Borromeo vs.
Sun Pertinent records reveal that the subject Deed of Assignment is embodied in
Borromeo vs Sun
G.R. No. 75908. October 22, 1999
PURISIMA, J future time. This is similar to Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
At bar is a Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolution of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, which reversed its earlier Decision setting aside the
Decision of the former Court of the First Instance of Rizal.
Facts:
Amancio Sun brought before the then Court of the First Instance of Rizal an
action against Lourdes O. Borromeo (in her capacity as corporate secretary),
Federico O. Borromeo and Federico O. Borromeo (F.O.B.), Inc., to compel
the transfer to his name in the books of F.O.B., Inc., shares of stock
registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo, as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment. Private respondent averred that all the shares of stock of F.O.B.
Inc. registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo belong to him, as the
said shares were placed in the name of Federico O. Borromeo 'only to give
the latter personality and importance in the business world.' On the other
hand, petitioner Federico O. Borromeo disclaimed any participation in the
execution of the Deed of Assignment, theorizing that his supposed signature
thereon was forged. LL
The lower court of origin came out with a decision declaring the questioned
signature on subject Deed of Assignment as the genuine signature of
Federico O. Borromeo. After considering the testimonies of the two expert
witnesses for the parties and after a careful and judicious study and analysis
of the questioned signature as compared to the standard signatures. On
appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals adjudged as forgery the
controverted signature of Federico O. Borromeo. Amancio Sun interposed a
motion for reconsideration of the said decision, contending that Segundo
Tabayoyong, petitioners' expert witness, is not a credible witness. Acting on
the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reconsidered
its decision.
Issue: WON the signature of Frederico O. Borromeo in the Deed of
Assignments is a genuine signature.
Held:
blank form for the assignment of shares with authority to transfer such shares
in the books of the corporation. It was clearly intended to be signed in blank
to facilitate the assignment of shares from one person to another at any
where the blanks may be filled up by the holder, the signing in blank being
with the assumed authority to do so. Indeed, as the shares were registered in
the name of Federico O. Borromeo just to give him personality and standing
in the business community, private respondent had to have a counter
evidence of ownership of the shares involved. Thus, the execution of the
deed of assignment in blank, to be filled up whenever needed. The same
explains the discrepancy between the date of the deed of assignment and
the date when the signature was affixed thereto.
While it is true that the 1974 standard signature of Federico O. Borromeo is
to the naked eye dissimilar to his questioned signature circa 1954-1957,
which could have been caused by sheer lapse of time, Col. Jose Fernandez,
respondent's expert witness, found the said signatures similar to each other
after subjecting the same to stereomicroscopic examination and analysis
because the intrinsic and natural characteristic of Federico O. Borromeo's
handwriting were present in all the exemplar signatures used by both
Segundo Tabayoyong and Col. Jose Fernandez.
Abubakar vs Auditor General
FACTS:
A treasury warrant was issued in favor of Placido Urbanes in his capacity as
disbursing officer of the Food Administration. He later indorsed it to
petitioner, Benjamin Abubakar, a private citizen. The Auditor General refused
to authorize the payment of said treasury warrant
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the subject treasury warrant is a negotiable instrument
HELD:
NO. This treasury warrant is not within the scope of the negotiable instrument
law. The document bearing on its face the words “payable from the
appropriation for food administration,” is actually an order for payment out of
“a particular fund,” and is not unconditional and does not fulfill one of the
essential requirements of a negotiable instrument.
PERTINENT PROVISION(S)
NIL, Section 3, last sentence: But an order or promise to pay out of a
particular fund is not unconditional.
G.R. No. L-39815 April 28, 1934
EULALIO BELISARIO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PAZ NATIVIDAD VIUDA DE ZULUETA, defendant-appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
FACTS
It appears from Exhibit A that the plaintiff sold the lands (Nos. 3357 and
3358) to the defendant fo P37,000, which was duly paid, and the agreement
on the part of the grantee to assume an indebtedness secured by a lien for 4,
500, which was likewise duly paid. The deed bears the date of April 29, 1927.
On the same date the defendant executed and delivered in favor of the
plaintiff an option to repurchase the lands on or before the end of May, 1931,
for the sum of P37,000.
On the 28th of May, 1931, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a check in
the sum of P37,000, drawn by Rosendo Santiago against his account in the
Peoples Bank and Trust Company.
ISSUE
Whether or not the checks made would produce the effect of payment.
HELD
At the time said check was tendered to the defendant the drawer thereof had
on deposit in the said bank subject to check the sum of P5.85. Even if the
check had been good, the defendant was not legally bound to accept it
because such a check does not satisfy the requirements of a legal tender.
Finding no merit in this appeal, the judgment of the court below is affirmed
with costs against the appellant.
Digest: New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc vs. Seneris [No. L-41764.
December19, 1980.]
FACTS: Herein petitioner was the defendant in a complaint for collection of a
sum of money filed by the private respondent. On July 19, 1974, a
compromise judgment was rendered by the respondent Judge in accordance
with an amicable settlement entered into by the parties. For failure of the
petitioner to comply with his judgment obligation, the respondent Judge,
issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, writ of
execution was issued for the amount of P63,130.00 pursuant to which, the
Ex Officio Sheriff levied upon the following personal properties of the
petitioner and set the auction sale thereof on January 15, 1975. Prior to
January 15, 1975, petitioner deposited with the Clerk of CFI the sum of
P63,130.00 for the payment of the judgment obligation, consisting of the
following. (1) P50,000.00 in Cashier's Checks No. S314361 dated January 3,
1975 of the Equitable Banking Corporation; and (2) P13,130.00 in cash. The
private respondent refused to accept the check as well as the cash deposit.
The respondent judge upheld private respondent's claim that he has the right
to refuse payment by means of a check, the respondent Judge citing Section
63 of the Central Bank Act, and Article 1249 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent can validly refuse acceptance
of the payment of the judgment obligation made by the petitioner consisting
of P50,000.00 in Cashier's Check and P13,130.00 in cash which it deposited
with the Ex-Officio Sheriff before the date of the scheduled auction sale. /
Can the check be considered a valid payment of the judgment obligation?
HELD: It is to be emphasized in this connection that the check deposited by
the petitioner in the amount of P50.000.00 is not an ordinary check but a
Cashier's Check of the Equitable Banking Corporation, a bank of good
standing and reputation. Where a check is certified by the bank on which it is
drawn, the certification is equivalent to acceptance. The object of certifying a
check, as regards both parties, is to enable the holder to use it as money.
When the holder procures the check to be certified, "the check operates as
an assignment of a part of the funds to the creditors". The exception to the
rule enunciated under Section 63 of the Central Bank Act to the effect "that a
check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor
shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor in cash in an amount equal to
the amount credited to his account" shall apply in this case. Petition was
granted ordering the private respondent to accept the sum of P63,130.00
under deposit as payment of the judgment obligation in his favor.
“Considering that the whole amount deposited by the petitioner consisting of
Cashier's Check of P60;000.00 and P13,130.00 in cash covers the judgment
obligation of P63,000.00 as mentioned in the writ of execution, then. We see
no valid reason for the private respondent to have refused acceptance of the
payment of the obligation in his favor”.