Blowout Preventer (BOP) Maintenance Schedule

for Optimal Cost and Reliability

Yang-Denis Su-Feher
PhD Student, Chemical Engineering
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center
denis@tamu.edu
 Outline
• Motivation

• Methodology

• Results

• Conclusion

• Acknowledgement

• References

2
Motivation

3
Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2010)1,2

• 11 fatalities
• 17 injuries
• $40 billion loss

4
 Location Incidents3,4
Macondo Prospect, USA Deepwater Horizon, 2010
Santa Barbara Channel, USA Union Oil, 1969
North Sea, UK Ocean Odyssey, 1988
Ekofisk B, 1977
West Vanguard, 1985
North Sea, Norway
Snorre A, 2004
Gullfaks C, 2010
Enchova, 1984
Campos Basin, Brazil
Frade, 2011
Bay of Campeche, Mexico Ixtoc, 1979

5
Blowout Preventer5

6
 Statistics of BOP failure

• 292 blowouts from 1980 to 20146

• Corrective maintenance downtime:
– Approximately 1-2 weeks per corrective maintenance7
– 2% offshore rig operational time lost8

7
Methodology

8
9
 Components List 19
Serial Number Category of Component Components
1 Annular Preventer
2 LMRP Connector (LMRPC)
3 Shear Ram
BOP Stack
4 Pipe Ram
5 Test Ram
6 Wellhead Connector
7 Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU)
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
9 MUX Cable Reel
10 Rigid Conduit & Hotline System
Surface Control System
11 100 HP Pumps
12 Driller Control Panel
13 Rig Manager Control Panel
14 Central Control Console (CCC)
10
 Components List 29
Serial Number Category of Component Components
15 Subsea Engineer Panel (SEP)
16 Subsea Electronic Module (SEM)
17 Subsea Control System Subsea Electrical Power
18 LMRP Stack Accumulators
19 Power Distribution Panel
20 Choke/Kill (CK) Lines
Choke/Kill System
21 Choke/Kill (CK) Valves (8)

11
 Assumptions
• Preventative maintenance is performed before each drilling job is
started, and not during jobs
• Preventative maintenance downtime is negligible compared to
the time between drilling jobs
• Overall reliability of the BOP system should be kept above a
minimum threshold
• Constant failure rate
• It is possible to replace components at any time in between
drilling jobs
• Maintenance fully restores component reliability to a value of one
• All components will either fail or work perfectly
• Components will be replaced on time by the beginning of the
next drilling job

12
Pareto-Optimal Multi-Objective Optimization10
• minimize 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑥
𝑥
• 𝑠. 𝑡. −𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ≤ 𝜖
• 𝑔 𝑥 ≤ 0
• ℎ 𝑥 = 0

13
Results

14
 Test Parameters

• BARON solvers
• 32-27 inch HP systems
• 3.2 GHz quad Xeon-E3 processors and
8GB RAM running Windows 7
• Maintenance Horizon: 1 year
– Mean computation time: 2.61 Hours
• Drilling jobs take 61 days
15
Maintenance Schedules

16
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Rlow=0.600
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
17
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
Rlow=0.700
13 1
14
15 1
16
17
18
19
20
21
18
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Rlow=0.800
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
19
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Rlow=0.900
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
20
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Rlow=0.950
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
21
Sr No. Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5 Job 6 Job 7
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1 1
8
9 1 1 1 1 1 1
10
11
12
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
Rlow=0.980
13 1 1 1 1 1 1
14 1 1 1 1 1 1
15 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 1 1 1 1 1 1
17
18 1 1 1
19 1 1 1
20 1 1 1 1 1 1
21 1 1 1 1 1 1
22
Findings

23
 Model Reduction

• From 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎𝟎 to 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟎:

– UPS (8), rigid conduit & hotline system (10),
and subsea electrical power (17) components
were never maintained in this one-year period
– Except at 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟔𝟎, the LMRP stack
accumulators (18) were never maintained

24
 Model Reduction
• From 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎𝟎 to 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟎:
– Choke/kill valves (21) were maintained for every
time step
• From 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝟓𝟎 to 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟎:
– Choke/kill lines (20) were maintained for every
time step
• From 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟐𝟎 to 𝑹𝒍𝒐𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟗𝟗𝟎:
– 100 HP pumps (11), rig manager control panel
(13), and CCC (14) were maintained for every
time step

25
 Trends

• Hydraulic components were maintained

more than electric components
• Although subsea control elements are the
most likely to cause incidents1, they are
not maintained as often because of the
high associated cost

