[G.R. No. L-47245. December 9, 1977.

GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE SECRETARY
OF FINANCE and THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, respondents.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J p:

Considering the allegations, issues presented, and arguments adduced (a)

in what the petitioner has denominated as a "Petition for Prohibition or
Declaratory Relief," (b) in the Solicitor General's Comment on the petition, and
(c) at the hearing on November 24, 1977, the Court Resolved NOT to give due
course to the petition and to DISMISS the same, for the reasons hereunder set
forth.
(1) The question to be submitted to the people in the December 17, 1977
referendum which reads, "Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos
continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime Minister after the
organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in
Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?," is in neither
the nature nor the form of an amendment. The holding of the referendum will
not result in an indirect amendment to Amendment No. 3 to the
Constitution which provides that "The incumbent President of the Philippines
shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even
after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge it
functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five Constitution and the powers vested
in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution." Presidential and
the Prime Minister under this Constitution." Presidential Decree No. 1229 which
calls for the December 17, 1977 referendum cannot therefore be said to suffer
from any constitutional infirmity. If the people vote "yes," Amendment No. 3 will
merely be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote "no," the incumbent
President, heeding "the will" of the people, will — as he has categorically
announced — resign; in such situation, he will be merely exercising the
prerogative, inherent in all public officials, to resign. In either case the
Constitution, as it now reads, will remain unaltered.
(2) The matter of whether or not the holding of the December 17, 1977
referendum is unnecessary because the people, on several occasions, had
already expressed their assent to the incumbent President's continuance in office
and their approval of his programs of government, is a political and non-
justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more and no less, of the
decision to call for a referendum. The power to determine when a referendum
should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides
in the political branch of the Government, the exercise of which involves
consideration of a multitude of factors — political, social, economic, etc. —
normally outside the periphery of competence of the courts.
(3) The call for the referendum is explicitly authorized by Amendment No.
7 of the Constitution which in part provides that "Referenda conducted thru the
barangays and under the supervision of the Commission on Elections may be
called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of
the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest."
If, pursuant to this grant of power, the President decides, as he has decided, to
 consult with the people and submit himself to a vote of confidence in a
referendum because he deems it important to do so, he cannot be
constitutionally faulted. His action would also be in full accord with the spirit of
Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that public office is a
public trust and that public officers shall remain accountable to the people.
It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question of
sufficient importance or significance to warrant the further intention of the Court.
The dismissal of the instant petition is immediately executory.
||| (Dela Llana v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-47245 (Resolution),
[December 9, 1977], 170 PHIL 544-556)
 [G.R. No. 169466. May 9, 2007.]

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by

SECRETARY ROMULO L. NERI, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
represented by POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO L.
LOMIBAO, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by
CHAIRMAN ANGELO T. REYES, AND CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRPERSON KARINA C.
DAVID, petitioners, vs. MANILA'S FINEST RETIREES
ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by P/COL. FELICISIMO G.
LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER INP
RETIREES, respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J p:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78203, to wit:
1. Decision 1 dated July 7, 2005 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, in Civil
Case No. 02-103702, a suit for declaratory relief, declaring the
herein respondents entitled to the same retirement benefits
accorded upon retirees of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No.
8551, and ordering the herein petitioners to implement the
proper adjustments on respondents' retirement benefits; and
2. Resolution 2 dated August 24, 2005 which denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts:
In 1975, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 765 was issued constituting the
Integrated National Police (INP) to be composed of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) as the nucleus and the integrated police forces as components thereof.
Complementing P.D. No. 765 was P.D. No. 1184 3 dated August 26, 1977 (INP
Law, hereinafter) issued to professionalize the INP and promote career
development therein.
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975, entitled "AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," hereinafter referred to as PNP Law, was enacted. Under
Section 23 of said law, the Philippine National Police (PNP) would initially
consist of the members of the INP, created under P.D. No. 765, as well as the
officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. In part, Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitation provided for in
this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter referred to as the
PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of the members of the
police forces who were integrated into the Integrated National Police
(INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). DaAISH
 A little less than eight (8) years later, or on February 25, 1998, R.A. No.
6975 was amended by R.A. No. 8551, otherwise known as the "PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE REFORM AND REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1998." Among other
things, the amendatory law reengineered the retirement scheme in the police
organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood to collect more
retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired
under the INP Law, received.
The INP retirees illustrated the resulting disparity in the retirement benefits
between them and the PNP retirees as follows: 4
Retirement Rank Monthly Pension Difference
INP PNP INP PNP
Corporal SPO3 P3,225.00 P11,310.00 P8,095.00
Captain P. Sr. Insp. P5,248.00 P15,976.00 P10,628.00
Brig. Gen. P. Chief Supt. P10,054.24 P18,088.00 P8,033.76

Hence, on June 3, 2002, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, all INP
retirees, spearheaded by the Manila's Finest Retirees Association, Inc., or the
MFRAI (hereinafter collectively referred to as the INP Retirees), filed a petition for
declaratory relief, 5 thereunder impleading, as respondents,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), the PNP, the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Docketed in the RTC as Civil Case
No. 02-103702, which was raffled to Branch 22 thereof, the petition alleged in gist
that INP retirees were equally situated as the PNP retirees but whose retirement
benefits prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551,
were unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from the higher rates and adjusted
benefits accorded to the PNP retirees. Accordingly, in their petition, the petitioning
INP retirees pray that a —
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT be rendered in their favor,
DECLARING with certainty that they, as INP-retirees, are truly
absorbed and equally considered as PNP-retirees and thus, entitled to
enjoy the SAME or IDENTICAL retirement benefits being bestowed to
PNP-retirees by virtue of said PNP Law or Republic Act No. 6975, as
amended by Republic Act 8551, with the corollary mandate for the
respondents-government agencies to effect the immediate adjustment
on their previously received disparate retirement benefits, retroactive
to its effectivity, and with due payment thereof.
The GSIS moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action. On the other hand, the CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP, in their
respective answers, asserted that the petitioners could not claim the more
generous retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6975 because at no time did they
become PNP members, having retired prior to the enactment of said law. DBM,
NAPOLCOM and PNP afterwards filed their respective pre-trial briefs.
The ensuing legal skirmish is not relevant to the disposition of the instant
case. The bottom line is that, on March 21, 2003, the RTC came out with its
decision 6 holding that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, did not abolish the INP but
merely provided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP, and
accordingly rendered judgment for the INP retirees, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT DECLARING
the INP Retirees entitled to the same or identical retirement benefits
and such other benefits being granted, accorded and bestowed upon
the PNP Retirees under the PNP Law (RA No. 6975, as amended).
 The respondents Government Departments and Agencies shall
IMMEDIATELY EFFECT and IMPLEMENT the proper adjustments on the
INP Retirees' retirement and such other benefits, RETROACTIVE to its
date of effectivity, and RELEASE and PAY to the INP Retirees the due
payments of the amounts. cSaADC
SO ORDERED.
On April 2, 2003, the trial court issued what it denominated as Supplement
to the Decision whereunder it granted the GSIS' motion to dismiss and thus
considered the basic petition as withdrawn with respect to the latter.
From the adverse decision of the trial court, the remaining respondents,
namely, DBM, PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC, interposed an appeal to the CA whereat
their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 78203.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 7,
2005, 7 affirmed that of the trial court upholding the entitlement of the INP
retirees to the same or identical retirement benefits accorded upon PNP retirees
under R.A. No. 6975, as amended.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its equally
assailed resolution of August 24, 2005, 8 herein petitioners are now with this
Court via the instant recourse on their singular submission that —
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR
IN LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
We DENY.
In the main, it is petitioners' posture that R.A. No. 6975 clearly abolished the
INP and created in its stead a new police force, the PNP. Prescinding therefrom,
petitioners contend that since the PNP is an organization entirely different from the
INP, it follows that INP retirees never became PNP members. Ergo, they cannot
avail themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP members under R.A.
No. 6975 and its amendatory law, R.A. No. 8551. HDIATS
A flashback at history is proper.
As may be recalled, R.A. No. 6975 was enacted into law on December 13,
1990, or just about four (4) years after the 1986 Edsa Revolution toppled down the
dictatorship regime. Egged on by the current sentiment of the times generated by
the long period of martial rule during which the police force, the PC-INP, had a
military character, being then a major service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and invariably moved by a fresh constitutional mandate for the
establishment of one police force which should be national in scope and, most
importantly, purely civilian in character, 9 Congress enacted R.A. No.
6975 establishing the PNP and placing it under the Department of Interior and
Local Government. To underscore the civilian character of the PNP, R.A. No.
6975 made it emphatically clear in its declaration of policy the following:
Section 2. Declaration of policy — It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State to promote peace and order, ensure public safety
and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the
effective delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the
establishment of a highly efficient and competent police force that is
national in scope and civilian in character. . . . .
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped
primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope
 and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the
police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be
occupied by active members of the [AFP]. (Emphasis and word in
bracket supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 23, supra, of R.A. No. 6975, the PNP initially
consisted of the members of the police forces who were integrated into the INP by
virtue of P.D. No. 765, while Section 86 10 of the same law provides for the
assumption by the PNP of the police functions of the INP and its absorption by the
former, including its appropriations, funds, records, equipment, etc., as well as its
personnel. 11 And to govern the statute's implementation, Section 85 of the Act
spelled out the following absorption phases: DACcIH
Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the
[PC], the PC elements assigned with the Narcotics Command, CIS, and
the personnel of the technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC
to include the regular CIS investigating agents and the operatives and
agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection. Investigation and Intelligence
Branch, and the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee
on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of the Department of National Defense to
be completed within six (6) months from the date of the
effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from
the INP, PC, AFP Technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM
Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have
been covered by official orders assigning them to the PNP, Fire
and Jail Forces by their respective units.
Phase II — Approval of the table of organization and
equipment of all bureaus and offices created under this Act,
preparation and filling up of their staffing pattern, transfer of assets to
the [DILG] and organization of the Commission, to be completed
within twelve (12) months from the effectivity date hereof. At the
end of this phase, all personnel to be absorbed by the [DILG] shall
have been issued appointment papers, and the organized Commission
and the PNP shall be fully operational. DASEac
The PC officers and enlisted personnel who have not opted to join
the PNP shall be reassigned to the Army, Navy or Air Force, or shall be
allowed to retire under existing AFP rules and regulations. Any PC-
INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month
period from the effectivity of this Act, retire and be paid
retirement benefits corresponding to a position two (2) ranks
higher than his present grade, subject to the conditions that at
the time he applies for retirement, he has rendered at least
twenty (20) years of service and still has, at most, twenty-four
(24) months of service remaining before the compulsory
retirement age as provided by existing law for his office.
Phase III — Adjustment of ranks and establishment of one (1)
lineal roster of officers and another for non-officers, and the
rationalization of compensation and retirement systems; taking into
consideration the existing compensation schemes and retirement and
separation benefit systems of the different components of the PNP, to
ensure that no member of the PNP shall suffer any diminution in basic
longevity and incentive pays, allowances and retirement benefits due
them before the creations of the PNP, to be completed within eighteen
(18) months from the effectivity of this Act. . . . .
 Upon the effectivity of this Act, the [DILG] Secretary shall
exercise administrative supervision as well as operational
control over the transferred, merged and/or absorbed AFP and
INP units. The incumbent Director General of the PC-INP shall
continue to act as Director General of the PNP until . .
. replaced . . . . (Emphasis and words in brackets supplied.)
From the foregoing, it appears clear to us that the INP was never, as posited
by the petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975. For
sure, nowhere in R.A. No. 6975 does the words "abolish" or "terminate" appear in
reference to the INP. Instead, what the law provides is for the "absorption,"
"transfer," and/or "merger" of the INP, as well as the other offices comprising the
PC-INP, with the PNP. To "abolish" is to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely; 12 to "absorb" is to assimilate, incorporate or to take in. 13 "Merge"
means to cause to combine or unite to become legally absorbed or extinguished by
merger 14 while "transfer" denotes movement from one position to another.
Clearly, "abolition" cannot be equated with "absorption."
True it is that Section 90 15 of R.A. No. 6975 speaks of the INP "[ceasing] to
exist" upon the effectivity of the law. It ought to be stressed, however, that such
cessation is but the logical consequence of the INP being absorbed by the PNP.
Far from being abolished then, the INP, at the most, was merely transformed
to become the PNP, minus of course its military character and complexion.
Even the petitioners' effort at disclosing the legislative intent behind the
enactment of R.A. No. 6975 cannot support their theory of abolition. Rather, the
Senate and House deliberations on the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
6975 reveal what has correctly been held by the CA in its assailed decision: that
the PNP was precisely created to erase the stigma spawned by the
militarization of the police force under the PC-INP structure. The rationale behind
the passage of R.A. No. 6975 was adequately articulated by no less than the
sponsor 16 of the corresponding House bill in his sponsorship speech, thus:
By removing the police force from under the control and
supervision of military officers, the bill seeks to restore and underscore
the civilian character of police work — an otherwise universal concept
that was muddled up by the martial law years.
Indeed, were the legislative intent was for the INP's abolition such that
nothing would be left of it, the word "abolish" or what passes for it could have easily
found its way into the very text of the law itself, what with the abundant use of the
word during the legislative deliberations. But as can be gleaned from said
deliberations, the lawmakers' concern centered on the fact that if the entire PC-INP
corps join the PNP, then the PC-INP will necessarily be abolished, for who then
would be its members? Of more consequence, the lawmakers were one in saying
that there should never be two national police agencies at the same time. cIHSTC
With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact abolished but
was merely transformed to become the PNP, members of the INP which include the
herein respondents are, therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the
retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees under Sections 74 17 and
75 18 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may be that respondents
were no longer in the government service at the time of the enactment of R.A. No.
6975. This fact, however, without more, would not pose as an impediment to the
respondents' entitlement to the new retirement scheme set forth under the
aforecited sections. As correctly ratiocinated by the CA to which we are in full
accord:
 For sure, R.A. No. 6975 was not a retroactive statute since it did
not impose a new obligation to pay the INP retirees the difference
between what they received when they retired and what would now be
due to them after R.A. No. 6975 was enacted. Even so, that did not
render the RTC's interpretation of R.A. No. 6975 any less valid. The
[respondents'] retirement prior to the passage of R.A. No. 6975 did
not exclude them from the benefits provided by R.A. No. 6975, as
amended by R.A. No. 8551, since their membership in the INP was an
antecedent fact that nonetheless allowed them to avail
themselves of the benefits of the subsequent laws. R.A. No.
6975 considered them as PNP members, always referring to their
membership and service in the INP in providing for their retirement
benefits. 19
Petitioners maintain, however, that NAPOLCOM Resolution No.
8, 20 particularly Section 11 21 thereof, bars the payment of any differential in
retirement pay to officers and non-officers who are already retired prior to the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. SAHIaD
The contention does not commend itself for concurrence.
Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of rationalized
retirement benefits to PNP members who have meanwhile retired before its (R.A.
No. 8551) enactment was not prohibited. In fact, its Section 38 22 explicitly states
that the rationalized retirement benefits schedule and program "shall have
retroactive effect in favor of PNP members and officers retired or separated from
the time specified in the law." To us, the aforesaid provision should be made
applicable to INP members who had retired prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975.
For, as afore-held, the INP was, in effect, merely absorbed by the PNP and not
abolished.
Indeed, to bar payment of retirement pay differential to INP members who
were already retired before R.A. No. 6975 became effective would even run counter
to the purpose of NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 8 itself, as expressed in its
preambulatory clause, which is to rationalize the retirement system of the PNP
taking into consideration existing retirement and benefit systems (including R.A.
No. 6975 and P.D. No. 1184) of the different components thereof "to ensure that
no member of the PNP shall suffer any diminution in the retirement benefits due
them before the creation of the PNP." 23
Most importantly, the perceived restriction could not plausibly preclude the
respondents from asserting their entitlement to retirement benefits adjusted to the
level when R.A. No. 6975 took effect. Such adjustment hews with the constitutional
warrant that "the State shall, from time to time, review to upgrade the pensions
and other benefits due to retirees of both the government and private
sectors," 24 and the implementing mandate under the Senior Citizen's
Law 25 that "to the extent practicable and feasible, retirement benefits . . . shall
be upgraded to be at par with the current scale enjoyed by those in actual
service." EcAISC
Certainly going for the respondents in their bid to enjoy the same retirement
benefits granted to PNP retirees, either under R.A. No. 6975 or R.A. No. 8551, is
Section 34 of the latter law which amended Section 75 of R.A. No. 6975 by adding
thereto the following proviso:
Section 75. Retirement benefits. . . . : Provided, finally, That
retirement pay of the officers/non-officers of the PNP shall be subject
to adjustments based on the prevailing scale of base pay of police
personnel in the active service.
 Then, too, is the all familiar rule that:
Retirement laws should be liberally construed in favor of the
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance and
hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve
the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security
and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 26
The petitioners parlay the notion of prospective application of statutes, noting
in this regard that R.A. No. 6975, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively,
there being no provision to that effect.
We are not persuaded.
As correctly found by the appellate court, R.A. No. 6975 itself contextually
provides for its retroactive application to cover those who had retired prior to its
effectivity. In this regard, we invite attention to the three (3)
phases of implementation under Section 85 for the absorption and continuation in
the service of, among others, the INP members under the newly-established
PNP. IHEDAT
In a further bid to scuttle respondents' entitlement to the desired retirement
benefits, the petitioners fault the trial court for ordering the immediate
adjustments of the respondents' retirement benefits when the basic petition filed
before it was one for declaratory relief. To the petitioners, such petition does not
essentially entail an executory process, the only relief proper under that setting
being a declaration of the parties' rights and duties.
Petitioners' above posture is valid to a point. However, the
execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily
indefensible. In Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation[PDIC] v.
Court of Appeals, 27 wherein the Court affirmed the order for the petitioners
therein to pay the balance of the deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we
categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on
the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A
special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary
civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to
56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special
subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But
the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil
actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil
actions. 28 IHEaAc
Similarly, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang,
Lanao del Sur: 29 the Court upheld the lower court's order for a party to refund
the amounts paid by the adverse party under the municipal ordinance therein
questioned, stating:
. . . Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may
be converted into an ordinary action and the parties allowed to file
such pleadings as may be necessary or proper, if before the final
termination of the case "a breach or violation of an . . . ordinance,
should take place." In the present case, no breach or violation of the
ordinance occurred. The petitioner decided to pay "under protest" the
fees imposed by the ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case;
 the declaratory relief action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be
resolved, although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary
suit for the recovery of taxes paid . . . In its petition for declaratory
relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of the
enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced
to pay under protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance,
and accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was that
the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it paid to
respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The
inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected
to by the respondents in their answer. During the trial, evidence of the
payments made by the petitioner was introduced. Respondents were
thus fully aware of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently
from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition becomes all the more appropriate
considering that the respondents, as petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the
immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits which, significantly, the herein
petitioners, as respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware of said
prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical consequence if, as it turned
out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the respondents' favor.
At bottom then, the trial court's judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits
which, needless to stress, would only entail a long and arduous process.
Considering their obvious advanced years, the respondents can hardly afford
another protracted proceedings. It is thus for this Court to already write finis to this
case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the CA, respectively dated July 7, 2005 and August 24, 2005, are
AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
||| (Department of Budget and Management v. Manila's Finest Retirees
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 169466, [May 9, 2007], 551 PHIL 90-110)
 [G.R. No. 166429. December 19, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive

Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
(MIAA), petitioners, vs. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his
capacity as Presiding, and Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO., INC., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc and Delos Angeles for PIATCO.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INHERENT RIGHTS OF THE

STATE; RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN; EXTENDS TO PERSONAL AND REAL
PROPERTY; CASE AT BAR. — The right of eminent domain extends to personal
and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil,
are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also
beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on
Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be
expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that
effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did
aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the
Philippines]."
2. ID.; ID.; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8974; APPLIES IN INSTANCES
WHEN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPROPRIATES PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS. — Rep. Act No. 8974, which
provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than
Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government
expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if
expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit
mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION; RULE 67
AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8974, DISTINGUISHED. — Under both Rule 67 and Rep.
Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings through
the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which
necessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished,
there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization
before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent
domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No.
8974 concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to
be entitled to a writ of possession. . . . Rule 67 merely requires the Government
to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the
property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the
other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct
payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such
payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value
of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, or if no
such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value
of the property to be seized.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8974; NATIONAL GOVERNMENT PROJECTS, DEFINED. — Rep. Act No.
8974 is entitled "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other
Purposes." Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Rep. Act
No. 8974 explains what are considered as "national government projects." "Sec.
2. National Government Projects. — The term "national government projects"
shall refer to all national government infrastructure, engineering works and
service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and
controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition,
supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation,
construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and
rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding."
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTEMPLATES WITHIN ITS COVERAGE REAL
PROPERTY ACQUIRED FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS; CASE AT
BAR. — Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the
nature of these facilities should now be determined. Under Section 415 (1) of
the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably immovable or real property, as
they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil. Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just be
packed up and transported by PIATCO like a traveling circus caravan. Thus, the
property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned
by PIATCO. . . . Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real
property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration
of the law's policy, refers to "real property acquired for national government
infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation." Section 4 is quite
explicit in stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of "real
property," which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions
adhered to the soil.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IN CASE THE COMPLETION OF A GOVERNMENT
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT IS OF UTMOST URGENCY AND THERE IS NO
EXISTING VALUATION OF THE AREA CONCERNED, THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY
SHALL IMMEDIATELY PAY THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY ITS PROFFERED
VALUE. — Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately
ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is
a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited
means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the
property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section
4 (c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no
existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value, taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered
value" may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition
of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by
which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial
determination of the propriety of the proffered value.
 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDATES THE IMMEDIATE PAYMENT OF THE
INITIAL JUST COMPENSATION PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT. — Rep. Act No. 8974 represents
a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government
Code merely provided that the Government deposit the initial amounts
antecedent to acquiring possession of the property with, respectively, an
authorized Government depositary or the proper court. In both cases, the
private owner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation of
property. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment
of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in
favor of the Government. Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the
requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory
deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards
eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation
proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation
proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private
property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate compensation
to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final
amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality
prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate monetary
recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVIDES FOR THE STANDARD THAT GOVERNS THE
EXTENT OF THE ACTS THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM
UPON THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION; CASE AT BAR. — Rep. Act
No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that governs the
extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform upon the
issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that "the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project." We hold that
accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is
authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3
as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.
These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex,
maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities
and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation
of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day
international airport.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION;
PROCEDURE; CASE AT BAR. — Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method
by which the final determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4
provides: "In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing
agency's proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be
paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation
case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the
implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount
already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court." We hold
that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed
in Rep. Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law's avowed policy "to ensure that
owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects
are promptly paid just compensation." In this case, there already has been
irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation, and
it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the just compensation due
PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint last 21 December
2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to effectuate the spirit of
the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60)
days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down
in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION; THE
APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS UNDER RULE 67 MAY BE RESORTED TO
EVEN IN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8974.
— Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with
the ascertainment of just compensation. This protocol though is sanctioned
under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67
may be resorted to, even in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974,
since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict
with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does
allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the
provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule
67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the examination of an issue of
fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court. But while the appointment
of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be sanctioned in expropriation
proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the
determination of just compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the
statute. In particular, the governing standards for the determination of just
compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in Section 10 of the
Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement
cost method in the valuation of improvements and structures.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS TO THE ORDER OF APPOINTMENT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE TRIAL COURT. — What Rule
67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of
these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These objections
though must be filed within ten (10) days from service of the order of
appointment of the commissioners. In this case, the proper recourse of the
Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to file an objection
with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67, and not as it has done,
assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that the
expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days
after the Order appointing the commissioners, it is permissible to allow the
parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days from finality of
this decision.
12. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; INHIBITION; DISQUALIFICATION OF A
JUDGE IS A DEPRIVATION OF HIS JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED ON THE BASIS OF MERE SPECULATIONS AND SURMISES. — The
disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power and should
not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly
cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards the
movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither
could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the
judge.
13. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; POWERS; COURTS HAVE THE INHERENT
POWER TO AMEND AND CONTROL ITS PROCESSES AND ORDERS SO AS TO
MAKE THEM CONFORMABLE TO LAW AND JUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. — The motu
proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be
sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized
principle that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.
Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent
power of courts "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice," a power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in
his 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order. This inherent power includes the right of
the court to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed
an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause
injustice to a party litigant.
14. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; INHIBITION; INCOMPETENCE MAY BE A
GROUND FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION, BUT NOT FOR INHIBITION. —
Incompetence may be a ground for administrative sanction, but not for
inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT;

SUPREME COURT; POWERS; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IS NO LONGER SHARED BY THE
SUPREME COURT WITH CONGRESS; CASE AT BAR. — Article VIII, Sec. 5 of
the 1987 Constitution gave the Supreme Court the following powers: . . . (5)
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice we emphasized that
the 1987 Constitution strengthened the rule making power of this Court, thus:
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. . . .
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time
was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. . . . But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress . . . . Undoubtedly, Rule 67 is the rule this Court
promulgated to govern the proceedings in expropriation cases filed in court. It
has been the undeviating rule for quite a length of time. Following Article VIII,
Section 5 (5) of the 1987 Constitution and the Echegaray jurisprudence, Rule 67
cannot be repealed or amended by Congress. This prohibition against non-repeal
or non-amendment refers to any part of Rule 67 for Rule 67 is pure procedural
law. Consequently, the Court should not chop Rule 67 into pieces and hold that
some can be changed by Congress but others can be changed. The stance will
dilute the rule making power of this Court which can not be allowed for it will
weaken its institutional independence.
CARPIO, J., separate opinion:

POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT NO.

8974; THE IMMEDIATE PAYMENT TO THE PROPERTY OWNER OF THE FULL
ZONAL OR PROFFERED VALUE PRIOR TO TAKEOVER BY THE GOVERNMENT
MUST APPLY TO ALL EXPROPRIATION CASES UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
8974 INVOLVING THE ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY FOR NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT PROJECTS; CASE AT BAR. — Congress has no power to amend or
repeal rules of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court. However, Congress
can enact laws on substantive matters which are the subject of court procedures.
Thus, Congress can prescribe the initial or minimum amount for just
compensation in expropriation cases, and require immediate payment of such
initial or minimum amount as condition for the immediate takeover of the
property by the government. The rules of procedure, like Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, must adjust automatically to such new laws on substantive matters.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, mandating immediate payment to the
property owner of the full zonal or proffered value prior to takeover by the
government, is a substantive requirement in expropriation cases. Thus, Section
4 must apply to all expropriation cases under RA No. 8974 involving the
acquisition of real property, like the NAIA Terminal III, for "national government
projects." Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Section 4 of RA 8974 is
not applicable to the expropriation of NAIA Terminal III, the Court must still
apply the substantive concept in Section 4 of RA 8974 to expropriation
proceedings under Rule 67 to insure equal protection of the law to property
owners. There is no substantial reason to discriminate against property owners
in expropriation cases under Rule 67. Under RA 8974, when private property is
expropriated for a national government project, the government must first pay
the zonal or proffered value to the property owner before the government can
take over the property. In the present case, private property is expropriated for
an admittedly national government project. Thus, the Court must extend the
substantive benefits in Section 4 of RA 8974 to expropriation cases under Rule
67 to prevent denial of the equal protection of the law.
CORONA, J., dissenting opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INHERENT POWERS OF THE

STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; LIMITATIONS. — The exercise of eminent domain is
circumscribed by two limitations in the Constitution: (1) the taking must be for
public use and (2) just compensation must be paid to the owner of the private
property. These twin proscriptions are grounded on the necessity to achieve a
balance between the interests of the State, on the one hand, and the private
rights of the individual, on the other hand, by effectively restraining the former
and affording protection to the latter. "Public use" as a limitation to the power
of eminent domain is not defined in the Constitution. It is thus considered in its
general notion of meeting a public need or a public exigency. It is not restricted
to clear cases of "use by the public" but embraces whatever may be beneficially
employed for the community. The concept now covers uses which, while not
directly available to the public, redound to their indirect advantage or benefit. It
is generally accepted that it is just as broad as "public welfare."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUST COMPENSATION; DEFINED. — Just
compensation is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The
compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum
equivalent to its market value at the time of the taking. "Market value" is the
price fixed by the buyer and the seller in the open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal trade and competition.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION; RULE 67
AND REPUBLIC ACT 8974, DISTINGUISHED. — Rule 67 and RA 8974 differ in
the manner of compensating the owner of the property under expropriation.
Under Rule 67, before the government can take possession of the property to
be expropriated, the deposit of an amount equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for taxation purposes is sufficient for the time being, that is, until
the conclusion of the court proceedings where both parties shall have proven
their claims and the court shall have made a factual determination of the price
of the property. Under RA 8974, on the other hand, immediate payment of the
full zonal value (a much bigger sum than the assessed value required by Rule
67) of the property and improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 of the law is required before the government can take possession of
the property.
4. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; LAW OF THE CASE; FINDS
APPLICATION ONLY IN THE SAME CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. — It is incorrect
to say that Agan constitutes the law of the case. The "law of the case" doctrine
is defined as a term applied to an established rule that, when an appellate court
passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case on
subsequent appeal. Unlike the doctrine of stare decisis, the doctrine of the law
of the case operates only in the particular case. The law of the case finds
application only in the same case between the parties. This case (which refers
to the expropriation of NAIA IPT3) is irrefutably not the same as Agan (which
was about the validity of the so-called "PIATCO contracts"). Hence, the
pronouncements in Agan cannot constitute the law of the case here.
5. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION; RULE 67 IS
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The application of Rule 67 in the expropriation
proceedings of NAIA IPT3 is in consonance with Agan. The determination and
payment of just compensation pursuant to Rule 67 are in accordance with law.
Under Rule 67, PIATCO will be given FULL JUST COMPENSATION by the
government for the taking of NAIA IPT3. That is mandatory.
The Constitution itself ordains it. Under Rule 67, there is no way the government
can unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO. Section 9 of Rule 67 ensures
this by requiring the payment of interest from the time government takes
possession of the property.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; INTERPRETATION OF;
IMPLIED REPEALS ARE NOT FAVORED; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent judge's
theory about Rule 67's supposed repeal by RA 8974 was totally devoid of factual
and legal basis. RA 8974 did not repeal Rule 67 at all. The Constitution will not
allow it. In fact, neither its repealing clause nor any of its provisions even
mentioned or referred to the Rules of Court, whether on expropriation or
anything else. But even assuming (but not conceding) that respondent judge's
theory had been based on an implied repeal, still there would have been no legal
justification for it. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied
repeals are not favored. Thus: "The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and
brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
known the existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts
should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject." The foregoing becomes all the more significant when, as in this case,
the provisions of RA 8974 reveal no manifest intent to revoke Rule 67. In fact,
Section 14 of the IRR of RA 8974 makes an explicit reference to Rule 67 and
mandates its applicability to all matters regarding defenses and objections to
the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of
appeal on the rights of the parties and such other incidents affecting the
complaint. If only for this reason, respondent judge's "repeal theory" is totally
erroneous.
7. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT;
SUPREME COURT; THE POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PLEADING,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IS NO LONGER SHARED BY THE SUPREME COURT
WITH CONGRESS. — [A]ny talk of repeal (whether express or implied) by
legislative enactment of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court
goes against the Constitution itself. The power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to this Court to enhance
its independence. It is no longer shared by this Court with Congress. The
legislature now has no power to annul, modify or augment the Rules of Court.
We expressly declared in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — There is no question that the
appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter, not
procedural. However, the manner of determining just compensation (including
how it shall be paid and under what conditions a writ of possession may be
issued) is a matter of procedure, not of substantive law. If a rule or statute
creates a right or takes away a vested right, it is substantive. If it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right, then it is procedural. The provisions of
Rule 67 neither vest a new power on the State nor create a new right in favor of
the property owner. Rule 67 merely provides the procedure for the State's
exercise of eminent domain and, at the same time, ensures the enforcement of
the right of the private owner to receive just compensation for the taking of his
property. It is purely a matter of procedure. It is therefore exclusively the
domain of this Court. The Constitution prohibits Congress from transgressing
this sphere. Congress cannot legislate the manner of payment of just
compensation. Neither can Congress impose a condition on the issuance of a
writ of possession. Yet that is what RA 8974 precisely does.
9. ID.; ID.; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT 8974; WHEN INAPPLICABLE. —
Section 1 of the IRR of RA 8974 provides that the law covers: "[A]ll acquisition
of private real properties, including improvements therein, needed as right-of-
way, site or location for national government projects undertaken by any
department, office or agency of the national government, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or state college or university,
authorized by law or its respective charter to undertake national government
projects." From this, we can clearly infer that the law does not apply to the
following: (1) expropriation of private property which is personal or movable
property; (2) taking of private property, whether personal or real, for a purpose
other than for right-of-way, site or location of a national government project;
(3) appropriation of private property for right-of-way, site or location of a project
not classified as a national government project; (4) acquisition of private
property for right-of-way, site or location of a national government project but
to be undertaken by an entity not enumerated in Section 1 of the IRR of RA
8974. In the foregoing situations, it is Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or the
relevant special law (if any) that will apply. Here, the expropriation of NAIA IPT3
falls under the second category since petitioners seek to take private property
for a purpose other than for a right-of-way, site or location for a national
government project.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INAPPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — [U]nder Section
2 (d) of the IRR of RA 8974 defining "national government projects", an airport
(which NAIA IPT3 essentially is) is specifically listed among the national
government projects for which expropriation proceedings may be initiated under
the law. However, the law and its IRR also provide that the expropriation should
be for the purpose of providing for a right of way, site or location for the intended
national government project. A national government project is separate and
distinct from the purpose of expropriation. Otherwise, there would have been no
need to define them separately. Thus, respondent judge erred when he equated
one with the other and obliterated the clear distinction made by the law.
Moreover, under Section 2 (e) of the IRR, the specific objects or purposes of
expropriation were lumped as 'ROW' which is defined as the "right-of-way, site
or location, with defined physical boundaries, used for a national government
project." Obviously, the NAIA IPT3 is not a right of way, site or location for any
national government infrastructure project but the infrastructure itself albeit still
under construction. The construction (and now the completion) of NAIA IPT3
never required the acquisition of private property for a right of way, site or
location since the terminal, including all its access roads, stands completely on
government land. Conformably, RA 8974 does not apply to the expropriation of
NAIA IPT3. And there being no special law on the matter, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court governs the procedure for its expropriation.
11. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION;
REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION; COMPLIED
WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — Under Section 2 of Rule 67, the only requisites for
authorizing immediate entry (that is, for the issuance of the writ of possession)
in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance, and (2) a deposit equivalent to the assessed
value for taxation purposes of the property subject to expropriation. Upon
compliance with these two requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession
becomes ministerial. Petitioners complied fully with the requirements of Rule 67
pertaining to the issuance of the writ allowing entry into the expropriated facility.
First, they duly filed the verified complaint with the court a quo. Second, PIATCO
was served with and notified of the complaint. Third, petitioners set aside and
earmarked P3,022,125,000 as provisional deposit, equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for taxation purposes with the depositary bank. From then
on, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court presided over by respondent
judge to issue the writ of possession. Section 2 of Rule 67 categorically
prescribes the amount to be deposited with the authorized government
depositary as the pre-condition for the issuance of a writ of possession. This is
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. The figure is exact
and permits the court no discretion in determining what the provisional value
should be.
12. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; REPUBLIC ACT
8974; WHERE THERE IS NO EXISTING VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY
CONCERNED, ONLY THE PROFFERED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY BY THE AGENCY
REQUESTING EXPROPRIATION IS REQUIRED TO BE PAID FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF THE WRIT. — Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was RA
8974 that was applicable, still the trial court could not order petitioners to
increase their deposit and to immediately pay the zonal value of NAIA IPT3.
Section 4 (c) of the law states that, in cases where there is no existing valuation
of the property concerned, only the proffered value of the property by the agency
requesting expropriation is required to be paid for issuance of the writ. So even
if it had been RA 8974 that was applicable — which was not so — the amount
deposited by petitioners would have constituted the proffered value estimated
by them, based on comparative values made by the City Assessor. In any case,
the final determination of the total just compensation due the owner will have
to be made in accordance with Rule 67. The provisional deposit shall then be
deducted and petitioners shall pay the balance plus legal interest from the time
petitioners took possession of the property until PIATCO is fully paid.
13. ID.; ID.; INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST
COMPENSATION; FULL PAYMENT THEREOF, THOUGH A CONDITION PRECEDENT
FOR THE TRANSFER OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP, IS NOT A CONDITION
PRECEDENT FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY. — In expropriation, private
property is taken for public use. What constitutes taking is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. The owner is ousted from his property and deprived of his
beneficial enjoyment thereof. The owner's right to possess and exploit the
property (that is to say, his beneficial ownership of it) is "destroyed". And it is
only after the property is taken that the court proceeds to determine just
compensation, upon full payment of which shall title pass on to the expropriator.
. . . Full payment of just compensation, though a condition precedent for the
transfer of title or ownership, is not a condition precedent for the taking of the
property.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP ENJOYED
BY THE EXPROPRIATOR INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO LEASE; CASE AT BAR. — [A]n
important element of taking is that the owner's right to possess and exploit the
land (in other words, his beneficial ownership of it) is transferred to and
thenceforth exercised by the expropriator. . . . The question now is whether this
right of beneficial ownership enjoyed by the expropriator includes the right to
lease out the property (or portions thereof) and to award concessions within
NAIA IPT3 to third parties. It does. . . . In this case, petitioners aim to acquire
the NAIA IPT3 as the site of a world-class passenger terminal and airport, and
to complete its construction and operate it for the benefit of the Filipino people.
This is the "public use" purpose of the expropriation. On the other hand, the
lease and concession contracts are the means by which the public purpose of
the expropriation can be attained. Since PIATCO never challenged the "public
use" purpose of the expropriation, the reasonable implications of such public
use, including the award of leases and concessions in the terminal, are deemed
admitted as necessary consequences of such expropriation. Furthermore, in a
contract of lease, only the use and enjoyment of the thing are extended to the
lessee. Thus, one need not be the legal owner of the property in order to give it
in lease. The same is true for the award of concessions which petitioners, as
beneficial owner of the property, can legally grant. Hence, respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he prohibited petitioners from
exercising acts of ownership in NAIA IPT3.
15. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; EXPROPRIATION;
ASCERTAINMENT OF COMPENSATION; APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS;
OBJECTION THERETO MUST BE FILED WITH THE TRIAL COURT WITHIN THE
PRESCRIBED PERIOD. — . . . Rule 67 does not require consultation with the
parties before the court appoints the commissioners. Neither notice to the
parties nor hearing is required for the appointment of commissioners by the
judge. However, in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, we held that "while it is
true that, strictly speaking, it is the court that shall appoint the said
commissioners, there is nothing to prevent it from seeking the recommendations
of the parties on this matter . . . to ensure their fair representation." This ruling
was more or less integrated into the revised rules of court as the latter now gives
the parties ten days from the service of the order appointing the commissioners
to file their objections to any of the appointees. This, in effect, allows them to
protest the appointment of the commissioners while providing them the
opportunity to recommend their own choices. But the objection must come after
the appointment. This is apparent from the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule
67: "[o]bjections to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed
in court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be resolved within thirty
(30) days after all the commissioners shall have received copies of the
objections." Consequently, if petitioners are unable to accept the competence of
any of the commissioners, their remedy is to file an objection with the trial court
within the stated period. Initiating a certiorari proceeding on this issue is
premature.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS
OF THE COMMISSIONERS. — In any case, even if the commissioners are
appointed by the court, the latter is not bound by their findings. . . . The report
of the commissioners on the value of the condemned property is neither final
nor conclusive. The court is permitted to act on the report in any of several ways
enumerated in the rules, at its discretion. It may render such judgment as shall
secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
condemnation and, to the defendant, just compensation for the property
expropriated. The court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered
from the records.
17. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; DISQUALIFICATION; COMPULSORY
DISQUALIFICATION AND VOLUNTARY INHIBITION, DISTINGUISHED. — As a
general rule, judges are mandated to hear and decide cases, unless legally
disqualified. However, they may voluntarily excuse themselves, in the exercise
of their sound discretion, for just or valid reasons. The rule on disqualification of
a judge to hear a case finds its rationale in the principle that no judge should
preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. It is aimed at preserving the people's faith and confidence in the
courts of justice. In compulsory disqualification, the law conclusively presumes
that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in a case. In voluntary inhibition,
the law leaves it to the judge to decide for himself whether he will desist from
sitting in a case with only his conscience to guide him.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; A JUDGE SHOULD INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM THE CASE AT
THE VERY FIRST SIGN OF LACK OF FAITH AND TRUST IN HIS ACTIONS; CASE
AT BAR. — A judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. He must hold
himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and
trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other
alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is maintained. Even
more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is preserved.
Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen and perceived to be
done. Besides, where a case has generated a strained personal relationship,
animosity and hostility between the party or his counsel and the judge that the
former has lost confidence in the judge's impartiality or the latter is unable to
display the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, it is a violation of due process
for the judge not to recuse himself from hearing the case. Due process cannot
be satisfied in the absence of that objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to
reassure litigants of his being fair and just. Respondent judge should have
recused himself from hearing the case in the light of petitioners' patent distrust:
"The presiding judge's impartiality has been irreparably impaired. . . . [A]ny
decision, order or resolution he would make on the incidents of the case would
now be under a cloud of distrust and skepticism. The presiding judge is no longer
effective in dispensing justice to the parties herein." Clearly, it would have been
more prudent for respondent judge to inhibit himself instead of placing any of
his decisions, orders or resolutions under a cloud of distrust. It would have
likewise deprived petitioners or any one else of reason to cast doubt on the
integrity of these expropriation proceedings with national and international
implications.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3)

was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the country's show window
to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. Regrettably too, despite
the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been
operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not
to mention its deplorable discredit in the international community.
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO, 1 the contracts
which the Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary
to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court involves the
matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built.
We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both
the Court's 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court's
decision in Agan v. PIATCO, 2 promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This
decision nullified the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III"
entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the
amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO
to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to
operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years.
The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium,
predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it
was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public
policy. 3
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities
had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. 4 However,
the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following
the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his
Separate Opinion, Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice Callejo, declared as
follows:
Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses
incurred in the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should,
otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of
Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors
— both local and foreign. After all, there is no question that the
State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and parcel
of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of
government. 5
PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions
for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the
Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). 6 However,
the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to
refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of
the NAIA 3 facilities. The holding of the Court on this crucial point follows:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that
the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost
complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their
construction. For the government to take over the said facility,
it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance
with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich
itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. 7
After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have
remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the
Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The
Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities. 8 It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced
before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration
and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 9 although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before
those two bodies. 10
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government 11 filed a Complaint for
expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with
an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special
raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of
a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over
the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00 12 (3 Billion) 13 in Cash with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation
purposes. 14
The case 15 was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by
respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day
that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order 16 directing the issuance
of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon
the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v.
Serrano, 17 the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent
to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found
these requisites present, particularly noting that "[t]he case record shows that
[the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in
the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the
certification attached to their complaint." Also on the same day, the RTC issued
a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take
possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of
Possession was issued. 18
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4
January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its
earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act
No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many
respects. CIAcSa
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon
the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule
67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation,
unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration
or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.
 Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its
earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran
Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of
US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that
which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this
expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just
compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the
Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of
Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just
compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and
safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in
preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending
expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the
Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding
concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties." 19
The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order,
the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for
hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order,
the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3)
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3
Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon.
The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in
an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed
before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier
dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance "the
superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding
concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties." 20
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was
filed on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC
orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the
inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case.
A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14
January 2005. 21
The Government, in imputing grave abuse of discretion to the acts of Hon.
Gingoyon, raises five general arguments, to wit:
(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present expropriation
proceedings;
(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of
the amount of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO considering that the assessed value as
alleged in the complaint was only P3 Billion;
(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from enjoining
the performance of acts of ownership;
(iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was erroneous;
and IcCDAS
(v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself from the
expropriation case. 22
 Before we delve into the merits of the issues raised by the Government, it
is essential to consider the crucial holding of the Court in its 2004 Resolution
in Agan, which we repeat below:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the
structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and
that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the
government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The
compensation must be just and in accordance with law and
equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the
expense of PIATCO and its investors. 23
This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate
this decision of the Court. Indeed, Agan, final and executory as it is, stands as
governing law in this case, and any disposition of the present petition must
conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004 Resolution.
The 2004 Resolution Which Is
Law of This Case Generally
Permits Expropriation

The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant

to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive
payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and
equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3
until such just compensation is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade
the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such
as the complaint for eminent domain.
It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution
prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it
could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under
review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass
the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004
Resolution.
The Government does not contest the efficacy of this pronouncement in
the 2004 Resolution, 24 thus its application to the case at bar is not a matter of
controversy. Of course, questions such as what is the standard of "just
compensation" and which particular laws and equitable principles are applicable,
remain in dispute and shall be resolved forthwith.
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available
under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the
determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We
appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the
Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which
the State already owns. 25 There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent
domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State
already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should
be akin to an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation
proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the
payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA
3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3
through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which
the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of
the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful
order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the
structures.
The determination of just compensation could very well be agreed upon by
the parties without judicial intervention, and it appears that steps towards that
direction had been engaged in. Still, ultimately, the Government resorted to its
inherent power of eminent domain through expropriation proceedings. Is
eminent domain appropriate in the first place, with due regard not only to the
law on expropriation but also to the Court's 2004 Resolution in Agan?
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and
the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real
property. 26 The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It
should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the
possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and
in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The
instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a
parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another
agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]." 27
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the
Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the
requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most
effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be
accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of
the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the
propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we
are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's
prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the
Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is
concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as
the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced,
in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the
rulings of this Court will be severely diminished. aDIHTE
It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule
67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings in this case.
Application of Rule 67 Violates
the 2004 Agan Resolution

The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the
other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Earlier,
we had adverted to the basic differences between the statute and the procedural
rule. Further elaboration is in order.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the
solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For
example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling
ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation
proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
 Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property "for national government
infrastructure projects." 28 Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues
to apply.
Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences
expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of
local governments which necessitate an authorizing ordinance before
expropriation may be accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act
No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with
a particular exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between
Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the
Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession.
The first paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 67 provides:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depository. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit
of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic
of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states:
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it
is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or
location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court
under the following guidelines:
a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to
the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of
(1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements
and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;
xxx xxx xxx
c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure
project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no
existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its
proffered value taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 hereof. ScAHTI
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court
shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.
 Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing
agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds
from the proper official concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires
the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the
assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of
possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government
make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue.
Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case
of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost
method, 29 or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency,
the proffered value of the property to be seized.
It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in
lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately
pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all
it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an
authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point
out that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the
undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national government project. Yet, these
efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution
in Agan on the adjudication of this case.
It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings
in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to
take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004
Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and
executory orders.
Section 2 of Rule 67 provides that the State "shall have the right to take
or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if [the plaintiff]
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court." 30 It is thus apparent that under the
provision, all the Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to deposit
the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government
depositary.
Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid
down in the 2004 Resolution that "[f]or the government to take over the said
facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures"? Evidently not.
If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from
receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes
over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Such an injunction
squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the
position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the
prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation
paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities.
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating
the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in
this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all,
adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's
requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just
compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the
property. aCcADT
 It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of
deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate payment" in cases
involving national government infrastructure projects. The following portion of
the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting
to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). ". . . Because the Senate
believes that, you know, we have to pay the landowners
immediately not by treasury bills but by cash.
Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment,
'no, of possession, we might as well pay them as much, 'no,
hindi lang 50 percent.
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in
favor of the landowners, e.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). That's why we need to really
secure the availability of funds.
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. It's the same. It
says here: iyong first paragraph, diba? Iyong zonal — talagang
magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a
payment kaagad. (TSN, Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill 1422 and Senate Bill 2117, August 29, 2000,
pp. 14-20)
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, 'no. Unang-
una, it is not deposit, 'no. It's payment."
REP. BATERINA. It's payment, ho, payment." (Id., p. 63) 31
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation
is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the
standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically,
this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just
compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession. Of course, rules of
procedure, as distinguished from substantive matters, remain the exclusive
preserve of the Supreme Court by virtue of Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution. Indeed, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the
continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all
matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain
ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties,
and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the
provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court." 32
Given that the 2004 Resolution militates against the continued use of the
norm under Section 2, Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act No. 8974?
We find that it is, and moreover, its application in this case complements rather
than contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits
to the Situation at Bar
and Complements the
2004 Agan Resolution

