ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Finding the Face in the Crowd: An Anger Superiority Effect

Christine H. Hansen and Ranald D. Hansen
Oakland University

Facial gestures have been given an increasingly critical role in models of emotion. The biological
significance of interindividual transmission of emotional signals is a pivotal assumption for placing
the face in a central position in these models. This assumption invited a logical corollary, examined
in this article: Face-processing should be highly efficient. Three experiments documented an asym-
metry in the processing of emotionally discrepant faces embedded in crowds. The results suggested
that threatening faces pop out of crowds, perhaps as a result of a preattentive, parallel search for
signals of direct threat.

Theories of emotion, both the more traditional facial effer-
ence models (Buck, 1984; Darwin, 1872/1904; Ekman, 1984;
Izard, 1977;Leventhal, 1982;Tomkins, 1980) and the less well-
known facial afference models (Gratiolet, 1865; Waynbaum,
1906; Zajonc, 1985), embrace the adaptive significance of facial
gestures of emotion to explain their existence. Whether trans-
mission of emotional facial gestures is through cognitive ap-
praisal of another's face (as Leventhal, 1982, for one, suggests)
or facial mimicry (Hansen & Hansen, 1984), the capacity to
efficiently pass an emotional signal from one individual to an-
other has obvious survival value. Certainly research has docu-
mented that the human perceptual system is highly practiced,
if not hard-wired, to detect human faces (Homa, Haver, &
Schwartz, 1976; Purcell & Stewart, 1981, 1986; Purcell, Stew-
art, Botwin, & Kreigh, 1983; van Santen & Jonides, 1978; Za-
jonc & Markus, 1984). This research, together with numerous
experiments demonstrating infants' capacity to discriminate
among emotional facial gestures (Barrera & Maurer, 1981; La-
Barbera, Izard, Vietze, & Parisi, 1976; Schwartz, Izard, & An-
sul, 1985; Wilcox & Clayton, 1968), suggests that the detection
and discrimination of emotional faces may be particularly
efficient. Indeed, there is evidence in the literature (Sackett,
1966; Schwartz et al., 1985) that the mechanism governing the
processing effaces achieves maximal efficiency at finding facial
signals of potential direct threat; angry faces may be particu-
larly attention-grabbing for infants early in development (cf.
Schwartz et al., 1985).
This hypothetical anger-superiority property of face-pro-
cessing can be conveniently conceptualized within the frame-
The authors are indebted to R. B. Zajonc for his insight and wish to
thank D. G. Purcell and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments on this article. This research was supported by Grant BNS-
8517416 from the National Science Foundation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Chris-
tine H. Hansen, Department of Psychology, Oakland University, Roch-
ester Hills, Michigan 48309-4401.
Journal of PeraonalHy and Social Psychology, 1988, Vol. 54. No. 6,917-924
Copyright 1988 by the American Psychological Association. Inc. 0022-35I4/88/S00.75
work of social cognition models constructed around the capac-
ity to process information automatically as well as attentively
{e,g., Bargh, 1984; Logan, 1979; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
The parameters of automatic or preattentive processing and at-
tentive processing have been described extensively. However,
they remain controversial and are currently being tested
(Cheng, 1985; Kahneman & Treisman, 1983; Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1985; Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Paterson, 1984;
Treisman & Souther, 1985). Among other things, automatic or
preattentive processing is said to be more rapid than attentive
processing and, unlike attentive processing, may be parallel
rather than serial and may not be capacity limited. These prop-
erties imply that automatic processing is less (if at all) suscepti-
ble to distraction and to information load (Bargh & Pietromo-
naco, 1982; Beck, 1983; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Treisman
& Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Souther, 1985). Preattentive pro-
cessing can be construed as a filtering of information so that
some features or aspects of an array are "passed through" and
others are "filtered out." By way of this automatic processing, a
feature passed through is more likely to come to attention than
one filtered out: It would seem to the (attentive) individual as if
that feature of the array commanded attention; it would appear
to "pop out" from the array (Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Gel-
ade, 1980; Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Treisman & Souther,
1985).
This theoretical perspective, applied to the hypothesized
property of face-processing, led to the prediction of a face-in-
the-crowd effect: An angry face in a crowd of benign or happy
faces should be found more easily than a happy or benign face
in a crowd of angry faces. If facial threat commands attention,
as hypothesized, an angry face in a happy crowd would be found
quite readily, whereas a happy face in a crowd of attention-grab-
bing, distracting, angry faces could easily be overlooked. If an
individual were given the task of surveying crowds for the pres-
ence of a discrepant face, performance when presented with an
angry face embedded in a happy crowd should exceed that when
presented with a happy face embedded in an angry crowd. Tc-

