Rule 75 PRODUCTION OF WILL: ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY

Probate Mandatory

GR 12184, Sept. 27, 1917

US v Chiu Guimco

Facts: Joaquin Cruz died in China during one of his visits there, leaving an estate worth P40,000-
P50,000. He also left a wife (Uy Cuan) and a child in China, and another wife (Maria Villafranca)
in the Philippines.

Before his departure to China, he was able to execute a will before a notary public, in which he
named his brother Chiu Guimco and a certain Co-Iden as executors. Co-Iden eventually died with
nothing done to institute probate of the will. Meanwhile, Chiu Guimco managed Joaquin’s
business and properties.

In exchange for certain properties, Maria agreed to relinquish any interest in the estate of Joaquin.
Later, however, Uy Cuan arrived in the Philippines to effect the settlement of her husband’s estate.
Through a friend (Ramon Contreras) who inquired about the affairs of the estate, Uy Cuan sent
Chiu Guimco a letter urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful
proceedings in accord therewith. He replied through a letter denying having seen or taken
possession of the will.

A complaint was filed in court charging Chiu Guimco, under Section 628 of the Code of Civil
Procedure with failure to produce the will within the time required by law. The CFI found him
guilty. Because he failed to produce the will even after the court’s order, he was fined and
committed to prison until he produces the will.

Issue: Whether it was right to commit Chiu to jail until he produces the will

Held: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that if a person having custody of
a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the
court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of
the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers
the will. This provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction
over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where administration proceedings
are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that there
be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court
under this section appropriate.

Further, Section 628 is an ordinary criminal prosecution. To enforce the production of the will by
the accused, as provided in Section 629, would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the
mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged in
the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that this would constitute an infringement of that
provision of law which says that in a criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying
against himself.

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Guevarra vs. Guevarra
January 31, 1956 G.R. No. L-5405

FACTS
Petitioner Ernesto Guevarra and respondent Rosario Guevarra were the children of Victorino
Guevarra. Prior to his death, Victorino executed a will distributing, among others, a 259-hectare
land between Ernesto and Rosario. However, he later executed a Deed of Sale covering the
southern portion of the land in favor of Ernesto. The Deed also expressly recognized Ernesto as
the owner of the northern half. Victorino and Ernesto then sought to register the entire parcel.
Fifteen prior days to issuance of the Certificate of Title, Victorino died. In this Certificate, Ernesto
Rosario is the sole owner.

Initially, Rosario brought suit against Ernesto for the recovery of half of the property as her
legitime, under the assumption that Victorino died intestate. This case however was dismissed by
the Supreme Court and ordered the parties to present Victorino’s will for probate in the proper
court. Hence, this case.

Rosario commenced in the CFI of Pangasinan a petition for probate of the will of Victorino. This
was opposed by Ernesto. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition, arguing, among others, that
the will was already revoked as alleged in the petition itself and that whatever right to probate the
parties may have has already prescribed. This is considering that the petition for probate was filed
12 years after the death of Victorino.

ISSUE
Whether probate of the will is still necessary and whether petition for probate is already barred by
the statute of limitations.

HELD
The probate of the will is necessary and the petition is not barred.

It has been held that “under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will
and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they
must first present the will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will.
They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.
Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression is contrary to law and public policy.” First, because the law expressly provides that
“no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court
and second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem cannot be dispensed with
and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public
policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance
with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided
by law.

Consequently, the statute of limitations is not applicable to probate of wills. This is because of the
danger that the decedent’s right of testamentary disposition be conveniently subverted by mere
inaction of the custodian of the will.

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Palacios vs. Palacios
December 24, 1959 G.R. No. L-12207

FACTS
Juan Palacios executed a last will and testament, instituting as sole heirs his natural children
Antonio and Andrea. Juan, availing of the provisions of the New Civil Code which permits the
testator to petition during his lifetime the allowance of his own will, filed before the CFI of
Batangas a petition for the approval of his will. Maria Catimbang Palacios, respondent herein, filed
an opposition to the probate, alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of Juan but
that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitime.

The lower court admitted the will to probate. Later, it set a hearing relative to the intrinsic validity
of the will. After hearing, the court issued an order declaring Maria to be the natural child of Juan
and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her legitime. Hence, this appeal by Juan.

ISSUE
Whether Juan’s will was properly annulled by the lower court.

