Professional Documents
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DNV RP-F113
• R
Requirements
i t ffor pipeline
i li iinspection:
ti what,
h t when
h and
dhhow
• Pipeline maintenance and routine inspection
• Pipeline damage during installation and operation in
deepwater, causes and effects
• Understanding the real risks and potential need for repair
• Repair systems, tools and techniques
• Water depths are beyond diver limits and all activity (IMR) is remote
• Wall thickness are typically high } Materials, Welding, buckling
• Operating pressures are typically very high or very low
• Ambient external pressures are high, commonly similar to internal operational
pressures } Coating and Insulation Degradation
• High levels of Insulation are commonly required } Insulation Degradation
• • All
Waters are typically inspection,
cold maintenance
approx 4C- and
6C } CP, Flow Assurance, Materials
• Pi li
Pipelines tend
d not to b
be protected
db
repair is performed remotely
by a concrete coating
i } Damage
D
• Geohazards can be significant } Spanning, Buckling, Damage, Bend Stability,
Turbitity and Debris flows
• Slugging within produced fluids is common } Spanning, Fatigue
• Greater tolerances – Survey inaccuracy, installation accuracy
• Metocean and environmental conditions tend to be benign } Stability
• Seabed mobility is less dominant } Scour, Spanning
• Corrosion coatings tend to be of very high quality } Corrosion, Damage
Deep and Ultra-deepwater Pipelines Conference Inspection Maintenance and Repair of
27 - 28 September 2011, Novotel Paris Les Halles Deepwater Pipelines 4
Ian Nash
BASELINE SURVEY
Planned inspection campaigns are an integral part of the IMR strategy, the
purpose of the inspections being to monitor pipeline system integrity over time
and to monitor the impact of the subsea and production environments on the
pipeline.
Understanding and confirming design assumptions
Routine inspections may indicate a requirement for more specific investigations
involving detailed or specialist techniques. The normal physical inspection tasks
undertaken on the Deepwater Pipelines can be split into locations internal and
external to the pipeline.
Internal and External locations are typically periodically inspected by Pigging
andd ROV/AUV methods
th d respectively.
ti l
Permanent monitoring methods also exist and are becoming more
commonplace.
p
With deepwater lateral buckling and walking issues, Inspection strategy needs
to include interaction with the designers.
designers
If your system is anticipated to have multiple start up and shut down scenarios
you will need to understand what the designers anticipated happening and how
to monitor
i i
it.
In addition there may be need to reconfirm whats happened once the pipeline is
in operation.
p I.e. the designers
g have p
probably
ypplanned ffor the worst case,, but iff
things are not that bad and/or the operational approach changes this can result
in very different results to those planned and design for.
The requirement for and frequency of inspection will most commonly be
determined using risk based techniques
Geometry (XYZ)
Gouges
Corrosion
P
Permanent Probe/Spool
Monitoring leak
Sand Probe
Visual
CP Failure
Geometry XYZ
Inspection C i D
Coating Damage
Burial
Acoustic Hydrate
ROV
CP Probe
Movement
Weld S
Scanner
Tomography
Buckle
Scanning
External Side Scan
Vibration
Visual
AUV G
Geometry
t (XYZ) Cracking
Sidescan
Fatigue
Permanent Vibration
Monitoring Protection Integrity (mattresses/
Strain Rock/Covers)
Buriial/ Scour
otection
Spaanning/
ovement
P Failure
orrosion
ntegrity
Vibration
Coating
Crracking
Damage
Hydrate
Erosion
Gouges
Buckle
Dents
Location Method Technique
leak
D
Pro
B
Mo
G
Co
In
CP
H
C
Magnetic Flux
Ultrasonic
Visual
Pigging
Calliper
Internal Geometry
(XYZ)
Corrosion
Permanent
Probe
Monitoring
Sand Probe
Visual
Acoustic
CP Probe
ROV Weld Scanner
Tomography
External Side Scan
Visual
AUV Acoustic
Sidescan
Permanent Vibration
Monitoring Strain
Identify Assess
Threats/Hazards Inspection
to Pipeline History DNV RP-F116 (Sec H1)
The risk assessment comprises the following main
tasks;
Susceptibility Failure Mode
a) Establish equipment scope
to Threat
Remaining
R i i b) Identify threats
Likelihood of Consequence Life or c) Data gathering
Failure of Failure Inspection
Grade d) Data quality review
e) Estimate probability off ffailure (PoF)
Risk Factor
f) Estimate consequences of failure (CoF)
g) Determine risk
Risk
OK?
h) Identify risk mitigating measures
i) All equipment threats have considered
Mitigation
Measure to j) Determine aggregated risk
reduce
susceptibility
k) Planning of inspection, monitoring and testing
Inspection activities
Scheme
Defect Type1
Defect
Defect Type 2
selected
Records
Defect Type 3
Inspection R
Defect Type 4
Review Review
design previous Defect Type 5
inspections
Defect Type 6
Record
Results
Defect
No observed? Yes
Failure rrate
• Phase 2, random failures or damage, due
Phase 2
The implication of the bath-tub curve is that relatively frequent and intensive inspection
is required in the early years, i.e.