917
918 CHRISTINE H. HANSEN AND RANALD D. HANSEN
ward testing the hypothesized threat-detection orientation of
face-processing, we conducted the three experiments reported
here to document the existence of this face-in-the-crowd effect.
Experiment 1
The subjects were given the task of surveying crowds for the
presence of a discrepant face. They were exposed to photo-
graphs of 108 crowds consisting of nine faces. On 54 trials, all
nine faces displayed the same emotional gesture. On the re-
maining 54 trials, one of the faces displayed a different emotion
than the other eight. The first factor in the design, then, was
Trial, designating whether a discrepant face was available (face
trial) or not available (no-face trial) in the crowd. The second
factor in the design was Crowd. On each of 36 trials the crowd
was happy, neutral, or angry.
Face Trials
The remaining two factors in the design (9 X 2) were nested
within face trials. The Position factor designated which of the
nine faces was the discrepant face. The Face factor described
the emotional gesture of the discrepant face. Two levels of dis-
crepant face were nested within each level of Crowd. On each
of nine angry crowd trials, a happy face or a neutral face was
embedded in the crowd. On each of nine happy crowd trials,
an angry or a neutral face was embedded in the crowd; and on
each of nine neutral crowd trials, a happy or an angry face was
embedded in a neutral crowd.
The experiment, then, w a s a 2 X 3 X 2 X 9 (Trial X Crowd X
Face X Position) within-subjects nested factorial design. The
analyses of the data were focused on specific comparisons test-
ing two predictions. First, angry faces in happy crowds should
be found more efficiently (lower reaction times and fewer errors)
than happy faces in angry crowds. Second, angry faces in neu-
tral crowds should be found more efficiently than neutral faces
in angry crowds. A processing asymmetry involving happy
faces in neutral crowds and neutral faces in happy crowds was
not anticipated.
Method
Twenty-two undergraduates volunteered to participate as subjects in
the experiment in partial fulfillment of psychology course require-
ments. On each of 108 trials, the subject's task was to discover the pres-
ence or absence of a discrepant face in a crowd. A discrepant face was
present in one half of the trials (face trials) and absent from the rest
(no-face trials). Crowds were displayed using a four-channel Gerbrands
tachistiscope. Five hundred milliseconds priorto exposure of the crowd
field, a fixation point was displayed in the center of a blank field. The
crowd field replaced the fixation field. The crowd field was removed
from view when the subject made a forced-choice (yes or no) verbal
response indicating whether or not a discrepant face had been present.
Reaction time from crowd field onset to verbal response was tracked
using a Gerbrands voice key. Subjects were given a standard speed-ac-
curacy instructional set: "Answer as rapidly as you can without losing
accuracy."
Crowds. Each crowd consisted of nine black-and-white, full-face
photographs of nine different individuals. The phot 'aphs were ar-
ranged in a 3 X 3 matrix that subtended a visual angle of approximately
5.04° in both height and width, centered in the visual field (i.e., the
location of the fixation point). Each face subtended a visual angle of
approximately 1.4° vertically and 1.05° horizontally. The faces were dis-
played against a neutral, gray background. The same nine individuals,
five women and four men, appeared in each crowd. On any given trial,
as a function of crowd condition, all of the individuals except the dis-
crepant face (if one was present) were shown posing happy, angry, or
neutral gestures of emotion. The position of each individual in the 3 X
3 matrix was randomly determined but was the same across all trials for
all subjects. Thus, individual was confounded with position. This was
not, however, of concern here because neither position nor individual
transmitter effects were currently of interest, and the data were col-
lapsed across this factor.
Face in the crowd On one half of the trials, a discrepant face was
inserted in the crowd. In happy crowds, the discrepant face was equally
as often angry or neutral. In angry crowds, the face was equally as often
happy or neutral. In neutral crowds, the face was equally as often angry
or happy. Each level of this 3 X 2 nested factorial was replicated with
the face located in each of the nine display matrix positions. In conse-
quence, there were 54 face-in-the-crowd trials. An equal number of no-
face trials—18 each of angry, happy, and neutral crowds—comprised
the balance of the experimental trials. Latin square counterbalancing
was used to ensure that each face-in-the-crowd condition was preceded
and followed approximately equally as often by the other conditions.
Likewise, it was used to generate the order of position placements in the
display matrix. The insertion of no-face trials into the counterbalanced
face trials was randomly determined. One complete order of all 108
trials and its reverse were used in the experiment. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one or the other order. Reaction times and error rates
were the data submitted to analysis.
Results
No-face trials. In crowds in which no discrepant face was
present, subjects made more errors when surveying angry
crowds than when surveying happy or neutral crowds (M =
15.4%, M = 6.8%, and M = 5.6%). Specific comparisons expli-
cating the significant crowd main effect, F(2, 20) = 27.74, p <
.001, indicated that more false positives occurred in the angry
crowd condition than in the happy or neutral crowd conditions,
F(l,2l) = 8.06,p<.008,andfi(l,21) = 8.65, p < .007. Because
of the difficulty of interpreting reaction time data on error tri-
als, only data from trials on which a subject made correct re-
sponses were submitted to analyses of the reaction time data.'
The time required to survey and correctly report the absence of
a discrepant face in the crowd was about the same for angry,
happy, and neutral crowds (M = 2,384 ms, M = 2,219 ms, and
M = 2,301 ms). In short, although it took about the same
amount of time to survey uniformly angry, happy, and neutral
crowds, surveillance of angry crowds was more error-prone.
Subjects were more likely to report incorrectly the presence of
a discrepant face in angry crowds than in happy or neutral
crowds.
Face trials. The results for face trials are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. It should be evident that the predicted processing asym-
metries emerged from the data. Because of factor nesting, the
1
Analyses of reaction times including both correct and error trials
revealed a pattern of effects similar to that reported here, except the
face-in-the-crowd effect was substantially weakened in neutral crowd
conditions. This suggested that angry faces and neutral faces used in the
experiment may have been somewhat confusable.
 FACE-IN-THE-CROWD EFFECT