HELD
No, the will was improperly annulled.

An opposition as to the intrinsic validity of a will cannot be entertained in probate proceedings

because the latter’s purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance
with the requirements of the law. Also, an opposition with a purpose to show that the oppositor is
an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will cannot be raised in
probate proceedings but in a separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in this case,
is still alive.

As held in Montano vs. Suesa, “the authentication of the will decides no other questions than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities
which the law prescribes foe the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned a being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication.”

Fernandez vs. Dimagiba

October 12, 1967 G.R. No. L-23638

FACTS
The deceased is Benedicta de los Reyes. Ismaela Dimagiba, respondent herein, submitted to the
CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of Benedicta. Said will instituted Dimagiba as
the sole heir of Benedicta. Petitioners herein, claiming to be heirs intestate of Benedicta, filed
oppositions for the probate, on the grounds, among others, of estoppel by laches and revocation of
the will by two Deeds of Conveyance of the major portion of the estate in favor of Benedicta to
Dimagiba.

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The trial court found that the will was genuine and properly executed. This decision was not
appealed. Later, the same trial court found that the will is unaffected and unrevoked by the Deeds
of Sale. Petitioners appealed. The CA held that the decree admitting the will for probate became
final for lack of appeal, and that there was no revocation of the will.

Petitioners now contend, among others, that the order allowing the will to probate should be
considered as interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation.

ISSUE
Whether an order allowing a will is interlocutory.

HELD
No, it is not.

“It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning the
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.” (Montano vs. Suesa)
As such, the probate order is final and appealable.

Since petitioners failed to appeal the decree allowing Benedicta’s will, then said decree became
final and executory.

Spouses Pascual vs. CA

August 15, 2003 G.R. No. 115925

FACTS
Canuto were Catalina were siblings. They were co-owners of a parcel of land together with 12
other people. They each claim 1,335 square meters of said parcel. Canuto had the parcel surveyed
and subdivided. Lot 2-A (670sqm) and 2-E (2,000sqm) were placed under Canuto’s name.

Canuto later executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering his pro indiviso share of the
parcel in favor of his niece Consolasion Sioson, petitioner herein. Consolasion immediately took
possession of Lots 2-A and 2-E. When Canuto died, his children executed an affidavit affirming
the earlier Kasulatan. This affidavit became the basis for the issuance of a TCT in the name of
Consolasion.

Nineteen years later, Remedios Eugenio-Gino, filed a complaint against Consolacion and her
spouse for annulment and cancellation of the TCT. Remedios claims that she is the owner of the
excess of 1,335sqm of Lots 2-A and 2-E because Catalina (Canuto’s sister and co-owner) devised
these lots to her in Catalina’s last will and testament.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It found that Remedios has no right against petitioners
because Catalina’s will from which Remedios claims to derive her title has not been admitted to
probate. The appellate court reversed this decision, saying that the unprobated will does not

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preclude Remedios from seeking reconveyance as the will may subsequently be admitted to
probate.

ISSUE
Whether the probate of Catalina’s will is required before Remedios can file her action.

HELD
Yes, the probate of the will is necessary.

Article 838 of the Civil Code states that “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court”.

Remedios anchors her right in the in filing this suit on her being a devisee of Catalina’s las will
and testament. However, since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s will, Remedios has
not acquired any right under the last will. Remedios is thus without any cause of action either to
seek reconveyance or to enforce and implied trust over these lots. The Rules require that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who is the party
who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit.

Probate Proceedings in Rem

In re Johnson (G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918)

FACTS: Ebba Johnson (child from 1st wife) alleges that at the time of the publication, the probate
court has knowledge that she was living in the US. She argues that the court should have appointed
a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in the future to permit the her to be present either
in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court to postpone the probate of
the will constitutes an infringement of that provision which declared that property shall not be
taken without due process of law.

ISSUE: W/N the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction

HELD: YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.

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The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things
the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be
given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an
exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property
without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon
the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short.

There was no denial of due process.

Ebba could have applied, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing
that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over which
she had no control and that the order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered
upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth, the court would have
been authorized to set the probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that 6 months was
a very short period of time within which to expect Ebba to appear and be prepared to contest the
probate with the proof which she might have desired to collect from remote countries.
Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently
short, the remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance
that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and excepted to the order
admitting the will to probate.

