K

The strategy of territorialization that is employed today allows for immense biopower
and genocide.
Houtum & Naerssen 01 ( Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen. Henk is a Research Professor Geopolitics of Borders at the University of Bergamo. Ton is a Senior
Research Fellow at Radboud University Nijmegen. "Bordering, Ordering And Othering". Published October 2001 by the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research . http://henkvanhoutum.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/TESG2002.pdf )

Bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent fixed point in space of time, rather they
symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation. Semantically, the word 'borders' unjustly assumes that places are fixed
in space and time, and should rather be understood in terms of bordering, as an ongoing strategic effort to make a difference in space among
the movements of people, money or products. In
democratic societies borders are not 'made from above', rather they
represent an implicit, often taken-for-granted, agreement among the majority of people. Put differently, territorial
borders continuously fixate and regulate mobility of flows and thereby construct or reproduce places in space. Territorial
strategies of ordering, bordering and othering often take place, although certainly not necessarily, at the spatial scale
of states. For example, Sanjay Chaturvedi's paper in this issue, exemplifies the discourses and strategies practiced between India and Pakistan,
where practices of inclusion and exclusion are framed by nation-building projects of the two countries, discursively uttered through differences
in religion. He demonstrates how on both sides of the border national education programmes reproduce and reinforce otherness. Spaan et al.
(this issue) focus on the borders between Malaysia and Indonesia. Recently, although not comparable in intensity to the case of India and
Pakistan, tensions have increased in association with the redefining of Malay identity and massive immigration of Indonesians to Malaysia.
Knippenberg (this issue) shows that practices of othering and cultural fragmentation are not merely practices or
interstate affairs, but also take place within states. He argues that a state territory hardly ever covers a homogeneous
population, yet it claims to represent and imagine one. In this claiming and producing of a unity out of subcultures and
different populations, some groups are ( voluntarily) assimilated while others are or remain
marginalized as semi-aliens. Such bordering processes sometimes go as far as political practices or
elimination, of the cleansing of the other that lives inside an imagined community. The making of a place
must hence be understood as an act of purification, as it is arbitrarily searching for a justifiable, bounded cohesion of people and their activities
in space which can be compared and contrasted to other spatial entities. It can be seen as a spatial strategy (de Certeau 1980). According to de
Certeau a strategy presupposes a place that can be circumscribed as one's own (unpropre), and that can serve as the base from which to direct
relations with an exteriority consisting of targets or threats such a clients, competitors, enemies and strangers. What
territorial human
strategy does is classify space, communicate a sense of place and enforce control over a place (Sack
1986). In doing so, territorial strategy reifies power, displaces others, and depersonalizes , neutralizes, fills
and contains space (Sack 1986).

DnG conclude Neg; The war machine fights not for territorialization, rather
deterritorialization
DnG ’87 (Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, smart dudes, 1987, A Thousand Plateus, pg
381)
nomads have no points, paths, or land, even though they do by all appearences. If the
It is in this sense that

nomad can be called the Deterritiorialized par excellence , it is precisely because there is no
reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant , or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary’s
relation with the earth is mediatized by something else, a property regime, the state apparatus). With the nomad, on the
contrary, it is a deteritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a
degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself . It is the earth that
deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad a territory. The land ceases to be land, tending to become

simply ground (sol) or support.

Territorialization justifies elimination of the other; Fear becomes the standard
England 06 ( Marcia Rae England, grad candidate in the University of Kentucky for Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences. "CITIZENS ON
PATROL: COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE TERRITORIALIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE IN SEATTLE, WASHINGTON". Published in 2006.
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1363&context=gradschool_diss )

This dissertation shows how organizations, including local government and police, and residents within
Seattle, Washington’s East Precinct define and police the contours of community, neighborhoods and
public space. Under the rubric of public safety, these players create territorial geographies that seek
to include only those who fit the narrowly conceived idea of a “neighbor.” Territoriality is exercised
against the social Other in an attempt to build a cohesive community while at the same time excluding
those who are seen as different or as non-conformant to acceptable behaviors in the neighborhood.
This research provides a framework through which to examine how community policing produces an
urban citizen subject and an idea of who belongs in public space. This work also combines discourses of
abjection and public space showing how the two are linked together to form a contingent citizenship.
“Contingent citizenship” describes a particular relationship between geography and citizenship. As I
frame it, contingent citizenship is a public citizenship where one must conform to a social norm and act
in a prescribed, appropriate way in the public sphere or fear repercussions such as incarceration, public
humiliation or barring from public parks.

The quest to obliterate all that differs and replace it with the image of the same leads
uncontestably to the destruction of everything.
Baudrillard ’96 (Jean, Professor of Philosophy of Culture and Media Criticism at the European
Graduate School, 1996, The Perfect Crime, p. 112-14)
In German, there are two apparently synonymous terms with a very significant dis -
tinction between them. ‘Verfremdung’ means becoming other, becoming estranged from
oneself— alienation in the literal sense. ‘Entfremdung’, by contrast, means to be dispossessed
of the other, to lose all otherness. Now, it is much more serious to be dispossessed of the
other than of oneself. Being deprived of the other is worse than alienation: a lethal change, by
liquidation of the dialectical opposition itself. An irrevocable destabilization, that of the subject
without object, of the same without other — definitive stasis and metastasis of the Same. A tragic
destiny for individuals and for our — self-programming and self-referential — systems: no
more adversaries, no more hostile environments — no environment at all any longer, no
more exteriority. This is like wresting a species away from its natural predators . No longer
threatened by them, it cannot but destroy itself (by ‘depredation’, as it were). Death being the
great natural predator, a species we attempt at all costs to immortalize and wrest away from death —
as we do with all our replacement technologies for the body’s organs — is doomed to disappear. The
best strategy for bringing about someone’s ruin is to eliminate everything which
threatens him, thus causing him to lose all his defence s, and it is this strategy we are applying
to ourselves. By eliminating the other in all its forms (illness, death, negativity, violence,
strangeness), not to mention racial and linguistic differences, by eliminating all singularities in
order to radiate total positivity, we are eliminating ourselves. We have fought negativity
and death, rooting out evil in all its forms. By eliminating the work of the negative, we have
unleashed positivity, and that is what has become lethal today. By setting off the chain reaction of the
positive, we have at the same time — by a perverse, but perfectly coherent effect — released an intense
viral pathology. For a virus, far from being negative, is the product, rather, of an ultrapositivity of
which it is the lethal embodiment. This had escaped us, as had the metamorphoses of evil which follow
the advances of reason about like a shadow. This paradigm of the subject without object, of the
subject without other, can be seen in all that has lost its shadow and become
transparent to itself. Even in devitalized substances: in sugar without calories, salt without sodium,
life without spice, effects without causes, wars without enemy, passions without object, time without
memory, masters without slaves, or the slaves without masters we have become. What becomes of a
master without a slave? He ends up terrorizing himself. And of a slave without a
master? He ends up exploiting himself. The two are conjoined today in the modern form
of voluntary servitude: enslavement to data systems and calculation systems – total
efficiency, total performance. We have become masters – at least virtual masters – of this world, but
the object of that mastery, the finality of that mastery, have disappeared.

