestringentcontrolcalledmaximumdailyloads
(TMDLs).Thesearetobemetifthedesiredlevelofwaterqualityisnotbeing
achieved,evenifapollutingsourceisalreadysatisfyingthetechnologybased
limits.
Thefactthatmodificationmaybenecessarycallsintoquestionthe
characterizationoftechnologybasedlimitationsasbest.Thetermsbest
availableandbestconventionalarenotexactterms.Withoutmorecareful
guidelinesandobjectivedecisionrulesofficialsareleftwiththetaskoftryingto
inferwhatthesetermsmean.
14. Meetingzerodischargegoal.
Thezerodischargegoalwasoverlyambitiousanditislikelyaninefficient
objectivesinceitisinherentlybenefitbased.ThelegislationrequiresEPAto
advancestandardstowardszerolimitasnewtechnologybecomesavailable.But
onlyinafewinstances(onshoreoilandgaswells)hasthislimitbeenimposed.
15. Lackofanefficiencycriterion.

InthedefinitionoftheBCTstandardthereisalackofprecisioninthereference
tobenefitsandcosts.Accordingtothelaw,officialsaretoconsiderthe
reasonablenessoftherelationshipbetweenthecostsofattainingareductionin
effluentsandtheeffluentreductionbenefitsderived.Thisisafarcryfromsetting
abatementlevelsatthepointwheremarginalbenefitsandmarginalcostsare
equal.Also,insettingBATstandardsonlycostsareamongthelistof
determinants,thereisnoreferencetoeconomicbenefits.Aslongasthelawdoes
notmandatethat,standardsbesettomaximizenetbenefits,efficientabatement
levelswillnotbeachieved.
16. Costineffectivedecisionmaking.
Asallpollutantswithinanindustrygrouparesubjecttouniformityofeffluent
limitsmarginalabatementcostswillnotbeequalizedacrosspollutingfirmsand
theprogramwillnotbecosteffective.
ForevidenceseeXeroxedpage.
AlsoseeXeroxofthesimulationstudyoftheDelawareEstuary.
17. ThePOTWfundingprogram
CongresssupportstheconstructionofPOTW,whicharepotentiallysignificant
sourcesofwatercontamination.Thesefacilitiesreleasepesticides,heavymetals,
virusesandbacteria.Unlessmunicipalwastewaterisproperlytreated,the
pollutionthreatensgroundwater,surfacewater,andaquaticlife.
Priorto1984thefederalgovernmentcostsharewas75%.Thiswasreducedto
55%in1984,whenstateaidwasaddedthemunicipalsharewasonly5%.These
werelittleincentivestominimizecosts.Thiswasawasteofresources.Also,as
theprogramsubsidizedconstructionnotoperatingcosts,theplantswerenot
operatedeffectively.Duringthe1970sinspectionsshowedthatonlyhalfthe
plantswereoperatingeffectively.
Onestudyshowedthatifthelocalsharewereincreasedsignificantly,capitalcost
wouldbereducedbyasmuchas30%.Furthermore,thereisevidencethatonlya
smallportionoffederalfundswereincrementaltowhatwouldhavebeenspent
anywaybylocalgovernments.Bethatasitmaythepercentageofthepopulation
thatisservedbyatleastsecondarytreatmentdoubledbetween1968and1996.
18. Nonpointsourcemanagementprogram.
In1987thegovernmentaddedaprogramthatcalledfarthedevelopmentof
programstocontrolnonpointsources.Bytheprimaryresponsibilitytodevelop
programstodealwithnonpointrestswiththestates.
19. Delegatingtostatesthepros.
Nonpointsourcesaredifficulttoidentifyandisolate.Asrunoffsourcesdepend
onprecipitationandweather,geologicalconditionsandsoilpatternsvaryfrom
locationtolocation.Theuseofcentralized,broadbasedcontrolsislikelytobe
ineffective.Also,nonpointrunoffisassociatedwithagriculture,mining,forestry
andurbandevelopmentthathistoricallyhavebeencontrolledbylocal
governments.
20. Theconsofstateaction.

Thestatehaslittleinformationonnonpointpollution.Thereissimplyisntmuch.