Manahan v Manahan (GR No. 38050, September 22, 1933)

FACTS: 1 year and 7 months after the will was admitted to probate, Engracia file a motion for
reconsideration and a new trial praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and
the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio, on the ground, among others, that she was
an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have
been notified of the probate of the will.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Engracia should be notified of the probate of the will

HELD: NO. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the
right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to
the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the
deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died

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leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced
heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

2. Whether Engracia can still question the validity of the will on the ground that the
external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied
with in the execution thereof

HELD: NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the
validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect
to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings.
In addition, as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the
provisions of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a
will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation
of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration
shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .

Note: Once the court admit the will to probate, it should be accepted and respected by all. The
probate of the will constitutes res judicata as to the questions of validity and sufficiency of the
execution of the will in question.

Alaban v CA (GR No. 156021, September 23, 2005)

FACTS: On May 30, 2001, the lower court allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and
directed the issuance of letters testamentary to Francisco. More than 4 months later, Alaban, et al.
filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the
allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent,
claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
Alaban claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of
the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. The RTC denied
the motion. Alaban filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA.
They claimed that Francisco already entered into a compromise agreement with them after the
death of the decedent and that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a

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result of which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the
probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled
and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
ISSUE: W/N Alaban, et al. became a party to the probate proceedings
HELD: YES.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province,
as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested
in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned
in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the
publication of the notice of hearing.
NOTES:
1. As parties to the probate proceedings, Alaban, et al. could have validly availed of the remedies of motion
for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. For failure to make use without
sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a
petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
2. Alaban, et al., as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are
entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation
to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
3. Assuming arguendo that Alaban, et al. are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by
the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
4. The non-inclusion of Alaban, et al.’s names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court,
as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the
probate court.

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RULE 76 ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL

JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROBATE OF WILL

Santos v Castillo (GR No. L-45463, March 18, 1937)

FACTS: Emerita Santos, as a guardian of the minor acknowledged natural children of the deceased
Nicolas filed a petition for the probate of the will. 2 days after, Emerita filed a motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and commissioners on appraisal. The legitimate children
(LCs) (Azores, et al.) of the deceased, filed an opposition on the ground that the Court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the case; the allegations made in the petition are insufficient to confer
jurisdiction because the petitioner did not allege that she had the custody of the will and, therefore,
was not entitled to present it for probate; and because the will that should be probated is the original
and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the Emerita. Before the court decided the issue as
to lack of jurisdiction, Emerita filed an amended petition (it stated that the testator designated
nobody as custodian of his will in distributing the copies thereof and in entrusting his nephew with
the presentation of a copy of said will to the court for probate) and prayed that the LCs present
immediately the copies of the will in their possession as well as any alleged codicil claimed by
them. The LCs were able to present the original will and the codicil. The LCs prayed that Emerita’s
original petition be dismissed on the ground that as the originals of the will and codicil of the
deceased Azores had been presented together with a petition for the probate thereof, the petitioner's
defective petition was unfounded. Emerita’s petition for probate was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction over the petition for probate.
HELD: NO.
In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the
administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition
to the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant
is the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated. The original
of said document must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the non-representation of
said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites had
not been complied within the application filed by the petitioner, the respondent judge did not
exceed his jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.

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Perez v. Perez, et al.
G.R. No. L-12359 15 July 1959
Facts:
Bernandino Perez filed with the CFI of Iloilo a petition for the summary settlement of the testate
estate of Caridad Perez. Conrada Perez, et al. lodged an opposition to the probate of Caridad
Perez’s will directly to the Supreme Court insisting that the lower court did not "acquire
jurisdiction to receive the evidence for the allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs,
Melanio Perez, Jr. and Milagros Perez, had not been notified in advance of the hearing for the
allowance of such will.
In reply to this, the Bernandino says that the persons mentioned were not entitled to notice, since
they were not forced heirs — grandnephew and niece — and had not been mentioned as legatees
or devisees in the will of the deceased. And as to Milagros Perez, Bernandino asserts that notice
had been addressed to her last known residence in this country.
Issues:
Whether the CFI of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes, the CFI of Iloilo acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings.
Such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation. At any rate the omission, if any, did not affect
the jurisdiction of the court: it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis
of reversal. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons
interested in the estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers — which in this
case admittedly took place.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural convenience,
not jurisdiction requisite, so much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been
omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not advised — the decree
allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction.
The result is that the matter of "jurisdiction" discussed by Conrada, et. al. appears to be so
unsubstantial as to furnish no reason to bypass the Court of Appeals authority to appraise the
factual issues in the litigation.
Needless, to add, in fine, the jurisdictional question directly appealable to the Court refers to
jurisdiction over the subject matter, not mere jurisdiction over the person.