Normalization leads to the eradication of Otherness, the ethnic cleansing by means of

communication
Baudrillard ‘96 (Jean Baudrillard, French philosopher, The Perfect Crime, First Printed by Verso 1996, pages 109-110, Print)
With the Virtual, we enter not only upon the era of the liquidation of the Real and the Referential, but
that of the extermination of the Other. It is the equivalent of an ethnic cleansing which would not just
affect particular populations but unrelentingly pursue all forms of othernes s. The otherness of death- staved off
by unrelenting medical intervention. Of the face and the body- run to the earth by plastic surgery. Of the world- dispelled by Virtual Reality. Of
every one [chacun]- which will one day be abolished by the cloning of individual cells. And quite simply, of the other, currently undergoing
dilution in perpetual communication. If
information is the site of the perfect crime against reality,
communication is the site of the perfect crime against otherness. No more other: communication . No
more enemy: negotiation. No more predators: conviviality. No more negativity: absolute positivity. No more death: the immortality of
the clone. No more otherness: identity and difference. No more seduction: sexual in-difference. No
more illusion:
hyperreality, Virtual Reality. No more secret: transparency. No more destiny. The perfect crime.

Engaging Otherness is the precondition to ethical politics and should be first priority
Jones 9 
(Rachel, University of Dundee, “On the Value of Not Knowing: Wonder, Beginning Again and Letting Be,”
As presented at ‘On Not Knowing’, a Symposium hosted by Kettle’s Yard and New Hall College,
Cambridge, 29th June 2009, to accompany the exhibition ‘Material Intelligence’, Kettle’s Yard, 16 May –
12 July 2009)

Thus described, wonder is the passion that can accompany not knowing , providing we recognize that the object we encounter is not the same as what we already
do know. Wonder arises before we know enough to make any utilitarian calculation about whether an

object might be pleasing or useful to us (or not). For Descartes, as for Aristotle, it could therefore be said that philosophy begins in wonder, for this passionate
state of not knowing is what makes us think , ask questions, and seek to understand. Wonder is the ‘first of all the passions’ not only
because it is our initial response to something new and unknown, but because it implies that other passions will follow , as we find out more about what we have encountered. 3.

Although she critiques Descartes’ model of a self-founding subject, Luce Irigaray takes up his notion of wonder in a short essay where she writes (second quote): ‘ In order for it [wonder] to affect

us, it is necessary and sufficient for it to surprise, to be new, not yet assimilated or disassimilated as known . Still
awakening our passion, our appetite, our attraction to that which is not yet (en)coded, our curiosity (but perhaps in all senses: sight, smell, hearing? etc) vis-à-vis that which we have not yet encountered or made ours.’ 3 The

as-yet-unknown is here aligned with that which we have ‘not yet encoded’, not yet translated into the
conceptual and symbolic frameworks we use to make sense of the world; at the same time, the passage hints at
an entirely different way of coming to know someone or something, involving an attunement of the
senses to that which is other and irreducible to those frameworks. While we may still go on to grasp and appropriate the unfamiliar, Irigaray calls on
us to cultivate the sense of wonder that can inhabit all our encounters , 4 providing we remain attentive to the unique singularity of others, to the ways

in which, no matter how much we know about someone else, they remain irreducibly different from us. Wonder thus remains the first of all the passions , not simply

because it is the first we experience, but because it has an ethical priority . Cultivating wonder is a way of remaining open to

the otherness of the other without seeking to appropriate or assimilate them. For Irigaray, the difference to which wonder holds us
open is first and foremost the difference between the sexes; sexuate difference is for her the first difference in the same sense as wonder is the first passion. Wonder is thus essential to the possibility of an erotic encounter in

the wonder that arises from not knowing is , she says, ‘the passion
which each desires the other without seeking to own or appropriate. However, as well as love,

that inaugurates … art. And thought .’ 5 4. Art, thought, and not knowing are linked in a long and complex history, from which I have selected only one particular moment here, albeit a
particularly influential one. In Kant’s account of genius, he emphasises that genius works without knowing what it is doing, insofar as no rule could be formulated in advance for producing a truly original artwork. Rather, the rule

while the artist

must be abstracted after the fact, to the extent that works of genius come to serve as examples for others. In fact, Kant’s genius works in a delicate balance between knowing and not knowing, for

is unable to use concepts or rules to fully determine what will emerge from their creative activities, for
these to be productive of more than mere nonsense, they must nonetheless draw on other kinds of
knowledge. This includes the technical knowledge or skills required to work with their materials as well as knowledge of preceding aesthetic traditions – which true genius will always both break and reinvigorate. For
those of us not blessed with what Kant calls genius however, not knowing remains an essential component of what he describes as the most intense kind of aesthetic experience, that of the sublime. One trigger for the sublime is

Our faculties struggle to grasp such apparent

the encounter with something which seems infinite to us – an ever-receding mountain range or the vastness of the ocean.

infinities, for the moment we try to take them in and represent them in a single image, we place a limit
on them and thereby lose the suggestion of infinity which attracted us to them in the first place . In ways that recall
the poster for this symposium, we experience sublimity when we are all at sea (though the image also pokes gentle fun at the overly serious language of the sublime, as it shows someone all at sea in a pedal-boat). On Kant’s

even though we cannot represent infinity, our very failure to grasp it makes us all the more aware
account,

of our ability to think that which we cannot know , to have an idea of that which goes beyond anything we can take in via the senses. Thus he writes: ‘[N]othing that can be
an object of the senses is to be called sublime. [What happens is that] our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination], our power of estimating
the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal in us of the feeling that we have within us a supersensible power … Sublime is what even to be able to think proves
that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.’ 7 Note the movement that characterises Kant’s account of the sublime, which begins with a sense of awe at nature’s apparent infinities, but ends with a similar sense of
awe at our own rational faculties. On Kant’s model, the disruptive moment of not knowing is recuperated in ways that re-affirm the powers of the subject, and reinforce his ability to separate himself from and transcend the
material world of the senses. 5. Despite this, the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, writing nearly 200 years after Kant, recognises the potential in Kant’s account of the sublime for a more radical challenge to the knowing

subject. For Lyotard, as for Kant, the sublime occurs when we encounter something we cannot represent , but unlike for Kant, this does not have
to be the grand horizons of seemingly limitless oceans or mountain ranges. Rather, the infinite is contained within the most immediate and subtle of
sensations, insofar as any sensation is infinitely unique, irreplaceable by any other. Hence, any attempt to grasp a sensory event, to make it present
to ourselves by re-presenting it, will inevitably erase that which we were seeking to capture. Rather than recoup this
inability via our power to think the infinite, Lyotard places the emphasis more on the value of this temporary incapacitation. It is only when we are thus undone as knowing

subjects that we are able to remain open to the singularity of the material event , which Lyotard describes in terms of: ‘a singular,
incomparable quality – unforgettable and immediately forgotten – of the grain of a skin or a piece of wood, the fragrance of an aroma, the savour of a secretion or a piece of flesh, as well as a timbre or a nuance. All these

terms … designate the event of a passion, a passability for which the mind will not have been prepared,
which will have unsettled it’. ‘Nuance or timbre are the distress and despair of the exact division … From this aspect of matter, one must say that it must be immaterial. … The matter I’m talking
about is ‘immaterial’, anobjectable, because it can only ‘take place’ or find its occasion at the price of suspending [the] active powers of the mind.’ 8 Though Lyotard does not describe the sublime in terms of wonder here, perhaps

wonder is still present in the ‘passion’ and ‘passability’ that allow us to remain open to the material
event. Such events are immaterial to the knowing subject who can only betray their incomparable uniqueness by trying to grasp them via familiar forms and concepts. For Lyotard, as for Irigaray, the moment
of not knowing thus holds an ethical promise, that of being able to do justice to the singular by letting
go of the desire to know, and allowing ourselves to be unsettled into bearing witness to the
incomparable and irreplaceable. 6. Allowing oneself to be thus undone is, for Lyotard, the very condition of
thought , and hence, the condition of doing philosophy. Learning how to think means letting go of
everything one thought one knew, so as to think again with an open and questioning inventiveness; teaching someone how to think means learning how to unlearn, so as to enter with them
on the journey of a question. 9 Teacher and pupil both must be prepared to return to a state of unpreparedness and

