Matibag vs.

Benipayo
Facts: Through the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner, Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag,was appointed as
the “Acting Director IV” of the Education and InformationDepartment (EID). President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
then appointed, ad-interim, Alfredo L. Benipayo as the COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners. The threeof them through the President renewed their ad-
interim appointment twiceand thus take oath twice as well. Benipayo, being the COMELE Chairmantransferred
Matibag in the Law Department, which the latter objected. Withthe case at bar, “petitioner requested Benipayo
to reconsider her relief asDirector IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.” Butshe was
denied and so the petitioner then appealed to the COMELEV enbanc and while here appeal was pending she
likewise filed an instantpetitioning the appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. 

Issue: Refer to photocopy 

Ruling:No. Ad-interim appoint is a permanent appointment that is made by thePresident while the Congress

is in recess. Such appointment is nottemporary and cannot be revoke nor be forfeited at any time. “An ad-
interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office become at thatmoment a government employee and
therefore part of the civil service. ” There is no problem of the fact that when the ad-
interim appointment isapproved by the Commission on Appoint there is no longer any
extendedreappointment available. Therefore, “The phrase ‘without reappointment’applies only to one who
has been appointed by the President and confirmedby the Commission on appointments, whether or not such
completes histerm of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission onAppointments of the
previous appointment before the prohibition onreappointment can apply.”

………………………………

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

 
GR 122156, 3 February 1997En banc, Bellosillo (p): 6 concur, others dissent
 
Facts:
 
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51%of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
atP41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner andthe execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince
Hotel sent amanager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of theMHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with
RenongBerhad,Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus. thenext
day theCourt issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
 
Issue(s):
 
1.
 
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XIISection 10, are self-executing.
 
2.
 
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
 
Held:
 
The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XII Section 10 provides: “The Congress shall,
 uponrecommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates,reserve tocitizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capitalist owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe,certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formationand operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.In the grant of
rights,privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
givepreference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority
over foreigninvestments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals
andpri
orities.”
Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto
 
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
 
De Jure vs De Facto President
 
Facts:
Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
claims she is the President. From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that
slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October
4,2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his
familyand friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately
ignitedreactions ofrage. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. At1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General AngeloReyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned tobe the day of surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
respondent Arroyoimmediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his
fall from the pedestal
of power, the Erap’s legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed againsthim in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
 
HELD:
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by hisleaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement,(1) he acknowledged the oath-
taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit withthe reservation about its
legality;(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peaceand in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palacedue to
any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as thedisability
disappears;(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, hewas referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President;

 
 
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the sameservice of our
country.
Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of 
the president which he has given up; and(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity couldnot be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release
was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap
canprove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave onthe ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest byCongress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-
equalbranch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201)
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and
sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
“advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government”
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at
bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps
given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an
event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people
and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that
reads “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”

The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.

………………………..
Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 24 April 1985 (136 SCRA 27)
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation, 1 took no part, 1 on leave

Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. They maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they are proper parties for
the petition. The respondents alleged, however through the Solicitor-General, that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. They further contend that
publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectiveness of
laws where the laws provide for their own effectivity dates. Thus publication is not
indispensable.

Issue: Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of laws

Held: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication — but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in the
light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and that unless so published, they shall
have no binding force and effect.