ASTORGA vs.

PEOPLEFacts:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, WenefredoManiscan,
Renato Militante,CrisantoPelias, SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Kr. and SPO1
RufoCapoquian, members of DENR RegionalOperations Group, were sent to
Western Samar to conduct possible illegal logging activities.Upon
investigation of the group, Mayor Benito Astorga was found to be the
owner of two (2)boats. A heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for
reinforcements. Ten armed menarrived in the scene. The offended parties
were then brought to Mayor Astogas house wherethey had dinner and
drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian further admitted that it
wasraining during the time of their detention.Mayor Astorga was convicted of
arbitrary detention by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.
Held:
No. The elements of arbitrary detention are as follows:1. That the offender is a
public officer or employee.2. That he detains a person.3. That the detention is without
legal ground.The determinative factor in arbitrary detention is fear. The
Court found no proof that Astorgainstilled fear in the minds of the offended
parties. There was also no actual restraint imposed onthe offended parties. The
events that transpired created reasonable doubt and are capable of other
interpretations. Mayor Astorga could have extended his hospitality and served
dinner anddrinks to the offended parties. He could have advised them to stay in the
island inasmuch as seatravel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains.
Astorga even ate and served alcoholic drinksduring dinner. The guilt of the
accused has not been proven with moral certainty. Astorga wasacquitted

People Vs. Sy Chua Case Digest

People Vs. Sy Chua
396 SCRA 657
G.R. No.136066-67
February 4, 2003

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-
appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles
City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their
back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber
firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated
the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez
at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different
version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the
store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the
attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face
his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course
of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused,
so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police
officers companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene,
pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him
for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and

(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on
him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer
had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid
being akin to a stop and frisk.

The trial court confused the concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely
used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be
arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this
exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did
not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime. Reliable information alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the
alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to
make any initial inquiry into accused-appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles is applicable
to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police
operatives on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted

Lacson Vs. Perez Case Digest
Lacson Vs. Perez

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on

May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter
effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for
the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected
by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them
were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also
contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint
being that hold departure orders were issued against them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have
declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants
of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law:

Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered
to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for
the delay of the same.
If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure
orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature
being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of
habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners
are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang

Case Digest on BASCO vs. RAPATALO 269 SCRA 220

November 10, 2010

THE FACTS: An information for murder was filed against Morente. The accused Morente filed a
petition for bail. The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not
heard since the respondent Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said
date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did
not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial was set. Again, the petition for bail
was not heard on said date as the prosecutions witnesses in connection with said petition were
not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned
that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all.
Upon investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order
dated June 29, 1995was issued on the basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the
bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva which stated: No objection:
P80,000.00, signed and approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent
Judge. Note that there was already a release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the
marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail
petition was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another hearing was scheduled
for July 17, 1995.
Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutors option not to
oppose the petition as well as the latters recommendation setting the bailbond in the amount of
P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he
had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved
the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he
was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Furthermore,
the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.
Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and
a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of complainants motion for reconsideration. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration.Accused is confined at the La Union Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a
sworn letter-complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with
gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a
murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.
ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING
EVIDENCE?
HELD: Nope.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Leo M. Rapatalo,
RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is only in theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of
the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct
ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also been
used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or
whom the judges might not want to release.
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in
cases where the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states,
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be
sound, and exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves
the exercise of the judges individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise
be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation
of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control.
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable
by death,reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or
to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination. If a
party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due
process.
The cited cases (w/c I didnt include kse madami) are all to the effect that when bail is
discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should
first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties.
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where
the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to the discretion
of the court. A hearing is likewise required if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for bail is required, as can be gleaned from
the Tucay v.Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in
Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a number of
cases held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application
for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain
not only the strength of the state s evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.
After hearing, the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as
to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges evaluation of the evidence
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense.
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals that respondent Judge granted bail to the
accused without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong
despite his knowledge that the offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the procedure
laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94.
Respondent judge admittedly granted the petition for bail based on the prosecutions declaration
not to oppose the petition. Respondents assertion, however, that he has a right to presume that
the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of the latters familiarity with the case due to
his having conducted the preliminary investigation is faulty. Said reasoning is tantamount to
ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt
of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
reposed upon the prosecutor.
The absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for granting bail to the accused.
It is the courts determination after a hearing that the guilt of the accused is not strong that forms
the basis for granting bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on the
recommendation made by the prosecutor but should have ascertained personally whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the prosecutors recommendation.
Moreover, there will be a violation of due process if the respondent Judge grants the application
for bail without hearing since Section 8 of Rule 114 provides that whatever evidence presented
for or against the accuseds provisional release will be determined at the hearing.
The practice by trial court judges of granting bail to the accused when the prosecutor refuses or
fails to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong can be
traced to the case ofHerras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons. It is to be recalled that Herras
Teehankee was decided 50 years ago under a completely different factual milieu. Haydee
Herras Teehankee was indicted under a law dealing with treason cases and collaboration with
the enemy. The said instructions given in the said case under the 1940 Rules of Court no
longer apply due to the amendments introduced in the 1985 Rules of Court.
It should be noted that there has been added in Section 8 crucial sentence The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but
upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless
the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify. is not found in the
counterpart provision, Section 7, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Court. The above-underscored
sentence in section 8, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Court, as amended, was added to address
a situation where in case the prosecution does not choose to present evidence to oppose the
application for bail, the judge may feel duty-bound to grant the bail application. The prosecution
under the revised provision is duty bound to present evidence in the bail hearing to prove
whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and not merely to oppose the grant of bail
to the accused. However, the nature of the hearing in an application for bail must be equated
with its purpose i.e., to determine the bailability of the accused. If the prosecution were
permitted to conduct a hearing for bail as if it were a full-dress trial on the merits, the purpose of
the proceeding, which is to secure the provisional liberty of the accused to enable him to
prepare for his defense, could be defeated. At any rate, in case of a summary hearing, the
prosecution witnesses could always be recalled at the trial on the merits.
In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the jurisprudential principles just enunciated, SC
reiterated the duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the
trial judge in cases of bail applications

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE,

G.R. No. 189122
Petitioner,THE COURT OF APPEALSand PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

THE FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste wasconvicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide
andsentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor
asminimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal
as maximum.
[11]
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
[12]
Pending appeal, he filed anurgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing
his advanced age and healthcondition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.
[13]
It invoked the bedrockprinciple in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during thecourse of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
[15]
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitionerstheory is
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not morethan 20
years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5
areabsent, bail
must
be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
THE ISSUE
Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bailshould
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
thirdparagraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court provides: S e c . 5 .
Bail, when discretionary
.
Upon conviction by theR e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t o f a n
o f f e n s e n o t p u n i s h a b l e b y death,
reclusion perpetua
, o r l i f e i m p r i s o n m e n t , a d m i s s i o n t o b a i l i s discretionary
. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by
thet r i a l c o u r t d e s p i t e t h e f i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l , p r o v i d e d i t h
a s n o t transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decisionof the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offensefrom non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed withand resolved by the
appellate court.
I f t h e p e n a l t y i m p o s e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s i m p r i s o n m e n t exceedi
ng six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bailshall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice tothe accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or

h a b i t u a l d e l i n q u e n t , o r h a s c o m m i t t e d t h e c r i m e a g g r a v a t e d b y t h e circu
mstance
of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without avalid justification