Table 1
Summary of the Effects of Crowd and Face on Mean Reaction
Times and Error Rates for Face Trials
Target face
Crowd/distract ors Angry Neutral Happy
Mean reaction time (ms)
Angry 2,270 2,450
Neutral 1,920 2,370
Happy 1,990 2,010
Mean error rate (%)
Angry 71.2 74.8
—
Neutral 31.3 79.3
Happy 30.3 —
31.8
— could account for the findings without resorting to the differen-
analysis took the form of a series of planned comparisons test-
ing face-crowd reciprocals (e.g., finding an angry face in a
happy crowd vs. finding a happy face in an angry crowd). Sub-
jects took less time, F(l, 21) = 9.98, p < .008, and made fewer
errors, F(l, 21) = 38.36, p < .001, finding an angry face in a
neutral crowd than finding a neutral face in an angry crowd.
Likewise, subjects found angry faces in happy crowds faster,
f(l,2l) = 8.36, p < .008, and with fewer errors, F(\, 21) =
52.80, p < .001, than happy faces in angry crowds. These pre-
dicted asymmetries tended to support the contention that a dis-
crepant angry face in a nonangry crowd attracts attention and
that angry faces in a crowd distract attention from a discrepant
nonangry face. But the overall pattern of data left this support
somewhat equivocal. Angry faces were found no faster, F(l,
21) < 1, p < .66, and with no fewer errors, F(\, 21) < 1, p <
.71, than neutral faces in the same happy crowds. Similarly,
happy faces in neutral crowds were found in about the same
time, F( 1, 21) = 2.01,p < .\\, with about the same error rate,
F(l,2l) = 1.18,p<.29, as they were in angry crowds. In short,
a processing asymmetry emerged here also. Neutral faces in
happy crowds were found faster, F(l, 21) = 9.98, p < .005, and
with fewer errors, F( 1,21) = 60.96, p< .001, than happy faces
in neutral crowds.
Discussion
The predicted face-in-the-crowd effect emerged from the
data. Angry faces were found more efficiently in neutral crowds
than were neutral faces in angry crowds. Angry faces were
found more efficiently in happy crowds than were happy faces
in angry crowds. Alone, these findings tend to support the hy-
pothesized threat-detection orientation of face-processing.
However, the finding that these predicted processing asymmet-
ries were of about the same magnitude as the unpredicted neu-
tral-happy asymmetry is disquieting. This unexpected result
raises at least two alternative interpretations of the data.2 First,
angry and neutral faces may be encountered less frequently
than happy faces. The face-in-the-crowd effect here, then, may
derive not from facial-gestural-threat detection but rather from
facial-gestural-novelty detection. Schwartz et al. (1985) have
offered a similar explanation for the finding (LaBarbera et al.,
919
1976) that for infants, neutral faces had about the same atten-
tion-grabbing capacity as angry faces. This alternative is neither
devastating to the face-in-the-crowd effect nor particularly dis-
couraging of the hypothesized orientation of face-processing. It
suggests, however, that the facial trigger underlying the orienta-
tion may be broader, perhaps a mechanism in which novel sig-
nals have some of the properties of threat signals.
The second alternative is more problematic. There may be
more variance across angry facial gestures than across neutral
facial gestures and, in turn, more across neutral facial gestures
than happy facial gestures. More varied crowd faces (i.e., an
angry crowd) would better disguise the presence of a face show-
ing a discrepant emotion. On the other hand, a crowd of less
varied faces (i.e., a happy crowd) would lend itself to the discov-
ery of an emotionally discrepant face. This explanation, then,
tial signal value of emotional facial gestures. This alternative
not only accounts for the data just as well as the hypothesized
process—even as amended to incorporate novelty—but has the
additional appeal of parsimony. It renders the findings of Exper-
iment 1 quite equivocal. In the remaining experiments, there-
fore, crowds were constructed to ensure that variance across
faces in the crowds could not account for the findings.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, the distractor faces (crowd) as well as the
target face (discrepant emotional gesture) were photographs of
the same individual. The crowd was comprised of three identi-
cal photographs of the individual posing either a happy or an
angry facial gesture. The target face was a photograph of the
same person posing an angry face in a happy crowd or posing a
happy face in an angry crowd. A face-in-the-crowd asymmetry
obtained here obviously could not be dismissed in terms of the
heterogeneity of angry crowds relative to happy crowds. Be-
cause we used a threshold paradigm in Experiment 2, the face-
in-the-crowd prediction tested was that the threshold to correct
location of an angry face in a happy crowd would be lower than
the threshold to correct location of a happy face in an angry
crowd.
Method
Eleven undergraduates volunteered to participate as subjects in par-
tial fulfillment of psychology course requirements. The experiment was
designed as a 2 X 2 (Face in the Crowd X Person) within-subjects facto-
rial. As in Experiment 1, subjects were exposed to a series of tachisto-
scopically displayed crowds. In one half of the trials, a happy face was
embedded in an angry crowd. In the remaining trials, an angry face
was embedded in a happy crowd. Each crowd was comprised of four
photographs of the same individual: three identical photographs posing
one emotion (happy or angry) and one posing the other. Black-and-
white photographs of two males (Person) were used. Order of exposure
to face-crowd condition and to person was randomly determined for
each subject.
The faces were displayed in the same manner as in Experiment 1. The
four faces in each display were placed in the four corners of the matrix
2
We are indebted to two reviewers for making these hypotheses ex-
plicit.
920 CHRISTINE H. HANSEN AND RANALD D. HANSEN
used in Experiment 1. Each trial consisted of a centrally located fixation
point exposed for a duration of 500 ms against a blank field, followed
by the crowd field. Crowd-field offset was followed by a 50-ms interstim-
ulus interval (a blank field) and a 100-ms exposure to a scrambled-letter
pattern mask. The masking stimulus consisted of four scrambled-letter
patterns presented at the positions used for the crowd faces. The place-
ment of the discrepant face on any given trial was randomly determined
for each subject by the computer program. Six replications of each face-
crowd condition for each person condition were used in each of the four
matrix locations, resulting in a total of 96 trials.
The subject's task on each trial was to identify verbally the location
of the discrepant face: a forced choice of upper right, upper left, lower
right, or lower left. The necessary exposure duration of the crowd field
for correct location (location threshold) was the dependent measure.
The location thresholds for the four Face-Crowd X Person conditions
