JHEA MAE GACO JD1B – Central Philippine University

G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a serving member of Congress

currently incarcerated in the national penitentiary, awaiting the appeal of his

conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. He has petitioned

for permission to fulfill his duties as a Congressman, including attending

legislative sessions and committee meetings, citing the principles of

popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents' representation.

Notably, Jalosjos has been granted temporary release from Makati City Jail

on multiple occasions for official or medical reasons, and during his

detention, he has actively proposed bills and resolutions. Additionally, he

continues to receive his salary and other financial benefits. In summary, the

accused-appellant has been carrying out his legislative responsibilities

within the constraints imposed by his current incarceration.

Issue:

Whether or not being an elective official result in a substantial distinction

that allows different treatment and a substantial differentiation which

removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all

persons validly confined under law.

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Ruling:

No. The Constitution explicitly guarantees that no person shall be denied

equal protection under the law. This principle ensures that individuals in

similar circumstances are treated equally, both in terms of their rights and

the obligations placed upon them. It prohibits the government from

displaying undue favoritism or hostility towards any person and strictly

forbids partiality or prejudice.

Even when public officers are performing legitimate and essential duties,

this does not serve as a valid reason to release a person who is lawfully

imprisoned. The responsibilities imposed by the "mandate of the people"

are diverse, with the duty to legislate being emphasized by the accused-

appellant. However, it's crucial to recognize that the accused-appellant is

just one of 250 members in the House of Representatives, not to mention

the 24 members in the Senate, all of whom share legislative responsibilities.

The proper functioning of Congress does not depend on the physical

presence of any single member or a few members.

The court cannot legitimize instances of inequality, even if they are argued

to be in the interest of public welfare. Government authorities may

rightfully regulate certain activities, even if specific groups claim that their

interests are being neglected. Therefore, we conclude that the election to the

position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in the context of

criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of this office do not

constitute substantial distinctions that would exempt the accused-appellant

from the category of individuals whose freedom has been interrupted, and

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liberty of movement restricted due to lawful arrest and confinement. These

measures are relevant to the objectives of the law and apply uniformly to all

individuals in the same situation.

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G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G.
TIMBOL, respondents.

Facts:

Lazatin has filed the present petition challenging the jurisdiction of the

COMELEC to annul his proclamation, especially after he had taken his

oath of office, assumed his congressional duties in the 1st District of

Pampanga, and carried out his responsibilities as a Congressman. Lazatin

contends that the sole authority to adjudicate all election contests rests with

the HRET and not the COMELEC.

Buan, Jr., and Timbol, who are opposing Lazatin, argue that the current

petition has become moot and academic because the contested COMELEC

Resolution had already achieved finality and enforceability by the time the

Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on October 6,

1987.

In the Solicitor General's COMMENT, it is asserted that the present petition

should be duly considered valid, given that Lazatin's proclamation was

legitimate. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC, instructing the

canvassing board to declare the winner as per Section 245 of the Omnibus

Election Code, essentially conferred authority upon the canvassing board to

proclaim the victor.

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The COMELEC has also submitted a Separate Comment, asserting that

Lazatin's proclamation was illegal and void because the canvassing board

merely corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the

final resolutions of the petitions submitted by candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr.,

and Lazatin himself, pertaining to specific election returns.

Issue:

Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.

Ruling:

In a Resolution dated November 17, 1987, the Supreme Court (SC)

resolved to grant due course to the petition. This petition holds significant

merit since the petitioner was duly proclaimed as the winner of the

Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, subsequently

taking his oath of office and fulfilling his duties as a Congressman. It is

essential for this Court to refrain from engaging in electoral disputes against

him, as doing so would encroach upon the jurisdiction of the House

Electoral Tribunal.

Furthermore, the purported invalidity of the proclamation, despite prior

directives from the COMELEC itself, and the alleged irregularities

associated with it, even in light of ongoing protests by rival candidates, are

matters that, under the given circumstances, should be left to the wisdom

and judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

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G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Facts:

In May 1936, the Director of Posts made an announcement in Manila

newspapers regarding his intention to issue postage stamps in

commemoration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress celebration

in the City of Manila, an event organized by the Roman Catholic Church.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the petitioner and Supreme Head of the

Philippine Independent Church, reached out to Vicente Sotto, a member of

the Philippine Bar, to bring this matter to the attention of the President. The

mentioned postage stamps had already been issued and sold, although a

significant portion of them remained unsold. The petitioner sought to

prevent any further sale of these stamps.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and

selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International

Eucharistic Congress.

Ruling:

No, the respondent did not contravene the Constitution through the issuance

and sale of commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted within the

framework of Act No. 4052, which does not entail any religious intent, but

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rather grants the Director of Posts the discretion to decide when introducing

new postage stamps would be "beneficial to the Government." It is crucial

to note that the phrase "beneficial to the Government" does not authorize

any breach of the Constitution.

In the present case, the issuance of these postage stamps was not intended

by Ruiz to show favoritism to a specific church or religious denomination.

The stamps did not confer any advantage to the Roman Catholic Church,

nor were the proceeds from the stamp sales allocated to that church. The

primary purpose behind issuing these stamps was to seize the opportunity

presented by an international event, considered an excellent chance to

promote the Philippines and attract more tourists to the country.