unknowing that he calls infancy: ‘You cannot open up a question without leaving yourself open to it. You cannot scrutinize a ‘subject’ ... without being scrutinized by it. You cannot do any of
these things without renewing ties with the season of childhood, the season of the mind’s possibilities.’ 10 The inventiveness of infancy allows us to judge without

criteria, where there are no rules to follow and no one to tell us what to d o. Lyotard counsels us to nurture and renew the potency of infancy,
the ‘childhood of thought’ that remains with us in adulthood and that grants human beings a capacity to begin again, to find new ways of thinking and being. Such infancy, he argues, is at odds with

the contemporary emphasis on ‘performance’ which insists that our inventiveness must be quantifiably
productive and refuses to tolerate a questioning that does not know where it is going or whether
answers will be found. What Lyotard calls ‘the stifling busyness of performativity’ 11 cannot bear the idea of not making progress, nor find any value in the possibility of failure: from this perspective,
having to begin again is a sign of time wasted, rather than of a capacity for renewal. Yet without the risk of failure, of getting lost or ‘being adrift’, 12 there

is no real openness to the unknown, to the new thoughts that might emerge from the as yet unthought :
‘We write before knowing what to say and how to say it, and in order to find out, if possible. … We recommence, but we cannot rely on it getting to the thought itself, there, at the end. For the thought is here, muddled up in the

To foreclose this impertinent time of infancy is to foreclose the

unthought, trying to sort out the impertinent babble of childhood.’ 13

possibility of recommencing, of thinking again and beginning anew .

The impact is literally infinite violence in the name of social order. It causes unending
bloodshed and is the reason for all large scale conflict and any attempt to deescalate
the violence is contained, which makes extinction by statism and terrorism inevitable.
Neocleus 2
But there is more to territory than just space. The notion of ‘territory’ is ¶ derived from a complex of terms: from terra (of earth, and thus a domain) and ¶ territ -orium, referring to a place from which people are warned off, but is
also has¶ links with terr -ere, meaning to frighten. And the notion of region derives from the ¶ Latin regere (to rule) with its connotations of military power. Territory is land ¶ occupied and maintained through terror; a region is

space ruled through force. ¶The secret of territoriality is thus violence: the force necessary for the production¶ of space and the terror crucial to the creation of boundaries. It is not just
that¶ sovereignty implies space, then, but that ‘it implies a space against which¶ violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted ¶ by

violence’ (Lefebvre, 1974: 280). As macrosociologists have pointed out time¶ and again, it is the use of physical force in controlling a territory that is
the key¶ to the state, for without it any claim to the territory would mean nothing. Put¶ more simply: ‘borders are drawn
with blood’ (General Mladić, cited in Campbell, ¶ 1998: 45). A founding violence, and continuous creation by violent means, are ¶ the hallmarks of the state.¶ Part of the construction of the

state’s territory took the form of defining the¶ legitimate use of violence – this is the key to Weber’s famous definition of the¶ state as
involving a monopoly over the means of violence. To do this, the distinction ¶ between the ‘legitimate’ use of force by the state and ‘illegitimate’ use of force ¶ by non-state actors had to be made coherent and acceptable to the
members of¶ states. During its early history, the state exercised violence alongside and often in ¶ conjunction with a range of ‘non-state’ or ‘semi-state’ organizations. (These terms ¶ are misleading because ‘state’ itself had not
been fully developed, but for the sake¶ of the argument we will leave that issue aside.) Piracy and banditry, for example, ¶ were once entirely legitimate practices within the state system, bringing, as they ¶ did, revenue to both
the sovereign and private investors and weakening enemies ¶ by attacking their ships. Piracy on the seas was conducted with the full cooperation ¶ and support of cities and states, while banditry, as a form of terrestrial ¶ piracy,
was conducted with the continual aid of lords. International agreements ¶ now have it that piracy, as an act of violence divorced from the authority of any ¶ state, is a crime. To reach this state of affairs required a campaign against
piracy¶ which relied on a change in the state’s attitude from one in which non-state ¶ violence was an exploitable resource to one in which it was a practice to be eliminated. ¶ The catalyst appears to have been a clash of British
interests in the 18th¶ century, when the British East India Company began demanding British Royal ¶ Navy protection against British pirates who were operating in collusion with ¶ British colonists to plunder British commerce in
the East. When the Navy was¶ sent to patrol the Eastern waters, the pirates moved to the Bahamas. Suppressing ¶ it in American waters in turn pushed the pirates back to Madagascar. Since other ¶ states and companies
connected with other states found themselves in the same ¶ situation, a broader and lasting solution to the problem was sought, and an agreement ¶ was reached among the European powers that each state was responsible ¶ for
controlling piracy in its own waters. But this required that states distance ¶ themselves from piratical acts.¶ No clear norm could develop, much less be universalized, until the state system ¶ produced a clear definition of what
constituted piracy. And this was impossible so long ¶ as states continued to regard individual violence as an exploitable resource. Simply put, ¶ piracy could not be expunged until it was defined, and it could not be defined until ¶ it
was distinguished from state-sponsored or -sanctioned individual violence. ¶ (Thomson, 1994: 117–18)¶ Distinguishing it from state-sponsored or state-sanctioned violence required that ¶ states be defined as the sole legitimate
organization in the exercise of violence, a¶ process that only occurred towards the end of the 18th century. By challenging ¶ the state’s claim to a monopoly of the means of violence within a particular territory, ¶ piracy and
banditry threatened the state system as a whole. Crucially, the ¶ delegitimization of piracy relied on pirates being defined as stateless persons – ¶ persons, that is, for whose actions no state could be held responsible. ¶ Similarly,
the word ‘bandit’ derives from the Italian bandire, meaning ‘to exile ¶ or banish’, and thus contains the notion of frontier or border within its very ¶ meaning. A bandit is by definition one who exists on the physical borders of the ¶
state as well as at the edge of law. In struggling against banditry, states were thus ¶ involved in a struggle over the frontiers of territory as well as the exercise of violence. ¶ Bandits contributed to the demarcation of territorial
states and were partly responsible ¶ for the consolidation of state power [through] the ‘border effect’. Boundaries took ¶ on concrete form in space through the interactions between border guards and bandits ¶ who seized upon
the jurisdictional ambiguity of these liminal zones as cover for their ¶ depredations. (Gallant, 1999: 40)¶ It is because the bandit throws down a challenge to law, state violence and the ¶ territorial imaginary that the state sees in
the bandit not just a criminal but a¶ political opponent and, conversely, why many bandits become ‘primitive rebels’ ¶ (Hobsbawm, 1969; 1971). The bandit, like the pirate, was slowly but surely ¶ ‘banned’ from the kind of political
order emerging under the state. The ‘ban’ is ¶ symptomatic of the connection between sovereignty and territory being drawn ¶ here. The ban designates exclusion from a territory, but also refers to the ¶ command and insignia of

The banned are not merely set¶ outside the law but rather are abandoned by it, an
the sovereign power.