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De Aranz v. Galing
G.R. No. L-77047 28 May 1988
Facts:
Joaqin Infante filed a petition at the RTC of Pasig for the probate of the will of Monseratt Infante
y Pola. His petition named Joaquina R. Infante de Aranz, et al. as legatees and devisees as well as
specifying their addresses. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order for the requisite hearing
and the the order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week
for 3 consecutive weeks. Come hearing date, no oppositor appeared and so the judge reset the
hearing date. No oppositor made manifestation on the later date, compelling the judge to request
for the submission of evidence ex-parte. Joaquin immediately presented evidence that same day.
He called a lone witness to the stand. Two days passed and Joaquina, et al. made an appearance
contesting the probate on the ground that no notice was ever sent to them. They requested ten days
to file an opposition. Joaquina, et al. asserts that failure to notify the legatees/devisees deprives the
court of jurisdiction. Joaquin opposed the opposition and the same was granted by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceeding despite the failure of
personal notice to the legatees/devisees.
Ruling:
No, the Pasig RTC was deprived jurisdiction over the probate proceeding due to the failure of
personal notice to the legatees/devisees.
The pertinent rule follows: Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. –The
court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will
to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with
the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person
named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor
not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the
notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from Sec 4 Rule 76 ROC that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance
of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing
in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no
question that the residences of Joaquina, et al. as legatees and devisees were known to the probate
court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. Despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the

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will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three 3 weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the province.
If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of Joaquina, et al. was not known,
then notice upon them individually was not necessary. Individual notice upon heirs, legatees and
devisees is necessary only when they are known or when their places of residence are known. In
other instances, such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction
simply upon the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
The CA’s ruling that notification was merely a matter of convenience sits in stark disregard of the
law which makes notice mandatory. Probate is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings, personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The
will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills.

Basa v. Mercado
G.R. No. L-42226 26 July 1935
Facts:
Judge Hermogenes Reyes, Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines
Basa. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him
as the only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to
reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to
comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that
the hearing took place only 21 days after the date of first publication instead of 3 full weeks.
Moreover, they questioned whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published,
was a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by the law.
Issues:
Whether there was compliance with the publication requirement
Whether Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
Yes, there was compliance with the publication requirement. The language used in Section 630 of
the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published
for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first
publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.
Yes, the records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation. The conclusion is
made in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at

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regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan
precisely because it was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

SCOPE OF INQUIRY OF PROBATE PROCEEDING

Maninang v. Court of Appeals

G.R.No. L-57848 19 June 1982
Facts:
Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic
will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. The will also provide that
she does not consider Bernardo Aseneta as his adopted son. Later on, Bernardo, claiming to be
the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-
Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss
the testate case on the ground that the will was null and void because he, being the only compulsory
heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the
court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of
the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The motion was granted.
The motion for reconsideration by Soledad was denied for lack of merit. In the same order, the
court appointed Bernardo as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be
unfit to perform the trust.
Soledad filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied. Hence,
this petition was filed.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the CFI-Rizal of the testate case was proper
Ruling:
No, the dismissal was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public
policy. Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the
extrinsic validity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.
However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passed
upon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void.
The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Such
would shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.

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In the instant case, there is still doubt as to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of Benrnardo
which cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which can
only be made if the will is allowed to be probated.

ACAIN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Facts:
Petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the RTC of Cebu City a petition for the probate of
the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be
given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall
be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. The oppositors Virginia
(respondent), a legally adopted daughter of the Nemesio and his widow Rosa filed a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been preterited.
Issue:
Whether the probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted
to probate?
Ruling:
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage
of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions
of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the Court ruled that, if the case were to be remanded
for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted.
And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before the court on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-
on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and
sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private
respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate

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outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly
availed of by private respondents.

PROOF REQUIRED ON PROBATE HEARING

GAN vs. YAP

Facts:

Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas
Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. Fausto E. Gan initiated
them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband
Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during
her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and
Rosario Gan Jimenez.