were determined (in 10-ms steps) by the Best PEST algorithm (Lieber-
man & Pentland, 1982; Purcell & Stewart, 1986), implemented in Pas-
cal for a four-alternative forced choice. Threshold values in each of the
four experimental conditions, then, were based on 24 trials (six replica-
tions at each of the four corner positions).
Results and Discussion
The face-in-the-crowd effect was significant, F(\, 10) =
12.73,p < .005. So, too, was the person effect, F(l, 10) = 24.16,
p < .001. The interaction was not, F(l, 10) = 1.62, p < .23.
The person effect indicated that thresholds to location of one
person's discrepant face were lower than those for the other,
probably because of that stimulus person's greater expressive-
ness. The face-in-the-crowd effect supported the prediction that
discrepant angry faces were easier to locate. Simple effects anal-
yses revealed that for both stimulus persons, thresholds to locate
an angry face in a happy crowd were lower than thresholds to
locate a happy face in an angry crowd, F(l, 10) = 11.94, p <
.001 (M = 657.3 ms and M = 742.7 ms) for one stimulus person
and W, 10) = 6.95, p< .02 (M= 458.2 ms and M = 628.2 ms)
for the other.
These data were more persuasive than those of Experiment
1. With the crowds comprised of identical distractors, the ad-
vantage of an angry face in a happy crowd over a happy face in
an angry crowd was clearly evidenced. The data suggest that an
angry target face, which better attracts attention in a crowd of
happy faces, also better serves to distract attention from a happy
face. This should be interpreted cautiously, for although these
data argued strongly in favor of the existence of the predicted
face-in-the-crowd effect, they were mute with regard to the pro-
cesses underlying its production. It was toward defining these
processes that Experiment 3 was conducted.
Experiment 3
The face-in-the-crowd effect was predicted from the hypothe-
sis that face-processing is oriented toward threat detection.
Theoretically, this could be achieved if faces were preattentively
processed in parallel for features of facial threat. A parallel
search, not necessitating attentional shifts, could be completed
more rapidly than a serial attentive search effaces. More telling,
a preattentive, parallel search for a feature would be relatively
insensitive to distraction whereas an attentive search, entailing
serial shifts of focus, would be susceptible to distraction (Bargh,
1982, 1984; Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Shiffrin & Schnei-
der, 1977; Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Treis-
man & Souther, 1985). If faces can be preattentively searched
in parallel for facial threat features, the latency to discovery of
an angry face in a happy crowd should not be appreciably in-
fluenced by the number of happy-face distractors in the crowd.
The angry face should pop out of the crowd (cf. Treisman &
Souther, 1985) with about the same latency in small and large
happy crowds. However, preattentive search of an angry crowd
would not render one of the faces distinctive. Finding a happy
face in an angry crowd, then, would require a serial attentive
search through the crowd. The number of angry-face distractors
would dramatically influence the latency to discovery of a dis-
crepant happy face. The face-in-the-crowd effect would be mag-
nified as the size of the crowd was increased.
Experiment 3 was conducted as an additional test for the exis-
tence of the face-in-the-crowd effect and as an initial step to-
ward uncovering the mechanism of its production. In this ex-
periment, subjects were exposed to crowds of different sizes:
either four or nine faces. The crowds were either happy or angry.
An angry face appeared in one half of the happy crowds and
a happy face appeared in one half of the angry crowds. As in
Experiment 2, all of the faces in the crowd were identical photo-
graphs of the same individual. Subjects were asked to determine
whether a discrepant face was present in the crowd.
If, as hypothesized, faces are preattentively searched in parallel
for features of facial threat, an angry face in a happy crowd would
pop out and not require an extensive, time-consuming, serial at-
tentive search to discover its presence. However, a happy face in an
angry crowd would not be preattentively distinctive; it would not
pop out, and discovering its presence would require a serial search
of the faces. This construction of the mechanism underlying the
production of the face-in-the-crowd effect led to the predictions
tested in Experiment 3. First, in crowds of any given size, the la-
tency to report the presence of an angry face in a happy crowd
should be less than that to report the presence of a happy face in
an angry crowd. Second, the latency to report the presence of an
angry face in happy crowds should not be substantially influenced
by the number of happy-face distractors in the crowd. Third, the
latency to report the presence of a happy face in angry crowds
should be greatly influenced by the number of angry-face distrac-
tors in the crowd: the larger the crowd, the longer the latency. Fi-
nally, we would expect a fourth effect if subjects come to recognize
that a "pop-out" is contingent on the presence of an angry face in
a happy crowd. If this contingency is recognized, subjects may
adopt a simplifying strategy. Notably, when no pop-out occurs,
subjects need only establish that the crowd is happy in order to
execute a correct no response. In this case, the latency to report the
absence of angry faces in happy crowds would not be appreciably
influenced by the number effaces in the crowds. This type of effect
was noted explicitly by Treisman and Souther (1985) and is quite
apparent in the data reported by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977,
Experiment 2). Unlike the pop-out of angry faces in happy crowds,
however, this simplifying strategy would evolve over experimental
trials. In short, the latency to report the absence of an angry face
in a happy crowd should be refractory to crowd size only on later
trials.
Method
Fourteen subjects volunteered to participate in the experiment, con-
structed a s a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (Matrix X Crowd X Trial X Stimulus Person)
 FACE-IN-THE-CROWD EFFECT
mixed factorial design. The experiment was comprised of 288 trials.
The lachistoscopic procedures were the same as those used in Experi-
ment 1. On one half of the trials, subjects were exposed to a four-face
crowd, arranged in a 2 X 2 matrix as described in Experiment 2. On the
remaining one half of the trials, subjects were exposed to a nine-face
crowd arranged in a 3 X 3 matrix as described in Experiment 1. On
one half of the trials, subjects were exposed to an angry crowd; on the
remaining trials they were exposed to a happy crowd. All of the faces in
all of the crowds seen by any one subject were identical photographs of
the same individual. Subjects were randomly assigned to see crowds