abandonment that has the full ¶ force of state violence to implement it (physical exclusion) and which identifies¶ a territory within which the ban
holds: one who has been banned is outside the¶ juridical order of this or that particular state (Agamben, 1998: 29, 109; Nancy, ¶ 1993: 44).¶ In a contemporaneous development, mercenarism was also gradually eradicated. ¶ It is
often claimed that the absolutist states of the 16th and 17th centuries ¶ pioneered the professional army. But such armies were far from being the kind ¶ of national conscription force which are now the norm. Rather, they were a
mixed¶ mass constructed from the ‘foreign’ and ‘professional’ soldiers then available to¶ any state. The condottieri hired by the 15th-century Italian city-states were essentially ¶ contractors – a condotta was a contract to make
war for a particular ¶ sovereign. The German Unternehmer conveys the same commercial tone, while ¶ etymologically ‘soldier’ means ‘one who serves in an army for pay’ not ‘one who¶ serves his country’. The extent of
mercenarism and its significance to the state is ¶ illustrated by the fact that in the 18th century, all the major European armies ¶ relied heavily on foreign mercenaries for troops, as Janice Thomson (1994: 10, ¶ 88) has shown:¶ Half
the Prussian army was comprised of mercenaries. Foreigners constituted onethird ¶ of the French army. Britain used 18,000 mercenaries in the American war for ¶ Independence and 33,000 mercenaries in its 1793 war with
France . . . The last¶ instance in which a state raised an army of foreigners was in 1854, when Britain hired ¶ 16,500 German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries for the Crimean war. ¶ For several reasons, however, states gradually
stopped hiring their soldiers and¶ sailors from anywhere, and began substituting them with standing armies based ¶ on conscription. Following the example of the French Revolution and Napoleon, ¶ in which huge effective armies
were raised from within France, the practice of¶ mercenarism gradually died out through the 19th century. One factor was sheer¶ cost: states began to realize that fighting forces could be constructed more cheaply ¶ from its
‘own’ citizens. But a further factor was reliability: states realized that an ¶ armed force whose relation to the state was purely contractual often dragged its ¶ feet and was always ready to rebel; its ‘own’ citizens, however, were

To form mass national armies states therefore had to lay claim to a monopoly on the acts of military
more reliable. ¶

violence carried out by its own citizens. The US Neutrality¶ Act of 1794, for example, prevented citizens of the United States from enlisting ¶ in the service of a foreign state, and
prohibited all persons in the US from ¶ ‘setting on foot’ military expeditions against states with which the US was at ¶ peace. Such practices of neutrality soon became the standard for other states. In ¶ other words, to prevent the
enlistment of those individuals increasingly seen as ¶ being the state’s ‘own’ citizens, states prevented their citizens from either joining ¶ the armies of foreign states or of forming their own armies.1 On the one side, ¶ then, states
began to develop an international code on mercenarism. Only at this ¶ point does mercenarism become mercenarism – just as ‘contraband usually ¶ becomes contraband when rulers decide to monopolize the distribution of the ¶
commodity in question’ (Tilly, 1992: 54), so mercenarism only becomes mercenarism ¶ when states decide to use and monopolize the exercise of violence by ¶ its own citizens. This was crucial to the states’ claim to a monopoly
over the¶ means of legitimate violence within its own borders. (It is also one reason, though ¶ by no means the only reason, why states felt threatened by the International ¶ Brigade in Spain in the 1930s.) On the other side,
however, to legitimize this¶ monopoly, each state had to foster a national consciousness among its citizens, ¶ in order that they would more easily imagine that allegiance to the state of which ¶ one is a member is stronger than
any allegiance formed through contract. Perry¶ Anderson (1975: 30) suggests that the most obvious reason for the mercenary ¶ phenomenon was the natural refusal of the noble class to arm its own peasantry; ¶ the nobility
understood that it was impossible to train its subjects in the art of ¶ war and to simultaneously keep them obedient. But by the late 18th century, the ¶ semi-disciplined peasantry had been more or less converted into a working
class¶ jointly disciplined through a combination of the new rules of wage-labour and ¶ the rationalization of the legal process. Ideologically, the newly emergent citizens ¶ were expected to imagine themselves as part of a
community held together by¶ and through the state. It is this imagination which has meant that many people ¶ are now more repulsed by the mercenary, and especially the citizen who fights ¶ against his own state, than by the
genuinely foreign enemy. This ‘nationalization ¶ of the masses’ was both material and ideological. It was a component of both the ¶ politically centralizing tendencies of the bourgeois class and the ideological ¶ tendency to imagine
political formations in national rather than international ¶ terms. This can be understood as the ideological generation of ‘one national class ¶ interest’ (in Marxist terms) or ‘national identity’ (in sociological parlance). Either ¶ way,
what is at stake is the generation of a subjectivity rooted in a political imaginary ¶ centred on the state and its national institutions. It is partly for this reason ¶ that writers on nationalism stress the importance of the late 18th
century for the¶ forming of the nation state. The ‘imagined community’ of the nation that ¶ emerges at this time was a product of the imagined community embodied in the ¶ state’s territory. ¶ Little is heard these days of the
bandit, pirate and mercenary, but thinking ¶ about them allows a greater sense of the historic importance over the struggle to ¶ delegitimize their practices. This struggle was central to the struggle over the ¶ means of violence and
thus to the consolidation of the notion of territory. They ¶ were the unwitting instruments of history, as Carlo Levi comments on the bandit ¶ (1947: 137), in that their existence acted as a major catalyst in the shaping of the ¶ state,

One effect of this ideological isolation of non-state violence from

a process in which they themselves were (almost) swept from history. ¶

other modalities¶ of violence has been to endow[ed] state violence with a special sanctity . Since¶ the Peace of
Westphalia, the state system has seen non-intervention in a state’s ¶ domestic affairs as the corollary of the ideological commitment to the protection ¶ of state sovereignty. As Cynthia Weber has shown, in modern global
political¶ discourse, ‘intervention’ generally implies a violation of state sovereignty. ‘Intervention ¶ discourse begins by positing a sovereign state with boundaries that might ¶ be violated and then regards transgressions of these
boundaries as a problem’¶ (1995: 4, 27).2 In violating sovereignty, intervention violates the norms of the ¶ international state system and the sanctity of the state. As a consequence, intervention ¶ comes to function as an alibi for
the actions carried out in the name of ¶ the sovereign state, to such an extent that states use their claim to territorial sovereignty ¶ to legitimize genocidal practices against peoples under its rule. The United¶ Nations (UN) has
generated for itself a humanitarian air, refusing a seat on theGeneral Assembly to such states, but in accepting the state’s claim to sovereign ¶ territorial control the UN has effectively condoned the sacrifice of human beings ¶ to

the demands of the territorial state and thus accepted genocide as regular tool ¶ of sovereign power (Kuper, 1981: 161–85). Conversely, while state violence has been endowed with a special sanctity, nonstate
violence is either ignored entirely or is invested with a unique danger. Identifying¶ 120 wars in 1987, Bernard Nietschmann found that only 3
per cent¶ involved conflict between two sovereign territorial states; the vast bulk of the wars were struggles between states and insurgent

groups or nations. Yet these struggles¶ receive very little media or academic attention. One reason for this is that the¶ statist imaginary is so deeply
entrenched in our political and intellectual culture ¶ that [makes] the predominant tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate ¶ or invisible. They are hidden from view because the struggles are against ¶
peoples, movements, formations and countries that are often not even on the map. ¶ In this war, as Nietschmann (1987) puts it, only one-half of the geography is ¶ shown and only one side of the fighting has a name. This last point
is only half¶ the story, however, since the ‘other’ side of the fighting, when it is mentioned, ¶ often does go under a generic name intended to capture the unique danger of ¶ non-state violence: ‘terrorism’. ¶ ‘Terrorism’ retains
part of the original double meaning of territory, in that it ¶ refers not only to violence, but to space too. Things are usually labelled terrorist ¶ when the acts of violence in question are not sanctioned by the state. Where they ¶ have
been sanctioned by a state, then they always take place outside of that ¶ particular state’s territories (and usually result in the state in question being ¶ labelled a ‘rogue state’). What this means, in effect, is that

terrorism’ is in fact¶ generated by the international state system; it is the ‘other’ generated by the system¶ of states. As William Connolly notes (1991: 207), terrorism
‘

‘allows the state and¶ the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international
sphere¶ while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state
agents’. Thus while terrorism appears to threaten the state, any such¶ threat is ultimately superficial, since the production of ‘terrorism’ by the state in¶ fact
protects the identity of particular states and the state system as a whole. The¶ statist political imaginary uses terrorism to effect a political rationalization of¶ violence under the firm
control of the state. The declaration of a war on terrorism ¶ by the US state and its allies in 2001 proves nothing other than the state’s ¶ own misunderstanding of the world it has created. (And note that such a declaration ¶ was
immediately expanded to include designated states which it could then ¶ properly confront.)