Rep. Act No. 8974 is entitled "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-
Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And
For Other Purposes." Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation
proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2
of Rep. Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as "national government
projects."
Sec. 2. National Government Projects. — The term "national
government projects" shall refer to all national government
infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including
projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled
corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities,
such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and
materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the
source of funding.
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was
made pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, 33 which pertains to infrastructure or
development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now
wholly or partly implemented by the private sector. 34 Under the build-operate-
and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the
construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure
facility. 35 In Tatad v. Garcia, 36 the Court acknowledged that the operator of
the EDSA Light Rail Transit project under a BOT scheme was the owner of the
facilities such as "the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals and the power plant." 37
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized
that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior
to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government
resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its
part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there
should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through
ordinary ejectment proceedings. cDTSHE
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the
nature of these facilities should now be determined. Under Section 415(1) of
the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably immovable or real property, as
they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil. 38 Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just
be packed up and transported by PIATCO like a traveling circus caravan.
Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real
property owned by PIATCO. This point is critical, considering the Government's
insistence that the NAIA 3 facilities cannot be deemed as the "right-of-way",
"site" or "location" of a national government infrastructure project, within the
coverage of Rep. Act No. 8974.
There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not, under any sensible contemplation,
a "right-of-way." Yet we cannot agree with the Government's insistence that
neither could NAIA 3 be a "site" or "location". The petition quotes the definitions
provided in Black's Law Dictionary of "location'" as the specific place or position
of a person or thing and 'site' as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of
property set aside for specific use.'" 39 Yet even Black's Law Dictionary provides
that "[t]he term [site] does not of itself necessarily mean a place or tract of land
fixed by definite boundaries." 40 One would assume that the Government, to
back up its contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that a "site" or
"location" exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles and weeds. There is none.
Indeed, we cannot accept the Government's proposition that the only
properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of
land. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property
constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the law's
policy, refers to "real property acquired for national government infrastructure
projects are promptly paid just compensation." 41 Section 4 is quite explicit in
stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of "real property,"
which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions adhered to the
soil.
It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules commonly
provide for a rule for the valuation of improvements and/or structures thereupon
separate from that of the land on which such are constructed. Section 2 of Rep.
Act No. 8974 itself recognizes that the improvements or structures on the land
may very well be the subject of expropriation proceedings. Section 4(a), in
relation to Section 7 of the law provides for the guidelines for the valuation of
the improvements or structures to be expropriated. Indeed, nothing in the law
would prohibit the application of Section 7, which provides for the valuation
method of the improvements and or structures in the instances wherein it is
necessary for the Government to expropriate only the improvements or
structures, as in this case.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to
which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent
treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on
substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of
the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction
between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no
purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of
expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon are
susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary
estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property.
The owner of improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same
degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar means. Equal
protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of
expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or
improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those
two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause. STcDIE
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law's application
in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation
would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the
case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the
2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any
takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does
not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover,
but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private
property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act
No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it
assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value
to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which
facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep.
Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.
The Proper Amount to be Paid
under Rep. Act No. 8974

Then, there is the matter of the proper amount which should be paid to
PIATCO by the Government before the writ of possession may issue, consonant
to Rep. Act No. 8974.
At this juncture, we must address the observation made by the Office of
the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government that there could be no "BIR
zonal valuations" on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since
zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. The Court
agrees with this point, yet does not see it as an impediment for the application
of Rep. Act No. 8974.
It must be clarified that PIATCO cannot be reimbursed or justly
compensated for the value of the parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands. PIATCO
is not the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facility is constructed, and it
should not be entitled to just compensation that is inclusive of the value of the
land itself. It would be highly disingenuous to compensate PIATCO for the value
of land it does not own. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited
to the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the
determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation under
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay"
the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures
as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot
apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be
limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and
regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures
on the land." Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the
improvements/structures are to be based using 'the replacement cost
method." 42 However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be
considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also
mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with
equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation,
the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to
the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well. ATHCac
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately
ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is
a matter for factual determination. 43 Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an
expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of
the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation.
Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a
government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and
there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value,
taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the
law]." 44 The "proffered value" may strike as a highly subjective standard based
solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide
relevant standards by which "proffered value" should be based, 45 as well as
the certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value. 46
In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have
deposited the amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing
the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the
determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the
erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law.
Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this
sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974.
After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is
not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its
proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards
enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
How should we appreciate the questioned order of Hon. Gingoyon, which
pegged the amount to be immediately paid to PIATCO at around $62.3 Million?
The Order dated 4 January 2005, which mandated such amount, proves
problematic in that regard. While the initial sum of P3 Billion may have been
based on the assessed value, a standard which should not however apply in this
case, the RTC cites without qualification Section 4(a) of Rep. Act No. 8974 as
the basis for the amount of $62.3 Million, thus leaving the impression that the
BIR zonal valuation may form part of the basis for just compensation, which
should not be the case. Moreover, respondent judge made no attempt to apply
the enumerated guidelines for determination of just compensation under Section
5 of Rep. Act No. 8974, as required for judicial review of the proffered value.
The Court notes that in the 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, the RTC noted
that the concessions agreement entered into between the Government and
PIATCO stated that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was "not less than" US$350
Million. 47 The RTC then proceeded to observe that while Rep. Act No.
8974 required the immediate payment to PIATCO the amount equivalent to
100% of the value of NAIA 3, the amount deposited by the Government
constituted only 18% of this value. At this point, no binding import should be
given to this observation that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was "not less
than" US$350 Million, as the final conclusions on the amount of just
compensation can come only after due ascertainment in accordance with the
standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974, not the declarations of the parties. At
the same time, the expressed linkage between the BIR zonal valuation and the
amount of just compensation in this case, is revelatory of erroneous thought on
the part of the RTC.
We have already pointed out the irrelevance of the BIR zonal valuation as
an appropriate basis for valuation in this case, PIATCO not being the owner of
the land on which the NAIA 3 facilities stand. The subject order is flawed insofar
as it fails to qualify that such standard is inappropriate.
It does appear that the amount of US$62.3 Million was based on the
certification issued by the LBP-Baclaran that the Republic of the Philippines
maintained a total balance in that branch amounting to such amount. Yet the
actual representation of the $62.3 Million is not clear. The Land Bank
Certification expressing such amount does state that it was issued upon request
of the Manila International Airport Authority "purportedly as guaranty deposit
for the expropriation complaint." 48 The Government claims in its Memorandum
that the entire amount was made available as a guaranty fund for the final and
executory judgment of the trial court, and not merely for the issuance of the writ
of possession. 49 One could readily conclude that the entire amount of US$62.3
Million was intended by the Government to answer for whatever guaranties may
be required for the purpose of the expropriation complaint. aIcTCS
Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire
US$62.3 Million is only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered
value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3 Billion as the amount
deposited characterized in the complaint as "to be held by [Land Bank] subject
to the [RTC's] orders," 50 should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear
evidence that the Government intended to offer US$62.3 Million as the initial
payment of just compensation, the wording of the Land Bank Certification
notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the consistent position of the
Government on that aspect.
In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of US$62.3
Million to PIATCO and not P3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that the
higher amount represents the valuation of the structures/improvements, and
not the BIR zonal valuation on the land wherein NAIA 3 is built. The Order dated
5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence of
contravening proof, the proffered value of P3 Billion, as presented by the
Government, should prevail.
Strikingly, the Government submits that assuming that Rep. Act No.
8974 is applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion should be considered as
the proffered value, since the amount was based on comparative values made
by the City Assessor. 51 Accordingly, it should be deemed as having faithfully
complied with the requirements of the statute. 52 While the Court agrees that
P3 Billion should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot
deem the Government as having faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974. For
the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere
deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct
payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.
Writ of Possession May Not
Be Implemented Until Actual
Receipt by PIATCO of Proferred
Value

The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC
authorized the issuance of the writ of possession to the Government
notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had yet been made to
PIATCO, despite the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that there must first
be payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did direct the
LBP-Baclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to PIATCO, it
should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it
altogether, until the Government shall have actually paid PIATCO. This is the
inevitable consequence of the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that requires
immediate payment of the initially determined amount of just compensation
should be effected. Otherwise, the overpowering intention of Rep. Act No.
8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of repossession would be
eviscerated.
Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from previous
expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the Local Government
Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided that the
Government deposit the initial amounts 53 antecedent to acquiring possession
of the property with, respectively, an authorized Government depositary 54 or
the proper court. 55 In both cases, the private owner does not receive
compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Rep. Act
No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to
the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government.
Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate
prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such
requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles
the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of
fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded
just compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit
requirement impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially
in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation would
prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974,
the private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same degree
of speed as the taking of his/her property.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there
is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment
of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited
procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is inherently
more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully
comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate
payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from
expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.
The Court has the duty to implement Rep. Act No. 8974 and to direct
compliance with the requirement of immediate payment in this case.
Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 should be held in
abeyance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the
proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.
Rights of the Government
upon Issuance of the Writ
of Possession

Once the Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of
P3 Billion, it will be entitled to the Writ of Possession. However, the Government
questions the qualification imposed by the RTC in its 4 January
2005 Order consisting of the prohibition on the Government from performing
acts of ownership such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA 3 to
other parties. To be certain, the RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order,
expressly stated that it was not affirming "the superfluous part of the Order [of
4 January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing
any part of NAIA [3] to other parties." 56 Still, such statement was predicated
on the notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until
final payment of just compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to perform
such acts of ownership. CHEIcS
In deciding this question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored,
particularly the declaration that "[f]or the government to take over the said
facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures." The obvious import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid just
compensation, the Government is barred from "taking over," a phrase which in
the strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA
3, much less operation of the facilities.
There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less
stringently, and thus allow the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the
effectivity of the Writ of Possession. For one, the national prestige is diminished
every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For another, the
continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it
has not already. And still for another, the economic benefits to the Government
and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA 3 is put in operation.
Rep. Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that
governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform
upon the issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that "the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of
the property and start the implementation of the project." We hold that
accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is
authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3
as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.
These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex,
maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities
and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation
of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day
international airport.
The Government's position is more expansive than that adopted by the
Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts de
jure on the expropriated property. It cites Republic v. Tagle, 57 as well as the
statement therein that "the expropriation of real property does not include mere
physical entry or occupation of land," and from them concludes that "its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title,
which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject
property."
This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle, 58 but
not from the ratio decidendi of that case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of
possession in favor of the Government was still necessary in light of the fact that
it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the Government
was entitled to the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ
vested not only physical possession, but also the legal right to possess the
property. Continues the Court, such legal right to possess was particularly
important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the Republic for
unlawful detainer, and the writ of possession would serve to safeguard the
Government from eviction. 59
At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious, that there is no transfer
of ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede
that the Government is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession
by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed to grant the
Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner.
Certainly, neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the
Government's proposition that it acquires beneficial or equitable ownership of
the expropriated property merely through the writ of possession.
Indeed, this Court has been vigilant in defense of the rights of the property
owner who has been validly deprived of possession, yet retains legal title over
the expropriated property pending payment of just compensation. We reiterated
the various doctrines of such import in our recent holding in Republic v. Lim: 60
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall
pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of
the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform [ 61 ], thus:
 "Title to property which is the subject of
condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which
the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the
commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
. . . Although the right to appropriate and use land
taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to
the property taken remains in the owner until payment is
actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited
several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as
1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that 'actual payment
to the owner of the condemned property was a condition
precedent to the investment of the title to the property in
the State' albeit 'not to the appropriation of it to public
use.' In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said
that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not
vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although
the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that 'both
on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to
enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of
law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from
the owner without his consent, until just compensation
has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v.
Camus and Paredes, that:
'If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the
preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this
jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that
no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
an unwilling owner until compensation is paid . .
.'"(Emphasis supplied.) IEaCDH
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be
no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise
stated, the Republic's acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the
full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia [62] this Court
ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
". . . The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint" . . . .
 The second phase of the eminent domain action is
concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. . . . .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation [63], we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure
of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for
a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who
consistently refuse to pay just compensation due to the private property owner
whose property had been expropriated. At the same time, Lim emphasizes the
fragility of the rights of the Government as possessor pending the final payment
of just compensation, without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed,
the public policy, enshrined foremost in the Constitution, mandates that the
Government must pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently,
the proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right
to just compensation.
Final Determination of Just
Compensation Within 60 Days

The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the
expropriation proceedings. As earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed
until payment to the property owner of just compensation. The proffered value
stands as merely a provisional determination of the amount of just
compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the
property to the Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership,
it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final just
compensation.
In Lim, the Court went as far as to countenance, given the exceptional
circumstances of that case, the reversion of the validly expropriated property to
private ownership due to the failure of the Government to pay just compensation
in that case. 64 It was noted in that case that the Government deliberately
refused to pay just compensation. The Court went on to rule that "in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned
shall have the right to recover possession of their property." 65
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final
determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides:
In the event that the owner of the property contests the
implementing agency's proffered value, the court shall determine the
just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from
the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the
court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay
the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court.
We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day
period prescribed in Rep. Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law's avowed policy
"to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government
infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation." 66 In this case,
there already has been irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of
just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the just
compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint
last 21 December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to
effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such
determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in
accordance with the guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its
Implementing Rules.
Of course, once the amount of just compensation has been finally
determined, the Government is obliged to pay PIATCO the said amount. As
shown in Lim and other like-minded cases, the Government's refusal to make
such payment is indubitably actionable in court.
Appointment of Commissioners

The next argument for consideration is the claim of the Government that
the RTC erred in appointing the three commissioners in its 7 January
2005 Order without prior consultation with either the Government or PIATCO, or
without affording the Government the opportunity to object to the appointment
of these commissioners. We can dispose of this argument without complication.
It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of
commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. 67 This
protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of
commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation
proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of
Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section
14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting the
complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a
commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32
of the Rules of Court. DTAHEC
But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67
may be sanctioned in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the
standards to be observed for the determination of just compensation are
provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular, the governing standards
for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for
the replacement cost method in the valuation of improvements and
structures. 68
Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with
the parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as
commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be
imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez 69 that
"there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the recommendations
of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to
ensure their fair representation." 70 At the same time, such solicitation of
recommendations is not obligatory on the part of the court, hence we cannot
impute error on the part of the RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion in the
appointment of the commissioners.
What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the
appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the
Rule. These objections though must be made filed within ten (10) days from
service of the order of appointment of the commissioners. 71 In this case, the
proper recourse of the Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners
is to file an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67,
and not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action
for certiorari. Considering that the expropriation proceedings in this case were
effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the
commissioners, 72 it is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections
with the RTC within five (5) days from finality of this decision.
Insufficient Ground for Inhibition
of Respondent Judge

The final argument for disposition is the claim of the Government is that
Hon. Gingoyon has prejudged the expropriation case against the Government's
cause and, thus, should be required to inhibit himself. This grave charge is
predicated on facts which the Government characterizes as "undeniable." In
particular, the Government notes that the 4 January 2005 Order was
issued motu proprio, without any preceding motion, notice or hearing. Further,
such order, which directed the payment of US$62 Million to PIATCO, was
attended with error in the computation of just compensation. The Government
also notes that the said Order was issued even before summons had been served
on PIATCO.
The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial
power 73 and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and
surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge's
rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord
with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of
the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People: 74
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent
judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous
rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By
themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and
prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying,
the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from
an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the
evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove
personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous
and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for
disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a
case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when
the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice. 75
The Government's contentions against Hon. Gingoyon are severely
undercut by the fact that the 21 December 2004 Order, which the 4 January
2005 Order sought to rectify, was indeed severely flawed as it erroneously
applied the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act No.
8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ
of possession. The 4 January 2005 Order, which according to the Government
establishes Hon. Gingoyon's bias, was promulgated precisely to correct the
previous error by applying the correct provisions of law. It would not speak well
of the Court if it sanctions a judge for wanting or even attempting to correct a
previous erroneous order which precisely is the right move to take. CacHES
Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January
2005 Order, without the benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on
the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu proprio amendment by a court of an
erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned depending on the
circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. 76 Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court further recognizes the inherent power of courts "to amend and control
its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice," 77 a
power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005 Omnibus
Order. 78 This inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself,
especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party
litigant. 79
Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to make the RTC's
previous order conformable to law and justice, particularly to apply the correct
law of the case. Of course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete,
as the 4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Rep. Act No. 8974 in several
respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most
basic premise of the case that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings.
Nonetheless, the Government belittles Hon. Gingoyon's invocation of
Section 5(g), Rule 135 as "patently without merit". Certainly merit can be seen
by the fact that the 4 January 2005 Order reoriented the expropriation
proceedings towards the correct governing law. Still, the Government claims
that the unilateral act of the RTC did not conform to law or justice, as it was not
afforded the right to be heard.
The Court would be more charitably disposed towards this argument if not
for the fact that the earlier order with the 4 January 2005 Order sought to correct
was itself issued without the benefit of any hearing. In fact, nothing either in
Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8975 requires the conduct of a hearing prior to the
issuance of the writ of possession, which by design is available immediately upon
the filing of the complaint provided that the requisites attaching thereto are
present. Indeed, this expedited process for the obtention of a writ of possession
in expropriation cases comes at the expense of the rights of the property owner
to be heard or to be deprived of possession. Considering these predicates, it
would be highly awry to demand that an order modifying the earlier issuance of
a writ of possession in an expropriation case be barred until the staging of a
hearing, when the issuance of the writ of possession itself is not subject to
hearing. Perhaps the conduct of a hearing under these circumstances would be
prudent. However, hearing is not mandatory, and the failure to conduct one does
not establish the manifest bias required for the inhibition of the judge.
The Government likewise faults Hon. Gingoyon for using the amount of
US$350 Million as the basis for the 100% deposit under Rep. Act No. 8974. The
Court has noted that this statement was predicated on the erroneous belief that
the BIR zonal valuation applies as a standard for determination of just
compensation in this case. Yet this is manifest not of bias, but merely of error
on the part of the judge. Indeed, the Government was not the only victim of the
errors of the RTC in the assailed orders. PIATCO itself was injured by the
issuance by the RTC of the writ of possession, even though the former had yet
to be paid any amount of just compensation. At the same time, the Government
was also prejudiced by the erroneous ruling of the RTC that the amount of
US$62.3 Million, and not P3 Billion, should be released to PIATCO. EAcIST
The Court has not been remiss in pointing out the multiple errors
committed by the RTC in its assailed orders, to the prejudice of both parties.
This attitude of error towards all does not ipso facto negate the charge of bias.
Still, great care should be had in requiring the inhibition of judges simply because
the magistrate did err. Incompetence may be a ground for administrative
sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality
to sit on a case.
The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a standard that a
judge should be inhibited from hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the
judge. Such loss of trust on the part of the Government may be palpable, yet
inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the feelings of the party-litigants.
Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge
was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and
people who do not understand the judicial process. The test in believing such a
proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant's claim of bias, but the
Court's judicious estimation, as people who know better than to believe any old
cry of "wolf!", whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.
The Court acknowledges that it had been previously held that "at the very
first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not,
the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case." 80 But
this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched rule that "a judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will
induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or
incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of
Justice is not impaired." 81 And a self-assessment by the judge that he/she is
not impaired to hear the case will be respected by the Court absent any evidence
to the contrary. As held in Chin v. Court of Appeals:
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere
conjecture and is not one of the "just and valid reasons" contemplated
in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a
judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. We have repeatedly
held that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough.
Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should
be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be
showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the
prosecution of the case. To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias
and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case. 82
The mere vehemence of the Government's claim of bias does not translate
to clear and convincing evidence of impairing bias. There is no sufficient ground
to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from hearing the expropriation
case. CDcaSA
In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be
observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be
payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any
ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of
the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires
the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the
NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods
for the determination of just compensation.
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession
in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is
directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA
3 under Section 4(c) of the law.
(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to
effectuate the operation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA 3) by performing the acts that are essential to its functioning
as such upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions
above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the
repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the
existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment,
provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and
transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international
airport." 83
(5) The RTC is mandated to determine the just compensation within sixty
(60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply
with "law and equity" as ordained in Again and the standard set
under Implementing Rules of Rep. Act No. 8974 which is the "replacement cost
method" as the standard of valuation of structures and improvements.
(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the
RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just
compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply
insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing
Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan.
(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision
of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of
these orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements
made by the Court herein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders
dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December
2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to
PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing
the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities;
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are
authorized start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III project by
performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said
International Airport Passenger Terminal project;
 3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from
finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be
paid to PIATCO by the Government.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the
qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of
this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the
commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby
LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, [December 19, 2005], 514 PHIL
657-782)
 [G.R. No. L-67496. July 7, 1986.]

TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES,

INC., petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
RODRIGO TAN, doing business under the name and style
"ASTRO AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY", respondents.

[G.R. No. L-68257. July 7, 1986.]

TOP RATE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and POLARIS MOTOR
SUPPLY COMPANY, respondents.

De Santos, Balgos & Perez for petitioner in L-67496 & L-68257.

Ponciano Subido for respondents in both cases.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

The two consolidated petitions before us seek to annul the decisions of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in
G.R. No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984, respectively. The two decisions both upheld
the validity of the levy made on two properties whose ownership is claimed by
petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said properties are far in
excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground
that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but
only the vendor's equity of redemption. The petitioner also asks that the
resolutions of the appellate court denying its motions for reconsideration be set
aside.
In Civil Case No. 142443 now, G.R. No. 67496, the facts as found by the
appellate court are:
"On August 12, 1981, petitioner (Rodrigo Tan, doing business
under the name 'Astro Automotive Supply') filed a complaint against
Consolidated Mines Inc. and Jose Marino Olondriz, the president of said
corporation, for the payment of the purchase price of certain heavy
equipment, parts and accessories sold to Consolidated Mines, Inc. with
a total cost of P271,372.20. In said complaint, plaintiff asked that a
writ of preliminary attachment be issued against defendants on the
ground that said defendants were guilty of fraud in securing said
equipment.
"On August 17, 1981, respondent Court granted plaintiff's motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment upon plaintiff's
posting of a bond in the amount of P271,372.20. Pursuant to said
order, a writ of attachment was issued on August 26, 1981. The sheriff
served notices of garnishment on the tenants of the building owned by
defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc. garnishing the rentals due from
said tenants, but since there were earlier notices of garnishment
served upon said tenants issued in two (2) other cases, the sheriff was
not able to garnish any amount from said tenants. The sheriff levied
on the properties of defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc. and the notice
 of levy was duly annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-68501
(143900) and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-68500 (14329). The
notice of levy was not annotated on the transfer certificate of title of a
third property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 79776,
although notice of said levy was duly entered in the primary book of
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
"Annotated as prior encumbrances on the first two properties on
December 20, 1978 was a mortgage in favor of twelve (12) consortium
banks and a notice of levy issued in Civil Case No. 136406 entitled
'Warmco Trading Company versus Consolidated Mines, Inc. and Jose
Marino Olondriz' on May 15, 1981."
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 142598 now, G.R. No. 68257, the appellate
court made the following findings:
"On August 18, 1981, the petitioner (Polaris Motor Supply, Co.)
brought suit (Civil Case No. 142598) in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the respondents Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI) and its
president Jose Marino Olondriz for the collection of P71,855.20. The
amount represents the price of the heavy equipment and accessories
which the respondent CMI had purchased from the petitioner. On
November 3, 1981, the respondent judge ordered the attachment of
CMI's properties. On November 26, 1981, notice of the attachment of
real properties of the CMI was served on the Register of Deeds of
Makati who on December 9, 1981 annotated the levy on Transfer
Certificate of Titles Nos. S-68500 (143929), S-68501 (143900) and
79711.
"On May 31, 1981, several banks, constituting the Consortium
Banks, filed a third party claim with the sheriff, alleging that they were
the mortgagees of the real and personal properties of the CMI with a
total book value of P656,613,303.00 and an appraised value of
P4,497,443,040.00. They claimed that their mortgage was evidenced
by a deed executed on November 10, 1978. They, therefore, asked
that the properties be released from attachment.
"The petitioner filed a motion to quash the third party claim but
its motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order of August
6, 1982. The court ruled that the Consortium Banks, as mortgagees of
the real and personal properties of the CMI had a superior lien on the
properties and that the petitioner could validly levy only on the
mortgagor's (CMI's) equity of redemption after the sale of the
mortgaged properties.
"The personal properties were foreclosed by the Consortium
Banks to which the properties were sold as the highest bidder and the
certificate of sale issued on July 6, 1982. The petitioner then asked
that it be allowed to exercise its right of redemption. But the
Consortium Banks opposed the motion on the ground that there was
an equity in redemption only in case of foreclosure sale of real
properties but not in the case of chattels.
"In the meantime, on March 17, 1982, the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXIII, acting as an insolvency court, authorized in Sp.
Proc. No. 9623 the sale of the properties of the CMI. Accordingly, on
September 17, 1982, the properties covered by TCT Nos. S-68500
(143929) and S-68501 (143900) were sold to the private respondent
Top Rate International as assignee of the El Grande Development Corp.
The sale is evidenced by a 'Deed of Confirmation of Sale with
 Assumption of Mortgage.' Previously, a contract to sell was executed
between the CMI and the El Grande (Annex C). On the basis of the sale
to it, Top Rate International filed a third party claim with the sheriff. It
asked that the properties covered by TCT No. S-68500 (143929) and
S-68501 (143900) be discharged from attachment."
On the basis of the same "Deed of Confirmation of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage," Top Rate International, Inc. (Top Rate) also filed a third-party
claim in Civil Case No. 142443 alleging that the properties involved therein had
been sold to it for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) on December 10, 1981
with the approval of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceeding No.
69623 in the course of the involuntary insolvency proceedings filed against
Consolidated Mines. Petitioner, therefore, asked that the attachment made on
these properties be discharged.
After hearing on the merits, the trial court in Civil Case No. 142598 ordered
the lifting and setting aside of the levy on attachment on the two properties
involved while in Civil Case No. 142443, the trial court issued the same order
maintaining, however, the levy on attachment on the property covered by TCT
No. 79776 in favor of plaintiff Rodrigo Tan.
The plaintiffs in the above civil cases appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
On January 6, 1984, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 142443, and ordered the levy on the two properties
maintained. The appellate court ruled:
"We find no merit in the contention of respondent Top Rate
International Services that its right over the properties in question
based on the deed of sale in its favor on September 17, 1982
confirming the contract to sell of December 10, 1981 in favor of El
Grande Development Corporation, should be recognized as superior to
the right of petitioner under the writ of attachment issued in his favor
and registered on October 1, 1981 because it succeeded to the rights
of the twelve (12) consortium of banks which hold a mortgage over
said properties registered on December 20, 1978. Said sale was not
actually a sale or assignment by the banks of their rights as mortgagee
over said properties but a sale of said properties by the mortgagor,
Consolidated Mines, Inc. with the consent of the mortgagee. The
consortium of banks could not have sold the properties to Top Rate
International Services except through foreclosure proceedings, for as
mortgagees they have no right to appropriate for themselves or
dispose of the mortgaged properties (Article 2088, Civil Code
Appropriation of the mortgaged properties of sale by the mortgagee of
said property even if stipulated by the parties would be null and void
being what is known as pactum commissorium. In the present case the
sale of the properties by Consolidated Mines, Inc. to Top Rate
International Services with the consent of the mortgagee banks under
an arrangement where the purchase price of P40,000,000.00 would be
paid directly to the banks did not adversely affect the rights of plaintiff
under the writ of attachment issued in the present case."
The appellate court also found that the Regional Trial Court in the
insolvency proceedings dismissed the petition to declare Consolidated Mines,
Inc. insolvent on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the same because
the petitioners in said case were not residents of the Philippines and, thus, not
qualified to file said petition. It, therefore, ruled that the claim of Top Rate over
said properties based on the approval of the sale in its favor by the insolvency
court must necessarily fail.
 On June 6, 1984, the appellate court likewise reversed the decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 142598 citing the same reasons it adopted in its
earlier decision in the other civil case. It further ruled that there is no merit in
Top Rate's claim that the attachment is improper because the value of the
property levied upon is in excess of the total claim of the petitioners which was
only P71,885.20 plus interest from November, 1979 for what was actually
attached by the petitioners (Rodrigo Tan and Polaris) was the equity of
redemption of Consolidated Mines, Inc. the levy made pursuant to the writ of
attachment being upon "all rights, titles, interests, claims and participation of
the defendant Consolidated Mines, Inc." to the properties covered by TCT No. S-
68501, TCT No. S-68500 and TCT No. 79777. However, as regards the validity
of the sale of the properties to Top Rate which was authorized by the insolvency
court, the Court ruled that this matter should be threshed out in an independent
action to give Top Rate the opportunity to ventilate its claims over said
properties.
On the same day, Top Rate filed a petition before this Court assailing the
decision of the appellate court in Civil Case No. 142443, docketed as G.R.
No. 67496. On August 16, 1984, Top Rate again filed a similar petition, assailing
the decision in Civil Case No. 142598, docketed as G.R. No. 68257.
As the two petitions raised identical issues, we issued a resolution dated
January 28, 1985 ordering the consolidation of the two petitions.
The only question raised by petitioner Top Rate in these consolidated
petitions, is whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that "because the private respondent through
the sheriff could not have levied on the properties but only on the right of
redemption or equity of redemption thereon, there could not have been an over-
levy sufficient to justify a quashal of the notice of levy on attachment on the
properties claimed by the petitioner."
Top Rate states that the respondents' claims are only P271,372.20 and
P71,855.20 respectively. It contends that an over-levy is obvious because the
properties levied upon are worth more than P40,000,000.00. It alleges as error
the appellate court's ruling that since the equity of redemption and not the
properties themselves were attached, its value has no way of exceeding the
respondents' individual claims because the value of the equity of redemption
should be that which will effectively release the properties, that is
P40,000,000.00. This is the amount which the respondents must necessarily
pay, at the very least, to exercise such right and not the amount of their claims.
There is, therefore, no over-levy.
Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the
mortgaged property after his default in the performance of the conditions of the
mortgage but before the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale,
whereas the right of redemption means the right of the mortgagor to repurchase
the property even after confirmation of the sale, in cases of foreclosure by banks,
within one year from the registration of the sale. (Cf. Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 283-284, 1980 Edition; Quimson v. Philippine National
Bank, 36 SCRA 26).
As we have ruled in Northern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia, (66 SCRA 415, 420):
"To levy upon the mortgagor's incorporeal right or equity of
redemption, it was not necessary for the sheriff to have taken physical
possession of the mortgaged taxicabs. x x x Levying upon the property
itself is distinguishable from levying on the judgment debtor's interest
in it (McCullough & Co. v. Taylor, 25 Phil. 110, 115)."
 Likewise, in the case of Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, (96 SCRA 463, 469),
we ruled:
"Quirino's interest in the mortgaged lots is merely an equity of
redemption, an intangible or incorporeal right (Sun Life Assurance Co.
of Canada v. Gonzalez Diez, 52 Phil. 271; Santiago v. Dionisio, 92 Phil.
495; Northern Motors Inc. v. Coquia, 66 SCRA 415).
"That interest could be levied upon by means of writ of execution
issued by the Manila Court as had been done in the case of property
encumbered by a chattel mortgage (Levy Hermanos, Inc. v. Ramirez
and Casimiro, 60 Phil. 978, 982; McCullough and Co. v. Taylor, 25 Phil.
110).
It is, therefore, error on the part of the petitioner to say that since private
respondents' lien is only a total of P343,227.40, they cannot be entitled to the
equity of redemption because the exercise of such right would require the
payment of an amount which cannot be less than P40,000,000.00.
When herein private respondents prayed for the attachment of the
properties to secure their respective claims against Consolidated Mines, Inc., the
properties had already been mortgaged to the consortium of twelve banks to
secure an obligation of US$62,062,720.66. Thus, like subsequent mortgagees,
the respondents' liens on such properties became inferior to that of the banks,
which claims in the event of foreclosure proceedings, must first be satisfied. The
appellate court, therefore, was correct in holding that in reality, what was
attached by the respondents was merely Consolidated Mines' right or equity of
redemption. Thus, in the case of Alpha Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v.
Reyes (106 SCRA 274, 278), we ruled:
"Deciding the legal question before Us, even if the DBP were just
an ordinary first mortgage without any preferential leins
under Republic Act No. 85 or Commonwealth Act 459, the statutes
mentioned in the Associated Insurance case relied upon by the trial
court, it would be unquestionable that nothing may be done to favor
plaintiff-appellant, a mere second mortgage, until after the obligations
of the debtors-appellees with the first mortgagee have been fully
satisfied and settled. In law, strictly speaking, what was mortgaged by
the Reyeses to Alpha was no more than their equity of redemption."
We, therefore, hold that the appellate court did not commit any error in
ruling that there was no over-levy on the disputed properties. What was actually
attached by respondents was Consolidated Mines' right or equity of redemption,
an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither be quantified
nor equated with the actual value of the properties upon which it may be
exercised.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. 67496 and G. R. No. 68257 are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decisions of the respondent court are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Top Rate International Services, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. L-67496, L-68257, [July 7, 1986], 226 PHIL 387-395)
 [G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991.]

EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA,

VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS,
OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION
BACUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GELILEO
DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely;
FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS,
ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA,
ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.

Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.

Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the trial court's judgment which declared as null and void the certificate
of title in the name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered the partition of
the disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court
and by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla
Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino
Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister
namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After
his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953
in the name of "The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo
Delima."
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed
an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No.
2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4, 1954 in the name
of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and
Juanita Delima, filed With the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial
Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners
for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which states: cdphil
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are
the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
 1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus
and Purificacion Bacus (one-fourth),
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Paciano, Fidel, Virgilio
and Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily
D. Arias, Helen Niadas, and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu, Irenea, and Fely,
all surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
"Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and
the Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and
issue in lieu thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso
owners.
"After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the
heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn over to the other heirs
their respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at
P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
"Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are
ordered to petition the lot in question and the defendants are
directed to immediately turn over possession of the shares here
awarded to the respective heirs.
"Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
"The counterclaim is dismissed.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 54-55, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On
May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and
upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino
Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived
their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone
paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes
thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred:
"1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of
inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription
and laches have already been waived.
"2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners." (p. 13, Rollo).
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for
partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall
enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription
to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. LLpr
Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
 "A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
"Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership."
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the
others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir
who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation
of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the
rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under
the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40
Phil. 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368).
Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-
owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
No. 72694, December 1 , 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the
question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa,
44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no
longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed
the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order
that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the
trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui
que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez
v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the
name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as
the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the
ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations
started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder
(Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since
an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective
assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
(Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420). LLphil
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by
Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance
of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs.
The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust
or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo
Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As
the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land,
such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period
of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or
to compel partition on February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by
prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before
can no longer be invoked by them at this time.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Delima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46296, [September 24, 1991], 278 PHIL
651-658)
 [A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510. November 6, 2000.]