Also,inconsistentactionsbyonestatewillharmthewatersofanotherstate
EPAischargedtoarrangeforinterstatemanagement.
Thefederalgovernmentspendsonly1.6%oftotalexpendituresonwaterquality
onnonpointsources.Andthispercentagehasgonedownintime.Also,federal
farmsupportwhichtendtopromotespecializationincertaincrops.Plantingthe
samecropsyearafteryeardepletesthesoilandincreasesvulnerabilitytopests
andsoincreasestheuseiffertilizerandpesticides.
Studiesofnonpointsourceshaveinvestigatedwhethertaxonnitrogenusewould
beburdentofarmers.Itwasfoundthatquantityrestrictionswouldreduce
revenuesquitealotandasthedemandfornitrogenispriceinelasticveryhigh
ratesoftaxationwouldbeneeded.Theseresultssuggestthatunilateralstate
controlwouldbedifferentbecauseitwouldplacethefarmerinthatstatein
jeopardy.Ifallstateactedtogether,thecostscouldbepassedontoconsumer.
Also,astudyinColoradowheremunicipalities(pointsources)coexistwitha
largenumberofnonpointsourcesassourcesofphosphoroustheconventionway
ofconcentratingonpointsourcesincreasedcosts.Sothatamorebalanced
programcouldbeachievedatasubstantialcostsaving.Themoregeneralpointis
theiraspointsourcesarecontrolledtohigherandhigherdegreesrisingmarginal
costswillmakecontrollingnonpointsourcesincreasinglyattractive.
21. Pollutionchargesandpermits.
Chargescouldbeusedtocontrolwaterpollution,especiallyiftheyarevariedby
locationtoaccountforvaryingdamages.Europeans(Germany)institutedcharges
overtheoppositionofstatesandtheindustrialsector.Thechargesaredecreased
sharplyifdischargerscomplywithmandatedminimumstandards.Ifthepolluter
usestechnologybasedstandards,thechargesarereducedby75%,thushave
greatlyincreasedinvestmentinwastetreatment.
SomepermitmarketshavebeenintroducedintheUSatstatelevelbutthenumber
oftradeshasbeenquitelimited.Buttheseearlyprogramsseemtobetheresultof
specialcircumstancessuchasrulesonwhocouldparticipateandwhenrules
wouldexpire.Also,programparticipantsstillhadtomeettechnologybased
effluentlimitsthusislikelytodecreasetheirinterestintradinginpermits.
22. PretreatmentStandards.
SeeXeroxofcasestudyofJewelryinRhodeIsland.
23. Summary
a. Historicallyemphasisisoncontrolofconventionalpollutant
b. Morerecentlymoreemphasisoncontroloftoxicsandtheprotectionof
groundwaterandoceans.
c. Unlikeairpollutionwheretherehasbeenashifttowardsmorecost
effectiveapproaches,thecontrolofwaterstillreliesonmunicipal
wastewatertreatmentandstandardimposedonindustrialsources.
d. Untilrecentlynonpointsourceshavebeenignored.

e. Technologyprogressisnotstimulatedbythecurrentapproach.Thereis
toomuchrelevanceondirectregulationratherthanonpermitsortaxes.
TheUScouldlearnfromtheexperienceofEurope.
f. Thecourtsystemhasassumedresponsibilityofoilspills.Inpracticethis
approachhasbeenhamperedbyliabilitylimitationandtheveryhighcost
ofoilspillcourtcase(SeeXeroxofcasestudy)
24. Protectingdrinkingwater.
In1993400,000residentsofMilwaukeebecameillfromawaterbornedisease.
Morethan40personslosttheirlives.Thiswastheresultofhumanerror,aging
facilities,illegaldischargesandmonitoringfailures.Groundwateristhesource
for50%ofAmericansincluding99%ofruralresidents.
25. Waterlegislation.
Federallegislationofwaterqualitydatesbackto1912.TheSaleDrinkingWater
Actof1974allowsEPAtoestablishdrinkingwaterstandards.The1996
amendmentsintegrateriskassessmentandbenefitcostanalysisintostandard
settingprocedures.Theseamendmentsalsoauthorized91billionayearinfederal
fundsforinfrastructuralinvestments.