The alternative is to embrace de-territoriality and the death of the state. The
alternative solves – the nation state and borders are not inevitable, but only a
function of our contingent representations. De-bordering is as simple as an alteration
in the way you think. Neocleus 3
Grant me fiat key to fairness and reciprocity.

The map, then, has been an instrument of power. On a superficial level it is¶ easy to see why the map appears to be a graphic representation of some aspect of¶ the
real world, for it presupposes the existence of borders and boundary lines. ¶ Logically this would appear to mean that boundary lines must exist before [after] the¶ map. But in reality the

reverse has been true. As Thongchai Winichakul ¶ comments, ‘it is the concept of a nation in the modern geographical sense that¶ requires the

necessity of having boundary lines clearly demarcated. A map may¶ not just function as a medium; it could well be the creator of the supposed

reality.’¶ Sovereignty does not just imply space, it creates it; left to itself, the earth has no political form. We need to therefore appreciate
the political function of maps in¶ constructing rather than merely reproducing the world and in
creating rather than¶ merely tracing borders. Borders are constructed through a socio-political
process;¶ to the extent that the map helps create the borders, so it helps create the thing¶ which is being bordered: the geo-body created literally on paper (Winichakul,¶ 1998: 56; also see Black, 1997: 18; Ferguson,
1996: 177; Turnbull, 1996: 5–23;¶ Wood, 1992: 17–19). \

And, it solves your aff, the nation state is the cause of nuclear war. The alternative
solves why those things happen so it solves the root cause.
We are in the midst of a race war and SAGE MP has refused to definitively align
themselves with militant revolution in the 1AC or wiki
Hesitation in the Race War is a voting issue:
(1) Survival Planning – debate is not a safe space proven by debaters calling the cops
on black students playing music and labeling native debaters cheaters for publishing
their scholarship in journals to read in debates SAGE MP must be clear on where they
stand on the race war so colored debaters can navigate hostile spaces – remedies
violence- that outweighs since every other impact assumes the ability to access the
debate space. side disclosure is key to planning out survival tactics and circumventing
racial violence by mapping coalitions and enemies.
(2) Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing – White Being supervises Reconstructionist politics
sustaining supremacist institutions while repackaging liberal politics as change. Think
of affirmative action policies that layers bodies in institutions while continuing to
sustain those very structures that recreate violence. Pre-round specification is key to
cross-checking their specification with their content to fight back against supremacies
implantation in resistance. Anything else allows for in round flip-flops and lying that
allow them to sustain supremacist structures while not being held accountable for
violence in the race war.

The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best deterritorializes states and
deconstructs the system of Biopowers.

Interpretation: Debaters must include a picture of themselves and a sheet of paper

listing the online tourney name in their first speech of the round.
Violation: They don’t
Standards:
[1] Identity impersonation: It’s the only way to verify we are who we say we are –
otherwise I could have a random debater impersonating me who is really good. The
picture verifies that I am the person behind the screen. Key to fairness otherwise
debaters could have really good debaters represent them before round. Fairness is a
voter constitutive of any competitive activity. Lack of fairness means I can’t engage
with their position because I don’t have
the capability to do so, so it comes prior.

No rvi chilling effect

DTD

**T – States**
Interpretation – debaters must defend elimination of nuclear
arsenals in all states
‘States’ refers to the 9 nuclear capable countries.
WPR 19’ [(World Population review, Most demographic data is hidden in spreadsheets,
behind complex APIs, or inside cumbersome tools. World Population Review's goal is to make
this data more accessible through graphs, charts, analysis and visualizations. We also strive to
present the most recent information available, and develop our own projections based on recent
growth. World Population Review is an independent organization without any political
affiliations.) “Countries With Nuclear Weapons 2020” World Population Review 11/4/2019] BC
Countries With Nuclear Weapons 2020
What countries have nuclear weapons? In the world today, there are nine major countries that
currently possess nuclear weapons. Here is the list of all nine countries with nuclear weapons in
descending order, starting with the country that has the most nuclear weapons at hand and
ending with the country that has the least amount of nuclear weapons:
Russia, 6,850 nuclear warheads
The United States of America, 6,185 nuclear warheads
France, 300 nuclear warheads
China, 280 nuclear warheads
The United Kingdom, 215 nuclear warheads
Pakistan, 145 nuclear warheads
India, 135 nuclear warheads
Israel, 80 nuclear warheads
North Korea, 15 nuclear warheads

Violation – you spec INDO PAK

1. Semantics outweighs:
A) Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity, they agreed to debate
the topic when they came to the tournament

B) Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed.

C) Grammar is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary

determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate

D) It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls
the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if
debaters aren’t prepared to defend it.

2. Limits: You can pick any of over 9 nuclear states and there’s no
universal DA since each state and geopolitical scenario is different.
That’s exploded by.

D IS THE PARADIGM ISSUES:

T is drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate

from the start

Comes before 1AR theory – if we had to be abusive it’s because it was

impossible to engage their aff –

Use competing interps on T – 1. topicality is a yes/no question, you

can’t be reasonably topical

Evaluate the theory debate after the 2n: Time skew - u have one more speech to give.
I solve reciprocity 2) Strat skew - u can extend args and extrapolate new things in the
next speech that I can’t respond to.

RVIs encourage all in on theory which decks substance and

incentivize baiting theory with abusive practices.

Reject 1AR Theory

1. They can just blow up dropped arguments in the next speech making it impossible
for me to win since I only have the 2n.
2. Aff gets to speak first and last and gets infinite pre-round prep time; new layers in
the 1AR just exacerbate the skew. 
3. Resolvability - every round dissolve to see if the judge thinks the 2ar answers to the
2n are good enough which means they have to inject bias.
4. They get 7 minutes on the theory debate and I only get 6 minutes, which puts me at
a significant time disadvantage because theory is mainly about coverage.
And, the aff must line by line all of these arguments, otherwise it proves the abuse –
you will make arguments that there is infinite abuse but err neg on this arg if they do
not respond to this bc all my args implicitly respond to this.

