Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter– II
(Pashtu Tappa)1
Their services were hired both by the Islamic East and the Secular /
Christian West. The cry of "Islam in danger" was raised, and the
movement of ghaza and jehad was carried to the extreme. Initially,
about four dozen factions and groups, under various names old and
new and boasting a variety of flags and programs sprang up among
the refugees in Pakistan. They could be divided into the following
main categories:
1: Twenty religious oriented groups, covering the spectrum
from conservatives / traditionalists to revolutionary
Islamists.
2: Five national-democratic groups.
3: Eleven non-Moscow communists of varying shades.6
The leading role among the Afghan refugees was played by the
following elements:
a) The mullahs and pirs, who preached the necessity and the
holiness of jehad.
b) The maliks and khans, and minor tribal chiefs who
consolidated their power in the jehad and founded local and
tribal organizations.
c) The Jamiat and the Hezb-e-Islami, with their various
respective factions.
d) Moderate organizations.
63
to the extent that they had to leave Pakistan for other countries. This
brain drain, unwisely encouraged by the anti-Soviet bloc, deprived
the Afghans' leadership of right thinking and guidance.9
Genuine lovers of freedom and other anti-Soviet elements in
Pakistan were stressing the need for unity among the refugee
organizations for realization of their common cause, but did so in
vain. The first attempt of an alliance was made in 1978, when the
fresh wave of refugees poured into Pakistan, including some
religious scholars and leaders. The religious leaders forced Hezb-e-
Islami (HIA) and Jamiat-e-Islami (JIA), the only two old parties at
that time, to coalesce. These parties had grown from the Jawanan-e-
Musalman (Young Muslims), backed by Jama’at-e-Islami of
Pakistan, and were still claiming to be upholding the cause of Islamic
brotherhood. The alliance of these parties was forged in August
1978, under the name of Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami-e- Afghanistan
(HIIA) and was chaired by Maulvi Sakhi Dad Faez of the JIA, which
was later challenged by Eng. Gulbadin Hekmatyar who suggested a
"third person" for the post. Consequently, Maulvi Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi, one of the promoters, was chosen to replace Faez.
However, Maulvi Mohammadi and his group of religious followers
failed to administer the two component parties of the alliance, and it
ultimately fell apart in January 1979. And HIIA became a new party
under the leadership of Maulvi Muhammad Mohammadi.
In September of 1979, the Jamiat-e-Islami, the HIIA and newly
formed Jabha-e- Nejat-e-Mill-Afghanistan (JNMA) of Sibghatullah
Mujaddedi agreed to form an alliance known as
Paiman-Ittehad-e-Islami (a pledge to Islamic unity). A joint council
65
was elected to run the alliance, but for all practical purposes it also
proved to be a paper-alliance as each component party maintained its
own office and implemented its own program.10
On 27th November, 1979, Jehad was declared jointly by the
resistance parties in Peshawar but no further details are available
about who proclaimed the jehad. It should be noted that even from
Islamic perspective it was not justified to declare jehad against
PDPA regime, because the Soviets forces intervened later on in
December. However, despite the fact that this activity took place
before the Soviet intervention, already by this time the armed
resistance in its own self-understanding was a jehad, though initially
the PDPA regime was not entirely unsuccessful in labeling the rebels
as ashrar (sinful) and basmach (bandit).11
An interesting account is given by S. Fida Yunis, former Charge
d’ Affairs, Pakistan Embassy, Kabul (1981-92), and once an officer
on special duty in Afghan Refugees Commissionrate, Peshawar in
one of his books Afghanistan volume-II:
On December 9, 1978, at the behest of Pakistan’s Foreign affairs
(ministry) a meeting of the following Afghan [elders/leaders] was
arranged at the residence of the author (Fida Yunis), behind Jabar
Flats, Tehkal Bala, and Peshawar:
1: S. Mujaddadi,
2: G. Hekmatyar,
3: Dr. Bashir Zakria (an Afghan holding US nationality),
66
4: B. Rabbani,
5: S. A E Gilani,
6: Maulvi Ghulam Nabi Khan Aamer,
7: Qazi Muhammad Amin Waqad,
8: Maulvi Nasrullah Ahmadzai of Paktia,
9: Shafiullah Muhammad of Kama,
10: Abdul Qader Bayan Khel Mullagori.