• Phase 1. As inspection data demonstrating good pipeline system* performance
accumulates, it is rational to adopt a reduced frequency and scope of inspection.
Thus a progressive reduction of inspection effort may be expected towards the end
of Phase 1 and into Phase 2 2.
• Phase 2 for a typical subsea pipeline extends to several decades,
• Phase 3 may not actually be reached during the operational lifetimes of many
projects.
j t H However, if inspection
i ti ddata
t starts
t t tto show
h th
the onsett off wear-outt
mechanisms then an increased level of maintenance could be reintroduced.
As far as p
possible,, inspection,
p , maintenance and repair
p activities should be p
pre-planned
p
to take advantage of tendered contracts, optimum weather conditions and where
necessary co-incidence with planned pipeline shutdowns.
*The
Th best way to controll some off these
b h i with
is i h the
h designers
d i h i
having the
h experience
i and
d being
b i
allowed the time to investigate/ design a more robust solution CAPEX vrs OPEX
1. Define equipment scope ( i.e. All equipment that can lead to a failure) (DNV-
OS-F101, Sec. 11, D304)
2 For each equipment,
2. equipment identify all threats which can lead to a failure (DNV-OS-
(DNV OS
F101, Sec. 11, D201)
3. For each threat; estimate risk (DNV-OS-F101, Sec. 11, D202)
• Consequence of failure (CoF)
• Probability of failure (PoF)
Propose plans for:
• Inspection, monitoring and testing (IMT) (DNV-OS-F101, Sec. 11, D103)
• Mitigation, intervention and repair (MIR) (DNV-OS-F101, Sec. 11, D700)
• Integrity assessment (IA) (DNV-OS-F101, Sec. 11, D600)
Consst As‐Built Survey
Baseline Survvey
e"
""Early Failure
Phase 1
Phase 21) Phase 33)
Type of Inspection
"Random Failure" "Wear‐Out Failure"
B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Intelligent Pig
Visual including CP
and Side Scan
Towed Acoustic Side
Scan Sonar 2)
Targeted Special
Targeted Special ? ?
?
Events
1) Reduction in annual inspection applies to remote subsea pipelines only 2) Acoustic side scan sonar is not always cost effective especially in
deepwater or where there are strong currents. An ROV survey with reduced scope could be considered 3) the third phase may not occur within
j
normal project lifetimes, i.e. the Phase 2 (plateau phase) extends for several decades with well designed,
g operated and maintained facilities.
Preventive maintenance
Because of the high cost and potential delays associated with intervention,
preventive maintenance should be eliminated at the design stage, wherever
possible.
ibl
Routine maintenance
Routine maintenance tasks are required
q where the elimination off specific
p f
intervention is uneconomic or technically problematic. Normally such
maintenance would be undertaken during repair activity, or combined with
planned inspection
p p campaigns.
p g
Corrective Maintenance
Intervention to rectify breakdown or degradation (Corrective Maintenance) is
referred to as ‘Repair’
Repair .
Normally Subsea Facilities shall possess sufficient reliability to ensure availability
throughout the field life.
Subsea equipment that is susceptible to failure should be designed to minimize
the effort/cost required for replacement of the failed assembly.
The potential causes and effects of damage during installation Phase of the pipeline(s) are
summarized as follows:
The potential causes of damage during operational Phase of the pipeline(s) are
summarized as follows:
The effect of damage that could occur during the operational phase of the pipeline(s) are
summarized as follows:
• Damage to pipeline geometry and/or pipe wall: • Coating Damage (Corrosion and Weight
Rupture. coating):
Internal Corrosion. Lost & Damaged weight coating
External Corrosion.
Corrosion Damaged corrosion coating
Pinhole Leak. Lost & Damaged insulation coating
Gouges, Grooves and Notches. • Anode Damage:
Cracks and Fracture Propagation. Lost anode
Dents and Buckles.
Buckles Disconnected anode
Overstressing or Excessive Bending. Over consumption
Fatigue Damage. Anode pasivity
• Hydrate Formation:
Pinhole Leak.
Leak
Lost & Damaged insulation coating
Incorrect operation
• The operator
p should have fullyy developed
p procedures and all necessaryy
p
equipment ready for implementation prior to the start of operations, to cater
for the following scenarios:
Hydrate formation.
