You are on page 1of 3

INDUSTRY

Enhanced Ground Proximity


Warning Systems Evolve,
Provide Greater Safety
B y K i m W i o l l a n d

I
n 1978, the FAA extended the tems based on specific CFIT accident “look-ahead” capability as well as
ground proximity warning system history, and for good reason. The sys- advanced aural and visual warnings.
(GPWS) requirement to Part 135 tem advancements were many dur- These advancements resulted in con-
operators with 10 or more passenger ing these early years, and soon the flict predictability and improved the
seats. Based on subsequent National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
reports since then, further amendments
One would think the geometric altitude provided
were made in 1992 to FAR 135.153, by the GPS alone would be sufficiently accurate,
which required GPWS equipment to but it is blended with other air-data signals to
be installed on all turbine-powered air- confirm its real-time accuracy.
craft with 10 or more passenger seats.
Following a Learjet controlled
flight into terrain (CFIT) accident in enhanced ground proximity warning crew’s warning time, by 20 seconds in
1994, the NTSB made further recom- system (EGPWS) evolved. some cases, over earlier scenarios. The
mendations that all turbojet-powered, The enhanced version features digi- EGPWS was a substantial improve-
U.S.-registered airplanes equipped tal terrain mapping techniques (nearly ment over the earlier GPWS technol-
with six or more passenger seats have a form of terrain navigation) paired ogy.
an operating GPWS. There has been with three-dimensional GPS infor- As stated in Advisory Circular 23-
a consistent push for these safety sys- mation, which gives this system a 18, the FAA adopted a broader term

Figure 1

38 avionics news • july 2007


for this safety system, “terrain aware-
ness and warning system”(TAWS), in
anticipation of broader follow-on sys-
tems. In 1998, the FAA issued a notice
proposing all turbine-powered, U.S.-
registered type-certificated airplanes
with six or more seats be equipped
with a TAWS system (mandated by
March 2005).
The TAWS is available as Class A
or Class B; passenger-seating capac-
ity dictates which version is installed.
The advancements in systems technol-
ogy and reduction in component sizes
(less than 2 pounds in some cases) has
facilitated the migration of these sys-
tems to even smaller aircraft types.
As a result of the system’s enhance-
ments, CFIT accidents have been
reduced substantially for aircraft with Figure 2
these systems. In January 2007, the
Flight Safety Foundation reported The geometric altitude uses a calcu- monitoring aircraft position, ground-
there were fewer commercial aviation lation based on pressure altitude, GPS speed and altitude, must continuously
accidents in 2006 than in the preceding altitude, radio altitude, groundspeed, look ahead of the aircraft to determine
year. None of the accidents involved a roll angle and position, along with if there will be a conflict with the ter-
TAWS-equipped aircraft. terrain and runway elevation data to rain elevation and the required clear-
In 2005, commercial jets were reduce any errors induced by altim- ance envelope protecting the aircraft.
involved in five CFIT accidents, and eter mis-sets and non-standard altitude If a conflict does arise, the EGPWS
none of the five aircraft were TAWS- conditions (the pressure gradient is not can be programmed to “pop-up” a
equipped. This is important to note as linear). terrain map on the compatible radar
more aircraft are filling the skies each One would think the geometric indicator or multi-function display.
year. The situational awareness and altitude provided by the GPS alone Depicted in Figure 2, we can see
safety margin this system provides would be sufficiently accurate, but it the Honeywell horizontal look-ahead
can’t be overestimated. is blended with other air-data signals mode and how it weighs decision-
This safety-of-flight system has to confirm its real-time accuracy. With making.
transferred information once again the geometric altitude computed, the There were two areas of concern
from the terrestrial domain onto the system can operate through extreme EGPWS was focused specifically: “No
aircraft, thus offering less reliance on temperature and pressure variations as Warning,” a scenario in which the
the systems and people below. The is typical on long commercial legs. aircraft was configured to land but
EGPWS computer must provide a This corrected true height is illus- ended up landing short of the run-
situational awareness of the surround- trated in Figure 1 as it relates to terrain way threshold; and “Late Warning”
ing terrain and obstacles to alert the elevation (msl). This extremely accu- or “Improper Response,” scenarios in
crew in a timely manner. The com- rate, multi-sourced altitude determina- which the crew gets behind the aircraft
puter requires an accurate geometric tion, in concert with known airport in a busy environment.
altitude compatible with the elevation elevation numbers from the database, As a solution to resolve the “No
and terrain data in the database. This produces a high level of confidence in Warning” scenario, EGPWS intro-
ensures confidence in the forward- the separation of the aircraft from an duced the terrain clearance floor (TCF)
looking capability and minimizes any anticipated terrain conflict. function, as the Honeywell diagram
nuisance warnings. The terrain alerting algorithms, while Continued on following page

avionics news • july 2007 39


EGPWS
Continued from page 39

Figure 3

illustrates in Figure 3. This provides times given to the crew. The fact this
protection when the aircraft is in the system is predictive by design says
landing configuration and might be it all — the capability for advanced
landing short or under a no-runway warnings are there.
scenario. This feature adds an increas- The extensive Kalman filtering of
ing terrain clearance envelope around multiple sensor inputs provides for an
the destination runway to prevent pre- accurate picture of any conflict with the
mature descent rates (such as landing terrain below and ahead of the aircraft.
short). The envelope should provide The aircraft’s speed will determine
adequate clearance for a typical three- the look-ahead distance the computer
degree glide path. evaluates to permit timely warnings to
The system’s database knows the the pilot. As the aircraft turns, so does
exact runway location and elevation; the area scanned, and any subsequent
therefore, it can predict a safe descent loss of radar altimeter information will
profile. If the aircraft were to penetrate not degrade the system.
the alert envelope shown, an aural There is a second mode of opera-
warning and conflict alerts would be tion, reactive ground proximity warn-
generated. Knowing exact location ing (RGPW). In this mode, the system
and elevation of the airports and run- relies more heavily on the radar altim-
ways through database sourcing, as eter and barometric altimeter readings,
well as latitude/longitude sensing, has rather than the terrain database. This
substantially improved the level of RGPW mode would be used only if
safety this system provides over the the aircraft was flying outside the ter-
earlier GPWS. rain database area or if the standard
The TCF function will significantly predictive mode was unable to provide
reduce CFIT accidents, as data has a solution.
shown the majority of these accidents EGPWS can keep the crew and pas-
have occurred near airports. sengers safe from terrain conflict. As
The advancements in predictability reports have confirmed, when EGPWS
and the look-ahead feature of EGPWS is onboard an aircraft, the chances of a
have made great strides in the warning CFIT accident are rare indeed. q

40 avionics news • july 2007

You might also like