The participants appreciating the need for unity, and a struggle
against the communist Kabul regime; however, soon the atmosphere
became charged when differences developed over the leadership of a
united front and in the discussion every one started to accuse the
other. The meeting was called off lest the situation went out of
control.
The second meeting was scheduled for December 11, 1978 but
cancelled by the Foreign Ministry.12
S. Fida Yunis further commented that it was perhaps under
pressure from Jama’at-e-Islami Pakistan and the ISI that the Foreign
Ministry changed the decision, due to fear of losing its favorite,
Hekmatyar, in the future overall leadership of a united front. Even on
5th December, 1978, the young members of the Hekmatyar group
attacked the office of Rabbani and proclaimed Hekmatyar as the sole
leader of the Afghan refugees.13
67
In February 1981, the HIIA, the JNMA and the MMIA formally
denounced the IIA, and declared that they were considering another
alliance. The IIA was, thus, reduced from an alliance to a party led
by Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf. Commenting on the making and
breaking of alliances, a contemporary Afghan writer Azizur Rahman
Ulfat tried to expose the tactics of selfish elements “who are out to
sell their country and the nation for a mess of pottage” by publishing
in 1981 a Pashtu document along with English translation signed by
S. Ahmad Gillani, Maulvi Y. Khalis, S. Mujaddadi and Maulvi
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi in a booklet. Following is the English
translation of the document:
“For the reasons that Ittehad-e-Islami Burai-Azadi
Afghanistan under the Presidentship of honorable
Sayaf within a period of one year, and in accordance
with the manifesto which we agreed upon, this union
did not only benefit each constituent member on the
basis of its share from foreign aid, but also as Sayaf
himself admitted has violated the manifesto of the
union, and now the time has come for a new party to
be brought into existence under his guidance. Such
happening would bring shame and disgrace from the
outside world to us. For these reasons we announce
the dissolution of previous union or Ittehad and make
an effort to bring a real new unity which would have
a united leadership for the member’s parties. Also we
expect that Mr. Sayaf would refrain from dishonesty
69
HIA (H), the HIA (K), the HIIA (Mohammadi), the JNMA, and the
MMIA. However, the MMIA, one of the initiators, stepped out. But
the names of HIIA (Mansoor) and IIA of Sayaf were also not
included.
The Main differences among these parties were over the
leadership, representation, weapons and funds. It was finally resolved
to form a High Council with 10 members from each component
party, and to give every party the chance of leadership in rotation.
The order of priority was, however, not defined. The parties changed
position and eventually there came into existence two alliances:
(a) a 7-party alliance or IIMA comprising the HIA (H), the HIA
(K), the JIA, and the IIA (these four parties were officially
recognized); as well as the HIIA (Mansoor), the HIIA
(Moezin), and JNMA (Mohammad Mir) (which were not
officially recognized as parties);
(b) a 3-party alliance or IIMA, comprising HIIA (Mohammadi),
the JNMA (Mujaddidi), and the MMIA (all officially
recognized)
The Afghan resistance movement can broadly be classified
into three categories.
(1) The Peshawar-Based Seven.
(2) The Tehran Based Eight, and18
(3) Those without a base outside Afghanistan.
71
The party claims to have thirty thousand men readily available for
action anywhere in the field.27
The second most important resistance party was Jamiat-e-
Islami, headed by Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, a Tajik and the only
non-Pashtun among the resistance leaders. The Jamiat was
committed to a radical restructuring of all aspects of life in
Afghanistan i.e. political, judicial, social, economic and
educational in accordance with the Islamic laws and principles. It
was generally referred to in the west as fundamentalist. Though,
fundamentalist in nature, but its leadership is more liberal as
compared to Hekmatyar for the implementation of Islamic laws.