26
Reliability vs Time

27
Rlow=0.600

28
Rlow=0.980

29
Cost vs Minimum Reliability

30
With a given budget, you can choose your
desired reliability

31
Incremental Cost for Risk-Efficient Decision
Making

32
 Conclusions
• An optimization formulation has been
developed for BOP maintenance scheduling
that can:
– Minimize overall maintenance cost
– Maintain reliability above a required threshold
– Generate maintenance schedules that prioritize
components that are cost-efficient to maintain
– Allow decision-makers to determine the optimal
maintenance schedule based on the cost and the
minimum reliability.
– Allow decision-makers to determine the cost-
effectiveness of changing minimum reliability.
33
 Acknowledgements
• Nilesh Ade
• Dr. Mannan
• Dr. Koirala
• Dr. Liu
• Dr. Rogers
• Captain James Pettigrew
• Leon Schwartz
• Ms. Valerie Green
• Alanna Scheinerman
• All members of the MKOPSC
• All members of the OESI Advisory Committee

34
 References
1) American Bureau of Shipping and ABSG Consulting Inc. , 2013. Blowout preventer reliability, availability
and maintainability analysis for Bureau of safety and environmental enforcement, s.l.: s.n.
2) J. Witthaus, "https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/morning_call/2016/07/bp-estimates-total-cost-of-
deepwater-horizon.html," BP estimates total cost of Deepwater Horizon disaster at $61.6B, 15 July 2015.
3) J. Vinnem and J. Erik, Offshore Risk Assessment, 3rd ed., Springer, 2014.
4) Arnold & Ipkin LLP, "Major Offshore Accidents of the 20th and 21st Century," 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.oilrigexplosionattorneys.com/Oil-Rig-Explosions/History-of-Offshore-Accidents.aspx.
[Accessed 23 July 2017].
5) R. Almeida, "BOP Blowout! $4.5 Billion Surge in Orders for 400-Ton Subsea Failsafe," gCaptain, 10
August 2012. [Online]. Available: http://gcaptain.com/blowout-4-5-billion-surge-orders/. [Accessed 2017
July 21].
6) SINTEF, SINTEF Offshore Blowout Database, 2013.
7) E. Draegebo, "Reliability Analysis of Blowout Preventer," Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, Department of Marine Technology, Trondheim, 2014.
8) Holand, "Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Application & Fault tree analysis," SINTEF,
Trondheim, 1997.
9) American Bureau of Shipping and ABSG Consulting Inc., 2013. BLOWOUT PREVENTER (BOP)
FAILURE EVENT AND MAINTENANCE, INSPECTION AND TEST (MIT) DATA ANALYSIS FOR THE
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (BSEE), s.l.: Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement.
10) "What Is Multiobjective Optimization?," Mathworks, 2017. [Online]. Available:
https://www.mathworks.com/help/gads/what-is-multiobjective-optimization.html. [Accessed 20 July 2017].
35
Questions?
Comments?
denis@tamu.edu

36
Backup Slides

37
 Objective Function
𝑇 𝑛

minimize 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑖

𝑅
𝑡=1 𝑖=1

𝑐𝑖,𝑡 : Cost of maintenance for component i at time t ($)

xi,t : Binary variable used to determine which, if any,
component i is maintained at time t
i: Index of component
t: Time step (days)
𝑚𝑖 : Number of parallel components of component i
38
 Reliability at each Time Step

𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑒 − 𝜆𝑖 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑀 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡

𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝑒 −𝜆𝑖 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑀 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 1 + 1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑀 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 1 − 1 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 𝑀 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡

𝑅𝑖,𝑡 : Reliability of component, i, at time t

𝜆𝑖 : Failure rate of component i
xi,t : Binary variable used to determine which, if any,
component i is maintained at time t
M: Big M formulation constant; M = 1
39
 Reliability of Parallel Components
𝑚𝑖
𝑅𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − 1 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡

𝑚𝑖 : Number of parallel components of

component i
R p,i,t : Reliability of parallel subsystem of
component i at time t
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 : Reliability of component, i, at time t
40
 Reliability of BOP Stack (Series)
𝑛

𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 ∀ 𝑡
𝑖=1

R p,i,t : Reliability of parallel subsystem of

component i at time t
R s,t : Reliability of BOP system at time t
41
 Reliability Constraint
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤 ≤ 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡
0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 1 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡

R low : Minimum reliability threshold of BOP

system (epsilon constraint)
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 : Reliability of component, i, at time t

42