Case

No Escalation
Younger generation, new diplomacy, and new responsibilities make Indo-
Pak nuclear war impossible
CSM 8/1/11 (Talking is Good, Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.thespec.com/opinion/editorial/article/570954--talking-is-good)
Exhibit A is Hina Rabbani Khar. The thirty-something woman who holds a master’s degree
from the U.S. and owns a nightclub in Lahore became Pakistan’s top diplomat this year. Last
week, she made a splash among India’s youth during important talks aimed at ending a cold
war between the two South Asian nuclear rivals — a rivalry that only fuels the Afghan conflict.
Like most young people on both sides, Khar tends to let bygones be bygones. (The two
countries fought three wars since 1947 and still struggle over terrorist attacks and claims to
Kashmir.) “A new generation of India and Pakistan will see a relationship which is going to be
much different than the one we experienced in the last few decades,” she said during the
talks. “We have learned lessons from history but are not burdened by history.” Nearly two-
thirds of Indians and three-quarters of Pakistanis are under 35 years old and may see their
history differently than previous generations. Their dream of a peaceful, prosperous future
was best summed up in a banner held up by fans in a stadium last March during a friendly
Pakistan-India cricket match: “We have two common religions — cricket and cinema. Why
then fight?” Such youthful atmospherics do count in the difficult diplomacy that lies ahead for
Pakistan and India, especially on the issue of Kashmir. Just the fact that they are talking is a
milestone, as talks since 1997 have been easily derailed by some blow-up. A year ago,
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
resolved to forge ahead. Singh has shown special courage in fending off domestic pressure to
be tough on Pakistan. He was tested again just before last week’s talks when a series of blasts
hit Mumbai, killing 24. The rise of China and the pending withdrawal of American forces from
Afghanistan add strategic reasons to reconcile. A nuclear war between Pakistan and India is
unthinkable. Pakistan has finally woken up to its own domestic terrorism. India needs to be a
peacemaker if it wants a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

War stays contained

Dyer 2 [(Gwynne, independent journalist, syndicated columnist and military historian)
“Nuclear war a possibility over Kashmir,” Hamilton Spectator, May 24, 2002]
damage would be largely confined to the region.
For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the

The Cold War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the
rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no outside powers would be drawn into the
fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and Pakistan would not

cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.

Odds of the war going nuclear are ZERO. Their high probability assessment
is media hype
Enders 02 [David Enders, “Experts say nuclear war still unlikely,” Michigan Daily, January 30th, 2002, pg.
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/experts-say-nuclear-war-still-unlikely.

University political science Prof. Ashutosh Varshney becomes animated when asked about the likelihood of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan.

"Odds are close to zero," Varshney said forcefully, standing up to pace a little bit in his office. "The assumption that India and
Pakistan cannot manage their nuclear arsenals as well as the U.S.S.R. and U.S. or Russia and China concedes less to the intellect of
leaders in both India and Pakistan than would be warranted."
The world"s two youngest nuclear powers first tested weapons in 1998, sparking fear of subcontinental nuclear war a fear Varshney finds ridiculous.

"The decision makers are aware of what nuclear weapons are, even if the masses are not," he said.

the evening news, CNN, I think they have vastly overstated the threat of nuclear war," political science Prof. Paul
"Watching
Huth said.
Varshney added that there are numerous factors working against the possibility of nuclear war.

"India is committed to a no-first-strike policy," Varshney said. "It is virtually impossible for Pakistan to go for a first
strike, because the retaliation would be gravely dangerous."

Offensive-defensive military doctrine prevents quick escalation

Lavoy 03 - Senior Lecturer of National Security Affairs @ Naval Postgraduate School. [Peter R. Lavoy (Former Director
for Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense & Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley) and MAJ Stephen
A. Smith, “The Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear Use Between India and Pakistan,” Strategic Insight, February 3, 2003, pg.
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/feb03/southAsia2.asp]

India has developed an offensive-defensive military

Both India and Pakistan have offensively oriented conventional military doctrines.
doctrine that calls for aggressive offensive action to pre-empt or counter-attack the enemy. Currently, India is exploring the concept of limited
conventional war based on the notion of strategic space between low-intensity conflicts and full-scale
conventional war. This concept is fueled by political and public pressure within India to launch conventional military strikes against Pakistan in retaliation for
Pakistan's alleged support of terrorism.[3] The Pakistani army also relies on an offensive-defensive strategy, which is
characterized by retaining adequate reserves at successive force levels, surprise, and aggressive leadership. This strategy
calls for the Pakistan army to detect the initial enemy thrust, take effective counter measures to limit penetration, and simultaneously attack the adversary to capture or
threaten a strategic objective.[4]

Indian nuclear policy ensures restraint

Singh ’18 – former researcher at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, with several
publications with the institute. “Nationalism, the Hindu State and Nuclear Power”; Shreya
Singh; July 11 18; http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/07/11/nationalism-the-hindu-state-and-
nuclear-power/
Key Elements of India’s Nuclear Doctrine
The tolerance for ambiguity in Indian nuclear policies is high; however it has maintained
some clear elements in the nuclear doctrine including the moratorium on further testing.
Additionally it has three key elements of its nuclear policy – a No First-Use policy, followed
by maximum damage inflicting second-strike capabilities, and a credible minimum
deterrence. The doctrine also mentions that India would not engage in an arms race and
reiterates its commitment to global nuclear disarmament. Resultantly, India’s strategic
nuclear culture is characterized by nuclear minimalism.
Conventional studies on India’s strategic culture focus on the influence of political parties,
the intelligentsia and the strategic elite in shaping the nuclear doctrine. Strategic culture is
seen as the social construction of state behaviour influenced by culture, historical traditions
and habits. Studies have variously looked at the role of public opinion, religious
symbolism, widely held attitudes and democratic values in understanding India’s nuclear
culture. However most agree on a few assumptions. First is the high tolerance for ambiguity.
Second is how India responds to the dynamism in the international environment—primarily
through restraint. Third is the distinction between India’s nuclear weapons for political or
operational purposes and fourthly, India’s shifting dispositions towards disarmament. While
some members of the strategic elite advocate for a stronger and more assertive nuclear
posture, thereby challenging global nuclear order norms, others call for a minimalist
approach, focusing on nuclear weapons expressly for political deterrence.

Nuclear Terrorism is extremely unlikely

Chapman 08 Steve Chapman, 2-14-2008, "Why nuclear terrorism is so unlikely," No Publication,
https://theweek.com/articles/516801/why-nuclear--terrorism-unlikely
But the chances of al Qaeda or another terrorist group carrying out a nuclear attack here,
nuclear experts say, are “vanishingly small.” Terrorists would first have to steal about 100
pounds of bomb fuel from a government, and then transport the material hundreds of miles
across borders without detection. Even if that were possible, [to] building a bomb isn’t
something you can do in a garage or a cave; you need specialized, high-tech equipment,
and people with training and skills. Any weapon would then have to be smuggled into the
U.S. without detection—and without anyone in the expanding circle of conspirators screwing
up. 

History shows that miscalculations are unlikely

Sokolski 16 Sokolski, Henry [Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] “Should We Let
the Bomb Spread?” Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College, November 2016,
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1021744.pdf. 

Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go off by
accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist declared it “most
unlikely” that the world could live with an uncontrolled arms race for decades. Moreover, in 1979, political scientist
Hans J. Morgenthau declared: The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world war—a strategic nuclear war. I
do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for
long. In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned about that danger today. In a 1982 New Yorker essay and
best-selling book, both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not
entirely novel proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he concluded ominously: One day—and it is hard to
believe that it will not be soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink into the final coma and end it all or, as I
trust and 80 believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.
As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place. The
common alarmist prognostications assuming that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later
one or more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed to deliver for 70 years—this suggests
that something more than luck is operating.