Rabbani is an appropriate symbol of his party's more moderate
style. The supporters of the Jamiat are mostly Dari speaking Tajiks
and to a lesser extent the Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan.28
Rabbani came to Pakistan in 1978 and formed a party along with
Khalis and Hekmatyar but later on he left them and organized his
own party, the Jamiat-e-Islami. Some of the reputed commanders
in its ranks were Ismail Khan, Zabih Ullah and Ahmad Shah
Masud. Rabbani enjoyed support in Panjsher Valley (Kapisa
Province), in Badakhshan, Takhar, and Parwan Provinces; and he
also had some influence in Kunar, Paktia and few other Pashto
speaking provinces of Afghanistan. The part’s fighting strength
was about twelve to thirteen thousands. 29
The Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (Khalis Group) was another
fundamentalist party of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Younis
Khalis got his preliminary education at various religious
institutions in Afghanistan. Later he moved to NWFP for further
76
public opinion, and had been made privy to the military’s Afghan
policy.60
Pakistani Political Parties and Refugees Parties:
The religio-political parties and groups of Pakistan openly
supported the refugee’s parties and the Afghan Jehad. Among
religious parties the Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam of Maulana Fazal
Rehman and Samiul Haq had close and cordial relations with
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Younis Khalis. But for all
practical purposes they failed to extend substantial material
assistance to the refugees or their favorite groups because they did
not fit as well into the agenda of Zia ul-Haq regime as comparison
with the Jama’at-e-Islami. Naturally Jama’at-e-Islami emerged as
the only relgio- political party in Pakistan which actively supported
the Afghan resistance movement, and started a campaign to turn it
into a Jehad. It was their leaders who had developed close and
intimate relations with the fundamentalist’s parties in the alliance
of ‘Peshawar Seven’. And among all the fundamentalists, Hezb of
Hekmatyar was their favorite. They regularly held public meetings
in various parts of the country in order to muster public opinion in
Pakistan in favor of the Jehad. The former Director of ISI
appreciated its role in the Afghan war.61
Almost all Pakistani regional-nationalist parties, particularly
Khan Abdul Wali Khan’s Awami National Party (ANP) and
Mahmud Khan Achakzai’s Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party
(PMAP), and all the leftist and communist parties, were pro-PDPA
and supported April Revolution in Afghanistan. Most of them were
94
Jehad is not for the watan (fatherland), but for Islam- the watan is
only khak (soil, dust).’65
One other important Islamist refugee leader declared in Pakistan
that “we will try to make Pakistan and Afghanistan one country with
a new name of Islamistan, and if it was not possible, then we will
make a confederation of the two countries.” In such a heat for
Islamism another refugee leader boasted that “our Jehad is for the
glorification of Allah’s will and our Jehad is not limited to the
liberation of Afghanistan; we will liberate the Central Asian Muslims
and will raise our flag on the Kremlin.”66
Islami broke its alliance with the Islami Jamhuri Ittihad (IJI)
government, and the ‘UN’ plan was also rejected outright by the
Mujahideen factions of Khalis and Sayyaf first and later
Hekmatyar as well. Hekmatyar asked the Pakistan government to
workout a new formula for the solution of Afghan crisis which
could be acceptable to the Mujahideen.68 However, Pakistan
extended its unqualified support to the UN plan. The following
were some of the important factors which compelled Pakistani
authorities to adopt political modalities for the resolution of
Afghan Crisis:
1: Pakistan seemed to be frustrated over the inability of the
Mujahideen to defeat President Najibullah militarily and
they thought it was useless to continue support for
Mujahideen.
