Echegaray v.

Secretary of Justice

Leo Echegaray was a sick man who raped his own daughter Rodessa Echegaray. The Secretary
of Justice at the time of this case was Serafin Cuevas.

Facts: On 4 January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the Supreme Court not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to
onstitutional Law 317
vb) By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2, 2008. Section 1 thereof provides: “The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. ”
vi) Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601, January 19, 1999, the Supreme Court declared: “But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.”
vii) Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment;
the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 (Death Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence.
But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend
laws be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than
the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant
reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.