No Nuclear Winter
No nuclear winter
Reisner et al. 18
(Jon Reisner – Climate and atmospheric scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Gennaro D’Angelo – Climate scientist at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research scientist at the SETI institute, Associate specialist at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, NASA Postdoctoral Fellow at the NASA Ames Research Center, UKAFF Fellow at the University of Exeter. Eunmo Koo -
Scientist at Applied Terrestrial, Energy, and Atmospheric Modeling (ATEAM) Team, in Computational Earth Science Group (EES-
16) in Earth and Environmental Sciences Division and Co-Lead of Parallel Computing Summer Research Internship (PCSRI) program
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, former Staff research associate at UC Berkeley. Wesley Even - Computational scientist in
the Computational Physics and Methods Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Matthew Hecht – Atmospheric scientist at the
Los Alamos National Laboratory. Elizabeth Hunke - Lead developer for the Los Alamos Sea Ice Model (CICE) at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory responsible for development and incorporation of new parameterizations, model testing and validation,
computational performance, documentation, and consultation with external model users on all aspects of sea ice modeling,
including interfacing with global climate and earth system models. Darin Comeau – Climate scientist at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Randy Bos - Project leader at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, former Weapons Effects program manager at
Tech-Source. James Cooley – Computational scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory specializing in weapons physics,
emergency response, and computational physics. <MKIM> “Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange:An improved
assessment based on detailed source calculations”. 3/16/18. DOA: 7/13/19.
https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331)

*BC = Black Carbon

The no-rubble simulation produces a significantly more intense fire, with more fire spread, and
consequently a significantly stronger plume with larger amounts of BC reaching into the upper
atmosphere than the simulation with rubble, illustrated in Figure 5. While the no-rubble simulation
represents the worst-case scenario involving vigorous fire activity, only a relatively small
amount of carbon makes its way into the stratosphere during the course of the simulation. But while
small compared to the surface BC mass, stratospheric BC amounts from the current simulations are significantly higher than what
would be expected from burning vegetation such as trees (Heilman et al., 2014), e.g., the higher energy density of the building
fuels and the initial fluence from the weapon produce an intense response within HIGRAD with initial updrafts of order 100 m/s
in the lower troposphere. Or, in comparison to a mass fire, wildfires will burn only a small amount of fuel in the corresponding
time period (roughly 10 minutes) that a nuclear weapon fluence can effectively ignite a large area of fuel producing an
impressive atmospheric response. Figure 6 shows vertical profiles of BC multiplied by 100 (number of cities involved in
the exchange) from the two simulations. The total amount of BC produced is in line with previous estimates (about 3.69 Tg from
no-rubble simulation); however, the majority of BC resides below the stratosphere (3.46 Tg below 12 km) and can
be readily impacted by scavenging from precipitation either via pyro-cumulonimbus
produced by the fire itself (not modeled) or other synoptic weather systems. While the impact on climate
of these more realistic profiles will be explored in the next section, it should be mentioned that these estimates are still
at the high end, considering the inherent simplifications in the combustion model that lead
to overestimating BC production. 3.3 Climate Results Long-term climatic effects critically depend
on the initial injection height of the soot, with larger quantities reaching the upper
troposphere/lower stratosphere inducing a greater cooling impact because of longer
residence times (Robock et al., 2007a). Absorption of solar radiation by the BC aerosol and its subsequent radiative cooling
tends to heat the surrounding air, driving an initial upward diffusion of the soot plumes, an effect that depends on the initial
aerosol concentrations. Mixing and sedimentation tend to reduce this process, and low altitude
emissions are also significantly impacted by precipitation if aging of the BC aerosol occurs on sufficiently
rapid timescales. But once at stratospheric altitudes, aerosol dilution via coagulation is hindered by low particulate
concentrations (e.g., Robock et al., 2007a) and lofting to much higher altitudes is inhibited by gravitational settling in the low-
Of the initial BC mass
density air (Stenke et al., 2013), resulting in more stable BC concentrations over long times.
released in the atmosphere, most of which is emitted below 9 km, 70% rains out within the first month
and 78%, or about 2.9 Tg, is removed within the first two months (Figure 7, solid line), with the remainder (about 0.8 Tg, dashed line)
being transported above about 12 km (200 hPa) within the first week. This outcome differs from the findings of, e.g., Stenke et al. (2013, their high BC-load cases) and Mills et al. (2014), who found that
most of the BC mass (between 60 and 70%) is lifted in the stratosphere within the first couple of weeks. This can also be seen in Figure 8 (red lines) and in Figure 9, which include results from our calculation
with the initial BC distribution from Mills et al. (2014). In that case, only 30% of the initial BC mass rains out in the troposphere during the first two weeks after the exchange, with the remainder rising to the
stratosphere. In the study of Mills et al. (2008) this percentage is somewhat smaller, about 20%, and smaller still in the experiments of Robock et al. (2007a) in which the soot is initially emitted in the upper
troposphere or higher. In Figure 7, the e-folding timescale for the removal of tropospheric soot, here interpreted as the time required for an initial drop of a factor e, is about one week. This result compares
favorably with the “LT” experiment of Robock et al. (2007a), considering 5 Tg of BC released in the lower troposphere, in which 50% of the aerosols are removed within two weeks. By contrast, the initial e-
folding timescale for the removal of stratospheric soot in Figure 8 is about 4.2 years (blue solid line), compared to about 8.4 years for the calculation using Mills et al. (2014) initial BC emission (red solid
line). The removal timescale from our forced ensemble simulations is close to those obtained by Mills et al. (2008) in their 1 Tg experiment, by Robock et al. (2007a) in their experiment “UT 1 Tg”, and ©
2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. by Stenke et al. (2013) in their experiment “Exp1”, in all of which 1 Tg of soot was emitted in the atmosphere in the aftermath of the exchange.
Notably, the e-folding timescale for the decline of the BC mass in Figure 8 (blue solid line) is also close to the value of about 4 years quoted by Pausata et al. (2016) for their long-term “intermediate”
scenario. In that scenario, which is also based on 5 Tg of soot initially distributed as in Mills et al. (2014), the factor-of2 shorter residence time of the aerosols is caused by particle growth via coagulation of

The BC distributions
BC with organic carbon. Figure 9 shows the BC mass-mixing ratio, horizontally averaged over the globe, as a function of atmospheric pressure (height) and time.