2: As the war in Afghanistan did not seem that it would end in
the near future, the international opinion was changed; and
Washington was no more interested in sponsoring the
Afghan Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan which came as a result of Geneva Accords.69
Thus a major supporter of the Mujahideen openly blamed
Pakistan for its support to Hekmatyar and other
fundamentalist groups, and even pressured Islamabad to
stop military aid to Mujahideen. The US authorities also
made it clear to Pakistan that American aid to Pakistan
would be stopped if there is no progress towards a political
settlement. In September 1991, the US and USSR
98
for their own petty gains. The tappa was frequently seen painted in or on buses,
rickshaws, and other transportation vehicles.
2
Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford
University Press, 2003, P.80
3
Interview with Niaz A Naik, Islamabad, Sunday, 8 August, 1993; quoted by
Frederic Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985, Oxford
University Press, 2003, P.92
4
The following story appeared originally on the Indy Media site, Interview of
Zbigniew Brzezinski Le Nouvel Observateur (France), January, 15-21, 1998,
P. 76.
5
It is also noteworthy that the former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Retd.
General Nasirullah Babur, confessed several times in press that it was he who,
during Z.A Bhutto regime, trained and organized Afghan terrorists to use them
against Daud Khan. A large number of supporters of the Seetmi-Milli,
Shula-i-Jawaed, Hezbi-Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami and Harakat-i-Islami began
crossing into Pakistan.
6
Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Curzen Press Ltd, St. John’s
Studios, Church Road Richmond, Surrey TW9 2QA,1995, P. 274. To one extent
or another, all of the resistance part leaders were cultivated by Pakistan and were
propped up by either government or an external power. Although previously
there had been round about 60 to 80 resistance groups operating in Peshawar, in
1982, Pakistani authorities forced them to coalesce into seven. Nearly all the
party leaders had a following, often narrow, based on respect for their religious
scholarships, religious status, and experience as dissidents.
7
Yousaf Elmi, Afghanistan: A Decade of Sovietisation, Afghan Jehad Works
Centre, Peshawar, nd, P. 2 .
8
Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge University
Press, Great Britain, 1986, P. 120
102
9
Azizur Rahman Ulfat was assassinated by unknown assailants but mostly
people suspected Hezb of Hekmatyar involvement in his murder. Aziz Rahman
was the son of eminent Afghan Pashtu writer and poet Gul Pacha Ulfat from
Ningrahar province of Afghanistan. Aziz Rahman openly criticized Pakistan
government and the Jehadi leaders in his booklet “The Crisis of Leadership”
published by the founder of the Islami Entiqam Party, 1981. In the same year
(1981), another refugee Shuhrat Nangyal in his booklet “Afghanistan’s Political
Parties” (Da Afghanistan Siasi Ahzab), Peshawar, pp. 47-48 wrote that “there are
many groups and factions working on the name of ‘Islam’ or ‘Afghans’ (to the
beginning or the end of their name); but otherwise every leader is (after free) ration
and business. There are such leaders whose offices and parties are just in their
pockets (i.e. the party exists o paper for the sole purpose of accumulating aid
money). In this storm, there are horrible faces whose identity is (suspicious). The
real leaders are hiding in the dust while only the businessmen are on the ground.
Every Muhajir is thinking to become leader for the ration and not for nation. Most
of them are leaders in Peshawar but having no courage to inter into Afghanistan”.
10
Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, “Afghanistan: Confusion of fusion and diffusion” The
daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, August 5 - 6, 1992.
11
Olesen opcit. P.276; Even in 1982, when the author (Dr. Marwat ) was on the
way towards Kabul from Jalalabad, the bus he was travelling on was stopped by
security guards near Sarobi. One of them was Central Asian Tajik speaking
Persian (Tajiki), who was informing the passengers in the bus that all people
should be aware of the Ashrars and Basmachis (referring to anti- Kabul
elements).
12
S. Fida Yunas, Afghanistan (1979-1997), Volume II, 31- A Sector D-5, Phase-
1, Hayatabad, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1998, pp. 889-890.