COMMISSIONER RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE

RODOLFO R. BONIFACIO, RTC, Branch 151, Pasig
City, respondent.

Jesus P. Castillo for complainant.

SYNOPSIS

Ma Jing was one of the 20 Chinese nationals with no valid employment

documents, apprehended on May 7, 1999. Confined at the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) Detention Center, she filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig RTC on
May 17, 1999. The same was granted by the respondent Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of
Br. 151. On May 21, 1999, the BI submitted a Return of the Writ alleging that a
Charge Sheet was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Sec.
37(a)[7] of the Phil. Immigration Act No. 1940, as amended. On May 27, 1999,
however, Judge Bonifacio issued an Order for the immediate release of Ma Jing to
which the BI filed a motion for reconsideration the very next day. As the BI did not
release Ma Jing pursuant to the Order, Ma Jing filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion to
Declare BI Commissioner Rufus Rodriguez and his co-respondents guilty of
contempt. On June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the BI and reiterated its Order to immediately release Ma Jing. On the same
day, however, the BI also issued a summary deportation order to Ma Jing. On June
16, 1999, the BI filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals of the May 27 and
June 15, 1999 Orders of Judge Bonifacio. Meantime, on June 24, 1999,
Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-respondents were found guilty of indirect
contempt for non-compliance of the Court Order dated May 27, 1999, and on June
25, 1999, they were arrested and detained.
Complainant is not guilty of indirect contempt. First to be stressed is the fact
that, the indirect contempt proceedings allowed by the respondent Judge was
commenced by Ma Jing not through a verified petition as required by Sec. 4, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court but through a motion. This is in complete disregard of the
explicit provision of the law. Second, the Return of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus stated that there was already a Charge Sheet filed against Ma Jing. Hence,
it was grievous error for respondent judge to give due course to the petition
for habeas corpus despite the pending deportation case against Ma Jing.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; CONTEMPT POWERS; PROPER EXERCISE

THEREOF, DISCUSSED. — [T]he degree of restraint respondent should have
observed in the exercise of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given
the prevailing facts of this case much more so, considering that the same bears
with it the taint of personal hostility and passion against the party to whom it is
directed. Time and again magistrates have been reminded that — . . . the salutary
rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised in the preservative
not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment.
The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise
the power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that
they exercise.
 2. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT REQUIRED. — Besides the basic
equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit
that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge anywhere should be the last person
to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an
image is, however, evoked by the actuations of respondent judge in this case. It
has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who
appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge
who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as
a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice is expected to be "a cerebral man
who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences
which he shares with his fellow mortals." Judges have been admonished to observe
judicial decorum which requires that a magistrate must at all times be temperate
in his language refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from resorting
"to the language of vilification." In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that — Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and
courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts
for the litigants. Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service
is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy
is a mark of culture and good breeding. Belligerent behavior has no place in
government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and
civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence.
3. ID.; ID.; MUST BE CONVERSANT WITH BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLE. — [I]t is
imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of
Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to "be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal
profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a given controversy. Indeed
— A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles and aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive
for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law. . . Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial
Ethics requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon
18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity
of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law. "Observance of the law which he is
bound to know and sworn to uphold is required of every judge. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than
that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law." In short, when the law is
so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DIRECT AND INDIRECT
CONTEMPT; DISTINGUISHED. — [A]s defined, indirect contempt is one committed
out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct
or embarrass the court and justice. On the other hand, direct contempt consists of
or is characterized by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the meaning of
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. ID.; ID.; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; HOW COMMENCED; DISREGARDED IN
CASE AT BAR. — There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a
court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules,
provides for two (2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt to
wit: 1] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. 2] In all other cases,
charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be
accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule 7). As can be
gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings commenced by Ma
Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as required by the
above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules,
completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly lays down the
manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; GIVING DUE COURSE TO PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF DEPORTATION CASE; NOT
PROPER. — [T]he Return of the Writ [of Habeas Corpus] stated that a Charge Sheet
was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order
dated May 27, 1999 directing Ma Jing's immediate release. It was grievous error
for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the
records, to give due course to the petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency
of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its
hearing and investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no
showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are
premature and should be dismissed. Along the same vein, when an alien is detained
by the BID pursuant to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary
Deportation Order had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance,
now Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even
in habeas corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; NOT
PRESENT IN LIEU OF THE TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
NOTICE OF APPEAL OF THE RELEASE ORDER ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED IN
THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE. — [O]n May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order (Order of Release dated May 27,
1999) but respondent judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999, and
required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not
be cited in contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued
in the BID Case against Ma Jing. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively tolled the period within which to appeal respondent judge's decision
dated May 27, 1999. It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself
did not say so in the June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period
to appeal provided in Section 39, B.P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing
of the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The
motion for reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision
dated May 27, 1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal, on the
other hand was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received
the order dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under
Section 15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the
officer or person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not
commit indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion or
reconsideration and later the notice of appeal.
8. ID.; HABEAS CORPUS; WHEN WRIT NOT ALLOWED OR DISCHARGE
AUTHORIZED; CASE AT BAR. — Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process
justifying Ma Jing's detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision
as shown by the Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge
Sheet was filed against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was
initially illegal, the filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity
there was in her arrest. Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release
the party who was thus committed. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court
provides: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or, defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to
be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-
judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
9. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. —
[R]espondent judge's malfeasance is not merely confined to the abuse of his judicial
prerogatives and ignorance of basic legal precepts but also to the predilection of
making false representations to suit his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more
evident in this case than in the attendant circumstances upon which he based the
Order dated June 28, 1999 denying the complainant's Notice of Appeal. A
circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in its first paragraph that it refers to
"respondent's Notice of Appeal dated June 16, 1999 to which petitioner filed a
Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June 29, 1999." A careful examination
of the Comment/Opposition itself discloses that the pleading was filed on June 29,
1999. No satisfactory explanation has been given for this judicial aberration.
Needless to state, the allusion contained in an order to a pleading filed after its
issuance can lead to no other conclusion than that the said order was antedated
and, thus, falsified in the absence of any explanation to shed light on the
discrepancy. The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects
on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also
betrays a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this
regard that "[M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe.
As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice,
he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow."
10. ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS. — A
verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint,
respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for
the same or similar offenses. . . [t]hese circumstances only further erode the
people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the
bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of
the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.
PARDO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; HABEAS CORPUS; NOT APPLICABLE TO PEOPLE CHARGED
WITH AN OFFENSE. — [C]omplainant Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez had reason
to hold in continued detention pending deportation Chinese national Ma Jing,
pursuant to the charge sheet filed by Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
. . for violation of Section 37 (a) [7], Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. Despite the validity of the detention, respondent judge issued a writ
of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of Ma Jing. The order of
respondent judge was patently erroneous. The rule is that the writ may not be
granted, or the person held in detention may not be discharged from detention if
he has been charged with an offense. Habeas corpus no longer lies. To justify the
grant of the writ, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action, which was not the situation in the case at bar.
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; ORDER NOT VALID
WHEN COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OF THE CASE BECAUSE OF NON-
COMPLIANCE OF THE PROCEDURAL REQUISITES. — [T]he order holding BID
Commissioner Rodriguez, and company, guilty of indirect contempt of court for
their failure to comply with the May 27, 1999 order directing the immediate release
of the Chinese national is void because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject case. Rule 71, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
outlines the procedural requisites before one may be punished for indirect
contempt, namely: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) opportunity given to
the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. Specifically, Section 4 of the same
rule provides how the case for indirect contempt may be commenced. . . The charge
for indirect contempt against Commissioner Rodriguez was commenced not by a
verified petition, but by motion and without compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings, which are now required in the rules. The record is bereft
of evidence on whether respondent judge conducted a hearing in the contempt
charge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest against complainant. Pursuant
to the clear mandate of Rule 71, Section 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
respondent judge can not immediately impose a penalty without complying with
the due process requirements, namely, the filing of a charge in writing and an
opportunity for the accused to be heard by himself or by counsel. It is essential
that the contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and
to be heard in his defense, as contempt of court proceedings are commonly treated
as criminal in nature. In finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt and
ordering his immediate arrest and confinement without affording him an
opportunity to be heard, respondent judge violated the requirements of due
process and, therefore, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
3. ID.; ID.; CONTEMPT OF COURT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR THE SAME,
ELUCIDATED. — The power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used
sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the
provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. It must be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Contempt of court
has been distinctly described as an offense against the State and not against the
judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always remember that the power of
the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are not
personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard, not for judges as persons,
but for the functions they exercise.
4. ID.; ID.; INDIRECT CONTEMPT; NOT PRESENT WHEN ORDER ALLEGEDLY
DISOBEYED HAS NOT AT YET ATTAINED FINALITY. — Respondent judge lost sight
of the fact that upon receipt of the May 27, 1999 order for the immediate release
of the Chinese national, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation sought
the reconsideration of the order, thus tolling the period to comply. The motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 15, 1999, and the Commissioner lost no time
in filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The order which complainant allegedly
disobeyed had not attained finality. Hence, the indirect contempt charge has no
basis.
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; JUDGES; BAD FAITH MANIFESTED BY THE
IMPOSITION OF EXCESSIVE PENALTY. — Assuming for the sake of argument, but
without conceding that complainant was guilty of indirect contempt, the penalty of
imprisonment meted out by respondent judge was excessive and ignominious,
considering the status and rank of complainant as commissioner of a government
bureau. Under the rules on contempt, a person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt
against a regional trial court may be punished by fine or imprisonment.
Imprisonment of the accused until he complies with the order is not mandatory,
but merely directory as implied by the use of the word "may." Respondent need
not resort to the application of the extreme penalty of imprisonment if his intention
was merely to exact compliance from complainant. The imposition of fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) would suffice for this
purpose. No other conclusion could be inferred from this set of facts than that
respondent judge was moved by spite and a desire to shame the complainant in
his constituency because of his purported refusal to comply with respondent judge's
order. CDESIA
6. ID.; ID.; GRAVE MISCONDUCT; PRESENT WHEN CONTEMPT ORDER
MALICIOUS IN TENOR AND PROCEEDING CONDUCTED IN HASTE. — It was more
than evident that respondent judge was moved not by his desire to uphold the law
and justice, but by bad faith and malice based on the tenor of the order of
contempt. . . The haste by which the contempt proceeding was conducted and the
time the warrant of arrest was carried out belied the good faith of respondent judge.
. . [The] attendant circumstances of the case clearly and convincingly establish
respondent judge's guilt for grave misconduct. The subject order of respondent
judge was not only contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but more
importantly, imposed with ignominy and ill will disguised to make complainant
suffer humiliation and perfidy.
7. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT REQUIRED. — Respondent judge's acts
showed that he was not possessed of that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint that are indispensable qualities of every judge. [As
mandated by] Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. . . Patience is an essential
part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted
with rudeness and insolence.
8. ID.; ID.; PREDILECTION FOR MAKING FALSE REPRESENTATION TO SUIT
HIS ENDS; MANIFESTED IN CASE AT BAR. — It will be noted that respondent judge
has a predilection for making false representation to suit his ends. On June 16,
1999, complainant filed his notice of appeal. Ma Jing filed her comment/opposition
to the notice of appeal on June 29, 1999. On June 28, 1999 complainant paid the
corresponding docket fees for such notice of appeal although as Commissioner of
Immigration in his official capacity, he was exempt from the requirement of paying
the docket fees. On the same day, respondent judge issued the order denying the
appeal even before the deportee filed her opposition thereto. What was significant
about the June 28, 1999 order was that it specifically stated that the trial court, in
arriving at the order of denial, took into consideration the complainant's appeal and
the opposition filed by the Chinese national. There was something questionable and
suspicious about this order of denial as it was issued the day before the other party
to the case filed his comment. How could respondent judge consider a pleading
that had not been filed with the court at the time the order was issued? Respondent
failed to give a satisfactory explanation for this judicial lapse. The only conclusion
that could be drawn was that the order of denial was premeditated, for whatever
reason or purpose is beyond the Court to divine. It was an unlikely coincidence that
the notice of appeal was denied by the trial court on the same day that complainant
paid the corresponding docket fees for the appeal. Time and again, the Court has
said that "the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly,
of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the
law." TcDIaA
 9. ID.; ID.; GROSS MISCONDUCT, IGNORANCE AND INCOMPETENCE ARE
SUFFICIENT GROUND FOR DISMISSAL. — Judges are required to observe due case
in the performance of their official duties. They are likewise charged with knowledge
of internal rules and procedures, especially those that relate to the scope of their
functions. They are duty bound to observe and abide by these rules and procedures,
designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice. The
facts of the instant case convincingly establish that respondent judge was not
conversant with basic legal principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges
to "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." Respondent judge
owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to
apply in a given controversy. Gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
gross incompetence are characteristics and quires impermissible in a judge. They
constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the judge from the judicial service. For
these reasons, I vote to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service on the
respondent judge.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