Localised damage (i.e. dent or pinhole leak).
Local Rupture.
Rupture over extensive pipeline length.
Sh lf
Shelf
Rise Abyssal Qualhat Middle Indus Fan Upper Indus Fan Abyssal
Trough
Plain
North Murray
South Murray
Ridge
Dalrymple
Ridge
Abyssal
Slope
Rise
Plain Seamou Plain
nt
1 1
2 2
4
5
3
3
3
6.00E-03
3.00E-03
Most likely
5.00E-03
2.50E-03 location for
4.00E-03
2.00E-03 Intervention is the
1 50E 03
1.50E-03
3.00E-03
deepest
p water
1.00E-03
2.00E-03
5.00E-04
1.00E-03 Material and construction defects
External corrosion
Material and construction defects
0.00E+00 Internal corrosion
External corrosion
0.00E+00 ShipInternal
grounding
corrosion
ShipDropped
sinking objects
Dropped objects
Anchoring
Anchoring
Trawling
Trawling
Shelf
Sl
p
o
Rise Abyssal Qualhat Middle Indus Fan Upper Indus Fan Abyssal
North
Trough
South
Plain
Dalrym
sal
Murray
Murray
Ridge
ple
Ridge
Abys
Sl
is
R
p
o
e
e
Plain Seamou Plain
nt
While not mandatory, it is advantageous if the system(s) and equipment also exhibit
the following characteristics:
• Modular and/or lightweight
• Minimum number of components
• Incur minimal shut down and/or reduction of operation
• Minimum CAPEX investment
Flooding/Dewatering / Drying
d Dredging / Levelling
Split
quipment
Components
pread
Pipe Lifting Device (i.e.
Tool
and
(i..e.
ol
e Recovery T
g Removal Too
ction System a
ent Pigging Eq
e Removal Sp
upport Vessel
w capability)
Spread (Onshore)
utting Tool
Repair Clamp
Pipelay Vessel
gy Unit
ment
es)
ce
(with d/w
Metrolog
Spoolpiec
Weld Be
ROV Su
H-frame
Pipe Cu
Pipeline
Hydrate
Coating
Seabed
Intellige
Equipm
Sleeve))
Connec
Dry Local Buckle
(recoverable)
Dry Local Buckle (non-
recoverable)
Dry Propagating Buckle
(non-recoverable)
Local Wet Buckle (non-
(non
recoverable)
Hydrate plug
Localised damage, no
leak
Localised damage with
leak
Rupture, local
Rupture, extensive
length
Pipeline Repair Systems Up to 3500m Sonsub’s SIRCOS currently can work up to 2200m Saipem indicates it can be upgraded for higher water depths
Deepwater Pipeline Repair System from Oceaneering and Oil States Oceaneering indicates depth requirement of 3500m can be
currently rated to about 3000m. designed and manufactured
EPRS Capability in Terms of MEIDP Requirements
Oil States
Oil States Saipem Oceaneering
210%
200%
190%
180%
170%
160%
150%
Percenttage of Requirements
140%
130%
120%
110%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Damage scenarios during installations and operation pose differing levels of risk.
The most significant potential damage scenarios during the installation phase are
dry and wet buckles.
The technology and methodologies required for rectification of installation phase
damage (i.e.
(i e buckles) are a direct extension of techniques used for similar events in
shallow water, and currently exists with installation contractors and specialist
equipment suppliers.
Several potential damage scenarios exist during the operational phase. The most
significant are where a damaged section of pipeline needs to be reinforced, replaced
or cleared of a hydrate blockage.
Where a replacement pipeline section is required, the length could vary significantly
d
depending
di on ththe nature
t off th
the eventt causing
i the
th damage
d (a
( ffew meters
t to
t severall
kilometres in the event of a geohazard (i.e. slope instability).
There is a wide range of qualified or nearly qualified equipment for the subsea
repair both currently available and under continual development.
repair, development The equipment
exists both as individual components (equipment, tools and fittings) and full
systems.
Some repair systems are owned and operated on a “club” club basis,
basis by a group or
consortia of pipeline operators. The clubs at present operate in specific
geographical locations.
The need to access the p pipeline
p at both ends for the p
purpose
p of re-commissioning
g
(i.e. flooding, cleaning, dewatering, etc.), is inherent in many of the repair scenarios.
Access facilities and the provision of adequate space for equipment (particularly
dewatering) are significant.
Deep and Ultra-deepwater Pipelines Conference Inspection Maintenance and Repair of
27 - 28 September 2011, Novotel Paris Les Halles Deepwater Pipelines 49
Ian Nash
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank South Asia Gas Enterprise PVT Ltd. for giving permission to
publish aspects of this work, and the team in Peritus, for their continued hard work.