13
Ibid; also Interview with S. Fida Yunas, Area Study Centre (Central Asia,
Afghanistan, China & Russia), University of Peshawar, 2nd March 2004.
103
14
An interesting feature of the 18-day parleys was the schedule of the summit
meetings arranged at the office or residence of each leader in rotation. When it
was arranged at the residence of Hekmatyar, he assigned his photographers to
take photographs while he was in the chair, with the rest sitting around on the
floor as in common practice. These photographs were released to the press with
a story that all the Muhajireen (refugees) leaders accepted the leadership of
Hekmatyar. It annoyed other leaders. See Taizai Opcit
15
In 1981, the author (Dr. Marwat) personally observed that some Arab
nationals, along with local Afghans, distributing money among Afghan refugees
in Tambowano market on road side near Peshawar Airport.
16
Aziz Rahman Ulfat, The Crisis of Leadership, published by the founder of the
Islami Entiqam Party, Peshawar, 1981, P 11.
17
Ibid. pp. 3-9.
18
In 1987, in Mashhad (Iran) an alliance was formed of the following eight
groups:
(1) Nohzat-e-Islami, (2) Sazman-e-Pasdaran, (3) Jehad-e-Islami, (4) Jabha-e-
Motahed-e-Islami, (5) Sazman-e-Nasir, (6) Hezbullah, (7) Hezb-e-Dahwat-e-
Islami,(8) Harakat-e-Islami.
The three Quetta based Shia groups of the Afghan refugees were: (1) Harakat-e-
Islami Afghanistan of Sheikh Asef Mohseni Kandahar, (2) Shura-e-Inqilab-e-
Ittifaq-e-Afghanistan of Syed Behishti, and (3) Sazman-e-Nasir-e-Islami of was
led by council.
19
In the 20th February, 2004 meeting of a weekly seminar in the Area Study
Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, General (retired) Naseerullah
Babur in confessed that in 1973, Pakistani Prime Minister, the President,
General Tikka Khan and Babur in a special meeting decided to use the Frontier
Corps to train Afghans who had escaped from the Daud regime; he stated that
this training was continued till July, 1977. Some of the Afghans trained during
104
this period were: Habibur Rahman, Ahmad Shah Masud, Professor Rabbani,
Hekmatyar, Younis Khalis, Mohammadi, Maulana Hadi, Gulab Ningrahari,
Wakil Khan Shinwari, Younis Khogiani, even Dr. Najibullah requested for
training but the army refused.
20
George Arney, Afghanistan, Machelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London,
1990, P.135
21
Ibid. P. 136
22
Far Eastern Economic Review, April, 23, 1987, P. 40
23
Robert Wirsing, Pakistan's Security under Zia 1977-1988, Macmillan
Academic and Professional Ltd., London, 1991, P. 62.
24
Newsweek, February. 13, 1980, P. 9.
25
Wirsing Opcit, P.62; In his book, Hekmatyar states that in a meeting with
Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Pakistani President) he proposed the appointment of
General Hamid Gul as the new Chief of Pakistan’s army … G. I Khan smiled
and told me: “You are right, but the Americans will be aggrieved by this action.
They say that General Hamid Gul is fundamentalist”. Hekmatyar’s Pashtu book
translated by Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Secret Plans, Open Faces, Area Study
Centre, University of Peshawar, 2004, P. 25.
26
Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat & S. Wiqar Ali Shah KakaKhel, Afghanistan and
the Frontier, EMJAY Books International, Peshawar, Pakistan, 1993, P. 225.
27
Ibid. P. 229.
28
Ibid. P. 230.
29
John Fullerton, Afghanistan, Far Eastern Economic Review. Ltd., Hong Kong,
1983, P. 72 .
30
Ibid. P. 74 .
31
Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit. P 230.
105
32
Fullerton Opcit, P. 73.
33
David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Arms and Armour Press, London,
1989, P.99.
34
Roy Opcit, P. 119
35
Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit, P. 217
36
Ibid. P 217.