made up of identical photographs of one of the two stimulus persons,
one man and one woman, used in the experiment. Stimulus Person,
then, was a between-subjects factor.
On one half of the trials, one of the faces in the crowd was a discrepant
target face. One half of the angry crowds had a happy target face and
one half of the happy crowds had an angry target face. The angry target
face was the same photograph used to create the angry crowd, and the
happy target face was the same photograph used to create the happy
crowd. The subject's task was to report the presence or absence (yes or
no) of a discrepant face in the crowd on each trial. The target angry face
was rotated through all four positions of the small crowd matrix nine
times and through all nine positions of the large crowd matrix four
times. Likewise, the happy target face was rotated nine times through
all four positions of the small crowd matrix and four times through the
nine positions of the large crowd matrix. As a result, an angry target
face was embedded in a crowd of happy distractor faces in 72 trials:
in 36 trials it appeared with three happy distractors and in 36 trials it
appeared with eight happy distractors. Likewise, a happy target face was
embedded in a crowd of angry distractor faces on 72 trials—36 trials in
each crowd size. The remaining 144 trials in the experiment were an
equivalent number of angry crowds and happy crowds without target
faces, half of each being crowds of four and half being crowds of nine.
Trial order was randomly determined. One order of trials and its reverse
were used in the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to order.
Trials were run in three blocks of 72 trials with a 2-min interblock rest
period. Trials on which subjects made errors were rerun at the end of
the block in which they occurred. Subjects' responses and response late-
ncies were recorded as described in Experiment I.
Results
The analyses fully supported the predictions. The 2 X 2 X
2 x 2 analyses of variance (ANOVAS) conducted on error rates
and reaction times indicated that Stimulus Person produced no
effects, so the data were collapsed across this factor. Error rates
were acceptably low. The crowd matrix size main effect was sig-
nificant, F(\,l3) = 6.6l,p< .03, and indicated that more errors
were made on large crowd trials than on small crowd trials
(M = 2.9% and M = 1.7%). Bear in mind, however, that trials
on which subjects made errors were rerun, so reaction time data
from error trials were excluded from the reaction time analyses.
Analysis of the reaction time data indicated that the main
effects due to trial, matrix, and crowd were all significant, F( 1,
13)= 141.50, p<.001; f X l , 13) = 31.72, p < .001;/^1, 13) =
152.51, p < .001, respectively. Further, the Trial X Matrix, the
Trial x Crowd, and the Matrix X Crowd interactions were all
significant, F(l, 13) = 7.11,p < .02;F(l, 13) = 24.01, p< .001;
andf(l, 13)= 105.17, p<. 00 ^respectively. All of these effects,
however, tended to be explained by the significant Trial X Ma-
trix Size X Crowd interaction, F(l, 13) = 13.72, p < .003. Sim-
ple effects analyses were used to explicate this interaction. The
mean reaction times underlying this effect are illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.
921
Face trials. Simple effects analyses revealed that, for face tri-
als, the matrix size and the crowd main effects, F(l, 13) = 33.73,
p<.001,and.F(l,13) = 167.13, p< .001, as well as the Matrix
Size X Crowd interaction, F(l, 13) = 30.24, p < .001, were all
significant. Angry faces in happy crowds were discovered faster
than happy faces in angry crowds, both when the target ap-
peared with three distractors, F( 1, 13) = 74.78, p < .001 (M =
874ms and M= 1,173 ms), and when the target appeared with
eight distractors, F(\, 13)= 170.58,p< .001 (M= 910ms and
M = 1,426 ms). More important, a happy target face embedded
in a crowd with eight angry-face distractors required signifi-
cantly more time to discover than a happy face embedded in a
crowd with three angry-face distractors, F( 1, 13) = 44.82, p <
.001. However, the time to discover an angry face appearing in
a crowd with eight happy-face distractors was no longer than
the time to discover an angry face appearing in a crowd with
three happy-face distractors, F(l, 13) = 2.30,p < .15. This pat-
tern, of course, matched the predictions and tended to support
the hypothesis that angry faces pop out from happy crowds as a
result of preattentive processing, but happy faces in angry
crowds can be discovered only after an attentive serial search of
the faces in the crowd.
No-face trials. The crowd matrix size and the crowd main
effect, F(l, 13) = 24.32, p < .001, and F(l, 13) = 52.08, p <
.001, as well as the Matrix x Crowd interaction, F(l, 13) =
116.15, p < .001, also were significant for no-face trials. It took
longer to report the absence of a discrepant face in large angry
crowds than in small angry crowds, F[\, 13) = 58.41, p < .001
(M = 1,774 ms and M = 1,325 ms). In contrast, it took no
longer to report the absence of a discrepant face in crowds of
nine than it did in crowds of four happy faces, F(\, 13)= 1.38,
p < .26 (M = 1,351 ms and M = 1,292 ms). As noted earlier,
this was the pattern anticipated if subjects became aware of the
pop-out contingency for an angry face in happy crowds. How-
ever, recall also that subjects' reliance on the absence of a pop-
out in happy crowds to simplify the detection of no angry target
face was predicted to emerge only on later trials. To test this
prediction, mean reaction time from the first 10 trials in each
condition (early) and the last 10 trials in each condition (late)
were submitted t o a 2 x 2 X 2 X 2 (Time X Trial X Matrix X
Crowd) ANOVA. The focus of this analysis was on the four-way
interaction which, as expected, was significant, F(\, 13) = 5.77,
p < .04. Simple effects analyses revealed the anticipated pattern
of effects. On early trials, it took longer to report the absence of
an angry face in a happy crowd of nine than in one of four, F( 1,
13) = 24.61, p<. 001 (M= 1,693ms and M= 1,388ms). On
late trials, it took about the same amount of time to report the
absence of an angry face in a crowd of nine as in a crowd of
four,fl(l, 13)= l , p < . 8 9 ( M = 1,225 m s a n d M = 1,217ms).
In short, as expected from the hypothesis, the use of the absence
of a pop-out in a happy crowd as a diagnostic for the absence of
an angry target face emerged only on later trials. Of course, it
should be noted that the pop-out of angry faces in happy crowds
was evident in the absence of a crowd effect on both early trials,
P(l, 13) = 2.29, p<. 16, and late trials,^!, 13)= l , p < . 7 7 .
The contrast across experimental conditions is quite evident
in Figure 1. When the size of the angry crowd was increased,
the time to report the absence of a happy target face increased
by about 90 ms for each additional distractor. Increasing the
922 CHRISTINE H. HANSEN AND RANALD D. HANSEN