When evaluating the stamp design, it prominently featured the map of the

Philippines, rather than emphasizing a Catholic chalice. The focus was on

highlighting the City of Manila's location, along with the inscription "Seat

XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." Considering

these aspects, it becomes evident that no violation of the Constitution

occurred, making the act of issuing these stamps constitutionally sound.

The Supreme Court, therefore, dismissed the petition for a writ of

prohibition without any ruling on costs.

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A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.

Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabananatuan City,
respectively.

Facts:

The appointments signed by then-President Fidel V. Ramos on March 20,

1998, for Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as RTC

Judges were referred to the Court En Banc due to the serious constitutional

issues arising from the preceding events.

On March 9, 1998, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) convened to address

concerns regarding the constitutionality of appointments to the Court of

Appeals, particularly in light of the upcoming presidential elections. The

focus was on Section 15 of Article 7 and Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article 8 of

the 1987 Constitution. Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, a

consultant of the Council, clarified that the election ban did not apply to

appointments to the Court of Appeals. This interpretation was accepted by

the JBC members and submitted to the President, along with the Council's

nominations for eight Court of Appeals vacancies.

However, on April 6, 1998, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa received an

official communication from the Executive Secretary regarding the

appointments of the eight Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, signed

by President Ramos on March 11, 1998, one day before the appointment

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ban took effect. This indicated that President Ramos did not concur with the

JBC's interpretation. Consequently, the Chief Justice temporarily suspended

the consideration of nominations for Court of Appeals appointments.

On May 4, 1998, the Chief Justice received a letter from the President,

addressed to the JBC, requesting the transmission of the final list of

nominees for a vacancy by May 6, 1998. On May 5, 1998, Secretary of

Justice Silvestre Bello III sought guidance from the Chief Justice on the

JBC's desire to hold an immediate meeting to fill the vacancy. The Chief

Justice advised Secretary Bello to await his response to the President. The

following day, the Chief Justice replied to the President, informing him that

the JBC had not scheduled any sessions until after the May elections. He

also noted that, as the President disagreed with Senior Associate Justice

Regalado's hypothesis, further study was needed to address potential

constitutional issues.

On May 7, 1998, the Chief Justice met with the JBC members to review the

events leading to the situation. After the meeting, the JBC decided to allow

the President time to respond to the Chief Justice's May 6, 1998 letter. The

Chief Justice received a reply from the President on the same day, in which

the President clarified that Section 15, Article 7 only pertained to executive

appointments, and appointments to the judiciary were governed by specific

constitutional provisions (Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article 8). The President

reiterated his request for the JBC to transmit the final list of nominees for

the Court of Appeals vacancy.

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On May 8, 1998, the Chief Justice responded to the President, stating that

the Court perceived a serious question regarding the matter due to the

seemingly conflicting constitutional provisions. Section 15, Article 7 did

not specify which appointments it proscribed, and thus, it was to be

interpreted as applying to all appointments of any kind and nature. The sole

exception was for "executive positions," where temporary appointments

could be made to prevent harm to public interest and safety. According to

the Chief Justice, it was evident that the prohibition under Section 15 of

Article 7 encompassed appointments to positions within the judiciary. He

emphasized the necessity for further study to resolve the seeming

inconsistency between Section 15, Article 7, and Sections 4(1) and 9 of

Article 8. Consequently, he requested the JBC and the President to refrain

from any action on the matter while the conflicting constitutional

provisions were referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate

resolution.

On May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received the appointments of

Valenzuela and Vallarta from Malacañang. To avoid potential constitutional

conflicts, the Chief Justice refrained from taking action on these

appointments. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court determined

that: (1) pending the proceedings and deliberations on the matter, and until

further orders, no action should be taken on the appointments of Hon.

Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta, which should be held in abeyance without

effect, and the appointees should refrain from taking their oath of office;

and (2) the JBC was instructed to defer all action on the nominations to fill

any vacancies in the Supreme Court until further orders. The documents of

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the appointments for Valenzuela and Vallarta were retained in the office of

the Chief Justice.

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1998, the Court required Mateo A.

Valenzuela to explain the authority under which he had taken his oath as

judge of Branch 62 of RTC of Bago City on May 14, 1998. Valenzuela

explained that he did so because he received a copy of his appointment

from Malacañang on May 7, 1998.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not during the period of the ban on appointments imposed

by Section 15, Article 7 of the Constitution, the President is nevertheless

required to fill vacancies in the Judiciary, in view of Section 4(1) and

Secion 9 of Article 8 of the same Constitution.

(2) Whether or not the appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were valid.

Ruling:

(1) No, Section 15, Article 7 of the Constitution stipulates that "Two

months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the

President's term, a President or Acting President shall not make

appointments, except for temporary appointments to executive positions

when prolonged vacancies would harm public service or jeopardize public

safety." This provision appears to conflict with the provisions in Sections

4(1) and 9 of Article 8, which outline the President's duty to promptly fill

vacancies within the judiciary.

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In resolving these apparent contradictions, the Supreme Court ruled that the

appointment ban specified in Section 15, Article 7 should be considered the

general rule. During the period of this ban, the President is neither obligated

to make appointments to the judiciary nor permitted to do so. Sections 4(1)

and 9 of Article 8 simply require the President to fill judicial vacancies

within the designated timeframe unless expressly prohibited by Section 15,

Article 7.

(2) No, the appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were made during the

appointment ban period. While filling vacancies in the judiciary serves the

public interest, this case does not present any compelling reasons to justify

making these appointments during the ban period. As a result, the

appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were deemed void.

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