For allegedly granting improvidently a petition for Habeas Corpus in Special

Proceeding No. 10931 1 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Ma Jing," respondent was charged in a verified complaint 2 with Violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, Grave Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
Incompetence, Gross Inefficiency and Knowingly Rendering An Unjust Judgment
relative to the above-mentioned case.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the verified complaint to
respondent judge for his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On July 30, 1999, respondent judge filed his comment 3 denying the charges
against him and prayed for the dismissal of the case against him "for utter lack of
merit." 4
The case was subsequently referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In an evaluation report dated September 21, 1999, 5 the OCA
recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent
judge for being sub judice, pointing out that the issues therein are the same as
those pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425 entitled
"Rufus B. Rodriguez v. Hon. Rodolfo R. Bonifacio, et al."
The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
53425 dated May 4, 2000 6 setting aside for lack of legal basis the assailed Order
of respondent Judge dated June 24, 1999 which found herein complainant guilty of
indirect contempt.
In the meantime, in a Resolution dated November 24, 1999, 7 the Court
resolved to: 1.] docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding; and 2.]
refer the case to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales for
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from notice.
In compliance with the foregoing directive, Justice Morales submitted a Report
summarizing the factual antecedents of the case thus:
On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p.m., the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in coordination with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) conducted
simultaneous raids at the Royal Flame Club, Space World and Narcissus
Club which are all located in Ermita, Manila as a result of which 20
female Chinese nationals were caught "in the act of entertaining
customers and guests."
No Alien Employment Permits or Alien Employment Registration
Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were
turned over to the BI for custody and verification of their alien status.
They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila on May 8, 1999.
On May 17, 1999, Chinese National Ma Jing, one of the 20
apprehended Chinese, filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig
Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was raffled to Branch 151 thereof.
The caption of the petition did not name any respondent but it
alleged as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. On or about 07 May 1999 at about 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, petitioner, a temporary visitor in the Philippines from
the People's Republic of China, was taken from a nightclub (Royal
Flame) in Metro Manila by individuals who represented
themselves as Agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and/or
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and since then
confined, restrained and deprived her of her liberty and [is] now
confined at the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, Metro Manila.
3. In spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined from
then on, to date, no formal complaint or accusation for any
specific offenses has been filed against her nor any judicial writ
or order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far.
4. According to reliable information, the petitioner is now
being unlawfully detained and deprived of her liberty by
the Warden and/or Chief of the BID Detention Center, at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila at the behest of
the Chief of a special operation unit of the NBI combined with
BID and DOLE agents and whose office is at NBI, NBI Bldg., Taft
Ave., Manila. (italics supplied)
Acting Presiding Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio of Branch 151 of the
Pasig RTC issued a writ.
On May 21, 1999, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical Assistant,
Commissioner's Office, BI, submitted a RETURN OF THE WRIT
alleging, inter alia: HaAIES
xxx xxx xxx
4. That an investigation was conducted by Special
Prosecutor Ramoncito L. Tolentino by (sic) the Bureau of
Immigration;
5. That during the said investigation the subject foreign
nationals including the petitioner failed to produce any travel
documents while the National Bureau of Investigation showed
their Affidavit of Arrest, pictures taken at Royal Flame Club and
other evidences in support of their claim, copy of said Affidavit of
 Arrest and pictures are attached hereto as Annexes B and C
respectively;
6. That on May 13, 1999, Special Prosecutor Ramon L.
Tolentino issued a Charge Sheet charging said alien for violation
of Section 37 (a) [7] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
as amended, a copy of the charge sheet is attached hereto as
Annex D;
7. That during the hearing at the Bureau of Immigration on
May 20, 1999, the Counsel for petitioner and a certain Willy Ang
manifested that the petitioner together with her companion are
going to submit [an] application for Voluntary Deportation;
8. That based on the foregoing premises it is crystal clear
that the petitioner is lawfully detained by the Bureau of
Immigration; and
9. That moreso (sic), if ever the petitioner would submit an
application for Voluntary Deportation as manifested by his
Counsel Atty. San Pedro and their representative Mr. Willy Ang
this petition would already be moot and academic.
After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus,
Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, held:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon due inquiry, the Court finds that the petitioner is not
really an undocumented alien as she has a valid PROC passport
No. 1437777 and Visa No. 1201 issued by the Philippine Embassy
on March 18, 1999. Her stay in the Philippines has been duly
extended up to June 30, 1999 under O.R. No. M 7922945. The
Charge Sheet, however, remains as a mere accusation, i.e. that
petitioner is a mere suspect, working as a Guest Relation Officer
at the Royal Flame Club without securing the necessary working
permit/visa from the Bureau of Immigration. She was not notified
though of the charges against her nor was she afforded due
process. No commitment order was issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration or any competent authority to justify her
continued detention.
xxx xxx xxx
In Dramayo, the Supreme Court has ruled categorically that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The strongest suspicion
must not be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195
SCRA 700). The illegal arrest of petitioner without warrant of
arrest or seizure on 07 May 1999 and arbitrary detention, to date,
is not remedied by the supposed filing in a Charge Sheet dated
13 May 1999 but assumably filed only on 14 May 1999. Petitioner
had been detained without any valid charge from 07 May 1999
to 14 May 1999. The filing of the Charge Sheet did not (sic) the
illegal detention of the petitioner. . . .
Accordingly the said Order of May 27, 1999 disposed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds no
cogent reason to hold petitioner under continued detention so
that Ma Jing's immediate release is hereby ordered, unless
otherwise held on a different case and/or valid judicial process.
 The following day, May 28, 1999 "respondent Bureau of
Immigration . . . by counsel Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Technical
Assistant, Commissioner's Office" filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the May 27, 1999 [Order].
On May 31, 1999, Ma Jing not having been released from
detention, filed a "Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt"
naming BI Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez, Atty. de Leon, BI
Detention Center Warden Enrico R. Paner and BI employees Mar
Novales and Richie Galvadores as contemnors.
By Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio denied the BI's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of May 27, 1999 and directed
BI Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents in the Motion to hold
them in contempt of court for failure to obey the Order of May 27,
1999.
In the same Order of June 15, 1999, Judge Bonifacio ordered
Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents to immediately release
Ma Jing in accordance with his May 27, 1999 Order.
Also on June 15, 1999, the BI issued a summary deportation
order to Ma Jing who refused to receive it.
The following day or on June 16, 1999, the BI filed at Branch 151
of the RTC Pasig a Notice of Appeal (to the Court of Appeals) of the
May 27, 1999 Order and the June 15, 1999 Order.
On June 18, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez and his co-
respondents, in compliance with the show cause order, filed an
Explanation dated June 17, 1999 stating, inter alia, that they were
never ordered in the May 17, 1999 Order to release Ma Jing; that
except for Commissioner Rodriguez, the other respondents had no
authority to release Ma Jing from the Detention Center; "that the
contempt proceedings in the case at bar was not initiated by the
Court motu propio, hence, the indirect contempt should be
commenced by a verified petition and not by merely filing a Motion as
was done in the instant case," following Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which they therein quoted; and that the Motion
for Reconsideration of the May 17, 1999 Order stayed the execution
thereof as did the Notice of Appeal (filed on June 17, 1999) of the same
order.
In the meantime, the other Chinese nationals' petitions for
voluntary deportation were, by separate orders, granted by the BI.
By June 24, 1999, Judge Bonifacio found
Commissioner Rodriguez and co-respondents guilty of indirect
contempt and ordered their arrest and detention at the Pasig City
jail until they have complied with the Order dated May 27, 1999 in the
light of the following disquisition:
. . . proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct
from any deportation proceedings taking place at the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. They (habeas corpus proceedings)
rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the deportation case and
require no pronouncement with respect thereto.
In its May 27, 1999 Order, this Court ordered the immediate
release of petitioner Ma Jing, principally upon the following
reasons: (i) the petitioner was unlawfully arrested without any
warrant of arrest and, thereafter, arbitrarily detained, in
disregard of her rights, even as an alien, to due process of law;
and (ii) a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose
of executing a final order of deportation.
xxx xxx xxx
1. It is not correct to say that the May 27, 1999 Order
should not be obeyed because it did not specifically direct Hon.
Rufus D (sic) Rodriguez, P/Supt. Angelito O. Tan, Mar Navales
and Richie Galvadores as the persons who should obey the said
Order.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus dated May 17, 1999 as directed,
among others, to "The Chief of the Special Operation Unit-NBI
and/or the Warden or Chief of the BID Detention Center, Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro, Manila." As such, all the
respondents fall under the classification "BID Agents" and are
thus included in the persons to whom the writ of habeas corpus is
directed.
xxx xxx xxx
2. Neither is the Court impressed with the argument that
P/Supt. Angelito O. Tan, Atty. Rommel J. de Leon, Enrico R.
Paner, Mar Navales and Richie Galvadores do not have the
authority to release the petitioner from the BID Detention Center,
such authority pertaining only to the Commissioner, BID.
The authority for the release of petitioner Ma Jing is
precisely the May 27, 1999 Order of this Court which directs her
immediate release. There can be no doubt on the jurisdiction of
this Court on habeas corpus cases, as the case at bar, and the
validity of its lawful orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such
jurisdiction.
It is significant that Hon. Rufus Rodriguez has not
disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the refusal of
his subordinates to obey the subject court order, as he would
certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Neither is this Court persuaded by the argument that the
May 27, 1999 Order was not yet executory because BID's Motion
for Reconsideration stayed its execution.
By its very nature, habeas corpus proceedings are always
characterized by promptness or speed. It is always timely to
recall this categorical affirmation in the ponencia of Justice
Malcolm in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra:
The writ of habeas corpus was devised as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
Therefore, only an injunction from a Higher Court could
restrain enforceability of the May 27, 1999 Order which, by its
unmistakable language, directed the "immediate release" of
petitioner Ma Jing.
 4. There is also a puerile claim that the contempt
proceeding was improper because it was commenced by mere
motion and not by a verified petition.
The Revised Rules of Court (should be 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) cannot be any clearer. The appropriate section is
quite explicit.: "After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt . . . (b) Disobedience of
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a
court . . ."
It is very clear that, as to form, the only requirement is that
the charge be in writing . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. On the claim that the Notice of Appeal filed by BID on
June 17 stayed execution of the May 27, 1999 Order, suffice it to
say that, as already discussed above, being a writ of
liberty, habeas corpus proceedings are always characterized by
promptness or speed. Therefore, the May 27, 1999 Order of
release was inherently immediately executory, and only an
injunction from a Higher Court could restrain its immediate
enforceability.
6. Finally, the respondents submit the argument that it is
no longer legally possible for the BID to order the release of the
petitioner because of the issuance of a Summary Deportation
Order against her.
The first time the respondents first disobeyed the May 27,
1999 Order was on May 28, 1999. There was no deportation
order yet at that time. The Court cannot accede to the proposition
that the subsequent issuance of the deportation order should
have the effect of erasing or pardoning the contempt already
committed by the respondents as early as May 28, 1999.
Moreover, the release of petitioner Ma Jing is not really a
primordial consideration insofar as the pending incident is
concerned. The ultimate purpose of this inquiry is to determine
whether the respondents are guilty of indirect contempt, i.e.,
'disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court.'
The Court finds that such disobedience has been indubitably
established by the various Sheriff's Reports extant in the records
of this case, and that the 'reasons' advanced by the respondents
in their 'Explanation' dated June 17, 1999 are not the real
reasons which impelled said disobedience, as the same
conclusively stems from the perception of the Hon.
Rufus Rodriguez and his subalterns that the Court has no
authority to order the release of petitioner Ma Jing. Even
assuming that the respondents were of the opinion that the
subject Order was grossly erroneous, they could have availed of
the remedy of certiorari immediately after its promulgation. But
they, certainly, cannot adamantly and belligerently defy the
Order of the Courts simply because they have a contrary opinion.
 Confronted with the mandatory directive of May 27, 1999
to release petitioner Ma Jing, the obstinate refusal of the
respondents to obey the same constitutes indirect contempt."
(Italics supplied).
On June 25, 1999, a Friday, at about 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, Commissioner Rodriguez, et al. were, pursuant to the June
24, 1999 Order, arrested by the NBI whose Director was specifically
ordered by Judge Bonifacio to serve the warrant.
Commissioner Rodriguez, et al. lost no time in filing at the Court
of Appeals on June 25, 1999 an Urgent Petition for Certiorari against
Judge Bonifacio, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53425, followed by an
Amended Petition, assailing the Judge's Order of June 24, 1999.
By Order of June 25, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the immediate release
of Commissioner Rodriguez, et al. after posting a bond and directing
Judge Bonifacio to file his comment on the petition.
At 10:00 p.m. of June 25, 1999, Commissioner Rodriguez, et
al. were released after posting a bond.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Investigating Justice recommends
respondent judge be fined Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for gross ignorance
of the law and warned that a repetition or the commission of a similar infraction
will be dealt with more severely, reasoning thus:
Under Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, contempt
proceedings may be commenced as follows:
SECTION 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings
for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of the documents or papers involved therein,
and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that
fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
joint hearing and decision.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that Ma Jing was
"[a]ccording to reliable" information being unlawfully deprived of her
liberty "by the Warden and/or Chief of the BID Detention Center at the
behest of the Chief of a special operations unit of the NBI combined
with BID and DLE agents whose office is at NBI." It did not name herein
complainant as respondent.
Neither did the May 27, 1999 Order direct herein complainant to
release Ma Jing. It was when Ma Jing filed on May 31, 1999 a Motion
to Cite in Contempt that herein complainant's name was for the first
time drawn in the case.
 Under the circumstances, compliance with the second mode of
initiating a petition for contempt under Sec. 4 of Rule 71 of the 1997
Code of Civil Procedure, — filing a "verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved
therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for initiating
pleadings for civil action in the court concerned" — was in order. It is
in this light that the undersigned investigator finds that respondent
ERRED in giving due course to the mere motion to cite in contempt and
finding herein complainant guilty thereof by Order of June 24,
1999, especially given the fact that in the Explanation-Answer to the
show cause Order of respondent herein, complainant et al. quoted Sec.
4 of Rule 71 and alleged that as "[t]he contempt proceedings w[ere]
not initiated by the Court motu proprio the indirect contempt should
be commenced by a verified petition and not by mere filing [of a]
motion as was done in the instant case."
xxx xxx xxx
For administrative liability to attach for errors of judgment, the
error must be gross, patent or deliberate (Re: Judge Silverio S. Tayao,
A.M. No. 93-8-1204, 229 SCRA 723 [1994].
For administrative liability to attach for gross ignorance of the
law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, it must
be established that the order or judgment is not only erroneous but
[that] he was actuated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, revenge,
corrupt purpose or some other like motive (Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M.
No. RTJ-90-617, 296 SCRA 88 [1998]).
For a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he renders (Rodrigo v. Quijano, 79
10 [1997]) [sic] otherwise it would "render judicial office untenable for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible (vide Lopez v. Corpus, 78
SCRA 374 [1997] (sic); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834
[1994]).
The undersigned finds that respondent's error in giving due
course to the "Motion to Declare Parties Guilty of Contempt" was
patent, given that circumstances mentioned above. Respondent's
invoking of Sec. 3 of the same Rule 71 (of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, not revised Rules of Court as he stated) which to him clearly
shows that "the only requirement is that the charge be in writing, citing
Tomas C. Aguador v. Malcolm S. Enerio, et al., G.R. No. L-20383,
January 30, 1971, betrays his ignorance that this Aguador case was
decided in 1971, long before Sec. 4, Rule 71, which is a new provision,
was incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. CTDacA
And, as from the following portion of respondent's Order of June
24, 1999, to wit:
Incidentally, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
not a sovereign entity where the commissioner reigns supreme.
It is a mere Bureau and a becoming modesty of inferior offices
demands a conscious realization of the position that they occupy
in the interrelation and operation of the huge governmental
bureaucracy. Most decidedly, this Court does not believe that the
Honorable Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation —
however exalted he may personally feel his position to be — is
beyond the processes of Courts of the land."
 it is gathered that he was actuated by anger or hatred in so acting
on the motion for contempt, administrative liability attaches for his
gross ignorance of the law.
As for the rest of the assailed Orders — bases of the other
charges at bar, complainant's charge that they violate the law and the
jurisprudence he cited not being indubitable in the light of respondent's
own citations of the law and jurisprudence, the undersigned does not
find respondent to have acted arrantly. The issue thus becomes judicial
in character and would not warrant faulting him administratively
(Godinez v. Alano, 303 SCRA 259 [1999]).
The Court agrees with the investigating Justice that respondent judge should
indeed be sanctioned, but finds the recommended penalty not commensurate to
the gravity of respondent's malfeasance for the following reasons:
First, the degree of restraint respondent should have observed in the exercise
of his contempt powers leaves much to be desired, given the prevailing facts of this
case much more so, considering that the same bears with it the taint of personal
hostility and passion against the party to whom it is directed. Time and again
magistrates have been reminded that —
. . . the salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt
must be exercised in the preservative not vindictive principle, 8 and
on the corrective not retaliatory idea of punishment. 9 The courts and
other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the
power for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for
the functions that they exercise. 10
Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law,
a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety 11 and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every
judge. 12 A judge anywhere should be the last person to be perceived as a petty
tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Such an image is, however, evoked
by the actuations of respondent judge in this case.
It has time and again been stressed that the role of a judge in relation to
those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and
courtesy. 13 A judge who is commanded at all times to be mindful of his high
calling and his mission as a dispassionate and impartial arbiter of justice 14 is
expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of
purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals." 15
Judges have been admonished to observe judicial decorum which requires
that a magistrate must at all times be temperate in his language 16 refraining from
inflammatory or excessive rhetoric 17 or from resorting "to the language of
vilification." 18 In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that
—
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to
all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and
others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously
falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the
courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
Respondent judge needs to be reminded that government service is people-
oriented. 19 Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a
mark of culture and good breeding. 20 Belligerent behavior has no place in
government service where personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and
civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. 21
 Second, it is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal
principles. The Code of Judicial Conduct, in fact, enjoins judges to "be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence." 22 Respondent judge owes it to
the public and to the legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply in a
given controversy. 23 Indeed —
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only
by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of
justice and the Rule of Law. 24
In this case, respondent judge displayed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp
of the basic principles governing contempt. As defined, indirect contempt is one
committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to belittle, degrade,
obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. 25 On the other hand, direct contempt
consists of or is characterized, by "misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same" within the
meaning of Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 26
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge
constitutes indirect contempt. 27 Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules, provides for two
(2) modes of commencing proceedings for indirect contempt, to wit:
1.] It may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which
the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.
2.] In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon
full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
civil actions in the court concerned. (all initiatory pleadings should be
accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping, Sec. 5 Rule
7). 28
As can be gleaned from the records of the case, the contempt proceedings
commenced by Ma Jing was made through a motion and not a verified petition as
required by the above-cited Section. Respondent Judge relied on Section 3, Rule
71 of the Rules, completely disregarding the provisions of Section 4 which explicitly
lays down the manner in which indirect contempt proceedings may be filed.
Contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the
State and not against the judge personally. To reiterate, a judge must always
remember that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised
for purposes that are not personal, because that power is intended as a safeguard,
not for judges as persons, but for the functions they exercise. 29
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing circumscription of a court's power to punish
for contempt, it bears stressing that the court must exercise the power of contempt
judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint 30 with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not
for retaliation or vindication. 31 In this case, respondent judge failed to observe
the procedure expressly spelled out in Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules.
As stated earlier, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles. 32 Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics
requires that a judge should be studious of the principles of law and Canon 18
mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of
the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law. 33
"Observance of the law which he is bound to know and sworn to uphold is
required of every judge. 34 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to simply apply it; 35 anything less than that would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law." 36 In short, when the law is so elementary; not to be
aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 37
Third, assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was indeed a valid contempt
charge filed against herein complainant, the validity of the charge will not extricate
respondent judge from his predicament. The records disclose that the Return of the
Writ 38 stated that a Charge Sheet 39 was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing
for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Despite
this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999 40 directing Ma Jing's
immediate release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these
factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the petition
for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing.
Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and investigation proceedings
with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its
decision, habeas corpus proceedings are premature and should be
dismissed. 41 Along the same vein, when an alien is detained by the BID pursuant
to an order of deportation, as in this case where a Summary Deportation
Order 42 had already been issued by the BID, Courts of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Courts, have no power to release the said alien on bail even in habeas
corpus proceedings, because there is no law authorizing it. 43
It, furthermore, must be pointed out that on May 28, 1999, complainant-
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration 44 of the said order but respondent
judge denied the same in an Order dated June 15, 1999, 45 and required
complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt. On the same date, a Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID
Case against Ma Jing. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively tolled
the period within which to appeal respondent judge's decision dated May 27, 1999.
It was not a pro forma motion, as respondent judge himself did not say so in the
June 15, 1999 order denying the motion. The two-day period to appeal provided in
Section 39, B.P. Blg. 129 certainly did not proscribe the filing of the motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in the habeas corpus case. The motion for
reconsideration was filed on May 28, 1999, a day after the decision dated May 27,
1999 was received by complainant. The Notice of Appeal, 46 on the other hand
was filed on June 17, 1999. Complainant and co-respondents received the order
dated June 15, 1999 of respondent judge on June 16, 1999. Since under Section
15, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the prisoner shall be released if the officer or
person detaining him does not desire to appeal, complainant did not commit
indirect contempt because of the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration and
later the notice of appeal.
Be that as it may, there was a valid judicial process justifying Ma Jing's
detention even before respondent judge rendered his decision as shown by the
Return of the Writ which averred, among others, that a Charge Sheet was filed
against Ma Jing. Even granting that the arrest of Ma Jing was initially illegal, the
filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever incipient infirmity there was in her arrest.
Respondent judge therefore had no authority to release the party who was thus
committed. 47 Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If
it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the
 custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge; or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question
his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy
would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. 48 The
writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released
had been charged before any court. 49 The term "court" includes quasi-judicial
bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. 50
It is significant to note vis-a-vis the foregoing disquisitions that in it Decision
dated May 4, 2000 51 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53425, the Court of Appeals faulted
respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the June 24, 1999 Order on similar grounds. In castigating respondent
judge, the appellate court minced no words:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties,
a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and
title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority 52 . . . Thus, when the law transgressed is elementary — the
failure to know to observe it, constitute gross ignorance of the
law. 53 To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain public
confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to keep abreast of
all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, consistent with the standard that
magistrates must be the embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence. 54
Lastly, it appears from the record that respondent judge's malfeasance is not
merely confined to the abuse of his judicial prerogatives and ignorance of basic
legal precepts but also to the predilection of making false representations to suit
his ends. Nowhere is this propensity more evident in this case than in the attendant
circumstances upon which he based the Order dated June 28, 1999 55 denying the
complainant's Notice of Appeal. A circumspect scrutiny of the said order reveals in
its first paragraph that it refers to "respondent's Notice of Appeal dated June 16,
1999 to which petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition to Notice of Appeal on June
29, 1999." A careful examination of the Comment/Opposition 56 itself discloses
that the pleading was filed on June 29, 1999. 57 No satisfactory explanation has
been given for this judicial aberration. Needless to state, the allusion contained in
an order to a pleading filed after its issuance can lead to no other conclusion than
that the said order was antedated and, thus, falsified in the absence of any
explanation to shed light on the discrepancy.
The foregoing act not only seriously undermines and adversely reflects on the
honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; it also betrays
a character flaw which speaks ill of his person. Suffice it to state in this regard that
"[M]aking false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the
judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he
must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the
others to follow." 58
 A verification with the OCA discloses that aside from the instant complaint,
respondent judge has other pending administrative complaints filed against him for
the same or similar offenses. In A.M. No. RTJ-99-845, respondent judge stands
charged with Serious Misconduct Re: JDRC Case No. 2913, while in A.M. No. RTJ-
00-972 he stands indicted for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Bias, Abuse of Authority
and Malicious Intent to Hinder and Frustrate the Administration of Justice by
Interfering with Orders and Processes of a Co-equal Court. Needless to state, these
circumstances only further erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary
for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety
to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been
the object of criticism and controversy. 59
Taking into account the prevailing circumstances of this case, the Court
believes that in lieu of the fine recommended by the investigating Justice, a three
(3) month suspension without pay would be a more appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio is SUSPENDED from the
service for three (3) months, without pay, effective upon his receipt of this
Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510 (Resolution), [November 6,
2000], 398 PHIL 441-480)
 [A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126. January 20, 2009.]
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2896-RTJ]