26. RelationshipofSDWAtootherlaws.
a. Theactismorefocusedanddesignedtotapwatersafe.
b. ThegoalsofSWDAarenotindependentofClearWaterAct.
c. Groundwaterprotectismorefragmented.Manystatutesimplementedby
differentgovernmentagencies.Butnounifiedoversight.Limitedrecently
therewasthefalsebeliefthatgroundwaterwasprotectedfrom
contaminationbysoilandrock.Buteverystatehasfoundsame
contaminationingroundwater.
d. TheFoodandDrugAdministrationregulatebottledwater,butthereisno
indicationthatbottledwaterissaferthantapwaterasthesamehealth
standardsareapplicabletoboth.Also,itisallegedthatsomebottledwater
istapwateronlyabout1000timesmoreexpensive.
The1986amendmentslist83contaminantsforwhichdrinkingwaterstandards
aretobeset.Manyofsubstancescoveredareincludedinsuperfundlegislation
andthepesticides,whichmustberegisteredunderotherlegislation.
27. Theestablishmentofdrinkingwaterregulationsconsistsoftheseparts:
a. Thesettingofmaximumcontaminantlevelgoal.Thisdefinesthelevelof
apollutantatwhichnoknownadversehealtheffectoccur(MCLG).
b. Thesettingofmaximumcontaminantlevel(MCL)tobesetorcloseon
possibletoMCLGaspossible.
c. WherefeasibilityisdeterminedbyBAT.
28. Benefitcostanalysisofnewarsenicstandard.
SeeXerox.
Thepricingofwater.

Addendum.
IndustrialWaterPollution
By
WinstonHarrington.
1. In1971Congressrejectedeffluentchargeamendments.Acommandandcontrol
systemappearedtoprovidemoreassurancethatreductionsinpollutionwouldbe
achieved.
2. Twobasictools
a. Wastewatertreatment
b. Regulationsgoverningwaterfrompointsaurus.
3. RegulationsforPOTW.
Todealwithorganicwastecontainingabout300milligramsperlitereachof
BODandtotalsuspendedsubstancesTSSandphosphorousandnitrogen.In1968
60%ofhouseholdsservedbyPOTWhadsecondarytreatment(useofphysical
processesskimming,screening,setting)followedbybiologicalprocessesthat
removed8090%ofBODandTSS.Onegeneralobjectivewastohavesecondary
treatmentthroughouttheU.S.andtertiarytreatmentwherenecessary.
4. TypicalrestrictiononPOTW.
a. Specificlimitationsonwastewaterandsludge.
b. Limitationsonconcentrationofnumeroustoxins.
c. Criteriaforusesofsludge.
d. 85%removalofBOD.
e. Requirementsoneffectiveoperationandmaintenance.
5. Regulationsforindirectdischarges.
Muchindustrialwasteissimilartodomesticwaste(organicmaterial).Thiscanbe
treatedinPOTW.However,industrialwastercancreateproblems.Toxic,or
highlyacidicoralkalinematerialcandisruptthemicrobialecologyofwastewater
treatment.Toxicandotherwastescanpassthroughuntreated.Alcoholcanpose
threatoffire.
6. Pretreatmentguidelines.
Setupapretreatmentprogramplusspecificprohibitionagainstcertainindustrial
discharges.Therearetechnologicallybasedpretreatmentstandards.Forother
industriesstandardsforpretreatmentaresetatstateorlocallevelordelegatedto
POTW.Thesetreatmentstandardstonewandexistingplantsdischarginginto
sewersweredesignedtopreventinterferencewithplantoperationsandlimitpass
throughofuntreatedpollutants.
7. Tosetlocallimitsforpollutantdischargesbyindustry,thePOTWconductsa
headworkanalysistodeterminewhataplantcansafelyacceptfromnon
householdsector.TheamountsoallocatediscalledMaximumAllowable
IndustrialLoading(MAIL).NowthePOTWmustallocatetheseloadsto
industrialusesandatleastoneinPassaicN.J.usestradablepermitstoallocate
theseloads.