in our simulations imply that the upward transport of particles is substantially less efficient
used
compared to the case in which 5 Tg of BC is directly injected into the upper troposphere. The
semiannual cycle of lofting and sinking of the aerosols is associated with atmospheric heating and cooling during the solstice in
each hemisphere (Robock et al., 2007a). During the first year, the oscillation amplitude in our forced ensemble simulations is
particularly large during the summer solstice, compared to that during the winter solstice (see bottom panel of Figure 9),
because of the higher soot concentrations in the Northern Hemisphere, as can be seen in Figure 11 (see also left panel of Figure
12). Comparing the top and bottom panels of Figure 9, the BC reaches the highest altitudes during the first year in both cases,
but the concentrations at 0.1 hPa in the top panel can be 200 times as large. Qualitatively, the difference can be
understood in terms of the air temperature increase caused by BC radiation emission , which is
several tens of kelvin degrees in the simulations of Robock et al. (2007a, see their Figure 4), Mills et al.
(2008, see their Figure 5), Stenke et al. (2013, see high-load cases in their Figure 4), Mills et al. (2014, see their Figure 7),
and Pausata et al. (2016, see one-day emission cases in their Figure 1), due to high BC concentrations, but it
amounts to only about 10 K in our forced ensemble simulations, as illustrated in Figure 10. Results similar to
those presented in Figure 10 were obtained from the experiment “Exp1” performed by Stenke et al. (2013, see their Figure 4).
In that scenario as well, somewhat less that 1 Tg of BC remained in the atmosphere after
the initial rainout. As mentioned before, the BC aerosol that remains in the atmosphere, lifted to stratospheric heights by the rising soot plumes, undergoes sedimentation over a
timescale of several years (Figures 8 and 9). This mass represents the effective amount of BC that can force climatic changes over multi-year timescales. In the forced ensemble simulations, it is about 0.8 Tg
after the initial rainout, whereas it is about 3.4 Tg in the simulation with an initial soot distribution as in Mills et al. (2014). Our more realistic source simulation involves the worstcase assumption of no-
rubble (along with other assumptions) and hence serves as an upper bound for the impact on climate. As mentioned above and further discussed below, our scenario induces perturbations on the climate
system similar to those found in previous studies in which the climatic response was driven by roughly 1 Tg of soot rising to stratospheric heights following the exchange. Figure 11 illustrates the vertically
integrated mass-mixing ratio of BC over the globe, at various times after the exchange for the simulation using the initial BC distribution of Mills et al. (2014, upper panels) and as an average from the forced
ensemble members (lower panels). All simulations predict enhanced concentrations at high latitudes during the first year after the exchange. In the cases shown in the top panels, however, these high
concentrations persist for several years (see also Figure 1 of Mills et al., 2014), whereas the forced ensemble simulations indicate that the BC concentration starts to decline after the first year. In fact, in the
simulation represented in the top panels, mass-mixing ratios larger than about 1 kg of BC © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. per Tg of air persist for well over 10 years after the
exchange, whereas they only last for 3 years in our forced simulations (compare top and middle panels of Figure 9). After the first year, values drop below 3 kg BC/Tg air, whereas it takes about 8 years to
reach these values in the simulation in the top panels (see also Robock et al., 2007a). Over crop-producing, midlatitude regions in the Northern Hemisphere, the BC loading is reduced from more than 0.8 kg
BC/Tg air in the simulation in the top panels to 0.2-0.4 kg BC/Tg air in our forced simulations (see middle and right panels). The more rapid clearing of the atmosphere in the forced ensemble is also signaled
by the soot optical depth in the visible radiation spectrum, which drops below values of 0.03 toward the second half of the first year at mid latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere, and everywhere on the
globe after about 2.5 years (without never attaining this value in the Southern Hemisphere). In contrast, the soot optical depth in the calculation shown in the top panels of Figure 11 becomes smaller than
0.03 everywhere only after about 10 years. The two cases show a similar tendency, in that the BC optical depth is typically lower between latitudes 30º S-30º N than it is at other latitudes. This behavior is
associated to the persistence of stratospheric soot toward high-latitudes and the Arctic/Antarctic regions, as illustrated by the zonally-averaged, column-integrated mass-mixing ratio of the BC in Figure 12
for both the forced ensemble simulations (left panel) and the simulation with an initial 5 Tg BC emission in the upper troposphere (right panel). The spread in the globally averaged (near) surface
temperature of the atmosphere, from the control (left panel) and forced (right panel) ensembles, is displayed in Figure 13. For each month, the plots show the largest variations (i.e., maximum and minimum
values), within each ensemble of values obtained for that month, relative to the mean value of that month. The plot also shows yearly-averaged data (thinner lines). The spread is comparable in the control
and forced ensembles, with average values calculated over the 33-years run length of 0.4-0.5 K. This spread is also similar to the internal variability of the globally averaged surface temperature quoted for
the NCAR Large Ensemble Community Project (Kay et al., 2015). These results imply that surface air temperature differences, between forced and control simulations, which lie within the spread may not be
distinguished from effects due to internal variability of the two simulation ensembles. Figure 14 shows the difference in the globally averaged surface temperature of the atmosphere (top panel), net solar
radiation flux at surface (middle panel), and precipitation rate (bottom panel), computed as the (forced minus control) difference in ensemble mean values. The sum of standard deviations from each
ensemble is shaded. Differences are qualitatively significant over the first few years, when the anomalies lie near or outside the total standard deviation. Inside the shaded region, differences may not be
distinguished from those arising from the internal variability of one or both ensembles. The surface solar flux (middle panel) is the quantity that appears most affected by the BC emission, with qualitatively
significant differences persisting for about 5 years. The precipitation rate (bottom panel) is instead affected only at the very beginning of the simulations. The red lines in all panels show the results from the
simulation applying the initial BC distribution of Mills et al. (2014), where the period of significant impact is much longer owing to the higher altitude of the initial soot distribution that results in longer
residence times of the BC aerosol in the atmosphere. When yearly averages of the same quantities are performed over the IndiaPakistan region, the differences in ensemble mean values lie within the total
standard deviations of the two ensembles. The results in Figure 14 can also be compared to the outcomes of other previous studies. In their experiment “UT 1 Tg”, Robock et al. (2007a) found that, when
only 1 Tg of soot © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. remains in the atmosphere after the initial rainout, temperature and precipitation anomalies are about 20% of those obtained from
their standard 5 Tg BC emission case. Therefore, the largest differences they observed, during the first few years after the exchange, were about - 0.3 K and -0.06 mm/day, respectively, comparable to the
anomalies in the top and bottom panels of Figure 14. Their standard 5 Tg emission case resulted in a solar radiation flux anomaly at surface of -12 W/m2 after the second year (see their Figure 3), between 5
and 6 time as large as the corresponding anomalies from our ensembles shown in the middle panel. In their experiment “Exp1”, Stenke et al. (2013) reported global mean surface temperature anomalies not
exceeding about 0.3 K in magnitude and precipitation anomalies hovering around -0.07 mm/day during the first few years, again consistent with the results of Figure 14. In a recent study, Pausata et al.
(2016) considered the effects of an admixture of BC and organic carbon aerosols, both of which would be emitted in the atmosphere in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange. In particular, they concentrated
on the effects of coagulation of these aerosol species and examined their climatic impacts. The initial BC distribution was as in Mills et al. (2014), although the soot burden was released in the atmosphere
over time periods of various lengths. Most relevant to our and other previous work are their one-day emission scenarios. They found that, during the first year, the largest values of the atmospheric surface
temperature anomalies ranged between about -0.5 and -1.3 K, those of the sea surface temperature anomalies ranged between -0.2 and -0.55 K, and those of the precipitation anomalies varied between
-0.15 and -0.2 mm/day. All these ranges are compatible with our results shown in Figure 14 as red lines and with those of Mills et al. (2014, see their Figures 3 and 6). As already mentioned in Section 2.3,

This overall agreement suggests that the inclusion of organic carbon

the net solar flux anomalies at surface are also consistent.

aerosols, and ensuing coagulation with BC, should not dramatically alter the climatic
effects resulting from our forced ensemble simulations. Moreover, aerosol growth would
likely shorten the residence time of the BC particulate in the atmosphere (Pausata et al., 2016),
possibly reducing the duration of these effects.

Starr doesn’t actually link these impact to Indo-Pak but rather just genrlaizes them
Takes Out Extinction Offense

Reliance on the state guarantees mass violence and destroys value to life
Shaffer 7
(Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln;
B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars.
“Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html)

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity.
Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence,
conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the
state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset
was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years
of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to
our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external
forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities . We adorn ourselves
with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our
sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this
way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate
with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient
consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the
organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its
permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting,
squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has
been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization
ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become
“institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent
parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that
collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that
“we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the
psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or
other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their
very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many
Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or
the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a
mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his
revealing post-World War II book, They Thought They Were Free, most Germans were unable to admit that the
Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate
wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state . It
also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government
leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the
system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of
the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction
with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim
does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a
squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its
ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most
Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form
of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World
War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into
American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., Flying Tigers) extolled the heroism of
American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy
theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is
prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots
having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those
whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not
the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits
that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing
behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible.
What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local
convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in
his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up
with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and
the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action . We do not have such attitudes toward
organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank
statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither
would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse
consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of
control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be
efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent
upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or
fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people -
we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these
expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our
sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of
the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to
continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the
practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless
recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or
not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious
minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or
that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or
consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within
us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to
eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by
subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our
own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest
our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most
of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics
class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to
experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our
home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-
burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we
blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that
precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We
fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence
upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a
world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives
of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs
generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who,
having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves.
We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed
without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s
actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against
the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the
sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and
threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us.
The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our
politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to
move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being . The only way out of our dilemma
involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the
development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without
division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

Overview