Number of Distractors (on Face-Present Trials)/

1800 Crowd Size (on Face-Absent Trials)
Three Distractors/
1700 Four Faces
Eight Dish-actors'
1600 Nine Faces

1500

1400

1300

1200

1100

1000

900

800

Happy Crowd Angry Crowd Happy Crowd Angry Crowd

Angry Face Happy Face Angry Face Happy Face
Present Present Absent Absent
Face Trials No Face Trials

Figure 1. The effects of crowd size on time to report the presence of an angry face in a happy crowd, the
presence of a happy face in an angry crowd, and the absence of target faces in happy and angry crowds.

size of the angry crowd lengthened the time to report the pres-
ence of the happy target face by about 52 ras for each additional
distractor. This suggests that subjects tended to engage in an
exhaustive serial search of angry crowds, searching the entire
crowd before reporting no target face but terminating the
search when a happy target face was found (Sternberg, 1966;
Treisman & Souther, 1985). In contrast, increasing the size of
the happy crowd lengthened the time to report the presence of
an angry target face by about only 8 ms and the time to report
the absence of an angry target by about 12 ms for each happy
distractor added. Each happy distractor increased reaction
times more on angry-face-present trials than on angry-face-ab-
sent trials in a ratio of 1.5:1.
This implies that if subjects became aware of the pop-out con-
tingency for happy crowds, they did not trust it sufficiently to
report the absence of a target without at least a cursory search
of the crowd. This seems reasonable because in this experiment,
all of the experimental conditions were interspersed. The ab-
sence of a pop-out was variably mapped (cf. Shim-in & Schnei-
der, 1977) to responses of present (i.e., a happy face in an angry
crowd) and absent (i.e., no angry target face in a crowd of happy
faces). In short, given no pop-out, before reporting the absence
of a target subjects probably engaged in a minimal search of the
crowd to ensure that it was comprised of happy faces.
Discussion
The data from these three experiments established the exis-
tence of the predicted face-in-the-crowd effect. In Experiment
1, angry faces in happy crowds were found more efficiently than
happy faces in angry crowds. Likewise, angry faces in neutral
crowds were found more efficiently than neutral faces in angry
crowds. In Experiment 2, thresholds to correct location of an
angry face in a happy crowd were lower than thresholds to cor-
rect location of a happy face in an angry crowd. In Experiment
3, it took less time to determine the presence or absence of an
angry face in happy crowds than of a happy face in angry
crowds, and the asymmetry of this face-in-the-crowd effect in-
creased as the size of the crowd was increased.
These findings, then, also support the hypothesis from which
the face-in-the-crowd effect was predicted: that faces can be pre-
attentively processed for features of facial threat. The nature
and consequences of the hypothesized preattentive processing
should be noted. Detection and location of a feature can be ac-
complished preattentively, whereas discrimination requires at-
tentional processing (Bergen & Julesz, 1983; Cheesman & Mer-
ikle, 1986; Sagi & Julesz, 1985a, 1985b). An angry face could
be detected and located in a happy crowd, but its content—
that it was, in fact, an angry face—could not be discriminated
preattentively. The consequence of preattentive face processing
from which the face-in-the-crowd effect derived, then, would be
a shift of attention to a preattentively located point in the
crowd. Given time to complete an attentional shift to that point,
the target could be seen as an angry face. And, indeed, the data
obtained, particularly in Experiment 3, are consistent with the
contention that angry faces pop out of a happy crowd (Treis-
man, 1982; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Paterson,
1984; Treisman & Souther, 1985).
It is important to note that our findings did not address the
nature of the feature that is preattentively processed. The face,
after all, is a complex stimulus; amazingly complex, it would
 FACE-IN-THE-CROWD EFFECT
seem, to be considered a perceptual unit, a feature having an
identity with a "specialized population of detectors" (Treisman
& Paterson, 1984, p. 13) or a basic perceptual element rather
than a molecular conjunction of features. Clearly the face-in-
the-crowd effect could derive from preattentive detection of a
local facial feature distortion unique to anger. This prediction
could be derived from the texton theory (Julesz, 1981; Sagi &
Julesz, 1985a, 1985b) that predicts that differences in some lo-
cal features (textons) can be preattentively detected, but detect-
ing the conjunction of local features requires attentive process-
ing. Recent psychophysiological research (Cacioppo, Martzke,
Petty, & Tassinary, 1987) indicated that the region of the brow
is a probable candidate. Within this view, the face would be
construed as a conjunction of local features and the face-in-the-
crowd effect based on preattentive detection of the angle of the
brow (local feature) produced by the activity of the corrugator
supercilii muscle in anger but not in happiness. In this case,
of course, preattentive face processing is reduced to stimulus
feature detection, and although it is interesting to speculate
about the parallel evolution or acquisition of nonface-specific
feature detectors and emotional facial gestures in which these
features happen to inhere, it is probably not particularly fruitful
to do so. Nevertheless, it is too early to dismiss the hypothesis
that emotional facial displays are perceptual elements. If the
human perceptual system has the capacity to be mapped to
complex stimuli, genetically available (cf. Hubel & Wiesel,
1968) or socially acquired (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977),
maps of faces would be high on the list of probable candidates
(Darwin, 1872/1904; Zajonc, 1985).
It also is important to be precise about how preattentive pro-
cessing could contribute to the observed face-in-the-crowd
effects. Response latencies were sufficiently long to suggest that