8. Regulationsfordirectindustrialdischarge.

EPAhadtosetuptechnologicalregulationsfor30broadindustrygroups.To
establishBestPracticalTechnology(BPT),whichwasbasedontheaverageofthe
bestplants.BestAvailTechnology(BAT)isthebestofthebest.Stillmore
stringentwereNewSourcePerformanceStandards(NSPS).
9. RoleInputs.
TosetthesestandardEPAhadtocollectavastamountofinformationandto
establishpollutantsdischargesinhundredsofindustrialsubcategories.Duetothe
greatheterogeneityinproductsandprocesseseachindustryhadtobebroken
downintosubcategories360industrialsubcategories.Buttheeffluentguideline
processwasremarkablyproductivity.
10. BATstandards.
The1977AmendmentsputagreaterfocusontoxicsandEPAhadtosetstandards
fortoxicpollutantsin23industries.EPAhadtroubleimplementingthestandard
fortoxicsandaslateas1992only33%ofdischargehadpermitsbasedonBAT.
Theresthadpermitsbasedonthebestprofessionaljudgment(BPJ)ofthepermit
writer.
11. Zerodischarge.
BATretainstothisdayanendofpipefocusandEPAhasissuedzerodischarge
regulationsinfewindustrialcategories.
12. Regulationstringency.
Thereislittleevidencethatindustryintervenedtocontrolthecontentof
regulations.Anindependentevaluationshowedthatthequalityofthedocuments
preparedbyEPAwhatevertheinformationpresentedwasinternallyconsistent
andwhethercalculationscouldbereplicatedhadamarkedimpactinthe
stringencyofthestandardsadopted.Also,staffturnoverduringtheprocesswas
associatedwithasignificantweakeningofthestandards.
13. Costs.
ThereisconsiderableevidencethatmarginalcostofBODabatementvaryby
industryandbyplantsize.Forduckssmallplantthemarginalcosts$3.15perkg
whileforchickenlargeplantsitisonly$0.10.ButEPAdidnotemphasizecost
effectivenessinsteadisconcentratedonaffordability,acriterionthatfocuseson
theoverallimpactofregulationsonthefinancialhealthoffirmsandonthe
workersintheindustry.
14. Comparisonofexanteandexpostcosts.
Theactualcompliancecostin1986ismuchlessthanthepredictedcostsin1979.
Threeexplanations:
a. The1979estimateswerebasedofftheshelftechnologyanddidnotallow
fortechnologicalchange.
b. ThebaselinelevelofpollutioncontrolwasbetterthanEPAexpected.
c. Theregulationswererelaxedduringthetimebetweenthecontractors
reportandthefinalpromulgatedstandards.
15. PatternsofAbatementInvestment.

Twotypesofinvestmentsarepossible.Endofpipeinvestmentsandprocess
changes.Overtimeinvestmentsshiftedtowardsprocesschangesfrom18%to
30%.
16. Havepollutantdischargesbeenreduces.
In1990EPAestimatedthatfullcompliancewithBATbasedpermitsand
secondarytreatmentforPOTWwouldleadto97%reductionindirectdischarges.
In1985thenumberofdirectdischargesfoundinnoncompliancewasrelatively
low614%.ButthestandardswerebasednotonBAT,butonBPJ.Secondary
wastewatertreatmentinBOTWincreasedfrom42%in1970to74%in1985.
ForPOTWtherateofsignificantnoncompliancewas1%in1990.Butinauditof
POTWpretreatmentprograms54%ofindustrialuserswerefoundtobein
significantnoncompliance.Theyfailedtoobserveatleastonecomponentofthe
POTWpretreatmentprograms.
Sountilthemid1990sthepollutionreductionsweresignificantlylessthanwhat
wouldhavebeenachievedbyfullimplementation.Thefailureaccountsforat
leastpartofthegapbetweenpredictedandactualcompliancecosts.
17. Haswaterqualityimproved?
SpecificbodiesofwaterPotomacnearWashington,Delawarenear
Philadelphia,ChicagoRiver,BostonHarborandNewYork.However,overall
estimatehavetocomeby.
Theseare424stationsinNationalStreamQualityAssessmentNetwork.During
the1980therewasnosignificantimprovementinDO.Butamong26stationsnear
urbanareasthereweregreaterimprovements.Also,suspendendedsolidsdid
decrease.Improvementswereslowbecauseofincompleteimplementationof
CleanWaterActandbecauseactdidnotdomuchaboutnonpointsources.