37
Roy Opcit, P. 123
38
Discussions with party members and followers in Afghan Refugee
Commissionrate, Peshawar. Novmber-December, 1981.
39
The Supreme Council was the most powerful organization wherein the
organizational and political activities of those Mujahideen affiliated to the
organization were discussed. The Board of Directors, comprising leaders of the
component parties, acted as Supreme Command of the alliance for military
operations across the border. Financial assistance received by the component
parties would be submitted to the Board of Directors, and then subsequently
forwarded to the Finance Committee along with official documents. According
to the Character of Organization, the Military Committee for which efforts were
being made was responsible for disposing off arms and ammunition received by
various component organizations. The alliance favored getting financial
assistance from the Western countries in addition to the Muslim world. Letters
in Russian language were published requesting Muslim Russian soldiers not to
side with Russians in Afghanistan. The same letters also pressed upon the
peoples of Muslim republic of Soviet Russia to start revolutions in their
respective republics to achieve independence. Such materials were secretly
distributed by their Mujahideen in Afghanistan, in those areas where the
Russians were in control. See also Marwat & Kakakhel Opcit. pp. 220-222.
40
Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and options for Muslim World,
Iran and Pakistan, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1982, pp 102-103;
106
46
Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit. pp .1-7; see also his book Silent Soldier.
47
Ibid. P. 98; Silent Soldier, pp. 6-9.
48
Roy Opcit, P.122.
49
Frederic Grare Opcit, P. 84.
50
Roy Opcit, pp.121-122.
51
Ibid. P. 122.
52
Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Resistance and
Reconstruction, West view Press, INC, USA, 1994, P. 29; See also Yousaf &
Major Mark Adkin Opcit.
53
Ibid. (Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin) P. 3.
54
Ibid. P. 4
55
Field Report 1982-83 and 1990-91, Peshawar.
56
Frederic Grare Opcit, P. 83
57
Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat personal papers, Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Peshawar, Pakistan.
58
Weinbaum Opcit, P. 34 quoted Mushahid Hussain from the Christian Science
Monitor, October 3, 1989; Being an old friend of Pakistani establishment,
Hekmatyar was opposed to the idea of an ethnic, secular state of Pashtunistan,
the Loya Jirga, and Zhahir Shah, and was anti-India and ant-USSR.
59
Diego Cordovez & Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The inside story of
the Soviet withdrawal, Oxford University Press, New York, P. 162.
60
Weinbaum Opcit,. P. 34.
61
Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit, P. 40.
62
The Pashto monthly Leekwal, Peshawar, April 2004, pp. 16, 17.
108
63
Field Report of 1988-89, Peshawar, Kurram Agency and Bannu.
64
Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, The Evolution and Growth of Communism in
Afghanistan (1917-79) An Appraisal, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1997, P
350; See for biography of Noor M. Taraki, H. Amin, cf. appendix –B of this
book.
65
Olesen Opcit, P. 288.
66
Professor Rasul Amin, A Collection of Professor A. Rasul Amin’s Papers,
(Pashtu) The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA), Peshawar, 1995,
P. 70.
67
Raziullah Azmi, ed. Pak-American Relations: The Recent past, Karachi,
Royal Book Company, 1994, P. 42.
68
Rashid Ahmad Saddiqui, “Pakistan Afghan Policy after the Soviet
withdrawal”, Unpublished M. Phil thesis, Institute of Pakistan Studies Quaid-i-
Azam University Islamabad, 1996, P. 17.
69
For details of Geneva Accord see Appendix-F; The Afghan venture had cost
the Soviets over 13,000 dead, 35,000 wounded and 311 missing. Reportedly, it
had required one million rubbles a day to keep the war going. In terms of cash,
the price rose steeply as soon as they withdrew. Only the most massive logistic
efforts could keep Najibullah’s men fighting, and the Soviets supplied.