both preattentive and conscious attentive processes play roles
in responses. If subjects had an attentional search strategy—if
they wished to be certain of their identification—they would
have had to serially survey a minimum of three faces in any
crowd. The preattentive advantage accrued to angry faces in
happy crowds, then, represents the likelihood that the angry tar-
get face in a happy crowd was the first or at least an early focus
of attention. Further research will have to be conducted using
convergent paradigms (e.g., Treisman, 1982; Treisman &
Souther, 1985) to isolate the preattentive components from the
attentive components of the face-in-the-crowd effect and con-
clusively demonstrate that facial features acquire signal value
at the level of preattentive processing.
However, documenting the preattentive processing of faces
would be only the first step. Clearly, one larger issue raised by
our data is whether the face-in-the-crowd effect is the result of
processes more appropriately labeled cognitive or emotive.
Most researchers would agree that preattentive processing has
the capacity to direct or call attention to some aspect of a stimu-
lus array (Cheesman & Merikle, 1985, 1986; Sagi & Julesz,
1985a, 1985b; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Treisman & Gelade,
1980; Treisman & Paterson, 1984; Treisman & Souther, 1985).
Other researchers seem to claim more for preattentive process-
ing: that emotion may occur preattentively (Kunst-Wilson &
Zajonc, 1980; Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983; Seamon, Marsh,
& Brody, 1984; Zajonc, 1980). A thorough investigation of the
processing underlying the face-in-the-crowd effect might be
923
used to address this critical issue. Facial expressions are mim-
icked (Dimberg, 1982,1986; McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan, Mas-
ters, & Englis, 1985; Ohman, 1986) and, hence, subjects' mim-
icry might be used as a psychophysiological measure of emotion
(cf. Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim,
1986) that is potentially independent of attentional processing.
It would be interesting to discover, for example, whether the
threshold to mimicry of an angry face precedes or occurs after
thresholds to its detection and to identification.
Further, the conjunction of our work with that of Agostinelli,
Sherman, Fazio, and Hearst (1986) implies that it might be
fruitful to explore asymmetries in the efficiency of detecting,
identifying, and mimicking a face in a happy crowd that
changes from angry to happy and a face in an angry crowd that
changes from happy to angry. The predictions from these two
lines of research converge. An angry face in a happy crowd is
the face in the crowd most likely to be given attentional process-
ing; it is the face most likely to result in a highly accessible me-
morial representation (Agostinelli et al., 1986). Detection and,
particularly, identification (Agostinelli et al., 1986) of an angry
face changing to a happy face should be rather efficient—for the
enemy who blends into the friendly crowd can be treacherous,
indeed.
References
Agostinelli, G., Sherman, S. J., Fazio, R. H., & Hearst, E. S. (1986).
Detecting and identifying change: Additions versus deletions. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
12, 445-454.
Bargh, J. A. (1982). Attention and automaticity in the processing of self-
relevant information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
43, 425-436.
Bargh, J. A. (1984). Automatic and conscious processing of social infor-
mation. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social
cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 1-43). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonaco, P. (1982). Automatic information pro-
cessing and social perception: The influence of trait information pre-
sented outside of conscious awareness on impression formation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 437-449.
Barrera, M. E., & Maurer, D. (1981). The perception of facial expres-
sions by the three-month-old. Child Development, 52,203-206.
Beck, J. (1983). Texture segregation. In J. Beck (Ed.), Organization and
representation in perception (pp. 285-317). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bergen, J. R., & Julesz, B. (1983). Parallel versus serial processing in
rapid pattern discrimination. Nature, 303,696-698.
Buck, R. (1984). The communication of emotion. New York: Guilford
Press.
Cacioppo, J. T, & Petty, R. E. (1979). Attitude and cognitive response:
An electrophysiological approach. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, J7. 2181-2199.
Cacioppo, J. T., Martzke, J. S., Petty, R. E., & Tassinary, L. G. (1987).
Specific forms of facial EMG response index emotions during an in-
terview: From Darwin to the continuous flow Hypothesis of affect-
laden information processing. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Iowa, Iowa City.
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Losch, M. E., & Kim, H. S. (1986). Electro-
myographic activity over facial muscle regions can differentiate the
valence and intensity of affective reactions. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 50.260-268.
Cheesman, J., & Merikle, P. M. (1985). Word recognition and con-
sciousness. In D. Besner, T. G. Waller, & G. E. MacKinnon (Eds.),
924 CHRISTINE H. HANSEN AND RANALD D. HANSEN
Reading research: Advances in theory and practice (Vol. 5, pp. 311-
352). New York: Academic Press.
Cheesman, J., & Merikle, P. M. (1986). Distinguishing conscious from
unconscious perceptual processes. Canadian Journal of Psychology,
40, 343-367.
Cheng, P. W. (1985). Restructuring versus automaticity: Alternative ac-
counts of skill acquisition. Psychological Review, 92, 414-423.
Darwin, C. (1904). The expression of emotions in man and animals.
London: Murray. (Original work published 1872)
Dimberg, U. (1982). Facial reactions to facial expressions. Psychophysi-
ology, J9, 643-647.
Dimberg, U. (1986). Facial expressions as excitatory and inhibitory
stimuli for conditioned autonomic responses. Biological Psychology,