18. Changesinpolicylandscape19722002.
Thesechangesdifficulttodocumentbecauseoflackofdata.
POTWConstructionProgram.Becauseoffederalsubsidiesthesewerevery
capitalintensiveandsomeareaswereabletogetconstructiongrantsthatdoubled
theircapacityandresultedinexcesscapacity.
Thisexcesscapacityallowedindustrialdischargestosendtheirorganicwastesto
beprocessedbyPOTW.AcaseinpointisaSmithfieldsFoodPlantdischarging
phosphorousintoChesapeakeBay.Theyhadtroublemeetingtheirobligations
untiltheproblemwasresolvedbypipingthewastewater20milestoan
underutilizedPOTW.
19. Trendsindirectandindirectdischarge.
Manyindustrialplantshaveschoicebetweenseekingpermitsanddischarging
directlyorsendingwastewatertoPOTW.Inthelast25yearstheresbeena
gradualshifttowardsindirectdischarge.InMarylandthenumberofdirect
dischargeshasdeclinedfrom50to35%.In19957000directdischargesmore
thanhalfwerePOTW.Atthesametimethereare35,000indirectdischargers.
Costsareaconsideration.Onedairyplantreports$3.00costsperlb.ofBODor
TSS.ThefeeschangedbyPOTWaremuchless.Theyhaveexcesscapacity
inducedbytheConstructionGrantsProgram.

Industrialfirmshaveotherreasonsforavoidingdirectdischargetherequirement
fordirectdischargesaremorestringentandaremorecloselyscrutinizedbythe
governmentandenvironmentalwatchdoggroups.
Thishasfollowingpolicyramifications:
Throughthemid1940sthedischargeregulationwaslessvigorousatPOTW.The
noncomplianceforpretreatmentpermitrequirementswas50%.Also,insome
partsofnortheastandMidwesthavecombinesanitaryandstormsewerandtheir
untreatedwastescanbypassPOTWandflowdirectlyintowaterbodies.
20. Thespreadofwaterbasedsewersurcharges.
POTWarenowchargingforBODbythelbsandTSSandfornitrogen
phosphorusandfats,oilandgrease.Thefeevariesfrom$0.60(Providence,R.I.)
to$0.06(Princeton,NJ).
21. Arethesesurchargeseffluentfees?
Aretheylargeenoughtohaveincentiveeffects?Ifso,thenfirmswouldinstall
pretreatment.Clearlyratesarenotsetwithsomeaggregateemissiontarget.Some
fragmentaryinformationforthreedairyplantsindicatesthecostofpretreatmentis
lessthanwastebasedfees.Butinformationfromotherdairyoperatorssuggests
thatpretreatmentofdairywastesisrarelycostefficientrelativetosendingthe
untreatedwastetothePOTWandpayingthefee.
Butbecauseofthefeefirmsreducewasteloadsbychangesinproduct
specifications,productionprocess,productsequencingandproductionruns.Yet,
firmshavenotbeenfullyadjustableastheauthorreportsthattheinonemulti
plantfirmthecentralofficepaidthefeeswithoutbeingawareofwhatkindsof
plantslevelwastereductioneconomieswereavailable.
InprincipalthePOTWcouldcontrolthelevelofindustrialwastebychangingthe
feelevel.ButitisunlikelythatEPAwouldallowthisinstrumenttobeusedasa
rationingdeviseandwouldinsistsonqualityrestrictionsbasedonanew
headworkanalysis.
22. Conclusions.
Aperformanceauditofcleanwateractin1993foundconsiderabledelaysin
promulgatingtherequiredBATstandards.In1972thefocusoftheprogramwas
onBPT,BAT,WSPSfordirectdischarges.Butnowwithashifttowardsindirect
dischargestheregulatoryprogramisgraduallyevolvingintoaneconomic
incentiveprogram:
a. Wastebasedsurcharges
b. Useofpermitsorfeesfordirectdischarges
Commandandcontrolappeartohaveastrongtendencytoadaptbyincorporating
economicincentivesintotheirstructure.