ATTY. ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III, complainant, vs. JUDGE

FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J p:

Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III (complainant), by Complaint-

Affidavit 1 dated June 8, 2006 which was sworn to on June 9, 2006 and received
by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on June 13, 2006, charged Judge
Fatima Gonzales-Asdala (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, with gross ignorance of the law and procedure,
gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, graft and
corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and culpable violation of the
Constitution.
Complainant was a party to the following cases which were originally raffled
to different branches but which were ordered consolidated and assigned to
Branch 86 presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having involved the
same parties (complainant and his wife), related issues and reliefs prayed for:
(1) Civil Case No. Q-06-57760, 2 for Violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or
the "Violence Against Women and Their Children Act", filed by complainant's wife
against him praying for, among others, the issuance of Temporary Protection
Order (TPO), (2) Civil Case No. 06-57857, 3 filed by complainant against his
wife for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (3) Civil Case No. Q-06-
57984, 4 petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by complainant's wife against
him involving their son Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara (habeas corpus case). TcEaAS
The habeas corpus case was raffled to Branch 102 which issued on May 23,
2006 a Writ 5 directing Deputy Sheriff Victor Amarillas to "take and have the
body of . . . . CARLOS IÑIGO R. TABUJARA before this Court on 25 May 2006,
at 10:00 A.M. and [to] summon the respondent-[herein complainant] to appear
then and there to show cause why he should not be dealt with in accordance
with law." 6 (Capitalization and underscoring in the original)
During the hearing on May 25, 2006 of the habeas corpus case before
Branch 102, on complainant's information that there were two pending cases
before Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay, Branch 102 directed the consolidation
of said habeas corpus case with the other cases pending before Branch 86.
After hearing was conducted on the habeas corpus case, Branch 86
Presiding Judge Bay issued on May 31, 2006 an Order 7 reading:
After considering the records of the three (3) cases consolidated
before this Court, this Court resolves as follows:
1. the child Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under
the custody of the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III until the
Court shall have resolved the issue of custody of said child.
This is necessary to protect the child from emotional and
psychological violence due to the misunderstanding now
existing between his parents. EDACSa
2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with Prayer for
Temporary Protection Order is GRANTED. The Temporary
 Protection Order dated April 19, 2006 is hereby extended
until the prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. The respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to
bring the child Carlos Iñigo Tabujara to this Court during
the hearing of these cases on July 14, 2006 at 8:30 in the
morning.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the same date (May 31, 2006) of the issuance by Judge Bay of the
above-quoted Order, complainant's wife filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order
Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For
Partial Reconsideration (Of the Order dated May 31, 2006). 9 The
motion contained no notice of hearing and no copy was furnished herein
complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via registered mail. Also on
May 31, 2006, respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 87, the pairing Judge of
Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay who had filed a Leave of Absence effective the
following day or on June 1, 2006, acted on the motion of complainant's wife and
amended Judge Bay's May 31, 2006 order by advancing the production of the
parties' child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006. 10 The decretal portion of
respondent's May 31, 2006 Order reads: EaCDAT
WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons
acting for and in his behalf and under his direction is hereby directed
to produce the person of minor Carlos I[ñ]igo R. Tabujara before the
Session Hall, Branch 87, located at 114, Hall of Justice, Quezon City on
June 1, 2006 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Failing which, the more
coercive process of a Bench Warrant will be issued against said
respondent, without prejudice to a declaration of contempt which may
be due under the obtaining circumstances. 11 (Underscoring supplied)
Alleging that respondent's May 31, 2006 Order was issued with undue
haste and without notice to complainant, and that respondent violated the rule
against interference with courts of co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction,
complainant filed on June 1, 2006 a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
Court of Appeals. 12
On June 1, 2006, complainant having failed to appear at the rescheduled
date (by respondent) for him to produce the minor child, declared him
. . . in contempt of Court for defying the order directing the
production of the minor, in which case, a bench warrant is hereby
ordered against respondent, who is likewise ordered imprisoned until
such time that he is willing to appear and comply with the order of this
Court directing the production of the minor. Until further
notice. 13 (Underscoring supplied) SDHCac
On June 2, 2006, the appellate court issued a Resolution 14 in
complainant's petition for Certiorari granting a Temporary Restraining Order and
ordering complainant's wife to submit a Comment on the petition. On even date,
in view of the contempt order and bench warrant issued by respondent on June
1, 2006, complainant filed before the appellate court an urgent ex-parte motion
to set aside respondent's June 1, 2006 Order and bench warrant. 15 The
appellate court granted the motion by June 7, 2006 Resolution. 16
Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when
respondent issued her May 31, 2006 Order, Judge Bay was not yet on official
leave as it was yet to start the following day, June 1, 2006; that as a judge of a
co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, respondent could not amend, revise,
 modify or disturb the orders of the other courts; 17 and that respondent violated
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court 18 on litigated motions which Rule calls
for the setting of such motions for hearing and the service of copy thereof upon
the opposing party at least three days before the scheduled hearing.
Complainant adds that respondent's May 31, 2006 Order was issued after
the opposing counsel personally met and conferred with respondent in her
chambers without the presence of his (complainant's) counsel; and that after
issuing the Order, respondent personally summoned via telephone complainant's
counsel to her chambers where she personally furnished him a copy of the Order
in the presence of opposing counsel. 19 THCSEA
Then Court Administrator Christopher Lock, by 1st Indorsement dated July
3, 2006, 20 directed respondent to comment on the Complaint-Affidavit within
ten days from notice.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) synthesized respondent's 22-
page Comment dated August 2, 2006, 21 the salient portions of which follow:
xxx xxx xxx
In acting on the subject cases as pairing judge of Branch 86,
respondent judge argued that she did not violate the basic rule against
interference between courts of concurrent or co-equal jurisdiction.
When respondent judge ordered the production of the minor child
during the hearing set on 01 June 2006, the regular presiding judge of
Branch 86 was no longer in his office as he already left the building as
per information of Branch Clerk of Court Buenaluz. Hence, as pairing
judge, she has the authority to act on the said urgent motion and to
issue the bench warrant. DACaTI
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent denied her alleged close personal relationship with
Atty. Carmina Abbas, counsel of record of complainant's wife. When
Atty. Abbas appeared during the hearing on 01 June 2006, it was the
second time that she saw her; the first time was sometime two years
ago during the IBP meeting in Makati City. She claimed that she did
not know either Atty. Abas or the complainant's wife. She only came
to know them when the case was referred to her for action.
With respect to her alleged failure to require complainant to show
cause and answer the contempt charge against him, respondent
explained that the record of the habeas corpus case shows
that complainant was given several opportunities to comply with the
Writ to bring the minor child. Per record, the 1st refusal to comply was
during the hearing on 25 May 2006 when complainant claimed lack of
material time to fetch the child from Tagaytay highlands. Then, the
2nd and 3rd refusal[s] to comply were during the hearings on 26 May
2006 and 01 June 2006, respectively.
Respondent likewise denied personally calling complainant's
counsel and informing her about the motion and the hearing on 01
June 2006. As to the reason for Atty. Ambrosio's unexpected arrival at
the respondent's sala and as to how she learned about the motion is
unknown to her. She claimed that the sending of notice to party
litigants and/or their counsel is not her concern or duty but that of the
Branch Clerk of Court. ScCEIA
Respondent noted that the Petition for Certiorari which
complainant filed in the Court of Appeals impleaded her in the capacity
of Presiding Judge of Branch 87. Hence, complainant misled the Court
 of Appeals in making it appear that she issued the questioned order in
her capacity as the regular judge of Branch 87.
Respondent only came to know of the TRO when the bench
warrant was already disseminated to the proper government
authorities. It was thus incumbent upon the complainant to submit
himself to the court and ask that the bench warrant be set aside or
recalled because of the TRO.
. . . . Complainant's detention at the office of the Executive Judge
Natividad was of his own making.
xxx xxx xxx 22 (Underscoring supplied)
After noting the following record of administrative charges against
respondent: 23
Docket No. Complainant Charge/ Penalty Date of
Violation Decision/
Resolution

1. RTJ-06-
Edano, Gross Dismissal from 26 July 2007
1974
Carmen P. Insubordination the Service
And Gross without
Misconduct prejudice

2. 05-10-618 OCA's Undue Delay in Fine of 11 July 2006

RTC Report The Disposition P11,000.00 Pesos
of Cases with Warning

3. RTC-05- Gross
Manansala, Fine of 10 May 2005
1916 Misconduct
Melencio P40,000.00
III P. Pesos with
stern Warning

4. RTJ-00-
Bownman, Grave Abuse of Fine of 06 March 2000
1546
(98-628-RTJ) James et al., Discretion P2,000.00 Pesos

5. RTJ-99-
Dumlao, Partiality Admonished 08 February
1428
Florentino, 1999
Jr.,

(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied),

the OCA came up with the following evaluation of the Complaint:
As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent Judge had
indeed acted on the three (3) consolidated cases: (1) without the
legal authority as pairing judge of Branch 86 considering that the
regular presiding judge thereat was still sitting as such when she
issued the order of 31 May 2006; (2) in violation of the basic rule
on procedural due process when she resolved ex-parte the motion
of the complainant's wife; and . . . in citing complainant in contempt
of court and issuing the bench warrant without requiring the
complainant to file his comment on said ex-parte motion and explain
 the reason for his failure to appear and bring the minor child during
the hearing on 01 June 2006. HcSDIE
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted that the motion of complainant's wife was an
ordinary motion which required the application of ordinary rules and
was not itself the application of writ under Rule 102.
xxx xxx xxx
Clear it is from the foregoing that respondent's basis in
disregarding the rule under Section 4 of Rule 15 is not valid. While
respondent may be justified in immediately setting the hearing of the
said urgent ex-parte motion, she should not have resolved it
without first requiring the complainant to file his comment.
Although the appearance of the complainant during the hearing may
be waived, he has the right to be heard insofar as the said motion is
concerned through the filing of his comment thereon.
Respondent Judge's blunder was compounded when she
immediately cited complainant in contempt of court and issued the
bench warrant without requiring the latter to explain the reason for his
non-appearance and non-compliance with a standing order. Under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, complainant's alleged disobedience is an
indirect contempt the punishment for which requires that a respondent
should be first asked to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
There is one more act equally serious in nature. As correctly
claimed by the complainant, respondent indeed took cognizance of
the consolidated cases without proper authority. Respondent
cannot reason out that she acted in her capacity as pairing judge. It is
clear from the records that her authority as pairing judge of Branch 86
started only on 01 June 2006 when Judge Bay's leave of absence
commenced. Judge Bay was still sitting as the regular judge of Branch
86 as evidenced by the issuance of his order on 31 May
2006. Respondent's explanation that Judge Bay was no longer in the
premises in the afternoon of 31 May 2006, so that she could act on the
subject ex-parte motion is clearly unacceptable. . . . AaCEDS
Under Section 8 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10, the penalty of gross ignorance of the
procedure and gross misconduct is dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which she may
be entitled and with disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporation. . .
xxx xxx xxx 24 (Italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As reflected above, respondent having been earlier dismissed from the
service, the OCA recommended that "respondent should be fined in the sum of
P40,000.00 pesos, the maximum penalty of fine under Section 11 (3) under Rule
140, as amended". cdrep
By Resolution of June 30, 2008, 25 this Court re-docketed the complaint
as a regular administrative matter.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA well-taken.
 As found by the Court of Appeals, respondent gravely abused her discretion
when she acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply
with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration
(Of the Order dated May 31, 2006). 26 That Judge Bay may have left the court
premises in the afternoon of May 31, 2006 did not justify her acting on even
date on motion of complainant's wife, as her authority as pairing judge
commenced only the following day, June 1, 2006, when Judge Bay's leave of
absence started; Nor did respondent's opinion on the urgency of the case justify
her sacrificing law and settled jurisprudence for the sake of expediency. 27
Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was
guilty of indirect contempt and not direct contempt. 28 Indirect or constructive
contempt is committed "outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a
judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending
directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice." 29
For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not
be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. 30 In Lim v. Domagas 31 where the therein judge declared the therein
complainant guilty of contempt and ordered his arrest for failure to bring three
minors before the court without the benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the
therein judge not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross ignorance
of the law.
Because, again as reflected above, respondent was,
in Edaño v. Asdala, dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all salaries,
benefits and leave credits to which she may be entitled, 32 she should, as
recommended by the OCA, be fined in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos, the
highest amount of fine imposable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, a
serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. 33 cCAIaD
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross ignorance of law
and procedure. She having been earlier dismissed from the service, she is FINED
the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos to be deducted from the Eighty
Thousand (P80,000) Pesos which this Court withheld pursuant to its January 15,
2008 Resolution in Edaño v. Asdala.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tabujara III v. Gonzales-Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126, [January 20, 2009],
596 PHIL 431-444)