22, 37-57.
Ekman, P. (1984). Expression and the nature of emotion. In K. R.
Scherer & P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Gratio\et,P.(l%65).Delaphysionomieetdesmouvememsd'expression
[About physiognomy and movements of expression]. Paris: Hetzel.
Hansen, R. D., & Hansen, C. H. (1984). Toward a facial primacy theory
of emotion. Unpublished manuscript, Oakland University, Rochester
Hills, MI.
Homa, D., Haver, B., & Schwartz, T. (1976). Perceptibility of schematic
face stimuli: Evidence for a perceptual gestalt. Memory and Cogni-
tion, 4, 176-185.
Hubel, D. H., & Wiesel, T. N. (1968). Receptive fields and functional
architecture of monkey striate cortex. Journal of Physiology, 195,
215-243.
Izard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York: Plenum Press.
Julesz, B. (1981). Textons, the elements of texture perception and their
interactions. Nature, 290, 91-97.
Kahneman, D., & Treisman, A. (1983). Changing views of attention
and automaticity. In M. Kubovy & J. R. Pomerantz (Eds.), Varieties
of attention. New York: Academic Press.
Kunst-Wilson, W. R., & Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Affective discrimination
of stimuli that cannot be recognized. Science, 207, 557-558.
LaBarbera, J. D., Izard, C. E., Vietze, P., & Parisi, S. A. (1976). Four-
and six-month-old infants' visual responses to joy, anger, and neutral
expressions. Child Development, 47, 535-538.
Leventhal, H. J. (1982). The integration of emotion and cognition: A
view from the perceptual-motor theory of emotion. In M. S. Clark &
S. T. Fiske (Eds.), Affect and cognition (pp. 121-156). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Lieberman, H. R., & Pentland, A. P. (1982). Microcomputer-based esti-
mates of psychophysical thresholds: The Best PEST. Behavior Re-
search Methods & Instrumentation, 14,21-25.
Logan, G. D. (1979). On the use of a concurrent memory load to mea-
sure attention and automaticity. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 5, 189-207.
McHugo, G. J., Lanzetta, J. T, Sullivan, D. G., Masters, R. D., & Englis,
B. G. (1985). Emotional reactions to a political leader's expressive
displays. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1513-
1529.
Ohman, A. (1986). Face the beast and fear the face: Animal and social
fears as prototypes for evolutionary analyses of emotion. Psychophys-
iology,23, 123-145.
Purcell, D. G., & Stewart, A. L. (1981). A face superiority effect. Bulle-
tin of the Psychonomic Society, 24, 118-120.
Purcell, D. G., & Stewart, A. L. (1986). The face-detection effect. Bulle-
tin of the Psychonomic Society, 24, 118-120.
Purcell, D. G., Stewart, A. L., Botwin, M., & Kreigh, R. (1983). A face
superiority effect: Hemiretina effects. Bulletin of the Psychonomic So-
ciety, 21, 351.
Sackett, G. P. (1966). Monkeys reared in isolation with pictures as visual
input: Evidence for an innate releasing mechanism. Science, 154,
1468-1473.
Sagi, D., & Julesz, B. (1985a). Detection versus discrimination of visual
orientation. Perception, 14, 619-629.
Sagi, D., & Julesz, B. (1985b). "Where" and "what" of vision. Science,
228, 1217-1219.
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic hu-
man information processing: I. Detection, search, and attention. Psy-
chological Review, 84, 1-66.
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1985). Automatic and controlled pro-
cessing revisited. Psychological Review, 91, 269-276.
Schwartz, G. M., Izard, C. E., & Ansul, S. E. (1985). The five-month-
old's ability to discriminate facial expressions of emotion. Infant Be-
havior and Development, 8,65-77.
Seamon, J. G., Brody, N., & Kauff, D. M. (1983). Affective discrimina-
tion of stimuli that are not recognized: Effects of shadowing, masking,
and cerebral laterally. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 544-555.
Seamon, J. G., Marsh, R. L., & Brody, N. (1984). Critical importance
of exposure duration for affective discrimination of stimuli that are
not recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory. andCognition, 10, 465-469.
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic hu-
man information processing: II. Detection, search, and attention.
Psychological Review, 84, 127-190.
Sternberg, S. (1966). High-speed scanning in human memory. Science,
153. 652-654.
Tomkins, S. S. (1980). Affect as amplification: Some modifications in
theory. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, re-
search and experience (pp. 141 -164). New York: Academic Press.
Treisman, A. (1982). Perceptual grouping and attention in visual search
for features and for objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Hu-
man Perception and Performance, 8,194-214.
Treisman, A., & Gelade, G. (1980). A feature-integration theory of at-
tention. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 97-136.
Treisman, A., & Paterson, R. (1984). Emergent features, attention, and
object perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 10, 12-31.
Treisman, A., & Souther, J. (1985). Search asymmetry: A diagnostic for
preattentive processing of separable features. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: General. 114, 285-310.
Van Santen, J. P. H., & Jonides, J. (1978). A replication of the face-
superiority effect. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 12, 378-380.
Waynbaum, I. (1906). La physionomie humaine: Son mecanisme et son
role social [The human physiognomy: Its mechanism and its social
role]. Paris: Alcan.
Wilcox, B. M., & Clayton, F. L. (1968). Infant visual fixation on motion
pictures of the human face. Journal of Experimental Child Psychol-
ogy. 6, 22-32.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no infer-
ences. American Psychologist, 35, 151-175.
Zajonc, R. B. (1985). Emotion and facial efference: A theory reclaimed.
Science, 228. 15-21.
Zajonc, R. B., & Markus, H. (1984). Affect and cognition: The hard
interface. In C. E. Izard, J. Kagan, & R. B. Zajonc (Eds.), Emotions,
cognition, and behavior, (pp. 73-102). Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Received November 14, 1986
Revision received November 2, 1987
Accepted November 16, 1987