American officials estimated that Afghanistan received military supplies worth
up to $300 million per month after February, 1989. In the six months following
their withdrawal at least 3,800 aircraft flew in, carrying food, fuel, weapons and
ammunition. Compare this with the US aid for 1988, valued at $600 million, and
the imbalance is crystal clear. In 1988 over 1,000 armored vehicles were handed
over by the departing Soviets. It is estimated that the first six months of 1989
saw the transfer of $ 1.5 billion of military support to the Kabul regime,
including 500 Scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Afghan Army still had
tremendous superiority in what I call the three ‘A’s: armor, artillery and aircraft.
Mohammad Yousaf & Major Mark Adkin Opcit, pp.216, 227.
109
70
The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, February 1992.
71
Charles H. Kennedy, ed. Pakistan-1992, Lahore, West Press Oxford Pak Book
Cooperation, 1993, P. 129.
72
Ibid, P. 130.
73
For biography of Dr. Najibullah, cf. Appendix-C of this book.
74
Amera Saeed, “The Peshawar Accord and After”, See in Afghanistan’s Past,
Present and future, Islamabad Regional Studies Islamabad, 1997, P. 422.
75
Intense rounds of talks started at Peshawar to arrange a transitional
government for the transfer of power in Kabul. The talks began in Peshawar
between the Pakistan government and the Mujahideen leaders. The Afghan
leaders present were Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, Engineer
Qutabuddin Hilal, Commandar Musa and Qazi Amin Waqad, Ayatullah
Muhsini, Javed and son of Subghatullah Mujaddidi. Four leaders were absent
being represented only by their spokesmen, and Maulvi Yunas Khalis, in spite of
their presence in and around Peshawar did not attend the meeting. This was a
significant signal of their independence of action. For days it appeared that the
fighting among parties would preclude any agreement despite the strong
intercession of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the foreign Ministry officials.
The Prime Minister was joined in Peshawar by Saudi Prince Turki-al-Faisal,
King Fahd’s special envoy. At the same time, Mir Hamid Musavi, a former
ambassador to Pakistan, was deputed from Tehran to ensure that the deal to form
a new government incorporated Iranian interests. Unable to move the factions,
frustrated Pakistani officials brought the Afghans together with the leaders of
several of Pakistan’s religio-political parties, including Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s
Jama’at-e-Islami of Pakistan, who were asked to use their influence with
various Afghans groups to reach a consensus. In the end, the Peshawar based
leaders agreed to a formula, mainly out of the fear, that if they delayed any
further, the field commanders, notably Ahmad Shah Masud, would take matters
110
into their hands and by pass the parties. For the text of Peshawar Accord see
Appendix-D of this book.
76
The Peshawar Accord and Related Developments, Spotlight on Regional
Affairs, Islamabad, Institute of Regional Studies, Vol. xii, No. 3, March 1993, P.
31.
77
The daily Frontier Post, Peshawar, April 30, 1992.
78
Ibid
79
Daily The Nation, June 07, 1992.
80
Ibid; Mohammad Sarwar (Pakistan Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington)
rejected Amiryar’s assertions and allegations by saying. Pakistan was not
interfering in Afghan internal affairs and was only trying to help for
reconstruction and stabilization of war torn country… Pakistan has paid a heavy
price for the Afghanistan liberation and still host to three million Afghan
refugees. The seminar, which was sponsored by International forum of George
Washington University on the theme “Afghan immigrants about Pakistan
interventionist policy towards Afghanistan”.
81
The agreement was signed on March 7, in the presence of Nawaz Sharif,
Saudi Prince Faisal and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister. On March 8, all the
signatories of Islamabad Accord accompanied by Pakistan Prime Minister,
Nawaz Sharif flew to Saudi Arabia for a joint umera. Further consultations
followed, which were rounded on by an agreement among Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan and Iran, to act as guarantors of Islamabad accord. The Islamabad
Accord was more substantive and balanced document than was the Peshawar
Accord. For a text of the Islamabad Peace Accord, see Appendix-E of this book.