Issue:

Whether a holographic will can be probated upon the mere testimony of the witnesses who
allegedly seen it even without the production of such will?

Ruling:

No. he execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic
will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing
witnesses are available to authenticate. In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish
and probate a lost holographic will, the court think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is
so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and
distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.

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RODELAS vs. ARANZA
Facts:

Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
Aranza, Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla opposed
the petition on the following grounds:

1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court; 2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after
death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will, it was merely
an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the
decedent; 3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved
by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. 4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law. The CFI dismissed the petition for the probate
of the will stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held
that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document
itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.”And that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more
than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact
that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had discarded the
alleged holographic will before his death.

Issue:

Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of
a photostatic copy.

Ruling:

Yes. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the
will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will
may be allowed because comparison can be made by the probate court with the standard writings
of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting
of the testator.

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RULE 77 ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER

LEON & GHEZZI vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO

Facts:
Basil Gordon Butler died leaving a will which was duly probated in New York. Pursuant
to a provision in his will giving discretion to his executors to purchase an annuity in favor of his
universal heir Mercedes de Leon, the appointed trustee James Madison Ross bought an annuity
from respondent insurance company, Manufactures Life Insurance. After a few months of
receiving monthly allowance however, Mercedes presented the will for probate in the CFI of
Manila.

Issue: Whether Mercedes has disposition of the funds covered by the contract of annuity.

Ruling:

No. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets
of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator
appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country. The
general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the assets of a decedent
found within the state or country where it was granted, so that an administrator appointed in one
state or country has no power over property in another state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a
contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance
the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its
possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made
out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been
transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY vs. In re: Intestate Estate of the
deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

Facts:

Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy, Fookien province, China, nine children by the first marriage, and a child by the second
marriage with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and Federico C. Suntay, one of his children by
the first marriage, was appointed administrator of the estate. Subsequently, however, the surviving

17
widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and
testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines by the late Jose B. Suntay.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before
the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will.

After the Pacific War, Silvino Suntay, the decedent’s child by the second marriage, claimed that
he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in
Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was
filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China. He then filed
a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines
in November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931.

Issue:

May the will allegedly executed by the deceased in China be allowed in the Philippines?

Ruling:

No. Under the Rules, the fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court
and the law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters,
it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese
courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and
for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested
parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines.
The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines.

Furthermore, the order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate
or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged
probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently,
the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court
of this country.

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VDA. DE PEREZ vs. TOLETE, G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

Facts:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens,
established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan
executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and
personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated” and in the event he would survive
his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the
will of her husband.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire
that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of
the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the
County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.

On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner
herein, filed with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary
to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple. The RTC issued an order, directing the issuance
of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner. After submission of evidence, the judge
to which the reprobate case was reassigned held that "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad
were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken
by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with
his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge
said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of
wills. The petitioner then filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign
law, which was granted by the judge. However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the
additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its
ruling" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the
testator". Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that
the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.

Issues:

1. Did the petitioner conform with the formalities required for the reprobate or allowance of
wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines?
2. Should the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses be probated jointly?

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Ruling:

1. No. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only
be effective in this country upon compliance with Art. 816 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which states both wills should conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws. Under the Philippine Rules, the evidence necessary for
the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines
are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a
probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
The petitioner submitted all the needed evidence, except for the first and last requirements.
The Supreme Court ordered the Respondent Judge to allow petitioner reasonable time
within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

2. Yes. What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the case at bench, the Cunanan
spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions
and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical
considerations dictate their joint probate.

ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON, G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006

Facts:

Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle. On July 29,
1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was
admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named
James N. Phillips as executor and also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator. In 1981, Richard
married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children. On October
12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal.
As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal
of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located
in Makati (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices,

20
as ancillary administrator. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey.Petitioner also filed a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being
apportioned the ¾ of all of Audrey’s properties, and Kyle, the remaining ¼ thereof. The motion
and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court.

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator of Richard’s estate also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent,
while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on
the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate
to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire
¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. Respondent is now
claiming that petitioner breached his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate.

Issue:

Did Atty. Ancheta breach his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s estate?

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an

official of the court.

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate,
was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine
law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally
disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission
of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of
the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest
upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances.

21